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Part I. Selection Type. Choose the letter of your best answer. 1.

Even if the Court approves the petition for Naturalization, the decision will not be executory until after (a) five years after promulgation (b) two years after the petition is filed (c) one year after promulgation (d) two years after promulgation of the decision. 2. The last step in the naturalization proceedings is (a) declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen (b) publication in the official gazette (c) taking the oath of allegiance (d) approval of the petition and rehearing thirty days after the promulgation of judgment of naturalization. 3. Which of the following is NOT a qualification for naturalization ? (a) residence in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than five years (b) age must be at least 21 years of age (c) mustown real estate worth not less than 5t pesos (d) able to speak and write tagalog. 4. Which of the following is NOT characteristic of status? (a) capacity is status (b) status is a social interest (c) it has a universal character (d) it is conferred by the state. 5. According to Falconbridge, there are three important steps in characterization. Which is not among these steps? (a) selection of the proper law (b) characterization of the question (c) application of the proper law (d) characterization of the factual situation. 6. Another word for the doctrine of qualification is (a) characterization (b) conflict resolution (c)selection of foreign law to be applied (d) decision making. 7. Which is true of a Filipino residing in a foreign country? (a) he can make a will only pursuant to Phil law (b) he can make a will in any form established by the law of the country in which he may be(c) if he makes a foreign will it cannot be probate in the Phil (d) he cannot make a will in that foreign country. 8. Capacity to succeed is governed by (a) the national law of the decedent (b) the law where he is domiciled (c) the law where his property is situated (d) the law of the place where he died. 9. Intestate succession is governed by what law? (a) the national law of the decedent (b) the law where he is domiciled (c) the law where his property is situated (d) the law of the place where he died. 10. In the absence of contrary stipulation in a marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of marriage and their residence. Which of the following is an exception to this rule? (a) when one of the spouses is an alien (b) when both spouses are aliens (c) with respect to the intrinsic validity of contracts affecting property not situated in the Phil (d) with respect to the extrinsic validity of the contracts affecting properties situated in the Phil. PART II. (5 points each) Essay type. Answer the following question briefly and concisely. Explain your answer. A mere yes or no answer earns no points.

1.Hix died with a will allegedly executed in accordance with the formalities of West Virginia Law. TO prove the existence of said foreign law, the proponent of the will presented in evidence a copyof said law found in a book taken from The Philippine National Library. Questions: (a)The corresponding certificate was signed by the Director of the National Library. Has the existence of said law been properly proved? (b) If the U.S. consul-general is presented to prove said law, will it suffice? (c) If the foreign law is not well proved, how will the court decide it?(d)What law shall be used pursuant to what principle of international law? 2.A testator, considered a Filipino citizen under our law, and a Chinese under Chinese law, died in France, leaving properties in the Philippines. Questions: (a) How should a Filipino judge in a Philippine Court determine the successional rights to the estate of the deceased? B) If A is considered a Chinese under Chinese law and a Japanese under Japanese Law but died in Manila leaving properties in the Philippines, but prior to his death, he was domiciled in Japan, what law shall be applied? 3.An illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother was registered in the Civil Registry as Chinese. She filed a petition for the correction of the entry to make her citizenship read as Filipino in view of the absence of marriage between her parents. Question: Will the petition prosper? 4. A Filipina works as a Flight Stewardess of an Arabian airline which maintains an office in the Philippines. While their plane landed in Indonesia, her co-crew who are citizens of Saudi Arabia attempted to rape her. She filed a case in the Philippines for attempted rape. Questions: (a) Will the suit prosper? (b)If not where should the case be filed? (c) IF she decides to file an action for damages against the airline, will your answer be the same?Explain your answer. 5. On March 30, 1999, petitioner Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd. (Nippon), a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments,3 entered into an Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese national permanently residing in the Philippines.4 The agreement provides that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year starting on April 1, 1999.5 Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's consultancy contract with the Philippine Government.6 When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, on January 28, 2000, this

