German Life and Letters 39:4 July 1986 0016-8777 $2.

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T H E TURKISH LUMPENPROLETARIAT: WEST GERMANYS INDUSTRIAL RESERVE ARMY ANTON ANDEREGCEN Since 1945, migratory movements on an unprecedented scale have taken place throughout the world, with Europe on centre stage. The scope of this movement makes it one of the largest of its kind in history. Western Europe has now become home, if only tenuously, to somewhere between 14 and 15 million migrants. Oddly enough, emigration and immigration countries do not like being designated as such and do not call their immigrants or emigrants by those names. The Federal Republic of Germany, in spite of the official orthodoxies and public protestations, has become a land of immigration. What was to become a continuing and swelling stream of Turkish migrants into the Federal Republic of Germany began in 1956, when twelve Turkish workers and their families were brought to Kiel for vocational training. The numbers ofTurkish workers who went abroad in the period from 1956 to 1961 remained minuscule. In the period immediately after that, a series of events, both in West Germany and in Turkey itself, began to change drastically the size of this migration flow. In Turkey, fundamental political changes were materializing in 1960 with the overthrow of the Menderes regime by the army. Because of the high surplus of unskilled and skilled labour not utilized within the Turkish economic system, the new military regime facilitated labour migration. Turkey was determined to build its own economy and to utilize migration as a component of modernization and development. It was assumed that the Turkish migrant worker who went to West Germany would improve his vocational skills, acquire modern standards of living, and thus become an innovative change agent who, upon his return to Turkey, would contribute to the modernization of that economy and society. This concept found its manifestation in the development of what is known as the rotation principle. This principle implies that the workers should rotate between Turkey and West Germany on a scheduled basis, staying in the host country for a stipulated period of no more than three to five years. Surveys indicate that the Turkish migrants anticipate leaving West Germany within three to five years of their arrival, but what occurs is a continual series of postponements that prolongs the stay abroad. This expressed intention of returning home in a short time, coupled with the extreme difficulties of realizing this desire (as will be explained later), has been appropriately termed by Braun Heimkehrillusion. The term Gastarbeiter denotes a belief that such workers could be utilized like spare parts; they would come to West Germany to perform the tasks which German workers dislike, and then depart, leaving a minimal impact on German society. However, the situation for Turkey and for West Germany has definitely not evolved as expected. In the first Five Year Development Plan for Turkey, implemented in 1963,

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the export of surplus manpower was one of the most important measures for attaining the Turkish goal of a set growth rate.2 It was expected that Turkey would be the recipient of a significant foreign exchange income, based on the large remittances sent home by the migrant workers. It was assumed that this income would be valuable, both for equalizing the balance-of-trade deficit accruing to Turkey and for making capital available for internal productive investments. Over a certain period of time, this would open sufficient employment opportunities for the Turkish labour force, thus negating the need for migration. Viewed in this context, emigration was thought to be a transitional process for the Turks as they worked to modernize their industry and to westernize their society. The need for migration was thought to be in direct correlation to the developmental gap. As the gap was closed, the need for further emigration would be correspondingly reduced. With the 1961 closing of the border between East and West Germany, the influx of Germans from the former Eastern Territories as well as from East Germany into West Germany stopped abruptly. At the Siemens plant in West Berlin alone 2,000 positions became vacant ~ v e r n i g h t At . ~ a time of continuing expansion of the economy, West Germany was forced to go further afield than in the past to seek the manpower necessary for its booming economic growth. In 1961 West Germany and Turkey signed a bilateral labour recruitment agreement with general stipulations for recruitment, employment, and wages. Recruitment procedures were to be the prerogative of the Turkish Employment Service and the official West German recruitment office. Therefore the Turkish workers were sought after and actively courted to come to West Germany, a fact that firmly counters the claim that Turks came to West Germany of their own accord to take away jobs from native Germans. The Turks are in West Germany as a result of policies made at the highest level of the West German government. Turkey did not wish its workers to be recruited through private arrangements and thus face higher risks of exploitation and discrimination. O n the other hand, the West German government was under pressure from union organizations; they feared that such private contracts would undercut the current wages of German workers. During the years of the mass immigrations into the industrial North (1965-1973), 85% of all Turkish emigrants went to West Germany. Through this emigration Turkey lost about 34% of all skilled workers. There is an additional dimension to this drain of skilled manpower that is critical to the developmental potential of Turkey. All candidates for employment in West Germany have to have at least an elementary school education. Thus the whole of the Turkish adult migrant labour population in West Germany has a minimum of a primary school diploma. Furthermore, about 20% of all first generation Turkish workers in West Germany have an education beyond the primary school level. When one juxtaposes these data against the figure cf 55% of the adult population in Turkey being illiterate, one immediately sees the seriousness of the drain of better educated workers from Turkey. They represent not only a major proportion of the skilled labour force, but also a major portion of the literate population in the country.* The absence of many tens

