Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Feminist Jurisprudence K
1
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
1NC Shell
The affirmative endorses current systems of jurisprudence which are essentially
masculine- the notion of “individual” rights necessarily assumes a separateness that
does not apply to women.
West, professor of law at the University of Maryland, Winter 1998
[Robin. “Jurisprudence and Gender.” University of Chicago Law Review. 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1. Lexis]
The first purpose of this essay is to put forward the global and critical claim that by virtue of their shared
embrace of the separation thesis, all of our modern legal theory -- by which I mean "liberal legalism" and
"critical legal theory" collectively -- is essentially and irretrievably masculine. My use of "I" above was
inauthentic, just as the modern, increasing use of the female pronoun in liberal and critical legal theory,
although well-intended, is empirically and experientially false. For the cluster of claims that jointly
constitute the "separation thesis" -- the claim that human beings are, definitionally, distinct from one
another, the claim that the referent of "I" is singular and unambiguous, the claim that the word "individual"
has an uncontested biological meaning, namely that we are each physically individuated from every other,
the claim that we are individuals "first," and the claim that what separates us is epistemologically and
morally prior to what connects us -- while "trivially true" of men, are patently untrue of women. Women
are not essentially, necessarily, inevitably, invariably, always, and forever separate from other human
beings: women, distinctively, are quite clearly "connected" to another human life when pregnant. In fact,
women are in some sense "connected" to life and to other [*3] human beings during at least four recurrent
and critical material experiences: the experience of pregnancy itself; the invasive and "connecting"
experience of heterosexual penetration, which may lead to pregnancy; the monthly experience of
menstruation, which represents the potential for pregnancy; and the post-pregnancy experience of breast-
feeding. Indeed, perhaps the central insight of feminist theory of the last decade has been that woman are
"essentially connected," not "essentially separate," from the rest of human life, both materially, through
pregnancy, intercourse, and breast-feeding, and existentially, through the moral and practical life. If by
"human beings" legal theorists mean women as well as men, then the "separation thesis" is clearly false. If,
alternatively, by "human beings" they mean those for whom the separation thesis is true, then women are
not human beings. It's not hard to guess which is meant.
2
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
1NC Shell
Moreover, The relationship of domination established in patriarchy and engrained
in our legal system creates the ability to oppress and kill
Williams, associate professor at the University of Wisconsin, 1988
[Patricia J. “On being the object of property.” From Feminist legal theory: readings in law and gender” ed.
Katharine T. Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy. p. 167]
p.167 “As I reflected…to production”
As I reflected on all this, I realized that one of the things passed on from slavery, which continues in the oppression
of people of color, is a belief structure rooted in a concept of black (or brown, or red) anti-will, the antithetical
embodiment of pure will. We live in a society in which the closest equivalent of nobility is the display of
unremittingly controlled willfulness. To be perceived as unremittingly will-less is to be imbued with an
almost lethal trait. Many scholars have explained this phenomenon in terms of total and infantilizing
interdependency of dominant and oppressed.6 Consider, for example, Mark Tushnet's distinction between slave law's
totalistic view of personality and the bourgeois "pure will" theory of personality: "Social relations in slave society rest upon
the interaction of owner with slave; the owner, having total dominion over the slave. In contrast, bourgeois
social relations rest upon the paradigmatic instance of market relations, the purchase by a capitalist of a worker's
personality. Slave relations are total, engaging the master and slave in exchanges in which each must take
account of the entire range of belief, feeling, and interest embodied by the other; bourgeois social relations
are partial, requiring only that participants in a market evaluate their general productive characteristics
without regard to aspects of personality unrelated to production."7
3
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
1NC Shell
Our alternative is to reject the affirmative’s discourse of individual rights. We must
use the law as a starting point for imagining new rules that escape the trap of the
current system.
Baer, associate professor of political science at Texas A&M, 1992
[Judith A. “How is Law Male? A feminist perspective on constitutional interpretation” From Feminist
Jurisprudence: The difference debate. Ed. Leslie Friedman Goldstein. p.164-5]
I submit that a feminist constitutional jurisprudence is free to reject these conceptual traps and to devise
new approaches to constitutional reasoning. Conceding that the rules were not invented for the express
purpose of frustrating claims to sexual equality, we can still raise the possibility that they serve that
purpose. In Katharine Bartlett's words (1990), they "drive underground" ideologies. Since feminist ideology
was not present to be driven underground when these rules were developed, feminists are justified in
suspecting that they will frustrate women's claims. This proposal is not so drastic as it may sound. I am not
suggesting that feminists should declare constitutional rights by fiat. What I am suggesting is that feminists
are justified in attempting to reason from preference to conclusion. How could such a process work? I have
argued elsewhere that one way out of the doctrinal traps is to employ the mind's intuitive and imaginative
faculties: to ask, for example, under what circumstances sexual equality could be compatible with the
absence of a right to abortion (Baer, 1990b). Another possible approach for feminist constitutional scholars
is to proceed from things we know as women that are not necessarily known to men, such as the ways in
which society apportions the consequences of the absence of rights like reproductive choice. Other possible
approaches have yet to be envisioned. I am arguing for feminist jurists to give full creative license to the
mind. The boundaries between reality and fantasy, between reason and emotion, between perceived and
proven fact, are as conventional and artificial as the boundaries between neutral and result-oriented
jurisprudence, between state and federal power, between consistency and inconsistency. Those rules served
purposes that women had little if any part in articulating. A central task of feminist jurisprudence is a
willingness to break the rules.