time for the detailed engineering and construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project.7 Respondent was named as the project manager in the contract's Appendix 3.1.8 On February 28, 2000, petitioner Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its International Division, informed respondent that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's expiry.9 Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project. Nippon insisted that respondents contract was for a fixed term that had already expired, and refused to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.10 As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent consequently initiated on June 1, 2000 Civil Case No. 00-0264 for specific performance and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Lipa City.11 Questions: (a) Will the suit prosper in our local courts? (b)What principles of conflict rules shall be applied on the matter? Explain. Distinguish residence from domicile. Explain the meaning of residence within the context of our election law and in the context of international law. Answer: It can be readily gleaned that the definition of "residence" for purposes of election law is more stringent in that it is equated with the term "domicile." Hence, for the said purpose, the term "residence" imports "not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention."[22] When parsed, therefore, the term "residence" requires two elements: (1) intention to reside in the particular place; and (2) personal or physical presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. As the Court elucidated, "the place where a party actually or constructively has a permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., hisdomicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law."[23] On the other hand, for purposes of venue, the less technical definition of "residence" is adopted. Thus, it is understood to mean as "the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residencesimply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile."[24] Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in

relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Put in another manner, Southern Leyte, as the domicile of petitioner Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time." On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo who is a duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila married the complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena (a Filipina) and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately each other. On May 25, 1935 they executed a document which in part says that each one is free to look for a rightful partner. On June 15, 1935, the Rodolfo without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband and wife in the city of Manila. Questions: (1) Is the divorce obtained by Rodolfo valid in the Philippines? (2) Can the two complaints against him, one for bigamy and another for concubinage prosper in the Philippines? (3)Rodolfo contends that he is immune from suit as he is a consul of Uruguay, is he correct? (4) Based on your readings, is Rodolfo liable for bigamy and concubinage? Explain your answer. Answer: (a)The divorce obtained by Rodolfo is not valid in the Philippines. There is no divorce law in the Philippines. (b)The complaint for bigamy is proper since he obtained two marriages. THE concubinage charge however must be dismissed for the reason that there is already condonation when they agreed to part ways based on the executed document. (c) A consul does not enjoy immunity,hence he is not immune from suit. (4) Rodolfo is made liable for bigamy only.(Sheneckenburger case) What is the effect of a foreign judgment in our Philippine courts? Answer: SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Is their an obligatory rule from treaties and conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments? Or allow for the enforcement thereof? Explain.

Answer: There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District Court), District of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military forces during the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international law. These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a class of similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable. The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of which were invoked by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court certified the case as a class action and created three (3) sub-classes of torture, summary execution and disappearance victims.Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real, rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgmentwas eventually affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996. On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the Final Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages. They argued that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force. On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to

dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a monetary amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141. Questions: As judge, will you grant the motion to dismiss? Explain your answer. Petitioner Alice is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn. Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent Richard filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Is the ruling of the Court correct? Explain your answer. Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order "relinquishing" jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the

Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree. In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained respondents motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise agreements on jurisdiction. Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction over the case. In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his nationality. Question: Is the ruling of the Court correct? Explain your answer. Answer: The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is contrary to law. In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.12Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed "inexistent and void from the beginning."13For lack of relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to test the validity of the Agreements joint child custody stipulation s.14 At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2) petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in law15 (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: "no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x." 16 (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody17 to the mother is mandatory,18 grounded on sound policy consideration,19 subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to obtain here. 20 ) Clearly then, the Agreements object to establish a post -divorce joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old contravenes Philippine law. The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement

would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together.21 However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.22 It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that "No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise." To limit this provisions enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children under seven years of age "to avoid a tragedy where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her."23 This ignores the legislative basis that "[n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of tender age."24 It could very well be that Article 213s bias favoring one separated parent (mother) over the other (father) encourages paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody, robs the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making between the separated parents.25 However, these are objections which question the laws wisdom not its validity or uniform enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rules seeming harshness or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the father visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under seven years of age, in case of disagreements. Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the childs seventh year. From the eighth year until the childs emancipation, the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting sole custody over Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the second

paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on respondent sole custody of Stephanie. Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decrees alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse26 - to support the Agreements enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v. Romillo27 settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.28There, we dismissed the alien divorcees Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this jurisdiction in this wise: There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy. It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxxx Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied) We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera29 to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he no longer qualified as "offended spouse" entitled to file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce. The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her. On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Question: Is the contention of Rodolfo San Luis correct? Explain. 9. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be

judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert wa s not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. Article 26 of the Family Code reads: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." Question: Is the RTC correct in its ruling? Explain. 10. On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two

complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". The city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. Question: Will the adultery case against Imelda prosper? Explain your answer. NO. When the foreign spouse obtained divorce, he is no longer considered as a proper person to file the case for adultery, as strictly speaking he can no longer be considered as the spouse of the Filipina. 1. The RTC of Sindangan appointed X as guardian of minor Y, in a special proceeding. Y is allegedly the son of a U.S. Veteran. X received the arrears of beneficiary Y. Later on, the U.S. Veterans Administration filed a case in Washington D.C. for the refund of the benefits received by Y, on the ground of wrong payment since it was found that the U.S. Veteran was a fake. Question: Does the court in Washington D.C. have jurisdiction concerning the case of refund? Explain. No, the point of contact here is the Philippines. (see p. 316) It was ruled: The provisions of the U.S. Code, invoked by the appellant, make the decisions of the U.S. Veteran Administrator final and conclusive when made on claims properly submitted to him for resolution; but they are not applicable to the present case, where the Administrator is not acting as a judge but as a litigant. There is a great difference between actions against the Administrator (which must be filed strictly in accordance with the conditions that are imposed by the Veterans' Act, including the exclusive review by United States courts), and those actions where the veterans' Administrator seeks a remedy from our courts and submits to their jurisdiction by filing actions therein. Our attention has not been called to any law or treaty that would make the findings of the Veterans' Administrator, in actions where he is a party, conclusive on our courts. That in effect, would deprive our tribunals or judicial discretion and render them mere subordinate instrumentalities of the veterans' Administrator. (In Re Guardianship of the Minor Roy Reginald Lelina. SEVERO VILORIA, guardian and oppositor-appellee, vs.ADMINISTRATOR OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, G.R. No. L-9620 June 28, 1957petitioner-appellant.) In an analogous case, we have ruled: By filing this action of partition in the court a quo, the Philippine Alien Property Administrator has submitted to its jurisdiction and put in issue the legality of his vesting order. He can not therefore now dispute this power. (Brownell vs. Bautista, 50 Off. Gaz., 4772.) From the time the amounts now sought to be recovered where paid to the appellee guardian, for the ward's benefit, the latter became their lawful possessor and he can not be deprived thereof on the sole allegation of the Veterans' Administrator that the money was erroneously paid. The burden lies upon him to satisfy the court that the alleged mistake was really committed; and the Philippine courts' determination of the

question is as binding upon the Veterans' Administrator as upon any other litigant. Concerning the claim itself, we agree with the court below that it was not properly filed in the guardianship proceedings, since the latter are solely concerned with the ward's care a custody and the proper administration or management of his properties. Conflicts regarding ownership or title to the property in the hands of the guardian, in his capacity as such, should be litigated in a separate proceeding.

2.Can Philippine courts recognize a foreign decree of adoption? Explain your answer. See p. 313 of the book

Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its own law.4It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once created under the proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country, except where public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our Civil Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign adoption "remains subject to local law."5 (JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitionerappellant, vs.LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila,respondent-appellee. G.R. No. L24006 November 25, 1967) It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of foreign adoptions. We hold that an adoption created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be governed by the laws of this country.6 3.Ching Leng , a Chinese man was granted Philippine citizenship upon his marriage to a Filipina in 1950. His wife filed an adoption to Ching's five illegitimate minor childen. The adoption was granted. Ching then filed a petition to cancel the alien certificates of registration of said minors on the theory that they have become Filipino citizens by virtue of the adoption. Is Ching Leng correct? Explain. Cheng Leng is wrong. The Alien certificates of registration will not be cancelled because the adopted children have not become Filipinos (see p. 312). Minor children refer to legitimate children only and not the illegitimates. 4.Alvin, a natural born U.S. citizen and his wife Evelyn, a natural born filipina who in 1988 became a naturalized citizen, jointly filed in 1990 a petition for adoption of Solomon, Evelyn's 12 year old brother. Are Alvin and Evelyn qualified to adopt? Explain. NO, an alien who may adopt a Filipino is one who is a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt a relative by consanguinity, or one seeking to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino

spouse, or one who is married to a Filipino seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. None of these requisites are present in the case at bar. (p. 308) 5.In State X, all children whether born inside or outside wedlock are considered legitimate. In State Y, all children born outside wedlock are illegitimate. Now then, a child is born outside wedlock of a father, who is a citizen of State Y, and a mother, who is a citizen of State X. Questions: (a) Should the Philippine courts consider the child legitimate or illegitimate? (b) What country's law shall govern the relationship of parents and child? (p. 304) The child shall be considered illegitimate since that is the characterization under the fathers law. Inasmuch as the child is illegitimate, the relationship shall be governed by the mothers law. 6.Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini, Pangasinan. Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988. On June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Petitioner contends that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City against Orlando and Merope. Question: Does petitioner have the personality to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy? Why? A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree becomes absolute. We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence Hence, a remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage as bigamous and void ab initio. 7. Leouel, a member of the Army, met Julia in Iloilo City. In September 1986, they got married. The couple latter lived with Julias parents. Julia gave birth to a son in 1987. Their marriage, however, was marred by the frequent interference of

Julias parent as averred by Leouel. The couple also occasionally quarrels about as to, among other things, when should they start living independently from Julias parents. In 1988, Julia went to the US to work as a nurse despite Leouels opposition. 7 months later, she and Leouel got to talk and she promised to return home in 1989. She never went home that year. In 1990, Leouel got the chance to be in the US due to a military training. During his stay, he desperately tried to locate his wife but to no avail. Leouel, in an effort to at least have his wife come home, filed a case to nullify their marriage due to Julias psychological incapacity. Leouel asserted that due to Julias failure to return home or at least communicate with him even with all his effort constitutes psychological incapacity. Question: As judge will you grant the nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity? Explain. Before deciding on the case, the SC noted that the Family Code did not define the term psychological incapacity, which is adopted from the Catholic Canon Law. But basing it on the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee, the provision adopted with less specificity than expected, has been designed to allow some resiliency in its application. The FCRC did not give any examples of PI for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the FCRC would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law. The term psychological incapacity defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety. Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. PI should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which (Art. 68), include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of PI to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The SC also notes that PI must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. In the case at bar, although Leouel stands aggrieved, his petition must be dismissed because the alleged PI of his wife is not clearly shown by the factual settings presented. The factual settings do not come close to to the standard required to decree a nullity of marriage.

8. IN 1948, Pastor and Vicenta were married before the catholic church in Cebu City. On Oct. 22, 1950 Vicenta obtained an absolute divorce in Nevada U.S.A., after which she married John Nichols, an American.They resided in Nevada since then, when she finally acquired her American citizenship in 1958. Meanwhile, Pastor filed legal separation proceedings in the Philippines plus damages. Questions:(a) Will the petition for legal separation and the claim for damages prosper?(b) State the "doctrines" laid in this case. The petition for legal separation will not prosper. THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE between Vicenta and Tenchaves: With regard to jurisdiction over Escano, the court states that when against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the matter , and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The point is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines. Divorce, although successfully obtained in another country, cannot be applied in the Philippines since it is contrary to public policy. The principle is well-established, in private international law, that foreign decrees cannot be enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy. Furthermore, Vicentas refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to damages (2176). When, however, the action against the non-resident defendant affects the personal status of the plaintiff, as, for instance, an action for separation or for annulment of marriage, ..., Philippine courts may validly try and decide the case, because, then, they have jurisdiction over the res, and in that event their jurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential. The res is the personal status of the plaintiff domiciled in the Philippines, 45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive: filing of suit nay have wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously injured their reputation or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society.

9. Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The marriage produced four children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States and both lived as husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced one offspring. During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. On August 13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.

Question: Does Perez have a legal interest in the matter of litigation required of a would-be-intervenor in Tristans petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his wife? Why? No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce. Petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her motion for intervention is based. 10. October 1986, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married in Bacoor, Cavite. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. Questions: (1) Is the abandonment by the husband of his family and his insensitivity to them automatically constitute psychological incapacity? (2) Do the requirements of psychological incapacity apply to mixed marriages? Explain. 1. No. the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. In Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)

sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. 2. The husband being a Japanese national is immaterial in proving psychological incapacity, no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. 1. Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Es critor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other hand, Quilapio is still legal ly married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will a ppear as if the court allows such act. Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio, Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office. ISSUE:Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement. 2. Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Negros Oriental. Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively. On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997. The parental custody of the children was granted to the father. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner already has obtained a divorce decree from a German court.

2. To whom should the custody of their children be awarded? 3. On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. LapuzSy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.In his second amended answer to the petition, respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O. LapuzSy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok. Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen O. LapuzSy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death. ISSUES: 1. Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action? 2. If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property rights? 4. Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case. ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case for concubinage. 5. On 29 May 1986, private respondent, the legal wife of the petitioner filed civil case against petitioner for legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, with a petition for support and payment of damages. On 13 October 1986, private respondent also filed criminal case against petitioner for concubinage. On 14 November 1986, application for the provisional remedy of supportpendente lite, pending a decision in the action for legal separation, was filed by private respondent in the civil case for legal separation. The respondent

judge, as already stated, on 10 December 1986, ordered The payment of support pendente lite. ISSUES:1. Does conviction for concubinage be secured first before the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed? 2. Did the respondent judge gravely abuse his discretion on the alleged partiality in ordering the payment of support to the wife pendente lite. ? 6. Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals On February 8, 1931 Respondent Consuelo David married Arturo Tolentino. Then on September 15, 1943 Marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3 continuous years Arturo Tolentio married Pular Adorable but she died soon after the marriage. Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945 and they have 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino. Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers and sisters). Trial Court ruled that Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of the surname of Tolentino. But the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Trial Court. Issues: 1. Whether or Not the petitioners cause of action has already prescribed 2. Whether or not the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo David from using the surname of her former husband from whom she was divorced. 7. Vicente and Rebecca are husband and wife. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen born in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar TanchiongMakapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American. Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican court granted the divorce and the same court settled the couples property relations pursuant to an agreement they executed. Meanwhile, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage. Rebecca, however, later moved and secured approvalof the motion to withdraw the petition. On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente. On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000. Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior

judgment of divorce. To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage. ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of divorce is valid. 8. On 7 February 1958 plaintiff Lavern R. Dilweg, a nonresident American citizen, through counsel, instituted the complaint at bar consisting of six causes of action against defendants Robert O. Phillips, Inocentes G. Dineros, and Isaac S. Eceta, claiming civil damages arising out of alleged libelous and defamatory statements uttered and published in the Philippines by the latter. On 24 February 1958 the first two named defendants presented a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff interposed an opposition thereto on 7 March 1958. On 11 May 1961 the trial court issued an order, which is the subject of the present appeal, the pertinent portion of which is as follows: "This action is one for damages by reason of alleged libelous statements uttered in the Philippines by the defendants against the plaintiff. In other words, it is an action bared on a tort or act, which under the law of the Philippines, is defined as a criminal offense. At the time the said libelous statements were uttered, the plaintiff was in Washington, D.C. where, he was and has always been a resident. There is no allegation in the complaint that plaintiff has ever been in the Philippines or has resided at anytime therein. "The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff by the filing of his complaint. It was contended that as the plaintiff therein has never been a resident of the Philippines, the courts of this country have not acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of his action bared on a contract which was executed in the State of New York,USA. The Court has come to conclusion that in order that it may validly try this case, it must have jurisdiction not only over the persons of the parties and over the subject matter and the plaintiff must be a resident within the territorial of this Court in order that jurisdiction over his person can be acquired, otherwise the Court will not be able to render a valid judgment against him. ISSUE: Whether or not our Philippine courts can rightfully refuse to assume jurisdiction over a personal action instituted by a nonresident alien who is not within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts? 9. On September 2, 1952, Alfonsa Pelingon filed a claim for compensation for herself and her two minor children with the Workmen's Compensation Commission against the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., who refused to entertain the claim on the ground that said company was not the employer of the deceased husband of the claimant. On September 17, 1952, the Workmen's Compensation Commission, believing that the Pacific Far East Line, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines, was not an agent of petitioner with authority to receive service of process, served notice of the claim on an official of said foreign corporation who in turn forwarded the notice to petitioner even if the latter was not an

agent of, nor was it authorized to accept service of process in behalf of, said petitioner. On October 10, 1952, petitioner filed a special appearance with the Workmen's Compensation Commission for the sole purpose of asking for the dismissal of the claim on the ground that the Commission had no jurisdiction over it because it is a foreign corporation not domiciled in this country, it is not licensed to engage and is not engaging in business therein, has no office in the Philippines, and is not represented by any agent authorized to receive summons or any other judicial process in its name and behalf. ISSUE: Since petitioner is a private foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines in contemplation of the rule, can it be brought within the jurisdiction of our courts by serving the summons upon the agent who represented it in entering into the contract of employment with the deceased Luceno Pelingon? 10. The property in dispute consists of four parcels of land situated in Tondo, Manila, with a total area of 29,151 sq. m., which, after the last world war, was found by the Alien Property Custodian of the United States to be registered in the name of Asaichi Kagawa, national of an enemy country, Japan. For such reason, the said Custodian, on March 14, 1946, issued a vesting order on the authority of the Trading with the Enemy Act of the United States, vesting in himself the ownership over two of the said lots, Lots Nos. 1 and 2; and subsequently under the same statue, on Lots 3 and 4 on July 6, 1948. Two formal agreements were then executed, one referring to Lots 1 and 2 and the other to Lots 3 and 4; whereby the said Administrator transferred all the said four lots to the Republic of the Philippines upon indemnifying the U.S. On the theory that the lots in question still belonged to Arsenia Enriquez, the latter's son Benito E. Lim filed on November 15, 1948 a formal notice of claim to the property with the Philippine Alien Property Administrator. On November 13, 1950, the claimant Benito E. Lim, as administrator of the intestate estate of Arsenia Enriquez, filed a complaint in the CFI of Manila against the Philippine Alien Property Administrator (later substituted by the Attorney General of the United States) for the recovery of the property in question with back rents. ISSUE: Has the action for the recovery of real property prescribed stripping the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter?

How to prove the divorce obtained abroad? In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service

stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. what is the effect of foreign judgment in our court? The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries.[17] This principle was prominently affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot[18] and expressly recognized in our jurisprudence beginning with Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.[19] The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn, was derived from the California Act of March 11, 1872.[20] Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Civil Procedure has remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly a century. Section 48 states: What is the effect of foreign judgment is our local courts? SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows: (a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing; (b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Is their an obligatory rule that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments? or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof? There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.[66]The classical formulation in international law sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.[67] While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law.[68] As earlier demonstrated, there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding

universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement. What is "Opinio juris sive necessitatis"? How is it applied in international law? Opinio juris sive necessitatis ("an opinion of law or necessity") or simply opinio juris ("an opinion of law") is the belief that an action was carried out because it was a legal obligation. This is in contrast to an action being the result of different cognitive reaction, or behaviors that were habitual to the individual. This term is frequently used in legal proceedings such as a defense for a case. Opinio juris is the subjective element of custom as a source of law, both domestic andinternational, as it refers to beliefs. The other element is state practice, which is more objective as it is readily discernible. To qualify as state practice, the acts must be consistent and general international practice. STATE APPLICATIONS A situation where opinio juris would be feasible is a case concerning self-defense. A condition must be met where the usage of force is limited to the situation at hand. The act of striking an attacker may be done with legal justification; however, legal territory limits the acceptability of such a claim. Even in this case, the usage of force must be acceptable to the conditions of the environment, the attacker, and the physical conditions of the people involved, as well as any weapons or tools used. INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS In international law, opinio juris is the subjective element which is used to judge whether the practice of a state is due to a belief that it is legally obliged to do a particular act. [1] When opinio juris exists and is consistent with nearly all state practice, customary international law emerges. Opinio juris essentially means that states must act in compliance with the norm not merely out of convenience, habit, coincidence, or political expediency, but rather out of a sense of legal obligation.[2] [1] Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice accepts international custom as a source of law, but only where this custom is 1) evidence of a general practice, (the objective component) (2) accepted as law. (the opinio juris or subjective component) [3] Thus, for example, while it may be observed that heads of state virtually always shake hands when they first meet, it is highly unlikely that they do so because they believe that a rule of international law requires it. On the other hand, a state would almost certainly expect some form of legal repercussions if it were to prosecute a foreign ambassador without the consent of his or her home state, and in this sense opinio juris does exist for the international law rule of diplomatic immunity. Because opinio juris refers to the psychological state of the state actorasking why the state behaved as it didit can be difficult to identify and to prove. In practice, a variety of sources tend to be used to demonstrate the existence of opinio juris, including evidence such as diplomatic correspondence,

press releases and other government statements of policy, opinions of legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, legislation, national and international judicial decisions, legal briefs endorsed by the state, a pattern of treaties ratified by the state that all include the same obligation(s), resolutions and declarations by the United Nations, and other sources. In the Paquete Habana case (decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1900 on the question of whether small coastal fishing boats are immune from capture during war time under customary international law), evidence of opinio juris included medieval English royal ordinances, agreements between European nations, orders issued to the U.S. Navy in earlier conflicts, and the opinions of legal treatise writers. Finally, the context, circumstances, and manner in which the state practice is carried out can also be used to infer the existence of opinio juris. As the ICJ stated in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases of 1969, Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. [4] Nonetheless, it should be noted that a state's motives can change over time, and that it is not necessary that opinio juris be a significant impetus for each instance of action. As Judge Lachs noted in a dissenting opinion in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, At successive stages in the development of the [customary] rule the motives which have prompted States to accept it have varied from case to case. It could not be otherwise. At all events, to postulate that all States, even those which initiate a given practice, believe themselves to be acting under a legal obligation is to resort to a fiction, and in fact to deny the possibility of developing such rules.[5] As difficult as it can be to prove why an actor did act in a certain way, it is exponentially more difficult to prove why it did not act. For this reason, the necessity of demonstrating that a behavior was prompted by a sense of legal obligation makes it particularly difficult for customary international law to develop around the prohibition of a practice. One important case in the development of modern customary international law theory is the S.S. Lotus case, in which France attempted to protest Turkey's assertion of criminal jurisdiction over a French citizen for acts committed on the high seas (outside of Turkey's territory). France presented a number of historical examples to demonstrate that the state of nationality or the state whose flag the ship had flown had exclusive jurisdiction in cases such as this. However, the Permanent Court of International Justice (a precursor to the ICJ) declared that the evidence showed merely that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom.[6] This reasoning was cited approvingly in the North Sea Shelf Continental Cases, which similarly declined to find the existence of customary law regarding the proper method to delimit territorial claims to the continental shelf extending from the coastline of states bordering the North Sea.[7] The ICJ also declined to find evidence of customary international law in an opinion on the legality of the use or threat of nuclear weapons, despite what some argued to be uniform state practice. As in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, it found that the mere fact that no state had used nuclear weapons against another state since World War II did not reflect opinio juris. Some states had pointed out that a series of U.N. resolutions had

