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OIINESE SUPPORT POR REVOLtrrIONARY ~ V E H E N T S
by
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Howard Il.' 8aUoc:h
Muter 0 fArts
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CHlISE SUPP'[ POIl UVOLUTIO!WlY IIJ'IBMENT'S
IN THE MDl WOIU.D. 1965 ... 1971
by
Howard R. Bal10ch
A thesls suba1tted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
\1 and Research in p.artial fulfiUtMnt of the
requ1reents for the degree of
Haater of Arts

of Polit1cal Science,
,
MeC11l University,
Montreal, canada
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Il., Ja 110ch
'1974
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...
January, 1974.
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RESUME
Les deux grands desseins de cette tude sont d'esquisser
les d'appui chinois pour les mouvements rvolutionnaires du
tiers-monde entre les annes 1965 et 1971, et d'indiquer les
variables dterinantes de cet appui. L'valuation du soutien
chinois pour tous les mouvements rvolutionnaires du tiers-monde
est suivie d'une analyse de douze cas particuliers qui fournit une
explication aux d'appui chinois.
Deux variables indpendantes sone utilises afin de
vrifier la validit d'une srie tires d'crits
.,
contemporains--traitant des -affaires extrieures chinoises--et
de l'idologie de la Rpublique Populaire. L'-tude
Go
de ces hypotbasea met en une gradation de variables "'1

dterminantes de l'appui chinois. Plusieurs nouvelles,
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sorties des donnes, sont formules. Quelques indications sone
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fournies pour des tudes nltrieures.
Nom: Howard R. Balloch
Titre de Thbe: Chinese Support for Revolutlonary Move .. nta in the
Tbird World, 1965 - 1971. (L'Appui Chinoi. pour
les Mouve.ents Rvolutionnaires du tiers-Monde,
1965 - 1971). ...
Science Politique. Faculty of Graduate Studies
and Research. McGill University.
Diplante : Kas ter of Arts'.
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ABSTRACl
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The major ques.t-'ions posed in this study What were
the patterns /o'f Chinele support for revolutionary movementa in the
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third wor1d from 1965 to 1971? and; What re the prtmary detenainants
of Chinese support for such movements? Chinese support tor aIl r \
third-wor1d revolutionary IDOvements ls assessed and then a /
group of case studies (twelve in total) are analyzed ta provide
explanation for Chinese support patterns.
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Tvo primary indepndent are used to test the
validity of a series of hypotheses drawn from contemporary literatur
on Chinese foreign affairs and from modern Chlnese ideo1ogy. The
testing of these hypotheses suggests a ranking of tbe prLDary
1
determinants of Chinese and new hypotheses. emerging
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the data, are 6armulated .a...jsome 8uidelines for future research
,. .., ..... ...
offered.
Name:
Tit1e of
Department:
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Howard . Bal10ch
Chinese for Revo1utionary
the Third Wor1d, 1965 - 1971.
1
t
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nts in
Politica1 Science, of Grad . te Studles
and Research, McGill University. /
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Master of Arts.
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ACIQI)WLEDGEMEN'l'S
The author wou Id like to express his deep
tu tho.e people Whose aid thl theaia poasible.
1 .. deeply lndebted to theaia
Janice Stein, for her thouahtful _gHtions and
the arest care rith whlch ahe read and reread varioua- II" ... (-
. drafts# Second, '1 vould like to "uy of .,
colleaguea for their those
moments when the t.sk ahead se_ed 1 .
wou Id lUte Ua express gratitude to P. Butler who read
parts of the t'bests and whoae were of areat
help. Finally. 1 would lite to thank Brue Kappel
for help in typinl prelt.inary drafts and Lalaae Rac:kett
for her care and in typing the final cqpy.
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TABLE OF tn'EIrrS
CBAPIIR f
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A.
IM'IllOIXJCl'IClll ................. ................. --- - 1
B.
TJIE()It.ETlCAL .......................... If .......... . 2
c.
4
Ge,neral Theories .......... -. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 4
Speolflc Theories of Cbioese luvolve8ent 6
D. THE atlHESE MODEL FOR-PEOPLE' S
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WAll ........................... .
E. HETIIODOLOOY. .. ................................... -............................... . 16
l. Construction of the "Support Index" ...... ........... 19
2. Construction of the ''Hostility lndex" 23
3. Construction of the "Revolutionary
lndex .. _
25
4. Analysis and .. 28
..... .................................................
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.. . .. .. .. .. . . .. .. .. . .. .. .,.
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CHINESE SUPPORT F REVOLUTIOIlARY tlJ'lEMENTS.. 35
\ A.
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UTIN AMER.ICA ..................................................... ' .................... ..
AEIlICA ABD THE MIDQLE EAS'F '
AStA ......................... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. .. . . .. .. . . .. . . . . .
3S
46
61
FOOrNCJ'lES ' .......... \ ........................... II' .. 78
THE LATIN CASE STUDIES .... 90
.
IIlSTILITY l'NDEX v. .. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . . . . .. 91
B. REVOLUTlottARy INDEX.
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.. .. .. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. . . --. 94
1. Argentina ............................ " 94
2.
1
3.
4.
Brazi1: . 99
Doainlcan Republic 10l
Ecuador 106
...................... ............................. " ............. 117
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CHArTER
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THE AFRICAN AND MIDDLE EASTERN bASE STUDIES. . .......... "' .... 121
A. HOSTILITY INDEX ......... " " " . " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " .122
B. REVOWTIONARY INDEX
" " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " .126
1. Angola
" " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "" " " " .128
2. Ethiopia.
" " " " " " " " " " " " " " " "
. 133
3. Israel . ........ :) ............. .
" "" " " " " .136
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4. South Africa.""""""" .. " .. """""""""""""""""" " 140
c. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE AFRICAN AND MIDDLE
EASTERN
" " "" " " " .144
CASE STUDIES
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FOOTNOTES.
" " " " " " " " " . " " " " " " .. " " " " " " " " .. " " " " " " .
_., ..... 151
THE ASIAN CASE STUDIES . 155
A" HOSTILITY INDEX""""",,""""""""""""""""""""" " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " .157
B " REVOLtn'IONAR.. y INDEX""""""""""""""""""""""" . """"""""""""""" 160
1. Burma .... "" ............ " .... " ........... 16()
2. Indla ......................................... 166
3. Laos .................. . 170
4 Tha 11 and. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................. 175
c. ANALYSIS OF THE ASIAN CASE STUDIES ... ..... 179
FOOrNO'rES ... .............. . '186
EXPLANATION OF CHlNESE SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY HOVEMENTS 191

A. TESTING AND REFORMULATION OF HYPoTHESES... ..
B. GUIDELINES FOR FtmJRE RESEARCH. . ....... . ....... 208 \
Focus of Research . .. Il 208
Methodological Questions ......................... ' 210
c. CONCIJ.fDING ,REMAIlK , . ',' Il' ' 211
FOOTNES
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BIBLlOORAPHY ...... , ................ ; . 214'
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CHAPTER 1
A. INTRODUCTION
In many parts of the third world, revolutionary aoveaents
are attempting to overthrow established and establish
revolutionary has been accused of backing
the revolutionaries. lt is determine empirieally
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whether this accusation is based on actual Chinese support or on
the propensity of governments to find external scapegoats for in-
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temal dissent. Secondly, China has assisted these revolutionary

movements, one wonders whether the pattern of Chinese supporf has
remained consistent over time. Both the period immediately before
and period immediately after the Cultural Revolution represent
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different epoehs in Chinese foreign poliey, as does the more recent
begun by the so-called "ping-pong diplomacy" of this decade.
One cannot assume priori that China has had a unifora strategy in
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sup'porting third-world movements. Nevertheles8 we do
assume that the Chinese have some measure of support to
these lIlovements.
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The major purpose of this thesis is to present a syste.-
atic analyste of Chinese support, during the paet ten years, for
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so-called revolutionary .avements in the third world. This
draws both empirically and Uheoretically from the works of a vide
variety of echolars and empirical data to exaaine the
2. 'p
levels patterns of Chinese support. The basic questions ve are
attempting to ansver are: (1) As a revolutionary great power, what
are the patterns of support China has offred revolutionary move-
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ments? (2) Has the nature of this support during different periods
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of Chinese foreign-policy making been untform or can we discover

changes in the level of support? and . (3) ,If patterns of support
can be determined, vhat conclusions can be drawn concernlng Chinese
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actions and objectives in the third world?
B. THEORETlCAL CQNCEPTS
Most of the literature on one state's involvement in the
internaI strife of another has centered around the discussion of
internaI vars .. Such vars have been defined in several'ways: .by
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Ted Gurr as "large-scale, organized, focused civil strife. almost
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alvays accompanied by violence"; by R. A. Falk as "sus.taind large-
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scale violence between two or more factions seeking to challenge in
whole or part, the of government authority in a
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particulal:' state"; and by John Eley as "large scale' focused civil
atrife. at least thirty days and between or more
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contending forces subject to the salle Jure PollUcal jurisdiction."
The focus of this project, while it could any or aIl of the
above definitions, is mu ch broader. Our concern ia with the move-
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ments themselves, and not the of their activity_ For
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the purpose of thesis a revolutionary .. y be defined
a8 an organized atte.pt. cOllprising an institutional core, to
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overthrow the 1ure politieal regime to effect both
structural change. Clearly, this definition is very general. Such
a movement can attempt to effect change through violent or
violent means. through institutionalized and accepted patterns or ,
through a strategy condemned by an inumbent regime as "parapoUtical" \
The requirement 'beyond the desire for both structural and
ideational change, is that a movement be institutionalized as a
communist party or a peasant band, a trade union, or whatever. The
nature of the revolutionary movement is one of the two main indepen-
dent variables of this study. Though it is often useful to have a
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rigorously defined independent variable, in this instance a broader
definition will permit a more extensive examination of the reration-
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ship that independent variable and the patterns of Chinese
support. In addition, the selection of revolutionary movements to
be included in study will include aIl movements whose longevity
has spanned at least two of the three time perioda, and whose efforts
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have merited the attention of either the Chinese or the western
press.
Chinese support comprises more tban positive behavioural
o jactionp. In international relations theory several type. of definl-
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tions of foreign policy actions have been of fered J. N. Ro_enau
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and Patrick McGow8n
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have deacribed foreign policy as national
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adaptation, Charles McLeUand and have it
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situation response, and Charles Herunn antf ROdoJ..f aUl!tml have
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deacribed it 8S dt.crete eventl. In tbis thes'):_, foreigl\ PC;UCy
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actions are defined aa discrete acts towards, or articulated atate-
ments about, a forelgn atate emanting f-ra. persons in decision-
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making posta in the oPerative goverDllent.. of a country. Ac.rlve
behaviour and verbal behaviour can both be conaidered foreign
action. Thu 1 Bhi.-hU to the troopa of the Provlaional
Revolutionary Government in South Vietnam and govern.ental state-
ments in support of BoUvian guerrillas are both foreign po11cy
actions. Both the dependent and one of the aajor independent
variabLes in this study' are action variables, and thus include
verbal as weIl as active behaviour. (A description of the variable.
followa Iater in this chapter.)
C. THEQRETlCAL BACKGROUND
The theoretical foundations of thi. study have been drawn
from generai studies of externai iavoivement in internaI vara and
specifie studies of such Chinese invoivement.
General Theories
In eX8IIIining the very broad subject of one' atate' s involve-
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ment in the internaI strife of another, C. R. Mitchell suggests
there are four of independent variables tbat auat be ....
He that in order to understand
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invoivement on.e IlUSt examine: (1) II:he factors within th attife-'
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ridden state which tend to .. ke lt prone to violence and di.cord!
(2) the factors in the intervening state which ted ta cre.te
so-called need for expansionist or inter,renUve bebaviour; (3) the'
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factors 11nking the internaI group seeklna and/pf receL'Ving e.x.ter;nal
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and the external parties appe'led to and involved; and (4)
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the factors in the international system whicb increase tbe lik,ll-
12
hood of either. internaI war or external i-nvolvement.
,
Tbrough
the study of tbe four categories, Mitchell suggests that the
-of ... i.Dg too ,,,ch :.exterJt sPlllover'" ca. be ....
Two such assumptions plague the literature, according to Mitchell:
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intervention of SOlDe so'rt i8 more or less Inevitable regardless of
the context of the strife; and an appeal for aid, by one combattant
at least. iB a:phen01llenon so ubiquitous that it can be taken as,
,
given. Though Mitchell,'s work does not offer a &OIIlprehensive
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theory of external involvement it does. posit a theoretical rela-.
tionship between,external involve.ent (the dependent variable)
-' and four primary groups independent variables; as well it
points out two theoretical assUlllpUons whicb are generally
accepted but which could qulte poss1bly be errorteous--the inev1t-
,
abUity of intervention and t.h ubiquity of tbe appeal for aid.
.
John W. Eley, in an on80in8 study known as the World
13
exaaines the policles of the Unite4 States
,
towards internaI wars from 1945 to 1970. Eley atteapts to relate
three dependent variables--the number of U.S. events involved in
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th-: war-torn system; the nomber of U .S,. ailitary assistance act;ions;
and the total nuaber of assistartce actions--to six Independent
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duration of the confUct;" the volu.! of trade be-
tween the U.S. and the state in question; the nu.ber 'of treati.
between the U.S. and 'parties in the
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level of U.S. eeonomie asaistnCej tbe level of previoUl U.S.
military assistance; nd of eonfliet. In preliainary
findings, Eley bas suggested that the type of confliet has the
elosest positive relationahip with ail three foreign poliey
6 .
measures, and that a stte'a reaetion to internai wars is determined
primarily by tbe nature of the confliet, ratber than by previoUl
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relations with the war-torn sfstem.
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TheJ?6-8re several authors, such as Mortan A. Kaplan and
15
'Oran Young who' have suggested t,hat the reaetion of a state ta
internal strife of can be explainetl through an examination
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of the positions - of the, two states in the international system.
Thse .systems theorists have agreed that resct ln an
interventive fashion to internai wars in amaller powera within their
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so-called "sphere of influence". Though neither YounS nor Kaplan
dealt ",tth a power such as their work 1& relevant here
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becauae it posits a positive relationsbip between tbe action of a
,
s tate (the dependent variable) and the position of:that
'tbe international system (the variable).
Specifie Theories of Chi-nese Involvement
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ata'te in
Few studies attempted a
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Chineae involvemnt in the internal of otber states.
Usually, authors have limited their analyses to a partieular geo-
graphieal Most of these studies have been descriptive
historieal ana!yses. While often illuminating and'fascinating,
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they have not produced the focused generalizationa
co..on to atudies of auperpower action.
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Ernat Ralpedn and Jphnson have both dealt
the support China has given revolutionary movements in Latin America.
Dowever, both of theae studies are concerned primar!ly with pre-
"" Cultural Revolution data. Halperin makes a major contribution in
,'his emphasis on the role of the Sino-Soviet confllct in Chinese
relations with Latin Ame.rican cOllllllunist parties and revolutionary
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groups. He suggests that warm relations between these parties and
are a function, at least ln e the party' s condemnation
of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Cecil
JOhn;on concludes in his work that the Chinese have been trying to
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win over any and'all communist parties and revolutionary groups
without regard to the nature of the movement or the national situa-
tion in which a movement ,is operating. Though he recognizes the
signifieance of the Sino-Soviet debate, he does not accord it "the
same B Ignifleanee as Halperin.
18
Bruee Larkin in a broad study of Chinese-African rela-
tiana, has suggeJted that Chinese support for revolutionary movements
Is primarily a funetion of the type of politieal system of the
in question, and secondarUy of the poUtica1 leanings of the
...
movement. Re suggesta that in those cases where a radical national-
ht Il1O Soviet Un10n interna-
tiona11y, Pking will it only lf there iB no other viable
moveaent wlthin that SaDe state. ln ot"r warda, Peking generally
support to the alternate even if 1t i and
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- one receiving support frOli HoICOW. Tbus \
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within colonial Alrica, it is the Sino-Soviet dispute which i8 the
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main explanatory variable in the allocation of Chinese support.
The literature on Chinese support for revolutionary IBOve-
ments in Asia is extensive, but most of these studies have concen-
trated primarily on the analysi8 of the war-torn states of the
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Southeast. Fewtoretical inaights have been offered.
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Peter an Ness is the only authorco deal with a11 geo-
areaa in the third world within t e confines of a single
study . Following a study of approximately fort y aovements in, 1965,
Van Ness suggesta that the major explanation for Chinese support is
the tenor of relations beFween the two states, as expressed by
hosti lit y of friendshiQ. by a third-world government' towards China.
Secondary variables such a8 the attitude of a revolutionary move-
ment towards the Soviet Union and nature of the state are
additionai factora in Van Nessla although he fails to
deal systematically with the relative importance of these other
variables.
The aim of this is to detemine the level 8n4-
pattern of Chine.e support and to offer an explanation of those
patterns. The theories of Chinese support offered by otber .uthon
will be assesaed,*and hopefully the results will be useful in
,developing a more generai theory concernlng patterns of externa1
. involvemnt in the internaI affaira of third-world .tates. This
s tudy can be seen in the context of three of. C. R. Mitchell 1.
21
categories of relevant foci, altbough the nature of the move.ent.
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ve are interested in ia .ore liaited than Mitchell' s all-encOllpaaaing
"internaI var". ln easence, we are atteaptlng to exp1ain: (1) the
f actora in China vhich increaae the tendency to support revolutionary
.ave.ents; (2) the factors in the state of the revolutionary move-
'.
aent vhich tend to aelte Chinese support more like1y; (3) the geo-
graphica1 and t .. porai factors which have in the pas t decade affee ted
dl..
the support re1ationships betveen China and revo1utionary movements.
The attribute8 of the international system which might posslbly
increase or decrea8e likelihood of Chinese support vUI not be
ex_ined directly although the conclusions of the tbesis could
suggest that these are iaportant variables for future study.
Betore ex .. ining the aethodo1oglcal foundations of this
8tudy, a short discussion of the Chinese lIIOdel1H revolution ta in
order as foras the ideologieal prototype of vhat Peking considers
an Ideal .ave .. nt. A discussion of this model is neeessary since
lt foras tbe foundation for the construction of one of the indepen-
dent variables.
D. THE CliNES! K>DEL FOR "PEOPLE' S WAIl"
The Chineae .odel for a sueeeaafui revolutionary move.ent
is ba8ed on the Chines ... revolutionary experience IIlOdlfied by the
conditions ln the underdeveloped world. Aimed at
colonial arf ao-called "neo-colonial regiae.,
direct app{ication of the Chinese revalut ion
lt iB IDOre than the
to other countries.
Instead, it providea 80veaents vith a nu.ber of iaportant principle.
vhieh .hould be adapted and used according to the particular
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situation in vhich a IMWelient operates. It i!l beyond the scope of
thi. analysis to explain how the .odel vas derived from the Chineae
revolution and consequently .odified; in any case. other analysts
22
have already treated this subject extensively. This section
vi 11 present an outline of the .ajor tenets of a "people' s var" as
23
set forth by Lin Piao in 1965. Though it .. y appear sOlDevhat
arbitrary to use a single article as the basis the model. this
article vas distributed videly in China in 1965. and often referred
24
to subsequently as the final ward on the subject. -Even after the
faU of Lin there has been no public refutation of the article and
thus it appears tbat Lin Piao vas presenting the official position
of the Peking government. We are ass\Ding here that this is in
fact so. and there appears very little evidence to suggest that such
,
vas not the case. The .odel can very easily be broken down into
component parts vhich represent separate ele.ents or tents of an
ideal revolutionaryaoveaent ev en though Lin himself did not do 80.
All of these. as ve shall now see. are rooted in the Chlnese ex
perience.
The be led by a coaaunist party, analyzing the
situation its country by the use of Marxist-Leninist dialectics,
as did Mao:
Basing himself on the funda.ental tenets of
Marxis.-Lenini and .pply! ... the .ethod of
cla.s analysis, Coarade Mao Tse-Tung analysed;
Urate the .. tual tranaforaation of China' s
principal and DOn-principal contradictions
following the invasion of China by Japanese
iaperiall ; second, the consequent changes

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in class within China and in inter-
national relations aria; third, the balance
of forces between China and Japan. This .
analysis provided the scientific basis upon
which the political and military lines of
the War of Resistance were formulated. 25
Whatever the particular in a country, the
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central communist party must use such an analysis to find the rigbt
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strat!egy for victory. While the strategy !tself can vary, ,it. 1&
only under the leadership of the party that sufficient understanding
fh
can be generated to produce a viable"7:tholution.
,,...
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. h The second requlrement of a people',\ s war is perhaps the .JIlOst
important; it is certai'nly the one ele.ent that has had the
greatest impact on the history of modern China. It is to:
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Apply the line and the United
In order ta win a people' s war, !t is im-
perative ta build the broadest possible
front and a series of policies which
will ensure the fullest .,bUj,zation of the
basic masses 8S weIl as the unit y of all tl\e
forces that,can be united. 26
The workers and the peasants auat be united in this front,
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as should all elementa of the country that can, be aarshalled agaiut
the rulihg govemment. In order to accoapUsh this sa.!
in the form of policy adjustments is invariably needed. bot ''within
,the united front the Cc:aaaunist Party must aaintain its ideological,
political and organizational independence and initiative and inaist
on !ts leading role". In building this united front the worker-
1
peasant aIl hnce must be firet estabUshed, "&pd only on the bas1a
of the worker-peasant alliance, It il poslible to establilh the
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second
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alliance, fatt! a broad united -tront aDel
27
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var
victoriously. fi The importance of thi. ele.ent seen in the
..... 1,_
Chinese experienc, for vitbout it the bave
28 "
faltered.
3. Undoubtab'lY, the greatest Cbinese
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Bolsbvilt
revolutionaries' historical 'exaaple their shUt in
j
emphsis from the urban proletariat to the rur peasants. Siail-
arly, very few countries in the third world ca suffi-
ciently developed economy to have a significa t urban labour force.
Therefore, in the Chinese model for a people's vat, it is iaperative
"to rely on the peasants,' build ba(le .. and use the
countryside to and finally capture the cities--sucb vas
,
'- . 29
the vay to in the Chipese revolution".. It . i,. fra. the ./
. -..... r
,
rural peasants that the strengtb of the IIOVeMnt .... t ca.! in .an- '
power, tactical\ advantage, and lU,terial resources.
Tva basic la.ents comprise the fourth require.ent wbicb describea
coriect nature of the revoluUonary Pirst. the .ust
be as orlented taward politics It Is taward figbtlng:
,
PoUUcal vork is the Ufeline of our aory.
True, a people's ar.y aust pay-attention to
the 'cona tant: iaprove_nt of its weapons' and
equipaent and Its adlitary technique, but in
Its fighting it doesoot rely purly on
and it relies .. ibly on
Politic8, on the proletarian
,- and of the
and Hghtera, on the support and backing of
the usses. 30
\,
','
"
.J
..
. ,.
Second, this/ Amy ... t he under the "solute leadership of the
31
13.
ec-unist Party," in fact a tol of the party, for lt 18 _adatory
tbat "the Party the gun, .and the guo ..st aever be aUowed
32
to the Party. Il
2...:.. Having estabUshed the nature of the revolutionary anay, Lin
" explained the strategy. Deeessary to defeat Us eoe.y. Western
often .. intain that the.strategy of var is one of
/"
guerrilla varfare', Mao biaself it clear that a .,dern .,.,il1zed
,
IUndatory for suceess and that guerrilla tactica, vbUe
are nonetheles8 supple.entary to th!s .obilized
33
force. Guerr!lla varfare ia neeesaary, however, for as Lin
pointed out:-
Guerrilla warfare ia the only vay to -abtlize
and apply the wbole Btreogth of the people
apiut the eaeay, the only vay to expand our
forces ln the course of the var, deplete and
walten the eneay, gradually change the balance
of forces between the eoe.y and ourselvea,
svitcb fra. guerrilla to .obile varfare, and
finaUy defeat the eneay. 34
\
Thus, "the strategie raie of guerrUla varfare la tvofo1d; to support
lS
regular varfare and ta tran.fona tt.elf ioto regular varfare."
Refusai to figbt unless of victory, however ... 11; tactica1
vithdraval in the face of .upertor forces; and surprise are the
other tactics espoused by Lin for the people'. aa.y. E ent1ally,
-'
tbe tactics of people' s var can be aa-ed up as the IIObl11za-
t10n of the population and the use of guerrilla varfare a 'pre-
requis1te to, and an adJunct of, a 1IOb1lized
li'
)' .
, "-'
"
r
-,
- - ..... ..,
14

y,
The flnal tenet of Lln Piao's people's var is the Adherence of
the revolutionary movement to a policy of lt i8 that:
,\
liberation of the masses is accomplished, by masses thm-
selves, thia is a bgsic principle of or
people's var in any country is the business of the masses in tbat
;
should be carried out primarUy by their own effrts;
, 36
there is no other way." This,is probably the most ambiguous of
a Il the tenets, nd in fact ,Q,ever mend.oned in earUer discuss-
9
,
ions ef the theory of people's war, such as that of Lui Shao-Chi
in 1949. This does not imply that China,would'offer'no support
national l it>e ra tion struggles, but rather that a self-reliant
struggle mJst be waged in order to expect external SUPpoft. Lin
Piao dealt easily with this seeming difficulty in his summary of
China's stance towards revolutionary movements:
fi '
.
As for revolutionary vars waged by th oppressed
nations and peoples, so far from opposing them,
ve invariably give them fine support and active
'alq. lt has been 80 ln the past. it remaina so
in the present, and when we grow in Itrength as
tilDe' gos on, we wUI sive them still more
support and aid in the future Of cours,
every revolution in a country stems from the
demanda of lta own people. Only when the
people in a country are awakened, mobilized,
orgnlzed, and anaed can they overthrow tbe
reactionary rule of impetialism and lts
lackey. struggle; their role cannot be
replaced or taken over by Any people from out-
s'ide. In thia .ense, cannot be
iaported. But this doea not exclde mtitual
ayapathy and on the part of revolution-
ary,people in their- .truggles againat the
Imperialiats and their lackeys. Our
and a1d to other revolut10nary people serves
precisely to help thelr self-reliant .truggle. '7
for
j
"
/
e .
..
, lS.
Deapite the fact that China bas outlined the characterlstlc8
1
of an Ideal revolptionary moveaent, the Chinese leaders nevet'
aaid explicitly that a movement not subscribing to a required
minimum of these would be denied support. ln fact, in sade

. article by Lin Piao, three other attributes were mentloned: (1)
a movement shoula be anti-colonial and ,nti-imperialist; (2) it
should be oriented towards socialism and/or communism; and (3) lt
should be vigorously pursued vith relatively strong popu1arl support.
ln practice, if a movement fulfills the first six attributes it
would aiso fulfill the last For China, these last three
"
tenets can perhaps be seen as the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions far a hypothetical member of the ,united front, despite the
fact that such a movement might be a long way from .eeting all
other conditions. According to the Chinese theory, .by presenting
a world-wide front against a common enemy, victory will he easier;
, ",
.. having overcOlDe the principle eneary. attention can then be turned
\
ta puiHying ele.-ents within the united front. In discussing the"
past vars of nathmal several of vhich differed
radieally from the Chinese model. Lin said:
The cl o.e I ding ond'
so may the breadth and depth of saobiliza-
tian and the extent of victory, bu the
vic tories in these people t 8 vars have very"
much weakened and pinned down the forces of
laperiaUslII, upset the b-.S. iaperiaUst plan
ta launch a world war, and becoe lIIighty
,factors defending world peaee. 18
This theory of people's war. its six major and tbree
tenets, fanas tbe basis for tbe conatruction of one of the
'rtt f.
"'
. ,
16.
independent variables, the ''Revolutionary We .re
that this model 18 accepted by the Chinese govern.ent, and the
methodology used to test our h,potheaea is based on this premise.
E METHOOOLOGY
The metbodology used in this thesis ia an outgrowtb of
p revioua work used in other atudies of .hinese behaviour and .in
more general eventa data researeb. Van Ness, in his study
of Chinese support for revolutionary movements in 1965, uses a
camparison of two indicators, representing Chinese support and the
hostl1ity of a third-world government towards China, to exaine
whether China supports IDOvements on the basis intergovernmental
hostility. At a time when China elaimed to support a movement on
the basis of its ideologieal nature, a study sueh as Van Nesa's
is naturally unsatisfactory, for it ignores posaibilities alter-
native to its central hypothesis. Second, as bis'study covers
only one year his generalizations require further testing. In

this thesis we are trying to avoid such pitfalls by using three
separate time periods and by setting up a series of variables
whieh can be used to test a series of hypotheses.
We have attempted to draw fro. that genre of re.eareh
that has been called events data researeh or event. research in
order to make this study more rigotou8. According to Burgess and
39
Lawson,
1\
the adv.nces made towards building a more rigoroua
science by events data research have been due to a careful approacb
to data collection and organiz.tion. 5tudies of th!s nature
LI
17.
generally: (1) exaaine both unilateral and collective action; (2)
use direct targets only; (3) break complex actions into discrete
..
actions; (4) tbcus on aIL salient foreign policy actions; and (5)
have a set time frame. This study fulfills aIL those criteria:
(1) Support granted a revo lutionary IIOvesaent by Chin., with tbe
co-operation of another.country is treated as an action of support
equivalent to Chinese unilateral support; (2} Only direct recip-
lents of Chlnese support are classified as targets; (3) An actIon
,
of support for several movements ls consldered as a separate action
of support for each movelDent; (4) lt focuses on both positive
verbal and active behaviour, and both are considered salient
actions of support; and, (5) A set time frame consisting of three
Ume periods hd been estabUsbed. Using consistent and controlled
interpretation of data, it is hoped generalizations drawn in
conclusion will avoid the pitfall of camparing essentially incom-
parable data. This atudy falls short of IlUch events data research
in statistical sophistication, but this ia a function of the
7 narrowness of its focus and the concoaaitant problem of too amall
1
a sample size for such'methodology. In any case, the only difficulty
this entails is the necessity of interpreting the data intellectually
rather than 8tatistically; while the latter i8 useful wen de.Ung
with large populations, it i. not clear by any .. ans that it .voids
the of le 8 s"'" quantitative techniques of data
The IM!thodology iuVolves a qualititive cOliparison of
three principle one dependent and two independent. One
-,
,{J., -'0' '." ", j'si
o
l@.
secondary inde pendent variable aad one control variable are elao ;-

included in the analys18. Tbe principle vat'iables are aU- COll-
,
posite indices coaposed oi' a series of relevant indicators. The
results of the coaparison will be used to test a set of bypotheses
presented at the end of this chapter. The dependent variable. the
"support index". descr-ibes the pattern of support China to
a11 revolutionary movements considered. The tva .. jor independent
variables, the "hostility index" and the "revolutionary index",
will be used to try to explain the opattern of support described
by the dependent variable. These tva independent variables will
be assessed for a Umited nu.ber of move_nts as a cOliplete
analysis is well beyond the seope of this thesis. the
movements chosen represent different types of and
receive varying leveh of support from China. Therefore lt 18 not
unreasonable to assUDe that the generaltlations drawn fra. the
results are in fact. valide Tbougb tbe nUilber g-f .ove.ents eon-
s i"dered 18 not large enough to just1fy a quantitative cOliparllon
of tbe indices through aultiple correlation and regression ana1y.ia,
essentially the .ethodology is a correlation of the .. jor variables,
albeit done intellectuslly. 8y relating the tvo pri .. ry independ-
ent variables to the dependent variable. their relative
c an be assessed. The cOliputlng of the dependent variable relates
it autoaaticaUy to the secondary independent variable, the geo-
graphieal of a particular state. The control variable, tt.e,
e.se8 ehadsea ln Chinese aupport poliey between 1965, 1969,
.'
-,
,
"
,t
l
r '
. '
,1
'.,.
'-
..
19.
j
"nl' 1911, th", tf'ree ft_ pt!rlodl or thh We ehAU no"
prtl( .... d tll thp (on .. trul1t1on of tlw 'ndit .... ,tJ1P)l. I .. out '
thp to b@ tp"lpd, C'
{l,,',"l \.
1. " ",Cqn'tn",,11Q!1 QI th! ";tvppott lWtt.a
1t
(d.plIndent vn, ... b t.)
.;"
",,: Gh' tW". ''''pport for l'no l\ldon.ry IIOv ... nt ... l'An tllh
ln th .. Il'p'''Ahtl;fl . ..,hon- Il dl .. Unctlcln Il dr""" b.l" n
. 40 .
,,01,' lA III y JH,IIt lt'A l '''.pp,,,''t throuMh rrA' Me or A
"vQJul tu,,"rv ml"Vp .... nl Chln",,,p J'r","'" Th', ttllPU t .. k ..
.. h".."",. Ali or whl"h .. rp MrouppcI h.n 111t .. upport" ,
'Nf'(on,l ... U 1t Ary And Pl'onom' (' '''l'Prt'rl 1II\1IIt b. l .. ", .. l.d "" th ' .....
:>:
lJI'" of ""pt"'I"I. ((lI' boU1 r .. fe lin l .. port"," t.m"lb Ica l'oc.-
, "
und.r III d"ltlltUut(,(lW cIIlhd "l"nRlble ,,,.pport". Ftn,,' l" tlMtr.
1
i" Il t tpcs of .upport thAl "ivel ".,.n r.coRnltlon to the r.volu
o J '
t lon .. rt-1llQvMMlnt. Th ... type' of Itupport, AcUna a. '" lo"lU.lllna
'- ,
IIIl(fnf; ((lr 'lIklvHifpnt. hl dfplOllalic or "ln"Utution4l1 aupport"
'1
whue Chlna ha .. utablhh.d fomAl ti." wHh th. MOv ... nt,
. \

, " 1 \
'1&) Pub lle Suppyrt
Thertt four type. oC public lupport that "lll b@
.XAnt-t.ned: (A) .tat ... nt. of .upport (or A IIOv_nt ... naUnl froa!
Mao or oU .. r a.n'or offtctah oC lM Chine IOVernMnt; (b) .l_Hu

"
P4
, .
1
l/
"t' ...
, {.,
..
,
8tatements by lesser officiaIs or major pre .. article. backing a

IIlOvement; (c) similar by the Chinese Co_unis t P.-tty or
statements by the front of, the movements reprinted
in the Chinese press; and, (d) general references of support 1n
the Chinese press. In computing the support index, each of the
f (,
, -
indicators will be weighted in order to iqdicate iU relative
signifieance. Iltithli case of public support for a government
'" '
opposed by a revolutionary movement, the indicators will be
weighted neg$t:ively, so as ca s,ignify support. The' data
for aIL four categories of public support are drawn from the
, \.
Pekins Review and the translated selections from the Chinese
-9.ress by the American Consulate in Hong Kong under the
titles: Survey of China Mainland Preu, Suner of China Mainland
Hagaz'ine, and Cu'rran t Ba'Cks round.

Tangible Support
Tangible economic or mil Hary support wi 11 be welghted
Along with the four indicators of public !Support.. As econa.ic or
mUitary support obviously connotes a strong c01aibDent to a
1
movelDent, it will be weighted heavUy. As with the indicators of

putl1c support, when tangible supPOrt 1& granted to a national
<
\, -
government lostead of a revolutlonary IIOvement. it will be welghted
"
negativet.y. (China has had. at various ti.aes, a policy of giving
relativelyJ ... u aalOunte of ..oney to leader. of revolutlonary
move.ents for purposea. ln theae Cal the a.ouot
J
of IIOney 1& .0 ... U tbat auch an Act 'Will, not be a.
----- .'

--
- '"
"
,-
1
.. e
...
.
tangible support; usually this money is of little help other than
l. .
providing funds for minor administrative purposes.) The data fot
this element are drawn primarily from secondary sources, although
the Chinese themselves occasionaHy make certain information
...
available.
(iii) Institutional Support
Some revolutionary movements have front organizations
_______ wi th permanent !!lissions in Peking, and send delegates to
f --_.- , ------ -- -- -.---. -
visit with Chinese officiaIs from time to time. ln cases where
either or both 0, these two types of formaI links exist, the

movement will be deemed to have "institutional support", another
indicator in the support index. Negative support will be ac.corded
a movement when active. diplomlrtic relations exist between
Peking and the '80vernment of the country in question. The Peking

,
Review, the Survey of China Hainland Press, and international
yearbooks serve as the sources for this data.
The weightings of the indicators in the support index
21.
are based on the relative importance of each indicaCor in coaaiting
China to a position backing the revolutlonary movement. As Peter
Van Ness points out:
A stateaent by Mao Tse-Tung is the strongest kind
of verbal support Pekins can provide. Rach atate-
ment Is invariably accompanied by MaSS rallies
propaganda campaigna throughout the country
and abroad. Public support doea not stop there;
o u8)Jally a .tatement of support by Chail'll8D Mao .
implies a contlnuing Chinue intereat in and
ca.itment to the particular area chosen 'for
endorae..ent. 41
)
22.
Thus such a statement is accorded a relatively heavy weigbt. Chou
En-lai and Lin Piao also .bave created parallel c01llllitments by
"
openly endorsing a movement, much IIOre than either junior -officials

or tbe CCP. The level of public support receives a lW
weighting, for while not as strong a statement as other levels,
'.
it is still signifieant: "when in official publications certain
areas are designated as areas in. whieh armed struggles against
imperial1sm are being carried on, there is, at the very least.
. 42
a strong implication of official Chinese endorsement." Clearly,
tangible economic,or military is as important as any
s tatement and thus 1t is accordec:1 th same significance as a
s tatement by Mao and other senior officials. Institutional sup-
port, while a very positive aet of support, annot be eonsidered
".
of quite the same magnitude as actual tangible aid, and thus is
accorded a slightly lower weighting.
The weightings of the indicators of the support index
ar therefore as follows:
SUPPORT IND,EX
PUBLIC SUPPORT
.= 4.1 4.1
... ..

... k k
0 .... k ..
&.
0

U o "0
.J'
iS
>. CI 4.1 a.
..... CI
='
.... 4.1
...... 0 l1li
B ...
"
0 .. CI l1li k
a &.
>-
>. ...... 4.116.1 IID'W
....
.Dk .DU CI CI 0 o a.
0 .....
116.10
Il
U ='
..... .16.1. 0 ..... l1li k l1li Il IID 0
... g
... 4.1 CloU
....
c: Il c: 0 ...
4.1 "
CI u
!t'
4.1
1
1 k
a. .4.1101.
.... CI
='
4.1 ;
4.1 CI"'" .. cu .a .. 4.1 ...
., '"
0 ...
.... c: :l
k ... .... 4.1 ....
&. =
..... ....... 0
... "

:t=
4.1
".e "CI_ Cl.o CloDO"

S ... 4.1
u='1
8
Il ... 4.1 Il
"
CI
FI) 0 en ...., k 0
CI
...
.... 1-4(1) ....
4 -4 ( ) 2 -2 ( ) 2 -2 ( ) l -1 ( ) 4 -4 ( ) 3(-3 )
,
Betveen
16 & -16
."
23.
These values perait the COllstructi0yf an index, applicable to a11
aovellent, vbich will yield a pictu(e of relative levels -of support.
2. Construction of the Index" (independent variable)
A country' s voting record in the United Nations General
Asse.bly on the tvo'resolutions of the annual China representation
--
issue will be used as indicators of bostility or friendship towards
China. Each yea r, up to and inc lud ing 1971 when China r s sea t in
the United Nations was UnaUy given to the Peking government, a
resolution, known as the "Albanian resolution", was voted on. This
, 1
resolution proposed the replacement of the ,Taiwan representatives
by those ,Of Peking, and restoration of China' s lawful seat in
the O.N. to the People's RepubUc of China. The United States
sponaored, each year, a procedural resolution declaring the
Albanian resolution an "important question" involving considerations
of the U.N. Charter. "This resolut.ion made the representation
issue subject to the rule that two-thirds of the General Assembly
aust be in favor of 'a resolut.ion for it to be passed. Clearly,
the fina supporters of China voted against the important question
resolution and for the Albanian resolution. Adversaries of Peking
did the reverse. A vote for the Albanian resolution will be con-
sidered an act o.f friendship, as will a vote against the U:!;.-
sponsored lIlportant question resolution. Votes opposed to these,
or abstentions, will he considered acta of hoatility.
Dipla.at.ic relations between the country in question and
Peking will be seen a8 an indicator of friendahip; al.tlar relatioa.


1\ (";.'"
1
indiate bostillty. Extensive trade with Peking
J
a country's total trade or .ore tban U.S. $50 million)
will be used as an indicator of friendsh1pi siaUar trade with
1
Taiwan will be used as an indicator of hostility. Finally, a
mUitary defence vith China will be considered friendly,
whUe one with Taiwan or the United States will be construed as an
act of. hostility. Most of the data for this variable can be foond
in t e U .N. International Trade Stati.tic8 Yearbook, the Far Eastern
Reviev, and/or any national sources available.

The weightiags of the indicators of the hostility index
unifonD; the index will neverthele8s provide a measure of
the relative intenslty of hostility or friendship by govemments
towards China. No Is aade to ascribe differing weights to
the various indicators as it would be excessively difficult to
detenaine relative even through 8uch techniques (which
are theDl8elves .ost questionable) as pair-scB,ling. AB opposed to
the 8upport index, where different Ieveis of public clearly
represent different degrees of co.ait.ent to a aove.ent, we are
assuaing that the relative of each indicator is 8igni-
ficant as it Adda or subtracts from the final index figure to
provide a coaparison of the relative intensity of hostility or
friendship of various govern.ents towards China. Probleas created
by unifora weighting ahould be less than those created by differential
The weighting 18 as follawa:
{
._-----
'0
,
, ,
25 ..
HOSTILITY INDEX
4.1

1

u

c:: c:I .r::: c::
0 0 4.1 cu.r:::

\
.... .... 4.1
.r:::
1:10 1:10
:.
..... 4.1
c:: c:: c:: u .r::: '0
.... 4.1 .... 0
.... -
.4.1 ...
1
>.
4.1 c:I a uc:l .... 4.1 d 0 >- .... 0

o 0 4.1
o 0 0.4.1
e -j J
-= 1:10 c:I
....
>4.1..-4 > .... =' .. a J c::
1 ....
c:I ..... c:: 1 c:I 4.1" ..

