REDUCING THE FLASH HAZARD

For Presentation at the IEEE/PCA Cement Industry Technical Conference Phoenix, AZ April, 2006 By: IEEE-IAS Cement Industry Committee Timothy B. Dugan, P.E. Electrical Engineer PENTA Engineering Corp.
Abstract This paper reviews the need for arc-flash hazard awareness, analysis, and personnel protection. It looks primarily at the low voltage electrical system and what can be done to reduce incident energy. It further outlines methods to protect workers from the devastating effects of arc-flash, and possible ways to reduce incident energy levels through review of various electrical design choices. Arc-Faults: Arc-Flash and Arc-Blast Electrical workers are commonly exposed to three types of hazards: Electrical shock, electrical burns resulting from contact and arc-flash, and arc-blast [1]. Electrical burns that result from contact with energized parts occur due to current flow through the body. Burns as a result of arc-flash occur due to radiant heat given off by an electrical arc. Lastly, arc-blast is the result of the heating effects of an arcflash that produce tremendous pressures through the expansion of destroyed circuit materials. Of these three, electrical shock and electrical contact burns are the hazards of which most personnel are aware. An arc-fault is the result of current flowing through air between conductors in phase-to-phase, single phase-to-ground, or multiple phase-to-ground configurations (i.e. a 3-phase bolted fault). Arc-faults can release large amounts of energy in an extremely short amount of time in the form of radiant heat, intense light, and high pressure waves. The radiant heat given off travels at the speed of light and can reach temperatures of 35,000F [1]. Due to these high temperatures, circuit components directly involved in the arc can explosively change physical state from solid to vapor. Once the vapor state of the conductive metal is reached the arcing fault can quickly proceed from a single-phase fault to a three-phase fault in less than 1ms [1]. The metal vapor, or conductive plasma cloud, superheats the surrounding air causing further explosive activity resulting in large pressure and sound waves. The pressure waves can destroy electrical components outside the vicinity of the arc, causing significant amounts of shrapnel to be expelled from the fault location at speeds greater than 700mph [1]. In general, an arc-fault is primarily composed of the release of thermal energy referred to as arc-flash, and large pressure waves referred to as arc-blast. In recent years the dangers and impact of arc-flash have been studied and are now becoming more understood. However, the electrical industry is still in the process of studying the effects of arc-blast and ways to mitigate its risks. This paper is limited to the review of arc-flash hazards, their analysis, and corresponding ways to reduce incident energy in low voltage systems.

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Causes of Arc-Flash Steps can be taken to reduce the level of available energy that can be released in an arc-flash at any point in an electrical system. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that the main contributors to arcflash events are human error and electrical equipment failure. Human errors can include the dropping of tools or loose parts inside equipment, inadvertently contacting energized conductors with tools, parts, or cables, or improper alignment of equipment while being inserted into live electrical bus such as MCCs or Switchgear. Factors related to equipment failure can include lack of equipment maintenance, equipment or cabling insulation failure, or continued electrical fault occurrences that go uncorrected causing premature component failures (i.e., overvoltage, overload, and overcurrent conditions). Therefore, it is important to establish and maintain regular preventive maintenance schedules for electrical equipment and systems, as well as take immediate action to correct repetitive problems. It is also important to point out that a suitable environment for electrical equipment is key to prevent the accumulation of dust, or buildup of corrosion and condensation, all of which can lead to improper equipment operation and/or premature equipment failure. Therefore, a clean, conditioned electrical room is warranted in places where major equipment such as low voltage substations, MCCs, and switchgear are located. A clean equipment environment also promotes safer working conditions for electrical maintenance personnel who must service electrical equipment while energized. Reduction of Arc-Flash Energy According to NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, incident energy is defined as the amount of energy impressed on a surface, a certain distance from the source, generated during an electrical arc event [2]. Methods for reducing incident energy are aimed solely at changing the factors that determine the amount of energy that an arc-flash can produce. Namely, these are voltage, current, and time. If one or more of these parameters can be modified, it is possible to reduce the energy available to an arcing fault. The voltage level in a new plant or existing facility is determined by the distribution system being used, and therefore is not easily modified. Hence, it is simpler to find ways to change the current and time factors. The current involved in an arc-flash is the available short-circuit current as determined by a short-circuit analysis. Possible ways to reduce the level of short-circuit current at the point of fault are: 1. Limit transformer size. The short-circuit current available