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Fall 2006 ARTICLES

Vol. 15, No. 2

The Economic Role of the State in Classical Islamic Literature...


Bassam Abu Al-Foul, Ph.D. and Mohamed Soliman, Ph.D.

The International Political System and the Westphalian Paradigm...


Shereen Saeidi, Ph.D.

Iraqi Perceptions of Outgroups ...


Jon Gresham, Ph.D.

Piracy and Terrorism


Samir N. Hamade, Ph.D.

POETRY Who Am I Without Exile?...


Yair Huri, Ph.D.

The Political Poetry of LeRoi Jones...and Mudhafer Al-Nawwabi...


Saddik M. Gohar, Ph.D.

The Doomed Ugly Duckling...


Yair Mazor, Ph.D.

Persian Love Poetry


Curtis Hinckley

REVIEWS Arab Jewish Relations...


Sanford Silverburg, Ph.D.

Bagdad and Beyond...


Sanford Silverberg, Ph.D.

...and more

DOMES
Digest of Middle East Studies

Fall 2006

Vol.15, No. 2

Tel: 414-229-3315

ISSN 1060-4367

Fax: 414-229-3314

aman@sois.uwm.edu

Copyright 2006 Global Information Company, Inc.

The Digest of Middle East Studies (DOMES) is a biennial, refereed journal published by the Global Information Company, Inc. DOMES provides its own index of topics annually in its fall issue. It is also indexed in Book Review Digest, Index Islamicus, MERIA, and others. DOMES can be searched online at LexisNexis, EBSCOhost, Index Islamicus and ProQuest Ethnic News Watch.

Fall 2006

Fall 2006

Vol. 15, No. 2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ARTICLES
Bassam Abu Al-Foul and Mohamed Soliman .........................1 .The International Political System and the Westphalian Paradigm... Shereen Saeidi .......................................11 Iraqi Perceptions of Outgroups... Jon Gresham ....................................... 26 Piracy and Terrorism in the Arab World Samir N. Hamade ..................................... 4

The Economic Role of the State in Classical Islamic Literature.

POETRY
Who am I Without Exile? ............................ 56
Yair Huri

The Political Poetry of LeRoi Jones...and Mudhafar Al-Nawwab... Saddik M. Gohar .................................... 69 The Doomed Ugly Duckling... Yair Mazor ..........................................89

REVIEWS
POETRY

Persian Love Poetry Curtis and Canby


ECONOMICS

Michael R. Hickley .................... 100

Markets of Dispossession: NGO, Economic Development... Julia Elyachar Heidi Morrison ...........................140
EGYPT-POLITICS

Islam Without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists Raymond Baker Roger Owen .............................. 128
GULF STATES

US Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf... Robert J. Pauley Mohammed M. Aman ............... 199
GULF STATES-SOCIOLOGY

Population and Development of the Arab Gulf States... Nadeya S.A. Mohammed Mohammed M. Aman ................ 170
IRAN-HISTORY AND POLITICS

The Persian Puzzle... Kenneth Pollack


ISRAEL-HISTORY

Mohammed M. Aman .................168 140 John M. Riley ..............................


(continued)

Yaweh versus Yaweh... Jay Y. Gonen

DOMES

Digest of Middle East Studies IARAELI SOCIETY

The Israelis: Ordinary People in an Extrordinary Land Donna Rosenthal Daphne Tsimhoni ...................... 130
JERUSALEM

Jordanian Jerusalem: Holy Places and National Spaces Kimberly Katz Sanford R. Silverburg ............. 134 The Open Veins of Jerusalem Akash and Moughrabi, eds. Sanford R. Silverburg .................. 164
JIHADISTS

Knowing the Enemy... Mary Habeck


JORDAN IN POLITICS LITERATURE

Mohammed M. Aman ...................137

Nationalist Voices in Jordan: the Street and the State Betty S. Anderson Michael J. Reimer .................... 160 Princesses' Street: Bagdad Memories Jabra I. Jabra Allen Hibbard .............................. 174
MUSLIM WOMEN

Midnight Tales: a Woman's Journey through the Middle East Rosina-Fawzia Al-Rawi Heidi Morrison ....................... 145 Resistance, Repression, and Gender... Frances S. Hasso Nancy E. Gallagher................... 179 Standing Alone in Mecca... A. Nomani Donald R. Ingram ..................... 189 Women and Media in the Middle East... Naomi Sakr, ed. Rachel Simon ............................ 203
PALESTINE

Media and the Politics and Democracy in Palestine... Amal Jamal Alexander Jacobs ...................... 142 Moral and Legal Perspectives on Palestine: a Review Essay Glenn E. Perry .......................... 148 Palestine: a Guide Mariam Shahin Sanford R. Silverburg ................ 167 Suicide in Palestine: Narratives of Despair Nadia T. Dabbagh John Bunzl ............................... 193
SYRIA-HISTORY

Sacred Law in the Holy City... Judith M. Rood Michael J. Reimer ..................... 182
SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis John Bradley Mohammed M. Aman .................186

SYRIA-FOREIGN POLICY

Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism... Rami Ginat Nancy R. Curry ......................... 195
INDEX
TO

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Vol. 15, No.2

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EDITOR'S NOTES
In addition to research articles and book reviews, this issue of DOMES also celebrates poetry from Arab, American, Jewish and Persian poets. In his article, Dr. Saddik Gohar, from the UAE University, compares the political poetry of two politically active poetsthe Arab, Mudhafar Al-Nawwab and the African American, Le Roi-Jones (who adopted the Muslim name, Amiri Baraka). Gohar examines selected texts from the political poetry of both poets in order to underline the radical aesthetics operative in their poetry, which emphasizes their condemnation of the hegemonic forces which contributed to racist and repressive policies towards Arabs in their own land, and African Americans in America. Dr. Yair Huri, from Ben Gurion University discusses the Arab poet, Mahmud Darwish, who has been labeled the national poet of Palestine and one of the paradigmatic poets of exile in modern Arabic poetry. Huri examines Darwishs poems of exile in order to show the relationship between Darwishs strategies of self-definition and his treatment of the literary motifs of displacement and exileanother form of oppression. Like Palestinians who have suffered exile and displacement and found voice in poetry, Jews in Europe who suffered injustices and oppression found voice in poetry as well. The Jewish poet, Meir Vizeltir, wrote one of the most powerful poems on the Shoa (Holocaust). His poem The Ugly Duckling addresses the Holocaust from a perspective of a small, nave child, who views Holocaust photographs and fails to comprehend them. According to Professor Mazor, Chairman of the Hebrew Studies Department at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and author of the article: while the presence of a child [in Vizeltir s poem] produces pleasant, joyous connotations, the presence of the Holocausts atrocities produces the opposite reaction while making one shiver out of fears and fury. The section on Poetry concludes with a review of the book on Persian love poetry, written by Curtis and Canby. It is a collection of poetry which expresses love in all its incarnations. In response to the question could Sunni, Shia and Kurdish factions be brought together, Dr. Gresham, from the University of Utrecht, the Netherlands and his team collected and analyzed 479 surveys of Iraqi opinions in Iraq, Jordan, and The Netherlands, asking perceptions of those other groups, their outer groups. They
Editor's Notes

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found that the background items of religion, ethnic origins, and location, taken by themselves, did not relate strongly to respondents attitudes towards out-groups. The research could contribute to a base from which researchers and fieldworkers can develop theories to explore and explain elements of civil society in Iraq and other societies. Indiana University Professor Glenn Perrys review essay on the moral and legal perspectives of Palestine gives a historical context of current developments affecting Jews and Palestinians and the moral and legal perspectives of the current conflict between these two groups of biblical ancestry. The excellent article by Drs. al-Foul and Soliman from the Department of Economics at the University of Sharjah in the UAE, explores the economic writings of the 13th century Arab scholar, Ibn Taimiyah, and his views on the economic role of the state. The two professors managed to offer explanations to the great gap puzzle posed by Schumpeter and introduce the reader to a model of the medieval Arab and Islamic economy thought. Dr. Samir Hamade, Professor of Library and Information Science at Kuwait University attempts to answer the timely question does piracy support terrorism? In his article he describes the various aspects of piracy and the war against terrorism. He questions the relationship between them and suggests some solutions. Special thanks to our reviewers who bring to DOMES readers on regular basis a wealth of information that summarizes and analyzes recent books on a myriad of Middle East topics from history, politics, literature, Muslim women, terrorism and law and economics.

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Digest of Middle East Studies

Economics

The Economic Role of the State in the Classical Islamic Literature: The Views of Ibn Taimiyah
Bassam Abu Al-Foul, Ph.D. babufoul@aus.edu Mohamed Soliman, Ph.D. msoliman@aus.edu American University of Sharjah United Arab Emirates
Abstract This paper explores the economic writings of Ibn Taimiyah, particularly his views on the economic role of the state. In so doing, it offers some explanations to the great gap puzzle posed by Schumpeter, and introduces the reader to a model of the medieval Arab and Islamic economic thoughts. Introduction The great gap hypothesis of Schumpeter (1954) occupied much of the history of economic thought. There have been several references to the discontinuity of Greek philosophy and sciences and their reemergence in the medieval. As the Renaissance represents the rebirth of the Greek body of knowledge, there have been very few attempts to examine the vehicle that preserved Greek heritage and made it readily available for the cultural and scientific resurrection of the enlightenment era. This is also true in the history of economic analysis. The expansion of industrial production and international trade, found in the writings of Smith, Ricardo and Mill, provides the foundation in modern economic analysis, and perhaps the starting point for studies of the history of economic analysis. However, not many studies go back to the economic ideas of the Greek. These contributions often make reference to such a gap and attribute it to what is known as the dark ages. Very little investigation, however, is devoted to the question of how humanity could preserve the Greek contribution. This paper attempts to shed some light on the economic thoughts of one of the classical Islamic scholars as one example of the Arab-

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Muslim scholarly contributions that fill the great gap. Ibn Taimiyah was a prominent Hanbali Muslim jurist of the thirteenth century. He was deeply engaged in the philosophical, theological, ethical, legal, political and social questions of the Muslim community in his days. In this paper, we focus on the economic discussion of Ibn Taimiyahs thought as well as his concept of the state and its role in the economic life. The paper proceeds as follows: Section I offers a brief biography. Section II explains Ibn Taimiyahs view on the necessity of the state and the objectives of an Islamic state. Section III explains Ibn Taimiyahs view on the state and its economic functions. Section IV explores the institution of Hisbah, and its role as a regulatory mechanism. Section V concludes with some remarks. Brief Biography Ibn Taimiyah was born in 661 AH (1263 AD) in Harran, a town in northern Syria. His name was Taki Al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taimiyah. He grew up in a family famous for its educational achievements. His uncle Fakhr al-Din and grandfather Majd al-Din were among those famous scholars of Hanbalite jurisprudence at that time. At the age of seven (1269 AD), Ibn Taimiyah and his family fled to Damascus to escape the vicious Mongols. His father, Abd al-Halim, was the head of the Sukkariyah Madrasah (a school in Damascus, well known for its teaching of Hadith and the Hanbalite tradition). Ibn Taimiyah got his education in Damascus from well-known teachers, including Shams al-Din al-Maqdisi, Ibn Abi al-Yuser, and Yahya bin al-Sairafi. He studied the commentaries of the Ouran, the traditions of the Prophet, and topics such as Greek philosophy and Islamic History (Islahi, 1988, 57-58). Most of Ibn Taimiyahs education was of a Hanbali theologian and jurisconsult. He not only used the Hanbali School of Jurisprudence, but he also referred to the other schools of jurisprudence. He was a devout follower of the Ouran and the traditions of the Prophet. He was firm in his belief; his teachings which were consistent with the Ouran and the traditions of the Prophet. He was outspoken and critical of those who deviated from the teachings of the Prophet and the Shariah (the sacred law of Islam). His passion for justice and his Ijtihad (original thinking) attracted some enemies. He was imprisoned many times where he wrote many of his books (al-Mubarak, 1967, 14-18). Ibn Taimiyah died in prison in Damascus in 728 AH (1328 AD)

Digest of Middle East Studies

Economics

Why is the State Necessary? Ibn Taimiyah argued that the institution of government is necessary in order to command the good and forbid the evil, and by doing that we fulfill what God has asked us to do. He emphasized in his writings, especially in his books al-Hisbah and al-Siyasah alShar'iyah, the necessity of having a ruler, considering it a religious duty. Describing the need for a state in his book al-Siyasah alShariyah, he says: Let it be known that [the designation of] public authority is one of the most serious requirements of religion. Indeed, religion may not stand without it being there to uphold it, for men cannot realize their good without consolidation (ijtima), and consolidation is not possible without authority (ras) (Makari, 1983, 135). He further stated: It must be known that ruling the people is a religious duty, even religion cannot stand without it and all sons of Adam cannot have their well-being without being together. If three people were on travel, they should have one of them as their leader Because God demand[s] doing the good and forbid[s] the evil and that cannot be done without power and government. Sixty years of an unjust ruler are better than one night without a sultan (alMubarak, 1967, 27). If a leader is considered necessary on a journey of a few persons, it is an instruction to have it in all kinds of greater associations. (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 5). He argued that the duty of commanding good and forbidding evil cannot be completely discharged without power and authority. The same applies to all religious duties, like justice, holy war, etc. So the institution of government and a state is necessary from the religious point of view, since all these tasks cannot be carried out without government and power. Ibn Taimiyahs view of the authority is that it is a trust from Allah, and it is to be exercised in accordance with the terms laid down in the Shariah. He also saw government as a religious duty. He quotes a Hadith that The most beloved creatures to Allah is an Imam adil (just ruler), and the most hateful creatures to Allah is an unjust one (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 5). Also, he considered the appointment of Imam to be chosen by the people and not by birth right (al-Mubarak, 1967, 35-38).
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Several Muslim scholars have emphasized the need for the state and its religious character. Among those scholars are AlMawardi (991-1058), Abu Yala al-Farra (990-1065), al- Ghazali (1031-1111), and Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406). Al-Mawardi, Abu Yala, and Ibn Khaldun distinguish between two types of government; one based on reason and the higher form of government based on revealed law. The first law guards against mutual injustice, conflict, and anarchy, while the second provides for the positive enforcement of law and justice in mutual confidence and fellowship (Islahi, 1988, 173-174). Legitimate Goals of the Islamic State Ibn Taimiyah emphasized the religious character and goals of the government: The greatest goal of the state is to enjoin the good and forbid the evil; for example, performance of prayer, payment of Zakah (a tax imposed upon Moslems assets), fasting, truth, honesty, obedience to parents, etc. (Islahi, 1988, 176). He further stressed that the welfare of the people and the country can be achieved only through commanding the good and forbidding the evil. The well-being of the people, their economic well-being, lies in obedience to Allah and His Apostle, which is possible only by enjoining good and forbidding evil. (Islahi, 1988, 176-177). In his writings, Ibn Taimiyah argued that the Islamic state was responsible for providing basic needs, such as food, shelter, health and education to its citizens. Also, Ibn Taimiyah was in favor of state intervention to eliminate usurious business activities, the poverty, and the deterioration in the economy (Islahi, 1988, 177 178). The State and its Legal Function Ibn Taimiyah considered justice as a crucial function of the state, stating: more often, injustice is done by boththe ruler and the subjectsthe former demands what is not legitimate, while the latter denies even what is due (Islahi, 1988, 178-179). He stressed two points regarding justice: the first was that injustice resulted from rulers, such as asking the people to do what is against the Ouran and the traditions of the Prophet; the second point was the injustice which resulted from the people, such as not performing their legal duties. In other words, the state may control the factors of production, such as prices of goods and wages to protect the public interest and prevent exploitation.

Digest of Middle East Studies

Economics

The State and its Economic Functions In Ibn Taimiyahs view, individual freedom in economic behavior was very important. Individual freedom in ownership was acceptable, as long as it was consistent with the Shariah. We believe that Allah has permitted earnings, trades, and industries and He has prohibited fraud and injury. (Islahi, 1988, 179). In terms of the authority of the state, Ibn Taimiyah states that It is obligatory for people to help each other in matters of food, clothing, shelter, etc... The Imam should insist upon it and force them to do so. (Islahi, 1988, 180). Ibn Taimiyah argued that the state can intervene in individual freedoms to achieve the larger interests of the people. The principle is to secure greater social benefits and to abolish injury or minimize it. When a situation arises where realization of one kind of benefit means the loss of another, then the greater benefit must be acquired in preference to the lesser. Conversely, the greater loss or injury must be avoided by tolerating a lesser one (Islahi, 1988, 180-81). The following is a summary of Ibn Taimiyahs view of some of the economic functions of the state and how the state intervenes in individual rights in order to secure maximum social benefits. 1. Administration of public funds Concerning the administration of public funds, Ibn Taimiyahs view was that the State is responsible for the mutual fulfillment of the financial obligation of the officials and the subjects (the people)...the agent shall collect the funds due the State, allocate them where they properly belong, and shall not keep them from those who deserve them (Makari, 1983, 139). Also, Ibn Taimiyah addresses the question of the States revenue and the penalty for those who do not fulfill their obligations and those who offer bribes. Regarding the legitimate expenses of the State, Ibn Taimiyahs view was that the State was responsible for the following: a) public works, such as building and maintaining roads, bridges, dams, waterways, fortification of ports, etc.; b) public compensation, such as the salaries of public employees like governors, judges, legislators, revenue collectors, trustees and administrators, leaders of public prayers, etc. (Makari, 1983, 140). 2. Economic planning Ibn Taimiyahs work shows no explicit reflection on the issue of economic planning as a function of the State. However, there were certain ideas which imply economic planning by the State. One of those ideas was the treatment of industries, such as weaving and agriculture, as socially obligatory. He argued that if there was not

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enough of a supply of goods to meet the peoples demand, the state has a duty to arrange for enough supplies, by keeping an eye on the economy and by a willingness to urge or arrange for increased production in the desired areas. Also, the state must emphasize education, as well as training its youth in order to prepare them to fulfill societys needs. His view was that although it is right to employ or appoint an incompetent person for a public office if he is the best of all available persons, it is necessary to make an effort for the training and preparation of men so that they acquire the essential qualifications needed for the performance of state and other affairs... The principle is that provision of all those means is obligatory on which fulfillment of any obligation depends (Islahi, 1988, 185-86). 3. The elimination of poverty Ibn Taimiyah considered the state responsible for the elimination of poverty. Also, the state is responsible for providing its people with a good living. The Islamic principles to remove poverty as seen by Ibn Taimiyah were: a. The prohibition of interest b. The institution of Zakahc. The institution of financial penalty on certain offenses d. Voluntary giving e. Grants by the government f. The obligation to spend on kinsmen and relatives g. The rights of ones neighbor h. The encouragement to work and do business; the condemnation of idleness Ibn Taimiyah emphasized the redistribution of income on the basis of justice and equity. He regarded it a duty of the state. He insists: It is the duty of the ruler to collect money from where it is due and put it where it is just and proper to do so and never to deprive the deserving (Islahi, 1988, 181-182). 4. The regulation of the market and its imperfections Ibn Taimiyah stressed that price controls were one of the states responsibilities for the market. Yet, he was against price control under normal conditions, since everyone should be free to sell his product at the rate he likes. It was said that the prices increased in the time of the Prophet and the Prophet was requested to fix prices. The Prophet refused to do so, and proclaimed, Allah is the Taker, the Disposer, the Sustainer and the Price Maker. I wish to

Digest of Middle East Studies

Economics

meet Allah with no claims against me for injustice or injury I have done to him in blood or property (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 16). However, he argues that there are some cases where price control is necessary: a. The peoples need for the commodity. In this case Ibn Taimiyah saw that the ruler could force the people to sell what they had without increasing the prices (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 15-16). b. The case of monopoly: Ibn Taimiyah defined the monopolist as the one who intended to buy [what the people need], then hide it wanting an increase in the price, and this is unjust to the buyers (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 15). He emphasized that price control was necessary when a monopoly existed, since that would deprive people of the food they need. c. The case of collusion among buyers: Ibn Taimiyah argued that price control was needed when buyers collude against the sellers in order to make an exorbitant profit. The same thing applies to the sellers collaborating against the buyers (Ibn Taymiyah, 1 Q67b, 18-19). In addition, Ibn Taimiyah discussed another situation which affected both the buyers and the sellers in the market. He argued that mediation between sellers and buyers would lead to a deteriorating price mechanism. He argued that the Prophet prohibited goods being intercepted before they got to the market because of the risk the seller might incur, not knowing the market price of his goods, and the buyers could purchase them for less than their value. Emphasizing the point of prohibiting mediation, Ibn Taimiyah added that the Prophet prohibited the townsman from selling for the nomads since this action will lead to an exploitation of the nomad by the townsman (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 14-15). Thus, mediation would be harmful to both sellers and buyers. Price fixing by the state would eliminate the profit expected by the middleman. Consequently, he looks for employment that is consistent with the Shariah and the traditions of the Prophet. 5. Employment Ibn Taimiyah considered labor as a service that people must do. He argued that when people need the service of others, such as cultivation or weaving or construction, then it is the duty of the worker to do the job. If the worker does not comply, then he should be forced by the ruler to work for fair wages. Moreover, the workers cannot ask the people for a surcharge, and the people cannot harm the workers by giving them less than what they deserve (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 21-22).

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6. Monetary policy An appropriate monetary policy is necessary to maintain stability and justice in the market, so the state is responsible for controlling currency expansion and the value of money. Ibn Taimiyah considered money to be a measure of value and a medium of exchange, so any deterioration in these functions would affect the economy. On the other hand, Ibn Taimiyah did not support the practice of trading in money: If money must be changed for money, the exchange must be completed simultaneously and without any delay.... For example, if two persons exchange money for money, with one of them paying cash while the other promises to pay later, then the first person will not be able to use the promised money for transaction till he is actually paid (Islahi, 1988, 140). The Institution of the Hisbah There are many economic activities supervised and controlled by the state. The institution that carries out those activities was called hisbah; the person who was in charge of the hisbah was called the muhtasib. The institution of hisbah was responsible also for the moral and spiritual well-being and the supervision of social and civil projects. Concerning the role of this institution, Ibn Taimiyah wrote a book on this topic, entitled al-Hisbah fi al-Islam. Ibn Taimiyah defined the function of the Islamic institutions, including the hisbah: to enjoin the good and forbid the evil (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 6). He stated that the Prophet used to inspect the market to check for the business frauds. For example, Abu Hurairah, a Companion of the Prophet, reported that the Prophet passed by a mound of food. He inserted his hand and his fingers reached wet, then He said: What is this, food owner? The food owner said: the food had been influenced by the weather, Prophet. Then the Prophet said: Why not you put it on the top of the heap so that people can see it? He who defraud[s] us is not among us. (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 11-12). In his treatise, al-Hisbah, Ibn Taimiyah briefly described the muhtasibs religious, social and economic functions: The muhtasib shall order for the Friday prayers, other congregational prayers, truthfulness, discharge trust, and, he shall forbid bad things like telling lies, dishonesty, insufficient weight and measures, fraud in industries, trade, and religious matters, etc. (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 11). The duties of the person who acted as the muhtasib were not just ordering the people to perform the five prayers, and punishing those who dont. He also had other duties:

Digest of Middle East Studies

Economics

a. Industry supervision The muhtasibs role in this case was to standardize products, impose bans on harmful industries, and prevent fraud and concealment of defected goods which may occur in food industries, such as bread, lentils, cooked food, etc, or in the clothing industry such as weavers or other crafts (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 12). b. Supply and provision of necessities Checking the availability of the necessary goods and services that the people need was the job of the muhtasib. c. Trade supervision In general, supervising the market was the muhtasibs responsibility. He had to check weights and measures and the quality of the product in order to prevent cheating or exploiting the consumer. He was also responsible for making sure that any merchant operation was not based on usurious transactions (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 11-12). d. Hoarding Ibn Taimiyah defined a hoarder as the one whoon purpose buys up food that people need and stores it with the intention of increasing the prices (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 15). Hoarding necessities was banned, and the muhtasib was responsible for preventing it. He had the power to fix the price of the hoarders goods, so as to eliminate the chance for charging exorbitant prices (Ibn Taymiyah, 1967b, 15). Conclusion The purpose of this paper was to shed some light on Ibn Taimiyahs concept of the state and its role in the economic life of the people. Ibn Taimiyahs thought and his writings could be described as his philosophy on Islamic political economy, while Ibn Khalduns writings (1332-1406) could be described as economic sociology. Ibn Taimiyah supported the idea that the state should play an important role in the economic life of the people. His view of the state was different from Ibn Khalduns view where he supported the idea that the state should not intervene in the economic life of the people. This points to the gap in the history of economic thought which should be filled. Such outstanding works should not be forgotten, and it should be mentioned in the studies of economic thought.

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References
Al-Mubarak, Mohammad. al-Dawlah wa-nizam al-hisbah inda Ibn Taymivah . Cairo: Dar al-Fikr, 1967. The Encyclopedia of Islam (New edition), Vol. III, London: Luzac and Co, 1971. Ibn Taymiyah, Ahmad. al-Hisbah fi al-Islam. Beirut: Dar al-Kutub alArabiyah, 1967b. Al Syasah Al Shar'iyyah in Al Fatawa, Saudi Edition, 1975. Islahi, Abdul Azim. Economic Concepts of Ibn Taimiyah. London: The Islamic Foundation, 1988. Makari, Victor E. Ibn Taimiyyahs Ethics: The Social Factor. Chico, California: American Academy of Religion, Scholars Press, 1983. Schumpeter, Joseph. History of Economic Analysis , New York: Oxford University Press, 1954.

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Digest of Middle East Studies

International RelationsMesopotamia

I nternational Political System and the Westphalian Paradigm: a Call for Revision
Shereen Saeidi University of Tehran Shirinsaeidi@aol.com
ABSTRACT This analysis examines the political documentation of the Amarna letters, which date back to the mid-fourteenth century B.C.E. This analysis will illustrate that a viable functioning international relations systems existed long before the Westphalia treaties (1648), which typically stand as the marker for the beginning of international relations. In order to examine this hypothesis, literature written about the Amarna period was examined for evidence of six defining indicators of international relations. This literature was applied in conjunction with the actual letters, providing the general tool of analysis. The analysis revealed that a fully-functioning international relations system existed during the Amarna period, consisting of actors, polarity, international law, diplomacy, foreign policy, territorial expansion, trade, and alliance building. These finding do not mark insignificant the Westphalian treaties, their claims, or their symbolic importance. The main implication here is that the international relations field, as well as others, needs to acknowledge that much of what is considered modern in international relations actually developed in ancient Mesopotamia. Continuing refusal to account for the disparity between historical assumptions and reality will limit the scope of knowledge regarding international dilemmas considerably. INTRODUCTION Most political science scholars regard the Peace of Westphalia treaties (1648) as the beginning of international relations. However, an examination of the origins of social complexity reveals that a complex and viable system existed long before 1648. In 1887, a set of 350 letters from the mid-fourteenth century B.C.E. between Egypt of the Eighteenth Dynasty and other states of the ancient Near East was found in Tell el-Amarna in Egypt (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 1). In 1907, the letters were edited and placed in chronological and geographical order by J.A. Knudtzon, who used the siglum EA as a
Internatinal Political System...Shereen Saeidi

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numbering system (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 1). These political documents, although incomplete and isolated, provide scholars with an understanding of the first international relations system. I should note that elements of the system existed even before this particular period, but because these letters represent the culmination of a tradition, developed over centuries, they are excellent sources that illustrate the flawed representation of politics by contemporary analysts (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 3). The refusal to recognize that, according even to modern definitions of what constitutes an international relations system, a functioning, complex system was in place long before 1648 lessens the potential for growth within the international relations field, thus decreasing potential benefits to the global community (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996; 5). In Amarna Diplomacy: a Full-Fledged Diplomatic System? Geoffrey Berridge argues that because the states at this time lacked embassies, did not ensure the safety of envoys, and did not have elite qualifications for government officials, they were not that advanced and should not be emphasized too heavily (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 219). Other analysts, such as Raymond Cohen, argue that the Amarna period allows us to observe in detail a constitutive phase in the development of a central feature [diplomacy] of Western civilization (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 212). My research aimed to examine the Amarna letters, find the common indicators of an international relations system, and examine the applicability of the data in the letters to modern international relations. It was hypothesized that the analysis would disprove the common assumption of political science scholars that Westphalia marked the beginning of international relations by deciphering the political correspondences between Egypt and states in the Near East. I first selected indicators of international relations from contemporary international relations (IR) texts (taking on the burden of proof that lies with my position), and then looked for these markers in the correspondences revealed in the Amarna letters. The analysis illustrated that not only did the indicators of international relations exist, but the skeleton of the modern-day IR system was well in place. METHOD OF ANALYSIS The general tool of analysis will be the application of literature written about the Amarna letters. In order to illustrate the hypothesis that a full-fledged international relations system existed by the Late Bronze Age, I first searched through two well-respected international relations texts, Bruce Bueno de Mesquitas Principles of International

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Politics (2003) and Peter Malanczuks Modern Introduction to International Law (1970), which, together, define both international relations and the modern indicators of the system. These texts emphasize the importance of diplomacy and sovereignty to international relations. My research revealed that these two concepts were also significant during the Amarna period. Before defining the key indicators, the concept of international relations needs to be defined. Bueno de Mesquita defines international relations as the process by which foreign policy leaders balance their ambition to pursue particular policy objectives against their need to avoid internal and external threats to their political survival (Bueno de Mosquita, 2003;7). This is the definition that my analysis followed because it captures the essence of IR and is similar to other definitions. I was particularly careful to stay with this central definition in my analysis of the results, and the random requirements of individual scholars or commentators were not considered. It should also be established that states did exist during the Amarna period before delving into the Amarna letters. Bueno de Mesquita defines a state as a territorial entity within which a single government has the legitimate right to use force against those inhabiting the territory (2003; 188). During the Late Bronze Age, Arzawa, Alashiya, Mittani, Babylonia, Hatti, Assyria, and Egypt are all states according to the above definition (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 8). This is an important point to clarify early on because if states did not exist, then a fully-equipped international relations system could not exist either. Simply the exercise of persuasion can be understood through the offering of rewards or the fear of punishment (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; 127). Foreign policy is a means by which states try to regulate their relations with each other (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; 127). The other indictors are easily identifiable and fall within the identification of the main indicators. The Amarna period is defined as the Late Bronze Age, ca. 15001100 B.C.E., and Amenhotep III (Akhenaten) is the king who reigned during the time span of most of the letters (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; XV). Figures one and two present a visual diagram of the region being examined. Figure one is a map of the region during this time period and depicts the states which participated in the Amarna correspondences. Figure two is a snapshot of the region under Egyptian occupation at the time. Canaanite vassals were Egypts connection to ancient Eastern states, and they retained much power due to their physical location. The stated hypothesis will be examined
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by searching for the indicators of international relations in texts addressing the Amarna period. Raymond Cohen and Raymond Westbrooks Amarna Diplomacy (2000), William Morans The Amarna Letters (1992), Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbachs Polities Authority, Identities, and Change (1996), and Donald Redfords Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times (1992) were used to study the information revealed in the Amarna letters. The letters themselves were used as a primary source for results and findings. The treaties that resulted from the Peace of Westphalia were examined also in order to gain an understanding of why they are so strongly emphasized; the results of this study will be addressed in the discussion section. In summary, the key theory behind this analysis is that the application of modern indicators to political documentation from ancient times will reveal an understanding about the initial formation of the international relations system. RESULTS AND FINDINGS Actors, polarity, interdependence One of the basic components of an international relations system is the involvement of actors. The king of Egypt throughout most of the correspondences is Akhenaten; Abdi-Ashirta is the leader of Amurru, a vassal under Egyptian control; Rib-Hadda is the mayor (vassal leader) of Babylonia, another vassal state; the Assyrian king was Assur-uballit; and there were also non-state actors like the Apiru, an outlaw group generally hostile to Egyptian interests who operated in the mountain region in Northern Cannan (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 115). The system of interactions was multi-polar; although Egypt was a dominant power in the region occupying much of modern day Syria-Palestine; it was not an absolute power. The Amarna letters illustrate that Egypt had to modify its behavior and language at times in order to maintain relations with its vassals and other states. That the Pharaoh accepted a designation from other kings (Sarru) that was commonly used to indicate less powerful kings illustrates his desire to seem at one with the masses; an absolute power, who does not fear the power of other states, does not behave in this way (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 167). The high level of anxiety that comes across in the letters also illustrates that kings constantly worried about the possibility of invasion or a fall from power, signifying an IR system according to Bueno de Mesquitas definition of the term. When the king of Hittite symbolically misrepresented his status in a letter, he was directly confronted by the king of Egypt, as shown in EA 42: And now, as to the tablet that [you sent me], why [did you put]

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your name over my name?...My brother, did you write [to me] with peace in mind? (Moran, 1992, 115). In the same vein, the mayor of Babylonia is constantly fearful that the king of Egypt will break his alliance with him: my brother and I made a mutual declaration of friendship, and this is what we said just as our fathers were friendsso will we be friends (Moran, 1992; 16). This level of anxiety would not be present if states were not interdependent; furthermore, an international relations system could not exist if there without a constant fear of anarchy. INTERNATIONAL LAW The concept of international law did exist during the Amarna period in its most pure form, and exchange of dialogue through envoys (or ambassadors, foreign representatives) and treaties between states are two of the main components of international law. It is important to bear in mind that much of what is today defined as international law stems from traditions of war established in ancient times and only the emphasis on lessening the use of force is considered by some to be a modern addition. Cohen and Westbrook, in Amarna Diplomacy, argue that international law was a system of rules regulating relations between kingsThe system was under the jurisdiction of the godsenforcement was by the gods or by legitimate self-help, sanctioned by the gods (200; 30). The constraints on a king were imposed by the gods; therefore, the source of international law for both ancient and modern times carries a significant religious component (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1996; 98). The modern concept of international law was cultivated during ancient times, including the Amarna period, which rules invalid the notion that only with modernity does the IR system crystallize. Killing or mistreating an envoy was considered a breach of international law, and was often the topic of letters. EA 30 is a letter of credentials of a Mittanian envoy: I herewith send Akiya, my messenger, to speed posthaste to the king of Egypt, my brother. No one is to hold him up. Provide him with safe entry into Egypt and hand (him) over to the fortress commander of Egypt. Let him go on immediately, and as far as his pre (sents) are concerned, he is to owe nothing (Moran, 1992; 100). This treaty was meant to seal the safety of the Mittanian envoy and if harmed, international law would be broken and the Egyptian king would have to repent. In EA 16, the Assyrian king was placed into a difficult position because his envoy notified him of being forced out in the sun for hours while Akhenaten participated in religious devotion. Since the entire
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Egyptian court was also forced outside, the Assyrian king politely addressed the issue in a manner as to not directly confront the king: if staying out in the sun means profit for the king, then let them stay out and let them die right there in the sun (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 34). The statement is viewed by analysts as a having a sarcastic tone aimed at conveying the Assyrian kings anger about the situation. Akhenaten did not mean any malice in his actions toward the Assyrian envoy, yet the Assyrian king still took offense to the situation and addressed it in a letter to the Pharaoh. The existence of evidence of international law can be found by examining the record of two famous ambassadors, Mane from Egypt and Keliya from Mittani. In EA 19, it is documented that Mane requested marriage on behalf of the Pharaoh from Keliya, the Mittani representative: send your daughter here to be my wife and the mistress of Egypt (Moran, 1992; 43). It is also believed that Keliya served as a translator for the king of Mittani. This signifies an advanced, if not sophisticated, diplomatic system. An international treaty between kings during the Amarna period was similar to the concept of personal oaths between families or domestic treaties (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 37). However, international treaties did differ from domestic treaties since kings were under the direct jurisdiction of the gods, treaty oaths were in the name of the gods alone. Domestic contracts were witnessed by the parties peers... (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 37). During the Amarna period, treaties did not have to be written; their validity came from the fact that parties swore by the gods (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 38). Typically, references to treaties in the Amarna letters simply use the word oath (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 38). For example, in EA 74, Rib-Hadda warns the king of Egypt that Abdi-Ashirta of Amurru had placed an oath with the leader of Ammiya and it is understood that a treaty had been formed between the two states (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 38). DIPLOMACY Aside from the existence of ambassadors and treaties at this time, there are other proofs that illustrate the extent of diplomacy during the Amarna period. The language in the Amarna letters is ritualized with niceties and other set phrases, suggesting that leaders had a well-defined way of communicating with each other. For example, when a king wanted to show his disappointment in the concessions or gifts (which were usually gold; gold came second to women as a desired gift/concession/payment) given to him from the king of Egypt, the phrase gold is as plentiful as dirt in Egypt (EA 20,

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26, 29) was used (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 193). This phrase may seem insignificant to an untrained eye, but the king of Egypt knew that he had to send more gold, renegotiate, or expect a hostile relationship to emerge. International recognition is another indicator of a functioning diplomatic system. Modern states want to be well respected in the international arena, and the states during the Amarna period were no different, even though correspondences appeared more personal. Cohen explains, the most crucial game of all concerned acceptance and recognition as a Great King, as this was the condition of diplomatic and strategic activity (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 195). Thus, in EA 16, the king of Assyria reminds the king of Egypt how much gold the Pharaohs ancestors had sent his ancestors, claiming now I am the equal (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 195). He goes on to complain that not enough gold was given to his messenger coming back from Egypt, implying that he, and therefore his state, were not given due recognition. The kings concern in this situation is that he wanted to maintain power if he already had it, and he wanted to alter the power dynamics if his situation had changed. So, it is evident that hypersensitivity toward language existed at the time because of how it measured political power. At the beginning of each letter, the greeting reveals the importance of international recognition and the depth of diplomacy during the Amarna period. For one, the kings and vassal representatives demonstrate the development of the system through phrases such as, Say to {Great King}, king of Egypt, my brother: Thus Assur-uballit, King of {Assy}ria, Great King, your brother. For you, your household and your country may all go well (Moran, 1992; 38). These actors had a systematic way of corresponding that indicated both humility and kindness. This is similar to the meetings of heads of state today, in which, in spite of political differences, a face of unity is usually presented. More importantly, it is evident that power relations were clearly understood at the time. In the above quote, the king of Assyria is trying to convey to the king of Egypt that he, too, is a major player in the international scene, thereby equating himself rhetorically as a great king. The salutation of a letter from a vassal to the Pharaoh, for example, has a much more humble (yet well planned and strategic) tone, again illustrating the politics that surrounded such a seemingly simple gesture: say to Namhurya, the son of the Sun, my lord: Message of Akizzi, your servant. I fall at the feet of my lord [seven] times (Moran, 1992; 127).

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Marriages helped forge political alliances with the Pharaoh: blood-relationships were the preferred method of building lasting relationships, and they illustrate the diplomatic nature of politics at this time. In Reciprocity, Equality, and Status-Anxiety in the Amarna Letters, Kevin Avruch states, Tushratta never tires of reminding Amenhotep III, Akhenaten, and the Queen Mother Tiye of the history of marriage ties that bonded Mittani peaceable to Egypt (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 163). The history that kings had with the Pharaoh played a significant role in their political expectations. For example, the king of Mittani, who often declares his love for the king of Egypt in letters, complains that the king is not according him the same respect and affection as did Amenhotep III, his father (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 162). This tendency to compare the treatment of past generations of Egyptian kings to the present often occurs in Amarna letters during alliance discussions. FOREIGN POLICY Aside from exchanging women, gold, and envoys, the Great Kings (kings of sovereign states) and vassal kings used other measures to create foreign policy. The treatment of vassal states by Egypt serves as an example of the strategic preparation used to implement foreign policy during the Amarna period. Canaan was the land which not only connected Egypt with states in the ancient Near East, but also had mayors at the head of each region who served as spies for Egypt collecting intelligence on each other, Great Kings, and vassal kings. In EA 333:4-18, Paapu, an Egyptian official, reports to a commissioner that two vassal kings were planning against the Pharaoh: May you know that Sipti-Balu and Zimredda are acting in disloyalty together (Cohen and Westbrook, 2000; 90). The vassal mayors were well aware of their importance to the Pharaoh, and in return, they demanded protection, social, and economic help from Egypt. This is well demonstrated in EA 49, when a vassal king requests a physician from Egypt: give me, too, a palace attendant that is a physician (Moran, 1992; 120). The vassal/Egyptian relations are important in another respect; they illustrate that territorial expansion and occupation existed during the Amarna period. Furthermore, the occupation entailed diplomacy and negotiation, as well as military power: when one examines the officials [operating in Canaan] whose names are transcribed into Akkadian in the Amarna letters, and tries to link them with known Egyptian officialsit becomes clear that the majority of probable identifications belong in the ranks of the military

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(Redford, 1992; 201). Although Egypt provided certain necessities to the vassals, they still lived under a harsh occupation in which the Pharaoh could at anytime cut off essential services, confiscate their land, or assassinate them, as in the case of Abdi-Ashirta (Redford, 1992; 268). Discussion Figure three [see p. 14] presents a summary of the data revealed in the Amarna letters, which proves that an international relations system not only existed but flourished during the Late Bronze Age. The table summarizes the results and finding discussed earlier; in addition, it explicitly identifies evidence of trade and an arms race between states. The vast amount of information found exceeded my initial expectations. I did not expect to encounter data signifying the existence of military occupation, ambassadors, or negotiations like the ones that occurred during alliance-building marriage discussions between states. Such results were unexpected because IR students are typically taught that issues like the Palestinian/Israeli/U.S. conflict or the 1979 Iranian revolution are manifestations of some modern phenomenon, such as terrorism. However, the Amarna letters and their analysis illustrates that terrorism is not a new phenomenon at all. The Apriu, a rebellious groups which fought against the established order of the day, were around even in the Late Bronze Age, and they focused on disrupting the international relations between states, in much the same manner as terrorists today. The Amarna letters also illustrate the extent to which ancient diplomatic approaches still exist in contemporary Eastern politics. For example, kings used subtlety in their language when criticizing others or making demands. This tradition can be seen today in Eastern cultures, where it is inappropriate to directly ask for anything or confront others, and the kind gestures of others are taken to be insincere and merely clich sayings aimed at demonstrating the good nature of the asking party. Additionally, the importance of familial bonds is still detectable in the political and personal dynamics of the East. The Amarna letters reveal that there is an entire realm of information that has not been tapped by contemporary IR scholars, which could be valuable in examining current IR dilemmas. The question remains, why do so many international relations scholars deny the existence of an international relations system long before the Westphalia treaties? Political science, like all other sciences, requires constants to measure and study particular events, leaders, and states. The field collectively decided to create an artificial birth of international
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relations using the Westphalia treaties in order to diagnose, examine, label, and formulate understandings according to their own Western assumptions. The significance of the treaties should not be underestimated; they have maintained a continuation of an IR system, whereas the system in place during the Amarna period collapsed only to be reapplied by various polities at a later time. This continuation is what gives the Westphalia treaties their legitimacy, and it is not the aim of this analysis to disregard their importance. However, the decision to rule all historical examples of international relations as invalid and not applicable to modern times is not only a form of collective dishonesty, but it also makes for poor scholarship in social science departments. Although most of the Westphalia treaties address the allocation or restoration of valuable products, much like contemporary treaties that end wars, several of the articles provided significant advancements for international relations (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; 29). Article 64, for example, established territoriality and the right of the state to choose its own religion, as well as the right to noninterference by other states in any of these matters (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003; 30). These concepts are crucial for the maintenance of states, but as the Amarna letters demonstrate, such advancements were not established for the first time in 1648, although that may have been the point when they were vocally and collectively declared. It is also important to bear in mind that the parties of 1648 were Christian and white. These documents that have formulated the concept of the modern nationstate do not consider the culture, religion, and philosophy of all the parties that are forced to abide by them. Given this reality, it seems unrealistic to expect the global community in general, and the East in particular, to acknowledge the principles outlined in the treaties. Had the makers of the treaties invited leaders from the entire global community, the Westphalian paradigm would carry international credibility. As my analysis has shown, the Westphalia treaties did not create IR, and by stubbornly holding on to this notion, we reduce the data and theories that could have the potential to guide the understanding of IR dilemmas today. Furthermore, abiding by the myth that everything civilized came from the Western Christian powers promotes an us against them paradigm which places in danger the entire foundation of IR. In the process, Eastern states (that in recent times are not even referred to as states, but more generally as the Arab world or Muslim world) are labeled as inferior. The demand for the presentation of the truth is also productive because the human psyche needs to know

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(Redford, 1992; 201). Although Egypt provided certain necessities to the vassals, they still lived under a harsh occupation in which the Pharaoh could at anytime cut off essential services, confiscate their land, or assassinate them, as in the case of Abdi-Ashirta (Redford, 1992; 268). Discussion Figure three [see p. 14] presents a summary of the data revealed in the Amarna letters, which proves that an international relations system not only existed but flourished during the Late Bronze Age. The table summarizes the results and finding discussed earlier; in addition, it explicitly identifies evidence of trade and an arms race between states. The vast amount of information found exceeded my initial expectations. I did not expect to encounter data signifying the existence of military occupation, ambassadors, or negotiations like the ones that occurred during alliance-building marriage discussions between states. Such results were unexpected because IR students are typically taught that issues like the Palestinian/Israeli/U.S. conflict or the 1979 Iranian revolution are manifestations of some modern phenomenon, such as terrorism. However, the Amarna letters and their analysis illustrates that terrorism is not a new phenomenon at all. The Apriu, a rebellious groups which fought against the established order of the day, were around even in the Late Bronze Age, and they focused on disrupting the international relations between states, in much the same manner as terrorists today. The Amarna letters also illustrate the extent to which ancient diplomatic approaches still exist in contemporary Eastern politics. For example, kings used subtlety in their language when criticizing others or making demands. This tradition can be seen today in Eastern cultures, where it is inappropriate to directly ask for anything or confront others, and the kind gestures of others are taken to be insincere and merely clich sayings aimed at demonstrating the good nature of the asking party. Additionally, the importance of familial bonds is still detectable in the political and personal dynamics of the East. The Amarna letters reveal that there is an entire realm of information that has not been tapped by contemporary IR scholars, which could be valuable in examining current IR dilemmas. The question remains, why do so many international relations scholars deny the existence of an international relations system long before the Westphalia treaties? Political science, like all other sciences, requires constants to measure and study particular events, leaders, and states. The field collectively decided to create an artificial birth of international

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SUMMARY The data found in the Amarna letters demonstrates that an international relations system existed in Mesopotamia well before the Westphalia treaties in 1648. The system contained actors, multipolarity, well-defined and regulated international laws, extensive diplomatic measures, and even territorial expansion and occupation. The policy approaches and dilemmas articulated in the letters provide valuable lessons that could be useful if applied to contemporary international relations issues, in particular to relations in the East. Although there did not exist fax machines and embassies during this time period, information was well organized and transferred. This lack of technological advancement is the most common and least imaginative reason given by those who do not view the previous proofs as adequate. It is important to avoid this argument because it ignores knowledge hidden in the larger analysis. By including a study of ancient history and politics in graduate and undergraduate international relations, sociology, history, and cultural studies departments, the United States can begin to groom more well-rounded, informed scholars.