Finally, We need a bottom-up approach that first criticizes the hierarchies inherent
in our legal system- individual criticism spurs action that topples these hierarchies.
MacKinnon, professor of law at the University of Michigan, 2005
[Catharine A. Women’s Lives- Men’s Laws. Harvard University Press. P.57]
The point of the new equality jurisprudence is to institutionalize social equality, rather than inequality,
through legal equality initiatives. It begins by articulating the systematic pervasive, and cumulative absence
of equality throughout society, including in democracies, and by moving to put legal power to redress it
into the hands of affected groups through law. In this vision, law can be something people do, not just
something states do to people. This democratic shift in legal form as well as content called civil rights as
pioneered by the Black movement in the United States, with echoes in the human rights of transnational
law—is appropriate to an aspiration to transform social hierarchy from the bottom up. Beyond clarifying
unnoticed dynamics in law and history, and stimulating needed scholarship and analysis, the goal of this
theory is to close the gap between legal promise and social reality in the equality area. This approach could
be adopted anywhere. A legal regime capable of producing equality of women to men—half the human
race to the other—made up as they are of all existing inequalities, might learn what it needs to know to
produce equality among men as well.
4
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Current legal theories are dominated by males and, as such, exclude women
West, professor of law at the University of Maryland, Winter 1998
[Robin. “Jurisprudence and Gender.” University of Chicago Law Review. 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1. Lexis]
The second thing I mean to imply by the phrase "masculine jurisprudence" is that both liberal and critical legal theory, which is about
the relation between law and life, is about men and not women. The reason for this lack of parallelism, of course,
is hardly benign neglect. Rather, the distinctive values women hold, the distinctive dangers from which we
suffer, and the distinctive contradictions that characterize our inner lives are not reflected in legal theory
because legal theory (whatever else it's about) is about actual, real life, enacted, legislated, adjudicated law,
and women have, from law's inception, lacked the power to make law protect, value, or seriously regard our
experience. Jurisprudence is "masculine" because jurisprudence is about the relationship between human beings and the laws we
actually have, and the laws we actually have are "masculine" both in terms of their intended beneficiary and in
authorship. Women are absent from jurisprudence because women as human beings are absent from the
law's protection: jurisprudence does not recognize us because law does not protect us. The implication for this should be obvious.
We will not have a genuinely ungendered jurisprudence (a jurisprudence "unmodified" so to speak) until we have legal doctrine that
takes women's lives as seriously as it takes men's. We don't have such legal doctrine. The virtual abolition of patriarchy is the
necessary political condition for the creation of non-masculine feminist jurisprudence.
5
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
6
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Human rights law marginalizes women’s rights because it is male-dominated and men don’t
experience the same hardships as women
Charlesworth, professor of law at the University of Adelaide, 1995
[Hilary. “Human Rights as Men’s Rights.” From Women’s rights, human rights. Ed: Julia Peters and
Andrea Wolper. p.105]
Why is it problematic that all the major institutions of the international legal order are peopled by men? What is the
value of insisting on the need for significant representation of women? Long-term male domination of all bodies wielding
political power nationally and internationally means that issues traditionally of concern to men are seen as
general human concerns; “women’s concerns,” by contrast, are regarded as a distinct and limited category.
Because men generally are not the victims of sex discrimination, domestic violence, or sexual degradation
and violence, for example, these matters are often relegated to a specialized and marginalized sphere and
are regulated, if at ail, by weaker methods. Unless the experiences of women contribute directly to the mainstream
international legal order, beginning with women’s equal representation in law-making forums, international human rights law loses its
claim to universal applicability: it should more accurately characterized as international men’s rights law.
