1 G.R. No. 110478 October 15, 2007 FERMIN MANAPAT, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents. Eminent Domain; Non-impairment Clause; The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State; By virtue of its sovereign character, the exercise of the power prevails over the non-impairment clause, and is clearly superior to the final and executory judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case; Section 9, Article III of the Constitution merely imposes a limit on the governments exercise of the power and provides a measure of protection to the individuals right to property. The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. Also called the power of expropriation, it is described as the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State. By virtue of its sovereign character, the exercise of the power prevails over the non-impairment clause, and is clearly superior to the final and executory judgment rendered by a court in an ejectment case; Section 9, Article III of the Constitution merely imposes a limit on the governments exercise of the power and provides a measure of protection to the individuals right to property. Same; The power of eminent domain may be delegated by Congress to the President, administrative bodies, local government units and even to private enterprises performing public services. Just like its two companion fundamental powers of the State, the power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. However, it may be delegated by Congress to the President, administrative bodies, and local government units and even to private enterprises performing public services. Same; Requisites. Over the years and in a plethora of cases, this Court has recognized the following requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain: (1) the property taken must be private property; (2) there must be genuine necessity to take the private property; (3) the taking must be for public use; (4) there must be payment of just compensation; and (5) the taking must comply with due process of law. Same; as a rule, genuine necessity for the exercise of eminent domain is a justiciable question but when power is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a political question. It is well recall that in Lagcao v. Judge Labra, 440 SCRA 279 (2004), we declared that the foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. As a rule, the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question. However, when the power is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a political question. Thus, in City of Manila v. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349 (1919), we held: The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well-settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute their own views for those representatives of the people. Same; Socialized Housing; Words and Phrases; Socialized housing is the construction of dwelling units of the middle and lower class members of our society; Zonal Improvement Program is an integral part of the governments socialized housing-as such, the Supreme Court has deemed it compliant with the public purpose requirement, it being clearly devoted to public purpose. The Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP), being implemented for government by NHA, draws breath from policy mandates found in the 1987 Constitution. 60 It is an integral part of the government's "socialized housing" program which, in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 61 we deemed compliant with the "public use" requirement, it being a program clearly devoted to a "public purpose." Justice Irene R. Cortes, speaking eloquently for the Court, said: "Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1). This definition was later expanded to include among others: a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the middle and lower income groups of the society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other facilities; b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as well as the provision of related facilities and services; c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the

2 area or property involved, rearrangement and re-alignment of existing houses and other dwelling structures and the construction and provision of basic community facilities and services, where there are none, such as roads, footpaths, drainage, sewerage, water and power system, schools, barangay centers, community centers, clinics, open spaces, parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities; d) The provision of economic opportunities, including the development of commercial and industrial estates and such other facilities to enhance the total community growth; and e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and maintain housing for the greatest number of people under Presidential Decree No. 757. (Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1) xxx xxx xxx Same; Same; Same; The "public use" requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions.- It need only be added, at this juncture, that the "public use" requisite for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. At present, it may not be amiss to state that whatever is beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. Same; Same; The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis, given that the Constitution speaks of lands, not of landed estates J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 (1970), is instructive. In that case, this Court adopted the dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic v. Baylosis, that the propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis, given that the Constitution speaks of lands, not of landed estates. Speaking through Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique M. Fernando, the Court said: This is not to say of course that property rights are disregarded. This is merely to emphasize that the philosophy of our Constitution embodying as it does what Justice Laurel referred to as its "nationalistic and socialist traits discoverable upon even a sudden dip into a variety of [its] provisions" although not extending as far as the "destruction or annihilation" of the rights to property, negates the postulate which at one time reigned supreme in American constitutional law as to their well-nigh inviolable character. This is not so under our Constitution, which rejects the doctrine of laissez faire with its abhorrence for the least interference with the autonomy supposed to be enjoyed by the property owner. Laissez faire, as Justice Malcolm pointed out as far back as 1919, did not take too firm a foothold in our jurisprudence. Our Constitution is much more explicit. There is no room for it for laissez faire. Same; Same; Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA No. 7279); Statutory Construction; A new statute should affect the future, not the past. The law looks forward, not backward. The language of R.A. No. 7279 does not suggest that the Legislature has intended its provisions to have any retroactive application. The Court is not unaware of the condition now imposed by R.A. No. 7279 that, for purposes of urban development and housing under the Act, where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by small property owners shall be exempted. "Small property owners" are owners of residential lands with an area not exceeding 300 sq m in highly urbanized cities and 800 sq m in other urban areas and who do not own any other real property. Invoking this limitation under the said law, the appellate court in the questioned rulings exempted from expropriation the lots owned by Loberanes, Quimque, Mercado, Vega and Santos, and partially exempted the lot of Oracion. The CA's ruling on this point is incorrect. R.A. No. 7279 was enacted in 1992, almost two decades after the expropriation cases against the property owners herein were instituted with the RTC in 1977. Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non praeteritis. A new statute should affect the future, not the past. The law looks forward, not backward. Article 4 of the Civil Code even explicitly declares, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." In these consolidated cases, the Court finds that the language of R.A. No. 7279 does not suggest that the Legislature has intended its provisions to have any retroactive application. On the contrary, Section 49 of the said law indicates that it "shall take effect upon its publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation." The law's prospective application being clearly stated, the Court cannot agree with the disposition of the appellate court that the subject lots not exceeding 300 sq m are exempt from expropriation.

3 DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, as represented by its Secretary, ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), respondent. [G.R. No. 158228. March 23, 2004] DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378, which reversed the August 30, 2000 decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, as well as the Resolution dated May 7, 2003, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. In controversy are Lot No. 2509 and Lot No. 817-D consisting of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental, respectively. On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by the late Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS (formerly Bureau of Education).[2] Consequently, titles thereto were transferred in the name of respondent DECS under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 167175.[3] On July 15, 1985, respondent DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994. The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.[4] On June 10, 1993, Eugenio Alpar and several others, claiming to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.[5] After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piosa, sent a Notice of Coverage to respondent DECS, stating that the subject lands are now covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries.[6] Then, MARO Piosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings. On August 7, 1998, DAR Regional Director Dominador B. Andres approved the recommendation, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the petition is granted. Order is hereby issued: 1. Placing under CARP coverage Lot 2509 with an area of 111.4791 hectares situated at Had. Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Lot 817-D with an area of 77.7671 hectares situated at Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, NegrosOccidental; 2. Affirming the notice of coverage sent by the DAR Provincial Office, Negros Occidental dated November 23, 1994; 3. Directing the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Negros Occidental and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers of Sagay and Escalante to facilitate the acquisition of the subject landholdings and the distribution of the same qualified beneficiaries. SO ORDERED.[7] Respondent DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. [8] Aggrieved, respondent DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.[9] Hence, the instant petition for review.

4 The pivotal issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL). The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. [10] Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP. It states that the program shall: cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program: (a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain; All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph; All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.

(b) (c) (d)

Section 3(c) thereof defines agricultural land, as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. The term agriculture or agricultural activity is also defined by the same law as follows: Agriculture, Agricultural Enterprises or Agricultural Activity means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.[11] The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS. From that time until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the government.[12] Moreover, there is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land. Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. Respondent DECS sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes, such as for the repairs and renovations of schools in the nearby locality. Petitioner DAR, on the other hand, argued that the lands subject hereof are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation. Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land per se, not the income derived therefrom, that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. We agree with the petitioner. Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption, viz:

5 xxx xxx xxx

c) Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.[13] xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, a reading of the paragraph shows that, in order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary; and 2) the purpose is for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes. The importance of the phrase actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary cannot be understated, as what respondent DECS would want us to do by not taking the words in their literal and technical definitions. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous. Thus, the plain meaning rule or verba legis in statutory construction is applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. [14] We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board,[15] wherein we declared the land subject thereof exempt from CARP coverage. However, respondent DECS reliance thereon is misplaced because the factual circumstances are different in the case at bar. Firstly, in the CMU case, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of the public domain because it was reserved by the late President Carlos P. Garcia under Proclamation No. 476 for the use ofMindanao Agricultural College (now CMU).[16] In this case, however, the lands fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. Secondly, in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school sites and campuses. Although a portion of it was being used by the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a Management and Development Agreement, the undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine Packing Corporation as part of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty and students. Moreover, the land was part of the land utilization program developed by the CMU for its Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project (CMU-KSSP), a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program.[17] Hence, the retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future educational needs of the CMU. On the other hand, the lands in this case were not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses, as they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational purposes but for the furtherance of its business. Also, as conceded by respondent DECS, it was the income from the contract of lease and not the subject lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of the schools in the locality. Anent the issue of whether the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP, we disagree with the Court of Appeals finding that they were not. At the outset, it should be pointed out that the identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No. 6657, which states: SECTION 15. Registration of Beneficiaries. The DAR in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data: (a) (b) (c) names and members of their immediate farm household; owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial relationship; location and area of the land they work;

6 (d) (e) crops planted; and their share in the harvest or amount of rental paid or wages received.

A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours. In the case at bar, the BARC certified that herein farmers were potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties.[18] Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP. Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP,[19] it behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency. In this case, there was none. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy. To those who seek its benefit, it is the means towards a viable livelihood and, ultimately, a decent life. The objective of the State is no less certain: landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization.[20] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision datedAugust 30, 2000 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.

7 ISIDRO CARIO vs. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991 ISIDRO CARIO vs. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991 FACTS: Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges. When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to investigate. ISSUE:* Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved HELD:The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasijudicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. Power to Investigate The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any

8 person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. Investigate vs. Adjudicate "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." "Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of

9 Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. Who has Power to Adjudicate? These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC. Manner of Appeal Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court. G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992 EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO ORDONEZ, respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.: On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario and General Trias, Cavite, as the Cavite Export Processing Zone (CEPZ). For purposes of development, the area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil Refinery Corporation, formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA). Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia. Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoez filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint (Pinagsamahang Salaysay) praying for justice and other reliefs and remedies (Katarungan at iba pang tulong). The CHR conducted an investigation of the complaint. According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission on May 10, 1991 a verified complaint for violation of their human rights. They alleged that on March 20, 1991, at 10:00 oclock in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer, accompanied by his subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to stop them by showing a copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the bulldozing.

10 However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member of Damondamons group who proclaimed that: The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla! On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the happenings in the area were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from them by members of the Philippine National Police and some government officials and their civilian followers. On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal before the Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A). On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla, again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air. On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order reiterating her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. The order reads as follows: Considering the sworn statements of the farmers whose farmlands are being bulldozed and the wanton destruction of their irrigation canals which prevent cultivation at the farmlands as well as the claim of ownership of the lands by some farmers-complainants, and their possession and cultivation thereof spanning decades, including the failure of the officials concerned to comply with the Constitutional provision on the eviction of rural squatters, the Commission reiterates its Order of May 17, 1991, and further orders the Secretary of Public Works and Highways, their Contractors and representativesto refrain and desist from bulldozing the farmlands of the complainants-farmerswho have come to the Commission for relief, during the pendency of this investigation and to refrain from further destruction of the irrigation canals in the area until further orders of the Commission. This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9 00 a.m. and the Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways or his representative is requested to appear. (p. 20, Rollo; emphasis supplied) On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders. On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion. On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this Court a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private respondents have no clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction; that the CHR abused its discretion in entertaining the private respondents complaint because the issue raised therein had been decided by this Court, hence, it is barred by prior judgment. On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders. In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of this Courts restraining order, and for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing further acts of destruction and

11 harassment. The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987 Constitution, is not limited to mere investigation because it is mandated, among others, to: a. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court; c. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection; d. Monitor the Philippine Governments compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 45, Rollo) On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that he be excused from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground that the Comment filed by the latter ful ly traversed and squarely met all the issues raised and discussed in the main Petition for C ertiorari and Prohibition (p. 83, Rollo). Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained of? In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December 2, 1991, we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body. The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. xxx xxx xxx Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power to investigate, cannot and should not try and resolve on the merits (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to resolve on the merits the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what were the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions. (pp. 5 & 8.)

12 The constitutional provision directing the CHR to provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828 -32, 28 January 1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived by implication (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on Election, et al.. G.R. Nos. 97108-09, March 4, 1992). Evidently, the preventive measures and legal aid services mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district. (Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction dated May 17 and 28, 1991 issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are here by ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order which this Court issued on September 19, 1991, is hereby made PERMANENT. Cario vs CHR (G.R. No. 96681 Dec 2, 1991) Commission on Human Rights has no jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights Simon vs. CHR (G.R. No. 100150 Jan 5, 1994) CHRs power to cite for contempt should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 901580. On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in

13 contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them.

Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction: a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City; b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners for contempt;

Held: a) Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution. b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.

A.