References Bueno de Mesquita, B. Principles of international politics. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003. Cohen, R., and Westbrook, R., eds. Amarna Diplomacy: the beginning of international relations. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. Ferguson, Y. and Mansbach, R., eds. Polities authority, identities, and change. South Carolina: University of South Carolina Press, 1996. Malanczuk, P. Modern introduction to international law. New York: HarperCollins Academic, 1970. Moran, W., ed. The Amarna letters. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992. Redford, D. Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in ancient times. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992. Suspension a matter of months not years, Tehrantimes: 12:1, 2004. Retrieved December 1, 2004 from World Wide Web: www.tehrantimes.com. http://

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Figure 1: The Ancient Near East ca. 1350 B.C.

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Figure 2: Egypt's sphere of interest in Western Asia

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Actors: *Akhenaten (Egyptian Great King) *Rib-Hadda (Vassal Mayor) *Abdi-Ashirta (Vassal Mayor) *Assur-Uballit (Assyrian Great King) Polarity: *Mittani (Great Power) *Assyria (Great Power) *Egypt (Great Power) *Vassal states retained significant power due to International Law: *Treaties between states *International law existed regarding the treatment of ambassadors Alliance: *Forged alliances through marriage *Family history between kings used to build alli ances Foreign policy: *Egyptian policies toward Canaanite region *Egypt provided aid, weapons, etc., in return for protection of Egyptian interests and intelligence reports Territorial expansion: *Cultural, military, and economic occupation of Canaanite region by Egypt Trade: *Exchange of women, exotic artifacts, and gold by kings and Great Kings with political aims Arms race: *Weaker states worked on building alliances with Egypt for weaponry support *Competition between weak and strong states for Egyptian support signifies the emergence of an arms race *Avoiding war and being prepared for war were two of the biggest concerns during this period

Figure 3

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IraqCivil Society

Iraqi Perceptions of Out-groups: Effects of Ethnicity, Religion, and Location


Jon Gresham, Ph.D. University of Utrecht, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT At the Iraq liberation in 2003, many asked, Could Sunni, Shia and Kurdish factions be brought together, or is it likely that ethnic conflicts would lead to civil war? This pilot project addressed: 1) How do Iraqis self-reported ethnic/religious identities (their membership in their personal in-groups) relate to their perceptions of other unlike groups (out-groups)?, and 2) How does a place of residence relate to Iraqi perceptions of out-groups? My team collected 479 surveys of Iraqi opinions in Iraq, Jordan, and The Netherlands, asking for perceptions of Those Other Groups, their out-groups. I found that background items of religion, ethnic origin, and location, taken by themselves, did not relate strongly to respondents attitudes towards out-groups. But, some combinations of background items did give significant differences in perceptions towards other groups. For example, moderate Arabs (with respect to ethnic importance) in Iraq were the group most opposed to foreigners, and were the group most opposed to expatriate Iraqis returning to Iraq. In this paper I explain important terms (out-group and wiki); report on my findings in the midst of a period of regime change in Iraq; mention the use of an alternate way to disseminate research findings over the internet via a wiki; and describe follow-up projects on social capital among Iraqis. My hope is that this will contribute to a base from which researchers and fieldworkers can develop theories to explore and explain elements of civil society in Iraq and other societies. This paper presents the following major sections: Abstract; Introduction; Purpose; Background; Methodology; Results; Conclusions; Further; Work; Appendixes; and End Notes

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I. INTRODUCTION The 2003 change of government in Iraq presented an opportunity for a different Iraq to emerge: a unified nation-state, with a degree of civil society and tolerance by each of the main ethnic groups for each others rights to: - equality before and rule by law - secure access to food, shelter, and clothing - equal voice to shape their future. Unfortunately, there was no body of literature available on: - tribal or inter-group confederations, allegiances, or compositions - in-group, out-group, or inter-group definitions or perceptions of each other - differences between inter-group perceptions in different locations - research instruments designed to measure inter-group perceptions of Iraqi peoples. Therefore, this seemed a unique opportunity to explore intergroup relations in a regime-change context. II. PURPOSE I wanted to accomplish five things in this pilot project: 1. Collect data on Iraq ethnic and religious perceptions about threat from other groups immediately after the war; 2. Evaluate this research process; 3. Analyze the data, looking for interesting facts about the people surveyed and their perceptions of those of other groups; 4. Put findings quickly into the hands of Iraq fieldworkers; 5. Design follow-up studies on Iraqi social networks and how they affect repatriation into home societies of Iraqis living abroad. QUESTIONS EXPLORED INCLUDED: 1. How do ethnic and religious identities relate to perceptions of threat from other groups? (i.e. Would all Sunni respondents express similar perceptions towards Shia Iraqis?) 2. How do locations of respondents relate to perceptions of threat from other groups? (i.e. Would respondents in urban Basra express different ideas from those in rural Basra?) 3. How do perceptions about return migration differ among groups and locations? (i.e., Would all Iraqis express similar perceptions towards the return of expatriate Iraqis?) 4. How do perceptions differ concerning threat by foreign states? (i.e., Would all respondents perceive the intentions of the USA the same way? Or those of Iran?)

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III. BACKGROUND TO THIS RESEARCH AND DEFINITION OF TERMS Before I present my research process, it is important to describe my understanding of Iraqs social situation, because it seems to me that hope for stable and good living conditions in Iraq would come from three integrated types of civility. These evidences of civility include: 1. Personal norms, morals, and values promoted as good in a community, 2. Associations of organized groups and informal networks that are active in geographic, financial, political, and religious interests of their members, and 3. Overarching authority to provide equality before the law, provide food-shelter-clothing resources, and provide a voice in shaping their common future.2 These are reasonable ambitions for nation-builders in Iraq. According to Michael Edwards, the World Bank working definition for civil society is the arena in which people come together to pursue the interests they hold in common; it includes all organisations and associations between family and state, except firms.3 Sudipta Kaviraj contributes a historical perspective, saying that Civil society is not a new, post-Hegelian concept....In its original sense...it simply meant a community, a collection of human beings united within a legitimate political order, and was variously rendered as society or community.4 This applies here, because nation building in Iraq needs a government established through just political and legal processes, and threat-free associations for the common good. This is the only basis from which to deal morally with criminal actions while increasing security for non-criminals. Without a strong central government to facilitate equal protection under the law and equal access to resources, and without evidence of many non-state organizations with membership across ethnic and religious lines, security seems mostly based in social networks among near-kinsmen and close friends. Without security beyond such a small circle of relationships, Civil Society (with both actions and structures) is unlikely to happen. This is why perceptions of threat from out-groups must be understood. HOW CAN WE COMPARE OUT-GROUP PERCEPTIONS? Thomas Nelson claims that traditional prejudice and bias research relies upon measures that can confuse a specific emotional response with a general group stereotype.5 For example, bias can be measured as the difference between how we see our own group (our in-

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group) and how we see the other group or out-group (a group of which we are not members of and that is unlike us in some key definable factor). My opinion is that exploring bias and prejudice between and among groups in Iraq needs to access both open and hidden personal viewpoints on out-groups. Laura Drake describes perfectly the past and present situations in Iraq. The model for Iraqs disintegration, if it occurs, will likely not be the Soviet Union but rather Lebanon. In contrast to the notion of breakup, which implies a territorial explosion of an entity into separate states, I refer here to the opposite notion of breakdown- a form of civil anarchy resulting from the implosion of society, economy, and polity within the boundaries of a failed state.6 Since most groups in Iraq are not strictly limited by geography, geographic identities are not present to promote cooperation and conciliatory behavior.7 Neither is there much evidence of inter-ethnic non-state organizations. In contrast, some social groups and patron-client networks are very strong, since they provide the social capital resources that group members need.8 A true multi-party democracy is not yet evident, but, thankfully, neither is an absolute re-tribalization of Iraq. The article UNDP and Civil Society Organizations at http:// www.undp.org/cso/ states, ...civil society organizationshave always been vital partners in helping communities build their own solutionsandhave come from within civil society. International organizations, such as the UN, tend to see civil society organizations as community groups within a geographic region. I, then, use the term civil society in a multi-purpose sense to include behavior, attitudes, and social systems. This also relates to similar concepts in the studies of social capital and social networks, the features of the structure of social relations that facilitate action.9
AGAINST OUT-GROUPS

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF IRAQ: THE MAIN THREAD OF IMPORTANCEPOWER The history of Iraq built many constraints to the development of civil society expression in Iraq. Iraq is the birthplace of domestic animals, the wheel, and writing. It is home to the mega-power centers of the Akkadian,m Assyrian,l Chaldean, and Babylonian empires, all of whom supported regime-sponsored violence against minority populations (the out-groups) at any given time. Subsequent rulers (Arab, Mongol, Turk, Baath, etc.) continued inter-group violence, and udner the previous regime, no sphere of life was without state contol. There were no civil or private affairs, and no rule by law.

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The past is not forgotten; it is not even past (Paraphrasing William Faulkner).

Except for these street boys who live only in the present

IV. METHODOLOGY: ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING THE PROCESS 1. I limited the survey to one page because I expected to have very limited time with any individual respondent due to the post-war instability. 2. The survey was designed to be self-answerable for individuals with a low level of literacy. See Appendix 2 for a sample. 3. As there were few out-group studies similar to this project, research design was adapted from a Russian Federation out-group perceptions study by Hagendoorn, Linssen & Tumanov12. 4. Opinion items were designed to be as non-threatening as possible, since I did not know exactly what would happen when questions were asked about ethnicity, religion, Saddam Hussein, Iran, etc. I chose to use a short survey instrument, with indirect questions about inter-group perceptions to avoid getting politically-correct answers. 5. Inter-group studies should explain the variance in answers to questions. That is, differences in answers to some questions, (the dependent variables), should be explained by a few answers to other questions, (the independent variables). For example, could different perceptions of other groups be explained by ethnic or religious identity? 6. Because I wanted to measure both obvious and hidden opinions, I used three versions of the survey instrument: -primed against the main ethnic out-group, -primed against the main religious out-group, and -a neutral version with no specific priming or mention of out-groups in questions.
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Priming means using a key word choice, or question ordering, to elicit a stronger reaction that may not be politically correct. This combination of questions allowed both implicit (indirect) and explicit (direct) measures of inter-group perceptions. 7. This research process tested both process (what could be done in an immediate post-conflict situation) and content (what might be the expressed perceptions of threat or bias against personal, group, and national out-groups). This may be considered as inferential data mining, but in this pilot project it was appropriate, especially given the lack of pre-war literature on Iraqi social systems. The intent of this project was not to test pre-established theories, nor to generalize to the larger population, but to work on a methodology and to lay a foundation for follow-up studies on the social networks of Iraqis.The set of variables is not comprehensive, nor is sample size large enough to apply to the whole population. 8. Statistically speaking, I assumed the following for the process and methods: a. Data represent a normal distribution representative of the population b. Variance (differences) of responses would be homogeneous (a bell-shaped curve should appear) c. Responses between respondents would be independent (each person would answer independently of others who may have been present when the survey was taken) d. Data would show internal validity for describing some intergroup relations, and for planning research in the future, even though the sample size was too small to make generalizations about the whole population of Iraq. Some analyses might seek to explain some relationships, but that would not be the main purpose of the project. f. Due to my assessment of the post-conflict environment, I believed it was inappropriate to ask questions concerning gender, personal identity, tribal affiliation, and political participation. g. Questions would be designed for quick response, using a 4point Likert scale. SURVEYING PROCESS Basic research goals and research questions were defined, and translated into colloquial Iraqi Arabic. Appendix 2 shows a sample of an English, non-primed version. To find surveyors in Iraq, I looked for groups of young Iraqi men, and found a few that would complete for me my survey on the Social Community of Iraqis.

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After we went through the survey together, I asked them if they would like to help interview others in the same way. We went back through the survey again, discussing any points of confusion. A sample of the instructions is in Appendix I, Sample of Instructions Given to Surveyors. Data was collected through snowballing. The surveyors approached friends who would not reject their first attempts, collected their opinions, and then asked them to find others who would also give opinions. Respondents were not selected completely at random; they were not part of a stratified sampling; and they were not completely independent from previous association with the surveyor. My preference was to move fast. Given the violence and uncertainty in Iraq, I am grateful to have collected data with no harm to any of the surveyors. Respondents were interviewed (almost always) in homes, sometimes with two or three adult members of a family completing the surveys at the same time with the surveyor guiding the process and answering questions. LOCATION-SPECIFIC DIFFERENCES IN COLLECTION In Baghdad, I joined a food distribution project to meet people and found respondents willing to collect surveys for me in their home communities. In Basra, I found students eager to answer questions and to collect data from others. In Amman (Jordan) and Leiden (the Netherlands), I contacted students who were willing to collect surveys, and also offered an English language version of the form in the event that some respondents could not read Arabic. POST-COLLECTION Collected surveys were numbered sequentially, write-in comments were added, coding sheets were developed to handle accurately the Arabic and English differences in formatting. All possible answers were compared with all other answers to look for all possible correlations between the thirty-two survey questions. For example, age of respondent was compared to answers to all other questions to see if age was directly related to opinions. Then, using multivariate analysis, all combinations of questions were compared to see which combinations of questions gave common answers to other items.13

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WEB PRESENTATION The research process itself continues to be reported on the dedicated website, http://www.CivilSocietyIraq.seedwiki.com. This wiki (an internet web forum) contained main areas of: (1) a basic collection of relevant literature, (2) current events related to research interests, (3) links to other agencies and individuals with an interest in Iraq, and, most importantly, (4) forums where visitors could participate in editing the web content itself. Choosing dense content over high-bandwidth graphics, I opted for a text-only format after experimenting with a variety of graphics and other features that looked better but interfered with fast skimming for information. There were often over one hundred different visitors per day. Sample of Demographic Item Responses (% of Respondents by Location, N= 412) ITEM
E THNIC IDENTITY ETHNIC IMPORTANCE

BAGHDAD N=225, 5% ARAB 59% KURD 6% OTHER 35% LITTLE 3% IMPORTANT 61% MOST 8%

BASRA (URBAN N=13, 3.2% ARAB 100% KURD 0% OTHER 0 % LITTLE 7.7% IMPORTANT 31% MOST 7.7%

LOCATION
BASRA (RURAL) N=14, 3.4% ARAB 93 % KURD 0% OTHER 7% LITTLE 0% IMPORTANT 50% MOST 29% S HI'A 57.1% S UNNI 35.7% OTHER 7.1% LITTLE 0% IMPORTANT 14% MOST 50% VERY G OOD 7% GOOD 7% BAD 22% VERY BAD 64% HELP 100% ALLOW 0% MUST ASK 0% DENY 0% JORDAN N=129, 31% ARAB 73 % KURD 14% OTHER 13% LITTLE 33% IMPORTANT 44% MOST 5% SHI'A 43.4% SUNNI 41.1% OTHER 15.5% LITTLE 23% IMPORTANT 39% MOST 14% VERY GOOD 1% GOOD 2% BAD 40% VERY BAD 57% HELP 62% ALLOW 29% MUST A SK 9% DENY 0% NETHERLANDS N=31, 7% ARAB 80 % KURD 20% OTHER 0% LITTLE 10% IMPORTANT 59% MOST 14% SHI'A 76.7% S UNNI 23.3% OTHER 0.0% LITTLE 6% IMPORTANT 32% MOST 23% VERY GOOD16% GOOD 13% BAD 39% VERY BAD 32% HELP 32% ALLOW 52% MUST A SK 16% DENY 0%

RELIGIOUS IDENTITY

SHI'A 20.3% SHI'A 76.9% SUNNI 12.4% SUNNI 15.4% OTHER 67.3% OTHER 7.7% LITTLE 8% IMPORTANT 15% MOST 23% VERY GOOD 0% GOOD 0% BAD 61% VERY BAD 39% HELP 31% ALLOW 69% MUST A SK 0% DENY 0%

RELIGIOUS LITTLE 5% IMPORTANT 15% IMPORTANCE MOST 44% VERY G OOD 8% OF GOOD 22% COUNTRY BAD 44% GOOD/B AD VERY BAD 26% DIVISION RETURN OF HELP 45% EXPATRIATE ALLOW 33% IRAQIS MUST ASK 17% DENY 5%

Footnotes to table: N = no. of respondents; Mean = average; Std. dev = how much difference there would be off the mean a Other Ethnicity. Baghdad: Not defined--86%, Dhaldean--11%, Assurian--3%, Armenian--0.4%; Amman: Assurian--100% b Number of Children: Amman--98 missing responses; Netherlands--9 missing responses c Two questions were concerning expatriate Iraqis: 1) Iraqi citizens forced to leave the country during Saddam's rule should: Be encouraged to return (Help); Be allowed to return (Allow); First ask permission (Must Ask); Be denied access to return to Iraq (Deny), and 2) Do you think that all Iraqi people will profit if Iraqi people living outside would return soon? Answers to the first question were strongly in favor of repartiation, but qnswers to the second question were not.

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NOTES ON THE FINDINGS 1. RELIGION AND ETHNICITY Respondents were mostly Arab, and mostly Shia. Compare Iraq statistics (generally reported, but not considered too reliable) with our sampling: Ethnic Identity Religious Identity Our sample % Arab 81%, Kurd 8%, Other 11%a Shia 55% Sunni 26% Other 19% Reported Iraq Statistics (1990) 78% 20% 4% 65% 17% 18%

There are no ethnic or religious identity breakdowns available for Iraqis living in Jordan or the Netherlands, or worldwide, except for rough estimates at http://www.Ethnologue.com. COMMENTS ON THE DEMOGRAPHICS: -Only in Basra did most respondents place a strong value on their ethnicity. -There were a large number of respondents who chose to respond as Other for religion or ethnicity, without any explanation or other comments given. A large number of Other wrote in a Christian identification for ethnicity and/or religion (see footnotes to the table above). -Religion and importance of religion showed correlation with ethnicity (F 74.98 and F .424 at p<.001, respectively) and with importance of ethnicity (F .138 and F .215 at p<.001). -Religious identification showed a strong relationship with importance of religion (F (3,398)=39.07; p<.001). 2. EXTERNAL THREATS -Those who expressed that foreign countries (except USA) were expected to help protect Iraqs natural resources also expressed more support for division of Iraq. -Turkey was seen by two groups (those in southern Iraq and among expatriate Iraqis) as almost identical to Russia in perceived threat of domination and exploitation.

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-The USA was expected to dominate Iraqi people but also to protect Iraqi oil against other foreigners. -In southern Iraq, the USA was expected to dominate the Iraqi people but NOT to support an Islamic republic. -Iran was seen (outside of southern Iraq) to promote an Islamic Republic, and to seek to dominate Iraqi people. Those who were Shia did not express a perception of threat from Iran. 3. LOCATION FACTORS Location of respondents had a significant relationship with many survey questions, much more than factors of religion or ethnicity. That is why the tables (above) were reported by location instead of by other factors. - Expatriate Iraqis expressed full confidence that Iraqi people would profit from return migration. -Expatriate Iraqis were confident that the new government of Iraq will be able to give peace and safety, and that all Iraqis will support the new government; this is much different from responses of Iraqis living inside Iraq. -100% of those in urban Basra expressed that all Iraqis have a duty to defend Iraq. It is beyond the scope of this report to speculate as to the reasons behind the above descriptions of responses. 4. CONTENT The findings from my study of perceptions of outgroups in Iraq include the following conclusions with respect to the purpose of the project. a. Ethnic and religious identities, taken by themselves, did not relate directly to perceptions of outgroups. In future surveys, there needs to be a clearer differentiation for other ethnic and religious identities, such as Armenian, Chaldean, Assyrian, Turkoman, and Mandaean. b. Different survey locations did reveal differing perceptions towards the repatriation of foreign-living Iraqis, and towards other outgroups. That is, people in different places expressed different perceptions about groups different from themselves. c. There was considerable difference in opinion about the return of a Saddam-like government. This work began in May 2003, when his location was still unknown to most people.

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5. Methodology a. The process relates well to studies in the fields of civil society, social identity and conformity, social networks, and intergroup relations. b. Rapid data collection in an immediate post-conflict environment can provide a useful foundation for analyses of social systems and schisms between ethnic and religious groups. c. Survey elements were useful in both content and format, data collection approaches worked even without highly-controlled environments, and the use in Iraq and among Iraqi expatriates of similar survey forms allowed comparison across locations. d. Using a web wiki for viewers to read, add comments, and linking to other resources was a great contribution towards the global collaborative effort. It allowed live updating continually as new information was found. It has been continuously updated for two years. VII. FURTHER WORK 1. Future surveys need to look for concepts connected in any way to foreign domination and exploitation. There are correlations between years of residence and age, with factors of exploitation/domination. Perhaps certain types of citizens, based on demographics, could be screened for as possible agents of peacemaking. 2. Economic stability is linked to opinions on return migration and social stability, and economic factors must be considered in profiles of social systems. 3. Education and vocation must be tested for relationship to outgroup stereotyping and perceptions of threat. 4. Social network analyses need to assess connections and social capital elements between families, clans, tribes, and communities, especially among the merchant class, and this work began in 9/2005. Outsiders and fringe members of society affect social dynamics and may be among the most volatile and fragile factions. And what about the spoilers? Leonard Wantchekon states Spoilers are factions that believe that the emerging peace threatens their power, world view, and interests, and who use violence to achieve it.15 Paul Adler and Seok-Woo Kwon state actors resources are a function of their location in the social structure.16 The spoilers of the Iraq have resources in their social networks. Since the spoilers are not defined by national, ethnic, or religious identity alone, they find identity in other groups.

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This means that social network studies must be in the forefront of nation-state stabilization research. Work should include aspects of both behavior coming from underlying norms and values and structural support for group identity and function. 5. The work done must not be left in isolation. Findings must be discussed and debated with other social scientists, especially with scholars on Iraq and the Middle East. 6. Some of the significant interactions are not easily explained, and there is a level of skewedness in responses to many items. For example, in personal conversation with me, Iraqis indicated that religious identity was not too important, yet 91% of those surveyed replied that religion was important, and only 8% replied that religion was not important to them. 7. Since social networks are part of ongoing instability in Iraq, there must be longterm analysis of how information, norms, and values are communicated, and how some specific communities may have approaches to governance and conflict resolution that do work well. Adler mentions that social ties of one kind have influence in other social contexts17, and therefore, appropriability18 is a concept important to studies of society in Iraq. This includes long-term study on acculturation and integration of expatriate Iraqis in foreign cultures and how that might affect their reintegration into home communities. FINAL COMMENT: There are many agencies with intentions of social engineering in Iraq. To separate the honorable from the others, there must be a recognition and affirmation of norms and values which promote healthy intergroup relations. This paper presents a summary of findings and methodology which should be useful to works that follow. JG Appendix I. Sample of instructions given to surveyors. Surveyors are to introduce themselves as: I am a researcher working for the Utrecht University in The Netherlands. Because many Iraqi people began to settle in The Netherlands some decades ago, Utrecht University became interested in how their communities there and in their homeland help the individuals, and how the individual helps the community. In these hard times in Iraq, it is even more important to for everyone to have some people they can count on to help them.

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THE ASSESSMENT It is permissible if others want to listen to the surveying, but they should not interrupt; if they are willing to wait and give their own opinions after the first person is done, that is better.If the person brings a strong objection: apologize and find a way to go ahead to the next questions. If the sample-subject does not know how to give an opinion on a 4-point response-scale, try the following example to demonstrate. Sample Question: Do you believe that Iraqi women should speak freely what they think? If you think that all women are allowed to say what truly is in their thoughts, then point to label where the mark is, below Absolutely agree. Absolutely agree X Agree o Disagree o Absolutely disagree o

EARLY VERSION OF THE WEBSITE USED TO SHARE THE RESEARCH FINDINGS.

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APPENDIX II. SAMPLE PORTION OF A NEUTRAL (NON-PRIMED) SURVEY IRAQ SOCIAL COMMUNITY: TYPE 2
TO WHICH IRQAI PEOPLE DO YOU BELONG? HOW IMPORTANT IS IT FOR YOU TO BE A PEOPLE? HOW LONG HAVE YOU LIVED IN THIS PLACE? HOW OLD ARE YOU? HOW HIGHDO YOU ESTIMATE YOUR TOTAL INCOME? HOW MANY CHILDREN DO YOU HAVE? HOW MANY CHILDREN ARE YOU RESPOSIBLE FOR? TO WHICH OF THE RELIGIOUS
COMMUNITIES DO YOU BELONG? LOW MALE

ARAB

KURD

OTHER
IMPORTANT MOST IMPORTANT

LITTLE IMPORTANT VERY IMPORTANT YEARS YEARS

AVERAGE FEMALE

HIGH

MALE SHIITE

FEMALE SUNNI OTHER IMPORTANT MOST IMPORTANT

HOW IMPORTANT IS IT TO YOU TO BE OF THIS RELIGION? DO YOU SUPPOSE THAT IN THE FUTURE A RULER LIKE SADDAM WILL GOVERN IRAQ AGAIN?
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY IF IRAQ BECOMES DIVIDED INTO ARAB AND KURDISH PARTS?

NOT IMPORTANT VERY IMPORTANT NEVER VERY LIKELY GOOD BAD

NOT LIKELY ABSOLUTELY VERY GOOD VERY BAD

WILL IT BE GOOD OR BAD FOR YOUR

COMMUNITIES, FORCED TO LEAVE THE

THOSE PEOPLE FROM OPPOSING ETHNIC

BE ALLOWED TO RETURN BE ENCOURAGED FIRST ASK PERMISSION ABSOLUTELY NOT LIKELY BE DENIED

COUNTRY DURING SADDAM'S RULE SHOULD:

DO YOU EXPECT THE NEW GOVERNMENT, IN


WHICH ANOTHER ETHNIC COMMUNITY TAKES SAFETY FOR ALL CITIZENS OF IRAQ? PART, WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE PEACE AND

VERY LIKELY ABSOLUTELY NOT

DO YOU THINK THAT ALL IRAQIS WILL


SUPPORT THE NEW GOVERNMENT IF ANOTHER ETHNIC COMMUNITY IS PART OF THAT GOVERNMENT?

ABSOLUTELY

VERY LIKELY

HAVE SOME DOUBT IT WILL NOT GET ANY SUPPORT

DO ALL IRAQIS OF YOUR ETHNIC COMMUNITY

IRAQ AS A WHOLE IS HARMED?

HAVE THE DUTY TO DEFEND IRAQ, EVEN IF

ABSOLUTELY

TO SOME EXTENT

NOT NECESSARILY ABSOLUTELY NOT ABSOLUTELY TO SOME EXTENT

PROFIT IF IRAQI PEOPLE LIVING OUTSIDE WOULD RETURN SOON?

DO YOU THINK THAT ALL IRAQI PEOPLE WILL

NOT NECESSARILY ABSOLUTELY NOT

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IraqCivil Society I, Jon, wish to thank Hub Linssen, Lead Statistician and Research Methods Consultant, University of Utrecht, for his remedial tutoring. 2 Edwards, M . 2004, Civil Society, Cambridge: Polity, p. 4. 3 ___________. 2000, Enthusiasts, Tacticians and Skeptics: The World Bank, Civil Society and Social Capital http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/library/edwards.htm, p.1. 4 Kaviraj, S. 2001, Civil Society & its Possibilities, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p17. 5 Nelson, T. 1999, Group Affect and Attribution in Social Policy Opinion in Journal of Politics, May, V. 61, Issue 2, p347. 6 Drake,L. 1996, Implosion of Iraq in Middle East Insight, March, and personal communications 7/1996. 7 Wimmer, A . 2003-04, Democracy and Ethno-religious Conflict in Iraq in Survival, V. 45, no. 4, Winter, p119. 8 Ibid, p113. 9 Adler, P. and S. Kwon. 2002, Social Capital: Prospects for a New Concept Academy of Management Review 27(1), p17. 10 Glubb, J. 1969, A Short History of the Arab Peoples, New York: Dorset Press, p.68. 11 Ibid, p. 275; P Marr.1985, The Modern History of Iraq, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p.36. 12 Hagendoorn, L., Linssen, H., and Tumanov, S. 2001, Intergroup Relations in the States of the Former Soviet Union: The perception of Russians. Hove, England: Psychology Press. 13 The KMO (0.622) and Bartletts (.000) tests were highly significant, allowing us to assume that a factor analysis is appropriate for this dataset. Kaisers normalization was used because all communalities are >0.6 and sample size was >250. 14 In Basra, I tested a repeated measures effect in combination with the priming effect. Using the same three versions of the survey form (ethnic primed, religious primed, and neutral), we administered the three versions of the survey to the same respondents, at one sitting, to assess if they would respond to the priming, or if they would differ in their
1

NOTES

responses to the primed versus neutral versions of the surveys. In all other locations, each respondent completed only one survey form, with one of the three versions only. For reporting purposes, here and elsewhere, only the neutral-priming version of the survey was described.
15

. L Wantchekon. (2004) The Paradox of Warlord Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation in American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, No. 1 (February), p21.

16 17 18

Adler, p.18. Ibid, p.20. Ibid, p.37.

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Intellectual Property

Piracy and Terrorism in the Arab World


Samir N. Hamade, Ph.D. Kuwait University samirn@kuc01.kuniv.edu.kw
INTRODUCTION Piracy is like sin; its roots are very deep in history. People in the world, especially those in third world countries, became accustomed to seeing and using fake materials and fake products; many of them are happy to be able to afford these materials without thinking about the damage to the industry, or the country itself. Piracy in general can be defined as the unauthorized reproduction of a copyrighted work without the consent of the copyright holder. It covers many products, both electronic and non-electronic. Copyright is a form of protection provided by the law to the authors of original works of authorship, including literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, and certain other intellectual works. Software piracy is the unauthorized copying of computer software that constitutes copyright infringement for either commercial or personal use. The advance in information, computer and communication technology leads to the advance in the methods and types of software piracy. Today software piracy is a pandemic disease that is costing software firms billions of dollars annually. It is estimated that Microsoft alone loses millions in sales to software pirates who unfairly sell their programs for next to nothing. Consumers who refuse to pay fair market prices for retail programs are also to blame (Lea). The loss of economic support, along with the interruption in the development of additional software, has placed a considerable dent into the software industry. If people are given the opportunity to purchase a perfectly good title from someone who offers it to them at a significantly reduced rate, as opposed to buying it full-priced from a licensed dealer, far too many individuals jump at such a chance. That is one of the reasons the software industry is suffering from economic and developmental difficulties (BSA). THE PROBLEM The war on terror, which was launched by the terrible events of September 11, 2001, affected, in many ways, the war against piracy
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all over the world, and specifically in the Arab world. The US and its western allies believe that these two wars parallel each other, based on their belief that piracy is funding terrorism, and by combating piracy they are draining funds from terrorists around the world, and especially in the Arab World. This paper aims to describe the acts of piracy and the war against it, the war on terrorism and its effect on the war against piracy, question the relationship between them, and attempt to suggest some solutions. OVERVIEW Initially, copyright law originated with the introduction of the printing press in England in 1492. Until 1964, piracy activities were strictly limited to the unauthorized reproduction of books and other printed materials. In 1964 the United States Copyright Office began to register software as a form of literary expression (Rao). In 1974, Congress created the Natural Commission on New Technological Uses (CONTU) to investigate whether the evolving computer technology field outpaced the existing copyright laws and also to determine the extent of copyright protection for computer programs. In 1980, the Copyright Act was amended to explicitly include computer programs. Title 17, of the United States Code, stated that it was illegal to make or to distribute copies of copyrighted material without authorization, except for the users right to make a single backup copy for archival purposes. The Software Rental Amendments Act, Public Law 101-650, was approved by Congress in 1990, prohibits the commercial rental, leasing or lending of software without the express written permission of the copyright holder. An amendment to Title 18, of the United States Code, was passed by Congress in 1992. This amendment, known as Public Law 102-561 made software piracy a federal offence and instituted criminal penalties for copyright infringement of software (SPA). TYPES OF PIRACY According to Business Software association (BSA) there are five common types of software piracy. Understanding each will help users avoid problems associated with illegal software (BSA). END USER PIRACY: Occurs when a company employee reproduces copies of software without authorization, such as using one licensed copy to install a program on multiple computers, or copying disks for installation and distribution.

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CLIENT-SERVER OVERUSE: Occurs when too many employees on a network are using a unauthorized copy of a program at the same time. INTERNET PIRACY: Occurs when software is downloaded from the Internet. The same purchasing rules apply to software purchased online as for those bought in traditional ways. HARD-DISK LOADING: Occurs when a business who sells new computers loads illegal copies of software onto the hard disks to make the purchase of the machines more attractive. SOFTWARE COUNTERFEITING: This type of piracy is the illegal duplication and sale of copyrighted material with the intent of directly imitating the copyrighted product. CAUSES OF PIRACY The development of effective strategies in the fight against international piracy necessitates a clear identification of the causes of the phenomenon. The international Chamber of Commerce (ICC) cites the following as the main causes of counterfeiting and piracy (Papadopoulos): A. Rising cost of original software, making them unafordable to a large segment of the population; B. Advances in technology (tools for reproduction of copyright product) making piracy an easy task; C. Low starting cost for pirating; D. Absence or lack of enforcing copyright laws; E. Huge profits can be made easily by pirates; and F. Weak deterrent (fines and prison sentences are minimal). LOSSES DUE TO PIRACY In 1997 worldwide losses due to piracy were as follows (Cole): A. $11.4 billion, according to Software Publishers association (SPA) B. $ 5 billion, according to Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) C. $ 3.2 billion, according to Interactive Digital Software Association (IDSA) Total losses are $19.6 billion (in spite of some overlapping)

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TABLE 1 LOSSES DUE TO PIRACY


YEAR 1993 1997 2003 2004 LOSSES (IN BILLIONS) 12.5 19.6 29.0 33.0 SOURCES SPA SPA, RIAA BSA BSA

As can be seen from Table 1, losses at the international level because of piracy is on the increase. It does not seem that the war on terror and piracy has reduced the losses in 2003 and 2004. To the contrary, the losses increased at a more rapid pace after the events of September 11, 2001. Losses due to piracy in Arab countries accounted for less than one billion dollars during the year 2004. This is only three percent of the total losses at the International level (McDonald and Roberts). DISADVANTAGES OF PIRACY: Piracy has its own disadvantages that are unknown to many populations in third world countries, due to lack of public awareness. They include: A. Lost revenue to the companies and countries involved; B. Increased prices by software companies to compensate for losses; C. Lost jobs wherever software companies have plants; D. Lost domestic and foreign investments; E. Lost trust in the ability of some countries to protect intellectual property; F. Immoral activity condemned by all religions; Illegal activity leading to prosecution; and increased international pressure at the economic level, such as inability to join World Trade Organization (WTO) and facing economic sanctions; business level, by software companies and their associations; and political level, by the United Nations. According to Robert Hollyman, BSA president and chief executive officer, software piracy robs the global economy of hundreds of thousands of jobs and billions of dollars in wages and tax revenues (Holleyman). COMBATING SOFTWARE PIRACY There is a strong push by developed nations (who are major producers of intellectual property) to force developing nations in general, and Arab countries in particular, to improve their enforcement of

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intellectual property rights, despite the fact that they themselves were slow to adopt strong protection of intellectual property during their own development phase. However, developed countries will need to yield some ground to make it worthwhile for developing nations to increase protection of intellectual property (The Intellectual Property Divide). Legislation can only guarantee such protection within the jurisdiction where the laws are in effect; in order to protect an invention or creation in another country, a mutual understanding must be reached between countries. This mutual understanding is expressed in international treaties and directives, and has the binding force of law on the signatory countries. The importance of international agreements grows in an environment of global digital economy, since inadequate intellectual property protection could hinder the import and export of intellectual goods between countries. For this reason, the current worldwide trend is toward harmonizing national laws that award intellectual property protection. International treaties and conventions replace international law and compel signatory nations to enforce minimum standards and intellectual property protection (Hefter). The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Nations, is responsible for administering 23 international treaties that cover various aspects of intellectual property protection. Currently, the number of member States belonging to WIPO stands at 180 (WIPO). In the Middle East, historically, Arab countries have taken a relaxed view of copyright. In many places, intellectual property laws are non-existent or are not enforced. Table 2 shows the rate of piracy in some Arab countries and their rank internationally. The rates are very high in Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon and Morocco. There is some evidence that this attitudeand particularly software piracyhas hampered development in the field of technology. While most of these countries admit that piracy needs to be combated effectively, the level of enforcement is still relatively low. What many of these countries are not grasping is that piracy affects not only music producers and artists, but national economies as a result of lower investment and rising unemployment due to fewer retail activities. Further, investment climate improves considerably when there is full protection of intellectual property rights.

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Table 2 SOFTWARE PIRACY RATE IN SOME ARAB COUNTRIES RANK


8 11 18 21 28 32 35 36 37 38 50 70 Algeria Tunisia Lebanon Morocco Egypt Kuwait Jordan Oman Bahrain Qatar Saudi Arabia United Arab Emirates

COUNTRY

PIRACY RATe
84% 82% 74% 73% 69% 68% 65% 65% 64% 63% 54% 34%

Piracy rate: the number of pirated software units divided by the total number of units put into use (Data is for 2004).

SOURCE: HTTP://WWW.NATIONMASTER.COM/GRAPH-T/CRI_SOF_PIR_RAT

TABLE 3 COPYRIGHT LAWS IN SOME ARAB COUNTRIES COUNTRY Algeria Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Egypt Sudan Bahrain Morocco Oman Qatar Syria United Arab Emirates Saudi Arabia Yemen
SOURCE: UNESCO: ARAB STATES: COLLECTION

Attitudes, however, are beginning to change. The United Arab Emirates has reduced its piracy rate to less than 35 percent, making it the only country in the area with less than a 50 percent rate. The UAE today stands at par with many western European countries in terms of copyright protection and it is, therefore, not surprising that the Emiratesconsidered today as the regions IT hubis winning the war on piracy (Maadad).

YEAR 2003 1999 1999 1999 1994 2000 1993 2000 2000 2002 2001 2002 1994 1994

OF NATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAWS.

