UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT RETURN DATE: , 2013 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------x IN THE MATTER OF:

ELENA SVENSON, CASE NO. 1-12-43050-ess Debtor. CHAPTER 7 --------------------------------------------------------x MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Plaintiff/Creditor, v. ELENA SVENSON, Adversary Proceeding No. 12-01229-ess Defendant/debtor, BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANA CONDOMINIUM NO. TWO; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INC., Defendants/Creditors, VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS; BORIS KOTLYAR, COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC; LANA KAPLUN, personally; FARID BADALOV, personally; BORIS MEYDID, personally; JOHN DOE and JANE JOHNS, personally (fictitious names to be discovered), Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------------x VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS and BORIS KOTLYAR, Cross-Claimants, v. MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Cross-Defendant. -----------------------------------------------------------------x NOTICE OF MOTION COUNSELORS: PLEASE TAKE NOTICE, that upon the annexed memorandum of law and supporting affidavit, Michael Krichevsky moves for an order to Disqualify BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP, Joshua Losardo, Esq. and all other attorneys of this firm from simultaneously representing OCEANA and COOPER (artificial entities), LANA KAPLUN, FARID BADALOV and BORIS MEYDID (Individual Defendants) in this action on the

following grounds: a) unwaivable and nonconsentable conflict of interest; b) refusal to comply with THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS and NEW YORK RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT in contempt of court; c) attorneys are substantially aiding and abetting commission of torts by defendants; d) plaintiff initiated a legal malpractice claim against BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & GOLDMAN, LLP and attorneys will be called as witnesses by plaintiff against defendants in this action, and defendants will be called as witnesses against attorneys in malpractice action. The hearing will be held by Bankruptcy Judge Honorable Elizabeth S. Stong of this Court at the Courthouse located at 271 Cadman Plaza East, at Courtroom 3585, Brooklyn, NY 11201, on the day of February, 2013, at 10 o'clock in the forenoon of that day, or as soon thereafter

as counsel can be heard; and for such other and further relief as to this Court seems just and proper. TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that, pursuant to FRCP, all answering papers, if any, shall be served at least seven (7) days before the return date of this motion.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York February 12, 2013 ______________________________ Michael Krichevsky, Pro Se 4221 Atlantic Ave Brooklyn, New York 11224 (718) 687-2300 tokrichevsky1@yahoo.com

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT RETURN DATE: , 2013 EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ---------------------------------------------------------x IN THE MATTER OF: ELENA SVENSON, CASE NO. 1-12-43050-ess Debtor. CHAPTER 7 --------------------------------------------------------x MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Plaintiff/Creditor, v. ELENA SVENSON, Adversary Proceeding No. 12-01229-ess Defendant/debtor, BOARD OF MANAGERS OF OCEANA CONDOMINIUM NO. TWO; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INC., Defendants/Creditors, VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS; BORIS KOTLYAR, COOPER SQUARE REALTY, INC; LANA KAPLUN, personally; FARID BADALOV, personally; BORIS MEYDID, personally; JOHN DOE and JANE JOHNS, personally (fictitious names to be discovered), Defendants. ------------------------------------------------------------------x VICTORIA EDELSTEIN, DDS and BORIS KOTLYAR, Cross-Claimants, v. MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Cross-Defendant. -----------------------------------------------------------------x MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISQUALIFY BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & G OLDMAN, LLP., JOSHUA LOSARDO, ESQ., AND ALL OTHER ATTORNEYs OF THE FIRM MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se, under penalty of perjury says: 1. I am the plaintiff (KRICHEVSKY) in the within action. 2. I make this affidavit in support of plaintiffs motion to disqualify attorneys of BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & G OLDMAN, LLP (BELKIN). INTRODUCTION

