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Candidate No.

0138037

Introduction
When an individual approaches scientific research in biology, physics, or
chemistry there is a systematic nature to the process of inquiry that is encapsulated in
the term the ‘scientific method’. This statement conjures imagery of a sterile lab
environment and working with objects of study, and maybe a white lab coat thrown in
for good measure. However when one approaches social scientific research there has
been a shift away from the strictures of the so called ‘hard sciences’ to embrace the
nature of the subject of study, humans. However the Social Sciences have not always
diverged from the sterile structure of lab based research in its philosophy or in its
practice. Positivism, is the name given to the philosophical approach which embraces
the methods of the ‘hard sciences’ and maintains the distance between the researcher
and the objects of research. This disconnect between researcher and researched has
lead to the development of more hands on approaches to the social sciences which
have in turn shifted the current philosophy behind social science research away from
pure positivism to a hybrid mish mash of philosophies.
One such philosophical approach to research is ‘standpoint epistemology’
which looks to end the disconnect between researcher and object of research to create
a more participatory research paradigm which yields specific knowledge or truths that
are only possible from that particular ‘standpoint’. ‘Standpoint epistemology’ will be
the focus of this analysis. Firstly, the analysis will seek to provide a summary of what
constitutes ‘standpoint epistemology’ with its grounding in Marxist Philosophy
(Anderson, 2003; Kemp & Squires 1997). Secondly, the analysis will provide
illustration as to an active ‘standpoint epistemology’ in the form of ‘Feminist
standpoint epistemology’. Thirdly, the analysis will evaluate ‘standpoint
epistemology’ generally and with special attention to ‘Feminist standpoint
epistemology’ versus the competing approach of ‘Feminist empiricism’. The goal of
this paper is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of ‘standpoint epistemology’ as
a philosophical foundation behind social science research.

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Summary: ‘standpoint epistemology’


The foundations of ‘standpoint epistemology’ are rooted in the construction of
the oppression of the proletariat by the bourgeois as conceptualized by Marx (Kemp
& Squires 1997, pg. 168). However, ‘standpoints’ gain their authority from the
ability to lay claim to epistemic privilege based on the social position of the individual
or group within society (Anderson 2003). An example of a ‘standpoint’ which allows
for such an epistemic privilege is that of a butcher when the topic is the selection of a
cut of meat (Anderson 2003). The butcher is clearly the most able to select the
appropriate cut of meat, experience has taught the butcher what is the best cut of
meat. The butcher’s judgment then carries sufficient weight to alter the decision of
the consumer without a need to justify the advice with further supporting evidence,
a.k.a. the butcher’s word is sufficient. The requisites of a ‘standpoint’ are best
described by Anderson (2003):

A complete standpoint theory must specify (i) the social location of the
privileged perspective, (ii) the scope of its privilege: what questions or subject
matters it can claim a privilege over, (iii) the aspect of the social location that
generates superior knowledge: for example, social role, or subjective identity;
(iv) the ground of its privilege: what it is about that aspect that justifies a claim
to privilege; (v) the type of epistemic superiority it claims: for example, greater
accuracy, or greater ability to represent fundamental truths; (vi) the other
perspectives relative to which it claims epistemic superiority and (vii) modes
of access to that perspective: is occupying the social location necessary or
sufficient for getting access to the perspective?

This description identifies the prerequisites for the creation of a standpoint and can be
illuminated by the case of the classical standpoint of the proletariat. Marx in
describing society as motivated by the eternal toil of the proletariat against the
excesses of the bourgeois was able to conceptualize the ‘proletariat standpoint’ which
claimed epistemic privilege over the fundamental questions of economics, sociology,
and history (Anderson 2003). However, issue can be taken with the use of the term
perspective in the creation of a ‘standpoint epistemology’; Feminist’s would suggest
that a standpoint is more than mere perspective and that it requires direct engagement
in the intellectual and political struggle that defines women’s social experiences
(Kemp & Squires 1997, pg. 169). Therefore a thorough illustration of the ‘Feminist
standpoint epistemology’ is in order since it is the most widely associated ‘standpoint’
in use in the social sciences which involves predominantly a qualitative approach to
research.

