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No.

490 September 30, 2003

Defining Democracy Down


Explaining the Campaign to
Repeal Term Limits
by Patrick Basham

Executive Summary

A campaign to place term limits on elected ed government. The principal concern of legisla-
officials swept the country in the 1990s. Since tive staff is that the relatively rapid turnover of
then, however, a concerted effort has been made legislators will make it harder to build career-
to undo the restrictions imposed by term limits. length relationships with legislators.
This paper examines the incentives behind the In many instances, senior bureaucrats’ fief-
campaign to repeal term limits at the state and doms are protected in state and local budgets
local levels. Particular attention is paid to recent written by career legislators with whom they
experience in California, Idaho, and New York have enjoyed mutually beneficial long-term rela-
City. Career politicians, senior bureaucrats, and tionships. Freshman term-limited legislators
special interest groups are intent on overcoming tend to ask tougher questions of bureaucrats
clearly articulated voter intent on this issue. and demand a higher level of performance from
The repeal campaigns are not grassroots government agencies. Lobbyists can no longer
affairs. Typically, they are initiated, funded, and rely on informal, long-lasting friendships with
managed by career legislators, legislative staff, senior members who can exert major influence
bureaucrats, and lobbyists. Legislative opposi- over a particular piece of legislation.
tion to term limits is bipartisan. Term-limited Efforts to repeal term limits have failed because
legislatures undergo many positive institutional they have been led by those who are seemingly
changes that are unsettling for career politicians. intent on preserving their professional advantages
Absent term limits, it is unlikely that the currents and institutional perks regardless of “common
of public opinion will rock the career politician’s good” considerations. Only once have such efforts
electoral boat. passed voter inspection.
Some career politicians oppose term limits on A great deal is at stake with the repeal of term
ideological, outcome-based grounds. They cor- limits. Without term limits, a state’s political
rectly assume that term limits produce both leg- infrastructure risks stagnation. Term limits offer
islators and legislative incentive structures that state taxpayers hope for an end to endless spend-
are inherently more inclined toward more limit- ing and taxing.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Patrick Basham is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Center for Representative Government.
Despite an its are the least documented yet most preva-
onslaught Introduction lent component of the term limits move-
ment.”5 Seventeen thousand local politicians
of negative Rules create winners and losers. . . . in 2,890 cities, counties, and towns through-
commentary Nor should we assume that politi- out 40 states are now subject to term limits.
cians and others are indifferent to Clearly, “municipal limits are changing the
from the manipulating the rules themselves; political culture of our country and paving
political and they cannot afford disinterest.1 the way to real reform.”6
media establish-
Term limits are under assault across the
ments, public nation.2 After they swept the country in the Public Choice and the
opinion remains 1990s, there was a backlash from those parties Repeal of Term Limits
who felt threatened by their retention.
solidly in favor Consequently, a concerted effort was made to Sixteen states currently limit legislative
of term limits. undo the restrictions imposed by term limits. tenure through term limits. However, accord-
This paper examines the incentives behind the ing to journalist Alan Greenblatt, “In virtual-
campaign to repeal term limits at the state and ly every . . . state that has not adopted a term
local levels. Particular attention is paid to limits system, approval by the legislature
recent experience in California, Idaho, and itself would be required, and that does not
New York City. Those jurisdictions best illus- appear to be on the horizon anywhere.”7
trate the central facets of the contemporary However, highly organized, well-funded
campaign to repeal term limits. opposition has been typical across the nation
Throughout this paper, the campaign to since Oklahoma, California, and Colorado
repeal term limits is analyzed from the public became the first states to term limit their leg-
choice perspective. The case is made that those islators in 1990. Thirteen years later, a major-
leading and supporting the repeal campaign ity of term-limited states have experienced
are rational actors pursuing their own self- campaigns to repeal those laws.
interested goals, as are the voters who contin- Term limits continue to be opposed by a
ue to support term limits through the ballot. majority of incumbent politicians. A survey
The term limits movement remains one of by the Council of State Governments found
the most successful grassroots political 76 percent of politicians opposed to term
efforts in U.S. history. From 1990 to 1995, limits.8 A majority of the legislative staff,
legislative term limits passed in 18 states, bureaucrats, journalists, and interest groups
with an average of 68 percent voter support. that depend on politicians for employment,
In November 2000, Nebraska became the patronage, sources, and votes also opposed
19th state to limit the terms of state legisla- term limits. Most special interest groups,
tures. By the end of 2002, term limits had especially large, heavily regulated corpora-
affected well over 700 legislative seats in 11 tions as well as unions that rely on govern-
states. Despite a steady onslaught of negative ment intervention in the labor market, view
commentary emanating from the political term limits as anathema to their interests.9
and media establishments, public opinion Term limits laws also have been attacked
remains solidly in favor of term limits.4 in the courts. To date, three of the five suc-
The widespread popular appeal of limit- cessful repeal campaigns at the state level
ing the terms of elected officials is also evi- took place courtesy of judicial decisions.
dent in the passage of term limits in munici- The Massachusetts term limits law was
palities across the country, including Los overturned by the state supreme court in
Angeles, New York City, San Francisco, and 1997. The next year, the state supreme
Dallas. According to the Initiative and court invalidated Washington State’s term
Referendum Institute, “municipal term lim- limits. Most recently, on January 11, 2002,

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term limits in Oregon were repealed by a ested and purposively oriented, and
state supreme court decision.10 Nonjudicial each engages in rational decision
overturning of term limits has occurred making. Unfortunately, and pre-
only twice: first, in Idaho last year (see cisely contrary to markets with
“Case Studies,” below) and, second, in Utah well-defined and defendable prop-
earlier this year. erty rights, political processes have
Why is there unrelenting (albeit usually certain properties that less efficien-
unsuccessful) pressure to return to the days cy and discourage harmony among
of unlimited legislative tenure? Can one char- the self-interested. . . . As maximiz-
acterize the general nature of these repeal ers who follow their own strongest
campaigns? The repeal campaigns are cer- impulses, without necessarily hav-
tainly not grassroots affairs. Typically, they ing the most noble ends in mind,
are initiated, funded, and managed by career citizens in the polity act much like
legislators, legislative staff, bureaucrats, and economic agents in the economy.11
lobbyists.
In their influential book, Beyond Politics: The political class in several states has
Markets, Welfare, and the Failure of Bureaucracy, attacked term limits. Here, the political class
political scientists William C. Mitchell and is defined by its collective self-interest irre- Repeal campaigns
Randy T. Simmons articulate a comprehen- spective of party lines. Its focus is on the are not grassroots
sive public choice model of politics and institutional context of its members’ profes- affairs. Typically,
democracy, a model directly relevant to our sional lives (i.e., career maintenance, career
understanding of the campaign to repeal opportunities, and career advancement).12 they are initiated,
term limits. Mitchell and Simmons explain: Incumbent politicians, and those who bene- funded, and
fit from close, established relationships with
Politics is assumed to be a system incumbents, are clearly disfavored by term
managed by
consisting of four groups of deci- limits.13 In most states, the absence of term career legislators,
sion-makers—voters, elected offi- limits severely limits the competition for leg- legislative staff,
cials or politicians, bureaucrats, islative seats. In Idaho, for example, the 2000
and interest groups. Individuals are election saw 66 percent of state senators and bureaucrats, and
assumed to be rational utility-max- 50 percent of state house members elected lobbyists.
imizers who seek benefits from the without opposition.14 As journalist J. E.
political system. Politicians are McReynolds observes, in states such as
assumed to seek votes, and bureau- Oklahoma the “chance of a challenger
crats seek job security and budgets. unseating an incumbent is slim to none in
Interest groups and voters seek many districts. Some offices are filled with-
more wealth and income. . . . Each out an election because no one files against
actor is assumed to want some- the incumbent.”15 Consequently, legislative
thing possessed and/or controlled opposition to term limits is bipartisan.
by others; for example, voters and Term-limited legislatures undergo many
interest groups want services from positive institutional changes that are unset-
politicians and bureaucrats, and tling for career politicians. In American poli-
bureaucrats want greater revenues tics, seniority has traditionally been the key
or budgets from politicians and factor in determining who holds leadership
taxpayers. And, of course, politi- positions. Term-limited legislatures, in con-
cians want votes and other forms of trast, become more merit based and less gov-
support from citizens and interest- erned by an outdated seniority system that
group members. . . . In our model, values longevity rather than competence.
each individual is assumed to con- Therefore, term limits eliminate the possibil-
trol certain assets. Each is self-inter- ity of entrenched legislative leaders dominat-

