Why Should You Believe It?

By John R. Searle
Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism
by Paul A. Boghossian
Clarendon Press/Oxford University Press, 139 ., !19.9" #aer$
1.
%elativis& has a long history in our intelle'tual 'ulture, and ta(es several different
for&s, su'h as relativis& about (no)ledge and truth, ethi'al values, aestheti'
*uality, and 'ultural nor&s, to &ention a fe). Paul Boghossian+s boo( 'on'entrates
on the first of these. ,he basi' idea he ooses is that 'lai&s to ob-e'tive truth and
(no)ledge, for exa&le the 'lai& that hydrogen ato&s have one ele'tron, are in
fa't only valid relative to a set of 'ultural attitudes, or to so&e other sub-e'tive )ay
of er'eiving the )orld. .urther&ore, a''ording to relativis&, in'onsistent 'lai&s
&ay have )hat he 'alls /e*ual validity./ ,here 'an be no universally valid
(no)ledge 'lai&s.
,here is a traditional refutation of relativis&, as follo)s0 ,he 'lai& that all truth is
relative is itself either relative or not. 1f it is relative then )e need not a''et it
be'ause it is only valid relative to so&ebody+s attitudes, )hi'h )e &ay not share. 1f
it is not relative, but absolute, then it refutes the vie) that all truth is relative. 2ither
)ay relativis& is refuted. Boghossian 'onsiders this traditional refutation and
though he thin(s it is serious, he does not regard it as de'isive. .or one thing, &ost
relativists regard it as a (ind of logi'al tri'(. ,hey thin( that they are ossessed of a
dee insight, that all of our (no)ledge 'lai&s are &ade relative to a 'ertain set of
attitudes, 'ultural nor&s, and re-udi'es. ,his insight is not refuted by logi'al
argu&ents, or so they suose.
,he 'urrently &ost influential for& of relativis& is so'ial 'onstru'tivis&, )hi'h
Boghossian defines as follo)s0 /A fa't is so'ially 'onstru'ted if and only if it is
necessarily true that it 'ould only have obtained through the 'ontingent a'tions of a
so'ial grou./ ,he so'ial 'onstru'tivist is anxious to exose 'onstru'tion )here
none had been suse'ted, )here so&ething that is in fa't essentially so'ial had
'o&e to &as*uerade as art of the natural )orld. 3any so'ial 'onstru'tivists find it
liberating be'ause it frees us fro& the aarent oression of suosing that )e
are for'ed to a''et 'lai&s about the )orld as &atters of &ind4indeendent fa't
)hen in reality they are all so'ially 'onstru'ted. 1f )e do not li(e a fa't that others
have 'onstru'ted, )e 'an 'onstru't another fa't that )e refer.
5hat do relativis& and so'ial 'onstru'tivis& loo( li(e in ra'ti'e6 Boghossian
gives a nu&ber of stri(ing exa&les. A''ording to our best eviden'e, the 7ative
A&eri'ans arrived on this 'ontinent fro& the 2urasian land&ass by 'rossing over
the Bering 8trait9 but a''ording to so&e 7ative A&eri'an a''ounts they are the
1
des'endants of the Buffalo eole, and they 'a&e fro& inside the earth after
suernatural sirits reared this )orld for habitation by hu&ans. 8o here are t)o
alternative and in'onsistent a''ounts. 8o&e anthroologists say that one a''ount
is as good as the other. As one ut it, /8'ien'e is -ust one of &any )ays of
(no)ing the )orld. :,he ;unis+ )orldvie) is< -ust as valid as the ar'haeologi'al
vie)oint of )hat rehistory is about./ Our s'ien'e 'onstru'ts one reality9 the
7ative A&eri'ans 'onstru't another. As Boghossian sees it, this is not a''etable.
,hese t)o theories are logi'ally in'onsistent )ith ea'h other9 they 'annot both be
true. 1s there any )ay to eli&inate the in'onsisten'y6
,he ans)er, say the relativists, is to see that ea'h 'lai& is relative. 5e should say
not that the early A&eri'ans 'a&e by )ay of the Bering 8trait, but rather0
/a''ording to our theory,/ they 'a&e by the Bering 8trait. And /a''ording to so&e
7ative A&eri'an theories,/ they 'a&e out of the earth. On'e relativi=ed, the
in'onsisten'y disaears. 1ndeed all 'lai&s are relativi=ed in this )ay #in'luding
resu&ably the 'lai& that the original 'lai&s )ere in'onsistent and the 'lai& that
they have been relativi=ed$. 5ill relativis& res'ue so'ial 'onstru'tivis&6
Boghossian sees 'orre'tly that relativis& fails to solve the roble&, and &u'h of
his boo( is about this failure. 1 do not agree )ith all of his argu&ents but 1 suort
his overall ro-e't.
