http://etn.sagepub.

com/

Ethnicities

European Shiism? Counterpoints from Shiites' organization in Britain and the Netherlands
Matthijs van den Bos Ethnicities 2012 12: 556 originally published online 3 January 2012 DOI: 10.1177/1468796811432687 The online version of this article can be found at: http://etn.sagepub.com/content/12/5/556

Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for Ethnicities can be found at: Email Alerts: http://etn.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://etn.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://etn.sagepub.com/content/12/5/556.refs.html

>> Version of Record - Sep 23, 2012 OnlineFirst Version of Record - Jan 3, 2012 What is This?

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

Article

European Shiism? Counterpoints from Shiites organization in Britain and the Netherlands*
Matthijs van den Bos
Birkbeck College, London, UK

Ethnicities 12(5) 556580 ! The Author(s) 2011 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1468796811432687 etn.sagepub.com

Abstract European Shiism is a neglected area in studies of European Islam, which raises the question of to what extent Shiism in Europe represents a particular realm of organization and a particular religiosity. Shiisms striking transnational features, and general findings on European Islam, suggest prolific border-crossing and cross-ethnic organization among Shiites in Europe. Exploring British and Dutch cases, however, leaves little room for the notion of a specific European Shiite realm. When focusing on the ethnicnational background of board members of Shiite organizations and on their formal organizational interlocks, ethnically articulate identities come to the fore, particular mixes of which take shape within sub-European frameworks of states. The last section explores sociopolitical implications of Shiites organizational life in Europe, as seen through the Dutch and British samples. A contrast is drawn between the relative scarcity of Shiite organization, which delimits the role of Shiism as a political actor in Europe, and recent indications of civic engagement. Keywords European Islam, Shiism, transnational networks, The Netherlands, Britain

Mainstream (Twelver) Shiism, more than Sunnism, often appears to be inherently transnational, because of the wide geographical distribution of its core symbols.1 Clerical cross-border movements back and forth take place between Iranian and

*Dedicated to the memory of Nico Kielstra Corresponding author: Matthijs van den Bos, Department of Politics, Birkbeck College, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK Email: m.van-den-bos@bbk.ac.uk

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

557

Iraqi seminaries (hawzas), the system of religious Sources of Emulation (marjaiyat) is analogically dispersed and Shiite minority constituencies in Sunni-majority countries practice emulation (taqlid) of them beyond the border. One also nds telling proofs of transnationalism on the level of popular piety in multi-centred practices of regional pilgrimage (for example, to Damascus, Medina, Karbala or Mashhad) or in topical aspects of Shiite religiosity.2 However, it is equally striking that modern scholarship typically researches Shiism in the context of nations (Cole, 2002: 1) while neglecting its transnationalism (Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2003).3 Another feature of modern scholarship on Shiism is a spatial focus that naturally lingers on Shiite heartlands but tends to overlook the west, and Europe in particular, despite the fact that [c]ities such as Toronto . . . Washington, D.C., and London now have sizable Shia communities in their midst (Nasr, 2007: 79).4 These facts dene this papers larger question of Shiites organization in European countries and the extent to which, within Europe, it is transnational. The articulation of that question derives from studies of Islam in Europe (or the west) and the question that often motivates them: does Islam in Europe evolve into particular European forms, or a European Islam? The application of that question to Shiism is long overdue given that studies of Islam in Europe, with very few exceptions, have addressed their topic as if Islam equals Sunnism. Shiite European Islam, or European Shiism, will be assessed in this article by the extent to which Shiites identities and relations are transethnic and transnational, rather than by other criteria that are often used but are more elusive and harder to measure, such as individualization (see Peter, 2006: 105118; Tezcan, 2003: 237261). Transnational and transethnic dimensions involve physical and social geographical translations of the word European, referring respectively to phenomena occurring across borders in European space and to phenomena that are particular to their European environment. A statement of the transnational dimension gures, for example, in Allievis claim that [t]he umma is in many ways an imagined community, but it exists in the facts [in Europe] . . . The mobilisation of resources, men, discourses and rhetoric clearly shows the depth of [its] links (Allievi, 2003: 23; cf. Salih, 2004: 1006). The signicance of such ties emerges from studies involving particular pan-European organizations, among which are the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO), founded in 1995; the Muslim Council of Cooperation in Europe (CMSE), founded in 1996 (Massignon, 2007); and the European Council for Fatwas and Research, founded in 1997 (Shadid and van Koningsveld, 2002). One nds the transethnic dimension of European Islam described by Allievi and Nielsen (2003), for instance, in their observation of a very active process of constructing Muslim/Islamic networks held together by shared ideas and responses to the European environment, rather than common ethnic or national identity (Allievi and Nielsen, 2003: vii; see Salih, 2004: 1000). In a slightly more assertive statement, Cesari observes that: [t]he existence in certain European countries of a

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

558

Ethnicities 12(5)

third or even a fourth generation of Muslims means that versions of Islam detached from the ethnic and national identications of the rst generations (cultural references, language, behaviour, interactions with non-Muslims, etc.) are already well established (Cesari, 2007: 56). Thus, there now exists a French Islam, an English Islam . . . etc. (Cesari, 2007: 56; see Cesari, 2003: 257). These detached Islamic identications often imply a reorientation not only towards Muslim (post-)migrants European surroundings, but also to what is deemed the pure religion. Transethnic Shiite organizations, therefore, are characterized by stronger religious than ethnic orientations, which are also conceivable in but may not dene ethnically articulated Shiite organizations.5 In the absence of quantication, the above citations on European Islam nonetheless suggest an important tendency, which seemed to be corroborated in many interviews and conversations that I conducted with representatives of Shiite organizations. Their self-representations often downplayed or denied ethnic, national (and sectarian) identity. The analysis of Shiites organizations in Europe will address that claim, then, by exploring the degree to which Shiites identities and relations are transnational and transethnic.

Overview
The section below on Studying European Shiism argues for the relevance of exploring Shiism on the level of transnational social interaction, and outlines further methodological considerations for this study. Two subsequent sections situate Shiism in Europe, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, historically, and present ndings on Shiite organization in the latter two countries as sample data for European Shiite Islam at large. The choice of sample countries is arbitrary, in the sense that the cited scholars of European Islam often presume the processes studied here to be cross-European, at least within the western European realm; however, further research expanding the sample will naturally provide stronger bases for claims regarding European Shiism. Landscapes of European Shiism are charted here through two complementary explorations of organization data. First, the focus is on 10 major Shiite organizations in Britain and 10 major Shiite organizations in the Netherlands a dualcountry sample of European Shiism that will allow insight into its most powerful formal ties and identities. Second, I will focus on the bulk of the Shiite organizations, which yield a qualitatively dierent kind of information not necessarily reecting power relations as much as the larger sociological reality of Shiisms European organization, both in terms of its (trans)ethnic identities and (trans)national board-member overlaps, or interlocks. In addition, the larger sample allows for comparisons with ethnic organization within Europe, for which Dutch Moroccan and DutchTurkish cases will be considered.

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

559

The data collection in each exploration comprises three categories: numbers and identities of organizations; numbers and identities of board-member interlocks; and the nature of peak organizations or organizational umbrellas.6 The rst entails an ethnic and cross-ethnic7 breakdown of Shiite organizations in each country; the second treats compactness of the two Shiite landscapes as seen through their densities and degrees of fragmentation; and the third explores the extent to which peak organizations bridge ethnic dierences between (trans)national Shiite communities. The conclusion evaluates the outcomes in light of preliminary ndings on Shiite religious ideology in Europe and the prospects of European Shiism in civil society.