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ing a legislative chamber. As a result, leader- Some career politicians also oppose term
ship positions (especially that of Speaker) limits on ideological, outcome-based
become less powerful as a more decentralized grounds. They correctly assume that term
power structure evolves in response to the limits produce both legislators and legislative
growing independence of term-limited fresh- incentive structures that are inherently more
men legislators. inclined toward more limited government.20
Michael H. Michaud, president of the The legislative staff echoes the political
Maine state senate, argues that “term limits class in deriding term limits. Seventy-eight
have weakened the legislature by making it a percent of state legislative staffers surveyed
more chaotic, less stable institution.”16 oppose term limits.21 The principal concern
Absent term limits, personal relationships of legislative staff is that the relatively rapid
among legislators and with staff, bureau- turnover of legislators will make it harder to
crats, and lobbyists are very important. Most build career-length relationships with legisla-
career politicians prefer things that way. tors.22 That self-interested concern has an
Lengthy tenures produce relatively civil empirical foundation. Political scientist
climbs up the legislative career ladder.17 Timothy Hodson found that the turnover
Pre–term limits, the seniority system ensured rate for California state legislative committee
that long-serving legislators automatically staff more than doubled under term limits.23
advanced to influential posts as committee In fact, in post–term limits California, 73 per-
chairmen and in the party leadership. cent of legislative staffers remain in their
Overall, their professional lives were more positions for three years or less,24 thereby
stable, more predictable, and more secure reducing the staffers’ alleged value to legisla-
under a relationship-driven, rather than a tors as purveyors of institutional knowledge.
policy-driven, regime. Political scientist Thad Kousser found that,
In legislatures without term limits, com- generally, “Across the term-limited states,
mittee members set legislative priorities and staff members who retain much of the insti-
subsequent challenges to those priorities on tutional memory have lost the close relation-
the legislative floor prove mostly unsuccessful. ships they had with veteran members.”25
Prior to term limits, the legislative leadership Why do bureaucrats oppose term limits?
in many of the affected states frequently dis- Research shows that the longer an official holds
tributed issue ownership to individual mem- office, the more likely it is that he or she will vote
bers rather than the legislator adopting a for higher government spending.26 After all, in
proactive policy agenda. By contrast, under terms of the political culture, experience in gov-
Term limits term limits new legislators are more likely to ernment tends to produce legislators who are
propose legislation, to take strong positions, interested in defending government. Inherent in
produce both and to vote against their leadership’s wishes.18 larger government is greater bureaucracy. In
legislators and According to Michigan State Senator Bill many instances, senior bureaucrats’ professional
legislative Schuette, term limits “compresses decision fiefdoms are protected in state and local budgets
making. It frees me from hesitations, of—‘Gee, written by career legislators with whom they have
incentive is it risky politically?’”19 More often than not, enjoyed mutually beneficial long-term relation-
structures controversial social issues (for example, abor- ships.27 Furthermore, freshman term-limited leg-
tion, capital punishment, and gun control) are islators, generally speaking, tend to ask tougher
that are relegated to the bottom of the legislative pri- questions of bureaucrats and demand a higher
inherently ority list. For example, the now term-limited level of performance from government agencies
inclined toward Michigan state legislature recently considered than did their predecessors.28
the death penalty issue for the first time since Mitchell and Simmons inform us:
more limited 1938. Absent term limits, it is far less likely
government. that the currents of public opinion will rock Unlike the business firm, which gets
the careerist politician’s electoral boat. its funds from sales of products or

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services, a public agency gets its funds ambit of government at all levels. Increasing Freshman
from elected representatives con- government activity leads to more efforts, espe- term-limited
vened in legislatures. The critical cially lobbying, to influence political decisions,
question, then, is how the legislature a relationship confirmed by scholarly studies.32 legislators
decides how much money is to be Long-term occupants of elected office become demand a
allocated each agency. . . . All of the socialized to favor the higher spending advocat-
major political actors—politicians, ed by special interest lobbyists.33
higher level
voters, bureaucrats, and interest In part, that results from the fact that the of performance
groups—interact to make collective witnesses before legislative committees, along from government
budgets and, incidentally, to insure with lobbyists and constituents, usually favor
growth in governmental spending higher levels of spending.34 The interest groups agencies than
and taxation. . . . Bureaucrats engage themselves favor income redistribution in their did their
most directly and continuously with direction. Because term limits threaten such
legislators . . . who have authority to spending, organizations such as the American
predecessors.
recommend budgets to the entire leg- Association of State Colleges and Universities
islature. Such interaction and mutual decry term limits on the grounds that the latter
dependence is certain to guarantee or produce uninformed legislators deciding on
reinforce powerful tendencies to budget priorities.35 In other words, citizen legis-
spend more funds. These committees lators are less likely than professional politi-
consist of largely self-selected politi- cians to agree that post-secondary educational
cians interested in winning the votes institutions are underfunded.
of grateful constituents.29 Lobbyists also oppose term limits because
they mean more work.36 According to politi-
Term limits, however, lead in the opposite cal scientists Gary Moncrief and Joel A.
direction. Bureaucrats know that term limits Thompson: “Most lobbyists . . . believe that
foster institutional settings that are favorable term limits have changed the nature of their
to smaller government. Limiting legislative job. They must work harder to get to know
terms may lead to limited government, or at the legislators and to communicate their
least a smaller government than would have message to them. They view the legislature as
existed in the absence of term limits. A pat- more unpredictable.”37 Lobbyists can no
tern is developing across the term-limited longer rely on informal and long-lasting
states. In states as disparate as Arizona, friendships with senior members (for exam-
Colorado, Florida, Maine, Montana, and ple, the Speaker or senate president) who can
Ohio, the composition of the legislature is exert major influence on a particular piece of
evolving from higher spending professional legislation.38 Clearly, this counts as evidence
legislators to more fiscally conservative citi- against the claim that term limits make lob-
zen legislators.30 byists more powerful.
Of course, bureaucrats are not alone in rec- In states as dissimilar as Maine, Michigan,
ognizing that term limits promise (or, from and Ohio, term limits have forced lobbyists to
their point of view, threaten) a more limited build new political relationships from scratch
government. Therefore, bureaucrats assert with each new crop of term-limited legislators;
that term limits make lobbyists more power- those lobbyists naturally worry about losing
ful because they become the source of infor- legislative influence as a result.39 In that way,
mation in the absence of experience, a refrain term limits act as a form of campaign finance
frequently heard in the media.31 That argu- reform. Term limits diminish the value of a
ment ignores a basic truth: the mere prospect legislative seat to lobbyists and the special
of term limits causes the lobbying industry to interests they represent in state capitals. That
fear for its professional survival. reduces the incentive for lobbyists to raise and
Taxes and regulations have increased the distribute the large contributions so publicly