in a system is primarily determined by the size of the system transformer. At 5.75% impedance, with a 480V secondary, and assuming an infinite bus on the primary, a 2,000kVA transformer can produce approximately 42kA. Under the same conditions, a 1,000kVA transformer can produce approximately 21kA. Furthermore, more conservative figures would approach 52kA and 26kA, respectively, when considering that a significant percentage of the current could possibly be contributed by motors connected to the system (100% assumed for simplicity). Therefore, it is easily seen that the use of multiple smaller transformers is advantageous over a single large one when comparing levels of short-circuit current. In the past, it was standard practice in the cement industry to install a maximum of a 1,000kVA transformer for secondary unit-substations [3]. However, in recent years it has become standard practice to install maximum 1,500kVA transformers [4], and occasionally 2,000kVA unit-substations. Generally, installation of a single large transformer has a lower capital cost for installation when considering the additional primary and secondary equipment, and electrical room space required to install multiple smaller transformers. Yet, installing larger transformers poses an increased risk to the electrical worker in the form of increased available incident energy.

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2. Install higher impedance transformers. Secondary unit-substation transformers are commonly manufactured with an approximate impedance of 5.75%. And, in the recent past, it was common to install transformers that were both smaller in size (1,000kVA) and higher in impedance, typically 8%. Today 8% impedance transformers will likely cost more than 5.75% transformers given that they require more materials to manufacture and are not commonly produced. Nevertheless, specifying a higher impedance transformer will provide significant reduction in available short-circuit current. Again, a 1,000kVA transformer with 5.75% impedance would source approximately 21kA. An equivalent transformer with 8% impedance would produce approximately 15kA. Again, conservatively including 100% motor contribution, current could possibly approach 20kA. Therefore, it is easily seen that the use of higher impedance transformers is also advantageous when reviewing ways to reduce incident energy. It is possible that using higher impedance transformers can cause voltage regulation problems when starting several large motors at full voltage. In applications where this is potentially problematic the engineer should perform a motor starting analysis to determine if installation of reduced voltage starting equipment is warranted. The costs associated with both higher impedance transformers and reduced voltage starting equipment can be greater when compared to installations with lower impedance transformers. But, if higher impedance transformers can help reduce incident energy exposure to electrical workers, they are certainly worth consideration by both the facility owner and the design engineer. 3. Use high-resistance grounding for low voltage systems. A high-resistance grounding system can reduce incident energy because of the addition of a resistance between the neutral connection point on a wye-connected transformer and the system ground. Phase-to-phase faults in high resistance grounded systems will behave similarly to solidly grounded systems. However, the resistance reduces the short-circuit current level in a phase-to-ground fault situation. And, since most arc-fault events start out as phase-to-ground, it is possible that using high-resistance grounding can reduce the possibility of faults escalating into phase-to-phase or bolted fault situations. An additional benefit of this system is that it is designed to remain in service under phase-to-ground situations, thereby increasing process uptime and allowing maintenance crews to fix faults before they escalate to phase-to-phase or bolted faults. The time factor in an arc-flash event is the time duration that spans from when the arc occurs to when the OCPD opens or clears the fault. The following are design changes that can be made to reduce the amount of time required to clear a given fault. 1. Size overcurrent protective devices (OCPDs) as low as possible. By design, lower ampere rated OCPDs will let through less current than higher rated ones prior to opening during a fault. Therefore, OCPDs for individual pieces of equipment such as motor starters or large electrical equipment feeders such as MCCs should be applied as tightly as the application will permit. For example, when an 800A MCC is protected by a switchgear feeder breaker with an 800A frame, the trip setting should be adjusted as low as the total running MCC load will permit. Future trip setting adjustments can be reviewed and made as the MCC load increases. 2. Use multiple feeders by splitting loads into smaller groups. For example, instead of installing a single MCC with a 2,000A continuous rating, install three 800A MCCs. Or install three 600A MCCs instead of a single 1,200A. By designing in this manner, the individual feeder OCPDs can be sized and set lower, again decreasing available energy as mentioned above. 3. Reduce time delay settings. Decreasing long time, short time, or instantaneous trip settings on low voltage power circuit breakers can help to reduce incident energy by decreasing the amount of time a breaker takes to open. Yet, the engineer should be cautious to consider any effects this may have on existing OCPD selective coordination prior to making any adjustments.