Distinguished from legislative power or rule-making Lupangco vs CA 160 SCRA 848

14 Facts: Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions: "No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions. Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy filed in their own behalf and in behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Issue: WON the Resolution is unconstitutional Held: The Resolution is null and void. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be curtailed. G.R. No. 79237 October 18, 1988 UNIVERSITY OF SAN CARLOS and VICTORIA A. SATORRE petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JENNIFER C. LEE, respondents. J.P. Garcia & Associates for petitioners. Florido & Associates for private respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.: The principal issue raised in this petition is whether or not mandamus is the proper remedy to compel a university to confer a degree with honors. The secondary question is whether or not the refusal of that university to confer honors would constitute bad faith so as to make it liable for damages. Private respondent Jennifer C. Lee filed an action for mandamus with damages against petitioners University of San Carlos and Victoria A. Satorre, docketed as Civil Case No. R22022 in the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII, Cebu, asking that petitioners be compelled to confer upon her the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, cum laude, retroactive to March 28, 1982, to execute and deliver to her all necessary credentials evidencing her graduation with honors, and to pay her moral damages in the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

15 After trial, the lower court rendered its Decision dated January 29, 1986, 1 the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, and accordingly, defendants University of San Carlos and Dean Victoria A. Satorre are ordered to confer upon plaintiff, Jennifer C. Lee, the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in accounting, with cum laude honors (sic), retroactive to March 28, 1982, and to execute and deliver to plaintiff all the necessary school credentials evidencing her graduation with such honors; and said defendants are ordered to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P75,000 as moral damages, the sum of P20,000 as exemplary damages, with interest thereon at 12% per annum beginning July 22, 1982, until said amounts are fully paid: and the sum of P15,000 as attorney's fees. The counterclaim is ordered dismissed. Costs against defendants. 2 Petitioners appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-09368. In a decision dated May 28, 1987, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. 3 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied in a Resolution of the appellate court dated July 7, 1987. 4 Hence, this petition where petitioners allege as grounds thereof(a) A university may not be compelled by mandamus to grant graduation honors to any student who, according to the university's standards, rules and regulations, does not qualify for such honors; and (b) The decision penalizing petitioners to pay excessive moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees is not justified by the facts and circumstances of this case and disregards the many decisions of this Honorable Court setting reasonable standards and limits in the award of such damages. (P. 2, petition; p. 12, rollo) Private respondent enrolled in the College of Architecture, University of San Carlos (USC), during the first semester of school year 1978-79. At the end of the second semester of that school year, she obtained a grade of "I.C." (Incomplete) in Architecture 121, and grades of "5's" (failures) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123. The following school year, 1979-1980, she shifted to the College of Commerce of the USC. Some of the units she had completed when she was still an architecture student were then carried over and credited in her new course. As a commerce student, she obtained good grades. However, she was aware of her earlier failing grades in the College of Architecture and that the same would be taken into consideration in the evaluation of her overall academic performance to determine if she could graduate with honors. So, on December 10, 1981, she wrote 5 the Council of Deans of the USC, requesting that her grades of 5s in Architecture 121 and Architecture 122 be disregarded in the computation of her grade average. She wrote a similar letter to the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports MECS in Region VII on January 5, 1982 6 and this letter was referred to the President of the USC for comment and return to the MECS. In the 3rd Indorsement dated February 4, 1982, the President of the USC informed the MECS that the university policy was that any failing grade obtained by a student in any course would disqualify the student for honors; that to deviate from that policy would mean injustice to students similarly situated before who were not allowed to graduate with honors; that the bad grades given to her were justified and could not be deleted or removed because her subjects were not "dropped" as required; that she had two failures and one incomplete grade which became a failure upon her inaction to attend to the incomplete grade within one year; and that while her three failures did not affect her graduation from the College of Commerce, they nonetheless caused her disqualification from graduating with honors. She was furnished a copy of said indorsement but she did not ask for a reconsideration.

16 On March 17, 1982, when the USC President was out of town, private respondent wrote to the USC Registrar' requesting that her failing grades be changed. The USC Registrar 7 referred her letter to the MECS and the request for change of grades was approved in a 4th indorsement of March 22, 1982. 8 Thus, her grade of IC in Architecture 121 was changed to "1.9" by Professor Victor Leves Jr. and the grades of "5" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 were changed to "W" (Withdrawn). On March 24, 1982, Mr. Marcelo Bacalso of MECS' Higher Education Division discovered that the change of the grade of private respondent from "IC" to "1.9" did not have the supporting class record required, so he wrote to MECS Supervisor Mr. Ortiz requesting the submission of the class record. 9 On March 28, 1982, the USC held its graduation exercises, and the private respondent graduated with the degree of Bachelor of Science in Commerce, major in Accounting, without honors. On March 31, 1982, the private respondent, assisted by counsel, demanded from Dean Victoria A. Satorre that she be allowed to graduate, cum laude. 10 Dean Satorre explained that the matter was held in abeyance pending compliance with certain requirements of the MECS through the memo of Mr. Bacalso. 11 On May 24, 1982, Arch. Leves Jr., the teacher required to produce the class records, reported he could not produce the same. 12 Thus, on May 27, 1982, Dean Satorre wrote to the MECS Regional Director Aurelio Tiro asking for the revocation of the change of grades of private respondent. 13 The request was denied as there was no positive proof of fraud. 14 It is an accepted principle that schools of teaming are given ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of these rules, it is within the competence of universities and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. In this case, the petitioner's bulletin of information provides all students and all other interested parties advise on the University policies and rules on enrollment and academic achievements. Therein it is provided, among others, that a student may not officially withdraw from subjects in the curriculum if he does not have the written permission of his parents or guardian. 15 For an incomplete grade, there must be an application for completion or removal within the period announced by the school calendar and when not removed within one (1) year, it automatically becomes final. 16 A "DR" (Dropped) subject which is in the same category, as a "5" disqualifies a student from receiving honors. 17 A candidate for honors should have earned no less than 18 units per semester but a working student should earn no less that 12 units. A failure in any subject disqualifies a student from honors. 18 Good moral character and exemplary conduct are as important criteria for honors as academic achievements. 19 Private respondent should know and is presumed to know those University policies and is bound to comply therewith. It is precisely because she knew of these rules that she exerted all efforts to have her final grades of "5's" in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 be disregarded in the computation of honors. When her request was denied by the university, she did not ask for a reconsideration thereof. Instead, in the middle part of March 1982 when the USC President was out of town, she wrote another letter to the USC registrar asking her failing grades be changed as above related. The matter was referred to the MECS and the request was approved on March 22,1982. However, when it was discovered thereafter that the change of private respondent's grades from "IC" TO "1.9" was not supported by the corresponding class records and its production was required the same could not be produced. There is thus no justification for said change of grade. Moreover, the request for the change of the grade of incomplete was not made by private respondent within one (1) year so that it became final according to the rules.

17 By the same token, the change of the grades of private respondent from "5" to "W" (Withdrawn) in Architecture 122 and Architecture 123 was without the written permission of her parents or guardian. Indeed, it is unusual that a student who got a "5" in a subject, as in this case, should still be allowed to withdraw from such subject. Withdrawal from subjects is not ordinarily allowed after mid-term examination 20 much less after a failing grade in the subject has been received. The change of grades of private respondent is thus open to question. Obviously, private respondent employed undue and improper pressure on the MECS authorities to approve the change of her grades to remove all obstacle to her graduation with honors. Petitioners' claim that the change of grades of the private respondent was attended with fraud is not entirely misplaced. Petitioners cannot be faulted for refusing to vest the honors demanded of them by the private respondent. One failure would have been sufficient to disqualify her but she had one incomplete and two failures. Her only change was to reverse her failing grades. This she accomplished thru the back door. Nevertheless, even if she succeeded in removing her failing grades, it was still within the sound discretion of the petitioners to determine whether private respondent was entitled to graduate with honors. The Court finds that petitioners did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in denying the honors sought by private respondent under the circumstances. Indeed, the aforesaid change of grades did not automatically entitle her to the award of honors. Private respondent not having demonstrated that she has a clear legal right to the honors sought, her claim for damages must necessarily fail. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the subject decision of the respondent court of May 28, 1987 and its resolution of July 7, 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

18 G.R. No. 88259 August 10, 1989 THE BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION and the HON. LOURDES R. QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and Chairman, Board of Medical Education, petitioners, vs. HON. DANIEL P. ALFONSO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Fourth Judicial Region, Antipolo, Rizal, and the PHILIPPINE MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN COLLEGE OF MEDICINE FOUNDATION, INC., respondents. Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz for private respondent. Anatolio S. Tuazon, Jr. for intervenors.

NARVASA, J.: Petitioners, the Board of Medical Education, the government agency which supervises and regulates the country's medical colleges, and Secretary Lourdes R. Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, as Chairperson of the Board, pray for a writ of certiorari to nullify and set aside the order issued by respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso, Regional Trial Court, Antipolo, Rizal, in Civil Case No. 1385 restraining the enforcement of petitioner Quisumbing's order of closure of the respondent Philippine Muslim-Christian College of Medicine Foundation, Inc. (hereafter simply the College).lwph1.t The, College, a private educational institution, was founded in 1981 for the avowed purpose of producing physicians who will "emancipate Muslim citizens from age-old attitudes on health." The, unstable peace and order situation in Mindanao led to the establishment of the College in Antipolo, Rizal, which granted it a temporary permit to operate in the municipality, instead of in Zamboanga City where the school was first proposed to be located. It has since adopted Antipolo as its permanent site and changed its name to the Rizal College of Medicine. In 1985, the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) and the Board of Medical Education (BME) authorized the Commission on Medical Education to conduct a study of all medical schools in the Philippines. The, report of the Commission showed that the College fell very much short of the minimum standards set for medical schools. 1 The, team of inspectors, composed of Doctors Florentino Herrera, Jr., Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Horacio Estrada, Jose V. Silao, Jr. and Andres L. Reyes, recommended the closure of the school 2 upon the following findings, to wit: (a) the College was not fulfilling the purpose for which it had been created because of its inappropriate location and the absence in its curriculum of subjects relating to Muslim culture and welfare; (b) its lack of university affiliation hindered its students from obtaining a "balanced humanistic and scientific" education; (c) it did not have its philosophy base hospital for the training of its students in the major clinical disciplines, as required by the DECS; (d) more than 60% of the college faculty did not teach in the College full-time, resulting in shortened and irregular class hours, subject overloading, and in general, poor quality teaching.

19 The, school disputed these findings as biased and discriminatory. At its request, the Board of Medical Education, in May, 1987, sent another team of doctors 3 for a re-evaluation of the College. After inspection, the team confirmed the previous findings and recommended the phase-out of the school. 4
The, first two reports were verified on June 23, 1987 by a third team of inspectors. A year thereafter, the College failed another test what was in effect the fourth evaluation of its fitness to continue as a medical school conducted on March 4 and 5, 1988 by a team from the Board of Medical Education determining the eligibility of medical schools for government recognition. The, College 6 was adjudged "inadequate" in all aspects of the survey, to wit, college, curriculum, facilities, teaching hospital, and studentry. The, inspectors, Doctors Nilo Rosas, Macario Tan and Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, accordingly recommended denial of government; recognition. Accordingly, the Board of Medical Education recommended to the DECS the closure of the College, effective the end of the school year 1988-1989. The, College however succeeded in having the Board form yet another team to review the previous findings. Doctors Elena Ines Cuyegkeng, Alberto Romualdez, Artemio Ordinaria Joven Cuanang and Nilo L. Rosas conducted their inspection on June 18, 1988. Their findings: although there had been a "major effort to improve the physical plant for classroom instructions and the library, serious deficiencies remain(ed) in the areas of clinical facilities and library operations;" "faculty continue(d) to be quite inadequate with no prospects for satisfactory growth and development;" "student profile ... (was) below par from the point of view of credentials (NMAT and transfer records) as well as level knowledge and preparedness at various stages of medical education," and "the most serious deficiency ... (was) the almost total lack of serious development efforts in academic medicine i.e., seeming lack of philosophy of teaching, no serious effort to study curricula, almost non-existent innovative approaches." Again, 7 the recommendation was to close the College with provisions for the dispersal of its students to other medical schools. In her letter of June 23, 1988, Secretary Quisumbing informed the Chairman of the College's Board of Trustees, Mr. Victor Sumulong, of the decision of the Board of Medical Education to close the College. Mr. Sumulong instead proposed a gradual phase-out starting 8 the school year 1989-1990 in order not to dislocate the students and staff and to minimize financial loss. The, Board subsequently allowed the College to continue its operations but only until May, 1989, after which it was to be closed, this decision being "final and unappealable." The, College was, however, assured of assistance in the relocation of its students and in its rehabilitation as an 9 institution for health-related and paramedical courses. The, College appealed the decision to the Office of the President, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the Secretary. On February 11 16, 1989, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., finding "no reason to disturb" the contested decision, affirmed it. On March 2, 1989, the College went to court. It filed Civil Case No. 1385 in the court of respondent Judge Daniel P. Alfonso against Secretary Quisumbing in her capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, questioning the decision as illegal, oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory and applied for a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain its implementation. The, writ issued as prayed for by order of the respondent Judge dated May 10, 1989. His Honor ruled that the inspection of June 18, 1988 was the principal basis of the closure order, and on such basis sustained the claim of the College that the inspection was done in an "arbitrary and haphazard manner" by a team of inspectors who had already prejudged the school. Judge Alfonso held that there was no evidence supporting the findings in the report of June 18, 1988, and declared that his philosophy ocular inspection of the College disclosed that the deficiencies mentioned in the report were non-existent, and that on the contrary, the laboratory and library areas were "big enough," and in the operations of the proposed base hospital were going on smoothly at the time of the ocular inspection." The, school thereupon promptly advertised in major newspaper dailies for enrollees in all levels of the medical college and in its pre13 board review classes. Hence the present petition, assailing the order of injunction dated May 10, 1989 as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, and praying for a restraining order against its enforcement as well as for the dismissal of the action instituted in the court a quo. The, Court on June 1, 1989 ordered the respondent College to desist from advertising and admitting students, and the respondent judge to refrain from enforcing his injunction order. The, College in its Comment would justify its entitlement to the questioned injunction on the ground that the closure order against which it was directed was issued without factual basis and in violation of the right of the College to due process of law, and that it
12 10 5

