Dried Up, Sold Out

How the World Bank’s Push for

Private Water Harms the Poor
On the Cover

A Tanzanian woman gathers water for her A river in El Alto, Bolivia, is contaminated A Bolivian citizen protests private control
family. Photo by Food & Water Watch. with blood from a slaughterhouse. Photo of city water. Photo courtesy of Red VIDA.
courtesy of Red VIDA.

About Food & Water Watch

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the corporate control and abuse of our food and water resources by empowering people to take action and by transforming
the public consciousness about what we eat and drink. Food & Water Watch works with grassroots organizations around
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able manner, and public, rather than private, control of water resources including oceans, rivers and groundwater.

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Dried Up, Sold Out
How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor

Table of Contents
iv Executive Summary

PART ONE: The World Bank and Water Privatization: A Failed Development Model
1 Introduction
2 Who Owns the World Bank?
2 World Bank Conditionality: With Strings Attached
2 Millenium Development Goals: A Lack of Political Will
3 Why Water Privatization Doesn’t Work
4 The Problem with World Bank Policies on Cost Recovery
5 The Many Forms of Water Privatization
5 Pricing Water: What Is Fair and Just?
6 Has the World Bank Admitted the Failure of Water Privatization Policies?
7 Water Privatization — The Real Cost of Failed Policies: Case Studies
7 La Paz & El Alto, Bolivia: No Water for the Poor
8 Guayaquil, Ecuador: Environmental and Public Health Catastrophes
9 Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania: Global Water Corporation Biwater Sues Heavily Indebted Country
10 Jakarta, Indonesia: Rising Consumer Water Rates and Corrupt Business Deals

PART TWO: Analysis of Current World Bank Loans and Policies

11 Section A: World Bank Finances Global Water Corporations
11 International Finance Corporation (IFC)
12 IFC Water and Sanitation Projects, 2000-2008
13 The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
13 MIGA’s Water and Sanitation Projects
14 The Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF)
15 Manipulating Public Opinion: PPIAF Project in Malawi
15 Citizen Groups Ask Their Governments to Stop Funding PPIAF
15 The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
16 Water Cases Filed with ICSID
16 Section B: World Bank Water & Sanitation Loans Still Push Privatization
17 Other Problematic Issues
17 Regional Summary of World Bank Water and Sanitation Portfolio, 2004-2008
18 Conclusion
19 Appendix: World Bank Water Supply & Sanitation Loans, 2004-2008
29 Endnotes
Executive Summary
Most people in the United States are accustomed to turning on the faucet and seeing safe and healthful water stream forth.

But take a trip into the developing world, and one often finds that the tap is dry. Indeed, literally billions of people in
developing countries have no access to water and sewer services. And for those who do, the quality ranges from poor to
downright dangerous.

Various international institutions and governments have long been laboring to right this injustice. Unfortunately, their
approach has veered off track in the last few decades. Rather than sticking to the proven path of publicly funded water
systems, the World Bank and other international financial institutions and governments have been promoting private
control and ownership of water services. They claim this will lead to greater efficiency, improved management and more
investment.

It hasn’t happened. This report, Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor,
shows that increased private sector participation has not made up for reduced public investment in water systems in
developing nations. As a result, people there have had to make do with less or no water.

All that said, this trend can be reversed. The World Bank and other institutions can revert to their original course of
promoting investment in public water and sewer systems that ensure the health and vitality of people all around the globe
for generations to come.

Key Findings
• Numerous international goals for getting water to poor countries have gone unmet.

• Because of dangerous water quality and lack of improved sanitation, gastrointestinal diseases such as diarrhea
and intestinal parasites are the leading cause of illness and death throughout the developing world.

• Corporate pressure has caused international institutions and national governments to decrease public investments
in water provision, causing a simultaneous increase in private-sector profits.

• Rather than focusing on guaranteeing access to clean and affordable water, the World Bank has promoted
measures that will cost consumers more money for water.

• Although the messages are mixed, evidence suggests that some in the World Bank are gradually seeing the
problems with private control of water.

• Case studies from Africa to Indonesia to Latin America illustrate the flawed logic of water privatization and why
now is the time to promote publicly owned and controlled water.
 Part One
The World Bank and Water Privatization:
A Failed Development Model

A public water tap in Tanzania. Photo by Food & Water Watch.

Introduction

D uring the latter part of the 20th century the World Bank, other international finan-
cial institutions and donor governments turned away from funding public water
systems and instead focused on promoting privatization of water services. They did
this with the belief that private sector involvement would lead to greater efficiency,
improved management and private investment in the expansion of infrastructure. The
World Bank substantially cut its investment in the water sector, and these reductions
were far greater than the actual investments made by the private sector.1 As a result,
poor countries received billions of dollars less for investment in water.

In sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and East Asia (exclud-
ing China) only 600,000 new water connections have
been made as a result of private sector investment.2 In
sub-Saharan Africa, 80 percent of the major water priva-
tization contracts have been terminated or are the subject
of disputes between the public authorities and the private
operator over levels of investment.3 In Latin America, all
of the high profile privatizations from those in Bolivia to
Argentina have failed.
Because of the well-documented failure of privatization,
many people are perplexed about why the World Bank and
other international funding agencies are continuing to pur-
sue this failed experiment. An investigation of the history
of the policies demonstrates it is largely driven by political
pressure from business interests in the developed coun-
tries that fund and govern the bank. Creating an attractive
investment climate for politically powerful economic
interests has, unfortunately, become as important a goal as
providing water services.
The World Bank is using the enticement of new loans, new
investment and modern technology to persuade developing
country governments to privatize their water systems. It
has even used the compelling moral imperative of meeting
the Millennium Development Goals as a reason to privatize
water systems.4 The private sector will provide the invest-
ment, the World Bank says, to do what governments were
unwilling or unable to do — connect more than a billion
people to water and sanitation, thus helping to meet the
development goals.
Unfortunately, the social cost of this strategy has been
very high to those who continue to suffer without adequate
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor
access to water and sanitation. Another lost decade in the
struggle for decent water and sanitation services has meant
that as many as 5 million people now die annually from
preventable water-related diseases, mostly children.5,6 The
cost of lack of access to decent water and sanitation services
also includes women and children toiling long hours toting
water to their homes. Children, especially girls, often are
Who Owns the World Bank?
The World Bank is a public international institution with
185 member governments. The governance structure of
the World Bank allots the greatest percentage of voting
power to the countries with the largest economic shares
or capital subscriptions. The five largest shareholding
countries appoint their executive directors to the World
Bank Board. These countries are the United States,
Japan, Germany, France and the U.K. Other countries
are grouped together, usually in regional groupings, and
elect one country to represent them on the Board. The
five largest shareholding countries have the following
percentage of the vote:
United States...............................................16.41%
Japan............................................................7.87%
Germany.......................................................4.49%
France...........................................................4.31%
United Kingdom.............................................4.31%
Source: World Bank website at www.worldbank.org.
See sections on Board of Directors and Voting Power.
World Bank Conditionality: With
Strings Attached
The World Bank typically requires certain actions to be
taken by country governments either before a loan is
approved or in the course of the loan or project imple-
mentation. This is commonly known as “conditionality.”
Typical conditions can include requiring a government
to privatize its state-owned companies, reducing trade
barriers to foreign imports, cutting back state expen-
ditures, or implementing new legislative or regulatory
initiatives. The World Bank’s imposition of controversial
conditions on borrowing governments, such as drasti-
cally cutting public services or charging high user fees,
has been heavily criticized over the years as a violation
of national sovereignty and as an undemocratic way to
push governments to impose policies that often have
substantial consequences on people and the environ-
ment. See sections on Board of Directors and Vot-
ing Power.
2
kept out of school to perform these tasks. Families must
pay a high percentage of their small incomes in order to
buy water (in bottles or from tanker trucks) because they
don’t have piped water in their homes.7 Each day, mothers
are forced to make impossible decisions about whether to
use the scarce family income for safe water, food, clothing,
school fees or health care. These are the real costs of the
World Bank’s water privatization policies.
The widespread practice of dumping human excrement and
other toxic waste into waterways, often straight into the
water that local populations rely upon, is having a devastat-
ing effect on human health. Ninety percent of wastewater in
developing countries is discharged untreated directly into
rivers, streams and other local water bodies,8 which creates
widespread environmental crises. The regulation of indus-
trial waste is as important a goal in providing safe drinking
water as the provision of water services.
While a large, well-organized water justice movement has
emerged and is affecting the World Bank’s policies, it is
time for the World Bank to admit its past mistakes and
reverse its strategy. It is imperative that the World Bank,
as a leader in the international development community,
enable developing countries to create strong public utili-
ties that provide drinking and sanitation systems. It also
should promote a regulatory environment that prevents
toxic pollution of waterways and encourages good resource
management.
Millennium Development Goals:
A Lack of Political Will
United Nations agencies, with the participation and leader-
ship of the most powerful countries of the world, have spent
almost three decades setting goals for universal access to
water and sanitation services.
But the goals have never been met. The UN declared
1981-1990 as the International Drinking Water Supply and
Sanitation Decade, with the aim of providing safe drink-
ing water and adequate sanitation systems for all people by
1991. This goal was not met. In 1990, the United Nations
World Summit for Children called for universal access to
water and sanitation services by 2000. This goal was not
met either. In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals
set the objective of reducing by one-half the number of
people without access to safe drinking water and basic
sanitation by 2015. These goals are much less lofty. They
step back from the goal of universal access by seeking only
to reduce the number of people without access by one-half.
Nevertheless, the World Health Organization stated in
 Food & Water Watch

2005 that it is very unlikely that the development goal on

basic sanitation will be met.9

It is already clear that sub-Saharan Africa will not be able

to meet the goal of halving the population without access to
safe drinking water.10 So it is highly unlikely, given the weak
financial commitments and failed policies of national gov-
ernments and international aid agencies such as the World
Bank, that the Millennium Development Goals for water
will be met. According to the Pacific Institute, even if the
official goals for water are met and the population without
access is reduced by one half, still as many as 32 million
people will die by 2020 from preventable water-related
diseases.11 This is an outrage. It should not be considered
acceptable by the international community.

Worse yet, the development goals don’t take into account

water pollution and its effects. According to Maude Barlow
in her book, Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and
the Coming Battle for the Right to Water, the World Bank
and United Nations seem to assume that “there is enough
water for everyone without seriously addressing the mas-
sive pollution of surface waters…”12

Barlow writes:

“In the last half-century, the human species has pollut-
ed surface waters at an alarming and accelerating rate.
The world may not exactly be running out of water,
but it is running out of clean water. Ninety percent of
wastewater produced in the Third World is discharged,
untreated, into local rivers, streams and coastal waters.
As well, humans are now using more than half of ac-
cessible runoff water, leaving little for the ecosystem or
other species.”13
With so much of the surface water polluted, people have
turned to mining groundwater that most likely never
will be recharged by the natural cycle of evaporation and
precipitation.
“To deal with this vast pollution and the resulting ef-
fect of reduced clean water supplies, farms, cities and
industries all over the world are turning to ground-
water sources, using sophisticated technology to drill
deep into the Earth and pull up ancient aquifer water
for daily use. This is a second piece of the ‘running
out’ puzzle. We are taking water from where it is ac-
cessible — in aquifers and other groundwater sources
— and putting it where it gets used and lost, such as in
mass irrigation of deserts, to make cars and comput-
ers, or to produce oil from tar sands and coal methane
beds where it becomes polluted or actually lost to the
hydrologic cycle.”14
The atrium of the World Bank in Washington, D.C. Photo by Doug Clayton,
Stock.xchng.
Why Water Privatization Doesn’t
Work
It has been widely argued that water is part of the global
commons. Water should be considered a public good or a
public trust, with local management guided by the commu-
nities within each watershed. This is a compelling argu-
ment from an environmental and social justice perspective.
However, regardless of the philosophical arguments about
the water commons, the facts speak for themselves. Water
privatization has been a commercial failure in most coun-
tries across the world — even in developed countries like
the United States and France.
Private water companies have been unable to meet obliga-
tions to shareholders, to provide a market rate of return
and also to meet their obligation to maintain and expand
the water system and to provide acceptable quality water at
affordable prices. Private sector companies are organized
to make profits, not to fulfill socially responsible objectives
such as achieving universal access to water and sanitation
services. In most developing countries, the water and sani-
tation system infrastructure desperately needs new invest-
ment. Such investment has not kept pace with population
growth, and large sectors of the low-income population

