SERAPIO VS.

SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others. Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists. Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson. Accused by Singson. Informations filed. The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. For his part, petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right. During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused filed their respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial. The bail hearing did not proceed because petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the amended Information on the grounds that as against him, the amended Information does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioners motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his petition for bail. He also filed a petition for Habeas Corpus. (Andaming nyang finile. Ang hirap tuloy isummarize) Meanwhile, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail. the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash the amended Information. The motion to fix bail filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada was also denied by the Sandiganbayan. Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail. (I will not include the issues regarding the charging of more than one offense, etc. anymore. Bail na lang tayo) ISSUES: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused is mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged

HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail. In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be authorized under the circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail. 2. YES. The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. An accused may file a motion to quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment. These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the Information charging him with such offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that

the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic. 3. No. There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion. It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the cases and of the factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic individual protections, including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when that fashion has become rampant over the earth. 4. No. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioners application for bail but the same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001. The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the following list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution. When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted bail.

Teehankee v. Director of Prisons (1946) Facts:

Haydee Herras Teehankee was a political prisoner detained by the Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment of the United States Army for having actively collaborated with the Japanese. In 1944, she was delivered by the United States Army to the Philippine Commonwealth Government. Since then, however, no information had been filed against her under the People's Court Act and the correlative provisions of the penal laws. The Peoples Court had denied her petition for bail. The Supreme Court, however, directed via a Resolution in May, 1946 that Teehankee be released from official custody upon the filing of a P50,000 bail. Judge Antonio Quirino, a member of the Division of the Peoples Court which earlier denied bail to Teehankee, impugned such decision of the Supreme Court, speaking as he did before newspaper reporters where he claimed that the Tribunal had robbed the Peoples Court of its inherent power to decide cases for bail. In July, 1946, the Supreme Court issued its full-dress decision over the matter. Issue: Whether the Peoples Court had correctly denied Teehankees petition for bail Held/Ratio: No. The Constitution provides: All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required. The Court, in the case involving the same detainee (Teehankee v. Rovira), has already ruled: This constitutional mandate refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed; it lays down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable, except those charge with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. According to this provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have been either arrested, detained, or otherwise deprived of their liberty may have occasion to seek the benefit of said provision. But in order that a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is filed against him. From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. The discretion inherent in the Court is embodied in the Rules on Criminal Procedure themselves, and as Justice Moreland enunciated: "It is clear that even capital offenses are bailable in the discretion of the Court before conviction." The discretion pertains to the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The discretion must be sound and exercised within reasonable bounds. While allowing the judge latitude, it must not be exercised uncontrollably, though, that is why rules must guide the exercise of discretion. The Court underscores: In this jurisdiction, inferior courts are controlled in the exercise of their discretion, first, by the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which the Supreme Court may promulgate under the authority of Article VIII, section 13, of the Constitution; and, third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part of the laws of the land. The instructions, as given by the Supreme Court to the Peoples Court, are as follows:

(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the release after approval of the bail which it should fix for the purpose; (2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special prosecutor's attitude is not justified, it may ask him questions to ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or to judge the adequacy of the amount of bail;

(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer any particular question on the ground that the answer any particular question on the ground that the answer may involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office of Special Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the rights of the defendant or detainee. In sum, the Court held: It is our considered opinion that the procedure adopted by the People's Court, after the hearing whereby it examined the special prosecutor's evidence in a private inquiry without the presence of the petitioner, and upon the basis of knowledge acquired therein, it denied the application for bail, is improper, arbitrary, and constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. As the great bulwark of justice, the Tribunal therefore granted the petition for bail, in the said recommended amount.