'&,-
0 ......... .'O .... ..-4..-4 .... 4.1 cu

-
Do ..... .... 4.1 .311 .... .......... .311 ....

..... " .... " ..
... 1 ..
.......
fo4dl.9 0- Ip cC ... .Poof-4
-
between
1(-1) 1(-1) 1 (-1) 1(-1) 1 (-1>- 5 & -5
(negative values represent Hostility)
1
3. Construction of the Revolutionary Index (independent variable)
The indicatora.of thia third variable conaiat of the
elements of an ideal people's var as outlined in the last section
of this chapter, and an indicator of a aovement's stance on the
Sino-Soviet rift. Altbough these vere dlscU8sed previously, the
main points will he outlined in order to explain the construction
of this index.
(i) The six major tenets of an ideal people'. var are tbe first
six indicators of this index. The flrst of tbese require.ents is
that a revolutionary comawnist party be the princlple front of the
organization of the movement. Secood, "In order to vin a people' s
, ..
var, it is imperative to bulld the broadest possible united front
..
consisting of a worker-peasant (and if necessary, an urban petit
, 1
bourgeois) alliance. though such an alliance la eaa.ntial,
it i8 imperative to rely on the peasantry in order to establiab
26.
rural ba.... Fourth, .e.aential to a people'l var is the ezuteoce
of an Amy aubordiJulted to the ec-unbt PaTty, and as interested
in political wart as venturel. Thil party-Ied ar., sbould
l
foUow the strategy of .,bUizlng the population and use the tactics
of guerrilla warfare. These two attributel eoaprile the fiftb
requirement of the Olinele .odel for, revolution. 'The final tenet of
Lin Piao's 'people's war' is the adherence of revolution to a
poliey of self-relianee. The more ciosely a .ave.ent conIonas to
these six principlea, the higher the leore 1t rii receive on the
Revolutionary Index.
(ii) The three lDinor require.ents, as pointed out eariier, deaand
that a moveaent: be anti-colonial, anti-feudal, and
," C)
be oriented towards soeialislD and/or co..unisa; and be vigorously
pursued with some significant 8IIIOunt of. popular svpport. Theae
.
three indicators will be considered along with the lirst six ta
indicate the degree of between a revolutlonary
movement 'and the Chineae .odel.
(Ui) Finally, an annotation be .. d to the nerical value of
the revolutionary index indieating whetber the in question
"'-.
supports China, supports the Soviet Union, or 18 in the
internationaHzation of tbe Sino-Soviet rift that has dlvided the
cOlIDUniat world. This indicator is iocluded to test the ;accuracy of
43 44
sOIae of the findiogs sugsested by Balperin aod Larkln. As this
element il of a distinctly different nature fro. the firat oine, it
w11l be added to the index in the fOIII of a letter: "ail if the
1
Il
e
IIOve .. nt .upporU the Soviet Union: if the .",elleDt supP'!rts
aDel "u" if the .oveIIent 11 or .plit ln lta ,
27.
'aUegiance. Thi8 will enable ua to a ess the correlation of this
e lellent vith the 8upport index as leparate froa the correlation
between the tvo c:o.polite indices.
The data for index are sathered prt.arlly fra. aec-
ondary &:Ources. a8 priallry research for even the seleeted ndlber of
.0ve_nU would present an insuperable obstacle for a proJect of
thi8 size,. ln any case, the literature on revol,utionary aove.enta
for the .ast part, 80fficient to provide the nece8sary infotlla-
tion.
The weights of the' first indicators of the revolu-
tionary index are The index la 81.ply a aea8ure of the
degree of conforalty of a given revolutlonary aoveaent to the
Chinese prG"totype.
REVournOtwty,:nmEX
....
....
....
...
t'
....
>-

c: u
c:
.... 401 0 ....
0 C c: .... ....... '0
....
:J
....
u
&. u .... . .......
=' -
_.401 .
.-4 ....
1':
=' .... u

. 't- o C2
> .... .-4
C2
C.a

...
o c:
401 0

....
....
>-.-
,c ....
M
'0'"
3:i!
1 1 1 1
C or veen
U o and 9
a.e or U
,
, .
..
,
1
"
,
28.
(For example. if a movement fulfl11ed only the
three 1Iin.iIII..- requlre.nts and backed" China in
the Sino-Soviet rift, i.t would receive a rating
al '3e' on this index.)
4. Analysis and Hypotheses
,
The analysis of the three pri.nciple variables will coyer
,
three time periods. provides the poss1bUity of testing for
in Chinese poliey across time. Time can, therefore., be
r
considered 8S a control variable. The literature indicates that
there have been four separate phases in Chinese foreign policy
45
since 1963.
J
Thdugh we shall analyze three of these four time
it has not been' established that these 114ve rep-
.reaented differing policies of for revolutionary movements.
--
The inclusion of Ume as a control variable wU'l test thts hypo-
thesis. The first of these ended with the introduction of
"
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and was marked by an
.
effort to establish a IDObUized group of third-world atates opposed
to both the United States and the Soviet Union, a real "third
force". With the breakirig up of the rather tenuous third force,
primarUy due to the overthx:ow of the pro-hinese governments in
such countr1ea as Ghana, Indonesia, Algeria, came the Cultural
Revolution, which marks the aecond historical phase. As it rep- J
46
resented a "turning-in" or a preoccupation with internaI affaira
at the expense of relations with the outside world, we are not
considering this era in this theaia. The third phase began at the
"turning-out" of Chineae attention at the end of the Cultural
\
.'
"
()
}
29.
and appears to have lasted until the'latter half of 1970.
, ,
At that time China began ta involve'herself more and'.ore in con-
,
,ventional diplomacy with western states together with renewed

.
hostility vith the Soviet Union. Therefore, we have chosen the
years.1965, 1969 and 1971 to represent the firat, third, .and four th
\
<
eras . Of course, the results of this study aaay suggest that vast
disparities the periods do not exist and tbat the break-up
, of Chine se foreign policy in ta these phases is unjustified.
Separate analyses are conducted in this thesis for three
geographical regions in order ta test for deviations 'in
of support based on physical toChina. The three regions
are Latin America, Alrica and the Middle East, and Asia. Renee,
geographical proximity an additional inde,pendent variable.
"-
In sUllllUlry. there is one depencfent; variable, three
inde pendent variables and a control variable. Of the independent
variables. the hostility index and revolutionary index are
, primary varIables vhich are composites of various indicators,
while geographieal proximity is essentially a seeondary or eon-
textual independent variable. Time servs as a control variable.
f
If neither. of the primary variables appear to be cor-
related vith the support index despite a consistent geographical
and/or temporal pattern, the conclusions drawn from the analysis
viII be quite different fram those drawn fram a significant eor-
relation between the prUDary variables. In the case where sueh a
signifieant correlation does exist, region could still be signifie.nt,
"1
1


..
30.
if patterns exist but appear lBited ta geographical region.
Temporal variation vithin and acros regions is possible regardles8
of the correlation between primary
results of this analysis vill be used ta test a set
of hypotheses. The hypotheses to he tested are not .eant ta b
lther mutually exclusive or necessarily complementary; their
testing should, hovever, illuminate the patterns of
"
for movements and the explanation for those
patterns. The are:
1. The greater the geographical proxaity of a state ta China,
the more likely China vill be to take an interest in indigenous
movement and offer it support.
2. When directIy confronting the United States or one of its so-
calied "{mperialist tools" (e.g., U.N. forces, Israel) a IIIOvement
is likely ta receive a high level of support, gre.ter than the
nature of the movement alone would dictate, regardle,s
of the geographical proxiaity.' (Chineae
3. A IIIOveaent. in Any geographical region, aiaed at the over-
throw of a government hostile to Peking is more likely.to receive
support than one aiaed at the displace.ent of a friendly regl.e
(Van Ness)
4. When a regime is uncomited ln its dealings vith ChIna,
vill hesitate to support an indigenous revolutionary -ave.ent,
in hppes of broadenlng her international politlal bases, regard-
less of (Van Larkln)
>
. .
p
1
' .
"
1
.. ',,-
l1.
S. ln Mdca. a at the overthrow of a colonial or
apartheid regiae will receive greater-support than one merely aimed
at a pro-wes tern regilDe. (!.arklra)
6. When a revolutionary .ovement supports the Soviet Union in the
international Sino-Soviet dispute. China vUI support either an
altemate organlzation within that state, or, if one'does not
'1
exiat, no moveaent at aIl, regard les. of the geographicsl
of that state to China or the tenor of relations between the
governing reg1me and China. (Johnson, Halperin)
7. Tbe greater degree of conforalty of a given revolutidnary
move.eot to the Chinese prototype for people'. war, the greater
the support the IDOvement will he aeeorded, r,gardlelB of geo-,
graphieal proxilllity or govenuMntal bo'stiUty. \ (Ollnese ideology)
,
l '_---
..
.
e
1
FOOTNOTES
1. T. R. Gurr. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A eo.parative
Analysis Udng New Indicators." "rican Political Science
Review. Volume 62. Decellber-, 1968. p. 1107.
32.

2. R. A. Falk. "Introduction" in Falk (ed.) The International
Law of Civil Strife. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press. 1972.
3. John W. Eley. "Events Data and Foreign Pollcy Theory: An
of American Foreign Poliey toward InternaI Wars,
1945-1970." Paper presented to the International Studies
AS80aiation annual meeting, New York. March, 1973. p. 3.
4. J. N. Rosenau. The Adaptation of National Societies: A
Theory of Political System Behaviour and Transfonaation.
New York: McCaleb-Seiler. 1971.
5. P. J. McGowan. "A FormaI Theory of poliey as Adaptive
Behavior." Paper presented at Alllerican Political Science
Association annual meeting. Los Angeles. Septeaber, 1971.
6. C. A. McClelland. "Some Effects on Tbeory fra. the International
Event Analysis Movement." Sage Professional Papers in Inter-
national Studies. Volume 1. 1972.
7. K. J. Rolsti. International Politics: A Fr..ework for Analysis.
Second Edition. Englewood Cliff\: Prentice-Ball, Inc. 1972.
8. C. Hermann. "Policy Classification: Key to the CoIaparative
Study of Foreign poUcy." in J. N. Rosenau, V. Davis, and M.
East (eds.) The ABalyais of Ipternational Relations. New York:
Free Press. 1972.
9. R. J. RUDIIDel. ''The Relationship between National Attributes
and Foreign Confllct Behavior." in J. D. Singer. Quantitative
International Polities: Insigbt and Evldence. New York:
MacMillan. 1969
10. This Is somewhat similar to the definition offered by J. N.
Rosenau in "Syetematic Analysie, Sclentific Conseiouaness aod
Moral Fervor in Foreign PoUcy Ilesearch." in A. Ranney.
PollUcsl Science and Publie Poliey. Olleago; Harkbaa. 1968.
,
Il. C. R, Mitchell. "External Involve_nt in Civil Strife," Inter-
national Studles Quarterly. VOlUM 14. June. 1970. pp. 170-176.
v
..
J'
"
.(
-
.
-
, \
12. Ibid. pp. 169-170.
13. Eley.
1
"
}
33.
"
14. Morton Ar Kaplan. "Intervention in SOII8
(' Sys te.ie Sources _," ifi.J. M. R.osenau (ed.) IntC!rnaUonal
DiJDenslons of Civil Strife. Princeton: Princeton University
Press. pp. 92-121.
15. Young. "Intervention and International 'Syste_. Il Journal 0
of International Affalrs. Volume 22. 1968. pp. 177-187.
) "
16. Ernst Halperin.
China quarterly.
"China and the Latin AlMdcan v
Vo!ume 29". January-Karh,'1961. '
-
17. Cecil Johnson. eo.aunist China and LatiJ1>,,"America 1,959-1967.
New York: ' Columbia University Press. 1970
" w _1
18. Bruce Larkin. China and Airiea 1919-1970. Berkeley: University
of CaUfornia Press. 1971.
19. See, for ex_pIe, T. W. Robinson. ''Peking's R.evolutionary
Strategy in the Developing World. Il AImaIs of the Aaerican
Aeade of Politic and SoCial Science. Volu.e 386. Boveaber,
1969; and R. A. 'Scala no (ed.) The ec-unist Revolution in
Asia. Second Edition." Englewood Cliffs: Inc.
1 %9 ' ./, .: - ::
.... -- )-
!L,., '" --_
20. Peter Van Ness. Revolution Md Foreign poliey.
Berkeley: University of ealifornia PFass. 1970

21. Mitchell.' gR. ill,- pp. 169-170.
22,. 'See Lyaan P. Van Slyke. Epaies Md fr.Jend.; The Upited
23.
24.
25.

27.
Front in Cbioese C(punist Hiat2'fY- St.llford: Stantord ""
University Press'. 1967; C. A .Johnson. Peasant Mati'onalis.
and ao-uni't Power: The !llers.nce of Revolutiouary Oaina
1937-1945 . -Stanford: Stanford,University Press. 1962; and
,Warner (ed.) Th Chi_se Model. Hong Kong: Bong Kong
Udiversity Press. . 1965.
Pekig Review. No. 36, 3 Septeaber, 1965. pp,-
9-30.
"
For examp le, . Pekins Review. No. 24.
6
1969. p. 22.
c-
J
Peking Review. "No. 36. 3 Septellbef, 1965. J'. 10.
n!!!..
p. 12.
Ibid. p. 14. ' 1
-,

,..
""
\
,

,0-
,
1

-"
1
.
28. Van S1yke. 22. ill .. pp. 75-209 for an ana1yaia of thla
iaportance.
'29. Peking Review. No. 36. 3 Se ptellber, 1965. p. 15.
30. Ibid. p. 17.
31. pp. 17,-18.
32. Mao Tse-Tung. Selected Warka. Peking: Poreign Lansuagel
Press. 1961 Edition. Volume III. p. 296. (;J
33. Mao Tae-Tung. On Guerrilla Translattrd by Samuel
Griffith. New York: Praeger. 1961. pp. 41ft.
34. Peking Review. No. 36. 3 September, 1965. p. 19.
35. Mao Tae-Tung. Selected worka. Pekin'
Press. 1961 Edition. Volume II. p.
36. Pekins Review.. No. 36. 3 September,
3 J' lIlli! . p 28.
38. p. 26.
Languages
34
39. P. H. Burgess and R. W. Lawaon. "Indicatora of International
Behavior: An Asaessment of EVents Data Reaearch."
Profeaiional Papers in International Studiea. 1972.
pp. 56ft. . -
40. See, for examp1e Eley.
!'
S,ll. p. 14.
41. Van Ness.
.2J?. s..!!..
p. 88.
1
42.
l!ili!.
p. 86.
U. Ernat Ra1perin.
llt
44. Bruce Larkin.
22 ill
45. For an earl1e.r of the phases in Chinese fore1gn
policy see, H. B. Yahuda. Poreign Poliey after 1963:
"The Haoht Phases." China Quarterlx. 32. October-Deee.ber,
1967.
46. See Daniel TreUak. "18 China Preparing to 'Turn-Out 1",
Aslan Syrvey. Vpluae XI. No. 3. Harch, 1971.
J

.
:x
...

35.
CBAPTER Il
CHINES! SUPPORT FOR REVOWTIOHAR.Y !lWEMENTS
This chapter will describe the support China offered
revolutionary movements during the three Ume periods that we are
considering in this project. There will be until later
'.
chapters ta explain this support--we are simply interested here in
1
compuUng the dependent variable. We shall examine each geographical
area separately, assessing the support index for aIl the movements
in each area (not just for the case atudies analyzed in subsequent
We shall Urst ,look at support offered Latin American
,
\lovements. then at 'support offere? African and Middle Eastern mave-
lIents, and finally at support oftred Asian lIovements.
Latin America
Chinese support for revolutionary movements in Latin
America has been generally low-keyed. 'buring 1965, the tempo of
public support for movements increased in reaction ta the very
severe hostiUty expressed by Latin America as a whole ta the inter-
vention in the Dominican RepubUc by the United States. The
American intervention sparked a massive anti-U.S. call1paign in the
Chlnese press and a high level of support for the forces ailled at 1:lt
the overthrow of the pro-U.S. Dominlcan reg1me. In the middle of
1965 the Chinese published a map of Latin America outllning the
a reaa of "anti-U.S. and anti-dictatorship armed' atrugglea and
guerrilla activities." Included in the p were twelve countriea:
-

\.
"
36
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Doinican Republic. Guate.ala,
1
Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua; Paraguay, Peru and Venezuela.
The Doainican struggle received a very high level of public
support, including a statemeftt by Mao himself supporting the
DoIIinicans in their struggle "against U.S. imperial1sm". Yet this
statement seemed not to focus on the actual events in the Republic
as it analyzed the entire situation as an. example of and a demon-
stration to the people of Latin America that the American claim to
adherence to the principles of non-intervention vas completely
bankrupt. The .\merican claim that the troops were there to defend
freedom met vith disdain from Mao:
What king of tfreedom is this? It 'is the freedom
to use airplanes, warships and guns to slaughter
the people of other countries. It is the freedom
to violate the sovereignty of other countriea at
will. the freedom to invade and oeeupy their
territory at will. It is the freedom of pirates
to loot 'and kn 1. It is the freedom to trample
underfoot aIl the countries and peoples of the
world.- This is what the U.S. iI.perialista are
doing in the Doainican Republic. in Vietnam, in
the Congo (LopoldvUle) and in IIUIny other
places. 2
Even though subsequent manifestations of Chinese sywapathy
for the Doainican insurgents would lend us to believe that the
Chinese leaders had "a high priori ty assigned to developments in
l
the tiny Caribbean republie, Il it aeeu as though this aupport ia
4
high for two reasons. Fira t and mas t iaportantly. it was seen
as a .ove_nt that would. given growing Latin A.eriean warinea. of
the A.erican behe.oth. apread throughout Central and South '-riea.
37.
Second, it vas related to the entire anti-U.S. prop8ganda
vhich vas at a relatively high point at this hence the com-
pariaon to the Vietaa.ese situation and the civil atrife in the
Congo (Zaire) vhich had precipitated the arrivai of U.N. troops in
an easentially da.estic confllct. An article in June, 1965, ap-
pearing in a Chinese Journal explained the regional signlficance
of the Doainican criais:
The signifieance of the Doainican people's struggle
far exceeda the border of DoIainiea. It has become
a signal for a nev tide of national de.aeratlc
revolution in Latin Allerica. The people of
Latin Alleriean countriea have all been under
American u-perialist oppression and exploitation.
Any people a struggle in one Latin American
country will light the fire of anti-Aaerican
struggle in a11 of Latin Alleri,ca. 5
,
Tbough this ia IlOt central ,to the ascertaining of relative levels
of support, it is included here the Chinese view of the
Doainican situation.
The Bolivlan co..unist Party the Communist Party of
Venezuela'are cited by Van Hess as being given explicit support
6
. during 1965. With this group our model aIso requires that we in-
,
elude Brazil, Colu.bia, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
and Peru. In aU of these cases tbe specifie revolutionary organi-
7
zaUon was discussed; not .erely the "people's struggle" as i8
1
usually t"e case in lowest level public support:. Therefore, aIl
these seven eountriea, plus Bolivla, Venezuela, and the Doainiean
Re pub 1 ic were the loc i of IIOve.ents given second leve 1 support by'
Peking.
\
IJ
"
, J
38.
At the tbird level, tbough the CCP .. de DO signifieant
support statements for parties or organizationa during 1965, the
coaauniat parties of Peru, BrazU, and ColUilbia had major statement:a
, 8
reprinted in the Pekins Reviev.
The delegation fra. the eo-mist Party of Venezuela was
the only visit ae.bers of Latin revolutionary move-
ments to peking in except for an unpublicized visit from
9
Elias Seman of the Argentine eo..unist Vanguard. There appears to
be no evidence of aid granted any Latin American
,
movements at thls time (or in 1969 for that matter), but on the
other band none of the $942 million of aid China granted to non-
communist countries 1956 and 1965 (inclusive) vas given to
10
Latin American states. Finally, in 1965, no Latin American
country that ve are considering had active dipla.atic relations
vith China. Therefore, as ve can see frOli Table II-l, :which 4-
J
summarlzes the evidence cited Chinese support for revolu-
tionary move_nts in Latin Allerica vas; for the IIk)st part, love
In 1969 levels of support we,lre generally lover, although
in some cases lupport was offered vhere in 1965 there had ben none.
AI in 1965. the event8 in Latin provided Peking with a
volatile issue. Tbough of auch less signifieance than American in-
tervention in the Doainican Republic, Rockefeller's tour of several
.J4 '
"countries in Central and South Allerica and his rather le .. than
" \,
vara wlcoae vas interpreted by the Chine.e pre as a .. jor slap
Il
in the face for Aaerican t.periali Th struggles of the
1
-:
N
...
w
0-
{
0
tG

N
N
...
Vt
e
tG

N
....
"-
W

.' ,

tG

0
lE
N
....
W
if If
N N
N
.... ...
Vt W
f
...
...
Cl
c:
N
...
W

N
0
PI
n
0
f


N N
N
.... ....
.... Vt
n
:r
0
Dt
N
N
....
Vt
g'
N
t
...
W
l .,
>
.,
,


"
....
c:
=
Do =
"
.,
'<
Statements by Mao or
other senior officiaIs
Statements by
junior officials or
.. jor press analyses
CCP Itatementl and
reprints of front
organizatian
statements
GeZleral pre ..
.... referenees of support
economic or
a111tary support
1
Institut10nal support
w
TOTAL -

Support
lnclex
\
\
CI)
C
t'Ct


=
0
E
;; ....
!
i <
....
i

;
....
..c
e;
-

w
\Q

"'-

... ta
,
"
40.
peoplea of latin A.erica vere prai.ed during the Rockefeller visit:
Fra. their experience through long
years of struglle in wbicb tbey fougbt, failed
and foulbt agaJn the Latin Mierican "ople bave
coae to underst.nd that liber.tion and freedo.
of the people cannot be Iranted by otben but
bave to be won tbrougb a tenacious strulgle.
The fact that the people of ColOllbia, Ecuador,'
BoUvia and Venezuela drave the "god of plague"
Rockefeller out of their countries once again r
abows th.t the aurging struBlle of the Latin
American people against the Aggreaaors ia
irresist.ble. 12 ..
Similar geoeral references during June, coupled vith analyses of both
the world revolutionary mov __ nt and the LaUn A8erican .ove.ent 10

particular at the the year, coaprlse the .. jor bulk of
the low-level support for 1969. Two ele.ents of the struBlles vere
stressed; the tactical the .ave.enta and their ubiquity.
The major policy stressed vas that of the united front:
ln Latin America, the atudent .oveaent and the
worker and peasant struggles vere joining forces
in Mexico. Brazil, C6ile. Argentina, Uruguay,
Bolivia, Peru, etc., to beco.e a nev powerful
storm a/laaiUng Yankee iaperiaUsa and dictator-
ial rule. 13
The outbreak of "powerfu1 .. 88 struggle" vhere genetal atrikes and
selzure of land vere the mode vere by tbe Chineae in dia-
cuaaing the movements of the countrie. mentioned abave aa weIl as
14
Ecuador and El Salvador.
1969 there vere no .. jor press atate_nU by
senior officials or leaders in Peking on Latin .Allerican affaira.
hlgher than the 1965 level was the frequeney of reprlntina
of .. jor article! of the specifie org.niz.tions by the Chineae Preaa.
,
. ,
..
[:
)
_.

..
41
The Co C 'ui,t of Irazll, the Olilean RevolutioDary o-lDbt
Party, the Argentine Cc_ nist
Party and tbe 'Marxist-teninlst ec-unist Party of Ecuador ail vere
o lS
granted the space to reprint .anifestos or state.ents.
very noticeable difference press caverage of
and 1969 Is the greatly increased frequency of reprinted
letters fra. revolutionary front organizationa fra. aIl aver the
world to the govern.ent and people of China. USWllly the se are
sent on the majdr occasions of the Chinese year: the anniversary
'\
of the People's Republic (China Rational Day), the opening of the
CCP Congress, etc. Tbough the se letter.s do not ln the.elves
taply that Peking supports the IIOve.ent, vben they
appear regularly, they can be regarded as endorse.ent. Tbeir
reprinting by tbe Chinese does help to legitlmize the organizations
and thus is an expression by the Chinese of support. Tbis
support, given the high level of frequency of letters, as
in Chapter l, should probably be weighted as support
equ'ivalent to expl1cit pra.otion of a .ave-.eat by the CCP. The
coamunist parties of Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Argentina and
Ecuador aIl cooducted this type of correspondence vith China and
16
bad their letters reprinted.
As in 1965, tbere is DO concrete evidence that Peking
proffered Any sort of tangible aid to either govern.ents orlllOve-
.ents, and had still yet to relations with any
one of the se potentially revolutionary Latin countries.
$44
42.
Conaequently there vere no referencea to Latin America other than ln
the context of revolutionary movements. The only relations of any
sort on a semi-formal level was the visit to China of a delegation
led by the former president of the Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch.
who was received warmly. This naturally was an endorsement of anti-
Government forces in Dominica, although the visit received relatively
little fanfare. The articles in the Chinese press stressed the visit,
not the struggle and the normal anti-imperialist theme.
In summary, Table 11-2 shows us that the Brazilian.
Peruvian and Bolivian movements had support quotients for 1969 equaJ
to those of 1965., The quotients for the rest of the
\
te'llded to have a tdrly high devbtion in 1969 from their pre-
Cultural Revolution levels.
During 1971, the support the Latin American
movements by China was considerably less than in either 1965 or 1969.
17
Perhaps part of China' s so-called "turning out" 'the support pa{- .
tern fur 1971 shows a marked tendency towards the development of
friendlier govemment to govamment relationa between most Latin
American states and China.
Perhaps the most significant element in Sino-Latin
American relations was the normalizing of relations with Chile
following Allende', victory. There was a of diplomat8,
sporting delegations, government officiais, journaliats
"friends" flowing between the two countriea alter diplomati"ela-
18
tions vere establilhed in early January. Thui Chile aust'be
"

,
< C ." ." ." Z
f f
;:
C'l fII2 fII2
r
..
a
.. .. Il ....

n
i
., .,
D n M D ....

IQ c: ..
1
Il .... a.
" "
en .. ....
M


.,
n c: ....
1
Il a. :2
i
Il 0
.,
0 ....
'< IQ ..
<
.,
n
... 'oC

.. ... ..
=
.. .. a.
0
.,
Ils
ID

.
,
-
.
NI NI
,
0/_-1..
,
NI
.
N
.
?"
-
-
... ... ... ... ...

.
,
, w
... ... \II 0 0 0 ... 0 0 0 ... VI


9
CIl CIl
>
.,
0
.,
.... .. 00
,
... toi .... ..
.. ....
< :2
....
"
.... Il ....
Il :2
Il
,.
'-
-
NI NI NI NI
:
'-
NI NI NI
-
... ....
.
.
... VI VI W \,/'1
-
'"
,1


" ,
by Mao or
other lenior
Statements by
junior official. or
.. jor prels analyses
CCP ;tatements and
reprints of front
organhation
statementl
General pre ..
of support
Tangible economic or
military support
Institutional support
10TAL -
Support
Index
\
\
-
!
."
."
S

a
5
M
i
M

;
1
en
M
Z
...
>&1.
$

toi
,t
f;;
M
M
1
N
e.;

"' 1
\
\
.1
.. ;,-j
b
"
44.
deleted from the 1971 analysla as the aoti-gqverament party that had
, been the recipient of support vas now part of the govern-
ment coalition. One .ight expect fra. the co.aunist-socialist
vict()ry in ChUe that hina would be prone to assl.lllle that events
were beginning to faU into the leftw'ard awing of a historical .
dialectic in aIl of Latin Aaerica and aller increasins support to
communist parties and revolutionary .avement8. Such vas not the
case.
The main theme of Chinese press attention ta Latin
America. throughout the entire year was the eonflict many
coastal countries and the United States over the question of
sovereign waters. Most countries with either
industries or off-shore mineraI interests began a very heated

e .. paign in 1971 to extend their lure territorial limit for 200
nautkal miles. A8 the United States very strongly oppoaed sueh a
move, the Latin ADlerican eountriea vere plaeed in a situation where
'1
the poUties of the united front could justUy Chinese support ,for

reactionary govertaenta. Though theae governa.entl were Dot revolu-
tionary they oppoaing American imperialis. aod tbus received
the bles8ing of Peking, altbpugb not at a very high level. Most
Chinese 8tatementa concerning the aovereignty que8tion were general
news analyses which, according to the taxonomy of 8upport ean be
c l,a.sified as ,the lowest level of public support for tbe goverDlents
in power. and th us negative support for revolutionary \
extant in tboae countrie.. Tbe cOUlltriea who ",ere involved in tbi.
,
/
f
---- 45.
challenge to U.S. heg8llOny in .Alle-riea and vere .praiaed by the
19 20 21 22
Chinese preA were: Mexico. Braxil. Cbile.
26
Argentina,
27 23 24 25
Uruguay.' . Bolivia,
29
Peru, Bcuador,
30
BI Salvador, Venezuela,
,
Nicar:agU8 and the Panama. ln statements of support, the
"
Chinese stressed:
Over the past-yeer, new progre .. has been .. de by
the Latin Aaerlca and peoples in their
struggle to defend natlonal independence and
state sovereignty and oppqse iaperiallst power
politics. A united front to the doctrine
of hegemony is gradually taking p(ace. 31
32
Colombia was also included in this united front although she vas
not active in the coastal waters issue.
28
While articles ln pres. were noticeably favourable ln
...
t11eir treatment of Latin governments geoerally, there vere
...
exceptions. Paraguay, Haiti and Guate.ala vere not once discuesed,
vhich is somevhat surprising considering the existence of revolu-
donary move.ents in aIl of them. The Doiainican Republic vas the
J
focus of considerable attention, and support was offered to the
. 33
anti-goveraent moveaent that appeared increasingly strong. Both
major news analyse. and geoeral references tbat China
would still support a revolutionary .avesent ln a country that vas
a. entrenched in the A.erican empire as was'Doalnlca
....
Apart frOli that offered the Do.inican Republic. the only
.
support given Any .we.ent vas in the fora of the of
congratulatory lettera fra. ca..uDiat parties on the Ccp'a 50th
34
annlver.ary. The Harxllt-Leninht Party of Bcuadot'.
3S 36
the to..unilt Party of Brazll, the ea.Lllllat Party of Peru,

e_
1
1 .
'-e
. ,.
46.
37
and the CoaIunist Party of Honduras (M-L) vere aIl Iranted this
M 1
form of support. In tbe Urst three c.ses th'ts confUc,ta dlrectly,
vith the support Peking gave to the govern.ents of tbese states ln
,1
their anti-imperialist over the coastal vaters ia.ue. It
38
ls especUlly 8urprislDI in tbe case of Peru, 'vho Along vith
39 40
Mexico, and CoIOllbia, was developing relations vith China.
With Peru, China seemed weIl on the road to eatablisb.ent of
, ,
formaI relations folloving trade alreements and fisberies
vhile vith Mexico the talks vere lDOre preU.inary, beiDg concerned
only vith trade. Only sporting del,egations vere ,vith
/."
Colombia, yet th!s is nbnetheless slgnificant the un-
likelihood of even thi. sort of friendline.s yeara'earlier.
"
Table 11-) summarizes the-data for the support China
JO;'
offered lDOvements in Latin America in 1971, and the
vast differences fram 1969 figures. Alain, there 1. no evldence
any tangible military or econa.ic aid to Any Latin Allerican .ove.ent
and there certa1nlrva., none for govera.ents.
Africa and the Middle East
Chinese support for revolution ln Africa a. the Middle
........
East is conaiderably .ore confusinl, .ore hldden, and lenerall; .ore
d t diacern tban support in Latin Allerican ca.e.. Thia
. '
ea.Uy understood wen one reeognize. 'tbet vbUe .,.t of
Latin AlMrica ha. alvay. been co".ldered a .ubaldiary of the Il000-
1
lithlc United States, Alrica v4. not clearly vithln ODe .pbere of
influence. As the Alrican ,peoples .aved fra. colon1aU. to
".
-..
., ...
,0 ..

a

,
---
Ar.""t t" ..
..
a,.a tv',-
".'tut'
..

'\
f" ...
",,,,',,'.-.- .. n tt ... ,
,....
tee,u,,'" ,.
'K 1 lia' v.d"" ,
O\U" ... t.
... tH
'-
Nond"' ....
4
:
",dco
"-
Ntoar \N
Pan ...

".ru
Urul")'
.-
V ..... vel.
--.
.....
"
i -
, ...
..
(\ ..
iS
..,0
.ft "

1.:
t. n
" ,
()
,
-JAlY ,iJ
, .
'm'MT IUCVOwrU*MY MUYICMIM't1 IN ,tU t
o
,tA",," Aa@MtCA
.... -
--
..........
1
t
t


Il
- .. -...

. !
1 n
! ..

.. '*
il
5'

1-1
.,
Ji

...

....

!
.... 'a
-< ..
.............. "QO
"
..
2
2
.2
.
)
,
,
-1
-1
-1
-1
....
1 .
-1
-1
-1
1
-1
,
-1
-1
-
-1
0
.->-'
)
.,

,
,
-

\
-4
1
-)
,
"
..
.
, ..


-1
-1
1-
1
_4''1
l
.
t
-1
0
0
2
-,
-l
.,
0
-2
-1
-1
" .
.
41.

";'l'l
"
'-'
\
,
1

48.
... .
independence ... ny methods and fot1ll of change vere used a. a tool to

help throw off the yoke of subordination. of direct or indirect rule.
ln many csas the inltruaaents of power vere pa ed from the European
,
overseers to the indigenous leaders peacefuHy without reeny up
setting anything mu ch beyond the nominal power centres. ln other
"
ca.es violence forced the tran.fer of Power, resulUng ofttimes in
revolutionary states and somet1JDes in miUtary dictato.rships. Still
. "
others have yet to win their independence. With few exceptions, the
"
new ,a tatea ha;"e been naarked by un.table regimea, often trying
sperately to consolidate a atate trom seemingly eclectic elements.
The future has been far from certain'. China thus has been pre.ented
'liiuch more complex set of issues ,than in Latin America. Certain
)
countries could very \1111 be extremely ausceptible to revolution and
certain groups and organizationa could very well leaders
such a new aerles of future govemments. Thua, China has had
difficulty in choosing whlch groups to support and hOv, taking into
, . .
account many difficultis &herent in the African poli.tical order.
... .... <t
Aa we shall' see in Chapte.r IV, a certain doe. seeal to be
discefJ\ible.
,
In 1965 public support wu.grantt!d fairly sparinaly ln
,
terms of the number ,0{' 'iec1pient ...av.alenta ,althouS;: forul a,,:d
tangible auppor,t was proUferated t0!l far greater .extent tun 'in
? ... Latin America.
,
<*
1
Statementa repreBenting highll't- level of suppor't, that
()
la, by the senior teader. 'of China" were as 'in LaUn Merica,

" ,
)
l'
1
'1
1-
49.
U.lted to topieal i .. ues t not general endoraementl ,one .1ght expeet
in poliey 8 tat8llentl. Mao hwe If, on bebalf of the Chineae people,
41
pledged lupport for the people of the Congo (refered to here aa
Congo (K) or aa Zaire). This, of course, vaa in reaponae to the
1964 Congo crisis and the subsequent havoc Hs repercusa10ns were
causing in the international aystm of Mrica. There were IIUIny
issues of serious contention at hand: the very nature of success-
ionist movement; the right' of foreign troopa in the Congo (X.) j and
the battle of Tshombe vith the workings of the OAO CouncU of
ministers. However, Mao addressed his statement aimply ta the
propagation of a people's struggle in the Congo (&:). This statement
might have been precipitated, or at least Hs publication quickened,
by the ,open of the ?inese by the Organization eo.aune
Africanne at Malgache (QCAM) for assisting Ghana in the training of
guerrUlas for the revolutionary movements in the Congo (K) and
42
otber countriea.
Endorsement through CCP support or atatement republic'ition
vas extended ta all three 8trugglea of national liberation in the
,
Portugueae colonies as well as to the Congo Supreme of
, ,'"
Revolution (CSCR). the organizational vanguard of the Congolese
43
movement. However, this is not t'a say that China 8upported
equally all the liberation IDOvementl of the Portugueae territoriel.
'"
Though the .ajor analya1s of this probleaa foUow8 in, Chapter IV, it
la worthy of note that the two Angolan aovements, the Angolan
People's Liberation Movement (MPLA) and the Angola National Liberation
1;;
...
,
r
50.
44
Amy both recelved tht,rd level public support although only the
1 45
fOnDer sent a delegation to Otina ln 1965. SiIIlUsrly whUe all
tbree Mozambique revolutionary organhations vere given 8pace in the
46
pres8 only the Liberation Front (FRELDI and the
Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (OOREHO) sent delegations ta
47
Peking. i-he !t>zaDlbique National Democratie Union (UDENAK and
the Guinean (Bissau) movement, the African Independence Party of
Guines and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC), both were given public
48
supporf;, but neither had formaI or semi-formal relations vith
China .
The IDOvements of the Portuguese colonies, the Congo,
South Alrica, Namibia (South-West Africa)
(later Lesotho) , SWaziland and Bechuanaland (later Botswana) were
t
explicitly endorsed in a speech delivered by Nan Hanchen at the
49
Afro-AsianrEconomic Seminar in Algiers in February 1965.
, ,
Public support was also granted several countries'of the
Middle East area. This includes terrltory normally class1fied as
West Allia but which falls into our category of Africa and the
Middle East because the areas of the three regions of our
are as'sumed to be internally sOIIlewhat homogeneous with ,respect to
geographic proxilllity to China. .ThU8 it makes IDOre sense to see
Aden (Southe ru Yeaan), the Dhofar Area (Oman), and Turkey in the
same grouping as Africa and Israel. Both Aden and the Dbofar Ares
50
vere displayed as sites of revolution in Chinese Maps, and Aden
was s180 the of special broadca.ts of the New China News
-.
.r
t

"d
51.
SI
Asency. The suenilla var agallUlt larael vas liven varyill8 levela
of support aad the PalesUne I,iberation was not only
52
apecifieaily Jlentioned frequently but aleo had a penunent aiss ion
in China. The only otber at..asions in atina vere A.sian al tboup as
.entiooed abave. delegation visits vere .. de during 1965 by the SCCR
53
(ConIO). and MPLA(Angola) and the FRELIHO and CXIlEI) (Mozambique).
Though levels of tangible aid are always somewhat difficult
to .. certain,_lt that the Angolan, MOzaabique, Guinean and
Conlolese the only struglles granted military aras
and supplies. The Guinean IIOveaent under the leadership of the
PAIGC and perhaps the IIOst successful of a11 the lII8y not
bave been receiving aid fra. China i n 1"1965, although tbere is suf-
ficlent evidenee of aid afterwards ta include it vith
54-
the ald-recipient countries. The PLO of Palestine probably had
55
not, by 1965, received aid.
Table II-4 s--.rizes the support for Alrican and Middle
Eastern IIOveaents in 1965. Included are mava.ents not supported
,"
, .
despl,te their relatively large size and revolutionary nature.
The year 1969 sav a pattern of support not _rltedly
1
different fra. that of 1965. The .. Jor changes vere the a.ergence
of Palestine ... n incrusingly faportant issue and the relative
q uiescence of the Congo insurlents.
At the beginning of the year, _de it clear that
the .. in areas of concern vere still the tbree Portuaueae territories
and the Congo:
52.
TAlLE 11-4
SUPPCllT P<ll UVOLUrIOIWlY IIWIIMrS IN 1965
AFlllCA AMD THE MIDDLE EAST
1! ...
-
OJ
CI
!k

C ...c
..... 0
ft
0

k
....

.... . .... C
.....
AC .0 CI

CS g
0
0


...c k
.,
CI
e
CI

'lot Po
11) ....
....
.,
0
..,

....... ...... ea.

"P4
Country
CI k"'"
CI 0 k.
... i
-u
., ... , ...
..
1 O
.... N ..... CS ...
..... "P4 ..,
=''''
, ...
,c:...c

... c-a
k
Ao-fk ... k k
... CI .....
... ki
ii &.

8.. =
o...c

H
.-

....
k
cs .... Po CS Po

..,k'lot
& :s
k :s CI :s
=' CS
en 0 0 en o. k 0 k f-to
..... 1-4(1) ....
-
Colonial Africa:
Angola
2 2 1 4 3 12
Basutoland
1 1
Bechuana1and
1 1
"
Fr. Soaa 1 Uand
-3 - l
,
Guinea (a)
2 1 4 7
Mo ab iq ue
2 2 1 4 3 12
Svaziland
}
1 1
Apartheid Afric.:
South Afde.