3
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor
A broad coalition of non-profit organizations protest the World Bank at its
annual meeting in Washington, D.C., in 2002 with a “Trojan horse.” Photo
courtesy of Public Citizen.
remain unserved. However, private companies have little
incentive to address the need to expand access to potable
water when large sectors of the population are poor and
unable to pay “market rates” for piped water. Private com-
panies put shareholders first and low-income water users
have suffered as a result. The World Bank’s water privatiza-
tion experiment has revealed the commercial failure of the
privatization model.
There have been two responses to the commercial failure of
water privatization. First, many major corporate water con-
glomerates, including Suez and Veolia, began to withdraw
from these failed water privatization experiments during
the last decade. In January 2003, Suez unveiled a new “ac-
tion plan” designed to rescue the corporation from its debt
problem and to chart the path back to profit. A key action
item was the plan to reduce by one third the company’s
exposure in “emerging countries.”15 Suez withdrew from
water privatization concessions in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil
and the Philippines, among others.16 In Manila, Buenos
Aires and other cities, the companies discovered there were
limits on how far government regulatory structures would
succumb to corporate demands.
Even weak regulatory bodies created to partner with corpo-
rate interests had limits in their political ability to burden
4
consumers with continuous rate hikes in order to compen-
sate for currency de-valuations or other corporate misfor-
tunes.17 Several of the major water conglomerates decided
to back away from the water privatization experiment and
move more of their investments to telecommunications and
energy ventures.
The second response to the commercial failure of water
privatization was a concerted campaign on the part of
international financial institutions such as the World Bank,
as well as governments and corporations, to reduce the cor-
porate risk involved in water privatization ventures. New
forms of privatization contracts were developed, such as op-
eration and management contracts where the private com-
pany has no investment requirements and received a set fee
for its services, regardless of revenue collection. The World
Bank and other international financial institutions, guided
by ex-International Monetary Fund Managing Director
Michel Camdessus, proposed new credit, risk insurance and
guarantee programs (subsidized with public tax dollars that
fund the World Bank, IMF, export credit agencies and mul-
tilateral banks) to protect the earnings of the global water
companies in risky markets.18 These programs are designed
to enable private companies to have a prominent role in the
delivery of water and sanitation services.
The Problem with World Bank
Policies on Cost Recovery
Access to clean and affordable water and sanitation services
are essential to public health. They should be a basic right
for all. Providing water services usually requires pipes,
treatment plants and chemicals and can be quite costly. But
who should pay? What are fair and just policies for pric-
ing water services? The World Bank focuses on increased
cost recovery, which means charging consumers more for
water. This tends to place a heavier burden on poor and
low-income people. It is unfair and unrealistic to expect
people who make a dollar or two a day to choose between
clean water and other essential needs like food, health care
or education. The alternative to increased cost recovery is
to use the taxation system to provide financial resources for
water services, either from within the country or through
international agencies from donor governments.
The social contract — The “social contract” is an unwrit-
ten agreement between citizens and democratic govern-
ments that taxpayer dollars will be used to provide public
funding for essential services such as education, health
care, roads, and water and sanitation services. With a pro-
gressive tax structure, expenditures for these basic services
can ensure that income is redistributed for the benefit
of all. When taxpayer money is used to provide essential
 Food & Water Watch

The Many Forms of Water Privatization

The World Bank has attempted to use a semantic maneuver to soften its promotion of water privatization. The Bank
claims that the term privatization should only refer to a permanent full-asset sale of a water utility. There are many dif-
ferent forms of water privatization that transfer some subset of the activities of the water utility to a private company
for a stated period of time. The World Bank prefers to use the term Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) or Private Sector
Participation (PSP). Below is a chart that shows some of the different forms of water privatization.
Source of Control over Investment in Length of Control over
company income tariff structure infrastructure contract assets
Operation/ Fee for service Remains with Responsibility Varies. Usually Remains with state
Management contract state remains with state shorter than lease
or concession
Lease/Concession Company derives Private company Private company 10-30 years Remains with state
revenue from user with state takes partial
fees oversight responsibility
Full asset sale Company derives Private company Private company Permanent Private company
revenue from user with state takes full gains assets
fees oversight responsibility

public services, the fees can be low or non-existent, and the

services are available and affordable for all. Unfortunately, Pricing Water:
this social contract has eroded in many countries around What Is Fair and Just?
the world. Nevertheless, the principle of prioritizing the use
of taxpayer dollars or public money for basic services such Pricing water to reduce Pricing water to
as health care or water and sanitation should be asserted by the burden on low- increase the burden on
citizens and upheld by governments. income people low-income people

World Bank policies have not upheld this principle. They Taxpayer funding: the Full cost recovery:
have focused on increased cost recovery — increasing government uses taxpayer raises consumer water
consumer water rates — as a principle mechanism to fund dollars to provide water fees to cover the
water utilities. Many World Bank loans have requirements and sanitation services cost of operation and
maintenance.
that pressure governments to implement increased cost
recovery and raise consumer water rates. (See the box Water lifeline: a basic Pre-paid meters: new
“Pricing Water” at right for current figures.) The World minimum amount of water technology that requires
Bank argues that developing countries are too poor to pro- is provided for free or at a upfront payment. Cuts off
vide public monies for water and sanitation services. They very low cost. household water when
believe that consumer fees for services should cover the payment is due.
full cost of operating and maintaining the water utility.19 In
some cases, the Bank has argued that consumer fees should Cross-subsidies: High connection
wealthier water users fees: raises barriers to
also cover capital costs — the costs of building and expand-
subsidize low-income connecting to the piped
ing the water service infrastructure. The truth is that the users, industry subsidizes network.
majority of citizens in developing countries are too poor for residential users, or urban
the governments NOT to provide public funding for these users subsidize rural
essential services. users.

The World Bank’s policy of increased cost recovery has high Free or affordable Special low-income
social costs. When piped water becomes more expensive connection fees: this programs: after
and therefore less accessible, women and children, who ensures that those outside water rates become
the piped network will unaffordable to the poor,
bear most of the burden for daily household chores, must
have access. low-income residents
travel farther and work harder to collect water. The higher must wade through
cost of piped water often will drive people to resort to water bureaucratic obstacles
from polluted streams, rivers or hand-dug wells. This in- and stigma to become
creases the risk of water borne diseases, including diarrhea, “eligible” for special
cholera and parasites. programs.

5
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor

Has the World Bank Admitted

the Failure of Water Privatization
Policies?
Understanding the World Bank requires separating its pub-
lic statements and research publications from actions — the
loans, projects and policy prescriptions they promote. The
World Bank is an enormous institution with many depart-
ments and a large staff of people who want to do the best
they can to alleviate poverty in an institution that is subject
to the vagaries of the political process in the United States
and other countries. As a result, the different arms of the
World Bank often engage in rhetoric and actions that are
contradictory to each other.

For example, during the World Bank’s annual Water Week

in Washington, D.C. in May 2008, Bank vice president
Kathy Sierra asserted that privatization was not “the only
answer” — there needed to be a full spectrum mix of public-
private investments. Only a few days earlier, senior World
Bank official Shekhar Shah reported in New Delhi that the
Bank had “learned the hard way” that it was not correct to
leave water to the private sector.20

However, a statement by Lars Thunell, head of the Bank’s

private-sector arm the International Finance Corporation,
at World Water Week in Stockholm in August 2008 shows
that the Bank is still committed to promoting private sector
water provision: “We believe that providing clean water and
sanitation services is a real business opportunity.”21
The IFC has just created a new $100 million fund, called
IFC Infraventures, to provide risk capital for early stage
development of infrastructure projects in developing coun-
tries and also to encourage more public-private partner-
ships.22 The Infraventures fund can be viewed as a renewed
drive to promote private sector opportunities in infrastruc-
ture — especially energy (oil, gas, electricity) and water-
related projects. Rather than address the serious problems
stemming from the failed water privatizations of the past,
the IFC is moving forward with business as usual.
and expansion of much-needed water and sanitation
infrastructure. But now the World Bank’s Public Private
Infrastructure Advisory Fund (PPIAF) states there have
been “no clear investment gains” from private sector par-
ticipation in the water sector.23 The World Bank’s Water &
Sanitation department concludes that:
Finding new sources of finance will be critical to expanding
access to urban water supply and sanitation (WSS). Present
investment towards the water Millennium Development
Goals is only half what is needed. Public finance will con-
tinue to be the main source of funding WSS investments.
Private financing has accounted for less than 10 percent of
investment in WSS over the last decade.24

It is clear that the World Bank has not made a formal ad-
mission of its failed water privatization policies, nor has the
institution acknowledged the serious costs incurred by this
hoax in the lives of billions of people who continue to lack
access to water and sanitation. However, there has been an
acknowledgment by the World Bank that privatization or
public-private partnerships (the World Bank’s preferred
euphemism) does not bring new private sector investment.
Many developing country governments were enticed by
privatization due to the World Bank’s initial claims that pri-
vate companies would actually invest in the rehabilitation
It is important that the World Bank has admitted that
the privatization model does not bring new private sector
investment. However, the Bank has not begun to acknowl-
edge the other aspects of the privatization failure. These
include (1) the failure to expand services to the poor, (2)
environmental and public health catastrophes, (3) legal
quagmires and new debt burdens for governments, and (4)
skyrocketing consumer water rates. Below are four short
case histories of World Bank financed water privatizations
that highlight these aspects of the failed privatization poli-
cies and show the real costs — from the perspective of those
without access to basic water and sanitation services.

6
 Food & Water Watch

Water Privatization — The Real Cost
of Failed Policies: Case Studies
1. La Paz & El Alto, Bolivia: No Water for the
Poor
In the mid-1990s, the Bolivian government received a large
loan from the World Bank to prepare the public water
utilities in its three largest cities for sale to the private sec-
tor. The loan also stipulated that the government should
create a new institutional and regulatory framework that
would protect the interests of consumers and create a free
market economy.25 In 1997 the municipal water utility that
serves the neighboring cities of La Paz and El Alto was
auctioned off in a 30-year concession contract to the only
bidder, Aguas del Illimani, a company involving Bolivian
and Argentinean capital, with majority control held by the
French multinational Suez.26
Most local residents in La Paz and El Alto were not very
happy with the performance of the public provider, which
offered sporadic service and never expanded to include
the poorest neighborhoods. However, they were even less
impressed with Aguas del Illimani. Over the seven years of
the concession contract, there were scattered protests by
residents over the inadequate water services. The poor and
indigenous neighborhoods in the sprawling outskirts of
El Alto were consistently excluded from water services. In
January 2005, the simmering dissatisfaction culminated in
protests, a general strike and road blockages that idled traf-
fic between the two cities of La Paz and El Alto. A federa-
tion of neighborhood and community councils, FEJUVE,
raised the following grievances:
basic human right to clean and affordable water. Bolivian
President Carlos Mesa feared that popular and indigenous
protest would destabilize the country and bring down his
government — a fate suffered by several predecessor gov-
ernments. He agreed to cancel the privatization contract on
January 12, 2005.
Since Mesa made this promise, the government dragged
its heels looking for a way to cancel the contract without
prompting an international lawsuit. Under the terms of
the contract, Illimani has the right to sue for damages in
international court should the contract be terminated in
a “unilateral” manner.29 Facing pressure from FEJUVE,
the government commissioned an independent audit of
the company’s investment activities over its eight years of
service (1997-2005).
The auditors found that Aguas del Illimani was paying at
least US$1 million per year to Suez for management fees,
money which could not count as its “investments.” The
auditor also found that Illimani systematically failed to re-
spect local environmental laws and had been dumping raw
sewage into the Rio Seco river, the river that flows directly
into Lake Titicaca. Suez falsely claimed that it had invested
US$63 million to expand water and sanitation infrastruc-
ture in La Paz-El Alto. However, an auditor determined
that the entire net fixed assets of the company were only
US$22 million.

