People Vs. Judge Ayson 175 SCRA 216 G.R. No.

85215 July 7, 1989 Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused. Held: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted in court. Facts: In order to determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the killing of Sen Aquino at MIA, PD 1886 was

promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board aka the Agrava Board. The board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the board. Among those who testified and produced evidence before the board are the respondents in this petition. Respondents contend that their individual testimonies before said board should not be admitted in evidence and prayed that the same be rejected as evidence for the prosecution. However, said prayer was denied by the Sandiganbayan contending that their testimonies could not be excluded because the immunity was not available to them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the ad hoc Fact Finding Board. Issue: 1. WON the testimonies given by the 8 respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board is admissible in evidence. Held: 1. NO. The Board is in truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible therefore so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort, to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. In the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his participation therein. This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or

be witnesses against themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or refused to do so. The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and protected by our fundamental law. Both these constitutional rights to remain silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by them. Issue: 2. WON the right against self incrimination extends to testimonies given before the Agrava board and not to an investigating officer Held: YES. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. If in a mere forfeiture case where only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the balance. The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to the herein private respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in its strictest sense, a criminal case. Immunity Statutes:

1. One which grants Use Immunity prohibits use of witness' compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the witness. 2. One which grants Transactional Immunity - grants immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates. It is beyond dispute that said law belongs
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to the first type of immunity statutes (Use Immunity). It grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution notwithstanding his invocation of the right against selfincrimination. He is merely saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated otherwise, he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right against selfincrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due process, demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them. The provision on self incrimination renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. As herein earlier discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only to confessions but also to admissions, whether made by a witness in any proceeding or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the commission of an offense. Summary: As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered. Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its desired results the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law practically strips away from the witness.

PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA [242 SCRA 565; G.R. NO.112983; 22 MAR 1994] Facts: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, Teresita Mendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw the two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked them for directions. Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such document. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case." Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa. Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence. Held: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so. The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because the information has been filed and a warrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights

are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial admission is inadmissible as evidence. As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state witness; and as to the other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible. Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC: Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.

GAMBOA VS. CRUZ [162 SCRA 642;L56291; 27 JUN 1988] Facts: Petitioner was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. During a line-up of 5 detainees including petitioner, he was identified by a complainant to be a companion in a robbery, thereafter he was charged. Petitioner filed a Motion to Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the line-up, without notice and in the absence of his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and to due process. The court denied said motion. Hearing was set, hence the petition. Issue: Whether or Not petitioners right to counsel and due process violated. Held: No. The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel. He had not been held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous
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at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel. On the right to due process, petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a counsel. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. People vs G.R. Nos. August 25, 2000 Facts: The trial court convicted the accused of murder. Among the evidence the trial court relied upon were the confession of the accused. The accused argued that their confession were inadmissible in evidence, since they were not informed of their constitutional right and contests the independence and competence of Atty. Filemon Corpuz (counsel for Itass) on the ground that said lawyer was a military lawyer. Issue: Whether or not accused-appellants were informed of their constitutional right to counsel? Held: Yes. We have consistently declared in a string of cases that the advice or "Paliwanag" found at the beginning of extrajudicial confessions that merely enumerate to the accused his custodial rights do not meet the standard provided by law. They are terse and perfunctory statements that do not evince a clear and sufficient effort to inform and explain to the appellant his constitutional rights. We emphasized that when the constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his rights to remain silent and to have an independent and competent counsel preferably of his own choice, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. In other words, the right of a person under investigation "to be informed" implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police Continente 100801-02

investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding of what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right. In the case of People vs. Jara, we declared that: "This stereotyped "advice" appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are later repudiated has assumed the nature of a "legal form" or model. Police investigators either automatically type it together with the curt "Opo" as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or even copy it in their own handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed, and artificially stately style does not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused. The showing of a spontaneous, free, and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing." Appellants Continente and Itaas may not validly repudiate the counsels who rendered them legal assistance during their respective investigations as biased and incompetent. It must be emphasized that both appellants never signified their desire to have lawyers of their own choice. In any case, it has been ruled that while the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of the lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. PEOPLE VS. BOLANOS 211 SCRA 262; G.R. NO. 101808; 3 JUL 1992 Facts: Oscar Pagdalian was murdered in Marble Supply, Balagtas Bulacan. According to Pat. Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao, deceased was with two companions on the previous night, one of whom the accused who had a drinking spree with the deceased. When they apprehended the accused they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair where the accused was allegedly seated. They boarded accused along with Magtibay, other accused on the police vehicle and brought them to the police station. While in the vehicle Bolanos admitted that he killed the deceased.

RTC convicted him hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or Not accused-appellant deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of his right. Held: Yes. Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, more particularly par. 1 and par. 3. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. xxxx (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. LUIS A. TABUENA vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Facts: In a Presidential Memorandum (the Marcos Memorandum) dated Jan. 6, 1986, President Marcos allegedly commanded petitioner Tabuena, in his capacity as General Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), to pay immediately the Philippine National Construction Corporation, thru this Office (Office of the President), the sum P55M in cash as partial payment of MIAAs account with said company mentioned in a Memorandum of (Trade and Industry) Minister Robert Ongpin to this Office dated Jan. 7,1985 Tabuena withdrew the sum of 55M on three separate occasions (25M, 25M, 5M with Adolfo Peralta) and delivered them to Gimenez, Marcoss private secretary.
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It is without dispute that Tabuena did not follow the normal procedures in withdrawal and delivery of the money (no disbursement slips and paid in cold cash). Tabuena was only issued a receipt after the third delivery and it did not mention anything about the purpose of the receipt or the money being used to pay PNCC, but merely acknowledged that Gimenez had received the sum of 55M from Tabuena on three occasions. Furthermore, there was no receipt from the PNCC recognizing payment of debt. Prosecution: there were no standing obligations in favor of the PNCC at the time of disbursement of 55M. PNCC said themselves that they didnt receive the P55M. Tabuena claimed that he was only complying with the direct order of Marcos (plus the Marcos memorandum which contained same order) to immediately forward to the office of the President, 55M in cash, as partial payment of MIAAs obligations to PNCC and that he believed that MIAA indeed had those liabilities to PNCC. In short, that Tabuena acted in good faith. Sandiganbayan rejected Tabuenas claim of good faith and found him guilty of malversation by negligence, hence this case. Issue: WON there was violation of due process in the trial of the Petitioner Held: Yes compelling reason for their acquittal is the violation of the accused's basic constitutional right to due process. "Respect for the Constitution", to borrow once again Mr. Justice Cruz's words, "is more important than securing a conviction based on a violation of the 35 While going rights of the accused." over the records, we were struck by the way the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised this as an error, there is nevertheless no impediment for us to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not. But more importantly, we note that