20
violates MECS Order No. 5 (Series of 1986) to the effect that the penalty of closure cannot be imposed earlier than three (3) years from the last evaluation, which in this instance was made, on June 18, 1988. Resort to the Courts to obtain a reversal of the determination by the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports that the College is unfit to continue its operations is in this case clearly unavailing. There is, to begin with, no law authorizing an appeal from decisions or orders of the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports to this Court or any other Court. It is not the function of this Court or any other Court to review the decisions and orders of the Secretary on the issue of whether or not an educational institution meets the norms and standards required for permission to operate and to continue operating as such. On this question, no Court has the power or prerogative to substitute its opinion for that of the Secretary. Indeed, it is obviously not expected that any Court would have the competence to do so. The, only authority reposed in the Courts in the matter is the determination of whether or not the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports has acted within the scope of powers granted him by law and the Constitution. As long as it appears that he has done so, any decision rendered by him should not and will not be subject to review and reversal by any court. Of course, if it should be made, to appear to the Court that those powers were in a case exercised so whimsically, capriciously, oppressively, despotically or arbitrarily as to call for peremptory correction or stated otherwise, that the Secretary had acted with grave abuse of discretion, or had unlawfully neglected the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, or excluded another from the use or enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled it becomes the Court's duty to rectify such action through the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, whichever may properly apply. Yet even in these extreme instances, where a Court finds that there has been abuse of powers by the Secretary and consequently nullifies and/or forbids such an abuse of power, or compliance whatever is needful to keep its exercise within bounds, the Court, absent any compelling reason to do otherwise, should still leave to the Secretary the ultimate determination of the issue of the satisfy action or fulfillment by an educational institution of the standards set down for its legitimate operation, as to which it should not ordinarily substitute its over judgment for that of said office. In any case, the recorded facts quite clearly fail to support the College's claim of grave abuse of discretion containing the order of closure, and on the contrary convincingly show the challenged decision to be correct. From 1985, no less than five (5) surveys were conducted of respondent institution to determine its compliance with the minimum standards established for a medical college. The, first survey, that undertaken by the Commission on Medical Education, disclosed such various and significant deficiencies in the school as to constrain the inspectors to recommend its closure. Four (4) other surveys were thereafter made by as many different committees or teams, at the school's instance or otherwise, all of which basically confirmed the results of that first survey. Moreover, the findings of all five (5) surveys were affirmed by the Office of the President. Indeed, the petitioner, through the Chairman of its Board of Trustees, to all intents and purposes accepted the validity of the findings of those five (5) survey groups when it proposed, in 1988, a gradual phase-out of the school starting in 1989. The, respondent College knew that the recommendation for its closure was made, as early as 1986, that recommendation was reiterated and reaffirmed four (4) times thereafter until it was finally approved and acted upon by the Secretary, whose action was confirmed by the Office of the President. Said respondent was given notice in June 1988, that in consequence of all these, the time for its definite closure had been unalterably set at May, 1989, a notice which was accompanied by assurances of assistance in the relocation of its students before June, 1989 and in its rehabilitation as a school for other courses. After having resorted to the whole range of administrative remedies available to it, without success, it sought to obtain from the respondent Court the relief it could not obtain from those sources, and what can only be described as a deliberate attempt to frustrate and obstruct implementation of the decision for its closure as of June, 1989 openly solicited, by newspaper advertisements or otherwise, enrollment of new and old students. Given these facts, and it being a matter of law that the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports exercises the power to enjoin compliance with the requirements laid down for medical schools and to mete out sanctions where he finds that violations thereof have been committed, it was a grave abuse of discretion for the respondent judge to issue the questioned injunction and thereby thwart official action, in the premises correctly taken, allowing the College to operate without the requisite government permit. A single ocular inspection, done after the College had been pre-warned thereof, did not, in the circumstances, warrant only the findings of more qualified inspectors about the true state of the College, its faculty, facilities, operations, etc. The, members of the 14 evaluating team came from the different sectors in the fields of education and medicine, and their judgment in this particular area is certainly better than that of the respondent Judge whose sole and only visit to the school could hardly have given him much more to go on than a brief look at the physical plant and facilities and into the conduct of the classes and other school activities. Respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in substituting his judgment for theirs. It is well-settled doctrine that courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government; involving the exercise of judgment and

21
findings of facts, because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters andn their findings of facts in that regard are generally accorded respect, if 15 not finality, by the courts. There are, to be sure, exceptions to this general rule but none of them obtains in this case. The, claim of denial of due process likewise holds no water, as the record clearly shows that the College was given every opportunity to so improve itself as to come up to requirements, but remained sadly sub-standard after the inspections conducted by the evaluating teams. It had, in fact, admitted its failure to have up to the desired standards when it proposed its gradual phase-out in its letter dated June 27, 1988 to Secretary Quisumbing. It was also precisely because of its complaints of bias and prejudice that the Board of Medical Education dispatched new teams to survey and re-evaluate its performance. It had even gone all the way up to the Office of the President to seek a reversal of the order of closure. There is thus no reason for it to complain of a lack of opportunity to be heard and to explain its side as well as to seek reconsideration of the ruling complained of. There is also no merit in respondent College's argument that the closure violated NMCS ORDER No. 5, Series of 1986, because it was sought to be effected before the lapse of the three-year period therein snowed, which in this case is sought to be counted from June 18, 1988, or the date of the last evaluation. The, provision referred to reads: The following sanction shall be applied against any medical school, for failure to comply with the specific requirements of the essentials, viz.: xxx c. Withdrawal or cancellation of the school's government; authority to operate, for failure to fully comply with the prescribed requirements after three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the school . It must at once be obvious from a reading of the provision, paragraph c, that the situation therein contemplated where a school is found to have failed to "fully comply with the prescribed requirements," i.e., has not complied with some requirements and has failed to do so within three (3) years from the last evaluation is quite distinct from that obtaining in the case at bar where respondent school was found to have deficiencies so serious as to warrant its immediate closure. Said paragraph c should not be construed to prohibit absolutely the withdrawal or cancellation of government; authority to operate until after three (3) years from the last evaluation conducted on the school; or, stated otherwise, it does not unexceptionally prescribe a three-year waiting period before authority to operate may be withdrawn. Rather, it should be read as giving the Secretary of Education the discretion, depending on the seriousness of the discovered deficiencies, to afford an educational institution which has failed to comply with some requirement or other, time not exceeding three (3) years to correct the deficiencies before applying the sanction of withdrawal or cancellation of the government; authority to operate. The, circumstances in the case at bar are far from nominal and, to repeat, are different from those obviously envisioned by the paragraph in question. There had never been a recommendation that the College be granted an opportunity to comply with certain requirements. From the outset, the proposal had been that it be forthwith closed, its discovered deficiencies as a medical college being of so serious a character as to be irremediable. The, other four (4) surveys were conducted, not to determine if in the course of time the petitioner school had already fully complied with all the prescribed requisites, but rather, whether or not the original recommendation for its closure was correct and should be sustained. And, as already mentioned, the subsequent surveys, over a period of more than three (3) years, served but to confirm the validity of that initial proposal for its closure. Under these circumstances, therefore, even if it be assumed that the provision, paragraph c, applied to petitioner school, it must be held that there has been substantial compliance therewith. Having thus disposed of the issues raised by the facts of the case, the Court sees no useful purpose to be served by remanding the case to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The, only acceptable reason for such a remand would be so that the Trial Court may determine whether or not the petitioners' first have acted within the scope of their powers or grossly abused them, a matter that this Court has already passed upon here. Such a remand cannot be justified on the theory that the Trial Court will make its philosophy independent determination of whether or not respondent medical institution has complied with the minimum standards laid down for its continued operation, since, as here ruled, it has not that power. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court is made, permanent. The, questioned writ of preliminary injunction dated May 10, 1989 is set aside and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss Civil Case No. 1385. SO ORDERED.

22 G.R. No. L-82499 October 13, 1989 CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., and DRA. THELMA NAVARRETE CLEMENTE, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. IGNACIO SALVADOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 77 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region (Quezon City), MONINA REYESVALENZUELA, PABLO L. DAMASO, LINA M. ABLANG, MA. TERESITA ROQUE, AMBROSIO LAZOL, DIOSDADO YAP, FLORDELIZA SINGSON, SARAH P. PELOBELLO JOEL H. GILLEGO, AGNES A. DE VEGA, NORAIDA Y. MAGALONG, AUGENCIO PAPA, IMELDA SIMBILLO, MAXIMO CALDERON and ROSALIE FLORIDA C. ILAGA,respondents. Samson S. Alcantara for petitioners. Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for private respondents.

GRINO-AQUINO, J.: At bottom, the only issue in this case is whether a school that, after due notice to the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, closed at the end of the first semester of the school year 1987-1988, because its teachers and students declared a strike, refusing to hold classes and take examinations, may be forced to reopen by the courts at the instance of the striking students. Some fourteen (14) years ago, the petitioner Capitol Medical Center, Inc. (or CMCI), a hospital corporation, organized, opened, and operated the Capitol Medical Center College (CMCC or "the College") beside its hospital, the Capitol Medical Center (hereafter "the Hospital") in Quezon City. It offered a four-year nursing course, a two-year midwifery course, and a two-year medical secretarial course. In the first semester of the school year 1987-88, 900 students were enrolled in various courses in the college. Half-way through the first semester in 1987, the college faculty, led by the Dean of Nursing, demanded that they be granted vacation and sick leave privileges similar to those enjoyed by hospital personnel. Dialogues were held but no agreement was reached between the faculty and the school administration, headed by the president, Dr. Thelma Navarette-Clemente, who was concurrently also the chairman of the CMCI Board. At a meeting of the CMCI Board on September 15, 1987, Dr. Clemente reported the deteriorating relationship between the CMCC administration and the teachers, which, from a simple disagreement, had degenerated into open hostility. She feared that the situation may give rise to mass action by the students, because the faculty, exercising their moral influence over the students, had enlisted the latter's sympathy and support for their cause. The Board resolved to authorize her, as president of the College, to close it at the end of the first semester if the antagonism of the faculty and students toward the college administration should become uncontrollable. The minutes of that meeting of the CMC Board disclose the following action taken by the Board: CMC College The chairman rported on the developing antagonism between the Dean and a good number of the Faculty on the one hand, and the CMC Administration on the other hand on economic matters, more particularly the demand of the faculty for similar vacation and sick leave privileges as hospital personnel, and that despite of dialogs (sic), the faculty does not show any conformity to the difference. She fears that this antagonisms might later on develop into mass actions and

23 demonstrations, wherein students who are under the influence of the dean and the faculty will show by concrete manifestation sympathy for the faculty demands. After a thorough discussion of the possible effect of these mass demonstrations especially if done in front of hospital premises, on patients confined in the hospital, and the possibility of this antagonism being manifested during the making of the rounds of patients by CMCC Nursing Students when being conducted Related Learning Experiences (RLE) the board unanimously approved the following resolution: Res. No. 87-86 to authorize the Chairman in his (sic) capacity as President of CMC College, to close the college at the end of the first semester, should the antagonism described by her become uncontrollable. (p. 79, Rollo.) During the next thirty (30) days, the rift between the administration and the faculty aggravated. The school administration scheduled the holding of the final semestral examinations on October 14 to 19, 1987, but the teachers defiantly and - unilaterally "postponed" them. On the scheduled dates for the examinations, the students joined their teachers in a noisy demonstration in front of the hospital (Annexes O,P,Q, and R, pp. 146147, Rollo). As the demonstrations disturbed the peace and quiet of the hospital and fearful of possible subversive action by hostile student nurses which might endanger the safety and lives of the patients in the hospital, an emergency special meeting was held by the CMCI Board on October 17, 1987. It unanimously resolved "to close the school effective at the end of the first semester of this school year, 1987-88" (p. 269, Rollo). Starting on that date, the following announcement was posted in several places on the school premises: ANNOUNCEMENT ALL STUDENTS, PLEASE BE INFORMED OF THE TOTAL CLOSURE OF CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER COLLEGE AFTER THE END OF THE FIRST SEMESTER OF SCHOOL YEAR 1987-88. PLEASE SEE POSTED LETTER INFORMING THE DECS OF SAID DECISION, BSN I-IV, MID-WIFERY I-II AND JUNIOR SECRETARIAL STUDENTS ARE THEREFORE ADVISED TO SEEK THEIR EVENTUAL TRANSFER TO OTHER SCHOOLS FOR THE SECOND SEMESTER. HERE IS A PARTIAL LIST OF SCHOOLS WILLING TO ACCEPT STUDENTS TRANSFEREES: 1. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY 2. DE OCAMPO COLLEGE OF NURSING 3. FATIMA COLLEGE OF NURSING 4. ST. JUDE COLLEGE OF NURSING 5. DE LOS SANTOS COLLEGE OF NURSING 1. FAMILY CLINIC COLLEGE OF NURSING 2. CMC COLLEGE ADMINISTRATION (p. 131, Rollo.) On October 20,1987, Dr. Clemente informed the Department of Education, Culture & Sports (DECS) that the school would be permanently closed at the end of the first semester.