1 1
N_Ibia
1 1
Zillbabwe
0 1 1

Other Africa:
Conso (Zain) 4 2 2 1 4 l 16 .
Kenya
-4 -3 - 7
Ithlopla _.
0
Middl. laat
". '\
lara.l-Pal ci'ne
2 1 3 6
Aden
2 1 l
Dbofar Ar
1 l ' 1
Turay
0
....,
,.
--

,
,
.
t
-
,..'
ln Africa. the revolutionary people in Portuguese
Guinea (Bi ... u). Angola, MozGlbique and the Congo
(K) having overcome all sorts of difficulties,
kept up their armed struggle and in sa.e areas
there were even 10. very aerked advances. A
ne", theatre of armed a troggle was opened up by
the Zimbabwean people who rose to fight colonial
rule in Southern Rhodeaia. 58
Occasional references were also made to the South African and
Namibian movements but generally it appears as thouah .ast of the
movements granted only a low level of support in 1965 vere no
longer viable revolut1onary areaa by 1969. Lesotho and Botawana
had replaced Basutoland and Bachuanaland when they achieved in-
< -
53.
dependence in 1966, and though n e i t ~ e r had recognized the People's
Republic of China, the movements within their national boundaries
had become quiet wi th the advent; of national sovereignty. Swaziland
,
had gained her Independence in 1968. Aden, or officially the Aden
Crown Colony and Protectorate, proclaiaed her independence with the
withdrawal of the British in 1967, and the then unprotected sultans
were quickly overthrown and a People's RepubUc of Southem YeMn
was formed following a short stay by a UN mission. A gradual wanaing
59
of relations between the new Middle Eastern state and Peking ensued.
1
The movement of the Dhofar Ares, however. remained active
and was granted a chance to legitimize itself through the republica-
tion of its letters to the CCP and to the Chineae govemment in the
60
press, as were the organizationa leading the Angolan atruggle,
61
the Zimbabwean struggle, and the Conl01eae stroggle. Curiously,
no such statements were .. de on behalf of the Moza.bique organiza-
tians or tbose of Portugueae Guinea although several articles of
;'
\ '-
1 _
1
c_
<l :s li;. ;,e'hf4ii
54.
62
relativel,Y .. Jor ahe dld offer th_ very'lubatanUal public lupport.
The Paleatine Li_ration Organizatton (PLO) v.a the only other lIOYe-
- 6J
lient to receive aecond leve! support.
The PaleaUne aituaUon, in fact, appeared to be the
lIaJor concern of the Chinele pre for the vhole area of Africa and
the Middle East. As can be leen froa Table S. the PLO received the
highelt alllC?unt of support of any lIOVelMnt. lt val the only .ove-
lient to be publicly lupported by a .enior Chineae leader. Thh
endorsement came in the gulae of a .tatellent by Lin Piao dUTlng
64
the 20th celebrations in Peking.
The only lIajor ItatelDenta that were reprinted in the
Chinese press was a statement of South Africa
l
Pan
,
African Congress (PAC) vith UNlTA, 00IlEH> and ZANU to
.attack the proceedings o.f the Internatl0,nal Conference in Support
of tbe Liberation MovelDents of the Portuguese Colonies and South
Africa, which met in IChartol in January, 1969. This joint atate-
lient, opposing the Congress which comprised JM)st of the pro-Soviet'
revolutionary mogeaaents--African National Congres. (ARC),

West Arrican people's Organizatian (SWAPO), U_ ... bve Africa People'.
65
Union (ZAPU), 8n(l HP LA , FRELIMO, and .PAlGe --wa. diatributed .by .
66 .
the New ChirlNew8 Agency. This is an exaple of the extreMly
cOllplex proble. Sino-Soviet rivalry in tbe.Third World aad it.
affect on Chinue .upport revohUoa.ary lIOV_ntl. Tbi8 will be
conaidered. al- di8cu8led in Chapter 1, a input to
Chine.e behaviour.
, "

,--'.'!t
55.
MlUt.ry ... 1at.ne. .. ppe.r. to bave been ,lv.n to the
,overuM!nt of no country wbere revolutlon v.s the .111 of slgnifl-
c.nt sector. On the otber band fev lIOVelMnts did beneflt fra.
Cbinese .. sistance, the .o.t noticeable of tbese being Anaol.,
Mozallbique, and Palestine. RITA v.s the .ost supported of tbe
Angol.n organiz.tions vhUe <XItEMO and FIlELDI) received .U of the
Chinese aid earaarked for Moz...,ique. FRELIMO, b.sed in T.nz.nia
and at one tu.e the only serioue revolutlonary group in Hoza.bique,
left large areas open for the work of COIlEI), whlch could operate
61
out of Zubia. 'PAC of Soutb Africa, whicb bsd se.i-fonul rela-
tions vith Peking in the guiselof .is.ioDl, a1ao appears to have
68
received madest flnancial support as did ZANU and SWAMU,
tbe Namiblan .avellent supported by a.lna seeas to bave been
secondary to SWAPO whicb, due to its atrict adberence to the
Hoscow llne, had no relations vitb China. In fact, it is quite
possible tb.t China supported SWARU only as a counter to the
already extensive dd of the Soviets to SWAPO. The Congo, quiet in
1969, provided no prospect for and tbus received no
.. "
tangible 8upport. Tudey and the Dhofar Area, while .till granted
public support by China. vere given little else. Si.ilarly there
appears to have been DO geographical of 8upport fra.
1965 to 1969 except in tbe c.se of ca.eroon. The ca.erOOD IIOV.-ent
69
firat granted support in 1967 va. not aentioned .t aIl in the
Chinese press in 1969. It sea.e a fair as.u.ption to .t.te that
by 1969 tbe Ca8eroon .",eaent Val, et best, the sheU of dyiOS
,..
orgenh . Uon
...
;; 4
56.
Thu., al efn be .een trom Table 11-5, no dra.tic chanae.
1
1
4,.415 ;UtOar,S.9i!
rked the pre- and Post-Cultural R.evolution period.. The dilferences
vere, for the .olt part, of degne, or can be speeifically explained
..
by aajor changel in the internal political order of each individual
'10
l '
No new gtoup wa. introduced, and in fact a tate except in Kenya.
ao.e, such as the Eritrean Liberation Front, merited more intense
71
non-support than in 1965.
ln 1971, the pattern orChinese support for African
revolutionary movementa differed only marginally frpm that of 1969.
Again the support that was given was ma1n1y earmarked for either
aovements in the Portuguese colonies or the apartheid rascist
regiaes of Zimbabwe, South Africe and Namibia. The one major
exception to this vas agaln the Palestine Liberation OrganizatioD,
which received more support that any other African or Middle-
Eastern IDOvement. The Congolese s truggie had by 1971 become
inactive, end was bot once mentioned by the Chinese press. Hove- -',
aentl in French Soma1iland, Kenya and Ethiopla were all indirectly
rep,udiated by the Chineae through the tacit support granted by
peking to the de Jure government8 by friendly diplomatie relations.
Yet whUe much of this 1& very siaUar to the picture in '1969,
" several interesting points do emerge from closer analys1l.
ln the Portuguese colonies a new movement had grown to
tbe point where i:t gained the attenUon of both the o.ther struul.s
and China. The i ~ l a n d 8 of Sao TOIl and Principle iD the Atlantic
Ocean off the coast of Guinea (Conakry) are under the .ame politieal
/
\
o ,
57.
TABLE 11-5
SUPPORT FOR REVOUTrIONARY MOVEHENTS IN 1969
AFR,ICA ABD THE MIDDLE EAST

1
0

u
!
l1li Il e::
....
... .-4 0
e
0 Il ID l1li ...
>. .... ID

e::
....
.0 e:: .ou

e:: e:: l1li 0 0 Il
Il
.... 0 ... u
t-
e::
" .,
..... 0. .l 0 ...... ... l1li ... 0
.. .... u Clou III ....
Country
e:: ... .-4 e:: 0 ... ID u ...
1 ...
1 0 QI
.... ........ u
='

l '"
.c:: ....
... .....
.... .. ... ... .0 .... ... ... ...
u U
Il 0 a
lIII"t!i3
...... &.
........
0
....
0
&. =
,
'" 0 ....
..,.... .... ...... ClOS Clo
'"
0.
"r-
IO IO c:: tG to.tIOlIII
e: Clo e:: Clo .. 0.
Clo"O
.., ....... .., ::s ... e:: ... ... ..,
... ='
Il ...
='
e::
='
::s e::
(1) 0 0 (1)...,0. 0 ... 0 ... l1li ... 0 l1li .... .. ... (1) ....
Colonial Afriea:
Angola
2 2 l 4 3 12
'---,
Fr. Somali land
-)
-)
Guinea (B)
.
2 l 4 7
Hoambique
2 2 l 4 3 12
-
Apartheid Afriea: ,
, ,
South Afriea 2 1 4 3 10
Namibia 2
f
1 4 7
Zimbabwe 2 2 1 4 3 12
-
Othe r Af riea :
Congo (Zaire)
2,
2 1 3 8
Kenya
0
Ethiopia
-3
-
)
,
Middle East:
Israel-Pala.tina 4 2 l 4 3 14
Dhofar Ana
2 1
)
Turkey
1 1
,
,
,
.... e'l':'lj:""'!,..I1._
.1
58.
structure as .. lnland colonie. and were, in 1911, the site of a
groving nationali.t MOVe.ent led by eo.aittee of Liberation of
'.
Sao Tom and Principle Islands. This group was praised the
72
Chinese press apecifieally. included in geoeral press referenees
n
to ongoing people's struggles, and vere invited to send a dele-
14
gation to China in July. The Islands, )owever, are very small,
and the CoaIDittee of Liberation has never beca.e a .. liber of the
Conference of Nationalist Organizattbns of Portuguese Colonies
(CONCP), or been the focus of major press stateaents of the African
Liberation Committee (Ale) of the OAU. It ia therefore very
doubtful that China vas involved in the granting of ilitary or
economic aid in 1971 as it had for the .ost part adopted a policy
of supplying to .ost of the nationalist movements through the
channels of the ALC. For example, the and material for
the largest recipient of Chinese aid in continental Afriea, vas all
75
distributed by the ALC.
In Mozamb ique, COIlEK) (vhich had subsumed UDENAK) vas
peeoming le8s signifieant in the face of an ever-grpwing FRELIHO
and vas no longer the subject of 4=hinese interest. It appeara tbat
China had ceased her atte.pt to aasist building of a oveent
,.
that avolded the non-aliga.ent polieies of OONCP favour of a
very stature. When OOREMO began to fa1ter, China
si.ply svitched all her attention on the MoZa.biqueaenfS to
76
FRELIHO, analyzlng 1ts victories, eonstantly referrin to its
77 '
struggle in g.neral review and ts stat.-ent.
1

,
"'
,
.
18
the apeeches of its leaders. A delegation fra. FRELIMO
19
59.
visited Peking and was greated by Chou En-lai, a rare honour for
a uch a movellent.
The Angolan situation la perbapa the ..ost interesting in
1971, forlwhile the MPLA had received "Chinese support in 1965 but:
,
not in 1969, it did again in 1911.
80
Both the MPLA and UlUTA vere
81
discussed generaHy and praised specifically
82
in the Chinese
press and the former sent a delegation to visit China. However,
only the latter was granted support through the reprinting'of
83
letters and policy atatements, as the MPLA still was regarded
with SOlDe suspicion due to its new non-aUgn.ent pol1cy_ in the
Sino-Soviet dispute. In 1969 it had been one of the most pro-
84
Soviet movements and was then firmly denounced for it.
85
The PAIGC rece1ved the same support as it had in 1969;
,
it still did not enjoy relations of any or sort
with Peking, nor did it have any lettera or statellents reprinted in
the Chinese press. It appears that aIl three .. jor move.ents
(FRELUHO, UNITA and PAIGC) were still military aid from
,
,
China, even though distribution vas beca.ing SOIDewbat more indirect
as greater use was .. de of the ALe.
In apartheid Africa, the pattern of support was again
soaewhat slailar to 1969.
85
AlI the .ave.nts granted lupport in 1969
86 81
(ZARU in in and PAC in Soutll Mric. )
vere again dlscusled in .. jor articles and references to the
88
people's struggl.s inc1uded ln general reviews, and PAC had
./
-,
.,
89
at least one .. jor poliey 8tate.ent reprinted by the,Chi .. se.
However, of theae .aveaent8, only the N.-bibian vas invited to send
90
delegation8 to China and there 18 no evidenee that taagible
eeonomie or military aid had deereased. we can tbat the
level of tangible support i8 paraI lei to that of 1969. Tbough this
is a very dangerous sort of assuaption, as PAC, and ZAMU aIl
eontinued in their press releases and state.ent8 to support China
\:_1
and align vith Peking, it appears rea80nable to assu.e
that China had not halted the flow of aid, meagre,as it vas in any
91
case.
The Palestine Liberation Organization vas very exten8ively
8upported by China. Chou En-lalJ tledged Otinese 8upport tni,l:he fight
92 -. 93'\ 94
galnst Israel, and the plethOra 'of major news' articles, ,\.!Moks.,
,- 95 ",r-
and general press referenee8 to the Palestinian cause vas
voluainous than th08e con any other revolutionary .avtlllent '
for the Vietnaaese c6Jlict. A delegation froa the PLO vas given
exceptional treatment in China, vith .. 8. celebrations, dinners vith
senior officials, .nd even a "Palestine International week" in
96
China,. In faet the only type of .upport not granted the PLO vas
reprinted policy state.ents or CCP .upport.
Elsewhere. Chine.e support wa. DOticably non-existent.
97
Though the Dhofar struggle va. once otber active .ove-
menta vere not. 80th of the two .ove.ni. ln French Urica (Front
1
de de la cete de. 8o.alia and Mouve.ent d. Lib4ratioQ de
Dj lbouti) J vere given negAtive support by virtue of Oti ..... f.ri.netly
"\ <
-----r'
\
61.
relationa vith France. Th .ave .. nt. ln len,. (Odln.a) Ind Ithlop'a
91
(!rHr.a" LiberaUon Front) luff.r.d th. a_ tnat..nt or wora
99
Thouah uny other countrh. ver. th, ait of ... 11 IIOv ..
China .upported none of th . . ,
Tabi. 11-6 'w.arh the p.ttern of Chin .... upport (or
Urle.ft and'Mlddle Eaatern IIOv ... nta in 11971.
Th. liai rd and final r'alon o( the Thl rd World vith vhich
(1
wet conc"rn our lve. hero la Allia.
,
Lolleally on. vould expect
o thetr rOKio(ul. and Chin " lupp<?rt for revolutionary .ave.nte IIOro
..
inton... Chtna aharo. bordora vith Indla and Bur.a tbat have not
c to op.n viiI' nd ln anothor, to hoatUe .klr.l.he L.o., '

ThaUand and South Vietn .. lie ln th, nrateafc Southea.t," peth.p.
the lIO.t thorn ln China' id., for t,hey rapr nt a con-
wal' encro.china nU .S. 1.pel'laU..... Malaylla,
th. 'Indone. Un uch .,alaleo .nd th. Phil lppln , .caU.nd .cro"
- 1
the petiphery ta th, South and the E .. t of Alla, fora vith Talv.n
,
thr of tland. and vhlch could be
\. 1
conatant ar.a of confrontaUon vith the U .S.-aupported .ut.a of
t'he re'lon. Thua China ha. 1101" to .aln, or ta 10", l'ft
A.la th.ft ahe do in Afrlca' or Latin '--rlc '1'011 th .. ve vould
. .

tben .,lwJ .. ny h.v.) thlt
luppore any pro-China .. IIOv ... nt
vould .ndor 19d taaaibly
ln Aal Yet .thh 18 too .1IIple,
1
1
"
62.
TMLI 1I-6
SUPPORT. FOR UVOWTIOlWlY IIWIMIIITS IN 1971
.
AFlllCA AD THE MIDDLE EAST
0' l'
]..,
U
.
! ..

c:
.
....
....

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,
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c: ......
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::8.
;1 8. = "'0 .... "' .... 1 ....
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: .. 2
g If
CI "" go
0.

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... ..,
.... ::1 CI ::1
cnoo
fI)...,OIf o foIO .... fo4
"
Colollia1 Mrica:
Aa.a01.
2

2 1 4 3 12
Fr. SouUl.lld
.
-3
- 3
,
GuiDe. (8)
2
1
1 4 7
Mo.-bique
2 2 1 4 3 12 ,
Sao Ta.
2 1 3 6
Apartheid Africa:
Soutb Alric.
2

2 1 4 9
"
lI_lbl. 2
A
1 '4 3 10
ZUIb.bve

2 1 4 7
>
Otber Afdc.:
,
Collio (Zaire)
"
0

-4 -3
- 7
Itbiopla
,
-3
-
3
,

tUddl. S.lt:
- 1
Ilr 1-'al ciaa 4 2 1 4 3 14
Dbofar Ar 1 1
Turkey
,
0

. r .
-


...
,1
\t
...
..

1
1
;Jl
.{
{}
J
'.
\
."
.
,
v
. '
..
63.
for It can be maintalned that it 1. in Chlna's intere.t to cultlvate
the friendshlp of Aslan states. regardles8 of their ideology. ln
order to create a friendly buffer zone between her8elf and the
threatening talons of the Weat.
.
ln any case. it is evident

Chinese intereat in tbe internal affaira of Adan states is paraaount;,
we shall now examine the extent of ber support for revolutionary
movements.
The South Vietnam National Liberation Front tNLF) re-
eeived total..chinese support. In 1965 it was the only revolutionary
organization specifieaHy endorsed by Mao or a senior government
100
leader. Its exploits were cons tantly lauded in the Cbinese press)
, 101
and its statements vere reprinted as major articles.
. - ""-
The Viet!,amese was naturaUy IDWltioned by Nam Han-chen in
bis speech at the Economie Seminar at Algiers
- 102
Laos. North Borneo and the four African movements mentioned above.
}
As Van Ness points out. even on the Chinese .. ps of World Revoluti9n.
the syaabol repreaenting armed struggle appeared larger for Vietnam
, ,
103 .;;...
....
than for any other state. It is beyond question that China -
"furnlahes a great de41 of aid to the NLF. In fact, it la one of the
very few moyements for which China openly and proud1y announces this
facto Wl tnes8 the stand taken Chou En-lai in .. 1965:
It ia all the more the bounden international dut y
of every locialist country to give aIl-out support
to fraternal Vietb8lDe8e people. Therefore,
whether or not a soclaUat country Hraly supports
th. RepubUc o( Vietnam and the South
VietnJllkational Liberation Front in their Just
stand againat U.S .. aggresaion and for national
1
. /
.. lvatlon vhethr or not lt con.tantly expo.e.
and cOlibat. the peace tallt schaM of U.S.
iaperiaU .. , and vhether or not lt genulnely
the people effective and
practical .aterial aid in .ood tl .. cQn.titute
an lortant criterlon for judgln. whether iu
antl-iaperlalla. ia real or .ham and whether
Ha belp to the Vietname.e people la real or
sh_. 104
Finally the NLF had already a permanent mi.sion ln
105
64.
(
Peking. an honour shared wlth only one other A.ian movement, the
l6
ThaUand Patrlotic Front.
The case of Laos is an extremely interestlng one. Chinese
press gave a considerable amount of .pace to the Neo Lao Hak Sat
(NIJlS). the revolutlonary organizatlon leading the Pathet Lao
107
movement. which was in control of tIluch of Laos. Statements by
Prince Souphanouvong on behalf of the NLHS were reprinted in the
Chinese press and even the Chinese Foreign Ministry pledged support
108
for Souphanouvong'. organization. There la' all no doubt that
in 1965 the NLHS wa. receiving .. aid frOll the Chine se ,
109
..ost of this was diatrlbuted through North Vietnam.
F1na11y China conducted relations vith the Pathet Lao through a
Chine.e Economie and Cultural Mlsston in 11berated territory. Yet
deapite ail of thia China maintained relations vith the neutralist
gover .... nt under Souvanna Phouma. Lui Shao-ch' 1 even cOIIIDunicated
with the Royal govel'lUM!nt on the Laotian National Day ln falrl,
110
wana teras. Though/Van Nes. lnterprets thi. 8S paradoxical, when
we /re._er the division of pollUeal power in Laos the
,
paradox vaniahe.. The phraling of Chinese for t,.he Mutralht
, ,
",' ""'-'J
"
(-
iF
.. ,.,
, "
61
goVerm.ent doe. DOt auaaeat DOn-aupport for th. MLIIS. Ind d. were
,
we to a.a.-e Chioese lupport for Phouaa' a government wa. non-
.upport for the 'revolutlon, the support quotient would be lower.
l '
However. we .uet that the Pathet Lao il at the
neutrali.t but at the right wing forcel. The neutrali.t
govern.ent, luppoledly a coalition of all three factions wa. not
particular1y oppoaed to the except ina .. uch aa Phou.. wiabed
to e.ploy peaceful .. ana for change. AU Chinese support of Pho\UU.
gover .... nt was phra.ed as support for the "LaoUan and.
adherence to the 1962 Geneva aaree.enta which established thil
.
govern.ent. It la c1ar that China aaw the right wing faction as
the abrogator of the accords. and the return to violence by the left
,
wina as an underatandable and necelsary retaliation. Thus 1 do not
1
conaider support of the autral regl.e a. non-support, although
Lui letter to the Royal Government could be so considered.
Uovever. 8S shown ln Table 6, th18 non-support 18 not included
'-"'"
because there aee .. to have been only one such exaaple; moreover,
, thi'a support ca.e !ro. Lui who fell frOli power Just a year later
f' \..
'-../
after .. king otber si.llar .tate .. nta which verel conaidered to be
111 /
beyond
his authority. "-
Due to the of
112 .
..... /
Malaysia al an illegal
and unnatural atate. It will be treated aa separate areas.
The fir.t. North Borneo (alternately Horth Kalinantan or Sarawak or
"'" .'
led by .the North la i .. ntaneVnltary St.te Revolutionary
Goven.ent (ImJSIlG). of attention in the Chlo,a.
..
66.
113 114
.nd sent a delegation to China during 1965. SUailarly
the Malayan eo..unist Party and the Malayan National L1beration
Ils
League (HNLL) vere supported by analytical articles in the press,
116
and the HNLL vas invited to set up a .lssion ln Peking.
Both ao'fements vere given space to reprint' organization statements.
Though there have been suggestions that China has aided the revolu-
tionary movements in Malayiia .ost of these assertions are based on
the existence of aid fra. the PKI in Indonesia before the coup in
1965. and on the existence of strong links between the Olen Ping
moveaent in the Malay peninsula and the Chinese-aupplied movement in
117
ThaUand. There is no evidence of direct aid from China to
either the mavement in North Borneo or the movements in Halaya and
Singapore. (Though SODe aid may indeed have existed. during any or
a11 the time perioda ve are conaidering. ve .ust assume that ,
there was none as one of the assumptlona we are working under in
this project i8 that significant tangible aid does not
.. .! ...
there is no concrete evidence of tta existence.) Despite Singaporefa
vithdraval Malaysia. China'continued to treat the o!
Halaya and Singapore together trying to break the artificial unit y
-. of the state of Malaysia.
1
ThaUand was the only other country in Asia vith a IIIOveaent
r,
supported strongly by China. Though so.ewhat young. by 1965
...
guerrilla varfare on a large scale had been launched again.t the
govemment. As vas aentloned above. both the ThaUand
Patriotic Front (TPF) and the Tbailand Independence Hove.ent merged
-
,
-- - --
61.
under the former in 1965, had relation. vith 0l1na. lupport
, 118
was forthcoming at a11 levels except the bigh.st and thera la DO
question that the Thai people'. moye_nt rec::eived a substanUal
"-
amount of miUtary .id from Clina, although Ha quanUty was to
119
inerease eonsiderably with the passage of Ume after 1965.
The struggle in tbe rhUipplnes was also given public
120
support although only,at the lowest level. Revolutionary
activity there was quite minimal. The Indian aaovementa vere not
suppot'ted, for China had relations India, as it did with Bur...
While there was no public support for the Indian goverlUllent, tbere
.
was fo r the Bunnese. Aid had been given to Burma in 1961 and payment
.'
was still outstanding. General support was granted Ne
Win 's government many times by the discussion of relations
between the two countries. At least one .. article supporting
the government in Rangoon followed Ne Wln' s Peking vilit ln July of

121
1965. The White Flags and the Red Flags were 1eft ln the eold.
Chinese supPort for Adan revo1utionary .ave.entB ln 1965
is stmmarized in Table II-7.
of support ln 1969 differed only Ilightly for those
movements who had receifved high support in 1965. The .. jor clulllge
was wi th the movements of, non-support and the lrttroduction of anothe,J'
movement, that of Indonesla.
o
South Vietnam' s tp.F continued to serve al a paradipa of
total support. Statements of support by Lin Piao, Chou En-Lai and
l22
Mao, Chou and LlO! together pledged total support to the Front.

! ,"'"91
' .h}

!.
,
1
,/
,
,.

: ,:/.; i!-,
. '

.
,Couat,...y
Bunaa
Indla
Laol
Malaya 6a Singapore
Horth Born.o
Philippine.
South VletnQ
ThaUand
.
"
wu II'''Z
SUPPORT POR RlVOWTlotWly tIWIMIft8 la 1965
ASIA
0

U
!k

t
ro4
0,0
0

k
""-.4 "" .....
....... . .... ro4
e
.,QUII
i .... g 0
0
3 .... k
. . .,
.....
0 .....
...
0


.... ww
Q.3
....
>
c:lkr04 c:l0 ....
...



1 O.

-=e"
:J"

......
..
....
1
1
. ....
g k !
g Q.
Uk .... ... w
3:!.
cnoo cn..,o k 0 1040. 1-4.
i.
-2 -1 -4 -,
,
-l
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2 2 1 4
:)
2 2 1 l
2 2 1
:)
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4 2 2 1 4 3
2 2 1 4 3

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,
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61
.
i
M

-10
,
- l
12
8
8
1
16
12
,
, .
i
>
Major article. on the avent. ln South V!etn.a. alorlfyina the MLF
123
and H. suce ..... vere co..onplace, and the ra-prl1ltina of tn.P
124
atate .. nt. wa qually fraquent. Durlna 1969 the Provl.lonal
_ Revolutionary GoveraMnt .of the llepubl1e of South Vi.tn_ wa.
e.tabli.hed. but It wa n Ar. of the MLF it .hall not be eon-
.idered .epa,rate ho. the Front. M far a. _HUary aid il eon-
ceroed, there i. no evidenee to .ulle.t that it had le ened ln
69.
. . volu.e .lnee 1965; on the contrary. exi.ting report ee. t0
4
laply
an increase. The RLF It i ion in Pekins and delesation.
(ro. South Vietn .. , a. hiah up a. Pre.ident Nguyan Huv Tho of the
. 12S
Provl.10nal Govern.ent, vete constantly vl.itlna Peklns.
The Laotion Patrlotie Front (NLUS) al.o appear. to have
reeeived .. xiau. .upport durins 1969. Lin Piao on the event of the
126
twentleth annlver.ary of the NLHS, offered congratulation. and
,,127
Chou En-lai pledged .upport to Prince Souphanouvona later ln the year.
The Chine.e pr wa. con.tantly extol11ng the exploit. of the
128 129
of NUIS and .. ny st. t.-enU by Souphanouvong va re reprinted.
... ,
China intained it. al lon ln the Laotian territory under the
corttrol of revolutloAlry and .everal caae fra.
Laos to Peking during the y.ar. Chine aid had decrea.ed froa the
i965 level but only beeauae China hadJ by 1969. eonceded to Horth
Vietn .. principal Jurl.dlction ovar the dl.trlbution of .1d to the
130
Lao revolutionary force
The ThaUand .ave .. nt received ln 1969 relaUvaly the ._
degree of aupport a. they'bad ln 1965. No atate.nt of .upport wu
k4j41'fJti
..
e
r
\
\
70
ad. by .enior Chin leader., althouah a very larae numb.r of
articles appeared in t h ~ pr either .upport1ng the Communi.t Party
13 L 132
of Thailand or r.publilhina its Itatements and manif to
The CPT retained its .1.aion in Pekins and covart .upport actlvlt!es .
of' weapon supply, guerrilla training program. and financial asslst-
133
Ance continued.
Si.118rly, bath the North Borneo movament (NKUSRG) and
Ma1ayan Singapore organizatlon. mUlt.rad the .ame levela of .upport
fra. Peking as they had ln 1965. The Chineee presa continued Its
support for the two .avements through a large propaganda campaign
l
for the North Kali .. ntan Forces in Sabah, and for the CPM, the MNLL,
134
the party Rayai and Barl.an Socialis of Malaya and Singapore.
Both centra1
1
11lOveaaents publbhed a great deal of ma te rial in the ~
135
Chlnese press. Durlng 1969 a radio station was set up whlch
caUed ttseU the ''Voice of Malayan Revolution" and broadcasted
progr .. s dealing,with both the North Borneo movement and the
Malayan and SiDgapore movemef\ts. Considerable Chineae press
136
attention vas given these broadcasts. A delegation from the
North Kalimarttan mavement vieited China during the year and the
Malayan National Liberation League maint.ined ita penbanent miaaion
in Peking. There was still no evidence to suggast a flow of
Chineselaid. lt ia possible that seme external .id w.s flowing
137
~ ~ r 0 8 s the Thai-MalaYlian border, but there i. no evidance that
thi. aid e .. nated fra. Pekiag rather than from the Thai mevement

/

71.
The year 1969 aav the be,innins of ChiDl.e aupport for the
Indian revolutionary movement under the leaderahip of the CPI (N-L),
or the Haoi.t faction of the CPI-M, which brok. from that party in
1967, often a.sociating it lf vith the Naxalite Thoulh China
maintained rel.tion. vith India, the achievements of th. Indian
0138
revolutionaries heralded and their .tatement. vere occa.ion-
.11y republished in the Chine.e prel., althoulh on1y very indirectly.
139
There i8 no evidence of aid ta the rather Im.11 band of revolutionarie.
and effort made tovards the establishment of fonnal
or aemi-formal relation
The eo.munist Party of Burma a1ao by 1969 had lained
Chines. support while the Chinele presl no longer praised, or even
politely mentioned the Buraese lovernment. The CPD, or the White
Fl.IS as they are a1ternately known, were praiaed in their armed
140 1 141
atrulile not ont y by the pre .. in lener.l, i1Cit also by the CCP.
ln March Chou En-lai received a delegation from the Central Committee
142 \
of the CPB formel (but cold) diplOlDAtlc relation. ItUl
exi.ted between the tvo goveromenta.
The PKI (co..unilt Party of Indone.ia) emersed .s an anti-
govetnent revolution.ry org.nization in the aftermath of the
Geatapu of 1965. due, to the virtua1 annihilation of the
Communiat. at the handa of the right wing elementl in the 1965-66
backla.h against Aidit and hil Chinese aupport bad Ilttle
focus Neverthel.a. a delegatlon from the PKl did remain ln Pekins
- 143
and the Chinese prell c.rrled aeveral of it. Itat.menta.
72.
In ge.ral revieva of vorld revolutlonary forc publlsbed
early ln 1969, aU the above lIOVe_nt. vere .upported, except the
lndian lIOVe_nt:, ,vhich received .iailar support ln later articles.
1
Table Il-8 .... rize. Chine.e support for revolutlonary
aovement. in during 1969.
144
The year 1971 .av .everal Interesting chanses in the pattern
of Chinese support for uian revolutionary lIIOVeaents. Th. bigg.st
change cae as a result of the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk in April
of 1970 and the consequent formation of the National Unio1)' Front of
Caabodia aimed 'at Ilberating Cambodia from the'United States and
General Lon- Nol. Though there had been a ... 11 guerrilla aovement

b efore vho vere opposed to Sihanouk, this IDOv .... nt (known ae the
Khmer Rouge) joined vith the Prince to oust the U.S .--propped
mUitary dictatorship. The nev NUF govem.ent, vhich Uke the PRG
of South .. , vas (and still la) a provlaional govemment, met
at the end of April in 1970 in China vith the leader. of Pathet
Lad
r
the PRG of South Vietnas, and the North Vietnamese and presumably
')
alaq the Chinese.

llere they agreed to co-operate agdnet the United
\ .
1
Stat,s and Ha puppeta vith an informal joint .Uitary
vhlle at the a ___ time _intaining that:
...
inspired by tbe princip1e tbat the liberation
and defence of each country i. the affair of ita own
people, the clifferent parties undertake to do every-
_ thing po .. to render autual support in accordance
- - vith the deaire of tbe intere.ted party and on the
bas1s of autual reapect. 145
Thia did not appear to be a fomal .iUtary allianc'e but ratber a
,
,
COuntry
,
Burma
India
Indoneal.
Laos
Malaye 6& Sinsepore
North Borneo
Philippines
South Viatn.
T haUead
WLI 11-8
SUPPCllT FOR R.IYOLUTIQKARY tIJ'IlMENTS IN 1969
ASIA


fl g
U
:2 ..

1
.
.....

.. . . ...
.... ..... ulW .IW
....
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... "" "' ...
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en 0 0
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2t 2 1 -3 +]
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4 2 2 1 4
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6
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12
73.
-
.. _ ..
s t,"
.'
,<'l
'i
'.
,
.
,
position<st.ilar to that ,of Lin Piao in 1965: a united front va.
necessary and belpful but at the s.., tt. the .tru&&l.a had to
74.
primarUy be based upon the indigenoua people. AU vere villing to
help each other where they eould, and this naturally involved North
Vietnamese and SOGle Chinese ,a'lsistance in the RUF fipt
147
agalnst Lon Nol and the U.S. Elsewhere in Aaia, ailitary
assistance almost certainly eontinued to the Thai Patriotic FroDt,

as 11 as to the South Vietn8lll NFL and the Pathet Lao'.
'"
O\i08'8 1IIOst seni'or officiaIs, At- in both 1965 and 1969
149
including Mao, pledged support for the MLF. Both the Pathet
150 r 151
Lao and the NUF of cambodia vere granted this support, and
aU these had poliey statements and lettera reprinted in the
152
Chinese press, as weIl a8 many long press analyses of the
153
8 uccesses of three IIIOvementa.
154
Sihanouk maintained his
goverriment in Peking and whUe the South Vietna.eae .ove.ent did
, have a permanent mission in Peking, it alao sent uny other deleaa-
!- 155 156
to visit the hinese capital, as did the Patbet Lao. The
Asian moveents who had either aissions in China or
151
delegations visit durlng 1971 vere the of lndonesia,
158
the
159
and the C:O-unls t Party of ButllA. ' Thailand patriotic Front,
However, "this support given to the BUr8ese IIOvement v nuUfied by
,,';1
the visit of both minor govermentl offieials and of He Win to
160
China during the iaprovement of Sioo-Iurmese relation. in the
half of tbe year. Siailarly, support of the Halaya .av ... ,t
and the North Borneo moveaent vas negated by the visit of the
161
delegation to Pekins tbe var.ins
, t
, ,
-
'.
,. ,
"
",
\
, ,
e
./
'\
("
. "
'/
0'
"
75.
of Slno-Kalayai.an relati1UJ. Bowever. the suceesses of botb the
162 / 163' ., ...
Malaya and the North Borneo IIK)vellent . vere'
strong1y in 'the Chinese press, as the ..ove_nta ip' the
. 164- 0 165 - ,. 166 ..
Phi lipplnea, ThaUand.. and' lndonesia vith the three
" . , ., '
A larg'r"movements aaentioned above). Al i dl., these IaOve.ents bad e1ther
167
polley st.atements or 1e,ttera published in the ChinesJt press and
'all vere .entloned 410ng with Laos, CaJa.bodia and South Vietn .. in
, - '
, " 168
ope of the several gener.l on Asian .,ve1lents.
\
The Philippine movemen had grqwn 8ubstantially over the
\
indueed the Chinese to offer' it the
,
las t two ,years, _ and th\;
Q
pubfic su.PP9rt than in 1969." However at the same tiaae, China
, .F
invited a trade de1egation f.!0IIl the to vf'.sit
,
" Chi.lla, a which can be classified as negativ support for the
philippine New People's Amy, the revolutionary plOvement support,ed.
,
pub 1 i.e 1y in China.
. ,
"
,The case is an inte.resting deviatloll froa 19'69 even "
though the only suppoJ;t qr non-support offered the ec-unbt Party
.
(H-L) was the continuing diplOllUltic relations vith Delhi.
, !
out 1971, relations with
\J
Iodia seemed to be iaproving:' gone vere
the frequent attacks fpund in the press >of yeara, and" the

wat1lling relations and growing friendUness vas aetU4l11y pr,tised
.,
in genera l artic les on
170
Asian affaira. . However when the Indo
Chi"" ou, 't the
This io itaelf ia not surpiising; however.' once during all
f

' ..
abuse and vUiflicatioQ of lndian actions was tbe epI-ML or the
\
,
..
'1'
.,"'
.'

.t \
"
,.
"
'\
, "

Il
,]

r
e,
'l,
,-

.. --1 .
f<'-
76.
8truag1e of the IndUn people _nUoned. It appeara that ,the Chinee.
/
had decided to IIllnimhe
17.,!
'''turning west'!; - this
)
euch 8upport. perhapa ln the intereet' of
assertion 11 supporte,ct. by the openlng of
8emi-formal relation. wlth Malayeia, Slngapore, and the PhUippines,
and the of relatlons to the point where
,.
General Re Win actually praised 88 a great leader of
...-
172
RevolutloDary Cooocll of .Burma.
Table 1I-9, which s\lDllUlrizes Chine8e for
move.ents in 1971, demonstrates the dispar!ty' be.tween the
.' .
offered dlffer.ent IDOvements, a. dieparity that was not as elearly
evident in 1969.
In the -following thl'ee chapters, the dependent va,ri.ble,
as described in the nine' tables, wUl be analyzed in terms of the
.two i.ndependent variables in hope,s of unearthing the reallons bl!hind
such support.
.-
.
.J


,x
. J
..
..
... -
...
1
,
.
.......
o
, ,

-,

,-
..

'-
. .
....
.,
,
1
.f

"
"
..-

,:'"
...


"
!lof CI)
::r 0

c:
.....
"
.- ::r

::1
<
.la. ..
..
,.
::s
;
,
.

N N
,
N N
,
.... ...
<'
.

(W
W
.
.... ...
N 0-
JO
"CI
!
lv
t'

::r ::1
....
.,
.- 0 Q.
-
"
.. lIIl 0
,.
::r 'oC
i '0 Il
'0''' DI QI
.. 0 tto ..
::1
. .,
.- ::J en

$ .....
0 ::s
QIQ
..
l
.,.
III

.
.
.
N N N N N
"
N N N N N
-
,
... .... .... ....
-
.,..
.

1 1 1
W W W W W
...
N N N 0- C
;'
= c:
Q.
l- ii
-
.. 0 ..
Q.
....
Dl

,

,

N N
N N
""
<-
.
....
-
.
Cl:>

.
T
1
"""
W W
r
w
--
1
...
"""
0-
-
.

.
.
\
\
,
..
, ,

-
,
.
.
Statements by
'or other senior.
officiaIs
r
StateaenU by
junior officiaIs
or major press
analnes
CCP state.ents ane
reprints of
organ1zation
statementl
General press ""'"
references of
r-support
1
r
Tangible economic
, or mil1tary
'support
Institutional
support -
' -
TotAL -
,
Support
Index
.



en
C

S
-i

0

>
....
en
....
>

t<

;,"
1

CI)
....
z
....
ID
...,
...

..
....,
...,

...


4
1
\
J
1
78. : 1
IIOOTNOTES
L' Kap pubU.hed in Jen ... in J.1h-pao (JHJP). May 27, p. 4; .
ana1yucl in Ven ""., pp. 90-91, 93-94.
,
2. Survey of China Mainland Pra (SCHP) , No. 3457, Hay 12, 1965,
p. 28: Quotacl al.p in CecU Johnaon, Co.auniat China , Latin
Allerica, Colu.bia Untvarl1ty Pre , New York, 197.0,
p. 258. .
3. Cecil Joh!'.on, ett., p. 259.
4. aive an ex .. p1e of the .1&a of the-:'8upport aeneratecl on,
5.
May 12 there va. a raUy ln Pektnl vith a larae proportion of
the than hierarehy of the Chin .. e lovarn .. ntl Chou En-Lai, Lui
Shao-ch'i, Tenl Haaio-p'inl, OIu Teh, etc., SCMPjNo. 3458,1965,
p. 27-8.
i).
"Doainica, .. Shih-chiah Chitl-.hih (SGCS). Juna a,
in Cecil John.on, eit., p. 259.
6. New China New .\aency (En,U.h) Hay 20, 1965, and JM.JP, Ju1y 22,
1965, p. 4 in Van Na .5' cit., p. 91..J
7. Part)' of BrazU: JkJP, Ha)' 23, 1965, p. 5.
Party of ColUllb!.: JKJP, AuS. 13,- 1965, p. J. Na ti on .. 1
LibeYaUon Arwy (CoIUllbta): JKJP, Har. 23, r1965, Frante
Unldo del .Pueblo :--p;'kins aaviaw (pa), No. 11, 1966,
p. 28. 14'aevolutioAary and .. Paopla'.
Mov_nt: JHJp" Dec. 25, 1965, p.'-4. Alejandro da laon,
Nov .bar 14 'RevoLptionary HOv .. ent SCCS, 1965,
"-
No. 21, p. 19.. Revolutionary LibaratioD Move_ent (Hondura.):
SCCS, 1965, No. 18, p. 22. Sandino National Liberatton Front
(Nic gua): SCCS 1965, No. 19, j). 29. eo.ander Lope,
Guerrtl Force (Paraluay): SCCS, 1965, No. 17, p. 29.
Peruvien uniat Party: JHJP, Dec. -16, 1965, p. 4. Hov nt
of the aevolu onary left (Paru): JMJP, JOa 22, 1965, p. 5.
Revoluttonary S ente Front (peru}"JKJP, Auauat 6, 1965, p. 4.
Party of Vanezuela, Ar.ed Porc ,
. and Hov ... nt of RAlvolutlonary Lefr (a 1965,
No. 1. pp. 12-14. CoIIpiled .by Ven Ne,. cit., p., 148.
8. "PoUUcal Report and aeaolution of ...tbe Peruvien C.P." p.a.
Jan. 17, 1966, p. 20. "Revolution of the Cent ral Executiv.
eo-lttee the Party of Brazil; 'T"e Dallaatic
Situation i'll Br .. :il n(f tha raak of the Ca.uniet Party of
BrazU, '" Hay 28, 1965, p. 21, and "Politiea,1 bvolution
of th. 10th Congre of tha Colu.bian eo..un1at P.Il.,
Augut 20, 1965, pp. 21-22. -
Il
-;
-J
.r--

- ,
9.
79.
See, John.on, U. ill., p. 140 for viait. ""Poo1e, P. A.,
"ec-uniat Chin.'. Aid Dlploucy," All.n Survey, 6(11), Nov. 1966,
pp.
10. lt perhap. ahould b tated th.t thla v.riab1. la, du. to lt.
Inherent1y a.cretiv. n.ture, extra .. ly dlfflcu1t to r rch.
Though there la no .pp.rent evldance .upportlna tbe rtion
that Chlne id v 11ven to cert.in .,. ... nU. there ta
.1vays a po lbl1ity th.t .1d va. ln f.ct forthca.lna. The .ld
of vhich we ape.k la obvlou.1y .are .ub.tantl.L th.n th. no.ln.l
fln.ncial .upport grant.d .ave .. nt. in .n .ffort to l.t the
oclation. ln ors.nh.tlon.1 .ctlvityc. See, for ex .. pl ...
Erneat Halperln, "Chin nd th. Latin AMrlc.n C:O-unhta,"
Chin. J.nu. ry-Ma l'ch , 1967, p. 140.
,
,
11. See, for exaap1e, No. 4448, 1969, pp. 27ff.
,
12 . !!:!!t, No. 44]6, 1969,
13. L!., Janu.ry 3, 1969, p; 18.
14. PrR., Janu!ry 3, 1969, pp: 23-24.
15. ""Jlrad1: P.R., June 20, 1969, p. 21. ChUe: Uo', Janu.ry 3,
1969, pp. 26-27. AraenUna: JuLy 4, 1969, pp. 20-21:
16.
Peru: P.R., October 10, 1969, p. 23. Ecuador: July 4,
1969, po. "21.
Coaauniat- Party of Brazll: 4348, 1969, p. 19.
BoUvlan eo-unlat Party: 1969, No. 4352, p. 21. J
ChUean Revo1utlonary Cot.unht Party: 4397, 1969,
p. 24. Peruvi.n P.rty:- 1962, No. 4406, p. 53.
Argent!ne CO-.uniat Vangu.rd: .9:!l!. 4412, 1969, p. 21.
Marxist-Leninist Party of Ecu.dor: SCHP, No. 4414,
19. -;-.
17.
..,l8. See, for the eat.bl1.t.e.nt of rel.tlort8, SCMP 4817, p. 55.
(
19. Mar 21, 1971," pp. 19-20, and P.R., June 25, 1971, p. 12.
,
20. No. 49l8. 1971. p. 50. P.R., May 21, 1971, p. 19, and
June 25, 1971, p. 12.
21. June 25, 1971, p. 12, but Ch11. 18 not included in the
1971 .n.lyais. ... /:
22. U., May 21, 1971, pp. 19-20, .nd PrR., June 25,' 1971, p. l2.
1 ..... 1-
t '
/
'-
,-
""'
./
2)
,
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
")
33.,
34.
35.
U,
P ,R.,

l.&!. ,
P tR.,
P ,R.,
U,
r
.
,
, .
J
/
)
80.
April 30,
19 and p,a., June 25, 1971, p. 12.
April )0, 1971 , p. 19.
No. 4919, 1971 , p. 129.
April 2, 1971 , p. 22-23.
Hay 21,
"
1971, pp. 19-20 and Psi., June 25, 1971, p. 12.
APtt1"!, 1971, pp. 21-22.
Hay -21, 1971, pp. 19- 20 and P .R., .June '"25, 1971, p. 12.
U., April 30, 1971, p. 19;
l.:!. , May 21, 1971, pp. 19-20;
and SCHP, No. 1971:, p. 75.'
, '
P .R., June 25, 1971, p. 12.