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4. Install ground fault sensing equipment. As stated previously, most arc-faults start out as phase-toground faults. Therefore, installation of ground fault detection equipment can help to detect arc-faults quicker. This is primarily because ground fault sensors are more sensitive than overcurrent sensors. Ground fault sensing equipment should be installed in multiple places such as on low voltage switchgear mains and feeders, and possibly on individual MCC feeders or motor starters. The more ground fault sensing there is, the lower the settings can be for each feeder or piece of equipment, thereby decreasing clearing time. Ground fault sensing installed only on the mains of switchgear provides some means of protection, but can be of little benefit when troubleshooting for fault isolation. 5. Use current limiting OCPDs. The use of current-limiting circuit breakers, fuses, or combinations thereof can greatly reduce the amount of incident energy in a fault. Generally, current-limiting devices have quicker clearing times than non current-limiting devices. Current-limiting fuses can typically interrupt a fault within the first half cycle whereas non current-limiting circuit breakers can take several cycles to open. Generally, when current-limiting devices are applied in conjunction with the above mentioned methods, further reduction can be achieved with some exceptions. Current-limiting devices must operate within their specified current limiting range to provide the greatest reduction in incident energy. When current limiting fuses do not operate in their current limiting range, clearing times can be significantly longer than cycle [5]. Therefore, when using current-limiting devices it may be best to apply lower impedance circuit components, such as transformers and/or cabling, in lieu of components with higher impedances [6]. The idea is to achieve higher available short-circuit current to allow current-limiting devices to operate in their respective current-limiting range, thereby clearing faults quicker and reducing incident energy exposure. 6. Use Type 2 motor starters. IEC 947-4-1 and UL508E provide for two different levels of coordination and damage protection. During a fault, a Type 1 coordinated starter will interrupt the fault current, but is not required to provide protection for the internal components. Therefore, components in a Type 1 starter can be severely damaged and/or destroyed during a fault. A starter that adheres to Type 2 coordinated protection must interrupt the fault current, and still be operational after the fault occurs. Type 2 coordination is referred to as No-Damage Protection, and is typically achieved through current-limiting devices such as current-limiting fuses. Therefore, since current-limiting devices are used, Type 2 starters can not only provide a means of reducing incident energy, but can also provide lower maintenance costs and less downtime because damage does not occur to the starter during a fault. Protection from Arc-flash The best protection against the dangers of arc-flash is to prevent exposure by not working on or near energized equipment. This is easily achieved through utilization and enforcement of documented lockout procedures as mandated by OSHA or MSHA. However, NFPA 70E recognizes that many circumstances may warrant working on equipment while energized, such as when deenergization would create additional hazards or would be infeasible due to equipment design or operational limitations. In cases when work must be performed on or near live parts, the following general requirements should be considered: Assign qualified worker(s) to the task. Train workers for the specific task they are undertaking. Keep workers not involved in the task outside the flash protection boundary. Limit the number of persons performing the work. Utilize appropriate PPE including fire resistant (FR) clothing for protection against arc-flash, and voltage rated gloves and/or leather protectors for protection against electrical shock.