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Illustration: ‘Feminist Standpoint Epistemology’


‘Standpoint epistemologies’ are most prevalent in the research conducted by
Feminists and the approach is utilized to elevate the value of knowledge produced
through social research into oppressed groups and to challenge the basic structure of
traditional sociological research. However, it is inappropriate to jump headlong into
the different foundations of ‘Feminist standpoint epistemologies’ without first looking
to the goals of the ‘Feminist research’ to bring about the end of oppression of women.
The contributions of ‘Feminist research’ are best captured by the following statement:

Feminist research has challenged some fundamental binaries of traditional


approaches, such as objectivity and ‘distance’ form the participants,
hierarchies amongst knowers, both within research teams and between
research and researcher, and universality and uniqueness. It also exposes
androcentrism in research language which excludes women, which separates
researchers from the people they are investigating and which facilitates elite
male control. (Truman, Mertens & Humphries 2000, pg. 8)

The approaches and challenges to traditional research may today seem commonplace
in qualitative research where the interaction between the researcher and the object of
research has been replaced with a more participatory research dynamic in which both
the research and the participant are equally involved in the research process. An
example of such an approach utilizing distance while at the same time embracing the
contributions of both researcher and participant is evident in the research by Clare
Woodward in Hearing Voices?: Research issues when telling respondents’ stories of
childhood sexual abuse from a feminist perspective (Truman, Mertens & Humphries
2000, pp. 37-51). Woodward in her analysis describes the dilemma in not contacting
the individuals that immortalized their experiences in writing while at the same time
balancing the ethical issues surrounding opening wounds of the past.
With some insight into the goals of ‘Feminist research’ it is appropriate to
discuss the competing dynamics that construct ‘Feminist standpoint epistemology’.
Harding (1986) suggests that the ‘Feminist perspective’ provides five different yet
inter-related reasons why understandings of nature and social life from a ‘Feminist
standpoint’ are not possible from the perspective of man (Harding 1986). Special care
should be taken when considering the five following perspectives because they are
formulated in order to discuss the movement for a feminist successor science of which
the social sciences is included.

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The first such perspective is entitled The Unity of Hand, Brain and Heart in
Craft Labor and is advanced by Hilary Rose in her ‘feminist epistemology for the
natural sciences’ (Harding 1986, pg. 142). The crux of this position is that amongst
women scientists the process which is employed is more closely related to some form
of ‘craft labor’ versus the traditional ‘industrialized labor’ that is typical of most
scientific research (Harding 1986, pg. 142). The basis for this interpretation is the
nature of the jobs and approaches that women have been assigned by male dominated
society, such as childrearing. In turn these experiences can be utilized by women
scientists to bring about a purer knowledge due to the perspective that allows for the
recognition of the value of treating an organism not as an object of study but as a
participant with a level of say in its future (Harding 1986, pp. 142-6). Harding (1986)
summarizes the essence of Rose’s position with:

…she (Rose) does argue that the origins of a feminist epistemology …are to
be found in the conceptions of the knower, the processes of knowing, and the
world to be known which are evident in … substantive scientific research.
The substantive claims of this research are thus to be justified in terms of
women’s different activities and social experiences created in the gendered
division of labor/activity. (pg.146)

The second approach to ‘Feminist epistemology’ is entitled Women’s


Subjugated Activity: Sensuous, Concrete, Relational and is advanced by Nancy
Harstock (Harding 1986). This approach embraces the Marxist sentiment of labor and
seeks to identify that the labor which women undertake is specifically unique and
therefore allows for the creation of a ‘feminist standpoint’ through the shared
experience of all women. However unlike Rose, who embraces the caring nature of
women’s labor, Harstock believes that women’s labor is divided into subsistence and
reproduction. The subsistence labor is present in all tasks that maintain the home and
are used to oppress women. This is the distinction that Harstock creates to
differentiate proletariat labor from women’s labor and grants the position its status as
a standpoint (Harding 1986, pp. 146-151).
The third approach is entitled The ‘Return of the Repressed’ in Feminist
Theory and is advanced by Jane Flax (Harding 1986). Flax asserts that “the task of
feminist epistemology is to uncover how patriarchy has permeated both our concept
of knowledge and the concrete content of bodies of knowledge, even that claiming to
be emancipatory” (Harding 1986, pg. 151). The assertion by Flax is that feminist
knowledge has the goal of bringing attention to the bias in traditional science and to

