1. Penal or criminal laws are strictly construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.

If the language of the law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice. 2. Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established. 3. Motive becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the accused had committed it. It assumes significance only where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was, or when the identity of the culprit is doubtful. 4. A person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Natural refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while logical means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. 5. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor. 6. There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause being the felonious act of the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The cause and effect relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim; the predisposition of the offended party; the physical condition of the offended party; or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors; or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene. 7. The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when: (a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or (b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim. 8. Where the wound inflicted on the victim is not fatal, i.e., not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death. 9. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed. 10. Facts: One evening, inside her room, Malou retired at around 10:30. Outside, right in front of her bedroom door, her maid slept on a folding bed. Early morning of the

following day, petitioner, clad in t-shirt and shorts, entered the room of Malou through its window. Once inside, he approached Malou and tightly pressed on her face a piece of cloth soaked chemical and at the same time pinned her down on the bed. She was awakened thereby and that she struggled but could not move. She wanted to scream for help but the hands covering her mouth with cloth wet with chemicals were very tight. Still, Malou continued fighting off her attacker by kicking him until at last her right hand got free. With this, the opportunity presented itself when she was able to grab hold of his sex organ which she then squeezed. Petitioner let her go and escaped while Malou went straight to the bedroom door and roused her maid. Is petitioner guilty of attempted rape? Ruling: NO. There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape. Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Harmonizing the above definition to the facts of this case, it would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybodys guess. 11. In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance. 12. Frustrated and attempted felonies may be distinguished as follows: 1. In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution. 2. In frustrated felony, the reason for the nonaccomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the nonfulfillment of the crime is a cause or accident other than the offenders own spontaneous desistance. 13. The intent to kill determines whether the crime committed is physical injuries or homicide and such intent is made manifest by the acts of the accused which are undoubtedly intended to kill the victim. In People vs. Almazan, the Supreme Court rejected the accuseds claim that he should be convicted of slight physical injuries only as

the he was motivated by the same impetus and intent, i.e., to exact vengeance and even kill, if necessary, when he shot the victim therein. The fact that the wound was merely a minor injury which could heal in a week becomes inconsequential. 14. Rape is either attempted or consummated. There can be no frustrated rape. 15. There is no crime of frustrated theft. Theft is already produced upon the taking of personal property of another without the latters consent. There was no need for permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento. 16. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, and may be inferred from the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when the said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interests. It is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. Conspiracy renders all the conspirators as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation because in contemplation of law, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. 17. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship. Mere suspicion, speculation, relationship, association, and companionship do not prove conspiracy. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime, with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy transcends companionship. 18. In determining the existence of conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. The presence of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by their conduct before, during or after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. There must be a showing that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. In such case, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime committed. 19. Conspiracy must be alleged in the information in order that an accused may be held liable for the acts of his coaccused. In the absence of any averment of conspiracy in the information, an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and such criminal responsibility is individual and not collective. 20. Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. While it seems that the two clauses are contradictory, a sensible interpretation will show that they can perfectly be reconciled.

21. The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. Said clause only restates the elemental rule of statutory construction that special legal provisions prevail over general ones. The second clause contains the soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary. 22. The elements of self-defense are: (1) that the victim has committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defense; (2) that there be reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense be not the proximate and immediate cause of the victims aggression. 23. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression, unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendants life in real peril. 24. The condition of unlawful aggression is a sine qua non; otherwise stated, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. In other words in self-defense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element. 25. A threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some external acts showing the commencement of actual and material aggression. 26. The aggression must be real and not just imaginary. A mere perception of an impending attack is not sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression, and neither is an intimidating or threatening attitude. The exchange of insulting words and invectives between the accused and victim, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical assault. 27. When an unlawful aggression has ceased to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor. An act of aggression, when its author does not persist in his purpose, or when he discontinues his attitude to the extent that the object of his attack is no longer in peril, is not unlawful aggression warranting self-defense. When the unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Aggression, if not continuous, does not constitute aggression warranting self-defense. 28. Retaliation is different from self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. In selfdefense, the aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused. After the danger has passed, one is not justified in following up his adversary to take his life. The conflict for blood should be avoided if possible. An assault on his person, he cannot punish when