been issued that deal with nuclear weapons and that affirm, with consistent regularity, the illegality of nuclear weapons, and argued that this signified the existence of a rule of international customary law which prohibits recourse to those weapons.[8] Nonetheless, the ICJ noted that states possessing nuclear weapons had almost always objected to these resolutions, which strongly suggests that those states did not believe that a customary law prohibiting their use existed. Moreover, it noted that the non-use of nuclear weapons could actually provide evidence of their use as a deterrent force.[9] This logical framework makes sense for existing norms of customary international law, but it becomes problematic in the context of new or emerging customary rules. If a practice is not currently governed by customary international law, then it is illogical to inquire into a state's beliefs about the legality of engaging in or abstaining from that practice, i.e., to ask whether it believed that its practice was in compliance with a law that does not yet exist. This paradox may be resolved to some extent by the idea of crystallization of customary international law, in which practice and legal obligation evolve jointly and eventually ripen into law. Under one model, this process occurs in three stages: first, some States engage in a given practice for reasons other than a sense of legal obligation (e.g. political expediency, economic gain, courtesy, etc.); next, States reinforce the practice by engaging in it or making claims based upon it, creating loops of reciprocity and reliance based on expectations that the practice will continue; finally, as these relationships expand in number and complexity, they eventually harden into a general rule. In this final stage, as more States become aware of the conduct and actively participate or at least passively acquiesce to the practice, the States' actions begin to be undergirded by a belief that they are complying with an emerging customary rule. What is the doctrine of processual presumption?

Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining the issues presented before us.(emphasis and underscoring supplied) Does the Philippines take judicial notice of foreign laws? The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must be proven. How is a foreign law proved?

To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads: SEC. 24. Proof of official record. -- The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul

general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied) SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. -- Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court. 1. Marvin filed a civil suit in the Philippines against Jolina citing in his complaint a provision of law in Hong Kong. After Marvin rested his case, he realized that he failed to prove the provisions of the law he was invoking. In his memorand um, Marvin insisted that the Hong Kong provision shuld be applied considering that Hong Kong is just one hour away from plane, our courts can take cognizance of the said provision of law. Is Marvin correct? What will you do with the case? . 2. A, a former filipino citizen died intestate. He left all his properties, a 10-hectare industrial lot located in the Philippines to B, his only son who now resides in California. Prior to his death, A was already an American citizen and was residing with his son in California. C, a brother of A, contested the fitness of B to inherit from his father considering that a foreigner cannot own real properties in the Philippines. A posited that since it is his capacity that is in issue, the law of California should prevail. Render a legal opinion on the matter. . 3. Jang Geum, a naturalized Filipino, got married to Jung Jung, a Korean national. Their marriage was celebrated in Hong Kong, but on their fifth anniversary, they again had a wedding ceremony in Korea. Assuming the law in Korea allows an agreement to govern the properties of the spouse to be entered even after the marriage, and the spouses agreed on an "absolute separation of property" regime, may Jang Geum insist in Philippine Courts that their properties in the Philippines be considered as forming part of the absolute community of property? Why? . 4. Yao, a black African guy, got married to Ming, a Filipino born of a Chinese father. Before migrating to Africa, Ming worked as a waitress in Ma Mon Luk. When Ming was fired because the customers were turned off by her name (some arguing that because her name gives the impression that Ma Mon Luk's siopao is made from cat's meat), they went to live in Africa. Ming did not adopt the citizenship of her husband though. When Kobe, their first child was born, Yao was denying that the child is his. Ming argues that Yao has no proof that the child is not his. Ming considers Yao unfair and unreasonable for suspecting that he is not the father of Kobe simply because Hobe is white and has natural blonde hair. If you are the judge, how will you rule the case of yao? Explain.

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