Studying European Shiism

The question of European Islam is often addressed at the level of religious practice, values, identity and thought (see, for example, Cesari, 2003), but seldom explored along the lines of transnational social interaction. Furthermore, a limited number of studies address European Islamic institutions (for example, Salih, 2004; Shadid and van Koningsveld, 2002), but these have not substituted the need for a more resolutely supra-individual perspective that goes beyond the focus on muftis, imams, preachers and intellectuals in the study of religious authority in European Muslim communities (Peter, 2006: 111). The transnational focus pursued here thus addresses a signicant lacuna in the study of European Islam, enhancing its conceptualization on the level of social organization.8 The Shiite organizations have been tagged for ethnic-national identity by taking into account board members or their parents countries of origin, or the communities that they catered for.9 This approach is sometimes taken to task for conating ethnicity with nationality, descent or citizenship (see, for example, Constant et al., 2009: 274), but evidence highlights country of origin as a key principle of organization in the context of European Islam. Much has been written about the purported uidity of immigrant/Muslim identities . . . but [w]hile identities are malleable [and] despite the theorized uidity, Muslims organizing behavior is strongly aected by their country of origin/descent and ties to homeland ethnicities (Warner and Wenner, 2006: 473). In France, for instance, [a]s in Germany, Muslims are divided by nationality or ethnicity; since Islam in the various countries of immigrant origin is dierent, country-specic Islamic organizations have emerged (Warner and Wenner, 2006: 468). To address the specic question of the degree to which European Shiism exists, it has been useful to borrow methodologically from research into ethnic organization designed to map ethnic civil society (for example, Van Heelsum, 2002, 2005). The method used to establish degrees of ethnic organization has been to seek out overlapping board memberships. It needs to be stressed that this method concerns formal organization only, and the ndings do not reect directly on the measure of informal association.

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

560

Ethnicities 12(5)

Informal contacts are likely to be signicant in cementing ties among European  s) travelling between reliShiites. Orators and religious performers (rowze khvan gious centres across European borders illustrate the process.10 In terms of organizations, the importance of informal ties is indicated, for instance, by the existence of European Ahl-e Beyt, which is not registered in either Britain or the Netherlands, but which nevertheless connects two prominent and registered Shiite organizations, the Islamic Centre of England (ICEL) in Britain and the Stichting Sjiitische Islamitische Raad in Nederland (SIR) in the Netherlands,  m Abdolhoseyn Moezi and through their respective representatives Hojjatolesla Sheykh Isral Demirtekin.11 Another example indicates how informal relations may signal cross-ethnic connections between prominent Shiite organizations that would remain invisible if one relied only on formal board information. Boardmember data are unavailable for the Islamic College for Advanced Studies (ICAS), which is predominantly Iranian, as to its directors and instructors (on whom data are available). But one ICAS director is also a board member of the Muhammadi Trust which, in terms of board members, is predominantly a Pakistani institution. While important, [i]nformal organizations [also] pose a problem [ . . . ] By their very nature they are dicult to track down and leave few traces in archives (Schrover and Vermeulen, 2005: 825). There are also positive reasons for focusing on formal organization, however. First, the threshold of formal organization is low (see Warner and Wenner, 2006: 472),12 and Shiite religious life soon attains a measure of institutionalization (the use of a mosque, the registration of a charity, the publication of a magazine and so on) that leaves formal trails. Often, these trails include board membership, through which organizational interlocks may be examined. Second, the public presence of formal organizations allows them to be charted with more precision, and the problem of sampling from a hidden population is thus diminished (see Fennema, 2004: 440441). Third, the focus on formal organizations allows comparison with a body of scholarship on ethnic organization, social capital and civil society in Europe. Data on Shiite organizations in the Netherlands and Britain were collected irregularly, mainly from October 2007 to January 2008, and in August 2008.13 The data cannot be presumed to be comprehensive in the absence of central registers for religious organizations in either country, and given that the landscape of Shiism is constantly evolving. However, the record is very likely to represent formal Shiite organization fairly in each country at the time of the search, because the database includes all active institutions that were listed by main umbrella organizations and online Muslim directories, and the survey targeted a wide variety of sources. The British data were collected through keyword searches on Google, online directories such as the Muslim Directory and the Ahlulbayt Directory, the Charity Register and the Company Register. In several cases, the organizations were contacted in order to ascertain ethnic backgrounds. The Dutch data were collected

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

561

through umbrella organizations, minority organizations, the Minorities Yearbook (Jaarboek minderheden) and similar guides, Google searches, the online Company register (Bedrijvengids) and the Chamber of Commerce (Kamer van Koophandel).14

Shiism in Europe, Britain and the Netherlands

The Twelver Shiite presence in Europe goes back to the 19th century when a group of South Asian individuals . . . came to Britain to study (see Ansari, 2004: 31; Shubbar, 2006). Shiite landmark establishments of the twentieth century include the Imam Ali Mosque in Hamburg, which originated from a building society established in 1953 by a local community of Iranian traders (Hesse-Lehmann and Spellman, 2004: 145) in consultation with their religious leader, the marja al-taqlid Borujerdi (see http://de.izhamburg.com/Ueber-das-Zentrum/ Baugeschichte), and several organizations in Britain. The Muslim Arab Youth Organization for Great Britain and Ireland and the World Islamic League were  qer al-Sadr and Golpa  yega  ni, and established in 1967 initiated by the marjas, Ba and the 1970s, respectively (Sindawi, 2007: 846). The Khojas World Federation of KSIMC (Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities) was established in London in 1976. Hawza graduates from the Middle East are reported to have started missionary work in Europe in the 1970s, and it seems to have increased in the 1980s (Sindawi, 2007), as did the migration of Shiites to Europe, often in connection with repression and war (Neijenhuis, 2008: 25). The establishment of major Shiite institutions continued into the 1990s. It was observed that, in Germany, there has been a clear resurgence of religious Shiite activities since the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 (Bo ttcher, 2007: 213). Britain was from the beginning a primary destination for Shiite migration to Europe, and has remained so. The bulk of the Shia are thought to have arrived from the early 1970s, with the Khojas expulsion from Uganda, followed by Iraqi, Iranian and Afghan migrants in the late 1970s.15 This was preceded by a wave of South Asian, particularly Pakistani, migration in the early 1960s (Nielsen, 2005: 4041). Hereafter, from the late 1960s many Shiite organizations with Pakistani boards or audiences were established, such as Idara-e-Jaaferiya. The Khoei Foundation, the Imam Ali Foundation and the Dar al-Islam Foundation in London (founded, respectively, in 1989, 1994 and 1993) are among the primary foreign representations of the marjas, (the late) Abul sem al-Khui, Ali Sista  ni and (the late) Muhammad Husayn Fadhlalla  h. Qa Numbers and percentages given for Shiites in Britain vary widely, but are usually within the range of 1025% of the total British Muslim population, implying 200,000500,000 individuals.16 The emergence of Shiism in the Netherlands has been associated with Turkish labour migration in the 1960s and with Pakistani or Indian migrants seeking either work or political refuge (Shubbar, 2008). In 1976, Idara-e Jaferia, representing the latter two groups, established the rst Dutch hoseyniya in Amsterdam (Shubbar,

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

562

Ethnicities 12(5)

2008).17 The main growth of the community, however, is thought to have started only in the early 1990s with the inux of Iraqi refugees.18 Other major groups of Shiites include Iranians, Indians, Pakistanis and Afghans (see OSV, 2008). Shiite organizations in the Netherlands have issued many often short-lived print and electronic publications (see Ibrahim 2005: 8283). Percentages given for Shiites in the Netherlands vary widely as well (none are based on Statistics Netherlands gures), but numbers are usually within the range of about 70,000 to 125,000.19 Even when accepting the lower estimate, the gure for the Dutch situation alone indicates exponential growth of the Shiite population in Europe at large, when seen in light of Momens 1980 estimate of 100,000 for that group (Momen, 1985: 282).