3. Attorneys have always been held in common law civilly liable for engaging in conduct violative of their fiduciary duties to clients, despite the existence of professional rules under which the attorneys could also have been disciplined. To prevent attorney from continuous breach of fiduciary duties and/or engaging in unethical conduct, injunctive relief will lie where there is no adequate remedy at law. 4. KRICHEVSKY presumes courts familiarity with the basic facts of this action. According to attorney Aaron Shmulewitz, the partner of BELKIN, he represented and continues to represent all unit owners of OCEANA in unrelated litigation against developer of Oceana complex, which started several years ago. OCEANA (Board of managers) as trustee and/or fiduciary acting on behalf of all unit owners hired BELKIN to represent their best interests in litigation. A lawyer's duty to his client is that of a fiduciary or trustee. Hafter v. Farkas, 498 F.2d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 1974); Spector v. Mermelstein, 361 F.Supp. 30, 38 (S.D.N.Y.1972), see Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F. 2d 1384 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 1976. Accordingly, BELKIN itself became a trustee and/or fiduciary suing developer on behalf of unit owners, and unit owners became the clients of this firm. Attorney-client relationship with BELKIN was confirmed on or about September-October 2012, when Mr. Shmulewitz during the meeting of all unit owners and developer corporate representatives, publicly gave legal advice to unit owners to accept terms of settlement proposal with developer and to cast their votes toward approval of settlement proposal. He stated that he personally worked on this settlement proposal, approves it as fair and in the best interest of every unit owner. Argument No 1 in favor of disqualification No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to the one, and despise the other. You cannot serve God and mammon, Matthew 6:24

5. KRICHEVSKY and individual defendant KAPLUN are clients of BELKIN as unit owners and beneficiaries of their services. Accordingly, this firm by representing individual defendant KAPLUN in this action has taken the adverse position of one unit owner against another unit owner, KRICHEVSKY, which is conflict of interest. Notwithstanding the above, this firm claims to represent the entity OCEANA as Respondeat superior against their client KRICHEVSKY. This is yet another adverse position against KRICHEVSKY, which is 2nd conflict of interest. To add more insult to the injury, this firm claims to represent the COOPER (corporation) against KRICHEVSKY, which is the third conflict of interest. In this conflict of interest, according to defendant MEYDID (COOPER officer or employee), attorney and partner of BELKIN, Robert Holland, advised MEYDID to continue disconnecting KRICHEVSKYs magnetic entrance keys to OCEANA. Needless to say, that this legal advice was adverse to the interest of KRICHEVSKY as firms client and as beneficiary of OCEANA and COOPER services. Mr. Holland knew as licensed attorney to practice law in New York that this advice is unlawful, and aids and abets MEYDIDs torts of nuisance and harassment against KRICHEVSKY. 6. KRICHEVSKY is not done yet. BELKIN claims to represent individual defendant BADALOV against KRICHEVSKY. In this conflict of interest, upon information and belief, BADALOV affirmatively claimed that he acted upon legal advice of BELKIN pointing to business judgment rule when he rejected KRICHEVSKYs tender of $5800 and the lease with Vladimir Traynin. Alternatively, KAPLUN affirmatively claimed that she acted upon legal advice of BELKIN when she directed BADALOV to reject the above-mentioned tender. See REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIMS AND ANSWER TO THIRD-PARTY CLAIM 95from civil court prior action The Third-Party Claims must be dismissed as the

Answering Parties acted pursuant to the advice of professionals under BCL 717, exhibit A. New York business corporate law BCL 717 states that director can rely on the advice of attorney. 7. As a reasonable attorney can see, there are counter and cross conflicts of interest with finger pointing among defendants and attorneys of the firm. BELKIN, in hate of God and for the love of money, is attempting to serve 6 masters KRICHEVSKY, KAPLUN, BADALOV, MEYDID, OCEANA and COOPER it cannot be done and BELKIN should be disqualified. Argument No 2 in favor of disqualification conflict of interest equals violation of due process 8. BELKIN has no authority to simultaneously represent OCEANA and COOPER (artificial entities), KAPLUN, BADALOV and MEYDID (Individual Defendants) because BELKIN has conflict of interests, which is already leading to finger pointing of defendants against each other and BELKIN. Please see Mercado v. City of New York, 2010 WL 3910594 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010). In this case, Magistrate Judge Pitman noted that the individual defendants had submitted written waivers of the potential conflicts. 9. Upon information and belief, now none of the defendants is aware of this egregious conflict of interests. However, should one or all of the defendants become dissatisfied with outcome of this lawsuit, they will quickly learn from appellate attorney about his conflict of interest and file an appeal. In case Dunton v. County of Suffolk, State of New York, 748 F. 2d 69 (1984) - Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit stated: a plaintiff's verdict was overturned because after judgment the defendant police officer had raised for the first time a claim that there was a conflict of interest in his being represented by the same attorney who represented Suffolk County. 10. KRICHEVSKY beliefs that BELKIN never advised his clients about this egregious conflict

