Interview of General Peter J.

Schoomaker
Assumed the office of Chief of Staff, United States Army, on August 1, 2003
Served as CINCSOCOM from November 1997 - November 2000
Participated in DESERT ONE (Iran), URGENT FURY (Grenada), JUST CA USE
(Panama), DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM (Southwest Asia), and
UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti)

I: Important Dates for Schoomaker (See the Policy

Chronology)

II. General Themes

A. What was the role of CT in United States defense policy during your tenure?
1. Mission: what was the CT mission within USSOCOM?

B. What was the strategy for combating the A-Q and UBL threat when you
assumed office as CINCSOCOM?
1. What was the role of SOFs/JSOC forces in that strategy?

C. How did that strategy evolve during the remainder of your tenure as
CINCSOCOM?

Ill: The East Africa Embassy Bombings

A. Did SOCOM receive any direction for the development of plans for SOF
or JSOC forces in response to the 1998 Embassy bombing?

B. What is your view on the use of TLAMs as the method of response to the
attack on the two U.S. Embassies in East Africa in 1998?

C. What should the U.S. have done in response to the attacks?

D. Did the negative reaction to the U.S. al-Shifa TLAM strike serve to limit the
NCA's ability to later conduct operations against A-Q and UBL targets in
Afghanistan?

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IV: Military Options, Plans and Operations

A. What was your position prior to 9-11 on the use of military force in
Afghanistan (including SOFs, larger conventional force, cruise missiles, etc.)?

B. Was it possible for the military, to have a more aggressive position prior to 9-
11? Could SOFs and JSOC forces engage in operations against A-Q and UBL
in Afghanistan prior to 9-11?

C. What were some of the limitations on the use of military operations in

Afghanistan pre 9-11, particularly SOFs and JSOC forces? Please be specific.

D. Was the military generally too focused on force protection and anti-terrorism
rather than on more offensive actions?

E. During your tenure as CINCSOCOM, when did you receive directives to

develop plans for SOFs to target A-Q and UBL in Afghanistan?
1. Do you recall the first time and the last time you received a directive?

F. In October 1999, there was a Planning Directive for USCINCSOC to assume

the lead for planning and development of a comprehensive plan for offensive
information operations called Able Danger.
1. Please explain the development of this plan.
2. What happened to this plan?

In December 1999, USSOCOM hosts an initial planning conference for

information operations against transnational threats.

G. What was the role of SOCOM in the development of the Infinite Resolve plans
for targeting A-Q and UBL in Afghanistan?

1. What was your position on the SOF options in the Infinite Resolve
plans? Did you support the conduct of SOF options as developed
in the plans? Why or why not?

2. What was your position on the other options that were part of the plan
(e.g., B52, B-2, TLAMS)? Did you support the conduct of these options as
developed in the plans? Why or why not?

H. In his interview, General Zinni noted there were SOF operations ongoing
in the CENTCOM AOR that he was not informed of directly. Is this a
true statement? If so, did any of those operations target A-Q or UBL?

1. Is SOCOM too "secretive."

Prepared by: B. Jenkins

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"A problem with the SOFs is that they are very secretive and this secrecy
makes it hard for them to coordinate with others. SOFs are very
compartmentalized so we don't know where they are or what they are
doing. " Interview with Ochmanek and Longstreth

I. As you know, Naval ships and submarines that were stationed in the North
Arabian Sea following the 1998 African Embassy attacks were taken off
status either late 2000 or early 2001. We are trying to determine when that
occurred.

1. were the submarines still on status when you left USSOCOM in

November 2000? What is the normal procedure for this type of action?

2. what was the requirement for the submarine to be in the launch basket
when it first was stationed in the North Arabian Sea and what was that
requirement when you left?

3. please explain the exact requirement...to be in the launch basket within

24 hours? How long before the missile had to reach its target?

J. Did you share General Zinni's concerns about military action in the
CENTCOM AOR targeting A-Q and UBL?

The potential collateral damage was not worth the price to US

servicemen's security if there was no assurance the planned military
operation would hit UBL.

K. What were some of the competing military operations SOCCENT was

engaged during your tenure?

L. Were there any other plans developed by CENTCOM or USSOCOM that

targeted A-Q and UBL in Afghanistan besides Infinite Reach, Infinite Resolve
and Able Danger? If so, please provide detail on those plans and any role
played by SOFs.

M. Did the military rely too heavily on the TLAM option to target A-Q and
UBL?

N. TLAM strike opportunities lost: Spinning the gyroscopes

a. December 23, 1998
b. March 1999
c.May 14-18, 1999
d. Other possible opportunities (2x in February 1999?)
e. Why was there no strike?
1. Intelligence concerns? Collateral damage?