24 CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC. October 20, 1987 The Honorable Lourdes R. Quisumbing Secretary of Education Culture and Sports Manila Through the Regional Director Mrs. Modesta Boquiren National Capital Region Quezon City Dear Madam Secretary: Greetings! Please be informed that in an emergency special meeting of our Board of Directors held on October 17, 1987 it was unanimously resolved to close the Capitol Medical Center College, effective at the end of first semester of this school year 1987-1988. The recurring problems between our corporation on the one hand and the Dean, Faculty and student body of the college, on the other hand, which was has resulted in the non- holding up to now, of final examinations for the first semester of this school year, has gotten out of hand. Kindly advise us of the procedure to effect the immediate closure resolution of our board. Thank you. Very truly yours, (SGD) THELMA NAVARRETE-CLEMENTE M.D., M.H.A., Chairman of the Board and President (p. 269, Rollo; italics ours.) As the DECS did not reply promptly, Dr. Clemente on October 29, 1987, sent another letter to DECS Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing reinforcing CMCI's resolve to "cease operation of school immediately effective as of the end of the first semester of the current school year 1987-88." The letter reads as follows: October 29, 1987 The Honorable Lourdes R. Quisumbing Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports

25 Manila

Dear Madam Secretary: Greetings! This is to reinforce our earlier letter, dated October 20, 1987, informing your honorable office of the corporate decision of our Board of Directors to cease operation of the Capitol Medical Center College immediately effective as of the end of the first semester of the current school year, 1987-1988. The decision as embodied in the corporate resolution contemplates in no uncertain terms theimmediate and total cessation of all education activities due to the following cogent reasons: 1. Mismanagement of the school administration and mishandling of corporate policies by the Dean, extending down to the lower administrative levels. 2. Failure of the school to produce the quality of education that may be reasonably expected or desired as evidenced by the poor quality of instruction it gives, the deficient program of guidance it maintains, and the poor performance of its graduates over the past few years. 3. The increasing costs of operation and maintenance of school facilities. 4. Considering the fact that the school is only a minor subsidiary of the hospital corporation, its continued operation and dependent existence will as projected, greatly impair the economic viability of the institution and ultimately affect health care delivery and other vital medical services of the hospital to the community and the general public. For the above reasons, we feel there are no legal impediments against the immediate and complete closure of the school under the purview of the Corporation Code. Since there are quite a number of Nursing and Midwifery Schools in the community who would be more than willing to take in our students, we will help undertake arrangements with these schools for their transfer, together with the assistance of your good office of course. Finally, we are very well aware of the requirements of the Labor Laws concerning the faculty members and other support personnel who are already permanent with at least three years of service. We shall settle these in due time under its proper forum. Very truly yours, (SGD) THELMA NAVARRETE-CLEMENTE, M.D., M.H.A. President Chairman, Board of Directors (p. 270-271, Rollo; emphasis supplied.)

26 The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) was likewise notified of the termination of the services of the faculty and other support personnel of the college "thirty days hence" as required by Article 284 of the Labor Code (p. 272, Rollo). It appears that on October 26, 1987, or three (3) days before Dr. Clemente wrote her second letter, DECS Regional Director Modesta Boquiren had written the following reply which was received later: October 26,1987 The Chairman of the Board and President CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER COLLEGE Sct. Magbanua Cor. Panay Avenue, Quezon City Dear Madam: This has reference to your letter dated October 20, 1 987 requesting for a gradual phasing out of all courses effective June 1988 according to the following schedules: June 1988 - No 1st year June 1989 - No 2nd year June 1990 - No 3rd year June 1991 - No 4th year This Office interposes no objection to your request provided that the school administrators can comply with the requirements of the Department of Labor and Employment regarding the benefits of faculty members and support personnel who are already permanent and who have already served the school for three or more years. Pursuant to regulations, after all the courses shall have been phased out, the school cannot reopen unless the corporate status is changed from a stock corporation to a non-stock corporation. Very truly yours, (SGD) Illegible MODESTA G. BOQUIREN Director (p. 256, Rollo; emphasis supplied.) Evidently, Director Boquiren failed to comprehend that Dr. Clemente did not request for permission to "gradually phase out" the school but merely informed the DECS of the school administration's decision to effect the "immediate and complete closure" of the school. As the DECS did not react to her second letter, CMCCI proceeded with the closure of the college.

27 The teachers, students and their parents, a representative of the DECS and the school administration, thereafter, held a series of dialogues to persuade CMCCI to open the school for one more semester or until the end of the school year. An agreement was prepared by the DECS but CMCCI wanted to include a written stipulation binding the students and their parents to hold no more strikes, rallies, or demonstrations until the end of the school year. Since the latter did not sign the agreement, the school did not reopen. The college and the DECS have assisted in effecting the transfer of some 411 students to other schools (p. 15, Rollo). THE CASE On December 2, 1987, fifteen (15) students and parents purporting to represent the 900 students of the CMCC filed a class suit (Civil Case No. 52429) against "Capitol Medical Center College" and petitioner Dr. Clemente, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for the reopening of the Capitol Medical Center College which had been closed effective at the end of the first semester of the school year 1987-1988 (p. 208, Rollo). As the complaint (Annex A) prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the court set the hearing of the application on December 9, 1987. As agreed at the hearing, an opposition was filed by CMCC on December 14,1987 (p. 257, Rollo). On the same day, the lower court granted the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and directed the defendants "to reopen (the) school and allow plaintiffs students to enroll in their respective course[s] ... " It fixed the plaintiffs' bond in the sum of P50,000 (pp. 85 and 273, Rollo). The order reads as follows: Plaintiffs' petition for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction having been heard by the Court, the plaintiffs appearing by their lawyer, Atty. Raymundo Armovit and the defendants by their attorney, Atty. Samson Alcantara and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown, the Court finds that this is a proper case for injunction and the writ prayed for should issue; WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders that a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction issue against the defendants directing them to re-open school and allow plaintiffs' students to enroll in their respective courses of study and to perform such other acts in the tenor and under the terms and conditions set forth in paragraph 8 in the complaint filed in this action, upon the filing of an injunction bond in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) within three (3) days from receipt of this order. (p. 84, Rollo.) The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above order (p. 87, Rollo) but the court denied their motion (p. 95, Rollo). In due time, the petitioners elevated the order to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 13626, p. 96, Rollo). The Court of Appeals issued a restraining order and directed the respondents to comment on the petition. After hearing the parties in oral argument, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on February 15,1988 holding that the respondent RTC Judge did not abuse his discretion in issuing the order of preliminary mandatory injunction because the petitioners had no right to suddenly close the school for the enrollment of the students created a binding contract between them and the school for the latter to continue operating until the former shall have finished their courses (p. 120, Rollo). On February 26,1988, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and re-hearing which was held on March 3,1988 (p. 127, Rollo). Nevertheless, on March 8,1988, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration (p. 154, Rollo). Hence, this petition for review.

28 The petition for review has merit. The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). It should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs. Macaraeg, 4 SCRA 930; Subido vs. Gopengco 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs. Bello, 37 SCRA 230). Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing (Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may, however, issue "in cases of extreme urgency; where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiffs right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation. Indeed, the writ should not be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear case free from doubt and dispute." (Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA 235.) The questions that we might ask are: (1) What was the status quo before the private respondents filed their complaint "for specific performance" on December 2, 1987? (2) Do the private respondents have a clear legal right to demand the reopening of the school? The status quo on December 2, 1987 was that the school was already closed. CMCC was closed effective at the end of the first semester, i.e, the first week of November 1987. What was the status quo prior to the closure of the school? There were no classes. The school was deserted. The teachers and students were on strike; they refused to attend classes and held noisy rallies in front of the CMC hospital instead. That was the status quo before the private respondents filed Civil Case No. 52429. The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court not to restore that status quo, but to restore conditions preceding the status quo, i.e., to reopen and resume the holding of classes which the private respondents themselves (plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 52429) by their mass actions had disrupted. In issuing the writ of preliminary injunction for that purpose, the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion for it allowed the writ to be used by the plaintiffs to undo the mischief that they themselves had initiated. The teachers, by refusing to teach, and the students, by refusing to attend classes, made the continued operation of the CMCC futile and untenable. The college had no reason to remain open under the situation which the private respondents themselves brought about. Did the private respondents have a clear legal right to reopen the school and to be readmitted therein? The Court of Appeals answered that question affirmatively on the theory that "the initial enrollment" of the students (meaning their enrollment in the first year of their chosen courses) created "a binding contract" between the students and the school, by which the latter became "legally and morally bound to continue operating the school until such enrollees shall have finished their courses.

29 The Court of Appeals presumably, but erroneously, relied on paragraph 137, Sec. IV of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, which provides: Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific requirements and reasonable regulations, provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire period he is expected to complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer. The meaning of this provision is that the school, after having accepted a student for enrollment in a given course may not expel him or refuse to re-enroll him until he completes his course, except when he is academically deficient or has violated the rules of discipline. He is presumed to be qualified to study there for the entire period it will take to complete his course. However, there is no contract between him and the school for the latter to remain open for the entire duration of his course. Section VII, paragraph No. 137, of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools provides: 137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school year for elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate course. A student who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of classes and who has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school fees in full or for any length of time longer than one month may be charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if he withdraws within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the second week of classes, regardless of whether or not he has actually attended classes. The student may be charged all the school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second week of classes. However, if the transfer or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to and including the last month of attendance. The contract between the college and a student who is enrolled and pays the fees for a semester, is for the entire semester only, not for the entire course. The law does not require a school to see a student through to the completion of his course. If the school closes or is closed by proper authority at the end of a semester, the student has no cause of action for breach of contract against the school. Thus did this Court rule in "Alcuaz, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business Administration, Quezon City Branch, et al.," G.R. No. 76353, promulgated on May 2, 1988, a case which involved some students and teachers who had participated in mass actions and rallies in the respondent school and who were respectively denied re-admission for enrollment, and re-appointment to teaching positions in the school: It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the 'written contracts' required for college teachers are for 'one semester.' It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers. Such being the case, the charge of denial of due process is untenable. It is a timehonored principle that contracts are respected as the law between the contracting parties (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 72456, February 19,1987, citing: Castro vs. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 722; Escano vs. Court of appeals, 1 00 SCRA 197). The contract having been terminated, there is no more contract to speak of. The school cannot be compelled to enter into another contract with said students and teachers. The courts, be they the original trial court or the appellate court, have no power to make contracts for the parties.' (Henson vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., supra. (p. 12 of the decision.)

30 Significantly, in Alcuaz only some students and teachers left their classrooms to hold rallies in the school premises. The majority remained in the classrooms. The school did not cease to operate. In this case, however, all the teachers and students struck and abandoned their classes. In Alcuaz, the mass assemblies and barricades were held for three days. In the CMCC case, the "strike" began on October 14 and continued until the end of the semester. In Alcuaz, the school did not close but it nevertheless refused to re-admit the offending students and teachers. In this case, the school has closed completely. If in Alcuaz, this Court recognized the right of the school to refuse admission to students guilty of breaches of discipline, and of the peace, its right to close when the entire faculty and student population have boycotted their classes, may not be denied. The irony for the school in this case is that it was forced to close by student action, and is now being forced to reopen by student action also, assisted by the lower court. We cannot sanction the order of the lower court which gave aid and comfort to the students who paralyzed the operation of the school by their mass actions forcing it to shut down altogether. We cannot approve a situation which would place a school at the mercy of its students. We, therefore, hold that the lower court gravely abused its discretion in compelling the CMCC to reopen and re-admit the striking students for enrollment in the second semester of their courses. Since their contracts with the school were terminated at the end of the first semester of 1987, and as the school has already ceased to operate, they have no "clear legal right" to re-enroll and the school has no legal obligation to reopen and readmit them. No provision in the Education Act of 1982, nor in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools can be, or has been, cited to support the novel view that a school is obligated to remain open until its students have completed their courses therein. Indeed, neither is there a law or rule that obligates a student who has enrolled in a school, to remain there until he finishes his course. On the contrary he may transfer at any time to any school that is willing to accept him. But even if it can be supposed that the enrollment of a student creates an implied "binding contract" with the school to educate him for the entire course, since a contract creates reciprocal rights and obligations, the obligation of the school to educate a student would imply a corresponding obligation on the part of the student to study and obey the rules and regulations of the school. When students breach that supposed contract by refusing to attend their classes, preferring to take to the streets to mount a noisy demonstration against their school, the latter may cancel the contract and close its doors. Its action would neither be arbitrary nor unfair. It was the trial court that acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the school to reopen and re-admit the striking students and teachers in spite of their refusal to desist from continuing their disruptive mass actions against the school. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated May 15,1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 13626 is hereby set aside. The order and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-52429 are hereby annulled and set aside. Costs against the private respondents. SO ORDERED.

31 NON VS. DAMES [185 SCRA 523; G.R. NO. 89317; 20 MAY 1990] Sunday, February 08, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings.

Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline.

Issue: Whether

or

Not

the

students

right

to

freedom

of

speech

and

assembly

infringed.

Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

32 G.R. No. 94961 February 25, 1991 Dean MARITA V. T. REYES, Dra. JOSEPHINA A. LAZARO, and other Petitioners/members of the Faculty Staff of the University of the Philippines College of Medicine AND Members of the University Council listed in Annexes "A" and "A-1" of this Petition, petitioners, vs. The COURT OF APPEALS, The BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES; Hon. JOSE V. ABUEVA, President of the University of the Philippines; Hon. ERNESTO DOMINGO, Chancellor of the U.P. Manila Campus; LUZ V. TUNGPALAN, Registrar of the U.P. Manila Campus; JULIE MIRANDA, Officer-in-Charge and Administrative Officer of the Office of the Registrar of the U.P. Manila Campus; MARICAR BLANCHE; ATENODORO RUIZ, JR.; EDMUND BENNET MULDONG; MA. BERNADETTE CAROLYN SANTOS; SALVADOR VILLANUEVA and GABRIEL NAZARENO, respondents. G.R. No. 96491 February 25, 1991 DEAN MARITA V.T. REYES, The Members of the ADMISSIONS COMMITTEE of the U.P. College of Medicine, DRA. JOSEFINA S. ANEL-LAZARO, DR. MARIO GUTIERREZ, DRA. SOLITA RAMOS, DRA. DINIA DE LEON, DRA. MERCEDES ALBA, DRA. NANETTE GANA and DRA. DIWATA REYES, petitioners, vs. The COURT OF APPEALS, The Hon. RUBEN T. REYES, as Presiding Judge of Branch 40 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region at Manila, MARICAR BLANCHE DECANO; ATENODORO RUIZ, JR.; EDMUND BENNET MULDONG; MA. BERNADETTE CAROLYN SANTOS; SALVADOR VILLANUEVA and GABRIEL NAZARENO, respondents. Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez & Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioners. Mauricio Law Office for private respondents. Demaree J.B. Raval, J.V. Lopez and Rolando D. Gamalinda for U.P. Board of Regents. RESOLUTION

MEDIALDEA, J.:p The controversy over the admission of certain students to the University of the Philippines College of Medicine is now presented before Us in two related petitions for resolution on the merits. The parties in both cases are practically the same. The first petition, G.R. No. 94961, is for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The petitioners pray for: (1) the reversal of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals which upheld the Board of Regents' (BOR) 1031st resolution; (2) a temporary restraining order and after hearing, a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents from enforcing the questioned BOR Order and from proceeding with the charges against the Dean and Secretary of the University of the Philippines College of Medicine and enforcing their preventive suspension; and (3) a Writ of Prohibition declaring the questioned BOR Order null and void for being ultra-vires and violative of petitioners' academic freedom. In addition, they seek the disqualification of Justice Irene Cortes from participating in the deliberation of this case. The other petition, G.R. No. 96491, is likewise for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. The petitioners seek to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50, dated June 27, 1990, directing the admission of the respondent-students to

33 the college and July 2, 1990, requiring the petitioners to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for disobeying and resisting the first court order. Essentially, the facts giving rise to this controversy are as follows: respondent-students (students, for brevity) as then applicants to the University of the Philippines College, of Medicine (UPCM) obtained scores higher than 70 percentile in the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which was the cutoff score prescribed for academic year 1986-1987 by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of January 17, 1986 as approved by the University Council (UC) on April 8, 1986. However, their scores were lower than the 90 percentile cut-off score prescribed by the UPCM Faculty in its meeting of October 8, 1986 effective for academic year 1987-88. Upon appeal of some concerned Pre-Med students, the BOR in its 996th resolution dated February 24, 1987 reverted to the NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile. The BOR reiterated its 996th resolution in its 997th resolution dated March 24, 1987. Subsequently, the University General Counsel, pursuant to the instruction of the Chancellor, conducted an investigation on the student's case and recommended inter alia the admission of all applicants obtaining a percentile rating ranging from 70 to 90 "as a matter of right". The Dean of the UPCM and the Faculty did not heed the BOR directive for them to admit the students. This prompted the students to file a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On June 11, 1987, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction for their admission. After the RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction, the BOR in its 1001st meeting resolved inter alia that "the act of fixing cut-off scores in any entrance examination required in any college of the University is within the authority of the College Faculty. Any question regarding the exercise of such act should be elevated and resolved finally by the University Council of the autonomous campus." (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 33) In the interim, the RTC's order was brought before Us in G.R. No. 78927 (University of the Philippines College of Medicine Committee Admissions, et al. v. Hon. Ruben Reyes, et al.) which We dismissed for lack of merit in the resolution of April 14, 1988. Hence, the students were admitted to the UPCM and passed three years in the college. Before the onset of school year 1990-91, the students, upon advice of the U.P. President and burdened with "three agonizing years of uncertain relationship in the College" as well as the BOR's 1001st resolution, wrote a letter to the UPCM Faculty where they manifested that they never intended to question the Faculty's right to academic freedom; that they believed the issue was simply on the question of observance of the proper procedure in implementing admission requirements; that they felt they no longer have any moral right to pursue the court action; that they would leave to the Faculty the determination of humanitarian consideration of their case; that they apologized for offending the Faculty and that they would like to appeal for a chance to remain in the college (Rolloof G.R. No. 94961, pp. 5-7). Shortly thereafter, the students filed with the RTC a motion to dismiss and attached thereto their letter to the UPCM Faculty. In an Order dated June 15, 1990, the RTC dismissed their case with prejudice. In view of this development, the UPCM Faculty held an emergency meeting on June 22, 1990 where it denied the appeal of the students by a vote of 86 on the ground that they were not qualified for admission to the UPCM. As a result, the students filed with the RTC a motion to reconsider its order of dismissal. On June 27, 1990, the RTC issued an order for the admission of the students to the college. Whereupon, the petitioners moved to lift the ex-parte mandatory order. Meanwhile, the BOR in its 1031st meeting dated June 28, 1990, invoking its plenary power under the Charter of the University over matters affecting university affairs, resolved to approve the admission of the students in the interest of justice and equity and to order the petitioners to admit them (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, pp. 38-39). The petitioners questioned the said BOR order with the respondent Court of Appeals on a petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. S.P. No. 22136). The Dean and Secretary of the UPCM refused to follow the BOR directive. Consequently, the UP President issued a formal charge of Grave Misconduct against them and later, issued an Order for their Preventive Suspension. On July 20, 1990, the RTC, on the other hand, issued an Order which (a) required petitioners to show cause why they should not be held in contempt for disobeying and resisting its order dated June 27, 1990 and (b) denied the petitioners' motion to lift injunction. Petitioners appealed these orders to the Court of Appeals by way of certiorariand prohibition (CA-G.R. S.P. No. 22344).

34 On August 14, 1990, the appellate court (Fourth Division) dismissed the petition for prohibition (Rollo of G.R. No. 94691, p. 508). Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in the resolution of August 23, 1990 (Rollo of G.R. No. 94691, pp. 569). They then came to Us in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order docketed as G.R. No. 94691. On September 5, 1990, the Court of Appeals (Thirteenth Division) dismissed the petitioners' petition for certiorariand prohibition (Rollo of G.R. No. 96491, p. 237). It ruled that the issue before the RTC has been rendered moot and academic by the decision of the court (Fourth Division) dated August 14, 1990 and that the Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied in the resolution dated December 10, 1990 (Rollo of G.R. No. 96491, p. 231). Petitioners assailed the respondent court's decision before Us in a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order docketed as G.R. No. 96491. At the outset, We agree with the respondent court (Thirteenth Division) that the issues raised before the RTC on the validity of the BOR's 996th and 997th resolution and on the students' qualification for admission to the UPCM have become moot due to the decision of the respondent court (Fourth Division) dated August 14, 1990. We meticulously reviewed the records of G.R. No. 94961 and found that in all their pleadings before the respondent court (Fourth Division), petitioners, beside assailing the questioned BOR 1031st resolution dated June 29, 1990, argued tenaciously that the students never qualified for admission. It was, thus, inevitable and proper for that court to pass upon this argument and to resolve the case in its totality considering that the resolution of the issue on the validity of the BOR 1031st resolution is inextricably linked with the issue on the qualification of the students to enter UPCM Petitioner's vehement denial of the fact that the RTC case has already been mooted by the decision of August 14, 1990 in G.R. No. 96491 cannot be given merit as their own petition in G.R. No. 94691 had admitted that the appellate court passed upon the issue raised before the RTC and even cited this fact as one of the errors committed by the court. Premises considered, the comment which We required the respondents in G.R. No. 96491to submit pursuant to Our resolution dated January 22, 1991 could now be dispensed with. Several issues have been presented in the herein petitions but the most basic and crucial issue to Us is whether or not the BOR could validly direct the petitioners to admit the students to the college of medicine. We rule in the affirmative. The powers vested in the BOR and the UC by the UP Charter (Act No. 1870) are clear. To the former belongs the governance and the general powers of administration of the university (secs. 4, 5 and 6) and to the latter, the power to fix the admission requirements to any college in the university (sec. 9). On the other hand, the University Code, Title II, Chapter 43, Article 324 thereof (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 388) grants to the College Faculty the power to determine the entrance requirements of the college subject to the approval of the autonomous UC. From the foregoing, it is evident that any entrance requirement that may be imposed by the College Faculty must bear the UC's approval. Otherwise, the same becomes unenforceable. In University of the Phil. College of Medicine Committee on Admissions, et al. v. Reyes, et al., supra, it was an undisputed fact that at the time the students took the NMAT, the new UPCM Faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off score of 90 percentile was without the UC'S approval. Consequently, the UPCM cannot legally implement any change in the NMAT cut-off score. The fact that the students knew beforehand of the 90 percentile NMAT cut-off score would not cure this defect. It follows then that the previously approved NMAT cut-off score of 70 percentile remains the prescribed passing grade. The Court of Appeals was correct to rule that: When the Board of Regents retained the cut off score in the NMAT at 70TH percentile (p. 161, Rollo) which was the cut off score approved by the University Council on 8 April 1986 it did not exercise the power to prescribe the entrance requirements. It merely upheld the power of the University Council under the law to fix the requirements for admission to the UPCM and rendered ineffective the action of the UPCM Faculty, which attempted to exercise that power to increase the cut off score in NMAT to 90 percentile without the approval of the University Council and the President of the University in violation

35 of Section 324 of the University Code (supra) which is very explicit on this matter. (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 511, Emphasis supplied) The BOR only exercised its power of governance and its duty in seeing to it that all the units abide with the law, university rules and regulations. It did not assume a power which it did not possess in the first place. The BOR's 1001st resolution made this point more evident when it recognized and emphasized the UC's jurisdiction over admission matters. Since the faculty prescribed NMAT cut-off score of 90 percentile had become legally inefficacious, the students have all the right to stay in the college inasmuch as they met the cut-off score of 70 percentile imposed by the UC Such right could not be abridged or denied by the resolutions of the UC Manila dated July 20, 1990 and September 5, 1990 which sustained the Faculty's refusal to admit the students. Under the Constitution, the students have the right to select a profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements (Article XIV, Section 5(3)). While it may be true that the UC could ratify the acts of the College regarding admission requirements, the same should be done within a reasonable time. It is to be recalled that the controversy regarding the students' admission started in 1987. It is surprising that despite petitioners' insistence on the UC's jurisdiction over admission requirements, they did not seek recourse to it immediately. From the records, there appears to be no physical or legal hindrance to the calling for a UC meeting on the students' case. To validate these resolutions at this point in time would not be fair and equitable to the students. In the span of three years, they have proved their mettle by passing the academic requirements of the college. Petitioners assert that the UC in its meeting dated April 8, 1986 did not approve the NMAT and its cut-off score of 70 percentile and that instead, the UC empowered the UPCM Faculty to choose any entrance examination and to set the cut-off score for the same. Such claims cannot be given credence. The minutes of the UC's meeting on that date do not support the petitioners' stand. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads: Approval of the Entrance Requirements of the College of Medicine (Annex P & P-1) Approved It was moved and seconded that the Entrance Requirements as proposed be approved. Approved. (Rollo of G.R. No 94961, p. 405, emphasis supplied) Annexes "P" (Rollo of G. R. No. 94961, p. 690) and "P-1" (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 691) also do not show any delegation of authority to the UPCM Faculty. We quote with approval the appellate court's findings on this point: Annex "P" refers to Memorandum 86-017 dated 27 January 1986 of the Dean, College of Medicine for the Chancellor, UP Manila, submitting the Entrance Requirements of the College (Annex "P-l") for submission to the University Council. Attached to said memorandum is Annex "P-1" entitled "Entrance Requirements of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines, Manila for courses leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine" prepared by the Chairman, Admission Committee and approved for submission to the University Council by the Dean of the College of Medicine. It will be noted, the UPCM Dean, in his memorandum 86-017 for the Chancellor, UP Manila, (Annex "P") manifested that all of the items in this submission (referring to Annex "P-l') were approved by the College Faculty in its 17 January 1986 meeting. The minutes of the meeting of the College Faculty on 17 January 1986 does not mention the approval of an entrance requirement "to pass written test(s) of achievement and aptitude in natural sciences as prescribed by the College of Medicine Faculty."