of interest and usurped authority to represent defendants without their knowledge and consent. Restatement of the LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS in 123 (2) states that when an attorney represents or advises a corporation, he may not simultaneously represent its officers, directors or employees, and therefore corporation cannot waive conflict of interest. To prove these points, KRICHEVSKY demanded that BELKIN obtain and file written waivers of conflict of interest as per Restatement of the LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS from all of the defendants. Here is what it says in 128: 128. Representing Clients with Conflicting Interests in Civil Litigation Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the limitations and conditions provided in 122, a lawyer in civil litigation may not: (1) represent two or more clients in a matter if there is a substantial risk that the lawyer's representation of one client would be materially and adversely affected by the lawyer's duties to another client in the matter; or (2) represent one client to assert or defend a claim against or brought by another client currently represented by the lawyer, even if the matters are not related In 122 it further says: c(i). The requirement of informed consentadequate information. Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the material respects in which the representation could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks of the conflicted representation. The client must be aware of information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision. Information relevant to particular kinds of conflicts is considered in several of the Sections hereafter. In a multiple-client situation, the information normally should address the interests of the lawyer and other client giving rise to the conflict; contingent, optional, and tactical considerations and alternative courses of action that would be foreclosed or made less readily available by the conflict; the effect of the representation or the process of obtaining other clients' informed consent upon confidential information of the client; any material reservations that a disinterested lawyer might reasonably harbor about the arrangement if such a lawyer were representing only the

client being advised; and the consequences and effects of a future withdrawal of consent by any client, including, if relevant, the fact that the lawyer would withdraw from representing all clients (see 121, Comment e). Where the conflict arises solely because a proposed representation will he adverse to an existing client in an unrelated matter, knowledge of the general nature and scope of the work been performed for each client normally suffices to enable the clients to decide whether or not to consent. 11. However, starting from about September 2012 until now, notwithstanding numerous objections in KRICHEVSKYs affidavits and oral demands to produce waivers or retainers BELKIN refused to do so. 12. Because this firm did not file and refuses to file any waivers at all, they have no authority to appear in this court on behalf of anybody, at least until they do. This manifest disregard of LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS and New York rules of Professional Conduct 1.7 and 1.13 constitutes contempt of the court and circumstantial evidence of lack of authority and waivers from Defendants. Rule 1.7 states that the waiver of conflict of interest must be in writing. 13. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit said in Connecticut v. Cahill, 217 F. 3d 93(2000) Suits to enjoin the unlawful actions of government officials have a rich history in the AngloAmerican tradition. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220, 1 S.Ct. 240, 27 L.Ed. 171 (1882) ("No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it."). 14. Therefore, this court does not have personal jurisdiction over defendants because they are not proper before this court, and BELKIN should be disqualified for contempt of court. Argument No 3 in favor of disqualification The Court Has Duty To Police Attorneys For Violation Of LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