No. 4887 .. 1971 , p. 153.
'\
SCHP, No. 4895, 1971, p. 89. .t:.!. ,
April 2, 1971, p. 2.
f..:!. , AU8ust 13, 1971, p. 14;
!9!!, l1Q.
4938, 1971, p. 269.

No. 4936, 1971, p. 135.
.36. - -SCHP, No. 1971, p. 225.
'37.

No. 4938, 1971 ,- p. 275.
01
38.
Ll,
Hay 21, 1971, p. 23; No. 4892, 1971,
,
p. 186;

No. 4894, 1971, p. 49; SCMP, Mo. 4924, 1971, p. 182!;
- "
4970,'
li,
39. sckP, Nd. 1971, p 113.
40. No. 4882, 1971 , 107.
\
r
.
4l. fyb lica tl2n Of th! 2e02
1e
' s s tD!&sla! of Vie tnaaa ! the
Peking. Peop as' Prsll; cHad ln Van 22. ill,., p. ,90.
This "as a stateaaent b)' Mao.,
42. frOll aeveral ountrlea vere being in
Ghana by and Chinese iutructors. AlI wut be
shor:t1y such ction la lnterpreted as be10w a low-level'
,ndorsemel)t of ,'" IIOvement and not aquivalent: to a
statellent ln -dIe Chinese press. For IIOre on the OCAK resolu
tion see Wallerstein, l, Africa; The Politica gf Ualti",
pp., 91-92. \
Q
-
1
\
\
'c;
, ,
" '
(
,81.
43. CSCR: l,d.., Aug_ 27, 1965, No. 35, p. 5. '

44.
45.
MLPA: No_ 3447, 1965, p. 27, and ALNA: 13,
1965, p. 4; cHed in Van Ne .. , .2.1?- p. 140.
Delegation vi.it the Anlo1a People'. Liberation Mov ... nt:
!9::If" No. 3447, 1965, p. 27, in Van Ne.s, 22. ill., ,p. 90.
46. Mozambique Liberation Front: !,gI" No. 1965, p. 34.
\
Mozambique National Democratie Union: 31, 1965, p. 3,
Mozambique Revolutionai, Conai-ttee: !9.f., 3510, 1965, p. 32,
in Van Ness,
47. FRELIMO: 3436, 1965, pp. 34-35, (X)IlE1I):
3510, 1965, ibid.
r -
48. PAIGC: 13, 1965, p. 4,
49. Nan Han-ehen's speech was reprinted in P.R" Mareh S, 1965,
No. 10, pp. 16-26.
50'. World Map, 1966, Nos. 2-3, as cited in Van 22. cit.,
p. 91.
51. .li9i! (Engl1sh Droadeast), May 20, ibid.
52. Perhaps more often than specifie referenees to the PLO
general atatements supporting the Arab cause against the
IaraeU imperialists; for an ex_ple of explicit specUie
support see 3425, 1965, p. 37.
53. Sec notc 22 above.
54. Sec Bruce Larkin. China and Africa, .l949-l970. pp_ 71-74,
pp. 186-193.
55. Again. concrete evidence ls 1acking for but thare i. not
"'\
,
sufflcient proof to asaume that .id was forthca.ing, de- , '-
56.
57.
spite the existence of the Office of PLO in Peking.
Kenya, received a $15 credit trom China in May 1964,
Larkin, 22- p. 94, and bad relation. vith Chlna since
1963. The movement (Od i a) there was 8ma11 but 1t wa. active,
even though peaceful. ' , .
Though many have been made that China bas 8"upported tbe
Erierean Liberation Front (Lark.in, .s. p. 186) there
seems little concrete 6Vidence of this. Ethiopia has retalned
an aloof p08turk froll China and untU of \
,diplomati relations in 1970, very little\nterchaftse Gf eny ,
sort took place the two Itates. (
-..>
"
\
\
,
,
\
. :
e
'J
'-
58. PrR .. Janwary 3, 1969, p. 18.
59. See SCMP, No 4461,.4483, 4484, 1969, for Souther Y ... n--
China rapproche_nt.
82.
60. See, for exalllple "Dhofn Friand. Acclata Vlctoriou. Clol1nl of
Chinele Communilt Party Conar , No. 4409, 1969, p. 19.
61. National Union for Total Inde,PMld.nce of Anaola (UlUTA) ,
(sub.umed ths Anlola National Liberation Army): April 27,
1969, No. 4407. Zilllbabwe African National Union (ZAIft1): SOIP,
April 12, 1969, No. 4391,. p. 27. Conlolea. PatrloUc
Forcee: '!91!!, No. 4501, 1969, p. 16.
62. See for February 27, 1969, pp. 15-16.,
,
63. PrR., January 10, 1969, p. 11.
64. Reprinted in K..r!., October 9, 1969, p. 16.
65. Even though th.ee lait two are aupported bath by Hoscow .Ad
Peking.
66. No. 4008, January 23',1969, p . U, quoted in Larkin,
,1
.22 s,ll., p. 187.
67. Larkin,.2.2' ill., pp. 189-191.
68. The amounta offered PAC appear to have besn pltifu11y ... 11
and the' uae of such funda la not detenained. For a di,cus.ion
of tbh see Larkin, op. cit., Chapter 8, Note 53.
69. 14, 1967, 'p. 5. See 22- cit., 218.
70. Kenya 8ulpended diplomatie relation. with China in 1967.
bThough there had been many lailDl as to Chine.e ald ln the
trainlng of and in the backing of Odingl"po re.l
revolutionary IDOvement wa. present 'and no overturee were made
to-support what little there wa. du ring 1969.
a
71. Although forma1 relationa were not eetablhhed between Ethiopia
and China untH 1910, tait, conferencee were aunder way in
1t was evident that 1t wo,-,"ld only be a ... tter of tiIM.
This can only be seen a. a blow to th. Eritrean LiberaUon
Front who must have at least ,hoped for same out.ide support
.'-
72. !Hf,. No. 4935, 1971 , p. 109.
'13. No; 4930, , pl 33.; PrR., May 28, 1971, pp. 12-1)
\
1
, "
1
1
1
/'" ( .
1
;
1
1
- /'
83. '
74. la, Mo. 4915, 1971, p. 109. !J2, No. 4939, 1971, p. 42.
75. Paul Whitaker, .tAra. and th. Natlonalht.: Where and on What
Tera. do they Obteln thelr Support and ho" Iaportant ta Bxtenual
Ald to their 'Revolution." 'frica Report. May 1970, p. 14.
, ,
76. !2tf, No. 4970, 1971, p. Ill.
77.
U- ,
January 15, 1971, p. 15; U., May 21, 1971, p. 18.
U,
Ju1y 2, 1971, p. 11;
Ll,
July 16, 1971, p. 29.
78.

Mo. 4979, 1971, p. 81; !!I(, No. 4973, 1971, p. 36.
79.

No. 4976, 1971, p. 186.
80.
U ,
January 15, 1971, p. 1500
8L
U ,

1971, p. 22.
82.

No. 4939, 1971 , p.' 25.
83. No. 100.

4940, 1971, p.
f 'r:. t' .. r
" r./

-
See Note 64 above.
,,-
li t) -
l, r: 'C", 10,
-
,
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91
T
92.
93.
f...J!.. ,
Septe_er 3, 1971, p. 14.
,

No. 4869, 1971 , p. 129.
<;
U., Ju1y 2, 1971,' p. n: U., Ju1y 16, 1971, p. 29:
U,
[)ece_er l, 1971,. pp. 8- L3

4898, 1971, p. '242.
--/'
No. 4935, 1971 , p. 109.
See Larkin, .22. sll,., p. 188.

P .R., May 14, p. 9.
,
LA., January 15, L971, p. 13: l,d., January 22,1971. p. 15;
P.R., Hay 7, 1971, pp. 12-11: No. 4826, 1971, p. 45;
No. 1971, p. 214. ,
94. the Palestinian and Other Arab ,eo,le Will
Forelgn Laquage. Pre .. , 1971.
Win. Peking:
'.
..
,
0j'6
1

i
l
.j
l


i
..J
"
84.
95. tal., J.nu.ry l", 1971, p. 8 .taI." April 23. 1971. p. 21; Ll .
Dece"er 1. 1971. pp. 8-U Jl. Mo. 490'. p. 36.
,
96. 1l, No. 4985.1971, p. 101; lQIP. No. 4897,1971, pp. 197-214;
No. 4598, 197L, pp. 25'8-161: !Sail. No. 4899, 1971,
pp. 46-48.
91. l..& JlIInu.ry 1. 1911. p. 21.
98. S", (or .x.-ple., No. 4832. 197L. p. 191: J.S2Ir.. No.
4861. 1971. p. 81; Chow .ven .xpr d hi. support for Kenyatta.
.gIf. No. 5038. '971. p. 79.
'99. Fdr flxa"'pl",: NiRer. Rwandi; Gabon; and Malawi.
100. ub lic.Uon' on the
(.tate .. nt by MAo
22. ill . p. 90.
,
,
n 0
N ....
ln the CIII' of Vietna .. , lt 11 aima.t m ningle .. to live ,
specifie c One onLy n'Gd to pick up .ny copy of p.kin.
Reyi,w ta find luch article. and .tatam.ntl. More than one
ln threo durlng 1965 v !lome comment on th.
tru8Hle ln Vletn ....
102 .f....& Harch 5, 1965, No. 10, pp. 16-26.
lft' . Van Nol'. ggl Fit., p. 90 and ___ ---:,--_______ ______ _
104. Chou En-Lai, Speech glven in Pekin., Dac.aber 20,
Dece.ber 24, 1965, No. 51, pp. 5-6. Raprinted ln ann,
Franz and Sche 11, Orv ill..
No. 3, pp .592-596.
/
"
105. Jen-ain .hou-tlJ'e, 1965, p. 226, cH.d iri Van ,22. ill.,
p.ge ,14.
106. Untll Decelllbr 1965, the ThaU.nd Front .nd the
Independ.nce Mov ... nt vere leparat.. Th.y, ch had
",I tonl in and both .ent de1e,aion. to vi.it Pekina
durlng l.al., Nov. 5. 1965. No. 45, p. 31. No.
1442, 1965, p'. 38. How.ve r. in Dacellbe r, the tvo groupa ,
_rJ.d under n ..., of the ThaUand Pat;:r1otic Front. For
the anaLyall here. the Thal1and group. wUl be con.id.rad to
h.ve been one throughout 1965. "

,101. ',,/iee, for exa .. ple U . June 25. P" '11.

-108. An article on the CFH atate_nt can be found ln m., January
23, 1965, p. 4. A
l'
,',.,_,',
,1.
"
"
e
)
"
r .... , ... , < ... '
---.
1
85.
109. S' Bern.rd ,.ll, ''Th. Pathet Lao, A. LibraUon 'Party'" in
Scal.pino (.d.), th. eo..upi.t IIyolutlop ip 4.1., 2nd Edition,
pp. 187-188.
110. Citpd in Van N , 22. p. 136: for the t.xt of thi,
letter see No. 3457, 1965, p. 37.
111. See Schunaann, Franz, Id.oloil 'nd Orl.nlzatlop ln Co!gMnl.t
l
China, Second .dition, pp. 555-556.
112. Though th. Malay.i.n FederaUon wu lomewhat dillnt.,tat.d by
the withdraw.l of Sinlapore during 1965, Chin 1ma.t ianor.d
thi. avent bec.u their image wal of on t.t. of Ma1.y.,
including Sina.por., and anoth.r of North Born.o.
113. !Q:!f, No. 3555, 1965; p. 38.
t14. 3551, 1965, p. 39.
115. Malayan eo..uni.t Party: May 7, 1965, p. 6: Malay.n
National Liber.tion League: January 28, 1966, p. 1.
See Van Neu, '2,2. ill., p. 137.
116. Van Ne.s,
117. See St_41ner, Fr.nc .. , "ColllllUnU. ,ln Sing.pore .nd MalaYlia:
A Mu1 tifront Strug81e," in Scalapino, ga. ... pp: 234-Z68.
For a of lndon.sian aid to guerri11 in th.
Sarawak r.gion see Simon Sh.ldon, W., The Broken Tri.ng1e:
Peking, Djakarta .nd the PKl, pp. 12-36. A.1.0 Van der Kroef,
, J. M., ''The Sino-Indone8ian Partnerlhip," SUlllllMlr 1964, <1'
pp. 342-344. -- '
118.' Octob.r 15, 1965, pp. 8-9. Republtshing ai Statement.
made through "The Voiee of the Thal People," in 1!Yf., cH.d
in Van Nels, 22' p. 137.
119. Lovelace, Daniel D., China and 'People'. W.r' in Thailand,
pp. 48-50.
..
120. Wo'rld map in SCCS, 1966, No 2-3. Van Nell, 2,2. ill., p. 91.
121. Van Nes8, 22. cit., p. 225 (on aid), PrR., 30
1
1965,
pp . 6-8.
122. Stat.ment by Chou En-Lai:, PrR., June 20, pp. 5-6: by
Lin Pi.o: !Q:!f, No. 43 63. 1969, p. 24: and' by Mao, Chou .nd
Lin: December 26, 1969, p. 5. The.e are on1y examp1e.
for many other .im1'lar stat.ments were made. .'
')
....
. ,
.....
,
-
e
<'
\
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
l29.
For ex .. ple, U' .. 17, 1969, pp. 'lo..-ll, and !m:Ir" No.
43 63, 1969, p. 25.
'For example No. 4523, 1969, p. 27.
Nos. 4519, 1969, p. 54: 4520, 1969, pp. 4521,
1969, p. 45;' 4522, 1969, pp. 34-35.
.9:f..
No 4345, 1969, p. l8.
.9!!,. 4520, 1969, p. 25.
For cleample, .9!f, 4564, 19.69, p. 25.
For example, No. 4523, 1969, p. 21.
c
86.
,
"
l)() Fall, Bernard, B., "The Pathet Lao: A 'LiberaUo ' Party",
p. 181 . China was bui road'
from China to Huon Sai, 30 .11ea ln Laoe wlt op. of
connectlng it with the Phnblenp.hu-Nol't, n .. Highw;y.
Zaa1off, J., "Lao.: The Forgottep Wlr Wlclena,"
A.ian Survey, X(l), 1970, 71-72.
Lll. For eXlmple U., January 17, 1969, p. 19-22 .!QIt, Nos.
4452, 1969, p. 29. The author counted more than 20 Auch
articles ln alone.
132. For No. 4560, 1969"p. 15. PeR., October 17,
1969, p. 23.
1)3. Lovelace, 22. pp. 65-66.
134. HKUSRG: No. 4330, p. 34. CPM: 1QIr., No. 4339,
1969, p. 21. HNLL: No. 4477, 1969, p. 18. Party Rayat:
.. No. 4345, 1969, p. 21. Barban SoeleUa:
I
,! No.
4430, p. 31.
135. For xample, U., October 17, 1969, pp. 23-4 nd !Q!f, No.,
4386, 1969, p. 26.
Ll6. For ex .... p1e'. N08. 4554, 1969, pp. 4555, 1969,
p. 33, 4564. 19ftJ, p. 26. ,
137 .- Loveh.ee, 22. m., pp. 58-59.
\
l,
138. "Indian People &abark on Rev01utionary ROld of .\rmed Strug81e'" )
No. 44l 1969'1P '25. ThNh ata
4
)rkOed 9th6e9 beglnning of .
meny arUe es,. See a 80 .. 9!t, o. 5 , 1 ,p. 21.
(}
..
, __________
::
42
1
l
..
"
87.
139. 4460, 1969, p. 15. Thi. 1 reprlntlng of an
arUcle fra. "LiberaUon". Thil la not conddered .ufUc1errt
to .. rit thlrd level lupport.
140. For exa.p1e: !QIr., NOl. 435,9, 1969, ,p. 20i 4480, 1969, p. 20.
141. For exemple, No. 4479, 1969, p. 25. (Article entltled
"Chinele rarty Central eo..lttee Sand. Mli .. age of
Greetings to Tntra1 CoI!-ittee of .eo.wniat Party of Buraa.")
, ,
142. 4384, 1969, p. 17.
,143. For example, No., 4383, 1969, p. 21. Ll., Octobr 17,
1969, pp. 26-7.
c
-144. ,P.R.',January 3,1969, pp. 11-17 al:!d P.R., May 16, p. 18.
145. PeR., May 8,1970, p. 3.
146. See the news
6 June 1970,
pp. 626-628.
,1
anaiyais by WUfred Bprch,tt 'in Guardla,n, -"
and in Forelap July, 1970,
,
147. Documented by Bannlna Garrett in "The National Union Front of
Cambodia," in J. S. Grant, L. G. Moss and 1. Unger (eda.)
Cambodla: The Wldening Wer ln Indochina. York:
Square Press, 1971, p. 131.
148. As ln 1969, most of the ald for the Laotian Vletnamese
movements probab1y weB dlstributd in the context of North,
Vietnam'. po1icies and North Vietnameae help, a1thougb
some was certalnly dlrect1y glven, such 88 the roacr-buildIng
1J
ln Northeastern Laos in l1berated territory. Arthur J.
Douman, Confliet ln Laos, Second Edition, New York: PraJger
1971, pp. 284-286. See a1ao, Paul Langer and Joseph Zaaloff,
North Vletnam- and the Pathet Lao; Pfrtner. in the Stru&gle
for Laos. Cambridge: Harvard University Pre .. , ,1970, for
an historie.1 enalysiB of thi8 relationahlp
149. PrR., December 3, pp. No. 4812, 1971., p. 56;
No. 5044,_ p: 190.
150. Ll., January 15 ... 1971, p. 3; !2If, No. 4817" '1971, p. S6;
No. 4828, 1971, p. 24; SOtP, No. 4889,:t9n, p. '31.
151. PrR., January 29, 1971, p. 3; December 3,'1971, pp. 8-13;
No. 4868, 1971, p. 73.
.. , 1
: Hi
r-
('

"
1 ,.
,<
l,
'" .

152.
153.
" .
88.
HLF: La., February 12, 1971, p. 13 and p. 14; Ll.,
19, 1971, 19-2Q; Ho. 4934, t911, p. 53; Lao
(NLHS): Ut, Pebruary 12, 1971, pp. 9-10; l,&., 'F.bruary ,19,
1971, pp. 17-19; Ho. 4957, 19,71 t p. 41; NUF: L.!.. .'
,January 29, 1971. p. 9; '!.:.& February 19, 1971, pp. 8,-13 and
, pp. 20-'21; St"UIJ, Ho. 4811, 1911, p. 36; SCKP, No. 4813, 1971,
- li'
p. 130; No. 4818, 1971, po' 76. <>
Fe: examp1e, NLF: P.R., January 8, pp.
No. 4868. 1971, p. 87. Path .. Lao: P ,1. Dec:..mer 31, 19t1, , ,
p. 21; No. 4869. 1971, p. 132., NUF: ,U., J,nualoy 29,
1971, No. 4857, 1971, p. 28. f"
, ( .6"
1.54.
155.
1
156.
157.
158.
rJ
L,&., February 12, 1971, p. 15; May 7, 191) 1 'PP, 6-7.,
For examp1e, P.R., Janu,ary,22. 1971, p. 9.; SCMP.,. No. 4821',
1911, "p. 72.
1"
May 7, 1971, pp.- 6-7; ..9!f, No. 4871. p. 26.
f..&.:, May-7, 1971, pp. 6-7.
The Thailand Patriotic: Front appeared to have ..
t'
, ,
p'emian,ent mission in Peking. ,'. .
159.
rtf 'l- '10." r-
U . ., May 7, t 971, pp. 6-7.
160.\ No. 1971, p. 130; No. 4958, 1911, 81-85;
1 SCMP, No. S020, '1971,' p. 75
. l---r
161. No. 4904,
.'
162. NOr 4910,
..
1971,p.
44:
1971 , p. 147;
SCHP, No. 5003,
--,.-
1cJ71 J p. 140."

No. 4'913, 1971, p 99-102.
, .
1
,
,,163. NO.,.;952, p. 37.
r
1971 , p. 1:4.
c
164'
J
l..:.&.,
>
13,
165. 1971, p./8; ,fdi., 197I, p. 19.
.
P,:R., :Jq1y 2, 1971, pp. 34-35.
,167.
\ P
KrJ1aya: P.R., June 4, 1971, pp. 16-11; PtR., June t8, 1971,
po. 12; f..:!., July 23, 1971, p. 17; 4873, 1971, p. 96.
,- SCKP;' No. 4896, U7l, p. 150.' North Bomeo: SCMP, No.
ffi, p. 161. Philippine.: U .. Augu.t 13, I97, p. 1,3;
, No. 4941, p. 197. Thalland: !.:,!., June 18, 1911, p. ,p; ,
U., Ju1y 23, 1971, p. 16; SafP,. Ho. 4871, 1911, p. 254. '
, \
..... '
1 1
1
, .

,.
"
,
,.'
'J
1
1

j

" ,
,
J
" :f t
,LJ
'.
\
. ,
168.
169.
170.
-- 1
89.
U., January l, 1971, p. 8; !.di., April 9, 1971, p ~ 21; P .. R.,
April 16, 1971 .. p. 22; a n d ~ , No. 4844, 1971, p. 128.

.Q!f., No. 4899, 1971, p. 50; SkP, No. 4900, 1971, p. 95.
SCMP, No. 5024, p. 93.
See Jim Peck "Why China 'Turned West' ", Ra_arts, May, 1972.
pp. 34-41.,

172. ~ , No. 5024, 1971, pp. 93-94.
<,
;
"
..
'h
- "
t
"\
, .
\
"-
--, ,
'.
90.
CHAPTER III
THE LATIN AMERICAN CASE STUDIES
J.
I10st of the governments Qf Latin America have been, for many
years, allies of the United States and very much part of the so-
f
ca lled American bloc. Thus, Most of these govermnents have acted
in a manner antithetical to the bepaviour of an a11y of China. We
will examine whether or not this hostility has formed an input in
,
Chinese decisions to support Latin American revolutionary movements.

As in the subsequent chapters on the other geographical regions,
this chapter wi Il compute the two Independent variab le indices, and
test preliminarily some of the hypotheses presented in Chapter 1 on ,
the basis of the data from the single region.
The case s tudies chosen for the Latin .American regtons are

Argentina, Brazi 1, the Dominican Republ1c, and Ecuador. As
is no logical separation between groups of states in Latin America
L
as there is in the Afdca and Middle East region (colonies. apartheid
regimes, independent African states, and Eastern states) the.
case1studies have been chosen on the basis of the level of support
of fered by China to the incumbent revolutiona ry movements. These
1 eve Is of support, according to the support index for the three
time periods, were as :
1965
1lli.
1971
....,.-
Argentina 4 5 -1
Brazll 5 S 1
Doainican Republic 7 4 3
Ecuador 0' S 1
..,'
91.
As these levels offer a fairly diverse selection of Latin American
cases (relative to the population--see Tables II-l, IP-2 and 11-3),
(\
an analysis of these cases should provide insight into the
determinants of Chinese support for revolutionary movements in a11
of Latin America.
First the hostilitty index will be computed fgr a11 four
case studies and then each case will be examined separately to
8ssess the degree of confonnity between a movement and the Chinese
prototype for a people's war. Fina11y, an attempt will be made to
explain Chinese behaviour towards the Latin Ameriean movements
through the testing of some of the hypotheses presented in
Chapte rI.
A. Hostility Index
1
Both in 1965
2
~ n d 1969 the four countries almost completely
supported the stand taken Dy the United States and Taiwan in the
voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Albanian
R ~ s o lution and the Important Ques t ion Resolution. Ecuador, the
\
\
on'y exception, abstained on the Albanian Resolution in 1969, and,
as W'e mentioned ln Chapter l, any action short of votlng for the
Albanian Resolution can be considered an aet of hostillty to China
..
As a matter of fact this pro-Taiwan aJ:ti tude was so pervasive that
not one other of the Latin American countries pnsidered in Chapter
II--the population of which this selection of four countries repre-
sents--abstalned. In 1971, the situation was only s11ghtly different.
Though Brazll and the Dominican RepubUc continued to support Taiwan

;5(
l ,
92.
by voting against the Albanian Resolution and for the Important
3
1
Question Resolution, Argentina abstained on the Albanian Resolution.
This was only a token break from the" pro-Ameriean stance, however.
as Argentina did vote in favor of the Important Question Resolution.
Ecuador was the only real exception to the norme Votin. against "
the Important Question and for the Albanian Resolutio,n. Eeuador was
the only Latin Ameriean country apart from Cuba and Chi le to vote
against the United States on both resolutions.
l
ALI four eountries maintained diplomatie relations with
the government of Chiang Kai-shek during aU three time periods.
Though Ecuador did not maintain an embassy in Taiwan, active rela-
tions existed until 1971. when. due ta the pro-Chinese stance of
the government of Dr. Jose Karia Valasco Ibarra, they deel1ned in
intensity. No formal break was made between the two states.
Because of the lack of active relations' in 1971, however, Ecuador
1
can be considered to have had no active diplomatie relations with
4
either Taiwan or China
(The mil i tary coup of early 1972 presaged
..
the formation of' a pro-Taiwan government and the re-e,stabl1shment
more 'active relations.)
.'
Host of the countries of Latin AJDerica have only modest
1
trading relations with Asian eountries. Consequently the trade
condueted with China and Taiwan ia rarely of a significant level
(which, as vas pointed in Chapter Il is defined here as 5"1 of
5
a country's total trade or V.S. $50 million). the
Dominiean Republ1c nor Ecuador had signifieant trade with elther
l
.,', '1 "
, t
.\'
'\
93.
,
Taiwan or China in 1965, 1969 or 1971. Though the figures for 1971
are still not clear for Brazil (somewhere in the of
U S. $18 exports and imports wi th Taiwan), i t doZot
appear as though Brazil's trade was significant. Argentina, on the
1
other hand, sold U.S. $83,700,000 in gratn r China in 1965, but
./
conducted no other sign!f!cant tude wittr"China or Taiwan in 1969
('
/"
or 19. Thus, pnly Argentina' s to China in 1965 was
ri"
of sufficient scope to be an act of fI:,iendship to China.
" r
AU four states still are) members of the
Organization of American States (OAS) which, by virtue of its charter
signed in 1948, pledges a11 member nations to collectively "defend
6
their sov8reignty, territorial integrity and independence."
Membership in this organization cannot be considered j}"er se as a

military defence l1iance with the United States. For examp1e,

Cuba is not exc1uded from membership, yet it is excluded from OAS
acti-vities by virtue of a 1962 decree. Thus it would make more(
sense to conslder only those members recelving military purchases
and from the United States as having such an alliance. The
United States maintained military sales and credits with all four
countries considered her.,e in aU three Uni'e periods with the ex,cep-
tion of Ecuador in 1971. Ecuador, along with several other Latin
American states, claims 200-mile jurisdiction of coastal waterways.
The Uni ted States maintains that miles lB the legal 1imit. Thu8,
when Ecuador continued to seize and fine U.S. fishing boats which

were fishing without license inside the 200-mUe li mit , the United
"
o
.
\.
ri
...,J .. __ ....
States, in January, 1971, suspended IDilitary sales and credits.
,
These remained suspended unti1 after the mi1itary coup a year
7 6
la ter. Therefore, 'Ecuador in 1971 can be considered as the only
s tate which did not have a military defence alliance vith the
Uni ted S ta tes.
Table III-l sUJllllarizes the hostUity expressed"towllrds
l.
China by the govermnents of Argentina. Brazil, the Dominican
Republic, and Ecuador for 1965, 1969 and 1971 as measured by the
hostility index.
B. Revolutionary Index
The computing of the ,evolutionary index for the four
94.
movements considered here will be based on a brief analysis of each
movement. No attempt is made to give a complete historical back-
ground to the movements as such are well beyond the scope
of this project . (The bibliography suggests work whel'e such dis-
eussions can be found.) Instead, we will examine each lDOveIDent to
see how closely it conforms to tenets of the Chinese model for
people's war, and to discover the movement's attitude towards the
Sino-Soviet dispute.
1. Argentina
The in Argentina supported by the Chinese has
beeq the CODlDuntst Vanguard of Argentina. An offshoot of the pro-
Soviet Party of Argentina, the CoaDunist Vanguard (or the
, 8 "
Communis t Vang"a rd Plirty 'as it is sOlM!t1.D1eB refened to) bas not
had the sucess that the pro-Soviet party has. Nonetheless, the
. .
, ;
..... .1
\
.
.
c:I
0
..-1
4.1
!j
d

d
0 0

1/1
bO

llO
d
c:.::.o'
J:l CI
.... 4-1 .... 0
d c:: 4-1 c:: 'fi

co 0 01\14.1
> 4-1..-1 > .... !j
4.1 r:: ....
&. 1/1
1\10

:z;.oll)
.... QI
l:) 0- ::;:,<114

1965
Argentina -1 -1

.. 1 -1
......
Dominican Republic -1 -1
Ecuador -1 -1
1969
Argentina -1 -1
Brad1 -1
(!
-1
Dominican Repub lie -1 -1
Ecuador -1 -1
1971
Argentina -1 -1
Brad1
... 1 -1
Dominican Repub lie -1 -1
Ecuador 1 1
. "
TABLE 1II-1
ILITY INDEX
LA:rIN AMERICA
a
1:,

.

"-
"),-\
.... ,
4-1 "
""
co
1-1 \'" 1-1
Q) 0 co 0

00 4-100
o d c::
........ Q)..-I
4-I.x >.x

.... QI
eP-or::

1\1
J:l .s:: CIII
.... ..c:::. Q) :.
Q.4.I .... 4-14.1 ....
......... ..-1 ce
12l)f-I
-1 1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
-1
;
-1
-1
-1
-1
95.

....



d

QI..c::

t-----
QI ....
'tJ :.
r:: >.
>.QI CIII 4-1
1-1 U :. \ ....
e:: ....
..
....
........ f-I QI
.... f4' "0
........
aoe::
x.o :11 ....
,
-1 -3
-1 -4
-1 -4
-1 -4
,
-1 -4
,
-1 -4
-1 -4
-1 -4
-1 -4
,-1 -4
-1 -4
2
0
96.
Communist Party of Argentina has concentrated on weakening the
Communist Vanguard. the Central cOmmittee of the pro-Soviet party
condemned the links between the Chinese and the Communist Vanguard:
The princip'le result of these divisive activities 1
of the Chinese is to have attracted a few unstabI'e
e lements especiaUy from the petty-bourgeois
circles, to have uni,ted with them counter-
revolutionaries who were exiled from the ranks of
Communist Parties for anti-Party activity, with
nationalist bourgeois intellectuals, and with
9
'\
Elias Seman, Poli tical Secre'tary of the Conmunist Vanguard,
visited China in 1965, as mentioned in Chapter II. He returned to
Argentina as an extreme1y vociferous proponent of Haoist ideology,
appealing primari1y to members of radical student groups and groups
10
of self-styled revolutlonaries. The major proportion of Seman f s
po1emic, and that of the Vanguard as a whole, has been directed
against the CODlDunist Party of Ar.gentina and its patron state, the
Soviet Union. Cecil Johnson points out that during the Cultural
Revolution, Seman and his party closely followed the events in China
11
and had their own version of the Cultural They close ly
fllowed d tets from Peking in order to carry out "ideologieal rev-
o lutions to remold the thinking of revolutiona'ries and apply Mao
\ 12
Tse-tung's thought to their poUtical line." Despite the polemic,
there ls litt1e evldence to suggest that there vas any effort made
to put the aceepted i'deology into praetice.
The CommWlist Vanguard' of Argentina has been one Cff the
weakest revolutionary organizatj.ons 8upported by China in Latin
America. Founded in 1964 around a small group of revolutionary
,
.1
.l'''.!.I:
9]1.
intel1ectua1s, it has never commanded more than the Most limited
popular support. Though it has paid tribute to the theory of
people's war as espoused by Lin Piao, the yanguard has ignored
$ome of the tenets of such a theory and has abrogated othens.
In 1965, the ColIIDunist Vanguard of Argentina was indeed
a revo1utionary communist party, trying, through
its appeal to students and intellectuals, to spread its message.
;.
However, there was no evident attempt to appeal to the workers to
build a united front, nor was there any effort to to the
a lienated peasants in the formation of rural bases. Indeed, the
activities of the Vanguard have never extended far beyond Buenos
Aires, where lts publication (appearing irregular1y) No Transar
13 )
is publ iShed. There is certainJy no sort of
a rmy, led by the Vanguard or any other with ties to the
,
Vanguard. In 1964, the national surrounded and captured
a series of guerrilla groups in Argentina
1
near the Bolivian border. dll claiming to be
part of the "national absolutely no con-
14
nection to either the Communist Vanguard qr the Communist Party.
..
Whether or not the Vanguard adhered to a policy of
appears to have been an irrelevant question in 1965, ,simply because
of the 1ack of ativity. ,As the Vanguard did not to have much
io 1965, ft only met the requirements that it be anti--,
, i 15
,
and anti-i,mperialist, that it be 1ed by a revolutionary
Harxist-Leninlst communist party, and that, therefore, lt be orlented
"
...
,
\ ,--
98.
toward communism.

By little progresg had been made. Still consisting
of a smal1 group of intellectuals with a following drawn mostly from
students, it appears to have had no support farmers and
16
peasants and practical1y nOne from industrlal workers. Though
there had been an effort during the intervening years to al1y the
Vanguard with John William Cooke and the extremlst branch cif the
Peronist movement, the National Liberation Alliance, the effort
failed, despite the claim to be a united front aimed at
17
social revolution and national liberation. The National Liberation
Alliance had adopted a Castroist strategy and was supported by the
for Latin American So1idarity (OLAS), a group very
18
much in,Cuban hands 'by 1969.

Cons ide ring the violent attacks on
/
China by Cuban leaders at the Tricontinenta1 Conference in Havana
19
in 1966, it is not surprising that the Vanguard's attempt to ally
Cook failed. Despite the increasing political vioLence in
Argentina "against the Organia such as the fourteen deaths '\.
the Cordoba strikes of 1969, there is no reason to
suspect that the Communist Vanguard was in any wa8 instrumental in
20
strike movement. Therefore. we can assume no change btween
1965 and 1969 in the level of conformity of the Communist Vanguard
to the Chinese model for people's war.
ln 1971, the Communist probab1y weaker than
t:J 1
-in the previous two periods. growing strength of the Peronlst
meant the adoption of line by Many who othr-
\
;
99.
wise might have been members of more radical groups. Second, the
imposed by President Ongania in 1967, iQsistlng on the registra-
tion of aIL communists and imposing severe lLmits on the activities
of comm,nist groups, was enforced strictly under Presidents General
Levingston and Lt. General Lanusse.

This surely hampered the already
irregular activity of the Communist Vanguard. Though there have
been suggestions that the Vanguard was more or less defunct in 1971,
it appears thal the movement was essentially unchanged sinee ...t969
22
despite i ts relative inactivity. Therefore, the movement con-
formed to the same three tenets of the Chinese mode L for people' s
war as it did in 1965 1969.
2. Brazil
The Communist Party of Brazil has been formally divided
into two earties since 1962; the pro-Soviet Brazilian Community
Party (BCP) under the leadership of Luiz Carlos Prestes and' the
CO ..... unist Party of -Bradl (CPB) under Mauricia Grabois and JOAo" " _"
Amazonas, which was the recipient of Chinese support.
\1 '.
As in the
case of Argentina, the party was originally a
"
group of the pro-Soviet party and has never managed to the
same level of popular support as the party from which it
.
The CPB appealed to both Cuba and China for aid and apparently
received Cuban aid until March, 1963, when pro-Soviet elements in
23
Havana persuaded the Cubans to terminate the aiJ relationship.
Since that tilDe the CPB has been openly pro-Chi,nese. !ts principle
21
publication Classe has tried, in its infrequent appearances ,
o
/
/'
)
to paraHels between the Brazilian situation and the
pre-revolutionary situation in China:
The conditions of struggle in Brazll are ln soae
respects sl.11ar to those of the Ohinese people's
struggle before they defeated thelr ene.les and
gained final victory. That is why ln the light of
Brazil's specifie conditions, the road travelled
,. by th Chinese eo-unist Party la a reliab le
chart for the Brazilian pe9ple ln their stru&gle
for national and social e.ancipatlon. 24
100."
ThIs rhetoric was coupled wi,th acUon; Just after tbe split between
d
the CPB and the Brazll1an Party the CPB appeari!d to be
puttlng the Chinese model to the test. A training centre vas set
up for guerrillas but vas qulckly overrun by police and .11it4ry
forces. According to Luis Merciers Vega, "the eo-.mist Party of
Brazi 1 tried to establ1sh terrorist cells and to get what vas
subsequently the 'Uberlandia golng, ln the .1nlo&
25
triangle." This vas an atte.pt to appeal to the varlten and to
a11y tl:J forces of the CPB vith so.e of the groups opposing the nev
/
/
mq,Hary regime that had ollsted the Goulart governaent in April, 1964.
/
/ In 1965, the ec-utlist. Party of Irazil vas clearly a
revolutionary Harxist-Leninist ca.aunist party espousing t.he Chinese
26
<t,heory of people' s var. It vas att.eapt.inS to'correctly utilize
the "united front poliey" ln it.s efforts to oppose the pOst-Goulart
military ln the .1nlng triangle vith an alliance vith
non-coUIDunist antl-goveru.ent workers and peasants. Sa. atteapt.
was made t.o establlsh rural bases in the State of Minas Gerais
f'
though there appeared to be Ut.tle, at.t.ellpt tQ rely on the
. f
Q
, 0
,
,
1.
JI
a
101.
peasants as the 'foURdation of the movement. The rural niches vere
terrorist hideouts and camps rather than the established territory
.
. '
of the movement whieh cOJlld serve as the bases for lDOvement opera-
tians. The army and the police forces under the government of
President General Branco vere too strong and too
far reaching for tbe of the type of rural bases Integral
ta the Chinese theory of people's
,
var. Clearly, by 1965, there was
no arm)' led by the CPB and the population vas .not by any stretch

of the imagination, mobilized in its support. Without an advaneed
movement, the question of whether or not it was following a.policy
of self-reliance is not a relevant one. The CPB in 1965 vas
,
clearly nti-feudal and anti-imperialist and oriented towards
communism, ,\and it also appeared to have a signifieant level of
27
popular support, 'considering it was only three years old.
By 1969 there had been little signifieant change in the
party. Cecil Johnson points out that during the Cultural Revolution
in China, the CP8 and many of its pro-Chtnese else-

i:" "-
where in Latin America were in a sort of Ideologieal "lilabo". Such
'-a situation hampered ther desire to start a full-scale
28
people 1 5 war iumediately. In any case, the aI1itary
,
of de COnsta e Silva
\
and General G. Mediei cfrrled
\
.
out polietes of severe represston of ca.aunist groups. forcing- the
, .. 1 '
,
actions of the Comunist Party further underground. De.pite the
,
lack of evidence and the re lative ly. assertion that ti.8e vas
. 29
working Jlgainst the movements tbere seeas' to be no evidence that
1
. ,
.'
, , '
3
, __________ ...
l
,
\
r
. "
. "
-, .
102.
30
the CPB suffered any setbacks. Considering the cOIJtinuing nature
31
of CPB rhetoFic, it seems reasonable to sU88est tbat tbe nature of
,
the movement in -1969 W$,S siQlilar to that of 1965 'and that the
'movement conformed to the s.-e tenets of the Olinese model for a
people' s waT\ as H' had in 1965.
" ,
rh 1971, the activi ties of the Coaunist Party of 1
were still clandestine. However, it appears to have suffered set-
backs as a result of continuaI activity by the successive military "
r- _ 1
in -the rounding up of subversive groups. The CPB still'
"
maintained that the "only road for the liberation of the Brazilian
. (
people is the rdad of a people' s war" that bas to be waged "in the'
, .
countryside with the broad masses of peasants as ite llainstay."
f'
a nd an urban worker-studenr alliance "in close cobination with the t)
32
a rmed in the interior." IDOst of support from
( 1
the alienated northeast country it seems that the CPB had
,
not continued its attempt to build a worker-student alliance and
"
t;.hat i t had, more or less. abandoned the idea building a united
33
front. Hs activities in 1971 appeared very Umited. The re fore
in 1971, the same minor tenets of the Chinese' mode 1 for a people's
war seem to be fu'1.filled as in 1969. the CPB does not see.

