A Perfect Failure: NATO's War against Yugoslavia Author(s): Michael Mandelbaum Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No.

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Perfect

Failure

NATO's War Against Yugoslavia Michael Mandelbaum

On the night ofMay 7,1999?the

of natos bombs

45th day

major

political

air campaign against Yugoslavia? in struck the Chinese embassy

unanticipated, itself was the unintended of a gross error

effects were unplanned, The war and unwelcome. consequence judgment. in political

downtown Belgrade, crushing the building and killing three Chinese who were said
to be journalists. that American identified An revealed investigation mis had intelligence as the headquarters that basis, nato an Ameri

Western political leaders Having begun it, declared that they were fighting for the
of the Balkans, who sake of the people from the war nevertheless emerged considerably been before. to establish world. would affected countries were But worse The a new off than alliance they had also fought

the structure On

of theYugoslav Bureau of Federal Supply

and Procurement.

planners had put it on the list of approved

targets and, guided by satellite, can B-2 bomber it. destroyed The attack

the use of force

governing principle in the post-Cold War war set that the precedents feasible nor desirable

it

was there on the embassy an was a It fore mistake. not, however, natos It symbolized aberration. Yugoslav success a marked conflict war, by military air alliance's failure. The and political with forces carried out their missions dispatch; military's Yugoslav the assault withdrawal forced from of Kosovo. the Serb the southern The wider

be neither

to follow.

this one like all wars, Finally, of the interests the national effects two large,

it. The that waged relations with negative: and troublesome

province of the war, however, consequences political were the nato's what of political opposite intended. leaders Every quences, war but conse has unanticipated all the in this case virtually

Russia countries, were set back by the military in the Balkans. PAVED WITH GOOD At was the outset

important, communist

formerly and China, operations

INTENTIONS campaign, nato

of the bombing to save lives. Before

the Clinton administration said that it

acting

Michael Council on

Mandelbaum Foreign Relations

is the Whitney for 1999-2000.

H.

Shepardson

Fellow

of the

[2]

A Perfect Failure
intervened on March 2,500 people had died between the Serb authorities Albanian tion Army 24, approximately civil war in Kosovos and the ethnic the worst outcome? Standard, although the permanent exile of the Albanians from Kosovo?was not successful. avoided, the war was

insurgents of the Kosovo Libera the 11 weeks of (kla). During an estimated 10,000 people bombardment,

THE FATAL MISCALCULATION According the harm was to the Clinton administration, to the of the Balkans people inevitable and entirely the fault of

in the province, most of them died violently Albanian civilians murdered by Serbs. nato was An equally important goal to prevent the forced displacement At the outset Kosovar Albanians. of the of the

to have 230,000 were estimated bombing, its left their homes. million end, 1.4 By were Of these, 860,000 were displaced. outside Kosovo, with in hastily constructed and Macedonia. The account, alliance also went the vast majority camps in Albania

Serbia. Yugoslav President Slobodan administration the Milosevic, said, had to evict all Albanians from long planned Kosovo?where number order come to out they had ten to one?in Serbs by almost to ensure Serb control of perpetual Nato could not honorably

the province. scheme a

stand bywhile Milosevic

of "ethnic but to no choice 78-day

carried out his

stability the The result, however, was precisely the war made all of them less opposite: stable. Albania with whom was flooded with it had no means

own to war, by its to protect the precarious political of the countries of the Balkans.

and thus had cleansing" as it did?with respond campaign. in Kosovo after

bombing

Precisely when Belgrade decided on

the tactics it employed

refugees of coping. Albanians of ethnic combination and large

the bombing began, and indeed justwhat

the displacement of was million Albanians its 1.5 original of a sweeping aim, simply a byproduct s assault on the kla, or a response to nato almost air campaign?are that cannot questions access to be seriously addressed without such records as the Milosevic regime may have kept. To be sure, the practice of ethnic cleansing was scarcely unknown to the an all regime; indeed, it has been too-familiar feature of twentieth-century Balkan their history. And whatever it decided?whether

InMacedonia,
between was Slavs threatened

the fragile political balance

and indigenous by the influx The

Albanians

from Kosovo.

of the Serb rampage on the ground nato attacks from the air reduced of Kosovo to rubble. In Serbia

parts air campaign proper the nato destroyed on which much of the infrastructure life depended. Had this been awar fought for national interests, and had the eviction of Serb forces from Kosovo been an important smember interest of nato the countries, a success, a although one. But nato the regrettably costly waged war not for its interests but on behalf of could be deemed its values. The supreme goal was the well war economic

motives,

thosewho killed and put to flight

authority cleansers bear

and those with Albanians, over the killers and ethnic of crimes But about in Kosovo.

