This article was downloaded by: [107.2.81.

143] On: 10 February 2013, At: 16:36 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

British Journal of Guidance & Counselling

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cbjg20

Towards ethical decision-making in counselling research

Maggie Robson , Peter Cook , Kathy Hunt , Geof Alred & Dave Robson
a a b a a a

Centre for Studies in Counselling, School of Education, University of Durham, Leazes Road, Durham, DH1 1TA, UK
b

Department of Computer Science, University of Durham, Science Laboratories, South Road, Durham, DH1 3LE, UK Version of record first published: 17 Jun 2010.

To cite this article: Maggie Robson , Peter Cook , Kathy Hunt , Geof Alred & Dave Robson (2000): Towards ethical decision-making in counselling research, British Journal of Guidance & Counselling, 28:4, 533-547 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713652317

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-andconditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sublicensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or

howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

British Journal of Guidance & Counselling, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2000

Towards ethical decision-making in counselling research

MAGGIE ROBSON, PETER COOK, KATHY HUNT & GEOF ALRED
Centre for Studies in Counselling, School of Education, University of Durham, Leazes Road, Durham DH1 1TA, UK

DAVE ROBSON
Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

Department of Computer Science, University of Durham, Science Laboratories, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, UK

This paper explores the process of ethical decision-making in counselling research and asks the question: after following ethical guidelines, reviewing ethical principles and consulting codes of practice, to what extent is our decision-making based on intuitive thinking? The paper begins by examining Kitcheners model of ethical justi cation and the ethical principles upon which it rests. Bonds approach to ethical problem-solving is also considered. The second part of the paper explores the sequential decision-making process suggested by Gellatt, upon which both the Kitchener and Bond models seem to rest, and compares this with Gellatts later revision of his model. The process by which we arrive at an ethical decision is then explored in relation to these. The nal part of the paper argues that we reach ethical decisions through intuition, informed by ethical principles, codes of practice and reference to the laws of society. In order to safeguard the well-being of our clients and/or research participants, we need to be aware of this and offer up our decision-making process to the scrutiny of peers and the public at large. Although much of the paper explores this process at a general level, research undertaken into childrens perception of stress will be used as an example.
ABSTRACT

Introduction This paper explores the process of ethical decision-making in counselling research and asks the question: after following ethical guidelines, reviewing ethical principles and consulting codes of practice, to what extent is our decision-making based on intuitive thinking? The aim of this paper is to examine critically the principles which guide ethical decision-making and to examine the process of making those decisions. In order to locate this examination in practice, examples of one of the authors own ethical dilemmas encountered whilst exploring childrens perception of stress will be used. However, the solutions to these dilemmas are not intended as an example of good practice, but rather as an illustration of the many ways that ethical dilemmas can be resolved. Resolution was not always an easy process, and this paper also describes how those decisions were made. It explores general ethical considerations
ISSN 03069885 (print) ISSN 1469-3534 (online) /00/04053315 DOI: 10.1080/03069880020004730 2000 Careers Research and Advisory Centre

534

Maggie Robson et al.