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decried by the political and media establish- beat the voters to the punch, thereby
ments. Hence, as Moncrief and Thompson enabling the legislature to pass a less dracon-
conclude, “The overall assessment of the lob- ian term limits law than in many states.43
byists . . . is a negative one.” However, such legislative maneuvering did
The generic critique of term limits put for- not satisfy many career politicians. There-
ward by lobbyists, bureaucrats, legislators, fore, in mid-February 1999 the Utah state
and staffers ensured that, during the past few house voted for the second time to repeal the
years, the American political landscape (at 1994 term limits law. For the second time,
both the state and local levels) was regularly the state senate failed to act on the repeal bill.
dotted with repeal campaigns. Between 1999 In mid-February 2001, the persistent state
and 2002, 83 separate efforts were made to house voted for the third time to repeal term
repeal, amend, or modify existing term limits limits. However, the bill failed to pass the
legislation.40 Nearly all of the repeal efforts state Senate, apparently ensuring that term
sought to overturn the voters’ original ballot limits would formally impact the composi-
box decision, and the vast majority flew in tion of the state legislature, as scheduled, in
the face of continuing, and overwhelming, 2006. Nevertheless, on March 5, 2003, the
public support for term limits. Consider, state house passed yet another bill to repeal
Between 1999 first, these brief examples: term limits.44 That followed a February 25,
and 2002, 83 Oklahoma, the first state to pass term limits, 2003 state Senate vote in favor of repeal.45
separate efforts saw a repeal campaign launched by the The governor signed the bill into law on
Association of County Commissioners. Almost March 17, 2003. The new law flies directly in
were made to 90 percent of the state’s 231 county commis- the face of public opinion. A recent statewide
repeal, amend, or sioners favored abolishing the state’s constitu- poll found 76 percent of Utahans against
tional provision that limits terms.41 They were repeal, and only 18 percent in favor.46
modify existing joined by career legislators, legislative staffers, During the past two years, repeal cam-
term limits bureaucrats, leading journalists, business orga- paigns took place in two of the nation’s most
legislation. nizations, labor unions, and an assortment of important political jurisdictions—New York
special interest groups. However, the repeal City and California—and in one of the most
campaign failed because term limits are even commonly overlooked jurisdictions—Idaho.
more popular in Oklahoma today than when Regardless of the stark ideological, cultural,
they passed 12 years ago. According to an and demographic differences between those
Oklahoma University poll, 82 percent of jurisdictions, individually and collectively
Oklahomans approve of term limits (67 per- they best illustrate the central facets of the
cent of voters supported term limits in 1990).42 contemporary campaign to repeal term lim-
During the 2000 election season, attempts its. Therefore, it is to those individual cases
to repeal term limits began and failed in that we now turn.
Arizona, Michigan, and Missouri. However,
this did not deter the pro-repeal forces in
those states or elsewhere. In 2001, measures to The Campaign to Repeal
repeal or weaken term limits were introduced Term Limits: Case Studies
in 10 of the then 19 states with term limits.
However, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Flori-
da, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Challenging Term Limits in Pre- and
Oregon, and Utah failed to pass bills extend- Post-9/11 New York City
ing legislators’ terms beyond existing limits. During the spring of 2001, local politi-
Utah is one of only two states that cians inadvertently united proponents and
imposed term limits through the legislature opponents of term limits who were dismayed
rather than a citizen’s initiative on a at those politicians’ effort to overturn New
statewide ballot. Utah legislators chose to York City’s term limits law.

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As recounted by the Citizens Union eliminating the career politician and the
Foundation’s Lenore Chester: patronage system that nourishes him or
her.”49
Term limits came to New York City Revealingly, the repeal bill would only
via a 1993 citizens’ initiative orga- have overturned term limits for council
nized by New Yorkers for Term members. Apparently, New York City is suffi-
Limits (NYTL), a new group founded ciently sophisticated to survive the loss of a
and largely financed by business- veteran mayor, but not the loss of veteran
man, philanthropist and former council members. One suspects that this
Mayoral candidate Ronald Lauder. It debate was really about more than disinter-
wasn’t easy. NYTL filed over 129,000 ested public service. Was it purely a coinci-
petition signatures, sued the City of dence, for example, that 20 of the 22 original
New York, received a favorable ruling cosponsors of the repeal bill were barred
from the New York State Supreme from seeking reelection that year? This repeal
Court, and only then won a place on effort sufficiently galvanized local opinion
the ballot.47 that so stalwart an opponent of term limits
as the New York Times editorialized against
In the November 2, 1993, citywide referen- “this self-serving rebellion . . . by Council
dum, 60 percent of New York City voters sup- members trying to keep their jobs,” urging
ported limiting senior municipal politicians council members to “spike the bill that
to two four-year terms in office. The 1993 vote would overturn term limits.”50
was subsequently the subject of a failed court An alternative instrument for repealing
challenge by the city council. In a November term limits was to seek New York City resi-
1996 referendum, the city council asked New dents’ stamp of approval in a third referen-
Yorkers to delay the implementation of term dum on the issue in less than a decade. This
limits and to lengthen the allowable term in was the route favored by those anti–term lim-
office to 12 years. Overwhelmingly, New York its politicians wary of appearing undemocra-
voters replied, “No.” An early 2001 opinion tic. In practice, this would have also consti-
poll found that two-thirds of New Yorkers tuted recounting the votes of New Yorkers
remained in favor of term limits.48 until a count generated the desired outcome.
Therefore, Election Day 2001 saw two- Fearful of further antagonizing the elec-
term Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, the city torate a little more than six months before
comptroller, the public advocate, four of five Election Day, in the spring of 2001 the New
sitting borough presidents, and 35 of 51 York City Council narrowly failed to pass the The New
council members barred from seeking reelec- repeal bill. However, following the harrowing
tion. Anti–term limits politicians alleged that events of September 11, 2001, many New York Times
the electorate’s unsophisticated majority Yorkers wanted their term-limited Mayor editorialized
twice failed to appreciate that these term lim- Giuliani to remain in office. In hypothetical against “this
its would exert a “destructive force” on City match-ups, a Marist College poll showed
Hall, robbing it, for example, of vital institu- Giuliani, a Republican, defeating possible self-serving
tional memory. Leaving aside the question of Democratic mayoral candidates by as much rebellion . . . by
how laudable New York City Hall’s institu- as 30 points.51 New York voters knew what
tional memory may be, such concerns were they wanted—to keep Giuliani in office—and
Council members
overwhelmed by the reality, succinctly articu- Giuliani’s comments revealed that he wanted trying to keep
lated in public hearings by term limits sup- the same thing.52 their jobs.”
porter Cathy Stewart, that “term limits foster There were two problems, however, with
competition and bring new blood into gov- “everyone” getting what they want. First, it
ernment.” She continued, “They break up would be illegal. It is important to recall that
institutionalized incumbency protection, term limits did not arrive in New York City