A roble& fa'ed by so'ial 'onstru'tivis& 'on'erns fa'ts about the ast. Are )e
no) 'onstru'ting fa'ts about the ast )hen )e &a(e 'lai&s about history6 One
extre&e so'ial 'onstru'tivist 'ited by Boghossian, Bruno >atour, a''ets this
'on'lusion )ith so&e)hat 'o&i'al results. %e'ent resear'h sho)s that the an'ient
2gytian haraoh %a&ses 11 robably died of tuber'ulosis. But a''ording to >atour,
this is i&ossible be'ause the tuber'ulosis ba'illus )as only dis'overed by %obert
?o'h in 1@@A.
:1<
/Before ?o'h, the ba'illus had no real existen'e./ ,o say that
%a&ses 11 died of tuber'ulosis is as absurd as saying that he died of &a'hine4gun
fire.
5hat is one to &a(e of >atour+s 'lai&6 ,he &a'hine gun )as invented in the late
nineteenth 'entury, and rior to that invention it did not exist in any for&. But the
tuber'ulosis ba'illus )as not invented. 1t )as dis'overed. Part of the &eaning of
/dis'overy/ is that to be dis'overed so&ething has to exist rior to the dis'overy,
and indeed 'ould not have been dis'overed if it had not existed rior to the
dis'overy.
,he 'lai& that (no)ledge is a so'ial 'onstru'tion is not &eant to state the
'o&&onla'e truth that &any fa'ts in the so'ial )orld are indeed so'ially
'onstru'ted. .or exa&le, so&ething is &oney, rivate roerty, a govern&ent, or
a &arriage only be'ause eole believe that+s )hat it is, and in that sense su'h
things are so'ially 'onstru'ted. 8o'ial 'onstru'tivis& &a(es the &u'h &ore radi'al
'lai& that hysi'al reality itself, the very fa'ts )e &ight thin( )e have dis'overed in
hysi's, 'he&istry, and the other natural s'ien'es are so'ially 'onstru'ted.
2
,his vie) has been influential in a nu&ber of dis'ilines0 fe&inis&, so'iology,
anthroology, hilosohy of s'ien'e, and literary theory a&ong others. ,he titles of
so&e tyi'al )or(s exress various degrees of suort for the do'trine0 Peter
Berger and ,ho&as >u'(&ann+s The Social Construction of Reality9 Bruno >atour
and 8teve 5oolgar+s Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts9
Andre) Pi'(ering+s Constructing Quars: A Sociological !istory of "article "hysics9
Bonald 3a'?en=ie+s Statistics in #ritain$ %&'()%*+,: The Social Construction of
ScientificKnowledge.
:A<
Boghossian *uotes a fe&inist vie) as follo)s0
.e&inist eiste&ologists, in 'o&&on )ith &any other strands of 'onte&orary
eiste&ology, no longer regard (no)ledge as a neutral transarent refle'tion of an
indeendently existing reality, )ith truth and falsity established by trans'endent
ro'edures of rational assess&ent. %ather, &ost a''et that all (no)ledge is
situated (no)ledge, refle'ting the osition of the (no)ledge rodu'er at a 'ertain
histori'al &o&ent in a given &aterial and 'ultural 'ontext.
:3<
,his assage is )orth a 'lose reading. On the fa'e of it, the t)o vie)s being
'ontrasted, that (no)ledge is a /refle'tion of an indeendently existing reality/ and
that /all (no)ledge is situated (no)ledge,/ are erfe'tly 'onsistent. Cistori'ally
situated investigators 'an dis'over the truth about /an indeendently existing
reality./ But the oint of the assage is to 'lai& that &ost fe&inists re-e't the idea
that (no)ledge refle'ts an indeendently existing reality9 and the rhetori'al
flourishes in the assage, su'h as /trans'endent ro'edures of rational
assess&ent/ and /neutral transarent refle'tion,/ are designed to reinfor'e that
oint.