and describes the ethical dilemmas encountered in the piece of research mentioned above. It will be argued that, although ethical decision-making is often presented as a rational process, the part played by gut reaction or intuitive process is denied at our own and our research participants peril. Intuition has been de ned as: Immediate perception or judgement, usually with some emotional colouring, without any conscious mental steps in preparation; a popular rather than scienti c term (Drever, 1976, p. 145). This rather dismissive de nition devalues, in our view, the signi cance of intuition as a major part of the decision-making process. The danger of denying the intuitive dimension may be that we construct a scienti c (and therefore without emotional colouring) rationale for decisions without acknowledging or being aware of the intuitive dimensions of the process. Scienti c is used in this sense to mean the narrow approach of reducing the phenomena to quantitatively measurable units and discarding the complexityin this case emotional colouringas unquanti able, and therefore unimportant. Dominant models of ethical decision-making (Bond, 1993; Heppner, 1989; Kitchener, 1984) appear to be insuf ciently complex to analyse appropriately a very challenging researcher and practitioner activity. The reason for this is that they concentrate on the rational and objective to the exclusion of the emotional and the subjective. It is our contention that decision-making is based not only on the facts of the decision-making but also on our feelings surrounding the facts and upon the values we hold that shape those feelings. All too often, our emotional, value-driven responses to decision-making are undervalued and we rationalise our intuitive process post-factum rationalisation. This paper will argue that we need to acknowledge our subjective response to ethical decisionmaking, re ect upon it and hold this process up to the scrutiny of professions and peers. Bayne et al. (1994) argue that We see it as important that, at least on re ection, they (counsellors) are able to account for what they do and why (p. 85). If we fail to acknowledge the place of intuition in decision-making, we are in danger of placing a false rationality upon our decision-making and thus ignoring the value or philosophical base that informs it. While intuition suggests a gut reactionan unre ected and under-examined responseit is interesting that the word intuition comes from the Latin intueor , which is de ned as to look at attentively, gaze at, to consider, contemplate (Simpson, 1977, p. 324). Thus, if we intuit our decision-making process, we will be able to hold our judgements up to scrutiny, accepting that a gut reaction is able to be subjected to re ective analysis. Most important in this process is the distinction between intuition as knowledge and intuition as the process of obtaining knowledge. Wild (1938) offers these two de nitions: A. An intuition is an immediate awareness by a subject of some particular entity, without such aid from the senses or from reason as would account for that awareness.

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

Ethical decision-making in research B. Intuition is a method by which a subject becomes aware of an entity without such aid from the sense or from reason as would account for such awareness (p. 225).

535

Both these de nitions imply unconscious process and suggest a knowledge or a knowing that is unavailable to conscious exploration. If this is the case, and if ethical decision-making is partly driven by intuition, our ethical decision-making process will not be available for scrutiny. Rather, we believe that intuition as knowledge is unconscious but the process of knowing has, as its foundation, our belief and value system, which is built from our perceptions of our experience. In other words, we know what we know because we know it and we can explore the how we came to know through exploring our values and beliefs. Westcott (1968) supports this view:
Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

When an intuition has occurred, logic and reason may be used to elaborate and, in part, to objectify the nonempirical knowledge gained (p. 179). Any piece of research is value-laden, in the sense that it is carried out by an individual who has certain values, and these values will suggest certain interpretations of the data as well as having methodological implications. There is a myth that traditional (i.e. quantitative) scienti c research is objective and thus describes the world as it is. Rogers (1955) suggests that when investigating complex phenomena, one attempts to work towards an understanding of that phenomenon and that In science this means an objective knowledge of events and of functional relationships between events (p. 269). He goes on to argue that, no matter how rigorous the scienti c method, all that this approach could offer is a description of the relationship and the probability of occurrence. By pursuing this objective route, the working models of reality which would emerge (in the course of theory building) would be increasingly removed from the reality perceived by the senses (p. 270). In studying human behaviour, it had been argued throughout this research that it is not possible, and probably not desirable, to be anything but subjective. Friedrichs (1970) argues that knowledge of people grants power over them and therefore is not neutral in its import. Thus, in conducting any study involving people, it is important to evolve an ethical framework. In one involving children, it seems to be of paramount importance given their relative dependency and the unequal balance of power. We need to make our philosophical assumptions and values overt and not draw a pseudo-objectivity over our decision-making. We have an obligation to make our value system transparent in order to, as Bayne et al. (1994) suggest, account for what we do and why. At the end of the paper, a framework of ethical decision-making which allows this, an adaptation of Gilmores (1980) model of a structure of a theory for helping relationships, will be offered. The research of one of the authors explored the concept of stress as it is perceived by children and built a paradigm of this perception. From an initial literature review, a starting point in terms of an examination of stressors was

536

Maggie Robson et al.