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Importance of Protection The danger and corresponding injuries caused by an arc-flash have been with us since the implementation of electrical power systems. It is an ever-present danger for the personnel charged with their maintenance and operation of electrical systems. Many electrical maintenance activities involve work on energized equipment. Additionally, working on equipment when cubicle doors are open is a regular occurrence when voltage or current testing on energized circuit parts is required. Therefore, it is highly probable that electrical workers could be involved in arc-flash incidents. Injuries suffered by electrical workers are usually more severe than injuries suffered by workers of other trade classifications. Yet, at some facilities there is no electrical safety program implemented other than basic electrical safety training and lockout or tagout procedures. In addition to destroying electrical components, the effects of arc-faults can be highly destructive and devastating to the human body. Studies show 80 percent of documented electrical injury cases were burns resulting from exposure to electrical arc-flash [1]. Furthermore, more than 2,000 people are admitted annually to burn centers in the U.S. with severe electrical burns [1]. However, in addition to burn injuries, victims of arc-faults may also experience sight damage, hearing loss, and respiratory, muscular, skeletal, or nervous system impairments. With respect to the need for arc-fault flash hazard analysis, the NFPA has adopted specific requirements in its code standards. Article 110.16 Flash Protection was added to the 2002 edition of NFPA 70, National Electrical Code. It states that equipment that is likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance while energized shall be clearly and visibly labeled to warn persons of potential arc-flash hazard [2]. Additionally, the 2004 edition of NFPA 70E, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, states in Article 110.8(B)(1) that both a shock and arc-flash hazard analysis shall be completed prior to work on or near energized equipment. The results of the study shall determine the level of PPE required to perform the task [2]. Since most electrical equipment in industrial manufacturing or processing facilities will eventually require some sort of maintenance while energized, it is safe to assume that all equipment should be marked or labeled per NFPA 70 and 70E requirements. Overall, the importance of protection from arc-flash hazards, as well as reduction of incident energy is shown by the need to: Decrease hazards to workers. Avoid litigation expense which is often incurred after serious or fatal arc-flash events. Minimize process downtime. Minimize equipment damage when faults occur. Compliance with codes (OSHA, MSHA, NFPA). Meet any particular insurance requirements. Arc-Flash Study and Analysis There are relatively few steps involved in performing an arc-flash analysis, assuming that the required information is available for use by the engineer, and is up to date. The following is a list of pre-requisite information needed to complete an arc-flash analysis. I. Short-Circuit Analysis. To perform an arc-flash analysis the level of short-circuit current at several different points in an electrical system must be known, and the protective devices and their settings must be identified. Therefore, the results of a short-circuit analysis are often required. Modern plants may have this information available in a previously completed short-circuit study. The results of this study may be used for the arc-flash study. Still, the engineer should be cautious to review the validity of this information if significant changes have been made to the system since the study was completed. For those facilities without an existing short-circuit study available, one must be completed using the general information requirements as outlined below:

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1. One-Line Diagram(s). Industrial facilities are often in pursuit of increased production. Hence, modifications are made to electrical systems that differ greatly from their original design. Because of this, electrical systems can quickly become poorly documented, mis-coordinated, underrated, and misunderstood as to their exact makeup. Therefore, it is critical that sufficient time be spent collecting information about the structure of an electrical system. A complete and accurate one-line diagram creates an electrical picture of a facility by documenting the following: a. The various voltage levels in a plant from Medium Voltage (i.e. 13.8kV / 4.16kV) down to Low Voltage (i.e. 480V / 120V). b. Equipment types such as MV and LV Substations, Switchgear, MCCs, Transformers, and Panelboards, and their corresponding locations in the distribution system. c. Rating information about the electrical distribution equipment such as fuse types and sizes, circuit breaker frame and trip ratings, short-circuit interrupting capacities, and transformer impedances. d. OCPD types, locations, ratings, and clearing times. 