2.
Boghossian distinguishes three features of 'onstru'tivis& and 'onsiders ea'h
searately0 'onstru'tivis& about the fa'ts #the fa'ts the&selves are so'ial
'onstru'tions$, 'onstru'tivis& about -ustifi'ation #)hat )e 'ount as a -ustifi'ation of
a belief is a &atter of so'ial 'onstru'tion$, and 'onstru'tivis& about rational
exlanation #)e never believe )hat )e believe solely on the basis of eviden'e$.
About the first and &ost i&ortant of these theses, Boghossian 'onsiders
argu&ents fro& three hilosohers0 Cilary Putna&, 7elson Dood&an, and %i'hard
%orty. Putna& i&agines a hyotheti'al universe 'onsisting of three 'ir'les0 A, B,
and C. ,hen he as(s0 Co) &any ob-e'ts are there in this universe6 ,hree6 7o,
says Putna&, be'ause a''ording to 'ertain Polish logi'ians #he 'ites 8.
>e=nie)s(i$, )e 'an 'onstrue one ob-e't as A, one as B, one as C, one as
'onsisting of AEB, another as BEC, yet another as AEC, and finally, one of AEBEC.
8o on this basis, there are really seven ob-e'ts in the universe. Be'ause )e 'an
'orre'tly say that there are three ob-e'ts or seven ob-e'ts, Putna& 'on'ludes that
there is no ob-e'tive fa't of the &atter about ho) &any ob-e'ts there are.
:F<
As Boghossian sees, the 'on'lusion does not follo) fro& the re&ises. On'e you
have sele'ted your 'onditions for so&ething being an ob-e't, there is a
3
straightfor)ard fa't of the &atter about ho) &any ob-e'ts there are. .or Putna& to
say that there is no fa't of the &atter )ould be li(e saying that there is no ans)er
to the *uestion /Co) &any guests 'a&e to the dinner arty6/ be'ause you 'ould
say eight eole or four 'oules.
Dood&an+s argu&ent is also )ea(. Dood&an says )e 'onstru't the 'onstellations
of the night s(y by dra)ing 'ertain lines and not others. 5e dra) one set of lines
that 'reates the Big Bier, for exa&le. All other 'onstellations are si&ilarly
'reated, and )hat goes for 'onstellations goes for everything, a''ording to
Dood&an. All of reality 'onsists of hu&an 'reations.On'e again, a bad argu&ent.
Constellations are atterns )e have sele'ted in the s(y be'ause )e 'an dis'ern
through our er'etual aaratus 'ertain geo&etri'al for&s su'h as the Big
Bier. Constellations are, in this sense, observer4relative0 the a'tual stars exist
indeendently of any observer, though the atterns )e use to na&e 'onstellations
exist only relative to our oint of vie).
But the stars, as )ell as &ountains, &ole'ules, and te'toni' lates, are not in that
)ay relative to an observer. ,rue, )e have to sele't a vo'abulary of /stars,/
/&ountains,/ et'., but on'e the vo'abulary has been sele'ted, it is a 'o&letely
ob-e'tive fa't that 3ount 2verest is a &ountain, for exa&le, and not a giraffe. ,he
general attern of error is to 'onfuse, on the one hand, the so'ial relativity of the
vo'abulary and the &a(ing of des'ritions )ithin that vo'abulary )ith, on the other,
the so'ial relativity of the fa'ts des'ribed using that vo'abulary. ,his 'o&es out
stri(ingly in %orty+s argu&ent.
%orty says that )e a''et the des'ritions )e do, not be'ause they 'orresond to
the )ay things are, but be'ause it serves our ra'ti'al interests to do so.
Boghossian agrees that the fa't that )e give the des'ritions )e do is a fa't that
refle'ts so&ething about us and our so'iety. But, he oints out, the fa't that
descri-tions are so'ially relative does not i&ly that the facts described by those
des'ritions are so'ially relative. Boghossian 'ites an argu&ent by %orty atta'(ing
an arti'le of &ine
:"<
in )hi'h 1 said that &ountains, for exa&le, exist 'o&letely
indeendently of us and our des'ritions. %orty ans)ered as follo)s0
Diven that it ays to tal( about &ountains, as it 'ertainly does, one of the obvious
truths about &ountains is that they )ere here before )e tal(ed about the&. 1f you
do not believe that, you robably do not (no) ho) to lay the usual language4
ga&es )hi'h e&loy the )ord /&ountain./ But the utility of those language4ga&es
has nothing to do )ith the *uestion of )hether %eality as 1t 1s 1n 1tself, aart fro&
the )ay it is handy for hu&an beings to des'ribe it, has &ountains in it.