identi ed and led to a survey in this area. This led, in turn, to ve subsequent investigations being undertaken, each driven by questions and issues emerging from the previous one. The methodology used in each study was different and driven by the questions that were under exploration. However, all had a qualitative philosophical base. The samples differed from study to study and encompassed children from the age of 11 to adults. The ethical issues encountered in her study can be viewed as the tension between the intuitive and the objective, characterised as two rights, This is explained by Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias (1992) in Cohen & Manion (1994) as: the right of the researcher to research and acquire knowledge and the right of individual participants to self-determination, privacy and dignity. A decision not to conduct a planned research project because it interferes with the participants welfare is a limit on the rst of these rights. A decision to conduct research despite an ethically questionable practice is a limit on the second right (pp. 364365). How this tension is resolved is dependent upon the background, experience and personal values of the researcher. During this research it seemed very important to nd an ethically defensible position that encompasses the demands of these two rights. Further light can be shed on the paradigmatic tension between the subjective/ objective task by Heppner et al. (1992), who argue that ve fundamental ethical principles are central to the conducting of morally sound studies. These are the principles of nonmale cence, bene cence, autonomy, justice and delity. However, following these principles is often complex. Ethical principles can compete and possible resolutions can be competing. Each of these principles will be described and case material used to exemplify the dilemmas encountered. The attempts the author made to critically re ect upon her intuitive decision-making are documented. Nonmale cence Nonmale cence has been de ned by Diener & Crandall (1978) as the most basic guideline for social scientists and state that participants should not be harmed by participating in research. A responsibility on the part of the researcher is assumed here, to avoid unintentional harm as well as intentional harm. Kitchener (1984) reported that many writers (Beauchamp & Childress, 1979; Brown, 1982; Frankena, 1963; Rosenbaum, 1982; Ross, 1930) concerned with ethics have argued that nonmale cence should be the most important of ethical principles and if a choice is present between harming an individual and bene ting another, the strongest obligation would be to avoid harm. This notion has links with the costs/bene ts ratio described by Cohen & Manion (1994) where they describe the dilemma as being the requirement to strike a balance between the pursuit of truth and the rights and

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

Ethical decision-making in research

537

values of the participants potentially threatened by the research. They adapt Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias (1992) and express it thus: The costs/bene t ratio is a fundamental concept expressing the primary ethical dilemma in social research. In planning their proposed research, social scientists have to consider the likely social bene ts of their endeavours against the personal costs to the individuals taking part The process of balancing bene ts against possible costs is chie y a subjective one and not at all easy. There are few or no absolutes and researchers have to make decisions about research content and procedures in accordance with professional and personal values (p. 348). At rst sight this seems to be a reasonable principle to work by, but on further analysis complications occur. To avoid both intentional and unintentional harm seems in the case of all research to be almost unavoidable. Using the study on childrens perceptions of stress, conducted by one of the authors, as an example, it can be shown that by asking participants to re ect upon their stress may cause them harm in the sense that it may be distressing. How distressing this will be is impossible to predict. Responses are subjective and may hook into material that the participant was not expecting. Therefore, harm in some sense seems unavoidable. However, her initial intuitive reasoning suggested that by exploring these issues, not only was the bene t greater than the cost in terms of social bene ts, but also that it may enable individuals to come to new understandings of their stress response and thus empower them to make new choices. Upon re ection, she came to realise that the converse may also be true. The cost of an individuals exploration of their perception of stress may be greater than the potential personal or social bene t. Within her research, this issue was resolved, in some part, by giving participants as full an explanation of the study as possible and by offering them the opportunity to opt out at any point. Participants were also offered support if they felt they needed it after the session, either in the form of a counselling session or introductions to helping agencies. None of the participants took advantage of these supports, which may or may not be an indication that the principle of nonmale cence was successfully applied. Bene cence Beauchamp & Childress (1979) argue that not only should we be preventing harm if we are researching ethically, but that we should also be contributing to the health and welfare of others. We should be acting with bene cence, or doing good for others. In terms of research, Lindsey (1984) argues that this principle mandates researchers to engage in effective and signi cant research in order to maximise the welfare of our participants, and White & White (1981) argue that it is our responsibility to our profession (of counselling) to provide all the knowledge and skill we can marshal to bene t our clients (in Heppner et al., 1992, p. 80). It is therefore possible to do good to others through contributing to a body of knowledge and yet

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

538

Maggie Robson et al.