7
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
8
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
9
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Links- Individuality/Privacy
As masculine legal theories value autonomy and individuality, the feminine essence is one of
interconnectivity and connection
West, professor of law at the University of Maryland, Winter 1998
[Robin. “Jurisprudence and Gender.” University of Chicago Law Review. 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1. Lexis]
To pursue my structural analogy to masculine legal theory, then, intimacy and the ethic of care constitute
the entailed values of the existential state of connection with others, just as autonomy and freedom
constitute the entailed values of the existential state of separation from others for men. Because women are
fundamentally connected to other human life, women value and enjoy intimacy with others (just as because
men are fundamentally separate from other human life men value and enjoy autonomy). Because women
are connected with the rest of human life, intimacy with the "other" comes naturally. Caring, nurturance,
and an ethic of love and responsibility for life is second nature. Autonomy, or freedom from the other
constitutes a value for men because it reflects an existential state of being: separate. Intimacy is a value for
women because it reflects an existentially connected state of being.
10
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Links- Individuality/Privacy
The male ethic of autonomy and individuality is incompatible with the feminine ethic of nurture and
care
West, professor of law at the University of Maryland, Winter 1998
[Robin. “Jurisprudence and Gender.” University of Chicago Law Review. 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1. Lexis]
Whether we embrace a material or a purely developmental explanation of women's heightened connection
with the other, however, the "story" of women's relationship with the other as told by cultural feminists
contrast in virtually every particular with the story of men's relationship to the other as told by liberals. First, men,
according to the Hobbesian account, are by nature equal. "Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that
though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body . . . ; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between
man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit. . . . [T]he weakest has strength
enough to kill the strongest. . . ." n30 Women, by contrast, are not "equal" in strength to the most important "other"
they encounter: the fetus and then the newborn child. Rather, the fetus and the woman and later the infant
and the mother occupy what might be called a natural, hierarchical web of inequality, not a natural state of
equality: whereas men may be "by nature equal" women are "by nature stronger" than those who are most
important to them and most dependent upon them. The natural physical equality between self and other on which Hobbes
insists is simply untrue of women's natural state. Second, according to Hobbes, "men" are naturally inclined to aggress
against those they perceive as the vulnerable other. Again, women are not: infants are dependent upon
mothers and vulnerable to them, yet the natural mother does not aggress against her child, she breastfeeds
her. And lastly, men respond to the vulnerability of natural equality by developing a morality and a civil
state that demand respect for the equality, rights and freedom of the other. Women [*28] do not. Women
respond to their natural state of inequality by developing a morality of nurturance that is responsible for the
well-being of the dependent, and an ethic of care that responds to the greater needs of the weak. Men
respond to the natural state of equality with an ethic of autonomy and rights. Women respond to the natural
state of inequality with an ethic of responsibility and care.
11
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Links- Individuality/Privacy
Individual rights are grounded in the notion of separation out of fear of rejection
West, professor of law at the University of Maryland, Winter 1998
[Robin. “Jurisprudence and Gender.” University of Chicago Law Review. 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1. Lexis]
Critical theorist Peter Gabel has given a perfectly parallel explanation of the attraction of autonomous, rights-focused, individuated
liberal values in spite of the acutely painful longing for connection which in fact permeates men's lives. Gabel's argument structurally
compares with Dworkin's, although it contrasts with it substantively. Thus, whereas Dworkin argues that women deny
their desire for freedom, and distance themselves from it through a false commitment to intimacy, Gabel
argues that human beings deny their craving for attachment with the other, and distance themselves from it
through a false commitment to rights. As women deny their desire for freedom because of a fear that by asserting that desire
they risk violent invasion, so human beings, according to Gabel, deny their desire for attachment because they fear
that by exposing their deeper and truer need for connection, they will leave themselves vulnerable to the
pain of rejection. This fear is rooted in an unconsciously embedded memory from infancy, just as women's fear
of their own desire for freedom is rooted in a memory of male violence. At some point in early infancy, according [*45]
to Gabel, the other (read: the mother) rejected him. That rejection was painful and humiliating. The individual
denies his need for connection because he refuses to risk the reenactment of such a painful, humiliating,
and embarrassing rejection, just as the woman denies her need for physical individuation because she
refuses to risk the reenactment of rape. So instead he creates a false self, defined by liberal "rights." In a
word, he collaborates:
Each of us senses that others are determined to keep themselves at what one might call a threatening
distance, desiring eye contact and yet forbidding this contact. . . . And because this forbidding distance
leads us to mistrust or lose confidence in the desire of the other, we seek to protect ourselves by installing
this same forbidding distance in ourselves. We each become "one of the others" to each other, thus helping
to create the very disconnection that we most wish others would allow us to overcome. . . .
12
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Links- Individuality/Privacy
The public/private distinction reinforces patriarchal ideas of submission.
Allen, Professor at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law, 1999
[Anita L. “Coercing Privacy.” William & Mary Law Review, L/N accessed 7-20-2005]
The concept of private choice seems to presuppose that social life is divided
into distinguishable public and private spheres, the private sphere being a
realm of individual decisionmaking about sex, reproduction, marriage, and
family. So conceived, "decisional" privacy has origins in classical antiquity.