15. Here is another eloquent statement of the court in Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F. 2d 903 (1984): There are at least two reasons why a court should satisfy itself that no conflict exists or at least provide notice to the affected party if one does. First, a court is under a continuing obligation to supervise the members of its Bar. E.g., In re Taylor, 567 F.2d at 1191; see Musicus v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 621 F.2d 742, 744 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam) (district court obligated to take measures against unethical conduct occurring in proceedings before it). Second, trial courts have a duty "to exercise that degree of control required by the facts and circumstances of each case to assure the litigants of a fair trial." Koufakis v. Carvel, 425 F.2d 892, 900-01 (2d Cir.1970); see ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A)(4). When a litigant's statutorily appointed counsel is acting against the litigant's interests because of a conflict that the litigant has not been informed of and cannot be expected to understand on his own, the litigant is not receiving a fair trial. Cf. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981) (divided loyalties of counsel may create due process violation)[emphasis added] 16. The court continued: Where a conflict is serious and disqualification might be warranted, the district court is under a duty to ensure that the client fully appreciates his situation. This Court has stated that "[w]hen a potential or actual conflict of interest situation arises, it is the court's duty to ensure that the attorney's client, so involved, is fully aware of the nature of the conflict and understands the potential threat to the protection of his interests." In re Taylor, 567 F.2d 1183, 1191 (2d Cir.1977). Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F. 2d 903 (1984) [emphasis added] 17. In the instant action, there are actual and potential conflicts of interest. Restatement of LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 122 g(iii) states: g(iii). Conflicts between adversaries in litigation. When clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation, the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client's position renders the conflict nonconsentable (see 128, Comment c, & 129). The rule applies even if the parties themselves believe that the common interests are more significant in the matter than the interests dividing them[Emphasis added] 18. Because in this action there are 2 institutional defendants OCEANA and COOPER, fiduciaries of KRICHEVSKY, KRICHEVSKY shows that these conflict of interests

unwaivable and nonconsentable. Therefore, this court should sua sponte disqualify BELKIN. Argument No 4 in favor of disqualification injunctive relief as a remedy for aiding and abetting commission of torts by BELKIN 19. KRICHEVSKY incorporates averments above by reference herein. 20. Attorneys of BELKIN in breach of fiduciary duty toward KRICHEVSKY and OCEANA conspired with individual defendants to profit from this breach by creating controversy and fueling the litigation. Particularly, attorneys of BELKIN advised, prepared and filed perjurious lien against KRICHEVSKYs UNIT, while they knew that individual defendants rejected KRICHEVSKYs tender upon BELKINs advice. This lien unlawfully included attorney fees and late charges, and was filed without notice to KRICHEVSKY. At the same time, KRICHEVSKY challenged the validity of prior lien in Civil Court while individual defendants were represented by another law firm. While civil court case was pending, BELKIN initiated foreclosure action in Supreme Court using sewer service, see United States v. Brand Jewelers, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 1293 (1970) long-standing and systematic practice" of obtaining default judgments against economically disadvantaged defendants by means of the technique known with apt inelegance as "sewer service." The question arises upon a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) 21. Filing a lien, foreclosure action in state court and advising defendants against KRICHEVSKY interests substantially aids and abets commission of abuse of legal process, conversion, nuisance and harassment by individual defendants against KRICHEVSKY. This representation is prohibited by rule 1.7. Of New York rules of Professional Conduct. 22. Therefore, to stop tortuous actions of BELKIN against KRICHEVSKY, this court should enjoin BELKIN from proceeding against KRICHEVSKY by disqualifying BELKIN from this action.

Argument No 5 in favor of disqualification attorneys of BELKIN will be called as witnesses by plaintiff 23. KRICHEVSKY incorporates averments above by reference herein. 24. KRICHEVSKY, a few weeks ago, initiated a legal malpractice action against BELKIN to compensate him for damages due to a wrong legal advice given to individual defendants. KRICHEVSKY will rely on facts known to him and those that revealed by defendants in their pleadings, exhibit A. Accordingly, KRICHEVSKY will call as witnesses defendants in this action against BELKIN in malpractice action. In instant action, KRICHEVSKY will call as witnesses attorneys of BELKIN against individual defendants. This arrangement will make discovery impossible and for BELKIN impossible to represent anybody in this action. Therefore, this court should disqualify BELKIN from this action. CONCLUSION 25. Each of these arguments alone and even more altogether show required disqualification of BELKIN from this action. Wherefore, KRICHEVSKY moves this Honorable court for an order disqualifying BELKIN BURDEN WENIG & G OLDMAN, LLP., JOSHUA LOSARDO, ESQ., and all others attorneys if this firm from representing defendants in this action; and for other relief which this court may seem just and proper. Brooklyn, New York February 12, 2013 ________________________________ MICHAEL KRICHEVSKY, Pro Se