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of thousands of such workers from the home country has had a considerable impact upon the ability of Turkey to undertake its own developmental programmes. It must be noted that emigration is a selective and negative process which hinders, rather than assists, the development prospects. It is selective in respect to age (it is the young adults who leave), to sex (both on cultural ' of all Turkish workers who went to West Germany and religious grounds, 82% between 1961 and June 1973 were male), and to working capacity (the most competent, strong and ambitious emigrate). Therefore the emigration of these best qualified workers strikes Turkey at the very heart of its development efforts: it causes the shortage of skilled workers and the abundance of unskilled workers.5 In order to ensure a steady flow of Turkish workers to the industrialized North, the EEC as a unit even proposed that Turkey should eventually become a full member of the EEC.6 It is important to note that in Western Europe the market situation has benefited the industrial immigration countries, being in a position of clear dominance over the labour-supplying countries. The result is that the flow of manpower, its structure and frequency, was guided by the needs of the labour-importing countries. Together with their families, the Turkish workers now number more than one million persons, or more than one quarter of all guestworkers in West Germany. Today, the number of Turkish workers and their families makes West Berlin the city with the third largest Turkish population in the world. Because of the cultural and social patterns that are very distinct and different from those of the Germans, and because of employment and linguistic barriers, the Turkish migrants seek companionship and community among their own ethnic group^.^ This inevitably leads to the formation of isolated enclaves within the urban areas. In the absence of strong and vigorous efforts on the part of German officials to give the Turks the opportunity to choose and experience as much integration as they desire, the tendency toward ghettoization is increasing. Housing for the Turkish migrants tends to be the oldest and least desired, and rents and density are proportionally higher than for native Germans. The housing conditions of the Turks in West Germany are but an additional manifestation of the social, political, and economic marginality that they experience. It is best described by the discriminatory public policies, the deliberate restriction of access to certain segments of the housing market, and the quiet toleration by the authorities of the private discrimination carried on by landlords and estate agents. It appears premature to suggest that German cities have developed the typical ghetto situation seen in the USA. This is not to say that West Germany has done a better job or made more positive efforts in housing the migrants. Rather, the immigration of a foreign work force is a recent phenomenon, the one of the Turkish migrants is only about two decades old. With time, and the exacerbation of current conditions, the creation of minority enclaves, segregated and shunted away from the other sections of German society, can be anticipated. The immigration of Turkish workers benefited West Germany in several ways. First, the Turks filled the labour slots which structurally already existed,

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but for which there were no German workers. Second, the shortening of the working week with sustained wage increases and social benefits for the native Germans was made possible by the presence of the migrant workers. Third, since the Turks tend to be employed in those categories of work that Germans were anxious to leave, it meant considerable social upward mobility and improvement in the working and living conditions for the Germans.8Therefore the Turkish migrants form an 'underclass', not only in the sense of supporting the higher positions and mobility of German workers, but as a class of workers who would not be able to compete in an industrial country for anything but the most menial and undesirable jobs. Hoffmann-Nowotny refers to this creation of a new societal stratum beneath the existing social structure of the immigrant country as a process of 'Unterschi~htung'.~ Initially it was assumed that Turkey would reap the benefits of a returning industrial work force which had acquired training and experience in West Germany based on the previously explained rotational principle. However, in the period between January 1973 and the end of 1975 a series of events permanently changed the manner in which the Turkish workers were viewed in West Germany. The oil embargo, the subsequent fourfold increase in the price of crude oil, the recession which eased only slowly, the unemployment of more than one million West German workers, and the growing awareness of the impact of the Turkish workers and their dependants upon German society, all led to the following scenario: The rigorous rotation system of migrants was abandoned; and West Germany started to implement regulations to protect the jobs and employment opportunities of its own nationals. As a result, employment permits for migrant workers are renewed only if no German nationals apply for the same position. Spouses and children of foreign workers who immigrated after December 1, 1974 are refused a work permit. Therefore, a large number of young Turks who are of legal age to seek employment are barred from doing so, because they entered West Germany after December 1, 1974. Any Turk who seeks to have a permit renewed, has stamped into his passport a list of those cities where he is no longer able to settle. When the foreign population in a given city exceeds 6% of the total population, that city can apply to its state government for designation as an overburdened settlement area. If the designation is granted, the city can declare an end to all further immigration of foreigners. It was assumed that large numbers of Turks would return to their homeland, taking their unemployment with them. But nothing of the sort occurred.'0 As a rule, migrant workers are not in competition for the same employment opportunities as the German workers. German nationals have little desire to experience the downward mobility inherent in taking on the jobs held by migrants. Therefore the unemployment rates for the migrant workers are generally no higher than those for the entire national work force. O n the other hand, successful Turks did not want to return home and to subject themselves to employment risks which they had overcome by leaving Turkey in the first place." Unemployed guestworkers were provided with a variety of unemployment benefits and services that cushioned the severity of their