• More than 200,000 residents were excluded from

the “served area” as defined in the concession con-
tract. This left about one-fifth of the urban popula-
tion without piped water. The excluded residents
were forced to purchase more expensive water from
vendors, drill their own wells or collect rainwater
— solutions that contributed to a proliferation of
water-borne diseases.27
• Another 80,000 were excluded from service be-
cause they simply could not afford the cost of a new
connection. To get water and sewerage connected
to a home in La Paz or El Alto, it cost US$450, the
equivalent of almost 9 monthly salaries working at
minimum wage.28

FEJUVE called for an indefinite civil strike and demanded

the cancellation of the water concession contract to Aguas
del Illimani. Thousands of residents of El Alto responded to
the call and took to the streets to demand access to decent Drinking water for a school in El Alto, Bolivia. Photo courtesy of Claudia
water services. They were tired of being excluded from the Lopez.

7
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor

The auditor also discovered that the company should have

been fined at least US$6 million by the government regu-
lator for failing to meet the promised expansion targets
for potable water in the cities of La Paz and El Alto.30 In
November 2006, when Suez finally disbanded its opera-
tions in La Paz and El Alto, Bolivian fiscal authorities
calculated that the company left behind approximately $20
million in debt — a burden that will rest on the backs of
Bolivian citizens — a country that already carries a heavy
debt burden (46 percent of GDP) and where 40 percent of
the population lives in extreme poverty. The privatization
experiment in Bolivia left a bitter legacy.

2. Guayaquil, Ecuador: Environmental and

Public Health Catastrophes

In October 2000, a Bechtel subsidiary, Interagua, signed a

30-year concession contract to run the water and sanitation
services in Guayaquil, Ecuador. The U.S.-based company
Bechtel had recently been thrown out of Bolivia due to a
scandalous water privatization in the city of Cochabamba.31
To better protect its investments this time around, the com-
pany requested a special package of political risk insurance
from the World Bank. The World Bank’s specialized insur-
ance arm, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA), provided Interagua with an $18 million invest-
ment guarantee.32 The Ecuadoran government also received
US$40 million from the Inter-American Development Bank
to promote the privatization process.33
Problems surfaced shortly after the Bechtel subsidiary came
to town. Lack of investment in storm drainage resulted
in many residents suffering health effects and structural
damage to their homes by the constant flooding. In 2002,
the press reported that the company was only treating 5
percent of the sewage and dumping the rest, including fecal
material and domestic and industrial waste, directly into
the river.34 The health department began to issue reports in
the press documenting health problems that children were
experiencing in communities to the north of the city, such
as Acuarelas del Río and Guayacanes, due to their proxim-
ity to ongoing release of sewage into waterways. The health
problems included skin, respiratory and gastric problems
such as chronic rashes, asthma and diarrhea.35
Serious health problems resulted from the pollution of
drinking water by flooding and dumping of sewage and
other waste. The most serious health crisis ensued in 2005
when more than 150 children contracted hepatitis A from
drinking dirty tap water. The outbreak was concentrated
around the western suburbs of Guayaquil — a community
where 76 percent of residents described their water as tur-
bulent and foul-smelling and 74 percent compared its smell
Open canals for wastewater in Guasmo, a neighborhood of Guayaquil,
Ecuador. Photo courtesy of Observatorio Ciudadano de Servicios Públicos.
to feces. Interagua denied responsibility for the outbreak,
but subsequent studies confirmed that it was a combination
of the disrepair of the school infrastructure, the inadequacy
of the sewage system in the area, and the poor water quality
that contributed ultimately to the outbreak of hepatitis A.
Investigations by the Commission for Civic Control and the
Public Defender’s office concluded that the poor service by
Interagua had contributed to the hepatitis A outbreak and
in October 2005 they declared the water “not fit for human
consumption.”36
The public health was also compromised by repeated and
ongoing residential water cutoffs for up to 36 hours at a
time. Citizens groups organized to try to put an end to
this practice, given that the concession contract required
Interagua to provide an alternative source of water if a
cut-off lasted longer than 24 hours.37 In addition to general
water cutoffs, there has been an 180 percent increase in the
price of water during the last six years, which has contrib-
uted to an increased problem of residential water cutoffs
due to inability to pay.38 Citizens groups are seeking reso-
lution of these problems through a variety of legal means,
including a case before the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights.39

8
 Food & Water Watch

The future of Interagua is uncertain. Bechtel recently sold
90 percent of its shares in Interagua to another private
company. At the same time, a quiet democratic revolution is
taking place in Ecuador, rooted in the activism of the indig-
enous population. This citizens’ revolution is rewriting the
country’s constitution and has included a clause, Article 318,
that states that water must be a public good or a community
holding — rather than a commodity that can be bought and
sold by private companies. How this slowly brewing conflict
will be resolved in Ecuador remains to be seen.
3. Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania: Global Water
Corporation Biwater Sues Heavily Indebted
Country
Tanzania, one of the poorest countries in the world and
categorized by the World Bank as a “heavily indebted
poor country,” was pressured by the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund to reduce its government
expenditures and address its debt problem by privatiz-
ing infrastructure and public services.40 In Tanzania less
than 40 percent of the rural population and 70 percent
of the urban population have access to piped water.41 The
rest of the population must buy water at expensive rates
from tanker trucks or private vendors or seek water from
untreated sources. Women and children often walk up to
15 kilometers to fetch water of dubious quality. Cholera
outbreaks are common.
also included raising water prices without substantial im-
provement in services, so angered Tanzanian government
officials that they decided to deport the top three Biwater
executives in May 2005.45 Biwater retaliated by hitting
Tanzania with lawsuits in both the British High Court and
the World Bank-based International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes, claiming compensation for ‘future
lost profits’ of $20-25 million.46
Nevertheless, the poorest areas in the outskirts of Dar es
Salaam were not even included in the water privatization
contract. Biwater constructed the water services contract
to ensure maximum profitability and minimum invest-
ment. This meant that large areas of the city, the poorest
neighborhoods where new pipes needed to be laid to bring
water to households, were exempted from the privatiza-
tion contract. 47 The contracts to provide water services for
these so-called “unprofitable areas” were given to charitable
and non-profit organizations. More than £250,000 was
spent by Adam Smith International on a communications
and media strategy which included a video with a song in
Swahili saying: “Our old industries are dry like crops and
privatization brings the rain.”48
“Biwater never performed under the contract,” says Mussa
Billegeya, staff for the Tanzania Association of NGOs. “They
were supposed to increase revenue, but couldn’t collect
the water fees. They didn’t even pay the lease fee to the

Pressured by their desperate need for World Bank loans,

in August 2003, the Tanzanian government contracted
with City Water, a joint venture of Biwater Gauff Ltd. and
a Tanzanian company, Superdoll Trailer Manufacturers
Limited, to run the water and sanitation system in Dar es
Salaam.42 The water privatization was part of a larger array
of policies promoted by the World Bank as a requirement
for access to new loans and debt relief. Tanzania received
a World Bank loan of US$61.5 million in 2003, which
required the country to pass enabling legislation, raise
water rates through increased cost-recovery and prepare for
privatization of water.43 Aid money from the British govern-
ment also facilitated the water privatization project. The
British Department for International Development paid
Adam Smith International more than £500,000 to provide
advice to the Tanzanian government on how to implement
the water privatization and counteract resistance by citi-
zens’ organizations.44

Less than two years later, City Water’s 10- year contract to
run Dar’s water system was terminated by the government
of Tanzania on the grounds that the company had made
less than half the required investment and was not meeting
the targets in the contract. The company’s behavior, which
Informal water vendors pull small carts with jugs full of water through
poor neighborhoods in Tanzania, where few residents are on a water
pipeline. Photo by Food & Water Watch.

9
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor
government. They owed around $3.5 million to the gov-
ernment in 2005. They did not contribute to a collection
fund, which was meant to connect the poorest people. They
were fulfilling almost none of the requirements in their
contract.”49
The contract was clearly a failure from the start. However,
when the Tanzanian government attempted to extricate
itself from this policy failure by terminating the water
privatization contract, it was unprepared for the legal
backlash unleashed by City Water and its parent company,
Biwater. Biwater sued the government of Tanzania twice
— once in the British High Court under United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law rules and once in
the World Bank-based International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes.50 The government was left scram-
bling to develop a legal strategy, pay hefty legal fees to
international lawyers and take over the management of the
city water services.
In January 2008, in a victory for the Tanzanian govern-
ment, the tribunal decided that Biwater should pay $8 mil-
lion in compensation to Tanzania. But it remains unclear
if the government of Tanzania will be able to collect the
millions in damages awarded to it as Biwater is seeking to
use its corporate structure to avoid liability. In contrast to
the first ruling, in July 2008 the World Bank’s ICSID panel
ruled in favor of Biwater, but refused to grant the company
any compensation for damages. Biwater continues to say
it will not pay the $8 million awarded to Tanzania in the
British High Court case — an amount sufficient to connect
50,000 people in Dar es Salaam to the water system.51
4. Jakarta, Indonesia: Rising Consumer
Water Rates and Corrupt Business Deals
The leading roles in the water privatization drama in
Jakarta are played by the global water companies Suez and
Thames, officials and consultants from the World Bank
and key business partners within the Suharto dictator-
ship. In the early 1990s, the World Bank provided a $92
million loan for water infrastructure and began advising
the Suharto government to privatize its water system.52
Under Suharto’s dictatorship, doing business in Indonesia
meant partnering with a local firm. And the Suharto family
controlled most local companies, so both Suez and Thames
formed alliances with local Suharto-related businesses. In
1997, after protracted negotiations, the Suharto govern-
ment awarded 25-year privatization contracts to a Thames
partnership with Sigit Group (controlled by Suharto’s eldest
son, Sugit Harjojudanto) and a Suez partnership with the
Salim group.53
10
“How dare the government
increase the water tariff! Every
morning when all people need
water, it does not come out.”
– Ibu Ratih
The following year, the entire political landscape shifted
dramatically due to the downfall of Suharto and the Asian
financial crisis. Fearful of protest in the streets, major
company executives from Suez and Thames fled to the
safety of Singapore. After intensive lobbying and interven-
tion by British and French officials regarding the impor-
tance of not “breaching the contract,” the companies were
allowed to return. Since Suharto had fled the country and
the former president’s family and business partners were
targets of public anger, Thames and Suez agreed to buy
out the local shares of their business operations in order to
remove the tarnish of the Suharto family connections.54
New contract negotiations were finally concluded in 2001
and included an automatic tariff adjustment mechanism
based on a complex formula and set to take effect in 2005.
From 1998 to 2005 the consumer water tariff increase had
already been approximately 227 percent.55 During this time
the companies needed permission from the city council and
governor to increase water tariffs. However, beginning in
2005 the new tariff adjustment was to take place automati-
cally every 6 months. Today, the current average water
tariff in Jakarta is approximately 7,000 Rupiah or about
75 U.S. cents per cubic meter, which is already the highest
among similar cities in the Southeast Asia region.56 If priva-
tization continues on schedule for the next 14 years, until
2022, there could be 28 more automatic tariff increases.
According to the People’s Coalition for the Rights to Water,
even those lucky enough to have piped water in their homes
cannot rely on the service because there is often no water
flowing through the taps or the quality of the water is not
suitable for human consumption. Ibu Ratih’s family, for
example, pays a monthly water bill to the private company
but often has to purchase bottled water from another small
enterprise 2 kilometers away in order to have clean and safe
water. They sometimes pay $US30 to $US50 every month
to buy water even though they are paying for the piped wa-
ter that they cannot use.57 Ibu Ratih is very angry about the
water tariff increases. “How dare the government increase
the water tariff! Every morning when all people need water,
it does not come out,” she said.58
 Food & Water Watch
Part Two
Analysis of Current World Bank
Loans and Policies

Women wash clothes using discharge water from a water treatment plant in Bolivia. They live in the same neighborhood as the plant but did not have
access to clean water until international activists helped the community lobby for one public faucet. Photo courtesy of Red VIDA.

P art II of this report reviews the current loans, projects and policies of the World
Bank from 2004 to 2008. We have analyzed the extent to which the World Bank is
continuing to promote water privatization and cost recovery policies. The World Bank
continues to grow in scope, with many arms tasked with mandates that are, at times,
conflicting. Some arms of the World Bank are tasked with giving money to govern-
ments. Other arms give money to private corporations. Section A of the report will ex-
amine the loans, projects and policies of the institution that deal with private corpora-
tions. Section B will analyze the departments of the World Bank that provide assistance
to governments.

