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Interview for Ms. Jami Miscik

Position: Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Purpose: The purpose of this interview is to explore the state of the DI prior to 9-11, its
priorities, structure, capabilities and the quality of the intelligence produced. We also
want to understand what, if any, reform initiatives were proposed by Ms. Miscik prior to
9-11 and those that were put in place immediately after the attacks. This is the first of at
least two interviews of Ms. Miscik in an effort to understand the Directorate and to
explore questions related to analysis and warning. It is our intent to use this interview to
help pave the way for our interviews of DI analysts.

Key Questions
Background

1) Please provide for us an account of your positions at the CIA and the years that
you held those positions.
State of the Directorate of Intelligence Prior to 9-11

1) Please describe to us the state of affairs within the DI when you were appointed as
DDL Were you pleased with the quality of the work force? Was there sufficient
depth of knowledge to meet the challenges you were presented? Was it resources
properly?
2) What was the arrangement at that time with the CTC on the conduct of
counterterrorism analysis? How was it functioning? Was there an analytic
strategy for counterterrorism when you arrived as DDI?
3) How did you find the quality of the analysis being performed in the DDI? How
do you judge the quality of the analysis?
4) Do you take responsibility for the analytic product of the Counterterrorism
Center, even though it is located in the Directorate of Operations?
5) Prior to 9-11, how did you review and evaluate the analysis on terrorism you
were giving the White House each day?
6) How do you manage the Directorate's operations? What data sources do you use
to know who is doing what and for how much?
7) STRATEGIC RESEARCH/ANALYSIS: How much of the DI's efforts are spent
on current vs. strategic intelligence and is this an appropriate dichotomy to
examine intelligence analysis?
a. What role does long range analysis play in the work of the directorate?
b. What guidelines do you give your leadership team on how analysts should
spend their time with respect to long range research and anlsysis?

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

r^
8) PDB: Is the President's Daily Brief the primary focus of the DI or the primary
I focus of just the PDB staff of the DI? To what extent does it drive the day-to-day
/^ Activities of the Directorate?
9) WARNING: When you arrived, what was the DDF s role/responsibility for
warning? Has this changed after 9-11?
a. Who is responsible for warning of terrorist attacks to the President and the
cabinet?
b. How should the warning system work?
c. How does the DI work with the NIC, and in particular, the NIO for
warning?
10) What is the role of the ADCI for Analysis and Production? Does this individual
have oversight over the analytic agenda of the DI? Please describe the role he
plays in the DI.
11) Generally, how many detailees from other intelligence agencies are working in
the DI? Which agencies provide the largest number of detailees?
12) The DI is host to several "centers," how do you judge the effectiveness of these
Centers? How do you arbitrate tensions between the Centers and the geographic
offices?
Tradecraft of Analysis
1) Is the T/C of analysis unique for CT as compared to other substantive areas?
2) Does CT analysis require special training or can an analyst be moved from a non-
CT area to a CT account?

Directorate of Intelligence after 9-11

1) Please describe the events in the DI on the morning of 9-11. Did a team remain at
their post after the attacks to support the DCI and the White House? What
analytic requests were made in the immediate aftermath of the attacks?
2) Please recall for us the changes implemented in the immediate aftermath of the
attacks (9-11 to 9-20).
3) Please describe the reforms made to the organization of the DI after 9-11.
4) What resources were reallocated to increase the DI's efforts on CT? What issues
were dropped in order to increase efforts on CT?
5) What new responsibilities does the DI have today to provide intelligence to non-
traditional departments and agencies in the aftermath of 9-11?
6) How do you evaluate the effectiveness of these changes to the CT analytic
product?
7) How do you evaluate the quality of the analysis the DI is producing today?
8) What do you see as the greatest challenges to the DI in the months and years
ahead?