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Even the better on a whim. When Giuliani ran for reelection of New Yorkers still favor term limits.
incumbents in 1997, he knew that the term limits law
(which he originally supported) prohibited a The Failure of California’s Proposition 45
usually need a third consecutive term and, consequently, his California recently experienced a sophisti-
new challenge tenure as the city’s Republican mayor would cated, self-interested campaign to eviscerate
end on January 1, 2002. Enter the New York its term limits law. Highly organized, well-
after two terms Conservative Party offering its mayoral can- funded opposition has been typical of anti-
in office. didacy to Giuliani if he successfully repealed term limits campaigns across the nation
the term limits law. Astonishingly, this “con- since states such as California first opted for
servative” organization paid such little heed term limits back in 1990. Proposition 45
to its philosophical heritage that it is was proved to be no exception.
willing to dismiss the spirit of the original Proposition 45 was placed on the primary
law if the latter ran counter to the party’s ballot by a successful, and expensive, initia-
political infatuation. tive petition drive. Senate President Pro Tem
As term limits are the law, their repeal John Burton (D-San Francisco), who was
would have been a serious legislative matter first elected to the California assembly in
requiring the agreement of either the New 1964 and who will be term-limited in 2004,
York State Legislature or New York City spearheaded the petition effort. Revealingly,
Council. Fortunately, in the post-9/11 climate the Proposition 45 campaign was backed by
neither legislative body appeared interested in the most of the state’s political establish-
revisiting an issue on which the voters had ment; nearly every interest group with busi-
spoken loudly. Whether out of high-minded ness before the state legislature (including
principle or simple political expediency, most the gambling, liquor, energy, and tobacco
New York elected officials recognized that the industries; the trial lawyers; the California
rule of law must take precedence over the pref- Association of Health Plans; the California
erences of a political leader, no matter how Correctional Peace Officers Association; and
popular he might be at the time. the California Teachers Association); labor
Second, a scenario in which every political unions; major media outlets (such as the Los
actor gets what he or she wants rarely Angeles Times); and a wide assortment of lib-
advances the public interest. During Giulia- eral groups, including the Sierra Club and
ni’s controversial tenure, he achieved some the League of Women Voters.
notable policy successes, particularly in the The liberal attachment to these repeal cam-
areas of crime, employment, and welfare.53 paigns has a certain irony since those who are
Although Giuliani’s record of accomplish- most enthusiastic about increasing legislative
ment dwarfs that of his predecessors, his sec- diversity are the most supportive of term lim-
ond term was not dominated by visionary its repeal. For example, California’s term-lim-
leadership or policy innovation. As the day- ited state legislature reflects greater gender
to-day chief operating officer of New York and racial diversity than its non-term-limited
City, Giuliani-the-policymaker largely ran predecessor. As predicted by proponents, the
out of intellectual steam. A third Giuliani number of successful female and minority
term was far more likely to resemble his candidates has risen. Female candidates seem
underwhelming second term than his note- to find it easier to gain entry to term-limited
worthy first term. That phenomenon is part legislatures than to non-term-limited legisla-
of the term limits rationale: even the better tures and are more likely to gain leadership
incumbents usually need a new challenge positions in high-turnover legislatures. The
after two terms in office. New York City resi- same is true for minority candidates. During
dents appear to agree. Despite the city’s gov- its 2001–2003 term, the California legislature
ernment being in the midst of a fiscal crisis, a contained 26 Hispanic members, up from 8
fall 2002 opinion poll found that two-thirds when term limits were introduced, and there

8
were 9 female Hispanic members, compared incumbents able to collect sufficient voter sig-
to none in 1990.54 natures within their district the opportunity
Despite a steady onslaught of negative to extend their legislature tenure. The signa-
commentary emanating from California’s ture threshold was only 20 percent of the total
political and media establishments, public of votes cast in the most recent election for
opinion remained solidly in favor of term that office and, courtesy of professional signa-
limits. In a June 1999 poll 73 percent of ture-gathering outfits, would not prove too
Californians agreed that term limits had onerous a hurdle for the average well-funded
been good for their state.55 In a June 2000 incumbent to overcome. Under this scenario,
poll 69 percent said they still approved of the if an incumbent garnered the required signa-
original term limits initiative.56 tures, he or she could then stand for reelec-
Why do ordinary Californians continue to tion. Allowing an additional four years in
support term limits? Though incomplete, the office if a legislator collected signatures from
experiment has proven largely successful. 20 percent of the voters who cast ballots in the
Since term limits were first put in place, legislator’s last election in many cases would
California has experienced relatively crowded, require only a few thousand signatures.
competitive state primaries and general elec- Opposition to Proposition 45 centered on
tions that see closer races, more incumbents the “No-on-45 Campaign,” a coalition of tax-
Since term limits
defeated, and more candidates running for payer organizations, such as the National were first put in
office. Both demographically and ideological- Tax Limitation Committee, and groups such place, California
ly, the legislature is now far more representa- as the Mexican-American Chamber of
tive of the California beyond the state capitol. Commerce, which provided an entrée for has seen closer
According to journalist Noam Levey, Proposition 45 opponents into an important races, more
“while many who watch state government Democratic constituency.59 Americans for
closely believe that term limits have eroded Limited Terms, a Wisconsin-based term lim-
incumbents
the quality of governing, most have a hard its group, provided almost all of the “No” defeated, and
time explaining how that has hurt citizens.”57 campaign’s funding.60 more candidates
Therefore, those opposed to term limits Senator Burton himself raised most of the
knew that the voters would overwhelmingly Proposition 45 campaign’s funding. In addi- running for
reject a frontal assault. Hence, it was erro- tion, the state Democratic Party contributed office.
neously argued that Californians could keep $3 million to the campaign, as Democrats
term limits by voting yes on Proposition 45. held 50 of 80 assembly seats and 26 of 40 sen-
In fact, the anti–term limits forces employed ate seats and did not relish the prospect of
a back-door approach to end the Golden sacrificing a significant number of those
State’s term limits experiment. seats on the term limits altar. Labor unions
Proposition 140, the original 1990 term spent an additional $2 million, and current
limits initiative, allowed for a maximum of 6 or former politicians spent $1 million, while
years in the state assembly and 8 years in the heavily regulated business groups spent sev-
state senate, for 14 years in total. Proposition eral hundred thousand dollars in support of
45 was marketed “as a way to ‘preserve and Proposition 45.61
protect’ those limits to voters.”58 In 2002, the However, as political consultant Dan Schnur
state’s most powerful politicians were staring observed, fortunately for term limits supporters,
extinction in the face. If it had passed, “the campaign to defeat Proposition 45 turned
California’s March 2002 term limits initiative out to be a classic example of what happens
would have presented those state legislators when money and political power come up
about to be forced out of office by against deeply held beliefs by the voters.”62
California’s term limits law with a probable Schnur continued:
stay of execution.
Proposition 45 would have allowed those The campaign against Proposition 45