the questions of the court were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing 40 (The insinuating type and insinuation. was best exemplified in one question addressed to Peralta, which will be underscored.) Thus we beg to quote in length from the transcripts pertaining to witness Monera, Tabuena and Peralta This Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. 44 But not only should his examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions, 45 the right should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible, neither interfering nor 46 intervening in the conduct of the trial. Here, these limitations were not observed. Hardly in fact can one avoid the impression that the Sandiganbayan had allied itself with, or to be more precise, had taken the cudgels for the prosecution in proving the case against Tabuena and Peralta when the Justices cross-examined the witnesses, their cross- examinations supplementing those made by Prosecutor Viernes and far exceeding the latter's questions in length. The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of magistrate and advocate. In this connection, the observation made in the Dissenting Opinion to the effect that the majority of this Court was "unduly disturbed" with the number of court questions alone, is quite inaccurate. A substantial portion of the TSN was incorporated in the majority opinion not to focus on "numbers" alone, but more importantly to show that the court questions were in the interest of the prosecution and which thus depart from that common standard of fairness and impartiality. In fact, it is very difficult to be, upon review of the records, confronted with "numbers" without necessarily realizing the partiality of the Court.
MEJIA VS PAMARAN

Issue: Whether or not respondent court acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the guaranty of due process of law as it has neither been created as mandated by the Constitution nor constituted as conceived by the decree for its creation Held: No. The Court ruled on the issue by citing the case of Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan when it held: It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos to create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such competence under the 1973 Constitution contemplated that such an act should the National Assembly the 1976 Amendments made clear come from the National Assembly that he as incumbent President" shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted. Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality of such lawmaking authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, ... . As the opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already eating in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law. ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001 Facts: Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659, wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal
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Facts: The Sandiganbayan found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). Petitioner took advantage of her position as branch clerk of court by persuading the offended parties Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista to deliver to her the sums of P 1,000.00 and P500.00, respectively, in consideration of a promise that petitioner will get a favorable resolution of their cases in court. Meimban and Bautista were defendants in separate ejectment cases.

Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Issue: WON the Plunder Law requires less evidence for providing the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process Held: No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. The reasonable doubt standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due Process Clause, which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof of reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime chargedthe element of the offense. Relative to petitioners contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that pattern is a very important element of the crime of plunder; and that Sec. 4 is two-pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime, such that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder. Petitioners contention is untenable. All the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to sec. 1 par. (d). Sec. 4 purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operated in

furtherance of a remedy. What is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. DUMLAO VS. COMELEC [95 SCRA 392; L-52245; 22 JAN 1980] Facts: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provicial or municipal official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact. Issue: Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void Held: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the need for new blood in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and

counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code). And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. People vs Burton G.R. No. 114396. February 19, 1997

Facts: Appellant, a British national, was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, for attempting to transport 5.6 kilograms of hashish, a prohibited drug, through the Ninoy Aquino International Airport. Though caught in flagrante delicto, he denies criminal liability therefor on the novel ground that he was not aware that his traveling bags contained the prohibited drug. He also challenges the credibility of the lawmen who apprehended him. The trial court convicted him. The main thesis of the defense is that it was not proven that appellant knew
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that the bags he had checked in at the airport contained a prohibited drug. Appellant further claims that the trial court misunderstood his defense to be lack of criminal intent in carrying the prohibited drug instead of lack of knowledge that he was carrying it. Appellant explains that the trial court confused malice or criminal intent, which is unimportant in malum prohibitum, and animus possidendi or intent to possess a prohibited drug, which is an element of illegal transportation of a prohibited drug. The prosecutions evidence was allegedly overcome by appellants testimony that he bought the luggage and shoes from a certain John Parry without knowing that they concealed hashish. In any event, he challenges the prosecutions evidence, particularly the testimony of Zuo, as unworthy of credence. Issue: Whether or contentions deserve decision. Held: No. Under the Rules of Evidence (Sec. 3[j], Rule 131, Rules of Court), things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him. Such disputable presumption is based upon the principle that direct proof of facts of this nature is rarely available, except in cases of confession. In several cases, the Court has held that possession of a considerable quantity of marijuana cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said prohibited [22] drug. Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular [23] case. In prosecutions involving prohibited drugs, the state has a right to specify what proofs shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and thereafter to place upon the accused the burden of showing that his act or acts are innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or [24] intention. not appellants a reversal of

The existence of animus possidendi is only prima facie. Thus, it is subject to contrary proof and may be rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did not [25] intend to do so. The constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be (a) purely [26] arbitrary mandate. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi. A mere uncorroborated claim of the accused that he did not know that he had a prohibited drug in his possession is insufficient. Any evasion, false statement, or attempt at concealment on his part, in explaining how the drug came into his possession, may be considered [27] in determining his guilt. Under the facts obtaining in this case, the 5.6 kilos of hashish cleverly and painstakingly concealed inside appellants luggage and rubber shoes can be said to be in the possession and control of appellant with his knowledge. Not only were the blocks and bars of the prohibited drug of a considerable amount, but they were placed inside three different objects in order to escape detection by the authorities. The Court also finds incredible appellants allegation that he had no idea that the luggage and rubber shoes he purchased from a certain John Parry contained prohibited drugs. Even the alleged transaction between them is dubious. Appellant claims that he had paid Parry P10,000.00 for the two pieces of luggage, clothes, camera, tape recorder, and Reebok rubber shoes which Parry would redeem from appellant in Australia. Appellant explains that this transaction, which brought no benefit or advantage to him, was more of a loan, an act of charity, to Parry who was raising money for his plane fare. However, appellant also admits that Parry was only a casual acquaintance whom he had met for about five to six times only. Thus, it is unbelievable for anyone, much less appellant who was unemployed and was relying only on the P6,000.00-per-month trust fund proceeds, to be so generous as to shell out such an amount to a mere acquaintance. Furthermore, this purchase was suspiciously made only hours prior to appellants apprehension at the airport. Appellants explanation, as a whole, is undeserving of credence as it is contrary to common experience. It

leaves us with no other conclusion than that the animus possidendi did in fact exist at the time of the arrest. Corpuz v People 194 SCRA 73 (1991) Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision finding him guilty for malversation of public funds. The accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial Treasurers office. He denied having misused the whole amount of P72,823.08 which was discovered to be a shortage from the government funds contending that the P50,000.00 was the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post said amount in his cash book despite not actually receiving the amount. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the accused of the charge against him Held: Yes. The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced, in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached. It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive findings that he malversed the government funds considering all the evidences presented that point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him. Records shows that the checks issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and there were inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not really on leave on the day the said checks were disbursed by the paymaster. People vs Olive Mamaril G.R. No. 171980 October 6, 2010 Facts: During the search in accused-appellants house, SPO4 Gotidoc found on the top cover of the refrigerator one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Thereafter he prepared a
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Certificate of Good Search and Confiscation Receipt which the appellant refused to sign. The plastic sachet was brought to the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory located at Tarlac Provincial Hospital for qualitative examination. The examination conducted by Engr. Marcene G. Agala, the Forensic Chemist who tested the white crystalline substance, yielded positive results for 0.055 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu, a dangerous [9] drug. The trial court found the accusedappellant guilty of violation of Section 11, Article II, of R.A. 9165 and so did the CA. In this appeal, accused-appellant, through her new counsel from the Public Attorneys Office, goes further back, presenting new arguments, that (1) the search warrant was not based on probable cause, hence, the evidence allegedly obtained through it may not be admitted to support the accused[18] appellants conviction; and (2) the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers cannot prevail over the [19] presumption of innocence.

