Sample Answers of Famous Bar Topnotchers!

Justiniano Montano (2nd Place, 1929) Civil Law, 100% Q.- Distinguish between nullity of marriage and divorce. A.- Divorce presupposes a valid marriage while a nullity presupposes a vicious or voidable marriage. In nullity the cause exists before or at the time of the celebration; in divorce the cause arises subsequent to the celebration. Q.- Differentiate between mortgage and sale with stipulation for repurchase. A.- 1. Mortgage is an accessory contract while sale con pacto de retro is a principal contract. 2. In sale with. pacto de retro the title is conveyed; in mortgage not. 3. In sale with repurchase possession is transferred; in mortgage it is not transferred. 4. In sale with repurchase, title in the vendee becomes absolute the moment the period for redemption expires; in mortgage, foreclosure is necessary whether judicial or extrajudicial. Hermenegildo Atienza (1st Place, 1932) Civil Law, 95% Q.- A executes in favor of B a promissory note for P10,000.00, payable after two years, secured by a mortgage on a cement building valued at P20,000.00. One year after the execution of the note the mortgaged building was totally burned. Can B demand from A the payment of the value of the note? Reason out your answer. A.- A can demand the payment of the note. Mortgage is an accessory obligation and the payment of the debt in this case is the principal obligation. Loss of the thing due extinguishes an obligation. But the extinguishment of an accessory obligation does not extinguish the principal obligation. The mortgage is lost and extinguished by the destruction of the mortgaged building. But it does not, as an accessory obligation, necessarily bring about the extinction of the principal obligation to pay the note. Arturo Tolentino (2nd Place, 1934) Civil Law, 91% Q.- A built a house on land belonging to B in the belief that the land was his own. The error discovered, B formally notified A that he elected to appropriate the house. All efforts to reach an agreement as to the sum to be paid to A having failed, A began an action to recover the expenditures incurred by him in building the house. The house was destroyed in a fire of purely accidental origin. Do you think that notwithstanding the loss of the house A would be entitled to recover from B the said expenditures? Why? A.- A would be entitled to recover the expenditures incurred by him in building the house. The law provides that when something is built in good faith upon the land of another, the latter shall have the option to appropriate the same upon payment of the

expenses to the builder, or to require the builder to pay the price of the land on which said building was constructed. In the exercise of this option, B elected to appropriate the house. By so doing he incurred the obligation to pay the expenses to A, which is an obligation which does not depend on the continued existence of the house. It may be said that his exercise of the option given by law made the house his own by accession. Res perit domino; hence, he must bear the loss and pay the expenses. Cesar Bengzon (2nd Place, 1919) Commercial Law, 92% Q.- The vessel A collided with the vessel B in Manila Bay. The officers of both vessels were negligent in the performance of their duties at the time of the accident. Has the owner of B any right to recover anything from the owner of A? Give reasons. A.- The owner of B has no right to recover from A any damage suffered by the vessel B. The owner of B however has a right to demand contribution from the owner of A for the amount (if any) which the former has been compelled to pay damages to the cargo of B. Because the law provides that when two vessels collide and both are to blame, each suffers its own damage but they are solidarily responsible for their cargo. And it is but reasonable that this should be the rule; because the shippers or freighters are not to be prejudiced by the negligence of the crew of the respective vessels; and it is also reasonable that each ship should suffer individually for the wrong of its officers. This is to be understood, however, subject to the rule that in collisions the responsibility does not extend farther than the value of the ship and the freightage earned. Estanislao Fernandez (4th Place, 1933) Criminal Law, 97% Q.- A received from B for safeguarding during Bs absence abroad a sealed trunk containing valuable articles. A afterwards broke the trunk open with a hatchet without Bs consent and appropriated its contents to his own use. What crime did A commit? State your reason. A.- This case falls within the intriguing boundary line of cases between theft and estafa. The test whether a crime is one or the other is: was the juridical possession of the thing delivered with it to the offender? If so, then there is estafa; otherwise, theft results. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which, in the words of Judge Albert, the transferee may set up even against the owner. Tested by this rule, it is respectfully submitted that A is guilty of estafa. Estafa is committed by any person who shall defraud another by any of the following means: (1) with ungratefulness or abuse of confidence, (2) by appropriating money, goods, or other personal property received in trust, for administration or on commission or under any obligation which imposes the duty to deliver or return the thing.