2. Protective Device Information. Detailed information about the protective devices used in an electrical system is equally important as an accurate one-line diagram. This includes information such as: a. Device type: Electro-mechanical or Microprocessor based relays, circuit breakers, fuses, etc. b. Device manufacturer and model or part numbers. c. Existing protective device trip settings (i.e. LT, ST, Inst, etc., and/or CB/fuse curves). 3. Cable and Raceway Information. An electrical cable has an inherent impedance determined mainly by size (diameter) and length. The cable impedance, along with transformer impedance, affects the level of short-circuit current at a given point in the system. The types of raceways cables are installed in, magnetic or non-magnetic, can also affect the short-circuit current. One-line diagrams often show cable sizes, but may or may not indicate length or installed raceway type. Therefore, it is important to survey this type of information as it is supplemental to the one-line diagram and corresponding shortcircuit analysis. 4. Identify Possible System Operating Modes: Facilities configured as main-tie-main or similar can be potentially problematic when the tie and both mains are closed concurrently. Configuration of the electrical system in this manner is usually only used when required to start large motors. However, placing both transformers in parallel causes the available short-circuit current to increase significantly. Since most plants do not operate continuously in this manner, it is likely not a valid consideration. This should be confirmed by verification with people knowledgeable about the normal operation of the plant. Once the above information has been collected, the engineer can complete a short-circuit analysis using traditional hand calculations or more often by using one of the many commercially available software packages. The main purpose of a short-circuit analysis is to determine that a facilitys electrical equipment and cabling have been applied within their short-circuit ratings. The output of the short-circuit study forms the basis of the arc-flash study as described below. II. Perform an Overcurrent Protection Coordination Study. It is common practice to perform an OCPD coordination study after completion of a short-circuit analysis. Coordination studies are performed to allow OCPDs closest to an electrical fault to open first, thereby limiting electrical outages to affected circuits only. The study output determines required fuse types, circuit breaker settings, and protective relay settings to achieve best coordination. Breaker and relay settings can directly impact the results of an arc-flash study as they often involve the use of short time delay, long time delay, and instantaneous settings to allow lower level OCPDs to open the circuit first. III. Perform Shock Hazard Analysis. In addition to arc-flash analysis, Article 110.8(B)(1)(a) in NFPA 70E requires a shock hazard analysis to determine the voltage to which personnel will be exposed, boundary requirements, and the personal protective equipment (PPE) necessary in order to minimize the possibility of electric shock. The shock protection boundaries are determined by the nominal system voltage that a piece of equipment is rated for.

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Table 130.2(C) in NFPA 70E defines approach boundaries to live parts for shock protection at various nominal system voltages. There are three approach boundaries defined: Limited, restricted, and prohibited. The limited approach boundary sets the limit where the potential for shock hazard begins. The restricted approach boundary is the limit where there is an increased risk of shock due to the possibility of an electrical arc. The prohibited approach boundary is the distance limit where work is considered to be the same as being in contact with live parts. Inspection of Table 130.2(C) shows that for a typical secondary unit-substation operating at 480V, the approach boundaries would be limited to 10 feet for exposed movable conductors, and 3 feet 6 inches for exposed fixed circuit parts, restricted at 1 foot, and prohibited at 1 inch. Generally, only qualified personnel should be inside the restricted approach boundary. However, Article 130.2(D)(2) permits unqualified personnel to be inside the limited approach boundary as long as they are outside the restricted approach boundary and escorted by qualified personnel at all times. IV. Perform Arc-Flash Analysis. Once the levels of short-circuit current have been determined, and the OCPD types and settings have been determined, use this information to determine the following at each possible arc-fault location: 1. Flash Protection Boundary. The flash protection boundary is defined as the distance from live parts within which a person could receive a second degree burn during an arc-flash event. NFPA 70E Article 130.3(A) states that for systems 600V or less the flash protection boundary is 4 feet for systems not exceeding the combined clearing time and bolted fault current of 300kA cycles. Alternately, NFPA 70E permits the flash protection boundary to be calculated according to the formulas listed in Article 130.3(A) if the combined clearing time and bolted fault current is greater than 300kA cycles, or the calculations are performed under engineering supervision. The formulae as shown in NFPA 70E are based upon the work of Ralph Lee outlined in a technical paper titled The other electrical hazard: Electrical arc-blast burns [8]. 