primacy of the constitutional presumption of innocence over the presumption of regularity in the performance of public [26] functions, the contention being that the frame-up argument is supported by the constitutional presumption of innocence. The argument is without merit. Indeed it is a constitutional [27] in all criminal mandate that prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and that on the other hand, it [28] is in the Rules of Court that. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence: xxx m. That official duty has been regularly performed; (Emphasis supplied) xxx

changes as to the lawyers assigned to the accused. Issue: Whether the accused was denied his constitutional right to effective and vigilant counsel. Ruling: In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been adduced, it is also essential that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental nights.This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not properly and effectively been accorded the right to counsel. It is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment. An accused must be given the right to be represented by counsel for, unless so represented, there is great danger that any defense presented in his behalf will be as inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process, which basically means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he should also be asked whether he wants to avail himself of one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so desires or that one can be provided to him at his request. Let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis of the complaint. Feeder International Line PTE, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals [GR 94262, 31 May 1991] Facts:

Issue: Whether or not, in this case, said presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by public officers cannot prevail over the presumption of innocence Held: No. The repeated contentions of [23] frame-up of the accused-appellant and that the dangerous drug of methamphetamine hydrochloride was planted by the police officers do not deserve further considerations by this Court. While We are aware that in some cases, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence in order that to, inter alia, harass, nevertheless the defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the police officers performed their duties regularly and that they acted within the [24] bounds of their authority. Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by the Court because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. It is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the [25] And so is Dangerous Drugs Act. the likewise repeated referral to the

In the case at hand, the socalled frame-up was virtually pure allegation bereft of credible proof. The [29] narration of the police officer who implemented the search warrant, was found after trial and appellate review as the true story. It is on firmer ground than the self-serving statement of the [30] The accused-appellant of frame-up. defense cannot solely rely upon the constitutional presumption of innocence for, while it is constitutional, the presumption is not conclusive. Notably, the accused-appellant herself stated in [31] her brief that no proof was proffered by the accused-appellant of the police officers alleged ill motive. Stated otherwise, the narration of the incident by law enforcers, buttressed by the presumption that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary, must be given weight. RIGHT TO INFORMATION (Art. III, Sec 7)- Right to be Informed People vs. Bermas (April 21, 1999) Facts: The accused was found guilty of the crime of rape. There were a number of

The M/T "ULU WAI" a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on 6 May 1986 carrying 1,100 metric tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to
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Far East Synergy Corporation of Zamboanga, Philippines. On 14 May 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the area. Acting on said information, the Acting District Collector of Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on 19 May 1986 to verify the report. The Customs team found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing the vessel for "Zamboan." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation. Feeder International Line PTE Ltd, through its agent Feeder International (Phils.) Inc. then filed its Motion to Dismiss and to Quash the Warrants of Seizure and Detention which the District Collector denied in his Order dated 12 December 1986. In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties, through their respective counsel, agreed on a stipulation of facts. On 17 March 1987, the District Collector issued his decision, finding the M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T Fuel Oil are found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and are hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. Feeder International appealed to the Commissioner of Customs who rendered a decision dated 13 May 1987, affirming the decisin of the District Collector of Customs of Iloilo in toto. On 25 June 1987, Feeder International filed a petition for review of the decisions of the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs with the Court of Tax Appeals, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or a restraining order to enjoin the Commissioner from implementing his decision. On 14 December 1988, the Court of Tax Appeals issued its decision affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs. Feeder International, on 19 January 1990, filed a petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals' decision with the Supreme Court. On 21 March 1990, the Supreme Court issued a resolution referring the disposition of the case to the Court of Appeals in view of the Court's decision in Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al. holding that final judgments or decrees of the Court of Tax Appeals are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. On 8 May 1990, the Court of Appeals rendered its questioned decision

affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. Feeder International's motion for reconsideration having been denied on 4 July 1990, it interposed the present petition. Issue: Whether a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature, and whether the corporation can invoke the right to be presumed innocent. Held: A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to the argument advanced by Feeder International. In the case of People vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., the Court made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture proceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, holding therein that "seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed. Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. The degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case. Herein, the Court finds and so hold that the Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at least an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Feeder International is guilty of illegal importation, there having been an intent to unload, is amply supported by substantial evidence. The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are in

consonance with the findings of both the Collector and the Commissioner of Customs, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court finds no compelling reason to deviate from the elementary principle that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, and of the administrative and quasi-judicial bodies for that matter, are entitled to great weight and are conclusive and binding upon this Court absent a showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. PEOPLE VS. HOLGADO [85 PHIL 752; G.R.L-2809; 22 MAR 1950] Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter. Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court. Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard by counsel. The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became
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satisfied with the fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court. People vs. Valdesancho GR 13705152, 30 May 2001 Facts: Two informations were filed against the accused Valdesancho for rape committed on August 15 and 16, 1994. The entire evidence of the prosecution, including the testimony of Elvie, showed that Elvie was allegedly raped by the accused on said dates while living in the latter's house. Contrary to the prosecution's evidence, the defense convincingly showed that in August 1994, Elvie was already in Grade 2 at the Barangay Minayutan Elementary School and living with her brothers in Minayutan. Nonetheless, the trial court convicted the accused of two counts of rape committed on August 15 and 16, 1993, instead of August 15 and 16, 1994 as alleged in the information and in the prosecution's evidence. Issue: Whether Valdesancho was denied due process when he was convicted for rapes alleged committed August 15 and 16, 1993, when the information alleged such rapes were committed on August 15 and 16, 1994. Held: Yes. Article III, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that no person shall be held liable for a criminal offense without due process of law. It further provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. Similarly, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, which took effect on December 1, 2000, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, it is the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To convict an accused for an offense not

alleged in the complaint or information 26 violates such right. The rationale behind informing the accused in writing of the charges against him was explained by this Court as early 27 as 1904 in U.S. v. Karelsen, viz: "First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542). In order that this requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstances necessary to 28 constitute the crime charged." In the cases at bar, the informations in Criminal Case No. S-1964 and Criminal Case No. S-1965 charged the accused with rape committed against Elvie Basco on August 15, 1994 and August 16, 1994, respectively. All evidence of the prosecution tried to prove that the victim was raped by the accused on these dates. The accused interposed the defense of alibi. He proved that on these dates he was in the town of Sta. Maria helping a friend butcher a pig for the town fiesta. He also proved that on said dates, the victim, Elvie, was no longer living with them in Mabitac, Laguna. She already transferred to Minayutan, Famy, Laguna where she was in Grade 2. Despite the parties' evidence, the trial court convicted the accused for allegedly raping Elvie on August 15 and 16, 1993. Without doubt, the accused was not given any chance to prove where he was on August 15 and 16, 1993. What he did was to prove where he was on August 15 and 16, 1994 for the informations charged him with rapes on those specific dates. He had no opportunity to defend himself on the rapes allegedly committed on the earlier dates. This is plain denial of due process.