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

harm to the individual participants. An extreme example of this is the medical experimentation in Nazi concentration camps. In terms of the authors research on childrens perceptions of stress, it intuitively felt right to explore this topicshe could contribute to a body of knowledge and not do harm to individual participants. On a personal level, engaging in research in this area has given her new insights and knowledge to bene t her counselling clients and, she hopes, by publishing some of these insights, new knowledge and insights will be offered to others. However, as has been argued above, those participating in this study may or may not have bene ted. The informal feedback she received from participants suggested that they had found the process helpful in that it gave them an opportunity to re ect upon their experiences and no-one reported being unduly upset by the experience. However, it may not be possible to be completely sure that she acted with bene cence and a greater exploration of intuitive reasoning may be necessary. Autonomy This principle requires the concept of an autonomous person and implies freedom of action and freedom of choice. It also assumes that someone who wishes to be treated autonomously also has the responsibility to respect the autonomy of others. Kitchener (1984) suggests that: Autonomous choice, here, implies the ability to use rational deliberation. Thus, whether or not we ought ethically to respect an individuals choice may also depend on whether the decision-making process is a rational one (p. 46). This has roots in many political institutions and law and, as Kitchener (1984) points out, is the basis of the mutual respect which is at the core of the therapeutic bond which implies a relationship between individuals regarded as free agents. This notion has implications for working with children. Can children be considered autonomous? Do they have a freedom of action and freedom of choice? The answer seems to be, rarely. Children often have even basic choices made for them, for example, what to wear (as exempli ed in school uniforms). Also their freedom of action is often limited by the adults around them. This is not necessarily a bad thing, since children need to be loved, protected and cared for and the establishment of boundaries and appropriate behaviour can be seen as part of this overall care. However, if children cannot be viewed as autonomous, can they choose whether or not to participate in research? The authors initial intuitive decision was that children were autonomous and could therefore have a choice. However, on re ection she changed her mind. Children, because of the relative power difference between them and the majority of adults around them, may not be in a position to make decisions based upon free choice. They are usually taught to do as they are told and therefore to refuse to take part in the research, or to withdraw during the research, may be dif cult for them. This was one of the reasons that older children (over 11) and

Ethical decision-making in research

539

adults were approached as participants for this research, rather than primary age children. The principle of autonomy rests upon the ability to make rational decisions and rational decision-making is dependent upon an objective view. Gelatt (1989) argues that There is no such thing as objectivity. Everything is interconnected to everything else in an unbroken wholeness, and the mind is the connector (p. 252). Perhaps, therefore, no-one is autonomous. With this possibility in mind, and the argument that Gelatt (1989) proposed, that information supplied to a decisionmaker is ltered through a subjective world, the participants were offered as much information as possible in order to construct a meaning for themselves as to what participation in the research would mean for them. The author, who conducted the research on childrens perceptions of stress, tried to offer as much permission as possible for people to opt out if they felt that this was appropriate. Their subjective world was valued and no explanations were expected for refusal to take part. Through these procedures, it was hoped to achieve informed consent. This concept is discussed later in this paper. Justice This principle is concerned with fairness (Benn, 1967), and based upon the assumption that people are equal. Kitchener (1984) suggests that justice: Translated into twentieth-century language (it) suggests that equal persons have the right to be treated equally and non equal persons have a right to be treated differently if the inequality is relevant to the issue in question (p. 49). Again, this is not a simple principle to follow. How do we determine equality? Are all adults equal? The answer is partially answered with reference to the above discussion on autonomy. Perhaps, in the nal analysis, people are not truly equal. If this is the case, how do we determine treatment? Do we compensate people because we perceive them as being unequal? These questions are impossible to answer without reference to our belief system. In terms of the childrens perceptions of stress research, rst, after re ection, the author came to believe that children are unequal in power to adults and therefore may not be able to choose for themselves whether to participate in this research or not. Simply because she is an adult, she may be pressuring them to take part. Second, she believed that children do not have such sophisticated defence mechanisms as adults and may not be able to retreat from possible psychological damage as well as an adult could. Because of these factors it seemed to her that an inequality in the perceived power and status of children existed and this therefore necessitated a difference in their treatment. Because of this, a decision was made that children would not be involved in all of the eldwork.

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

540

Maggie Robson et al.