The Greeks distinguished the "public" sphere of the polis, or city-state, from
the "private" sphere of the oikos, or household. n7 The Romans [*725]
similarly distinguished res publicae, concerns of the community, from res
privatae, concerns of individuals and families. n8 The public realm was
the
sector in which free males with property whose economic status conveyed
citizenship participated in collective governance. n9 By contrast, the private
realm was the mundane sector of economic and biologic survival. n10 Wives,
children, slaves, and servants populated the private sphere, living as
subordinate ancillaries to male caretakers. n11 The classical premise that
social life ought to be organized into public and private spheres survives in
the post-Enlightenment Western liberal tradition, as does the premise that the
private sphere consists chiefly of the home, the family, and apolitical intimate
association.
13
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Links- Individuality/Privacy
The liberal idea of privacy is flawed: privacy is just another form in which the government controls
its subjects.
Allen, Professor at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law, 1999
[Anita L. “Coercing Privacy.” William & Mary Law Review, L/N accessed 7-20-2005]
Relative to the moral justice liberals demand, privacy and private choice are
indispensable, foundational goods. Neither privacy nor private choice, however,
is an absolute, unqualified good. There can be too much privacy, and it can be
maldistributed. Some liberal feminists take an appropriately skeptical view of
traditional uses of privacy and private choice to subordinate [*726] women.
n12 Likewise, some liberal exponents of law and economics take an appropriately
skeptical view of traditional uses of privacy to conceal adverse information
unreasonably. n13 Characteristically, though, liberals of all stripes proclaim
that a degree of privacy and private choice is beneficial to individuals and a
society marked by aspirations for free, democratic, and reasonably efficient
forms of life. n14
The impossible ideal of a private sphere free of government and other outside
interference has currency despite the reality that, in the United States and
other Western democracies, virtually every aspect of nominally private life is a
focus of direct or indirect government regulation. Marriage is considered a
private relationship, yet governments require licenses and medical tests, n19
impose age limits, n20 and prohibit polygamous, n21 incestuous, n22 and
same-sex marriages. n23 Procreation and childrearing are considered private,
but government child abuse and neglect laws n24 regulate how parents must
exercise their responsibilities. The liberal ideal of a private sphere can be no
more than an ideal of ordinary people, living under conditions of democratic
self- government, empowered to make choices about their own lives that are
relatively free of the most direct forms of governmental interference and
constraint.
14
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Links- Individuality/Privacy
The notion of privacy rights reinforces power structures of male domination over females
MacKinnon, professor of law at the University of Michigan, 2005
[Catharine A. Women’s Lives- Men’s Laws. Harvard University Press. P.7]
Privacy, another abstract doctrine, is regularly code for sexuality, which mobilizes sex and gender as a
power division between women and men, including lesbian women and gay menu Views on the realities of
homosexuality and abortion determine views on privacy, not the other way around, On a substantive
reading, judicial opinions in abortion cases turn on (surprise) views of abortion, which on a sex equality
reading derive in turn from views on the substantive realities of the relative status and treatment of women
and men with a stop en route at “the fetus,”36 producing what is talked about as “privacy.” Views on
sodomy laws similarly reflect experiences and emotions and conclusions predicated on who people know
and love and identify with. “Privacy” becomes the second-order derivative abstract vehicle for that
substance. The point of this discussion is simply to identify which is the tail and which is the dog, and to
observe that legal analysis often has them reversed or feels constrained to pretend that it does.~~
15
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
16
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Links- Reason
The system of reasoning inherent in the constitution is anti-female and exclusionary
Baer, associate professor of political science at Texas A&M, 1992
[Judith A. “How is Law Male? A feminist perspective on constitutional interpretation” From Feminist
Jurisprudence: The difference debate. Ed. Leslie Friedman Goldstein. p.151-2]
p. 151-2. “This set of priorities… male or female?”