36 What was actually approved in said meeting of the College of Medicine Faculty are: "NMAT has replaced CMET" and "It was moved by Dr. Talusan and seconded by Dr. Reodica that 70% be the cut off point of NMAT for all categories. The motion was carried without any objection. Evidently, the written test(s) "as prescribed by the College of Medicine faculty" in paragraph b(3) of annex "P-l" paraphrased the approval by the UPCM faculty in its meeting on 17 January 1986 of the NMAT with a cut off score of 70%. The clause "as prescribed by the College of Medicine faculty" cannot possibly be interpreted as a delegation or grant of authority to prescribe the written test(s) of achievement and aptitude in natural sciences without the approval of the University Council. The clause is worded in the past tense and can only refer to an accomplished act of the faculty which in the light of the memorandum of the UPCM Dean (Annex "P") refers to the NMAT with a cut off score of 70% approved by the UPCM faculty on 17 January 1986. (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 569) Petitioners remonstrate against the respondent court's mention of the aforesaid annexes which it obtained from the UPCM directly without informing the petitioners. They aver that these annexes were not on record. We do not see this as an error. The fact is that petitioners submitted the minutes of April 8, 1986 meeting of the UC where the subject annexes were cited. Hence, these annexes were on record except that no copies of the same were submitted. The appellate court's resourcefulness in securing copies of these annexes was meant to let the records speak the truth. Such initiative should be commended rather than condemned. Besides, petitioners failed to show that they sustained substantial injury due to the court's action. Moreover, the then Ex-Officio Secretary of the UC, UP Manila, Dr. Sofronio P. San Juan executed an affidavit which corroborated the appellate court's findings. Thus, he stated: 5. At the said meeting, when the University Council took up Item No. 8 in the Agenda regarding the entrance requirements of the UP College of Medicine for the courses leading to the degree of Doctor of Medicine, the members of the College of Medicine Admissions Committee discussed and explained its proposal to adopt the National Medical Admissions Test NMAT rating of seventy (70%) percentile as the cut-off score as one of the entrance requirements of students seeking admission to the UP College of Medicine, instead of the national cut-off score of forty-five (45%) percentile. 6. Upon motion made by Prof. ANTONIO TALUSAN to adopt the NMAT rating of seventy (70%) percentile, instead of the national cut-off rating of forty-five (45%) percentile, as the cut-off score for students seeking admission to the UP College of Medicine, which was duly seconded by Dr. ROBERTO REODICA JR., who was then the Chairman of the Admissions Committee of the College of Medicine, the University Council approved the motion and adopted the aforesaid proposal. 7. While it may be true that the details of the discussion in the proposal to increase the national cut-off score of forty-five (45%) percent to seventy (70%) percent were not embodied in the minutes, it is no less true that the aforesaid proposal was discussed, moved for adoption and duly approved by the members of the University Council present at the meeting. 8. Being the then Secretary of the University Council of UP Manila on the 08 April 1986 meeting, I scribbled handwritten notes on my copy of the hand-outs based on the deliberations on the floor, which now form part of the official book-bound copy of the minutes deposited in the Office of the UP-Manila Registrar. A certified true xerox copy of the hand-outs bearing my handwritten notes is hereto attached asAnnex "A" and made an integral part hereof.

37 9. This Affidavit is executed to attest to the truthfulness of all the foregoing facts and to prove that at the meeting of the UP-Manila University Council held on 08 April 1986, at the BSLR East, after the members of the UP College of Medicine Admissions Committee discussed and explained their proposal to adopt the NMAT rating of seventy (70%) percentile as the cut-off score for students seeking admission to the UP College of Medicine, which is a big leap from the national cut-off score of forty-five (45%) percent for all other medical colleges in the Philippines, Prof. ANTONIO TALUSAN moved for its adoption and was duly seconded by Dr. ROBERTO REODICA JR., and was duly approved by the members of the University Council present, as well as for all legal intents and purposes. (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, pp. 688-689) We are, likewise, unconvinced by petitioners' arguments that the BOR's 1031st is contrary to justice and equity because the students themselves judicially confessed that they have no right to admission. In their letter to the Faculty, copy furnished the trial court, the students stated that "(they) feel that (they) no longer have any moral right to further pursue court action" and that "(they) cannot continue the court case without any moral leg to stand on." (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, pp. 5-6). The student's aforesaid feeling does not amount to a categorical admission of the absence of a legal right. Somehow, there is still a tinge of doubt expressed in the statement rather than a firm conviction on the students' part that indeed they do not possess any right to admission. Even assuming that an admission was made, the same cannot be accepted as it involves a conclusion of law based on the students' misapprehension of their legal right. We find that the letter appears to be predicated more on an overwhelming sense of hopelessness in view of the circumstances which they perceived to be against them like the BOW's 1001st resolution and the "three agonizing years of uncertain relationship spent in the college" (seeletter, supra) than a realization of the absence of a right. The records show a few of the difficulties the students encountered. xxx xxx xxx (2) Respondent Reyes (now one of petitioners in these cases upon being informed that the students would be enrolled that day) ordered the security guards to prevent the six students from entering the premises of the College. (3) When Chancellor Domingo allowed the students to enrol, respondent Reyes, in a written note (Annex "B"), advised the Cashier of U.P. Manila to defer acceptance of any payment from the students. xxx xxx xxx (5) Despite the July 5, 1990 letter of the University Registrar to respondent Reyes which categorically states that the registration of the students is valid, the Form 5's (Dean's Copy) of the students were returned to the University Registrar with the statement that they were not qualified to be admitted to the Medicine Program. (Rollo of 94961, p. 614) and 3. Before, and after, the filing of this Petition on July 5, 1990, the Intervenors have experienced at the hands of the Petitioners various attempts to frustrate their admission to their classes with full privileges as duly enrolled students, to wit: Intervenor Decano on July 9, 1990, Doctor Napoleon Apolinario, Chairman of the Department of Orthopedics told Decano that she will not be admitted to her classes. Decano was also transferred to another student block (another group of students) in the Department of Medicine after she was told she cannot rotate in the Section of Neurology.

38 Intervenors Muldong and Nazareno after the completion of their rotation in the Department of Ear, Nose and Throat, they were told that their grades will be withheld until after the resolution of the case. Intervenors Santos, Ruiz and Villanueva From July 9 to 20, 1990 (for Intervenors Santos and Ruiz), and from July 2 to 6,1990 (for Intervenor Villanueva), they were repeatedly told by Dr. Mario Gutierrez, Chairman of the Department of Family Medicine and by Dr. Mila Barzaga of the same Department that they should not attend classes in this Department because they have not been admitted as students of the College. (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 575). Considering such antagonistic conditions, We can empathize with the students' mental anxiety and emotional strain in their three years in college in the company of some professors who looked down on them as academic pretenders. Furthermore, the students were pressed for time as they have only one more year before graduation. These circumstances combined with the advice of the U.P. President unduly influenced the students to write this reconciling letter. With Our findings in these cases, petitioners' argument that the BOR violated their academic freedom cannot be sustained. The individual faculty member has the freedom to pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments (Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277). In contrast, the University has the academic freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study (Garcia case, ibid, citing Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 US 234, 263 [19571). As a corporate body, the University has entrusted to its academic staff thede facto control of its function of admission and examination of students (see Garcia, ibid). Petitioners now claim to be in charge of that function with respect to fixing the admission requirements in the college. We disagree. Under the UP Charter, the power to fix admission requirements is vested in the University Council of the autonomous campus which is composed of the President of the University of the Philippines and of all instructors holding the rank of professor, associate professor or assistant professor (Section 9, Act 1870). Consequently, the UC alone has the right to protest against any unauthorized exercise of its power. Petitioners cannot impugn these BOR directives on the ground of academic freedom inasmuch as their rights as university teachers remain unaffected. As succinctly explained by the appellate court: Under the UP Charter, the power to fix the requirements for admission to any college of the university is vested in the University Council (Sec. 9). The power to prescribe the courses of study is vested in the University Council subject to the approval of the Board of Regents (Sec. 9). The power to appoint the academic staff, fix their compensation, hours of service and other conditions is vested in the Board of Regents [Sec. 6(e)]. The power to allocate the income among the different categories of expenditures is vested in the Board of Regents [Sec. 6(a)]. Academic freedom may be asserted by the University Council or by the Board of Regents or both in so far (sic) as it relates to the functions vested in them by law which are essential to institutional academic freedom. The academic freedom claimed by the faculty to have been violated by the Board of Regents when it issued the questioned order is related to the right of the University to fix admission requirements. This right and power to fix admission requirements is clearly vested by law in the University Council. The College Faculty was merely empowered by the Board of Regents under Article 324 of the University Code to initially determine the admission requirements, subject to the approval of the University Council and the President of the University.

39 The questioned order of the Board of Regents in upholding the admission requirement approved by the University Council in 1986 is supportive of right of the University Council to fix or approve admission requirements, against the UPCM faculty and Dean who changed the admission requirements approved by the University Council without following the prescribed rules and procedures of the University. (Rollo of G.R. No. 94961, p. 513). One final note. While We recognize and affirm the BOR's power of governance in the instant petitions, We, however, can not give Our imprimatur to its claim of plenary power over admission requirements. Such claim has no basis in law. The UC has the final say in admission requirements provided the same conforms with law, rules and regulations of the university. In the event the power is abused or misused, it becomes the duty of the BOR, being the highest governing body in the university, to step in and to correct the anomaly. ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are DISMISSED and the decisions of the Court of Appeals dated August 14, 1990 and September 5, 1990 are hereby AFFIRMED.

40 G.R. No. 97238 July 15, 1991 JULIA L. TAN and JAMES L. TAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Antonio M. Nuyles for petitioners. The Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p This is a petition to review the decision as well as the resolution of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the order dated June 16, 1989 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 88 in Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 convicting petitioners Julia L. Tan and James L. Tan of indirect contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) days and to pay a fine of P500.00 each. Petitioner Julia L. Tan is an 84 year old widow who is the Principal of Grace Christian High School offering both elementary and secondary courses while petitioner James L. Tan is the Administrative Consultant of the school. This case arose from the refusal of the petitioners to admit and enroll certain students for the school year 1987-1988 because heated controversies, acts of misbehavior, and a refusal to dialogue with the school administration led the school authorities to believe that it would be best for all concerned if these children enrolled in other schools. Two separate petitions for mandamus with prayers for preliminary mandatory injunction were eventually filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The first case docketed as Civil Case No. Q-51039 was assigned to Branch 79 of the court. The second case which led to the present petition was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 and was assigned to Branch 88. The latter case was filed by Vicente Luy and his daughter Vonette Luy, who were also petitioners in Civil Case No. Q-51039. On July 1, 1987, Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-51039 issued an order granting the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The school and the petitioners were ordered to allow enrollment of the subject children. While the two cases were pending in court, the children were enrolled and continued their studies. During the enrollment period in May, 1989, however, the petitioners refused the enrollment in the first year high school of Carmella Ang See, Michael Robert Ang, Karen Gay Dipasupil and Vonette Luy on the ground that the school was under no legal duty to still accept them in the high school after graduating them from the elementary course. On May 23, 1989, Vicente Luy (father of Vonette Luy) together with other parents Josefina Ang, Teresita Ang See and Teresita Dipasupil filed in Branch 79, a motion to hold in indirect contempt the petitioners for refusing to enroll their children in alleged disobedience of the writ of preliminary injunction issued on July 1, 1987. On May 25, 1989, Branch 88 issued an order in the second case granting the prayer for the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and ordering the petitioners to enroll Vonette Luy in the first year high school. In the meantime, the herein petitioners challenged in the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No. 13179) the order granting the writ of a preliminary mandatory injunction by Branch 79.

41 On June 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals set aside the order prompting the respondents to file a petition forcertiorari with us. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 90063. In a resolution dated December 12, 1989, we dismissed the petition for lack of merit and resolved "that . . . the children here affected shall be allowed to finish the current school year (including the summer term if any), as the questioned order of the Court of Appeals shall take effect only as of the beginning of school year 19901991." Meanwhile, the case in Branch 88 continued its independent course. Thus, on June 16, 1989, the trial court upon motion of Vicente Luy issued the questioned order. This order is now challenged by the petitioners in this case. The facts of the controversy which led to the two cases against the petitioners are stated in this Court's Resolution in G.R. NO. 90063, "Yap Chin Fah, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.", December 12, 1989 as follows: Sometime in 1986, private respondent Grace Christian High School ("Grace Christian") applied with the then Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS) for a tuition-fee increase of fifteen percent (15%) for the School Year (SY) 1986-87. Private respondent Grace Christian had applied for, and been granted, yearly increments in tuition fees from SY 1973-74 (except for SY 1983-84) until SY 1985-1986. On 18 December 1986, Grace Christian received a notice from the MECS that its fee-increase application had been definitely approved on 10 November 1986. Meanwhile, a group of parents whose children are enrolled in Grace Christian, allegedly alarmed by what they perceived to be the deterioration despite the periodic fee increases in academic standards and physical facilities of the school, formed the Grace Christian High School Parents-Teachers Association ("Association"). The Association, composed of a majority of the parents (despite its name, no faculty member sits on the executive committee) demanded: (a) recognition as an organization; and (b) representation in Grace Christian's policy-making process, viz., faculty selection and improvement of the physical plant. Feeling that their demands had been largely ignored, the Association in October 1985 asked for a formal dialogue with the school administration. During a heated exchange in this dialogue, one of the petitioners herein, William Tiu, stood up and pointed a finger and shouted at Grace Christian's vice-principal, and later spat on the latter. On 23 September 1986, Grace Christian had been granted provisional authority by the MECS to impose a fifteen percent (15%) increase in tuition fee for SY 1986-1987. Thereupon, some of the above-mentioned group of parents lobbied with the other parents urging non-payment of the fee increase. During the enrollment period for the second semester of SY 1986-1987, a number of parents, among them petitioners (comprising nine [9] members or officers of the 19 member executive committee, of the Association) refused to pay the incremental fee: Grace Christian in turn refused to receive these parents' payment of regular (i.e., the fee before the fifteen [15%] increase) tuition fee for that semester. On 16 December 1986, Grace Christian reminded the parents about the payment of the approved increased tuition fee for the second semester. From 23 February to 5 March 1987, a group of parents, petitioners included, staged a rally outside the school gates. Banners and placards critical of the school administration were set up. The latent animosity between the Association (or some members thereof) and Grace Christian began to flare up. Petitioners first came out with statements in the print and broadcast media attacking Grace Christian's periodic fee increases and allegedly deteriorating academic standards. Some of the petitioners, armed with video-cameras, forced their way into the school premises and interrupted a class in session, urging students therein to speak using the allotted class hour against school policies. Some of the students walked out of their classrooms to join their parents in the rally outside.