Facts: The defendant was accused of the crime of embezzlement while acting as postmaster and having in his charge public funds, withdrew for his own use and benefit the sum of $1,000, gold currency of the United States. The said accused presented a demurrer to the said complaint, alleging that the amount of the funds alleged does not appear in the complaint and neither does there appear a description of said funds in a manner that an intelligent person can identify them. The court overruled the said demurrer and the accused was convicted. Issue: Whether or not the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature of accusation against him was violated. Held: No. If personal property is the subject of the offense, it must be described with certainty, and in those cases in which its value is material the value must be stated. If the descriptive terms used are sufficient in their common and ordinary acceptation to show with certainty to the common understanding of intelligent men what the property was and to fully identify it they will be sufficient. In other words, the description of property in such cases is subject to the rule that the law only requires such certainly as the nature of the property and the circumstances will permit. A less degree of certainly is required in the description of the of the offense when the facts which constitute it lie more particularly within the knowledge of the defendant. A complaint for the crime of embezzlement ought to state the description of the property embezzled with the same particularity as is required in a complaint for larceny. But in the case of larceny the property was in the possession of the owner, and he is presumed to know its particular description, while in embezzlement where the offense is committed by a person in the course of a long, continuous employment as a clerk, cashier, or postmaster, who is daily receiving and disbursing large sums of money, a description of the pieces of denominations of the money is absolutely
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US vs KARELSEN

impossible. In such a case, if his accounts are correctly kept, the only description which can be made is by a general statement of the amount which his books disclose. Is it to be argued that a cashier, for example, who daily embezzles sums of money for months is to be discharged from liability simply because the prosecution can not give a minute description by piece or denomination of all the money so misappropriated? England has taken advanced ground upon this question, and by the seventh and eight George IV, chapter 29, section 48, enacted that it shall be sufficient to allege embezzlement to be of money without specifying any particular coin or valuable security, etc. In the present case the books of the accused showed that he had the sum of $1,046.64, gold, United States currency, belonging to the Post-Officce Department on the 1st day of April, 1903. He is charged with embezzling $1,000, gold, legal money of the United States. This allegation is in substance in the terms of his own accounts, and we fail to see how he can in any way misunderstand the allegation or be confused in making his defense under it. PEOPLE VS CRISOLOGO Facts: On 6 April 1983, the accused through a counsel de oficio waived the reading of the information and pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded without any evidence being presented on his part. Finally, on 10 February 1986, without the services of an expert in sign language ever being utilized at any stage of the proceedings, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and sentenced to die by electrocution. Executive clemency was recommended, however, in view of the accuseds infirmity and his nearly tenyear detention as a suspect. Counsel for the accused and the Solicitor-General now ask for the reversal of the judgment of conviction due to the failure of the trial court to safeguard the accuseds right to due process of law and the insufficiency of the purely circumstantial evidence presented to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused Issue: Whether or not accused constitutional rights was violated due to lack of interpreter in the arraignment. Held:

Yes, The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the accused his fundamental right to due process of law. 1 The accuracy and fairness of the factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him 2 in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake. . In the absence of an interpreter it would be a physical impossibility for the accused, a deaf-mute, to know or to understand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and, as here, he could only stand by helplessly, take his medicine, or whatever may be coming to him, without knowing or understanding, and all this in the teeth of the mandatory constitutional rights which apply to an unfortunate afflicted deafmute, just as it does to every person accused of a violation of the criminal law. In other words the physical infirmity of this appellant can in no sense lessen his rights under the Constitution, and, in the proper administration of its laws, this great and sovereign state must and will accord the means by which its citizens, humble and afflicted though they may be, shall receive all the rights, benefits and privileges which the Constitution, laws, regulations, and rules of practice provide. 4 The basic constitutional infirmity alone in the conduct of the case against the accused is, in our candid assessment, fatal to the judgment of conviction meted out against him. SORIANO VS SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Tan was accused of qualified theft. The petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal, was assigned to investigate. In the course of the investigation, petitioner demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price for dismissing the case. Tan reported it to the NBI which set up an entrapment. Tan was given a Php.2000, marked bill, and he had supplied the other half. The entrapment succeeded and an information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the petitioner guilty as a principal in violating the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A motion for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan, hence this instant petition.

Issue: Whether or not respondent cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of as constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Held: NO, A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed. The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the offense charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended. The prosecution showed that: the accused is a public officer; in consideration of P4,000.00 which was allegedly solicited, P2,000.00 of which was allegedly received, the petitioner undertook or promised to dismiss a criminal complaint pending preliminary investigation before him, which may or may not constitute a crime; that the act of dismissing the criminal complaint pending before petitioner was related to the exercise of the function of his office. PEOPLE vs FLORES Facts: For automatic review before the Supreme Court is the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated April 7, 1997 finding accused-appellant Pedro Flores Jr. alias "Pesiong" guilty of two counts of rape of his then 11 year old daughter and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death in each. The complaints against accusedappellant filed on February 3, 1997 read as follows: Criminal Case No. U-9184: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
1

The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y FLORES for the crime of "RAPE", committed as follows:
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That on the 9th day of December 1996, in the morning at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, all against her will. Criminal Case No. U-9185: CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
2

The right cannot be waived for reasons of public policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have been committed. For an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the complaint or information. The essence of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse between a man and a woman under the circumstances enumerated in the penal code. Thus, to sustain a conviction, the complaint or information must allege that the accused had carnal knowledge of or sexual intercourse with the private complainant. In the criminal complaints at bar, however, no such allegation was made. The allegation that accusedappellant "sexually abuse[d]" the private complainant cannot thus be read to mean that accused-appellant had carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse with the private complainant. The recital of facts in the criminal complaints simply does not properly charge rape, "sexual abuse" not being an essential element or ingredient thereof. Neither can accused-appellant be convicted of acts of lasciviousness or of any offense for that matter under our penal laws. It is settled that what characterizes the charge is the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. For every crime is made up of certain acts and intent which must be set forth in the complaint or information with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant), and circumstances. In other words, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged, the accused being presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. CONDE VS. RIVERA G.R. No. 21741 January 25, 1924 Facts: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been forced to respond to no less the five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year

from the time when the first information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged. Issue: Whether or Not petitioner has been denied her right to a speedy and impartial trial. Held: Yes. Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