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE V CA G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010 J Corona FACTS: Jose Antonio Leviste was conivted by the RTC of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk of flight on his part. The CA denied petitioners application for bail. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioner quotes section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. His theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal. ISSUE: Whether the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any circumstanced mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court? HELD: NO

1. WORDING OF THIRD PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 5, RULE 114 CONTRADICTS PETITIONERS INTERPRETATION Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the following rules: xxx xxx xxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5); f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x

The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter. In view of the grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed.[32] It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the applicant,[33] among other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court.[34] In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.[35] This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound, specially since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals except for substantial error. The very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to the following or other similar circumstances. Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal. 2. PETITIONERS THEORY DEVIATES FROM HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF RULE ON BAIL PENDING APPEAL In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons. In fact, it has even been pointed out that grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5. Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following: The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction . From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is a matter of wise discretion. 3. MAY FINAL WORD PA SI CORONA Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied) After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Paderanga vs Drilon (1991) FACTS: On October 16, 1986, an information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court, Gingoog City, against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the deaths on May 1, 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Venue was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter No. 87-2-244. Only Felipe Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused remained at large. Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since then. In an amended information filed on October 6, 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and "Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained petitioner Paderanga as his counsel. As counsel for Roxas, petitioner filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on October 14, 1988. The trial court in an order dated January 9, 1989, denied this omnibus MOTION but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce whatever evidence he has in support of his defense." In the course of the preliminary investigation, through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated herein petitioner in the commission of the crime charged.

State Prosecutor moved for the amendment of the information to include petitioner. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, 2 contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet completed when said resolution was promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and additional evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The motion was, however, denied by respondent Gingoyon in his order dated January 29, 1990. 3 Issues raised by Petitioner in his petition for mandamus and prohibition: Petitioner raises two basic issues, namely: (1) that the preliminary investigation as to him was not complete; and (2) that there exists no prima facie evidence or probable cause to justify his inclusion in the second amended information. Held: Petition dismissed. Ratio Definition of Preliminary Examination Generally inquisitorial, often only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial discretion to determine wither or not a criminal case should be filed in Court. General Rule: Injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution Exception (Brocka vs Enrile): 1. Afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused 2. Necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions 3. When there is a prejudicial question 4. When the acts of the officers are without or excess of authority 5. Double jeopardy is clearly apparent 6. When the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense 7. A case of persecution rather than prosecution 8. The charges are manifestly false and motivated by vengeance 9. Clearly no Prima Facie case against the accused The right of the accused to ask clarificatory questions is not ABSOLUTE. QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE required in preliminary investigation is such such evidence sufficient to engender a wellfounded belief as to the fact of the omission of a crime and respondents probable guilt.

G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010 JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE vs.HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS Facts: Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) was, by Information, charged with homicide for the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Petitioner was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati Medical Center. After petitioner posted a bond which the trial court approved,he was released from detention, and his arraignment was set.

The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. Issue: Whether or not in cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused. Held: No. The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation. All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor The private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after the information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case.Thus, in cases where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal action, and is granted the authority to prosecute, the private complainant, by counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion for reinvestigation. In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Once the trial court grants the prosecutions motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion wide and far reaching regarding the disposition thereof, subject to the trial courts approval of the resulting proposed course of action.

Leviste v Alameda (August 3, 2010) Facts: Leviste was charged with homicide for the death of Rafael delas Alas. Presiding Judge Alameda issued a commitment order against Leviste who was placed under police custody while confined at Makati Med. Leviste posted bail, and he was arraigned on January 2007. The heirs of delas Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the prosecutor to re-examine the evidence to determine the proper offense. RTC granted the motion of the heirs and denied Levistes motion for reconsideration. Leviste assailed the RTCs orders before CA. Leviste filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to defer acting on the public prosecutors recommendation on the proper offense until after CA resolves his application for injuctive reliefs; he also moved for the inhibition of J. Alameda. RTC instead admitted the Amended Infor for murder and issued a warrant of arrest for Leviste and set his arraignment on Feb. 2007. Leviste questioned the two orders. CA subsequently dismissed Levistes petition hence this present petition. Leviste alleged that the heirs did not have the right to cause the reinvestigation when the information had already been filed; therefore, J. Alameda acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the amended information.