This set of priorities—rational over emotional, abstract over concrete, general over particular—has also
been described as a common feature of male thinking.2 Many scholars who would not accept any rejection of reason as
inherently antifemale have nevertheless posited gender differences, whether inherent or acquired, in ways of thinking. Carol Gilligan's
important work In a Different Voice (1982) asserts that women's moral reasoning differs from men's in being more
rooted in the context of concrete experience and relationships. A decade earlier, Philip Slater characterized
"rationalism" as "the inability to perceive wholes," as one of the "disconnector virtues" practiced and prized by men. Slater contrasted
this kind of "icy pathology" with the warmth, nurturance, and awareness of "humanity's embeddedness in a larger organic system"
associated with women (1974, pp. 26, 33, 155; 1970, ch. 3). Legal reasoning is inevitably a variety of moral reasoning. However
conscientiously a judge strives to keep his or her own morality out of a decision, most statutes that judges must interpret reflect some
moral standard. Similarities also exist between legal reasoning and scientific reasoning. Both legal and scientific inquiry represent
efforts to impose order on material. The assumption that "a political world can be constructed and controlled with words" (Harris,
1982, P. 34) is analogous to Francis Bacon's model of scientific research as a quest for mastery over nature (Keller, 1987, pp. 242—
46). Like "mainstream" moral philosophy, "mainstream" philosophy of science has been attacked as male
biased. Some philosophers of science posit the existence of gender differences in scientific reasoning. Evelyn
Fox Keller's study of Nobel prizewinner Barbara McClintock, for instance, contrasts McClintock's emphasis on "letting the material
speak to you" with the attempts of her mostly male peers to "impose an order" on the material in the Baconian model (1987, p. 243;
1983). The idea of a contrast between "abstract, deductive" male reasoning and "concrete, contextualjzed"
female reasoning has become a staple of contemporary feminist epistemology (Bartlett, 1990, p. 832; Binion,
1989; Sherry, 1986). The logical step from this dichotomy to the idea that philosophy, science, and law are
"male" disciplines, antithetical to female ways of thinking and knowing, is a short one. The overwhelming
historical realities_that these disciplines were founded, were monopolized for centuries, and continue to be
dominated by men—lend credence to this conclusion. So does the powerful emotional resonance that works like
Gilligan's and Keller's have had for female scholars. An additional attraction of this kind of theory lies in the fact that control, whether
of the natural or the political world, can become something more threatening. The graphic "gang rape" metaphor trenchantly describes
a feeling that most women will recognize from their own dealings with men, both in public and in private. Consider, for example,
these bits of dialogue: "Name one time when I—_-~," with the response then followed by, "That was a special situation; you cannot
generalize from it"; or, "You're contradicting yourself if you demand both equality of opportunity and maternity leaves"; or, "I
challenge you to find support for Roe v. Wade, in the text of the Constitution, the intent of the framers, or any constitutional doctrine.
Go on, convince me." I am sure that some women, somewhere, have used this ploy. But suppose we encountered statements like these
in a novel, as part of a lengthy passage in which the author expects the reader to know, without being told, which character is
speaking. Would any reader have trouble guessing whether the speaker was male or female?
17
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Links- Deference
Link- deference- the concept of “deference” connotes a femininity- implying that the courts are
inherently female when they defer.
Baer, associate professor of political science at Texas A&M, 1992
[Judith A. “How is Law Male? A feminist perspective on constitutional interpretation” From Feminist
Jurisprudence: The difference debate. Ed. Leslie Friedman Goldstein. p.157]
p. 157. “This emphasis… feminine role”
This emphasis on "deference" and "renunciation of power" evokes
demands that have been and continue to be made of women. The
"feminine" role has historically involved a considerable amount of
putting oneself second to others. Now, obviously, a judge is not going
to act like a woman in a subordinate relationship to a man. But
something is going on in this concept of the judicial role that is
similar to certain influential concepts of women's roles. We can even
think of other public and traditionally male roles in which this kind
of selfsubordination to the interests of others plays a part: lawyers
in relation to their clients, for instance. And if the practice of
judicial self-restraint is sometimes more apparent than real, that gap
between appearance and reality hardly distinguishes the judicial from
the feminine role.
18
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Links- Torture
Anti-torture laws ignore the systemic torture that happens to women
Charlesworth, professor of law at the University of Adelaide, 1995
[Hilary. “Human Rights as Men’s Rights.” From Women’s rights, human rights. Ed: Julia Peters and
Andrea Wolper. p.107]
A similar myopia can be detected in the international prohibition on torture. A central feature of the international legal
definition of torture is that it takes place in the public realm: it must be “inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”13
Although many women are victims of torture in this “public” sense,14 by far the greatest violence against women occurs
in the “private,” non-governmental sphere. This is left untouched by the international definition of torture.
19
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Most men in our patriarchal culture are still acting out old patterns that are radically inappropriate for the
nuclear age. To prove dominance and control, to distance one’s character from that of women, to survive the
toughest violent initiation, to shed the sacred blood of the hero, to collaborate with death in order to hold it
at bay – all of these patriarchal pressures on men have traditionally reached resolution in a ritual fashion on
the battlefield. But there is no longer any battlefield. Does anyone seriously believe that if a nuclear power
were losing a crucial, large-scale conventional war it would refrain from using its multiple-warhead nuclear
missiles because of some diplomatic agreement? The military theater of a nuclear exchange today would
extend, instantly or eventually, to all living things, all the air, all the soil, all the water. If we believe that
war is a “necessary evil,” that patriarchal assumptions are simply “human nature,” then we are locked into a
lie, paralyzed. The ultimate result of unchecked terminal patriarchy will be nuclear holocaust.