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In addition, most Arab countries are adopting legislations to protect intellectual property and fight piracy and enforcing them. Table 3 shows that most Arab countries adopted new copyright laws in the 1990s and early 2000. Some Arab countries, such as Egypt and Lebanon, had previous copyright laws that were adopted as early as 1954. COMBATING TERRORISM Until the events of September 11, 2001, the war on terrorism was not a main concern of the US government, due to the fact that this war was overseas, far away from its borders. It is true that the US used to help other countries in their war against terrorism, but this help was at a low level, including information, intelligence, training, arms supplies, etc. The events of September 11, 2001 changed the whole world. The terrorist attack of Ben Laden and his followers at the heart of the US changed the rules of the game. Suddenly, terrorism became a domestic problem and the main concern of the US. The war on terror became widespread inside the US and around the world. It was not only a military war, but an economic, financial, social, political, and, to some extent, a religious war. In addition to the invasion of Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq, the US decided to use some unconventional methods in its war against terrorism, such as cutting terrorists supply routes, draining terrorists funds, and pressuring countries that remain soft on terrorism to take counter-measures to fight terror. After the September 11, 2001, attacks on the US, the discussion of terrorism, including the need to define it and decide on measures to combat it, has found a prominent place in the international agenda, particularly among the individual states. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, making it binding on all UN member states. It calls on states to adopt wide-ranging measures to combat all terrorist acts. The Council called on States to take steps to suppress the financing of such acts, to refrain from supporting them, and to ensure that those practicing in them are brought to justice (Amnesty). Many countries, including those in the Middle East and North Africa, have intensified measures in the name of efforts of combating terrorism, and in the name of implementing Security Council Resolution 1373. Amnesty International welcomed the determination expressed by the Council in its resolution, but it expressed concern that the terms terrorists and terrorist acts in the resolution are open to widely differing interpretations and therefore may facilitate
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violations of human rights in states that are bound to implement the resolution. Prior to that, the 1998 Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, which was adopted in Cairo by the Council of Arab Ministers of Interior and the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice, was also of concern to Amnesty International. Many such measures, according to Amnesty International, appear to be wide-sweeping and sacrifice guarantees and respect for human rights in the name of the fight against terrorism (Amnesty). THE LINK BETWEEN PIRACY AND TERRORISM: Although the link between software piracy and terrorism was not reported before September 11, 2001, the entertainment industries in the US and Western Europe were hinting at the link between software piracy and organized crimes in all their reports and press releases. John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, addressed the US House Judiciary Committees Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Property oversight hearing entitled International Piracy Links to Organized Crime and Terrorism. Making the link to terrorism, Malcolm said Organized crime syndicates are frequently engaged in many types of criminal enterprises including supporting terrorist activities. Malcolm, however, could not cite any actual case where software piracy was linked to terrorism, but said It would surprise me greatly if the numbers were not large. Turner concluded that just as branding your enemy a communist during the 1950s was a sure fire way of ensuring their downfall, the so-called War on Terror has sparked a modern day witch hunt for terrorist links " (Turner). On July 16, 2003, the Secretary General of Interpol reported that the link between organized crime and counterfeit goods was well established and sounded the alarm that intellectual property crime was becoming the preferred method of funding for a number of terrorist groups. However, he admitted that terrorist financing was difficult to investigate, and this complicates establishing links between IPC and terrorist financing. Furthermore, much of the financing is of an indirect nature and it is difficult to attribute direct links between an individual involved in IPC and funds remitted to a terrorist organization (Noble). Developments since then have reinforced this view, according to the April 6, 2004 report prepared by Interpol Secretary General Roland Noble. (Boliek) But many journalists who reacted to Nobles speech were not convinced of the link between piracy and terrorism. John Lettice, for example, stated that Nobles case boils down to it is possible to state that IPC may become a more important source of illicit

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financing for terrorist groups. He concluded that Nobles sound-bite doesnt mention terrorists, doesnt cover downloads, and is sourced from press reports that were published two and a half years before the press report. He accused Noble of running entertainment industry propaganda (Lettice). The Interpol report prepared for the House Committee on International Relations stated that Intellectual property crimes are a growing resource for terrorist groups from Northern Ireland to the Arab World, including Al-Qaida and Hizbullah. While MPAA president and CEO Jack Valenti said that his organization had no knowledge that funds generated from pirated movies paid for terrorist operations, RIAA president and CEO Mitch Bainwol said he has evidence that some illegal CD plants in Pakistan are financed by a specially designated global terrorist. The terrorist connection is but one of the reasons Washington needs to pressure other states into enacting and enforcing strong anti-piracy laws, executives with the entertainment and software industries told the Committee. In 2004 the world spent more than US$59 billion for commercially packaged PC software. Yet software worth over $90 billion was actually installed. For every two dollars worth of software purchased legitimately, one dollars worth was obtained illegally. These are the results of the 2005 Business Software Alliance (BSA) study of global trends in software piracy, the second conducted by International Data Corporation (IDC), the information technology industrys leading global market research and forecasting firm (BSA). The RIAA has published annual piracy studies showing losses due to piracy since 1990 and claimed that there is a link between piracy and organized crime, but it was not until 2003 that RIAA made the link to terrorism (RIAA Files). Jack Valenti, president and chief executive officer of the Motion Picture association of America (MPAA) in a hearing titled: International Copyright Piracy: A Growing Problem with Links to Organized Crime and Terrorism before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee on Judiciary, House of Representatives made the connection to organized crime and terrorism by stating that piracy and guns go hand in hand. This is an organized crime enterprise ... This is a sniper rifle, M16, heavy weapons, as well as cocaine was there. Wherever we go, we find this connection. In his prepared statement, Valenti found that a lucrative trafficking in counterfeit and pirate products accounts for much of the money the international terrorist network depends on to feed its operations (Valenti).
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RIAAs statistics were under attack by many artists and journalists accusing the association of not telling the truth about their losses. Some even hold the view that the RIAA is presenting a misleading view of CD sales trends to bolster its ongoing war against copyrighted-music pirates. Jane Black, a journalist who covers technology for Business Week Online in New York, stated that RIAAs numbers have been convincing to more than a few policymakers in the US and Canada, leading to what many consider draconian and unfair proposals, regulations, and taxes for people who burn music onto CDs. Black argued that it seems irresponsible for music-industry officials to present these sales statistics as proof that piracy is overwhelmingly responsible for the industrys woes while conveniently ignoring the economic and technological context that puts those numbers in perspective (Black). George Ziemann, a musician has published many responses to RIAAs statistics saying that their numbers do not add up to piracy; that they raise more questions than answers. (Ziemann) He concluded that The RIAA is looking for pirates. They need to look in the mirror. The biggest threat to the recording industry is that they long ago dismissed as insignificant the two elements without which there would be no recording industrythe music and the artists(Ziemann). In 2004 Fred Locklear stated that Methodologies used to gather data and provide piracy damage estimates were criticized in previous studies and many of those concerns are still valid, especially when determining the value of piracy losses. He reacted to PSAs piracy study in 2003, saying that The BSA seems to be confused on where to pin the blame on software piracy, but it may be due to the audience they are trying to influence. Piracy is a global problem and it is hard to pin it down to a single cause (Locklear). This argument questions the real motivation of the entertainment industry and its inflated statistics. It seems that they are trying to convince the Bush administration that terrorist organizations around the world, and especially Al-Qaida, are getting at least some of their funding from the sale of illegally copied intellectual property; and that the huge amount of money lost due to piracy is ending up in the hands of terrorists. THE COUNTER MEASURES The image of heroes, like the Robin Hood syndrome is still alive and well in the Arab world. The people of the Arab world dream of a leader who will come to power and rescue them from poverty, oppression and defeat. Salah El Deen El Ayoubi, known in the West as

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Saladin, and Jamal Abdul Nasser were such heroes. Saladin liberated Jerusalem from the Christian Crusaders in 1187 after he had united the Muslim Nation under his leadership. Nasser came to power in 1952, confiscated lands from the rich and wealthy and distributed them to the poor. He nationalized the Suez Canal and won the war in 1956. His defeat in the 1967 war against Israel did not end his legacy because the people rallied behind him and supported him until his death in 1970. A large number of people in the Arab world see software pirates as heroeslike Robin Hoodwho take money from the large, wealthy software companies and distribute it to the poor by selling them very expensive software for next to nothing. Thanks to software pirates, these people can afford to buy the latest movies, videos, songs, computer programs and computer games for them and their children to enjoy. The war against piracy was seen by many groups in the Arab world as an American and European pressure on their governments to protect Western companies interests. They believe that these companies, with their huge profits, are donating a large amount of money to Israel, who, in turn, is using the money to confiscate more Palestinian lands, build more illegal settlements and expel more people from their country. It is, then, the duty of every Arab to stop or reduce donations to Israel by draining Western companies profit through piracy. The Bush administrations objective in combating terrorism was, not only to go after the terrorists, but also to disrupt their supply routes and drain their funds. This type of war led to the closure of hundreds of charitable organizations in Islamic countries after being accused of supporting terrorism, many of them without any proof of such support. People in the Arab world found it an unjust war fought to deprive Palestinian resistance groups and Islamic charitable organizations of their right to support Palestinian families whose children were resisting Israel occupation. The US and Israel became partners in the war against Palestinian resistance groups by labeling them terrorists and not freedom fighters. The reaction to the unjust war against the Palestinians and the invasion of Iraq lead to the widespread boycotting of American products in the Arab world, and the increase in piracy is a form of retaliation against the US. The increasing number of pirated software confiscated by Arab governments is seen by many Arab groups as a response to American and Western pressure. A large group of people
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were angered by their governments combating piracy because it was seen as bowing to American pressure, and was not in the interest of their country. THE SOLUTIONS In spite of the combined efforts of individual companies, organizations, and law enforcement agencies, the issue of software piracy seems to remain a permanent feature of the marketplace. It is a problem that will not go away, but it can be controlled or curbed to reduce its negative effect on the companies and countries involved. There are some measures that can be taken to reduce piracy and the losses associated with them. These measures involve the US government and its Western allies, the software companies for movies, music, computer games and programs, and the Arab governments. The US government and its Western allies can still pressure Arab governments to enforce copyright laws, combat piracy, and pass harsh sentences and fines on the pirates, but this pressure should be done discreetly. It should not be seen by Arab people as a response to American companies alone, but rather a legitimate interest of the countries involved. The war on piracy should be disassociated from the war on terrorism in the Arab world, because many of the acts that are considered terrorism by the US governments and its Western allies are considered legitimate national resistance by Arab governments and their people. Hezbollah, for example is considered a terrorist organization, but more than 90 percent of the Lebanese people and a great number of Arabs from other countries consider it a legitimate Lebanese National Resistance. Any act of war against Hezbollah will backfire and more Arab groups will rally behind it as retaliation against what they see as an American aggression aimed at fighting Israels war and depriving Lebanon of its own power to resist. The most important step to combat piracy and terrorism in the Arab world is to find a solution to the Palestinian problem, as well as a just and lasting peace between Arab countries and Israel. This solution by itself will significantly reduce the acts of terrorism in the area and around the world; Arab countries can thrive and improve their economic, cultural and financial conditions, and in turn, they can combat piracy and win. Software companies have to take some drastic measures to combat piracy in the Arab world. Instead of complaining, pressuring and portraying themselves as victims of pirates, they have to reduce prices for their products in the Arab world as well as other countries

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in Asia and Africa. Software is expensive, especially in developing countries where the per capita income is much lower. Charging the same price for software in the US, where the average annual income is $37,610, in contrast to a country, such as Egypt, where the average annual income is US$1,390 is not fair or realistic.
TABLE 4 AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME IN SOME ARAB AND WESTERN COUNTRIES -2003 (IN DOLLARS) Country Average Annual Income Non-Oil Producing Countries Sudan 460 Yemen 520 Syria 1160 Egypt 1390 Jordan 1850 Lebanon 4040 Oil-Producing Countries Oman 7830 Saudi Arabia 8530 Bahrain 10840 Qatar 12000 Kuwait 16340 United Arab Emirates 18060 Western Countries France 24770 Germany 25250 United Kingdom 28350 United States 3761
SOURCE: UNICEF (2003) AT: HTTP://WWW.UNICEF.ORG/INFOBYCOUNTRY/

When asked if high prices of legal software might be a factor in piracy, BSA Regional Director Jeffrey Hardee responded If you can afford the hardware, you can afford the software. Bangeman reacted to this response and called it naive and unrealistic because some governments are subsidizing the cost of PCs for their residents. And even buying a cheap, US$300 computer can put a serious crimp on a familys discretionary spending for many people. He concluded that all the IP and copyright laws in the world wont help you sell products if theyre overpriced (Bangeman). Combating piracy without reducing prices for original software is considered a formula for failure. Table 4 shows that most Arab countries average annual income is less than $4,100 with the lowest in Sudan ($460) and the highest in Lebanon ($4,040). Even in the oilrich Arab Gulf States, the average annual income is less than $18,100,
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as compared to Western countries, such as Germany, France, the U.K. and the US. Arab Governments also have to take some drastic measures in order to combat piracy. They have to introduce new copyright laws that involve electronic materials and new legislation to toughen deterrents, such as fines, closures, and prison sentences, and they have be consistent in their enforcement. There should be a public awareness campaign in all the Arab countries media educating people about intellectual property protection and copyright, and the advantages that come with them. Arab people should be made aware of the disadvantages that piracy has on their countries at all levels, especially the economic, financial and political level. They should see the enforcement of copyright laws and the combat against piracy as a fundamental interest to the country itself and not as bowing to American pressure or protecting American interest. Courses on intellectual property protection and copyright laws should also be taught in schools, colleges and universities. Piracy and terrorism are not going to be eliminated or eradicated from the world, but they can be curbed, with the cooperation of the developed, as well as the developing countries. REFERENCES
Amnesty International. January 9, 2002. The Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism: a serious threat to human rights. Available at: h t t p : / / w e b . a m n e s t y . o r g / l i b r a r y / I n d e x / ENGIOR510012002?open&of=ENG-2MD Bangeman, Eric. (May 19, 2005). Software piracy losses rise in 2004. <http:/ /arstechnica.con/news.ars/post/20050519-4942.html> Black, Jane. February 13, 2003, Big Musics Broken Record. <http:// www.businessweek.com/technology/content/feb2003/ tc20030213_9095_PG2_tc078.htm> Boliek, Brooks. June 10, 2004, Interpol IDs piracy link to funding terrorism. <http://hollywoodreporter.com/thr/ article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1000528473> Business Software Alliance,1995. Software Piracy and the Law. <http:// www.bsa.org/bsa/docs/soft_pl.html> .2005.Software Management Guide,<http://www.bsaengineers.com/ downloads/gsmus.pdf> Cole, Brian A. November 5, 1998, Computer Piracy. <http://www.cc.utah.edu/ ~bac2/piracy/paper.html> Hefter, L. R. & Litowitz, R. D. (1995), Protecting Intellectual Property. Washington DC: United States Information Agency. < http://www.usinfo.org/trade/ bg9515e.htm >

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Intellectual Property Holleyman, Robert. May 25, 2005, Piracy of Intellectual Property. <http:// judiciary.senate.gov/print_testimony.cfm?id=1514&wit_id=4304> The Intellectual Property Divide. April 29, 2005, <http://themindtrap.typepad.com/ mindtrap/2005/04/the_intellectua.html> Lea, Graham. October 19, 1999, "MS piracy losses claims dont stack up". http:/ /www.theregister.co.uk/1999/10/19/ms_piracy_losses_claims_dont/ Lettice, John. November 17, 2004, Piracy funds terror, Guardian lesson tells schools. <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/11/17/graun_piracy_lessons/> Locklear, Fred. July 7, 2004, BSA: Piracy losses totaled US$29 billion globally in 2003. <http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20040707-3968.html> Maadad, Sanaa. July 15, 2004, UAE winning the piracy war. <http:// www.khaleejtimes.com/index00.asp> McDonald, Gael and Roberts, Christopher. 2004, Product Piracy: The problem that will not go away. Journal of Product and Brand Management. 03 (4) p.55-65. Noble, Ronald K. July 16, 2003, The links between intellectual property crime and terrorist financing. Public testimony before the U. States House Committee on International Relations.<http://www.interpol.int/Public/ICPO/speeches/ SG20030716.asp> Papadopoulos, Theo. 2004, Pricing and pirate product market formation. Journal of Product Management. 13 (1), p.56-63. Rao, Siriginidi Subba. 2003, Copyright: its implications for electronic information. Online Information Review. 27(4), p.264-275. Recording Industry Association of America. 2004, RIAA Files Statistics ,19902004, <http://www.azoz.com/riaa/> Software Publishers Association,1995, SPA Anti-Piracy Backgrounder. <http://www.spa.org/piracy/pi_back.htm.> Turner, Adam. March 21, 2003, Software piracy funding terrorism. <http:/ /www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/21/1047749921225.html.> UNESCO. May 13, 2005, Arab States: Collection of national copyright laws. <http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php> Valenti, Jack. March 13, 2003, International Copyright Piracy: Links to Organized Crime and Terrorism. Testimony before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property. US House of Representatives. <http:// www.mpaa.org/MPAApress/2003/2003_03_13B.htm> WIPO general information. 2004, Member states as at March 31, 2004. <http:// www.patent-scope.net/freepublications/en/general/400/wipo_pub_400.pdf > Ziemann, George. December 11, 2002, RIAAs Statistics Dont Add Up to Piracy. <http://www.azoz.com/music/features/0008.html> Ziemann, George. March 12, 2003, RIAA-Repent, the End is near.<http:// www.azoz.com/news/2002stats.html>

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Who am I without Exile?: on Mahmd Darwshs Later Poetics of Exile


Yahir Huri, Ph.D. Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Beer Sheva, Israel yahirhuri@bgu.ac.il
Who am I after these paths of exodus? I own a boulder that bears my name on a tall bluff overlooking what has come to an end. Seven hundred years escort me beyond the city walls. Time turns around in vain to save my past from a moment that gives birth to the history of my exile in others and in myself.
Mahmd Darwsh, Be a String, Water, to my Guitar

Our eyes and ears refused obedience the princes of our senses proudly chose exile
Zbigniew Herbert, The Power of Taste

Writing is impossible without some kind of exile


Julia Kristeva

ommenting some thirty years ago on Muhwala Raqam 7

(Attempt Number 7, 1973), one of Mahmd Darwshs earliest collections of exile poems, Palestinian literary critic Ysuf alYsuf wrote:
Exile, banishmentthese are the objective realities that are the topics of Mahmd Darwshs investigation in his most recent collection, Attempt Number 7. In striving to grasp the external dimension of the subject, he is really aiming to gain an artistic grasp on this exile once it has managed to penetrate into his inner self as a result of everyday experience [] in this collection, Darwsh is not merely reflecting and embodying disaster; he is embodying his own sense of calamity in that the Arab people in general have not been able to transcend the disaster. Put in a different way, he is stunned by our present circumstances after becoming acquainted with them at first hand, penetrating their innermost secrets and being affected by them in a direct fashion.1

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Darwsh, often labeled the national poet of Palestine, has long been acknowledged as one of the paradigmatic poets of exile in modern Arabic poetry. Exile, as Ysuf notes, is indeed a persistentsome would say obsessivetheme in Darwshs artistic writings. It would scarcely be an exaggeration to aver that the vision that forms the core of the Darwshs thematics and gives unity to a work that is diverse in its literary references, complex in its imagery and language, often unconventional in its syntax and varied in its generic structures is a result of his experience of exile. Nevertheless, I would like to maintain that while Ysufs above assertion is certainly true for Darwshs early exile poems, it is not entirely applicable in the case of his later literary exilic output. In what follows, I have focused on the theme of exile in Darwshs later work, concentrating most on a critical reading of his poem Man An Dna Manfa? (Who am I without Exile?), included in his volume Sarr al-Gharba (The Strange Womans Bed, 1999). By considering closely the panoply of intertextual and intratextual references in this poem and others, the article attempts to examine the relationship between Darwshs strategies of selfdefinition and his treatment of the literary motifs of displacement and exile. In his Literature and Exile, David Bevan postulates that:
Both theorists and exiled themselvesof whatever kindhave long debated whether the experience is predominantly one that invigorates or mutilates. For some, undoubtedly, the sense of release, of critical distance, of renewed identity, of fusion or shock of cultures and even of languages, is interpreted as productive, generating a proposition that originality of vision must almost necessarily derive from the transgressing and transcending of frontiers. However, for others, physical displacement means rather rejection, alienation, anguish and, quite possibly, suicide.2

Indeed, traditional criticism of exile writing has tended to analyze these works according to a binary logic, where exile both produces creative freedom and enables the artist to retain a degree of critical detachment or it traps him in restrictive nostalgia. But things are not so clear-cut as far as Darwshs later poetry is concerned. Although the pain of displacement and dispossession is evident in Darwshs early treatment of exile, his later exilic poems, I would suggest, signals that the poet sees the experience of exile as an opportunity in which we he can forge a new kind of consciousness that will be able to gain creative impetus even though it is plagued by pain, fear, doubt and fear. As numerous literary scholars have pointed out, the Latin exilium

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relate to the Latin verb salire to leap or spring. Already within the Latin etymology of the term we find the contradictory notions of exile as a movement forward and also a painful separation. The later Darwsh is keenly aware of the complexities involved in the notion of exile, and his later verse dexterously responds to these complexities. The search for a stable identity, Paul Tabori observed in his seminal study, The Anatomy of Exile, is an integral part of exile itself,3 and my contention here is that Darwshs poem demonstrates how the poets cognitive mapping, to use Fredric Jamesons coinage4, is expanding outwardly, or, stated differently, to show how the exiled poets perceptions are no longer bounded by the traditional binary divisions of homeland/exile, rootedness/ strangeness, and so on. One finds that rather than favor one side of the binary, many of Darwshs later exilic texts actually present both sides of these dialectics in irresolvable tension. Thus, Darwshs later literary exilic output should not be read simply as representative of the longing of the exile, but as a more complicated performance which aims at both insisting on seeing a positive aspect in the exilic experience (The land is not constantly alienating, as he declared in one of his recent poems5) and undermining the idea that identity, whether national or personal, is fixed. In his essay, Nostalgia and Exile, Nol Valis rightly notes that:
The physical act of exile is such a brutal uprooting and displacement that it is bound to produce, not only the most obvious kinds of material changes in the lives of individuals and societies, but other, more subtle changes. These displacements of the human heart are inseparably tied to the complex emotions which are the aftermath of exile. Exile, in other words, creates a structure of feeling which is not static or timeless, but historically unstable and subject to shifts in time and space.6

Indeed, exile poetry is a category that takes different forms of poetic expression in Darwshs oeuvre, and whilst his seventies and some of his eightiespoems are indeed imbued with the grief of dislocation and dispossession, his later exilic poems reveal a more ambivalent attitude towards physical displacement. In these later poems, Darwsh defines himself his encounters, his dialoguesthrough the dynamic language of exile. Central to the image of the poet as a transcultural migrant, is the complex, even contradictory relationship with his
A stranger on the banks of the river, like the river... Water Ties me to your name. Nothing returns me from my distance To my palm tree: not peace nor war. Nothing Brings me into the book of gospels. Nothing...

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Nothing glows from the coast of ebb And flow between the Tigris and the Nile. Nothing Brings me down from Pharaohs chariots. Nothing Carries me or makes me carry an idea: not yearning Nor promise. What shall I do? What Shall I do without exile and a long night Peering at water? Water Ties me To your name... Nothing takes me from the butterflies of my dream To my reality: not dust and not fire. What Shall I do without the flowers of Samarqand? What Shall I do in a town square which polishes the singers with its oonstones? We have become as light as our houses In the distant winds. We have become friends with the strange Creatures between the clouds... and we have been let loose from The gravity of the land of our identity. What shall we do? What Shall we do without exile and a long night Peering at water? Water Ties me To your name... Nothing is left of me except you, and nothing is left of you Except a stranger caressing the thigh of his strange one: O Stranger! What shall we make of what is left for us Of quiet... and a siesta between two myths? And nothing carries us: not the road nor home. Was this road the same from the very beginning, Or was it that our dreams found a horse among the Mongols Horses on the hill and traded us off? And what shall we do? What Shall we do Without Exile? 7

Perhaps a good starting point would be to consider Edward Saids view on Darwshs poetry. Darwshs distinctiveness as a poet, Said notes, resides in his reluctance to provide the reader with a simple closure: Darwshs work, Said contends, amounts to an epic effort to transform the lyrics of loss into the indefinitely postponed drama of return. The pathos of exile is in the loss of contact with the solidity and the satisfaction of earth: homecoming is out of the question.8 Darwsh, he claims, encapsulates the fundamental, essential dimensions of the exilic experience: Fragments over wholes. Restless nomadic activity over the settlements of held territory. Criticism over resignation [] Attention, alertness, focus. To do as others do, but somehow to

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stand apart. To tell your story in pieces, as it is.9 Indeed, the complex and precarious relationship between the speaker and his homeland are revealed from the poems outset, an outset which establishes the tone of proceeding lines and, in fact, of the whole poem. The addressees identity, as in many of Darwshs poems, is vague and unclear. In his early poetry, Darwshs conflation of woman and homeland and the feminization of the land served as a prevailing poetic device that was exploited by the poet for various purposes throughout the poem, as Egyptian literary critic Raj' alNaqqsh points out in his account of Darwshs celebrated poem A Lover from Palestine (1966):
The poet talks about his beloved, but we soon realize that he is moving from his beloved to his homeland. Then he combines the two, but we do not feel that his beloved is in anyway separate from his homeland [] the talk is of love, but it is a love that is sad and wounded, as is everything in a sad and wounded country. 10

Or as Nasser Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb assert in their introduction their anthology of Palestinian poetry:
This attachment to the land is an affirmation of identity against persistent attempts by the colonial settler state to rob him of such identity by expropriating more and more of his land. Through this affirmation, a new meaning emerges from the use of the word Palestine. It is not only the homeland of those poets; it is also their land threatened by government takeover. Still a third dimension is added when their love for a woman is identified with their love for the land and for Palestine. The merging of the three concepts is exemplified in the poetry of Mamd Darwsh, A Lover from Palestine [] the land like the woman and the homeland, becomes a symbol of dignity, life, and the future: a symbol of humanity and manhood. The merging of these three is an act of resistance and a declaration of opposition.11

But in this collection, and especially in the poem discussed here, it seems that the exilic space is what assumes the role of the lover/homeland. The poet is now tied up, to use Darwshs words, to a place far away from his homeland. Despite the fact that the speaker defines himself as a stranger, he nonetheless affirms that nothing will bring him back from his distance to his palm tree, to the coast of ebb and flow, between the Tigris and the Nile. To him, the decision has nothing to do with the political situation (not peace nor war) in his homeland; it is a resolution of an individual who insists not to let longing become the decisive factor in his selfmaking as an exile. In the next lines the speaker identifies himself with Moses through an intertextual reference to a story included in the genre of Qisas al-Anbiya' (Stories of the Prophets) in

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which Moses is portrayed as a stranger in an unknown city, welcomed by no one: When Moses grew up, he used to ride the chariots of Pharaoh and to wear whatever Pharaoh was wearing. He was called Moses the Son of Pharaoh. One time, Pharaoh was riding his chariot without Moses and when Moses came he was told: Pharaoh had already ridden away. He then rode after him and caught up with him in midday sleep time at a land called Menf. He entered in the middle of the day, when its markets were closed and no one was to be seen in the roads.12 Identifying with the figure of Moses, Darwshs speaker affirms that he wishes to stay on his chariot, entering exilic spaces in which he feels displaced and estranged. In his eyes, homelessness as home paradox allows him to celebrate the jouissance of transitoriness. A sophisticated and mature poet, Darwsh is also acutely aware of the pitfalls of exilic writing, the most common of which is nostalgia, or as Valis puts it in his aforementioned essay:13
Nostalgia and exile are not synonymous. Yet they are often associated together because we think of the experience of exile as steeped in feelings of nostalgia. Thus, nostalgia is seen as an effect of exile. Indeed, the two terms share certain things in common: they are stories of loss and memory, and they are about home, or what passes for home, for the things and persons which centre us in our private and public lives. Nostalgia originally meant homesickness, only later becoming identified with vague feelings of longing. Exile (exsilium) was banishment, expulsion from ones home, and was later extended metaphorically to the very place of exile. Exile could, in this regard, be seen as a form of nostalgia; the reverse could also be argued: each is conditioned by absence. But to collapse the two notions together poses certain difficulties. First, it presupposes that we know exactly what nostalgia is, and what exile is. Second, it suggests that these are stable concepts, immune to historical or cultural changes. And finally, equating the two terms places them in the same category of mental experiences.

Being highly conscious of the danger of blindly associating exile with nostalgia, Darwsh knowingly and deliberately separates between the two by pronouncing: Nothing carries me or makes me carry an idea: not yearning, nor promise, and concluding the stanza with the recurring line: What shall I to do, then? What shall I do without exile and a long peering at water? This question, that was once unthinkable, is a question that the speaker can finally ask, notes the critic Mohja Kahf in her short review of Darwshs collection.14 To the speaker, then, exile seems to become an

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integral component of the poetic self. Darwsh further articulates this view in the second stanza. The stanzas opening lines refer intratextually to the following lines from his poem Faras lilGharb (A Horse for the Stranger), included in his volume Ahada 'Ashara Kawkaban (Eleven Stars, 1992):
Not one bird is left in our voice to fly to Samarkand or any other city for time is shattered and so is our language15

Samarkand, a symbol of the glorious past of the Arabs in Darwshs earlier poems, a place to which the poet cannot reach, becomes in this poem a symbol for the exilic space: a distant, remote yet desired space, a space which makes him feel outside the reach of the gravity of the Land of Identity, to use the words of the poem. This perpetual condition of in-betweenness, of mentally being connected to both homeland and heritage yet at the same time to resolutely define oneself as an exile, is pretty well exactly the condition that critic Nolle Burgi-Golub attempts to examine in his study. Burgi-Golub argues that one consequence of being in between means that one must rethink his relations both to the place of origin and also the destination. Exile, Burgi-Golub argues, necessarily throws light on how one relates to the place in defining who he himself is; and as a condition it activates the imagination in pursuing the reconstitution of the self.16 This reconstitution of the exilic self comes to the fore even more strongly in the third stanza. The speaker rejects the attempts to idolize the past and rather wishes to take a leave of the mythicization of the past, a siesta between two myths. This is a poetic expression of Darwshs notion that the one of the exiles crucial tasks is to liberate his geographical and human space from the pressure of myths.17 Here, the conflation of exile and woman is embodied already in the way the speaker intimately refers to his much-loved partner: Nothing is left of me except you and nothing is left of you except mea stranger caressing the thigh of his strange one He then concludes by reaffirming his state of inbetweenness and asserting the futility of both longing for a lost homeland and exilic wandering: And nothing carries us: not the road nor home. In the penultimate lines of the stanza, the poet uses yet another intratextual reference to a line from his poem Hudna Ma 'al-Maghl Amm Ghbat al-Sindiyn (A Truce With the Mongols in Front of the Oak Trees Forest), included in his volume Ar M Urd (I See What I Want, 1990):
The Mongols wants us to become what they wish for us to become: a handful of dust blow on China or Persia.18

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The speaker here is keenly aware of the vicissitudes of the exilic trajectory: Was this road the same from the very beginning? Here, the Mongols (a symbol of the occupier/conqueror?), which were previously depicted by the poet as a callous enemy who wishes to wipe out the identity of the poet and his people, are also those who now embrace the poets old dreams of returning: was it that our dreams found a horse among the Mongols horses on the hill, and trade us off? The speaker thus decides not to pursue these old dreams but rather to again conclude the stanza and the poem with the recurring line: And what are we to do, then? What are we to do without exile? Wandering without a fixed home, dwelling at the crossroads of the world, bearing on a sense of being and difference all become the defining factors of Darwshs poetic self. Exile, the poet realizes, can be either productive and empowering or fruitless and disabling. Even if it results in loss, it also inspires the need to recover (or create) origins through an intense and continuous self-searching. A tale of exile in broad outline, as numerous critics have pointed out, recounts a rite of passage: it is a process of symbolic transition that involves stages of separation, marginality and reaggregation. The loss of homeland in its geographical meaning creates the emergence of a new homeland. For Darwsh, as for many artists in exile, writing becomes the poets new homeland and displacement an important factor in his aesthetic make-up. Distance gives perspective, Andrew Gurr observes in his Writers in Exile, and for exiles it is the prerequisite for freedom in their art.19 Exile, Gurr further claims, creates a kind of isolation which is the nearest thing to freedom which the twentieth century artist is likely to attain.20 In two different places, while tackling the issue of exile and creativity, exiled author and essayist Salman Rushdie notes that:
the word translation comes, etymologically, from the Latin for bearing across. Having been borne across the world, we are translated men. It is normally supposed that something always gets lost in translation. I cling, obstinately, to the notion that something can also be gained. 21 migration [] offers us one of the richest metaphors of our age. The very word metaphor, with its roots in the Greek word for bearing across, describes a sort of migration, the migration of ideas into images. Migrantsborne-across-humansare metaphorical beings in their very essence.22

Reading Darwshs recent exilic poems, it seems that Gurr and Rushdies propositions certainly hold true for the Palestinian poet. Even though a tone of sadness is hovering above the poem,

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the speaker nonetheless feels that his whole being is subsumed under the experience of exile, but he now sees it as the generous exile (al-Manfa al-Sakhiyy) as he refers to it in a different place in the collection. In the following lines from the prefatory poem of Sarr al-Gharba, entitled Kna Yanqusuna Hadir (We Were Missing a Present). Viewing exile as an ambivalent environment that wavers between pain and jouissance, the poet feels that he can positively relate to the exilic mode and further asks his beloved to wholeheartedly accept this present:
Not long now, there will be another present. If you look back youll only see, Behind you, places of exile: Your bedroom The courtyard willow, The river behind buildings made of glass And the coffee house of our rendezvous. All, all Are turning into an exile. May we be well... What we needed was a present, to see Where we are. Lets go then as we are An unfettered woman And an old friend Let us go our separate ways together Let us then go together And may we be well!23,24

These lines constitute Darwshs sense of being-in-theworld, to use a Heideggerian term.25 In his aforementioned Anatomy of Exile, Paul Tabori cites the exiled Polish poet Jzef Witllin as stating the exile lives in two different times simultaneously in the present and in the past.26 Witllin suggests that the exile lives in the present of his country of exile and in the past of his native land. The exile is exiled from the present time of his native land. Such a condition heightens the exiles remembrance of the past and creates a great nostalgia. He further posits that the exiles time is only the past, insofar as the exile dwells in nostalgic melancholy unable to engage with the present in any manner whatsoever. This is the condition from which Darwshs speaker wishes to break. The present that the speaker and his beloved were missing, because of their dwelling in the past, is now embodied in the form of exile; but now is a present that is celebrated rather than mourned, despite the pain it carries with it: What we needed was a present, to see where we are .... Let us then go together and may we be well. Exilic space, in the poets eyes, is not merely a geometric space to be described objectively, that it may be considered independent of the human beings who inhabit it.

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Fall 2006

Rather, the speakers personal sense of spatiality constitute a notion of space which is intimately linked to him, so much so that it would not make sense to talk about space without considering how it is connected to him. Finally, and in an effort to represent the universally alienated quality of exile, the above lines implicitly express the poets notion that exile and homelessness are the everpervasive and irrevocable conditions not only of his lifes work but also of our world: All, all are turning into exile. Exile is not a geographic state. I carry it everywhere, Darwsh once declared27; and as an artist fully steeped in the experience of exile, he continued to express, indeed to affirm his celebratory sense of exile in his poetry collections that were published in the recent years. The poets predilection toward this existential state of being is given voice in the beginning of his poem L Yandhurna Warahum (They Dont Look Back), included in his most recent collection L Tatazir Amm Faalta (Do Not Apologize for What You Did, 2004). This segment of the poem expresses not only the poets own destiny but the Palestinian destiny in general.
They dont look back to bid exile farewell, for in front of them there is another exile, they now know the circular way: there is neither front nor back, neither north nor south.28

Our truest reality is expressed in the way we cross over from one place to another, Edward Said notes in his study of Palestinian exile, we are migrants and perhaps hybrids in, but not of, any situation in which we find ourselves. This is the deepest continuity of our lives as a nation in exile and constantly on the move.29 A peripatetic wanderer, the poet assumes the role of an outside observer who attempts to define the life of exiles. By so doing, he obliquely aligns himself with this group of people for whom homelessness is the only home state, for whom exile is the only stable condition they know. In the speakers eyes, exile is a circular way that leads to another exile; in such a condition, there can be no talk about an obvious or clear reality; the only thing that is certain for the displaced individual is the omnipresence of exile. Such lines enact a poetic strategy of diversion away from themes of loss and dispossession. The poets awareness of the ubiquity of exile and determination not to be trapped in a state of perpetual liminality between identities, is given a clear and distinct voice in his poem Tunsa Ka 'annaka Lam Takun (You Will be Forgotten as if You Have Never Been), included in the same

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volume. Here, we find the poet, the creative avatar of the exilic condition, blatantly exclaims:
I belong to the road; there there are those whose steps follow my steps, those who will follow me till I reach my vision. Those who will recite poetry in praise of exiles gardens, in front of the house, free from the worship of yesterday30

Exile is marked, Said observes, by the sheer fact of isolation and displacement, which produces the kind of narcissistic masochism that resists all efforts at amelioration, acculturation, and community. At this extreme, Said cautions, the exile can make a fetish of exile, a practice that distances him or her from all connections and commitments.31 But here, it seems that the poet is completely aware of this hazardous side-effect of exile, but nonetheless strives to disconnect himself from past attachments, from the worship of yesterday, and to defiantly praise exile. Without experiencing a sense of disorientation and dislocation, as Darwshs speaker obliquely implies, one remains a prisoner of banality. To recite poetry in praise of exiles gardens, to gain imaginative sustenance from exile, is now what the poet struggles for. It is at this point, when the speaker declares that he is no longer bound to yesterday that he comes to terms with the stranger within him. This is the end of the process described by Julia Kristeva in her Strangers to Ourselves:
A stranger inhabits us: it is the hidden face of our identity, the space that ruins our resting place, the movement where understanding and instinctive fellow feeling become swallowed up. Recognizing the stranger within ourselves, we are spared from hating him in himself. A symptom which renders precisely the we problematic, perhaps impossible, the stranger begin when the awareness of my difference arises and reaches its completion when we acknowledge ourselves all to be strangers, unnamable to ties and communities.32

Before ending the article, I think there is a last question to be answered: is exilic space to be extolled only for enabling the poet to branch out to broad and universal vistas? Reading Darwshs later exile poetry, few will fail to notice that exile is praised not only for constituting a creative, invigorating and liberating space that enables him to reconcile the uneasy alliance between his emotional and displaced selves. Not willing to be umbilically connected to the past is also to resist the enemys continuous attempt to turn poet into an identity-deprived individual by assuming that exile inevitably strips the displaced individual of a firm and clear sense of self. This is how literary critic Claudio Guilln puts it in his essay on exile and literature:

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Even when the causes of banishment were political, its consequences were frighteningly cultural, for to be expelled from the center of the circle amounted to the danger of being hurled into the void or doomed to non-being.33

By taking delightmentally and artisticallyin exile, the poet therefore constructs an alternative, albeit highly crystallized, identityan identity which foils the enemys attempts to annihilate the poets selfhood. Perhaps the following lines, taken from an essay on literature and exile by the exiled Argentinean writer and critic Julio Cortzar, best delineate this notion:
And if exiles also opted to think of their exile as positive? [] I believe it is more necessary than ever to convert exiles negativitywhich confirms the enemys triumpinto a new take on reality, a reality based on values rather than nonvalues, a realty that the writers specific work can make positive and efficient, completely inverting the adversarys program and moving ahead in a manner that the opponent could not have imagined.34

Notes
1

al-Ysuf, Ysuf . Muhwala Raqam 7 li-Mahmd Darwsh, in Al-Adb 22, November, 1974, p. 24. The English translation is taken from: Roger Allen (ed.), Modern Arabic Literature. New York: The Ungar Publishing Company, 1987, p.88. 2 Bevan, David. Literature and Exile. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1990, p.4. 3 Tabori, Paul. The Anatomy of Exile: A Semantic and Historical Study. London: George Harrap, 1972, p.37. 4 Jameson, Fredric. Cognitive Mapping, in Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg (ed.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Urbana/ Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988. 5 Darwsh, Mahmd. LTatazir Amm Faalta London: Riya al-Rayyis, 2004, p.29. 6 Valis, Nol. Nostalgia and Exile, in Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies, 1/2, 2000, p.117-8. 7 Darwsh, Mahmd. Sarir al-Ghariba. London: Riyad-al-Rayyis, 1999, p.112-115. 8 Said, Edward. Reflections on Exile and Other Essays (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 179. 9 ___________. After the Last Sky: Palestinian Lives. London: Vintage, 1986, p.150. 10 Cited in: Allen, p.84. 11 Aruri, Nasser and Edmund Ghareeb (eds.), Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance Poetry. Washington,D.C.: Drum and Spear Press, 1970, xxxiv-xxxv. See also Helena Linholm Shultzs, The Palestinian Diaspora. London: Routledge, 2003, p.102: Shultz notes that in Darwshs early woman/land poems Palestine is represented either as

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PoetryPolitics beloved woman (wife, mistress) or the comforting, consoling mother, thus representing passion and romance as well as safety and protection. 12 al-Jazir, Nimat Allah. Al-Nr al-Mubn fi Qirat al Anbiya walMursaln. Ab ab: Dr al-Faqh, 2002, p.229. 13 Valis, p.117. 14 Kahf, Mohja.Mahmoud Darwich: Le lit de letrangere, in World Literature Today. January 2002, p.109. 15 Darwsh, Mahmd. Dwn Mahmd Darwsh. Beirut: Dr al-Awda, 1994,v.2, p.555. 16 Burgi-Golub, Nolle. Emotion as a Dimension of Ethical and Moral Motivation, in Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences 10(4), 1997, p.4334. 17 An interview with the poet in: Al-Quds al-Arab, 5.4.,2002, p.16. 18 Darwsh, op. cit., p.407. 19 Gurr, Andrew. Writers in Exile: The Identity of Home in Modern Literature. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1981, p.17. 20 Ibid. 21 Rushdie, Salman. Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 19811991. London: Granta Books, 1991, p.17. 22 Ibid, p.278. 23 Darwsh, 1999, p.12, 17. 24 The English translation is taken from: Margaret Obank & Samuel Shimon (ed.). A Crack in the Wall: New Arab Poetry. London: Saqi Books, 2000, p.80-82. 25 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1962. 26 Tabori, p.23. 27 Darwsh, Mamd. When My Country is Free, I Can Curse it, in The Arab American News, 21.6.2002, p.18. 28 Darwsh ,2004, p.21. 29 Said, 1986, p.164. 30 Darwsh, 2004, p.73. 31 Said, 2000, p.183. 32 Kristeva, Julia. trangers nous-mmes. Paris: Fayard, 1988, p.9. 33 Guilln, Claudio.The Writer in Exile or the Literature of Exile and Counter-Exile, in Books Abroad 50. Spring 1976, p.275. 34 Cortzar, Julio. Obra Critica 3, Madrid: Punto De Lectur, 1994. p.167-8.

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Comparative Poetry

The Political Poetry of Le Roi Jones (Amiri Baraka) and Mudhafar AlNawwab: a Comparative Perspective
Saddik M.Gohar, Ph.D. saddik59@yahoo.com United Arab Emirates University
A BSTRACT This paper critically examines selected texts from the political poetry of the African American poet, Le Roi Jones (Amiri Baraka) and the dissident Iraqi poet, Mudhafar Al-Nawwab, in order to underline the radical aesthetics operative in their poetry and emphasize their condemnation of the hegemonic forces which attempted to dominate the African American community and the Arab World. Illuminating common areas of interest that link these two poets together, the paper explores their attitudes toward the aggressive and inhuman policies advocated by racist and repressive agencies in the United States and the Arab World which sought to brutalize their nations. The paper also illustrates their points of view toward major issues such as oppression, struggle, and identity, in addition to their efforts to revolutionize the collective consciousness of African American and Arab people at times of national crises and political turmoil.

n Comparative Literature, its Definition and Function, Henry Remak points out that comparative literature is the comparison of one literature with another or others and the comparison of literature with other spheres of human expression (p.3). Rene Wellek also argues that comparative literature will flourish only if it shakes all artificial limitations and becomes simply the study of literature (p.13) from a comprehensive perspective that incorporates national and world literature and employs the methods of both literary history and literary criticism (p.22). Further, Clayton Koelb and Susan Noakes state that comparative literature emphasizes the significance of understanding literary texts in relation to other languages and cultures to inform the comparative perspective today (p.17). Taking into consideration the above-cited definitions and Rene

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Remaks observation that the major function of comparative literature is to give scholars, teachers, students and readers a better, more comprehensive understanding of literature as a whole (p.10), this paper explores new territory in American and Arabic literatures by analyzing selected texts from the political poetry of Le Roi Jones (Amiri Baraka) and Mudhafar Al-Nawwab in order to open new horizons and pave the way for further research in comparative literature. For Baraka and Al-Nawwab, the postWorld War II era was a significant period that witnessed dramatic developments on the socio-political level which had a great impact on the life of their people in the African American community in the United States, as well as in the Arab World. Like Baraka, who was enraged by the racist American policies toward blacks during the 1960s, AlNawwab was agonized by the tragic consequences integral to the Palestinian tragedy, which culminated after the 1967 war with Israel. This defeat, which resulted in the occupation of the remaining Palestinian territories in Eastern Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula, triggered Al-Nawwabs feelings of hate and anger toward the dictatorial Arab regimes responsible for the defeat, as well as other catastrophic events that have left a damaging impact upon the Arab psyche and collective memory. Due to the dramatic developments in the Arab World in the post-war era and the increasing racism and violence against blacks in America during the 1960s, Al-Nawwab and Baraka were forced to come to terms with the new realities in their societies. Therefore, both of them used their poetry as a weapon in their struggle against the hegemonic forces that attempted to crush the ambitions of their people. Baraka and Al-Nawwab developed a radical poetics of anger in order to awaken the consciousness of the black and Arab masses and move them toward revolution against representatives of hegemony and oppression. Due to its inflammatory rhetoric and severe criticism of Arab rulers, Al-Nawwabs poetry is still banned in many Arab countries. However, it has been secretly circulated all over the Arab World; its famous lines are memorized by the young generation of Arab intellectuals. Like the poetry of Baraka, Al-Nawwabs poetry has gained wide reputation in the Arab region as it embodies the frustrations, and ambitions of a nation cursed with repressive regimes and damaged by feelings of humiliation. As a voice of resistance and struggle, Al-Nawwab identifies his own exilic experience inside and outside Iraq with the tragedy

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of the Palestinians living in Arab ghettoes inside Israel, or in the ghettoes of the Diaspora. Seeing no difference between the policies of Arab rulers who brutalize their own people and the Zionist policies which seek to annihilate the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, Al-Nawwab writes poetry which is a criticism of Arab governments as much as an attack against racist Israeli policies in the occupied territories. Attempting to express his view toward the national cause of his own people in Iraq, Al-Nawwab was subjected to torture, persecution and displacement. Like Baraka, who was arrested and jailed as a result of writing political poetry which urged black people to protest against the inhuman practices of the white American police forces during the 1960s, Al-Nawwab was brutalized in Iraqi and Iranian prisons because of his ideological beliefs. As an Iraqi poet descended from a Shiite family, Al-Nawwab suffered from alienation and exile in his homeland and in the Diaspora. He was also exiled from his homeland when the village of his birth, AlAhwaz, located on the Iranian/Iraqi border, was annexed to Iran during the era of colonization. Afterwards, he was cast out of Iraq due to his political commitments and opposition to the oppressive policies of the Iraqi regimes in the postWorld War II era. In The Way to the Other Tent (Al-Tariq Ela Al-Khaymati AlOkhra) (1), Radwa Ashour states: When the revolutionary intellectual in Third World countries comes to terms with the suffering of his nation which is attributed to the damaging impact of the imperialistic legacy, he becomes committed to sacrificing himself for the sake of his nation. In all cases, he learns from the experiences of his own people and from those of the people all over the world how to be a revoloutionary like Guevara, Cabral and Kanafani. In the same study, Ashour argues that the literary works which have emerged in Third World countries during eras of national liberation were not concerned with subjective issues, but were reflections of the collective pain of the people. Ashour also points out that the tragedy of Palestine is embodied in the plight of its people, particularly the poor classes; therefore it was the poor who advocated revolution from the beginning. The poor Palestinians have always been pioneers in resistance and believers in revolution and they constituted the first group that was engaged in armed struggle against the enemy. Obviously, the poor classes occupy a central position in the poetic world of Baraka and Al-Nawwab who have devoted their poetry to reflect the ambitions and frustrations of the masses.

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Their poetry, as a whole, endeavored to reveal the moral bankruptcy of the repressive and hegemonic agencies that attempted to castrate their people in the United States and the Arab World. In response to the dramatic consequences in the Arab World and the black community in America, Al-Nawwab and Baraka were forced to turn their poetry into weapons against the agents of tyranny and oppression who seek to brutalize their people. In Watariyyat Layliyya (Night Lyrics), Al-Nawwab severely attacked contemporary Arab rulers who betrayed the Palestinians, turning the Arab World into a brothel and paving the way for Western imperialistic countries to plunder Arab wealth and natural resources. Lambasting the Arab rulers and policy makers for their failure to fulfill the dreams and ambitions of their people, Al-Nawwab employs sarcasm and artistic obscenity as an integral part of poetics addressed to the masses all over the Arab World. Describing a region governed by dictatorial regimes and repressive governments, Al-Nawwab depicts the Arab countries as a complex web of adjacent prisons. In Night Lyrics he says: this homeland which extends from the Arabian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean is made up of prisons. Through many years of oppression and tyranny, every Arab ruler has turned his country into a private prison where the citizens are kept as prisoners and the regimes agents are used as the prison guards. In spite of the gloomy tone of Al-Nawwabs poetry the poets works are characterized by a sense of humor which aims to reduce the tension of a reader confronted with the absurd and tragic realities of Arab life. In his poetry, Al-Nawwab draws all the Arab rulers in caricature in order to satirize them and expose their ignorance, impotence and lack of initiative and political will. Incorporating political jokes and literary obscenities, Al-Nawwab attempted to strip them of the false veneer of solemnity which they have acquired after remaining in power for ages. In other words, Al-Nawwabs poetry tried to debunk the image of the Arab rulers by creating a counter narrative which aimed to subvert the false narrative of a hypocritical, government-controlled media which has turned these dictators into idols and demi-gods. Instead of demonizing them, Al-Nawwab preferred to expose them to the public opinion, by transforming them into a laughing stock: A very patriotic Sultan/ who has never had any relationship with Great Britain/ He is completely different from his tyrannical daddy/ He has always been dedicated to democracy since the day of his birth/

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because of his democratic commitments/ he, thanks to Allah, is finally able to wear slippers and put on sunglasses (Night Lyrics, 5). Apparently, the young Sultan in Al-Nawwabs poem sequence is as tyrannical as his father. Like his father, the young Sultan is a puppet in the hands of England and other imperialistic countries. The only difference between the father and the son is the formers reluctance to wear slippers or shoes as a result of being brought up in a desert environment. Thus, the young Sultans contribution to his country and the Arab World, according to Al-Nawwabs satirical poem, is his ability not only to wear slippers but also to put on sunglasses as a false manifestation of modernity and advancement. In this context the poet sarcastically underlines the reactionary attitudes of Arab rulers and the false modernity of their successors. Moreover, Al-Nawwab uses folkloric and pornographic jokes to satirize the lazy Arab kings who seem to be ignorant of what is transpiring around them. For example, in Night Lyrics, he says: Long live the Arab king, long live the king of gases. In spite of its obscenity, Al-Nawwabs poetic satire still has a purgative function on the psychological level, as well as an illuminating function on the political level. Blending satire with humor, Al-Nawwabs poetry, which criticizes Arab tyrants, dictators, conspirators and impotent rulers who have betrayed the Palestinian cause, is characterized by what may be described as satiric relief. Because Al-Nawwabs poems about the Arab World involve a great deal of tension, pessimism, pain and psychological pressure, lampooning, satire and obscenities are manipulated as a means of relief and purgation. In the last section of the first part of Night Lyrics, which was devoted to the Palestinian/Israeli issue, Al-Nawwab exposed the political and military impotence of Arab governments underlying the failure of all corrupt Arab leaders to support the Palestinians in their struggle for freedom and dignity. Al-Nawwab intensified his satire, sarcasm and lampooning of Arab puppets. He also attacked some PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) leaders who exploited the suffering of their own people by wasting funds, earmarked for the support of Palestinian refugees, on personal pursuits. Instead of using the money raised in Arab countries and elsewhere to sponsor the liberation war, some Palestinian leaders, according to Al-Nawwab, have squandered big amounts of money on extravagant adventures: These are your enemies, oh my homeland/your enemies are those who have sold Palestine and gained the price/your enemies are contended of being beggars /

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standing at the doorsteps of hypocritical rulers/and attending the banquets of imperialistic and rich countries (p.49). In the famous Awlad Al-Kahba (Sons of a Bitch) section of Al-Nawwabs anthology, Night Lyrics, the poet attacked all the Arab rulers accusing them of being responsible for the loss of Palestine: Oh sons of a bitch, Jerusalem is the bride of your Arab nationalism/why did you send all the night adulterers to her bedroom/while shrinking cowardly behind the doors/watching the rape scene/ and listening to her screams and appeals for help/while her virginity was being violated, all of you attempted to withdraw your swords/pretending to avenge her raped honor/instead of slaying the rapists/you began shouting at her/demanding her to be silent in order to conceal the scandal/you even forced her to shut up her mouth to preserve Arab honor from disgrace/you are really very honourable men/shame on you, shame on all of you/sons of a bitch/How can a raped lady remain silent? (p. 50) Portraying Jerusalem as a virgin lady raped by an alien Zionist invader, Al-Nawwab emphasized the Arab identity of the holy city, as well as the brutality of the Zionist invaders. The sexual impotence and lack of manhood on the part of the Arab rulers is symbolically affirmed by alluding to their reluctance to draw their swords and challenge the enemy. By depicting the Arab rulers as a group of cowards remote-controlled by imperialistic forces, the poet affirmed the impossibility of liberating Palestine or establishing a Palestinian state under the current political circumstances in the region. In their confrontations with the enemies of the Arab nation, the Arab rulers behave as cowards; nevertheless, in their domestic policies they are transformed into aggressive and brutal dictators tyrannizing their own peopleparticularly those who call for freedom and democracy. Al-Nawwab, therefore, criticized the oppressive policy advocated by the dictatorial and military regimes in the Arab World, a policy which advocates persecution and suppression as a law. In most Arab countries people are dominated by a repressive apparatus whose main function is to brutalize its Arab citizens. In these countries, democracy and human rights are luxuries; ethnic/ religious minorities, in addition to political activists and opponents of state policy spend most of their lives either in external exile or in domestic prisons. Having been imprisoned himself, Al-Nawwab wrote in Night Lyrics: I have to be very cautious when I speak on the telephone/ when I speak to the walls/when I speak with children and babies (p.51).