Major Dutch and British Shiite organizations20

The largest single group of the 20 major Shiite organizations in Britain and the Netherlands is cross-ethnic (containing ve cross-ethnic organizations); four are Iraqi and four are Pakistani; there are three Iranian organizations; Afghan occurs twice; and there is one Khoja21 and one Turkish organization. The dominance of cross-ethnic organizations is underscored by the fact that only one is a peak organization (peak organizations tend to be more diverse than their constituent members). The larger reality, however, remains one of ethnic, as opposed to crossethnic, organization, accounting for 75% of the sample. Of the 10 key Shiite organizations in Britain taken into account, in terms of their board memberships or audiences catered for (see legend to Table 1), three are Iranian, two have cross-ethnic identities, two are Pakistani, two are Iraqi and one is Khoja. Of the 10 principal Shiite organizations in the Netherlands, three are cross-ethnic, two are Iraqi, two are Afghan, two are Pakistani and one is Turkish. In other words, the ethnic articulations of Shiism are quite dierent in each country, with Iranian organizations in Britain standing out.22 Cross-ethnic, Khoja and Turkish dene smaller dierences (with three of ve cross-ethnic organizations in the Netherlands, one Khoja organization in Britain and one Turkish organization in the Netherlands). Separate national identities also come to the fore when taking boardmember interlocks into account. In regard to the absence of such overlaps, the major Shiite organizations in Britain stand in mutual isolation (although, as previously explained, a notable ICAS is on the board of the Muhammadi Trust). Among the listed prominent Shiite organizations in the Netherlands, there are three board-member interlocks between the SIR and Stichting Saqalein Delft; Stichting Saqalein Delft and Stichting Ahlalbait Jongeren; and the Unie van Irakese Organisaties in Nederland (UVIO) and SIR. The national dierence is crucial, because the latter pair of Dutch institutions are umbrella organizations linking the majority of Shiite organizations in the Netherlands, whereas Shiites represented by dierent British umbrella organizations remain separate.23

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

563

Table 1. Major Shiite organizations in Britain and the Netherlands Britain Organization locationa Al-Khoei Foundation, London Al-Mahdi Institute, Birmingham Imam Ali Foundation, London Islamic Centre of England, London Islamic College for Advanced Studies, London Islamic Unity Society, Manchester Ethnic profileb Iraqi Cross-ethnic Iraqi The Netherlands Organization locationa Hussaini Mission Nederland, Den Haag Idare E Jafria 1976 Nederland, Amsterdam Overkoepelende Sjiitische Vereniging, OudBeijerland Stichting Ahlulbait Jongeren, Arnhem Stichting Al Cauther Nederland, Den Haag Stichting Cultureel Centrum Iman voor Afghanen in Nederland, Rotterdam Stichting Saqalein Delft, Delft Stichting Sjiitische Islamitische Raad in Nederland, Den Haag Stichting Sociaal Cultureel Islamitisch Centrum, Rotterdam Unie van Irakese Organisaties in Nederland, Nieuw Vennep Ethnic profileb Pakistani Pakistani Iraqi

Iranian Iranian

Cross-ethnic Cross-ethnic

Cross-ethnic

Afghan

Islamic Universal Association, London Majlis-E-Ulama Shia Europe, London Muhammadi Trust, London World Federation of KSIMC, London

Iranian Pakistani

Afghan Cross-ethnic

Pakistani

Turkish

Khoja

Iraqi

Location refers to organizations centres of activities or place of registration in the Chamber of Commerce. Based on dominant tendencies of board members identities or audiences catered for (except in the case of the Islamic College for Advanced Studies, where the directorate has been relied upon). Thus, the ethnic labels do not imply ethnically exclusive organizations.
b

The lack of board-member interlocks among the major Shiite organizations in Britain occurs despite their greater geographical proximity when compared with major Dutch Shiite organizations. Whereas Shiite organizations in the Netherlands are dispersed throughout the country, British Shiite key organizations are concentrated in London (and within London, particularly in a small area in the north-west).

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

564

Ethnicities 12(5)

The separation between the Dutch and British spheres of foremost Shiite organizations is also evident in a straightforward way, in that they are isolated from one another in the sense that institutional interlocks between them are lacking. The four mentioned links are each cross-ethnic (IranianPakistani in the British case, and twice Afghancross-ethnic and once Iraqicross-ethnic in the Dutch case). This indicates a degree of cross-ethnic integration of major Shiite organizations in Britain and the Netherlands. However, this tendency is superimposed on a larger reality dened by networks which are, in the British case, wholly fragmented, and in both cases scarce,24 and whose grassroots organization is ethnically articulated. These summaries of the Dutch and British landscapes indicate an organization of Shiism that is ethnic and national (and nationally particular) rather than transethnic and transnational.

The larger sample of Dutch and British Shiite organizations

The above samples are part of a larger data set that includes 240 Shiite organizations, 76 of which are based in the Netherlands and 151 of which are based in Britain. It has been possible to assemble board-member data for 169, or 74%, of the combined Dutch and British Shiite organizations, and to label 78% of them for ethnic-national background. This record, which includes near-complete information for the 20 Dutch and British key organizations, allows for a fair impression of the larger data set as regards major trends in organization, interlocking and umbrella formation.

Organizations
Pakistani and Khoja organizations emerge as ethnic centres of gravity among Shiites in Britain, while Iraqis and Turks are more strongly represented in Shiite institutions in the Netherlands.25 The particular signicance of Pakistani and Khoja in the British case, and of Turkish in the Dutch (Iraqi is less straightforward to interpret), illustrates nationally dierentiated patterns of Shiites migrancy into Europe. Whereas the ethnic composition of Shiite organizations as seen through their board members is signicantly dierent in the Netherlands and Britain, ethnic as opposed to cross-ethnic organization nevertheless dominates in both countries. Other commonalities between the two national spheres of Shiism surface, for instance, when comparing them with degrees of ethnic organization in Europe. Taking organization densities of Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands into account (i.e. their organization numbers in relation to population size), both Shiite spheres, whether relying on high or low estimates for their populations, emerge as signicantly sparser (see Table 2). The analysis of Dutch and British Shiite organization density, that is, suggests that Shiism in Europe ranks signicantly below

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

565

Table 2. Comparative ethnica and religious organization densityb in Europe Ethnic organization Population Year Turks/Netherlands 2001 Moroccans/Netherlands 2001
a b

Religious organization Population Year Shiites/Netherlands 2008 Shiites/Britain 2008 Organization density

Organization density

3.44 2.65

0.601.08 0.300.76

Netherlands ethnic data derive from Van Heelsum, 2001: 8, 22; 2005: 23; and Van Heelsum et al., 1999: 22. Organization density consists of organization numbers divided by population number, multiplied by 1000.

ethnic organization as a contributor to civil society as associational life (Edwards, 2008).

Interlocks
The overlaps between Shiite organizations, as understood through the interlocks of their board members,26 may be represented by 43 lines: 22 lines between Shiite organizations in the Netherlands, 20 between Shiite organizations in Britain and one line linking a Dutch and a British Shiite organization.27 These gures allow for several observations on the general compactness of the Shiite organizational landscape in each country, as can be seen in the measurements of network density and fragmentation. A networks density indicates the ratio of lines (which represent board-member interlocks in this study) between nodes (that is, organizations) to the total number of possible links, which is based on the number of organizations,28 while fragmentation indicates the percentage of isolated organizations in a network.29 The density and fragmentation of Shiite organizations break down, for the Netherlands and Britain respectively, into 0.015 and 56%, and 0.003 and 72%.30 In other words, the board-member interlocks of Shiite organizations in the Netherlands have a much higher density and a much lower fragmentation thus showing far greater compactness. In order to gain a clearer perspective on what these dierent compactness gures mean in light of civil associational life in Europe, it will be worthwhile to compare them with European data for ethnic organization for which the previous cases from the Dutch context will again be referred to. This comparison is given in Table 3. The density of Shiite organization in the Netherlands is 15 times higher than that of the Dutch ethnic organization gures, whereas its fragmentation does not stand out from the range of ethnic organization. Contrasting with the Dutch context, Shiite organization in Britain diverges only slightly from ethnic organization in

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

566

Ethnicities 12(5)