COMMISSION SENSITIVE 2
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

Interview for Ms. Jami Miscik

Position: Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Purpose: The purpose of this interview is to explore the state of the DI prior to 9-11, its
priorities, structure, capabilities and the quality of the intelligence produced. We also ^
want to understand what, if any, reform initiatives were proposed by Ms. Miscik prior toj
9-11 and those that were put in place immediately after the attacks. /This is the first of lit
least two interviews of Ms. Miscik in an effort to understand the Directorate and to
explore questions related to analysis and warning. It is our intent to use this interview to ' ^J
help pave the way for our interviews of DI analysts. ,i ~ , . ^>r

^ Key Questions

Background

1) Please provide for us an account of your positions at the CIA and the years that
you held those positions.
State of the Directorate of Intelligence Prior to 9-11

1) Please describe to us the state of affairs within the DI when you were appointed as
DDI. Were you pleased with the quality of the work force? Was there sufficient
depth of knowledge to meet the challenges you were presented? Was it resource^ a.
properly?
2) What was the arrangement at that time with the CTC on the conduct of
counterterrorism analysis? How was it functioning? Was there an analytic
strategy for counterterrorism when you arrived as DDI?
3) How did you find the quality of the analysis being performed in the DDI? How
do you judge the quality of the analysis?
4) Do you take responsibility for the analytic product of the Counterterrorism
Center, even though it is located in the Directorate of Operations? JPrior to 9-11,
how did you review and evaluate the analysis on terrorism you weregiving the j.T^-f
White House each day?
5) How do you manage the Directorate's operations? What data sources do you use
to know who is doing what and for how much?
6) How much of the DI's efforts are spent on current vs. strategic intelligence and is
this an appropriate dichotomy to examine intelligence analysis?
7) Is the President's Daily Brief the primary focus of the DI or the primary focus of
just the PDB staff of the DI? To what extent does it drive the day-to-day
activities of the Directorate?
8) When you arrived, what was the DDFs role/responsibility for warning? Has this
changed after 9-11? Who is responsible for warning of terrorist attacks to the
President and the cabinet?

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 -j"
c COMMISSION SENSITIV

How does the DI work with the NIC, and in particular, the NIO for warning?
-<> A
10) What is the role of the ADCI for Analysis and Production? Does this individual
/c have oversight over the analytic agenda of the DI? Please describe the role he
plays in the DI.
11) Generally, how many detailees from other intelligence agencies are working in
the DI? Which agencies provide the largest number of detailees?
12) The DI is host to several "centers," how do you judge the effectiveness of these
Centers? How do you arbitrate tensions between the Centers and the geographic
offices?

Directorate of Intelligence after 9-11

1) Please describe the events in the DI on themoming of 9-ljj>Did a team remain at
Cjheirpost after the attacks to support the"DCT and the~White House?JWhat
analytic requests were made in the immediate aftermath of the attacks?
2) Please recall for us the changes implemented in the immediate aftermath of the
attacks (9-11 to 9-20).
3) Please describe the reforms made to the organization of the DI after 9-11.
4) What resources were reallocated to increase the DI's efforts on CT? What issues
were dropped in order to increase efforts on CT?
5) What new responsibilities does the DI have today to provide intelligence to non-
traditional departments and agencies in the aftermath of 9-11?
6) How do you evaluate the effectiveness of these changes to the CT analytic
product?
•2
7) How do you evaluate the quality of the analysis the DI is producing today?!'* * &,-•
8) What do you see as the greatest challenges to the DI in the months and years
ahead?

.
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 .:INBOX:Miscik

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Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2003 10:05:55 -0400
From: "" <lfenner@9-11commission.gov>4?
To: "" <team2@ 9-11 commission. gov>^
Subject: Miscik
I'd also be interested in the following:

1. what does she think the value of the detailees is? what is their function -
liaison or integrated? Does she provide detaiklees to other org.s - what's
the value of that?
•K-.
2. Education and training of analysts - isuues? long term plan to address them?
3. Transformation into the transnational issues arenas?
4. Input from foreign sources of all kinds (esp from/thru INR)?
5. Role and value of OSINT?

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RG: 148
Box: 00003 Folder: 0009 Document: 15
Series: Team 2 Files

Copies: 1 Pages: 34

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

Folder Title: Jami Miscik

Document Date: 08-29-2003
Document Type: Handwritten Notes
Special Media:
From:
To:

Subject: notes and summary of interview with Jami Miscik

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is
restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in
general and specific record group restriction statements which are available
for examination.

NND: 361
Withdrawn: 11-05-2008 by:

RETRIEVAL*: 361 00003 0009 15

System DocID: 5557