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In Iraq as well as in many other Arab countries, school children have been frequently used as spies for the regimes secret police agency; thus, the poet was afraid of talking even with children in the Arab World. By using the police forces, the intelligence agencies, the prison system and other repressive instruments to subjugate their own people, the Arab rulers have succeeded, to a great extent, in keeping the status quo and remaining in power for ages. Nevertheless, these repressive regimes have mutilated and maimed the regenerative human power in the Arab World, creating a nation of cripples and cowards unable to achieve the Arab dream of restoring occupied Arab territories, and reluctant to cope up with the requirements of a post-industrial world. Maintaining systematic tyranny against their people, have, ironically, paved the way for the emergence of fundamentalist Islamic organizations which have wrecked havoc upon the Arab World and the West. Being disappointed by the deplorable political conditions in the Arab World which brought about catastrophes such as the bloody confrontation between the PLO and the Jordanian army in Amman in the early 1970s, the Lebanese civil war, and the IraqiIranian war, Al-Nawwab lamented in Night Lyrics, that the Arab World had already become the homeland of Arab-Arab wars. He regreted the notion that the Arab World was still dominated by the tribal spirit of Dahes and Al-Ghabra, a pre-Islamic war which erupted in the Arabian Peninsula because tribal differences and conflicting interests among Arab tribes. He implored Iraq, his homeland, to save him from what he calls the fearful smell of human starvation. He continued to address his homeland seeking its emotional support: Please save me from cities in which human beings have been transformed into chimneys of fear and cattle waste / cities which are submerged into stagnant water / Oh, my homeland, please save me from our national buffaloes / those who chew the remains of our dead bodies (p.47). The images of stagnation, horror, cattle waste, people turned into chimneys of fear, and buffalo chewing dead bodies are signifiers of the difficulty of living in the Arab wasteland. In moments of disappointment, frustration and pain, Al-Nawwab complained to the Arabian desert appealing to it to listen to him: I am making a confession to you / I am a bastard / I am a nasty and miserable son of a bitch just like your defeats/I am a coward like your defeated rulers/I am an asshole just like your defeated people/ How dirty are we? How dirty are we? I do not exclude anyone (p.52).
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Like Amiri Baraka, who struggled to create a distinctive black voice in his poetry, reflective of the aspirations of black people, AlNawwab gave expression to an appropriate poetic voice capable of revealing the pains and hopes of the Arab people. This distinguished voice reflected the growing national consciousness in an Arab World which is hostile to the American double policy in the region. In this context, Avraham Sala considers the Arab-Israeli conflict as the ultimate sphere of interaction between state interests and all Arab commitments (Sala, 1). The occupation of the Palestinian territories in 1948 and 1967, according to Sala, was supposed to lead to Arab unity against the Israeli expansionist policies in the region. Nevertheless most of the rulers did not show real concern over the Palestinian tragedy. Instead, they recommended the restoration of Palestine through the use of arms. Sala also affirms that since 1948, most of the Arab regimes have succeeded in using the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a means of suffocating the opposition voices calling for domestic political reform and democracy. Pretending that the Arab World is in a state of war with Israel, all Arab regimes crushed any attempt toward change; the majority of Arab rulers remained in power until they either died or were assassinated. The Arab summits which are supposed to give impetus to major Arab issues, particularly the liberation of the Palestinian occupied land, reflect the gap between the aspirations of the masses and the policies of individual Arab governments. AlNawwab ridiculed the Arab rulers who turned these summits into formal rituals and ceremonies where rulers discuss public relations as well as personal interests. Al-Nawwab referred to one of those impotent leaders, an Arab Sultan, who suddenly decides to wear slippers and sunglasses, therefore the Arab League, may Allah bless her, acknowledges his fabulous achievements (p.54). AlNawwab also referred to a newspaper article which scandalized a famous Arab ambassador who behaves like a prostitute during a meeting with foreign military Generals (p.55). Al-Nawwab also denounced the attempts of leaders of some Arab countries in the 1960s to be engaged in secret talks with American politicians in order to reach a clandestine agreement regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. These secret talks, according to the poet, had a damaging affect upon the morale of the Arab soldiers located in the battlefields. To Al-Nawwab, such an attempt to shake the hands and kiss the asses of the invaders while we are still fighting is a full surrender to the enemy. Therefore, he urged all the popular and revolutionary

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forces in the Arab World to uproot existing regimes through the use of force in order to save the Arab people from internal tyranny and external hegemony. Recognizing that puppet Arab regimes and their imperialistic allies are responsible, to a great extent, for the recurrent defeat and tragedy of the Arab World, Al-Nawwab depicts Western imperialistic countries, particularly the United States and England, as wolves which threaten the security of the Arab World. In the same context, the Arab World is portrayed as a brothel governed by the royal thighs. The poet also denounced the submissive attempts of cowardly Arab leaders who appeal to the wolves, to find a peaceful solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Dismissing all peace negotiations as different forms of submission, Al-Nawwab criticized what he calls the masturbation of Arab tragedies through peace initiatives and the exchange of toasts with bastard American politicians (p.53). Denouncing all the tricky treaties designed by American politicians, Al-Nawwab called for armed resistance against the Israeli occupation, simply because all peace initiatives were created to fulfill Israeli goals, not to help Palestinians restore their usurped homeland. In his Complete Works, Al-Nawwab pointed out that all Arab rulers must be removed from power because they failed to stop the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, which paved the way for the horrible massacre of unarmed Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps at the hands of the Lebanese militias supported by Israel and its allies. Al-Nawwab also laments the miserable conditions of the Arab World as a whole and the failure of the Arab rulers to protect the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. He criticized the Arab League and the defeated / castrated Arab summits which did not provide any kind of support to the Palestinians who were subjected to systematic massacres in Lebanon during the Israeli invasion. Al-Nawwab also attacked the United Nations, describing it as a Masonic lodge where Henry Kissenger, the former US Secretary of State was seen sleeping with the drunk Arab Kings (p.41). Al-Nawwabs attitude and ideology toward issues such as resistance, struggle and revolution are similar to Barakas views, in that they reject passive resistance which helps the enemy to maintain the social and political status quo (Hudson, 21). In Home: Social Essays, Baraka points out: In the White West, nonviolence means simply doing

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nothing to change this pitiful society, just do as you have been doing, e.g., suffer, and by some beautiful future-type miracle the minds of the masses of white men will be changed, and they will finally come around to understand that the majority of people in the world deserve to live in that world, no longer plagued by the white mans disgusting habits. But why. WHY, must anyone wait until these certain changeha hatheir famous minds..Why indeed (p.202). Baraka, like Al-Nawwab, calls for armed resistance, urging black writers to be engaged in struggle. In Home: Social Essays, he argues: The black artists role in America is to aid in the destruction of America as he knows it. His role is to report and reflect so precisely the nature of the society and of himself in that society, that other men will be moved by the exactness of his rendering and, if they are black men, grow strong through this moving, having seen their own strength, and weakness; and if they are white men, tremble, curse, and go mad, because they will be drenched with the filth of their evil (p.251). Urging black writers to participate in the destruction of the racist American society in the 1960s, Bararka revealed his concept of the function of an angry and revolutionary poetry echoing Addison Gayle, who points out that the black artist in the American society who creates without interjecting a note of anger is creating, not as a black man, but as an American. For anger in

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black art is as old as the first utterance by black men on American soil (Gayle,15). In Citizen Cain, Baraka revealed his anger toward the persecution of the black people, and describes his own desire to get personally involved in armed resistance against white American racism: Roi, finish this poem, someones about to need you. Roi, dial the mystic number, ask for holy beads, directions, plans for the destruction of New York. Work out your problems like your friends in some nice guys couch. Get up and hit someone, like you useta. Dont sit here trembling under the rammer (Black Magic, 8). But Barakass violence against the oppressors sometimes turns into a kind of anarchy the destruction of New York that contradicts with the ideal world he plans to build on the ruins of the white American civilization. In Black People, he urges the oppressed black masses in the ghettoes to rob white banks and get all the money they need for sponsoring their struggle: banks must be robbed the guards bound and gagged the money must be taken and used to buy weapons communications systems must be seized or subverted the machines must be turned off smoke plenty of bush before and after work or during the holdup when the guards are iced (Black Magic: 68). Barakas violence in Black People is basically directed against a racist system that has violated all human moral codes and brutalized the black nation. To Baraka, American racism should be confronted with violence because the killing instinct deeply rooted in the white mans racist psyche, which was responsible for the

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eradication of the Red Indians would lead people, like the American President Johnson, to massacre the black nation. Like Al-Nawwab, Baraka attacked the racist policies advocated by President Johnson. Using revolutionary poetic discourse, Baraka says: President Johnson is a mass murderer, and his mother, was a mass murderer, and his wife is weird looking, a special breed of hawkbill cracker and his grandmothers weird dump and dead turning in the red earth sick as dry blown soil and he probably steals hates magic and has no use for change, the changing, and changed the weather plays its gambling tune. His mother is a dead blue cloud. he has Negroes work for him hate him, wish him under the bullets of Kennedy death OPEN FIRE FROM THE SCHOOL WINDOWS these projectiles kill his mother plagued by vulgar cancer, floating her dusty horoscope, without the love even she thinks she needs, dead bitch, Johnsons mother, walked all night holding hands with a nigger, and stroked that niggers hard. blew him downtown Newark 1928.. I got proof (p.93). Baraka also ridicules President Richard Nixon using obscene diction: With his pointed head a dignified deadbeat, with EUREKA a job, better than the one in the grocery store or the one as Insurance Spider or the one biting teeny girls putties Dusty Brown Suit Congealed Hair Saluting dont sit near guys like that anywhere theyll disturb you if you intelligent

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bore you if you life-ridden EUREKA this one got a job a dull wrinkled salesman with nothing to sell, Hey Dick HEY DICK NIXON You a dull ass (p.169). Like Al-Nawwab, Baraka uses pornographic speech in his poetry to reflect the reality of an ugly system. In his answer to a question concerning the use of obscene language in his poetry, Baraka responded, in the following excerpt from an interview: You see, the problem was that when you actually printed real peoples speech, some people found that shocking. Thats because most of the formalistic Western (poetry) didnt deal with peoples speech at all. I am not talking about just the scatology or obscenities in it. They didnt deal with it in terms of its rhythms and syntax either. I try to deal with living speech and I try to deal with the way that people really talk, what they really say. I try to deal with how they actually sound (Duval, 12). Barakas use of obscene language in his poetry is also an extension of his manipulation of the then popular black forms of language stemming from black folklore culture, such as playing the dozens. In T.T. Jackson sings, Baraka echoes the dozens tradition: I f. your mother / on top of a house / when I got through / she thought she was Mickey Mouse (Black Magic, 105). In his comment on the use of obscene language in modern black poetry, Donald Gibson observes the revolutionary attitude of modern black poets toward conventional notions of sex and sexual morality. He states: Black poetry tends to be very free in its dealing with the sexual act and in its use of sexoriented Anglo-Saxonisms. Language scatological in nature is allowable as another means of expressing the poets desire to escape the restraints of the system of institutions and conventions which oppress him. Yet, despite a surface lack of concern with morality, black poetry is highly moralistic, attempting to convince its audience of the meaningfulness and

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significance of a moral order superior to that reflected in American institutions or that revealed through the attitudes and practices of the society at large (Gibson, 10). Like Baraka who used obscene language in his portrayal of a racist society that seeks the dehumanization of his black folks, AlNawwab employed the same type of language to reveal the ugly facts of Arab life. He confessed, in his Complete Works, that his poetic diction was obscene and that poetry itself is ashamed of his own obscenities and vulgarities; however, Al-Nawwab swears that the obscene poetic expressions of his poetry was insufficient in describing the shameful policies of Arab regimes toward their own people. Ridiculing what he calls the menstruating rulers who have lost their manhood, Al-Nawwab said: My middle finger becomes fearful at night / I screw all the converted rulers who have betrayed their Arabism (Complete Works, 100). The sexual implications here were not used to allude to a homosexual fantasy on the part of the speaker, but were meant to humiliate those who had sold out their countries and national cause to the enemies. Like Al-Nawwab, who attempted to awaken the collective Arab consciousness by revealing the danger of submitting to the enemy or ignoring the oppressive policies advocated by Arab regimes, Baraka draws the attention of his people to the dangers of seeking integration into a racist society: Do not obey their laws which are against God believe me brothers, do not ever think any of that shit they say is true. They are against the law. Their laws are filthy evil, against all mighty God. They are sick to be against God, against the animals and sun (Black Magic, 121). Like Al-Nawwab who denounced the Arab regimes for the crimes they committed against their people, Baraka condemned the racist policies of the American governments: Whatever youve given me, whiteface glass to look through, to find another day there, another

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what, motherf..? Another bread tree made at its sacredness, and the law of some dinagaling god, cold as ice cucumbers, for the shouters and the wigglers, and what was the world to the words of slick nigger fathers, too depressed to explain why they could not appear to be men. The bread fool. I dont love you who is to say what that will mean. I dont love you, expressed the train, moves, and uptown days later we look up and breath much easier I dont love you (Black Magic, 55) Apparently, in their poetry, Baraka and Al-Nawwab wanted to revolutionize the masses in the African American community and the Arab World, urging them to take action against forces of oppression and subjugation that sought to tyrannize them. Thus, they both believed in a functional poetry that is able to participate in revolution and struggle against the forces of evil in their societies. In Black Art Baraka says: Poems are bullshit unless they are teeth or lemons piled on a step. Or Black ladies dying of men leaving nickel hearts beating them down. we want live words of the hip world live fresh & coursing blood. we want poems that kill. assassin poems, poems that shoot guns (Black Magic, 116). Speaking of poems that kill and poems that shoot guns, Baraka affirmed the importance of creating a radical poetics, a liberal physical tool as an expression of anger and revolt against the racist agencies in the American society. Furthermore, like AlNawwabs poetry which attacked the traitors of the Palestinian cause, Barakas radical poetics was supposed to be used as a weapon to confront the assimilation attempts of middle class African Americans who have betrayed the cause of black people:
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smear on gridlemamma mulatto bitches whose brains are red jelly stuck between lizabeth taylors toes. Stinking whores! We want poems, poems that kill (Black Magic, 116). Baraka also urged the black masses to protest against hypocritical middle class politicians who deceive their people and behave like whores with representatives of the racist American government: Theres Negro leader pinned to a bar stool in Sardis eyeballs melting in hot flame. Another Negro leader on the steps of the white house one kneeling between the sheriffs thighs negotiating coolly for his people (Black Magic, 116). Baraka attacked what he calls the middle class Negroes, categorizing them as traitors for their attempt to be assimilated into the mainstream American culture. Baraka also demonstrated that entrance into the mainstream of American life destroyed the Negro as a possible agent of dissent. He argues that Negroes are fooled by tokenism, which he defines in Home: Social Essays as the setting up of social statements or the extension of meager privilege to some few selected negroes in order that a semblance of compromise or progress or a lessening in racial repression might seem to be achieved while actually helping to maintain the status quo (p.73). In Blues People Baraka attacked the black middle class, affirming that: The black middle class, from its inception (possibly ten seconds after the first Africans were herded off the boat) has formed almost exclusively around the preposition that it is better not to be black in a country where being black is a liability. All the main roads into America have always been fashioned by the members of the black middle class (not as products of a separate culture, but as vague,

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featureless Americans). The black middle class wanted no sub-culture, nothing that could connect them with the poor black man or the slave (p.12324). In this context, the black middle class person is depicted in Black Magic Poetry in poems such as Black Bourgeoisie as someone who has a gold tooth, sits long hours on a stool thinking about money sees white skin in a secret room rummages his sense for sense dreams about Lincoln (s) conks his daughters hair sends his coons to school works very hard grins politely in restaurants has a good word to say never says it does not hate ofays hates, instead, himself his black self (p.11). Barakas criticism of the black middle class is due to its fascination with a hostile culture that seeks to marginalize the Negro as a carrier of a distinctive civilization. The ambition of the middle class Negro to be integrated into the white mainstream is seen in his imitation of the white American style of living thinking about money and dreaming of driving luxurious cars. The middle class Negro hates his black self, therefore he conks his daughters hair and reveals admiration of white Americans ofays. Thus the middle class Negro is dismissed in Barakas poetry as a traitor because he still looks at white Americans as his masters. Due to his slave mentality, the middle class Negro grins politely in restaurants and has a good word to say does not hate ofays. Barakas radical poetics is used in Black Art as a tool of resistance not only against the white racist system but also against the middle class Negroes who have betrayed the cause of their people. To Baraka, the middle class blacks who seek integration with a racist society are stinking whores who must be eliminated. Barakas lines are striking and shocking because of their angry language and rhetorical violence: f. poems

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and they are useful, and they shoot come at you, love what you are, breathe like wrestlers, or shudder strangely after pissing, We want live flesh & coursing blood. Hearts Brains souls splintering fire. We want poems like fists beating niggers out of jocks (p.116). Celebrating a functional black art, Baraka created poems which are not vehicles of escape but concrete and active weapons of struggle and revolution. Baraka called for poems that are able to beat niggers out of jocks, poems that are useful to the black masses. Barakas radical style was used as a weapon to confront the assimilation attempts of the middle class Negroes who take Elizabeth Taylor, a representative of white American popular culture, as their model. His poetry was also used as an instrument of resistance, confronting the humiliating attempts of black politicians to compromise their blackness in order to be integrated into the mainstream white culture. Like Al-Nawwab, Baraka was antagonistic to the forces of oppression that seek to tyrannize his people, thus, he called for poems that urged the black masses to Wrestle cops into alleys and take their weapons leaving them dead/with tongues pulled out (p.116). Baraka not only encouraged the black masses to use violence against the white police forces, but also to assassinate all the Negro traitors who refused to use violence against the racist system in America. He called for airplane poems, r r r r r r r r, R r r r r r r r, Tuh, tuh tuh, tuh ../ setting fire and death to whites ass. Barakas poetics of anger was meant to motivate black revolutionaries in eliminating all forces of evil and hypocrisy that seek to deceive the black masses, particularly Negro politicians who are ready to sacrifice the ambitions of their people to achieve personal interests: On the steps of the white house one/ kneeling between the Sheriffs thighs/ negotiating coolly for his people. Baraka wrote poems which could scream poison gas on beasts in green berets. Baraka addressed his poetry to the toiling masses in the black American ghettoes, asking them to turn into a concrete weapon of resistance: Put it on him poem/ strip his naked/ to the world. In this context, Barakas assassin poem fulfilled his concept of the political and ethnic function of black poetry. In spite of its angry language and rhetorical violence, Barakas revolutionary poetry attempted, not only to kill the enemies of his people, but also to clean out the world for virtue

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and love (p.117). In Black Art Barakas black aesthetic involved both the destruction of a racist system and a building of his black utopia: Let there be no love poems written / until love can exist freely and cleanly / let black people understand / that they are the lovers and the sons of warriors, are poems or poets of all the loveliness here in the world / we want a black poem and a black world / let the world be a black poem / and let all black people speak this poem silently or loud (p.117). After indicating that all the forces of evil and hypocrisy in the American society are targets for radical poetry that turns into a literal physical instrument, Baraka underlines the humanitarian objective of his poetryto establish a black utopia on the ruins of a racist society. Nevertheless, Barakas vision of a utopian black world was tarnished by the violence and the counter-racism which characterize his radical poetry in the 1960s. Regardless of the verbal violence and ideological drawbacks of the political poetry of Baraka and Al-Nawwab, it is relevant to argue that both poets succeeded in penetrating the core of contemporary history and culture in America and the Arab World, disrupting the central myths and traditions which dominate these societies. In bringing to light the concepts of revolution and struggle, Baraka and Al-Nawwab attempted to draw the attention of their people toward issues, not merely of political or ideological concerns, but of complex and profound human significance. On this basis, the poetry of Baraka and AlNawwab not only explores themes with radical and ethnic implications, but also underlines symbolic, mythic, exilic and human issues with universal implications, traceable to complex motifs drawn from African American and Arab/Islamic culture and history. Due to the wide-scale popularity of the political poetry of Baraka and Al-Nawwab, this kind of poetry reveals the tremendous impact of both poets on American and Arab literatures because Baraka and Al-Nawwab have entered American and Arab consciousness, not only as poets, but also as significant and national events and symbols, suggesting a blending of radicalism and rebellious/political energy.

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WORKS CITED Al-Nawwab, Mudhafar. Al-amal Al-shirriyya Al-kamela (The Complete Poetic Works). London: Dar Qonbor, 1996. __________________. Watariyyat Layliyya: Al-harakah Al-oola wa Al Thaniyya (Night Lyrics: The Fist and Second Movements). London: Dar Sahari, 1985. Ashour, Radwa. Al-Tariq Ela Al-Khaymati Al-okhra (The Way to the Other Tent: A Study of Ghassan Kanafanis Works). Beirut: Dar Al-Adab, 1977. Baraka, Amiri. Black Magic: Collected Poetry (1961-1967). Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969. __________________. Blues People: Negro Music in White America. New York: William Morrow, 1963. __________________. Home: Social Essays. New York: William Morrow, 1966. Duval, Elaine. Reassessing and Raising Our History: An Interview with Amiri Baraka/Le Roi Jones. Obsidian II, Vol. 3 (1988): 1-19. Gayle, Addison Jr., ed. The Black Aesthetic. New York: Anchor Books, 1972. Gibson, Donald B., ed. Five Black Writers: Essays on Wright, Ellison, Baldwin, Hughes and Le Roi Jones. New York: New York University Press, 1970. Hudson, Theodore R. From Le Roi Jones to Amiri Baraka: The Literary Works. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1973. Koelb, Clayton and Susan Noakes, eds. The Comparative Perspective of Literature: Approaches to Theory and Practice. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. Remak, Henry H.H. Comparative Literature, its Definition and Function, cited in Comparative Literature: Method and Perspective. Newton Stallknecht and Horst Frenz, eds. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971. Sala, Avraham. The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for Regional Order. New York: State University of New York Press, 1999. Wellek, Rene. The Name and Nature of Comparative Literature, cited in Comparatists at Work. Stephen G. Nichols, ed. Waltham, Mass.: Ginn, 1968. (1) All translations from Arabic prose and poetry are done by the author.

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The Doomed Ugly Duckling Will Never Turn into a Swan: Meir Vizeltir Writes Holocaust
Yair Mazor, Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee ymazor@uwm.edu
When I was a child Reed and masts were erecting by the seashore And I, while lying down there, Failed to tell the difference among them, Since all of them ascended to the sky over my head.
Yehuda Amichai. When I Was a Child

Dad and Mom Went to See a Movie, Ilana is Sitting Alone In an Armchair, Reading a Grey Book
She is turning pages, naked uncles Running naked and so skinny And the aunt is skinny as well, you can see the fanny And people in pajamas like in the theater And stars of David made of cloth.

And they are all so ugly and skinny With big eyes like birds. It is awfully weird and so grey. And Ilana has red crayons

And blue, and green, and yellow and pink. Then she is stepping in her room And she is bringing all the pretty crayons And she is drawing with much enthusiasm Eye glasses and funny faces to all of those people. And especially the skinny, bald child. She draws on his face such a red, gigantic moustache And on the edge of the moustache a bird is standing.

ndoubtedly, the poem in focus by Meir Vizeltir (who earned his fame in contemporary Hebrew/Israeli poetry) is one of the most surprisingly exceptional, and equally powerful, among numerous Hebrew poems that focus on the Holocaust. The following interpretative approach to the poem aims to both clarify and justify such a bold statement.

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The first aesthetic phenomenon that stands out with the reader is the incredibly, atypically long and detailed nature of the poems title. The latter is neither arbitrary nor random. Accordingly, one may cogently argue that the title represents the entire poem, like squeezing and encapsulating it into a nutshell, or embodies the poem in a tiny embryo state. Indeed, part of the above shall be clarified upon the readers part, only once the reader completes reading the poem. Nevertheless, the latter is both expected and natural when one encounters art that consists of a verbal medium. The accumulative sequence of the literary text conditions and dictates an eternal gap between the parts of information that are spread along the textual continuum. Accordingly, the late bulk of information not only joins the early bulk of information, but also elucidates it from its remote perspective one that did not exist prior to the emergence of the late bulk of information. More than once, the new light that the late information casts on the early information, makes the reader realize that he/she understood only partially the early information, and now that partial understanding of the early information must be updated. However, very often the late information sheds on the early information such a drastically novel, insightful light, to the point that the readers early comprehension is proven to be absolutely wrong. In such a case, must the reader practice a process of reverse reading, return to the early one that is in congruence with the latter information? In this respect, one may plausibly depict the reading process as a pendulum that constantly keeps oscillating, fluctuating and swinging back and forth1. In light of the above, it is more than natural in the verbal medium (like in other media that depend on sequence of time, such as drama/theater, cinema, dance, music) that the early information, fails to introduce the entire volume of relevant information. That entire volume of relevant information shall be delivered later to the reader, in a more progressed stage of the textual sequence. Regarding the function of the long detailed title in the poem under consideration, however, it does manifest some very persuasive, foreshadowing, portending hints that shall be confirmed upon reading the entire poem that lead the reader to understand the titles function as a miniature of the entire poem. Upon reading the entire poem, does one realize that it basically consists of two prominent poetic phenomena: theme/topic and rhetoric? When it comes to theme/topic the poem is entirely dedicated to the Shoa (Holocaust). When we discuss rhetoric, however, the poem consists of a combined viewpoint. On the one hand, the formal narrator in the poem (through his viewpoint the poem is

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delivered) is an adult narrator, an external narrator, who is not part of the plot, the chronicles or characters, which are the pillar of the poem. On the other hand, however, the adult, external narrator adopts the viewpoint of Ilana (meaning a tree, in feminine, in Hebrew) who is a little child, the prominent protagonist of the poem2. Hence, the combined viewpoint in this poem, materializes when the adult, external narrator suspends and mutes his mature, comprehending point of view, and limits his perspective to the viewpoint of the child Ilana, whose capacity to comprehend (what she sees in the Holocaust album) is less than limited. As previously stated, addressing the Holocaust from such a drastically unexpected perspective, a perspective of a small, nave child, who views Holocaust photographs and fails to comprehend them (although they confer on her an opaque, still piercing discomfort and fear), endows the poem with a remarkably unique perspective one that bestows upon the poem a singularly throbbing puissance. The title plausibly displays at least two indications that call the readers attention to the fact that a child is the center of the poems topic and chronicles. The title starts with the following: Dad and Mom Went to See a Movie Utilizing words such as Dad and Mom (in Hebrew: Abba, Imma), most certainly indicates that the perspective is childish. Secondly, the outstandingly long title does indicate that it may be associated with a child. Accordingly, it is rather natural that once a child tells something to an adult, the child uses cumbersome verbosity, adding as many tiny details as possible, in order to earn the adults attention and serious response. Thus, the poems untraditionally long title that adds to using childish expressions, Dad, Mom, cogently signals to the reader that a child is involved with the poems substance. While the presence of a child produces pleasant, joyous connotations, the presence of the Holocausts atrocities produces the opposite reaction, while making one shiver out of fear and fury. Indeed, the Holocaust is not indicated directly in the title. Nevertheless, there is a certain point in the title that deviates from the titles childish navet and innocence, while delivering murky, bleak connotations. That point is further stressed by the titles context, since it is associated with the rhetorical mechanism of frustrated, breached expectations. The long, detailed title narrates the following: Ilanas Dad and Mom went to see a movie; Ilana is alone in the house, sitting in an armchair, while reading a grey book. The expression grey book

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is one that deviates from the childish gratifying connotations, while being equally engaged with the rhetorical device of frustrated expectations. The fact that the book that the little girl, Ilana, is a grey book, does rhetorically upset and frustrate the readers expectations. Accordingly, one may justly expect that a little girl shall not entertain herself with a grey book, but rather with a childrens book, that introduces imaginative adventures, children poems, or tales decorated with cheerful, colorful pictures. In this respect, the grey book is at odds with the entire titles context, and correspondingly, it breaches the readers expectations regarding a book that a little girl customarily reads. The fact that the expression a grey book is both confusing and obscure, while telling nothing whatsoever about the content of the book, makes that grey book further enigmatic, while igniting the readers attention and curiosity. Not only a rhetorical device (frustrated, breached expectations) and thematic opaqueness, but also a compositional device is hereby enlisted in order to kindle the readers attention to the book. The information about the grey book is the one that ends and concludes the very long title. Putting the words grey book as the last ones, however, in such an untraditionally long title, is a cleverly orchestrated amalgamation of two devices: compositional and rhetorical. The placement of the verbal material along the textual sequence is conditioned and dictated by compositional calculations. Putting the verbal material at the very end of a long verbal sequence produces a rhetorical device, since the end has the strongest impact on the reader (exactly like a punch line in a joke). Consequently, one realizes that the poem emphasizes the enigmatic strangeness of the grey book, as strongly as possible. In light of the above, does one realize that the color of the book produces connotations that conflict blatantly with the little girls innocences? The color grey radiates gloomy, dusky, bleak, murky, obscure, shadowy connotations. Indeed, in the poems body, the reader will encounter Ilanas confused response to the Holocaust photographs in that grey book: It is awfully weird and so grey. In this respect, a grey book in the title, that earns the readers intensive attention, acts in capacity of a foreshadowing clue that augurs the poems somber substance. Once the reader realizes that, however, does the reader further realize that the little girls innocence is eclipsed by the fact that she is left alone, at nighttime? It is one more portending clue to the obscure atmosphere that is lurking for the reader in the body of the poem?

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Paradoxically, however, the childish nave perspective is expected to produce a tint of touching callowness, is the one that yields the very opposite, contradictory result: an inhumane approach to the Holocaust. Accordingly, via the little girls innocent perspective, one that suffers from a lack of acquaintance with the Holocaust (and correspondingly, one that fails to comprehend the Holocaust atrocities that are documented in that grey book in which she is turning pages) makes her relate to the tormented, starved victims, who are naked in the freezing cold, not as to real people, but rather as to bizarre, ugly, repulsively looking birds. Most certainly, the above further fortifies the remarkably powerful viewpoint through which the Holocaust is presented in the poem. Thus, the paradox that is conceived by that childish perspective further emphasizes the stupendous atrocities of the Holocaust. Hence, due to that paradox, the sinister, monstrous human beings who designed and executed the Holocaust had deprived their victims of their status as human beings, while those who had not deserved to be called human beings, had carried proudly, and equally falsely, that title. Here a blatantly bitter irony is produced and surfaces: the victims and their victimizers exchange roles. That vicious irony appears to be the peak of cynical cruelty. Since it is conceived via the paradox mentioned above; and since that paradox is conceived by the poems uniquely sculpted perspective, the poems rhetorical device that consists of that outstanding perspective confers upon the poem a tremendously powerful and equally shocking impact. The surprisingly irregular perspective that is enlisted by the poems rhetorical mechanism, one that views the Holocaust via a childs eyes, does evoke a rhetorical distance that mutes overemotionality, and even more importantly, silences sentimentality. Undoubtedly, no topic can be as stupendously saturated with over flooding emotionality as the Holocaust. While tamed emotionality contributes to a poems (or any other work of art) impact of touching vitality, overemotionality, and certainly sentimentality, are a "snare that lurks for the work of art, while plotting to void it of worthy value and estimable substance. The above derives from the fact that overemotionality, and certainly sentimentality, kindle and provoke a lack of a desirably calculated balance between the emotionality that is associated with the topic of the work of art, and the emotionality that is displayed via the way that work of art is poetically portrayed. In other words, upsetting that required delicate balance is a regretful

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formula for demolishing the work of arts emotional dam. The latter will allow a deluge of overemotionality and sentimentality cloud its aesthetic essence and eclipse its artistic value and substance. Correspondingly, both overemotionality and sentimentality are justly considered the most perilous foes of any work of art. The latter even becomes more acute when the topic of the work of art in focus is the Holocaust, the greatest and deepest quarry of emotions ever known since the distant, misty dawn of humanity. Thus, a poem that makes the Holocaust its prime, prominent topic must enlist all aesthetic means possible, in order to tame emotions, to mute emotions, to bridle and curb emotions. Only upon acting such, aesthetically harmful overemotionality and sentimentality shall be effectively restrained. It does not mean, however, that emotions must be entirely evicted or exiled from the artistic, aesthetic territory. Just the opposite. As previously stressed, emotions confer vitality and energy on the work of art. Nevertheless, in order to protect and ensure the aesthetic value of a work of art, the latters implied author (in a case of a work of literature) must enlist all artistic means and harness them to the crucial need of dimming overemotionality and sentimentality. As previously emphasized, the point of view that is practiced in the poem by its rhetorical mechanism is extremely extraordinary and surprising, since it enlists a little girls viewpoint to observe the Holocaust, while that little girl has neither heard of the Holocaust, nor does she possess the capacity to decipher or comprehend what she views regarding the Holocaust. By definition, any surprise produces a distance between the surprised observer and the surprising material. Once that recoiling distance is created, the reader cannot be too emotionally identified with the material since identification calls for total closeness, one that is blocked by the distance. Thus, that distance that erects a damming block between the reader and the text; that distance that is established by the surprising point of view; that distance operates effectively as a gate keeper which does not let either over emotionality or sentimentality creep out and flood the poem. Hence, Ilana is turning pages in that grey book that introduces horrible photographs from the Holocaust, in which starving, tormented, humiliated, naked Jews, women, men and children, are running around. Ilana has no way to know that those people are tormented, humiliated, brutally plagued, starved, while heading for their dreadful death. She even doesnt know that, like her, they are Jewish. Thus, from her childish perspective, she

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sees a group of running naked, skinny, enigmatic people, who are physically distasteful. Although she fails to decipher and comprehend the true meaning of those photographs, she certainly feels uneasy. The unusually unappealing people, and the fact that she feels that those people keep a secret that she cannot unearth, make the little girl rather restless, distressed perhaps even scared. As the title proclaims, Mom and Dad went to see a movie, and thus, there is nobody around who can explain to her the scary secrets introduced by the perplexing photographs. The fact that she is alone in the house, probably at late evening, or even at night time (in Israel it is customary to attend a movie that starts at 9:30 pm) makes her feel even more restless, perhaps even nervous. The combination of scary, unexplained photographs and a child who watches them with wonder, while she is alone at home may be easily transformed and translated into a fright, on the part of the child. The latter becomes more acute since the little girl is very young, as one can deduce from the fact that she cannot yet read. Correspondingly, the little girl tries to fight that fright, while enlisting her only childishly active, even creative means. She brings from her bedroom pretty crayons of numerous colors, and she draws eye glasses and funny faces to all those people. Hence, since the little girl is in no position to understand the true, secretive meaning of the photographs; and since those photographs make the little girl feel very uneasy, she decides to convert the photographs into ones that make sense to her, and consequently extract her from a state of uneasiness. Thus, as children commonly do upon encountering a poster, or an ad on a billboard, the little girl decorates those scary photographs with funny eyeglasses and faces. In this manner, she confers on the photographs a novel visual language, one that she comprehends, one that makes sense to her childish concepts, as well as one that makes her smile and forget her fear. In other words, drawing funny faces, while using many animated colors, on the Holocaust photographs, is indeed the little girls self-defense mechanism, one that rescues her from the scary, obscure photographs (that are probably in black and white as hinted by the grey book). Throughout the entire poem, Ilana entirely refrains from expressing any feeling whatsoever. That lack is quite extraordinary, since it is quite clear, and equally taken for granted, that she is touched by feelings such as uneasiness, discomfort, confusion, and even fear. No feeling of the above, however, is expressed by either the narrator or by Ilana, despite of the fact that her circumstances

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must conceive such feelings: a little girl, left alone in the empty house, it is late at night and she encounters horrifying photographs. In light of the above, the reader is surprised to encounter one, unexpected, single expression of feeling by the little girl, towards the end of the poem:
And she is drawing with much enthusiasm Eye glasses and funny faces to all of those people

The surprise that the reader experiences upon encountering the little girls feeling of much enthusiasm stems from two reasons. First, this is the only feeling that the narrator expresses on the little girls part, despite the fact that it is more than certain that she experiences very strong feelings engaged with discomfort, even with fright. Second, this only unveiled feeling on the part of the little girl is a cheerful one, in contrast to all other feelings that she probably experiences, which are associated with an opposite nature: confusion, loneliness, fear. Hence, all the above makes that feeling of much enthusiasm on the part of the little girl, very obtrusive in the poems textual texture. The latter acts in capacity of a rhetorical signpost that urges and goads the reader to notice that outstanding feeling. Once the above materializes, however, the reader realizes that the exposure of that only little girls feeling in the poem is indeed a psychological selfdefense mechanism that she unconsciously operates, in order to silence her feelings of confusion, discomfort and fear. Accordingly, she enlists from her childish quarry of jois de vivre, the only means that she possesses that can mute her uneasy feelings: masking the scary people in the photographs, with funny, cheerful drawings, painted in many animated colors. Consequently, an intriguing paradox is introduced: the verbally muted feelings of fear and discomfort are unveiled via letting an emotional, cheerful feeling surface and speak out. That paradox does not only contribute to the poems textual, aesthetic complexity, but it equally stresses the operation of the little girls psychological selfdefense mechanism, that helps her to cope with her fears upon encountering for the first time the Holocaust. Indeed, she is too young to decipher the true meaning of the Holocaust photographs. However she does possess the capacity to notice unconsciously the murky, bleak echo that those photographs reflect and radiate. Due to the latter, she finds necessary to mobilize her psychological, childish, self-defense mechanism: camouflaging the frightening photographs with childish drawings painted with cheerful colors. This way the discomfort is blanketed and the little girl can tolerate the rest of her loneliness. Will she be able to turn the scary ugly duckling into a swan? It is less than doubtful.

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Undoubtedly, the little girl fears most especially the skinny bold child. The reason for that is psychologically obvious. Since he is a child, like herself, she feels emotionally closer to him than she feels to the adults. Correspondingly, she can easily see herself in his awfully horrifying role. The latter calls on the little girls part to mobilize and utilize more assertively, more effectively, her childish, psychological self-defense mechanism. She does that in the following fashion:
She draws on his face such a red, gigantic moustache And on the edge of the moustache a bird is standing.

Her psychological, self-defense mechanism consists of two actions that are indeed separate, but still, reciprocally complementary. The first action is drawing a huge mustache on the childs face. From her childish, nave perspective, that action changes him from a child into an adult. Accordingly, this way she sweeps under the rug her fear that, due to the fact that he is a child as she is, they might exchange roles and she can end up as terribly looking as he is. Now, that he has a gigantic moustache, he has been converted into an adult, he is no longer a child, and consequently, her fear that she may be like him, evaporates and fades away. The second action that stems from and is propelled by the little girls childish, psychological, self-defense mechanism is drawing a bird on the childs drawn adult-like moustache. The latter brings to mind the scary simile that portrays the scary peoples eyes as big and ugly as eyes of birds. Most certainly, Ilana, the little girl, fears such big, ugly birds eyes (like ostrichs huge eyes, for instance) notably when they are eyes of human beings, of people, to whom she can relate. Thus, in order to compensate for those ugly, big, frightening human-birds that she sees in that grey book, she draws another, compensating bird, one that is cute and cheerful in her many colors (And Ilana has red crayons / And blue, and green, and yellow and pink). Hence the scariest person, the bold, skinny child in the photographs, kindles and ignites her urgent need to enlist, as effectively as possible, her childish, psychological self-defense mechanism. The latter earns its plausible effectiveness from the fact that this time it is based on two separate actions that mutually complement each other, while reinforcing their joint performance. In light of the poems entire interpretation introduced throughout the discussion, one may discern one more powerful paradox. On the one hand, the poem enlists a singularly irregular viewpoint upon relating to the Holocaust: the Holocaust is addressed in this poem via the eyes of a nave little girl, who does not know a thing about the Holocaust photographs when she encounters them. Utilizing such an incredibly unique point of view upon approaching the Holocaust, reinforces the Holocausts somber, atrocious impression,
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since such a cogently original viewpoint confers on the Holocausts atrocities a sense that they are reoccur again, in front of the child who had not heard, or read, about them before. On the other hand, however, using such a childish, oblivious perspective upon approaching the Holocaust, evokes a distance between the Holocausts atrocities and the childish viewer, who follows them in photographs and fails to comprehend even the first thing about the Holocaust. The vast distance between the Holocaust and the childish, entirely oblivious perspective that addresses the Holocaust, creates an unbridgeable gap between the Holocausts atrocities and the way they are viewed in the poem. Since such a vast distance is the most effective damming barrier between the text and an undesirably sentimental response to the text, utilizing the childish viewpoint in the poem, suffocates and mutes potential sentimentality, the arch-foe of any work of art. Thus, such a paradox that simultaneously resurrects the dreadful, monstrous occurrences of the Holocaust, and silences any sentimental response to the poems reinforcement of the Holocaust atrocities, does not only confer on the poem further aesthetic intricacy, but it equally restores and stresses the inhumane tormenting, haunting, suffering, caused by the Holocaust. The latter further delivers, more loud and clear than ever, the Holocausts everlasting heritage: eternally remember; do not ever dare to forget. In the Holocaust, there were neither ugly ducklings, nor swans. No fairy tales. Only millions of brutally tormented human beings all doomed to their devilish death. Only a little girl, who knows nothing whatsoever about the Holocaust, attempting to turn that doomed ugly duckling into a swan; only due to fear and hounding bewilderment. When she shall grow up she shall learn: no ugly duckling can turn into an enticing swan. Fairy tales had never lived there, in that venomous, evil valley.

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NOTES
1. The aesthetic phenomenon hereby addressed is the dynamics of the literary text. See for instance: Menahem Perri. The Semantic Structure of Bialiks Poems. Tel Aviv: Siman Kria, 1976. Menahem Perri. The Dynamics of the Literary Text: How the Textual Composition Determines the Texts Meaning. Hasifrut, vol. 28 (1979), pp. 6-46. Yair, Mazor. The Dynamics of Motifs in S.Y. Agnons Works. Tel Aviv: Dekel Academic Press, 1979. 2. About point of view in literature, see:Norman Friedman. Point of View in Fiction: The Development of a Critical Concept. Approaches to the Novel (Schorer, R. ed.). Chandler Publication Company, San Francisco, 1961, pp. 113-142. Yosef Ewen. Author, Narrator, Writer: Scholarly Synthesis of a Prominent Aspect in Narrative. Hasifrut, vol. 18-19 (1974), pp.137-163.