., to, Havt been at tempting to a united! front policy. Though
the amount of support that' the ,CPB cOlllD8nded is very unclear. it
seems reasonable to assume that it had sufficient popular support in
34
the northeast to conform with last tenet of the Dese"proto-
,
type for people's waT; the requirement that a IDOveenU,e
pursued' with popu1ar support
.,
...
"
- .
!
c;
(
103.
JI
3. The Dominican
The case of the Dominican Republic ia substantially
d if ferent fr01ll the cases of Argentina and Brazil. The support tbat
.
.
China offered the revolutionary movement in the' Caribbean
" ...
offered not on1y to one orgnizational centre of the .ove.ent
to three; the Dominican People 1 s (MPO), the June 14
Revolutionary Movement (JRM), and to the Doainican kevolutionary
Party of Juan Bosch (PRO). In addition, the MPO bas at been
35
s pUt into as Many as fout separate parties.
Originally formed in 1956 the HPO was consolidated as a
poqUeal party in 1 under the leadership of Maxi.-J Lopez l'bUna
who attempted to use his party to start a guerri11a war in 1963.
,-'
.-
The MPD under Lopez was a major proponent of the Chinese ttheory of
people 1 S war t as wel(,e the main spl1nter aroups under Alfred Toussent
Jean and Cayetano Rodriquez deI Prado." Though a Cc.pari80n and
analysis of these divisions i8 beyond the 8COpe of tbis a .... lysl.,
i t is interesting to note tbat a11 of the divisions clat.ed to be
the sole propogator of true Marxist-'Leninist doctrine as interpr:eted
36
1 1
"by Each accused the others, of r,visioni .. , counterrevolu-
tionaty actlvity and personai corruption. AH cIat.ed to be
o rganizing and directing "the revolutionary fight of the people
against U.S. imperiaUsm and iU lackeys at boIae, turning to ar'lled
" ,
8 as the only way out and taking the country.ide as the chief
37
arena o( a truggle."
The June 14 Rev01utionarj Hove_lit (JRM) vas ln a posltion.
very aim! lar to that Jbf the HPO. ,Continued factionaU_, and
7
.

f
o
104.
ollc"illation between pro-Castro and pro-ChlQ.ese positions, created in
. 38
the party no set policy and very little unit y

Finally, the PRD was not a p;oponent of Chinese
nor ,did it claim to be cODlDunist. What is lDOs,t significant is that
the PRD under Juan Bosch was the main organization supported in the
Chinese press, and, although both the others were'not without
support, it was Juan Bosch who was invlted to visit China in 1969.
In 1965, the majority of Chlnese support for the Dominican
Movement, as we saw 1'n Chapter II, came in the fonu of public
support for the forces crushed by the Dominican military forces and
the American military intervention. Though there was support for
Bosch from the MPD and JRM at the Ume of the American invasion,
these parties were not the direct target of the Chlnese support.
These f;WO groups were merely part of the uprising aRd reaction of
the Dominiean people in general against the American action; neither
play ed a signifieant central roie.
, '
these parties, or at least one of them, could help lead the .ove-
Des,pite the Chinese hope
-
ment to a revolutlonary Marxlst-Leninist stand, the movement which
1 10 .. {
39
the Chinese praised W4S popularly supported by many non-cOIIIDUJllsts.
Therefore, the conformity ta the Chinese prototype of the movement
as a whole must be assessed. Led a. it was, primariIy by the PRD,
it ls clear that it did not have a revolutionary
party as ita vanguard. Nor did it fulfill any of six
1
pri .. ry tenets of an ideal people's war, except for perhaps the
second, for 1t did indeed repreaent a croas-section of DoIIinican
'-,-..---
\
.
.. ' .. t
;,
",
---
---
..
society, a rea,l united front. The PRD was, with a doubt, anti-
imperialist and cODID8nded support, but it was not
definitively orlented towards communism or the Chinese model ,of
40
people's
105
By 1969, the ideological battle between MPD and the
JRH was full Juan Br and the reamants of the core of
the PRD hich he still commanded (many had fleQ the ranksco join
41
the fores of Joaquin Balaguer) had apparently given up ,hope of
returning to power through the e1ectoral process, and were advocat-
fng mass struggle and This was coupled with an ideological
shift to the left, for Bosch no longer attempted to appeal to a
wide range of political views but instead espouaed ,the creation of
a socialist repub l,ie to be achieved through the IOO,bUization of the
42
masses.
!.i
lt was probably this stance that earned him the invita-
'';tion to Peking during October. This new element ln the Dominican
situation meant new possibilities for people' s war. Deapite the
changes in the movement between 1965 and 1969, it was still not led
by a Marx1at-Lenlnist communist party, and the only tenets of the
-- Chinese model for people's war that it fu1filled were the three
minor tenets: it was anti-imperla1ist; H was, ,unlike 1965,
definitive 1y or'lented towards aocialism; and 1t appeared
43
increasing popular support in both rural and urban areas.
Between 1969 and 1971 very little changed ln the nature
of the revo1utionary mavement ln the Dominlcan The one
IIUljor difference 11 that the debate between the MPD and JRM appeared
, J
,
,
. \
,
\
-'\._-
.-
106.
to be overj by this time the KPD vas in full ideological debate vith
44
the smaller pro-Soviet CoaBunist Party of the Doainican Republic.
Though it is not elear whether the .JRH and the KPD resolved their
differences or merely turned to more matters, the MPD seems
to have been the only active Marxist-Leninist party adhering to
Chinese doctrine.
41- (
The JRM. inactive during 1971, had reverted to
its soewhat more pro-Castroite stand, but appeared to have lost its
central position in the movement. Pro-Bosch forces vere still
strong and the revolutionary as a whole remained fragmented.
Thus the Dominican movement can be eonsidered to have remained con-
f
\
sistent vith the three tenets of the Chinese model for
people's var.
In aU -three Ume periods, the Dottinican ,
movement vas uncoaaited in the Sino-Soviet debate. Despite aignifi-
cant blocs of pro-Chinese sentiment vithin the moveaent
to time, together the HPD, the JRM, and the PRO (vhich is the ''move-
ment" which China supported) never had a unified poliey <sn the
matter.
4. Eeuador
As in DOst Latin states, the DOst noticeable
\
element in the ca.aunist move.ent in Ecuador ove: the ,past decade
has been the ongoing confliet between the pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese
parties. Until 1963, there existed only party, but vith the
emergenee of the debate between China .nd the Soviet Union, the" pro-
Soviet e1e-.ents expelled those who backed Oli08, bl_ing virtually
\
45

. ,j
a11 of lta probleas on the relationshlp such ..mers had with
l Peking:
The CP of Ecuador, can affim that ail whlch was
undertaken to tsq'late 1t frosa the genera1 Une
of the world CoaIlunist IIIOvement, a11 the maneuvers
which have ai.ed at decapitating it in order to
seize upon iu leadership organs, aU the attempts
at schism, have obtained the direct support of
the Chlnese leaders. 46
Though there appears little evldence for such accusations It i8
evident that the Sino-Soviet dispute had as severe repercusslons
in Ecuadorian communist circles as ln Brazil and Argentina.
However, there was one major dlfference. The split in the
107.
Party of Ecuador did not come to a head unt!l November,
1965, vhen the Central Committee of the party the expulsion
of Jose Rafael Echeverria Flores and his'followers for scheming
against .the leadership of tlv party. This ratification appeared to
be the final step in the Schism whlch had begun vith the' less formai
47
expuls ions of a year earlier. Uni ike other coallunist movements
vhich had split in reaction to the growing hostlilty between the
Soviet Union and China, by 1965 there vere not already tva estab-
llshed parties in Ecuador. It was not untll 1966 that the expelled
group banded cogethe r tc? fona a pro-Chlnese party. The
new ",party. known as the Marxist-Leninist eo..unis t Party of Ecuador
vas the party that was offered Otinese support ln 1969 and 1911.
In 1965 the communlst moveaent in Ecuador was in astate
,
of illlDCnse internai upheaval. lt carried on very Uttle activity and
restricted itself malnly to the resolution of Its own ideological
\
, .
conflicts. There was certainly no continuing
48
108.
s truggle led by the CoaDunist Party in 1965, and appears no
evidence in secondary literature to suggest that the movement ful-
filled any of the major tenets of the Chlnese model for a people's :1
, ' )
war. In fact, the only fulfilled two of the ainor tenets.
The movement was, without a doubt, both oriented towards coaaunisfn
and very much opposed to yet it enjoyed very little
, 49
popu1ar support.
For the purposes of this analysls, we,can assume that the
Ecuadorian movement was, in 1965, uncommitted in the Sino-Soviet
Though the Party of Ecuador vas officially pro-
Soviet, it was this very issue that divided the party. As the
movement as a whole vas not therfore led by, the pro-Soviet party,
and as no alternative party had yet eJDerged, the movement must be
classified as uncommitted. If we vere considering the Communist
Party of Ec'ador alone, ve would have to classify 1t as pro-
Soviet, but the dissension in the JDOvement such clas81ft-
cation.
By 1969, the MarxiJt-Leninist Coaaunlst Party of Ecuador
had emerged as the pro-Chinese counterpart to the older eo..unlst
w Party of Ecuador. Under the leadership of Rafael Ecbeverria, 1t had
8uffered factionalism of its ovn during 1966 and 1967, when a
spI inter group under Jorge ArreUano, a close of Echeverria
ln the old party, split off because of Echeverria's intraneigence
ln opposing pro-Castro elements withln the new Marxist-Lenlniat
" ,
/
50
party. As this internaI
109.
tbe pro-Chinese party
, '
much as it preoccupied the pro-Soviet party in 1964 and 1965.
...
few advances were made ln the actlvities of the party. The .ove-
ment was now led by a Marxist-Lenlnlst coaaunist party, yet fev'of
- 0fthe other tenets of the Chinese model for a peop1e's var vere fu1-
51
fliled. Though lt did espouse Chinese theory. there is no e.vi-
den ce to suggest that it conformed closely to the Chinese model in
1
action. lt was, as in 1965, anti-imperialist and oriented towards
52
communism, and lt had increased its popular support. nte .ajor
difference in the movement betveen 1965 and 1969 vas the
stance on the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Marxist-Leninist Comunist
Party of stood firm1y the refusing to
accept either members."
.....
Between 1969 and 1971, very 1itt1e activity had been
carried out by Echevarrla's party. lt vas active in anti-
activity in 1971, especlal1y in the widespread
demonstration, even though it dld not clat. any credit for the
53
of the demonstrations. party reaained firaly
,. t -:..
, " -
within the camp, a stance lt .. de
the visit of a delegation led by Polltburo me.ber Caai1a
to during the year. Yet, the Marxist-Leninist co..unist
Party of Ecuador had made no progress, if Indeed It bad atte.pted
...
to, in the imp1ementatlon of the major tenets of the Chinese .ode1
for a people's war. We can assume' that the nature of the Ecuadorian
,
"
\
,
l'lOo
movement supported by China did not between
. 1
1969 and 1971.
SUDIIlary
Table 111-2 summarizes the conformity of the four case-
study movements to the Chinese model for a people's war. as
measured by the revolutionary index.
Co' PreUminary Analysis of the Latin American Case Studies
Not aIl the hypotheses presented in Cbapter 1 can be
assessed given the Latin American data alone. However, that data
does allow preliminary examination of aIl of those hypotheses
except for the first and the fifth. One major difference between
this preliminary examination and the more complete exmaination to
be offered in Chapter VI is that geographical proximity of astate
to China cannot yet be considered, since that entails a comparison
of the data from aIl three regions.
l)
These hypotheses will be tested through the comparison of
the two independent variabres and the dependent variable.
Table 1II-l summarizes that data for the Latin American case studies.
(The hypotheses are numbered according to the list in Chapter 1.) We
should remember that the conclusions suggested here are not the
final conclusions of this thesls, as they are subject to reconsidera-
the data for aU three regj.ons are C:ons-ldered.
i'
1
-------
2: When directly confronting United, States or ____
one of Hs so-called "imperial1st tooia" a moye_nt is likely to
,
receive a high level of support, greater than the
"
..

r
'"
l.JI.

/
/
,
,

-
,
,

.

rol8'CD>- rol8'CD>-
n ...... ..0 n ...... ..0
c::B.OIl ..... C::BDlOIlO'
..... N,.-.DI ....
c.::s .... ::s CI.::s .... ::s
0 .... -"
0 .... _"
... n .... ., n ....

::s DI ::s
::s

::s DI
:a :a
CD
"CI "CI
. .
- -- - --
-
r.
-_ .... -
......... ....
................
,
................. .
---
-_.-
.
n C n n . nCnn
,

nCnn

nc:nn
e
rol8't:D>-
n ...., 100
C::SDlOQO'
'DI ....
CI.::S .... ::s
0 .... -"
., n ....
DI ::s
::s DI
::c

"CI
.
Led by a revolutionary '"
--
lHarxist-Leninist.. . ,
Couaunil t Par t v
Corret Utilization of
--
the "united-front
.t
IDOlicv"
on peasantry
'\
and the establishment
of rural bases
_ - ::munis t paK y-led army,
politically motivated
and maIS -backed
Kobilized population and
varfare,
strate2v and tactics
:a

5
0

....
= z ....
f;;
0
i
....
....
to a
:a ....
.... . 1
poliey of
seU-reUance

.... N
Z
t:1
rI2
Anti-colonial ><
.................
anti-feudal lInd
antl-imoerialist
Oriente: tovards
-
-
--
soeia .. ,,;u of
CODlllunlsm
).
Vigorously pursued
--
vith significant
'popular SUDDOrt
Stance on Sino-Soviet rift
ccnn
R:pro-Soviet. C:pro-Chinese.
11 : uncommi t ted
NW""
TOTAL -
Revolutionary
c:c:nn
-
-
-
Index
. e

...

,
,e
..
1965-
...,
.
,
Argentina
BruU
Dominican
Ecuador
1969
Argentina
Bruil
Dominican
Ecuador
1911
Argentina
Bradl ,
Dominican
Ecuador
RepubUc

Republic
. 11.2
TABLE 111-3
. ,...-"'
'StJ!IWtY OF THREE INDICES
LATIN AMERICA

Support Index HostUlty Index Revolutionary Index
..
4 -3 3e
5 -4 5e
1 -4 JU
0
-4 2U
5 -4 3e
5 -4 se
4
-4 3U
5 -4 4e
/.
-1 -4.
3e
1
-4 4e
3 -4
3U
1 2
4C
" 1
1 ,
"
/
e
113.
nature of the moye_nt alone vould dictate.
It appears that this hypothesis is upheld by the data.
The one moveaent in Latin case studies that was interpreted
by the Chinese as directly confronting the United States was the
Dominican movement in 1965. When we compare the support index for
that IIOve.ent with that of other movements opposing regimes with
hostility indices similar to the 1965 Dominican, we find an excep-
tiona11y high figure. This relatively high level of support cannot
be by the revolutionary nature of the Dominican movement.
This revolutionary index indicates a degree of conformity between
that IDOvement and the Chinese prototype for a people' s war which
in other movements is coup1ed vith a lower level of support.
Hypothesis No. J: A movement aimed at the overthrow of a government
hostile to Peking is more likely to receive support than one a1med
a t the displacement of a friend ly regime.
The data are insufficient to test this hypothesis. As
there is only one ca,e in twelve where a governing regime has a
pos,itive rating on the hostility scale--Ecuador in 1971--it would be
premature to
,
Hvpothesis No. 4: When a tegime ia uncoaaitted in its dealings with
China, will besitate to support an indigenous revolutionary
movement. in hopes of broadening her international political base.
\ 0
Without a a ingle case where a regime is rated near "0" on
\ ,
the hostility index, we the validity of this bypothesis.
"
\
114.
*
Hnothes1s No. 6: Wben a revolutionary .,velHnt supports tbe Soviet
Union in the international dispute, China will supp6rt
,
e ither an al te mat ive organization vitbin tbat state, or, if one
does not exist, no aove.ent at aIl, reg.rdless of the teoor of the
relations betveen the governing regt.e and China.
Hypothesis No. 6 appears to be partially validated. China
offered no support to any movement that backed the Soviet Union in
-
-
.. '
the SinoSoviet dispute. In several cases tbere existd a pro-
Soviet party tbat vas considerably stronger than the pro-Chinese one,
yet China invariably offered suJport for the latter. ln 'ituations
where a movement vas in the dispute, the data is less
clear. Apart from the Do.inican .,va.ent, vhich vas seen as
directly confrontlng. the United States in 1965 and one of its
"imperialist tools"--the Balaguer regt.e--in 1969 and 1971, the only
movement uncOlllllit ted in the Sino-Soviet debate W'as the Ecuadorian

movement ln 1965. That aove.ent received no support frOta China.
Perhaps the data from the other regions viII shed furtber light
on this matter.
Hypothesls Hg- l: The the degree of conforaity of a given
revolutionary movement to tfie Chinese prototype for people's var..
the greater the support the 8Ove.ent will be accorded, regardless of
governmntal hostility.
The data tend to support the assertion tbat Chinese support
Is, at least partly, 4f the degree of conforaity between
1
"
, {


....
\
}\ "..
...
lJ
115.,
t 0
a reva, 1 ut16nary movement and the Chinese -.odel for a people' s var.
Of the movements which backed China in the SlnO-Soviet dispute.
there appears to be some the aupport index and
, ,
the revolutionary index for 1965 and and perhaps for 1971
(although the support index figures are substantial1y lover). For
example, in 1971, the two movements receiving a rating of 4C on the
revolutionary index received a rating on the support index of 1,
t,.
while the receivlng only a rating of le on the revolutionary
index received a -Ion the support index. However, due to the s .. ll

number of movements and the large nUllber of cOlllbinations of dif-
fexent ratings on the two scales, conclusions on'the validity of
.the seventh hypothesis should be reserved until data for the other
regions has been presented.
Apart from the testlng of the hypotheses, one other con-
clusion can be drawn. It is evident that tbere ia a aarked
d ifference in the figures of the support index between tbe first
two time periods and the third tDe Chinese poliey towards
Latin American revolutionary movements appears to have been suh-
o '
stantially different in 1971 froa her policies in 1965 and 1969.
As there ls re lative ly little change in the pr1aary iodependent ,:;1
variables when we examine tbem tille, we can conchacle tut the
change in poliey was a function of so.ething other tun the bosti11ty
expressed by Latin American govenu.enta taward China or the nature
l;1
J
i
of the revolutionary movements. The data for the other'tvo aeoar.phi-
1
cal regions should e08b1e us to Judae or not thi. v a .ore
"
.,
,
j
1
1.
........ -
-.
)
'- '
f
\
,..,.
c
.,
. '
/ ...
genral phenomenon. IIDpefufly then ve will be .ble to suggest so.
explanation for sueb a shift in poliey.
, ,
\
r
','
l'
f
\
1)
l, t
1
~ .
"
\.,
1
, .
-,
"--
. ,.)
'1
-"
", ,,..
,
l ~
"
.. -

'--

"
'j
FOOTNOTES

1. New York Times. 18 Novembe r 1965>, p. 2.

,2. New York Times. 11 November 1969,
p./4(
3. New York limes. 26 October 1971, p. 1.
4. The Statesmanls Yearbook", 1966-1967, 1970-1971, 1972-1913.
" London, St. Martinls Press, Maciiillan, 1966, 1970, 1972.
5. Year}!ook of International Trade Stathtis, 1969 and .ru!.,
New York, United Nations, 191i-ltQd 1973. For an analysls of
Chinais trade with Latin the now so...what dated
study by George and Arthur Stahnke. "ec-mlst
China 's T'rade Relations with Latin AlBerica." Asian .Survey.
,September, 1970. pp. 803-819.
6. "Charter of the Organization of American States." signed in
1..948. reprinted in The StateslUn's Yeat-book, 1964-1965.
London, St. Martin's Press, 1964
"'1
.
Jo. -..;
-on 15 January, 1972, Valasco was ousted- by a military revolt
which put General Guillermo Rodriguez Laca ln power. '
117
8. Cecil Johnson attaches slgnificant importance to 'the dlffereace,
claimlng that th'e word "party" signifies a greater support for
movement when used in the Chineae press. 1 do Dot accept
this rell80ning for 1t appars as tbough the party Hself has
osciUifted between the use of ,the two na.es. c.f. Johnson,
m .. p. 244.
9. Branco Lazitch,""RepercusBions of the Sino-Sovi-et Dispute on
the Latin American ColllQUllist Parties." Est et OVest, .January,
1965, reprinted in Translations on Develop!!Dt.
Joint PubUcation. Resarch Servite, No. 693, p. 11.
10. '(Unsigned) "The Present Situation' of the Argentine 0.: Mmist
pa'rcy." Es t et Oues t, Hay, 1966, reprinted in Translations OD
COQllllunht bevelopments. Joint Publications ltesearch Service,
No. 857, p. 25. \
LI. Cecq Johnson, 2,2. cH., pp'. 272-273.
_." 12. ,NCNA, 290ctober, 1"967, quoted in Cecil Johnson, ill.,
'.. p. 272.
.
13. Yearbook on International eo..uniat Affaira 1966. edited by If'
Milarad M. Drachkovitch, 5tantord. Hoover Institute, 1967. p. 184

,.---
\ -
118.
14. Mercier Vega, Qy'rrUlII ln L,Un Merlc. i The Technique of
the Coupter-,t,te, Lqndon, P,11 Mall Pre , 1969, pp. IU-ll7.
..
15. NCHA, 4 October, 1965, quoted in Cecil Johnson, 22' ill., p. 271.
16. Peter Ranh, Flve Latin .dc,n Nations i A CamDanUve
PoUtic,l Study, New York, MacMillan, 1971, p. 138.
17. Mercier Vega, 2.2. ili., p. Ll7.
18. lIi1!!., p. 45, Sec ,lso le.rbook on Intern.tional eo.unbt
Affair". 1968, edited by Allen, Stanford, Hoover
Inst Hute, 19.69, p. 20.
1
- 119. Hcrtit.'t" 2,2. Ut., p. 44.
20. Pe-ter Ranis, 2l!.. ill., p. 143.
21. earbook on l tern_tional anun1st Affain 19 2, edited by
Richard F. St r, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1973, p. 311
22. Nw York TilDeS, 9 Augult, 1971, p. 10.
23.
24-
. ,
25.
26.
ErnsJt ,Ua1 pe r in, 22'"' m., p. 140.
Quoted ln Pekins R.view, 30,A\J8ust, 1963, p.27.
Mercier Vega, 2.2. ill., p. 142.
See "Relolutions of the Central Executive Co_ittee of the
CoaIIIIunist Party of Bru-il: 'The Domestic Situation in Brazil
and the Task .. of the CoI!Dunlat Party 'of BrazU f ." Pekins
Review, 28 May, 1965, p. 21. See dso "PollUea1 Resolutions
of the 6th N.Uonal Conference of tb.: CoaIDunist party of
BrazU." Pekins Rev1ew, 16 December, 1966, pp. 28-32.
27. learbook on lnt.m.tlonal eo.uni.t Aff.irl, 1966, edited by
Milarad M. Drachkovi tch, Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1967. '
28. Cecil Johnson, 22. cH., p. 206.
29 . See, for exaaple, J. Bowyer Bell, The HYth of the GuerEUla:
Revolution.rx Theor! .nd Halpractiee, New York, Alfred A.
Knopf, 1911, p. 248.
1p. Xearbook,on InternatloQl1 Co!eUP1,t Aff.1rt, 1970, edited by
Richard F. Staar, Stanford. Hoover lnatitute, 1971, p. 356.
)
&1
119.
31. 4348, 1969, p. 19.
32. NeRA, 3 1970, quoted in Yearbook on International
ec:-unist Affaira. 1972, ecfl'ted by F. Staar, Stanford,
Hoover Institute, 1973, p. 323.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
.!!!.!&.
New York Times, 26 September, 1971, p. IV 3, see also Cecil
Johnson, ,22. S,ll., pp., 206-207.
For an analysis of the confusion in the political parties in
the Dominican Re pub 1 ic see Abrahan F. Lowenthal, "'l'h' Dominican
Republic: The PoUtics of Chaos" in Reform and Revolution:
Readings in Latin American Politics, edited by Arpad von Lazar
and Robert R. Kaufman, Boston, Allyn and Bacon, 1969, pp. 34-58

Florangel Cardenas. "The Crisis in the Dominican Popular
Movement: Division amang the Dominican CoaDunists.
n
Ahora,
August, 1966, reprinted in Translations on Communist Developments,
Joint Publications Research Service, No. 879.
Yearbook on Coaaunist Affairs. 1968, edited by Richard Allen,
Stanford, Hoover Institute, 1969, p. 188.
See Cardenas, .2,2. ill,., for a more extensive examination.
For a general discussion of the 1965 DoIIIinican affair see
Theodore Draper, "Dominican Crisis", Coamentary, December, 1965,
\
pp. 33-68.
Theodore Draper, .2l?,. ill.
Stanley Plastrlk, "Bosch and Laiaguer: Dominican Roulette",
DiSsent, November-December, 1970, pp. 521-522.
p. 522.
Jer Slater,
and Row, 1970,
Intervention and Negotiation, New York, Harper
pp. 210-211.
Xearbook on International Coaaunist Affairs. 1972, edited by
Richard F. Staar. Stanford, Hoover lnstitute, 1973,
New York 28 August, 1971, p. 2, and November 9, 1971, ,
p. 49.
Quoted in Lazitch, ,22. ill., p. 19.

:.
,
III
47.
120.
Central ec-1ttee of the Co_Jnllt Party ~ f dor, ''Resolution
on Ors.nbaUon", Il Pueblo, IIovellber, 196 , reprinted ln /' 1
Tr .... l.tlog. on eo.unlet Develo_nta, J lnt Public.tions
Reeearch Service, No,. 188.
48. Van Reae, 22,. cit., p.- 221.
49. Xearbook on Igternational CD-AAlst Affaira, 1966, ecUted by
Milarad H. Dr.chkovitch, Stanford, Hoover Inetitute, 1967,
p. 2 1 9 ~
50. Cecil Johnson, 22. ill.., pp. 244-246.
51. Pekins Review, 4 July, 1969, p. 21.
52. Xearbook on Internatiopal es-unist Affairs. 1970, edlted by
Richard F. Staar, Stanford, Hoover Inatltute, 1971, p. 412.
,
, '
53. Yearbook on International eo..unist Affairs. 1972, edited by
Richard F. Staar, Stanford, Hoover Inst1tute, 1973, p. 369.
t\ .
/ ~
1
,
,; ... ,
1;.-.- .
. .
-----'
CllAPTER IV
THE AFRICAIf AHD KIDDLE EASTElUf CASg SnJDIES
..
Unlike Latin A.erica, Africa cannot be considered an
essentially unifora bloc of states. There la auch greater diversity
in types of political systems, patterns of alignaaent, stages of
developaM!"nt, and types of econoaic organization. Thus, rather than
choosing a selection of IDOvements on the basla of the variation in
support received from China, the selection can be made on the basis
of the nature of, the in which the IIIOvement ope rates In
Chapter II, when exalllining the support China offered African and
Middle Eastern IIlOvements, we suggested that there existed a natural
four-group typology for the separation of the in this region.
The Brst of these groups comprises those areas 'of Afdca still
under formaI colonial rule. The second group consists of those
states in southern Africa whose political and social organization is
based on racial discrimination; the regimes pursuing the policy
known as apartheid. The independent states of Africa and
the states of the Middle. East are the logical two remaining groups.
-It is on the basis of this four-group typology that the selection
of case studies for the Afdca and Middle East region is aade. One
state or colony from each group will be analyzed: Angola fro. the
colonial territories; Ethiopia fra. the independent African states;
South Africa froID the apartheid area.; and Israel-Palestine froa the
Middle East.
.. /
-- \'!\;
f
122.
The four movements se lected provide a auch IIOre varied
choice of movements than the Latin case studies both in
of the nature of the struggle, and in teras of the support
offered the IDOvements by China. As we saw in Chapter II, the leveis
of support thelse move.ents during the three tiae periods,
\ j
according to the support index, vere as follovs:
.rill. !lli. ill!
Angola 12 12 12
Ethiopia 0 - 3 - 3
Israel-Palestine 6 14 14
South Africa 1 ' 10 9 -
In this chapter. as in Chapter III, the hostility index
l
will be computed for aIl four caae studies firat, and then the
revolutionary index will be coaputed for each of the four lIOVe_nta ,/.
separately. Finally, some of the hypothses presented in Chapter 1
will be tested to provide a preltainary explanation of Chineae
for revolutionary movements in Africa and the Middle East.
A. Index
State to state relations cannat be considered in tbe case
of Angola. Though the colonial regille does act as the ruUng
government in many cases of da.esti adainistration. it is the
government of Portugal that deteraines policy for Angola, through a
sy8 telll of direct rule. It i8 therefore necesaary to conaider the
metropolitan govemment of Portugal when coaputing the h0l!ltility
index. Portugal. a melllber of the Horth Atlantic Treaty Organization.
voted with the United States and Taiwan on tbe Iaportant Question
1
\
T
123
l
Resolution and the Albanian Resolution in 1965. ln 1969, Portugal
abstained from aIl voting on the representation issue and reaained
2
s Hent throughout the debate'l This vas not to reaain Portugal' s
policy. In 1971, d,uring the vhich finally allowed China to
regain her lavful seat, broke this pattern of hostility.
,
She voted for the Important QOestion Resolution as she had in tbe
past, but then reversed her earlier stance and voted for the Albanian
3
Resolution. This act vas not surprising; several countries did
!
exactly the same thing. When it was clear that the United States
and Taiwan were going to lose on the issue of representation (when
the Important Question Resolution was defeated, the. outcOl8e vas
evident since there had been a plurality of votes for Albanian
Resolution a year' earlier) man, countries fuaped on the bandwagon.
1
Only for 1971 can Portugal be accorded a positive rating on
of the voting indicato.s of the hostility index. As ve pointed out.
in Chapter l, by abstaining 'on either or both issues, astate did

not befriend China. As far as the Chinese vere concerned,
,
short of a vote in favour of legitimate Chinese representation was
an act of hostility. In 1965, Portugal was conaidering establishlng
Q
di plomatic reltions vith China, although no foraal aetings betveen
4
the two states ever took place. For unexplained reasons, Portugal
did not pursue the matter, and malatained d\pfOll8tic relations vith
5
Taivan during aIl three time periods. Portugal did not conduct
sufficient trade vith either China or Taiwan ln any'of the three tille
6 -
periode to merit attention on' the index. As the North
\

. '
.
. ,
. (
,
" .
\1
/ .t..
-e
'J
124.
Atlantic Treaty Organization is very clearly a defence alliance of
western states led primarUy by the U.S., Portus.e Mmberahlp in
that body will be considered as an indicator of hostil1ty towards
China.
Ethiopia, homeland of the Eritrlan Liberation Front, ha.
-.
generaUy been friendly to China during the paat decade. Her record
of votlng oll the representation issue in the General Assembly at the
United Nations shows no deviation from the pro-Peidng line. Not
once, in any of the three time perlods, did Ethiopia break from the
pattern of voting againat the Important Question and for
7
the Albanian Resolut ion. Ethiopia has not been a party to any' J
military aIl lance with either Peking or the west. and has never had
Qluch t rade wi th the far esst. No Ethiopia-China or Ethiopia-Taiwan
trade is recorded in the U.N. compilations of statistics of interna-
8
t iona 1 t rade for any of the three yeara. The issue of diplomat ie
is an inte.resting one. Though Chou En-laI visited Ethiopia
in 1964, it vas not untU 1971 that formaI diplomatie re laUons vere
9
set up between the two countries. The reasons' for thia long de lay
- are not .clear, but in any case, Ethiopia did not malntain relations
with Taiwan. Her official stance dudng 1965 and 1969 was non-
recognition of both. }
ln the case of Israel-Palestine, though we are trying to
explain- ,the support offered the Palestine Liberation Organization
1
and Al Fatah, we must assen the hoaUlity index for the Israeli
. .
government, as these organizations are alaaed at its overthrow.
"
"
. "
125 .
'"
Israel presents a pattern of hostility to, but less intense
than that of Portugal. in the United Nations General Assembly
for the Important Question R--'olution and againat the Albanian
Reaolution in both 1965 and 1969, Israel reversed her attitude on
10
the Albanian Resolution in 1971: As might be expected, 18 Illel ' S
trade with the far east has always been extremely and 'ber
11
t rade with either China or Taiwan nonex1stent. Israel has po
diplomatie re laUons with either Taiwan or Peking, despite the fact
that, she recognizes the Peking regi'& as the legitimate and
o perat ive govemment of China. Though there 18 no formaI' mitit'ary
alliance between Israel and the United States or other western
countrles, we can assume for the purposes of the computation of the
hostility index that such an alliance did indeed existe Israel
relies very heavily on members of th6. North- At,lantic' Treaty Organha-
t ion for mill tary sa les and credits, especially the United States
and ln the middle 1950's Israel' had actuaily tried to jo1o
NATO, and when unsuccessful, had a t teaapted to enter into a joi nt
defence treaty with the United States alone. It was U.S. fears that
such a treaty would jeopardize relations vith cO\lntries that
12
put an end to Israell efforts
"\
Yeti. the lack 'of a fo'rmal treaty

has created a 81 tuation where Israel 18 not a close, ally,
!!.tl2. 'if not ture. of tbe United States. Thus, we have Uttle
choice but to .compute the tiostil1ty -lqdex as if a fonul .alliance
e xisted. "',
\
or
"
" ,
1
<,
126.
final case study of thia region is South Afriea. South
" '1'.
Africa has been the MOst eonsistently hostile to China of any of the
four countries we are eonsidering'here. ln the United Nations,
South Africa voted'in favour of Taiwan on"both resolutions in
13
three time periods. Diplomatie relationft with Taiwan have been
'\ '
1 maintained by SO'lth Africa since 1949.and trade links have been
Il
bet.een the two for many years, even though they never
14
what we have defined as a level. Finally, as
"{n the case of Israel, the lack of a ,formal military alliance with the
United St4tes or the west must be overlooked in the light of a taeit
, -
alliance with Great Britain. South Afriea has been a recipient of
BrH:ish military aid: Thus, it must be considered as strongly
..
aligned militarily as Portugal, which is an acUual member of a
(
regionsl security alliance. Table IV-l summarizes the hostillty of
the governments of our four African and Middle Eastern ease studies,
as measured throu&h the hostility index. We'shall now proceed to
..
compute the index for eaeh of the cases.
. Revolutionary Index
As we meptioned in our exaination of the Latin American
case studies, purpose of this section ia to explain the reasoniqg
, \
{
behind the computation of the revolutionary index. The only baek-
.
ground information on the movements that will be included is that'
p
which 1& relevant. to the understandlng of the elements of the move-
ments whieh are important in this index. The bibliography augge8ta
where more detailed historieal analyses can be located. - ._-.........
l27.
BOSTILITY INDEX
AFllICA AlQ) THE MIDDLE EAST

. -
.
0 0
....
.... -.4

'"'
'"'
... .. .
='

CU U CU
c::
....
c::
-
,"0 c:
.
0 0 0
.,

0 ..c:

... ...
.... "' ...
1"
CIO

CIO CIO
J--
'"' !

c: c:
Ig
u
O
-.4 '"'.
-.4 -.4 .... c:-

c:
'"'C:C::
,",C::.-4

"
e- .....
'"' o 0 o.'"
i ., :1
... u :. ofo4
>'"' .... > -.4 ='
....

.c: ....
-
... '"'
c:: ....

'" ...
.... Md
,
0.
0
-.c ... .. .c: :1
.... .... (-4
-< '"' .,
SI: o.. $1:..0-
o.,",
'"'''' ....
........
S'"
El ='
. -.....
-.4 .... M ...... ........ o c::
:;, .... 0-

Q:'O ral:l(-4 X 0 ... :1: ....
'-
-
-
,
..;
1965
------------

Angola
\....
-1 -1 -1
r-----1--------. -4

,
1 1

Isreal-Pa1estlae -1 -1 -1 -3
Soutb Africa -i -1 -1 -1 -4
,
1969
Angola -1 -1 -1 -1 -4
Etbiopla 1 1 2
Israel-Palestine -1 -1 -1 -3
Soutb Af1rica -1 -1 ' -1 -1 -4
1971
Angola -1 1 -1 -1 -2
Itbiopla 1 1
;
1
"
3
lIr .. l-Pal.stiae -1 1 -1 -1
South Africa -1 , -1 -1 -1 -4

r
-

1. Angola
- Angola. the site of ongoing civil var dnce 1961, bas
experienced nationalist uprisings against the Portuguese ainee the
Europeans' arrivaI in the sixteentb century. ,fst of the
anU-colonial IDOVe1M!nts vere based on tribal unit y and tbus reaained
ec1ectic and in the face of the better-
....... 15
6rganized and unified colonizers. The .adern .ove.ents are
,
natural offspring of the tribal groups of earlier periods, it
is perhaps this legacy that has createdso .uch of the internaI
16
difficulty in the Angolan IDOveaent since 1961, vben the var of
,
liberation began.
, ,."''' ""
" ,
As we $.av .in Chapter Il, in 1965 China supported priaarily
/ .
an organ bat ion cal the fppular Llberati'" Move.ent of Angola
... t
(MPLA); in 1969 an organization called the Rational Union for the

Total Independence of Angola (UNITA); and in 1971 both,of these
groups. A brief discussion of the background of .ave.ents in
.. 1
the context of the overall Angolan struje is "ces.ary to explain
1
the revolutionary of each organi tion.'
f /1
The MPLA vas founded in 1965 a* a clandestine nationalist
party. lt originally grouped a series of saaller radical organip-'
- - -----------_.
tions vith the Angola __ confined to
17
the of tbe colony. Led by intellectuals. l..t .. de
little attelllpt to appeal to the peasants in the rural paru of the
.
colony. and tberefore vhen Portugal begaD.a c.apaign of .... arre.t.
in 1959, the MPtA vas forced into exile. It regrQuped ln France-and
<;l
\.
.'
.'
\. .
.,-
-------
--------
. '
\
129.
then returned to Africa to e8tablieh ita headquartere ftr8t in
Brazzaville and then in LU8aka. Viriato da Cruz, Mario. de Andrade
and Agost1nho Neto were the principle leaders of the .ove_nt wbich
espoused a policy of struggle uniting tribal groupinga against the
Portuguese. (Andrade one of the oraanizera
-- -
,
African Revolutionary Front for National Independence (FRAIN) wbich
Uk
an inter-territorial united front.) Rowever, the MPLA
---------
o ,
altDOst entirely of Ki_undu and Ovl.llbundu, the
two peoples who had flocked
1
to the citles to trade and cooperate
with the Portuguese. adopting the religion aQd .. ny
19 '
European social fonms. That the MPLA was )iaited pri.arl1y to
theae peoples (And more to the Kiabundu than the was not
a function of policy but of circuastance; the .aveaent had been
vlgorously auppressed before it had had auch of a chance to apread
its influence in non-urban areas
t
and other groups vere organizing
#
themselves S'pecif,ically around t,dbal Unes in the countryside.
The Revolutionary Govern.ent of Angola ln Exile (GRAE) waa
,
one of these tribal organizationa. Set up firat ln Klnahaaha, and
then in Accra and Lusaka. it, really V8a ,little .ore than a Bakongo
, movement. despite multi-tribal leadership untU the .14-196O'a.
The Bakongo, a northe rn people. are aplit between Zalre (Belgian
Congo) and Angola by the colonial boundary. Bolden Roberto, leader
of GRAE. appealed for support a non-ideologieal natlonallst
t
stance. He vas denounced by Preaident Kasavubu a. a coa.uni.t; by
tbe AII-African People's Congreaa in Ghana as an tool; and
,
#
. 1
v.