personal responsibility for the epidemic

there are reasons the Clinton s for skepticism assertion administrations offensive against

being of theAlbanian Kosovars. By this FOREIGN AFFAIRS-

that Milosevic

spring

iggg September/October

[3 ]

Michael Mandelbaum
the Kosovar against Albanians, the Jews, was like Hitler's long intended war and quired its and, when assent to the Rambouillet persisted for the withdrawal the Serbs plan, in their of the to bomb.

carefully planned. Milosevic the province all, controlled without what

had, after for ten years

refusal, waited osce monitors

attempting anything approaching in 1999. In October 1998, happened an offensive Serb forces launched against the KLA that drove their homes. A 400,000 people from was cease-fire arranged, returned. from A team of

resorting Albright to force, nato went to find the extra mile a but the terms on resolution," peaceful

and then began later said that "before

which the bombing ended cast doubt on

her assertion: departures to concessions Nations they included from Rambouillet important that amount United

and a great many unarmed monitors for Security (osce) was

the Organization in Europe and Cooperation

to the Serbs. The ultimate

give At the outset concerted

to the to province dispatched a measure of protection. the Albanians of 1999, the cease-fire broke

for authority a Kosovo, country friendly giving Russia, to the Serbs, the power of veto. The Rambouillet document had called for a referendum Kosovo's after ultimate three years to decide status, which would

received

down, violated by both sides.Although

effort to reinforce ended the cease-fire observers alto and strengthen could not have on noncombatants that Kosovo was the international the violence

a certainly have produced large majority on which terms for independence; the the war gave nato ended made And forces no mention of a to referendum. whereas unimpeded Rambouillet access

gether, itmight have limited the assaults

and averted Containing the disaster the suffered.

fighting could have bought time forwhat

resolution for a peaceful necessary a of of the conflict: change leadership from in Belgrade. Milosevic Removing office was

all of Yugoslavia,

including Serbia, the

the alliance free

allowed June settlement rein only in Kosovo.

Whether
before with a more

suchmodifications,

if offered

no means an by impossible was not He proposition. popular with Serbs assault temporarily (the subsequent nato increased'his popularity), he did not exercise totalitarian control resembling anything over Serbia, and prolonged But nato chose

the bombing robust

could have Kosovo, can never be known. What natos were leaders believed unnecessary "I think because

began and combined osce presence in avoided what followed is clear is that a few exemplary within that concessions

demonstrations course.

in 1996-97 had almost toppled him.

a different

salvoswould quickly bring the Serbs to

heel. this is ... achievable

Led by Secretary of StateMadeleine K. Albright, it summoned the Serbs and the

KLA to the French chateau of Rambouillet, under nato

a relatively short period of time,"Albright saidwhen the bombing began. She and
her colleagues were a Balkan Milosevic who would Apparently where said to consider "schoolyard bully" back down when challenged. in Serbian school the customs of the Clinton for he did

a presented them with detailed plan for

political auspices, and threatened refused. thereupon [4] Both autonomy demanded in Kosovo that both agree to it, reprisals if either Americans the kla, ac

military did refuse. The with

yards differ from those in the institutions

the senior officials were administration educated,

negotiated

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS

-Volume 78N0.5

A Perfect Failure
not back down. Nato thus began its war on the basis of amiscalculation. It was a that exacted the war a high price. as but eventually found peacekeepers the targets of local forces. themselves

miscalculation Yet when

The people of the Balkans paid it.

question the proper prin That question concerned The for sovereignty. determining ciple at its heart ended, the political remained unsettled.

THE CLINTON DOCTRINE the Albanian Kosovars, protecting to establish, with its Yugoslav aspired war, a new doctrine military governing era. War in the post-Cold operations of "humanitarian This putative doctrine Besides nato intervention" force on behalf of the narrower had two parts: the use of of universal values instead interests for which

Albanians had fought for independence

based on the right to national self in the name

determination. The Serbs had fought to

keep Kosovo part of Yugoslavia

national

of the inviolability of existing borders. While insisting thatKosovo be granted

nato asserted that itmust autonomy, remain part of Yugoslavia. The alliance had in a civil war and therefore intervened defeated one side, but embraced the war had been the war, the posi

sovereign traditionally fought; and, in defense of these values, military in the internal affairs of sov intervention states rather than mere opposition ereign as in the to cross-border aggression,

states have

Gulf War of 1991.