9
. . . had two distinct advantages . . . ruary 1, 2002, the state legislature overrode a
most important was continuing gubernatorial veto to become the first state
strong support among voters for term legislative body in the country to repeal term
limits. This ongoing support forced limits.
Proposition 45’s supporters to deliver In repealing term limits, the legislature acted
a two-part message that was received in flagrant oppositioin to the demonstrated
with marked suspicion by voters. On sentiment of the Idahoan electorate, which
one hand, the Prop 45 campaign repeatedly supported inititatives that would
maintained that its goal was to pro- bring term limits into effect in 2004. The Idaho
tect term limits. At the same time, legislature also overrode Gov. Dirk
though, they argued that Prop 45 was Kempthorne’s veto66 and ignored a December
necessary to improve those limits. 2001 Idaho Supreme Court ruling upholding
The internal contradiction in the the state’s term limits law. The original House
campaign’s message kept it from bill even contained an emergency clause that
developing broad support.63 repealed term limits almost immediately. The
fact that, in Idaho, these are statutory term lim-
On March 5, 2002, the voters rejected its meant the legislature could repeal them
Proposition 45 by a margin of 58 to 42 per- without a popular vote, unlike the situation in
cent. The attempt to weaken term limits was states where term limits are part of the state
defeated in 56 of 58 counties statewide. constitution and, therefore, repeal requires
Proposition 45 only passed (and narrowly at popular approval.67
that) in liberal Los Angeles and San Francisco It was an ideologically conservative,
counties. The overwhelming rejection of Republican-dominated state legislature that
Proposition 45 occurred despite the initia- repealed term limits.68 The Idaho Republican
tive’s supporters outspending their oppo- Party previously supported term limits in
nents by $10 million to $1 million.64 order to remove careerist liberal Democratic
Importantly for the “No” campaign, the congressmen from office. The party was
self-styled campaign finance reform lobby largely successful in its quest to make
group, Common Cause, a long-time term Democrats something of an endangered leg-
limits foe, had chosen to remain neutral dur- islative species throughout most of the state.
ing the campaign. Meanwhile, the nation’s At the time of repeal, Republicans held 89
self-styled campaign finance reformer-in- percent of the legislative seats, making Idaho
chief, Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), announced the most Republican legislature in the coun-
Representative his opposition to Proposition 45, despite his try. Aware that term limits would soon bite
longstanding opposition to term limits. the partisan hand that fed it, by 2000 senior
democracy is McCain’s endorsement of the “No” cam- state Republican Party officials began to
not alive and paign significantly aided the targeting of indicate support for the repeal idea.69 At its
well in Idaho. undecided moderates and independent vot- annual convention in June 2002, the Idaho
ers. That was reflected in the final results, as Republican Party rejected a neutral position
self-described moderates voted “no” by a 14- on the term limits issue in favor of support-
point margin while independents voted “no” ing the majority of Republican legislators
by a 2-to-1 margin.65 who voted to repeal term limits.70
Term limits critics erroneously maintain
Idaho Repeals Term Limits that this instrument for enhanced political
Representative democracy is not alive and competition will reduce the quality of the
well in Idaho. Term limits opponents won in average elected official.71 In Idaho, foes of
Idaho by a razor thin margin after a deceptive term limits asserted that a majority of the
advertising campaign that unfairly benefited 1994 electorate was dazzled by the pro-term-
from taxpayer-subsidized advocacy. On Feb- limits campaign and, consequently, failed to

10
appreciate how such limits would weaken Over the course of a few weeks, more than One is led
state government. Either before a jurisdiction 66,000 Idahoans signed a petition to place an
adopts term limits or during a repeal cam- anti-repeal referendum question —Proposition to ask whether
paign, critics always present the argument 2—on the November ballot.72 The pro-term- legitimately
that term limits unfairly restrict the right of limits campaign also targeted repeal-support-
voters to elect whom they want. ing incumbents seeking their respective party’s
expressed,
But the critics’ argument rang a little hollow renomination in the May 28 primaries. Of the constitutionally
in this case. After all, Idaho voters overwhelm- 10 incumbents who lost their party’s primary, 3 defensible
ingly approved term limits by initiative in 1994 defeats were directly attributable to the term
and reaffirmed term limits in 1996, 1998, and limits vote. Less than two months before the popular
2000. Idaho voters repeatedly demonstrated vote, polling showed the anti-repeal campaign sentiment
that they wanted some reasonable restrictions comfortably ahead.73
placed on the options available on any given Therefore, Proposition 2’s defeat came as
counts for
ballot for the state legislature. a surprise to term limits supporters. It was something in
In large measure, democracy is about also an agonizingly close loss. The anti-term- our representa-
respecting the choices of the people. Idaho’s limits yes vote secured 50.2 percent support;
term limits law was the product of over- the pro-term-limits “no” vote secured 49.8 tive democracy.
whelming public opinion as registered in a percent support. Therefore, the repeal passed
free and fair election. Over the past decade, by a margin of just 1,825 votes out of more
the term-limits-by-referendum experience than 403,000 votes cast. Why did the Idaho
was replicated innumerable times at both the repeal campaign succeed, albeit very narrow-
state and local levels. In the Idaho case, the ly, at the polls? Why did the term limits vote
state Supreme Court upheld the term limits decline from a high of 59 percent in the orig-
law against the latest legal challenge. One is inal 1994 initiative?
led to ask whether or not legitimately Obviously, the political landscape changed
expressed, constitutionally defensible popu- between Labor Day and Election Day. There
lar sentiment counts for something in our appear to be several reasons for this unexpect-
representative democracy. Apparently, the ed set-back for term limits. First, the repeal
contemporary political class of careerist campaign was astutely marketed. Mitchell and
Idaho legislators thinks not. Simmons restate the noted public choice
The legislative effort to repeal term limits, economist Gordon Tullock’s observation that
led by House Speaker Bruce Newcomb, was “the name of the political game is shaping
encouraged by the political action commit- preferences and their distribution. That is why
tees sponsored by a variety of special interest political advertising . . . is such an important
groups. Idaho’s largest business and agricul- ingredient in the electoral process . . . Shaping
tural lobbies, such as the Idaho Association the options and the agenda become addition-
of Commerce and Industry and the Idaho al subjects of intense scrutiny among activists,
Farm Bureau Federation, backed the for on such factors the outcomes of elections
Republicans’ repeal campaign, as did the depend.”74
Idaho Association of Counties and the The pro-repeal campaign was popularized
Association of Cities. During the referendum under the guise of protecting those small,
campaign, those special interest groups coa- rural communities that find it increasingly
lesced under the organizational umbrella of difficult to fill offices from diminishing
Idahoans for Voter Rights, headed by Steve pools of candidates. When the votes were tal-
Ahrens, a lobbyist for the Idaho Association lied, “the number of rural Idahoans voting to
of Commerce and Industry. support repeal of the law offset the number
In a challenge led by stockbroker Don opposing it in the cities,” according to jour-
Morgan, term limits supporters sought to send nalist Wayne Hoffman’s analysis of the
the state’s political class an opposing message. results.75 Only two rural counties supported