Section A: World Bank Finances The International Finance Corporation (IFC)

Global Water Corporations
But Still No Water for the World’s Poor
There are four branches of the World Bank that have been
especially important in providing money and support ser-
vices for multinational corporations — including the largest
global water companies. They are the International Finance
Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency, the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory
Facility59 and the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes. Each of them has played an impor-
tant role in promoting privatization.
The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was cre-
ated as a new branch of the World Bank in 1956. The IFC’s
creation marked a significant turn in World Bank policies.
The World Bank is an international organization owned
and managed by governments. It was originally created
to provide low-interest loans to its member governments.
However, with the creation of the IFC, the World Bank
expanded its mission to include providing loans to private
corporations. The founding president of the IFC, Robert L.
Garner (prior CEO of General Foods Corporation), opened
his inaugural press conference on July 25, 1956, by saying
that the IFC was the first inter-governmental organiza-
tion to have as its main objective the promotion of private
enterprise.60

11
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor
Today, more than 50 years later, the IFC’s annual report
states that they provided $16.2 billion of new private sec-
tor investments in 2008.61 The report states that the IFC
is “creating new opportunities for people to break free
from poverty and improve their lives.” 62 But the pie graph
illustrating the distribution of the IFC’s billions by sector
shows that 40 percent of the investments were provided to
“Global Financial Markets.”63 Unfortunately, as the current
economy demonstrates, this is not the type of investment
that helps people break free from poverty.
IFC Water and Sanitation Projects, 2000-2008
Types of IFC Financing $ to the four largest water
multi-national corporations
IFC equity investments $36.8 million
% 42.4%
IFC credit guarantees $44.6 million
% 45.9%
IFC loans $176 million
% 80%
TOTAL IFC investments $257.4 million
% 48.7%
Source: IFC Projects Documents Search at: www.ifc.org/disclosure
12
IFC investments in the water and sanitation sector show
some similar problems. Between 2000 and 2008, the IFC
proposed or approved US$528.9 million for water and
sanitation projects. Approximately $257.4 million of this
money, almost 50 percent, went directly to projects financ-
ing the four largest European-based multinational water
companies (Veolia, Suez, RWE and Biwater). World Bank
officials will say that these multinational corporations were
provided IFC financing because they were best able to do
the job. However, it is important to note that these large
water corporations do extensive lobbying with the most in-
fluential governments at the World Bank. They have their
own lobbying arm, the International Federation of Private
Water Operators, with offices opposite the European
Commission headquarters in Brussels.64
The IFC provides a variety of financial services to private
corporations. These include basic loans, credit guarantees
and equity investment (where the IFC buys shares in the in-
vesting water company). Historically, the IFC has provided
loans only to private sector companies. Recently it began
to provide a few public sector loans, which made up about
15.6 percent of the IFC water portfolio from 2000-2008.
However, as one might guess, the majority of IFC loans,
about 80 percent, have gone to the four largest multina-
tional water companies. A very large percentage of the
credit guarantees also went to the four largest multinational
water companies, about 45.9 percent. And about 42 percent
of IFC equity investments were made in the four largest
multinational water companies.
IFC equity investments have been highly controversial due
to the potential conflict of interest they generate. It can
be very problematic when a government is getting loans
from one arm of the World Bank while it is the host country
for a private company in which another arm of the World
Bank owns shares. Then, to further complicate the matter,
when a conflict between the government and the company
develops, it is very common that the privatization contract
$ to other private $ to public sector TOTAL
corporations
$50 million 0 $86.8 million
57.6% 0 100%
$30 million $22.5 million $97.1 million
31% 23.1% 100%
$115 million $54 million $345 million
33.4% 15.6%
$195 million $76.5 million $528.9 million
36.8% 14.5% 100%
 Food & Water Watch

MIGA’s Water & Sanitation Projects

Year Country Company Amount Insurance Type Project
2001 Ecuador International Water US$18 million Expropriation, war & Water supply services
Services (Bechtel) civil disturbance
2004 Russian Federation WTE Wassertechnik US$51.75 million Expropriation & breach Water supply & treatment
of contract
2004 China Darco Environment US$7.1 million Transfer restriction, Water supply & treatment
expropriation, war and
civil disturbance
2004 China Compagnie General des US$70 million Expropriation Water supply
Eaux
2005 Russian Federation WTE Wassertechnik US$56.4 million Expropriation & breach Water treatment
of contract
2006 China Compagnie Generale US$40 million Expropriation Water & wastewater treat-
des Eaux ment
2006 Jordan Suez US$4.1 million Breach of contract Wastewater treatment
2007 China Golden State Water US$2.32 million Expropriation Water supply
Group Corp.
2007 China Darco Environment US$7.56 million Expropriation Water treatment plant
Source: MIGA Projects Database at: http://www.miga.org/projects/index_sv.cfm

requires arbitration by a third arm of the World Bank
(International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes). This might sound like the plot of a cheap thriller
novel, but it is a surprisingly common situation that has
taken place in Argentina, Bolivia and Tanzania, to name a
few. (See “Water Cases Filed with ICSID” on page 16 for
details.)
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA)
In 1988, yet another arm of the World Bank, the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) was
founded to provide exclusive services to the private sec-
tor. The agency’s stated mission is to “promote foreign
direct investment to help support economic growth, reduce
poverty and improve people’s lives.”65 The central service
provided by MIGA is political risk insurance for companies
investing in developing countries. The political risk insur-
ance provided by MIGA protects investors from losses that
could be caused by expropriation, war and civil disturbance,
breach of contract and currency transfer restrictions.66
Water privatization can be a very politically risky invest-
ment. Citizens view water as a common good, a public
trust — not as a commodity that can be bought and sold.
For this reason there is often heated domestic opposition to
water privatization projects and policies. In 2000, a mas-
sive number of citizens rose up in Cochabamba, Bolivia
against the water privatization policies of the U.S.-based
company Bechtel. Following this incident, MIGA developed
a package of political risk insurance for another Bechtel wa-
ter privatization in Guayaquil, Ecuador. Since then, MIGA
has provided political risk insurance for eight other water
privatization projects. Five of these projects, or about 56
percent of all MIGA’s water privatization projects, are based
in China. MIGA has provided a total of US$257.23 million
in political risk insurance for water privatization projects.
US$126.98 million, about 50 percent, has gone to Chinese
projects. In addition, more than half of MIGA’s political
risk insurance for water privatization, US$132 million, has
gone to just three multinational water companies; Suez,
Compagnie Generale des Eaux (now Veolia) and Bechtel.
Historically, developing country governments have used
certain tools such as nationalization (also known as ex-
propriation) or currency controls (also known as currency
transfer restrictions) to try to ensure that more of the
benefits of foreign investment stay in the host country.
However, these policies do not make for an “attractive in-
vestment climate” for corporations and are heavily discour-
aged by the World Bank. With help and support from the
World Bank, corporate investors have developed a variety
of mechanisms to protect their investments and ensure the
flow of profits to shareholders. However, what is consid-
ered an “attractive investment climate” for foreign inves-
tors often includes a lack of sufficient environmental and
social protections. For this reason, foreign investment can
be very controversial and provoke political instability, civil
disturbances and even war. In recognition of the conflict
and social instability that foreign investment often causes,
MIGA developed a package of political risk insurance to
protect foreign investors.

13
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor
The Public Private Infrastructure Advisory
Facility (PPIAF)
In 1999 the World Bank created a special new office called
the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF).
The mission of PPIAF is to convince governments that
private sector involvement in water, energy, transporta-
tion and telecommunications will improve performance
and efficiency and bring new investment and technological
improvements to their countries.67 PPIAF is managed by
the World Bank, but most of its funding comes from the
United Kingdom, with smaller amounts from Japan, the
World Bank itself and 11 other countries, primarily from
the European Union. The United States and the Asian
Development Bank make small contributions as well.68
Much of the work of PPIAF is focused on funding consul-
tants to provide technical advice to developing country
governments on how to implement privatization projects.
The “advice” provided includes pressuring governments
to implement the regulatory and legal reforms that private
corporations find most conducive to insuring adequate
returns to their shareholders.69 PPIAF resources are used
to promote “public private partnerships” as the solution to
increasing efficiency and improving performance in what
is usually underfunded and crumbling infrastructure in
developing countries around the world.70 But PPIAF has
not proven to be committed to expanding access to clean
and affordable piped water for low-income people. Rather,
its goal is to create new opportunities for private sector
involvement (new profit streams for private corporations)
in infrastructure development around the world.
However, given the track record of failure that has clouded
water privatization projects, even the PPIAF literature
has been forced to admit that there are serious problems
with private sector participation in water infrastructure.
The September 2006 PPIAF newsletter, Gridlines says:
“Enthusiasm has been replaced by doubts.”71 The newsletter
goes on to say, “the investment boom of the late 1990s has
been followed by declining investment flows and the can-
cellation or distress of several high-profile projects.”72 Latin
America was the initial guinea pig for many of the high-
profile water privatizations. To date, much of the impact
of the failed water privatization projects has been suffered
by people in the Latin America region and especially in the
country of Argentina. The PPIAF newsletter explains the
situation in Latin America like this:
“Indeed, its private water activity came largely to a
standstill in 2005 with only four small projects award-
ed. The drop in private activity appears to be a direct
result of a backlash against utility concessions, which
had been the favored scheme for introducing the pri-
vate sector in the region.”73
14
Water rights activists protest at the 3rd World Water Forum held in 2003
in Kyoto, Japan. Photo by Food & Water Watch.
Despite this “backlash,” it is clear that the advice and
consultation services provided by PPIAF are designed to
promote the interests of private sector companies. The
consultation services do not provide developing country
governments with an objective array of options for upgrad-
ing, improving and expanding their water delivery and
treatment services. Genuine, open-minded and indepen-
dent consultation on all approaches to water utility reform
would have to include options that do not merely promote
new roles for private companies. Many other models exist
that are based on partnerships with a wide range of public
entities, community groups and non-profit organizations
— local, national and international. Any serious discussion
about how to expand and improve water and sanitation
services for low-income people would need to include a full
range of options.
Indebted developing country governments are usually des-
perate for new sources of finance for infrastructure proj-
ects. While PPIAF’s advice and consultation services may
have previously taken advantage of this desperation when
promoting private sector interests, the recent research pa-
pers by PPIAF make it very clear that private companies do
not bring increased investment to water sector projects.74
Other important research on the topic has reached similar
conclusions.75 It is very significant that PPIAF itself is ad-
mitting that the public-private partnership model does not
bring new investment. In its recent report PPIAF notes that
“…political leaders sometimes rashly promised that greater
private investment in utility services would lead to vastly
greater investment...”76 In the section of the report titled,
“no clear investment gains,” the PPIAF report concludes:
“For lease and management contracts, particularly relevant
for water and sanitation, there is generally no investment
 Food & Water Watch
obligation for the private party, and the results suggest that
the public asset-holding company does not increase invest-
ment even if PSP brings operational improvements. For
concession contracts, there is no conclusive evidence that
investment increases.”77
Perhaps the conclusion that private sector participation
does not increase investment, as well as the track record of
Manipulating Public Opinion: PPIAF
Water Project in Malawi
The World Bank has been pushing water privatization
in Malawi since 2000. A total of four World Bank water
supply loans have been approved during this time, to-
taling more than US$107 million.80 These loans financed
technical studies, institutional and regulatory reform in
the sector and a communications strategy all designed
to push forward the water privatization project. Howev-
er, the privatization process in water and other utilities
has been delayed. The World Bank states that this is
because:
“Over time, the levels of resistance to the program
increased as people took the view that there was
no consultation taking place between the [Privatiza-
tion Commission] and its stakeholders.”81
Due to this resistance, the World Bank amended its
original plans and funded a communications strategy
and a public awareness campaign.” The World Bank
loan attempted to manipulate public opinion by “funding
media (television, radio and press) programs targeted
at specific stakeholder groups, such as members of
parliament, trade unions, employees and state-owned
enterprises and civil society.”82
This was followed by a PPIAF project in 2007 that
granted the government an additional US$149,550 for
“in-depth public opinion research to design a communi-
cations strategy to ensure two-way communication and
participation of the urban water sector. The findings of
this qualitative and quantitative research were used “to
better understand the opinion and attitudes of consum-
ers around water sector reform.”83
When this didn’t yield the desired result, PPIAF granted
the Malawi government yet another loan in 2008 for
“stakeholder consultation and public awareness building
activities for the key policy makers,” as well as work-
shops on private sector participation and advisory sup-
port to Malawi’s urban water sector reform activities.84
Despite eight years of ongoing attempts to manipulate
public opinion in Malawi, the citizenry is still extremely
skeptical of the water privatization project and it is un-
clear if the project will be able to move forward.
failed water projects, has made it more difficult for PPIAF
to convince governments to implement water privatiza-
tion projects. This may explain why in at least 16 countries,
PPIAF has funded projects to “build consensus” for water
privatization.78 Building consensus refers to activities that
promote the benefits of privatization or particular privatiza-
tion options and attempt to persuade skeptical members of
governments, legislatures, business, trade unions, civil soci-
ety and citizens that privatization is in their interests. This
is also referred to by PPIAF as “stakeholder engagement”
and “strategic communication.”79 A typical example of this
manipulation of public opinion is taking place in Malawi.
(See “Manipulating Public Opinion” at left.) Other PPIAF
projects focus on reforming laws, the regulatory environ-
ment and institutions to make them friendlier to private
sector investment. In total, PPIAF has funded 31 projects
since its inception in 1999 in countries such as Afghanistan,
the Congo, Colombia, Mozambique, Malawi and Mongolia.
Citizen Groups Ask Their Governments to
Stop Funding PPIAF
In May 2007 more than 138 civil society groups and trade
unions from 48 countries urged their governments to with-
draw support for the World Bank’s PPIAF.85 The organiza-
tions said that water, like air, is so essential to life that ac-
cess to it is a human right, and water should not be treated
as a commodity.
In an open letter, the organizations stated that the bias of
the World Bank’s Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory
Facility, PPIAF, towards private sector “solutions” to water
access represents a poor use of aid money.86 In February
2007 the Norwegian government announced that it would
not support PPIAF in the future because it no longer be-
lieved the agency increased access to water for the poor.87
The Italian government followed with a similar announce-
ment in May 2007.88 The European Commission said it
would also review its contributions to PPIAF and the civil
society groups vow to continue the pressure on their gov-
ernments to cut PPIAF’s funding.
The International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID)
The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID), a practically unknown part of the World
Bank, was founded in 1966. ICSID is an international
dispute mechanism used by foreign investors to take legal
action against governments when privatizations or other
projects fail and profits are lost.89 The more economi-
cally powerful governments around the world have always
sought new mechanisms to protect the economic interests
15
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor

of their major corporations abroad. Foreign investors filed with the World Bank’s ICSID. (See “Water Cases Filed
argued that domestic court systems in the developing with ICSID” below.) They have all been filed by large global
countries did not provide adequate protection for their in- water and energy companies including Suez, Biwater,
vestments. The World Bank agreed to set up a new dispute Vivendi, Bechtel and Enron. The Bechtel case was settled
mechanism, arguing that a new international arbitration out of court. Five of the seven cases were filed against the
system would help to promote increased flows of interna- government of Argentina.
tional investment.90 ICSID was structured by the World
Bank in a manner that provided grandiose new powers to
multinational corporations. This branch of the World Bank Section B: World Bank Water
enables foreign corporations to sue sovereign states directly & Sanitation Loans Still Push
for monetary compensation.
Privatization
Water privatization, as previously mentioned, has provoked
social instability and generated conflict between govern- A grassroots water justice movement emerged in the late
ments, their citizens, and the private company. Host gov- 1990s that linked activists fighting privatizations on the
ernments can be easily intimidated when investors threaten ground in developing countries with activists in the devel-
lawsuits against them. Powerful corporations often enlist oped world. This water movement has documented and
the support of their home country officials to resolve their publicized the abuses — forcing the World Bank and other
investor disputes. For example, the Bush administration international finance institutions to react. As a result, the
recently broke off free trade negotiations with Ecuador good news is that World Bank water supply and sanitation
when the Ecuadoran government canceled a contract with (WSS) loans that push privatization and cost recovery are
Occidental Petroleum. Occidental Petroleum retaliated on the decrease.
with an ICSID claim.91
In this section of the report we have analyzed the World
To understand the imbalance of power, it is important to Bank’s WSS loans to governments between 2004 and 2008.
remember that it is not unusual for the revenues of a multi- A similar study conducted by Public Citizen94 from 2000
national corporation to exceed the GDP of a small develop- to 2003 showed that about 94 percent of World Bank WSS
ing country. Corporations that rank in the top 500 globally loans promoted privatization and about 93 percent promot-
make up more than 20 percent of all ICSID claims.92 About ed increased cost recovery.95
42 percent of ICSID cases involve the services sector (water,
electricity, telecommunications and waste management).93 In our research for this report we have found that between
To date, there have been seven water privatization cases 2004 and 2008 approximately 52 percent of projects (78
projects totaling $5.9 billion) promoted some form of priva-
tization. The private sector involvement in WSS projects
Water Cases Filed with ICSID included loans with the stated objective of obtaining private
sector investment, increasing private sector participation in
Claimant Parent Defending
Company Country
the water and sanitation sectors, or promoting outsourcing
to the private sector.
Azurix Corporation Enron Argentina
Bechtel, Aguas del Tunari Bechtel Bolivia
Approximately 64 percent of WSS projects (93 projects
Biwater Gauff, Limited Biwater Tanzania
totaling $7.2 billion) promoted some form of cost recovery,
Suez, Sociedad General Suez Argentina
which results in impoverished people spending a large por-
de Aguas de Barcelona,
Interagua
tion of their income on water services. Projects promoting
cost recovery included recovery of operation and mainte-
Aguas Cordobesas, Suez, Suez Argentina
Sociedad General de nance costs, tariff adjustment, subsidy reduction, increas-
Aguas de Barcelona ing the commercialization of public water utilities and full
Suez, Sociedad General Suez Argentina cost recovery.
de Aguas de Barcelona,
and Vivendi Between 2004 and 2008, the World Bank spent approxi-
Compania de Aguas de Vivendi Argentina mately $9.5 billion in loans to fund 157 water supply and
Aconquija and Vivendi sanitation projects in more than 70 countries. (See box on
opposite page for regional breakdown and Appendix I on
Source: ICSID cases listed on website at: http://icsid.world- page 19 for detailed loan information.) During this time,
bank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&action
Val=ListCases WSS projects funded by the World Bank shifted away
from concession contracts and toward more operation and

16
 Food & Water Watch
management contracts and outsourcing. Public utilities
were urged to become commercial operations with private
sector management contracts. Many projects included
provisions calling for the restructuring of public utilities,
turning them into more autonomous bodies governed by
a corporate board, with shareholders from both the public
and private sectors.
While World Bank WSS projects still have about 52 percent
promotion of privatization policies and 64 percent promo-
tion of cost recovery policies, this is a vast improvement
over the earlier part of the decade. We are pleased to see
that the global water justice movement has had a major
effect on World Bank policies. The World Bank is slowly
inching away from privatization policies and returning to
policies that emphasize greater support for public utilities.
It is important to note that the World Bank has not al-
ways promoted privatization as the answer to problems
in the water and sanitation sector. In fact, from the 1960s
through the 1980s, World Bank loans to developing coun-
tries focused on the creation and expansion of public water
utilities. In the 1960s and 1970s, the prescription of World
Bank economists and other development experts was that
investment in public utilities and other large infrastructure
projects would help trigger a development “take-off.” The
thesis was that “public utilities, accompanied by financial
stability and the encouragement of private investment,
would do more than almost anything else to trigger devel-
opment.”96 A return to these policies of supporting public
water utilities should be applauded and encouraged.
Other Problematic Issues
Our review of World Bank water supply and sanitation
loans revealed a number of other problematic issues. For
Regional Summary of World Bank Water and Sanitation Portfolio,
2004-2008
Region Total No. Total Cost of
of Projects Projects
Africa 47 $US2.1 billion
East Asia & Pacific 29 $US2.9 billion
Latin America & Caribbean 27 $US1.2 billion
Europe & Central Asia 20 $US1.3 billion
Middle East & North Africa 19 $US1.2 billion
South Asia Region 15 $US790 million
TOTAL 157 $US9.5 billion
Source: Compiled from review of Project Information Documents (PIDs) and Project Appraisal Documents (PADs) available
on the World Bank project database at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/
example, about 35 percent of the projects included the in-
troduction or expansion of water metering (55 projects to-
taling $4.3 billion). Water conservation is often used as the
reason for installing water meters in poor neighborhoods
in the developing world. However, poor households in
developing nations use a small amount of water compared
to people in rich countries and to industrial agriculture. For
example, one flush of a western toilet uses as much water
as the average person in the developing world uses for a full
day’s activities.97 The better route to solving water short-
age problems would be to regulate industry and large-scale
agriculture.
While there are certain situations where water meters can
improve the social equity and fairness of water pricing,
more often water meters tend to raise the price of water
for low-income people and increase the barriers to access-
ing clean and affordable water. Installing water meters is
extremely expensive and has been used in some situations
as a way to limit the number of people who are connected to
water systems. For this reason we are very concerned to see
such a large number of projects focusing on water meters.
In addition, a large number of the projects (62 projects to-
taling $5.4 billion) include involuntary resettlement, which
raises concerns regarding the potential loss of land and
housing for low-income communities and small farmers.
There are also serious problems in all World Bank loans,
water supply and sanitation loans included, with the high
percentage of project monies going to consulting services
located in the United States, the United Kingdom and other
developed countries. Too often the consultants are high-
paid technocrats associated with the World Bank and other
regional development banks. The consultancy services do
not provide a useful, independent or objective assessment
Average Project % Privatization % Cost Recovery
Size Promotion Promotion
$US45.6 million 50 percent 41 percent
$US86.3 million 68 percent 71 percent
$US44.4 million 70 percent 78 percent
$US65.9 million 42 percent 79 percent
$US65.4 million 56 percent 56 percent
$US52.9 million 27 percent 60 percent
$US60 million 52 percent 64 percent
17
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor
of the proposed project. Approximately 43 percent of WSS
projects included significant funds for consulting services.
Overall, these consulting services do not add any substan-
tial value to the project and they don’t make use of expertise
local to the nation in which the project is being developed.
Given the high cost of consultant services juxtaposed with
the serious needs for basic water and sanitation services, we
do not believe that consultant services are the best use of
WSS project monies.
Conclusion
The World Bank’s promotion of water privatization and
increased cost recovery has had very high costs for low-in-
come people around the world. These privatization policies
have failed to bring water services to those without, and
the private sector has not invested in expanding access to
clean and affordable water in the developing world. The
World Bank’s cost recovery policies have made water more
expensive and therefore less accessible—driving the world’s
poorest people to drink from polluted streams, rivers, or
hand-dug wells. The result has been an increase in eas-
ily preventable water borne diseases, including diarrheal
diseases, cholera and parasitic diseases.
The World Bank has not formally admitted the failure
of its water privatization policies, nor has the institution
acknowledged the serious costs incurred by this social
experiment that has affected the lives of billions of people
who continue to lack access to water and sanitation. But it
is clear that the global citizens movement has affected this
powerful institution’s policies.
From 2004 to 2008, the World Bank reduced the number
of water supply and sanitation loans that promote privati-
zation and increased cost recovery. This shows a slow but
important shift in policy back toward support of public
utilities. It is also very important that the World Bank has
now acknowledged that the privatization model does not
bring new private sector investment in water. Still, the
World Bank has not begun to acknowledge many serious
aspects of the water privatization failure, including the
failure to expand services to the poor, the environmental
and public health catastrophes, the legal quagmires and
new debt burdens faced by governments, and the impact of
rising consumer water rates.
In order to improve access to clean and affordable water,
World Bank water supply and sanitation loans should im-
mediately implement the following:
• Remove all loan conditions, implicit and explicit,
that promote or require private sector participation
18
or public-private partnerships in World Bank water
supply and sanitation loans;
• Remove all loan conditions, implicit and explicit,
that promote increased cost recovery by raising the
price of water for low-income people or creating
barriers to access to piped water services;
• Fully recognize the human right to water in
all World Bank policies related to water and
sanitation;
• Encourage loans that strengthen public-public
partnerships (PuPs) and support the participation
of citizens and community organizations in the
management and oversight of water services; and
• Prioritize projects that improve the public health
by expanding access to affordable water services in
low-income communities.
The World Bank should acknowledge that removing toxic
pollution from waterways is an important goal for develop-
ment. It should use its influence to:
• Encourage countries to regulate industrial waste;
• Take leadership at the international level to address
the problem of industrial and agricultural pollution.
Activists in the United States can hold our government
accountable for its failure to adequately address the lack
of access to clean and affordable water in the developing
world by:
• Educating yourself and others about the terrible
impacts of the lack of clean drinking water and
sanitation in developing countries;
• Lobbying your legislators to continue funding
the Paul Simon Water for the Poor Act of 2005
and to pass the Paul Simon Water for the Poor
Enhancement Act (to be introduced in 2009),
which will create high-level posts at the State
Department and USAID responsible for implement-
ing the Act;
• Lobbying your legislators to advocate that the
World Bank stop pushing poor countries toward
privatization of water and sanitation services.
Similarly, activists around the world can lobby their gov-
ernments to advocate that the World Bank stop pushing
poor countries toward privatization, and can demand that
government foreign aid agencies give clean water and sani-
tation the highest priority, protecting access to water as an
affordable public good and part of the global commons.
 Food & Water Watch