:G<
,his is a strange assage. %orty is saying 'orre'tly that )e adot the vo'abulary
that )e do be'ause it serves various interests to have that vo'abulary. But )hat he
negle'ts is that the fa'ts in this sort of 'ase exist *uite indeendently of the
vo'abulary. Ce begins, /Diven that it ays to tal( about &ountains...,/ i&lying that
so&eho) the existen'e of &ountains deends on the usefulness of the
4
vo'abulary. But it does not. ,he fa'ts are the sa&e, )hether or not /it ays to tal(
about &ountains./
>et us agree that )e have the )ord /&ountain/ be'ause it ays to have su'h a
)ord. 5hy does it ay6 Be'ause there really are su'h things, and they existed
before )e had the )ord and they )ill 'ontinue to exist long after )e have all died.
,o state the fa'ts you have to have a vo'abulary. But the fa'ts you state )ith that
vo'abulary are not deendent on the existen'e or usefulness of the vo'abulary.
,he existen'e of &ountains has nothing )hatever to do )ith )hether or not it /ays
to tal( about &ountains./ And it does not hel %orty+s 'ase to sneer at the
existen'e of &ountains as /%eality as 1t 1s 1n 1tself,/ be'ause insofar as that
exression is &eaningful at all, it is obvious that %eality as 1t 1s 1n 1tself 'ontains
&ountains.
1 thin( Boghossian does a ubli' servi'e by ointing out the )ea(nesses of all of
these argu&ents. But 1 fear that the real target of his boo( is not addressed by
refuting bad argu&ents of the sort 1 have -ust 'ited. Peole )ho are 'onvin'ed by
so'ial 'onstru'tivis& tyi'ally have a dee &etahysi'al vision and detailed
refutations do not address that vision.
1n a sense Boghossian &a(es it easier for hi&self by ta(ing on &ore or less
rational authors, se'ifi'ally Putna&, Dood&an, and to a lesser extent %orty. ,heir
vie)s are reasonably easy to refute be'ause they are, at least in the 'ase of
Putna& and Dood&an, fairly 'learly stated. 1t is &u'h easier to refute a bad
argu&ent than to refute a truly dreadful argu&ent. A bad argu&ent has enough
stru'ture that you 'an oint out its badness. But )ith a truly dreadful argu&ent, you
have to try to re'onstru't it so that it is 'lear enough that you 'an state a refutation.
Boghossian ta(es bad argu&ents by Putna&, Dood&an, and %orty and refutes
the&. But )hat about the truly dreadful argu&ents in su'h authors as Ha'*ues
Berrida, Hean4.ranIois >yotard, and other ost&odernists that have been &ore
influential during the last half4'entury6 5hat about, for exa&le, Berrida+s atte&ts
to /rove/ that &eanings are inherently unstable and indeter&inate, and that it is
i&ossible to have any 'lear, deter&inate reresentations of reality6 #Ce argues,
for exa&le, that there is no tenable distin'tion bet)een )riting and see'h.$ ,he
at&oshere of Boghossian+s refutation is that of a Prin'eton se&inar. And in fa't
Boghossian )as a student of %orty at Prin'eton. But he does not go into the
s)a& and )restle )ith Berrida J Co.
:K<
Boghossian observes that )e 'ould say, )ith logi'al 'onsisten'y, /a''ording to our
vie)/ the 7ative A&eri'ans 'a&e by the Bering 8trait, and /a''ording to their vie)/
they 'a&e fro& the 'enter of the earth, but that this nonetheless does not solve the
roble& of relativis&. Co)ever, it see&s to &e that Boghossian gives the )rong
a''ount of )hy it does not solve the roble&. Ce says that it does not solve the
roble& for three reasons0
5
#A$ 1f )e relativi=e the 'lai&s by saying /a''ording to our vie),/ )e still have so&e
nonrelative fa'ts left over9 there )ill still be nonrelative fa'ts about )hat different
'o&&unities a''et or do not a''et, for exa&le, hysi'al eviden'e of eole
'rossing the Bering 8trait.