11
term limits, as pro-term-limits sentiment was have been actively campaigning in favor of
almost exclusively confined to the urban cen- repeal.80 In addition to those groups, Idaho’s
ters of Boise and Coeur d’Alene. secretary of state, Pete Cenarrusa, the state’s
The pro-repeal campaign also warned vot- chief elections officer, appeared on campaign
ers that their safety could be at stake when billboards throughout the state calling for
they voted on November 5. Included in the Idahoans to vote yes on Proposition 2.
Idahoans for Voter Rights’ voter pamphlet Morgan asserts that this taxpayer subsidy was
were the following questions: “If someone kid- worth 5 percent of the vote to the “Yes” cam-
napped your daughter, would you want the paign.81 Finally, voter fatigue may have mar-
most experienced sheriff at the crime scene— ginally affected the pro-term-limits tally, as
or someone just out of the academy with no Idaho voters were asked about term limits in
experience?” and “At the trial, would you want five separate statewide votes over eight years.82
an experienced prosecuting attorney putting Idaho’s repeal left 17 term-limited states.
the bad guys in jail or would you be satisfied Even if one dismisses the above concerns
with someone who just got out of law regarding the marginal nature of the repeal
school?”76 The pro-repeal campaign also mar- victory in Idaho, there is little, if any, evidence
keted a yes vote by taking a page out of the to suggest that term limits are no longer pop-
The consistent term limits movement’s populist playbook. ular with voters, either nationally or locally.
failure of The “pro-yes” advertising claimed that a yes In fact, the consistent failure of other repeal
other repeal vote would “Stop Special Interests from campaigns both prior to and including the
Running Idaho”—a powerful message, indeed. 2002 election strongly suggests that the
campaigns both Second, the ambiguous nature of the ques- Idaho outcome was an aberration.
prior to and tion’s wording may have confused some vot-
ers. According to columnist Jim Weatherby, The Voters’ Verdict on Term Limits
including the “this is the first referendum that proposed to In fall 2001, a campaign orchestrated by
2002 election repeal a repeal of a state law. That created the an interest group failed to extend Michigan’s
suggests that the double-negative ballot question—do you sup- term limits to 12 years. This latest repeal
port the repeal of term limits? Yes meant no to effort followed on the failure of two bills to
Idaho outcome term limits. No meant yes.”77 In other words, either repeal or extend term limits in time for
was an term limits supporters had to educate voters the 2000 election. The campaign was jointly
aberration. that a “no” vote was a vote to keep term limits. led by Kevin Kelly, a Michigan State Medical
Furthermore, according to Stacie Rumenap, Society executive who had served as outgoing
executive director of U.S. Term Limits, “the Republican Gov. John Engler’s former cam-
import of the referendum was more clearly paign manager and chief of staff, and
expressed in newspaper summaries than it was Richard Cole, a Blue Shield executive and
on the ballot itself—which seemed to present member of former Democratic Gov. James
two opposite interpretations of what a yes vote Blanchard’s administration.83 The
would do, depending on whether you were anti–term-limits coalition continued to bat-
reading the short version of the question or tle against overwhelming public sentiment
the long one.”78 Morgan maintains that the on this issue. A February 2002 poll by
ballot wording confusion cost the term limits Basswood Research found that 71.5 percent
campaign up to 8 percent of the vote on of respondents favored term limits, whereas
Election Day.79 just 20 percent opposed them.84 During this
Third, the anti-repeal campaign was disad- campaign, the state Republican Party
vantaged by the taxpayer-subsidized nature of remained opposed to term limits; however,
the repeal campaign. As Morgan pointed out the state Democratic Party changed its mind
during the campaign, taxpayer-funded organi- on the issue, moving from support to oppo-
zations, such as the Association of Cities and sition, as its leadership concluded that term
the Idaho Association of Counties, should not limits would provide an electoral advantage

12
to Democrats in the 2002 election.85 ported the introduction of terms limits on
The Michigan repeal effort failed for the county commissioners.
same fundamental reason that most repeal
efforts fail: term limits themselves have not
failed the voters. As recounted by Lawrence Conclusion
W. Reed, president of the Michigan-based
Mackinac Institute: The almost universal failure of repeal
campaigns reflects the fact that it is political-
Term limits do not guarantee better ly premature, to say the least, for the average
government. They don’t eliminate state legislature or city council to consider
influence peddling. They don’t make either repealing or watering down term lim-
saints of legislators. But all that can be its. Legislative term limits are a fact of life, at
said of the absence of term limits. least in the short- to medium- term. Hence, it
This illuminates the conundrum that may be reasonable to assume that their oppo-
the anti–term limits people have not nents would adjust their sights accordingly.
yet solved: They have not made much Clearly, however, that is not the case. Instead,
of a case that term limits have been a it appears that each network of career politi-
setback for Michiganians.86 cians, senior bureaucrats, and influential spe-
cial interest groups inexorably coalesces into
During the spring of 2002, repeal efforts a self-interested cabal intent on skewering
were unsuccessful in politically important clearly articulated voter intent on this issue.
states throughout the southwestern and Most efforts to repeal term limits have
southern regions of the country. In March, a failed because their sponsors are clearly self-
bill to repeal the Arizona term limits law was interested. Ohio state Sen. Mark L. Mallory
withdrawn after having passed a house com- (D-Cincinnati) says any successful relaxation
mittee. The career legislators pushing repeal of term limits or a repeal movement will have
backed off after coming face to face with the to be started by individuals or groups “that
latest evidence that Arizonans continue to don’t have a vested interest’’ or it will appear
oppose long political careers: 58 percent sup- self-serving.88 To date, however, repeal cam-
port term limits.87 Meanwhile, a Florida pro- paigns have been led by those seemingly
posal to extend legislative tenure from 8 to 12 intent on preserving their professional
years passed a state house committee but was advantages and institutional perks regardless
withdrawn from legislative consideration of other, larger considerations. Only once has
due to highly negative voter reaction. In early this approach passed voter inspection, and The fundamental
May 2002, Austin, Texas, voters rejected by 55 then by a narrow margin, trickery, and tax-
to 45 percent a proposition that would have subsidized campaigning. reason that most
repealed term limits for the mayor and city A great deal is at stake with the repeal of repeal efforts fail:
council members. term limits. Without term limits, a state’s term limits them-
On the same day that a tiny majority of political infrastructure (that is, its elections,
Idahoans voted yes to the repeal of term lim- legislature, legislative committee system, leg- selves have not
its, voters in several other cities and states islative staff, and bureaucracy) risks stagna- failed the voters.
around the country indicated a clear unwill- tion. Term limits offer hope to state taxpay-
ingness to weaken or repeal term limits. In ers that the future will not be like its past of
Colorado, voters defeated the effort to endless spending and taxing—the seemingly
exempt district attorneys from term limits. In inevitable results of state political systems
Nashville, Tennessee, and in Troy, New York, dominated by careerist politicians.
campaigns to weaken mayoral and city coun- As importantly, if the politicians that
cil term limits were comprehensively defeat- term limits constrain can overturn them, one
ed. The voters in Palm Beach, Florida, sup- must ask whether voters have ultimate con-