Table 3. Comparative compactness of ethnic and religious organization in Europea Ethnic organization Population (2001) Turks/Netherlands Network density 0.001 Fragmentation 48% Religious organization Population (2008) Shiites/ Netherlands 2008 Shiites/ Britain Network density 0.015 Fragmentation 56%

Moroccans/Netherlands

0.001

65%

0.003

72%

a Netherlands ethnic data derive from Van Heelsum (2001: 8, 22; 2005: 23), Van Heelsum et al. (1999: 11, 22); and Van den Bos and Achbari (2007: 174, 176). See Van den Bos and Achbari (2007) for further methodological considerations.

terms of density, while its fragmentation degree ranks higher than that of any other community considered. Thus, Dutch and British realms of Shiite organization stand apart, not only from one another but also from these samples of ethnic organization. The dierences particularly involve, respectively, network density and fragmentation. Taking the ethnic make-up of all organizational overlaps into account, the Dutch Shiite interlocks were between Iraqi organizations (10); cross-ethnic and Iraqi organizations (7); cross-ethnic organizations (3); cross-ethnic and Turkish organizations (3); and Turkish organizations (1). British Shiite institutional linkages were between organizations labelled Pakistani (4); cross-ethnic and Khoja (3); cross-ethnic and ethnically unknown (3); Iraqi (3); Afghan and cross-ethnic (1); Bahraini and cross-ethnic (1); cross-ethnic and Iraqi (1); cross-ethnic and Iranian (1); cross-ethnic and Pakistani (1); Iraqi and ethnically unknown (1); Iranian and Iraqi (1); Iranian (1); and Khoja and ethnically unknown (1). One linkage between a cross-ethnic and an Iraqi organization connected the British and Dutch Shiite landscapes. Most ties involve cross-ethnic organizations (25), and the majority of links in either case cross ethnic divides (55% of the links between ethnically known organizations). However, the record is ethnically divergent for the two countries, broadly replicating the ethnically separate patterns of Shiite organization, with Iraqi links in the Netherlands and Pakistani links in Britain, representing the largest groups of organizations, dening the dierence. As in the smaller sample, furthermore, the majority of organizations are not linked either ethnically or cross-ethnically (see Table 3). Whereas the link between the Dutch and British Shiite organizations acts as an ethnic bridgehead, its eect remains limited given that it does not connect umbrella organizations. The transnational connection therefore indicates strongly self-contained, national organizational enclaves. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that only one link connects the two spheres indicating the paucity of

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

567

Shiite transnational ties in the absence of legal restrictions for foreign nationals in either the Netherlands or Britain to participate in foundations (stichtingen) or charities as board members.

Umbrellas
Umbrella organizations oer an additional indication of the ethnic composition, cross-ethnic identity and degree of communal organization of Shiism in Europe. These organizations particularly allow one to explore the degree to which the European tendencies observed for ethnic organization and cross-ethnic linking also apply where Shiite organization is aimed explicitly at overarching communal representation. Presently, there are at least three Shiite umbrella organizations in Britain: the World Federation of Khoja Shia Ithna-Asheri Muslim Communities, established in 1976; the British Shia Muslim Council, which is to be established shortly;31 and the long-established Islamic Students Association in Britain (stemming probably from the early 1970s).32 There was talk of a Shia Students Council being established in September 2006 (see www.aimislam.com/activities/studentcouncil.html), but this does not seem to have materialized. British universities do host a range of student associations named Ahlul Bayt [Islamic] Society (a quick Internet search nds references for Imperial College; Roehampton University; Queen Mary, UCL and Kings College at the University of London; and Bradford, Cardi, Leeds, City, De Montfort and Keele Universities). A unitary logo, shared URLs and a central referral page for Ahlul Bayt Islamic Societies (http:// absoc.co.uk/) indicate mutual coordination, but they are not apparently led by an independent coordinating body. The model claimed is one of non-centralized selforganization.33 The rst institution is straightforwardly an ethnic organization (for Khoja Shia Ithna Asheri Muslims) and this equally applies to its regional and local subsidiaries, among which is the Council of European Jamaats. The many ties and interactions between these institutions and non-Khoja Shiite individuals and organizations may suggest uid ethnic boundaries. This also relates to the fact that, in the absence of Khoja marjas, many emulate a non-Khoja (the majority   h Sista  ni see of Khoja Shia Ithna Asheri communities reportedly follow Ayatoll a Professor A Sachedinas 2004 statement available at http://www.uga.edu/islam/ sachedina_silencing.html). However, the mentioned emulation, or taqlid, is in fact a collective arrangement (the World Federation speaks in several of its online documents of our marja);34 in terms of organizations, while geographically dispersed across the continents, Khojas retain a distinct and exclusive prole. The second organization, the British Shia Muslim Council, encompasses Shiite organizations across ethnic divides (including Iraqis, Iranians and Khojas), although it was observed to have a strong Pakistani colouring.35 It was stated by the Central Coordinator of the Councils Interim Working Committee that the aim of improving Shiites representation to the government lay behind the

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

568

Ethnicities 12(5)

establishment of the council, given dissatisfaction among British Shiites with the Shiite voice within the Muslim Council of Britain.36 One of the most important Shiite organizations in Britain or anywhere else, the Khoei Foundation, was not on the councils list of supporting organizations. The Khoei Foundation was seen also to conceive of itself as an umbrella organization, as doing a lot of good work, and in fact as having been very well established with the government, that is fullling the functions envisioned by the British Shia Muslim Council. The foundation was similarly observed to have taken the lead on the cross-sectarian Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB), which had brought the Shias [in Britain] together. However, some questioned the foundations general Shiite representation, given the role of particular family ties in the organization and its historical representation of a particular marja.37 The third is an Iranian body. The Union of Islamic Students Associations (In      dar Orupa  ), or UISA, Europe) (Ettehadiye-ye anjomanha-ye eslami-ye daneshjuy an is a prominent organization among the globally dispersed Iranian Islamic students societies outside Iran. It has many national sub-branches (indicated by region manteqe as in ISA-UK) and sub-sub-branches at local levels (with city designations, as in ISA-London). In Britain, the Islamic Students Societies gather in centres that are often called Kanoon towhid (for example, in Cardi, Liverpool and London) after their namesake in Tehran on Towhid Square, originally headed   h Musavi-Ardabili (presently a marjaresiding in Qom). Besides Cardi, by Ayatoll a Liverpool and London, there are centres in Glasgow, Manchester and Newcastle, whose buildings are owned by the Islamic Republic.38 In 1993, the Iranian government established the Towhid Universal Charity Foundation to take charge of the maintenance of Kanoon centres worldwide.39 In 1984, it purchased the London Kanoon Towhid, which serves as UISAs headquarters. Through a representative of Irans leader on its board, who is currently strongly supported by many local ISAs within the British branch (but not by all of their members),40 the UISA   h Kha  meneis rahbari into Europe.41 eectively extends Ayatoll a There are presently at least three Shiite umbrella organizations in the Netherlands as well: the SIR (founded in 2004), the OSV (Overkoepelende Shiitische Vereniging, established in 2004) and the UVIO (Unie van Irakese Organisaties in Nederland, founded in 2003), which is a member of the SIR. The SIR was in the national news in 2005 for an initiative developed in coordination with the largest Sunni Muslim organization in the Netherlands aimed at nationally based imam education (Santing, 2005). Just like the SIR, the OSV has been recognized as an interlocutor by the Dutch government, and it aims at the general representation of Shiites in the Netherlands (OSV, 2008: http://www.shiaparlement.com/nl/).42 The OSV is probably the most prominent among the three umbrella organizations, having made headlines in 2006 because of an integration course (inburgeringscursus) which it designed, and which the Minister for Foreigners Aairs and Integration recommended for other Islamic organizations in the Netherlands to follow (De Volkskrant, 26 April 2006). Whereas the SIR