The undersigned, FILIPINA FLORES Y LAZO, 11 years old, grade three pupil and a resident of Sitio Buenlag, Brgy. Nancamaliran West, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, under oath, hereby accuses PEDRO FLORES, JR., Y FLORES, ALIAS "PESYONG", committed as follows: That on the 28th day of December 1996, in the evening at Sitio Buenlag, Brgy Nancamaliran West, Municipality of Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloniously sexually abuse the herein complaining witness FILIPINA FLORES, an 11 years old and daughter of the herein accused with the use of sharp pointed bladed weapon and all against her will. Issue: Whether or not the accusedappellant has been denied of the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him Held: Yes. This right has the following objectives: 1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make the defense; 2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against further prosecution for the same cause; 3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had.

MARTIN vs GEN. FABIAN VER Facts: This is a petition for habeas corpus filed by Eulalia Martin on behalf of her husband, Pvt. Francisco Martin. Pvt. Martin was an enlisted man in the Philippine Army. On or about April 14, 1981, when he was still in the service, he allegedly sold two grenades to one Rogelio Cruz at P50.00 each, one of which exploded during a picnic in Laoag City on April 17, 1981 causing the death of three persons, including Rogelio Cruz, and injuries to three others. On May 5, 1981, Pvt. Martin was arrested and confined (restricted to barracks) at Fort Bonifacio pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, infra. The following year, he was discharged from the service effective as of May 5, 1982. On November 17, 1982 the instant petition was filed. The following month, i.e., December 3, 1982, Pvt. Martin was charged for violation of the 85th and 97th Articles of War. The petitioner claims that he has been denied his constitutional right of speedy trial because the charges against him were filed only about 1 year and 7 months after his arrest.
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Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has been denied of his constitutional right to speedy trial Held: No. As stated by the Supreme Court in a per curiam decision: "x... the test of violation of the right to speedy trial has always been to begin counting the delay from the time the information is filed, not before the filing. The delay in the filing of the information, which in the instant case has not been without reasonable cause, is therefore not to be reckoned with in determining whether there has been a denial of the right to speedy trial." (People vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226 at 236.) At any rate, whether or not one has been denied speedy trial is not susceptible to precise quantification. At best, the constitutional right of speedy trial is relative, consistent with reasonable delays, taking into account the circumstances of each case. As expressed in Barker vs. Wingo, 33 L. Ed 2d 101: ... the right to a speedy trial is a more vague and generically different concept than other constitutional rights guaranteed to accused persons and cannot be quantified into a specified number of days or months, and it is impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the judicial process when the right must be asserted or considered waived ... ... a claim that a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial is subject to a balancing test, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and courts should consider such factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion or nonassertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay, in determining whether defendant's right to a speedy trial has been denied ... In the case at hand, the criminal act imputed to the petitioner unfortunately resulted in the death of three persons (including Rogelio Cruz who allegedly bought the hand grenades from the petitioner) and very serious injuries to three others whose testimony is vital to the preferment of charges and prosecution of the petitioner. It is therefore not unreasonable to heed the claim of respondents that the delay complained of was occasioned by the

unavailability of witnesses, a claim which has not at all been challenged or denied by the petitioner. Dacanay vs. People [GR 101302, 25 January 1995] Facts: In 1985, Jaime C. Dacanay was the vice-president of the National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA). In 1986, a criminal complaint for economic sabotage through smuggling, with regard to the importation of raw sugar in 1983 and 1984 by NASUTRA, was filed with the Tanodbayan against the principal officers of the said corporation including Dacanay. On 10 October 1986, the Tanodbayan approved the resolution of the team of Special Prosecutors who investigated the case. It found sufficient prima facie evidence against Dacanay and his co-accused to warrant the filing of an information with Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019, as amended. The corresponding information was filed with the Sandiganbayan. On November 20, Dacabat filed a motion to quash but he later withdrew the same. On 14 October 1988, a resolution was issued by Special Prosecutors Margarito P. Gervacio and Robert E. Kallos, recommending the dismissal of the complaint against Dacanay and his co-accused for lack of sufficient evidence and the withdrawal of the information filed in court. The resolution was approved by Acting Special Prosecutor Jose Ferrer. On 6 January 1989, the resolution issued by Prosecutors Gervacio and Kallos was reviewed by special Prosecutor Wilfredo Orencia, who recommended its disapproval. The recommendation of Prosecutor Orencia was approved by Acting Special Prosecutor Jose F. Guerrero and by Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez. On February 22, Jose Unson, Dacanay's co-accused, filed a motion to quash the information in the Sandiganbayan. The motion was adopted by Dacanay. On December 12, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. Likewise, the motion for reconsideration filed by Unson and adopted by Dacanay was denied. On 3 April 1991, Dacanay filed a motion for immediate and separate trial invoking his constitutional right to a speedy trial. On April 23, the People of the Philippines opposed the said motion on the ground that a separate trial for Dacanay would entail a lengthy and repetitious proceeding. In a resolution dated 24 April 1991, the Sandiganbayan denied Dacanay's motion. On June 6, Dacanay filed a motion for reconsideration setting forth as grounds therefor his advanced age and the protection of his reputation. On July 9, the People of the Philippines filed a comment to Dacanay's motion for reconsideration and alleged that the

parties should first await the resolution of the petition for certiorari filed by his coaccused Jose Unson with the Supreme Court. In a resolution dated 6 August 1991, the Sandiganbayan denied Dacanay's motion for reconsideration. Dacanay filed the petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether Dacanay is entitled to a separate trial. Held: Section 8, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure explicitly states: "When two or more accused are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any accused orders separate trials for one or more accused." The resulting inconvenience and expense on the part of the Government (due to a repetition of the presentation of the same evidence) cannot be given preference over the right to speedy trial and the protection to a person's life, liberty or property accorded by the Constitution. This is particularly true in Dacanay's case where the prosecutors' opposition to the request for separate trial was based on the ground that the principal accused in the case, the former President of NASUTRA, was abroad and was not yet arrested. If an accused cannot be placed under arrest because he remains outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, with more reason should his co-accused, who are under arrest, be entitled to a separate trial. A separate trial is in consonance with the right of an accused to a speedy trial as guaranteed to him by the 1987 Constitution, more specifically under Section 14(2) of Article III thereof. Herein, it has been 8 years since the information against Dacanay was filed, but the case against him has yet to be tried. The long delay has clearly prejudiced Dacanay, who is now more than 73 years of age. People vs Teehankee 3. The right to an impartial trial. The the accused blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as no less than then Vice-President Estrada and then DOJ Secretary Drilon attended some of the hearings and, President Aquino even visited Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the prosecution of the cases.
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The SC did not sustain the accuseds claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. Its true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavelto-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality. At best, the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. The SC had previously rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result