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Persian Poetry

Persian Love Poetry


Vesta Sarkhosh Curtis and Sheila R. Canby
Northampton, MA: Interlink Books, 2006. 95p. $16.95. ISBN: 1566566282. Review by Michael R. Hinckley, M.A. University of California-Santa Barbara nto the climate of linking and debunking the connection between the Middle East and violence comes a truly magnificent examination of the rich culture of Persian poetry and art. Both Vesta Sarkhosh Curtis and Sheila R. Canby are astute scholars of the region and of its art. This compilation of love poetry is proof of that expertise. Curtis previous works included examined Persian myths, art and archeology while Canbys have analyzed artistic depictions of Royal Persian paintings. Together, Curtis and Canby have created a fantastic tour of Persian culture, useful to both the experienced student of the region and its art and the novice interested in broadening their horizons. The authors introduce the reader to the language and its changes over time, the forms of poetry unique to the Persian style, and most importantly, the influential artists whose works transcend time and culture. Important figures, such as Rumi, Hafiz, and Gurgani, Parvin Etesami, and Rabaa Qazdari, as well as their history, mythology and stories are covered in brief, but fulfilling biographies. These figures are not only important to Persian society, but to the worlds culture, as Curtis and Canby prove in their opening poem by Goethe (p.7): He who wants to understand the art of poetry Must go to the land of poetry He who wants to understand the poet Must go to the poets country. Each poem is accompanied by Persian works of art, some of which evoke the mood of the poem perfectly; others serve to accentuate a feeling or a moment captured by the poem. The poems themselves are expressions, not only of romantic love, but of all types of love in all its incarnations: pre-Islamic Sasanian heroic epics (p.24), the courtly love of Farrukhi Sistani (p.26), forlorn love of Jahan Malik Khatun (p.60),

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and sensual and fiery poems of Rabaa Qazdaris forbidden love (p.16). The passion, allegories, and emotions are all transmitted in an excellent translation of the original New Persian texta boon to those who are unable to read Farsi. Persian Love Poetry illustrates concepts of the universality of love, the beauty of poetry and the timelessness of true art, regardless of origin, that are desperately needed in this growing age of uncertainty and rhetoric. It may come as a surprise to some that poets such as Hafiz, of whom Goethe wrote so glowingly, are still revered and honored in their homeland, and their poetry is considered a national treasure. Curtis and Canby have compiled a first-rate scholarly work analyzing the art, poetry and literature of Persia in a work that can be enjoyed by any audience and have made a vital, spiritual and artistic connection between Persia and the world.

Digest of Middle East Studies

Arabs and Jews

Arab-Jewish Relations: from Conflict to Resolution? Essays in Honour of Professor Moshe Maoz
Elie Podeh and Asher Kaufman, eds.
Brighton, England; Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2006. 386p. $69.50. ISBN: 1903000689. Review by Sanford Silverburg, Ph.D. Catawba College

festschrift is presented for a well known and recognized Israeli scholar of Ottoman Syria, modern Syria, and Palestinian politics, Moshe Maoz. The collection of 19 essays by authors representing the United States, Israel, Canada, and the Palestinian Authority is divided up into three parts: the historical dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the political aspects of the regional conflict, and an examination of the peace process. Following a full publication record of Professor Maozs career, there is a brief tribute offered by Asher Kaufman. Part one is introduced with an essay by the Ottomanist, Amnon Cohen who examines the role of the coffeehouse in 19th century Jerusalem as an social and economic institution. Haim Gerber reviews the sensitive subject of Zionist ideology towards Palestinians during the period of 1882-1948. He takes the position that early Zionists were, indeed, cognizant of the resident Palestinian Arab connection to the land and their political self-control. He attacks the position taken by David BenGurion as uncompromising to Palestinian claims, hence guaranteeing inter-communal hostility. Hillel Cohen studies the cooperationhe uses the term collaborationbetween Palestinians and various Zionist institutions during the period 1917-1936. Some of the explanatory factors found the described relationship as being practicality, pragmatism, pure selfinterest, and personal gain. The classic opposition to Ben-Gurions policies was evinced by Israeli Prime Minister Moshe Sharett, whose policies are closely examined by Neil Caplan. Historian David
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Lesch examines what he finds to be a shift in American foreign policy toward the entire region during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations. First, the increased Soviet influence moved the Americans closer to Cairo, supporting panArabism, but retreating somewhat with American policy toward Yemen which alienated the Saudis, causing a reversal of policy. Under President Johnson, it is pointed out, the US sought a balance of power within the region. The Johnson approach was overshadowed by Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, who imposed a globalist foreign policy. Part two focuses on the complex interrelationship between Israel and the regional Arab states. First Elie Podeh attempts to place Israel in some sort of a context for study. He argues, for several reasons, for the integration by academicians, of Israel into the study of the region, rather than segregating it for single state consideration. More specifically is the dyadic relationship between Syria and Israel, a concern of Eyal Zisser. The argument presented is that political instability in Syria, matched by a powerful Israel, has never allowed for a stable relationship. Amatzia Baram treats the bi-lateral relationship with Iraq. He provides, first, an historic overview of the presence of Jews in ancient Mesopotamia up to the present day. His analysis of the ruling Bath partys ideology is virulently anti-Semitic, which makes national discourse an unreasonable expectation. His analysis precludes any discussion of post-Saddam Iraq. Lebanon is treated in two essays, the first by Guy Maayan who looks at the countrys role in the first ArabIsraeli conflict in 1948. The author argues that, in fact, Lebanons role was, for all practical purposes, inconsequential. The second essay by Oren Barak applies the popular international relations theory of political realism to the manner in which Lebanon was carved out of the Muslim world of Syria for Maronite Christians, focusing on the concept of state formation. Gad Gilbar and Onn Winckler study the role of economics in the regional peace process involving Egypt, Jordan, and Syria and the implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict. The authors find that war, which may bring the value of pride from victory, may be more costly than the loss from a war which can bring an economic dividend with peace. Gil Feiler and Simon Lassman also look at the role of economics, as it is employed by the Asad regime in Syria, to balance its foreign relations with Israel against its domestic political demands. Part three is devoted to the intricacies of the peace process. Ilan Pappe argues that opportunities for rapprochement in the Arab-Israeli

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Arabs and Jews

conflict, historically speaking, have always been one-sided, tending to favor the Israeli position while simultaneously neglecting Palestinian perspectives and offers. Joseph Ginat examines the Arab qua Islamic notion of a hudna, essentially a cease-fire arrangement between warring parties, as institutionalized among Bedouin societies. He examines the origins in Islamic history of various forms of pacific agreement to conflict resolution. Ginats solution is to create the conditions for a hudna between Israel and the Palestinians. Itamar Rabinovich, a former Israeli diplomat, examines the triadic relationship between the US, Israel, and Syria as the three are engaged in the peace process during the period from 1993 to 2000. During the Clinton Administration, Americans dealt with the Israelis who were secretly engaged with the Palestinians during the period before and after the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin. It is a case study of coordination and collaboration between a super-power and a small state. Naomi Chazan studies the role of peace activists in both the Israeli and Palestinian camps during three distinct time periods between 1993 and 2004. Acting outside the formal governing institutions, the efforts of these groups, it is pointed out, have varied widely in their effectiveness. Ifat Maoz, Professor Maozs daughter draws upon the insight gleaned from her family experience combined with her personal academic training in social psychology. Her prism is inter-communal encounters between Israeli Jews and Arabs. Robert Rothstein tackles the complex and difficult post-mortem of the Oslo process, which offered so much hope. Simply stated, Oslo was not a comprehensive statement that hador could havea full commitment from either side. Hence, there was sufficient ambiguity for failure to set in. The concluding essay by Palestinian Kkalil Shikaki looks at the micro issues of Palestinian refugees. The attitude of Israelis and Palestinians, as might be expected, differ significantly. Collectively, this set of essays represents simply an outstanding array of perceptive and scholarly analyses of the Arab-Israeli conflict in its present stage and should be a welcomed read to all interested in the topic.

Arab-Jewish Relations...Podeh and Kaufman, eds.

IraqMilitary

BAGHDAD, AND BEYOND: THE U.S. MARINE CORPS IN THE SECOND IRAQ WAR
Col. Nicholas E. Reynolds, USMC (Ret.)
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005. 276 p. $32.95. ISBN: 1591147174. Review by Sanford R. Silverburg, Ph.D. Catawaba College, NC

his is an official military historians operational history of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) of the Marine Corps in Iraq operating under the U.S. Central Command (CentCom) during 2002 and 2003. Although ostensibly a military affairs narrative, the political context comes into play quite forcefully. Thus, the author takes issue with the prevailing argument set out by the Bush Administration for its rationale for the invasion of Iraqthat the Saddam Husseins regime was somehow linked to the 9/11 terrorist attack, noting that the origin of the terrorist threat emanated from Afghanistan and not Iraq (p. 2). Reynolds notes the difficulty with which the Marine Corps operates in its involvement in Iraq. For example, the Marine Corps mission that tasked the Middle East was subject to the force management directorate, headquartered in Hawaii and was thinly manned. The necessary administrative restructuring was put into motion by transferring the Marines to the Tampa-based CentCom Army control. In this regard, general inter-service rivalry was replaced by greater trust in the post-9/11 era largely through the sense of the grave threat presented to the country. This historical narrative is really more than a review or a chronology of Marine tactical deployment or combat operations as a part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It is an analysis of the successful use of combined arms. In joint operations, especially between the Army and Marines, the allocation of battle space was based upon the technical specialties of each force as it related to Iraqi geography.

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Two military operations encompass the combat phase of the American invasion of Iraq and the elimination of its military, all complementary to regime change. Operation Enduring Freedom was followed by Operation Iraqi Freedom, from Afghanistan to Iraq. Reynolds argues that the second did not evolve effortlessly from the first. The point is strenuously made that planning for the war began early on, long before the onset of combat operations, thus adding to the debate of whether the war was one of choice or necessity. The combat history covers activities from small unit tactics to strategic planning. The author seems to cover the smallest detail with due attention, from supply lines, the psychological stress of combat at the individual level of the warrior to the general staff level. While the political rhetoric issued in part to deflect the criticism of American unilateralism, referred to as the Coalition of the willing, the supporting role of the British can not depreciated. While the intent of the book is a delineation of the Marine Corps contribution, there is substantial insight into the necessary diplomatic relations among war-time allies. The post-war planning or lack thereof was, perhaps, a failure to appreciate how a centralized governing structure maintained stability among diverse ethnic and religious elements within Iraqi society. Thus when the Iraqi military collapsed, it was immediately followed by civil breakdown. The American military in general and the Marines in particular, while not tasked to fill the eventual vacuum, found their military role expanded very rapidly. Appended to the basic material is a summary of the combat activities, a chronology of events, and order of battle listing, followed by a command list, and a glossary of military abbreviations. Significantly lacking are maps of the line of march of the various units which would illuminate the narrative. Additionally, unless the reader is comfortable with military jargon and argot, particularly with acronyms and complex organizational titles, the reading may be unnecessarily dense. These minor criticisms aside, this is a good read and adds to a clearer understanding of US policy prior to, and during the invasion of Iraq.

Digest of Middle East Studies

North AfricaHistory

Britain and Barbary, 1589 1689


Nabil Matar
Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2005. 241 p. ISBN: 081302871X. $59.95. Review by Kenneth J. Perkins, Ph.D. University of South Carolina

ompleting a trilogy that includes Islam in Britain,1558 1685 (1998) and Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery (1999), Britain and Barbary,1589 1689 examines the impact on early modern Britain of the Muslim lands with which it had the most intensive and multifaceted relationshipthe Maghrib. Matar contends that these initial British contacts with North Africans greatly influenced the construction of a British imperial identity but have received little attention from scholars more inclined to see the forging of such self-imagery in the conquest of Ireland and the ventures across the Atlantic. In the late Elizabethan era, the Saadian sultans resistance to both Iberian and Ottoman encroachment and their seemingly limitless access to sub-Saharan gold, made Morocco an object of political and economic attraction to Britain, enabling the queen and the Moroccan ruler to initiate a dtente, one by-product of which was the appearance of Moorish characters on the London stage. As in other volumes of the trilogy, Matar adeptly draws on literary and theatrical sources to illuminate British views of the Muslim Other. In the books first substantive chapter, he ties the production of plays with North African characters to the visits of Moroccan embassies to London. Despite negotiations at the governmental level, the Moors on stage are objects of fear and contempt, whether by virtue of their strange customs and appearance, their race, or their faith. After the deaths of both Elizabeth I and Ahmad al-Mansur in 1603, Britains relationship with Morocco and the remainder of North Africa deteriorated. Corsairs captured British sailors and travelers in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, occasionally even venturing into the waters of the British Isles to take victims, not only at sea, but in raids on coastal villages. The ensuing Crisis of the Captives exemplified the intrusion of North Africa into British consciousness and is explored by Matar in Chapters two and three. At the heart 1 Britain and Barbary, 1589 1689Nabil Matar

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of the crisis lay the ineffectual response of Charles I to many of his subjects worsening plight. The king failed to understand that the captives were not soldiers whose profession entailed the risk of imprisonment or death far from home, but rather civilians whose absence deprived their merchant employers of skilled personnel needed to maintain their commercial endeavors and their families of breadwinners essential to their very survival. Moreover, he neither ordered the fleet into battle against the corsairs nor used publicly collected funds to ransom any but court favorites and others with connections. An exasperated Parliament took responsibility for ransoming captives in 1642, but the monarchs lack of empathy contributed, albeit it along with many other factors, to the rift between Parliament and the king that ultimately led to Charles deposition and execution. North Africa would never have impinged on the consciousness of countless British women had it not been for the chance misfortune of their husbands captivity, which thrust the idea of the region on them in deeply painful ways. Because long periods of time commonly elapsed before captives were freed, their families frequently found themselves reduced to penury and dependence on public charity. Such dire circumstances prompted some captives wives to take unprecedented measures. Corsairs, slave markets, and captivity were, of course, realities on both shores of the Mediterranean, and Matar judiciously warns that viewing these phenomena from an exclusively Eurocentric perspective distorts and misrepresents them. He focuses on this less frequently explored aspect of the British encounter with the Other in a chapter on North Africans held in Britain which includes a useful discussion of the distinction in Arabic between captivity (asr) and enslavement (ubudiyya). Cromwells decision to expand the navy resulted in an institution that dominated the seas around North Africa by the latter half of the seventeenth century, replacing the fear the region had instilled in the British consciousness with an attitude of arrogance and superiority bred of power. It also facilitated the venture begun in Tangier in 1662 (Britains first such experiment in an Islamic setting) which forms the subject of the books final chapter. The early expectation that developments in Morocco would replicate those in North America, with Tangier as an analog of Jamestown, foundered on Moroccan resistance. Rather than a base for the conquest of the land, the city became a commercial outpost and launching pad for the projection of naval power in the Mediterranean, its inhabitants ignoring the indigenous

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population except when thrust into combat with them. These events affected the British image of North Africans and Matar again utilizes literary and theatrical references to reveal their increasing demonization. Despite successfully withstanding a Moroccan siege in 1680, Britain acknowledged its failure at Tangier by abandoning the city four years later. Britain and Barbary is a carefully researched study based on a wide array of primary materials in English and Arabic, with some of the former included as appendices. The book has the great merit of speaking to historians working in two quite diverse geographical fields the Maghrib and Britainwho, despite the intersection of interests demonstrated by Matar, would rarely find themselves in dialog. In this final volume of his trilogy on early modern Britain and the Muslim world, the author has elegantly filled a significant gap in the historical literature.

Britain and Barbary, 1589 1689Nabil Matar

Fall 2006

Brutal Truths, Fragile Myths: Power Politics and Western Adventurism in the Arab World
Mark Huband
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004. 331 p. ISBN: 0813337534. $26.00. Review by Erik Sean Estep, Ph.D. Swarthmore College here is the saying that journalists write the first draft of history. Even though that is a clich, there is much truth to that quote. In this era of quickening political time, where the communications revolution has increased the speed of information to a simple tap on the keyboard, it has become more difficult for print journalists to keep up with events and maintain their relevance. Still more challenging are books by reporters that are culled from their writings over a long period of time. Since newspaper and magazine articles, by their very nature, lose currency quickly, these books can seem irrelevant. These hybrid compilations are not really the first draft of history since the authors work has already appeared in print, and they seem to lack the scholarship of good historical writing. Happily, British journalist Mark Hubands new book, Brutal Truths, Fragile Myths: Power Politics and Western Adventurism in the Arab World, avoids most of these pitfalls. Huband has been a correspondent for The Guardian, the Observer, and the Times of London, and covered the Middle East and Africa. He has used his experiences to write several books about those regions (The Liberian Civil War, Skull Beneath the Skin: Africa after the Cold War, and Warriors of the Prophet: the Struggle for Islam). In his latest work, Huband surveys the political scene in Algeria, Morocco, Afghanistan, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, and Iraq. Hubands journalist credentials have given him access to those countries politicians, intellectuals, and dissidents, whom he quotes extensively and to great effect. Huband describes a volatile region where the governments are trying to modernize their economies without extending democratic or civil rights.

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Huband believes that the Arabs are still looking for a common identity and are without leaders who can help get them there. He places his quest for modern identity against the backdrop of three recent events: (1) Ariel Sharons clampdown on the Occupied Territories, (2) the decline of American credibility in the region, and the (3) rise of Osama bin Laden. Accordingly, Huband devotes lengthy chapters to the aftermath of the war in Iraq, Al-Qaida, and the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. Since the West has been flooded with books on those three subjects, his book is at its best when he focuses on the less known countries of Saharan North Africa. In order to meet dissidents in these countries, he sometimes had to meet them secretly. Often, the book takes on the shape of a tense spy novel, as shadowy government agents in unmarked cars tailed Huband. Although, there are many differences in the countries he visits, the twin themes of government oppression and a frustrated opposition emerge. The room for political dialogue is so small that Huband has to meet opposition leaders in literally confining spaces; in some cases it is the back of a cab, in others it is their home, because the subjects are under house arrest and cannot leave the premises. Huband contrasts these furtive meetings with descriptions of the modern, plush offices where he meets government officials. He extends this further by detailing the physical beauty of the Middle East against the backdrop of the stark and dehumanizing prisons. According to Huband, what makes matters worse is the corrupt political leadership that can contain, but not eliminate their opposition. The articulate intellectuals and dissidents that he interviews all want to move their societies forward, but are frustrated by the lack of openness. He even makes the claim that there are no genuinely popular leaders in the Arab world, which he blames on economic and political failures. There is also a sense of failure that permeates his discussions with these intellectuals. They feel their societies have not created successful nation-states, and are far behind the rest of the world. This has all created the unrest that threatens to topple the authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes. Huband provides a lucid and concise description of the rise of AlQaida in the Sudan and Afghanistan. He carefully traces the financial operations of the group and explains the political factors that led to their expulsion from the Sudan. He also correctly argues that AlQaidas primary strategy is to undermine the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. By destabilizing these regimes, Al-Qaida can provide a clear alternative, united by a distinct ideology and free from the taint of secular corruption. He makes the case that bin

Brutal Truths, Fragile Myths...Mark Huband

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Laden is popular among the poor masses of the Arab world because of his transnational belief system (this somewhat contradicts Hubands earlier claim that there are no popular leaders in the Arab world). The Iraq War and the Israeli-Palestinian struggle take up nearly half of the book. It is here that Hubands account loses steam. Although his writing remains sharp, he is going over familiar territory and he doesnt add many new insights. He joins the left in categorizing the Iraqi invasion as essentially a neo-colonial venture. He questions the realism of the neo-conservative goal of implanted democracy at the point of a bayonet. In fact, he believes that the contradictory image of the United States as both a model for democracy and an invader will inhibit any serious attempts at reform. He also believes that the United States has a miserable record in nationbuilding, though the American occupation of Germany and Japan would challenge that assertion. Sharons tough minded and often brutal policy against the Palestinians is also severely criticized. Huband goes over familiar ground when he criticizes the expansion of Israeli settlements during the peace process, the callous demolition of Palestinian homes, and evolving division of the Occupied Territories into bantustans. His major innovation is in calling the Israeli bluff when it comes to democracy. He points out that despite the rhetoric calling for more democracy from the Arab states, the Israelis actually exploit the weakness of the authoritarian regimes to their benefit because a more efficient and popular state is a more formidable opponent. As a corollary, the Israeli manipulation of Arafat can be seen as part of the same strategy. To be fair, Huband does criticize Arafat for this corruption but his view of the struggle is decidedly one sided. For example, he calls the Occupied Territories concentration camps. This is really too much. To use that historical freighted term in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle is inexcusable. Furthermore, he doesnt try to get inside Israeli society beyond talking to a few peace activists. This is in sharp contrast to his analysis of other Middle Eastern countries, where talked to all different kinds of people, from government ministers to jailed political dissidents. Apart from the predictable chapters on Israel and Palestine, there are only a few other flaws. The book could have used a stronger editor; the end of one chapter is almost identical to beginning of the following chapter. However, Hubands writing style is crisp and evocative. He has the good journalists eye for the telling anecdote. When he spots a container of bottled water with an Israeli label, he uses it to illustrate the Israeli theft of Palestinian water (the bottle

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came from 400 meters below the town of Jericho, so the water should have been Palestinian and not Israeli). In contrast to many American journalists, he does not simplify and turn the Arabs into a caricature. Rather, he gives them space to tell their own stories. It is not a pretty one with authoritarian governments regularly depriving their citizens of basic rights and ruling over them arbitrarily. But at the same time, he doesnt let the United States, United Kingdom, or Israel off of the hook either. He shows how the American colonial project in Iraq has distorted the politics in the region by depriving it of a model for democracy. The Israelis, in their bid for hegemony, prefer weak leaders that they can manipulate. It is this foreign intervention and lack of a common identity that has caused the crisis in the Arab world. Huband should be given credit for highlighting these problems in a manner that goes beyond journalistic clichs.

Brutal Truths, Fragile Myths...Mark Huband

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Middle EastModern History

The Contemporary Middle East


Karl Yambert, ed.
Cambridge: Westview Press, 2006. 308p. ISBN: 0813343399. Review by SaraJane Tompkins, MSLS University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee estview Press has selected writings focusing on Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Palestine and Saudi Arabia. Even with this focus, it is hard to begin to understand the current Middle East without information on the United States, United Nations and other smaller countries in the region, including Bahrain, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. This collage of countries represents the birthplace of three of the major monotheistic religions: Islam, Christian and Jewish, although the population of the Middle East is 80% Muslim. The value in this volume comes from its broad and direct scope. To separate one countrys history from the rest of the Middle East would present an incomplete picture. In reading this book, one can get a sense of the mass of history that permeates choices, betrayals, treaties, success and failures. Westview Press has focused upon the current impressions of the Middle East. Some of the elements that are interwoven between countries are religion, resources, ethnic groups, language and geography. There have been struggles and victories, as countries attempt to create sustainable patterns in relating to each other. During the first half of the twentieth century, the Middle East was the huba crossroadsfor Europe, Asia and Africa. The discovery of oil in the second part of the century moved the Middle East towards a globalization that exacerbates the complexities of all the countries of the Middle East. Divisive forces arise as sects and religions collide in the politics of globalization. These forces, along with recent changes in leadership in countries such as Iran, Israel, Palestine and Saudi Arabia, give rise to conflicting pressures to modernize or strive for more religious conservatism. A discussion of the roots of Arab bitterness is necessary to begin to understand the attitudes and choices that prevail in the

The Contemporary Middle EastKarl Yambert

Fall 2006

Middle East today. In August 1914 the Ottoman Empire entered World War I, pronouncing a jihad against Britain, France and Russia. Forward two years to the Husayn-McMahon correspondence which revealed that if Husayn (sharif and amir of Mecca), proclaimed an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule, it (Britian) would provide military and financial aid to help create an independent Arab government. Husayn found too many exclusions in the lands described and refused to accept the deal. This ended their correspondence. Later, in 1916, Jemal, one of the rulers of the Ottoman Empire ordered public hangings in Beriut and Damascus of twenty-two Arabs for treason. This was the spark that ignited the Arab revolt. Husayn was supported by European Advisers and troop support from Britain. The Ottoman Empire signed an armistice with the Allies in late October. Arabs were promised the right of self-determination by the British and French. This did not happen because the British promised different Ottoman lands to other powers. The details of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 1916 included direct French rule in some areas. Husayn was unaware of this pact until after the end of World War I. From these beginnings the obstacles, including mistrust, has continued to plague the Middle East. From this history and background the book moves to Israel and Palestine, where the contributing authors focus on significant events and dates for these countries. These chapters also document the American involvement, from Presidents Carter through Clinton. Because both Israel and Palestine depend on support from other countries, the path to reconciliation is further complicated by these support mechanisms and relationships, which include contradictory domestic objectives within Israel from the hard line Israelis to the peace activists. Iraq and Iran and their differences are presented in the following section. Iraq has reflected great diversity without equality for many years. Since its creation by British mandate in 1920, the Sunni, Shii, and Kurds have bred contention in Iraq. For Iran, the contention develops from attempting to politicize Islam. Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, the country has struggled with economic, social and political problems. Current events, including the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continue the story of Iran. The perspective given from these chapters focuses upon the cultural and historical background of both countries.

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The section on Saudi Arabia and Egypt discusses the relationship these two countries have with the United States. For Saudi Arabia, oil is the common language. For Egypt, as they have sought to stabilize their government, the US has been there (for better or worse) to bring aid. The final section of this book attempts to encapsulate perspectives on the United States and the Middle East. Whether from the Muslin, Jewish or Western viewpoint, the list of unresolved issues, unmet needs and flawed strategies tangle into a web of mistrust or a lack of understanding. This book includes some helpful tools including: Select Bibliography by William L. Cleveland, a glossary, Brief Biographical Register, a Chronology and an index.

The Contemporary Middle EastKarl Yambert

FolkloreYemen

From the Land of Sheba: Yemeni Folk Tales


Retold by Carolyn Han, trans. by Kamal Ali al-Hegri
Northampton, MA: Interlink Books, 2005. 104p. $13.95. Pbk.: ISBN: 1566565715. Review by Issa J. Boullata, Ph.D. McGill University

his book contains twenty-four Yemeni folk tales of mostly two or three pages each; there are a few slightly longer ones. They betray a narrative style truer to English writing than to Arab oral traditions. The title page rightly announces that these tales are retold by Carolyn Han, her translator (and Arabic instructor) Kamal Ali al-Hegri having conveyed them to her as collected from Yemeni people while she was on a fellowship from the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs awarded through the American Institute of Yemeni Studies. However, the retold tales have delightfully captured the spirit of the folk themes that reflect, in part, the rich culture of Yemen and the popular interpretation of its history and values. The tales retold in 65 pages have a 24-page introduction by Carolyn Han and a 4-page glossary of Arabic words at the end of this slim book. The relatively long introduction touches briefly on a variety of subjects, including Yemens history, geography, culture, architecture, society, and legends. It mentions Biblical and Quranic references relevant to Yemen, and travelers who visited the country, from Marco Polo and Ibn Battuta to more recent ones like Carsten Niebuhr and Freya Stark. It speaks of Yemens coffee, myrrh, frankincense, and qat, as well as its foods, such as salta, shafut, and bint al-sahn; and even about mens and womens clothingbut very little about folk literature. This introduction is apparently meant for the general reader and, as such, is useful in summarily describing the country in the tales that follow. One of the tales evokes the history of ancient Yemen. Entitled Al-Qalis, it tells of Abrahah [al-Ashram], a Christian general

From the Land of Sheba...Carolyn Han

Fall 2006

from Abyssinia who occupied Yemen in the 6th century and built alQalis, a cathedral in Sanaa, on the spot where it was believed Jesus of Nazareth prayed, and where Abrahah wanted to create a center of pilgrimage to replace Mecca. He attacked Mecca to destroy the Kabah, but when he revealed his hidden elephant intended to frighten his pre-Islamic Arab enemies, the elephant knelt, on approaching the Kabah, and thousands of birds dropped red-hot stones on his army, which then fled in defeat. This year was called the Year of the Elephant, and it was the year in which the Prophet Muhammad was born [570 A.D.], as well as the year in which the great dam of Marib in Yemen collapsed. Another tale, entitled Al-Mokha: The Story of Coffee, tells about a ship, after having tossed on the waves of the Red Sea, eventually reached an uncharted Yemeni port. The exhausted crew landed, but their sick captain remained on board. They were led to a Sufi named Shaykh al-Shadhili, whose servant offered them a dark-colored liquid, which healed their seasickness. They begged to take some of the drink to their captain, who, upon drinking it, felt better and went, the following day to thank the Sufi. The captain asked him about the name of the liquid and learned that it was called qahwa (coffee), that its beans came originally from Abyssinia, and now grew in the mountains of Yemen where, when goats ate the beans, they became frisky. The Sufis experimented with roasting the beans and making a drink from them, which helped them stay awake all nightto pray. On alShadhilis advice, the captain sold his cargo in Yemen and bought sacks of coffee beans, which he profitably sold in India. Eventually more ships bought coffee beans at the Yemeni port of al-Mokha and spread it around the world, where the superior coffee came to be called mocha. Another tale is entitled Henna Leaf, taking its title from the name of a girl, whose stepmother did not let her go to the party of the Sultans daughters where all the women were invited, and made her stay at home to separate and grind a large amount of grain, but her stepsister Ekram was permitted to go. An old woman appeared out of nowhere and, encouraging Henna Leaf to leave her kitchen work, provided her with a silken dress, a pair of silk shoes, a silver necklace, and silver bracelets and anklets. She then took her to the Sultans palace, where the old woman disappeared. At the palace, Henna Leaf attracted the womens attention, including her suspicious stepmother and stepsister. When the Sultans son, Prince Ali, saw Henna Leaf, he fell in love with her

Digest of Middle East Studies

FolkloreYemen

and eventually married her. (Cinderella, one would immediately think! But no, the story has its Yemeni and Muslim dimensions.) As the women were clapping and dancing to the sound of loud music, they did not hear Ali repeating the name of Allah as a warning to the women that a man was coming in, and that they should put on their cloaks and veils. He had forgotten that his sisters were giving a party for the women. His surprise entrance permitted him to see Henna Leaf and be smitten with her beauty. As the other women sought cover, Henna Leaf grabbed her cloak, picked up her silk shoes that she had left outside the door according to custom, and dashed down the stairs to go home. She stumbled over the threshold and one shoe fell from her hand, but she returned home safely with the other one. Prince Ali sent his servant the next day to find the owner of the shoe. Ekram tried hard to force her foot into the shoe but it did not fit, whereas Henna Leaf slipped it on easily then produced the other shoe. The following day, she was invited to the palace, but her stepmother sent Ekram instead, heavily veiled to deceive the prince, but the ruse did not work. Ali married Henna Leaf and they lived happily at the palace until the Sultans wife became jealous of her and, with the help of a witchs acacia thorns, turned her into a white dove that flew away. Ali was told that Henna Leaf was unhappy and ran away, but he later learned the truth, found the dove and removed the seven magical acacia thorns from her neck, and Henna Leaf was restored to him. The Sultan banished his wife as a punishment and, upon retiring, appointed his son Ali as Sultan. Ali ruled with Henna Leaf by his side, and they were happy and blessed with many children. The book could have benefited from a more vigilant editor, for it has several misprints. For example, the Romans called the region of Yemen Arabia Felix, not Felix Arabia as on page 11; and they called the northern wastes of the peninsula Arabia Deserta, not Arabia Diserta also on page 11. The reception or entertainment room, often located on the top of a Yemeni tower-house of several floors is called mafraj, as it is correctly spelled, except on page 28 where it is mafrij. Azrael, the angel of death, is called Izrail in Arabic, not Azrail as on page 42. The English sentence on page 83, Thankfully, a beacon of light shown in the distance misspells the word shone. These and other misprints should be eliminated in a second edition, and a uniform system of transliteration of Arabic names and words should be adopted.

From the Land of Sheba...Carolyn Han

Gulf Security

Gulf Security in the TwentyFirst Century


David E. Long and Christian Koch, eds.
The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies & Research/ I.B. Tauris, 1997. 334p. $25.70. ISBN: 1860643167. Review by Mohammed M. Aman, Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

he book is a collection of research papers written by experts in the field of socio-economic development and security. Collectively, they explore regional instability and global security. Collectively, the introduction and twelve chapters demonstrate that achieving Gulf security in the twenty-first century will be a complex task indeed. The ultimate strategic challenge for the Gulf States in the twenty-first century will be, not only to deter and prepare to defend against external military threats, but also to insure that change-economic, political, and social-remains evolutionary instead of becoming revolutionary. Iran and Gulf Security, is the title of chapter two, written by Jerold D. Green, deals with the issues of Gulf security and how this can be achieved only through the collective agreement and involvement of three sets of political factors: the member states of the GCC, Iran, and Iraq. Without explicit cooperation and implicit agreement among these key actors, Gulf security will continue to elude the Middle East. The chapter analyzes the Iranian component of this complicated mixture in order to speculate in an informed fashion how Iran is likely to influence the question of Gulf security in the twenty-first century. Chapter three Iraq Faces the Twenty-first Century: Potential Challenges for Gulf States, Phebe Marr presents three scenarios for how Iraq might be governed in the twenty-first century: 1) What, if any, evolution will take place in Iraqs domestic political situation? 2) What social, economic, and political structures will emerge within Iraq after the impact of wars and sanctions? and 3) What important domestic trends can be identified and how are they likely to affect Iraqs posture towards the Gulf in the next

Gulf Security in the Twenty First CenturyLong and Koch

Fall 2006

century? He argues that the potential challenges from Iraq will not be easy to manage, but they present the GCC and its Western partners with three essential tasks. The first is how to handle the return of Iraq to oil markets in ways that do not destabilize or create serious economic problems for the rest of the Gulf. Dr. Marr points out that Iraqs economic losses have been so severe and its reconstruction needs are so high as to generate constant pressures in Iraq to create more revenues. This, according to Marr, will keep competition for oil markets and the issue of oil prices at the front of Gulf priorities. Restoration of Iraqs sovereignty over its territory and easing the country out of isolation are key challenges. Chapter four The Gulf Cooperation Council and the United States, by Joseph Moynihan points out that from the US perspective, the current set of security relationships with the Gulf States serves three important and interrelated interests: 1) uninterrupted access to the petroleum resources of the Gulf; 2) a potential military base of operations should a regional opponent of the Middle East peace process initiate hostilities against a peace process partner; and 3) the prevention of either Iran or Iraq from attaining regional political-military dominance in a strategically important area of the world. Dr. Moynihan questions the assumption that access to Gulf oil will indefinitely remain a vital interest of the US. For the present, so long as US forces remain in or readily accessible to the region, the extent military threat to the sovereignty of the GCC States is effectively deterred and contained. In her article on Europe and Gulf Security: A Competitive Business, Dr. Rosemary Hollis, argues that the principal European concern in the Gulf are in line with those of the US, i.e. the security of energy supplies without access to a continuous flow of oil and gas at a predictable and manageable prices, Europes economies and the standard of living of its people would be at risk. A related concern is continued access to lucrative markets in the Gulf oil-producing states and the security of European investments there. She points out that the EU members are in competition for Gulf business, both with each other and with the USA. The Europeans are not altogether happy with the US formula for Gulf security on Dual Containment. Europes principal interests in the Gulf region are: 1) assured access to oil at reasonable prices; 2)

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favorable conditions for trade and investment; 3) and the safety of European expatriates. The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Gulf Security, is the title of chapter six, written by Dr. Robert V. Barylski, in which he examines continuity and change in Russian foreign policy towards the Gulf, and how the collapse of the Soviet Union altered the larger context in which Gulf States must conduct their diplomacy. He explains why Moscow evaluates its relations with the Gulf States within a larger frameworka structure in which Russia competes with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and China for influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. He also discusses some of Russias post-Soviet, domestic, and near-abroad, Islamic problems. He suggests that the Gulf States should build and sustain effective alliance that protects their sovereignty, territorial integrity, and access to world markets. Part Three consists of three chapters (7-9). The subject of Islamism is written by David Lang in chapter seven. He states that Islamism is, at present, not a major threat to Gulf security. However, failure to disarm public disaffection through governmental reform could become a self-fulfilling prophecy, a serious threat which could easily materialize by the twentyfirst century. Chapter eight, by Richard Schofield, examines the degree to which the current regional territorial framework should be regarded as final and permanent. He also looks at recent trends and developments in the region on a case by case basis, concerning the two disputes which have dominated the agenda of successive annual summit meetings of the GCC in recent years: the Bahrain-Qatar dispute over Hawar Islands and the Dibal and Jarda Shoals, and the Iran-UAE dispute over the Sovereignty of the Islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs in the lower Gulf. He concludes that the disputes of the region are being increasingly polarized into those which have recently been settled and those which remain to constitute threats to regional stability. Chapter nine, The Greater Middle East Co-Prosperity Sphere: The Arab-Israeli Problem and Gulf Security, by Glenn E. Robinson highlights the official line of the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict and presents an Islamic counter vision and a Pan-Arab response. He then challenges a number of assumptions implicit in these competing versions of the future with particular attention being paid to questionable assumptions in the official line. By using a

Gulf Security in the Twenty First CenturyLong and Koch

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variation of the global economic system approach, Robinson outlines an alternative view of where the Middle East may be heading as a result of the containment (if not cessation) of the Arab-Israeli conflict. He argues that the containment of the ArabIsraeli conflict will not diminish the importance of that issue in the larger region, particularly the Gulf. Rather, the diminishing of the conflict will likely transform the nature of the engagement from one of arms length rhetoric to direct entanglement. The ultimate impact of the conclusion of the Arab-Israeli conflictwhen, and if, that conclusion occurson Gulf States is still an open question. Part four deals with Internal Determinants of Gulf Security Chapter 10 Economics and Security in the Gulf, by Charles Doran attempts to answer the following questions: 1) have the economic policies of the Gulf states accomplished what was expected in their first phase of economic development? 2) What are the strategies these states have so far adopted to achieve eventual revenue independence from oil? 3) Is there a better alternative? 4) How have economics contributed to the political security in the Gulf? Dr. Duran argues that the Gulf States are one-third to one-half way through their cycles of revenue generation from oil and must look beyond current strategies for effective economic planning within the next century. Doran looks at various revenue stream optimization strategies, among them, waiting for the next international oil shortage price hike sequence, increased Gulf foreign investment in the economies of the West; and indigenous investments within GCC economies. These three strategies, he argues, raise more problems than they solve. He concludes that it is regional development that offers the best hope for long-term economic prosperity, and by extension, political security into the twenty-first century. Dr. Jill Crystal, in chapter 11, Social Transformation Changing Expectations and Gulf Security, analyzes the impact of social transformation on Gulf security in the twenty-first century. She describes the transformation that affects Gulf security in the coming decades, among them social transformation resulting from social groups attempting to make foreign policy themselves directly or indirectly. Second, Gulf security is affected whenever social groups put pressure of any kind on the state, or on other social groups. Dr. Crystal points out that tribal influence remain important. She asserts that in order for social transformations to affect Gulf security, there must be organized groups with articulated grievances, government, or individuals whose policy responses to

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those grievances are seen as inadequate, and outside powers with an interest in the issue around which conflict has arisen. Chapter 12, Population Growth, the Labor Market, and Gulf Security, by Michael E. Bonine examines the rapid population increase and the labor markets of the Gulf states, focusing on the six Arab members of the GCC. He analyzes characteristics and the factors influencing the growth of population and labor, and provides a number of projections for future population in the Gulf States, which he notes could be staggering by the mid-and latetwenty first century. Many of the jobs in the Gulf States are menial in nature, and thus, are socially unacceptable to a majority of Gulf citizens; and should Gulf citizens be economically coerced to accept a menial position, internal stability could diminish at least during the transition period. The topic of health, education, gender and the security of the Gulf in the twenty-first century are treated by Dr. Mai Yamani in chapter 13. She attempts to examine the long-term effects of social restructuring on traditional values and norms, on existent ethnic diversity and inter-communal relations, on shifting boundaries of gender relations, and on the growth of health services and educational programs, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Dr. Yamani asserts no country can be secure unless its citizens are safe and well. This is a changing but increasingly accepted conception of security that in the twenty-first century will require the enhancement of social integration, the reduction of poverty, and the expansion of productive employment. Brief bios of each contributor (p.281-85), followed by extensive notes (p.286-312), an equally extensive bibliography (p.312-22), and index (p.323-334) concludes this very valuable publication. A must read for anyone with interest in global security, and the stability of the Gulf States.

Gulf Security in the Twenty First CenturyLong and Koch

Iraqi Jews

Iraqi Jews: a History of Mass Exodus


Abbas Shiblak
London: Saqi, 2005. 215p. Pbk: $ 19.95 .ISBN: 0863575042. Review by Nancy E. Gallagher, Ph.D. University of California-Santa Barbara raqi Jews: a History of Mass Exodus first appeared in 1986 as The Lure of Zion. The author has incorporated, to good effect, new, published material on transfer of Palestinians and Iraqis based on recently opened Israeli archives in this new edition. In the Preface, Peter Sluglett, a British Jewish historian currently at the University of Utah, recalls a wonderful evening in London spent with Abbas Shiblak, a Palestinian Muslim, and a group of Iraqi Jewish exilesall former members of the Iraqi Communist Party. They enjoyed Iraqi food, played the `ud, and the men began to sign Iraqi maqamat. At the time, Shiblak was just beginning the thesis that would grow into this fascinating book. In the new Preface, Sluglett comments that Shiblak and the Iraqis were all victims of Zionism and that the expulsion of the Palestinians from Palestine and the Iraqi Jews from Iraq were two sides of the same coin. Of the 325,000 Jews from Arab countries who fled to Israel, about 125,000 came from Iraq. Sluglett believes that if the state of Israel had been a bi-national state that was established nonviolently and without displacing the Palestinian Arabs, only a small number of Iraqi Jews would have thought of leaving Iraq to immigrate to it. Shiblak begins by explaining that in 1948, Jews living in Arab countries had diverse origins. Some had lived in the region for centuries before Christ. Others emigrated from Spain and were assimilated into North African societies. Small numbers of European Jews arrived with other colonizers during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Most Jews spoke Arabic and were culturally and economically well integrated into the region. Today there are only a few tens of thousands of Jews living in the Arab world. ProZionist sources consider the emigration of Arab Jews to Israel a result of anti-Semitism in Arab societies, while pro-Arab sources consider it a result of Zionist activities and propaganda. Shiblak,

Iraqi Jews: a History of Mass ExodusAbbas Shiblak

Fall 2006

however, carefully weighs the circumstances of the mass emigration and shows that neither version is entirely right or wrong. Iraqi Jews were relatively homogeneous, mainly upper- and middle-class, and well established in Baghdad and other large cities, though there were also small communities of Jews, including Kurdish Jews, living in towns and rural areas throughout Iraq. Many Iraqi Jews studied at the Alliance Israelite Schools where they learned modern subjects and foreign languages. Others studied in free Ottoman government schools where they tended to specialize in medicine, law, pharmacy, and engineering. The great Iraqi Jewish families, such as the Kadouries and Sassoons, were merchants and traders with branches throughout the Middle East and often Europe and Asia. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, London began to think of solving the Jewish Question by sending European Jews to under populated parts of the Arab East, such as southern Mesopotamia. In the face of Ottoman opposition, such schemes came to nothing. After World War I, the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the growth of the Zionist movement, the picture changed. European Jews planned to settle in Palestine, displace the indigenous Arabs in one way or another, and to bring in Jewish Arab laborers to mitigate the resulting labor shortage. Iraqi Jews, however, were indifferent and often hostile to Zionism, did not participate in international Zionist Congresses, and before 1948, only rarely immigrated to Palestine. Like minorities elsewhere, under British imperial rule, some Iraqi Jews benefited from the Capitulations, from preferential employment opportunities, and from their relatively high levels of education. Increasingly, impoverished majority Iraqis resented them and other new elites for their prosperity and favored status. In the Farhud or riots of 1941, several hundred Jews were killed or injured, as looters from slums around Baghdad invaded commercial areas and carried off food and goods. In the politically charged postwar era, many Jews joined the Iraqi Communist Party, believing that only working class revolution would secure the interests of minorities. Iraqi Jewish women played a large role in the womens branch of the Iraqi Communist Party. Others Iraqi Jews, often of middle class backgrounds, responded to Zionist emissaries. With the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the weak Iraqi government used it as an excuse to impose martial law, ban political parties, and suspend press freedoms. Many Communists

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Iraqi Jews

were arrested and some were executed. The government dispatched 5,000 poorly equipped Iraqi troops to Palestine and after the defeat of the Arab forces, treated Iraqi Jews as associates of the Communist and Zionist enemy. The position of Iraqi Jews deteriorated after the 1948 defeat. The government took steps to eliminate Jews from the army, the police, and public services. Jewish banks lost their licenses to deal in foreign exchange. Zionist agents argued that Jews had no future in Iraq and should immigrate to Israel. Iraqi Jewish leaders found the measures less severe than those taken against Japanese Americans in World War II and predicted that they would be temporary. Non-Iraqi Zionists reported to the international press that thousands of Jews were being persecuted and taken to concentration camps in Iraq. The charges were fabricated or exaggerated, but heightened the general atmosphere of tension and mistrust. With British and American support, the Iraqi government facilitated the emigration of Jews to Israel as part of a larger scheme to settle Palestinians in Iraq. The difficulty was that neither the Palestinians nor the Iraqis were enthusiastic, nor were the great powers willing to pay for the project. Iraq passed a denaturalization law in 1950 and a few thousand Iraqi Jews left the country. Many still hoped that things would return to normal. Then a series of bombs was detonated near synagogues and other locations frequented by Jews. After about a year, the Iraqi government announced that it had apprehended the perpetrators along with their explosives, member lists, and presses. The perpetrators were Mossad agents. The damage, however, had been done. Iraqi Jews decided they had no choice but to leave; Zionist agents facilitated their departure. The wealthiest of the Iraqi Jews, about 10,000, settled in Europe and North America, and the rest went to Israel. The 3,500 year old Jewish community in Iraq had come to an end. The great merit of Shiblaks book is his judicious use of the sources and his fairness in evaluating them. He convincingly argues that the emigration of Iraqi Jews can only be understood in the context of various transfer schemes, long envisioned by Zionist leaders, in which Arab Jews would be exchanged for Palestinian Arabs. Standard texts dealing with the IsraeliPalestinian conflict seem to spend far more time on European Zionism than on the history of Arab Jewish communities. I hope that this revised edition encourages them to focus more on Arab Jews, especially because at least 60 percent of the Jewish population of Israel originated in Arab countries.