Fidelity Kitchener (1984) supports the view of Ramsey (1970) in arguing that this principle involves faithfulness, promise-keeping, and loyalty and is fundamental to all helping professions. Lindsey (1984) suggests that part of the issue of delity is about providing adequate information so that a decision can be made, and, as such, is particularly pertinent in counselling or psychotherapy research. They argue that: the client and the therapist enter into a special contractual agreement, a therapeutic alliance, wherein they decide together how they will relate to one another and the areas of concern they will address. To withhold pertinent information in this regard, could violate this agreement; this relationship (p. 81). The issue of what would constitute pertinent information is far from straightforward. Kitchener (1984) argues that issues of delity arise when people enter into voluntary relationships and so they seem to be very relevant to a volunteer participantresearcher relationship. Kitchener argues that the act of freely giving consent implies certain obligations from both parties. These arise partly from the reciprocal respect that is implicit in autonomous relationships and partly from the necessity for truth if human relationships are to be meaningful. Con dentiality can be viewed as a component of delity and of autonomy and it is argued by Kitchener (1984) that: Since con dentiality is basic to trust it is a component of delity, although it may also derive from the respect due to autonomous persons (i.e. individuals reveal information about themselves by choice with the understanding that it will be kept private; not to do so is disrespectful of their autonomy and destroys delity) (p. 51). Con dentiality in the childrens perception of stress study was ensured with respect to the anonymity of participants. In some of the eldwork, no attempt was made to identify the data with the participant, and in other parts of the eldwork, ctitious names were used. A contract about the con dentiality of the material offered by participants was agreed from the outset. All the participants agreed to the anonymised use of their personal material in this research and in any resulting publications. In this case, con dentiality did not seem to be an ethical dilemma, but if participants had revealed information of a more controversial nature it could have been. Examples of this would be revelations of abuse or being an abuser. It was, perhaps, fortunate that this did not occur, but it is an eventuality that needs to be re ected upon and probably contracted for.

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

Ethical decision-making in research Other issues Informed consent

541

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

Consent is the process of giving participants the right to decide whether or not to participate in the study and an opportunity to exercise this right. Codes of ethics indicate that consent is not enough. The consent given has to be one that is informed. Heppner et al. (1992) suggest that the investigator has an ethical responsibility to clarify and agree with each participant obligations, responsibilities and risks before the research starts. Turnball (1977) identi ed three key elements in this issuecapacity, information and voluntariness. Capacity refers to the ability of the participant to understand and make decisions from the information and involves age as well as ability. Children under 18 are not legally considered able to make some decisions and thus may be thought not to have the capacity to give informed consent. Ramsey (1970) argued from this position and suggested that it was therefore impossible to obtain a fully rational consent from them. He also considers the idea of parental consent nonsensical, as a parent cannot know whether, if the child was rational, she or he would consent to participate. This position is considered too radical by other writers (Cooke, 1982; Powell, 1984), and Kitchener (1984) reports that: The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioural Research (1977) has taken the position that using children in research has important potential bene ts for all children and as a consequence, they argue research with children can be carried out in an ethical manner (p. 47). This position is, however, open to debate. The other category, that of information, concerns the information given to a participant to enable them to make an informed consent. Kitchener (1984) argues that this does not and indeed should not mean that participants be given complete information. Instead she argues that information should be given commensurate with the guideline of What would a reasonable and prudent person, cautious for his/her own welfare need to know before making a decision? (p. 51). As well as information giving, the manner in which it given is also important. Turnball (1977) argued that it is important that it is presented in an understandable manner. As with the other categories, this is not as simple as it may appear. Tensions may be created by information given and the response made by the participants. An example of this may be the concern that if information given is about the possible effect upon the participant, this will lead to expectations by the participant and so in uence the results. If, for example, in this study, participants were warned that re ection upon perceived stresses may cause them to become upset, an expectation that that is what is required might be created and the participants led to feel that either they were upset or that they were not doing it properly if they were not upset. Equally, such a warning could lead to such self-protection that the actual perception of stress could be blocked. This creates a tension between giving enough information to allow people to give informed consent and confounding the results. Equally, as

542

Maggie Robson et al.