2. Incident Energy. NFPA 70E defines incident energy as the amount of energy impressed on a surface (person) generated during an electrical arc event at a specific distance from the arc source. Incident energy is often measured in calories per square centimeter (cal/cm2), and is primarily determined by the amount of available fault current and the amount of time it takes for the OCPD to clear the fault. Incident energies are needed to determine the required minimum PPE. Alternatively, Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) Hazard Risk Category Classifications, can be used to determine the Hazard/Risk Category for a given task. Conversely, if the specific task to be performed is not listed in the table, or the available short-circuit current is greater than the assumptions included with the table, or the assumed clearing times are longer for the particular OCPD, the incident energy should be calculated. Calculations to determine incident energy can be made using the examples in Annex D in NFPA 70E or by utilizing other calculation methods such as those provided by IEEE 1584-2002 [9]. IEEE 1584 includes an excel spreadsheet that performs arc-flash analysis calculations. Alternatively, there are commercially available software packages that calculate incident energy and determine required minimum PPE, with their calculations based on the formulae included in IEEE 1584. Two general examples of program outputs and arc-flash warning labels are included in the attached annex. 3. Hazard/Risk Category and Required PPE. Table 130.7(C)(10) in NFPA 70E indicates the specific clothing and equipment characteristics for a given Hazard/Risk category. Table 130.7(C)(11) shows the corresponding minimum arc rating associated with a given hazard/risk category. So, if the incident energy is known through calculation, the minimum PPE rating can be selected in table 130.7(C)(11), and then the associated Hazard/Risk Category can be reviewed in table 130.7(C)(10) to determine the exact PPE requirements. V. Review Design Changes. Examine suggested design changes to reduce incident energy on a plantwide basis. This can be achieved through updating short-circuit and arc-flash analyses based on selected changes, and reviewing the results.

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Putting Study Results to Use The following general steps can be used to implement the results of an arc-flash study. 1. Label equipment so that personnel will recognize the presence of possible arc-flash. 2. Train personnel how to interpret labels and what actions should be taken by them to protect themselves against the devastating effects of arc-flash. 3. Implement an electrical safety program that addresses when and how to work on energized equipment per guidelines in NFPA 70E. 4. Review possible electrical system design changes and their corresponding effect on incident energy exposure levels. 5. Create an action plan for approved design changes to reduce incident energy and improve personnel safety. Conclusion Much research and testing has been completed in recent years studying the effects of arc-flash as well as ways to reduce incident energy. Additionally, code standards such as NFPA 70 and NFPA 70E have adopted new requirements to warn personnel of the presence of arc-flash, as well as provide information that the electrical worker can use to select appropriate personal protection equipment. It is becoming more apparent that facilities should implement workplace safety programs including those that educate, train, and protect workers against arc-flash. Furthermore, electrical system planners, designers, and engineers should work closely together to implement means of reducing incident energy through appropriate electrical design changes. References [1] Safety BASICs, Handbook for Electrical Safety, Bussmann Awareness of Safety Issues Campaign, Edition 2, Cooper Bussmann, 2004. [2] Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, NFPA 70E, 2004. [3] IEEE Recommended Practice for Cement Plant Power Distribution, IEEE Std. 277-1975. [4] IEEE Recommended Practice for Cement Plant Power Distribution, IEEE Std. 277-1994. [5] R.L. Doughty, T.E. Neal, T.L. Macalady, V. Saporita, and K. Borgwald, The use of low-voltage current-limiting fuses to reduce arc-flash energy, IEEE Transactions On Industry Applications, vol. 36, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 2000. [6] Tim Crnko, Steve Dyrnes, Arcing flash/blast review with safety suggestions for design and maintenance, in IEEE Pulp and Paper Industry Technical Conference Record, June 2000, pp. 118-126. [7] National Electrical Code, NFPA 70, 2005. [8] R.H. Lee, The other electrical hazard: Electrical arc-blast burns, IEEE Transactions On Industry Applications, vol. IA-18, No. 3, May/June 1982. [9] Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, IEEE 1584-2002. ANNEX Attached are two general examples of program outputs and arc-flash warning labels that are available through commercially available arc-flash analysis software packages. 1. 1000kVA (5.75%) secondary unit-substation, with secondary switchgear breaker feeding an MCC, with a total load of 500Hp. 2. 1000kVA (5.75%) secondary unit-substation, with secondary fused switch feeding an MCC, with a total load of 500Hp

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