#B$ 1t is often &u'h harder to figure out )hat eole believe than it is to figure out
)hat a'tually haened. ,he &ental is &ore u==ling than the hysi'al #this is one
of his )ea(er argu&ents$.
And
#C$ if )e get out of ob-e'tion #A$ by saying that there are no nonrelative fa'ts, )e
get an infinite regress. Cere is the regress. 5e start )ith0
#1$ A''ording to a theory )e a''et, they 'a&e over the Bering 8trait.
But if everything has to be relativi=ed then #1$ has to be relativi=ed, )hi'h
rodu'es0
#A$ A''ording to a theory )e a''et, there is a theory that )e a''et and a''ording
to that theory...
And so on ad infinitu&.
1 agree )ith ob-e'tions #A$ and #C$ but 1 thin( they are sy&to&s of a deeer
ob-e'tion, )hi'h Boghossian does not &a(e. ,he dee ob-e'tion to relativi=ing is
that the original 'lai&s have been abandoned and the sub-e't has been 'hanged.
,he original 'lai&sLthat the an'estors of the 7ative A&eri'ans 'a&e via the
Bering 8trait, and that they 'a&e out of the 'enter of the earthL)ere not about us
and our theories but about )hat a'tually haened in hu&an history regardless of
anybody+s theories. Our 'lai& is not that )e hold a 'ertain theory. Our 'lai& is that
the a'tual an'estors of the early A&eri'ans 'a&e via the Bering 8trait, that there
)ere a'tual hysi'al &ove&ents of hysi'al bodies through hysi'al sa'e.
%elativi=ing of the sort that Boghossian 'onsiders does not solve the diffi'ulty9 it
'hanges the sub-e't to so&ething irrelevant. 1t 'hanges the sub-e't fro& histori'al
fa'ts to our sy'hologi'al attitudes.
,his is the &ost i&ortant 'riti'is& of 'onstru'tivis&. 1t is of the very essen'e of
the see'h a't of stating or asserting roositions of the sort )e have been
'onsidering that the see'h a't 'o&&its you to the truth of )hat you say and
therefore to the existen'e of a fa't in the )orld 'orresonding to that truth. 8u'h
see'h a'ts are &ade fro& a oint of vie) and tyi'ally )ithin 'ertain sorts of )ays
of thin(ing, but the state&ents and assertions do not thereby be'o&e about the
oints of vie) or the )ays of thin(ing. 1f you treat the& as being about the oint of
vie) and )ay of thin(ing you get a different state&ent altogether, one that is not
about the hysi'al &ove&ents of 7ative A&eri'ans but about the sy'hology of
the sea(ers. Boghossian is right to see that the relativi=ation still leaves you )ith
nonrelative fa'ts about sea(ers and their attitudes and that if you (ee going you
get an infinite regress, but these are -ust sy&to&s of the deeer in'oheren'e. ,he
'onstru'tivists do not have a 'oherent 'on'etion of the see'h a't of asserting or
stating.
6
3.
,he se'ond version of relativis& Boghossian 'onsiders is about eiste&i'
syste&s, that is, syste&s used to a'*uire (no)ledge and -ustify 'lai&s to
(no)ledge. 5e -ustify our beliefs using one eiste&i' syste& but so&ebody &ight
have a different eiste&i' syste& that )ould give different results fro& ours. 1t &ay
loo( li(e any effort to -ustify ours )ould be 'ir'ular be'ause )e )ould have to
resuose the validity of our syste& in order to try to -ustify it. %i'hard %orty gives
the exa&le of the disute bet)een Cardinal Bellar&ine and Dalileo.