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fight against the repression that is created by the distancing by male children from
mothers (Harding 1986). Flax however does not maintain this line of argument in her
later work, she instead begins to embrace post modern feminism which in turn
challenges all conceptions of an absolute knowledge or truth to come to a more
subjective viewpoint where truth is relative (Harding 1986).
The fourth approach to a ‘Feminist standpoint epistemology’ is constructed
through the work of Dorothy Smith in The Bifurcated Consciousness of Alienated
Women Inquirers (Harding 1986, pp. 155-8). Smith suggests once again that
women’s labor is uniquely different to that of a man but moves beyond actual types of
labor to look at the impact on both the male recognition of the work and self
recognition by the woman. The premise is then that woman allow a man to neglect
self maintenance and as well the maintenance of his environment through the division
of labor. This division of labor then in turn makes the man unaware of the acts of the
woman and makes them unimportant in the eyes of the male. Once the labors are
deemed unimportant they are unable to be reflected upon by the woman as such tasks
have now become essential to the female identity (Harding 1986; Delanty & Strydom
2003, pp. 405-409). This stance once again returns to the Marxist division of labor to
define the unique knowledge/perspective that woman can contribute to scientific
study. Smith like Flax does also embrace a postmodern approach to feminism in her
later work.
The fifth and final approach is entitled New Persons and the Hidden Hand of
History, which is advanced by Engels (Harding 1986, pp. 158-162). This approach
looks at the historical developments when crafting the knowledge and labor
surrounding women. The implication is that individuals are limited by the constraints
of the time they are in and as such the social construction and impact of the times is
not observable unless from the perspective of a historical review. The premise is then
that with knowledge of the history of women’s labor a woman is then able to more
readily identify current oppression (Harding 1986).
These five rationales behind the development of the ‘Feminist standpoint’
contribute to the general knowledge of oppression and women’s roles which leave
them in the privileged epistemic position to have feminist knowledge provide insight
into societal interaction. However, there is a modern take on the approach to
‘Feminist standpoint’ and what grounds such a theory. The principles behind this
grounding are Centrality, Collective self-consciousness, and Cognitive style

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(Anderson 2003). Centrality refers to the role of women within the dynamic of social
relations as individuals responsible for reproduction which in turn allows women to
have the epistemic privilege of knowing whose needs get better served and the
converse neglected under patriarchy (Anderson 2003). Centrality is related to the
work of Hartsock and Rose. Collective self-consciousness refers to the work of
McKinnon who asserts that male dominance is based on the sexual objectification of
women, in turn grants women the epistemic privilege of agent self-knowledge. This
self-knowledge allows women to demand not to be treated as sexual objects
(Anderson 2003). Cognitive style refers to once again the nature of women’s labor
and is represented in the work of Flax, Hartsock, Rose, and Smith. The cognitive
style is generally associated with the ‘ethics of care’ that is embraced by ‘Feminist
research’ which is the product of hands on emotional care of others inherent in the
division of labor between male and female (Anderson 2003).
‘Feminist standpoint epistemology’ is therefore the construct of the social and
oppressive forces at work in the lives of women. This construct maintains its
theoretical roots in the Marxist division of society between proletariat and bourgeois
which in turn imparts the division of labor to discern the epistemic privilege granted
by women’s work. However the analysis of ‘standpoint epistemology’ is not
complete without evaluating the effectiveness of such an approach.

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Evaluate: ‘Feminist Standpoint Epistemology’


The ‘Feminist standpoint’ epistemology is not free from criticism. The most
common criticism comes from ‘Feminist empiricists’ and relates to the nature of bias
within the approach. The second criticism comes from within the ranks of ‘Feminist
standpoint’ epistemology with the assertion by Hill Collins that there is a need for the
creation of an ‘Afrocentric feminist standpoint’ due to the oppression imposed by
white middle class feminists. Finally in response to the nature of ‘Feminist
standpoint’ epistemology there is the suggestion that the field is nothing more than
essentialist by hiding behind exclusivity of access to oppress male feminists. These
criticisms will be handled one at a time to illustrate the challenges that face ‘Feminist
standpoint’ epistemology. Then the analysis will be widened to generally comment
on ‘standpoint epistemology’.
The alternative theoretical foundation to ‘Feminist research’ is found
in feminist empiricism. ‘Feminist empiricism’ looks to balance the scientific nature
of inquiry with the political movement that is Feminism. Clearly when one thinks of
the process of research or scientific inquiry it is believed that bias or a political
motivation should be excluded from such a process. ‘Feminist’ empiricists hold to the
belief that the problem in research in the presence of social biases which lead to sexist
and androcentric claims in research (Kemp & Squires 1997, pg. 166). The solution to
remove these biases is a strict adherence to the scientific process as suggested by
Sandra Harding:

Feminist empiricists argue that sexist and androcentric biases are eliminable
by stricter adherence to the existing methodological norms of the scientific
inquiry; it is ‘bad science’ or ‘bad sociology’, etc, which is responsible for
these biases in the results of research. (Kemp & Squires 1997, pg. 166)

With this premise Feminist empiricism seeks to utilize the existing framework and
process of the scientific method to bring about social change through the researchers
as well as what is researched. This does not mean to ignore the political nature of the
Women’s movement but to acknowledge that the movement brings about increased
access for women researchers and encourages more work by feminist researchers
(both male and female) who are able to identify more accurately the biases present in
sociological research over a sexist male (Kemp & Squires 1997, pg. 166). The
‘Feminist empiricists’ challenge the benefits provided by ‘standpoint epistemology’

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because of a fundamental adherence to the traditional methods of science does not


allow for what is perceived as bias to be embraced in research.
The second challenge to the ‘Feminist standpoint’ comes from Hill Collins
(1990) who would suggest that there needs to be the development of an ‘Afrocentric
feminist’ epistemology. The basis for this position is that the experience of Black
women is not included in the established ‘Feminist standpoint’ because the
experiences of a Black female are inherently unique and not experienced by white
females (Truman, Mertens & Humphries 2000, pg. 8). Hill Collins conceptualizes
this stance:

Black feminist thought …reflects the interest and standpoint of its creators.
… Because elite white men and their representative control structures of
knowledge validation, white male interests pervade the thematic content of
traditional scholarship. Black women’s experiences … have been rountinely
distorted in or excluded from traditional academic discourse. (Hill Collins
1990, pg. 201)

Furthermore, Hill Collins suggests that a Black feminist can merge and work between
a ‘Feminist standpoint’ and ‘Afrocentric feminist’ standpoint but the two are unique
standpoints. However the question remains if there is a unique standpoint for all
varieties of Feminist does this not cause a weakening within the Women’s movement
and undermine the traditional ‘Feminist standpoint’.
The ‘Feminist standpoint’ has also come under fire because of its inability to
recognize that contributions to the field my come from non-female individuals.
Unlike ‘Feminist empiricism’ which embraces the idea that feminist (male and
female) can contribute to the wider understanding of the social struggle of women in a
sexist society ‘Feminist standpoint’ subscribers feel that research based on such a
foundation makes the field exclusive to women.
To describe the limitations of such a stance it is appropriate to turn to an
article by LaSusa (2005) entitled Can a White Woman be a Black Feminist?: An
inquiry into standpoint epistemology in which the principle goal is to address the
barrier to the epistemic privilege granted by a standpoint because one does not fit
within the group that is defined by the ‘standpoint’. With reference to the discussion
above concerning the creation of an ‘Afrocentric feminist’ standpoint Hill Collins
(1990) states:

Black women's work and family experiences and grounding in traditional


African-American culture suggest that African-American women as a group

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experience a world different from that of those who are not Black and female.
Moreover, these concrete experiences can stimulate a distinctive Black
feminist consciousness concerning that material reality. (LaSusa 2005)

This definition however clearly limits the group which can lay claim to the epistemic
benefits of the standpoint and leave LaSusa without a means to actively engage in the
‘standpoint’ because she has not experienced the Black Feminist life. LaSusa
describes her realization of her own limitations when approaching the ‘Black Feminist
standpoint’ with the following statement:

At the same time, however, a Black feminist standpoint cannot emerge from
one who does not have the material experience of Black women. Such an
assumption would be completely contradictory to the theory of standpoint
epistemologies, which state that knowledge is derived from personal
experience. As Patricia Hill Collins claims, ``It is more likely for Black women
as members of an oppressed group to have critical insights into the condition
of our own oppression than it is for those who live outside those structures''
(SW 253) and ``Other groups cannot produce Black feminist thought without
African-American women'' (SW 255). Any attempt for me as a middle-class
white woman to define Black feminist thought cannot and will not be
liberatory. Instead, it will merely be another outsider imposing her own values
and beliefs on Black women: a moral and epistemological imperialism which
is the source of Black women's oppression. (LaSusa 2005)