Iraqi Jews: a History of Mass ExodusAbbas Shiblak

EgyptPolitics

Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists


Raymond Baker
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. 309p. $29.95. ISBN: 0674019792. Review by Roger Owen, Ph.D. Harvard University

slam without Fear is a study of the thinking of a group of men Raymond Baker identifies as the New Islamists who emerged as an important, central (wassatiyya) trend within Egyptian Islam in the early 1990s. They include well-known names like the constitutional lawyer, Kamal Abul Magd, the journalist, Fahmy Huwaidy, the historian, Tareq al-Bishry and two significant religious scholars, Yusuf al-Qaradawy and the late Shaikh Muhammad alGhazzaly. As Baker ably demonstrates they were (and continue to be) linked by long-standing ties of personal friendship, as well as by a constant exchange of ideas regularly cemented by joint appearances on a variety of public platforms, often during times of crisis, as after 9/11, or the run up to the American attack on Iraq. Bakers own vivid personal descriptions of a number of such highly charged occasions are among some of the very best anecdotes in the book. Bakers stated intention is to present the ideas of the group in their own words under three general headings, Culture, Society building and community (including economics), and Politics. This method of organizing the material highlights the predominance the members give to questions of culture, which include the central importance of a reformed system of education which they see as vital to the protection of Egypts precious Islamic heritage, and hence, the key to the healing of the wounds inflicted by the colonial period upon every aspect of the nations educational, legislative and intellectual being. As far as the other two headings are concerned, the groups major contribution involves much less of a blueprint, and much more of a general open-mindedness towards western experiments in pluralism and democracy, as well as a courageous defense of Coptic membership of the national community exemplified by Huwaidys 1995 al-Ahram article entitled

Islam without Fear...Raymond Baker

Fall 2006

Lets elect Copts, reprinted in time to make a significant impact on the elections five years later. Underlying both the New Islamists thinking and practice is the notion of tarshid (guidance) which sees Islam, not only as a system of beliefs, but also as an intellectual and cultural reservoir, an instructive experience of political, economic and social history and a moral and practical guide to the improvement of life (p.13). It is this willingness to put themselves and their ideas at the service of the nation which makes them such a valuable asset while, at the same time, highlighting the folly of the Mubarak regime in not allowing one of the political expressions of their views, the abortive initiative to obtain official acceptance for a Wassat Party in 1996, to play a positive role in the national dialog. Bakers method reaches its limits in its refusal either to place the New Islamists in their historical and international context or to subject them to more than limited criticismfor example, his few measured words about Shaikh Ghazzalys rather ambiguous response to the assassination of the outspoken secularist, Farag Foda. It is clear that he sees the group as true heirs to the legacy of Afghany and Abduh. But, equally clearly, he has no wish to try to define the ways in which their thinking goes beyond that of their intellectual forefathers other than the fact that, in so many ways, they have to respond to the daytoday problems thrown up by very different contemporary political and social circumstances. Nor is he interested in exploring the influence or, in some cases, the possible mutual interaction, between them and such important Arabic and Iranian religious thinkers as Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr, with his pioneering work on Islamic economics or Abdul-Karim Soroush. It is a pity that Baker seems to have no wish to speculate about the longer-term influence of the group. It is true that there are occasional hints concerning possible future problems, for example his mild criticism of the Wassat Partys failure to address the question of how the New Islamists notion of an Islamically-inspired educational curriculum might be encouraged to emerge from popular involvement and discussion rather than by the bureaucratic fiat of a Muslim Brothers influenced Ministry of Education. More to the point would have been some indication as to how he believes that New Islamist thinking might have paved the way for some of the striking new features to be found in the recent (March 2004) Muslim Brothers initiative with its announcement of its unequivocal respect for a parliamentary/constitutional regime and its recognition that Copts constitute an integral part of Egyptian society with equal rights and obligations.

Digest of Middle East Studies

Israeli Society

The Israelis, Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Land


Donna Rosenthal
New York: Free Press, 2005. 466p. $28. ISBN: 0684869721. 480p. $15. Pbk. ISBN: 0743270355. Review by Daphne Tsimhoni, Ph.D Israel Institute of Technology and The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

sraeli society is a very complex one: improbable people tormented by gaps and strifepessimists would saymulticultural fascinating state, optimists would say. The author of this book, Donna Rosenthal, belongs to the latter. She is an outstanding journalist who has traveled extensively and reported to American journals from over 60 countries, earned several academic degrees, resided in Israel for several years, and taught at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Her approach to Israeli society is warm and empathic and is based upon her close acquaintance with Israelis of all strata and ethnic groups, as well as on extensive academic reading. The author tells the story of ordinary people and their everyday lives through their own narrativesa perspective that is usually overshadowed by the turbulent political agenda of Israel. Her book focuses on middle class people of all groups who, one way or another, consider Israel as their homeland. The author tried to avoid stories of extreme discrimination, hatred, violence and despair. She discusses Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, but excludes the Palestinians of those territories who deserve their own book (p.4), an explanation which symbolizes the abnormality of the state of Israel. As it appears from this book there is no Israeli identity per se. Each Israeli carries with him at least one additional ethnoreligious identity which comes to light in the titles of the chapters of the book, which is divided into five parts containing 18 chapters and an epilogue, followed by notes, bibliography, and index. Each

The Israelis...Donna Rosenthal

Fall 2006

Chapter has a short introduction gleaned from an extensive reading of academic sources, followed by stories and interviews with a wide variety of people who tell their own version of that topic. The first part of the book (Chapters 1-4) deals with the most salient experiences that make Israelis who they are: suicide bombs, dating and mating, army service, and the thriving hightech industry. The opening chapter tells of a suicide bomb, its victims, their families and the effect it has on Israeli society. Each victim forms a world of his/her own, coming from different socio-ethnic groups. But, as the author puts it, despite the traumas of the second Intifada they [the Israelis] fill symphony halls, dance in discos, and argue in cafs.... Israelis are experts at living with a frequency of terrorist attacks no other people has endured for so long.(p. 1) In contrast to the gloomy stories of Chapter 1, Chapter 4 tells us about the greatest Israeli successhightech industry that involves Jews of different backgrounds, as well as Arabs. Rosenthal tells the story of a successful Arab hightech start up company in Nazareth, whose members Muslims, Christians and Jews all work together successfully under the management of its Arab founder, who has managed to successfully leave the Arab-Israeli conflict at the front door. The second part (Chapters 5-8) portrays the mass immigration of Jews to Palestine and to the state of Israel, and their unique ethnocultural identities: the Ashkenzim, who came from Europe; the Mizrahim, who emigrated from Middle Easternlargely Arab countries; the Russians, who emigrated from the Former Soviet Union; and the Ethiopians. The third part (Chapters 9-11) discusses the fissure among Israeli Jews that stemmed from contradicting attitudes regarding the Jewish religion and religious affiliation. The chapters are entitled: The Haredim (Ultra-Orthodox Jews), The Orthodox, and The Non-Orthodox. Chapter 10: The Orthodox elaborates on the Jewish settlers in the territories occupied in the 1967 war. This identification is somewhat misleading, because there are some non-Orthodox settlers in these territories, whereas the majority of religious Jewsboth Orthodox and ultraOrthodox still live in Israel within the green line. Chapter 11: The NonOrthodox refers to the largest group of Israeli Jews who consider themselves as secular Jews or Jews by nationality. The author maintains that there is no real secular Jew in Israel since every Jew has a certain attachment to religion which finds expression in

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Israeli Society

celebrating Jewish holidays and in observing the Saturday eve special meal. However, as the author describes it, celebrating holidays and Saturday eve meals are usually culturally traditional experiences rather than an expression of piety. The fourth part (Chapters 12-15) is titled Schizophrenia: Non-Jews in a Jewish state. Inside these Chapters Rosenthal describes their complex and somewhat ambiguous identities, with some of the most intriguing stories. One such is about Mikhail Fannus, a son of an Anglican minister who runs an open house for both Jews and Arabs in the town of Ramleh, a Jewish-Arab working class town. He also became the first Arab member of the municipal coalition. The building itself was donated by Dalia Landau whose holocaust survivor parents, had settled down in the early 1950s in a house evacuated by its Palestinian Arab owners during the 1948 war. Dalia was visited following the 1967 war by the son of the original Palestinian owners who were living in a refugee camp in the West Bank. (The son later initiated a suicide attack in West Jerusalem and paid for that act by being jailed for 15 years.) When Dalia inherited the house, she offered to sell it and give the money to the son of the original Palestinian owner. At the suggestion of the original owner, she donated it to be used a kindergarten for Arab children, and as an open house for rapprochement activities between Jews and Arabs in Ramleh. Chapter 12: The Muslims: Abrahams Other Children tells about urban, middle class professional Muslims. A pediatric doctor and his teacher wife live in Haifa, a tranquil town with a long tradition of Jewish-Arab co-existence. They are well integrated professionally and economically into the local society, and try to avoid discussing issues of nationality. A young lawyer from Acre who now resides in Jerusalem considers herself a Palestinian demands that all signs of Judaism be removed from the emblems of the state of Israel. Rosenthal refers to the second Intifada and the emergence of the Islamic movement in Israel. She describes the first suicide bombings by Muslim Arab citizens of Israel, and the embarrassment that they caused to their Muslim countrymen. These interviews portray the dilemma of educated Muslim Arabs in Israel regarding the acceptance of the state as the nation-state of the Jewish people, while being proud of their personal professional achievements and free lifestyle. Rosenthal did not include stories of poor destitute Muslim Arabs who could tell more about the discriminatory policies of the state of Israel regarding its Arab

The Israelis...Donna Rosenthal

Fall 2006

citizens, particularly those Muslims, the majority of whom are urban working class, farmers, and Bedouins. Chapter 15: The Christians: Uneasy in the Land of Jesus relates how Christians live amongst Muslims in Jerusalem, Nazareth and the village of Turan in Galilee signifying their dilemma of being a minority within minority. The Christian Arab socioeconomic features resemble those of Israeli Jews, rather than their Muslim Arab countrymen. Being veteran journalists, social activists and Knesset members, the Christian Arabs consider themselves as Arab nationalists and have been speaking and working for the benefit of the Arabs in Israel at large. However, their feelings of insecurity have been expanding in proportion to their declining numbers, due to their higher emigration rates and lower birthrates than those of the Muslims. The fifth part (Chapters 16-18): The Sexual Revolution deals with issues of personal status, the changing habits of marriage and divorce, as well as the growing homo-lesbian community versus the Orthodox Jewish religious courts that have an exclusive authority to deal with issues of personal status. These courts still refrain from adapting themselves to social change and new marriage habits of Israeli Jews. The books epilogue describes several attempts at Jewish Arab dialogue and co-habitation following the second Intifada, despite the growing violence: the story of Neve Shalom, a Jewish-Arab village located between Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem, and the industrial initiatives of the leading industrialist and entrepreneur Stef Wertheimer to build industrial parks to be shared by Jews and Arabs. The final story concerns the performance of an original play by Jewish and Arab children in Galilee. The book ends with the message of an Arab young actress: You say there will be no peace. Well, were going to find a different way. Solutions you havent found. Parents looked embarrassed. Puzzled. And proud. (p.394) This optimistic message sums up the books motto: despite its many problems, Israel still looks forward with hope for a better future for its younger generation. Recommended for those who are interested in the state of Israel and have faith in its future. It is also recommended for researchers of Israeli society and those who seek to learn about its everyday life behind politics and of the people behind the news.

Digest of Middle East Studies

Jerusalem

Jordanian Jerusalem: Holy Places and National Spaces


Kimberly Katz
Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2005. 214 p. $59.95. ISBN: 0813028442. Review by Sanford R. Silverburg, Ph.D. Catawba College, NC

he available and extant literature on Jerusalem is legion. There is, however, far less on Jordanian policies dealing with East Jerusalem and Palestinian and Islamic interests in the city during the period from 1948 to 1967. The book under review covers this lacuna, albeit in the briefest fashion. A book revised from a doctoral dissertation, it is, as can be expected under this condition, reasonably well researched from archival material, personal interviews, and the standard secondary literature search. Jerusalem, during the period immediately before the one under review, was between two stateseach, to some degree, the result of artificial geographical configuration from the British Mandate following World War I negotiations. TransJordan was created from the Palestine Mandate by separating it at the Jordan River in 1922, essentially to serve as a staging area for British forces in the Middle East, protecting the Suez Canal in the West, and India, farther to the East. Soon after the British ended their Mandate over a truncated Palestine, the Palestinian Jews, in 1948, declared the Provisional State of Israel in existence. Almost immediately thereafter, the British subsidized TransJordanian Arab Legion crossed the River Jordan and took up positions on both sides of the Allenby Bridge at Jericho, which stands in distinction to the authors claim that Jordanian forces had been pulled back from Palestine (across the River) (p.46). It is important to consider that Jordan was then in a prime position for the violent confrontation that came about in 1948. After the chapters on the background to the origins of Jordan and its relationship to Palestine, the author delves into the central

Jordanian Jerusalem...Kimberly Katz

Fall 2006

subject of Jordanian administration of East Jerusalem. The Jordanian presence in Jerusalem must be understood in the context of Arab World politics and the role of the family. Much of the controversy involved over Muslim control over some portion of Jerusalem involves family rivalries between the Saud and Hashemite families, with each jockeying for prestige and position in the Muslim world. Strengthening the Hashemite family relationship to the Muslim character of the city is always a central feature of Jordanian policy and is featured prominently throughout the book. While the history presented is a bit skimpy, it does provide some insight to Palestinian attitudes to the overarching presence of Jordan as an occupying power. Indeed, the animus between Palestinians and Hashemite Jordanians was evidenced, in part, with the assassination of King Abdullah by a Palestinian nationalist outside of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. On the substantive issue of Jerusalem, we find at the outset that the author surprisingly does not distinguish the important differences between the distinctiveness of the urban center as a municipality from an administrative district, an important facet of demography as well as boundary issues. Distinctive in an academic tome is the relish provided the popular tourist interest and the Jordanian use of it in developing nation-building projects. This is certainly an added bonus to the book. But counter-balanced is something most disturbing for those most interested in political issues, the lack of a concentrated treatment of the intersection of the PLO between the Palestinians and the Jordanians. To be sure there is an entire chapter dealing with the connection, but in an already thin work, there are just too many unanswered questions. Even more parsimonious is the discussion of the impact of Jordans role in Jerusalem as result of the 1967 conflict. To Katzs credit, great use of philately, bank notes and picture post cards as historical evidence is made, thus adding to an appreciation of methods of modern historical analysis. Perhaps the books real contribution to further our understanding of the impact of Jordanian influence over Jerusalem comes in the discussion of the governments role in the citys religious affairs, sans Jewish interests. While Jerusalem is most often related to the tripartite religious affiliation, there is less appreciation of the reach of Eastern Christian rites in a complicated process of sharing control over holy sites. Many political scientists concentrate on political socialization and the factor of education as a primary

Digest of Middle East Studies

Jerusalem

agent. Here the author contributes by detailing the Jordanian governments actions to control Christian schools. It is somewhat unfortunate that a work whose topic is filled with potential is disproportionately subject to available criticism. In addition to the relevant commentary already noted, Katz perpetuates the unsupported claim that Pakistan, in addition to Great Britain, diplomatically recognized Jordans annexation of the West Bank (p.74). Additionally, the cartography offered is somewhat sloppy. For some reason, a map of TransJordan is dated 1935 to 1946 rather than from 1922, the mandates chronological inception. The Palestine partition map does not fully delineate Palestine from TransJordan at the River Jordan. The opportunity presented itself to the author to make a contribution on a topic that requires further elucidation. While the substance may be lacking here, there is now, more than ever, a reason for further discussion.

Jordanian Jerusalem...Kimberly Katz

Jihadists

Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror


Mary Habeck
New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. 243 p. $25.00 ISBN: 0300113064. Review by Mohammed M. Aman, Ph.D University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee ary Habeck enumerates the varied explanations offered by analysts and scholars as to why nineteen men hated the United States enough to kill three thousand civilians in an unprovoked attack on September 11. Among the reasons cited are Americas unconditional support for Israel, globalization, US arrogance, cultural, political, and economic imperialism, and poverty and oppression endemic in many Arab countries. The author reiterates President George W. Bushs own version, which argues that it was the very existence of the United States that led to the attacks. In his view, certain nations and people fear and envy what they do not have for themselves-the freedoms, democracy, power and wealth of the U.S. and this alone is enough to explain why the towers had to fall. Habeck added to these voices, the voice of the attackers themselves: what were they thinking, and what their reasons for the attack were. She attempted to find reasons behind who and why they hate America, and to show the relationship between these nineteen men and the religion of Islam. She argues that the nineteen men who attacked the U.S. and the many other groups who continue to work for its destructionincluding al-Qaida-are part of a radical faction of the multifaceted Islamist belief system. This faction generally called jihadi, or jihadist-has very specific views about to revive Islam, how to return Muslims to political power, and what need to be done about its enemies, including the United States.

Knowing the Enemy...Mary Habeck

Fall 2006

Habeck points out the main difference between jihadis and other Islamists as the extremists commitment to the violent overthrow of the existing international system and its replacement by an all-encompassing Islamic state. She believes that only by understanding the elaborate ideology of the jihadist faction can the United States, as well as the rest of the world, determine how to contain and eventually end the threat they pose to stability and peace (p.5). Habeck argues that factors such as nationality, poverty, oppressive governments, colonization, imperialism, only partially explain a commitment to extremist religious groups. These are important underlying issues that may push Muslims toward some sort of violent reaction, but they do not, by themselves, explain why jihadis have chosen to turn to violence now, and why extremists offer religious explanations for all their action (p.6). To see why jihadists declared war on the U.S., Habeck urges her readers, and other scholars, and perhaps politicians to listen to jihadists explanations and not to impose Western interpretations on the extremists. In Chapter Two, she shows how the jihadists explain their actions by quoting extensively from the writings of ideologues like Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1382); Abd al-Wahhab (1703/ 4-1792), Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935), Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), Sayed Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), and Sayed Qutb (1903-1966). In Chapter Three, The Quran Is Our Constitution"), Habeck explains the reasons why al-Banna, Mawdudi and Qutb won over followers. According to her, it was due to their shrewd use of the Quran and hadith-as well as the traditional interpreters of these texts to support their arguments about the need for jihad. Chapters five and six deal with the "clash of civilizations". She explains how Ayman Zawahri and Usama Bin Laden tied the founding and continued existence of Israel-to the United States specifically. Zawahri argued, Israel is a developed American military base in the heart of the Islamic world and in one of its most sacred places. Therefore, he argues America must pay the price for the Muslims, especially in Palestine. The entire campaign against Iraq (1991-present) is viewed as part of the overall Jewish/ American plot to disarm any potential enemies of Israel and ensure Israeli dominance in the Middle East as the first step in the long-term strategy (p.99). She mentions among their arguments: Islam is meant to be the only way of life for humanity. In addition, since Islam is a

Digest of Middle East Studies

Jihadists
message meant to be create a community of believers, jihadist argue that Muslims must live in a society that implements all the laws commanded by God, and as lived out by the Prophet Muhammad and explained by the learned men of religion (the ulama). Jihadists solution to the intellectual stagnation in the Muslim world is a return to the Quran and hadith alone as the only authorities for their actions. They want to eliminate interpretations and traditions that they see as heretical and, using their own reasons, justify their conduct through the sacred texts alone. Habeck advises her readers in the West in general to be willing to lay aside prejudices and be open to hearing what the jihadists themselves are saying to the world and what they believe and how they will act.

Knowing the Enemy...Mary Habeck

Fall 2006

Markets of Dispossession: NGO, Economic Development, and the State in Cairo


Julia Elyachar
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. 279p. $79.95. ISBN: 0822335832. Pbk. $22.95. ISBN: 0822335719. Review by Heidi Morrison, MA University of California Santa Barbara

arkets of Dispossession is an engaging book from the first page. It embodies keen academic analysis with a humanistic touch. The purpose of the book is to question prevailing ideas of the market, whose all-pervasive presence in the world these days is assumed to be a triumph by development organizations, globalization movements, the World Bank, and other agencies emerging from the decline of state-centered political order. Markets of Dispossession looks particularly at the expansion of the neoliberal market in the market of workshops in Cairo in the 1980s and 1990s. The neoliberal market was expanded by the idea of empowerment debt, in which the poor could undertake loans from IFOs, banks, and NGOs to open micro enterprises. Elyachar argues that the neoliberal market should not be understood as bringing the market to those where none existed. The poor came to exist in a field of interwoven institutions the state, international organizations, and the NGOwhich, in turn, reconfigured power relations. The poor did not passively receive lessons they were taught in training sessions and NGO meetings, instead they turned the tools of empowerment to their own ends by such activities as: taking out loans that would get them in hopeless debt to buy an apartment and get married; forging order forms from public sector stores to get their loans released from the bank; or making their micro enterprises into shells for wealthy businessmen seeking new ways to escape government taxes. Each form of empowerment debt thus reinforced the phenomenon of dispossession through empowerment.
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Economics

Elyachar places the blame for this phenomenon largely on the utopia of the neoliberal market model. She says we cannot look for blame with the poor alone, even though empowerment teaches us to blame victims for their problems. Elyachar writes, The market that empowerment debt helped to unleash was like a wild west of private appropriation without productive investment (p. 217). Empowerment debt evolved in a historical period when neo liberal economic policies demanded forced privatization and the elimination of basic health, education, and welfare institutions. Thus, in Markets of Dispossession, Elyachar convincingly makes the claim: The notion that empowerment through the market could substitute for a viable development strategy was a sad joke (p.218).

Markets of Dispossession...Julia Elyachar

141

PalestinePolitics

Media and the Politics and Democracy in Palestine: Political Culture, Pluralism, and the Palestinian Authority
Amal Jamal
Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. 209p. $67.50. ISBN: 1845190394. Review by Rev. Alexander Jacobs Lutheran Campus Ministry Milwaukee, WI

his is a book fraught with contradictions. The reports of the creative and imaginative responses to the occupation and the struggle for statehood by the Palestinian civil society are encouraging. Yet, the fragile sovereignty and the daily threats of Israeli incursion and violence trump the hopefulness and support the case for armed resistance from Hamas and others. In his Conclusion, the author states: Any understanding of Palestinian politics cannot escape the existence of Palestinian counter-public spheres (to the PA) that seek to negotiate the political minefield and facilitate their impact on the emerging political culture. At the same time, [t]he Palestinians must free themselves from the grip of Israeli occupation and establish an independent state before they will be able to freely determine their institutional choices and political culture (p.168). The dilemma posed in these statements points to both the hopeful prospects of a future Palestinian state, and to the frightening alternative of an endless quagmire of occupation. Dr. Jamal paints highly nuanced pictures of the struggles and the realities of Palestinian sociopolitical culture. On the one hand, he demonstrates the lively pluralism of Palestinian society: Among the PAs most vocal critics are the secular civil organizations, the womens movement, and the Islamic movement.

Media and the Politics...Amal Jamal

Fall 2006

These forces sought to influence PA policies by capturing the communicative space created by the establishment of the PA, or by constituting alternative counter-public spheres. Different civil organizations initiated public debates about the character of the Palestinian polity that might emerge as a result of the peace process with Israel. Other social movements, especially those that strongly identified with Islam, tried to compete with the PAs dominant elite for the hearts and minds of the Palestinian people. Different Palestinian voices protested against the PAs egemonic attempts to dictate, without consultation, the future of the Palestinian people based on authoritarian political measures. . . The outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada and the reoccupation of all Palestinian areas by Israel rendered the efforts of opposition movements futile and, in some cases, even harmful to endeavors for independence. Nevertheless, civil contention has succeeded in establishing deliberation as a character trait of Palestinian politics and placed limitations on the desire of the dominant elite to expand its power over all realms of public life. (p.3-5; italics mine). On the other hand, he describes the untenable situation of the PA which has no land over which to be sovereign and whose hold on power is dependent on Israeli violence and whose actions are triggered by Israelis actions (and US reactions) resulting in a very codependent relationship. The territorial dimension is central to the Palestinian stateformation process because of Israels continued occupation and the lack of Palestinian sovereignty.The symbolic-cultural dimension, however, is just as important in the process of state formation, as the Palestinian case demonstrates. . . The process of state formation is about the attempts of different social movements to determine the territorial, structural, and symbolic features of the Palestinian state. (p.6-7; italics mine). The PA which should be understood as a series of interacting and interdependent institutional structures, procedures, and behavioral norms, not as a unitary entityhas been eager to establish its authority on the ground by subjugating all realms of Palestinian society to its control. . . External pressures, especially Israeli, to curtail the opposition and prevent incitement have added to the rise of autocratic and neo-patrimonial political structures, which serve the interests of those involved in the peace process. (p.59; italics mine).

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The methodology chosen by the author is that of discourse analysis. Analyzing discursive formations can serve as a tool for understanding manifestations of power relations.Discourse analysis is relevant in terms of understanding the power structures and relations between the various political and social players, as a critical analysis of public opinion polls and various types of publications including periodicals, journals, reports, and newspapers will show (p.13). In the main chapters, he focuses on the attempts by the PA to institutionalize control of the media and the symbolic culture of the Palestinian people. He also shows how the opposition groups tried to open up the public spheres to debate and negotiation and ultimately to compromise. Specifically, he concentrates on the independent press, the womens movement and Islamic movements. In each case, he examines their various publications to determine how they attempted to frame the questions and concerns of their constituencies in the movement toward state-building. He also shows how their attempts to increase diversity and democratic participation were frustrated by the authoritarian policies of the PA. The author has here demonstrated that there is a democratic and pluralistic complexity to the Palestinian population which is foundational to a viable political state. There are already significant social movements that will hinder authoritarian rule, from either the religious or the secular elites. The challenge is how durable they will remain in the face of the overwhelming power and interference of the Israeli Occupation.

Media and the Politics...Amal Jamal

IraqLiterature

Midnight Tales : a Womans Journey through the Middle East


Rosina-Fawzia Al-Rawi, trans. by Monique Arav
Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, trans. ed., 2005. 303p. $15. ISBN: 1566565588. Review by Heidi Morrison, MA University of CaliforniaSanta Barbara idnight Tales is a collection of personal essays in which an Iraqi author recounts the travels she made with her family, and by herself, throughout the Middle East during her childhood and young adult years (during the last quarter of the twentieth century). With each voyage, the author transports the reader into the culture, history, and politics of a different region of the Middle East, while at the same time bringing attention to the similarities across the region. Al-Rawi explores Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait, Syria, Egypt, and the Emirates, paying closest attention to female perspective in each country. The book allows the grandmothers, mothers, aunts, young ladies, and girls in these countries to speak for themselves and, as such, the reader hears not only the voice of a segment of civilization that is often overlooked, but also the different ways this segment experiences life. By the end of Midnight Tales, the reader is left with an appreciation of the role of women in the Middle East over the centuries, as well as the ethnic, class, religious, and generational nuances of womanhood. Al-Rawi herself writes, When she moves, a thousand-year-old history of her people swings in her hips. What is femininity? (p.214) The book begins with a discussion of the authors childhood in Iraq. The unique aspect of this section is that it gives insight into how Al-Rawi, and other girls with whom she lived, developed their identities as females. Overall, the author describes a carefree childhood in which she enjoyed sleeping on the roof, and sending greetings from roof to roof. She recalls, Familiar ahhs oohs and Allahs resounded across the roofs, accompanying bodies relaxing and eyes gazing at the stunning sight of the star-filled sky (p.37).

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The author paints a general image of the beauties of childhood in Baghdad, while at the same time, offering glimpses into how the girl child experienced the world. One of the most poignant examples of this is in the description of the little girls playing make-believe games, such as harem or queens. When playing the role of the queen Zubayda, Al-Rawi sat in an armchair ordering her girlfriends, who played the role of slaves, to go to town to run errands. Al-Rawi said she preferred to play the role of the slave so she could be free, instead of locked up in a harem. Reflecting back on this period of her life, Al-Rawi says the oppressed condition of women in history was taken for granted by the children. She writes, In our harem games, we knew nothing of the intricate and difficult circumstances in which women lived at the time. Our school books merely told us about the glorious early Abbasid era, the Golden Age, as being an epoch of tremendous economic and socio-cultural upswing, a time when philosophy, sciences, and literature reached their full flowering. No one had told us that we owed to this early period the emergence of so many misogynous interpretations of the Quran that have survived to this day and been turned into dogma, carried by the patriarchal traditions that arose in Islam and remain today (p.34). The author seizes this opportunity in her book to detail the many contributions that women have made to the history of the Middle East, such as Shuda, a famous judge of Baghdad; Chayzuran, a politically savvy wife of the third Abbasid Caliph; and Ulayya, who set fashion trends among society ladies in the medieval period. When Al-Rawi visits Egypt, she recalls the different attitudes towards patriarchy of her classmates at Cairo University. She offers the reader a very accurate account of the intimate issues young ladies face when deciding whether or not to take the veil. One colleague at the university says she wears the veil as a return to traditional values, due to living in a society that she felt had become disoriented and confused from having neglected the faith. Another university colleague says she veiled in order to conform to her familys expectations and to not be pestered outside the house. An unveiled student says she feels no need to prove to those around her that she is virtuous. Al-Rawi also gives voice to those young ladies who wear the veil as a symbol of rejection of western oppression.

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Although Midnight Tales highlights the experiences of women in the Middle East, it should be noted that the topic of nationalism is another, though less, important theme in the book. Nationalism has played a large role in the modern, post-colonial history of the Middle East, but its treatment in this book is incomplete. Al-Rawi presents nationalism as an outburst of raw emotions, stemming from an insult to honor. She does not present the logical, rational side of nationalism, and as a result, the book seems to reinforce the stereotype that is all too often seen in the media todaythat of mad, shouting, violent Arabs marching in the street. Regarding Iraq, Al-Rawi says the sense of the Iraqi people has been lost due to outside conquering forcesthe Ottomans ruled for 400 years; the Mongols plundered the whole population; Israel made a wound which still bleeds; and the borders of Iraq were created artificially by European powers (p.22-24). She tells the reader that as a result of these insults to Iraqs honor, the Iraqi people prefer death to bondage. Pride and honor matter more to them than their daily bread (p.24). What about acknowledging the side of nationalism that is not born from fury, but from the universal standard of freedom, equality, and self-determination for all people? Other topics that Midnight Travels touches upon include: Sufi teachings of love; the different Islamic schools of law; the Lebanese civil war; urban architecture; the root system of the Arabic language; the bustle of bazaars, such as Khan al-Khalili; and, the disenchantment in the Gulf of moving from a Bedouin society to an industrial society (for instance, Al-Rawi writes about Abu Dhabi, Clay huts were pulled down by bulldozers and replaced with villas, schools, administrative buildings, streets, airports, everything that belongs to a modern city (p.241). One of the best qualities to Al-Rawis book is its attention to the small details that comprise daily life in the Middle East, such as reading the coffee grounds in the bottom of a cup, taking a bus in Cairo, or eating mnaish with a cup of sweet tea in Beirut. While this book is full of wanderlust and adventure, it tends to be a laundry-list of facts on culture, history, and politics, instead of using the high literary craftsmanship that is permitted in a nonacademic, fictionalized account of this sort. Midnight Tales lacks character and plot development. The book falls short of being sophisticated enough for study in a college-level course, but would be very appropriate for students at the junior high or high school level seeking a simple, straight-forward, and personalized encounter with the Middle East.

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Moral and Legal Perspectives on Palestine: a Review Essay


Glenn E. Perry, Ph.D. Indiana State University gperry@isugw.indstate.edu
Speaking the Truth: Zionism, Israel, and Occupation Michael Prior, ed.; foreword by Archbishop Desmond Tutu Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, an imprint of Interlink Publishing Group, Inc., 2005. 254 p. Pbk: $26.95. ISBN: 1566565774. The Case for Palestine: an International Law Perspective John Quigley Durham, NC; London: Duke University Press, 2005, rev. ed. 344 p. $79.95. ISBN: 0822335271. Pbk.: $22.95. ISBN: 0822335395. Palestinians Born in Exile: Diaspora and the Search for a Homeland Juliane Hammer Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005. 271p. $55.00. ISBN: 0292702957. Pbk: $22.95. ISBN: 0192702965. he publication of books never ends on the subject of Palestine, the little country lying between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River that is the site of todays State of Israel. This should hardly surprise us, considering the fact that this is the location of holy places for three faiths, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. But add to this an even more unusual set of facts: that just as the era of outright European colonialism climaxed at the end of the nineteenth century, a nationalist colonialist movement known as Zionism arose among the Jewish minority in Europe calling for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, a country that then was uninhabited, except, of course, by natives. Such people, as the historian Arnold J. Toynbee perhaps pointed out most poignantly, hardly count, as they are implicitly assimilat[ed]...to the non-human fauna and flora.1 Natives never were allowed to get in the way. And for those Westerners who might have qualms about such thinking, there were other unusual

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arguments that could be invoked: that Palestine was the ancient homeland of the Jews and that they had the right of return even after nearly two millennia (and regardless of whether the modern Jews were literally descendants of their ancient co-religionists or of more recent converts), that the bad treatment of Jews in Christian Europe made this a special case, and evenfor somethat the Jewish return to Palestine was a necessary step leading to the Second Coming of Christ and the conversion of a few Jews to Christianity (and the death of the rest). Other unusual events ensued that brought the implementation of the Zionist scheme, notably the displacement of the bulk of the indigenous Palestinian population (vermin and weeds to be extirpated, as Toynbee goes on to characterize the colonialist attitude toward natives) and the confiscation of most of the land by the newcomers in the territory in which the State of Israel secured itself during 1948-1949. Such had to occur, of course, if this was to be a Jewish state, although the facts were long obscured and still have not become widely understood by the general public in the West even after revisionist Israeli historians eventually discovered the truth. By that time, the Israelis had gone on (in violation of the United Nations Charters prohibition of the use of force except in defense against an armed attack) to conquer the remaining 22 percent of Palestine, that is, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), at first claiming that they had no territorial aspirations but would return the new territories in return for peace, but then going on to integrate them as a subject population into their state on a de facto basis, while not formally annexing most of the additional territory, lest this evoke demands for enfranchisement. This characterization of the Palestine conflict might surprise someone who has depended on the American press for information and analysis. Such a person would remain oblivious to basic facts, particularly those relating to the historical context of current developments. Admittedly, the mass media technically are free, with no government dictating what can and what cannot be written and broadcast, but the way they are used for manufacturing consent2 is no less real. However, somehow publishers of books, including university presses and other mainstream publishing houses, increasingly provide us with a wide spectrum of perspectives, many of which uninhibitedly present the truth about Palestine, including historical facts and the moral and legal issues involved. Such is the case with the three works under review.

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PALESTINE AS A MORAL ISSUE The Reverend Dr. Michael Prior, a Christian theologian who has written widely on the Palestine question, including The Bible and Colonialism: a Moral Critique (Sheffield Academic Press, 1997), has assembled an array of distinguished scholars who passionately are devoted to Speaking the Truth. In his foreword, Archbishop Tutu draws home the remarkable similarities between Palestine and South Africa, but stresses the contrast between the improvements in the latter at a time the situation in the former has got increasingly worse (p.9). How much worse is indicated by his prescription for partial justice (p.11), that is, a two-state solution in which the Palestinians get the West Bank and Gaza (in effect, as he undoubtedly realizes, a Bantustan in no more than 22 percent of their homeland, paralleling South African grand apartheid). Affirming his faith that injustice and oppression will never prevail, he reminds those in the United States who are scared...because the pro-Israel lobby is powerful that other evil forces have bit the dust (p.12). In the introductory essay (Zionism and the Challenge of Historical Truth and Morality), Prior provides the kind of broad moral analysis of the conflict that desperately needs to be understood by the Western public. He explains The generally benevolent assessment of Zionism and the State of Israel in the West (p.13) as resulting both from the history of the Jews persecution in Europe, but also from the success of the most successful disinformation campaign in modern times, whichby repeatedly presenting a distorted Zionist narrative (court history)has mask[ed] the fact that the creation of the state [of Israel] resulted in the dispossession and dispersion of another people through formal planning and ruthless execution (p.14). He forcefully contrasts this with the truth about the 1948 dispossession in light of the recent findings of Israeli historians relating to the origins of the Palestinian expellees as well as what has come to light about the Zionist Population Transfer Imperative, that is how this was an integral part of the Zionist programme from the beginning (p.27). He also shows how the Bible has been used (simplistically and out of context) to give this particular example of colonial plunder a justifying ideology (p.34)making this a unique case in which ethnic cleansing is applauded (p.44). Prior divides the essays in his book into three sections: Historical Perspectives, Contemporary Moral Perspectives, and The Future. This is convenient, although the division is somewhat artificial, as it is the historical events that are being evaluated in moral terms (largely through the prism of Christian theology), while those pieces

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focusing on the future are pointing the way to the achievement of moral goals. The historical section includes three chapters: Zionism, Christianity and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, by Herman Ruether and Rosemary Radford Ruether; State of Denial: the Nakbah in Israeli History and Today, by Ilan Pappe; and Why We Remember Deir Yassin, by Daniel McGowan. The section on moral perspectives includes The International Christian Embassy, Jerusalem: A Case Study in Political Christian Zionism, by Stephen Sizer; Mainstream Christian Zionism, by Peter Miano; Politics and Multi-Faith in the Holy Land: A Challenge for Christians, by Duncan Macpherson; and Theologising, Truth and Peacemaking in the Palestinian Experience, by Jean Zaru. The section on the future includes three essays: Speaking the Truth to Jews, by Paul Eisen; The Right of Return and Its Detractors, by Naseer Aruri; and Waking the Sleeping Giant, by Betsy Barlow. As anyone familiar with the literature on the Palestine question will recognize, several of the contributors are prominent scholars who have written widely on the topic, and this volume has the merit of making their wisdom available to a wide audience. The Ruetherss essay corrects the widespread Western misunderstanding of the history of the conflict. They deal with the 1948 Catastrophe (nakbah), the events of June 1967, and Oslo peace process, penetratingly explaining the last of these as a process of entrapment in an apartheid system that encloses Palestinians in their ghettos (p.59). They call on Western Christians to examine critically the various themes that have been used to divert them from supporting justice in Palestine and on Palestinian Christian liberation theologians to help them shatter this distorted use of Christianity that justifies Israeli colonialism (p.69). One of the most capable and honest Israeli historians, Pappe presents a frank picture of the way Jews expelled, massacred, destroyed and raped Palestinians in 1948, a process that he proposes should be reviewed from within the paradigm of ethnic cleansing rather than of war (p.77), and generally behaved like all the other colonialist movements (p.71). In what he labels Nakba denial (p.86), he then shows how the Israelis eliminat[ed] these deeds totally from the societys collective memory (p.72). Warning of the danger that the events of 1948 will be repeated in the future, he stresses the importance of alerting sensitive sectors of the Israeli population to the truth. McGowan focuses on one event, the massacre of the population of Deir Yasin, a small but central part of the larger process of ethnic cleansing in 1948. He also shows how this has become deliberately

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flushed down the memory hole...to become a symbol of ...Nakba denial (p.95) and stresses the need to create a memorial. The section on moral perspectives focuses heavily on Christian theology, starting with Sizers essay on the International Christian Embassy in Jerusalem (ICEJ) as a case study of Christian Zionism. The author provides an excellent account of the historical roots, the theology, and the politics of this sectarian, pseudo-Christian organization (p.124), which unconditionally endorses the most extreme Israeli claim, much to the delight of right-wing Israelis. But Miano argues that, while such fundamentalist manifestations get so much attention, the phenomenon of mainstream Christian Zionism is much more pernicious and numerically superior but almost wholly ignored (p.128). He concludes that, Until we understand Christian Zionism in its mainstream aspects..., we have not begun to appreciate how pervasive Zionism really is (p.146). MacPherson provides a broader discussion of the importance of Israel-Palestine in Christian theology and in particular in relation to an appropriate interfaith perspective (p.148). Thus he speaks of the approaches of some Christians to relationships with Jews and Muslims that fail to take serious account of the injustice suffered by the Palestinians, whether Muslim or Christian (p.157). The piece by Zaru, the last contribution to the Moral Perspectives section, concentrates less than the others on the Bible and Christian attitudes. A Palestinian Quaker who begins her essay by relating her lifetime involvement with issues of theology and liberation, she warns against reliance on the Bibles Exodus narrative as a paradigm for liberation, as that is inseparable from the genocide of the indigenous peoples, that is, the Canaanites (p.165), and presents a passionate, informed picture of the injustice in Palestine and a call for the unrelenting pursuit of truth, justice, and peace everywhere. In the section of the book devoted to The Future, Eisen presents a forceful statement of the truth that must be stated in response to the attempt to defend the indefensible (p.190) treatment of the Palestinians. The ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians, he tells us, was intentional, premeditated and planned (p.191). In some ways, Eisen demonstrates special forthrightness, as in his conclusion that there has been no occupation of the West Bank of Gaza Strip but rather that occupation...has been a fig-leaf to conceal the reality of the final conquest of Palestine (p.193).

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Aruri presents a cogent analysis of the issue of the Palestinians who were displaced by the process of ethnic cleansing (the refugees) that allowed the new state established on their land to be a Jewish one. He points out that the so-called peace process only succeeded in perpetuating the 1967 occupation while keeping the 1948 issues off limits (p.207) and that the United States and Israel, while not taking the two-state solution...seriously, used it to marginalize the refugee issue (p.211), with the reemergence of the issue in 19992000 left to segments of Palestinian civil society (i.e., private associations) (p.217) while compliant circles of the Palestinian leadership cooperating with those who seek to dilute and undermine the right of return (p.226). He calls for a truly representative Palestinian body to take up the issue and re-establish the right of a constructed PLO to resolve the refugee question (p.231). In the last essay of the volume, Barlow reviews cases in which world opinion has helped resolve other conflicts and analyzes barriers to effective mobilization on the Palestinian-Israeli issue, including widespread misunderstanding of so many aspects of the conflict. She goes on to propose ways to awaken the world community (p.203). PALESTINE AS A LEGAL ISSUE Quigley, who is a professor of law at Ohio State University, has updated his study of international law in relation to the Palestine question which first appeared fifteen years earlier. Although his book is hardly an obscure study that only other international lawyers could understand, it is more of a purely academic work than the one edited by Priorand much more specific in its focus, thus perhaps making it less the sort of book that a wide general audience would be expected to read. Also, international law is a much more clear-cut field than is international morality, which is subject to various opposing definitions depending on the ethical theory one espouses (although there are principles defining decent human conduct toward other human beings that are widely understood). International law is a body of rules that came to be accepted by members of the international community, historically mainly states, as legally binding on themselves. Unlike morality per se, international law is invoked by courts (although in some cases domestic courts are not able to give it priority). Under the influence of legal positivism, it used to be understood as an amoral set of rules arbitrarily agreed to by states that, inter alia, allowed individual human beings no rights, vis--vis their own governments in their own territories, and permitted any state to resort to war at any time and to impose whatever peace terms it could on the other side (in

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effect, might makes right), but since 1945 the resurgence of the law of nature concept and the adoption of new principles in such documents as the United Nations Charter and conventions on human rights have moved international law much closer in many ways to the kind of international morality that many of us invoke. Consequently, a study such as Quigleys that is restricted to international law deals, to a large extent, with what we would recognize as international morality too. Quigley provides us with a thorough, documented treatment of the subject, and he is quite objective. The title of the book implies that it is one sided, the case for Palestine that complements another attorneys case against it, but I believe that he has presented the kind of analysis that would be found in the decision that would result if however unimaginable in practicea court were ever authorized to adjudicate the conflict. Such a label for his book is unfortunate, because if one assigned this truly balanced work along with any existing brief for Israel and Zionism, the result would be imbalance. And in fact, while realistically recognizing that peace based on legal entitlement not reflecting the balance of power may not be attainable, Quigley insists that the rights of the individuals who make up the two populations must be respected in a settlement, adding that a peace not based on justice may turn out to be no peace at all (p.xii). Since a legal analysis involves the facts of the case as much as the legal principles involved, Quigleys book amounts to a history of the conflict, though from the perspective of an international lawyer. Actually, he covers the broad aspects of the beginnings of Zionism, Zionist settlement, the British connection, and the impending conflict between a settler community established in league with an imperial power on the one hand and, on the other hand, the indigenous Palestinian people whose existence in their own country consequently was being threatened better than do most standard histories. By bringing the normative factor into the analysis, a much enriched history results. Thus, in dealing with the British mandate, Quigley brings out, not just the facts, but the principle of self-determination, which, by relating this to the League of Nations actions in the Aaland Island dispute between Finland and Sweden (p.15), he shows to have already developed a legal, as well as, moral standing. After recounting the history of the General Assemblys vote on partition in 1947, Quigley devotes a chapter to asking what authority the UN had to adopt a territorial solution against the wishes of [a countrys] population in light of the International Court of Justices later advisory opinion on Namibia (p.52).