:@<
Dalileo
'lai&ed to have dis'overed, by astrono&i'al observation through a teles'oe, that
Coerni'us )as right that the earth revolved around the sun. Bellar&ine 'lai&ed
that he 'ould not be right be'ause his vie) ran 'ounter to the Bible. %orty says,
astoundingly, that Bellar&ine+s argu&ent )as -ust as good as Dalileo+s. 1t is -ust
that the rhetori' of /s'ien'e/ had not at that ti&e been for&ed as art of the 'ulture
of 2uroe. 5e have no) a''eted the rhetori' of /s'ien'e,/ he )rites, but it is not
&ore ob-e'tive or rational than Cardinal Bellar&ine+s exli'itly dog&ati' Catholi'
vie)s. A''ording to %orty, there is no fa't of the &atter about )ho )as right
be'ause there are no absolute fa'ts about )hat -ustifies )hat. Bellar&ine and
Dalileo, in his vie), -ust had different eiste&i' syste&s.
,he oint 1 believe Boghossian should have &ade i&&ediately, though in the end
he does get around to saying so&ething li(e it, is that there are not and 'annot be
alternative eiste&i' rationalities. Bellar&ine and Dalileo rea'hed different
'on'lusions but they )or(ed, li(e everybody else, )ithin exa'tly the sa&e syste&
of rationality. Bellar&ine held the false vie) that the Bible )as a reliable
astrono&i'al authority. But that is a 'ase of a false resuosition, not an
alternative eiste&i' rationality.
5hy 'an+t there be alternative and in'onsistent eiste&i' rationalities6 Consider
the exa&le of the state&ent that the 7ative A&eri'ans 'a&e by the Bering 8trait.
1 have ointed out that anyone )ho &a(es su'h a state&ent is thereby 'o&&itted
to the existen'e of a fa't. But that 'o&&it&ent in turn 'arries a 'o&&it&ent to
being able to ans)er su'h *uestions as, Co) do you (no)6 5hat is the eviden'e6
.urther&ore, only 'ertain sorts of things 'an 'ount as eviden'e for and against the
'lai&. ,hese re*uire&ents of rationality are not a''retions to the original
state&ent, but they are built into it. ,he re*uire&ent that 'lai&s ad&it of eviden'e
and 'ountereviden'e and that only 'ertain sorts of things 'ount as eviden'e is not
so&ething added on to thought and language. 1t is built into the funda&ental
stru'ture of thought and language.
Consider another exa&le. 1 no) believe &y dog Dilbert is in this roo&. 5hat is
the eviden'e6 1 'an see hi&. 1t is in the nature of the 'lai& in *uestion that )hat 1
see 'ounts as eviden'e. 7oti'e that, if in resonse to a de&and for eviden'e, 1 said
/1 E 1 M A,/ that )ould not ans)er the de&and for eviden'e.
Boghossian is )orried by the ossibility that )e &ight en'ounter an /alternative to
our eiste&i' syste&...)hose tra'( re'ord )as im-ressive enough to &a(e us
7
doubt the 'orre'tness of our o)n syste&./ 1n su'h a 'ase, he fears, )e )ould not
be able to -ustify our o)n. But )hat is &eant by /tra'( re'ord/6 ,he fa't that he
uses this &etahor )ithout ade*uate exlanation ought to )orry hi& and us. ,he
only /tra'( re'ord/ that )ould be relevant )ould be a body of established
(no)ledge. But in order to as'ertain the resen'e of a /tra'( re'ord/ in this sense,
to as'ertain the resen'e of a body of (no)ledge, )e )ould have to use the only
eiste&i' rationality )e have, the one already built into thought and language. ,he
hyothesis of alternative eiste&i' rationalities has no 'lear &eaning. 2ventually,
after three diffi'ult 'haters #", G, and K$, Boghossian see&s to 'o&e to so&ething
li(e this 'on'lusion.
1n the great debates of the 19GNs and after, 1 )as on'e as(ed by a student, /5hat
is your argu&ent for rationality6/ ,hat is an absurd *uestion. ,here 'annot be an
argu&ent for rationality be'ause the )hole notion of an argu&ent resuoses
rationality. Constraints of rationality are 'onstitutive of argu&ent itself, as they are
of thought and language generally. ,his is not to say that there 'annot be irrational
thoughts and 'lai&s. ,here are lenty of irrationalities around. #.or exa&le, given
the available eviden'e, it is irrational to deny that the resent lant and ani&al
se'ies evolved fro& earlier for&s of life. 5hy6 Be'ause, to ut it as an
understate&ent, the eviden'e is over)hel&ing.$
4.
,he last for& of relativis& that Boghossian 'onsiders is the exlanation of belief.