42 On 27 February 1987, the Association through a letter asked Secretary Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS) to reconsider the 23 September 1986 (as well as the 10 November 1986) order granting the school's application for a fee increase. On 12 March 1987, the Association obtained a "freeze-order" from the DECS, enjoining Grace Christian from imposing the already approved fifteen percent (15%) fee increase, until the DECS shall have received proof that sixty percent (60%) of the increase had been apportioned to salaries of Grace Christian's faculty. After submission by Grace Christian of proof of payment of salary increases to the faculty, the DECS in an Indorsement dated 16 March 1987 lifted the "freeze-order," thereby allowing the school to resume collection of the fifteen percent (15%) fee increase. Meanwhile, the already adversarial relationship between Grace Christian and the Association further deteriorated when the school administrators overheard several of the Prep (pre-school) students chanting slogans against the school and its teachers, indicating that their parents had imbued them with hostility or at least disdain and scorn for the school. During the period 14-18 April 1987, petitioners were individually and personally informed through a letter by the principal of Grace Christian that, as they were severely critical of the school's policies, it would be best for all concerned if their children enrolled in some other school. On 25 May 1987, the first day of the enrollment period for SY 1987-88, petitioners were informed that as their respective children were in the list of "referral" cases, the school principal would confer with them either in the afternoon of 29 May 1987, the last day of enrollment, or on 30 May 1987. Petitioners felt that their children were being singled out by the school and decided not to see the principal and instead proceeded to the DECS for advise. The DECS in a lst Indorsement dated 1 June 1987 ordered private respondent School to enroll petitioner's children. The latter however refused to enroll these students, prompting petitioners to file an action for mandamus in court. The trial court on 11 June 1987, to maintain the status quo between the parties, ordered the temporary enrollment of petitioner's children. (ResolutionGR No. 90063, pp. 1-4) While Civil Case No. Q-51039 was being considered on appeal by the Court of Appeals and later the Supreme Court, the proceedings were also going on in Civil Case No. Q-89-2357, which had been filed by Vonette C. Luy and her father Vicente Luy and assigned to Branch 88 on April 26, 1989. The Luy petition alleged: xxx xxx xxx . . . [T]hat during the school year 1989-1990 appellants unjustifiably refused to admit her in the High School Department, despite the fact that she was given a reservation slip which she was instructed to fill up and "return not later than April 15, 1989 together with report card for this year." Before April 15, 1989, she submitted the reservation slip to the school principal, but the principal informed her that she would no longer be admitted because her father was very vocal against certain school policies and activities. As the school principal refused to allow her to enroll in the High School Department, her father wrote a letter complaint dated April 7, 1989 to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). The Department indorsed the letter to the school for immediate comment and/or appropriate action (Exhibits "E" and "D"). In reply, the lawyer of the school wrote the DECS to reiterate the school's decision not to enroll Vonette Luy in its High School Department (Exhibit "E"). (Rollo, pp. 40-41) The school and herein petitioners Julia and James Tan opposed the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on the grounds that:

43 xxx xxx xxx . . . (a) the right of a student to enroll in a private school is not absolute; (b) Vonette C. Luy failed to exhaust all administrative remedies; and (c) there is no clear legal basis for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. (Rollo, p. 41) On May 25, 1989, Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco issued the writ, stating In view of the foregoing, the petitioner has clearly established her right to be admitted to the First Year, High School Department, Grace Christian School, Quezon City and the unmitigated duty of respondents to admit the petitioner to the aforesaid High School Department. The Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction is hereby GRANTED and the respondents are ordered to allow the enrollment of petitioner in the High School Department, Grace Christian High School, Quezon City, after posting a bond of Five Thousand Pesos of compliance to this Court within three (3) days from receipt hereof. (pp. 73-74, Records.) (Rollo, pp. 41-42) A motion for reconsideration was filed followed by a supplemental motion for reconsideration. The petitioners stated that the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports had decided their administrative case upholding the right of the school to refuse enrollment in the first year high school of Vonette Luy as well as the other students similarly situated. (See Annex "D", Rollo, pp. 52-53) Significantly, the petitioners also pointed out to the court that Vicente Luy and his daughter were engaging in forum shopping because Civil Case No. Q-51039 had been filed earlier by Mr. Luy himself and various other parents. There was pending exactly the same cause of action on contempt and both cases were raising the same issues. As earlier stated, the first case on the grant of mandatory injunction was at that time already with the Court of Appeals. On June 9, 1989, Vicente Luy filed a motion to declare the petitioners in contempt of court for refusing to enroll Vonette Luy in high school. We note that on this same date, June 9, 1989, the other court presided over by Judge Godofredo Legaspi denied the similar motion for contempt filed by Mr. Luy, Josefina Ang, Teresita Ang See, and Teresita Dipasupil. On June 13, 1989, Judge Tirso Velasco ordered the petitioners to comply with the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction or he would act on the motion for contempt. The petitioners opposed this order stating that Judge Legaspi had just denied the similar motion for contempt in the other case (Civil Case No. Q-51039). In this opposition, the petitioners again charged Mr. Luy with forum shopping contending that the first case he filed with others should take precedence over Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 pending before Judge Velasco's court. On June 16, 1989, Judge Velasco issued the order questioned in this petition, stating: IN VIEW HEREOF, and for continuously defying not only the writ of this court but also the three Orders of June 7, June 13 and June 15, 1989, the Court finds the two respondents Julia L. Tan and James Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of indirect contempt and hereby sentences each of them to suffer a penalty of imprisonment of ten (10) days and to pay the cost. They are likewise fined P500.00 each. The Court orders that a warrant of arrest be immediately issued and served upon them to start service of sentence. The Court will determine whether, during this period of time, petitioner

44 Vonette Luy shall have been enrolled in respondent school for if not a determination shall be made whether respondents shall be continuously held in custody until compliance by them of the court's writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. (Rollo, p. 57) Only ten (10) days later, on June 26, 1989, the Court of Appeals set aside the writ issued by Judge Velasco which had commanded the herein petitioners to enroll the protesting school children. It lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it had issued. A motion for reconsideration was denied. The parents went to our Court. We initially issued a status quo order, enjoining the parties to maintain the situation existing before the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered. On December 12, 1989, however, we decided the controversy in favor of herein petitioners and the school. The Court in G.R. No. 90063 declared the petition of the parents and their children unmeritorious. We stated: ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for lack of merit. However, the children here affected shall be allowed to fill the current school year (including the summer term, if any), as the questioned Order of the Court of Appeals shall take effect only as of the beginning of SY 1990-91."(Padilla, J., took no part, Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on official leave)." (at p. 7) The petition in this case is impressed with merit. Our ruling in Yap Chin Fah et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al. was already long final when the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals rendered its October 22, 1990 decision practically ignoring and rendering naught the ratio decidendi which impelled us to dismiss the earlier petition. This cannot be countenanced. We stressed in Ver v. Quetulio (163 SCRA 80 [1988]), citing Ang Ping v. Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 40(154 SCRA 77 [1987]): As early as 1922, this Court declared in Shioji v. Harvey (43 Phil. 333) that "the only function of a lower court, when the judgment of a higher court is returned to it, is the ministerial one of issuing the order of execution. A lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court." This is especially true where it is a Supreme Court decision or resolution which states with finality how the particular case before it has been resolved. We ruled in Tugade v. Court of Appeals (85 SCRA 226): Respondent Court of Appeals is really devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is a simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera (34 SCRA 98 [1970]). "The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit." (Ibid, 107). The opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: "Such a thought was reiterated in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: "Judge Gaudencio Cloribel need not be reminded

45 that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justiciable controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. (Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI, 23 SCRA 948, 961). (Emphasis supplied) The respondent Court of Appeals should have been aware that in the related case (G.R. No. 90063), we had already set aside the writ of preliminary injunction similar to the writ from which emanated the contempt order directing that the petitioners be imprisoned and made to pay fines. If this Court had already found a preliminary injunction invalid and sustained the school's position that there was no unmistakable and indubitable right to enroll the petitioners' children, any lower court's decision to the contrary is not only unenforceable and ineffective, but certainly cannot be the basis for a contempt order. Our ruling in the related case of Yap Chin Fah, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., states: As the Court of Appeals pointed out, petitioners here failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before resorting to court action, as they had failed to: (a) see the principal of Grace Christian on 29 May 1987, their scheduled conference date; (b) wait for the resolution of the letter of reconsideration/clarification of lst Indorsement dated 1 June 1987 filed by Grace Christian with the DECS Assistant Regional Director; and (c) appeal to the DECS Secretary to finally resolve their disagreements with Grace Christian, the right to appeal from the decision of a subordinate officer to a superior one constituting "a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" within the meaning of the Rules of Court. The Education Act of 1982 vests in the DECS the primary authority to hear and resolve disputes by and among members of the educational community similar to those between petitioners and Grace Christian. Moreover, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction lies only when the right sought to be enforced is clear, unmistakable and indubitable (Rivera v. Florendo, 144 SCRA, 643 [1986]). In the instant case, no such clear right was shown. It is true that private schools not unlike public utilities and other private corporations whose businesses impinge on the public interest are subject to reasonable regulation and supervision of the State (Const., Art. XIV [4] [1]). At the same time, however, private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right to establish and enforce reasonable rules and regulations extends as well to parents and parent-teacher associations, as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools. In the instant case, since petitioners have failed to comply with the conditions and prerequisites for admission, i.e., registration within the prescribed dates, payment of duly-approved tuition fees, and compliance with school rules and regulations, Grace Christian cannot be regarded as having acted arbitrarily or capriciously in refusing to re-enroll petitioners' children. xxx xxx xxx Lastly, where relations between parents and students on the one hand, and teachers and administrators upon the other hand, have deteriorated to the level here exhibited, a private school may, in the interest of the rest of the student body and of the faculty and management as a whole, and of the children of the parents affected, require the affected children to be enrolled elsewhere. The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioners' children and to reintegrate them to the student body. It may even be argued that petitioners' children have been innocent victims in a deplorable confrontation between some parents and respondent School, but the situation here finds some analogy in labor cases

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where, because of pre-existing and supervening strained relations, reinstatement is not always a feasible solution. (G.R. No. 90063, December 12, 1989, pp. 5-6; 7) The issue before us was the right to enroll in high school of students who graduated from the elementary department of the same institution. Exactly the same issue is raised in the case which gave rise to the contempt order and to the present petition. Under the common facts of the two cases, both the DECS and this Court have found the petitioners' position valid. We cannot close this case without deploring the action of Vicente Luy and his counsel for filing Civil Case No. Q-89-2357 in 1989 when exactly the same issues were already before Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-51039 filed by, among others, Mr. Luy in 1987. This results not only in unnecessarily clogging the heavily burdened dockets of our courts but also in the unseemly sight of two Branches of the same trial court and two Divisions of the Court of Appeals issuing contradictory decisions one in favor of the school and the other in favor of the students and their parents. This problem of forum shopping is now before our Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court. Pending any amendment of the Rules or a circular remedying this problem, lawyers and litigants alike are warned to be more candid with courts of justice and not engage in forum shopping through deliberate splitting of actions or appeals in the hope that even as one case is dismissed, another would still be open. The Court of Appeals in this case was also misled. It ruled: It is important to note that Civil Case No. Q-51039 was filed for the purpose of requiring appellants to maintain the eight (8) students in the roll of students in the Elementary Department. This prayer was granted when the court issued the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction asked for. Herein appellants thereafter complied with the said order. It was only when the school refused to admit the eight (8) students in its High School Department that they filed the motion for contempt. Said motion was denied because what the initial petition prayed for was for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to maintain the enrollment in the Elementary Department of the students and not their admission in the High School Department of said school. Therefore, the right of the students to be admitted in the High School Department was not in issue hence, the court was correct in ruling that it had no jurisdiction to declare the appellants in contempt of court for the act complained of, thereby dismissing the charge without considering its merits. (Rollo, pp. 45-46) Civil Case No. Q-51039 was filed by Vicente Luy and other parents not only to continue enrolling their children in the elementary department but also to compel the enrollment of their other children in the high school department of Grace Christian School. As pointed out by the petitioners, there were eighteen (18) students involved in Civil Case No. Q- 51039, not eight (8) as stated by the Court of Appeals. Vonette Luy had two sisters, Vivian Luy and Virna Luy who were high school students and who joined in the petition. The case involved not only elementary grade but also high school students. No thinking person can dispute the fact that our country is suffering from the effects of a serious deterioration of academic and other standards in our educational system. This Court is disturbed by the big number of candidates taking the bar examinations who, after six (6) years in the elementary grades, four (4) years in high school, and eight (8) years in college appear to be functionally semi-illiterate judging from the answers they give to bar examination questions. The same is true of other disciplines, professions, and occupations. A drastic upgrading of educational standards especially in the elementary and high school levels is imperative. It is for the above reason that Government should uphold and encourage schools and colleges which endeavor to maintain the highest standards of education. We have consistently sustained the rights of students to legitimately address their grievances both to school authorities, media, and the general public to the extent of sometimes countenancing uncivil and rowdy behavior. However, we have not hesitated to strike down violence and anarchy when certain students and their inevitable supporters misuse the grant of "ordered liberty" mandated by the Constitution. Educators who insist on high standards and who enforce reasonable rules of discipline deserve support from courts of justice and other branches of Government. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned DECISION and RESOLUTION of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners are ACQUITTED of the offense of indirect contempt of court.SO ORDERED.