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V. The Use of SOFs

A. See the "SHOWSTOPPERS" article.

L. What was your particular concern about the use of Special Forces in
Afghanistan to target A-Q and UBL?

C. Was there a "Desert One" or "Somalia" syndrome that prevented the use of
SOF's in planning operations against A-Q and UBL in Afghanistan during
your tenure?

Charlie Allen MFR: "But overall, he [Allen] saw the reluctance to act against
this kind of elusive enemy as very pervasive within the military. It was a
product of both "Vietnam syndrome" and "Mogadishu syndrome. "

D. Allen remarks that the CIA had good information on A-Q and training camps.
Does this make sense to you in light of the complaints we've heard about
actionable intelligence?

E. In your view, how should SOFs and JSOC forces been used in
Afghanistan pre 9-11 to target A-Q and UBL.

VI. The Use of Surrogates/CIA Paramilitary and SOF

Relations
A. How would you characterize the relations between the CIA paramilitary and
SOFs during your tenure as CINCSOCOM?

1. Describe some of their joint operations.

2. Were there any CT focused joint operations between CIA paramilitary

and DoD within the CENTCOM AOR?

3. How did that relationship change during your tenure?

Pre 9-11, the US was not able to conduct clandestine operations in Afghanistan
without relying on surrogates in Afghanistan who proved to be inadequate. This
caused a great deal of frustration in the CIA.

B. Could the military have played a role in recruiting and working with
surrogates in Afghanistan prior to 9-11?

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C. What were the limitations imposed on the military taking a more active part in
conducting clandestine operations?

D. Could SOFs have been pre-positioned or deployed to the Afghanistan region

to address some of the shortfalls of the CIA?

E. In your view, should the CIA develop a larger capacity to address this issue,
or should the military be tasked with developing a larger capacity to conduct
clandestine operations?

F. Should the military place its forces under the direct command of the CIA to
conduct clandestine operations against selected targets?

VII. Millennium Plot

A. Please tell us how SOCOM was engaged in preparing for potential terrorist
attacks during the millennium.
1. were there any requests for SOF plans in preparation for the
millennium?

VIII. The USS Cole

A. Were you requested to develop plans for the use of SOFs or JSOC forces in
response to the USS Cole incident?

B. Do you recall any other discussions regarding a possible retaliation for the
attacks? If not, why were there no considerations for a retaliatory strike? Was
there a deliberate decision not to attack?

C. What would have been some potential SOF operations in response to the USS
Cole?

D. What was your assessment of who was responsible for the USS Cole attacks?

IX. Intelligence Support to the Warfighter

A. What was the requirement for intelligence pre 9-11 to support a SOF
operation against A-Q and UBL targets?

B. Provide an assessment of the intelligence provided to SOCOM to support

plans for a CT operation against UBL and A-Q in Afghanistan prior to 9-11.

C. Were you satisfied with the quality of the intelligence you received? Is the
quality of the analysis up to your standards?

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D. In your view, was it possible that the NCA would never get the type of
intelligence it needed to take action against UBL pre 9-11?

E. Provide your view on the following comment: "the requirement for

'actionable intelligence' can and has been used as an excuse for the
military's desire not to be more aggressive. If the military takes some
action, it will obtain intelligence. DoD has blamed and vilified the
intelligence community. However, DoD intelligence, not CIA, sat back
and said there was an intelligence failure. The truth is that it was an
operational failure because DoD did not do the things necessary to get
the necessary intelligence. 'We expected the 1C with its billions of
dollars to produce intelligence that if DoD had gone out and done
something, we would have gotten more intelligence. Give me action, I
will give you intelligence."

X. The Predator
A. What was your involvement in the deliberations about the use of the Predator
in 2000?

B. Did you support the use of the Predator to improve intelligence collection
capabilities in late 2000?

XI. Final Questions

A. Is DoD winning the global war on terrorism (GWOT)?
1. Is DoD changing fast enough to fight the GWOT?
2. How is success in the GWOT measured? What are the metrics by which
success is measured?

B. What are some of the specific changes that have taken place within DoD
(policy formulation and structure) in its effort to win the GWOT?
a. What other changes are needed to better fight the GWOT?

C. Does the U.S. have a broad, integrated and comprehensive plan to combat
terrorism? Are the various instruments working well together (diplomacy,
intelligence, military, financial, etc)

D. Describe the adequacy of intelligence provided today to the warfighter? Has it

improved since 9-11? If so, in what ways?

E. Who is responsible for the search for UBL? CIA? Defense Special Forces?
How is that going today?

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F. What role can the military play in winning the hearts and minds of those who
might one day become our enemies?

G. Lessons learned

H. Recommendations

I. What should we have asked?

Prepared by: B. Jenkins