In the instant case, A was given the juridical possession over the trunk, namely, the possession of a depositary, thereby imposing upon him by the duty to hold the property in trust and to deliver it to B on demand. Roberto Concepcion (1st Place, 1924) Criminal Law, 95% Q.- The municipal president of a town, in a fit of anger, mutilated and destroyed a municipal payroll presented to him by the municipal treasurer for approval and signature. This payroll had not yet been signed by the other municipal officials as required by law. What crime, if any, was committed by the municipal president? Reasons. A.- He has not committed any crime, because the papers destroyed were nothing more than some ordinary documents, a kind of rough draft (so we may say), because they were mere documents prepared to be converted into public documents. When they were destroyed, they did not have any value other than what they had materially as paper. At most, the president will be liable for the value of the papers destroyed, which is certainly too insignificant to raise the responsibility of said president to the category of crime. Manuel Roxas (1st Place, 1913) International Law, 100% Q.- Jusara, a Turkish subject, sells to Hatchina of the same nationality, 100 slaves, for which the latter gives a promissory note. The sale is made in Turkey and is perfectly valid in that country. Both come to Manila where Jusara sues Hatchina for failure to pay the note. Will action prosper? Explain the doctrine on this matter. A.- The action would not succeed because, although the contract was perfectly valid where made, yet the consideration for the same is not only illegal and immoral but is discountenanced and condemned by all civilized countries. Our courts cannot let themselves be the instrument for the enforcement of such a contract. It is against our plain public policy and slavery being considered an inhuman practice, our courts would not even entertain a suit for the recovery of the purchase price. Roque Desquitado (1st Place, 1923) International Law, 98% Q.- Is a state responsible for the damages caused to the subjects of another in cases of revolution or civil war? And in cases of local disturbances? A.- A state is not liable for damages caused the other subjects in cases of revolution or civil war. The subjects must suffer the consequences arising from revolution or civil war. A state is not expected to guarantee to other subjects that they shall never be molested in their peaceful residence therein. There are certain events in which a state cannot at times cope with the situation, and revolution and civil war are among those cases. Moreover, the residence of other subjects in the territory is a mere privilege conferred upon them by the state. If the revolution or civil war attains such proportion that other states deem it expedient to recognize their belligerency, then the state where such revolution happens shall with more reason be released from the consequences arising from such state of things. In local disturbances the state is liable as in the case of the Boxer Rebellion in China where China was compelled to pay indemnity to states whose subjects were injured thereby.

Hermenegildo Atienza (1st Place, 1932) Political Law, 100% Q.- Can the judicial power ever exercise any control over the executive or legislative? A.- When the judicial power declares a law unconstitutional, or nullifies an act of the executive, it may be said for practical effect that the judicial power exercises a certain degree of control over these branches. Yet in legal theory, as repeatedly declared by the courts, such acts of the judiciary in no way control the other branches, but simply gives effect to the fundamental law which is of superior obligation. It is the particular province of the courts to declare what the law is, and when a statutory enactment contravenes a constitutional provision, it is for the courts to give effect to the constitution. In the famous case of Marbury vs. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall denied that in the declaration by the Supreme Court that a certain act of Congress was unconstitutional, it was thereby in control of the legislative branch. It was only declaring what the fundamental law is, and to show the way for the legislature. For like any branch of government, the legislative and the executive branches must act within the law, or they are lawless usurpations. Q.- Can legislative powers be delegated? A.- Legislative powers cannot be delegated. This is based on the ethical principle that the power is not simply a right or privilege, but a duty and obligation. It has its constitutional justification in the doctrine, that where the sovereign power has placed a power, there it must remain, and one to whose judgment, wisdom and patriotism a duty has been entrusted should not perform it through the judgment, wisdom, or patriotism of another. However, where the delegation is not of the power to determine what the law is, but how it is to be executed, the delegation is proper. (U. S. vs. Ang Tang Ho; U. S. vs. Barrias; Inchausti vs. Public Utility Commission). Q.- Define the police power. What are its bases? What are its limitations? A.- Police power has been defined as the inherent power of the state to adopt any measure necessary to protect public interest and promote public welfare. It includes practically the whole field of regulation. (U. S. vs. Pompeya). It extends to everything essential to public safety, health, morals, peace and order and justifies abatement of anything that may be considered a public nuisance. (U.S. vs. Toribio). It is based on 2 well-known maxims: Salus populi est suprema lex (The welfare of the people is the supreme law); and Sic utere tuo, ut alienum non laedas (So use yours that it may not damage your neighbors) The only limitations on public power are that it must be reasonable and not oppressive or discriminatory, and must be for the public benefit or purpose primarily, and not for the benefit of a private person, although the public be incidentally benefited. There must, therefore, be a fair and reasonable necessity and relation between the means employed and the end to be achieved.

Manuel Roxas (1st Place, 1913) Remedial Law, 100% Q.- Upon what ground is hearsay evidence excluded? A.- Hearsay evidence is excluded upon the broad grounds of public policy. It is excluded upon the sound theory that no man can better express his ideas than he himself. A perfect knowledge of human nature must commend this rule, for it is very seldom, if at all, that a man can repeat in court what another has told him regarding a particular fact, and the allowance of the evidence would lead to innumerable frauds and to great difficulty in the determination of facts. Besides, if hearsay is admissible if given by the person who say that he heard another say something, logically, at least, it must also be admissible if told by a third or a fifth, or a tenth person who testifies as to what he had heard the previous man said to what he had heard another previous man saying, and so on, and thus a story of three words may become a thousand. The law cannot allow that. Hearsay is only admitted in very few cases where the law on the ground of necessity or convenience admits it, but well guarded by technical rules. Arturo Tolentino (2nd Pl ace, 1934) Legal Ethics, 94% Q.- What limitation is there upon the right of an attorney to coach his witnesses? A.- The attorney may coach his witnesses in the proper manner of answering questions so that the facts to which they testify may be clearly brought out. The limitation is that he should never teach the witness to state facts which the witness does not know; in other words, he should not manufacture evidence and then make the witness his mouthpiece. He should never induce the witness to commit perjury.