Appendix: World Bank Water Supply and Sanitation Loans, 2004-200898

 AFRICA REGION              
Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion
Water Sector Institutional Republic of Ministry of Energy and
Development Project Angola Water Angola 57 7/31/2008 YES YES

Ministry of Local
Community Based Rural De- Government, Rural
velopment Project Supple- Government of Development and
mental Ghana Environment Ghana 22 6/26/2008 NO NO
RCI – Emergency Urban Republic of Ministry of Urban
Infrastructure (FY08) Cote d’Ivoire Development Cote d’Ivoire 90 6/12/2008 NO NO
Tana & Beles Integrated MOFED,
Water Resources Government of Ministry of Water
Development Ethiopia Resources Ethiopia 45 5/29/2008 YES NO
Multi-Sectoral Water and
Electricity Infrastructure Government of
Project Burundi REGIDESO Burundi 50 5/13/2008 YES YES
Ministry of
Kampala OBA Water Water and National Water and
Connections for the Poor Environment Sewerage Corporation Uganda 3 5/1/2008 NO NO
Cameroon Water Affermage Camwater (National project project
– OBA for Coverage Government of Asset-Holding Public document not document not
Expansion Cameroon Company) Cameroon 5 5/1/2008 available available

Water and Sanitation Nairobi Water Services

Service Improvement Republic of Board (WSB), Coast
Project Kenya WSB, Lake Vic WSB Kenya 150 12/20/2007 YES YES
Government of Ministry of Finance, project project
Blue Nile Start-Up the Blue-Nile Government of the document not document not
Emergency Project State Blue-Nile State Sudan 7.32 12/3/2007 available available
LR-Agriculture &
Infrastructure Development Government of Ministry of Public
Project Liberia Works Liberia 37 7/31/2007 NO NO
Senegal Sanitation – Sup-
porting Access to on-site Office National De
sanitation services through Government of L’ Assainissement
OBA scheme in Senegal Senegal (ONAS) Senegal 7.7 7/6/2007 NO YES
Ghana Small Towns Water
Supply & Sanitation Government of Community Water and
Additional Financing Ghana Sanitation Agency Ghana 10 6/21/2007 YES NO
Mozambique Water Private Fundo de Investmento project project
Sector Contracts – OBA for e Patrimonio de Ab- document not document not
coverage expansion FIPAG stencimento de Agua Mozambique 6 6/19/2007 available available
CAR – Emergency Urban Central
Infrastructure Rehabilitation Central African Ministry of Public African
& Maintenance Republic Works Republic 18 5/24/2007 YES NO
EPPR – Consolidation Phase project project
– Maritime GA#090493 – Republic of document not document not
LICUS Ref. No. 58 Togo AGAIB Maritime Togo 0.89 5/16/2007 available available
Poverty Reduction Emer- project project
gency Program – Savanes Republic of AGAIB – SAVANES document not document not
and BNL Togo AND BNL Togo 0.42 5/16/2007 available available

19
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion
project project
EPPR – Consolidation Phase Republic of document not document not
– Savanes GA#090492 Togo AGAIB SAVANES Togo 0.89 5/16/2007 available available
Federal
Democratic
Urban Water Supply and Republic of Ministry of Water
Sanitation Project Ethiopia Resources Ethiopia 100 4/24/2007 YES YES
Government of
the Democratic Democratic
Emergency Urban and Social Republic of Republic of
Rehabilitation Project Congo TBD Congo 180 3/29/2007 NO NO
Second Phase Community
Based Rural Development Government of
Project Burkina Faso Ministry of Agriculture Burkina Faso 24 3/27/2007 NO NO
Government of Ministry of Urban
Urban Development Project Chad Development Chad 15 3/6/2007 YES NO
Government of
Water Sector Support United Tanzania
Project Republic Ministry of Water Tanzania 200 2/13/2007 YES YES

Freetown Water Supply Republic of Guma Valley Water

Rehabilitation Sierra Leone Company Sierra Leone 8.23 1/30/2007 YES YES
Government of Fonds D’Appui au
Additional Financing for the the Union of Developpement
Services Support Credit Comoros Communautaire Comoros 5 12/21/2006 NO NO
project project
Kenya Microfinance for Community document not document not
Water Services Project Water Projects K-Rep Bank Ltd Kenya 1.15 12/6/2006 available available
Ministry of
Rural Water Supply and Government of Cooperative and Rural
Sanitation Sudan Development Sudan 15 10/27/2006 NO YES
Government of Central project project
Licus grant in support of Central African African document not document not
CDD activities Republic COOPI Republic 2.7 10/10/2006 available available
Government of MLGH/Ministry of
Water Sector Performance the Republic of Energy and Water
Improvement Project Zambia Development/Utilities Zambia 23 10/5/2006 YES YES
Water Sector Project – Government of
Additional Financing Niger Ministry of Water Niger 10 7/18/2006 YES NO
project project
AGAIB Maritime – LICUS document not document not
Ref. No. 18 C, TF056809 AGAIB Maritime AGAIB Maritime Togo 0.43 6/22/2006 available available

Emergency Infrastructure Government of Ministry of Public

Project Liberia Works Liberia 30 6/20/2006 NO NO
Ministry Of Energy /
Multi-sector Infrastructure Government of EAGB / Ministry Of Guinea-
Rehabilitation Project Guinea-Bisseau Public Works Bisseau 15 6/15/2006 YES YES

Urban Infrastructure and Government of Ministry of

City Management Project Rwanda Infrastructure Rwanda 20 11/10/2005 YES NO

Second National Urban Government of Lagos State

Water Sector Reform Project Nigeria Government Nigeria 200 7/1/2005 YES YES

20
 Food & Water Watch

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion
Insufficient Insufficient
information in information in
AO-Emerg MS Recovery ERL Government of project docu- project docu-
(FY05) Angola Ministry of Planning Angola 50.7 2/17/2005 ment ment
Government of
Lesotho Water Sector Im- the Kingdom of Ministry of Natural
provement Project Lesotho Resources Lesotho 14.1 10/26/2004 YES YES

Local Development Program Government of Ministry of Land, Ur-

Support Project Chad banism and Habitat Chad 23 9/16/2004 NO NO
Ministry of Local
Community-Based Rural Government of Government and Rural
Development Ghana Development Ghana 60 7/29/2004 NO NO

Small Towns Water Supply Government of Water and Sanitation

and Sanitation Project Ghana Department of GWCL Ghana 26 7/27/2004 YES YES

Government of Ghana Water Corpora-

Urban Water Project Ghana tion Limited (GWCL) Ghana 103 7/27/2004 YES YES

Republic of Ministry of Energy and

Power and Water Project Sierra Leone Power Sierra Leone 35 7/1/2004 YES YES

National Urban Water Sector Federal Ministry Federal Ministry of

Reform Project 1 of Finance Water Resources Nigeria 120 6/15/2004 YES YES

Ethiopia Water Supply and Government of Ministry of Water

Sanitation Project Ethiopia Resources Ethiopia 100 5/11/2004 YES YES
Government of Ministry of Rural
Community-Based Rural Islamic Republic Development and
Development of Mauritania Environment Mauritania 45 4/20/2004 NO NO
Fonds D’appui Au
Government of Developpement
Service Support Credit Comoros Communautaire Comoros 13.3 3/13/2004 YES YES
Second National Water
Development Project – Government of Ministry Of Public
Supplemental Credit Mozambique Works And Housing Mozambique 15 2/26/2004 YES YES
41% of
50% of projects
projects promote
promote cost
 Total percentages           privatization recovery

 MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION 

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion

Additional Financing for

Third Social Fund for Government of Social Fund for
Development Project Yemen Development Yemen 10 6/26/2008 NO NO
GZ-North Gaza Sewerage The West
Treatment Plant Additional PLO for the Palestine Water Bank and
Financing benefit of PA Authority (PWA) Gaza 12 4/22/2008 YES YES

21
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion
The West
GZ-Gaza II Emerg Water PLO for the Coastal Municipalities Bank and
Add. Financing benefit of PA Water Utility Gaza 5 4/22/2008 YES YES
IQ-Emergency Community
Infrastructure Rehab Government of Ministry of Water
Additional Financing Iraq Resources Iraq 26 4/10/2008 YES NO
Integrated Sanitation & National Organization
Sewerage Infrastructure Government of of Potable Water and
Project Egypt Sanitary Drainage Egypt 120 3/20/2008 YES YES
Ministry Of Water
Rural Water Supply – Government of & Environment And
Additional Financing Yemen Governorate Level Yemen 20 1/15/2008 NO NO
CDR/Regional Water
Bekaa Emergency Water Government of Authority/Ministry of
Supply Project Lebanon Energy and Water Lebanon 15 3/20/2007 NO YES

Morocco Urban WS&S Government of Lydec, Amendis,

Access Pilots Morocco Radem Morocco 7 1/29/2007 YES YES
Office of the
Emergency Services Support President, Office of the project project
Program Multi-Donor Trust Palestinian President, Palestinian West Bank document not document not
Fund Authority Authority and Gaza 62 9/18/2006 available available
Rural Water Supply and
Sanitation Project ONEP ONEP Morocco 60 12/15/2005 YES YES
SONEDE with SONEDE (Societe
Government National d’Exploit &
Urban Water Supply Project guarantee Distrib. des Eaux) Tunisia 38.03 11/17/2005 YES YES

Gaza Water and Sanitation PLO for the Coastal Municipalities

Project 02 benefit of PA Water Utilities Gaza 20 6/7/2005 YES YES
Guilan Water And
Sewerage Comp. Islamic
IR-Northern Cities Water Government of (WWC) and the Republic of
Supply & Sanitation Project Iran Mazandaran WWC Iran 224 5/26/2005 YES YES
Emergency Community project project
Infrastructure Rehabilitation Government of Ministry of Water document not document not
Project Iraq Resources Iraq 20 12/10/2004 available available
project project
IQ-TF Emerg. Baghdad Municipality of document not document not
Water Supply Republic of Iraq Baghdad Iraq 65 12/3/2004 available available

Insufficient Insufficient
information information
Iq-Tf Emerg. Water, Municipality of in project in project
Sanitation & Urban Republic of Iraq Baghdad Iraq 90 12/3/2004 document document
IR-Ahwaz & Shiraz Water Islamic
Supply and Sanitation Islamic Repub- NWWEC and Ahwaz Republic of
Project lic of Iran and Shiraz Iran 279 5/25/2004 YES YES
RY-Social Fund For Republic of Social Fund For
Development III Yemen Development Yemen 60 2/26/2004 NO NO
56% of
56% of projects
projects promote
promote cost
 Total percentages           privatization recovery

22
 Food & Water Watch

 EUROPE AND CENTRAL ASIA REGION 

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion
Additional Financing for the Armenia Water and
Municipal Water and Waste The Republic of Wastewater Corpora-
Project Armenia tion (AWSC) Armenia 20 10/30/2008 NO YES
Regional and Municipal
Infrastructure Development Georgia Municipal
Project Georgia Development Fund Georgia 40 10/2/2008 NO YES