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

each persons experience is different, how is it possible to know how much information a reasonable and prudent person, cautious for his/her own welfare needs to know before making a decision? The third category identi ed by Turnball (1977) is that of voluntariness. Heppner et al. (1992) says of this that a critical aspect of consent is that subjects can voluntarily decide on participating free from blatant or subtle extraneous factors that may compel them to participate (p. 97). This seems a simple task if undue pressure to participate such as threats or excessive bribes are not applied. However, the subtle extraneous factors seem virtually impossible to combat. It may be that participants agree to take part because they like the researcher and feel it would hurt his or her feelings to refuse. It may be that power is perceived differently. A researcher, because of being an adult, may inadvertently, because of their role, exert pressure on children to participate simply because they are expected, as children, to do as they are asked. It may be extremely dif cult, even impossible, for children to say no. This leads on to the question of whether participants can voluntarily decide on participating free from blatant or subtle extraneous factors that may compel them to participate (Heppner et al., 1992, p. 97). We think that the answer to this is no. The best that is possible is to accept that participants can never be completely voluntary and to try and be aware of as many of these subtle pressures as possible and to create as many opportunities for opting out as possible, as well as discussing with the participants, as openly as appropriate, these dilemmas.

Ethical decision-making As can be seen from the above discussions and descriptions, ethical decision-making is a complexity of interrelated elements. Probably the rst step in reaching the moral judgement, which is necessary in ethical decision-making, is what Hare (1981) describes as the intuitive level of moral reasoning. This is a central issue. This is described by Kitchener (1984) as the immediate, pre-re ective response to an ethical dilemma, which is informed by the set of knowledge, beliefs and assumptions that individuals carry with them. Kitchener (1984, p. 45) argues that this is not enough and suggests a model for ethical justi cation. She suggests that a critical evaluative level of moral reasoning is necessary to guide, re ne and evaluate our intuitive moral judgement. The criticalevaluative level is composed of three tiers of increasingly general and abstract forms of justi cation. If the rst form of justi cation fails, then we move on to the next tier (see Fig. 1). Similarly, Bond (1993) suggests a way of ethical problem-solving for counselling situations, which could be transferred to research situations. He suggests a six-step approach as follows: 1. Produce a brief description of the problem or dilemma. 2. Decide whose dilemma it isclient or counsellor in his example.

Ethical decision-making in research

543

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

FIG. 1. Kitcheners (1984) model of ethical justi cation.

3. Consider all available ethical principles and guidelines. This is similar to the criticalevaluative level described by Kitchener (1984). 4. Identify all possible courses of action. 5. Select the best course of action. Here Bond suggests three tests taken from Stadler (1986a,b): i. Universalitycould the chosen course be recommended to others, and would I condone my course of action if someone else did it? ii. Publicitycould my chosen course of action be explained to other counsellors and would I be willing to subject my rationale and actions to public scrutiny? iii. Justicewould I treat similar client situations the same and would this be affected if the client was well known or in uential? 6. Evaluate the outcome in order to learn from the experience and to use in similar situations in the future. As has been previously discussed, the ethical principles referred to in both Bonds (1993) framework and Kitcheners (1984) model cannot be applied in a straightfor-

544

Maggie Robson et al.

ward way. The principles have, both within them and between them, dilemmas. The same is true for rules and ethical theory. There is no straightforward way of making these decisions, but perhaps some understandings of the processes involved can be found in decision-making frameworks. Implicit in most models or frameworks for ethical decision-making is an idea of a rationality supporting the decision. Gelatt (1962, p. 242) suggested a model of the sequential decision-making process. In this model he suggested a totally rational approach to making decisions. The approach required decision-makers to de ne their objectives clearly, analyse information rationally, predict consequences, and be consistent (Gelatt, 1962, p. 252). It is upon this rational view that both Bonds and Kitcheners frameworks rest. Gelatt (1989) later changed his mind and proposed a new decision-making strategy called positive uncertainty. He argues that:
Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