a first of these precepts contained interest contradiction. Because no national The was at stake, the degree the war could command of public support smember in nato

tion of the party it had defeated on the

issue over which This made fought. as a deliberate act of

a policy, perfect failure. The humanitarian nato of goal sought?the prevention not achieved suffering?was by the bomb

countries was

ing; the political goal the air campaign

made possible and the Albanian Kosovars not only favored?independence?nato did not seek but actively opposed. the Albanian Kosovars Moreover, were any continuing unlikely case to in which connection Belgrade, nato would face an awkward choice. An effort to accept

severely limited. Recognizing leaders decreed this, the alliance s political risk that the war be conducted without Its military personnel. to bom thus confined even attempted to be the purpose in the first place: the never

to their military were operations meant what of going that nato was to war

bardment from high altitudes. But this

announced

to grant to Kosovo independence encounter from Russia would opposition as permanent members and China, which, of the U.N. Security Council, would be

of the Kosovar Albanians. protection As for the second tenet of "humanitarian it is, by the established intervention," standards illegal. The law is the of proper international conduct, basic precept of international interference

able to block it.Denying

however, would troops in Kosovo and repeating the unhappy

independence,

the nato risk putting at odds with the kla experiences troops of

against prohibition in the internal affairs of other for international

states. Without no basis

sovereign this rule there would be order of any

the British army inNorthern Ireland since

the early 1970s and the American in

kind. But if the rule is inviolable, rulers

can mistreat as in any way people they like as the mistreatment takes long place

Lebanon in 1982-83, both ofwhich arrived FOREIGN AFFAIRS-

?ogg September/October

[5 ]

Michael Mandelbaum
within borders. Thus, legally recognized in recent years international practice has to but only under begun permit exceptions, two conditions, neither of which was pre swar sent in nato against Yugoslavia. is a gross violation of One condition rights. The Serb in Kosovo before was treatment of the nato but Nor did the way the war was The set a useful fought basic procedure war" is to spare scrupulous attacks on

precedent. for the conduct of a "just was noncombatants. Nato about trying civilians. But water able

to avoid direct by striking

infrastructure

human Albanians bombing measured

in Serbia, including electrical grids and

the alliance did consider facilities, to the civilian indirect damage there. Besides those population harming nato claimed leaders had pro political innocent of the crimes committed not s

rights it exceptionally before

hardly exemplary, worst of all human the by was violations?murder?neither bad. Far fewer started people

whom

had died as a result of fighting inKosovo

the bombing than had been in which

killed in civil strife in SierraLeone, Sudan,

or Rwanda?African nato Thus a viable showed nato no swar countries interest in intervening. to establish did nothing for when human standard deciding

which they blamed the Serb Milosevic, people?these strikes violated Article 14 of the 1977 Proto col to the 1949 Geneva Convention, which on to bars attacks "objects indispensable the survival of the civilian population." of Serbia, moreover, bombing an continued ugly pattern that the Clinton The

in Kosovo?for

may be undertaken. it left the unfortunate Instead, impression an assault that, in the eyes of theWest,

itarian intervention

administration had followed inHaiti and

of pattern born of a combination to and reluc leaders objection particular tance to risk American casualties. As Iraq, with Milosevic, the administration had a

terrible enough to justify military inter vention is the kind ofthing that happens
in Europe but not in Africa.

A second condition for violating the

against intervening proscription state in the internal affairs of a sovereign a is authorization legitimate authority. by the United Nations, This means which, is the closest thing for all its shortcomings, the world nato But has to a global parliament. acted without U.N. authorization, normal

opposed the policies of the military junta that had seized power inHaiti and of
Saddam Hussein of Yugoslavia, to remove in Iraq. As in the case two countries invading those

militarily tive for the Clinton all three therefore

was the offending leadership unattrac feasible but politically administration. In

implying either that theAtlantic alliance

can it law when international disregard to chooses?a precept unacceptable that any of the alliance?or nonmembers

the administration countries, took steps short of invasion

that inflicted suffering on the civilian

of crushing embargoes population?the were Haiti the of and Iraq equivalents of the Serb infrastructure? the bombing

regional grouping may do so (giving,

for example, Commonwealth the Russian-dominated of Independent States

without

(until October 1994 inHaiti,

the right to intervene inUkraine if it be

lieves ethnic Russians treated)?which there are being mis to nato. is unacceptable FOREIGN

the and to the present in Iraq) removing leaders from power. If there is a Clinton Doctrine?an administration innovation by the present in the conduct of foreign

[6]