Cere the 'lai& is that the exlanation of )hy )e believe )hat )e do is never a
&atter of eviden'e or solely a &atter of eviden'e, but involves so&e irrational
fa'tors, so&e so'ial 'ondition in )hi'h )e find ourselves. 1 a& u==led )hy
Boghossian ta(es this 'lai& very seriously, not be'ause it is obviously false, but
be'ause it does not really &atter to the issue of the truth or falsity or the
-ustifi'ation of the 'lai&s under dis'ussion. 1f )e have -ustifi'ations for our beliefs,
and if the -ustifi'ations &eet rational 'riteria, then the fa't that there are all sorts of
ele&ents in our so'ial situation that in'line us to believe one thing rather than
another &ay be of histori'al or sy'hologi'al interest but it is really *uite beside the
oint of the -ustifi'ations and of the truth or falsity of the original 'lai&. 1t is a fa'tual
*uestion to )hat extent eole rea'h their beliefs by rational araisal of the
eviden'e, not a *uestion ade*uately settled by hilosohi'al argu&ent.
1 thin( the reason that Boghossian is so 'on'erned about this is that so&e )ho
have )ritten about the so'iology of s'ientifi' (no)ledge thin( that they 'an exlain
all of our beliefs, both the true and the false, the )ell4suorted and the
unsuorted, by a 'o&&on attern of so'iologi'al exlanation. Ce 'ites Bavid
Bloor+s Knowledge and Social .magery
:9<
as an exa&le, along )ith the )or(s by
>atour, 5oolgar, and Pi'(ering that 1 &entioned earlier. ,he )riters in *uestion
adot )hat Bloor 'alls /sy&&etri'al/ &odes of exlanation0 they argue that true
and false beliefs, as )ell as rational and irrational beliefs, &ust be exlained by the
sa&e 'auses. One exa&le, 'ited by Bloor, 'on'erns a study involving hysi'ists
in 5ei&ar Der&any )ho atte&ted to /disense )ith 'ausality in hysi's./ A
8
/sy&&etri'al/ understanding of this s'ientifi' ro-e't )ould argue that, )hile
'onsidering ho) the hysi'ists thought about observed eviden'e, one should
'onsider as )ell ho) they atte&ted /to adat the 'ontent of their s'ien'e to the
values of their intelle'tual environ&ent./
Boghossian oints out 'orre'tly that sy&&etry about truth and falsehood is *uite
different fro& sy&&etry about rationality and irrationality. 8y&&etry about truth is
a ossible resear'h rogra& in the so'iology of (no)ledge be'ause eole
tyi'ally arrive at their s'ientifi' vie)s, both true and false, through the study of
eviden'e9 thus, in &ost 'ases at least, both true and false beliefs 'an be seen as
arising fro& the sa&e 'ause, eviden'e. 8o&e eviden'e &ay be &ore revealing of
truth than other eviden'e9 nevertheless, if )e ut aside the use of fraud, both true
and false theories have the sa&e underlying 'ause0 observed eviden'e.
But that is not the sa&e as treating rationality and irrationality sy&&etri'ally. .irst,
as )e+ve -ust seen, for both true vie)s and false vie)s to be sy&&etri'al, they
&ust originate in the sa&e 'ause0 argu&ent based on eviden'e. But all argu&ent
based on eviden'e assu&es a 'o&&on rationality. ,hus, as Boghossian argues,
the 'ase for the sy&&etry of truth is )rong be'ause it rests on /the falsity / of the
/sy&&etry about rationality/9 both 'annot si&ultaneously be 'orre't. ,rue vie)s
and false vie)s &ay be arrived at by sy&&etri'al &ethods, but )hen those
&ethods involve eviden'e, they are the&selves &anifestations of a 'o&&on
rationality and thus &a(e i&ossible the sy&&etry, or e*uality, of rationality and
irrationality. ,his is one of the best argu&ents in Boghossian+s boo(.
5.