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unemployment. Thus housing allowances, family childrens allowances, and medical care were all available. The sum total of such benefits might easily exceed the option for earned income in Turkey. The immigration ban of 1973 also generated a tremendous backlog of Turks wishing to emigrate. For a period of twelve months beyond 1973, West Germany continued to receive applications at its recruiting offices in Turkey. At the end of this period, a total of nearly 1.4 million Turks had requested immigration visas to work in West Germany. In spite of the immigration ban, the Turkish population in West Germany to this day has increased appreciably due to its high birth rate and family reunions. A Turkish worker who has been working in West Germany continuously for four consecutive years may have his spouse join him. All children under the age of sixteen are allowed to join their parents in West Germany after the migrant worker has worked in the country continuously for two consecutive years.I2 There are many other conditions that have to be fulfilled before a family reunion can take place: The migrant worker must prove that he has adequate living facilities for his family, that his income is sufficient to support his family, that he has no police record (a traffic violation may jeopardize his application), etc. In spite of this, many family reunions did take place and still do. Those Turks who have their families in West Germany no longer have an interest or need to send remittances home. At the present, Turkeys economy is accumulating large deficits because of the loss of this important source of foreign exchange. With the introduction of the immigration ban in 1973, and with the continuation of employment permit renewals for foreign workers, West Germany has created a stable migrant worker population committed to a long-term residence. The Turkish work force has become an industrial army in reserve, functioning at a minimum level of efficacy during times of unemployment, but ready to be called upon in times of need. As the German working-age population continues to decline, the need for this labour supply may become quite acute. It is in this sense that West Germany is speaking of integration of the migrant workers. It is definitely not an integration aimed at the enhancement of either assimilation or pluralism, but rather a process to institutionalize marginality. l 3 Therefore the role the foreigner plays on the labour market does not diminish. O n the contrary, it will be the secondgeneration immigrants, the sons and daughters of the Turks born and raised in West Germany, who will fill a significant number of the employment opportunities open to foreign labour.I4 The lurking danger of such an arrangement is obvious; with partial integration into the German culture these second generation Turks will hold values similar to those of the German workers in respect to employment expectations. They will no longer be content with the dirty, dreary dead end jobs which their parents took.15 These young Turks no longer use the people in the villages from which their parents emigrated as a reference group, but rather their German peers. They do not assess their status in the light of the social hierarchy in rural Turkey, but in terms of urban Frankfurt, Munich, or Berlin. They recognize that their daily lives are constricted and continually influenced by discriminatory practices and this can

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only move them into a position of tension and conflicl with the present German social system. l6 Unless they are allowed to participate in West German society with the opportunity of a new way of life which approximates that of their German neighbours, the relationship between Turkish workers and German nationals will deteriorate. Bodenbender sees these developments as eine gefahrliche Zeitbombe. l 7 Despite this gloomy prognosis, West Germans are not yet ready to take the next step. With the assertion that West Germany is not an immigration country, most West Germans are reluctant either to send the guestworkers home or to allow them to become citizens. A foreigner can be naturalized, provided he does not have a criminal record and is able to maintain his family. Eight years is the minimum residence required before application can be made. Even though this residence requirement is necessary, it is an insufficient condition for naturalization. Naturalization is considered as an act of grace - and since grace is coming from God, but rarely from the state, it is not practised vis-ri-vis foreign workers unless they are married to a German.Ig There exists a great deal of administrative discretion and latitude in how the immigration laws are interpreted and administered. It is this lack of specificity as regards the protection and rights accorded to the Turkish migrants that allows abuses and questionable practices to occur. When civil and political rights are relegated to a dependence upon administrative discretion, the possibility arises that private prejudices will become public policies.20In addition to this, the legal rights of the Turkish migrants residing in the Federal Republic are scattered through a maze of international agreements, state and federal laws, precedents established by court rulings and procedural details. When the Turkish workers were invited by West Germany to come and participate in the economic sector of the country, it was assumed that these workers would not have an interest in participating in the cultural, political and social sectors of Germany. The presupposition was that they would remain on the periphery of German society, except for the manner in which they offer their labour. The fact is that West Germany has created an integrated labour market with the immigrant workers, but maintains a separatist, perhaps even a segregationist social system. It is true that the government in Bonn is making certain efforts in respect to assimilation of its existing foreign labour force. But these efforts are generally minimal and half-hearted. As a rule, long-term decisions on the future of the Turks in West Germany are being postponed and ignored. With the course set neither in the direction of integrating the Turks into German society nor toward eventual return to their homeland, a set of social policies has developed that leaves the position of the Turks in West Germany ambiguous and ill-defined. Such benign neglect has the cumulative effect that the social policies toward the Turkish migrants continue to reinforce their marginality. West Germany is neither ready nor willing to stake out a clear direction for its relations to the Turkish workers and their families. Public pronouncements emphasize the need for some minimal level of integration of the Turkish migrants, but simultaneously the social policies ensure that such integration does not occur. The basis for this indecision on the part of the