AFFAIRS-Volume78No.5

A Perfect Failure
is this: punishing policy?it order to express indignation STRATEGIC DAMAGE the innocent at the guilty. in itwas strictly a defensive one; mission, not a nato and that Russia, although in member, would be a full participant war in security affairs. The European gave the lie to all three: nato Yugoslavia state initiated awar against a sovereign a that had attacked none of its members, objected Moscow could not prevent. nato Whereas expansion of Serbia war to which Russia but that had

Although ostensibly waged on behalf of

nato its most China relations the world the United s values, the war also affected two of important and Russia. with interests: relations with to worsen in at

Its effect was

the only that aim nuclear States.

two countries weapons

angered

the Russian political class, the bombing

accounts by all triggered wide in Russian the public. Thus spread outrage the sudden postwar occupation of the

The Chinese leaders professed to be

by the American explanation for the accidental attack on their embassy. the attack was Whatever they thought, unconvinced

a political windfall for their regime. It

deflected niversary cities attention from the tenth crackdown an on of the bloody

at Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, airport 200 Russian troops evoked enthusiastic by

approval inRussia and signaled a shift in

the politics nationalist Moscow Russian the Kosovo; reinforce of Russian direction. foreign policy in a

the student rallies in Beijing and other

against sentiment that might popular have been directed toward otherwise States perpetrators it strengthened of oppression. the elements It was and channeled the United

zone

to secure a separate sought of occupation in postwar nato refused. Russia could not

thus a

double setback forAmerican China policy:

in the Chinese in least favored byWashington, government and it stirred anti-American sentiment population. for Russia, the war accelerated the in its relations with theWest deterioration As that the ill-advised membership decision to extend nato and the to Poland, some sectors of the Chinese

at the its position airport (and case on the nato in any gov depended ernments so it for economic assistance), a less: presence within accepted something the American, war zones. French, and German therefore had the same conse

The

that nato quence for Kosovo expansion as awhole: had for Europe the stability of the military in both arrangements places consent came to less on Russian depend than on Russian weakness. LEGACY

Hungary, a reunited Gorbachev

Czech Republic had set inmotion.

return for permitting within nato, Mikhail

In

Germany was

THE ALBRIGHT The United

that the Western alliance promised military not would expand further eastward. The Clinton administration broke that promise but offered that nato three compensating was transforming assurances: itself into a

diplomacy war was thus amonument the two officials with on American The Clinton. mander

the prewar and the air and the campaign, to the efforts of the greatest influence toward the Balkans. President the role of com reluctance. Asked

States dominated

for the pro largely political organization motion of democracy and free markets; that insofar as nato retained a military

policy lesser of the two was He assumed

in chief with

FOREIGN

AFFAIRS-

1999 September/October

[J ]

Michael Mandelbaum
23 press conference with nato Javier Solana during Secretary-General April nato s 50th anniversary celebration whether the alliance would consider inserting at an or sentiment, is that not even something the most powerful and visionary of her or Thomas Jefferson predecessors?not

John Quincy Adams, not Charles Evans

or Dean Acheson?could Hughes have imagined, let alone achieved. bombs fell on Yugoslavia, American ever But as

de Clinton troops into Kosovo, ground ferred to Solana, as if itwere the Spanish

official and not he who had the power

and responsibility to make that decision.

The officialmost closely identifiedwith

the war was Albright. When to troops inMacedonia spoke to enter Kosovo what America as it ended, she preparing "This is peacekeepers. is good at," she said, "helping Kosovars help the Albanian

Madeleine Albright had done both.?

people." The needed was with and their istrations left chaos.

their homes rebuilding lives. Here, the Clinton admin was not track record encouraging: to restore It had gone to Haiti and had left anarchy. It had for the sake of national over a de facto partition.

it had promised order in Somalia and

democracy in Bosnia bombed unity but presided money United

But sinceClinton had made clear that little

come from the for recovery would States, the Kosovars' prospects on whether, at the end of the depended twentieth

century, "helping people" was what had come to be good at. Europe was on firmer Albright ground with she said, was another assertion. Kosovo, we have most thing important "simply the in the world." This proved accurate, no in small part due to her efforts. And unlike the other political consequences of nato's Yugoslav war, itwas, for her, In an administration intentional. entirely done increasingly preoccupied the vast with its legacy,

she had thereby produced one for herself.

Focusing foreign possession economic States policy or of no strategic importance the which United value, with geography, AFFAIRS Volume y 8No. s of American strength on a tiny former Ottoman

had no ties of history, [8]

FOREIGN