Belarus Water Supply and Republic of Ministry of Housing

Sanitation Project Belarus and Utilities Belarus 60 11/4/2008 YES YES
Second National Water Government
Supply and Sanitation of Republic of
Project Azerbaijan AzerSu Azerbaijan 260 5/27/2008 NO YES
Agency for Construc-
National Water Supply and Government of tion and Territorial
Sanitation Program Moldova Development Moldova 14 5/13/2008 NO YES

Rural Investment (AZRIP)

Project Additional Financing Azerbaijan ASDAPS Azerbaijan 15 3/27/2008 NO NO
Min. of Construction,
Architecture & Housing
Urban Infrastructure Project Ukraine & Communal Svcs Ukraine 140 8/23/2007 YES YES
Urban Infrastructure Bosnia- Ministry of Foreign
Additional Financing Herzegovina Trade Bosnia 5 6/19/2007 YES NO
Government of
the Republic of
Water Supply Project Azerbaijan AzerSu Azerbaijan 230 6/14/2007 YES YES
Sustainable Tourism
Development Project Serbia and Program Coordination
(Montenegro) Montenegro Unit (PCU) Montenegro 10 6/12/2007 NO NO
Additional Financing for the
Dushanbe Water Supply Government of The Dushanbe
Project Tajikistan Vodokanal Tajikistan 5 12/19/2006 YES YES
Community
Second Village Investment Development and Kyrgyz
Project Kyrgyz Republic Investment Agency Republic 15 8/3/2006 NO NO

Ministry of Ministry of Public

Municipal Services Project Public Finance Finance Romania 131.7 7/13/2006 YES YES
Municipality of
Municipal Infrastructure Government of Dushanbe and Other
Development Project Tajikistan Towns, Oblasts Tajikistan 15 1/19/2006 NO YES

Municipal Services Project Iller Bank Iller Bank Turkey 275 6/23/2005 NO YES
Ministry of Agriculture,
Water Management Bosnia and
Quality Protect GEF N/A  and Forestry Herzegovina 8.9 6/7/2005 NO YES
Ministry of
Yerevan Water and Waste- Finance and Yerevan Water and
water Project Economy Sanitation Company Armenia 20 2/24/2005 YES YES

23
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion
Government Ministry of Foreign
Urban Infrastructure & of Bosnia and Trade and Economic Bosnia and
Service Delivery Project Herzegovina Relations Herzegovina 20 7/8/2004 NO YES
Ministry of
Municipal Water and Finance and Armenica Water and
Wastewater Project Economy Sewerage Company Armenia 23 5/2/2004 YES YES
79% of
42% of projects
projects promote
promote cost
 Total Percentages           privatization recovery
               

 SOUTH ASIA REGION 

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion
project project
ARTF-Kabul Urban Recon- Governmentof Ministry of Urban document not document not
struction Project Afghanistan Development Afghanistan 5.6 6/13/2008 available available
Second Rural Water Supply Rural Wate Supply
and Sanitation Project – Ad- Government of and Sanitation Fund
ditional Financing Nepal Development Board Nepal 27 5/6/2008 NO YES

Government of Poverty Alleviation

Poverty Alleviation Fund II Nepal Fund Board Nepal 100 12/6/2007 NO NO
project project
Naandi document not document not
Naandi – India Foundation Foundation Naandi Foundation India 0.85 5/16/2007 available available
Sri Lanka: Puttalam Housing Government of Ministry of
Project Sri Lanka Resettlement Sri Lanka 32 2/20/2007 NO YES

Punjab Rural Water Supply Government of

and Sanitation India Government of Punjab India 154 12/14/2006 YES YES
Uttaranchal Rural Water
Supply and Sanitation Government of Government of Ut-
Project India taranchal India 120 9/5/2006 NO YES
Punjab Municipal Services
Improvement Project Government of
(PMSIP) Pakistan Government of Punjab Pakistan 50 6/1/2006 NO YES
Islamic Transi- Central Authority
Afghanistan Urban Water tional State of for Water Supply &
Sector Project Afghanistan Sewerage Afghanistan 40 5/25/2006 YES NO
Islamic Transi- Ministry of Rural project project
ARTF – Rural Water Supply tional State of Rehabilitation and document not document not
and Sanitation Project Afghanistan Development Afghanistan 5 12/15/2005 available available
Department
of Economic Ministry of Water
Hydrology Project Phase II Affairs Resources India 104.98 8/24/2004 NO YES

Bangladesh Water Supply Ministry of Local

Program Project Bangladesh Government Bangladesh 40 6/17/2004 YES YES

24
 Food & Water Watch

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion
Rural Water Supply
Second Rural Water Supply The Kingdom of & Sanitation Fund
& Sanitation Project Nepal Development Board Nepal 23.5 6/1/2004 NO YES
Karnataka Urban In-
Karnataka Urban Water Government of frastructure Develop-
Sector Improvement Project India ment Finance Corp. India 39.5 4/8/2004 YES YES
Community Development
and Livelihood Improvement Government of GEMI DIRIYA FOUN-
“Gemi Diriya” Project Sri Lanka DATION Sri Lanka 51 3/30/2004 NO NO
60% of
loans
27% of loans promote
promote cost
Total percentages            privatization recovery
               

 EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION 

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion

LA-Poverty Reduction Fund Lao Poverty Reduction

Project Lao PDR Fund Laos 15 7/8/2008 NO NO

LA-Khammouane Develop- Government of Office of the Governor,

ment Project Lao, PDR Khammouane Province Laos 9 (grant) 6/17/2008 YES NO
National Program for Com-
munity Empowerment in Republic of Ministry of Home
Rural Areas Indonesia Affairs Indonesia 231.19 5/20/2008 NO NO
East Meets
Vietnam Rural Water (East West Founda- East Meets West
Meets West) tion Foundation Vietnam 3 11/30/2007 NO YES
Thames Pam
Jaya; Pam Ly- Thames Pam Jaya;
Jakarta Water onnaise Jakarta Pam Lyonnaise Jakarta Indonesia 5 11/1/2007 YES YES

Manila Water Supply Manila Water Manila Water Philippines 1 10/19/2007 YES YES
China-Second Liaoning People’s
Medium Cities Infrastructure Republic of Liaoning Provincial
Project China Government China 173 6/26/2007 YES YES
Western Provinces Rural
Water Supply, Sanitation People’s
and Hygiene Promotion Republic of Sichuan and Shaanxi
Project China Provinces China 25 6/26/2007 NO YES

Mindanao Rural Develop- Government of Department of

ment Project – Phase 2 Philippines Agriculture Philippines 83.75 3/22/2007 YES NO
CN-Second Guangdong People’s
Pearl River Delta Urban Republic of
Environment Project China N/A  China 96 3/21/2007 YES YES
People’s
Second Shandong Republic of Shandong Provincial
Environment Project China Government China 147 2/27/2007 YES YES

25
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion
People’s project project
CN-GEF-Second Shandong Republic of Shandong Provincial document not document not
Environment Project China Government China 5 2/27/2007 available available
Socialist CITIES OF NHA
Coastal Cities Environmental Republic of TRANG, QUY NHON,
Sanitation Project Vietnam Vietnam DONG HOI Vietnam 124.7 12/19/2006 YES YES
project project
VANUATU - Utility Regula- Ministry of document not document not
tory Authority Finance Ministry of Finance Vanuatu 0.9 11/28/2006 available available
ID-Aceh-Infra. Reconstr BRR – Republic
Enabling Program (IREP) Of Indonesia BRR Indonesia 42 6/30/2006 NO YES
Third Water Supply and
Sanitation for Low Income Republic of
Communities Project Indonesia Ministry of Health Indonesia 137.5 6/27/2006 YES YES
People’s
Liaoning Medium Cities Republic of Liaoning Provincial
Infrastructure Project China Government China 218 6/27/2006 NO NO
People’s
Henan Towns Water Supply Republic of
and Sanitation China Province of Henan China 150 6/27/2006 YES YES
VN-Red River Delta Rural Socialist Ministry of Agriculture
Water Supply and Sanitation Republic of and Rural Develop-
Project Vietnam ment Vietnam 45.87 9/15/2005 YES YES
People’s
Shanghai Urban Environ- Republic of Shanghai Municipal
ment APL Phase 2 China Government China 180 7/5/2005 YES YES
Manila Third Sewerage Land Bank of Manila Water
Project the Philippines Company, Inc Philippines 64 6/21/2005 YES YES
Chongqing Small Cities People’s
Infrastructure Improvement Republic of Chongqing Municipal-
Project China ity China 180 6/21/2005 YES YES
MINISTRY OF HOME
Initiatives for Local Gover- Government of AFFAIRS, DIR.GEN-
nance Reform Project Indonesia ERAL OF REGIONAL Indonesia 29.5 6/9/2005 YES NO
project project
Dutch TF Grant – ID Water Government of Bank and Government document not document not
and Sanitation Program Indonesia of Indonesia Indonesia 6 2/10/2005 available available
Socialist Municipal and
Vietnam Water Supply Republic of Provincial Water
Development Project Vietnam Supply Companies Vietnam 112.64 12/21/2004 YES YES
Second Ulaanbaatar Ser- Municipality of
vices Improvement Project Mongolia Ulaanbaatar Mongolia 18 4/29/2004 YES YES
Ministry Of
Water Resources Assistance Government of Agriculture And Rural
Project Vietnam Development Vietnam 157.8 3/30/2004 NO YES
People’s
Zhejiang Urban Environment Republic of Zhejiang Provincial
Project China Government China 113 1/29/2004 YES YES
71% of
68% of projects
projects promote
promote cost
Total Percentages            privatization recovery

26
 Food & Water Watch

 LATIN AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN REGION 

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion

Sergipe State Integrated Secretariat of Planning

Project: Rural Poverty State of Sergipe – Pronese Brazil 20.8 11/23/2008 NO YES
Bage – RS Integrated
Municipal Development Municipality of
Program Bage Municipality of Bage Brazil 60 7/23/2008 NO YES
Nicaraguenese
de Acueducto y
Nicaragua Rural Water and Government of Alcantarillado Sanita
Sanitation Project Nicaragua Enacal EMP Nicaragua 20 6/12/2008 YES YES
Recife Urban Develop-
ment and Social Inclusion Municipality of
(CAPIBARIBE MELHOR) Recife Municipality of Recife Brazil 32.76 12/20/2007 NO YES
Lake Titicaca Local Government of Vice Ministry of
Sustainable Development Bolivia Tourism Bolivia 20 12/20/2007 YES YES

Water Supply and Sanitation Government of

in Low-Income Communities Panama Ministry of Health Panama 32 7/17/2007 YES YES
AR Infrastructure Project for Government of Ministry of Economy
the Province of Buenos Aires the Province of of the Province of
(APL2) BS AS Buenos Aires Argentina 270 6/28/2007 YES YES
OSE Modernization & Obras
Systems Rehabilitation Sanitarias del Obras Sanitarias del
Project APL-2 Estado (OSE) Estado (OSE) Uruguay 50 6/28/2007 YES YES
Honduras Water and
Sanitation Sector Government of Fondo Hondureno De
Modernization Project Honduras Inversion Social (FHIS) Honduras 30 6/21/2007 YES YES
project project
GPOBA W3 – Honduras OBA Government of Fondo Hondureno De document not document not
Fund Honduras Inversion Social (FHIS) Honduras 4.44 6/19/2007 available available
Water Supply Infrastructure
Improvement Additional Government of
Financing St. Lucia Ministry of Finance St. Lucia 1.84 4/10/2007 YES NO
Ministry of Ministry of Uberaba
BR Municipal APL1: Uberaba Uberaba and Codau Brazil 13.27 3/21/2007 YES YES
La Guajira Water and Sani- Gobernacion of
tation Infrastructure and Department of Department of La
Service Management Project La Guajira Guajira Columbia 90 3/15/2007 YES YES

Haiti Rural Water and Sani- Republic of Service National d’Eau

tation Project Haiti Potable Haiti 5 1/30/2007 YES YES
Additional Financing for the ANA (National Water
Federal Water Resources Government of Agency) / Ministry
Management Project Brazil National Integration Brazil 50 12/19/2006 NO YES

BR APL 1 Para Integrated Para State

Rural Dev Government n/a Brazil 60 12/12/2006 YES NO
Additional Financing for the Secretariat for Social
Rural Poverty Reduction State of Development and
Project – Pernambuco Pernambuco Citizenship Brazil 30 10/19/2006 NO NO