the danger or peril is over. When the danger is over, the right of self-defense ceases. His right is defense, not retribution. 29. The second element of self-defense demands that the means employed to neutralize the unlawful aggression are reasonable and necessary. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is a rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct more than reason, that moves or impels the defense; and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury. 30. As to the third requisite that the provocation must be sufficient, it should be proportionate to the aggression and adequate to stir the aggressor to its commission. To be entitled to self-defense, however, the one defending himself must not have given cause for the aggression by his unjust conduct or by inciting or provoking the aggressor. Or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defense be not the proximate and immediate cause of the victims aggression. 31. In state of necessity as a justifying circumstance, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. 32. For fulfillment of duty to be appreciated as a justifying circumstance, the following must be established: (1) that the offender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or a duty; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such right or office. 33. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. 34. For a minor between 15 to 18 years of age to be criminally liable, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, by direct or circumstantial evidence, that he acted with discernment, meaning that he knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstantial evidence may include the utterances of the minor; his overt acts before, during and after the commission of the crime relative thereto; the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the crime; his attempt to silence a witness; his disposal of evidence or his hiding the corpus delicti. 35. For accident to be properly appreciated as an exempting circumstance, the following requisites must concur: (1) that the accused was performing a lawful act with due care; (2) that the injury is caused by mere accident; and (3) that there was no fault or intent on his part to cause the injury. Appellant must convincingly prove the presence of these elements in order to benefit from the exempting circumstance of accident. 36. For uncontrollable fear to be considered as an exempting circumstance, it must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have succumbed to it. It should be

based on a real, imminent or reasonable fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough. It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape. 37. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose oftrapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. In instigation on the other hand, instigators practically induce the would-be defendant into the commission of the offense and become co-principals themselves. 38. There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution.The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does. 39. In order that incomplete self-defense may be successfully appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete self-defense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete, because if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no basis. 40. Before threat or provocation can be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the following elements must concur: (1) That the provocation or threat must be sufficient or proportionate to the crime committed and adequate to arouse one to its commission; (2) That the provocation or threat must originate from the offended party; and (3) That the provocation must be immediate to the commission of the crime by the person provoked. 41. Provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two separate mitigating circumstances. If these two circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one mitigating circumstance. From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances. 42. For passion or obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance to be considered, it must be shown that (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed by the intended victim; (2) that the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accuseds mind; and that (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge. 43. To be entitled to this mitigating circumstance, the following elements must be present: (1) There should be an

act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; (2) the act that produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. 44. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: 1) the offender has not been actually arrested, 2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent, and 3) the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the surrender must be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them. 45. To be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of confession of guilt, the accused must have voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. The following requirements must therefore concur: (1) the accused spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before a competent court trying the case; and (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. 46. An offer to enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense cannot be considered as an attenuating circumstance under the provisions of Art. 13 of The Revised Penal Code because to be voluntary, the plea of guilty must be to the offense charged. 47. In malversation of public funds, payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of funds misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender which, at most, can merely affect the accused's civil liability thereunder and be considered a mitigating circumstance being analogous to voluntary surrender. 48. A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the other hand, does not affect the designation of the crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, a qualifying circumstance may not. 49. Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the character of the offense charged. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

50. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. 51. Disregard of age, sex or rank is applicable only to crimes against persors or honor. It is not aggravating in robbery with homicide, which is primarily a crime against property, as the homicide is regarded as merely incidental to the robbery. 52. Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party if the latter has not given provocation or if the victim was killed inside his house. Provocation in the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the commission of the crime. 53. The victim need not own the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bedspacer, the place is his home, the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect. 54. If the building where the offense was committed was not entirely for dwelling purposes, dwelling cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. 55. For abuse of confidence to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended partys belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. 56. By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance, however, it becomes aggravating only when: (1) it is especially sought by the offender; or (2) it is taken advantage of by him; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by ensuring the offenders immunity from capture. 57. If the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, uninhabited place or band concur in the commission of the crime, all will constitute one aggravating circumstance only as a general rule although they can be considered separately if their elements are distinctly perceived and can subsist independently, revealing a greater degree of perversity. 58. When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence support this view but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance. 59. To consider evident premeditation, it is necessary that the following requisites be met: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (c) a lapse of time, between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In the present case, no evidence was presented by the prosecution as to when and how appellant planned and prepared for the killing of the victim. There is no showing of any notorious act evidencing a determination to commit the crime which could prove appellants criminal intent. Hence,

