Democracy Comes of Age in Somaliland

Stefan Simanowitz reports on the first parliamentary elections in a nation

that officially does not exist

Contemporary Review, December 2005, Vol.289, No.1678

THE rising sun reveals two long lines of people snaking towards a small concrete
polling station in Gabiley, a town in rural Somaliland. Many of them have walked
considerable distances and queued all night in order to vote in these, the first
parliamentary elections held in the territory for nearly forty years. But although
voters across the country have turned out in force, and although the election is
deemed free and fair by international observers, the result will not be officially
recognised beyond its territorial borders. Indeed, in the eyes of the international
community, Somaliland is a country that does not exist.

Since its unilateral proclamation of independence in 1991, Somaliland, an area the

size of England and Wales in the north of Somalia, has struggled to gain international
recognition. Whilst neighbouring Somalia has all but ceased to function as an
administrative, judicial and territorial entity, Somaliland has taken important steps
towards creating a stable working democracy in one of the poorest and most
dangerous regions of the world.

A new constitution was adopted in 2001 following a referendum. In 2002 local

elections passed off peacefully, and in 2003 free and fair presidential elections took
place. Having thus laid the foundations of a functioning democracy, the
parliamentary elections of 29th September 2005 were seen as the final step in the
democratisation process and an important milestone in the transition from a
traditional clan-based, single-party-dominated political structure to a stable multi-
party democracy. Many Somalilanders also regarded them as the final prerequisite
for international recognition.

However, despite the fact that Somaliland may fulfil the requirements necessary for
recognition as a sovereign state, the question of recognition will be determined by a
number of external geo-political factors. These factors include the African Union's
position on the sanctity of colonial borders and Somaliland's role in the so-called 'war
on terror'.

Background
Somaliland was a British Protectorate for over eighty years during the colonial period.
In 1960, it gained independence but formed a hasty union with the former Italian
Somaliland to create the Somali Republic. In 1969 Mohamed Siad Barre's military
coup brought Somalia's flirtation with democracy to an end and planted the seeds of
a secessionist struggle in Somaliland. This struggle culminated in a brutal three-year
civil war in which 50,000 people were killed and half a million refugees fled. Between
1988 and 1991, Barre's forces massacred civilians, laid over two million mines and
reduced cities to rubble.

In 1991, the overthrow of Barre's regime plunged Somalia into a state of anarchy
from which it is yet to emerge. Somaliland, however, was quick to declare
independence and, over the years, it has managed to establish itself as a model of
stability, good governance and economic discipline. Rival militias have been
demobilised, mines have been cleared and refugees have been repatriated. The war-
ravaged infrastructure has been rebuilt and Somaliland now boasts modern airports,
hospitals, ports, power plants and universities. There is a free press and the central
bank manages an official currency with relatively stable exchange rates. An unarmed
police force and independent judiciary maintain order.

What is most remarkable about this progress is that it has been achieved with
virtually no external help. Whilst economic development has been heavily supported
by Somalilanders in the Diaspora, lack of international recognition has meant that
Somaliland does not qualify for bilateral aid or support from international financial
institutions. This international isolation has not, however, resulted in isolationism.
Lack of access to external aid has forced this country of 3.5-million people to become
more self-reliant than many other African states. This self-reliance is reflected in
what is perhaps the most significant of Somaliland's achievements: its system of
government.

Rather than having a Western democratic model of governance imposed on them

from outside, Somaliland has managed to fuse Western-style institutions of
government with its own traditional forms of social and political organisation. Its bi-
cameral parliament reflects this fusion of traditional and modern, with the Senate
consisting of traditional elders, and the House of Representatives consisting of
elected representatives.