13
trol over their political servants. Term limits’ its are vigorously opposed and sheds light
critics reply that the people always have the on why their repeal is repeatedly sought.
power to reject incumbents. But relatively
few incumbent politicians are defeated in the
normal course of events. Absent term limits, Notes
significant turnover only occurs after years of 1. William C. Mitchell and Randy T. Simmons,
fiscal irresponsibility and incompetence. In Beyond Politics: Markets, Welfare, and the Failure of
most jurisdictions, the ship of state appar- Bureaucracy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press,
ently has to sink before the crew can be fired, 1994), p. 80.
such are the advantages of incumbency. 2. Jennie Drage Bowser, “Idaho Makes Term
Democracy is about political choice fos- Limits History,” National Conference of State
tered by meaningful political competition. In Legislatures, February 1, 2002, www.ncsl.org/pro
a democracy, all partisan interests and ideo- grams/legman/about/idahorepeal.htm.
logical flavors have a chance to make their 3. Ibid.
case to the electorate. A well-functioning
democracy does not guarantee success in the 4. See Patrick Basham, “Assessing the Term
political marketplace. It does ensure that Limits Experiment: California and Beyond,” Cato
Institute Policy Analysis no. 413, August 31, 2001,
everyone should potentially be capable of pp. 2, 20.
securing elected office.
Term limits further this democratic goal 5. Initiative and Referendum Institute, “Local
by guaranteeing the regular turnover of Term Limits,” www.iandrinstitute.org/local/
term%20limits.htm.
politicians in and out of office. Without
term limits, the average challenger finds it 6. Ibid.
extremely difficult and expensive to over-
come the inherent advantages of incum- 7. Alan Greenblatt, “Crash Course,” Governing,
November 2001, http://64.67.181.148/11term. htm.
bency, such as name recognition, office
staff and mailings, and constituency ser- 8. Cited in Paul Jacob, “A Stake through the
vice. Absent term limits, not only are fewer Heart,” U.S. Term Limits weekly radio commen-
incumbents threatened by serious chal- tary no. 23, April 5, 1999, www.termlimits.org/
Press/Common_Sense/cs23.html.
lengers, thereby reducing political competi-
tion, but fewer candidates step forward to 9. See, for example, Paul Jacob, “From the Voters
challenge these incumbents in the first with Care,” in The Politics and Law of Term Limits,
place, thereby reducing political choice. ed. Edward H. Crane and Roger Pilon
(Washington: Cato Institute, 1994), pp. 38–39.
What if the voters were correct the first See also Norman Leahy, “Corporate Interests:
time? After all, a growing body of evidence Why Big Business Hates Term Limits,” Term
suggests term limits help to foster a rein- Limits Outlook 2, no. 1.
vigorated political culture. This remedial
10. Mike Lehman et al. v. Bill Bradbury et al. (CC 01C-
measure remains overwhelmingly popular 14353) (SC S48771), January 11, 2002.
and appears increasingly effective at foster-
ing political competition and strengthen- 11. William C. Mitchell and Randy T. Simmons,
ing the political culture. The belated Beyond Politics: Markets, Welfare, and the Failure of
Bureaucracy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994),
democratization of state politics threatens pp. 41, 43.
only entrenched incumbents. Term limits
should be a vital part of our system of rep- 12. See Klaus Stolz, “The Political Class and
resentative government. However, a public- Regional Institution-Building: Conceptual
Framework, Methodological Problems and
choice-based analysis of the institutional (Some) Ideas for Empirical Applications,” paper
actors who invest so heavily in non-term- presented at the European Consortium for
limited legislatures speaks to why term lim- Political Research Workshop “Regionalism

14
Revisited: Territorial Politics in the Age of 27. See, for example, Reed, “Time to Repeal or
Globalization,” Mannheim, Calif., March 26–31, Revise Term Limits?” Mackinac Center for Public
1999, p. 4. Policy, April 10, 2002, http://www.mackinac.org.

13. See, for example, Basham, “Assessing the Term 28. Cited in Michael E. Conway, “Times of
Limits Experiment: California and Beyond.” Change,” State Government News, February 2000,
p. 12. For further discussion of bureaucratic
14. Cited in Marty Trillhaase, “Newcomb’s behavior, see Aaron Wildavsky, New Politics of the
Selective Memory,” Post Register Online, January Budgetary Process (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman,
30, 2002, www.idahoansforfairelections.org/ 1988); T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, “Bureaucrats
InTheNews.htm. versus Voters: on the Political Economy of
Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy,”
15. J. E. McReynolds, “Voters Spoke Clearly on Quarterly Journal of Economics 93 (1979): 563–88; A.
Term Limits,” Sunday Oklahoman, August 19, 2001, Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-
www.nexis.com/research/search/submitView Tagged. Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 64
(1974): 291–303; and Anthony Downs, Inside
16. Michael H. Michaud, “Term Limits and the Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).
Weakened Legislative Process,” Spectrum: The
Journal of State Government, Fall 2001, p. 28. 29. Mitchell and Simmons, Beyond Politics: Markets,
Welfare, and the Failure of Bureaucracy, pp. 59–60.
17. Chuck Perricone, “A New Paradigm under
Term Limits,” Spectrum: The Journal of State 30. See Basham, “Assessing the Term Limits
Government, Fall 2001, p. 30. Experiment: California and Beyond,” pp. 18–19.
18. John Carey, cited in Lee Leonard, “Term 31. See, for example, Michael Green, “Limiting
Limits Are Here to Stay, Legislators Told,” Colum- Terms, Limiting Democracy,” Las Vegas Mercury,
bus Dispatch, February 22, 2002, www.ohiocitizen. January 10, 2002, www.lasvegasmercury.com/
org/moneypolitics/to_stay.htm. 2002/MERC-Jan-10-Thu-2002/17797761.html.
19. Quoted in Arlene Levinson, “So Little Time, So 32. See Patrick Basham, “It’s the Spending,
Much to Do,” State Legislatures, July/August 1995. Stupid! Understanding Campaign Finance in the
Big-Government Era,” Cato Institute Briefing
20. Basham, “Assessing the Term Limits Experi- Paper no. 64, July 18, 2001.
ment: California and Beyond,” pp. 17–19.
33. See, for example, Payne, The Culture of Spending.
21. Drew Leatherby, “The Truth about Term
Limits,” December 1997, www.csg.org/sgn/ 34. See ibid.; and Stephen Moore and Aaron Steelman,
dec97/limits.html. “An Antidote to Federal Red Ink: Term Limits,” Cato
Institute Briefing Paper no. 21, November 3, 1994,
22. See, for example, the discussion in “IGS Goes www.cato.org/pubs/briefs/bp-021.html.
to Sacramento to Assess Ten Years of Term
Limits,” Public Affairs Report 42, no. 3 (Fall 2001), 35. See, for example, Sara Hebel, “As Term Limits
www.igs.berkeley.edu:8880/publications/ Kick In, State Colleges Fear the Impact,” The
par/fall2001/index.htm. Chronicle of Higher Education, September 28, 2001,
p. 36.
23. Timothy Hodson, “Conventional Wisdom or
Wishful Thinking? Staff Influence in Post Term 36. See, for example, University of California,
Limit Legislatures,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Berkeley, “IGS Goes to Sacramento to Assess Ten
July 1994, p. 9. Years of Term Limits.”
24. Steven Hayward, “Same As the Old Boss?,” 37. Gary Moncrief and Joel A. Thompson,
Reason, December 1997, www.reason.com/9712/ “Lobbyists’ Views on Term Limits,” Spectrum: The
fe.hayward.html. Journal of State Government, Fall 2001, p. 15.
25. Thad Kousser, “Response to Term Limits Is 38. Greenblatt, “Crash Course.”
Reshaping State Legislatures,” Public Affairs Report
42, no. 3 (Fall 2001), www.igs.berkeley.edu:8880/ 39. See Basham, “Assessing the Term Limits
publications/par/fall2001/reshape.htm. Experiment: California and Beyond,” pp. 16–17.