The internal struggle that is occurring within LaSusa is laudable for the effort to try
and combine and appreciate the material realities that are not her own, however it is
clear that a white woman can not be a black feminist nor can a biological male utilize
the ‘Feminist standpoint’ to bring about social change.
Expanding this evaluation of ‘Feminist standpoint’ to general concerns with
‘standpoint epistemology’ it is clear that the creation of a standpoint though rigorous
in nature can create a never-ending specialization which in the end could go so far as
to recognize groups as small as three. The philosophical challenge to this reality is
that it is the common experience shared on a larger scale that then allows the
members of the identified ‘standpoint’ to have the social force to bring about change
and end oppression. The identification traditional within the Marxist creation of the
‘proletariat standpoint’ embraced the reality that one gained access to the ‘standpoint’
once the actor was exposed to the experiences of the proletariat within the structure of
society and not by merely being a worker. It is this investment in the experience and
the pressure from the social forces that shapes the common experience and caution
should be taken when trying to identify distinct groups with ‘standpoints’ because by
constantly dividing larger groups the ability to bring social change is weakened. If
critical studies has provided any guidance on this matter it would be to suggest that by

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stratifying the larger groups into smaller segments the overall group integrity and
unity has been defeated. The best example of this would be to look at critical studies
surrounding the gay community, so called queer theory. The gay community is
traditional associated with mainstream white middle class individuals and the social
experiences of minorities are significantly hindered by this reality. In response queer
theorists have divided the gay community also along race lines. However this has
exposed internal tension within the gay community and at the same time allowed the
movements push for equality to be halted by disunity within an oppressed group as
each individual ‘standpoint / theory’ fights for its own voice alone (Truman, Mertens
& Humphries 2000, pp 52-64).

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Conclusion
The goal of ‘standpoint epistemology’ is to bring about social change through
a more pure knowledge that is only obtainable through the epistemic privilege granted
by the experience that is the day to day life of the group involved. The traditional
foundations of ‘standpoint epistemology’ are found in the creation by Marx of the
social division between worker and manager and this social dynamic has been the
foundation of ‘Feminist standpoint epistemologies’ with reference to the unique labor
that women engage in by their place in society. The goal of this analysis was to
summarize, illustrate, and evaluate ‘standpoint epistemology’ in order to look at its
place in the development of Social Science research philosophies. The ‘Feminist
standpoint’ was chosen as the illustration because it is by far the most widely used
philosophical standpoint in social research. The reason for this prevalence is that the
‘Feminist standpoint’ brings along with it the end to the disconnect between
researcher and the researched to develop a more participatory research dynamic.
However, the ‘Feminist standpoint’ is not without its criticism which is both internal
and external. “Feminist empiricists’ see the ‘standpoint’ as bias ridden without true
objectivity which is essential in scientific research and seek to right the oppression of
women by bringing individuals into the field who are able to identify androcentric and
sexist biases in research from an objective standpoint. Within the ‘Feminist
standpoint’ is the challenge from Hill Collins to suggest that the mainstream
‘standpoint’ does not encapsulate the unique contributions of black women and that
an ‘Afrocentric standpoint’ is appropriate. These challenges are typical of the debates
within the philosophy of social science and it would appear that ‘standpoint
epistemology’ is an approach that provides access to knowledge that is unable to be
ascertained through the use of traditional scientific approaches and therefore a valid
method of inquiry.

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Bibliography

Books:

1. Connell, R.W. 1995, Masculinities, 2nd edition, Polity Press, Cambridge.

2. Delanty, G. & Strydom, P. eds. 2003, Philosophies of Social Science: The Classic
and Contemporary Readings, Open University Press, Maidenhead.

3. Harding, S. 1986, The Science Question in Feminism, Open University Press,


Milton Keynes.

4. Hill Collins, P. 1990, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the
Politics of Empowerment, Routledge, New York.

5. Kemp, S. & Squires, J. eds. 1997, Feminisms, Oxford University Press, New York.

6. Murphy, P.F. ed. 2004, Feminism & Masculinities, Oxford University Press, New
York.

7. Truman C., Mertens, D. & Humphries, B. eds. 2000, Research and Inequality, UCL
Press, London.

Internet Resources:

8. Anderson, E. 2003, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Feminist Epistemology


and Philosophy of Science, link verified 25 – Jan – 2007, available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-epistemology/ .

9. LaSusa, D. 2005, S.W.A.T. Conference: Can a White Woman be a Black Feminist?:


An Inquiry in Standpoint Epistemology, link verified 25 – Jan – 2007, available at:
http://conference2005.swapusa.org/papers/lasusa/ .

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