However, with its history of 'tribalism' and internecine fighting, the key challenge for
Somaliland's new parliament is to try and replace clan-based politics with party
politics. For its first twelve years, Somaliland had no political parties but instead
followed more traditional clan-based forms of political organisation. Political parties
were introduced during the presidential elections and it was hoped that the recent
parliamentary elections would help to usher in a representative system without
allowing representation to be overtly clan-based. Clearly, if clan loyalties were to
take precedence over party loyalties, parliament would be seriously weakened. The
traditional clan-based political system had resulted in an under-representation of
some clans and it was hoped that having just three non-clan-based parties would
reduce the extent to which clan allegiance affected the selection of candidates and
the way in which people voted. A limited number of political parties would force
alliances between clans to develop thereby increasing integration and pluralism.

In the traditional clan system it is the male elders who make decisions, and during
the nomination process, many candidates were indeed selected by elders along clan
lines. The male-dominated nature of the selection process was reflected in the fact
that only seven of the 246 candidates were female. There was also evidence that
political parties often chose candidates based on their perceived popularity and
support base. Whilst the absence of voter registration makes it hard to analyse voter
patterns, it would seem from the results that there is some evidence that regional
voting patterns reflect clan preferences. There is also evidence however, that
alliances were sought between subgroups of different major clans across regions
under the different party umbrellas. This would indicate that, although tribalism
inevitably played some part in the election, it has been weakened.

The election itself was very tightly fought. At one stage it seemed inevitable that the
president's Democratic United National Party (UDUB) would lose to the Solidarity
Party (Kulmiye). However, UDUB was able to use its powerbase as the governing
party to maintain its percentage of the popular vote, while Kulmiye lost considerable
ground to the Justice and Welfare Party (UCID). The close nature of the result means
that parliament will not be dominated by clan or party, but will require much greater
consensus-building coalitions. It will nevertheless be interesting to see how party
loyalties will be negotiated against clan interests in the new parliament.

Election Day
Lack of international recognition meant that Somaliland was not able to access forms
of governance support commonly received by post-conflict areas such as Iraq and
Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the elections were well organised and successfully
conducted with over 800,000 voters turning out to the country's 985 polling stations
to elect 82 members of parliament. This represents a turnout of over 90 per cent.
Like all elections in infant democracies there were some inevitable teething problems
of a practical, administrative and logistical nature. The absence of a census and voter
register meant that a decision was made to allow voters to vote in any of
Somaliland's six regions: the only requirements for voting being that voters were 16
years of age and spoke Somali. Inevitably, this led to widespread attempts at
underage and multiple voting. Due to the tradition of women decorating their hands
with henna it was decided that invisible ink (and black lamps) should be used instead
of indelible ink. This generally proved an effective barrier to multiple voting; however
punishment for those caught varied. In some polling stations those attempting to
vote more than once were merely turned away, often only to rejoin the queues. In
other polling stations people had their shoes and belts taken away and were made to
sit outside the polling station awaiting detention by the police. Whilst the fact that 30
per cent of the population are nomadic makes census taking and voter registration
more difficult, there is confidence that both will be in place before the local elections
in 2007.

With illiteracy rates as high as 80 per cent and with many people having had little or
no experience of voting, substantial voter education was attempted prior to the
elections. In addition, ballot papers had symbols beside the name of each candidate
to make it easier for those that could not read. On the day however, many voters,
not even knowing which way up to hold the ballot paper, chose to announce their
choice to the local chairperson, who marked the paper for them. Whilst this
compromised the secrecy of the voting process, it did not seem to bother voters who
were generally eager to talk about whom they had voted for.

Shadow of Terror
The shadow that hung over the elections and continues to darken Somaliland's future
is that cast by the threat of terrorism. On 25th September the atmosphere in
Hargeisa, Somaliland's impoverished but relaxed capital, changed. With the elections
only days away, several suspected Islamic militants were arrested following a shoot-
out with police. The following day a cache of arms, including heavy anti-tank
weapons, was discovered in the city. According to the Interior Minister, one of the
men arrested was a senior al-Qaeda operative allegedly in the region to organise
attacks on local leaders and foreigners. This incident heightened fears of violence
especially as it coincided with the arrival of 76 international election observers
including potentially high-profile targets such as parliamentarians from South Africa
and Europe as well as a former US Ambassador. It also provided a stark reminder of
Somaliland's precarious position in the global war on terror.