...
'.'
Co
t'
\
J
130.
by other Angolan nationalists as" a Bakongo ratber than an Angotan
,7
nationalist. The other Angolan national1sts clai.ed that "'Robertio
. . r n
aftually fnllowed'a policy of racial genocide; that he ordered the
,
liquidation of all non-Bakongo in the forces of
21
GRAE. It
-1
was this issue that precipitated the withdraval of Jonas Savbllul.
"
an vlmbundu and a senior official, from GR.AE to fona UNITA.
-
UNITA was founde.:Jl by Savimba in 1966. Despite ita relative

youth, UNITA was the largest and most successful of the Angolan
by 1971.
22
Founded inside Angola {unlike the other
groups) UNITA did establlsh an office outside of the country, at
\ Lusaka in Zambia. In 1967 UNITA forces sabotaged the Zambia-Angola
railway and were thrown out of Lusaka Il}' Zambhn President Kenneth
"
Kaunda. When Savimba attemP'ted to organize HPLA, GRAE, and UNITA
into a united front" Holden Robert.o demanded the dissolution of
..
-
UNITA and the merging of its forces under the leadership of
" ,
, ..
was elearly not to Savimba. Mario de Andrde of the
, (
MPLA answered with armed attacks the QmUitary ving of UNITA
....
t,)le Liberat''tIon oPorees (FAU), whieh, however. vere repulsed.
23
Though some analysts have eharged that UNITA vas the divisive force,
it is clear that UNITA Is the one multi-ethnie organization and has
been the main proponent of unit Y of tbeothree groups: Fo.r ex_pIe.
r
.despite the attaeks on by the MPLA, did not cease in its
efforts to unify the 'divided JDOVements. In "reaction to the paaUci- \
patton of the HPLA as the Iole voiee of the Al)golan people"-" s Ubera-
e: .' 24
t ion at the Rome conference on the colonies.
'.
4l;I.;
or
;

'\
131.
the foreign secretary of UNITA conde.ned the efforts of the Soviet
Union to influence the structure of the Angolan aove.ent through
MPLA:
",*- ,

Histc,ry has ,demonstrated that no foreign country
big or small, has ever succeeded in t.posing
solutions' upon other countries and peoples vith-
out their full and conscious consent. oOly the
Angolan people are ID8sters of their ovn struggle
and des tillY. Therefore, to deteI'llline !. priori
that only MPLA represents the Angolan people
i8 no more, no less, than wishful thinking and
me re mental exercise. This does not represent
the objective conditions inside 25
1971, the fratricidal struggle had lessened
and both the MPLA and UNITA had turned their at,tention to the
against Portugal. There is some evidence of a for.al pact bet:ween
26 t.l
the two groups, and both the rhetorical and the ar.ed clashes .
,
ceased. The HPLA modified its pro-Soviet stance to the point where
it, accepted the'theory of the united front, as evidenced
27
Agostinho Netols visit to China in'July, 1971
..
by
'-,
In 1965, the MPLA was a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist
1
party which was leading a struggle.that fulfilled al80st aIl the
J
tenets of the Chinese prototype for a people's var. It had e&tabUsbed

rural' bases in the Cab.inda area of the IlOrth; it had .obiUzed the
population and was using the tactics and strategy of guerrilla war-
1
tare; and it certainly was anti-colonial, oriented taward. ca..uoisa.
vigoro'us in the pursuit of its objectives, "and it, had videspread,
extremely popular backing. There la one questionable ele.nt vbich
is alwoys sOlDewhat ambiguous; the s1xth require.ent of a people's
/
--,
,
132.
,
var--It.dherence to a poVcy of self-reUance". Though the MPLA vas
aided by China and other external organizations, we would s.till bave
to assert that the Angolan IDOvement was indeed the ''business of the
29
lUsses and carried out primarily by their own efforts. Il
Therefore, there are only two tenets that the Ang01an movement did
not adhere to in 1965. The MPLA did not pursue a united front
policy; in tact 1t fostered factionalism. Seond there was no
comunist party-led army\ The clashes with the Portuguese by the
guerrillas were the only confrontations with the colonial forces.
The MPLA was not conaitted to either side in the Sino-Soviet debate,'
even though it was to shortly a11gn itsel f with elements
/1
in other countries in condemning China.

.
8y 1969, powerful pro-Chinese
Marxist-Leninist c It received a11 the Chinese
"""
support for Angolan organizations in 1969. Operating primarlly in 1
southem and central Angola, the movement it led fulfilled aIl the
a ftributes of an idea1 people' s war. UNITA created, in 1967, a
military wing, ca1led the Liberation Armed Forces (FALA) which
conducted both guerrllla warfare and more conventional al'lled clashes
with the Portuguese forces. UnUke the MPLA in 1965, it pursued

the poliey of building a united front. Though the KPLA and GRAE
were to thwart UNITAls efforts, it was very mucb part of UNITAls
prograaae. (Actual1y, the similarity between the .ovement led by
UNITA and the revolution i8 quite striking: FALA cadres
and pollUeal officera work wilmedics in opening 8chools and cUnics
-
f

.... '"<""---------------
",133.
and social service centres, and UNITA has tried to preserve whatever
it cao of the exis ting coaaunal society while worldng to gain the
30,
confidence and support of the peasants.)
,
Between 1969 and 1971 the only major change was the termina-
tion of the struggle betveen the MPLA and UNITA. The movement now
8upported by C ~ i n a was once again uncOIIIIlitted in the Sino-Soviet
debate. Though UNITA was still pro-Chinese, the MPLA vas, despite
fonnal relations with China, probably more closely aligned vith the
Soviet Union. Both UNITA and the MPLA had made great advances in
31
gaining territory from the Portuguese forces.
Table IV-2, appeartng after the discussion of the other
three case studies, summarizes the dbnfonnity-of the Angolan movement
to the Chinese prototype for a people's var.
2. Ethiopia
ln 1952, Eritrea, once an ltalian colony, vas federated
into Ethiopia as a semi-autonomous state. Ten years later the once
independent Red Sea state vas incorporated completely into Ethiopia
as the I4th province. An act of the United Nations in 1952 had
removed Eritrea from the administration of Britain, under which it
had been ruled since its liberation from ItaIy during the second
vorld var. b'Three years previous to the UnLted Nations resolution,
a national movement for total autoaomy had begun lobbying both in
Eritres and in the United Nations. lt vas ~ o t untii 1962 and the
end of Eritrea's semi-autonomous status that the leaders of the
nationalist IDOvement began to think in terms of an armed struggle'.
(
134.
Yet the efforts to obtain inde ence througb non-violent lleans vere
not abandoned--tbe Eritre Liberation Front still .. intains a lobby
at the U.N. in New York. However, the major efforts of the front
are now violent; there has been an at.ost continuous araed confronta-
tion between Ethiopian s01diers and Eritrean guerrillas since 1966.
China did not support the Er1trean Liberation Front in any
32
of the three t1me perioda, as ve' aav in Chapter II. Though the
Eritrean Liberation Front toyed briefly vith the rhetoric of Harxist-
33
Leninis t movements, ita main platform has been to work tavards tbe
total independence of Eritrea and tbe establishment of an autonomous
01/
government and poUtical structure. Due to the dearth of secondary
literature on the Eritrean movement, we have bad to rely on more
34
general sources on Ethiopian politics and newspaper references to
determine the conformity of the IDOveaaent to the tl:..nse prototype.
In 1965, the Eritrean Liberation Front ~ a s not a revolu-
1
tionary, Harxist-Leninist party. Nor was it to beca.! one by 1971.
""lt vas a nat10nalist party vith the objective of sovereignty.
Armed clashes with tbe Ethiopian aray vere infrequent untU 1966,
vhen guerrilla warfare started in earnest. The tvo tenets of the
Chinese model for a people!s war that the Eritrean Liberation Front
fulfilled in 1965 were anU-colonialisa and anti-iaPerialism and
vigorous pursuit of it8 objectives. It appears also that the ELF
vas following a united-front policy. We .ust r e . e ~ e r that a pollcy
of united front refers to construction of a worker-peasant alliance,
and thon, if po lbla, a bruader alliance of all peopl. tn tho
country oppo8ed to tncuNbont rOMl ...
4'
WA" prl.artly of lnt.ll.ctu.l., it derlv.d lupport {rom
popul:ttrd ("",,lnR "rNua of thr Sntt'rlor. Th.r.for., we l'Rn ,,,,,,,,m.
1
th'Forne, the' fn'n't bl'c"" "cUvr pd",,, ... tly tn th" lntt'rlnr.
t" thl' Krilrc"n p""""nt", il t'"uhlhheod clAnd."tinl' rural
15
"""htan"r l'xc .. pt ... tert,,1 a1d, "nd th ... nnt pr .. cludt' the
po .... lhitity lh,H .. war wu condut .. d prfmarlly by th. effort.., of
lb
th ... Krf t r ... anR. .. Rome ln 1967 concprn1nM th ...
31
th. Eritr.an Liberation
Front WB" not, .t .ny d@(fnitively orlented towardl .oclaill.
as po"t-tndel,,"Udt'ncfI for. of goverruaent. In tu .tte.pt to
lntaln the hroAdt'st po iblt' united front, the ELF appe"r. to
have fMnor.d "I.o8t entlrl'ly the ll.ue of polt-lndependence
tion.

ln the petJod between 1969 and 1971, very 11ttle chan,ed
ln th. Erltrean lndependence .ov ... nt. Popular lupport appeared to
...
(
136.
have increased along vith tbe size of the guerrilla RLF
38
clai.med to have 40,000 men. HaUe Selasaie vas extre.ely concernai
about the increasing success of the independence .ove.ent, had
assigned more than a third of his ar.ed forces to what he called his
"bandit suppression" progbllllDe. The Eritrean Liberation Front Bever
committed itself to one side or the other in the Sino-Soviet debate;
it generally tried to avoid such contentious issues entirely.
3. Israel-Palestine
The revolutionary moveent confronting Israel is an excell-
ent example of a movement receiving a high level of support from China
a high degree of confonaity to the Chinese .odel of people's
var.
C'
Though the Palestinian movement consists of several dif-
ferent organizations, China has supported only the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) and Al Fatah, both of which China
considers as part of the Palestine Liberation Organization. China
also considers such groups as the Arab Front in Iraq to
be part of. the same organization. While the se and other fedayeen
......
are often affiliated, -there are saae clear differeii:es between the.
vhich China does not recognize. This failure to differentiate is a
real deviation fram the usual Chinese pattern of supporting the one
''vanguard'' of the aovement when .ore tun one organization exista.
The Palestinian move.ent ia Don-ideololical.
None of the major organizations se .. to bave a well-developed stand
, .
"

,
.'
137.
on post-victory organization. Thelr one pre-ealnent goal is the
destruction of the state f Israel. The PLO. operating prt.&rlly
out of south (originally out of the Gaza strip) bas firaiy
stated that it is not interested ln ideological debate:
Doctrines politlcal, Boclal or econoaic
shall not the people of fra.
the primary dut Y of tiberating their hoaeland
Palestinians have three .ottoes: National
unit y; National mabilization; 'Liberation.
Once liberation ls completed. the people of
Palestine Bhall choose for its public life what-
ever political, economic or social system they
want. 39
Similarly, Al Fatah has made goal the liberation of Palestine.
40
not the establishment of Any particular sort of state. Al.oat
all official statements have carefully avoided espousing any parti-
cular political idology to maximize the popu1ar base of the
.-..,.,..
guerrilla-led movement. Witness the stand taken by Yaser Arafat.
1
leader of Al Fatah:
We have formed very s'trong Ue's vith the liberation
movements aIl over the wor1d--in Cuba, in China. in
Algeria and in Vietnam. we must DOt forget that in
a war of liberation we sbould -.ke use of every
available source and means that belp us reach
our ultimate goal--that is the of our
hameland. 41
Arafat stresses how Vietnam's National Liberation Front had .. naged
to inc1ude twenty-three organhations "ranglng from the CatboUC8 to
42
the 'Buddhists to the Couaunists. Il According to the Chlnese theory
of people's var between the National Liberation Front of
" ,
Vietnam and Al Fatah produces .ore differencea than
National'Liberation Front ia a ca.auniat party activeiy
, '
ta
..
utilizlng the unitedrfront policYi the PLO and Al Fatah are not
communist parties. The Arab organizations uae the concept of a
united front not" as a policy aimed at marshalling aIl possible
138
8upport for a worker-peasant.alliance, but rather as a policy aimed
at marshalling support external to Palestine. At the
. \. 43
of the Iraq-supported Arab Liberation Front, which claias affilia-
tion with the PLO and Al Fatah, it ls a8serted that the Palestinian
guerr1l1as ,carved "for the revolution a new path under the banner 6f
the revolutlonary Arab creed based on a national organlzation Incor-
44
porating Arab fighters frorp a11 parts of the Arab homeland. ", Un-
fortunately, neither this nor any of the other guerrilla organizations
seem to be willing to make expUcit what 1s IDeant by this' "revolu
1
tionary Arab creed". Abu Shehab, leader of the Arab Liberation
Front, claims that the movement's ideology "ia based on Arab
" 45
naUonalism and the 90cial1sm of progressive struggle." That it
ia indeed based on Arab nationalism one cannot diapbte, but the
"socialiem of progressive atru881e" 8eemB to be an inversion of the
Chinese concept of the ,"progressive BociaUs t atrugIIe".
J
Although much of the operation of'the Pale8tinian guerrilla
'\ movement 1& in rural territory, there has not been a real attempt to
rely,on the peasantry and to establish rural bases. The rural bases
that do'indeed exist are not in Israel, but in neighbouring statea.
(
This would clearly not be equivalent to Chinese eaphasis OD raliance
on the peasantry and the eata611ahment of rural bases within the
state to be liberatedi it ls oaJy fra. the ,national countryside that
f
one s.fficient strenath to 8urround and capture the cft!.s.
(
1 1
,1
o 139.

In 1965 guerrilla actlvity wa llght. Untll after the
Six-Day War of 1967 very litle was accoplilhed ln mabllization
the population and the adoption of guerrilla warfare strategy and
tacticl. The Palestinian movement ln 1965 conformed to on1r minor
tenets of the Chinese model of people's war. As the PLO and Al Fatah
vere attempting to destroy the of Israel, the y eatab11shed
themselves 8S anti-imperialist;, China views Israel as an 1mperialilt
tool of the United States. As these organlzations were opposing
Israel, we can assume, for the purposes of the revolutionary
lndex, th8t the Palestlnian movement was, according to Chinese,
" anti-imperialist. Finally, the Palestinian mavement was vigorously
, \
pursued and did have support amang .,the Pales-
t inian Araba.
'.
The only difference and the later two time
periods i8 that in 1969 and 1971 the guerrilla operations had grown
8ubltantially. Al Fatah had begun ta U8e guerrilla tactic8, which
had nat u8ed in 1965. Despite the setback8 8uffered by the
guerrillas in the 1970 Jordanian clvil war, the.activitie8 of the
guerrilla bands were pronouneed agaln in'197l. The one tenet of a
people's var that ls alway' sGaewhat a.biguoua, a. we have 8een ln
our discussions of other movement., 1. the requlreaent that a
move_nt adhere' to a poliey of aeU-reUance. In the ca.e of the
PLO and Al 'Fatah, wc would they were not
..
adhering to suc of Arab govern.ent.,
their exlstenee it la Dot lapas.ible to
)
Q,

,
140.
receive externa1 support while adhering to a policy of self-relianca
(as w diacussed in Chapter 1), when the exiatence of a movement
dapends on the bf neighbouring governments it ia apparent
.t,
tbat self-reliance can hardly be an attribute of that movement.
Therefore, in both 1969 and 1971, the Palestinian movement contlnued
to conform to the two minor tenets of the Cbinese model fOr a
war, and to one major tenet, as it had adopted the strategy
V
and tactic8 of guerrilla warfarc.
In aIl three time periods the backed
China in the Sino-Soviet debate. The PLO, as we saw in Chapter Il,
had established a permanent mission in Peking during 1965 and was
46
vociferou8 in its support for China from that time forward. (The
reason for this was not an ideological one, fori as we have
seen. the ideologieal convergence tbe movement
and China was quite slight. Instead, this pronouneed affiliation
with ChinaIs stance in the Sino-Soviet debate was probably due to an
unhappiness with Moscowls so-called "peaceful approach" to the con-
flict in the Middle East. We shall return to this point in
Chapter VI.)
4. South Africa
As, in the case of 80 many movements in the third world,
the movement supported by China in South Africa--the Pan Afrlcan
orlginally an otf.hoot of a .avement a.lociated vith
<'
a Soviet lupported Communiat Party\ The South African eo..unilt,
Party, a predominantly white orgenization multiraciali ...
J
1 ..
,
.
<
,
/'
')
141 .
all:l.ed itself vitb several other organizations in the 1950's to
, 47
fora the Congre . AlI iance The ara of this alliance which
represented the .truggle of the black people of South Africa was
the Alrica National Congress (ARC) which spUt in 1959 on the issue
of racial organizationo The rebels, who formed the P4n African
Congress (PAC) vere opposed to tbe insignificarit.role the black
aasses vere playing in the Congress Alliance. The aim.of the new
organization was to vork towards the building of a United States of

Africa, wbich would be a ",:?,ion of free. sovereign, independent
48
de.ocratic states." The first leader of the PAC vas Mangaliso
1
Robert Sobukwe, who advocated non-violence' 'as a means for social
change and for the construction of political democracy. Sobukwe
and PAC condeaned the patronising attitude of the South African
eo-unist Party to the black "and coloured groups in the Congress
Alliance, stating that the Alrican people should:
by tbemselves formulate policies and programmes
\ and decide on the methods of struggle withot
Interference froa either so-called left-wing
or right-wing groups of the ainorities vho
arrogantly appropria te to themselves the risht
to think and plan for the Africanao 49
? -
Immediately after its founding in 1959, PAC began to
1
a.ctively i.JDplement its progra.aes of defying the pass lav8' and 1
paralydng South Africa by leaving the factories and crowcling the
~
jails vith those arrested. This was the theory behind the now f-.oua
SharpvUle tragedy. - Hundreds vere kUled by both poUce and .1Utary
~
force., and che South African reglM tlghtened lts repre.l1on,
-
..
"
,
\
)
,1
.1

.
e
?
142.
50
out1awing both ARC and PAC. The face of PAC chaopd qulcUy.
Sobukwe was jl'1led and leadershi;' of org4nizatlon vas tak.en over
by Potlaka Leballo. Violence the accepted .eans of change,
and PAC moved its headquartera into Basutoland (nov Lesotho). PAC

turned Hs effort!l to the building of a people's var as prescribed
by the Chinese. In 1963 PAC vas.repressed by the British adainistra-
'tion in Basutoland and vas forced underground. Leballo fled the
following year to Dar es Salamil anct'>began to reorgaoize the IIOveaaent
Cl
from there. Sinee 1964, PAC has oprated froa Tanzania and Zaslbia,
oondueting ita aetivities from large enclaves near the South Afric,n
, 51
borders and smaller bases withip South African terrltory.
PAC has never beeo a party. lt does not DOW
ClaUD, nor has it ever even to be work!og tovards the
construction of a coaaunist state. lts ideology has been that of
Atricfnism. According to PAC's tirst leader, Sobukwe, Afr!canis. is
not neeessarily soeialist:
Africanists reject totalitarianis. in any fora aod
accept political de.ocracy as understood in the
We alao reject the econoaic exploitation of
the .. ny for the benefit of a {ev. We accept as
policy-the equitable distribution of vealth,
as as 1 .. coocerned, to equality of 1nco.e
(Bic) which to Ille is th only basia on vb1ch the
slogan of "equal opportun! tles" cao ja6---fc:rUid'. 52
".-
. At the beginning, PAC did oot puraue a united front policy.
---lu appeal wu to the black vorkers ln and arouod South Alrica'.
,
urban .reas. ln 1966 the eoloured People's Congre dl o1ved and
" 53
integrated ita aeaheTa into PAC. It al.o belan to .btft it.
r,

.1
J
-----------------.0.---------- ---- -
..

=======-=--.:- -
, .
143.

attention away from its preoccupation vith the u9.n are ..
to the rural areas as vell, atteapting to build .-worker-pe nt
il!
Due to the industrialized nature of South Afriean society,
LebaUo elalmed that PAC should rely on the peasantry and eeubUsh
rural bases on one front, while .. ssing support in the citiee ..anget
the wotkers at the seme time. Though this is clearly not exaetly
what the'Chinese theory of people's war postulates, it i8 an adapta-
tion of the theory whieh Lin Piao sU8gested aight be
54
neeessary As PAC was relying on the peasantry in its .tte.pt to
build rural bases in 1969 and 1971, we would bave to judge tbat its
s imultaneou8 struggle in t;he eities was not in conflict vith the
ChLnese model of a people's war.
Leballo, in a speech in su..ed up the polLey
\
,on-the importance of a selfreliant struggfe, stating that self-
J ,
relianee was an absolute neeesslty The statecl parfey
i s very simllar to the Ch ine se' stance, on the need for self-reU.nee:
A party that looks to the outeide vorld for
finaneially and ailitarily, before it
has shawn what it has acbJ.eved by relyill8. on ite
own efforts, i* not practisiog revolutionary self-
relianee. 55 (eaphasie added)
------.--
ln, both 1969
f'

1t fulf111ed aU bu.t three tenets of th. Oaines .odel for

1
a people' 8 var. The th/ee that it did DOt fulfill thoa. related
to the ideological leanings of a prototypical IIOvellent. PAC v.s
certainly not a revolutionary Marxiat-Leniniat party; it v.a not even
o riented towards co.-uni .. or eociaU_. Finany, then naturally
vas no party-led
1
,! "
)
,

,
144. '
,
ln 19M I\A(:,had n,'t cow-ttud tt U lu au.nd ln tho
"-0
Slntl-SovS.'l d"bato. Wh! hl lt had r ... Sovlot l.anlna.
, '
01 tt,,, ANC-SAl;P ul ... not untU 1967 that it c_ltted luoU
t.u th. Chin"". dd. l'AC allllntld H .. lI w!th Il.hl c'th"r ACrtcan
.
nAl.lunalht tu cond.an th, crSU-'p',n.orod Cair"
- \6
.omln.r {ln "Al'rh'." NationAl .nd Social '"""lutlon", Throulho"l
l'JM and l'H,t ... tn.,,, ftrmly prtl-Chin t'ond nln, I,ro"
Sovl"t or",.nl .... tilm. lor thoir in.latonco ()n "la ralher th.n
H
->-'
IV-2 .\I-.r'zo. -th. conforalty \le thtt {uur
.. n"wOI"""tl&- l\,ntht' Chin ,dol (or .. p4H'pll'. war, OX;' Od
lhrulIKh 'tht',n'vulutinnary lnllex._
, .
.-
C, llr" llmlnftry yi t .nd tI'ddl. l'UUD C .. , SWdl ..
A. we dld ln Cha"to r III (or th., AlMrtun cau ltudl.!l.
J
....
w .. wU! now oU..,r 1 prolillinery analy.t. of Chin ..... uppoN on lho
., bail' the dat" (or the 'h"can .nd Middlo Elltern reKlon alon.,
\ "'1 1\,. 1
i
t".t1nt& thollt\ hyp.1tho .,. pr .. ontctd in Ch.ptor 1 that If" relev!lnt
, '
to t!lb aroa. Tho hypoth that "tll look \t her.
1 1
8
a ro tht\ 1 .. t b 1 btod in Chapto" 1. Th .. hypothe._. vU l, 'be

-t. tod through cOlllpartaon of thd thro ... lnet le COIIput.d lor the
ca Itudl... Table LV-) Iu-.rhe. th. data for the two lndependent
variablea and tho dependont varllbl for the Afrlcan and .. Htddl.
Ea.Urn ca ... tucHu .. '
"
;
- '.
'"
,
"" r
cn .... &IIIt"-
o.,.. \0
f .... cn ....
.,.. \0 0111,.. \D
c .. ::r ...... c .. ::rcu 0- c ... 0-
\Dfft ..... QVt
:r1lo0 .... :r.0 .... ,:r.O ....
... " III
..... " III ' .... "Q III
> ... > .....
........ ." .., .... ." III
.. . .. . ' ...
.... -1

" . " . " 1

III
" "
.
"
.. .. ....

::1 .
i
::1

. 1
,
.
-
,
,
...
,....
-
-
'.
-
...... ....
-:---
-
J
-1.
.... ........ .... ......... ...
"
,
,
-
....
.
.
... _--

- -
., r
\"
. -
-- -
---
.... ....
\
,

.
---- ----
-.... _-
-
"
... ... ...
,
................
... .... """' ...
... ..........
\
,.
"-
e::: n Je::: c,ncc:: n n c n
-

N'ir c ; ,/

t
.
,
Led by a revolutionary
Marxlst-Leninlst
Cui aist Party
Correct Utl1lzation of
the "united-front
/
. DOlicv"
,'Reliance on peasantry and
the e.tabliabment of
rural ba.es
- Coaaunlst party-led ary,
politieally .ativated
.,
and .... -baeked
Mobllized population and
tuerrl11a varfare,
.trateRY and tactica
AdbereQCe te a
policy of

Anti!:lOllial
anU- eudal and
i
anti-laHriali8t
Orl'Dtld toward.
10ciaU. of .
If_
Vlaorou.ly pur.ua4
vith .1lDificant
.
_ ..... 1.r
Staace OD Slao-Saviet rift
l:pro-Sovlet. C:pro-Chlneae.
U:" tted t
TOTAL -
levol\ltloaary
IDdl1
,:.
.
1
1

5
0
fi
i5 1
! :
!
-4

s
f;;
=
1
N

...
e:


1965
-
Ana
ola
Ethiopla
Israel-PalesUne
'South Africa
1949
"-
Angola
Ethiopla
Iarael-Palestlne
South Africa
1911
Ana
ola
Ethiopla
Israel-Palestlne
South Africa
TABLE IV-3
SU!tWl Y OF TIIlU INDICES F
APRlCA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Support Index Do-tility
12 -4
0 ~
6 ,-3
1
)
-4
12 -4
- 3
2
14 -3
10 -4
12 -2
- 3
)
1
14 -1
9 -4
146.
Index Revo lut:l.oHry
Igde,
1U
3U
'2C
.' /"'
4U
9C
6U
3e
6e
'9U
6U
le
6C

Hypothesl. No. 2: When directly confronting the United States or
one of ita ao-called "imperiaUst tool." a movement ia likely to
reeeive a high level of support, greater than the revolutionary
l nature of the movement &lone would indieate.

The data appear to suggeat that this hypothesis is vaUd.
The Palestinien IDOvement taiming at the destruction of the state of
was aceorded a mueh higher level of support than, would have
f"'V .
been sugges ted by che conformity of the IDOvemencJt;o the Chinese
revolutionary model. In the two periods after che 1967 Middle
Eastern the Palestinian movements reeei"'d close to total

Chinese support ('14' rather than '16' on the support index) despite
relatively low levels on the revolutionary index. The theory auggested
by Peter Van Ness--that support is a function of hostility towards
China expressed by! the government. against which the revolutionary
58
movement is,.,working-- appeara to have 1 ittle validity in this one
case., Hovements directed against govermaents whieh were more nostile
to Peking than Israel reeeived lower levela of Chinese support.
Though it was not considered here. the Congo (Kinshasha) --now Zaire--
situation provides even more evidenee for the validation of this
59
hypothesis
Hypotheets Ng,. 3: A movement aimed t 'the overthrow of a gove rnment
hostile to Peking la more li,!tely to receive support than one aimed
at the displacement of a friendly reg1me.
On the basis of the Ethiopian data, the third hypotbe.1s
.
appeara to be upheld. Deapite signifieant confonaity between the

-'
t
148.
;
Eritreen LlberaUon Front and the Chlne.e .odel ('6' out of 'g' on
1
th. revo lu tionary index in 1969 and 1971) Otlna 8upported the
Ethiopian govenuaent;. .Such 1ack of .upport for a IIOv .. ent cannot
be expldned by the "ELF'. stance on the Slno-Soviet debate, for
aeveral other move.enta in Africa vere ln the dispute
and yet recelved hlSh levela of support. In Chapter VI ve ahall be
able to examine this hypothea1a on the ba.le of the data for aU
three geographlcal regions.
Hypothes1s No. 4: When a res1_ la uncoaaitted ln ita dealinas vith
Chlna, China will hesitate to support an indigenous revolutionary
movement, ln hopes of bro.dening ber international po li t,l ca 1 ba.e.
The data do "not .-llaw consideration of this hypothesis.
As in the lAtin Ami"iean ana lys18, wc uncovered no c.se vhich re-
elvd an uncOllllllitted ratins on the hostllity index.
,
Hypothesis Ni' 5: In Africa, a !lOVe_nt ai.ad the- overthrow of a
colonial or apartheid regime will reeeive greater .upport than one
merely aimed at a pro-western regime.
for 1969 and 1971 uphold this assertion, the data
for 1965 do not. The low level of 8upport offered the South African,
Namib tan, and Zimbabwean IIOvements clearly invaUdate thi. hypothed_
for 1965. However, givon that it remains accurate for he last tvo
perioda, and for colonial Africa ln 1965, we can .ug8tlt that It i.
partlaUy valldated. In Chapter IV. va .hall IURseit a refomu1atlon
of thls hypothe.is.

----..
1
149.
Uypotheal8 No. 6: When a revolutioury aupporta the Soviet
Union in the international Sino-Soviet dispute, China will support
either an alternate organhation wlthln that state, or, if one does
not exiat, no ..,ve.nt at aU, regardIes.' of the tenor of reJaUons
between the goveming ,regiaae and China.
China supported one movement that was pro-Soviet in Africa.
Though not in our case .tudies, the PAIGC of Guinea
(Bissau) was the only revolutionary organization within that atate.
Hypothesis No. 6 does not appear to be vaUdated. China did indeed
offer support to one .ave .. nt that was pro-Soviet, which 8uggests
the following refomulation of this hypothesia: When a revolutionary
movement supports the Union Ln the InternatLonal Sino-Soviet
debate, China will support that movement only if an alternate or.api-
zation does not exist, regardle of the tenor 'of relations between
the goveroing regime and China.
Hypothesi. No. 7: The greater the of conforaaity of a given
revolutionary .-ove.ent to the Chineae "rototype for people '. war,
the greater the aupport the IDOve .. nt will be accorded, regard leu
of bostility. \
The variety of situations plesented in Table IV-) invali-
date the last hypothesia. For .ave.ents tbe overthrow of
a c:olonLal or apartheid regiat, the revolutionary conformity to the
Chinse .adel for a people's war appears to be a deterainant of the
1
relaUve level of support. For other aoveai1enta, such appeara not to
be the case.
-- ---- -----

'>.
,
150.
IUther than ca.pare the r.luit. of thll preU.laary au1yal.
to thole aUlleeted lli Chapter III, ft ahall DOW turft to th. cae
tudie. for Alia, returninl to t ..... re.ulta in Olapter VI vben aU
"
the data for t'he three re81on. ha. b n aather.d.
r
1
-
... .
1
.,
.
"
t,;
,
,)

.,
'.,


,,,,

1 :
, "
""II : ... -
.
, ,t.;
"
" ,
..
151.
FOOTNdI'ES
1.
lf!x 121:
k
:n.
a
,
18 Novemb.r, 1965. p. 2.
,
2. NtX 'fork
Tl .... 11 Nov"'er, 1969. p. 4.
3.
D!W 12
r
15 T,
26 October, 1971, p. 1.
4. John K. Coo1.y, Iist Hind 'frica, York:
walker, 1965.
5. Tbe Statea.an'. y,a(book. 1966-1967. 1970-1971. 1972-1973.
London: St. Martin'. Pre .. , MacMillan, 1966, 1970, 1972.
6.- Some trade w .. r'ported with Taiwan but at a very tn.ipiflcant
level. See Yeaibook of Inte'rn,UQnal Trade Statbticl. 1969
and!2Ll. New United Nationa, 1971 and 1973.
1. New York Time., 18 Hovember, 1965. p. 2; 11 Novaber, 1969, p. 4;
and 26 October, 1971, p. 1.
8. I.arbook of International Trad, Statt.UcI. 1969 and 1971, 22.
clt. -Nor WII an.y luth tr!de .entioned in edltionl of rar
he taro Economie Review. -
9. Bruce Larkin, n Chin, and Afrlca. 1949-1970. Berkel.y: Unlverd.,
- "Of C,Ufornia Preea, 1971. p. 1.
10. hw York limes. -18 1965, p. 2; II Novellber. 1969, p. 4;
and 26 OCtober. 1971, p. 1.
11. X.arbook of lnt.m,tional Trade Statt.Ucs, and 19H,. 22.
12.
ill
Nadav Safran, From War to War: The Ar.b-laraell Confrontation
1948-19.67, New York: Pesasus .. 1969. 105, 108.
13. H,X York IiH.B. 18 NoveDlber. 1965j p. 2; 11 Nove_flr, 1969, p. 4;
and 26 October. 1971. p. 1. -
......
14. LeI. than n. of South Aflta'. trade va. with Taiwan, ln any of
tbe thr ,tiN perioda. As 51 or $50 .11Uon 11 our leve1 of
l'inifieance, Africa 11.a u.ed to have-trade vith neither
Taiwan nor Chlna. Yearbook of International Trade Stati.tica,
.lli and 1971, ie.. Ut.
18
152.
15. Bee David M. Abahire and Michael A. Saauela (ed ). POItuayele
Africa: A Handbook, Nev York: praeger, 1969. Cbapter 1. for
a aood historical account of the situation.
16. John A. Ma rcUlll , The Angolan Revolution, ea.bridge: M.!.T.
Press, 1969. pp. 43-44.
17 Richard Giblon, African L'ti.ratiog !1pyeMnta: ContelllpOrary
Stru881ea Alainat White Hinorlty Rule, London: Oxford
Uniyerslty Press. 1972,'. pp. 211-212.
18. l!W!., p. 215.
19. Abahire and Samuels. ill . pp. 4-7.
20. Richard Gibson, 2J!.. ill., pp. 225-231.
21. J. A. Valentim, Qui l'Anlola. Brusaele: Coppers,1969,
pp. 11-12.
22. This' fact 18 s aource of great pride to UNITA, aa it demon-
atrates the cOlllllllttment of ita membera to the internal
st-ruggle.
23. For examp1e. Douglaa Whee1er and Plissier, Anl0la.
London: PaIl Hall, 1971, p. 225.
24. Organized by the ItaUan CoaIIlunlll; Party and ,the CoIIIauniat
Party of the Soviet Union. Only pro-Soviet groupa vere invited.
25. Quoted in Richard Gibaon, 22. S!!., p. 242.
26. Nev York Times, 12 Harch, 1971, p. 12.
27. SOfP, No. 4939. p. 25.
28. United Nations, A Pd.nciple in Torment i The United -NaUoU agel
Portuaueae Adminiatered Territories. New York: United Natlons,
1971, pp. 47-48.
29. Lin Piao's 8ixth tenet of people's var; PekiN lleview, 3
September, 1965. p. 22.
JO.Richard Cibson, 22. s,ll. p. 238.
31. Nev York TilDea, 7 June. 1971, p. 8; and 15 Oetober, 1971, p.S.
\.
J
--
153.
J
32. De.pite
J
reporta to the contrary Bey York TlMa, 3 March, 1967,
p. 49. Cla tu tut China tralned and suppUed the ..-.bers of
the EU have never been
\
1
33. l,eki. Review, 15 Ju1y, 1966, p 52.
..
34. Christopher Clap"", IJalle Sel.ssie's Governaegt, London:
Lonpan's, 1969; W. R. Levis, "Ethiopi.: 'l1le Quiekening Pulse"
in "Afric. 1968", Current Ristou, Pebruary 1968, pp. 65-101;
and Barbara A. Alpert, ''The Ethiopian Perplex" in "Alrica 1971",
Current History, March, 1971, pp. 129-168.
35. New York Times, 15 December, 1971, p. 12.
36. See footnote 29.
37. New York TilDes, 3 March, 1967, p. 49.
38.
ti
Ethiopian govemment sources say the ELF has 1,000 men,
independen t sources suues t this is grossly unde rs ta ted, the
number beins closer ta three to five tille that figure. New
York Times, 15 December, p. 12. "-
39. Articles 9 and 10 of the ''National Covenant of the pale.tini.n
Liberation Orsanbation" reprinted in The Israe1-Arab Reader,
edited by Walter Laqueur. Second Edition, Toronto: Bant ..
Books, 1965, pp. 374-379.
40. "The Seven Pointa, passed by the Central ec-ittee of Al Patah,
January 1969", reprinted in j!2. ill., pp. 379-380.
41. "An Interview vith 'Abu ..n!4., p. 382.
42. Ibid.
43. lfew York Tilles, 7 January, 1971, p. 12. Iraq apparently was
disenchanted with Hoscow' s "peaceful approach'f to the Middle
Eastern confllct.
44. Jbid. This is a quotation from a tract espouaing the ideals
and aims of the movement.
45. Ibid.
46. No.' 3425, p. 31.
47. The Consres. included the African Rational Conare.s,
the lndian Congress, the Cq10ured People'. Oonare , 'the SACP,
and the South Alrican Congre of Tr.cIe Unions (SACTU).
/
\
... -
\
J
1
)-
/
......
"'
.'
1
154.
48.
'>-?
Quoted in Richard Gibaon, 22. ~ . ,
49. Ibid., p. 87.
50. The predominant asaumption in the west ia that the SACP waa
0tunning the non-violent reaiatance movement which reaulted in
the Sharpeville maaaacre. Thia ia clearly wrong. for the SACP
actually condemned PAC proposala for non-violent marches in
defiance of the paas lawa. See Hary Benson, The Stru181e for
a Birthright, London: Penguin Books. 1966, pp. 220-223.
~ l . See David Sibeko, "SharpevUle. the Turning Point" in .!2lh
Anniversary of Sharpeville, Dar es Salaam: PAC, 1970, quoted
in Richard Gibson, 22. ~ . , p. 96.
52. Quoted in Richard Gibson, 22. s!1., p. 85.
53. Mtrhew Nkoana, Crl818 in the Reyolytion, London.: Mafube
Publications, 1969, pp. 50-52. Nkoana h ~ e l f announced this
move as the head of the London office of PAC. ~ oppoaed
Leballo's leadership)
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
Lin Piao, Peking Review, 3 September, 1965, pp. 15-16.
Quoted in Richard Glbson, 22. s!i., p. 101.
Richard Allen (ed.), 22. s!!., p. 528.
-t;ee Richard
24 October,
Gibson, 22. sil., p. 105. and N:J York Times,
,
1971, p. 13.
Van Ness, 22. ~ . , pp. 151-184.
The Conseil Supreme de la Rvolution was not a Marxiat-Leninist
cOIDIDUnist organbatton, nor did it fulfiH many of the tenets
of a Chiaese model for a people'a war. It was. however, in
conflict wlth U.N. forces which; according to the Chlneae, are
a tool of U.S. Imperlalism, and thua the movement received total
Chlneae support ('16' out of '16' on the support index-;see page
58). For an aoalysis of the Congo rebellion see Crawford
Y<1ung, "Rebellion and the Congo" ln R.I. Rotberg (d.) Rebellion
in Black Africa, London: Oxford University Prels, 1971, pp. 208-
245.
..
1-
155
CIIAPTEIl V
1'IIE A5.IAB CASE STUDIES
Our cGap'ltation of the revolutlonary
1
.ave.ents of Aaia in II de.onstrated that Chinese interest
-
in these .aveaents is greater than that in move.ents elaewhere in
the vorld. Asian .aveaents received a level of support .than
those in any other geographical region in aIl time periods.
This support included both tangible atd and verbal support by senior
Chinese leaders. We shall first compute the hostility index for aIl
of the four case studles, and then exsaine each revolutionary move-
D
ment aeparately to detenaine the conforaity of that movement to the
, Chinese model for people's war. A testing of sOGe of
the hypotheses preented ln Chapter 1 will follow.
Campared to the other two geographical regions, the total
populatIon of aovementa consldered in Chapter Il for Asia la very

small. In' 1971, we considered only ten IDOve.ents which h, however,
tvo .are than in 1965. Despite this. we have stUI chose!) four'
case studles to represent the Asian reglon. The var torn states of
Southeast Asia considered in Chapter II--South Vietnam, Caabodia,
ot
Laos and Thailand--are aIl involved in inten.e internaI atruggle
In choosing thue case studies, va are lbdted to the last two,
Laos and Th.iland. Call1bodia cannot be as the intrnal
ttruggle did not begin until after the overthrow Of:jrin e Sihanouk
and the establiab.ent of the Lon Nol regt.e, in April 0 1970. South
.
.
"
, '
" :1

.;
156.
Vietnam, where a receiving the highest level of support
,
from China po ible for aIl three periods, is not helpful as a
o
case study. exaaination of South Vietnaa pr04uced the
highest level possible on the revolutionary index and the .ast in-

tense level of hostility possible on the hostility index. Therefore,
it would be i.possible wlthin the confines of this study to deteraine
the reasons for such a high level of Chinese support. It could be
a function of either the confonaity of the South .ovement
to the Chinese model for people's war, or the level of inter-
gOYernmental hostility. The data vould not allow'differentiation;
that is, both the independent variables and the dependent variable
--- are as high as possible invariant over tt.e.
In addition to Laos and Thailand, the ot"'r .ave_nts
.J chosen as case studies are Bunas and India. Buraa is an exaaple of ,
a Jure governaent of astate receiving a very high level of
support during 1965 des,pite the esistence of a revolutionary lDOVe-
,--
ment. India is a rather special case due to the history of
lndian relations, and the lack of Chinese support for indigenous
Indian
'The levels of support granted by China to these four
aoveaents for the three tille periods vere. according to our cc.pu-
tation of the support index in Chapter II, as follows:
.,
ill2.
1971
Bu ras -10 5 1
Indla - l 0
- l '
LaOI 12 16
,
',16
Thailand 12 12 , ,
." t
'.

1

.. 157. ,
"'
We aball proceed to acce88 the hoatility expreased by the "L
governents_of these four statea to China.
A. HOSTILITY INDEX
ln the United Nations General Aasellbly voting on the
Chinese representation issue, vas one of the .ost consiatent
advocates of restoring ChinaIs legl aeat to Peking. In 1965, 1969,
and 1971, Bunaa opposed the U.S.-spoD8ored Question
1
Resolution and supported the Albanian Resolution. Though foraal
diplomatie "relations vere maintained between Dur.. and China
througbout aIl three years, between 1967 and 1970 the se relations
were not active. BunDese repre8entative. were vithdravn fra.
,
Peking in respon,e to the reeall of the Chinese deleaation fra.
2
,.
Rangoon. Sino-Burmese trade was signifieant in 1965 (approxt.ately
" 3
71. af Burma's total trade), but by 1969 there virtuelly none.-
Analyses of Chinese trade in 1971 that the trade links
4
between Rangoon and Peking had not yet been reatored. The
gQvernment of General Ne Win, sinee it ousted U Mu in 1962, ha_

. -
been attempting ta remain non-aligned It has
avoided any sort of'military alliance vith any .. jor power.
Generally, Burmese relations with China have been'friendly--earnina
- ,
Bunaa a positive rating on the hostility index for a11 t_
periods.