47 UP Board of Regents VS Court of Appeals and AROKIASWAMY WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE G.R. No. 134625. August 31, 1999 Facts: Private respondent Ms. Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine a citizen of India enrolled doctoral program in UP CSSP Diliman QC. She is ready for oral defense with selected panel members Drs. E. Arsenio Manuel, Serafin Quiason, Sri Skandarajah, Noel Teodoro, and Isagani Medina, the last included as the deans representative. Even though Dr. Medina noticed that there were portions of her dissertation that was lifted from different sources without proper acknowledgement, she was still allowed to continue to with her oral defense. Four (4) out five (5) give her a passing mark with condition to incorporate the suggestion made by the panel members. Dr. Medina did not sign the approval form. Dr. Teodoro also noted that a revision should be submitted. On March 24, 1993, The CSSP College Faculty Assembly approved her graduation pending the final revised copies of her dissertation. Private respondent submitted the supposedly final revised copies although petitioners maintained that suggestions were not incorporated. She left a copy for Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina and did not wait for their approval relying to the Dean Paz remarks during previous meeting that a majority vote was sufficient for her to pass. The supposedly revised copies were later disapproved by Dr. Teodoro and Dr. Medina. Private respondent was disappointed with the administration. She charge Dr. Diokno and Medina with maliciously working for the disapproval of her dissertation and further warned Dean Paz against encouraging perfidious act against her. Dean Paz attempts to exclude the private respondent in the graduating list in a letter addressed to the Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs (Dr. Milagros Ibe), pending for clarification of her charges against panel members and accusations relating to her dissertation. Unfortunately the letter did not reach on time and the respondent was allowed to graduate. Dean Paz wrote a letter that she would not be granted an academic clearance unless she substantiated the accusations. In a letter addressed to Dean Paz, Dr. Medina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended for the withdrawal of her doctorate degree. Dean Paz formed an ad-hoc committee (Ventura Committee) to investigate and recommend to Chancellor Dr. Roman to withdraw her doctorate degree. Private respondent was informed of the charges in a letter. Ventura Committee finds at 90 instances or portions of thesis lifted from other sources with no proper acknowledgement. After it was unanimously approved and endorsed from the CSSP and Univ. Council the recommendation for withdrawal was endorsed to Board of Regents who deferred its actions to study further for legal implications. Private respondent was provided with a copy of findings and in return she also submitted her written explanation. Another meeting was scheduled to discuss her answer. Zafaralla Committee was also created and recommends private respondent for withdrawal of her degree after establishing the facts the there were massive lifting from published sources and the private respondent also admits herself of being guilty of plagiarism. On the basis of the report and recommendation of the University Council, the Board of Regents send a letter to inform private respondent that it was resolved by majority to withdraw your doctorates degree. On August 10, 1995, private respondent then filed a petition for mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and damages to RTC QC. She alleged that petitioners had unlawfully withdrawn her degree without justification and without affording her procedural due process. She prayed that petitioners be ordered to restore her degree and to pay her P500, 000.00 as moral and exemplary damages and P1, 500,000.00 as compensation for lost earnings. RTC dismissed for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision and ordered to restore her doctorates degree. Issue/s: 1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of mandamus and ordering petitioners to restore doctoral degree. 2. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in holding that respondents doctoral degree cannot be recalled without violating her right to enjoyment of intellectual property and to justice and equity.

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Held/Ruling: The decision of Court of Appeals was reversed. 1. Yes. The court of appeals decisions was based on grounds that the private respondent was denied of due process and that she graduated and no longer in the ambit of disciplinary powers of UP. In all investigations held by the different committee assigned to investigate the charges, the private respondent was heard on her defense. In fact she was informed in writing about the charges and was provided with a copy from the investigating committee. She was asked to submit her explanation which she forwarded. Private respondent also discussed her case with the UP Chancellor and Zafaralla Committee during their meetings. She was given the opportunity to be heard and explain her side but failed to refute the charges of plagiarism against her. The freedom of a university does not terminate upon the "graduation" of a student, as the Court of Appeals held because the "graduation" of such a student that is in question. The investigation began before graduation. She was able to graduate because there were many investigations conducted before the Board finally decided that she should not have been allowed to graduate. 2. Yes. The court held that academic freedom is guaranteed to institutions of higher learning by Art XIV of the 1987 Constitution. This freedom includes deciding whom a university will confer degrees on. If the degree is procured by error or fraud then the Board of Regents, subject to due process being followed, may cancel that degree. Art. XIV, Section 5 par. 2 of the Constitution provides that "academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." It is a freedom granted to "institutions of higher learning" which is thus given "a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students." If such institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

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414 Miriam College Foundation Inc. vs. Court of Appeals [GR 127930, 15 December 2000] First Division, Kapunan (J): 3 concur, 1 took no part Facts: Following the publication of the September-October 1994 issue (Vol. 41, No. 14) of Miriam College's school paper (Chi-Rho), and magazine (Ang Magasing Pampanitikan ng Chi-Rho), the members of the editorial board, and Relly Carpio, author of Libog, all students of Miriam College, received a letter signed by Dr. Aleli Sevilla, Chair of the Miriam College Discipline Committee. The Letter dated 4 November 1994 informed them that letters of complaint were "filed against you by members of the Miriam Community and a concerned Ateneo grade five student have been forwarded to the Discipline Committee for inquiry and investigation. Please find enclosed complaints. As expressed in their complaints you have violated regulations in the student handbook specifically Section 2 letters B and R, pages 30 and 32, Section 4 (Major offenses) letter j, page 36 letters m, n, and p, page 37 and no. 2 (minor offenses) letter a, page 37. You are required to submit a written statement in answer to the charge/s on or before the initial date of hearing to be held on November 15, 1994, Tuesday, 1:00 in the afternoon at the DSA Conference Room." None of the students submitted their respective answers. They instead requested Dr. Sevilla to transfer the case to the Regional Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 )Narratives (Berne Guerrero) Office of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) which under Rule XII of DECS Order 94, Series of 1992, supposedly had jurisdiction over the case. In a Letter dated 21 November 1994, Dr. Sevilla again required the students to file their written answers. In response, Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, lawyer for the students, submitted a letter to the Discipline Committee reiterating his clients' position that said Committee had no jurisdiction over them. According to Atty. Valmonte, the Committee was "trying to impose discipline on his clients on account of their having written articles and poems in their capacity as campus journalists." Hence, he argued that "what applies is Republic Act No. 7079 The Campus Journalism Act and its implementing rules and regulations." He also questioned the partiality of the members of said Committee who allegedly "had already articulated their position" against his clients. The Discipline Committee proceeded with its investigation ex parte. Thereafter, the Discipline Board, after a review of the Discipline Committee's report, imposed disciplinary sanctions upon the students, to wit: (1) Jasper Briones [Editor-in-Chief of ChiRho, 4th year student]: Expulsion; (2) Daphne Cowper: Suspension up to (summer) March 1995; (3) Imelda Hilario: suspension for 2 weeks to expire on 2 February 1995; (4) Deborah Ligon [4th year student and could graduate as summa cum laude]: suspension up to May 1995; (5) Elizabeth Valdezco: suspension up to (summer) March 1995; (6) Camille Portuga [Octoberian]: graduation privileges withheld, including diploma; (7) Joel Tan: suspension for 2 weeks to expire on 2 February 1995; (8) Gerald Gary Renacido [2nd year student]: Expelled and given transfer credentials; (9) Relly Carpio [3rd year student]: Dismissed and given transfer credentials; (10) Jerome Gomez [3rd year student]: Dismissed and given transfer credentials; and (11) Jose Mari Ramos [Art editor of Chi-Rho, 2nd year student]: Expelled and given transfer papers. Said students thus filed a petition for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction/restraining order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City questioning the jurisdiction of the Discipline Board of Miriam College over them. On 17 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch CIII, presided by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr., issued an order denying the students' prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order. The students thereafter filed a "Supplemental Petition and Motion for Reconsideration." Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dated 10 February 1995 granting the writ of preliminary injunction. Both parties moved for a reconsideration of the above order. In an Order dated 22 February 1995, the RTC dismissed the petition. The students, excluding Deborah Ligon, Imelda Hilario and Daphne Cowper, sought relief in the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition of preliminary injunction/restraining order11 questioning the Orders of the RTC dated 10 and 24 February 1995. On 15 March 1995, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for disposition. In its Decision dated 26 September 1996, the appellate court granted the students' petition. The CA declared the RTC Order dated 22 February 1995, as well as the students' suspension and dismissal, void. Miriam College filed the present petition. Issue: Whether Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act precludes the schools right to discipline its students. Held: In several cases, the Supreme Court has upheld the right of the students to free speech in school premises. The right of the students to free speech in school premises, however, is not absolute. The right to free speech must always be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Thus, while the Court upheld the right of the students to free expression in the cases of Malabanan vs. Ramento, Villar vs. Technological Institute of the Philippines, Arreza vs. Gregorio Araneta University Foundation, and Non vs. Dames II, the Court did not rule out disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason - whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior - which materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Provisions of law (such as Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act) should be construed in harmony with those of the Constitution; acts of the legislature should be construed, wherever possible, in a manner that would avoid

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their conflicting with the fundamental law. A statute should not be given a broad construction if its validity can be saved by a narrower one. Thus, Section 7 should be read in a manner as not to infringe upon the school's right to discipline its students. At the same time, however, said provision should not be construed as to unduly restrict the right of the students to free speech. Consistent with jurisprudence, Section 7 of the Campus Journalism Act is read to mean that the school cannot suspend or expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or she has written, except when such article materially disrupt class work or involve Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 ) substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others. Further, the power of the school to investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. the Court therefore rule that Miriam College has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against the students. [ G.R. No. 161172, December 13, 2004 ] NADINE ROSARIO M. MORALES, PETITIONER, VS. THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
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ACADEMIC FREEDOM
At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire,[37] thus: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study. Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State," has deservedly earned for himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of his was the "best, the most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge of "corruption," the forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about: "Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord: they like to hear the pretenders examined, and they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are plenty of persons, as they soon discover, who think that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them, instead of being angry with themselves are angry with me. This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And then if somebody asks them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of knowledge has been detected -- which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies.[38] Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority, whether State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and blatant attempts at thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual centers in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy. In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the professors of the new German Universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden (1575), Helmstdt (1574) and Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of

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fundamental human rights of the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, with the right of individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue, discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external interference or pressure. But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect of academic freedom have been categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach. It is to be realized that this individual aspect of academic freedom could have developed only pari passu with its institutional counterpart. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study. In the Philippines, the Acts which were passed with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government, namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights now subsumed under the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the term. It had to await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection. The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which stated: "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State university at that time, being the University of the Philippines, the Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the expense of the rest. In an attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in its Section 8 (2): "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who was also a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the University as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor.[39] Has the right been carried over to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section 5 (2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."[40] More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . ." Gascon finished off the broken thought, - "the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes." Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology,[41] we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather

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than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.[42] "For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."[43] Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student discipline.[44] Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival. Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a Christian school that includes Theology as part of its curriculum and assiduously strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the founder of the order of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and ruthless acts are the more reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man. In essence, education must ultimately be religious - not in the sense that the founders or charter members of the institution are sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said, is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence.[45] It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the Ateneo de Manila University has been lost on the respondent students. Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after them. Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body."[46] Thus, the decision of petitioner university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence between the offense committed and the sanction imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento.[47] Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its decision founded on the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted hazing activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result of the hazing, Leonardo Villa died from serious physical injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of respondent students upon those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we countenance the imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty of dismissal upon respondent students. This finds authority and justification in Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.[48]