The past laws of science and a knowledge gave persons an ability to predict the future. It showed an external world that existed apart from the mind. It had scienti c objectivity. The old decision strategy was appropriate for the linear, objective, scienti c methods of the past (p. 252). He goes on to argue that, however logical our steps, we eventually arrive at a point in our decision-making where our criteria for making judgements are an implicit value statement. Gellatt believes that values lie at the core of our decision-making (McGuiness, 1993, p. 31). Krumboltz (1983) also argued against rational decision-making. He says, One outcome of my study was the decision that it is irrational to distinguish between rational and irrational decisions. Gelatt (1989) goes onto argue that: Helping someone decide how to decide must move from promoting only rational, linear, systematic strategies to recommending, even teaching, intuitive, situational, and sometimes inconsistent methods for solving personal problems or making decisions. Perhaps the intuitive, situational and sometimes inconsistent methods that Gelatt suggests are also important when we are faced with ethical decision-making and that knowledge forces us to recognise the part of intuition and gut reaction. A possible model of practice Gilmore (1980) offers us a model of practice or a conceptual framework for an intervention system, which is built upon a general theory of human behaviour which, in turn, rests upon philosophical assumptions. This seems to be a helpful model in terms of relating theory to practice and practice to theory. She suggests that all counsellors are theory builders and that necessarily by practising counselling, we base that practice on theory, which in turn is based on a philosophical view of what constitutes human nature. The same may also be true of ethical decision-making, and it may be possible to adapt Gilmores

Ethical decision-making in research

545

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

FIG. 2. Gilmores (1980) structure of a theory for helping relationships.

(1980) model of practice for helping relationships into one which could be implemented when decision-making. Philosophy is about our beliefs about the nature of existence, about how we know what we know and about what we believe is good and evil. If we believe that we should look after our own interests, no matter what cost to others and that human nature is essentially self-seeking, this affects our view of human behaviour. We would make sense of behaviour through those beliefs, for example, if we saw a person walking towards us we might assume that they were going to do us harm. That, in turn, would lead us to conceive that we were threatened (conceptual frameworks) and lead us to behave defensively. So, our basic philosophical assumptions affect our theory of human behaviour and form the reason behind our behaviours. Just as this is true in life, it is also true in ethical decision-making. If we believe that we are here to be the best that we can be and that we are experts on ourselves and are all basically good, then we will understand peoples behaviour as being the best that they can be at that moment, in those circumstances. This will lead us to behave towards others with respect and valuing. When making ethical decisions we often have to decide which of the competing ethical principles should have primacyis the principle of autonomy more important than the principle of bene cence when a participant chooses to take part in research and the researcher fears a harmful consequence for the participant? Our philosophical assumptions will affect the ethical principle, which we believed to be most important at that time. If we believe that people know best about themselves, we may decide that autonomy has primacy, but if we believe that people are a danger to themselves, then we may choose bene cence. It is important that we explore our philosophical assumptions and hold them up for examination so that we can be truly accountable for our ethical decision-making. The implication of this stand is that at some point in the decision-making process we need to hold our assumptions up for scrutiny. We suggest a method which would allow us to do that would be to follow Kitcheners process but instead

546

Maggie Robson et al.

of nishing at the criticalevaluative level of moral reasoning to return to the intuitive level and explore our implicit belief using Gilmores model and to repeat this process until we, and our participants and colleagues, are satis ed that our value system and decision-making process are transparent. Conclusion With the above in mind, and as a result of the preceding discussion, perhaps ethical justi cation does, after following the process suggested by Kitchener (1984), return to rest upon the intuitive level of moral reasoning or gut feelings. There appear to be no absolutes in this area, and after consultation and investigation in the appropriate criticalevaluative level of moral reasoning, there seems to be a necessity to return to our intuitive level of reasoning. This will, however, have been informed by the next level, and as a means of trying to ensure the safety of the client, needs also to be discussed in a broad and public forum. So, perhaps ethical decision-making in counselling research and counselling is ultimately a gut reaction rather than a rational process, but we need to view the safety of the participant as of paramount importance. In order to safeguard participants well-being, we need to offer our decision-making process to the scrutiny of peers and fellow professionals as well as the public at large. We need to acknowledge the part played by intuition and to make transparent our decision-making process in order to account for what we do and why (Bayne et al., 1994). Westcott (1968), perhaps tongue in check, argues that knowledge gained by intuition has its own criterion for truth: The criterion of its truth is three-fold: rst, the fact that it is intuitive knowledge renders it true by de nition; second, the knowledge gained by intuition articulates perfectly well with all other knowledge and is satisfying; third, it is accompanied by a subjective feeling of certainty and joy (p. 179). References
BAYNE , R., HORTON, I., MERRY , T. & NOYES , E. (1994). The Counsellors Handbook. London: Chapman & Hall. BEAUCHAMP, T.L. & CHILDRESS , J.F. (1979). Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Oxford University Press. BENN, S.I. (1967). Justice. In P. EDWARDS (Ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4 (pp. 298302). New York: MacMillan. BOND, T. (1993). Standards and Ethics for Counselling in Action. London: Sage. BROWN, F. (1982). The ethics of psychodiagnostic assessment. In M. ROSENBAUM (Ed.), Ethics and Values in Psychotherapy. New York: Free Press. COHEN, L. & MANION, L. (1994). Research Methods in Education, 4th edn. London & New York: Routledge. COOKE, R.A. (1982). The ethics and regulation of research involving children. In B.B. WOLMAN (Ed.), Handbook of Developmental Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. DIENER , E. & CRANDALL , R. (1978). Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. DREVER, J. (1976). A Dictionary of Psychology. London: Penguin. FRANKENA , W.K. (1963). Ethics. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