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In Part II (The 1948 War and the Establishment of Israel), Quigley provides a candid account of the dispossession of the bulk of the Palestinian people. He does not depart from the recent findings of such Israeli historians as Benny Morris (whose moral judgment we now know from recent statements is at odds with those of Quigley and others who see the issue in terms of ordinary principles of justice). Again, the author interrupts his historical account to ask normative questions, devoting a whole chapter to Jewish historical claims to Palestine, concluding wisely that The fact of psychological attachment to a territory does not yield territorial rights (p.72), and another chapter to whether the 1948 War was a War of Independence or War of Aggression? (p.73). A short chapter presents the facts in relation to The Departure of the Palestine Arabs (p.82). Part III is devoted to the Arabs in Israel, that is, the Palestinians within the Green Line who were not permanently expelled from the territory Israel occupied by 1949 (although some were expelled and slipped back in while others were expelled from their homes to other locations under Israeli rule). This treatment of the Israeli Arabs, an often-overlooked part of the Palestine question, is an important contribution. Recurrently making comparisons with the former apartheid system of South Africa, Quigley concludes that South Africa was more rigid in some aspects of segregation, particularly in housing, Israel has been more rigid in others. Unlike South Africa, Israel expelled most of the indigenous population. Its segregation in land ownership and use is more thoroughgoing, and the performance of governmental functions by Israels national institutions has no counterpart in South Africa (p.156). Part Four deals with the events leading to the 1967 War and with the resulting Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The author provides excellent, if brief, analysis of both the historical facts and the legal principles involved. Although rejecting Israeli arguments, he does so softly and objectively, almost leaning over backward to respect opposing arguments, such as the claim that Article 51 of the United Nations Charter allows a preemptive use of force in situations where an attack...is reasonably expected to occur immediately, although he shows that in fact Israel did not face such a situation in 1967 (p.165). He also clearly presents the facts relating to the occupation as well as the legal basis for the Palestinians right to resist this kind of colonial oppression. The last section of the book focuses on Resolution of the Palestine-Israel Conflict, that is, the Palestinian struggle for an independent state in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, i.e., to

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salvage some national existence, even at the expense of their full aspirations (p.209), a process that eventually led to disappointment and more violent resistance in 2000. There are short chapters examining the major issuesJerusalem and the Settlements and The Displaced. He is on solid legal (and moral) ground in insisting on the right of the displaced Palestinians to return, even showing that this is an individual right that would not be extinguished but could still be pursued even if the PLO renounced it (p.234). Quigley is of course right, but surely he also knows that, in practice, the world has not moved beyond the situation in which, according to Thucydides, the representatives of the Athenians reminded the besieged Melians that in the real world the powerful exact what they can, and the weak grant what they must.3 But realism also tells us that without the sense of justice that would ensue from ending the post-1948 ethnic cleansing, no peace can last. And while Quigley is right in urging International involvement (p.238), the reality is that as long as the sole superpower subordinates its interests to those of the Israelis the global distribution of power is equally skewed against a just peace. THE RETURN FROM THE DIASPORA? The book by Juliane Hammer, who teaches religious studies at Elon University in North Carolina, the last of the three under review, is concerned with the story of the Palestinian return to Palestine, though hardly the Return that has been the stuff of dreams since the exile began in 1948. If anyone confuses the two, that may indicate how far away any realization of the real right of Return is. In fact, this return was part of a process that, if completed, would have involved the renunciation of the broader right of Return to places such as Haifa, Jaffa, and over four hundred other villages and cities within the green line. (In fact, the return was to places where Palestinians fled following their ethnic cleansing in 1948, although some were forcefully exiled from those places in 1967 and afterward.) And the author tells us that this return has even been perceived as a betrayal of the right of return of all Palestinian refugees (p.221), although the leadership used the word Aidin (Return) to convey the false implication that this was a first installment in a broader Return (p.93). Still, Hammer tells us about the return after 1993 of approximately a hundred thousand Palestinians...to the West Bank and Gaza through a process that has disappointed most Palestinians with its premise and implementation, including those who were working for the PLO and applied to return and work for the Palestinian

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Authority and/or the police forces and their families as well as some others (p.34), many of whom eventually left, more than half of them, according to the authors estimate in the Epilogue to her book (p.225). This is a study based on research and fieldwork conducted between 1997 and 2000involving interviews with young Palestinians born abroadamid the initial euphoric feelings about the peace process (p.vii). According to the author, her study revolves around the key termsidentity, migration, homeland, memory, history, Diaspora, and return (p.8). In each chapter, Hammer weaves stories of individual Palestinian returnees she interviewed with the broader picture. Thus, in the chapter on Palestinian National Identity, Memory, and History, she brings in Tariqs story informed by theories of nationalism and writings on Palestinian identity and a discussion of the historiography and oral history of the events of 1948. In the chapter on The Country of My Dreams, she brings in Majids story, asking how is Palestine imagined and how is the process of developing images of Palestine as a homeland linked to literature, poetry, and visual arts? (p.53). She contrasts the more realistic images of those who had visited their homeland before with the idealistic images of others. In her chapter on Return to Palestine: Dreams and Realities, Hammer uses Nimrs story to introduce the dream of return in politics and poetry, the right of return in international law, and the positions of Israelis and Palestinians on the issue, while she uses Najmas story and Ibtisams story to illustrate the experiences of young Palestinians who returned from other Arab countries and from the United States (the Amrikan). Drawing on Victor Turners somewhat obscure concepts of liminality and the rite of passage, Hammer devotes Chapter 5 to The Return Process in Comparison. Contrasting those Amrikan who had already visited the country with those Aidin for whom the country was only imagined, she divides the process into stages: 1) the decision to return, 2) the arrival in Palestine, 3) meeting Palestine (the place, the people, relatives, and naming the others, i.e., the local people versus the Amrikan, etc.), 4) living in Palestine, particularly in Ramallah and the group formation, political conflict with the local elite, cultural conflict, acts of resistance, finding spaces (for schooling, leisure time), and visibility as a group, and 5) the decision to stay in Palestine or to leave. The author identifies three aspects of identitypolitical, cultural, and religiousdeveloped in the Diaspora and shows how they changed following the return. Regarding political identity, interviews focused on political commitment and knowledge of Palestinian

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politics, distinguishing those who grew up in Western and Arab countries (p.168) and between different age groups. Under the rubric of cultural identity, Hammer noted use of Arabic and particularly of the Palestinian dialect. She also considered such matters as poetry, fiction, music, cuisine, and features of homes and how these take on a different meaning in the return process (p.186). As for religious practice, Hammer got diverse responses to her questions that sometimes surprised her (p.187), as in finding how central religion was to those who had grown up in Western countries (p.191). She concludes that identities are constantly rewritten and renegotiated, as well as applied to different contexts and situations (p.196), with important Islamic, Palestinian, and Arab components asserting themselves (p.196-197). Hammer provides a telling portrait of people imbued with an idealized version of who they are and of a homeland that in many cases they had never even seen who now find that The realities of Palestine were more complex, less glorious, and in everyday life more difficult than they had imagined (p.209). Do they adjust themselves to what they have found, try to change the country, or leave? She begins her concluding chapter by asking, Has being without a home and homeland become the home of the Palestinian Diaspora? (p.200). She reports that her respondents had had to rewrite aspects of their Palestinian and other identities but with all of themstrengthening their Palestinian identity, whether politically, culturally, or even religiously even as they accepted a more complicated reality (p.222). CONCLUSION Each of the works under review is excellent in its own way. The volume edited by Prior consists of short piecesmostly reflecting a liberal Christian or theology of liberation perspectivecorrecting the distortions of moral, religious, and factual matters that tend to prevail in the Western world, particularly in the United States. Courageous people and capable scholars, some of whom are the authors of more detailed studies, wrote the various chapters. Many will regard them as one-sided and polemical, but their writings come much closer to being objective presentations of historical truth and expressions of the sort of moral judgments usually accepted vis--vis other issues than do the perspectives on the Palestine question that typically get heard in the United States. The same may be said of Quigleys book, which presents the basic facts relating to the question of Palestine and applies well known principles of international law is ways that will

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cause surprise to some readers only because they are accustomed to skewed accounts, notably in the American press. While not lacking empathy with the passions of those with whom it deals, Palestinians Born in Exile exemplifies what many readers will recognize as a more academic sort of study. Only with some difficulty can one fit it into a review essay focusing on works presenting the moral and legal case against political Zionism, although the wrong done to the Palestinian people becomes apparent to anyone who reads Hammers book. Whatever academic discipline she may be identified with, her work, as represented in this volume, appears to be that of an anthropologist. Perhaps I should call much of her book political anthropology. Aside from being a study of Palestine and Palestinians, it is a significant contribution to political culture and political socialization, particularly to the central political issue of identity and to the literature on nationalism. It will prove valuable to specialists in a variety of disciplines that deal with these matters as well as to general readers. Hammer has conducted an innovative type of research and presented it in elegant style. All of these are books that it would behoove any library to acquire. Each one is informative, as well as written in a style accessible to the general reader. In addition, Speaking the Truth will be valuable to specialists in the field of religion and politics, The Case for Palestine for students of international law, while Palestinians Born in Exile will prove useful to specialists both on Palestine and on national identity in general. NOTES
1. A Study of History, vol. XIII (London, New York, and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 574. 2. See Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). 3. The Peloponnesian War, The Melian Dialogue (Book 5, Chapter 17), translated by Richard Crawley (< http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/ intrel/melian.htm>).

Moral and Legal Perspectives on PalestineGlenn Perry

159

JordanPolitics

Nationalist Voices in Jordan: the Street and the State


Betty S. Anderson
Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005. 288p. $22.95. ISBN: 0292706103. Review by Michael J. Reimer, Ph.D. American University in Cairo

he political history of Jordan has been told, until now, mostly from the standpoint of the Hashemites, while literature on the countrys social history, still quite meager, has been concerned chiefly with tribes and peasants. Betty Andersons lucidly written monograph broadens our view by examining the new urban social strata that emerged in the 1940s and 50s and their contributions to the political dynamism of the period. The books specific purpose is to explain the rise and fall of the Jordanian National Movement (JNM), and to place Sulayman al-Nabulsis controversial premiership (October 1956-April 1957) in wider historical perspective. The author convincingly shows that, in the struggle with populist nationalist forces, the success of the Hashemites in holding onto power was not a matter of luck, nor can it be ascribed merely to external support, however vital that was. Rather, a solid indigenous constituency for the ruling family that had been built up over more than three decades proved more durable than the coalition of Jordanians and Palestinians that opposed them. The book falls naturally into three sections: Chapters One-Two, which set out the theoretical and empirical agenda of the study; Chapters Three-Five, which look at Jordans social and political development to 1948; and Chapters Six-Nine, which chronicle and analyze the political parties and personalities that made up the JNM, their challenge to Hashemite policies, and the suppression and dissolution of the movement in 1957. The first section of the book begins with a sampling of school textbook declamations about the intimate relationship between the Hashemites and the people of Jordan. It is instructive that the people in these textbooks remain nameless and are only distinguished with

Nationalist Voices in Jordan...Betty Anderson

Fall 2006

reference to certain conventional spaces within the countrys social topography (p.2). The challenge, Anderson suggests, is to move beyond this top-down narrative, which has characterized even scholarly studies, to an appreciation of the active roles played by Jordanians and Palestinianswho are not to be treated as though they were separated by different primordial identitiesin the building of colonial state institutions and ultimately in the making of Jordans first mass political movement, the JNM. The studys implications for colonial and postcolonial historiography are given succinctly on p.8: Thus, Jordan represents a case study about the institutions and agencies vital for the successful establishment of a new state; the interplay between changing societal conditions and political activity; and the simultaneous writing of a historical narrative defining and delineating national identity. However, the delineation of a boundaried identity presented a particularly vexing problem in Jordan, since its peoples were pulled toward a distinctly Jordanian identity by the regime, and toward pan-Arabism by young activists educated in universities outside Jordan. For Jordanians of Palestinian descent, there was also a Palestinian nationalism wary and resentful of Hashemite intrigues. The establishment of institutions that furnished a prima facie legitimacy to the existence of a separate state of Jordan lends coherence to the second section of the book. Anderson attributes the success of the Hashemite-Jordanian project to the benefits it provided for key social groups. These included peasants who profited from the land settlement program; tribes people who were helped by military employment and the extension of social services to the badiya; and merchants who appreciated the public security and legal predictability supplied by state institutions. Of special interest in these chapters is the authors extensive use of memoirs, poetry, and interviews, to trace the education, socialization, and coming to political consciousness, of Jordanian activists in the 1920s, 30s, and 40s. These memoirs add vividness to the analysis, and reveal that teachers in particular were the midwives of the short-lived protest movements that punctuate this period. Anderson suggests that two major events galvanized young activists in Transjordan: the Rashid Ali coup in Iraq (1941) and the phony independence gained by Jordan (1946), which left Jordan dependent on Britain for financial support and its army under British command. (It is odd that the resonance of the Palestine issue in Transjordan and its role in the politicizing the population is passed over in this context.) But the indigenous opposition movement remained too diffuse on its own to challenge

Digest of Middle East Studies

JordanPolitics

the regime; it would require the assertive energy and political sophistication of the Palestinians to shake the status quo. This leads naturally to a discussion of Palestinian political development in Chapter Five, which is misnamed Hashemites and Palestinians, 1921-1948. This chapter contains significant data about schools, clubs, and other associations in Mandate Palestine, and the politicization of the population; but it does not offer much insight into Hashemite-Palestinian connections and frictions (except in a couple of meaty footnotes on p.226-227). It is true that the subject has been covered in other works, but some discussion of Abdullahs relations with the Palestinians before 1948, and his behavior in 1948-49, would seem necessary to an understanding of Palestinian attitudes after the annexation of the West Bank. The third section of the book deals with the years 1951-1957. This section comprises the heart of the book since this was when the struggle was joined between street and state. Chapter Six offers sketches of the leaders and programs of the leftist-nationalist parties that made up the JNMBaathists, Communists, the National Front, the Movement of Arab Nationalists, and Nabulsis National Socialist Party (NSP). The author cautions that it is extremely difficult to gauge its numerical strength of any of these groups. Nonetheless, evidence is cited to show a wide sympathy for the parties of the JNM. To some extent this was the result of the popularity of its commitment to Arab unity, its advocacy of some kind of state socialism, and its vociferous opposition to Western imperialism and Zionism. But it was also the result of socio-economic dynamics familiar to developing countries across the world: deteriorating person/land ratios, the shift of rural populations toward the cities, urban unemployment and housing shortages, the migrants search for new sodalities, and the inability of postcolonial governments to meet the pressing needs of the populace. In Jordan, the unrest arising from these problems was exacerbated by the refugee influx, continuing cross-border conflict with Israel, Jerusalems displacement by Amman, and lingering anger at Hashemite cooperation with Britain and the Zionists. Education had already been politicized, so it is no surprise to find that schools became recruiting grounds for the JNM. In a familiar paradox, the jailing of teachers turned the prisons into schools and probably helped to reinvigorate and refine the new ideologies by bringing together activists from various parts of the country. The movement, led by this radicalized intelligentsia, achieved a startling success in 1955-56, with the mass demonstrations against

Nationalist Voices in Jordan...Betty Anderson

Fall 2006

the Baghdad Pact that prevented Jordans adhesion to the alliance. It was powerful evidence of the personal influence of Nasir and especially of Sawt al-Arab radio. The subsequent dismissal of Glubb Pasha on 1 March 1956, while in part the result of this increasing pressure coming from Cairo, was also linked to the protests since Glubb was blamed the violent behavior of Arab Legion troops sent to quell the demonstrations. The high water mark of the JNM came shortly thereafter in October 1956, when the JNM parties triumphed in parliamentary elections and Sulayman al-Nabulsi was appointed prime minister. But gaining power was also the JNMs undoing, for at least three reasons. First, as in the case of Irans National Front, leaders of the nationalist movement were guilty of overbidding. The inflated expectations of their supporters were impossible to fulfill, especially after the termination of the British subsidy and the failure of Egypt and Syria to make good on their promises of aid to Jordan. Second, the JNM underestimated the King and his men, who successfully internationalized the crisis in Jordan, attracting US attention and support. But the Hashemites also had a more substantial body of support in the country than the leadership of the JNM estimated; and they proved themselves past masters in co-opting their adversaries. Finally, there was a fatal flaw in the program of the opposition. As Anderson writes: An inherent contradiction existed in Jordan and within the JNM: realistically, to accomplish the primary goals of the JNM, the Hashemite regime would have to be overthrown; yet most of the leaders of the JNM were reluctant to go that far and most understood that they did not have the power to do so (p.145). Nationalist Voices in Jordan is a superbly documented, cleanly organized, and theoretically au courant study of the social forces, political factions, and leading personalities of Jordan in the 1950s. The book is a model of creative research, particularly for its pioneering use of memoirs composed in Arabic. It is perhaps unfortunate that the author stopped her close analysis of the nationalist movement in 1957, since the revolution in Iraq and the crisis of 1958 seem integrally related to the nationalist movement examined here; in that sense the terminus ad quem of the work seems a bit arbitrary. In addition, this reviewer would venture in criticism one major question that has to do with the object of the study: did it actually exist? The study lacks hard evidence of the functional reality, not of its constituent parties, but of the Jordanian National Movement itself. But apart from a lack of clarity on this one point, the book is to be recommended to all specialists on Jordanian history, politics, and society, and is an exemplary case study of the emergence of newly politicized populations in the heyday of pan-Arabism.

Digest of Middle East Studies

Jerusalem

The Open Veins of Jerusalem


Munir Akash, with Fouad Moughrabi, eds.
Arlington, MA: Jusoor Books, distr. by Syracuse University Press, 2005. 290 p. $24.95. ISBN: 0815681453. Review by Sanford R. Silverburg, Ph.D. Catawba College collection of 11 essays divided into two parts, each dealing with the agonizing connection Palestinian Arabs have had with Jerusalem over the centuries. The characterization of each part is a forthright statement of the emotional appeal sought out by Palestinians from some time in the past to the present. The introduction accepts the notion of the currently popularly-used term orientalism as the editor guides the reader to an appreciation of an oppressed people who have been subjected to a foreign occupation by an alien folk who have no discernable connection to the region. This is followed by part one, entitled, Misrepresenting Jerusalem, introduced by the late Israel Shahak, the well known anti-Zionist Israeli who separates the Jewish connection to Jerusalem by noting the differences in attraction of the secular and the observant Jew. Karen Armstrong attempts to elucidate in an academic manner how each of the three religious faiths has come to view Jerusalem over time. Perhaps most notable here is when she disabuses the Orientalist tendency to equate the Western notion of urban space with that of Islam, noting the sacredness that is attached to the latters belief system to the area. Nasser Rabbat focuses on Islamic architecture and the Umayyad dynastys building of the Dome of the Rock and the alAqsa Mosque. The prominent Palestinian-American academician, Naseer Aruri, attacks the Israeli position on Jerusalem as an attempt to create a myth. Rashid Khalidi calls for a system of joint governance of the urban center as a viable alternative to continued conflict. A bonus to this collection is the contribution made by Sarah Rogers who rounds out this first part with a provision of a set of photographic reproductions of Palestinian Arab artists renditions of political art.

Open Veins of JerusalemAkash and Moughrabi

Fall 2006

Part two, entitled They Came for Our Land, is in the form of an indictment of those foreigners who have taken Jerusalem from its rightful connection. It is introduced by Fouad Moughrabi who provides a personal memoir of his childhood in Jerusalem before he left for the United States. Issa Boullata left Jerusalem in 1975 and decided to settle in Canada, accepting an academic position in Montreal. He instills the emotional quality that memories tend to bring. The late writer, Jabra Jabra relates tales of family travail during the first Palestinian-Israeli conflict in 1948 when battles raged throughout the city. The concluding essay is by Heather Spears, who weaves of heartwrenching tale of Palestinian youngsters who become targets of Israeli soldiers engaged in security operations. The Open Veins of Jerusalem is one of the better depictions of the communal values of Palestinian Arabs attitude toward the meaning of Jerusalem to their culture. Popularly written, it can be easily read and the impact similarly absorbed.

Digest of Middle East Studies

Palestine

Palestine: a Guide
Mariam Shahin
Northampton, MA: Interlink Publishing, 2005. 500p. Pbk. $27.95. ISBN: 156656557X. Review by Sanford R. Silverburg, Ph.D. Catawba College, NC

nostalgic travelogue of Palestine presented with two themes, a colorful description of life, food, and culture of Palestinians and a political history replete with polemical taint. Both perspectives are subject to an expected context determined by a distinctive cultural outlook. The combination of two particular interests, which can be easily combined, nevertheless means that the more popular subject, in some way, reduces the value of complementarities by the insertion of a polemical impression. Understandably, self-interest guides perception and the descriptions that follow. A review of this effort must, therefore, separate the material accordingly. With due care for a logical organization, the book is divided into four parts. The introduction covers Palestinian life and culture, to include some standard subjects, the bulk of which may be unknown to those unfamiliar with Palestinians, except as it relates to the more popularly reported incidents of violence. The bulk of the description of Palestine assumes the existence of a geographical entity as something more than what was carved out by European colonial powers following World War I. Hence, in the introductory part, there is the historical setting focusing on the ancient Canaanite folk, the exchange of ethnic populations with the establishment of the State of Israel, the refugee status of many in the Palestinian community, and the current establishment of a physical security barrier separating generous parts of the West Bank and Jerusalem from Israel proper. Again, while the political elements are probably better known outside the region, less known but far more attractive in both descriptive and cultural terms are literature, music and dance, traditional foods, and dress to include jewelry. The culinary delights exhibited by description are further enhanced with recipes.

Palestine: a GuideMariam Shahin

Fall 2006

The other three sections are clearly designed to feature geographical regions, the North, from Acre (Akka) to Haifa, and Nazareth (Al-Nasria); the Central Region, which includes Jaffa (Yaffa), Lydd, and Jerusalem (Al-Quds); and the South, from Bethlehem (Beit Lahem) to Gaza (Ghazza), and the Negev (AnNaqab). In each of these sections, urban centers and traditional historical sites are highlighted with details. The photographs were well chosen, clear and attractive. The included maps are, however, simply less acceptable. Perhaps most egregious is the one ostensibly setting out Palestine in 1878, clearly attempting to show the overwhelmingly Arab settlement in the area over Jewish settler sites, but showing the boundaries of the British mandate of 1922. In lieu of any comprehensive collection of descriptive material on the history of Palestinian culture,1 this book is a contribution. An added value to this guide is a set of appendices providing a great deal of useful information. Appendix One contains listings of tourist organizations, research centers, cultural organizations, and museums. This information is then supplemented by a listing of hotels and restaurants, where visitors to Palestinian sites would feel most comfortable.2 The second appendix, lists organizations that work with Palestinian refugees and Palestinian officialdom, as well as various web resources. The third appendix is a compendium of UN agencies engaged in Palestinian affairs. Again, the dual presentation should be clear to any reader regardless of their political position on the status of Palestine. One can only appreciate the presentation of Palestinian culture throughout the area of the historical pattern of settlement. The infusion of politics, perhaps because of the accumulation of anxiety combined with memories, would probably be better suited in a strictly political tract, however.
There is, as a sample, Walid Khalidi. Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians, 1876-1948 (Washington, DC: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991); Jehan Rajab. Palestinian Folk Custom. (NY: Kegal Paul International, 1989); and Abdel Al-Samih Abu-Omar. Traditional Palestinian Embroidery and Jewelry (London: Al-Sharq, 1986). 2 For those seeking a more comprehensive guide, look at: Ingrid Jaradat Gassner et al. (comps.). Palestine/Israel Directory: A Guide to Independent Palestinian and Israeli Initiatives for Human Rights, Womens Rights, Social and Economic Justice, Peace and Cooperation. Palestinian and Israeli Authorities and Official Institutions. 4th and rev. ed. (Jerusalem: Alternative Information Center, April 1996).
1

Digest of Middle East Studies

IranHistory and Politics

The Persian Puzzle: the Conflict between Iran and America


Kenneth Pollack
NY: Random House, 2004. 576p. $26.95. ISBN:1400063159. Review by Mohammed M. Aman, Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee he relationship between Iran and the US has not been a healthy one. The Iranians have not forgotten about the US interference in Iranian politics in 1953, when the CIA eliminated Mosaddeq and sided with the Shah. It repeated itself in the 1980s, when it sided with the Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, who gassed and massacred millions of Iranians and Iraqi Shiites. To the Iranians, the US was no better than the British or the Russians who had dominated Iran for most of the 19th century and half of the 20th century. The question facing the Iranians today is how they can trust America, regardless of its stated desire for a global political reform and democracy, which acts like the previous colonial powers. Polack, in his 428 pages of main text and five maps, followed by 60 pages of notes and a bibliography of approximately 25 pages, takes his reader through a somewhat historical journey. He covers 13 topics, including a history of Iran, the rise of US influence in Iran, the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, and the post1980 political developments in Iran. The first chapter gives a short history of Iran, beginning with the Elam, the first people to civilize the area that is Iran today, more than 1000 BC, to the present. This is followed by two chapters that recount, in great detail, the CIA in 1953, and how it helped to overthrow Irans president, Mohammad Mossadeq, and install Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Mossadeqs ghost has haunted the Iranian landscape and become the fodder for the Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Ruhollah

The Persian Puzzle...Kenneth Pollack

Fall 2006

Khomeini in 1979. Pollack takes us through the 25 year reign of the Shah. The chapter that follows (about 200 pages) describes the developments related to Iran from 1980, including political figures, the long and exhausting war with Iraq, the current and past Iranian views of the US in the 1990s, Islamic fundamentalism, supporting terrorism against Israel, Iranian designs on controlling the Gulf region, support of al-Qaeda members, Hamas, the Geneva working group on Afghanistan, etc. The chapter on developing a future US strategy with Iran seems to address the title theme of the book, The Persian Puzzle. Pollack argues that the Iranians want the bomb in order to deter an American attack, which the Iranians genuinely fear. Many questions are raised, such as can we do anything to solve the problems short of a war? There are options, none of them pretty, such as attacking Iran or better yet, developing a rationale for a long term relationship with Iran, possibly following many paths short of war. Pollack presents the arguments without taking sides. He tries to accurately explain the causes for the contentious relationship between the two countries. Past American actions were designed to promote US commercial, trade, and strategic defense interests at the expense of the Iranians. Such admission by Pollack and former Secretary of State Madeline Albright is refreshing and contradicts the current American public posture. With this book, Professor Polack redeems himself, after appearing to be a war monger in his previous book on a similar crisis with another Middle East country. Pollack sounds wiser when he acknowledges his mistake regarding Iraq in his book The Threatening Storm, and is now attempting to avoid the same the mistake in dealing with Iran. He is advocating negotiation instead of invasion. Professor Pollack is an expert on the subject, having worked for seven years as a Persian Gulf military analyst for the CIA, and for three years as Director for Gulf Affairs at the National Security Council. He is also an author of several books on the region, including the previously mentioned The Threatening Storm. The Persian Puzzle is long and comprehensive in its coverage of the subject; it is well-written, informative and stimulating. Unfortunately, Polack relies heavily on American sources and ignores the many valuable sources from European countries, as well as Iran.

Digest of Middle East Studies

Gulf StatesSociology

Population and Development of the Arab Gulf States: the Case of Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait
Nadeya Sayed Ali Mohammed
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003.181 p. $99.95. ISBN: 0754632202. Review by Mohammed M. Aman, Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

his title questions the ability of the Gulf governments to continue to providing relatively high standards of education, health and employment under conditions of rapid population growth, an undiversified economic base, and a tribal political framework. Within this context, population growth is identified as one important variable that hinders long term development. The book is divided into three parts and ten chapters: Part One: Demographic Components of Gulf Population; Part Two: Public Services and Employment in the Arab Gulf States; and Part Three: Towards 2005: The Alternative Scenarios. Collectively, the chapters deal with the important issues of, and the relations between population growth, economic growth and human welfare. The author adopts a revisionist approachthat population growth is one important variable (amongst others) that hinders long-term development and avoids a purely quantitative or statistical analysis due to data inadequacies. The author bases her argument on an examination of the ability of the Gulf governments to continue providing quality education, health and employment under conditions of rapid population growth, specifically, on three alternative population growth scenarios. She selected the scenario approach because, in her words (p. xvi) it would: i. Trace the different paths along which Gulf Demographic Transition could proceed toward assumed low mortality-low fertility equilibrium by 2005. ii. Illustrate the implications for population growth of fertility and mortality trends, which could be modified by public policy;

Population and Development...Nadeya S. Ali Mohammed

Fall 2006

iii. Demonstrate the likely alternatives for future populations growth in the context of unrealistic/ unlikely projections based on implausibility rapid/ slow assumed trends of fertility decline; iv. Highlight the importance of integrating population matters in Gulf development planning through outlining the implications of the various scenarios on the provision of various services, and hence, human capital development in the long run. Chapters one to four analyzed the main determinants of population growth in the three Gulf States of Kuwait, Oman and Bahrain migration, mortality and fertility; additionally, they developed some qualitative expectations of future trends. The population growth rate averaging 2.8 per cent per annum for the total population remains one of the highest in the world. Fertility in the Gulf States can be expected to continue declining, even in such states as Saudi Arabia and Oman, where the fertility transition may have already begun. Todays low mortality levels and high average life expectancies (averaging 72 years) have been achieved. Kuwaitis, for example are expected to live the longest (78.11 years for Kuwaiti females and 74 years for Kuwaiti males)levels that are comparable with those found in the West. Other Gulf States lag behind Kuwait. However states such as Bahrain and Oman are expected to achieve these life expectancies by 2025 (pp. 130-131) through investing oil revenues in extensive network of hospitals and clinics, and a modern urban infrastructure that has rapidly improved living standards in these Gulf States. The author focused on the accounting issues of rapid population growth, which will have political repercussions (p.115). Rapid population growth and the intensified pressure of excess labor supply may work towards keeping women from working, or discouraging any further participation of women in the workforce. There the onus is on men to provide for the family needs, which means that men will have to continue supporting large families. The figures show that non-national workers account for 62 per cent of the total workforce. This population, as the author points out, has been predominantly male, given the nature of the work required, which is mostly construction. However, the shift in the structure of the economy towards services has necessitated an increase in the proportion of female non-traditional workers (increases of 2.6 per cent per annum between 1980 and 1993 in Kuwait, and a steady increase of 1.2 per cent per annum between 1971 and 1993 in Bahrain.

Digest of Middle East Studies

Gulf StatesSociology

The authors scenario for the non-national worker population assumes that by 2005, the proportion of working non-nationals will increaseparticularly non-national femaleswhilst that of the nonnational males will remain constant (p. 139 and Table 7.10). Chapters five and six focus on and analyze the development of the human capital assets of the Gulf States, where non-national workers dominated the labor market. The low prevalence of nationals in the work force was attributed to the low female participation rates, the young age structure of the national population, the lack of relevant skills and training, and a rentier ethic, which regards only white collar employment as acceptable. This was compounded by the availability of generous allowances, grants and subsidies that reduce the need to seek employment. Chapters seven and nine focused on the Alternative Scenarios. The author generated three alternative scenario projections for the national population and one for the non-national population. They were based on the expectations raised by the analysis of the components of population growth and declared policy direction of the Gulf States. The three alternative scenarios traced different paths along which the Gulf Demographic Transition proceed toward a low mortality-low fertility equilibrium by 2005, and illustrated the implications for population growth of the potential fertility trends. In chapter eight, the author considers the effects that population growth would have on educational and health care provision. However, a reduction in the birth rates currently experienced by the Gulf States would reduce the burden that governments would have to bear with respect to education and health care. The author concludes in chapter 8, that all three Gulf States would stand to gain if their fertility levels were to decline immediately. The greatest beneficiaries will be the sectors of education and health care. There would be less demand for teachers, doctors, nurses and dentists, as well as less demand for hospital beds, and related expenditures. The alternative scenario protection shows that the impact of population growth would be to increase the labor supply through the next decade so that it would not be unrealistic to assume an increase in unemployment, even with healthy economic growth (as has already occurred in Bahrain). Because of the relatively young population in the three Gulf Stats, in comparison to international estimates, such a youthful labor force implies a less experienced labor force with a greater need for job training. The growing number of young people will swell the labor force and even a rapidly growing economy will be strained in its ability to create sufficient new jobs, with a greater need for job training.

Population and Development...Nadeya S. Ali Mohammed

Fall 2006

There is a need for policies that simultaneously stimulate growth and labor intensity in production (to promote long-term employment) and for training youth so as to overcome their lack of skills. The labor force is relatively young, and in the case of Oman continuing to get younger. Therefore Gulf governments need to provide productive employment opportunities for young workers. Demographic factors, as the author points out, will determine the size and structure of labor surpluses. In order to stem or arrest the surplus (in a decade or so), the Gulf States must formulate appropriate population policies through appropriate child spacing complemented by improved health and education services since in the long term only population policies will be able to ease the stress on future labor markets. The author concluded that, thus far, the governments of the Gulf States have not (at least publicly) managed their population growth, nor monitored it as part of their development planning.The most active attempts at regulating their population began in the 1990s, when Oman and Bahrain (to varying extents) initiated a birth spacing program (p.166). She suggested that Gulf States need to re-evaluate their strategic direction, and formulate comprehensive population policies that would be sensitive to Gulf cultural norms, but would take the economic and political realties into account. This would necessarily encompass, among its aims, increasing female labor participation, improving education, especially with respect to effective contraception, and promoting its proper use. To postpone population management is to risk the erosion of the gains secured in living standards and hence slow down the process of the Gulfs socio-economic development for the near future (p.166-167). The author concludes her analysis and projections by stating that the Arab Gulf States would gain if the pace of decline in the fertility rates were speeded up. If the national fertility rates were left to continue declining as gradually as they currently are, the demand to provide employment would increase at a rate for which Gulf governments may not be adequately prepared. This would be particularly significant if it occurs within a context of depressed economic performance and/or reduced oil revenues. The author was successful in making and defending the argument that there are causal links between population growth and economic growth and to qualitatively demonstrate the reciprocal and simultaneous relations.

Digest of Middle East Studies

Literature

Princesses Street: Baghdad Memories


Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, trans. from the Arabic by Issa J. Boullata
Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2005. 196 p. $19.95. Pbk.: ISBN: Review by Allen Hibbard, Ph.D. Middle Tennessee State University ne reason we read writers memoirs is to gain clues about the creative process, and about the unique factors accounting for the writers production. Or, we might hope to get a deeper sense of the spirit and feeling of the times during which the writer lived. Or, we might hope to find juicy tidbits, scandalous, or lurid gossip about the writer or those in his orbit. Princesses Street is short on gossip, yet rich in details that enhance our understanding of Jabra Ibrahim Jabra and his times. A sequel to the earlier account of his childhood years in Bethlehem, The Last Well (al-Bir al-Ula), this work covers the period from roughly 1939 to1954formative years for Jabra and defining years politically for the Middle East and the world. During this time, Jabra traveled from Palestine to Britain to continue his education, returned to teach in Jerusalem, left for Baghdad in 1948, and traveled to France and the US. Jabra provides a vivid portrait of Baghdad at a moment of optimism and vibrant cultural activity. US audiences, thus, will learn something of the rich cultural history of modern Baghdad, a period we might look back on now with a good deal of nostalgia given, how tragically civil order in Iraq has undone the country. Jabras memoir continually reminds us of how embedded our lives are in the fabric and course of history. Lying behind his story, of course, as a subtle but ever-present burden, is the recognition that his own fate is linked to the fate of Palestine. But his attention to history is much broader. When visiting Port Said in 1939, on the way to study in Great Britain, he meditates on de Lesseps, the building of the Suez Canal, and the colonial experience in Egypt. While at Oxford during WWII, he registers the threat of Germanys military assault.

Princesses Street...Jabra Ibrahim Jabra

Fall 2006

Jabra displays a reverential, almost worshipful attitude toward the literary past, and delights in the sensations produced by visits to sites associated with literary figures. At Oxford he feels the profound presence of Shelley, and later, on board ship, passing by Livorno, he imagines Shelley drowning there at the age of 30. At Shakespeares home in Stratford-upon-Avon he writes his name next to Byrons on a wooden frame of one of the windows. His journey to the Lake District is laden with knowledge of the lives of Wordsworth and Coleridge, and memories of their verse. Other images, feelings, and memories went back to my reading of the poetry of Wordsworth himself in Jerusalem a year earlier. I read him while going back and forth from our home, situated in a lowland crowded with houses and people, to the fields near our neighborhood where the town suddenly ended and where sparse olive trees, grass, and wild plants had absolute mastery. I used to be totally engrossed in Wordsworths poetry, which made mystical ones experience of nature and the simple people living in its lap, uniting with nature, and both with the Godhead (p.25). Profound appreciation for Western artistic achievement is once again demonstrated, later, in Paris, when he directly encounters masterpieces of the French impressionists and modern artists. He relates the excitement he felt on seeing works by Lger, Matisse and Braque, who inspired this response: Such are those who change our times so that we may have more love and joy in an age corroded by the fear of a forthcoming nuclear war (p.106). In 1948, after the Nakba, Jabra moves to Baghdad to take up a teaching post at the College of Arts and Sciences. His memories of the city in the early fifties include two-horse carriages, the horse track, and fish grilled on wooden stakes [mazqouf], along the Tigris, on Abu Nuwas Street: people walked every evening on the riverbank or sat at the teahouses crowded with guests and domino players (p.82). He found himself in the midst of a cultural effervescence: The Arab imagination at the time was at the beginning of a wonderful awakening (p.80). Baghdad, along with Beirut, Damascus and Cairo, was a central site in the emergence of modernist sensibilities in the Arab world. Young aspiring writers had a feeling that the new writings they had to come up with to enliven the spirit of a nation that was threatened from

Digest of Middle East Studies

Literature

every direction gave them the right to impose their revolutionary intellectual quarrels on the current media of those days (p.84). Poetry flourished on the legendary Rasheed Street. Existentialism was in vogue among the young, and there were vigorous debates about political and economic issues and theories, Islamic history, and Iraqi identity. Jabra participated in The Group of Lost Time, did radio broadcasts in English on Iraqi writers and artists, and established a classical music association. There was lively exchange and cross pollination among writers, artists, sculptors, musicians. Jabra was himself both a writer and an artist; descriptions of his artwork and theories about art are threaded through the book. For instance, one work he titles Mask Sellers, consistent with his notion that the artist often has many masks because it is his fate to live more than one life and to live more intensely than others. He goes on: Every art work he creates is a mask that he has worn in one of his other lives and that he offers to others to wear in hours of their rich experiences (p.109). Jabra also discusses developments in Iraqi education at the time. Baghdad University was in planning stages, engineered by Iraqis, some of whom had been educated in the US and influenced by John Dewey. One dominant principle was that educational opportunity should not be restricted to students of a particular economic class: It was obvious that Iraqs educational system in those days made it possible for a boy who was born in a poor mud shack and who had spent his childhood barefooted to have the opportunity to complete his university education and even to earn a doctorate at any university in the world by being given a fellowship or grant if he showed evidence of intelligence and ability to persevereall, without having to spend one fils of his own. (p.72). Jabra formed strong friendships in Baghdad and met a number of interesting, famous personalities there. He describes first meeting Agatha Christie in Baghdad without knowing at first who she was. He met her again on a visit to Nimrud/Calah in 1951 where her husband Max Mallowan, an archeologist, was working. Jabra imagines what things must have been like during the time of Nimrud in the ninth century B.C., and speculates that, given the date, Christie would likely have been working on The Mousetrap at the time. He also offers accounts of meeting the widow of George Antonius, the psychiatrist and professor Ali Kamal, novelist Desmond Stewart, and the young Denys Johnson-Davies, one of the foremost translators of modern Arabic literature. Among Jabras friends in Baghdad were Buland al-Haydari and Tawfiq Sayigh.
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An integral connection between walking and writing existed for Jabra, as it did for many other writers, most famously, perhaps, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. He recalls walking along Princessess Street in the neighborhood where he lived with his family in Baghdad for many years. There on his walks he formed ideas that were incorporated into various works, including Ghuraf al-Ukhra (The Other Rooms), Yawmiyyat Sarab Affan (Diaries of Sarah Affan) and al-Bahth an Walid Masoud (The Search for Walid Masoud). He laments the sad, dilapidated condition of the sidewalks, typical of so many Arab cities of the region. Central in the memoir is the growth of Jabras love for Lamia, whom he met in Baghdad. While in the initial phases of their relationship, several other women vied for his attention, it soon became abundantly clear that she was the one for him. A love for poetry, common values, intellectual interests, and reciprocal romantic feelings gradually cemented their relationship. Toward the conclusion of the memoir, like at the end of a Shakespeare comedy, couples come on stage, pair off, and marry. Jabra and Lamia marry despite differences of nationality, religion, and class background, over family objections and reservations. I had never known a marriage like ours, Jabra writes, for it was realized by our own will and not by the will of any other human being (p.163). Soon after their marriage, the two head for the US where Jabra takes up a Rockefeller fellowship for literary studies at Harvard, arranged personally by John Marshall. When he returns to Baghdad in 1952 he finds that his teaching contract will not be renewed, no doubt because of his Palestinian background. Eventually he is offered a position in the PR department at the Iraqi Petroleum Company. I worked in a civilized atmosphere that helped me continue my intellectual activities as I wished for about a quarter of a century, he writes (p.184). Baghdad remained his home for the rest of his life. Jabra wrote his memoir several decades after the events he describes. Those times, we sense, were the halcyon days. On occasion he alludes to conditions at the time he was writing, such as when he notes effects of the first Gulf War, when many of the inhabitants of the neighborhood had deserted their houses and gone to remote and more secure villages (p.53). He remained in his Baghdad neighborhood, undeterred, taking walks, writing, and witnessing the breaking of windows caused by air raids. Near the end of his life the writer reflects on the toll of passing years on those around him.

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There were those who were martyred in the war, those whose married lives were wrecked, those who emigrated in despair, those who went mad, those who were killed, and those who committed suicide. To see such events happen to people who were your neighbors and visited you, whom you knew and visited, and to people whom you loved and who loved you reminds you constantly that this small neighborhood that you reside in is nothing but one small part of the larger society. It may appear quiet on the surface but, deep down, it boils like a kettle, human emotions like volcanoes in the depths of the ocean, not visible to the eye but erupting from time to time and causing tidal waves in which many are drowned. . . .(p.57) Jabra did not live to see the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the massive disorder and destruction caused by the second Gulf War. He died in 1994, just two years after his beloved wife, Lamia.

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PalestineWomen and Politics

Resistance, Repression, and Gender Politics in Occupied Palestine and Jordan


Frances S. Hasso
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2005. 230p. $24.95. ISBN: 0815630875. Review by Nancy E. Gallagher, Ph.D. University of California-Santa Barbara

rances S. Hasso, who self-identifies as an Arab American feminist of Jordanian and Palestinian heritage, spent six months during the early years of the first Intifada interning with the Palestinian Federation of Womens Action Committees (PFWAC). This experience proved to be pivotal for Hasso. The PFWAC was known t o be active in feminist and nationalist politics and Hasso was put on a newly formed three-member Production Committee to evaluate and make recommendations to strengthen the organizations five income-generating projects. She made a survey of women employees of PFWAC income generating projects that focused on the influence of the womens paid work on gender status in which she found that womens roles in the Intifada were less central than reported in the media, and that men remained in charge of the nationalist movement. She returned to the US disappointed that the gender question was so easily set aside by the male nationalist leadership. Hasso again worked in the Occupied Palestinian Territories in the early 1990s, but no longer participated in PFWAC activities. In the mid 1990s, however, she interviewed the same women employees of the PFWAC income generating projects, this time for her dissertation. During the course of six years, their ideas about marriage, child rearing, work, and political activity had changed, and they had acquired a new sense of feminist subjectivity. She then conducted interviews with women and men who were or had been active in leadership positions in the PFWAC or the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). In

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2000, she returned to Jordan, Syria, and the Occupied Territories to study gender dynamics in branch units of the DFLP. This book is the result of her decade of research. It is an insightful study, not only of a transformation in the women workers consciousness, but of the history of the Palestinian nationalist movement itself. She demonstrates that the authoritarian Jordanian state and the authoritarian Israeli occupation produced different models of opposition. In Jordan, almost half the population worked for the state and this hindered the development of autonomous political organizations. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, however, the entire Palestinian population opposed the Israeli military government. This enabled leftist organizers to develop a successful model of mass-based mobilization that was democratic, flexible, and decentralized. Women were able to organize themselves and to play a much larger role in public life than in previous years. After the 1970-71 Civil War in Jordan, however, there was a backlash against women fighters in the Palestinian resistance. To discredit them, the Jordanian regime accused them of illicit sexual relations. While Jordanian society became more conservative, the DFLP remained generally inclusive of women. Hasso was able to interview Nayef Hawatmeh, the leader of the DFLP, in Damascus in 2000. Hawatmeh is of Christian Jordanian heritage which, as Hasso states, complicates the identity politics at work. Hasso skillfully incorporates excerpts from her interviews with Hawatmeh throughout the book. While the DFLP incorporated a Marxist line, he was a militant pragmatist committed to liberating Palestine by any means. This meant including women in order to build a mass movement. DFLP women were successful in mobilizing women in the West Bank and Gaza, where they organized sewing and weaving classes and cooperatives where women could buy, sell, or trade merchandise. The tension between nationalist and feminist objectives, however, remained, with womens interests in reforming unequal marriage, divorce, child custody, or inheritance laws subordinated to nationalist goals. During the first Intifada, power struggles between men elites ultimately disillusioned and marginalized many activist women. The book makes it clear that the Palestinian political organizations faced a nearly impossible situation. After 1971, they were forced to operate far from major Palestinian population centers and were beset with centrifugal tendencies that undermined state building. The reader is left with an appreciation not only of

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the many challenges facing women and men activists, but also respect for how much they have overcome. Hasso concludes by stating, The challenge in the present is how to invigorate (womens activism) under the debilitating conditions of Israeli occupation, unaccountable or authoritarian state rule, or legalized disenfranchisement of diasporic communities. Intertwined with these state-produced obstacles is the patriarchal impulse that is too often comfortable for many men activists otherwise committed to progressive and democratic societies. To what extent will they fight for the inclusion and dignity of their women comrades, fellow citizens, sisters, mothers, daughters, and friends? (p.194-195). In response to the information in this complex and fascinating book, the reader might answer that the women themselves will find ways to insist on their inclusion.