of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. The accused has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden. There is no evidence showing that the trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at bar. Parenthetically, the accused should be the last person to complain against the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than 7 newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defenses documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant at the same time. Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that the trial judge voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing the case, but the SC, nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge, directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the administration of justice. People vs Sanchez SYNOPSIS Accused-appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of rape with homicide on seven counts and sentenced each one of them to suffer the penalty of sevenreclusion perpetua. The prosecutions version of the events was based mainly on the recollections of its star witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan - coconspirators turned state witnesses. Both admitted having taken part in the abduction of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez, but denied any personal involvement in the rape of Eileen and the twin killings that followed. In this appeal, the pith of the assigned errors and the focus of the appellants arguments is the issue of witnesses Centeno and Malabanans credibility, whose open-court narrations served as principal basis for the trial courts rendition of a guilty verdict. The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected in the

record. The trial courts impressions of the star witnesses for the State bind this Court, for we accord great respect if not finality, to the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. Further, all the appellants relied on the defense of denial/alibi but positive identification by credible witnesses of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime, demolishes the alibi. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL; NOT IMPAIRED BY PUBLICITY. On appellants claim that the publicity given to this case impaired their right to a fair trial, we need only to revisit this Courts pronouncements in People v. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54), viz: We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all hight profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field x x x . The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processe to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. x x x Re: Request For Live Tv Of Trial Of Joseph Estrada 360 SCRA 248 A.M. No 01-4-03-Sc June 29, 2001 Facts: The Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a letter requesting the Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan in order "to assure the public of full transparency in the proceedings of an unprecedented case in our history." The request was seconded by Mr. Cesar N. Sarino and, still later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and Attorney Ricardo Romulo. Issue: Whether or Not live media coverage of the trial of the plunder and other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be permitted by the court.

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Held: The propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involve the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another, jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win. Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial that is not lifted about its individual settings nor made an object of publics attention and where the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only be evidence and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secret conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial, it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public. Nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions. PEOPLE VS. DONATO Facts: Salas aka NPAs Ka Bilog was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged together with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his coaccused later filed a petition for the WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to hear each partys side. It was later agreed upon by both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the stipulations of the parties,

held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did not bother hearing the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody. Issue: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail. Held: No. Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his codetainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. MARZAN-GELACIO VS. FLORES Facts: Ms. Juana Marzan Gelacio filed two (2) counts of rape against Emmanuel Artajos. After going over the records of the case and the recommendation of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Redentor Cardenas, Judge Flores concluded that the evidence of guilt was weak but made a finding of a probable cause. Consequently, he issued warrants of arrest with a recommendation of P200,000.00 bailbond in both cases. Complainant through her private prosecutor, Atty. Jessie Emmanuel A. Vizcarra, filed an Urgent Motion to Deny Bail. Two months thereafter, counsel for the accused, Atty. Salacnib Baterina filed a Petition to Reduce Bailbond.

Judge Flores issued an order denying the "Motion to Deny Bail" and reduce amount of bail. Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge may validly grant bail to an accused charged with two counts of rape without bail hearing. Held: No. The procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the grant of bail cannot be dispensed with especially in this case where the accused is charged with a capital offense. The following duties of judges in case an application for bail is filed have been clearly and repeatedly spelled out during seminars conducted by the Philippine Judicial Academy, to wit: 1.....In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended); 2.....Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion; (Sections 7 and 8, supra) 3.....Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; 4.....If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, the petition 5 should be denied. PEOPLE v CABRAL 303 SCRA 361; February 18, 1999 FACTS : Roderick Odiamar was charged with the rape of 15 year old Cecille Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, the
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accused filed a motion for bail which was opposed by the petitioner. - The lower court grated the motion on the ground that despite the crime alleged to have been committed is punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence thus far presented is not strong enough to warrant denial of the bail. The judge in concluding thus cited the fact that the girl went with the offender voluntarily and did not resist during the commission of the rape. In addition, the judge quoted the medico legal report as not conclusion that rape was in fact committed consideration that the lacerations on the victim may have been weeks or months old when the medical examination was performed six days after the offense occurred. - The CA affirmed the decision saying that there was no abuse of discretion in this case. There is grave abuse of discretion where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of the law. The People filed the appeal on the ground that while the judge had discretion on the grant of bail, he had abused this discretion. ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse in granting bail despite a showing by the prosecutor that there is strong evidence proving respondents guilt for the crime charged. HELD: YES. The SC held that the CA and the lower court failed to mention and include some facts which are significant factors and circumstances which are strong, clear, and convincing. Consideration of the said factors and circumstances would have resulted in the denial of bail. Reasoning: Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides: All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.

Excessive bail shall not be required. Section 7 Rule 4 of the Rules of court provides: No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when the evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of criminal prosecution. In the case at bar, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right considering that the punishment for the offense is reclusion perpetua. The grant of the bail is dependent on the evidence of the guilt which should which should be strong to justify denial. this determination is a matter of judicial discretion. By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. Proof evident or evident proof is this connection, has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well guarded dispassionate judgment to the conclusion that an offense has been committed as charged, that the accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. Presumption great exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion. In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. In the case of an application for bail, the duties of the judge are as follows: 1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; 2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion 3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution 4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval

of the bail bond. Otherwise the petition should be denied. Based on the duties, the courts order granting or denying bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a test or statement. HENCE, THE SUMMARY SHOULD NECESSARILY BE A COMPLETE COMPILATION OR RESTATEMENT OF ALL THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED DURING THE HEARING PROPER. The Lower court cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. Otherwise, the same will be considered defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained or be given a semblance of validity.