26. See, for example, James L. Payne, The Culture of 40. The 15 affected states were Arizona, Arkansas,
Spending (San Francisco: ICS Press, 1991), chaps. California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Maine,
5, 11. Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oregon,

15
South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. 122101.shtml.

41. John Greiner, “Term Limit Repeal Drive 54. Dan Schnur, “Prop 45: Turning California Term
Approved,” The Daily Oklahoman, August 23, 2001, Limits,” Campaigns and Elections, June 2002, p. 38.
www.nexis.com/research/search/submit
ViewTagged. 55. Los Angeles Times poll of registered California
voters conducted June 10–14, 1999. Published in
42. Poll results cited in The Daily Oklahoman, the Los Angeles Times, June 18, 1999.
“Dead on Arrival: Term Limits Repeal Has Flat-
Lined,” editorial, September 7, 2001, www.nexis. 56. Diversified Research polled likely California
com/research/search/submitViewTagged. voters on June 6, 2000. Results from this survey
are available at http://www.termlimits.org/Press /
43. In Utah, governors, state senators, and state Press_Releases/20000607.html.
representatives are all limited to 12 years of con-
secutive service. Once out of office, they can run 57. Noam Levey, “Term Limits Have Proved a
again as there is no lifetime limit on tenure. Debatable Proposition,” San Jose Mercury News,
March 1, 2002, www.bayarea.com/mld/mercury
44. See Bob Bernick Jr., “Term Limits Get the news/news/politics/2770226.htm.
Boot,” Deseret News, March 6, 2003, http://
deseretnews.com/dn/0,1249,465031273,00.html. 58. Schnur, “Prop 45: Turning California Term
Limits,” p. 34.
45. See Jerry D. Spangler and Bob Bernick Jr.,
“Utah Senators Vote to Repeal Term-Limits Law,” 59. Ibid., p. 38.
Deseret News, February 25, 2003, http://deseret
news.com/dn/1,1442,465029487,00.html. 60. Ibid., p. 39.

46. Dan Jones and Associates, poll of 413 Utah 61. See, for example, Greg Lucas, “Attempt to
residents conducted January 6–9, 2003. Margin of Limit Term Limits Trails,” San Francisco Chronicle,
error is +/- 5.0 percent. March 6, 2002.

47. Lenore Chester, The Big Turnover: Term Limits in 62. Schnur, “Prop 45: Turning California Term
New York City, Citizens Union Foundation, New Limits,” pp. 34–35.
York, 2000, p. 4.
63. Ibid., p. 35.
48. Cited in the “Ignoring the Voters,” Wall Street
Journal, editorial, February 8, 2001, p. A18. 64. By comparison, the “Yes” campaign spent
more than any of the three candidates for the
49. Quoted in Eric Lipton, “Waxing Philosophic, Republican gubernatorial nomination spent on
and Just Waxing, in 9-Hour Term-Limit Hearing,” their respective primary campaigns. The 1990
New York Times, March 9, 2001, www.nytimes. term limits initiative was supported by a cam-
com/2001/03/09/nyregion/09TERM.html. paign that was outspent 3-to-1 by the opposition
campaign.
50. “Vetoing New York’s Voters,” New York Times,
editorial, March 8, 2001, www.nytimes.com/ 65. Schnur, “Prop 45: Turning California Term
2001/03/08/opinion/08THU4.html. Limits,” p. 39.

51. A Marist College poll conducted September 24, 66. Bob Fick, “Kempthorne Vetoes Term Limits
2001, that surveyed 508 registered voters (margin of Repeal; House, Senate Ready for Override,”
error +/-4.5 percent) found that Giuliani would Associated Press, January 31, 2002.
cruise to victory in the November general election
over either of the Democratic mayoral candidates 67. The other states with statutory term limits are
involved in the party’s run-off election. Maine, Utah, and Wyoming.

52. See, for example, Giuliani’s interview with 68. Michael Janofsky, “Idaho Legislature Repeals
journalist Dan Rather on CBS-TV’s 60 Minutes II, Term Limit Law, Undoing Voter-Approved
September 26, 2001. Measure,” New York Times, February 2, 2002, p. A13.

53. See, for example, the summary provided by 69. “Idaho Is First to Repeal Term Limits for
Deroy Murdock in “Rudy’s Legacy: A Model for Officials,” Salt Lake Tribune, February 2, 2002,
the Right,” National Review Online, December 21, www.sltrib.com/2002/feb/02022002/
2001, www.nationalreview.commurdock/murdock nation_w/172843.htm.

16
70. “Your Choice on Proposition 2, Term Limits,” By: Confusion Reigns on Ballot Wording,”
The Idaho Statesman, November 3, 2002, www. idaho November 8, 2002, www.termlimits.org/Press/
statesman.com/Search/Story.asp?ID=24608. Executive_Director_Messages/20021108.html.

71. See Basham, “Assessing the Term Limits 79. Cited in Hoffman, “Term Limits Could Be
Experiment: California and Beyond,” pp. 12–14, Put on Ballot for 6th Time.”
for the opposing view.
80. See, for example, Don Morgan’s comments as
72. The referendum is rarely used in Idaho poli- reported in The Idaho Statesman, “Campaign Trail:
tics. In fact, there have only been four in the state’s Groups Join to Battle Term-Limit Referendum,”
history. July 5, 2002, www.idahostate man.com/Search/
Story.asp?ID=14520.
73. Poll results cited in Dan Popkey, “Term-limits
Advocates Go All Out for ‘Vote No on 2’,” The Idaho 81. Cited in Hoffman, “Term Limits Could Be Put
Statesman, September 19, 2002, www.idhostatesman on Ballot for 6th Time.”
com/Search/Story.asp?ID =20787.
82. See, for example, Weatherby, “The Voters’
74. Mitchell and Simmons, Beyond Politics: Unexpected Term Limits Reversal,” The Idaho States-
Markets, Welfare, and the Failure of Bureaucracy, pp. man.
79–80.
83. Stacey Range, “Michigan Foes of Term Limits
75. Wayne Hoffman, “Term Limits Could Be Put Look to Idaho,” Lansing State Journal, February 3,
on Ballot for 6th Time,” The Idaho Statesman, 2002, http://www.lsj.com/news/capitol/020203_
November 7, 2002, www.idahostatesman.com/ terms_1a-6a.html.
Search/Story.asp?ID=24999.
84. Cited in Reed, “Time to Repeal or Revise Term Limits?”
76. As reported in Wayne Hoffman, “Group:
Term Limits a Threat to Safety,” The Idaho 85. Range, “Michigan Foes of Term Limits Look
Statesman, September 27, 2002, http://www.id to Idaho.”
ahostatesman.com/Search/Story.asp?ID=
21509. 86. Reed, “Time to Repeal or Revise Term Limits?”

77. Jim Weatherby, “The Voters’ Unexpected 87. Poll results cited in Mary Jo Pitzl, “Term Limit
Term Limits Reversal,” The Idaho Statesman, Repeal Unpopular,” The Arizona Republic,
November 10, 2002, www.idahostatesman.com/ February 10, 2002, http://arizonarepublic.com.
Search/Story.asp? ID=25218.
88. Quoted in Leonard, “Term Limits Are Here to
78. Stacie Rumenap, “Idaho Politicians Squeak Stay, Legislators Told.”

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