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

569

represents an ethnic range, however, both the OSV and the UVIO are exclusively Iraqi organizations. In sum, the number of Dutch and British umbrella bodies is considerable, indicating a high degree of Shiite peak organization, which stands in contrast to the overall low organization density of Dutch and British Shiism. Processes of umbrella formation indicate Shiites increasing eorts at national organization in Europe. In Germany, for instance, Shiite notables gathered in May 2008, in the Islamische Zentrum Hamburg, to discuss the prospects for a nationwide registered  meneis Shia federation (IRNA, 31 May 2008). The location controlled by Kha representative in Germany (see www.al-shia.de/persoenlichkeiten/ghaemmaghami.htm), and scarce non-Iranian publicity, suggest that it concerned an Iranian (and pro-Islamic Republic) rather than a cross-ethnic (and otherwise pluralistic) initiative. Umbrella organization hardly connotes cross-ethnic in the Dutch and British cases either, as one-third of them represent dierent communities, although this gure is somewhat higher than the overall number of cross-ethnic Shiite organizations. However, of the two cross-ethnic community-wide organizations (i.e. those not restricted to students), one remains only virtual, as it is still in the process only of establishing itself (see the British Shia Councils online about note). The umbrellas transnational isolation and divergent ethnic make-up (Khoja and Iranian in the British case, Iraqi in the Dutch case) underscore ndings for organizations and interlocks pointing to self-contained national enclaves of Shiism.

European Shiism in civil society

European Shiism has been explored here through the indicators of transnational European links and transethnic organizational identities and relations, and charted for powerful organizations and a sample approaching the larger sociological reality. The one outstanding dierence between the latter two probes concerns the crossethnic nature of the few links in the smaller sample (100%, as opposed to 55% of links in the larger sample). This fact accords with the overall characterization of Shiism in each country by low organization density, with a considerable degree of overarching representation, or centralization, in umbrella groups (although most peak organizations are articulated ethnically rather than crossethnically). In these samples, European Shiite organization mirrors the theological ideal type that conceives Shiism as a hierocracy of multiple sources of high religious  ) in relation to which the Shiite community at large is dened authority (maraje through individual emulation. Most importantly, there is only one transnational linkage between the larger Dutch and British Shiite spheres, which, while it provides an ethnic bridgehead, remains limited in its eect as it does not connect umbrella organizations. Second, the lack of cross-border ties sustains, and is likely to be caused by, national dierences between the British and the Dutch organizational settings. This applies especially to the ethnic composition of Shiite organizations and their linking patterns,

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

570

Ethnicities 12(5)

including those of umbrella organizations. These dierences are paralleled by differential compactness, both mutually between the two spheres and in the comparative light of European ethnic organization, with high density dening Dutch Shiite organizational interlocks and high fragmentation dening the British ones. It remains to be explored whether organizational dierences, such as the relatively more articulate cross-ethnic and by implication more religious organization and interlock patterns for major Dutch Shiite organizations, relate to dierences in size between the Dutch and British Shiite communities. Do smaller (ethnic) communities necessitate lower common (transethnic, religious) denominators for organization?43 Far higher ethnic than religious organization density in the Netherlands (Table 2) does not support this contention. Another factor more visibly relevant to dierences in national transethnic organization degree is that of ethnic residential segregation, whereby the British debate focuses on similarities with highly segregated American cases (Johnston et al., 2010; Peach, 2009), while for the Dutch case an article recently concluded ethnic residential segregation to be moderate or average by European standards for large Dutch cities (Musterd and Ostendorf, 2010). Furthermore, the Shiite landscape in both the Netherlands and Britain is dened by ethnic rather than cross-ethnic organization (88%) and umbrella formation (67%), while cross-ethnic interlocks reach a minority of 18% of Shiite organizations with ethnicity and board-member details available (26/144). Finally, that ethnic (as opposed to transethnic) features dene a trend is suggested by the fact that the three Dutch peak organizations, two-thirds of which are ethnically articulated, were all established recently, in the twenty-rst century. With the contours of the sampled European Shiism now established, the task remains of drawing out some of their sociopolitical implications. First, European Islams indicator of organization transcending national state boundaries may be interpreted through the concept of civil society as associational life (Edwards, 2008), which often turns on the notion of its density, measured through interlocks. Putnams neo-Tocquevillian argument that a dense network of secondary associations both embodies and contributes to eective social collaboration (Putnam et al., 1993: 90) is echoed in the widely held view that a well developed civil society is characterized by dense networks (Fullinwider, 1999: 39). Such dense associationism is often also posed as a political agent (as in Putnams argument), either supporting or weakening democracy (Berman, 1997), and has been suggested to work both nationally and transnationally (Katz and Anheier, 2006: 246247). European Shiism would be a transnational political agent, in this line of thought, were it to involve dense networks. Among the conclusions that the Dutch and British data permit, however, is the shallowness of formal Shiite organization organization degrees are low, networks of major organizations sparse and interlocking boards across the North Sea few.44 The three organizations from the larger sample that carry Europe in their names (the Council of European Jamaats (Khoja), the Majlis-E-Ulama Shia Europe (Pakistani) and the Union of  diye-ye anjomanha  -ye esla  mi-ye Islamic Associations of Students in Europe (Etteha  neshjuya  n dar Orupa  ) (Iranian)) are isolated. In the early 1980s, Momen wrote da

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

571

that [e]thnic . . . and political dierences have prevented much cohesiveness among the Shiis in Europe . . . although a number of umbrella organizations have been set up (Momen, 1985: 281).45 Leaving aside the issue of political dierences, which requires further research,46 this citation indicates remarkable continuity with respect to Shiites organization in Europe. Their ethnically articulated social fragmentation remained, despite the growth of the community and the establishment of marjas oces in London that aspire to global reach, and it has been substantiated here both nationally and on the transnational European plane. Warner and Wenners (2006) exploration of European Muslims peak organizations, by and large Sunni, found the same pattern of ethnically articulated social fragmentation. This suggests a widespread, cross-European and trans-sectarian Islamic phenomenon, and the importance, as they indicate, to consider facts of decentralized Islamic organization for its explanation. Further research would be required to establish the balance between internal religious dimensions and contextual factors of European Shiism such as state policy (but see note 41) or the weight of the early migrant generations on religious life. I found doubt as to the substance of European Shiism in regard to its associational life to be conrmed in interviews with leading Shiites in Britain and the Netherlands. Among them was the chairman of the Union of Iraqi Organizations in the Netherlands, who emphasized that contacts between Shiites in Europe were mostly informal and indicated that it was trans-European ties which mattered: I do not know how long it will take for European Shiism to develop . . . Until presently, Shiites in Europe . . . are connected with the hawza.47 A representative of the Muhammadi Trust one of the oldest and most prestigious of Shiite institutions in Britain characterized the European connections of his organization as minimal.48 These facts indicate that European Shiism does not constitute a political agent on account of dense associationism, although other factors are also relevant to that question. A second pillar of civil society theorization civility has been notably absent from the conceptualization of global or transnational civil society. It overlaps with concepts such as civic engagement (Anheier, 2007: 11), and, when conceived through Hayeks denition of a method of collaboration which requires agreement only on means and not ends, serves the political function of enabling agreement and peace (Hayek, 1976: 3) in a modern pluralistic society (Boyd, 2006: 871). Scratching the surface of European Shiism along ideational lines, and examining the ways in which it is disseminated and articulated, does allow glimpses of such a reality. One nds examples of civic engagement, for instance, in the outreach to non-Muslim audiences for lectures or celebrations by an array of Shiite organizations such as Noor Youth (see Moss, 2008: 45), in the ocers of the Khoei Foundation, which holds monthly meetings with the metropolitan police on police/youth interactions (Leichtman, 2006: 6) or in the yearly Imam Hussain Blood Donation Campaigns organized by the Islamic Unity Society (IUS). The IUS caters for students and young professionals in Britain. Its executive committee contains members of mainly Arab, and to some extent Asian, descent,49