Ampatuan v. Macaraig G.R. 29 June 2010 No. 182497

PONENTE: Perez, J.: PARTIES: 1. 2. PETITIONERS: NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN RESPONDENTS: JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON

NATURE: Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND: 1. 2. Regional Trial Court: Original petition for Habeas Corpus Supreme Court: Elevated to the Supreme Court by way of petition for certiorari under Rule 65

FACTS: Petitioner Nurhida Juhuri Ampatuan filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus for the release of her husband, Police Officer I Basser B. Ampatuan (PO1 Ampatuan). The petitioner alleged that on 14 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan, who was then assigned at Sultan Kudarat Municipal Police
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Station, was asked by the Chief of Police to report to the Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan. He was then brought to the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Maguindanao where he was restrained of his freedom without cause. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then conducted where it was announced that PO1 Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two (2) Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the Law Department of the COMELEC. However, on 21 April 2008, Chief Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. The Order was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release PO1 Ampatuan. Hence the petition for habeas corpus. Respondents for their part, alleged that on the evening of 10 November 2007, a sixty-four-year-old man, later identified as Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. The investigation conducted by the Manila Police District (MPD) Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutors Office. On 18 April 2008, PO1 Ampatuan was charged with the administrative offense of grave misconduct for the alleged killing of Atty. Dalaig. On the same day, Police Director General Avelino I. Razon, Jr. ordered that PO1 Ampatuan be placed under restrictive custody. Acting on the orders of General Razon, Jr., Special Order No. 921 was issued by Police

Director Edgardo E. Acua, placing PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody of the Regional Director, NCRPO, effective 19 April 2008. Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds. However, on 25 April 2008, Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig denied the petition for habeas corpus and held that the placement of PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52, par. 4 of Republic Act No. 8551 (otherwise known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998) constitutes a valid restraint of his liberty. PERTINENT ISSUE: Whether or not the placement of PO1 Ampatuan under restrictive custody pursuant to Section 52 of Republic Act No. 8551 is unlawful or illegal for which the remedy of habeas corpus is proper. ANSWER: No. SUPREME COURT RULINGS: PROPRIETY OF THE REMEDY OF HABEAS CORPUS The writ of habeas corpus applies only to cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should not be issued when the custody over the person is by virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed

under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. Habeas corpus applies to any form of illegal or unlawful restraint of liberty In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. Habeas Corpus: judicial inquiry and discretion In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then the writ should be granted and the petitioner discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the writ will be refused. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed. Restrictive custody under R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 8551 is not an unlawful or illegal restraint on liberty Under Section 52 of R.A. No. 8551, the Chief of the PNP has the authority to place police personnel under restrictive custody during the pendency
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of a grave administrative case filed against him or even after the filing of a criminal complaint, grave in nature, against such police personnel. Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty. Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for. Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans r estrictive custody is the administrative case filed against him, his remedy is within such administrative process. Dizon v Eduardo G.R. No. L-59118 March 3, 1988 C. J. Teehankee Facts: Eduardo Dizon, a 30 year old businessman, and Isabel Ramos, 22 years and a former architecture student, disappeared during Martial Law. The two had been arrested with others by the military, detained in the military camp, and then claimed by the military to have been released after nine days. But they were not released to their parents, who had been visiting them, and were never seen or heard from by anyone since then. The application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus had been filed by petitioners, Juan Dizon and Soledad Ramos, on behalf of their son, Eduardo Dizon and their daughter, Isabel Ramos, respectively, who were arrested by Philippine Constabulary of the Pampanga PC Command then led by respondent Provincial Commander Col. Teddy Carian at, Sta. Ana, Pampanga without warrant of arrest or Presidential Order of Arrest. They were detained by the respondents at the PC Stockade at San Fernando, Pampanga under the jurisdiction of respondents Brig. Gen. Vicente Eduardo, then Regional Commander of the area, holding office at Camp Olivas, and Col. Teddy Carian for interrogation and investigation without assistance of counsel. The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on December 29, 1981. In the return of the writ filed on behalf of respondents on January 5,1982, by then

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, and verified by respondent, then Provincial Commander Col. Carian, respondents insisted that the detainees were indeed released on September 24,1981, and submitted the supporting affidavits of the men assigned with respondent Carian's Provincial Headquarters. Respondents denied petitioners' allegation of falsification of the detainees' signatures on their release papers, claiming that the same were signed in their presence and asked for dismissal of the petition. Jose Diokno, as counsel for the petitioners, invoked the United Nations General Assembly Resolution to stop the practice of enforced disappearances. He also posed several questions to the Court. Issues: 1. Do petitioners have the burden in law of proving that the detainees are still detained by respondents or does the burden shift to respondents of proving that they did release the detainees? 2. If respondents have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that they released the detainees, have they in fact discharged that burden in this case? 3. If respondents have not satisfied the Court that they released the detainees, but nevertheless refuse or are unable to produce their bodies, what relief may the Court grant petitioners? Held: respondents, No, reinvestigation by the CHR Case remanded to CHR for further investigation. Ratio: 1. The general rule in a number of cases that the release of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic. Respondents make such a plea in line with their return that they had released the desaparecidos after nine days. But their return begs the question. If the release of the detainees is an established fact and not in dispute, they do not continue to be missing persons or desaparecidos. Where, however, there are grounds for grave doubts about the alleged release of the detainees, where the standard and prescribed procedure in effecting the release has not been followed, then the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the alleged release is shifted to the respondents. Release is an affirmative defense and "each party must prove his own affirmative allegations," just as the burden of proof of self-defense in a killing rests on the accused. Moreover, evidence of release lies particularly within respondents' power.

2. Diokno claimed that signatures of the detainees on their release papers were falsified. He submitted specimens of Dizons signatures and compared it to signatures on documents that respondents themselves submitted. He concluded that they were markedly different from the signatures on their supposed release certificates. With respect to Eduardo Dizon, Diokno noted particularly the very poor line quality of Dizon's signature on the release certificate when compared to the speed and freedom of his signature on his voter's application form. The Solicitor General, in turn, disputed Diokno's conclusions about the falsity of the detainees' signatures on the release certificates and questions the reliability of the specimen signatures used, adding that "it is not possible to make any comparison of signatures for the purpose of determining genuineness on the basis of xerox copies. The Court also noted that the respondents did not follow the prescribed standard procedure for releasing detainees. 1. The respondents did not release the detainees to their parents though the latter had been visiting them and, in fact Dizon's father was in the camp on the very day he was supposedly released. 2. Respondent Carian did not report the supposed releases to the Ministry of Defense or General Eduardo 3. Respondent Carian's command could not readily furnish copies of the detainees' release certificates to their parents when the latter asked for them. 4. Respondent Col. Carian had no authority, inherent or delegated, to release the detainees. Carian also claimed to release them under the pretext that they would act as spies for the military. He knew that the probability of the detainees' keeping their supposed bargain was remote. Yet, he took no precautions to insure compliance. Worse, when they broke the supposed bargain by failing to report as he says they agreed to, he took no steps to look for them. 3. Court cant grant petitioners relief. Petitioners' charges of falsification of the detainees' alleged signatures on the certificates of release, compounded by the irregularities and failure of respondents to follow the prescribed procedure in effecting the release for purposes of authentication and to produce and furnish the parents upon request copies of the release certificates need thorough investigation. It is not a trier of facts, nor does it have the means and facilities to conduct such investigation of the grave charges at bar as well as of the whereabouts and fate of the desaparecidos. More, the 1987 Constitution which was overwhelmingly ratified on February 2,1987 expressly mandated the creation
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of the Commission on Human Rights. The Constitution vested the Commission on Human Rights with broader powers than its predecessor committee, such as to investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. Hence the case was referred here. Paredes v. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 89989, January 28, 1991 Facts: In January 1976, Paredes, provincial attorney of Agusan del Sur was granted land through free patent. Eight years later, Paredes was charged with perjury by the provincial fiscal requested by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. A former Mayor of Agusan filed a criminal complaint charging Attorney Paredes with having violated section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. 3019) because he allegedly used his office as Provincial Attorney to influence, persuade, and induce Armando Luison, Land Inspector of the District Land Office in Agusan del Sur, to favorably indorse his free patent application. Fiscal Brocoy proceeded to conduct the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses without the presence of accused because the summon was erroneously served. Fiscal found a prima facie case against Paredes. His motion for reconsideration was denied, assailing validity of the preliminary investigation that it was conducted without his notice. In the meantime, Paredes was elected Governor of Agusan del Sur and the free patent was reverted back to public domain. Information was filed and warrant of arrest was issued against Paredes. He refused to post bail in protest against the injustice to him as Governor. A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife of Paredes, alleging that the warrant for her husbands arrest was void because the preliminary investigation was void, and, that the crime charged in the information against him had already prescribed. Issue: 1. WON the warrant of arrest was void because the preliminary investigation was conducted w/o notice to the accused. 2. WON the crime had already prescribed. Ruling: 1. Not void. The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the courts jurisdiction over the case nor impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. The remedy is to demand that PI be conducted before entering his plea, the