India. despite the war in 1962 and varioua hostile inter-
changes with China db a less belligerent level, ha8 aenerally been
friendly tovard8 China. Indian representativea in the United latloaa
, t:
l
o
o'

1
,
..
"""l"lt'ha" 'lM" .... " "lh,,,,\,t,, ln " ... d" .... '.r .... "n' .. Uu" .. ".ty y._.
'\
"
"ut.
""" .. t,I", .. ,1 "",... "".1 ,,,,tly,, ,u.,a,)tlNU h' ... , .. tC"" .. "" ...... ,"' .. ,,,,,.a
r,
1 lu .'u.h",,' .
1
,
.",H .. t" ... ",,, h .. ,1 .. t ... ,I" "'.,,, ,,'t"ca. 1'"h,_"
, "',, hp, Il'v ,Ir 1\",,,,1 l "I",P" ,
" . "" ... "'''' P .. mh 1"""" .. " III' t ,,,.1 "," ,,"11111 p,I . "rt..,.
'-'""1''''1"'.'' ''''"''l',u,,i. l'I;HIII""J,,,,,,,,I,,p,t t"""''''''1 "Iut .hp ."', ""14>,
\
""'1" """"1\1" Il'I'''I''' ,," .... -'p,I 'n 'h" "'vta "'''1 ,h., 'III .. tlll '''1&1" .
...
,
,:hl"""" lit .. r,." ,h., O\.,,,ltl l,,,, ,,"YPt""""'" tu lus
"
, ,
n .. -,,,llvs> """'11' th" NI.US. "P"" .... Ih" r .. d th .. t "ltC", .. , ..
,
vh''''l'v 1"1 th" "",hpi '.r:h' "",,,t,I ,,, .. ,,at ,,, th. '",utt,,,U,,,, .'f
, -
"tH'''''''')'' luI", rllt .. ,'1""'"'''' "."hl"", 'n ttUi "., .. "",,,,,,,,, "r th.,
(
h" "' tilt v , ",1",.. . '&'I",,,-,h" 1 Il t .... "tt n. ,,, .. vu ". .. .......... , "1& "" ,,,,, .. k
\ . "\
'" r"1 thp """'I4ItIll' _.,,' .. h""tUlly
, ""',""IIIIP,I hv th" l ,,,hl -",1,,-, r,"" .. ". 'h .. ,,, " .. " "Pypr .. ' "P,u""".
. ,. . ,
J,
(
J '
J
.. l ".J'l" h. 'tir" (r
I&uy"r.-nl ,,..c ..... t thruah
< ........
...
159.
l
enotropy if not intent, more al1gned with the roy.Ust forces.

Second, friendllness of the neutraUn towards China
i
coutd. hypothetically, 1ead Peking to push for a cOltprOiaiae solution
to Laotian civU war, and therefore the variable should be
"a8se8sed for the neutral1st Third. and most iaportantly.
' ..
in our later analysis of the data presented through the three indices,
we can easi 1y make aUowances for the fact that the hOBt,Uity index
appl1es only to the centrist element; if we do not assen this index
- ."
for the de. 1ure govemment (and there ia no 'questton that Phowaa's
. -
government has been the legal government) we .!. priori preclude the-
,
elt8mination of this relat10nship which 18 the major theoretical.
. '- :-- 1

on&rn of th1s study. )
In 1965 and 1969, Laos voted fol' the Important Question
and abstained on the Albanian ln 1971 the
\ ,
LIl9tian reptesentatives" voted for Albania,n Resolution ",hile
8
abs taining on -the procedural issue. The neutral1st govenaent
,
'aintained active re laUons vith Peking throughout aU
three time" periods. Due to the widespread ffects of .the civil
var, Laos conducted very Uttle external trade and has publlshed no
10
t rade figures for several years. According ta Figures 'released
by Peking and Taiwan. there has been no signlficant trade in any
11
Case. Despite the presence of United States forces in Laotian
territory supporting the right-wing forces in the1r struggle vith
the Pathet Lao, -Laos annot be conl1dered to Jaave beeb a lIe_er of
a miJitary alUance with either Peking or the west.
. ,

)
.<.'!.
. .
e,
160.
The fin,l case, ThaUand, la an exalDple of relatively
intense governaaental hostility towards China. Supporting Taiwan's'
claim that Chiang Kai-shek vas the leader of aU China, ThaUand
conslatently voted for the Important '"Question Resolution and 8gainsf
the A1banian Resolution in the annual China representation issue in
12
the. Upited Nations General Assembly. Thailand maintained, during
13
aU three time periods, active d.iplomatic relations with Taiwan.
'ThaU)nd has been a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
-
aiee its creation in 1954.
''1
This alliance pledges hs
amongst whom are included both the United States and Great Britain,
to collectivl' defence i\ ThaUand dld not receive the IIIOst intense
rating of hostility possible on1y because her Taiwan was
. (, /14
not s1gnifican in any of the three time periods. '''Table V-l
sUlllllar,Jzes the hostU ity expressed' by the governments of Buma,
Indla, Thailand and Laos for 1965, and 1971, as measured by
the hostiNty index.
B. REVOwrlONAR y INDEX
" As ve mentioned in Chapters III and IV, the alse.SlDent of
the revolutionary index' la not a complete historiea1 8naly.18 of the
revolutionary movements in question. ' This section is mere1y meant
describe the conformity between these movements and the Chine"8e
, .
model fbr people's war, and to asse8S the attitudes of the move-
,
.enta towards the Sino-Soviet dispute.
1. Bunu
Though thelle has been a fairly ec leetic group of cOIIIIunin,
- .,
quali-coaDUniat, and other revolutionary organiz.tions in Bul'll8 for
...
e
.,


---

--.
ik**(f ... __
..J
.
.-
A-
..
H.,...CIIf-
:r :l'ID
IItOo.S"'"
.... ID ........ _ III
III
8-
1
,

1 1
..- .... ..- ......

........ ,... ......
1
--- ....
1
....
-
I

c
toi ,-q. -
:r :SCID
11100.;0-
.... ID .... -D
-
III III
III
='
Q.
1 1
...... .....
,....,... ........
,
1
.... ........
....
1 1
.... WN
toif' .... -
::r :lCID
IItOo.io-
.... ID .... VI
- III
III
a
-' <
1
U .N. voUng on
1 1
Important ,.....,.... ........
question Resolution
U .N. voUng on

Albanian ,.... ..- ,.... ,....
lelolution
"
DiPlo;:tiC relations
1
.... ............ with Pe ing
or Taiwan
Extensive trade
.... with Peking or
Taiwan
Military defence
1
allia?ce vith PeklD8 ....
or Taiwan or West
1

TOTAL -

HostiUty
Index
s
fi)
l'i
....
t
t""
....
,...
.;
<> 0<
....
li:
li
><
1

-.to:J
e
<
1
....


....

.
1
..

162.
, the pattern of the overall ea.auaiat .ave.ent la si.ilar

to others. There is a party, knovn .a the Burmeae
') .4
Communist Party (BCP) or th Whlte Flags, and there ls pr4-Sovlet
party, known as the Red FLags. Unllke moveaenta in other countries
(whieh generally split in the 196O's), thls division dates a. far
back as 1946, when the original BUnDese Comaunist Party split on
similar ideologiel issues to thoae that vere to divide the co.uniat
world tventy years later.
The Red Flags, under Thakin Soe (who perceived himaelf as
the only true modern eOIIIDunist thinker folloving in the tradition of
Marx and Lenin and Stalin), have attempted to maintain a stance of
16
ideological purity. The White Flags, on the other hand, vere led
by Thakin Than Tun who, until hls death in.1969, advocated the
,
widest possible anti-governmental coalition under the striet leader-
1
s hip of 'the'" Bep. The White Flags have cOIIIIlanded popular
\
support from time to tlme and have reeeived aIL Chinese support.
It is therefore this party, not the amall and ineffeetual Red Flags,
ln which we are interested.
e ollllll'lfli s t
J
The White Flags, ln occaslonal alliance vith variorys non-
groups and ethnie organizat ons,
vith the Burmese
17
gover'nment both before an
")
r the fait of U Nu
in 1962. The new government General Ne Win began peaee
talks in 1963, encouraged by the Chiaese government which had a
veated interest. in friendly rel.tions vith tm(1lurmeae government
18
as as an ideologieal cOlllllitbaertt to the BUl'Jleae Co_unht Party. /
'"
'. '
163.
Repreaented at the puce MloUaUonl vere the White Flall, the
lovera.ent, and the National De.ocratic Union Front (NDUF) vhich wa.
a union of the four left-wlng factions o( the Karen, Mon, Kayal, and
19
The peace negoUaUons broke down in the
autuan of \ 1963 and il' 1964 Ne Win outtawed all polit ical parties
except hi1 ovn, the Buna. Soelalilt Progra. Party. Not lurprilinsly,
thi. prec1pltllted a renewal of the clvU war. Durlng 1964, the White
.,
Flag. undeorwent an internai Itruglle becaule of diaagre.ent on the
It ratelY of confrontation to be adopted. The result was the
adoption of s Maoist approaeh to revolution:
Mao Tac-tung'. 'thought la the gulding principle
for al1 revolutionary work in Bunu. ln
particular, Cotarade Mao Tae-tung' 1 theorles on
the building of s proletarian revolution and a
people', war are the bescon light for the
victory of the revolution ln Bunaa. 20
Desplte Ruch dalas. lt does not apPCar that the White Flags lndeed
atte.pted to l.plemont the specifie elements of a people's war unt!l
1967.
of his
During the vinter yeu Thakln Than Tun took advanUge
nevly conaolidated to proclai. the o! s
BUnDese "cultural revolution" parallel to that of Olina. The two
1
major proponentl of less-Hao!st revoiution for BUna8, thakin Ba
theln Tin and Yebav Htay (both .emberl of the Bep Politburo) vere
21
ordered by Than Tun. Follow!ng a purge vhlh eracUcated
supportera of these two PoUtburo ."'ers from the rank of
the White Flagl, the party's .Uitary acUvlty againlt the 10verl1llent
22
increased and guerrilla warfare .pread acroll southern Burma.
-
164.
The internal f.cttona1t threatenad th trenath of the
Bun..e revolution, for lt allen.ted .. ny of the ..-b.r. of the
Na\tonal Union Front, which had aUlned iueU vith the
White FlaSI in early 1966. Thil factionali v not allevl.ted
until 1969, ",hen Th.kin Than Tun hi elf w lin.t.d .nd
repl.ced by the more moderate Th.kin Zin. Thaktn Zin
restorc the aIl i.nee t.he National De.aeratic Union The
White Flags alao gained the aupport of larle proportions of the
Kachin8 and the Shana, built an affiliation vith the powerful Karen
National Defence Organlzatlon and constructed .n ani.nce vith a
24
worker movement in Rangoon.
ln terma of confonaity to the Chinese .odel for a people'.
war, the White Flasa in 1965 fulfilled aeveral of the basic tenet
(' The Bep waa indeed a revolutionary Harxiat-Leniniat p.rty,
as it has been lince lt va.,founded ln De.pite a .t.ted
of e.tablishinl the broadeat possible .nti-govern.ntal
/
coalition, intense internaI factionaUs. rendered sueh a poUcy
inoperative. There ",ail no effort to. rely on the pealantry or to
seriously eon.truet rural bases'. In 1965, the White Fiai. vere .till
operating primarily in the louthern part. of Bunaa vhere
forces could readlly counter IIOve ... de by the revolutionariea; thia
, '
limited guerrilla stratesy to quick-Itrike .etivity. Clearly, there
was no pOllibility of establilhlna a ea..unilt party-led ar.y, delpite
1
lupport from the K.ren and Hon peoplel for their .por.die .Uitary
,
activities. Recelvlng vlrtually no .upport fra. outlide Buraa, the
"
, ..
. .
'rI "
/
165.
BCP not help but follow a poltcy of lf-rallanc.. Final1y,
there i. no doubt that the Bur...e .ov ... nt fulfll1ed the three
minor teneta of a people's var; it va. antl-colonial and anti-
\
imperial1at. it was co .. uni.t in'orientatlon, and it wa. vigorou.ly
25
pur.ued with an active member.hip of at least' aeveral thousand.
Dy 1969, under the leader.hlp of Thakin Zin, the BCP
"
approximated more closely the Chin.se .odel for a people's war.
ln the face of failures in the delta area southern the
White Flags had moved north into the Kachin and
,
they vere able to conatruct rural bases and claba'victorie. a.aiost
26
government forces. \ ln the north the atrategy and (tactlcw of
guerrilla warfare could be implemented while in the south .uch
actlvlty had been seriously clrcumscribed. Apart fro. the.e tvo
changes. the revolutionary nature of the BCP did not alter radically
between 1965 and 1969. 1 .
Similarly. there were fev between 1969 and 1971.
Still Increasing Its popular support 'hlch had been a8 high a8
27
15,000 direct supporters in 1969), t e Bep retuined active both
, -
in a[1lled confrontations with the force', of the Bun.el gover.-eot
JI -
and in the poUtical I8Obllt.zation of ,t,e fanlers and peasanta of the
28
north.
Throughout ail three time the White Fla,. vere
1
consistent in their pro-Chinese 10 the Sino-Soviet d18pute.
T.ble V-2 relatively high confor.ity to the hlnes. ideal
1
for a peopl,'a by the BUr.8ae revolutionary .ove .. nt, which
1
1
o
1-
eema .urpri.ing given the lack of .upport fra. Pekin
for thia apparent anoaly will be di.cuaaed 1ater.
2. India

166.
The rea.on
The only Indlan revolutionary movement which was supported
bY'China was the Communist Party India, Harxist-Leninist (CPI-ML)
in 1969. The CPI-ML was an ofhhoot of eo.auniat Party of ""
lndia, Marxist (cPt-M) which in turn had broken away the
Communist Party of India (CPI).
since
l Th. CPI had i. th. I .... i atiG.a1ht __ nt
.independence struggle was fought against the Briti.h in
the 1930's and 194O's. lts ideology precluded accept.nce of Chinese
revolutionary strategy or friendly relations with Peking. First,
the CPI ha. 8upported the ruling Congress Party in its clashes with
China--the three wars with Pakisran and the Tibet crisis of 1962.
Second, the CPI has been firmly committed to the Soviet side of tbe
Sino-Soviet dispute. After the war with China in 1962 over the
Tibet issue,'a group within the CPI objected to the pro-Congress

Party stance of the party'. Central eommittee. This faction broke
away from the CPI in 1964 to form the &rI-M, claiming that the older
. . "" 29
party had become "the tai lof the Congress Party."
\
Yet th!s new party was not willing to follow the path
taken by so many renegade factions of establisbed pro-
o
Soviet parties in adopting the Chinese approach to
1
CPI-M remained neutral in its attitudes towarda the division in the
communist world, claiming that there was only one road to follow in
(j'.,
"
'\
\ ,
,-
-(
,
, .
'-r'
, -
',..
161.
the Indlan a Marxlat-Lenlnl.t revolutlon ba.ed solely on
the objectlve factors ln Indla nelther the dosaatis. of the
)0
CPSU or the CCP. The CPI-K experienced fational conflict Just a8
the older 'CPI had. Of th08e who had for.ed the CPI-K, there vas a
pro-Chinese group who had hoped that the nev party would adopt an
..
ideology 8tmllar to that of the Chinese. However, the CPI-H
to stress legal electoral 8truggle ba8ad on eleetlon
)1
strategies that vere markedly like those of the CPI.
-t
The more
{
militant pro-Chine8e groUp8, usually found at the state eommittee
level rather than in the India-vide party, vere unhappy vith this
parliamentary Ilne and welea.ed the Naxalbari uprising ln West
Bengal 'in 1967. Led by two men who interpreted the organization of
the Naxalbari IIlOve.ent refered to as the Naxalite IIOvement)
.. j
"as, a relVolutionary upris,ing in the spirit of the Chinese revolutlon,
Charu Maxumbar and Kanu Sanyal, the CPI-ML split away from the
32
CPI-K. Though it dld .. nage to a large pereentage of the
CPI-K lnto its the CPI-HL was not able to mar8hall the
support of all the 80-ealled Maoist organlzation8 India. The
Andhra Pradesh Revolutlonary eom.unlst eo.mittee, the largest of
1 ))
these autona.ous groups, never affiliated itself vith Mazuadar's
..... H.
party. Instead there ha8 been a great deal of ideologieal debate
between the.e two groups over revolutionary strategy. E88entially,
the major military strategy of the larger CPI-HL has amounted to
,
little more than sporadie terrorism ln isolated villages of west
34
Bengal and, since 1971, siailar aetivity in the Calcutta are
/
,
j
-
j
)
1
168.
Though thi'l action was supposed to be one of "annihUation of cl ...
35 .
enemies "
,-
it has always been denounced by th Andhra Pradesh
movement as illegitimate terrorlam in the fact of the failure to
con.truct a true peasant movement.
Raving thui looked, however briefly, at recent pattern
of inter-group strusgle that has so marked the Indian communlst
parties, we are' in somewhat of a dilemma. Whieh organizatioDs do
we ehoose ta 8S8es9 the revolutlon8ry index? ln 1969, there is no
question, for as we pointed out in Chapter l, whenever China supports
a movement, we should assees the index for the orBanization (if any)
which 18 Biven support, as we are attempting to determine why mave-
ments are given support. For 1971, we will' tagain 88sess the revolu
tionary index for the CPI-ML, to determine why a movement given
support in 1969-,hould be denied such support two years later. ln
1965 we must assess the index for the movement as it existed before
,>
the CPI-ML split away the CPI-M. AB there was no support by
China of any Indian movement in 1965, we could asseS8 the index for
the CPI or the CPI-M. It see .. aore logical to -choose the latter.
Preliminary examination has shawn a aDllar ratins Eor both in terme
of thelr conformity to the Chinese for 'people's war. As
the CPI-M would be the more 10Bleal party for the Chinese ta support
.
Biven the CPI' s openly pro-Soviet' stand and snU-Peking rhetoric, we
will consider only the uncommitted party in our computation of the
.4J
revolutionary index for 1965.
)



(
169
.
Powerful e.pecially in Kerala. and west Bengal, in
36
1965 the CPI-H dld not strongly to the Chinese model
of a people'. war. Its leadership was there was no
atte.pt to build a united front, establish rural bases while appeal-
IDg to, the peasantry (both the CPI-M and the CPI have been urban-
oriented) or to initiate anything that aight reseJllble a guerrUla
war. 80th the CPI and the CPI-M anti-imperialJst and opposed .
colonialism, and both vere clearly oriented towards communism.
There was substantial backing for the two parties and the fact that
they held a number of elected in especially at
the state level, demonstrates that theae parties were indeed
vigoroualy attempting to gain electoral strength.
By 1969, the CPI-ML had appeared and was publicly 8upported
by the Chinese. The CPI-ML was a revolutionary Harx1st-Leninist
coamnist party. lt fulfilled aU three of the .. inor tenets of an
Ideal people's war but few'others. It ha4 mobilized the peasants
in West Bengal and lt had adopted guerrilla warf_re as lts major
military s\rategy. eveo though thls guerrllia warfare was to qulckly
deterlorate into sporadic terrorls. when the atate security forces
responded with effective repressive measures. The ePI-ML made no

atte.pt to buUd a united front--ln fact lts leaders refuaed to ..
affiliate with the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Coamunist Comaittee, ,
37
under Nagi Reddi. which vas ideol08ically very sailar to it. It
see .. .-ost unUkely tut Charu KaJ;l.8CIar would have beeo a proponent
1 .,.
; i ''1

,
,

' ..
170.
of a broader vorker-'peasant alUance. The CPI-ML did not attellpt to
p
- \
build rural baIes, nor dld it lead a poUticaUy active amy--becaule
lt Jailed to accept the protracted nature of a people'. var. The
vas unqueatlonably pro-Chinese ln ita attitude towarda the
debate--ao issue tbat v very .alient in ita ideologieal
confrontation vith the other ca..wnist parties and groupa ln Iodia.
Tvo years later, China no 10l)8er supported Any aove_nt ln
"
:
Indla. The overall 8Ovelle'nt vas ln IlUch the SGae situation that t't
. ,
had been in 1965. The CPI-ML had ceased lta guerrllla va'rfare ln
Naxalbari areas aod.hrd 80ved It8 foc us of to the urban
areas--specially Calcutta. The pro-Chineae party vas by
internaI dlssension, and to have lost .ucb of it8 strength
38
ln Wes t Bengal. It undoubtably st111 fulfllled the three ainor'
tenets of the Chineae IIOdel for a people's var., and lt vas still
revolutionary Harxist-Lenioiat coaaunist lIoweve r t 1 t had
abandoned its atte.pts to aobiUze the population in rural a,reas
Along vith its prevloua efforts to begln a guerrilla var. The
Chlnese claimed tbat its support stopped of these changes.
3. Laos
The aituation in Laoa has been often COIapared to the
39
altuation in China durina the revolutloo.
construct a neutral govermlent have only ben interludes ln the
continulng civil var between the broad walted front of the Pathet
Lao, ,and the increa,aingly unpopular U.S.-auppotted dght-wiog force
. -
(
" '
171.
The Pathet Lao maintains control ovar a larae proportion of LaOI.
and gradually appeara to be encircUng the urban footbo1dl of ita
.
en.yon its road to final victory. The stru88le datel
back to,the Japanese invasion durina ,the second world and to
the anticolonial movement _gainat France. It is not possible bere
, 40
to look at . uch of this histor'y' but there are .0IIe intereaUoa
demonstrate a fascinating ai.ilarity between the Patbet
1
Neo Lao Hak Sat) and the Chinese
by the forces of,Ho Chi Minh, Prince SQJlphanouvona,
the ounder of the NLHS, crossed from North Vietnaa into the higb-
ds of Laos in 1953 to begin building the Itrusale
"
going on today. Though originally depeadent on the
m iUtary presence of the North Vietnaaaeae (the b-attle of)Dien Bien
.Phu was fought sp that the North not overrun Laol)
once Hos forces had handed/over the captured province of Houa Phan
.:' (nd Hs capital at Sam Neua) to Souphanouvong, the NLBS bes.-n ite
own struggl ln eamest. It gained control of another northem
province, Phong Saly, and was granted jurlsdiction over theae (as
d
l ,
41
we 11 as a connecting corridor) ilf the \ 1954 Geneva' ac;cords.
the NLHS began polltical and social proar...ea that vere at the
construction of the widest posaible united front through vhich tbe

right wing Royalist goyernment could be challenged. A political
administration was established which linked the central co.aittee of
the party, the Phak pasa.on Lao, to the people of
the province. under Pathet Lao control. The acbdniatraUve ayat ..

,. ;;11
;.- li
\
\ ,
, ,
\
-...... ;
, ,
\
,\
.
"
\ C
. ,. 72.
was (and still is:"-the of the Pathet Lao ha; re .. ind
/ . '.,.'
the 8me throughout all the provinceS" where
J
.1t has won elther COll-
''42

ple"e partial control) on a Sy8 tm of"
arrahged the_Celttral .
oaaittees., Townahip ant
.,... 43' , " . t , " " , ..
.. ., \ 4 ,,' (\
Village Co1llllittees. This atruc;ture "thougll Qn a lDuch reduced' 8aJe /
(is) simi'iar t' .that. 0(. the 'in 1{44

Famers t groups', orga!,i.zations wblDen-,' and youth parUes "nd group"\
" . "
all are structure.ts'
. ,
"'." "",
. ..
, .
Tbl!t' rank and ,fUe of the' NLHS 18 oby no lIe.ns
, . '
P.athet Lao has been very successful ln
consl;uct t'ng a unit'ed 'front -
Though It or1gill'al,ly appaled to the peoptes (th Khm,
45 "
'1 ,the Heo and the Neua espec1ally) who were ,the focutt of diecri.(na-
.
t ion by colonta 1 and post-colonial administrations in Vientiane
(who favoured the,. low-land Lao), has gradually expanded Hs base
!
of support to inc Lude allnoat' aIl the people" of Laos. Thottgh not',
strictly a worker-peasant alliance, the Pathet Lt0 la a moye_nt
) ,
that has had yery lit t le chance to operate ln urban areas. Workers
in the' towns of the NLHS-cohtrolled provinces are fully incorporated
of the movement and a -S1U81'1 but slgnlfic:ailt
.\ "
of the mi li tary ani of the
. ( 46
Pathet Lao, the Units
,(
'Pathet-Lao (UCPL).
" .
Il
,

1


:
0'
;.
1

1
.
.
J
\
\.'
'l
)
...... J..-
.
' ..

,.1
)
Ci
, .
,
.1
. '-.
r
..,-- /)
113.
"
PoUt"ically, the p.the't Lao has be.n willing to broaden
the uni.ted front to allow and operation of
neutra1iat governtnents. The faHures of the cOIDproaats8 govenacnts
of 1955, 1958 and 1960 ",ere due not to the intranaigence of the
1"
NLHS but' instead to the rcalizatlon by the rlght-wing mll1tary
f orce8 that the e lectora.,1 procedures favoured the le fthta becalrse
of thclr growing popular support, Each government fell ,by the
, ,A
8word of the Roya11sts, During the 1960'(1 the
,)
ln Laos became more and more polarized, {ncreaaingly criblng
the freedom of of the neutralist gaverrnent. As Soviet
Union had been 8upporting the -netralist troops of Kong
. .
the Sino-Soviet dispute developed the Pathet Lao'became inc.rea8'lngly
susplclous of the neutralist 8overnmeot oC Souvanna PhoUlD8. The
re!,ult has becn a coalition between the and the, neutraUat
forccs and a new-found NLHS intran8igence in refsing ta co-aperte
47
",i th phouma '.
" '
\1
(For examp,le. the Pathet Lao refu.ed to take part in
.1
the, January, 1972 clcction8, even though in put attempts ta find a
peaceful Bolut ton to the civil var and his' follower.
48
had always promoted compromise,)
,. ,
For the purposc of computing the revolutionary Index, tt
18 unnece;sary ta look at a11 three time periods" TWere was Little
change in th,e nature of the Pathet Lad from 1960" to 1971, cxc:ept
for the progresB il made ln 8al.n108 territory from the right-wing


-
activLty of the United States in' Laoa-helped the
.
.....
Pathet Lao ta increase i.ts popular support and undel'1llf.ne ,the
. . ( , ,...
. '.
..
]
..
1 !
1 j
\
\
\
,
,..
,
.


" ,
114.
pol {ticd base of the neutraUet and the right-wio8
49 '
forces.) \' We can thereforc look at the Pathet Lao generally aver
the three timel Jft!riods to determine its conformity ta the Chinese
'model of a people's war .
./')
The Neo Lao Hak Sat has been (and s5ill la) Led by the
Ph.k Pasason Lao, a H.arx1st-Leninist communist party. One of the
'Pathet Lao'.s central 41ms, as cspouscd in a twelve-point progranne
of the NULS in 19.69, has becn the construction of Il broad united
50 -
front., The NHLS has always relied on the peasants in the
establ1!1hment of rural bases (by 1969, the ao-called "rural bases
of the Pathet' Lao' consisted of more than half of..rthe entire
1
51 .
territory of Laos.) The UCPL ia an examplc of an armed force
enti re ly consistent with the Chinese not ion of a ,conununiat
-.1
led anily. Rather than being merely a guerr1l1a force, the
has demonstratcd over the past decade' that 1t la a mbdern mobl1ized
army, capab le of conducting both guer,d lla and conventional Jarfare.
!ts poUtical actinty includes the training of cadres in mil1tary
" ..
schools and w9rking with the masses in the setting up of social
S2
,
prog rammes The onc element that is ambiguou8, as we
f
have seen throughout this study, is the final tenet of the Chinese
prototype for people's war--"adherence to a policy of
At the. beginning of the. Pathet Lao' s struggle, Souphanouvong re lied 1.
heavi ly upon the North: Vietnamese and the Chineae for military
support. By 1965 the North Vietnamese troops were the
1
NLHS and
l 1 4-'
in 1969' 'some reports have sugges ted that there were as lOany
1

... ?{
il 1
. .
i '
175.
53
as 45.000 North VletRameso iR Laos. However, the NOTth Vietnam
troop. were Rot actlvcly involved ln the armed confrontation with
right-wing forccs but ralhor vith action in' the wu in Vietnam J
,
(the Ho Chi Minh trail goc .. directly Laoll). Given the large
,numbcr of troops in the UCPL and the vallt support
. {
enjoycd by the 'Pathet Lao, wc mu .. t conclude that the Laotian atru88le
wall indced ".the bUlinell8 of the musc ..... and earried 'out
')4
by thelr own cffortH." Il iH clear thal the NI.IIS fulfills the
thn!t' mlnor tenets for a people'8- war

...
Flnally, the llathcl LAO ha-s alway" suppor'ted China in the
Sino-Soviot dispute.
4. Thal land
Th.lland historically has not been th locus of many
revo1tltionary moyement8. Un t il the 1960' s 1 t appes red to be immune
to the violent uprlsinga
, .'
and confl1cts ttat
"
\
wer 8weeping aerosa
moat of Houtheast 'Asia.
."-
Though a party had existcd,in
J
Thailand ilS carly a8 official founding of the now
violent Conmu.n1s't Party
pities e.lstcd
Hand (eN) was ln othcr
a means (or social and plitlcal
the 1960'8.
ime--vlolence,was as
change by the Thal lef sts uny 1
_./'

ln 1962, the United States moved troops to Thailand under
.' -the SEATO treaty ln respon8e to the grow1.ng difflcul ties U.S.
policieR werc facing in Southast'Asla. The reaction in Thailand's
\
communist and le(t-leanlng'groups waR slow and uncoordlnated. The
".
. \
'fi
...
.r:;
, 176.

CPT was hardly in a position' to do anything openly; ;lu 1ega1 .tatua
55
wae at belt preear.louB. Yet ln the northa.t of country
violence broke out sgainet the Royal Thai sovernment, even though
i t was not part of any large organized movement. The CPT reacted
to theee demonatrstions of unrest with". caU to any and all group.
and individuel8 who opp08ed the government ta fana ",ith the CPT s
"patrlotie, democratlc united front to chaUenge th U:8.
56
and .their lackeY41 "
"-
ln Dcc_or, 1964, th., radio of the
o ( Thalldnd" announced the formatlon of the ThaUand Independence
Movement (TIM) under che leader8hip of Hon Kon Nonakon. The mani-
festo 1t broadca8t outlined the progranane of the TIM:
(1) Chaae the American agreaaore (rom
Thal 8011; (2) Overthrow the Thanom traltorous
dictatorial sovemment, eltablhh a government
1
formed by p.trlotic, democraey-lovinS politlcal
part les and per80nalities which earrU's O\lt
neutral, peaceful pol1clu; (3) Strusgle to .
preserve and 8ave the true" ,.democr.tic righte of
the people; (4) Struggle for the polides of
neutrality, peaee, democracy. prosperity and
the peop1e's happlnes8. 58
,
ClearLy, thia an attempt to appeal to the broade8t poulblc
speetrwn of people in ,Thailand ",ithut deny1!l8 the pp8lliblUty:of a
united front with more ideo1ogically rlgorou8 group. euch as the
CPT.
ln January, 1965, the establishment of a Thai Patd,otic
Front (TPF) was announced under the leadership of Phayom'hul.nont.
Again broadc8st by the Volee of tbe Th.iiand, the announee-
,
, -
"1-
. .

# / ,,-", '-
,
" ,
>.
, '
/
177
nt of th of thi. third ,coup .tated that the TP'
,
vhhed to Join with other group" and "aU Thd people who love
pO.Ct' and do.oc racy lrretlpecti ve' of po Utical or re Ugtoui aff il ta-
5CJ
tian." At the end oC th" yoar, the TPF and the 'fIH atergod under
the na. Thal United Patrlotlc ."ront (although il IItHl u."d the
namt' Thal Patrlotic Front ... 01- U:,s operationl).
Many organizat-lonll were united ln the nov TPF. Indultry-
vide vorkers' unlon., natlonal labour union., vogan' .. group' and

60
profeMdona 1 anoelatlons a 11 plC!ldred thair support (or TI'F.
Somt' obaervt'rB havt' auggested that these group .. , .. well 1111 the
TlH th,o vere aU crcaLlons of the CPT ta give the 'ppe.rance
61
of a united Cront. Though thls L8 not beyond realm oC
- ,
p08sibll Hy. tht' re lB no evidance Cor thiN aaaerUon except the
abaence of Cacttonalia ... --hardly .ufficient proof for the exll1tence
;"f " cOlll1luniat .... lIter plan. _ As bath the naw TPF and the CPT con-
. "
Llnued tn malntain' aeparate organizations. and a8 they bath c lalmed
lcaderr,iP of lht' Thal movement, W:2can conclude that the TPF was
<-
,.tire than ge creat ion of th" 'cl'T.
ln 1967. howc-.ver, l'hayom Chulenont, leader of the TPF.
\
announced that the Cl'! had anumed leadership of the Th.l people',
rmed Corce8 and declared hlmself ta be "a new pupl1 of Chdrman
63 -4
Mao." Elghteen months l.ter the8e forces jolned together i" the
Thal People's Armed Forcee (TPLAF). under the-
64
<
command of the CPT. Thia was the final Act in the construction
Q
>f,,!
)
'u
- .
, ,
118.
of a united flont that No further china ver ... de
between then and the end of 1971.
In a very 8hort perlod of Ume. the revalut ionary IIOveIHnt
ln Thaliand made very sub8tantlal advances. Froal a sltuaUon ln
1
..,+
-
19'64 where armed ion wlth the ThaijoverOllent and Allerlcan
[orees waB limited to spor.dle guerrllia actlvlty ln the northea,t
" ,
" ,
of the country, ln 1971 there wu an guerrtlla var,ln" the
Rduth (where the TPLAF forces .ho vorked ln aldlng
revolutlonary group Ping). In the the .abl1lzed force.
of the TPLAF had ln eapturlng territory that v tater
65
deslgnated "liberated
lt

In 1965 the Thal revolutlonary mov.ent weI not led by e
Mllrxlst-Lenlnist eOftllDunlst party. It wa. not untll
1967 that the movement coalesced under the. leadership of the CPT t
everl though the CP,'!' had becn active earller. Throughout atl thre
time periods the most notable element ln the structure of the Thal
movement was the adherence to II united-front pol icy. ,The partlcl-
patlon of the major organlzatlons, sueh as the TPF, the TIM and the
CPT, as well as the smaller groups., such as the Thal Patrlotlc
\
.
Youth Organi zaUon, the Federation of Ratrlotlc Workera, the Thai
Monks' Group and the Patriotle del80nstrates a
flrm and widespread belieC"ln the need to U Id a united front.
66 .
.... Uthough Thai intellectuals (o['1led the core of the CPT there va.
stiJ,l great placed on the raUance of the IIIOve.aent on the'
..-...
peasant ry;
t\bUlk
of the CPT support comes frOID the

'--
,,/
....
1/
\
/ J \

""-
-!
,

.,.
,
J
.'

..
Rural baaes were estabUahed during 1965 on the Halay Peninsula
'-
(aome ahared by Chen Pins) as well aa in several regions of the
. northeast. By 1971, substantial areas of the northern high1aods
119
were under the control of the TPLAFj progra..es of .. as ive
genocide and suppression of sympathetic Meo tribes.en only inereased
67
spport of the revolutionary IDOveaent. .'
tactic8 of guerrilla and atteapts to .obilize
the population have always been central to th strategy of the Thai
As in other cases we have looked at, the presence of
externai support for the indigenous IDOvement does Dot detract froa
the self-reliance of the movement. Apart fro. the fact that th
s truggle of the Thal movement was carried on prilllarily by Tha1s with
substantial popular support, Chinese militarr assistance baa never
been'*,ufficient to sus tain the level of revoautionary struggle by
68
itself.
Throughout a11 three time perlods the CPT supported the
Chinese ln the Sino-Soviet debate. In 1965. before the merger of
69
the TPF and the CPT, the TPF alao supported the Cbinese.
Tab,le V-2 the confonaity of the Adan ..ave.enta
th, Chinese model for a people 's war as measured by the revolu-
tionary index
C. PRELIHINARY ANALYSIS .oF THE !SIAN CASE STUDIES
'" -, r
.
.. The hypotheses that we can examine on the baais of the
'\
data gathered from t:he Asian case studies alone are the S8l8e live
that we considered in Chapter Il in the analysia of the' ,
, \
-\
'\
- ...
..

-;
'\..


:'III='C:\O :'111 =c: \Q o :' III =' c: \l:)
IDOQ,S"" IIIOQ,iO'l. III 0 ,Q,l CI'
\Q VI

-
III III III
_ III
c III ID III
:s :s :s
Co Cl. Cl.
......
"
.
\ .
.-
\
,

.


- -
by a
Marxist-Leninist
.
Communist Party
Correct utilization of
-- - --
..... .......... the "united-front
Doticv"

Reliance on peasantry and
..........
-
.....-
- --
--the. establishment of
rural bues

. Communis t party-le.d army.
,
--
..... .....
.-
politically motivated
.
and mass-backed
.
Mobilize.d 'population and
1
--
\
--- --
guerrilla warfare,
, i
8trategy and tac tics
0
Adherence to"a !
Ill'

0 .....
E l"iI
l"iI

t;
M
M iE;
>
<
0< 1
N
--
-
-- ..... -
-- -
policy of
self-reliance
1
. 0
Anti-colonial
M
:z:

---1-'
..... --1-'
----
anti-feudal and
J anti-imnerial1st
.,

Orlented towards
..... -..... -
----
socialiall of
'cOldiaunism
\

Vigorously pursued
---- ---- ----
vith .
.
. popular support
.
'0

Stance on Sino-Soviet
nnnn nnnn nncn R:pro-Soviet. C:pro-Chinese.
U:uncouaitted
'TarAL -
- .\O\D.J:'- .... \0 ,\Q g .... ....,\DWVI
bvolutiooary n nOn n nn, n nncn
-


- - - -
_.
-
f _____ ,
=
'!. ,..
"
---------- ..
--------.\-.....
q,
."i
..!iI!
,
181.
Latin Aaerican data. we Ihall beat theae hypotheae. more definitively
1
in the following chapter, when al,l the data for aU three geographical
are considered. It ia uaeful, however, to their
validity wlthin the Aslan contexte The data for the Asian case
studies as summarized through the three indices are prelented in
Tab le V-3.
Hypothesi8 No. 2: When directly confronting the United States' or one
of its socalled tools," a movement is likely to reeeive
,
:>
a high level of support, greater than the revolU&ionary nature of the
.
movement alone wouid dictate.
Unltke the other two'geographieai tegions, the Asian data
are not conaluive in the testing of hypothesis No. 2. Accor4ing
,
to the Chinese, both in Laos and Thailand revolutionary movements
were confronting U.S. troops and "lackeys of U .S. 1,.mper1a1ism". Both
received a high level of support yet both also received high ratings
\,
on the revo lutionary index. While in 8uma and lndia movements "were
not opposlng U.S. or so-called imperialist troops, the low level of
support offered them could be explained by their lack of confomity
to the Chinese model for peop'le's war. We cannot, on the basts df
the Asian data consider this hypothesis vaiidated or
rejeeted. ln no case does the support index indicate a high level
of 8upport, despite a Iow degree of confomlty of the to
the Chinese prototype.
HYpothesi8 No. 3: A movement aimed at the overthrow of a goveroment
, 1
hostile to Peking ts more llkaly to receive support than one ailled
., 1 ....
\
, :.
, \
..
\
cf


"'.
. ,

Indh
Laol
Thai1and
"<l.,,' "'"
D .1O


Indta ""-0,.0,.
Lao. "t ....
Thailand ,.''.-

Bu
,
,
India
t
"
Laol-
ThaUand
p
./
.t
TABLE V
lo
3
SUMMARY OF THRIE INDICES
ABIA
Support Iod., Uo.tlUty lOci.,
,
-10 4
.
- 3
3
12 -1
12 -4

5 2
'0 l
16 -1
12
-4
1 \'
l
- 3
l
16 1
12
.. 4
# .'

" ..". li
182.
.. 0
\
I.yshutlooarx
'pd"
,C
3U
9C
7C
6
7e
6C
9C\
ge
7e
4e
ge
9C
,

r -
, ..,

.
'.

"
C
..
183.
at the diaplace..ent of a frlendly reai.fle",
exprea.ed by a government tawarda
doea not to be a major det.rainant ai the Leve l of support
J oHered by peking to the AJltan taOv_ents. In Laos, de.pite only
hoatllity tow.rd. Peking in and L969 and a (rlendly
\
attl tude in 1971, the Pathet Lao was 'given an extremely high level 1 '
of aupport. Sl.tlariy, ln.' Burma ln 1969, the White FLags vere,
" '
offered ft moderate level of support deapite the pro-Chinele atti-
tude of Ne Wl.n'. govern.ent. Hypotho.la No. 3 ta InvaUdated ln .
the Aaian contexte
Hypothesl. No. 4: Whon reglme ls in its dealing8 with
>'\
China, China will hesitate to support an indlgenous movement. ln
.,
(
)opcs of broadenlng her tritcrnatlonal pol1tlcal base.
There 18 11ttle data that 1. relevant ta the af
,
hypothes1a No. 'Laos la the only country where the govcmment
" .
" .
was uncommltted ln It8 deallngs wltb China. While the
l '... \
data suggeat the hypothcsls 18 rl'je,cte,d-'-dcaplte moderate
;
1
'attitudes on 'the part of th Laotian government a high' level of,
support was grantod Che Pathet Lao--one casc rcslly Ln8ufficient
for 'the, testing ,of a hypothesls.
. .
Hypothes18 No. 6: When li movemcnt supports, the' Sovlet
Union ln the internationPl Sino-Soviet dispute, China will 8upporf
CI
elther an alternative withln that state, if,one does
not exist, no movement at all,' regardless of the tenor of relations.'
between the regtme and China.
'.
. '
.' r
.
> a

)
...
\
o Q

This hypothe8i8 appearl to have sa.. valldlty. Olina
Ir
(8upported no moveaent that backed the Soviet Unlon ln the Slno-
Soviet debate. A8 we consldered no case (her. or lIn Chapter Il)
where an Alian country was the locus of only a revolut,ion-
ary the part of the hypothesis is irrelevant ln
Ada. t
Hypothesls No. 7: The greater the degree of con forait y of a given
revolutlonary movement to the Chinese prototype for people's war,
the greater the support the movement will be accorded, regar-dless
lII.
of governmental hostillty.
Despite a hlgh correlation between the support:' index and
,the revolutionaty for tt Laotian and Thal cases, a all1t.;ar
index comparlson for the Indian and Burmanocases suggests that the
"
final hypothesis cannot be validated as It stands. Actually, when
considered year by yer, ,there appears to be s_ correlation be-
<)
o ,
tween the se two In 1969 and 1971, least
.
to the,Chlnese prototype received the lowest level of
J
the moveent most closelY,adherlng to that prototype
,
,received the highest. 'l'he Burmese case in 1965 is the on1.y reat
o
exception to this patte{n . In any case the hypothesis cannot be
. \ ,
\ va Udated in its present fonn.
\
The variation in Chinese supPort across time seells to
have been minimal in the southeast Asian cases and more pronounced
in the Indian and Burese. cass. Whl1e the changes in the Indian
case seem to mirror changes in the revolutionary index, the pattern
(.
-
..
"
J
1
; l
l
1
J
.
185.
'\
ln Burma ta not con.twtent. Rather thal\ proceedina at thi. point to
,
det.naine the reason for. patterna and app_rant
lncon.lIt.ncles with Aa'lan data. alon., we vUl .xaa1ne the
1
with data for al1 seoaraphica! reilona.
J If
o
1
'.