The arraignment pushed through during which Leviste refused to plead. RTC rendered a decision finding leviste guilty of homicide. Leviste appealed to CA. CA denied his appeal, which SC affirmed. During all of these, Leviste posted bail. OSG argues that this petition had been rendered moot since the presentation of evidence concludes that Leviste actively participated in the crime. ISSUE: 1. WON posting of bail bars Leviste from questioning the regularity of the reinvestigation NO 2. WON the reinvestigation is valid (ie, can the heirs/complainant validly requiest for reinvestigation Yes 3. WON the orders of the RTC are valid considering that Levistes objections over the said orders are still pending in the CA Yes, valid 4. WON a hearing for probable cause is necessary given that an amended information (revised charge) was accepted by the Judge - No HELD: 1. No. Sec 26 Rule 114: Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation. Therefore, by applying for bail, Leviste did not waive his right to challenge the regularity of the reinvestigation, and the validity of the amended information and the legality of his arrest, since he raised them prior to his arraignment. He even refused to enter a plea because the issues he raised were still pending resolution by CA. GR: The accused after arraignment is precluded from questioning illegal arrest or lack of/irregular preliminary investigation if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial without previously invoking his objections Exc:. When this right has been waived. There must be clear and convincing proof that Leviste had an actual intention to relinquish his right to question the existence of probable cause. Based on the vigorous objections of Leviste and his refusal to enter a plea, the Court did not find a valid waiver. Whatever delay from Levistes availment of remedies against the RTC cannot be imputed to him to operate as a valid waiver. However, the petition is moot because the RTC already rendered a judgment. Moot and academic cases are those that cease to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. This supervening event is the RTC decision finding LEviste guilty of homicide. Even if there is a ground to annul the finding of probable cause for murder (the crime imputed in the amended information), there is no practical use since he was found guilty of homicide (the original crime imputed to him). 2. Right to seek investigation or re-evaluation of a case except through a petition for review before the DOJ Leviste contends that in cases when an accused is arrested without a warrant, the remedy of preliminary investigation belongs only to the accused. Court No, the complainant can request for investigation. A complainant in a criminal case becomes a witness, and by himself cannot ask for reinvestigation. This is the privilege of the public prosecutor who controls the case. However, if complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in criminal actions (private prosecutor), the complainant can file motion for reinvestigation.

The Court also cited Sec 6, Rule 112 and the rules on PI and Inquest: When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person. Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception. After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule. GR: PI is required before the filing of complaint, except when there is no need for PI in cases of lawful arrest without warrant, so long as an inquest has been conducted. Inquest an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest, for the purpose of determining whether said persons should remain under custody and be charged in court. Process: 1. The complainant may coordinate with the arresting officer and the inquest officer for the arrest of the accused before the filing of complaint or information. This must be followed by an Inquest proceeding. However, the arrested person has the option to avail of a 15-day PI (instead of inquest), provided he signs a waiver of any objection against delay in his delivery to the proper judicial authorities (Art 125 RPC). Remedy under Art 125 belong therefore to the arrested person. 2. The inquest ends with either the filing of information or immediate release of the arrested person. Under the Rules, there is no MFR on inquest result neither is there appeal to DOJ Secretary available in inquest. The 2000 National Prosecution Service Rule on Appeal, Sec 1 states that appeal applies only to PI/reinvestigation. Therefore, in inquest, the arrested party must first avail of PI before he can appeal to DOJ. If the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, then the complainant may request a regular PI. 3. Once a complaint or information has been filed, the accused may request for PI within 5 days from knowledge of the complaint. And, under Sec 14, Rule 110, a complaint or information may be amended at anytime before the accused enters his plea. 4. There is need to determine WON the amendment is substantial. Substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. Mere formal amendments are (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of penalty, (2) amendments which do not charge another offense, (3) allegations which do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case, (4) amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, (5) amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness.

The Court held that there is substantial amendment. In this case, the remedy of accused in re-investigation is to present countervailing evidence on the propsed amended charge. However, Leviste failed to do so. 3. ROC state that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a TRO or writ of preliminary injuction has been issued. No such orders were issued by CA, hence, the RTC orders were validly rendered. Moreover, Leviste opted to forego appealing to the DOJ Secretary, which is a post-inquest remedy that was available after the reinvestigation and which could hve suspended the arraignment. 4. As to lack of additional hearing for judicial determination of probable cause considering that new evidence were adduced during the reinvestigation. The Court discussed two kinds of determination of probable cause: Executive and Judicial. Executive this is the one made during preliminary investigation. This is a function of the public prosecutor who is given broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those he believes committed the crime. The prosecutor has the quasi-judicial authority to determine WON a crim case must be filed in court. Judicial made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody. The Court held that the rules do not require a hearing to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrant.

Petition denied.