5hat &otivates so'ial 'onstru'tionis&6 After all, )e ay an enor&ous intelle'tual
ri'e if )e deny the ob-e'tive validity of the ast three and a half 'enturies of
s'ientifi' investigation. Boghossian thin(s 'onstru'tionis& is &otivated artly by
intelle'tual argu&ent and artly by oliti'al 'orre'tness. 1n the ost'olonial era,
so&e have felt that )e should not i&ose our 'on'etion of reality on other
'ultures. 5hy shouldn+t )e, in a &ulti'ultural de&o'ra'y, grant that ea'h 'ulture, or
indeed ea'h erson, 'an have his or her o)n reality6 1 thin( in fa't the antirational,
antis'ientifi' bias of 'urrent versions of relativis& and 'onstru'tivis& are &otivated
by a &u'h deeer &etahysi'al vision than one based on ost'olonial oliti'al
'orre'tness.
5hat exa'tly is that vision6 Cints of it o''ur in the assage on fe&inist
eiste&ology that 1 *uoted fro& ?athleen >ennon. 1t is a vision a''ording to )hi'h
all of our (no)ledge 'lai&s are radi'ally 'ontingent be'ause of their histori'al and
so'ial 'ir'u&stan'es. A''ording to this vision, all of us thin( )ithin arti'ular sets
of assu&tions, and )e al)ays reresent the )orld fro& a oint of vie), and this
&a(es ob-e'tive truth i&ossible. .or so&eone )ho a''ets this argu&ent, the
idea that there are s'ientifi' 'lai&s that are ob-e'tive, universal, and established
beyond a reasonable doubt see&s not only ina''urate but ositively oressive.
9
And for su'h eole the very idea of an ob-e'tively existing, indeendent reality
&ust be dis'redited.
On this vie), if )e are to be truly free, free to 'reate a &ulti'ultural de&o'ra'y, )e
&ust above all liberate ourselves fro& /ob-e'tivity,/ /rationality,/ and /s'ien'e./ ,he
&otivation, in short, is &ore rofound than Boghossian allo)s for, and it bears
interesting affinities )ith earlier for&s of Counter42nlighten&ent %o&anti'is& of
the sort des'ribed by 1saiah Berlin in his The Roots of Romanticism.
:1N<
Boghossian has )ritten an ex'ellent boo(. 1t is very 'o&ressed, and it is not
al)ays easy reading, but it 'ontains relentless exosures of 'onfusion, falsehood,
and in'oheren'e.
Notes
:1<
Bruno >atour, /%a&ses 11 est4il &ort de la tuber'ulose6,/ La Recherche, 3ar'h
199@.
:A<
Peter >. Berger and ,ho&as >u'(&ann, The Social Construction of Reality: A
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge #Boubleday, 19GG$9 Bruno >atour and
8teve 5oolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts #8age,
19K9$9 Andre) Pi'(ering, Constructing Quars: A Sociological !istory of "article
"hysics #University of Chi'ago Press, 19@F$9 Andre) Pi'(ering, /8'ien'e as a
Cultural Constru't,/ letter to the editor, /ature, Hune ", 199K9 and Bonald A.
3a'?en=ie, Statistics in #ritain$ %&'()%*+,: The Social Construction of Scientific
Knowledge #2dinburgh0 2dinburgh University Press, 19@1$.
:3<
?athleen >ennon, /.e&inist 2iste&ology as >o'al 2iste&ology,/ "roceedings
of the Aristotelian Society$ Su--lementary$ Oolu&e K1 #199K$, . 3K.
:F<
Cilary Putna&, The 0any Faces of Realism: The "aul Carus Lectures #Oen
Court, 19@K$, . 1@.
:"<
Hohn %. 8earle, /%ationality and %ealis&0 5hat 1s at 8ta(e6/ 1aedalus$ .all
1993.
:G<
%i'hard %orty, /Boes A'ade&i' .reedo& Cave Philosohi'al Presuositions6,/
Academe$ 2ol3 @N, 7o. G #7ove&berPBe'e&ber 199F$, . "G.
:K<
8ee &y arti'le and ex'hange about Berrida in these ages0 /,he 5ord ,urned
Uside Bo)n,/ O'tober AK, 19@3, and /An 2x'hange on Be'onstru'tion,/ .ebruary
A, 19@F.
:@<
%i'hard %orty, "hiloso-hy and the 0irror of /ature #Prin'eton University Press,
19@1$, . 3A@P331. Quoted in Boghossian, . G1.
10
:9<
University of Chi'ago Press, se'ond edition, 1991.
:1N<
Prin'eton University Press, ANN1.
htt0//))).nyboo(s.'o&/arti'les/A3NKK
A'ess. K set. ANN9.
11