Whilst Somaliland has managed to avoid the violent lawlessness and extremism of
Somalia, the discovery of Islamic militants in Hargeisa does not come as a great
surprise. Over the last two years, extremists have murdered four foreign aid workers
in Somaliland. Last month four men were sentenced to death for murdering a British
couple in 2003 in a school they had built. Although the predominantly Sufi form of
Islam practised in Somaliland does not lend itself to extremism, concerns have been
raised by the presence of an increasing number of radical clerics as well as the
porous nature of the border with Somalia. Mogadishu has become something of a
haven for al-Qaeda-affiliated fighters and Somalia was used as a transit point for the
terrorists who carried out the 1998 attacks on the US embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as the 2002 suicide bombing in Mombasa.

Whilst the threat of terrorism is clearly a problem for Somaliland, it also presents an
opportunity. Ironically, the discovery of al-Qaeda operatives in the territory might do
more to make Western governments take notice of Somaliland than the free and fair
conduct of their elections. Somaliland is strategically positioned on the Gulf of Aden
and is also home to what could be an important navel base in Berbera. Currently the
only location in Africa where the US has a military base is neighbouring Djibouti, and
Somaliland is seen by the Americans as a potentially important ally against the
spread of extremism.

Somaliland is conscious that too close a relationship with the Americans might not be
popular with its population, but it also recognises the advantages that collaboration
with the US could bring in terms of finance, security and long-term stability. By
promoting itself as a non-threatening strategic partner in the 'war on terror',
Somaliland could fast-track its entry into the international community.

Recognition and beyond

Even if the US were to support Somaliland's right to self-determination, it is unlikely
that they or any other country will recognise Somaliland without the approval of the
Organisation of African Unity. One of the OAU's central principles is that African
colonial borders should not be redrawn. This is based on a well-grounded fear that
recognition of 'separatist' states could cause the continent to descend into chaos.
However, there is a strong argument that by breaking a union that it had entered
into as an independent state, Somaliland would be reverting to, rather than
redrawing its colonial borders. It is also worth noting that despite its reluctance to
acknowledge secessionist states, the OAU has recently recognised the newly formed
nations of Eritrea and Western Sahara. It is also important to note that thirty new
countries have been internationally recognised since 1990, although most of these
emerged from the dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia.

Despite OAU intransigence, Somalilanders remain optimistic about the possibility of

recognition and the benefits it will bring. As well as giving Somaliland access to
bilateral aid, recognition would finally give access to the mining and oil companies
eager to exploit Somaliland's proven natural resources. Large-scale extraction of oil,
coal, gemstones and minerals could transform this country where 43 per cent of the
population are living in extreme poverty. Whilst international recognition is not a
panacea that will lift Somaliland out of poverty or eradicate its problems with health,
education, food insecurity, water supply, and HIV/AIDS, it would undoubtedly speed
development.

Although there is still a distance to travel, Somaliland's accomplishments are

impressive. It has created effective institutions of state and attained a level of
political maturity well beyond its years. Somaliland provides a useful model of
democracy that offers lessons to us all. It reminds us that democracy is not a static,
prescriptive system but a living idea that is constantly adapting and taking new
forms.

In Hargeisa, reminders of how far this small nation has come are all around. When
the rains come, a mass grave beside the river is exposed. Bones protrude from the
red earth, some still tied at the wrist. Beside the airport road, a rusting Russian tank
is plastered with election posters: a reminder of Somaliland's war-ravaged past and a
symbol of hope for a democratic future.

Stefan Simanowitz is a writer and researcher. He was part of the

International Election Observer mission to Somaliland in September 2005.