20
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Patriarchy and domination over women is necessary for international militaristic projects
Marshall, co-moderator of the Feminist Peace Network, April 2004
[Lucinda.
The theory of “power over” an “other” provides the common thread between military campaigns and
assaults against women. In order for “power over” to work, an other must be defined by creating
distinctions (no matter how false) between people, cultures, and so on. The other can be a person, country, ethnic
group, etc. Militarism depends on creating an other by declaring distinctions between two groups. The other is
asserted to be “less than.” The other must then be controlled or destroyed.
Commonly, whether implicitly or explicitly, women are the “other.” Consequently, it becomes necessary in the
eyes of those who seek power to control and belittle women. In many cultures, women are viewed as the possessions of
their men. Therefore, when a woman is raped, it is effectively an attack on the “manhood of her man.” Using this reasoning, wo- men
become the targets of war in order to attack the honor of the men of a particular culture, ethnic group, or country. For these
reasons, rape and other forms of sexual assault against women are always a part of war and conflict. When
women are assumed to be possessions that can be attacked, stolen, and dishonored, they become a means of
“feminizing” and degrading the enemy.
21
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
The inequalities we address in the law are the root causes of all racism and systems of dominance
MacKinnon, professor of law at the University of Michigan, 2005
[Catharine A. Women’s Lives- Men’s Laws. Harvard University Press. P.3]
Substance, on this theory, centers on society’s divisions of power. If it is perhaps evident that power
divisions drive cases where inequality is involved, where is inequality not involved? This general theory of
inequality is that inequalities are particular. To have a substantive theory of an inequality requires having
an explanatory analysis of its particular content, function, and driving dynamics: what makes it go and why
it exists. If society systematically divides women from men, poor from rich, people of color from white,
gay from straight, young and old from adult, human from nonhuman animals (among others, not
necessarily in that order), to pursue equality on these grounds, one needs to know, in fact, what racism is
really about, where homophobia comes from, why humans treat nonhuman animals as lesser beings,2° why
children are kept so socially powerless and elder adults have less power than middle-aged adults, why the
rich get richer and want to, and all the interconnections between the forces so set in motion. Substance, in
other words, is not an abstraction.
22
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
23
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
24
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
That air of irrationality is partly real and partly feigned. The reason for the air of irrationality around particular,
substantive feminist legal reform efforts, I believe, is that feminist legal reforms are by necessity advocated
in a form that masks rather than reflects women's true subjective nature. This is hardly surprising: language,
of course, constrains our descriptive options. But whether or not surprising, the damage is alarming, and we
need to understand its root. Arguments for reproductive freedom, for example, are irrational because the categories in which
such arguments must be cast are reflective of men's, not women's, nature. This culture thinks about harm, and violence,
and therefore self defense, in a particular way, namely a Hobbesian way, and a Hobbesian conception of physical harm cannot
possibly capture the gender-specific subjective harm that constitutes the experience of unwanted pregnancy. From a subjective,
female point of view, an abortion is an act of self defense, (not the exercise of a "right of privacy") but from the
point of view of masculine subjectivity, an abortion can't possibly be an act of self defense: the fetus is not
one of Hobbes' "relatively equal" natural men against whom we have a right to protect ourselves. The fetus is
unequal and above all else dependent. That dependency and inequality is the essence of fetus-hood, so to speak. Self-defense doctrine
with its Hobbesian background and overlay simply doesn't apply to such dependent and unequal "aggressors," indeed, the notion of
aggression itself does not apply to such creatures.
Rape reform efforts to criminalize simple rape are also irrational, as Susan Estrich has discovered, and for the same reason: [*70]
subjectively, "simple rapes" are harms, but from the point of view of masculine subjectivity, non-violent acts that don't threaten
annihilation or frustration of projects can't possibly be "harmful." In both cases, we have tried to explain feminist reform efforts
through the use of analogies that don't work and arguments that are strained. The result in both cases is internally inconsistent, poorly
reasoned, weak, and ultimately vulnerable legal doctrine.
"Reconstructive feminist jurisprudence," I believe, should try to explain or reconstruct the reforms necessary
to the safety and improvement of women's lives in direct language that is true to our own experience and
our own subjective lives. The dangers of mandatory pregnancy, for example, are invasion of the body by the fetus and the
intrusion into the mother's existence following childbirth. The right to abort is the right to defend against a particular bodily and
existential invasion. The harm the unwanted fetus does is not the harm of annihilation, nor anything like it: it is not an assault, or a
battery, or a breached contract, or an act of negligence. A fetus is not an equal in the state of nature, and the harm a fetus can do is not
in any way analogous to that harm. It is, however, a harm. The fetus is an "other," and it is perfectly sensible to seek a liberal sounding
"right" of protection against the harm the fetus does.