Ethical decision-making in research

547

FRANKFORT-NACHMIAS, C. & NACHMIAS, D. (1992). Research Methods in the Social Sciences. London: Edward Arnold. FRIEDRICHS , R. (1970). A Sociology of Sociology. New York: Free Press. GELATT , H.B. (1962). Decision-making: a conceptual frame of reference for counseling. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 9, 240245. GELATT , H.B. (1989). Positive uncertainty: a new decisionmaking framework for counseling. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 35, 252256. GILMORE, S. (1980). A comprehensive theory for eclectic intervention. International Journal for the Advancement of Counselling, 3, 337360. HARE, R. (1981). The philosophical basis of psychiatric ethics. In S. BLOCK & P. CHODOFF (Eds). Psychiatrics Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University. HEPPNER , P.P. (1989). Identifying the complexities with clients thinking and decision making. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 35, 252256. HEPPNER , P.P, KIVLIGHAN , D., JR & WAMPOLD, B. (1992). Research Design in Counseling. Paci c Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. KITCHENER , K.S. (1984). Intuition, criticalevaluation and ethical principles: the foundation for ethical decision in counseling psychology. Counseling Psychologist, 12(3), 4355. KRUMBOLTZ , J. (1983). Private Rules in Career Decision Making Columbus, OH: National Center for Research in Vocational Education. LINDSEY, R. (1984). Informed consent and deception in psychotherapy research: an ethical analysis. Counseling Psychologist, 12(3), 7986. MCGUINESS , J. (1993). Teachers, Pupils and Behaviour: a Managerial Approach. London: Cassell. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF H UMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH (1977). Report and Recommendations: Research Involving Children. DHEE Publication (05)770004. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Of ce. POWELL , C. (1984). Ethical principles and issues of competence in counseling adolescents. Counseling Psychologist , 12(3), 5767. RAMSEY, P. (1970).The Patient as Person. New Haven: Yale University. ROGERS , C.R. (1955). Persons or science? A philosophical question. American Psychologist, 10, 267277. ROSENBAUM , M. (1982). Ethics and values in psychotherapy. In M. ROSENBAUM (Ed.), Ethics and Values in Psychotherapy. New York: Free Press. ROSS, W.D. (1930). The Right and the Good. London: Clarendon. SIMPSON, D.P. (1977). Cassells EnglishLatin, LatinEnglish Dictionary. New York: Macmillan. STADLER , H. (1986a). Con dentiality: the Professionals DilemmaParticipant Manual. Alexandria, VA: American Association for Counseling and Development. STADLER , H. (1986b). Making hard choices: clarifying controversial ethical issues. Counseling and Human Development, 19(1), 110. TURNBALL , H.R., III (Ed.) (1977). Consent Handbook. Washington, DC: American Association on Mental De ciency. WESTCOTT, M. (1968). Towards a Contemporary Psychology of Intuition: a Historical, Theoretical and Empirical Enquiry. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. WHITE, M.D. & WHITE, C.A. (1981). Involuntary committed patients constituted right to refuse treatment. American Psychologist, 36, 953962. WILD , K.W. (1938). Intuition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Downloaded by [107.2.81.143] at 16:36 10 February 2013

(Accepted 5 May 2000)