"
J

'Il
,
.
:j
i
l


.l

"
,
J
1.
2.

186.
FOO'l'HOTES
New York Tt.es, 'l8 Novellber, 1965, p. 2; 11 1969, p. 4;
26 October, 1911, p. 1. U'
For an analysis of Si,no-Bur.!se relations see Robrt A.
"Sino-Bun.ese Rlations: Bellwetber of Cbinese DiplO1Ucy. Il
Current Scene; Vol. X, No. S, May 1912.
3. Yearbook of International Trade Statistics, 1969, New York,
United Nations, 1971.
4. Editor., "China's Foreign Trade in 1971", Current Scene, Vol. X,
i
No. 10, October 1972, pp. 1-17.
5. New York Ti.es, 18 Nove.ber, 1965, p. 2; 11 Nove.aber, 1969, p. 4;
26 October, 1971, p. 1.
b. The Statesaan's Yearbook, Jl966-1967, 1970-1971, 1972-1973,
London, "'St. Kartin's Press, MacMillan, 1966, 1970, 1972.' For
an exaaple of Sino-Iodian relations, see N. Maxwell, "China and
India: The Un-Negotiated Dispute", Otina Quarterly, No. 4,3,
1910.
#<
o
7. Editor, "China's Foreign Trade 1971", Current Scene, Vol. X,
No. 10 .. October, 1972, pp. 1-17.
8. New York Tis, 18 Novellber, 1965, p. 2; 11 Noveaber, 1969, p. 4;
26 Octobr: 1971, p. 1.
9. Yearbook, 1966-1967, 1910-1971, 1912-1913,
London, St. Kartin's MacMillan. 1966, 1970, 1912.
;-
10.
Il.
If.
13.
14.
Econa.ic ec:-ission for Asia and the Far East. Statistical
Yearbook for ASia and the Far East,' 1970, New York, United
Nations. 1972. )
Xearbook f International Trade Statistic!, 1969, New York,
United Nations, 1971, and Editor, "China' s Foreign Trade in
1971", Current Sceae, Vol. X, No. 10, pp. 1-17: The Far
Eastern Econo.ic Review has DOt llentioned any trade either.
New Vork tilleS, 18 Novellber, 1965,' p. 2; Il Nove.ber, 1969. p. 4;
October. /1971 . p. 1.
The Statesaans Yearbook, 1966-1967, 1970-1971, 1972-1973,
London, St. Maftio's Press, MacMillan, 1966, 1970, 1912.
Xearbook of Intemational--Trade Statlstic., 1969, New York,
UJlited llatioa., 1971; and Eclttor, "o.ina'. Foreign Trade in
1971", Curreat Sceae. Vol. X. 110. ,10, pp. 1"'711.
'.
?
, ,
, /

15.
187.
See John "t Badg1ey, "The CODlllunist Parties of Burma", in
Robert A. Scalapino (ed.), The Collllllunist Revolution in'Asia:
Tactics, Goa Is, and Achievemellts. Second Edition, Englewood
CHffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969, pp. 309-328.
16. lbid., p. 327, Note
17. See Melvin Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia--The PollUes of
SUrViva1, Lexington, Mass, D. C. Heath, 1971, 96-9B. Also
note r. p. 98.
lB. p. 99.
19. The Karen National Union Party, the New Mon Party,
K)al Party, and the Chin Supreme e'olmlittee.
Richard Allen (ed.), Yearbook of Internation!1 C01ll1lunist
Affaira, 1968, Stanford, lfoover Institute, 1969, p. 60.
the
See
20. Quoted in A. Holmes, .2,2. cit., p. 8
.
21. Gurtov. 2E.. ci t., pp. 104-105 .
22.
23.
Ibid., p. lOs'.
MUarad M. Drachkovi tch (ed.), Xearbook on International
Co_unist Affairs, 1966, Stanford, Hoo'lC,er Institute, 1967, 'Pp.
345-346.

24. Richard Allen (ed.), ill.
25. M. Drachkovi tch (ed.), 2E.. ill., p. 346.
l
2 i 6; S kt 6. "olmes, '!. U., p. ee,81so Pe ng Review,
'970, p. 27.
o
Robert A. ScaJapino, "ConInunism in Ash: Toward a Comparative
alys1s", in Robert A. Sc1apino (ed.), The Conmunist Revo1utt> n
i Asia: 'ractics Goals and Achievements. Second Edition,
Eng1ewood CHffs, Prentice-Hall Ine., 1969, p.36.
28. Deidre M. Ryan, ''The DecliRe of -'the 1 Aniled Strugg1e' Tactic in
Chinese Forign Poliey", Current Scene, Vol. X, No. 12,
December, 1972._ p. 4. See at'so New 'York Times, 3 Januat"y, 1971,
p. 9.
29. Gaigi Dutl, "Peking, The Indian Communist HOvement and Inter-
national Coamonism', 1962-19'0", Adan Survey, XI, No. 10,
1971, p. -
, '
" ,
.'
"

-
188.
30. Bhabani Sen Guptaj "China and Indian Communism", China Ruarterly,
NC? 50, April-June, 1972, pp. 281-282.
31. <> pp. 282-283.
32. For a IDOre complete discssion of the factionaism, see Moban
Ram, ''Haoism in India: Two Tactical Lines", The Instituee ;or
Defenee Studies and Analyses Journal, January, 1971, and bis
earUer study Indian Communism, Split with a Split, New Delbi,
Vikas, 1969. /
33'. Richard F. Staar '(ed.), Yearbook 01\ International Commug,ist
Affairs. 1972, Stanford, Hoov.,er Institute, 1973, pp. 505-506.
Tbe figure quoted is 6,000 for the movement compared
with 10,000 for the CPI-ML.
34 .!.l!.!i., pp. 605-607.
35. B. S. Gupta, 22.. m., pp. 284-285.
-
36. Gaigi Dutt, f!!., p. 988.
37. Richard F. St&ar (ed.), cit., p. 506.
38. lli5!.
39. For example, see A. Ha
j
1pern and H. Fredman, C01llllunist
Strategy in Laos, Santa Monica, Rand,
40. For If IDOre complete study,see Bernard B. Fll, "The Pathet
Lao: A 'Liberation' Party", in Scalapino (ed.),,22. m.,
pp. 185-211; and also, Arthur J. Dommer. Conflict in Las,
Second Edition, New'York, Praeger, 1971
1

(
41.

B. Fall. "The Pathet Lao:
p. 193.
A 'Libet:ation' Party", 22.
.....
42.
43 .
r
44.
J.
Ibid., pp. 194-196.
'.
.!!?!!!., ,p. 195.
,
Halpern and Fredman, 2,2. ill. , p. 4. Though' this analysis was
writfen before even our first Ume per10d, the slmi1arity bas
no; changed.
45. B. Fa11, .2,2. ill., p. 197.
46. See Richard Allen ill,., pp. 362-372

..
"
--------1
, ,
1
...
l,'
.
, .
, .
,e
r
1
189.
47. See Joseph J. Zas loff, "Laos: The Forgotten War Widens",
Suney, Vol. X, No. 1, ,January, 1970, pp. 65-72.
48. lUchard F. Staar (ed.), 22' ill.] p. 540. >
49. Roger H. Saith, '''Laos'', .in George Kahin (ed.) Governments and
Politics of Southeast Asia, Ithaca, Cornell University
19.64.
50 . " For. the text 9f the progruae' see Ricbard Allen (ed.), 'Yearbook
on International co..unist Affaira, 1969, Stanford, Hoover
Instltute; 1970, p. 549.
,
5J. Scalapino,
ill,
p. 38.
j
52. B. FaU, ill., p. 19S.

53. Scalapina,
22- ill,
p 34. '
'f
54. See Chapter 1. p.

55. H.' Gurtov, .22.
t., pp. 11-15.
56. CB, No. 744"
1964, p . 35.
. 57. The "Voiee of the People of ThaUand" was 'one of several"
1
extra-national radio stations set up in China for
lnto countries by rebel groups. .
58. Quoted in M. Gurtov, f,ll .. p. 13
. 59. Daniel D. Lovelace, China and "People's Wu" in Thailand,
1964-1969, ptlnese .lesefl reh Nonographs, Berke 1ey, Uni ve rai ty
Qf Califortlia, Centre for Cbioese Studies, 1971.
60. Far Eastern Econoale lleviev, 19 May, 1966, p. 327.
61. M. Gurtov, ill.
62. D. LDvelace, 2,2. s..!!, ... , p. 56 quotes the MCNA as differentiat-
108 between two very specifieally.
\
63 .!!!!.!!., p. 57.
64. Ibid., p. 59:
i
65. D. .. p. s. ,li,.1 vith \Chen Pinl are
in R.ichard F. Staar (ed.), Yearbook on International eo-&nlat
Affaira, 1972, Stanfor:d, Hoover Inltitute, 1973, p. 384.
o
..
Ill';
..
"
"
'\
:
66. pp. 38-39. ;
67. Clark D. lleber, "rbaU.Bd: The POUlie} eoit:tnuityll.
Mian Survey. 1101. X, No. 2" Feb ruary , 163-164.
. ..
,
. 68. Lovelace argues that: the leve1s of Chioese assist:ance bave
been too' law to provlde tbe Thal .aye.ent vith
sUPPPrt", 2,2. ill,., p. 86 ..
69. Pekins Reviev, 23 July, 1971, p. 30.

'.
,
..
"
"-.
..
. -
,...
,.
r
1
'f

"
j
190.
"
.
-"
/
0-
..
; .
,
, .
J
191.
CHAPTt!=R VI
KXPLANATION OF CHlNESK SUPPORT
FOR REVOLUTIONARY
Raving computed both the dependent and the independent
variable indices we can now attempt an explanation of Chinese
c
support for revo1utionary movements in the third world. Though we
glanced at sorne of the possible patterns at the end of each of the
>'
three chapters, Iole have not yet determined the validtty of
"
the hypotheses that w presented in Chapter I. In this chapte r we
will examine thege hypotheses in l the data presented in
Chapter'l Il, Ill, IV, and V. We will attempt to their
val idity and Iole wi Il refornulate thosc- tha-t- need adjustment in
oder to better explain the data. Raving the hypotheses,
and in RO doing offered an eXplln"ltlol'\ for Chineqe behaviour, we
will then tllrn tl) '1 brief look at sorne of the and
f.cing research in this and related areas.
A. TESTING AND REFORKJLATION OF HYPOTHESES
Hypothesb No. 1-: The greater the geographical proximity of astate
ta China, the more likely China will be to take an interest in the
indigenous movement and otfer it support.
Geographical region has been trkated in this study as a
scondary variable, in arder to test wat any analyst8 have merely
"
assumed; 0 that offers greater support to lIIOVements in Asta
than in other""areas of the world. Without examining the primary
. .-
..
. ,;
..(1
\
" -
192.
, ,
de terminant (s) of levels of support in individual cases, can
. ,
readily see that there is some truth to this hypothesis. If we look
at Table VI-l we can clearly see that the Latin American movements
.

have generally been oftered less support certain and
Middle Eastern and Asian movements. The ratings on the support
...
index for the Latin American movements are generally closer to zero
..
than those ratings for movements elsewhere. (This is further seen
if we look back at Tables 11-1 to II-9--even in cases of negative
values on the support index.). Consideration of subsequent hypotheses
will suggest the reasons for this disparity. However, on the basls
of this alone, we suggest a reformulation of the
hypothesis in the foem of a proposition:
,
la. Chinese support for Latin 6merican D!OVements
generallx has not b!;en as sr!at as sU220rt for moveaaent'S
,
in other areas of t'he tbird wrld.
(J
.
However, as we s ha-Il now see
t
only certain types of African
and Middle Eastern a'nd movements hve been offered higher levels
of than Latin American movements.
Hypothesis IW, 2: When directly confronting the United States or
one of Hs socatled "impriaUst tools", a movement is likely to
rccei ve a pigh Leve l of support, greater than the revolutionary
nature of the movement wou Id dictate, regardless of the
proximity of a movement to China.
The Chinese have maintained tbat one of the rea8on8 for
8upporting revolutionary movements is to present a untted front

1
...
,
J'

\,.'
\
, '
l 19}.
'-
TABLE VI-l oC
;
SUtItARy OF DATA
,
, '!l
./
/
' )
Count!I SU]!22rt Index Index RevolutiOn8
.!lli
( 1
Argentina 4
-)
3e
.Brazil 5 -4 se
RepubJic* 7 -4 3U

Ecuador 0 -4'
2U
Angola 12 -4 "
7U
Ethiopia 0 2
' ,
. 3U
6
-)
2e
South Africa 1 -4 4U
r" Bunna
.. 10'
4 se
India
- 3 3 3U
Laos* 12 -1 ge
e-
Thailand * 12 -4 7e
"
.ill2
Argentina
.
5 -4 3C
Bradl 5 -4
t
se
Dominican Republic 4 -4
3U
I
'
Ecuadot' 5 -4 4e
Angola i2 -4 ge
"
Ethiopia - 3
2
6U
Israel-Palestine 14 -3
3e
South Africa 10"
-4
6C
Burma 5 2 7e
India 0 3 6C
Laos* 16 9C
Thailand* , 12 -4 ' ge
!21l
Argentina 0 - 1 -,4 3e
Brazil 1 -4
4C
Dominican Republic 3 -4
3U
Ecuador 1 2 4C
Angola
' < l 12
-2
,
9U
Etbiopia - 3 3 ' &i'
Israel-Palestine* 14. -1 3e
South Africa 9 -4
6C
< Burma 1
C
3 ,7C
India
- 3
3
4C
. Laos* 16 1 ,9C
1
Thalland* 12
.. 4
9C
r
* &vementa tnfl'onting U.S. ilaperLall ... according to ChlDese perceptl0D8.
. .
-
,
.1
,r.
"
(
,
>
194.
against imperialism. Therefore, if practice were to follow thecary, ,
.ovements opposed to the Uni ted' States, either directly or indirectly
'.
, through regimes perceivd by 'the leaders in Peking as "imperial ist
tools" of the United States, vould receive h,igher levels of support
than similar JDOvements in other situations. This second hypothesis
J
tests the congruence between Chinese theory and practice
. '.,
,"
If we c;d.pare the support index (see Table VI-!! for move-
ments opposed to those regimes aceo rd Ing to the Chinese, f
. .,
into the category of "U.S. imperialism", we find this'hypothesis to
be The leve Is of 'support offered to the movement ln the
Dominican Republic in 19b5, to. the Palestinian movement, and to
certain mdvements we did not ln detaU (such as the
, .
Congolese movement in 1965) support this hypothesis. ' These move-
ments aIl received a rlatively hlgh level of sl1pport, despite lov
degrees of conformity to the Chinese model for a people 1 s var. Tbe
hostiL ity expressed tovards China by the regimes in question does
not seem to have been suficient1j more intense than in other cases
where lover 'levels of support vere offered ta 'explain the' disparity
in the support given (see the discussion of the third
--;-
be1ow)
However, the As lan cases seem to present data less clear
, \.
on this issue . In ASia, movements opposed to U.S.-
supported did a hi8h leve,l of support. Yet the
aoveaents that vere granted this high leve 1 of support' alao scored
vell on the index; the conformity of these movemenU

1
,
l ,
If
, .
..,

"
195.
to the Olioese ,.odel fr a people' s war could equally explain '
the higb leve'ls of support. On t.he other hand, given ,lower levels ,
c
of support. pffered other movement.a, of the degree of
, -
t.o t.he Chinese model, we.cfn suggest that this hypothesis
is indeed valid across regions. Th movement. in BUnDa, as weIL as
two .ove.ent.s that we did not exaiqe dept.h in this project,
t.hose in North Borneo and in Ma,laya and Singapore (these are clearly
separated despite' the fact that they both operate within
the federated states of'Malaysia) never received as high a level of
support as did those movements in southeast Asia that were opposing
regb.es and forces that. vere perceived in Peking as part of U.S.
iaperialis ...
Therefore we can theObypot.hesis for aIL geographi-
i
'\ reg
"
2a. A reyolut!ollfrv moyeaent confrontigg t.he Upited
States or one of Ha so-called "imperialist ls" will
be offered reater su China than the confonDl
of that ..,vement. t.o the Chinese Ideal fOI a people' s
var would otherwise indicate. regardless of geographical
region.
Thus, Olinese action adheres to Chinese ideology, at. least wit.h
respect to the idea of building a unit.ed front. to oppose imperialism.
1.
. '
,
Rypothesis.lio. 1: A aoveaent"inany geograpbical region, abDed at
the overthr8w of a governaent host.ile, td Peking is more likely t.o
receive support tban ODe displacement of a frlendly
regiae.
T
;,
\
196 ....
. \
1
De,ite, its popularity in the Uterature, as.:we saw in
Chapter l, both quantitative and qualitative testing clearly demand
tbe invalidation of this hypothesis.
Basically, this hypothesis posits a relationship between
, .
the support index and the index. If we use a simple
statstical technique to assess the correlation betwee'n the "
we cau test whether or not mch a relationship exhts. Th,rough tbe
computation of Rho ufor the two indices in ea,ch of the
" three time periods, we Und that there exists no significant
relationship."!,
a qualitative consideration of the two indices
within geographical regions produces the same conclusion. In Latin
1

--------------------------------------------------------------------
* Spearman's Rho is a rough equivalent to r, used'to measure the
correlation of data according to ranking of two for a set
universe. lt is a product-moment cpeff clent for ranked
data. . .
In of the correlation the support index and
the hostility index, the movements were ranked according to the values
on the indJces. The difference between the ranking on the support
index and the ranking on the hostility index was measured by simply
one the other to produce D. Then Spearman's
Rho, X, was computed using the following formula:
6Ico2)' l'
X - 1--
N(Nl_l) where N equals the number of con-
sidered. The significance of X was assessed by the pse of standard
t tables, computing ! in the following manner:
X
! - \rI - i
2
) At the .05 level of significance!
should be greater than 2.23. For the we considered
here, following ! values emerged: ,
r 1965 ! - 2.04
1969 ! - 1.17
1971 ! - 1.42
.'>-
. ,
!
As none of these'values ia aignificant at the .05 level of lignifi-
eance, we clin auert that' there la not a slgniflcant relationship ,
between th't support index and the index,.
1
o
...
,
197.
America, the support, offered IDOve.-ents fluctuated in a anner that
bore no similarity to the fluctuation of the hostility index;
goverrunent of Ecuador was friendly towards China in 1.g71 and yet
the Harxist-Lenlnist Communist Party of-Ecuador was still supported
by Peking--while in Argentina in s&me year the exact
was'" t.lie case. In the African and Middle Eastern region, the Ethiopian
aSe appears, on the surface, to support the hypothesis. 'However, on
closer inspection, we see that Ethiopia falls into the category o(
African states <as opposed ta colonial territories and
apartheid countries) and no independent African state was the locus
of a Chinese-supported except in the case of Congo' (Zaire)
-...-
'",
in 1965 where China supporte<l the movement oppasing the U.N. forces
e
and the Kinshas'ha government. As the U.N. forces were perceived by ,
the Chinese to be an extension of U".S. imperialisID, we may ,suggest
that except in cases where movements were actively the

United States or one 'of iu so-called "imperialist tools", indepen-
dent Africa has ben the site of Chinese-supported movements.
In Asia, as we pointed out in Chapter V, the cases of Lsos and Burma
invalidate any hypothesis which posits governmental hostility as a
primary detenuinant of Chinese support.
The consideration of this data suggests two propositions.
The first emerges from a comparison of the,hostllity index and the
support index, and the second is drawn from this data and the con-
struction of hypothesis No. 2a. The first proposition refutes
hypothesis No. 3:
'e
\
, ---)
C
The' expressed bt the
, -
tovards China is not a .. Jor deterainant of the level of
,
. '
v
support offered' by Peking to a revolutionary .ove.ent
; "
. .
opposig that
.
has
The refers to the lve l' of support atina
offered in independent Such
support been very severely rest-ricted. not one tbe three
time periods did 'China offer tan8ible to a .,ve.ent cballeng-

ing a de jure independent regi.e ..,.rtheid Africa and in
.
those cass wher.e . Chi nese leaders perceived the lIOVe.ents as
, ' s truggles against U. S.: i:-periaU's.: in th()se countries vhere, U.S
.
troops wece'actively invQlved in combat (South Vietnaa, Laos,
1
- Cambodia, and th lack of tangible support n0t.viths.tand-
l'
, .
Ingo the Dominican Republic); in cases where a I!IO'veaent va,s
ing U.N. 'forces, vhich China 'petceived as tools of 'U.S. poUcy
\ .
(Congo); and in the one case where Oaina the United States
tQ have establ ished a beach-bad iaperiaUst (br.el.).
, ,
No movement received public endorseent Mao or otber seniQr
, leaders uniess it vas perceived to be' one of these struggles apinst
U.S. imperiaUaaa, ,or opposed to an apar-tbeld govera.ent in Mrica.
\ \
We can therefer Juggest the follovibg proposition: . \
\
lb. China refrains fra. offeriQ& eitber tanalble supeort
or high-Ieve 1 endrse.ent to lIOVe..ents vboae ala la the
overthrow of non-apartheid Independent except
vhen the move.ents are coos idered by 'hina to be
actively U.S. ..
. \
.,
,
, '(
,
,l

-iJ
,
\
..
199
. Clearty this proposition is consistent vith proP9sition No. 2a. As
we sha11 see in the consideration of hypothesis No. 5, this is a
most significant finding, for i.t not only earlier
findtngs extaqt in the literature, but it a1so suggests a auch
8reater\restraint in Chinese behaviour than is ususlly assu.ed.
,
We shall return to this point short1y.
, '
Hypothesis No. 4: When a regime is uncommitted in its dealins_ vith
\
China, China will hesitate support an indigenous revolutionary
, .
movtlnt, il hopes of b roadening her international pol iUcal base,
" '2
regard1ess of geographical of a to China.
" (V
Tilts ls essentially a corollary of hypothesis No. 3: It
is refuted by the invalidation of the hypothesis positing a priaary
re lationship between governmental hostllity and Chinese support.
Despite its popularity in the liter,ture, it merits no further ,
attention here.
\ 1
Hypothes18 No .. 5: In Africa. a movement imed at the overthrow of
.
colonial or apartheid will receive 'a greater level of support
thsn one mere1y aimed at a pro-western rgtme.
Ou.r case stud( .. analysifS appea'rt!d. to validat this hypo-
...
thesis, with two minor exceptions. ( First, this hYPPthesis appeara
'true for the last two time periods only, as the .ave.ents in South
o
Afrlca, Namibia,' and Zimbabwe vere not offered .uch support in 1965'.
Second, there' la one deviant ca-se throughout aIl three ,ti. periods
in colonial Africa. The revolutionary aove.ent opposing the Frenc:h
regime in French Somaliland,
during aIl ti .. periods
-/ \
1

'.
",.
\
/'
/
.
e
. .
"
"!:
(
ve considered, va:; .by peking througb Chinese support of
France. Curiously enough. the explanation of this exception lies
in a corollary of proposition HG. 2a. France had estab1ished
dipla.atic relations vith China in 1964, and bad de.onstrated its
opposition to A.erican haperialis. through its vithdrawal fra. the
o
ailitary ana of lIATO and its concle-.ation of the O.S. iovolve.ent

in southeast As. Thus, by supporting the .we8ent
..
in FrenGh Sa-aliland, atina vould have been opposing a ail
the .ore iaportant because of its place in Europe and erstwhile
unqualified alliance vith the United States, that vas de80DStrating
itself to be anti-iDlperialist. Given the i.-portance the Olinese
. "
attach to the construction of a united front against iaperialis.,
Peking did not support the .ove.ent in French The
pattern of Chinese support in Latin Allerica in 1971 provides further
o
evidence for suggesJ;ing that vhe"n a ,state challenges the United
States, Peking vill likely reduce its support of a at.ed
at its overthrov. Many Latin A8erican cQtantries challenged the
United 'in 1971 on the lssue:- of territorial vaters. This )Fas
/
hailed in China, as we S8W in Cllapter II, as a reversaI fo-r

U.S. iaperialisa,in l.aUn A.erica. The consequence of this shift vas
ta al ter atinese 'attitudes tovards Latin AlRTica generally, and to,
1

reduce support for .ove.ents. We cau suUest a
proposition. which is consistent vith proposition No. 2a:
2b. ,Olina vill olIer less support to
ai_d at the over'throw of reaillel 2!![s;elu!l .
/
roC')
.
- r
/'

...
- . -
o
t01.
in Peking as opposed to imperialism, than to
lDOVements aimed at the overthrow of resimes not so
eomaaitted.
Returning or attention to No. 5. we find that
ve can DOW assrt its validity. exeept for _parthid Africa in 1965:
"
i
Sa. 'ln Afriea, China generaHI offers a high level ,of
support to aimed at the dverthrow of colonial
regimes and,- sinee 196Y, to movements aimed at the over-
throv of apartheid sovernments,
Jour findings point to an el,planation ,of ehinese support
that 18 generally a.nti thetieal to the conclusions most other analysts
of Chinese foreign policy have drawn. Sino-American rap-
prochement on t:he diplomatie level, ,ehinese attitudes towards the
United" States do not appear to have changed substantially. Even
.
after the beginning of the period of so-ealled "ping-pong diplomacy"
vhieh marked a shift away from ideology in favour of pragmatism in
3
Chinese foreign affairs, the importance of the anti-imperialist
, s as a determinant of Chinese support for rvolutionary
movements continues to be paramount. This is an
.
which we shall ,return when all the hypotheaes have been dlscussed.
Hypothesia No. 6: a ;evolut!onary movement supports the Soviet
Union in the international Sino-Soviet dispute, China will support
either an alternative organization within that; or, if one
, ,
does not exist .. no 1IIOvement at .ll. regardless 'of the geo'graphieal
, \ r
proxiaity of that .tate to or the tenor of relationa between
')
1.<",
/
202.
4
,,'
the governing regime,and China.
we saw in the case study analyses, are two
1 - r,
be considered befGfe we can reject or confinn this
pypothesis. First, there is 6ne deviant case, although we did not
e OUT case studies. In Guinea (Bissau), China supported
the P IGC, a'lpro-Soviet mov?:. aimed at the overthrow of Portuguese
'- '
colo rule. No alterna organization in Guinea
as in Moambique and Angola. Therefore we can suggest\that China
,
bas not been as unequivocally opposed to supporting pro-Soviet
revolutionary movements as has bee,n suggested in the literaturt
\
f
Second, severai of.the movements we considered in Chapters III, -IV!
and' V were rated as \.MCommltted in 'the dispute. Th7
movements did not, appear to have received markedly lower levels of
support than their pro-Chinese counterparts. For example, ln
, neither Angola nor in the Dominican Republic did an uncommitted
. ,
stance on the part of the revolutionary movement affect the support
China offered. Angola provides evidence: between 1969
and 1911 the support granted the independence movement by China did
1
not change, despite the from to an uncommittd
tHude." ,\e clan thus suggest a reformulaUon of .hypothes,ls No. 6:
6a jWbeo a reyolutipQ.ry ppyement '"lIpgrt' the Soviet
,
. .
Qaion in the internatigpal Sipg-Soyiet diapQte. Chip'
f
'
... )
supports .itber an altorDlte mgy';cnt Witbip tbat ,tate,
or
tbe case of Africa were China' is wilUn to ' .
,\
api

. ,

\
"
/
203.
grant support to a pro-Soviet organization vben no
altfma,Uve exista. atina does IlOt refrain frOUl supporting
UDca..dtted .ave.ents.
While the stance of a aove.ent on the Sino-Soviet issue ls an lapor-
,;
tant variable in the detenalnation of Chinese support, it certainly
not appesr to be tbe or critical deterainant of
Chinese 'support, as so.e analysts have aaintained.
HtP9tbeSiS No. 7: The greater the confoI'lllity of a given revolutionary
,
aove.ent to the Chinese prototype for people's war, the greater the
support the .avement viii be regardless of geographicsl
proximlty or governaental bostility
. -'
Given the bypotheses above, this lsst hypo-
tbesis cannot be whlle the degree con formi t y
a revolutionary .,veaent and the Chinese model fOr a people's
1.. .....
vAr i8 IlOt the priaary of support (as might be expected
if one interpreted Chinese revolutionary the ory as practice), it is
quite that it coaprises an input into Chinese.action.

If ve the statistical technique we used in the compari-
son of the support index and the hostility index above (Spearman's
Rho) we can test this hypothesis quantitative ly. Through such a
test for correlation between the revolutionary index and the support
index ve flnd that there ls no significant relationship between the
tvo variables.*

* As in the earller test, the acceptable level for t at the .05
level of significance, for 10 degrees of freedoa (N -: 2), 18 2.23.
Fr the twelve .-avellents we here, the following .! values
eaerged: \
1965 !. - 1. 79
1969 !. 1.42
1971 ! - 1.27
Given the.e low value., ve can a ert that
betveeD
the support indu aGd
\
tbere is DO significant
the iad.x.
..
,
r
, \
"204.
The degree of confor.ity a given revolutionary
1
movement and the Chines prototype l18y have been / of
levels of support wen other variables relUlined constant. This
assomption of ceteris paribus posits that a change in the revolution-
ary nature of a movement viII. change the support it receives, if aIl
other variables re.ain constant. There is DOt a great deal of data
with vhich we cao test the validlty of tbis relationship. The
for Ecuador between 1965 and 1969, the data for India for aIl three
time periods, and the data South Africa between 1965 and 1969,
as we can see in Table VI-l. aIl see. ta point to the eonclusion

that, ceteris paribus, there 'is a relationship between the revolu-
J
tionary index and the support index. Yet there appears some contrary
evidence as weIl. The revolutionary .ave.ents in Thailand and
Angola received a higher rating on the revolutionary index in '1969
than in 1965, vithout any change in their ratings on th support
index (the hostility index figures reaained constant). Thus there
.. '
is certainly not a direct pra8ry relationship between the indices.
However, to reJect this last hypothesis coapletely vould
be to obscure a general relationship that aight be suggested by a
simple examination of the covariance of the support and revolutlonary
indices for a smaller of .aveaents than the we con-
sidered above. For example. if we vere to use the Spearaan's Rho
to assess the relationship for aIl the aoveaents except those
perceived by the Chinese leaders as actively confronting'U.S.
\
imperialism (the Republic in 1965. and Israel-Palestine
\
10
l
1
J
\
..
205.
case, Laos Thailand during all three time periods) we would be
able to determine whether there was a significant
ship between the two indices for all MOvements involved in an
anti-imperialist struggle. Yet the exclusion of such
" .
movements would reduce the number of movements to a point where the
Tesults of such a test could no longer be relied upon. (Ten is the
smallest uniyerse for which one can use Spearman's However,
<
if we simply omit the Israel-Palestine case study--as we have 'seen
.')Ir
this is the c'learest of a supported
because of its opposition to a perceived in Peking as an
Ilimperialist tool" of the U.S .--and use Spearman' s Rho to test for
correlation between the two indices for the remaining eleven
ments, we find that there is indeed a significant correlation.*
As already determined that the Palestinian received
,t'a high leve l of. support because it was confronting a tao l of U.S.
imperialism, this findinE allows us to reformulate hypothesis NO. 7,
albeit in rather qualified terms:
Other thlngs being equal. th greater the conformity
between a revolutionary movement and the Chlne.e prototype
,
* Fbr 9 degrees-of freedom (N'- 2) the acceptable level for t'at .
the .05 level of'significance la 2.26. For the eleven movemeits
here considered, the follofilng t values emerged:
, 1965 . t - 2.47
1969 t - 2,85
1971 t - 2.89
Given \hat a11 three of these are greater 2.26, we can
assert that there ls a slgnificant correlation between the revolu-
tionary and, the support index.
t'
. /
fil
'1
/JI
(
/
.
(
206.
for a people' s war. tbe hiaber the' level of support Qlina
.7
will
l
olfer that revolutionaTf movement.
This variable, the degree of conformity between 'a revolutlonary
movement and the Chinese model for a people' s war, ,i-8 clearly, sub-
ordinate to the nature of the state--see propositions No. lb and
No. 5a--and the political affiliation of the incua6ent
, \
government which the mOvement ia cballenging--see propositions No.
2a and No. 2b.
SUDDIlary
.
The propositions presented above imply a hierarchy of
significance among the determining Chinse support for
revolutionary movementa.
The is the perceiyed ideologieal
affiliation of 14enged by any particular movement.
1 f the Chinese that the regime (or' the forces of that
regime) is directIy or indireetIy (through U.N. forces, for exaple)
aimed at the maintenance and expansion U.S. iaperialisa, the
."
movement is very likely to receive a high level of support. In the
o,posite case, where a movement'is opposed to an anti-lmperialist
reglme, China not offer it support.
The second most Lmport_nt la the polltical nature.
of the state in question. In and apartheid countries and
1
China is very\likely'to support a revolutionary aove-
ment, except in the rare case where the regbDe has established its
.
opposition to the poUeies of the United"States (.S ln
,
, \:.';
1
Co
\,
207.
'the case of French Soma ll1and) Hovements in independent, non-
apartheid, countris have never been supported by
China beyond a certain point; they have never been offered tangible
aid or endorsement.
Third, the 'ideological affiliation of the aove.ent can
preclde Chinese support. In cases which do not fall into either of
the considered Aboye (confronting imperialism, or con-
fronting aparthei,d or colonial reg1mes), China will not support a
movement which Soviet Union in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Fourth, the nature of the movement, as determined by the
degree of conformity to the Chinese model for a people's war, will
determine the approximate level of support, given the predominance
of the first three
Tinally, geographical regiop .ets lBits in the 'variation
of levels of support. China has not supported move.ents in Latin
America beyond a certain point; a Latin American haB never
received military or economic assistance, while certain
in the other two Tegions have.
Chinese policy has not undergone the massive changes one
might eXPected since 1965. The Cultural Revolution did Dot'
have as great a lasting effect on.Peking's support for revolutionary
S
movements as certain scholars have indicated. With few exception.
are Aoted in the refon.ulated propositions), the three ti-.
n
periods seem to be very .uch a part of the same pattern of Chinese
support for revolutionary move.ents.
1
'.
208.
Moat aurprising in tbeae findinga ia the relative
portant role of the Sino-Soviet dispute whpn eompared with the
of the confrontation with U.S. Despite
the frequently repeated assertion that Chinese leaders have resolved
to aprove relations with the United States and her allies in order
6
to coneentrate on the struggle with the Soviet Union, the results
of this study suggest that sueh assertions are, at best, exaggera-
1
Il
tion. Though there has certainiy been a normalization in relations
with many western eountries, China has made no attempt to repudiate
J
the ideologieal of the antl-imperialist struggle. Whether
this phenomenon applies only to the support of revolutionary move-
ments, or more generally to Chinese foreign poliey, is a subjeet
'for further investigation. This finding does however, that
there bas been an on the Sino-Soviet as a
of Chlnese foreign poliey behaviour.
B. CUlDELlNES FOR. FUTURE RESEARCH
Certain suggestions ean be made on the basis of this study
relatin& to both theoretieal and methodologieal problems and
strategies for future researeh, in the area of Chinese foreign
poliey and more general studies of external involvement in internal
't
war.
Focus of Researeh
ln order to further understand the reasons that China
aight support (or not support) revolutionary movements today, and
0
, 209.
pre ..ably in the future. the addition of still another tille period
vould be very useful. Since 1971. China the effort
to establish diplo.atic and trade relations vith a much larger
nu.ber of countries than ever before. ,While it is clear that this
has been a fonction prt.arily of the decreasing iqtransigenee of
coontries to abrogate the anti-China stand propagated by
United States. it vould be intecesting tO,see if this increasing
openoess has been refleeted in China's poliey towards revolutionary
aove.ents. Our study suggests that this polic-' i8 not related to
,the so-ealled "noraalization" process in Chinese relations with the
vestern world; the inclusion of data from 1913 couid serve to test
the validity of this assertion.
we have concerned ourselves only vith Chinese behavipur--
that bas been the focus of our inquiry. The variables we examined
suggest that Chine.e behaviour tovards revolutionary movements Is
detenained by pheno.ena very different from the explanatory
variables establisbed by other analysts in examinations of other
\ -1
states' involv.ent in internai var. These studies have had
de pende nt variables that have been differently eonstructed--usually
.
coaprising les. explicit actions of support than the lndieators in
.
our .upport index. It would further under.taodins of the differenees
,.0
betveen Cllioese behaviour behaviour of other states--the
ussa and the United States especially--if their toward.
internai var. vere studies using the sa.e sort of ea.poa ite index ve
used in describlng a.loeee acUon'. The differences between our
, .
\
210.
support index and the dependent variables pre,sently used by analysts
of Soviet and American behaviour make ,cpmparison of results impossible.
..
"
Methodological Questions
Clearly, theoretical advancement is related to methodological
considerations of the conditions necessary to produce results that
are comparable. Lmprovements in the methodology used in-this study
would permit a more fruitful analysis.
First, the categories used in fhis study are intrinsically
t '
, related to spec1ficlllly Chinese phe!,omena and must be modified in
" .
order to examine the polieies of ot!ber .For example, we.
s tated that the most important determinant Chinese support vas
the manner in which Chinese leaders pereeived the ideologiea!
affiliation of regime challenged by a movement. We would have
no difficulty adapting to American perceptions, searehing perhaps
for an leetion comparable to the "anti-
imperiaUst" element in Chinese perceptions,. our second
q
independent variable index, which measures the degree of conformity
of a given movement to the model derived from Chinese ideology, could
1
be replaced by a composite index measuring ideological similarity
between a party in an internaI war (either governmental or
1 ..
and the prevalent Ameriean conception of an ideal third-world state;
the s&me eould be done for the Soviet Union.
Aside from the methodologieal adaptations nece8sary for
comparative research, some additions to the present
would be useful in order to provide a more rigorous analysis. Firat,
-
..
211.
fjrther quantitative analysis of the indice, would be very uaeful to
vhether or there vere indeed covariances and relation-
sh.i'ps that ve were unable to discern frOID our large!y qualitative
. -
eX8lll'ination of the variables. This quantitative analysis should
, , '
not replace the qualitative comparison, but rather complement it.
/
1
While tbe !irst provides Ithe statistical to guarantee com-
parable results, the other can often provide insight based on
i ndividual observations vhich can so easily become obscured by
s ophisticated statistical Though we Would obvloualy
have to increase the size oL the sample of case studies treated in
depth. this vould not be an insurmQuotable obstacle in a
s tudy. Second, a more rigorou8 coding, method for indicators
1
comprising the indices could be devised. This study is not
particularly vulnerable to coding errors because of its attention
to data drawn from a reltively homogeneoas population and
only one analyst vas coding. However, in using more than one
analyst in the examination of the behaviour of more than one state,
a more rigorous approach to coding would be an absolute necessity.
Third, t,ough the of statistical tools the compollite indices
could be broken down to test the importance of each and every com-
b ination of indicators in the explanation of behaviour.
C. ' CONCLUDIll; REMAlUC.
Thia theeia bas been an attempt to describe and explain
the policies of 'Republic. towarda revolutionary
movements in the third World. Deepite certain metbodological


:---' 1.
..
!

,,:
..
,
..
..'
'.
,
1
0
212.
d,. to it., l1a1te4 abe, tbia proJect .... bopeful1y.
iDcre the UDderetaoclioa of Oalbeae forelp ........... tad
atate behaviour.

J Q
r-

li

e-.
, ..
,
...
., ,

\ .J
,
,
.'
l ..
'-

\
.'Q
.'
.,
Cl,
'.
-
.
4"
,
.
j

"
"if 1 a
r
1.

3.
213.
orES
This waa Peter Van Ness s pri .. rt ftndinS'
189.
1
r) ,
5ee BrUce Larkin, 22,. Fit., c:oncluding cru.pter.
J /
This period la UBually Interpreted to bave besun duriDs the
latter half of 1970 and the firet.balf of 1971, culainating
with the Ameriean ant1ounce.eni of tbe iapending viait of
ident Nixon to China. ' ,
.-
:"". 4. For an of thiB attitude, 8ee Ernst Halper1D, ,22. cit.
5. 5e Robert A. BolIDes, .22,. ill., pp. 7-9; and W .. A. C.
6.
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.,
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2,2. 91., 'p. 11. 0
Even Van suggests that tbia Bort of sbift' appeared
to be tki.ng pl.,ce with the teraination of the Cultural
'Revolution. Vin Ness, 22. ,ill . pp. 25 \-252. One only bas to
pick up any newspaper _editorial written during Mixon's viait
to' see how attitude really la. See
also DanieJ Tretiak, 22,. 'cit, 224-229.
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214.
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