court should then suspend the trial and order the fiscal to conduct a PI, that is, to file a Motion before the trial court to quash the Warrant of Arrest, and/or the Information on grounds provided by the Rules, or to ask for an investigation/reinvestigation of the case. Habeas corpus would not lie after the Warrant of commitment was issued by the Court on the basis of the Information filed against the accused. So it is explicitly provided for by Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court . . . . The settled rule is that the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so 2. The defense of prescription of the offense charged in the information should be pleaded in the criminal action otherwise it would be deemed waived. Whether the crime may still be prosecuted and penalized should be determined in the criminal case not in a special proceeding of habeas corpus. The accused may file a bail bond of P20,000, fixed by the Sandiganbayan for his provisional liberty. GO, SR. VS RAMOS Facts: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmys personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. Associate Commissioner Linda L. Malenab-Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. However, the Board of Commissioners (Board) reversed said dismissal, holding that Carlos election of Philippine citizenship was made out of time and directed the preparation and filing of the appropriate deportation charges against Jimmy. Then the corresponding Charge Sheet was filed against Jimmy, charging him of violating provisions of The Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The

Board issued a Decision ordering the apprehension and deportation of Jimmy. The Bureau of Immigration issued Warrant of Deportation which resulted in the apprehension and detention of Jimmy at the Bureau of Immigration Bicutan Detention Center, pending his deportation to China. Jimmy filed a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC but dismissed the same. On appeal, the CA granted the petition. Issue: Whether or not the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed? Held: Yes. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a persons detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term "court" in this context includes quasijudicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the persons confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it. US VS. TAN TENG G.R. No. 7081 September 7, 1912

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Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police. Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Issue: Whether or not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights against selfincrimination. Held: No. The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him. The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose of the provision of the Philippine Bill is to prohibit compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for the purpose of extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a crime.

BELTRAN VS. SAMSON 53 PHIL 570 G.R. NO. 32025 Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.

criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. MEKIN VS. WOLFE

FACTS: Application was made by Frank Mekin to the Hon. B. S. Ambler, judge of the Court of First Instance, for a writ of habeas corpus against George N. Wolfe, Warden of Bilibid Prison, for the illegal imprisonment, detention, and confinement of petitioner by the respondent as warden of said prison. Petitioner was discharged from Thirtyseventh Infantry, United States Volunteers for entering the service of the enemy in violation of the laws and was found guilty and sentenced by military commission. The CFI ruled in favor of the petitioner. Subsequent to the date of the filing of the application for habeas corpus, but prior to the date of the trial and of the judgment in the case, the Philippine Commission promulgated Act No. 654, dated March 4, 1903, by the provisions of which an appeal in habeas corpus proceedings may be taken from the judgment of the Court of First Instance to this court, the decision of this court having previously been that no appeal would lie in such a case in the absence of a statute authorizing it. It is contended by counsel for this petitioner that Act No. 654 is in the nature of an ex post facto law, and having been enacted subsequent to petitioner's right to the writ of habeas corpus this appeal should not be entertained. ISSUE: Whether or not Act No. 654 is an ex post facto law which affects the petitioners right to the writ of habeas corpus. HELD: No. An ex post facto law has been defined as one (a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
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Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination. Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases

(b) Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) Which damages the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant. (Black, Constitutional Law, 595.) The case nearly does not come within this definition, nor can it be seen in what way the act in question alters the situation of petitioner to his disadvantage. It gives him, as well as the Government, the benefit of the appeal, and is intended as furnishing the means for the correction of errors. The possibility that the judge of the Court of First Instance may commit error in his favor and wrongfully discharge him appears to be the only foundation for the claim. It would be a sufficient answer to the contention of the petitioner that Act No. 654, allowing an appeal, relates to a habeas corpus proceeding. This character of proceeding is entirely distinct from the criminal proceedings under which the prisoner has been tried and convicted. It is a new suit brought by petitioner to enforce a civil right which he claims as against those who are holding him in custody under the criminal process. The proceeding is one instituted by himself for his liberty and not by the Government to punish him for his crime. It is distinctly a civil proceeding, and as such is provided for and regulated in the Code of Civil Procedure. The doctrine of ex post facto laws refers only to the criminal law. LACSON SECRETARY VS. EXECUTIVE

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein petitionerintervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory. The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the principal accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section 2 of R.A. 7975. Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. Issues: (2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 42 8249. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one (a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed. (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant.
43

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person to his 44 disadvantage. This Court added two more to the list, namely: (f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful; (g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of 45 a amnesty. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural
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301 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 128096; 20 JAN 1999] Facts: Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitionerintervenors.

Held: No.

statute, one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional. PEOPLE VS. FERRER [48 SCRA 382; NOS.L-32613-14; 27 DEC 1972]

through writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly and association.

applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been made. The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of Freedom of Expression and Association in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY. The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established: 1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. 2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts. The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT. Marcos, petitioner respondent (Part 1) Facts: Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various
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Issues: (1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers, subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness. The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957. A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.) In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors. The Acts focus is on the conduct not person. Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a members direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts. Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute

VS.

Manglapus,

directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family. Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events: 1. 2. 3. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar Honasans failed coup Communist insurgency movements secessionist movements in Mindanao devastated economy because of accumulated foreign debt plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Decision: No to both issues. Petition dismissed. Ratio: Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State. The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied. For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there

are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

4. 5. 6. 7. 1. 2.

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquinos power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order. Issue: 1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

2.

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