27
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor

Loan Cost
Recipient of Implementing Amount (In Date Privatization Recovery
Project Name Funds Agency Country $Millions) Approved Promotion Promotion
Rural and Small Towns Ministry of Urban
Water Supply and Sanitation Republic of Development, Housing
Project II (PRAGUAS) Ecuador and Basic Sanitation Ecuador 48 7/25/2006 YES YES
Additional Financing for the project project
Rural Poverty Reduction State Secretariat of document not document not
Project – Piau State of Piau Planning Brazil 22.5 7/18/2006 available available
Ministry of Federal
Basic Municipal Services Argentine Re- Planning, Investment
Project public and Infrastructure Argentina 110 6/6/2006 YES YES
Ministry of
Environment,
CO Sustainable Government of Housing and Regional
Development Inv Project Columbia Development Columbia 7 10/27/2005 YES NO

Bahia State Integrated

Project: Rural Poverty State of Bahia CAR/SEPLAN Brazil 54.35 9/1/2005 NO YES
Modernization of the Water
and Sanitation Sector Government of CNA (Comision
Technical Assistance Project Mexico Nacional de Agua) Mexico 25 8/4/2005 YES YES

GY (CRL) Water Sector Government of Guyana Water

Consolidation Project Guyana Company Guyana 11.5 7/28/2005 YES YES

Honduran Social
Government of Investment Fund
Barrio-Ciudad Project Honduras (FHIS) Honduras 15 7/7/2005 YES YES

St. Lucia Water Supply Government of

Infrastructure Improvement St. Lucia Ministry of Finance St. Lucia 7.7 5/19/2005 YES YES
MX-Decentralized Estado de
Infrastructure Reform and Guanajuato &
Development Loan Other Sources BANOBRAS Mexico 108 6/8/2004 YES YES
78% of
loans
70% of loans promote
promote cost
Total percentages            privatization recovery

28
 Food & Water Watch
Endnotes
1 Pipe Dreams: The Failure of the Private Sector to Invest in Water
Services in Developing Countries, Public Services International
Research Unit and WDM, March 2006, p. 48-49.
2 Ibid. p. 51.
3 Ibid. p. 51.
4 See: siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSDNETWORK/Resources/4.
pdf
5 Global Environment Outlook 3, UNEP, Nairobi, 2002
6 Peter H. Gleick, “The Millennium Development Goals for Water:
Crucial Objectives, Inadequate Commitments,” Pacific Institute,
2004.
7 United Nations Economic and Social Commission, Human
Settlements Program, “The Poor Pay More.” See complete study at:
http://www.unescap.org/huset/urban_poverty/poorpaymore.htm
8 World Resources 1996-1997, WRI, New York. Cited in WRI et al.,
World Resources Report 2000 — 2001, Washington DC, 2000.
9 See World Health Organization at: www.who.int/water_sanitation_
health/mdg1/en/index.html
10 Ibid.
11 Peter H. Gleick, “The Millennium Development Goals for Water:
Crucial Objectives, Inadequate Commitments,” Pacific Institute,
2004.
12 Barlow, Maude. “Blue Covenant: The Global Water Crisis and the
Coming Battle for the Right to Water.” The New Press, 2007. p 6.
13 Ibid.
14 Barlow, Maude. Op. cit., p. 10.
15 “Suez introduces its 2003-2004 action plan; refocus, reduce debt,
increase profitability,” Jan. 9, 2003 http://www.suez.com/upload/
up970.pdf
16 See map at: www.debtireland.org/resources/Failing_the_poor_
Map_10.05.pdf
17 2002 Results, presentation to shareholders, March 6, 2003 http://
www.suez.com/documents/english/suez_ra_2002_va.pdf
18 See Executive Summary of Camdessus Report, “Financing Water for
All,” at: http://www.financingwaterforall.org/index.php?id=1098
19 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTWAT
/0,,contentMDK:21706928~menuPK:4602430~pagePK:148956~piP
K:216618~theSitePK:4602123,00.html
20 Nuria Molina and Peter Chowla, “The World Bank and Water
Privatisation: Public Money Down the Drain,” Bretton Woods
Project, Sept. 2008 at: www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-562458
21 “IFC sees big market for H2O,” David Ehrlich, Cleantech, August
2008 at: http://cleantech.com/news/3282/ifc-sees-big-market-h2o
22 Ibid.
23 “Does Private Sector Participation Improve Performance in
Electricity and Water Distribution?” World Bank and Public-Private
Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2009, p. 4
24 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTWAT
/0,,contentMDK:21662768~menuPK:4620645~pagePK:210058~piP
K:210062~theSitePK:4602123,00.html
25 Spronk, Susan. “Another Hole in the Boat: Suez’s Private Corruption
in Bolivia,” Z magazine, July 2006. See: http://www.zmag.org/znet/
viewArticle/3493
26 Ibid.
27 “Despues del Triumfo de El Alto en Bolivia,” FEJUVE (undated) and;
14 razones para romper el contrato de Aguas de Illimani, FEJUVE
(undated).
28 Chavez, Franz. “Bolivia: Protests spread over foreign ownership of
water,” Inter Press Service, March 16, 2005.
29 Many privatization contracts include a clause that permits the
company to resolve disputes in international arbitration courts. One
such court, ICSID, is run by the World Bank.
30 Regulatory Audit with Technical, Environmental, Economic,
Financial, Legal and Commercial aspects regarding compliance with
the Concession Contract of Aguas de Illimani, S.A. (AISA) by Pozo y
Asociados, May 2006.
31 For background see: http://democracyctr.org/bolivia/investigations/
water/
32 See: http://www.miga.org/projects/index_sv.cfm?pid=466
33 “Support from the Inter-American Development Bank Group
1990-2005,” IDB Sustainable Development Department,
Washington, D.C. March 2006, Table A-5 and; Inter-American
Development Bank, project abstract for Interagua-Guayaquil Water
and Sanitation Project, January 24, 2003.
34 “Tratamiento de aguas servidas no supera el 5% en plantas de
Interagua,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, June 8, 2002.
35 Enfermos por malos olores que salen de la planta de tratamiento de
aguas servidas,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, June 11, 2002.
36 Joiner, Emily. Murky Waters: A Critical and Purposeful Look at
Water and Sanitation Services in Guayaquil, Ecuador. Observatorio
Cuidadano de Servicios Publicos, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2007.
See Chapter 6, pp. 77-90.
37 Ibid, p. 99.
38 “Observatorio Cuidadano planea demandar a Interagua ante Corte
Interamericana,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, April 15, 2008.
39 Ibid.
40 World Development Movement, press release, May 18, 2005 at:
http://www.wdm.org.uk/news/archive/2005/biwatertanzan.htm
41 Tanzania Case Study, Human Rights and the Environment,
Earth Justice at: http://www.earthjustice.org/our_work/issues/
international/human_rights/case-studies/water_access.html
42 “Tanzania ditches private water supplier,” BBC News, May 18, 2005.
See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4558725.stm
43 Misfortune 500, Biwater Profile, Women’s Environment and
Development Organization at: http://www.misfortune500.org/
company/Show.aspx?articleid=36
44 “Flagship water privatisation fails in Tanzania,” The Guardian, U.K.,
May 25, 2005 at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/may/25/
uk.world
45 “Biwater fails in Tanzania damages claim,” The Guardian, U.K., July
28, 2008. See: http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/jul/28/
utilities.tanzania
46 “Biwater to pay $8 million in Tanzania Water Privatisation Case,”
Public Services International. See: www.world-psi.org/TemplateEn.
cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=19316&TEMPLATE=/
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm
47 Op. cit. Multinational Monitor, Nov./Dec. 2008, Vol. 29, No. 3. See:
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2008/112008/front.html
48 Ibid.
49 “Tanzania: Thirsty for Justice,” Multinational Monitor, Nov./Dec.
2008, Vol. 29, No. 3. See: http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/
mm2008/112008/front.html
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 “Water and Politics in the Fall of Suharto,” The Center for Public
Integrity, Washington, D.C. At: http://projects.publicintegrity.org/
water/report.aspx?aid=52
53 “Indonesia: How not to privatize water,” Bill Guerin. Asia Times,
Nov. 14, 2003 at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/
EK14Ae01.html
29
 Dried Up, Sold Out: How the World Bank’s Push for Private Water Harms the Poor

54 Op. cit. “Water and Politics in the Fall of Suharto,” The Center for 85 NGOs ask donors to drop World Bank water privatisation,
Public Integrity, Washington, D.C. Environment News Service, May 21, 2007.
55 “Current Situation of Jakarta Water Privatisation,” by Hamong 86 Ibid.
Santono, People’s Coalition for the Right to Water. See: www.kruha. 87 http://www.corporateeurope.org/murkywater.html
org
88 http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?act_id=16851
56 “Tap water gets 70 complaints a day,” Jakarta Post, Dec. 19, 2008 at:
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/11/20/tap-water-gets- 89 http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/AboutICSID_Home.jsp
70-complaints-a-day.html 90 Ibid.
57 “KruHa: Struggling for the Right to Water,” 11.11.11 at: http:// 91 Miller, Scott. “United States Suspends Trade Negotiations with
www.11.be/11/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1030 Ecuador, U.S. Department of State,” May 17, 2006.
72&Itemid=112
92 Challenging Corporate Investor Rule, Food & Water Watch and
58 Ibid. Institute of Policy Studies, April 2007, p. 5.
59 PPIAF was created by the World Bank and is managed by the World 93 Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA
Bank, but most of its funding comes from donor governments. Monitor No. 4.” UNCTAD, New York and Geneva, 2006, p. 3.
60 http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/about.nsf/Content/History 94 Food & Water Watch spun off from Public Citizen in 2005 and
61 Creating Opportunity: Highlights from IFC Annual Report, 2008, became an independent organization.
World Bank Group. See: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/annualreport. 95 “Will the World Bank Back Down?” Public Citizen, Washington, D.C.
nsf/Content/AR2008 April 2004 at: http://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/water/pubs/
62 Ibid., p. 1. reports/worldbank
63 Ibid., p. 4. 96 Mason E. and Asher R. The World Bank Since Bretton Woods. The
Brookings Institute, Washington D.C., 1973, p. 190.
64 European Double Standards, Olivier Hoedeman, Transnational
Institute, March 2007 at: http://www.tni.org/detail_page. 97 “International Year of Freshwater: 2003.” United Nations. Available
phtml?act_id=16533 at: www.un.org/events/water/brochure.htm
65 See MIGA website at: www.miga.org/about/index_sv.cfm?stid=1588 98 Compiled from Project Information Documents (PIDs) and Project
Appraisal Documents (PADs) available on the World Bank project
66 See: www.miga.org/guarantees/index_sv.cfm database at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
67 Http://www.ppiaf.org PROJECTS/
68 World Development Movement, Media Briefing, May 2007 at: http://
www.wdm.org.uk/campaigns/water/ppiaf.htm
69 http://www.ppiaf.org/content/view/182/168/
70 See PPIAF publications at: http://www.ppiaf.org/content/
blogsection/11/485/
71 Gridlines, PPIAF newsletter, No. 14, Sept. 2006, page 1
72 Ibid, p. 3.
73 Ibid., p. 3.
74 See, for example: Gassner, Popov and Pushak, Does Private Sector
Participation Improve Performance in Electricity and Water
Distribution, PPIAF Trends and Policy Options, No. 6.
75 Pipe Dreams: The Failure of the Private Sector to Invest in Water
Services in Developing Countries, Public Services International
Research Unit and WDM, March 2006.
76 Op. cit. Gassner, Popov and Pushak, Does Private Sector
Participation Improve Performance in Electricity and Water
Distribution, p. 4.
77 Ibid., p. 4.
78 World Development Movement, Media Briefing, May 2007 at: http://
www.wdm.org.uk/campaigns/water/ppiaf.htm
79 http://www.ppiaf.org/content/view/62/95/
80 Search Malawi water supply projects at the World Bank projects
web site at: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/
PROJECTS/
81 IDA, Malawi: Privatisation and Utilities Reform Project-(Credit
No. 33950-MW), Proposed Amendment to the Development Credit
Agreement, 2005.
82 Ibid., p. 27.
83 http://www.ppiaf.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&
id=224&Itemid=214&sub_action=activities&action=show_projects_
by_country&country=MALAWI
84 Ibid.

30
Photo by Gary Scott, Stock.xchng
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