Resisance, Repression, and Gender...Frances Hasso

Fall 2006

Sacred Law in the Holy City: the Khedival Challenge to the Ottomans as Seen from Jerusalem, 1829-1841
Judith Mendelsohn Rood
Leiden: Brill, 2004. 262p. $124. ISBN: 9004138102. Review by Michael J. Reimer, Ph.D. American University in Cairo

acred Law in the Holy City is an admirably researched and neatly documented study of a distinct episode in the history of greater Syria, known in Arabic as Bilad al-Sham. This episode is defined by the invasion, occupation, and evacuation of the country by the forces of the Ottoman viceroy of Egypt, Mehmet Ali Pasha. The books narrative covers the situation in Syria just before the invasion; the reasons for Mehmet Alis invasion of Syria; the rebellion of 1834; the mixed sultanic-vice-regal administration of occupied Syria; the social, economic, and political consequences of the occupation for the people of Syria, with a special focus on the Muslim community in Jerusalem; and the aftermath of the withdrawal of Egyptian forces. The work is a significant addition to the literature dealing with this period, principally because of the sources used. No previous studied has examined the impact of the Egyptian occupation by utilizing the rich legal material found in the archives of the Islamic court in Jerusalem. Also, an impressive part of the work is given over to discussing the meaning of Arabic and Turkish legal and administrative terms, with an awareness of how these have changed in nuance over time. A helpful glossary and several clearly drawn maps are included, and there is an appendix in which the author describes the court registers, containing information about the intervals covered in each volume, the chief judge, the physical size and condition of the register, the quality of penmanship, etc.information that will prove useful to future researchers. In addition, the study draws on a wealth of relevant primary and secondary materials, in English, Arabic, Turkish, and Hebrew.
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Although court records serve to document each chapters discussion, the core chapter of the book, in which these documents are analyzed in considerable detail, is Chapter Six, A Study in the Application of Law in Jerusalem under Khedival Rule. Here the author uses specific (representative?) cases, to illustrate the themes alluded to in previous chapters. These include the ways in which the Khedival regime altered the demography of Syria; the interventions of the Khedival government in the affairs of Islamic endowments (waqf); the effects of the occupation on commerce and landownership; and the impact of the occupation on intercommunal relations. The work elucidates the enormity of the demographic impact the Khedival occupation had in Syria. Peasant flight from a harsh tax regime, military conscription, and deportations of men to labor in the workshops and factories of Egypt devastated the settled communities of Palestine in particular. Absurdly, the Khedival response was to legislate a decrease in the mahr or bride-price that it alleged was causing the decline in birth rates, and to attempt to control the costs of weddings by fixing the fees that could be charged by local officials. Several legal cases related to the dislocating effects of Khedival policies are considered with a view to showing how new administrative bodiesabove all the majlis alshura or consultative counciltook over the judgment of disputes and enforcement of decisions from the qadis. An examination of the administration of waqf and other religio-legal institutions in this period reveals the peculiar political and legal hybridity of Khedival rule. Some of the most prominent appointments were made by the Sultan while others were made by the Khedive and his delegates. It is worth noting that in the midst of his revolt against his suzerain, Mehmet Ali permitted Istanbul to name the mulla qadi (chief judge) of Jerusalem; and the mulla qadi continued to fill some subordinate positions with his own candidates. An intriguing case is cited of a merchant named by the Khedive as the custodian of a major network of endowments supporting the mosque-tomb complex of Abraham in Hebron, to show the governments determination to reduce the influence of the ulema and put its own clients into positions of considerable financial clout. Since an enormous quantity of land in Syria was held as waqf, nearly everyone was involved in one way or another in the question of its control and disposition. Another case is presented in which the local ulema fought to prevent the assumption of positions of power and assets by persons regarded as interlopers,

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i.e., Muslims from outside the community. There is also evidence indicating the Khedives confiscation of some waqf revenues, which is not too surprising given Mehmet Alis rough handling of the ulema and their assets in Egypt. Perhaps even more problematic, from the standpoint of Muslim sensitivities, was the occupations apparent disruption of the annual hajj and the suspension of the payment of the jizya, which was replaced by the a poll tax called firda, which was paid by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. The book suggests that waqf also represented a convenient loophole allowing Mehmet Ali to avoid compliance with the AngloOttoman Commercial Convention of 1838. This is a provocative thesis, but it is not supported by sufficient evidence nor are its implications worked out in sufficient detail. Similarly, the significance of waqf for the Muslim institutions in Jerusalem is strongly asserted and the most important foundations are described, but one does not gain a clear sense of the quantity, value, productivity, and distribution of the endowed properties, nor, except in a few cases, how revenues were transferred and disposed of by custodians. (Admittedly, these are matters of tremendous complexity; the sources may not have permitted greater clarity on these points.) Nevertheless, the sources do supply evidence to indicate that the Khedival government did not alter the typology or classification of lands during its reign in Syria, which is a critical observation and sets Syria apart from Egypt. In particular, and contrary to expectation, lands continued to be classed as timars, although it seems doubtful that this had anything more to do with the holders military obligations to the Sultan. The other major category of land explored here is malikane, the latter being a long-term, even lifelong and heritable lease of state lands to a member of the askeri class. Rood makes clear, in discussing several tangled legal disputes over land, that theoretical rights had less to do with the final judgment than the governments overriding concern in ensuring the continued cultivation and productivity of the soil. The books principal aim is to situate the changes occurring in Syria within the long context of Ottoman-Islamic history, in order to demonstrate the disruptive nature of the changes brought about by the modernizing Khedival regime. The author proves that there was a significant diminution in the authority of Muslim judges and jurisconsults, as a result of the establishment of local consultative councils, bureaucratic bodies whose activities impinged on the prerogatives of the Islamic court. In the process, she also

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delineates the differentiated character of local society in Jerusalem, Palestine, and greater Syria, and elucidates how the Khedival regime touched the lives of merchants, Muslim scholars and administrators, Bedouin tribesmen, and peasants. The work resonates with the current literature in Ottoman history in several ways. First, there is an appreciation for the intricate dynamics of Ottoman rule, which has now completely supplanted a dismissive understanding of what used to be called Turkish despotism. The ideals of justice embodied in OttomanIslamic political theory, as well as some of the difficulties of realizing these in practice, are discussed with some heuristic comparisons to Western legal traditions. The work shares with other recent appraisals of Ottoman history a certain nostalgia for an era in which the diverse communities that make up the Middle East managed to coexist under religio-legal structures that were, in certain respects, more adaptable than modern nation-state models. Second, the work represents yet another scholarly foray into Ottoman provincial history, in recognition of the fact that the Ottoman empire was never a monolith and that conclusions concerning its social and legal institutions can only be established on the basis of empirical evidence taken directly from the areas ruled by Istanbul, or in this case by Mehmet Ali. (With respect to the latter, one often wishes for a more detailed comparison with policies and events in Egypt.) Third, the emphasis on the Muslims of Jerusalem, and on legal and political realignments originating from within the region itself, is part of the current tendency to treat modernization in the Middle East not as an abstract project undertaken for the sake of imitating Europe, but one in which indigenous forces were deeply involved from the outset, in promoting or resisting changes based on their perception of their material interests, as well as for the sake of upholding sacred moral ideals. In all, the work is a solid contribution to a field and period that is underdeveloped and will be an important secondary source for future studies of early modern Syria and Palestine.

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Saudi Arabia Exposed: Inside a Kingdom in Crisis


John Bradley
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005. 240p. $22.95. Pbk.:$13.95. ISBN: 1403964335. Review by Mohammed M. Aman, Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

audi Arabia has attracted World attention since before the Saudis colonized that part of the Arabian Desert, and brought with them the strict Wahhabi doctrine. The Kingdom has a history of being shrouded in secrecy, and unlike other monarchies, the Saudi royal family numbers in the thousands; they rule with an iron fist, with no true checks and balances. It is also a country ruled by the royal males rather than the law. It has been maligned by neoconservatives, and liberals alike; it has come under constant scrutiny and attack by the pro-Israeli lobby. The Oxford-educated Arabic speaking John Bradleys description of life in the Kingdom is honest and fair. He acknowledges what the Saudi royal family has done for the country by converting it to a modern society within a century. The Kingdom has enjoyed a high standard of living, with its citizens sharing in the wealthperhaps to their own detriment, as the kingdom has become a huge welfare state, with the subjects expecting the monarchy to take care of them from mahd (birth) to lahd (the grave). The kingdom is not a homogenous entity, as falsely portrayed by the Western media. It is a heterogeneous and divided country, with diverse and hostile tribes and sects that include Shiites, Ismaili Shiites, Hijazis, Asiris, Wahhabis, Bedouins, reformists and moderates, and of course, the Al-Saud family. During his more than two years work/stay in Saudi Arabia as a correspondent for the English newspaper, Arab Times (2003 to 2005), Bradley traveled throughout the kingdom. His book gives a detailed account of what he witnessed and experienced during those crucial years after 9/11. He takes credit for having access to what he describes as a high profile Saudi like Osama bin Ladens nephew. He explains the political dynamic and historical roots of the Saudi authoritarian system of government which has been

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closely associated with the ultra-conservative Wahhabi clergy and the fifteen Saudis who participated in the terrorist attacks on September 11, and governed by the most corrupt family the world has ever known (p.xvi). The image he portrays posits the modern alongside the medieval. The author gives due credit to successive kings who backed liberal reforms and embraced Western technology and know-how, but always against the protests of dissenting Wahhabi hard-liners. The result, he wrote was a periodic crisis (p.87). In his two-part book of five chapters each, Bradley provides his readers with a valuable inside look at Saudi Arabia through the eyes of a Western journalist. He reveals information on the life of the average Saudi, the lives of foreigners, crime, drug use, and high level of government corruption in everyday life. The author writes of the contradictions within the Saudi society drug abuse, male prostitution, slums, racismhardly what one expects to discover on ones doorstep has just arrived in the land of the two holy mosques (p.xiv). He is right in stating that the Kingdom is in crisisit has a huge number of non-Saudi immigrant workers, who are treated like slaves, a growing number of Saudis excluded from the power structure, and a country with great potential for trouble. Any direct un-tempered criticism of the Al-Saud family, or the Wahhabi establishment that rules alongside, might easily be overheard and reported by a person sitting nearby, who might even himself be a member of the feared secret police (p.5). In Chapter One, Liberal Voices of the Hijaz, he shares with his readers lectures of, and interviews with Saudi intellectuals, authors and writerssome belonging to members of the prominent merchant families in the kingdom. Chapter Three, Flower Men Tribal Sheikhs, describes the Asir region where its boys and men wear flowers and herbs in their hair and cultivate a passion for perfume. The more extremist Wahhabis damn them as infidels and nature worshippers. In Chapter Five, Ticking Time Bombs: Saudi Youth, Bradley attempts to find answers to difficult questions, such as why young men would be so full of hatred and despair as to plot and act against the tenets of Islam, whether in terms of joining in the decadence of the West while undercover in terms of targeting innocents, or in terms of deliberately killing themselves (p.88). He found the young Saudis to be devout and believing, but they have no guidance, which leads some to wantonness and others to the straight and narrow of fundamentalism (p.92).

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The author casts a cloud of suspicion over the efficiency of the Saudi Security Forces, which are very efficient when it comes to silencing and arresting political dissidents, but slow to react to Al-Qaeda terrorist cells, who attacked many westerners in Yanbu on the Red Sea Coast, and Khobar in the Eastern Province. On both occasions, it was reported that it took more than an hour and a half for the Security forces to engage the terrorists (p.55). Written in journalistic style, the book covers politics to education, as well as social issues, such as crime, gays and lesbians. It gives a very pessimistic, yet realistic picture of a Saudi Arabia with its imported Third World workers. The author refrains from giving citations and footnotes in the text, but acknowledges in his A Note on Sources, located on page 218, a number of respectable sources such as: The Merchants: the Big Business Families of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States (1984) by Michael Field; The Rise and Fall of the Hashemite Kingdom of Arabia (2001), by Joshua Teitelbaum; Arabia: the Painters Garden (2002), The Flower Men of Asir (1996) by Thierry Mauger. Other sources included the Saudi Institute in Washington, D.C., and the Middle East Media Research Institute Website <www.memri.org>. This is a must read book if one is to understand one of Americas closest affluent, influential, and controversial allies.

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Standing Alone in Mecca: an American Womans Struggle for the Soul of Islam
A. Nomani
San Francisco: Harper, 2005. $16.47. 320p. ISBN: 0060571446. Review by Donald R. Ingram University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee tanding Alone in Mecca is a journey of hope that the author takes by doing a pilgrimage to Mecca. She begins by getting permission to take the trip, and then is conflicted about going to Saudi Arabia because she is an unwed mother. She became pregnant while she was in Pakistan and then, decided to raise the child with her parents in West Virginia, her familys home. Saudi Arabias laws are very strict about sexual behavior, so she was concerned about causing herself or others pain.To go on this pilgrimage, she needs a sponsor, so her father and severl other family members accompany her as her sponsors. This book is a kind of sequel to her prior book on tantric sex. She wrote that she had a Christian boyfriend who wanted to marry her, but instead of marrying him, she went to Pakistan and tried to marry a Muslim man to please her family. According to custom, Muslim women are generally forbidden to marry a man who is not a Muslim. She takes this journey to Mecca to find out what she believes in and to find her voice as an intelligent Muslim woman. In her pilgrimage she tries to research what the attitude of the Prophet Muhammad was during the seventh century. She discovered that he respected women and had many women in his life. These persons in the Prophet Muhammads life become more alive while she was taking part in the pilgrimage. Also, she finds special meaning with Abrahams second wife, Hagar, whose husband deserted her with her small baby.This is something with which she can relate because she felt left alone when her lover rejected her pregnancy. In Mecca she prays beside men and has no reason to

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not participate because of sexual differences. So, in a way she discovers seventh century Islam and finds it less sexist than Islam is today. She believes that Muslim men have often tried to set up sexual laws to control women. There are two recognized Hadiths; there is another that is more controversial - Abu Hurayrah - for those who would put down women. (Nomani, 2005) Dr. Abou El Fadl discredits men like Abu Hurayrah whose records of the prophets sayings were often some of the most virulently anti-women elements of the religionIn the name of the prophet, Abu Hurayrah objectified, marginalized, and hypersexualized women. He said that the prophet declared women were made from a crooked rib, making us more deficient. (p.236) So, according to Nomani there is a kind of battle in Islam going on about the true place of women. On the side of those who would keep women marginalize is the Wahhabis movement.This movement is imported from Saudi Arabia where it has a long tradition of adherence. According to their rational, there are zina laws that depict women as possible temptresses. Nomani rejects this fundamentalist tradition because she has more of a humanistic, universal faith. She even followss the advice of the Dalai Lama who inspired her to make this pilgrimage; she also spent time with him in India. Furthermore, she quotes a Unitarian Universalist as saying that fundamentalist religions often make women subservient. So, Nomani is coming from a more experiential place than merely listening to authority; she wants to experience the truth for herself. I knew my study of Hinduism and Buddhism would not go over well with all MuslimsOn the roads through the Himalayas in India, I had meditated to Durga, the fierce Hindu goddess who sits on a tiger. In trying to understand other faiths I didnt feel as if I was violating the one into which I was born. I was motivated by the Quranic injunction to think and to learn. (pp.175-176) According to Zina laws, one must separate women from men during worship in the Mosque and even in the household situation. The average Mosque has the men seated far away from the women

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so that men and women cannot see each other, even though they are sitting in the same mosque and praying at the same time. Though proponents of this practice would say that the situation is separate but equal, Nomani questions whether this phenomenon is healthy for men and women and disagrees that it represents the true spirit of 7th century Islam. Instead she feels that it is a tendency to punish women rather than be supportive of them. Stoning a woman for breaking the zina law is one example that is not in the Quran but is used to punish the sinner. It was clear to me that if Muslim society is to mature, we must move away from punitive responses to the realities of this world. Why not support mothers instead of stoning them? The clerics who condemn mothers to death simply subscribe to the most puritanical interpretation of Islamic law from among the four diverse and often conflicting schools of jurisprudenceand there is no reference to stoning in the Quran as a punishment for zina. (p.171) Nomani is an intelligent woman who grew up in the states and feels that the original intent of the Quran is to not separate the sexes, but to free them from fears and injustice. If there is a separation during prayer time it should be insignificant. Nomani prays twenty feet behind the men so as to be in the main hall, but not sitting with the men so as not to disturb them. She says that it is the Islamic right of women to sit in the front of the main hall for prayernot just in the back separated from them.Nomani does not want to force her view on anyone else; however, she is suggesting more humane approaches to Islam for the sexes. According to Nomani, there are minority groups of Muslims that treat women more equally and believe that the Quran and the prophets intention were to treat women as equals. They would even allow a Muslim woman to marry a Christian man, which in conservative Islam is strictly forbidden. For Nomani, this approach promotes a more compassionate Islam that parallels the compassion that Islam purports to teach. Nomani wrote an Islamic bill of rights for women in Mosques (Appendix A). In it she asserts that (2) women have the Islamic right to enter the Mosque through the main door. And (4) women have the Islamic right to pray in the main sanctuary without being separated by a barrier, including in the front and in mixed-gender

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congregational lines. The emphasis is on Islamic rights because she felt that because of her experience in Mecca she was enlightened to see that marginalizing women is built on an interpretation of the Quran that is mistaken. She, therefore, sees it as her mission to enlighten women about their rights under Islam, which is very different than the rights of the Saudi- inspired Wahhabi movement preached by many ex-patriots in Americas Mosques. The last part of her book is one in which she is trying to assert her view of equality for women in her own mosque in Morgantown, West Virginia. Morgantown is a small college town in Appalachia As a consequence, the leaders of the Mosque try to kick her out of the mosque. Her protests resulted in a kind of stand-off between the conservative side and the more liberal side led by Nomani. This reads a bit like an adventure story because of the tactics that the conservative side uses are at times very intimidating. This book is, in a sense, a journal in her fight for equality in her own Mosque. The quality of the information is excellent because her research is basically experiential. The format of the book is like a journal. Nomani wishes to test her hypothesis that women and men are equal before the eyes of Allah. The pilgrimage and the lessons learned make for interesting reading. Nomani introduces the reader to many of the legal terms that tradition has introduced into Islam over the past 1200 year, such as hudud, which means boundaries of a moral code, zina or sin, and many others. I would recommend this book to a Muslim man or woman,or even non-Muslims who are interested in studying cultural anthropology, especially regarding religious practices. Many Islamic practices are not really justly written down; they are interpretations. Nomani exposes interpretations that are sexist. She asserts that Islam supports feminism, it doesnt fight it. Hers is an interesting perspective on her own religious experience and will allow the reader introspection on the meaning of religion in ones life.

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Suicide in Palestine: Narratives of Despair


Nadia Taysir Dabbagh
Northampton, MA: Olive Branch Press, 2005. 280p. $17.95. ISBN: 1566566037. Review by John Bunzl, Ph.D. Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP), Vienna, Austria

his book is not about what you would expect at the first glance. It does not deal with self-sacrifice or martyrdom or suicide bombers as a form of political struggle. But it gives you very valuable information on an under-researched subject of epidemiology in societies of Arab and/ or Muslim cultures. After reading this book it appears that politically motivated suicide operations have even less to do with mental health problems strictu sensu than within other societies. Nadia Taysir Dabbagh in chapter 3 of her book gives a clear and precise description of general norms concerning these issues. In Death and Self-Killing in Arab Thought: Suicide and Martyrdom she reiterates Muslim (like in any other religion) rejections of suicide as an individual, private act. Self-Sacrifice for political purposes is permitted, although under strictly circumscribed conditions. But this is not her main subject. Normal, private suicide is remarkably infrequent in Palestinian society. This is explained not only by cultural norms but also by two essential factors: first, as observed in other societies suicides do decrease under war conditions and when belief in the cause works against selfish behaviour and second, tight family networks function as preventive and protective factors. Religion and community may give many people a sense of belonging as well. This close relationship with family, community and culture does obviously lead to a less individualistic sense of self and thus appears to have for most people a protective effect in a stressful environment. The few cases of suicide seem to correspond

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with a lack of integration into protective social institutions out of a variety of individual reasons. This applies both to women and men. As the authors fieldwork was conducted after the end of the first Intifada (1993) the open war situation may have played a reduced role. The Oslo agreements seemed to signal a drastic change in the overall situation: normalization, modernization, institution building. But the facts on the ground did not really improve, at least from the Palestinian perspective. Therefore the cases of suicide in that period are influenced by the stress of continued occupation which tends to affect the weakest members of society in the worst way. This is particularly true for Palestinian women although their marital status and other personal issues would play a major role as well. It is interesting to learn from the author that the perception of the magnitude/danger of the suicide problem in Palestinian society during the 90s was exaggerated. I wonder how the relevant figures look like after the huge destruction inflicted by the occupation during the Second Intifada (after 2000). The PA is confronted with a worse situation than before 2000. Unemployment rates are exceptionally high and constitute a mental health risk in themselves. Add to this the continuing humiliation of Palestinians resulting from an enormous imbalance of power. Add to this the creation of ghettos for Palestinians and the continued colonization of their territories. How can the establishment of a huge prison contribute to the reduction of suicidal phenomena among Palestinians and to a future of co-existence for both peoples?

Suicide in Palestine...Nadia Taysir Dabbagh

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SyriaForeignPolicy

Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism: from Independence to Dependence


Rami Ginat
Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2005. Dist.:ISBS (International Specialized Book Services, Inc.) of Portland, OR. 310p. $69.50. ISBN: 1845190084. Review by Nancy Elizabeth Currey, Ph.D. University of California-Santa Barbara

ased on extensive scholarly research in multi-linguistic publications, intelligence reports, and diplomatic exposs from both the East and West, Ginat documents Syrias foreign policy from the early 1940s to the early 1960s and its reliance on the doctrine of Arab neutralism (p.x). The development of Syrias ideology and policy is presented within the context of the third world non-alignment movement and the influences of Nehru, Nasser, and Tito. This publication provides a valuable, accessible, and note-worthy portrait of Syrias political position within Arab countries, the third world, and the context of an East-West power struggle in post-mandate Syria. Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism begins with a Preface that provides an overview of the books structure and a discussion of its sources. A wide range of literature generated by Arab intellectuals and policy makers and archives in Britain, the United States, India, Israel, the former Soviet Union, and Poland serve as primary sources. Materials from both the East and West are intentionally used since that chasm served as an impetus for neutralism. The Introduction details definitions and paradigms of neutralism (p.1). The works of Ogley, Sayedh, and Kimche serve as a basis for a discussion of positive neutralism, passive neutralism, negative neutralism, and non-alignment. The terms are explicated with historical examples thereby introducing the principle political events discussed at length within the chapters of the book. For

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example, we learn that Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq were non-aligned countries for the better part of two decades. Chapter I chronicles the political status of the Middle East between 1940 and 1945, the end of World War II. The conflicts and interests of the British and French are distinguished from those of the Lebanese and Syrians. The increasing importance of the Soviet Union and the development of passive neutralism in Syria conclude this chapter. In Chapter II, Ginat covers events from the mid 1940s to 1951, dividing them into two periods: 1945-1949 and 1949-1951. The first period is characterized by the rise of neutralism in Syria as a result of the polarization of East and West. Ginat perceives this period as one of ideological development lead by the Ba`th (p.44). In contrast, the rise of anti-Western neutralism, growing reliance on and relations with the Soviet Union, and international incidents defined the second period. Syrias opposition to the West is enumerated. Chapter III details the development of a non-aligned Arab-Asian group made up of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Iran, India, Burma, Ethiopia, and Liberia (p.88). At the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia in April of 1955, these countries declared their consolidation as non-aligned nations based on the principles of mutual respect, equality, non-aggression, and peaceful coexistence. The group rejected colonialism and found leadership in the non-alignment movement in three neutralists, Nehru, Nasser, and Tito. In this chapter, Ginat emphasizes Syrias struggle for independence and economic development (p.128) and the fusion of nationalist and Islamic ideas with socialism (p.129). The SyrianSoviet alliance is the focus of Chapter IV. While the West, particularly the United States accused Syria of being a Soviet satellite, Ginat reports that Syria viewed its relationship with the USSR as a practical and utilitarian one (p.135). The Soviet Union did not have an imperial history in the Arab world (p.151) and Syria needed economic and cultural trade. Representing Syria at the Bandung Conference, al-`Azm said: There can be no peace with imperialism, aggression, and lack of freedom (p.144). In keeping with this philosophy, Syria broke off relations with Britain and France (p.162) and supported Nasser when he nationalized the Suez Canal (p.158). Six pages of significant political figures lie within Chapter IV.

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Chapter V is dedicated to the turbulent time period leading up to the formation of the United Arab Republic in 1959. In the late 1950s, Egypt and the Soviet Union were fighting over Syria (p.173). In 1956, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Jordan changed their positions to pro-United States neutralism, isolating Syria and Egypt (p.174). Meanwhile, the USSR continued to establish public work projects in Syria (p.175). Attempts by the United States to stabilize and solidify relations with Syria failed repeatedly (pp.179, 182, and 183). Ultimately, Syria chose a policy of positive neutralism and Arab unity (p.190). The United Arab Republic (UAR), the union of Syria and Egypt under the leadership of Nasser, and its positive neutralism are the focus of Chapter VI. Between its founding in February 1958 and its fall in 1961, the UAR was a nation-state of pan-Arabism. Relations with the USSR deteriorated as cooperation was limited by self-interest and wide ideological differences (p.199). Yugoslavia and Tito replaced India and Nehru as allies in neutralism (p.213) and Belgrade hosted a Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in September 1961 (p.217). The participants were pure neutral countries, neither pro-USA nor proUSSR (p.216). The Conclusion of Ginats book details the rise of neo-Ba`th and the gradual demise of neutralism (p.220). In this section, Syrias political positioning from the mid 1960s through the early 1990s is reviewed. Struggles with Israel, alliances with Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and the growth of economic relationships with the East are highlighted. With the collapse of the USSR in 1991, neutralism was defunct. Three additional sections follow the Conclusion. A three-page Appendix defines each of the Modes of Practiced Arab Neutralism (p.234) and identifies the country and time of its application. Extensive notes running 41 pages are gathered and an eight-page bibliography completes the book. Ginats book has a number of strengths. First, the depth and breath of Ginats research is note-worthy. Multi-national and multi-linguistic findings permeate the text, notes, and bibliography. It is telling that in the bibliography, primary sources include Archives unpublished and official (p.280) from diverse institutions and associations in Great Britain, India, Israel, Poland, the Russian Federation and the United States. There is also Official Published Material, Newspaper, Journals, and Monitoring Services and Primary and Secondary Published Sources in many languages. In addition, the Appendix is a particularly helpful synopsis of complex positions in an imminently accessible manner.
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Second, the methodology Ginat chose, one with mutual feedback between political history and the history of ideas, (p.xiv) enriches his work and makes it compelling and accessible to a wide range of readers. Likewise Ginats grasp of the international arena and its manifold partitions and historical context is admirable. Third, Ginats articulation of Syrias perspective is particularly valuable. Ginat captures the Syrian viewpoint of internal, regional, and international happenings. As such, he enunciates a rarely heard outlook, particularly outside of Syria. It should be noted that the Introduction provides an essential foundation in the theoretical bases of neutralism / non-alignment. For those new to the concepts, reading the Introduction followed by the Appendix may prove valuable. At times, Ginats presentation is not strictly chronological. It might be helpful to provide a chronological chart to assist the reader in future additions. Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism provides a detailed and insightful study of Arab neutralism and its manifestation in Syria. yriaIt is a significant contribution to our understandings of politics during the Cold War, the historic alliance of third world countries in the face of super powers, ideological movements, and Middle Eastern studies. It provides particularly telling lessons for students of and contemporary advocates for Syria and the Middle East.

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Gulf States

US Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf; Safeguarding American Interests Through Selective Multiculturalism: US Foreign Policy and Conflict in the Islamic World
Robert J. Pauly, Jr.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005. 158p. $69.95. ISBN: 0754635333. Review by Mohammed M. Aman, Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

elying upon primary and secondary resources, including documents and official sources, newspapers and serials, monographs, articles, essays and reports, the author gives a concise analysis of the policies of three US presidents (Bush 1, Clinton and Bush, the son) towards the Greater Middle East in general, and focuses specifically on the fundamental economic, military and political causes of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crises. Pauley does an admirable job in investigating the causes which have continued to drive recent unfolding events in the Persian Gulf. The author raised some serious and thought-provoking questions in a balanced treatment of a very sensitive subject. He concludes with bold observations concerning the dynamics that shaped US policy in Iraq. In his efforts to explore, in detail, the role of American leaders since 1989, Pauly posed several research questions, namely: A. What were the fundamental economic, military and political causes of the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War? Were such causes primarily regional or global in nature? B. Who were the principal actors, individual, national and international in the contexts of the 1990-91 and 2000-03 Persian Gulf conflicts? C. To what extent did each of these actors drive events in the Gulf from 1990-2004?

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D. What roles did American leaders, and the policies they developed and implemented, play in both the 1990-91and 2001-2003 Persian Gulf conflicts? E. How effectively did the administration of Bush, the father manage the 1991 Persian Gulf War and its aftermath? F. How effectively did the Clinton administration define, articulate and pursue US interests in the Persian Gulf from 1993-2001, and what were the short and long-term costs and benefits of its diplomatic, economic, and military policies toward the region? G. How effectively did the administration of Bush, the son, define, articulate, and pursue US interests in the Persian Gulf, from 2001-04, and what were the short and long-term costs and benefits of its political, economic, and military and policies toward the region? H. What steps must American leaders take to safeguard future US interests in the Persian Gulf? The author advances the following theses in his attempts to address the above questions. 1. George H. W. Bush administrations management of 1990-1991 Persian Gulf Crisis was both prudent and effective when assessed in the short term; 2. The Clinton Security Council to enforce a series of resolutions proscribing Saddams development of WMD programs and sponsorship of terrorist organization, and its limited use of force in response to Iraqs repeated violations of those strictures, were relatively ineffective in safeguarding US interests in the Persian Gulf, from 1993-2001; 3. The George W. Bush administrations use of a pre-emptive strategy to confront Iraq over its alleged development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and sponsorship of terrorist groups and forcibly remove Saddam from power was both necessary and effective given the fundamental shift in the nature of the threats

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posed to the security of Americans at home and abroad in the aftermath of al-Qaidas attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (p.7); 4. It is estimated that US policymakers consider the liquidation of Saddams regime and subsequent building process in Iraq as useful first steps rather than endpoints in the democratization of the Persian Gulf and broader Greater Middle East over the long term. The pursuit of such a vision for change will ensure that history deems the second Iraq successful in both military and political terms; The book addresses the research questions and theses through the presentation of five main chapters and a concluding chapter that examine the following issues: 1. The history of the Persian Gulf, with emphasis on US foreign policy toward the region during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (ch. 2); 2. Evaluation of George H. W. Bush administrations policies toward the Persian Gulf from 1989-93, placing an emphasis on the planning and prosecution of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War (Ch. 3) 3. Evaluation of the Clinton administrations policies toward the Persian Gulf from 19932001 (ch. 4); Chapter Five examines and evaluates George W. Bush and his administrations policies toward the Persian Gulf from 20012004. In this chapter, the author places emphasis on the planning and prosecution of the second Iraq War in 2002-03 and the conduct of nation-building operations in 2003-04. In Chapter Six, the author recommends an interconnected diplomatic, economic and security policy network for the pragmatic pursuit of American interests in the Persian Gulf in light of the strengths and weaknesses of the George W. Bush, Clinton and George H. Bush and administrations respective approaches to that region. Chapter Seven revisits the research questions and elaborates on the theses using the evidence presented in the five main chapters of the book (p.8). The chapter concludes by presenting four sets of related observations in two sections.
US Foreign Policy and the Persian Gulf...Robert J. Pauly

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The first section discusses the extent to which American policy toward the Persian Gulf will condition the evolution of the relationships between the US and the states of the greater Middle East over the long term. The second section offers a set of brief responses to the research questions in light of the evidence presented in the main chapters of the book. The third section of the book evaluates the theses that the author posed in the beginning of the book. The final section considers the significance of the books findings as pertains to the broader relationship between the Islamic and Western worlds. The concluding section of the book articulates a series of policy prescriptions that are designed to safeguard US interests in the Middle East in the forthcoming years, and to face the potential threats to those interests in the past 9/11 era.

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Fall 2006

Women and Media in the Middle East: Power Through Self-Expression


Naomi Sakr, ed. London & New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004. 248p. $69.50. ISBN:1850434859. $27.50. Pbk: ISBN: 1850435457. Review by Rachel Simon, Ph.D. Princeton University

his collection examines how women in the Middle East and North Africa are empowered or disempowered through their involvement and presentation in the media. The collection includes eleven papers by specialists in both media studies and women studies. Several of the authors are active in the media and others are academics in the Middle East, England and the USA, all of whom conducted field studies in the region. Much of the research included interviewing key figures in Middle Eastern media. The collection has a rich bibliography (p. 228-240), endnotes and an index. The book opens with an introduction by the editor, Naomi Sakr, on women-media interaction, setting forth the aims of the book. This is followed by papers on womens press in contemporary Iran (by Gholam Khiabany and Annabelle Sreberny); a study of women and the press in pre-revolutionary Egypt (by Sonia Dabbous); Maghrebi women film-makers (by Zahia Smail Salhi); women and Egyptian political cinema (by Lina Khatib); Egyptian rural womens interpretation of televised literacy campaigns (by Sahar Khamis); gender and media in Palestine (by Benaz Somiry-Batrawi); women and the press in Kuwait (by Haya al-Mughni and Mary Ann Ttreault); women and the internet in the Arab world (by Deborah L. Wheeler); women and politics in Lebanese television (by Victoria Firmo-Fontan); and Arab women journalists at home and abroad (by Magda Abu-Fadil). The involvement of women in the media and their representation in it are examined on the wider background of the

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Women and Media

role of the various aspects of the media in the Middle East and the role of women in the region. In addition to statistical data on employment the papers examine the actual status and power of women in the media. Several papers show that although many women are graduates of academic programs in media studies, their share in prestigious roles and decision making in the media is smaller than that of men. However, Arab female journalists active abroad can reach much higher positions and status than those in the Middle East. This is not that much different in comparison with the position of women and the press in general or with the position of women in other fields in the Middle East. The examination of rural womens reaction to literacy campaign in the Egyptian television shows that the campaign largely failed with regards to its main target audience: traditional illiterate women didnt feel that illiteracy was to blame for the negative results which were aimed by the campaign leaders to encourage women to become literate. The examination of women in Egyptian cinema focuses on women as representatives of the nation and the Other, whether in a positive sense (Egyptian decent and courageous women) or negatively (Israeli, Jewish or American whores trying to tempt decent Arabs). As for Maghrebi cinema, female film-makers have used this medium to break womens silence in reference to their private lives and accepted traditional modes of behavior. As can be seen, the term media is broadly used: printed press, radio, and television as well as the internet and the cinema. On the other hand, several important states in the Middle East are hardly examined (e.g., Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen; Israel is treated mainly in relation to the Palestinian Authority) while Egypt is the focus of three papers. Thus, although the collection includes interesting papers and deals with important issues, it is somewhat imbalanced as far as the region as a whole is concerned. Similarly, most papers focus on current issues while the historical background is examined less. Nonetheless, while the collection is imbalanced with regards to its coverage, the papers themselves are well researched, interesting and contributing to our knowledge of women and the media in the Middle East and North Africa.

Women and Media in the Middle East...Naomi Sakr

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Yaweh versus Yaweh: the Enigma of Jewish history


Jay Y. Gonen
Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2005. 183p. $19.77. ISBN: 0299203301. Review by John M. Riley, Ph.D. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

n this book, the author, a self-proclaimed non-Jewish Jew, (p. 152) sets out to make a case for the Jewish people as a whole (and, by extension, the state of Israel), through a psychohistorical study that aims at explaining the behavior of a people (and how such behavior is frequently repeated over time) through an examination of a peoples collective psychology, or group culture. In the preface, Goyen painstakingly makes his case for the importance of this approach. In addition he points to a series of dialectics that recur in, and underlie the premise of, the book Jews as a chosen people, yet singled out for punishment; a series of redemptions, always presaged by disaster; love for, versus fear of, God all based on a collective belief (which the author characterizes as a starting point) in the dualism of Yahweh as a deeply conflicted deity, an alternately angry and jealous, yet at other times benevolent, God. In the second chapter, the author elaborates on one of the fundamental threads that run through the book the bases of the messianic nature of Judaism. In the second chapter, he explains, in the context of the dialectic that underlies his discussion, the idea of a messiah, and two related questions: when will the messiah appear to mankind and, when he does, what will ensue? The fact that these questions exist in contemporary society should not be lightly dismissed, as they are, in the authors estimation, basic to the history of the Jewish people and the existence of Israel itself (the messianic overtones of the Holocaust and the ensuing creation of the Jewish home state, and the ongoing tensions with its neighbors are all more fully discussed in subsequent chapters). The author discusses, in Chapter Three the relevance of Jewish holidays to reinforce his assertion of the dualism inherent
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IsraelHistory

to the Jewish religion. Special attention is given to the holidays of Passover, Purim, and Yom Kippur; for the student of recent history in that region, the discussion of the symbolism of the 1973 Yom Kippur War is especially relevant. Gonen appears to depart from the stated premise of the book in Chapter Four, Love and Bereavement, to delve into another, seemingly disjointed, aspect of his discussion of dualism: the divide between love and fear of Yahweh by the Jews. Other than presenting the reader with an insight into the psychology of personal psychology, the chapter has little to add to his arguments other than to suggest that the dualism that is the central theme of the book is present throughout Judaism. It is in Chapters Six, Bereavement and Resurrection, and Seven, Messianism, Zionism, and the Holocaust, that the authors theme of redemption, always presaged by a cataclysm, comes into full play. That fact that these always occur in tandem is not coincidental the linkage between two occurrences (the Holocaust and the subsequent creation of the state of Israel as perhaps the most significant examples to the modern reader) is emblematic of the dualism that, in the authors view, permeates judaical consciousness. Other historical examples of this punishment/ reward, cataclysm/redemption, punishment/absolution duality are discussed. In the final chapter, Alternatives, the author returns to his discussion (p.170) of the shared group psyche regarding the allencompassing specialness of Judaism and, by extension, the state of Israel and asserts that Israel, a people whose religion and perceived uniqueness permeates every action and every expression of statehood, and whose group psyche informs their relations with the rest of the world, will find it difficult to come to peace with their neighbors if they cannot break free of this deeply engrained zeitgeist . Yaweh versus Yaweh is neither sympathetic nor hostile to the case of the Jewish people or the state of Israel; the author carefully and convincingly guides the reader through an understanding of religious texts, beliefs, and historical events in support of his thesis. Of course, one individuals interpretation of such a vast subject as the history of Judaism and the psychology of a people is subject to critique. And, in addition, the psychological premises upon which this study is based are certainly subject to question. For the historian or social scientist interested in Israel and the Jewish people, however, this book provides interesting, provocative, and revealing reading.
Yaweh versus Yaweh...Jay Y. Gonen

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Index to Volume 15

Index to Volume 15
Entries appear by author, title, subject, and reviewers. Each entry is followed by the issue number and the page. Titles appear in italics.
Abu-Lebdeh, H. 1:113 Afghanistan-History 1:123 Akash, M. 2:164 Al-Anzi, A. 1:35 Al-Balhan, E. M. 1:18 Al-Foul, B. 2:1 Al-Hegri, K. 2:117 Al-Rawi, R. 2:145 Al-Saleh, A. 1:1 Ali, Y. 1:62 Aman, M. 1:90; 2:120, 137,168, 170, 182, 199 Anderson, B. 2:160 Anthology of Arabic Literature 1:77 Arab-Jewish Relations 2:102 Arabic fiction 1:103 Arabic literature 77, 103, 108 Arabs and Jews 2:102 Asad in Search of Legitimacy 1:80 Baghdad, and Beyond... 2:105 Bahgat, G. 1:90 Baker, R. 2:128 Banking 1:106 Bedoon 1:62 Boullata, I. 1:103; 2:117 Bradley, J. 2:186 Britain and Barbary,1580-1689 2:107 Bunzl, J. 2:193 Brutal Truths ... 2:110 Brynen, R. 1:113 Campbell, C.1:84 Canby, S. 2:100 Case for Palestine... 2:148 Car accidents in Kuwait 1:1 Cleveland, W. 1:113 Comparative Poetry 2:67 Conflict and Peace 1:113 Contemporary Middle East, The 2:114 Corre, A. 1:84 Courting Conflict 1:82 Curry, N. 2:195 Curtis, V. 2:100 Dabbagh, N. 2:193 Divine, D. 1:111 Doomed Ugly Duckling, The... 2:56 Dorraj, M.1:113 Dorronsoro, G 1:123 Economic Role of the State, The... 2:1 Economics 2:1; 140 Education-Kuwait 1:35 Egypt-Politics 2:128 El-Aswad, S. 1:113 Elyachar, J. 2:140 Estep, E. 1:123; 2:110 Folklore, Iraq 1:84 Folklore, Yemen 2:117 Frangieh, B. 1:77 From the Land of Sheba... 2:117 Ghallagher, N. 1:83; 2:125, 179 Gharaibeh, M. 1:35 Ginat, R. 2:195 Globalism and the Middle East 1:113 Gohar, S. 2:67 Gonan, J. 2:205 Gresham, J. 2:26 Gulf Security in the 21st Century 2:120 Gulf States 1:90; 2:120,170,199 Habeck, M. 2:137 Hajjar, L. 1:82 Hamade, S. 2:4 Hammer, J. 2:148 Han, C. 2:117 Hasso, F. 2:179 Hibbard, A. 2:174 Hinckley, M. 2:100 History of the Modern Middle East 1:113 History, Ancient 1:99 History, Modern 1:83, 113 Holocaust 1:93 Holocaust-Poetry 2:56

Index to Volume 15 (nos. 1 and 2)

RM

Fall 2006 Huband, M. 2:110 Huri, Y. 1:80, 2:87 Ingram, D. 2:189 Intellectual Property 2:4 International Political System... 2:11 International RelationsMesopotamia 2:11 Iran-History and Politics 2:101 Iraq-Civil Society 2:26 Iraq-Military 2:105 Iraqi Jews... 2:125 Iraqi Perceptions of Out-groups... 2:26 Islam Without Fear... 2:128 Israel 1:82, 90, 93, 11; 2:205 Israel and the Persian Gulf States, 1:90 Israels Holocaust...1:93 Israeli Society 2:130 Israelis, The... 2:130 Jacobs, A. 2:142 Jamal, A. 2:142 Jassen, A. 1:99 Jayyusi, S. 1:103 Jefferson, J. 1:82, 86 Jerusalem 2:134,164 Jihadists 2:137 Jordan 1:113 Jordan-Politics 2:160 Jordanian Jerusalem... 2:134 Kamrava, M. 1:95 Katz, K. 2:134 Kaufman, A. 2:102 Kedar, M. 1:80 King, J. 1:123 Knowing the Enemy... 2:137 Koch, C. 2:120 Kuwait-Education 1:18, 35 Kuwait-Sociology 1:1 Long, D. 2:120 Literature 2:174 Mahmood, S. 1:121 Mamdouh, A. 1:108 Markets of Dispossession...2:140 Marriage, Money and Divorce 1:95 Matar, N. 2:107 Maurer, B. 1:106 Mazor, Y. 2:56 Media and the Politics...2:142 Middle East at the Crossroads1:113 Middle East-Modern History 2:114 Middle East Under Rome, The 1:99 Midnight Tales... 2:145 Modern Arabic Fiction... 1:103 Modern Middle East...1:83 Mohammed, N. 2:170 Moore, C. 1:95 Moral and Legal Perspectives... 2:148 Morrison, H. 2:140, 145 Moughrabi, F. 2:164 Moukdad, H. 1:106 Multiple Intelligence Styles1:18 Muslim Women 2:145,179, 189, 203 Naphtalene: a Novel from Baghdad 1:108 Nation-building...1: 113 Nationalist Voices... 2:160 Nomani, A. 2:189 North Africa-History 2:107 Open Veins of Jerusalem, The 2:164 Owen, R. 2:128 Palestine 1:111; 2:142,148, 193 Palestine: a Guide 2:166 Palestine and Israel ...1:111 Palestinians Born in Exile... 2:148 Pauly, R. 2:199 Peace in the Middle East 1:113 Perkins, K. 1:86; 2:107 Perry, G. 2:148 Persian Love Poetry 2:100 Persian Puzzle, The... 2:168 Permeability of the Middle East 1:113 Piracy and Terrorism... 2:4 Podeh, E. 2:102 Poetry 2:56, 67, 100, 87 Political Culture ... 1:35 Political Poetry... 2:67 Politics 1:80, 113; 2:110 Politics of Piety... 1:121 Pollack, K. 2:168 Population and Development... 2:170 Porter, C. 1:99 Princesses' Street... 2:174 Prior, M. 2:148

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Digest of Middle East Studies

Index to Volume 15 Quigley, J. 2:148 Rachal, M. 1:108 Rapoport, Y. 1:95 Rawlings, E. 1:99 Reimer, M. 2:160, 182 Resistance, Repression... 2:179 Revolution Unending... 1:123 Reynolds, N. 2:105 Riley, J. 2:205 Rood, J. 2:182 Rosenberg, J. 1:113 Rosenthal, D. 2:130 Sacred Law in the Holy City 2:182 Saeidi, S. 2:11 Sakr, N. 2:203 Salloukh, B. 1:113 Sartre, M. 1:99 Saudi Arabia Exposed... 2:186 School Reading 1:18 Shahin, M. 2:166 Shiblak, A. 2:125 Silverburg, S. 2:102, 105, 134,164,166 Simon, R. 1:121; 2:203 Soliman, M. 2:1 Speaking the Truth... 2:148 Standing Alone in Mecca... 2:189 Stateless and Citizenship Rights...1:62 Stein, R. 1:11 Suicine in Plalestine... 2:193 Swedenurg, T. 1:111 Syria 1:80, 2:182, 195 Syria and the Doctrine of Arab...2:195 Theroux, P. 1:108 Tompkins, S. 1:93; 2:114 Tsimhoni, D. 2:130 Tunisia 1:86 US Foreign Policy... 2:199 U.S.-Jordan relations 1:113 Who am I Without Exile? ... 2:87 Women and Media... 2:203 Women in Islam 1:95, 121 Yambert, K. 2:114 Yaweh versus Yaweh... 2:205 Zertal, I. 1:93

Index to Volume 15 (nos. 1 and 2)

RM

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Gulf Security in the Twenty-first Century
Mohammed M. Aman, Ph.D.

The Israelis, Ordinary People in an Extraordinary Land


Daphne Tsimhoni, Ph.D

Jordanian Jerusalem...
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