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German government and those in the industrial sector is the fact that the fundamental economic role of the Turkish worker has not been acknowledged. There continues to be the quiet and rarely discussed belief that somehow the Turks would gradually disappear and leave West Germany to the Germans again. The conclusion is rather pessimistic. The Federal Republic of Germany has become a culturally and ethnically pluralistic society, in spite of the failure of the native population to legitimate this fact. German policy-makers and political leaders are confronted with the continued belief of many citizens that the presence of the guestworkers is the main reason for Germanys high unemployment and inflation rate. Also common is the view that the presence of the foreign workers, in particular that of the Turkish migrant workers and their families, is having a profound negative impact upon the cultural and ethnic identity of West Germany. Given current production and labour arrangements, the economic necessity of the Turkish migrants is obvious. But the simultaneous rejection of any political, cultural and social integration of these same workers and their families creates a situation of inherent tension. The policies and practices that are currently in force and govern their lives, are confused and contradictory and sustain their institutional marginality. For over twenty years Turkey has supported the exportation of its workers, but was unable to mobilize effectively the benefits which were to accrue from this through remittances and experience with Western industrial life. Today, Turkey remains essentially as it was in 1956, when the first Turkish migrants went to West Germany: still underdeveloped, still with high unemployment, still with a small skilled work force, and still with few internal resources whereby to change its condition. NOTES
R . Braun, Sozio-kulturelle Problem der Eingliederung Italimischer Arbeitskrajle in der Schweiz, Zurich 1970, p. 15. N. K. Abadan-Unat et al., Migration and Developmrnt, Ankara 1976, p. 28. Personal interview with Theophil Swadda, director of the Siemens AG in West Berlin, 3 July 1985. Ahmet Aker, A Study of Turkish Labour Migration to Germany, International Conference on Migrant Workers, Berlin 1975, p. 475. W. R. Bohning, Some Thoughts on Emigration from the Mediterranean Basin, International Labour Review, 3 (1975), 251-277. Mario5 Nikolinakos, The Concept of the European South and the North-South Problem in Europe, International Conference on Migrant Workers, Berlin 1975, p. 20. Miteinander leben: Bilanr und Perspektium, Berlin 1985, p. 30. * P. R. Kleindorfer, Ayse Kudat, Economic and Managerial Aspects of Foreign Labor in West Germany, Pmprint Series, Berlin 1974, p. 3. Hans-Joachim Hoffman-Nowotny, European Migration after the Second World War, Paper presented to the Conference on Migration, New Harmony, Indiana, 14 April 1976, p. 10. Martin Frey, Auslanderpolitik in Europa, Aus Politik und Zcilgcschichte, B 32 (1984), B32. Riickkehr: Information r u rechtlichm, finantiellen und praktischm Fragm bei der Riickkehr tiirkischer Arbeitnehmer in ihre Heimat, Berlin 1983, p. 60.
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I A reduction of the age limit to six years has been proposed by several members of the Bundesrat (Pazarkaya, p. 48). l 3 Marios Nikolinakos, The New Dimensions in the Employment of Foreign Workers, International Confnence on Migrant Workns, Berlin 1975, p. 5.

Ayse Kudat, Ali Gitmez, Emigration Efects on the Turkish Countryside, Berlin 1975, p. 18.
Hoffman-Nowotny, p. 10. Citizenship in Germany is based upon lineage. It is quite different from the situation in, for instance, the USA, where any child born in the country, regardless of the nationality and citizenship of the parents, is automatically considered to be an American citizen.
l5 l6
I

W. Bodenbender, Zwischenbilanz der Auslanderpolitik, Paper presented to the Conference

Yuksel Pazarkaya, Spuren des Erots: Zur Lage der auslandischen Arbeitn, Zurich 1983, p. 40.

on Bildungsprobleme und Zukunftsemartungen der Kinder Tiirkischer Gastarbeiter, Munich 1976.

I*

Friedrich Franz, Die Rechtsstellung der auslandischen Arbeitnehmer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Gastarbeitn: Anabsen und Bmchte, Frankfurt a.M. 1972, p. 42. O Personal interview with Gianna Chimaris, secretary and member of the Ausliinderberatungsstellefur die Bezirke Kreuzberg und Tiergarten, Berlin, 5 July 1985.