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

572

Ethnicities 12(5)

and it rst launched the Imam Hussain Blood Donation Campaign in 2006. Promotional footage for the 2007 campaign (featured on the 2008 promotion   h Seyyed Fa  dhil al-Mila  ni and site) hosts two prominent Shiite scholars, Ayatoll a Seyyed Mahdi Modaressi, who oer religious backing for blood donation. Modaressi mentions Quran 5:32, which says: And whoever saves one life, it is as  ni presents blood donation as isar  if he had saved the whole of mankind. Mila  ni altruism/sacrice. Asked for his opinion on giving blood to non-Muslims, Mila states emphatically that there is [n]othing wrong [with] that, no (see CAMPAIGN Islamic Unity Society, 2008). When compared with the words of the two religious authorities, there is a slightly more armative, societal emphasis in various IUS statements. Two representatives of the organization portrayed the religiously inspired social act to me as one that involved bringing various ethnic groups together, and one stated that it was hoped that, through blood donation, members of the Muslim community will be more encouraged to contribute to British society and that members of the British society will recognize the Muslim communitys eorts in taking active steps to participate.50 The dual-country sample undercuts the idea of a European Shiism dened by signicantly transnational or transethnic organization. Dutch and British Shiite organizations do not integrate into civil society through dense networks, but some of their prominent representatives do shape Shiism as a political actor in European settings, through civic engagement. Whether civic engagement reects deep commitment to a plural society or deects from contrary political purposes is not always easy to tell (although the given cases do not suggest the latter), and, like dense associationism, the concept remains ambiguous. But it is in such local religious articulations, rather than in organizational features, that Shiism and Europe meet. Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments.

Funding
Research for this paper was funded by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declares that he does not have any conicts of interest.

Notes A simplied transliteration method for Persian and Arabic has been adopted in this  <, >u< and >i< for long vowels, >a<, >o/a< and >e/i< article, with >a for short vowels, >< and >< for eyn and hamze, and >ey< and >ow< for diphthongs, except where dierent renderings have gained wide currency, as in the case of Khoei Foundation or Kanoon Towhid.

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

573

1. The usage of transnational in this paper builds on the general meaning of actions conducted across national borders . . . by non-institutional actors from civil society (Portes, 2001: 185) to distinguish from international and multinational phenomena, but broadens the concept to any cross-border fact to include the overlapping board memberships that this article focuses on, and to society at large, to include organizations founded on primordial ties. 2. For example, a motif resonating to the prophetic saying that Islam began as a stranger  diqs and will return a stranger . . . (Meier, 1992: 105) figures in the imam Jafar al-Sa  ) among Muhammads commuview of Shiism as the religion of expatriates (ghoraba nity (Corbin, 1971: 33). 3. Chehabi (2006) is an exception, as are a few very recent studies (e.g. Louer, 2008). 4. Long before the Iraq war, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the United States and Great Britain are growing strongholds of Shiism (Walbridge, 2001: 243). A study of the Khoei Foundation states the Shiite Muslims have chosen London to become their new capital (Leichtman, 2006: 5). 5. One finds the connection of religious identification and transethnic Muslim organization implied, for instance, in Nielsens statement that parts of the younger generation [of Muslims in Europe] increasingly see themselves as Muslims first (Nielsen, 2003: 42). 6. Both terms refer to organizations that claim representation of a group of other organizations. 7. Cross-ethnic refers to multiple ethnic backgrounds, implying transethnic identity. 8. Transnational social interaction is conceivable in other shapes beyond the focus in this article on organizational ties and identities, such as (arranged) marriages, religious education, ritual manifestations and web forums none of which, however, give an equally powerful sense of social organization. 9. Dutch Chamber of Commerce files register board members place of birth. The British Register of Charities lists trustees names only which I examined with the aid of Mr T Fouda to establish likely national background. Ethnic data have also been collected through other Internet searches and direct contacts. In cases where audiences catered for and board memberships had different ethnic identities, the board-membership data was relied upon. 10. Interview with Dr Sajjad Rizvi, 4 January 2008. 11. I am grateful to Ms K Neijenhuis for having offered this information on the existence of European Ahl-e Beyt and its members, which derives from an interview that she conducted with Mr Demirtekin in 2008. The latter further mentioned that he heads the  em-Maqa  mi was the chairman in Germany Dutch-Belgian section, that Mr Qa and that they would meet in Iran once every four years. Ibrahim indicates that the   Dutch Society is a part of the international [al-Majma al-Alam i li-] Ahl al-Bayt (Ibrahim, 2005: 25), organization which pursues one main objective, namely to gain control over the political, social and religious affairs of the Shii communities through-ye out the world in order to centralize them under the leadership of the Iranian wal h (Buchta, 2001: 351). faq 12. [T]he broader European context facilitates the multiplication of Islamic groups . . . With their civil liberties and constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion, European states allow the expression of multiple varieties of Islam. This has enabled multiple competing schools and sub-schools of Islam to go public and work to attract supporters, producing

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

574

Ethnicities 12(5)

13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

20. 21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

a variety of orientations and organizations much broader than that available in most if not all of the exporting countries. The Netherlands data were largely collected by Ms K Neijenhuis on my behalf and for her MA thesis. Future additions will include Shiite Sufi orders in the Netherlands. There is one hypothetical category of Shiite organizations that the survey does not reach. This includes organizations not included by umbrella organizations or Islamic directories, not visibly referred to online and not identifiable as Shiite by name. As it is difficult to imagine that such bodies would also be formal, their impact on the sample cannot be significant. Interview with Yusuf Al-Khoei, available at: audio.theguardian.tv/sys-audio/Guardian/ Islamophonic/2007/03/21/Islamophonic21032007.mp3 (accessed 8 December 2011). It was reported in April 2008 that the Home Office thought there might be around 2 million Muslims in Britain (Travis, 2008). Hoseyniya refers to a Shiite religious centre named after the third Imam, Hoseyn (d. 680). Interview with Dr Hussain Alkhateeb (a key figure in Dutch Shiism), 22 August 2008. Several Dutch media reproduce the figure of an estimated 70,000 Shiites in the Netherlands (for example, De Volkskrant, 2 April 2006); Alkhateeb approximated their number at 125,000 (email correspondence, 12 October 2008). Major is relative to Shiite organization in each country, and includes small organizations. The Khoja category differs from other labels in referring to a transnational ethnic group, and may overlap with place of birth categories. But place of birth labels here imply non-Khoja. The Dutch listing resulted from consultations with one expert on Shiite organizations in the Netherlands and one key participant in them. For the British listing, I consulted with two widely respected insiders. The listings for a few of both the Dutch and British organizations are slightly arbitrary, in that a few other organizations might also have qualified on such subjective scales as influence and respectability. However, the listings are congruent with my reading of both spheres of Shiites organization and the organizations that were mentioned to me in interviews. None of the alternatives would diminish the contrast between the Dutch and the British Shiite landscapes. The informal link in the British Shiite landscape between ICAS and the Muhammadi Trust involves major Shiite institutions, but neither organization is an umbrella organization. The bridging function of that link, therefore, is far more limited than that of the Dutch Shiite interlock. The networks may be considered scarce given that one expects the more prominent Shiite bodies with a presence in the public sphere to figure in a dense cluster of interconnections. Regarding ethnicnational background, and in descending order of numbers, the labelled Shiite organizations in Britain and the Netherlands are Iraqi, Pakistani, Khoja, Iranian, Turkish, Afghan and Turkmen. Lebanese, Kuwaiti and Bahraini organizations have equal lowest numbers. Most of the British-labelled entries are, respectively, Pakistani, Khoja, Iraqi and Iranian. Lebanese, Kuwaiti, Bahraini and Afghan organizations have equal lowest numbers. In the Dutch case, labels include, first, Iraqi, second, Turkish, third, Afghan, Pakistani or Turkmen, and fourth, Khoja or Iranian. Besides ethnically particular organizations, nine Shiite organizations in the Netherlands

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

575

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31. 32.