we cannot agree that there was evident premeditation here, on appellants part. 60. Where conspiracy is directly established, with proof of the attendant deliberation and selection of the method, time and means of executing the crime, the existence of evident premeditation can be taken for granted. However, where no such evidence exists, and where conspiracy is merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of the crime, as in the case at bar, the above requisites of evident premeditation need to be established. 61. Evident premeditation is not aggravating when the victim is different from that. However, even if a person other than the intended victim was killed, if it is shown that the conspirators were determined to kill not only the intended victim but also anyone who may help him put a violent resistance, evident premeditation may be appreciated. 62. Craft involves intellectual trickery and cunning on the part of the offender. When there is a direct inducement by insidious words or machinations, fraud is present. 63. To appreciate abuse of superior strength, there must be a deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take advantage of their greater number. They must have notoriously selected and made use of superior strength in the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength is to use excessive force that is out of proportion to the means for self-defense available to the person attacked. 64. Mere superiority in number would not necessarily indicate the attendance of abuse of superior strength. The prosecution should still prove that the assailants purposely used excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked. 65. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For treachery to be considered, two (2) elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and, (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. 66. The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the person of the victim, without the slightest provocation on the part of the latter. Otherwise stated, there is treachery when the following conditions concur: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 67. In treachery, the mode of attack must be consciously adopted. This means that the accused must make some preparation to kill the deceased in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. The mode of attack, therefore, must be planned by the offender, and must not spring from the unexpected turn of events. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. 68. Mere suddenness of the attack would not, by itself, constitute treachery. There is a further need to prove that

appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attack to insure execution without risk to himself. 69. There is no treachery when the killing results from a verbal altercation between the victim and the assailant such that the victim was forewarned of the impending danger. 70. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. 71. Chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment, or those that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the accused deliberately to employ a treacherous mode of attack. 72. For treachery to be appreciated, that circumstances must be present at the inception of the attack, and if absent and the attack is continuous, treachery, even if present at a subsequent stage is not to be considered. 73. Treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime. In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of homicide and not to the constituent crime of robbery of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. 74. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime is absorbed by treachery. Nighttime was evidently an integral part of the peculiarly treacherous means and manner adopted to ensure the execution of the crime, or that it facilitated the treacherous character of the attack. 75. The aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men are absorbed in treachery. 76. The use of a motor vehicle qualifies the killing to murder if the same was perpetrated by means thereof. It was appreciated when a truck itself was used to kill the victim by running over him. 77. For cruelty to exist, there must be proof showing that the accused delighted in making their victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical and moral pain in the consummation of the criminal act. 78. Confederation is not enumerated as an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like conspiracy which must be alleged in and not merely inferred from the information, confederation is but a mode of incurring criminal liability and may not be considered criminal in itself unless specifically provided by law. Neither may

confederation be treated as an aggravating circumstance in the absence of any law defining or classifying it as such. 79. Under PD 1866, as amended RA 8294, where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance. 80. If an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. 81. The general rule is that intoxication may be considered either as aggravating or mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Intoxication is mitigating and therefore has the effect of decreasing the penalty if the intoxication is not habitual or attendant to the plan to commit the contemplated crime. On the other hand, when intoxication is habitual or done intentionally to embolden the malefactor and facilitate the plan to commit the crime, it is considered as an aggravating circumstance. 82. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 83. The following requisites must concur in order that a person may be considered an accomplice: (a) community of design, i.e., knowing that criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperates in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts; and, (c) there must be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice. 84. Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the perpetration of the offense. 85. After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have reached the conclusion that they should be held guilty as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators they should be punished as coprincipals. However, since their participation was not absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the murder, the rule that the court should favor the milder form of liability may be applied to them. 86. Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code defines an accessory as one who had knowledge of the commission of the crime and did not participate in its commission as principal or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or

assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited modes. 87. Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there are two (2) classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public officer must have acted with abuse of his public functions, and the crime committed by the principal is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. 88. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has actually been committed. As applied to a particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. 89. A criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes. By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, once it has been instituted in court. A private complainant loses the right or absolute privilege to decide whether the charge should proceed, because the case was already filed and must therefore continue to be heard by the trial court. 90. The penalty of life imprisonment is not the same as reclusion perpetua. They are distinct in nature, in duration and in accessory penalties. First, life imprisonment is imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Second, life imprisonment does not carry with it any accessory penalty. Reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties. Third, life imprisonment does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years. 91. Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or maximum periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime. (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code) Reclusion perpetua is imprisonment for life but the person sentenced to suffer it shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty (30) years, unless by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he shall be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon (Art. 27, Revised Penal Code). 92. Where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a single complex offense. 93. The slight physical injuries caused by the accused to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they

should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed. 94. There can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible abduction. 95. In People v. Bayotas, the Supreme Court made the following pronouncements on the implications of the death of the accused: 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. 2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) xxx xxx xxx e) Quasi-delicts 3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 96. Under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, x x x. In People v. Reyes, this Court has declared that registration in public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains.

97. That the filing of a complaint with the fiscals office suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. 98. The prescription of penalties shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. xxx One who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. 99. The prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted by final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the term of his service, the period for prescription never began. 100. Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. 101. The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is insolvent. 102. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability.

While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused. 103. Due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a defense on the part of the employer and may not free the latter from subsidiary liability for the employees civil liability in a criminal action. 104. The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. 105. The subsidiary liability of the employer arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action.