25
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
26
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
That women live with a fundamental contradiction between invasion and intimacy is much harder to test than
the parallel claim that men live in a fundamental contradiction between autonomy and alienation for this simple reason: the
fundamental contradiction that characterizes men's lives is manifested absolutely all over the place in
public life. As Kennedy correctly claims, once we are sensitized to it, we see the "fundamental contradiction" in art, literature,
music, and, perhaps most emphatically, in virtually every field of law. The fundamental contradiction that characterizes
women's lives (if it does), by contrast, has no outlet. Women are silent, particularly with respect to the
injuries we suffer. This is, of course, changing: Women speak, write books, compose music, produce art, drama and dance, and
increasingly even legislate, advocate and adjudicate law. But nevertheless, women express their subjectivity with nowhere
near the voice of authority with which men express theirs. Women's subjectivity, unlike men's subjectivity,
is not expressed in the objective world. Women's silence, more than any other single factor, inhibits the
study of women's subjective lives.
27
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
28
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Criticism Solves
29
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Criticism Solves
We need to actively criticize the systems that subordinate women to achieve any progress
MacKinnon, professor of law at the University of Michigan, 2005
[Catharine A. Women’s Lives- Men’s Laws. Harvard University Press. P.23]
The movement for the liberation of women, including in law, moves the other way around. It is first
practice, then theory. Actually, it moves this way in practice, not just in theory. Feminism was a practice
long before it was a theory. On its real level, the women’s movement- where women move against their
determinants as women- remains more practice than theory. This distinguishes it from academic feminism.
For women in the world, the gap between theory and practice is the gap between practice and theory. We
know things with our lives, and live that knowledge beyond what any theory has yet theorized. Women’s
practice of confrontation with the realities of male dominance outruns any existing theory of the possibility
of consciousness or resistance. To write the theory of this practice is not to work through logical puzzles or
entertaining conundrums not to fantasize utopias, not to moralize or tell people what to do. It is not the
exercise of authority; it does not lead practice. Its task is to engage life through developing mechanisms
that identify and criticize rather than reproduce social practices of subordination and to make tools of
women’s consciousness and resistance that further a practical struggle to end inequality This kind of theory
requires humility and it requires participation
We who work with law need to be about the business of articulating the theory of women’s
practice~women’s resistance, visions, conscious ness, injuries, notions of community, experience of
inequality. By practice, I mean socially lived. As our theoretical question becomes, What is the :~eory of
women’s practice? our theory becomes a way of moving against and through the world, and methodology
becomes technology.
30
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Criticism Solves
We need to move beyond the masculine hegemony and criticize the legal system rather than applaud
a hollow “equality” theory
MacKinnon, professor of law at the University of Michigan, 2005
[Catharine A. Women’s Lives- Men’s Laws. Harvard University Press. P.54-55]
The implications of this critique are far-reaching and transformative. In politics and law, they range from
state theory to doctrine, from jurisprudential theory to positive law, from epistemology to constitutional
interpretation. Once the reality of gender is faced, it becomes clear the extent to which the laws, the legal
system, the state as such, and relations between states have built in the experiences of the dominant and
have been built from the perspective of those who created them. In the sociology of knowledge, this is a
common kind of observation. Those who have created these systems have been the dominant gender group,
the naming of which— men—becomes what is considered an extreme position, particularly when it is
noted that the result has been their systematic hegemony over half the human race. To be clear: this
equality theory is not a conspiracy theory; it relies on no conscious invidious motivation. It assumes, as
other political theories do, only that people act in their own interest, as they see it, when they can. Why
they see their interest as they do, and why they are permitted to act on it unchecked, is a separate question.
The present analysis merely observes a political system of institutionalized interest supported by social
facts of patterned behaviors and its embodiment in legal doctrine and philosophy. Nor is it a moral theory
of who should do what. It is a political analysis of who gets what, how, and why, when that is dramatically
differentially distributed, it is also a critique of terming “equality” the maintenance of that system and
embodying it in legal equality doctrine. It should be noted that the conflict between ranks in a hierarchy
need not be intractable. The sex hierarchy is merely big, old, pervasive, tenacious, denied, and a good many
people are in love with it. Once it is faced as posing a certain division of interest enforced by force, like
other serious inequalities such as race and class (and inextricably interconnected with them), it can be faced
as in need of change through its own solutions.