33.

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

count as cross-ethnic (15% of the labelled Dutch Shiite organizations), while 27 count in Britain (23% of the labelled British Shiite organizations). There are likely to be some more board-member interlocks among Dutch and British Shiite organizations, and their ethnic make-up will be slightly at variance with the record given here. The linkages outlined here represent an exploration of interlocks between the 74% of organizations for which board-member data have been assembled. For those organizations with board-member data available, 85% (144/169) could be labelled for ethnic identity. Actual lines that include multiple overlaps between pairs of organizations amount to 47: 24 (Netherlands), 22 (Britain) and one (NetherlandsBritain). I am using the reduced number of a simple graph, where only one line is taken into account if two organizations are connected, to avoid methodological uncertainties involved in computing multiplicity-based density (see Scott, 2000: 7677). Density is computed here on the basis of the undirected network of overlapping board members, where tie direction is irrelevant. This is expressed in the formula 2l/n(n-1), where l represents lines and n the number of organizations (see Wasserman and Faust, 1997: 101). I focus on fragmentation rather than centralization, first, because it is more intuitive as an indicator of cohesion a decentralized, unfragmented network looks more cohesive than a centralized, fragmented network. Second, the focus on fragmentation allows for the comparison with other ethnic communities, for which percentages of isolated organizations are available (see Van den Bos and Achbari, 2007: 171181). Density and fragmentation apply here to the record of organizations with boardmember data available (as in Van Heelsums (2005) rendering of ethnic minorities organization data in the Netherlands, used for the comparison in Table 3, which amounts to 169, or 74%. The decision to establish the council was taken on 18 June 2006 (see BRITISH SHIA COUNCIL (2007): http://shiacouncil.org/index.php). The Islamic Students Association in Britain is part of the Union of Islamic Students Associations in Europe (UISA), which was founded in 1966 (see STATEMENT 42/ 1098/6 (2008): http://www.islamicsa.com/manchester/files/20080124-uisa-2008-programmes.pdf). Iranian Shiite Muslim students started organizing in private homes from 1973, and these activities later evolved into the Islamic Students Society in London (Tarikhche (2008): http://www.kanoontowhid.org/history.php). It seems likely that the national British UISA branch evolved from this local organization and these local activities. A representative of Roehampton Universitys ABSOC stated to me that ABSOCs were not coordinated by a central organization (Facebook correspondence, 23 November 2008). For example, see www.world-federation.org/Secretariat/Articles/Archive/Update_ Ayatullah_Seestani.htm (World Federation Secretariat message of 6 February 2004). Interview with an academic expert on Shiism, 4 January 2008. Interview with Ali Ridha Jaffar, 28 July 2008. Interview with Ali Ridha Jaffar, 28 July 2008. Interview former UISA president, 16 January 2008. Interview former UISA president, 16 January 2008.

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

576

Ethnicities 12(5)

40. The UISA chairmans alleged disrespect of the Leaders representative was among several critiques of the chairman by a range of the British branches in 2007 (see UISA  /28 November) in Khabargozari-ye   ELECTION (1386/2007, 7 azar Fars/Fars New Agency). 41. A former UISA president stated that, while the representatives position had been contested at times, he had generally remained a powerful figure in the union (interview, 16 January 2008). 42. Additional research is necessary to assess and compare the effects of state policy on Shiite organization in each country which I expect to be able to report on in future writings. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the role of the state should not be overestimated. An account by SIR founder and chairman Sheykh Israfil Demirtekin indicated that a plan for the national representation of Shiites had emerged among Shiites in the Netherlands, who subsequently approached the Dutch state (interview, 17 October 2008). 43. The question for further exploration of how population size relates to the observed organization patterns was usefully suggested to me by a peer reviewer of this article. Besides approaching this issue empirically, as I have done in the body text, theoretical inquiry in the realm of social networks also suggests itself. Particularly, the literature concerning scale effects for density comes to mind here as well as that exploring the conditions for and modalities of bridging and bonding. 44. It remains for future research to assess this reality relative to trans-European networks. 45. Momens conclusion applied to both Europe and the United States, and reinforces my findings, but the details are different. Ethnic differences that Momen remarked upon occurred between Lebanese, East African Asians and Iranians, whereas the ethnic faultlines of contemporary Dutch and British Shiism lie between Iraqi, Iranian, Turkish, Pakistani and East African-Asian (i.e. Khoja) Shiites. As to political differences, Momen referred to Iranian communities. Whereas the main political fault-line still  meneis marjaiyat specifically involves issues crucial to Iranian Shiism namely Kha and, beyond that, Khomeinis legacy (the two of which, inter alia, are not always evaluated equally: some appreciate the second but dislike the first) their evaluation is not only divisive among Iranians, but among other Shiite communities as well. For instance, I encountered a similar duality of sentiment and opinion among Pakistani Shiites in London. 46. Political differences so far observed have broadly involved the extent to which political readings of Shiism are favoured, and whether these readings imply  velayat-e faqih or support for Iran (which is not always the case). Another, partially overlapping divide that also requires separate treatment concerns attitudes towards   (and more broadly, the classification of the correct ritual practice during Ashur a various activities that organizations engage in). A third area for further research concerns gender articulations of the observed organization patterns which are apparent even at first glance in the fact that the great majority are strongly male dominated, with subsidiary womens representation (e.g. a ladys representative) in some cases, and that in some subsidiary or independent youth organizations, women have assumed leading roles. The factor of class, fourthly, is more difficult to discern in Shiite organizations and remains to be explored. Beyond questions of organization, lastly, further research is required into which ideational tendencies and debates predominate. This applies, for instance, to doctrinal religious dimensions of

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

577

47. 48. 49.

50.

European Shiism including the question of whether there exists any independent articulation. Interview with Dr Hussain Alkhateeb, 22 August 2008. Interview with Ali Ridha Jaffar, 28 July 2008. Email correspondence with IUS National Community Officer Dr Marwan Al-Dawoud, 23 February 2008. He gave a precise figure: The . . . committee is comprised of 67 percent Arab and 37 percent Asian descent. Email correspondence, 23 February 2008.

References
Allievi S (2003) Islam in the public space: social networks, media and neo-communities. In: Allievi S, Nielsen JS (eds) Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe. Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 127. Allievi S and Nielsen JS (2003) Preface. In: Allievi S, Nielsen JS (eds) Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe. Leiden [etc.]: Brill, viiix. Anheier H (2007) Reflections on the concept and measurement of global civil society. Voluntas 18(1): 115. Ansari H (2004) The Infidel Within. Muslims in Britain since 1800. London: Hurst. Berman S (1997) Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic. World Politics 49(3): 401429. Bo ttcher A (2007) The Shia in Germany. In: Tramontini L, Mallat C (eds) From Bagdad to Beirut. Arab and Islamic Studies in Honor of John J. Donohue SJ. Beiruter Texte und Studien. Beirut: Ergon Verlag, 209230. Boyd R (2006) The value of civility? Urban Studies 43(5/6): 863878. British Shia Council Interim Working Committee: British Shia Muslim Council. (2007) About us. Available at: http://shiacouncil.org/index.php (accessed 29 February 2008). b): A Veritable Ecumenical Buchta W (2001) Tehrans Ecumenical Society (Majma al-Taqr Revival or a Trojan Horse of Iran. In: Brunner R, Ende W (eds) The Twelver Shia in Modern Times. Religious Culture & Political History. Leiden [etc.]: Brill, 333353. CAMPAIGN Islamic Unity Society (2008) The Imam Hussain Blood Donation Campaign. Available at: http://www.ius.org.uk/giveblood/ (accessed 14 February 2008). Cesari J (2003) Muslim minorities in Europe: the silent revolution. In: Esposito J, Burgat F (eds) Modernizing Islam. Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe. London: Hurst, 251269. Cesari J (2007) Muslim identities in Europe: the snare of exceptionalism. In: Al-Azmeh A, Fokas E (eds) Islam in Europe. Diversity, Identity and Influence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 4967. Chehabi HE (2006) Distant Relations. Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years. London [etc.]: I.B. Tauris. Cole J (2002) Sacred Space and Holy War. The Politics, Culture and History of Shiite Islam. London [etc.]: I.B. Tauris. Constant AF, Gataullina L and Zimmermann KF (2009) Ethnosizing immigrants. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 69(3): 274287. Corbin H (1971) En Islam iranien. Aspects spirituels et philosophiques. Vol. i: Le Shiisme ditions Gallimard. duodecimain. Paris: E

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

578

Ethnicities 12(5)

De Volkskrant (26 April 2006) Verdonk krijgt opnieuw geen hand van imam. Available at: http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2824/Politiek/article/detail/767518/2006/04/26/Verdonkkrijgt-opnieuw-geen-hand-van-imam.dhtml (accessed 11 November 2011). Edwards M (2008) Civil Society. Cambridge: Polity Press. Fennema M (2004) The concept and measurement of ethnic community. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30(3): 429447. Fullinwider RK (1999) Civil Society, Democracy, and Civic Renewal. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. Hayek FA (1976) Law, Legislation and Liberty. Vol. 2 The Mirage of Social Justice. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Hesse-Lehmann K and Spellman K (2004) Iranische transnationale religio se Institutionen in London und Hamburg. In: Ko ck C, Moosmu ller A, Roth K (eds) Zuwanderung und Integration. Kulturwissenschaftliche Zuga nge und soziale Praxis. Mu nster [etc.]: Waxmann, 141162. a Muslims in the Netherlands. Unpublished MA thesis, Leiden University. Ibrahim L (2005) Sh IRNA (31 May 2008) Shia groups in Germany aim for creation of nationwide federation. Available at: http://en.ieus.de/news/Shia-groups-in-Germany-aim-for-creation-ofnationwide-federation (accessed 11 November 2011). Johnston R, Poulsen M and Forrest J (2010) Moving on from indices, refocusing on mix: on measuring and understanding ethnic patterns of residential segregation. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36(4): 697706. Katz H and Anheier H (2006) Global connectedness: The structure of transnational NGO Networks. In: Glasius M, Kaldor M, Anheier H (eds) Global Civil Society: 2005/6. London: Sage Publications, 240265. Leichtman MA (2006) A day in the life of the Khoei Foundation: a transnational Shiite institution in London. The Middle East in London 3(5): 56. Louer L (2008) Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press. Massignon B (2007) Islam in the European Commissions system of regulation of religion. In: Al-Azmeh A, Fokas E (eds) Islam in Europe. Diversity, Identity and Influence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 125148. Meier F (1992) Sufik und Kulturzerfall. In: Glassen E, Schubert G (eds) Bausteine I. Istanbul: Franz Steiner Verlag, 94130. Momen M (1985) An Introduction to Shii Islam. The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiism. Oxford: Ronald. Moss D (2008) Imam Hussayn is love. Individualization of Shia practices in Britain. ISIM Review 22: 4445. Musterd S and Ostendorf W (2009) Residential segregation and integration in the Netherlands. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35(9): 15151532. Nasr V (2007) The Shia Revival. New York [etc.]: W. W. Norton and Company. Neijenhuis K (2008) Sjiieten in Nederland. Unpublished MA thesis, Faculteit Geesteswetenschappen, Universiteit Utrecht. Nielsen J (2003) Transnational Islam and the integration of Islam in Europe. In: Allievi S, Nielsen JS (eds) Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across Europe. Leiden: Brill, 2851. Nielsen J (2005) Muslims in Western Europe, third edition. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

van den Bos

579

OSV Overkoepelende Shiitische Vereniging (2008) Available at: http://www.shiaparlement.com/nl/ (accessed 9 August 2008). Peach C (2009) Slippery segregation: discovering or manufacturing ghettos? Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35(9): 13811395. Peter F (2006) Individualization and religious authority in Western European Islam. Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 17(1): 105118. Portes A (2001) Introduction: the debates and significance of immigrant transnationalism. Global Networks 1(3): 181193. Putnam RD, Leonardi R and Nanetti R (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sachedina A (2004) What happened in Najaf? Available at: http://www.uga.edu/islam/ sachedina_silencing.html (8 August 2008). Salih R (2004) The backward and the new: national, transnational and post-national Islam in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30(5): 9951011. Santing F (21 February 2005) Moslims gaan zelf imams opleiden. NRC Handelsblad. Available at: http://vorige.nrc.nl/dossiers/moslimterreur/moslims_in_nederland/article1860541.ece (accessed 11 November 2011). Schrover M and Vermeulen F (2005) Immigrant organizations. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31(5): 823832. Scott J (2000) Social Network Analysis. A Handbook. London [etc.]: Sage. Shadid W and van Koningsveld PS (2002) Religious authorities of Muslims in the west: their views on political participation. In: Shadid W, van Koningsveld PS (eds) Intercultural Relations and Religious Authorities: Muslims in the European Union. Leuven: Peeters, 149170. Shaery-Eisenlohr R (2003) Transnationalism, Shiism, and authenticity. GSC Quarterly 10: http://www.ssrc.org/programs/gsc/publications/quarterly10/shaerytrans.pdf (accessed 14 November 2008).  Ashari s. Available at: Shubbar L (2006) The cultural reality of the Dutch Shiite Ithna http://www.shiaparlement.com/Akhbar/revised_Religious_cultural_life_1.doc (accessed 9 August 2008). Sindawi K (2007) Hawza instruction and its role in shaping modern Shiite identity: the Hawzas of al-Najaf and Qumm as a case study. Middle Eastern Studies 43(6): 831856. STATEMENT 42/1098/6 Union of Islamic Students Associations (in Europe). (2008) Statement 42/1098/6.  sei az ta  rikhche-ye anjoman-e Tarikhche Kanoon Towhid ISA London (2008) Khola  mi-ye da  neshjuya  n-e Landan. Available at: http://www.kanoontowhid.org/hisesla tory.php (accessed 22 March 2008). Tezcan L (2003) Literaturbericht: Islamstudien Das Islamische in den Studien zu Muslimen in Deutschland. Zeitschrift fu r Soziologie 32(3): 237261. Travis A (8 April 2008) Officials think UKs Muslim population has risen to 2m. The Guardian. Available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/08/population.islam (accessed 11 November 2011).  -ye markazi-ye jadid-e etteha  diye-ye anjomanha  -ye esla  mi-ye UISA ELECTION Shura  neshjuya  entekha  b shod. (1386/2007, 7 azar  n-e Orupa  /28 November) in da   Khabargozari-ye Fars/Fars News Agency.

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013

580

Ethnicities 12(5)

Van den Bos M and Achbari W (2007) Cultural migration: networks of Iranian organizations in the Netherlands. Migration Letters 4(2): 171181. Van Heelsum A (2001) Marokkaanse organisaties in Nederland. Een netwerkanalyse. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. Van Heelsum A (2002) The relationship between political participation and civic community of migrants in the Netherlands. Journal of International Migration and Integration 3(3): 179200. Van Heelsum A (2005) Political participation and civic community of ethnic minorities in four cities in the Netherlands. Politics 25(1): 1930. Van Heelsum A, Tillie J and Fennema M (1999) Turkse organisaties in Nederland. Een netwerkanalyse. Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis. Walbridge LS (2001) The counterreformation. Becoming a Marja in the Modern World. In: Walbridge LS (ed.) The Most Learned of the Shia. The Institution of the Marja Taqlid. New York: Oxford University Press, 230246. Warner CM and Wenner MW (2006) Religion and the political organization of Muslims in Europe. Perspectives on Politics 4(3): 457479. Wasserman S and Faust K (1997) Social Network Analysis. Methods and Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Downloaded from etn.sagepub.com at Sodertorns Hogskolebibliotek on April 2, 2013