The Supreme Court of Canada expressly adopted this alternate theory of equality in its first equality
decision under the new Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1985, in Law Society v. Andrews, a case
adjudicating whether noncitizens could be made to wait longer than citizens before becoming lawyers.25
Interpreting the Charter to effectuate its purposes, the Court determined that the purpose of an equality
provision is to “promote equality.” This does not sound like much, but it is everything: given social
inequality, it requires that law has to move the world to be legal. It no longer leaves equality law standing
neutrally in the face of an unequal world, sorting sameness from difference, reinforcing social inequalities
by law. It requires courts to interpret laws so as actually to produce social equality. One might have thought
this was obvious. The point of equality law is to produce equality. What else is it for—to produce
inequality? That this stance is regarded as a major departure supports the indictment of the prior theory as
status quo—reinforcing.
31
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Similarly, the individuation prized by radical feminism is not the same as the autonomy liberalism heralds,
although it may be a precondition of it. The "autonomy" praised by liberalism is one's right to pursue one's
own ends. "Individuation," as understood by radical feminism, is the right to be the sort of creature who
might have and then pursue one's "own" ends. Women's longing for individuation is a longing for a
transcendent state of individuated being against that which is internally contrary, given, fundamental, and
first. Autonomy is something which is natural to men's existential state and which the state might protect.
Individuation, by contrast, is the material pre-condition of autonomy. Individuation is what you need to be before
you can even begin to think about what you need to be free.
The foundation of the affirmative’s conception of legal rights- individuality- is necessarily excluded
from a concept of interconnectivity, as separation is the greatest harm in a feminist jurisprudence
West, professor of law at the University of Maryland, Winter 1998
[Robin. “Jurisprudence and Gender.” University of Chicago Law Review. 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1. Lexis]
[*19] Intimacy, the capacity for nurturance and the ethic of care constitute what we might call the "up side" of the subjective
experience of connection. It's all good. Intimacy feels good, nurturance is good, and caring for others morally is good. But there's a
"down side" to the subjective experience of connection. There's danger, harm, and fear entailed by the state of
connection as well as value. Whereas men fear annihilation from the separate other (and consequently have
trouble achieving intimacy), women fear separation from the connected other (and consequently have
trouble achieving independence). Gilligan makes the point succinctly: "Since masculinity is defined through
separation while femininity is defined through attachment, male gender identity is threatened by intimacy
while female gender identity is threatened by separation." n19 Separation, then, might be regarded as the
official harm of cultural feminism. When a separate self must be asserted, women have trouble asserting it.
Women's separation from the other in adult life, and the tension between that separation and our
fundamental state of connection, is felt most acutely when a woman must make choices, and when she must
speak the truth. It is at those times that separation and individuation are at a premium. Gilligan explains:
32
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
33
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
Turn- Essentialism is treated as a disease inextricable from feminism- it means we throw out the
baby with the bathwater
MacKinnon, professor of law at the University of Michigan, 2005
[Catharine A. Women’s Lives- Men’s Laws. Harvard University Press. P.89]
What I want to say here is this: Sexual abuse is a real problem in the real world, not a move in an
ideological or academic parlor game. Women of color are severely, pervasively sexually abused, including
in racist ways worldwide, They are violated by it, resent it, resist it, want justice for it, and they want it to
stop. Sexually abused women tend to know with real clarity that sexual abuse has everything to do with
being women. It is mainly academics and perpetrators who, along with the law, dens’ it.
Fear of being labeled “essentialist” for identifying the role of gender in sexual abuse has far-reaching
consequences. Those within and outside the academy who know that male power in all its forms remains
entrenched also know they face defamatory attacks and potential threats to their economic survival if they
say so. As ‘essentialism” has become a brand, a stigma, a contagious disease that you have to avoid
feminism to avoid catching, it has become one more way that the connections and coherence of the ways
women are oppressed as members of the group “women” can be covered up. It is silencing when women
cannot tell the truth of what they know and survive; Professor christi cunningham is among the few who
explore the dilemmas of discussing these subjects in public.
Feminism is not essentialist- it does not claim that all women are affected equally by patriarchy,
simply that none are unaffected
MacKinnon, professor of law at the University of Michigan, 2005
[Catharine A. Women’s Lives- Men’s Laws. Harvard University Press. P.87]
Further, feminism does not take the view that gender is all there is. It takes the view that gender is almost
never not there. Feminism claims not that all women are affected the same by male power or are similarly
situated under it. It claims that no woman is unaffected by it. Feminism does not see all women as the
same; it criticizes this view. It claims that all women are seen and treated as women in some way under
male supremacy. This is not to say that feminism is always practiced, even by feminists. It certainly is not
to say that feminism does not need to be more race- conscious; it does. Nor is it to say that some work,
claiming to be feminist, has not been racist; it has. It is to say that some of the feminist analysis that has
been dismissively tagged with what has become the academic epithet of “essentialism,” as exemplary of the
“straight, white, and economically privileged,”1’ is not.
34
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
35
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
36
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
37
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
38
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
39
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
40
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
41
GDI Scholars 2k5 Patel/Symonds
Feminist Jurisprudence K
42