N

TME CUSTODY Of= TME BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY.

SHELF

TREATISE
O N T H E

SOCIAL COMP A CT;

O R
The

PRINCIPLES

of

POLITIC LAW.
By
J. J.

ROUSSEAU,
Gen
eva.

Citizen of

Fcede

is

aquas

Dicamus

leges,

w^Eneid, xi.

LONDON:
Printed for

T.

Becket

and P. A.

in ihe Strand.

M DCC LXi V,

De Hondt,

ADVERTISEMENT.
little

treatife

is

taken
In

THIS
from
which
I

much

larger

work,

formerly engaged, without hav-

ing duly confulted

therefore,

my
to

abilities.
it

have,

long

fince

laid

afidej

con-

ceiving
extra(fl

it

proper

offer

the following
as the lead

only to the public,

eX'

tionable part of the performance.

CONTENTS.
BOOK
Jn which the
,

I.

trdnjition

from a
is

ft ate of nainveftigated^

ture

to

that

of focieiy^

with the
compact.

effential

conditions of

the foetal

Introduction^

CONTENTS.
CHAP.
Cnfavery^
IV.
"^

C H A
On
the
vecejjity

P.

V.
to

of recurring always

ile
1

primitive convention,

CHAP.
On

VI.
ig

the foetal pa} or covenant y

CHAP.
Of
the fovereign,

VII.

23
VIII.

CHAP.
Of civilfociety in general^

27
IX.

CHAP.
Off real ^mefne$y

2g

BOOK

CONTENTS.
BOOK
C H A
That

IL

Concerning the Legi/lature*

P.

I.

the fovcreignty is unalienable,

3^

C H A
That

P.

II.

the foveretgnty is indiviftbU,

3S

CHAP.
Whether the general will can

III.

be in the

wrong, 42

CHAP.
C H A
On

IV.

Of the limits of thefoverelgn power^

P.

44

V.
5i

capital puniJhmentSy

CHAP.
On
the laiv^

VI.

55

CHAP.

CONTENTS.
CHAP.
Of
the genius

VII. 61

and charaSJer of a
VIII.

legljlatory

CHAP.
Of
the people^

^p
IX.
.

CHAP.
The fuhje^l continued^

*j%

CHAP.
The
fuhje5l
continued^

X.
^8

C H A

P.

XL
legijlature^

Of

the various fyf ems

of

83

CHAP.
On
the divfions

XII.

cf the laws^
III,

S7

BOOK
CHAP.
On
government

Concerning political laws^ or the forms of

Government,
I.

ID
general,

>5l

CHAP.

CONTENTS.
CHAP.
On
the pr'inctpk
ir.

which conJiituUi

the differed

forms of government,

loi

CHAP.
Of
the aSiual dtftlnSlions

III.
'i

of government
I Ya

s^

ii6

C H A
Of
a Democracy:^

P.

to^
P.

C H A
0/

V,
IiJ
VI.

Arijlocraq^

CHAP.
On
monarchy i

Ii^

C H A P
Of
mixed Governments y

VII.

128

CHAP.
proper

VIII.
not equally

That every form of government

is

fr every

countryy

130

C H A

F.

CONTENTS.
C H A
Of th
P.

IX.
141

marks of a good Government^

CHAP.
Of
the abufe
to

X.
its

of government'^ and

ten*

dsncy

degenerate^

^44
XE.
1

CHAP.
Of
the dijfolutlon

of

the body poUticy

51

CHAP.
By what means
maintained^

XIT.
authority
is

the fovereign

'53
XIJI.

CHAP.
^he fuhjcH antinuedy

15^

CHAP.
ThefuhjeSi continued.,

XIV.
^

^i9

CHAP.
Of deputies

XV.
i^^

or nprefeniaiiveSf

CHAP.

CONTENTS.
CHAP.
Tto
the injihutlon

XVL
is

of government
-

not

a
i^S

company

CHAP.
Of
the injiitution

XVII.
171

of government,

CHAP.
Of
the

XVIII.

means

of preventing the ufurpa^

tions

of government,

173

BOOK
In which the fuhje5f of
tinued^

IV.

political

laws

is

con-

and the means of ftrengthening the

of the fl ale confidcred.

conftitution

CHAP.
That

I.

thf general zvilUannot be annihilated^

79

CHAP.
On
VoteSi

IL
183

CHAP.

CONTENTS.
CHAP.
On
Ekiiionsy
III.
1^3 g

CHAP.
Of
the

IV.

Roman

Comifia,

I94

CHAP.
On the
Tribunate,

V.

214
VI.
218

CHAP.
Of
the D'i^aiure^

CHAP.
Of
the Cenforjhip,

VII.

224

CHAP.
Of political
Religion^

VIIL
227

C H A
Conclufton,

P.

IX.

24^

TREATISE
O N T H

SOCIAL COMPACT,

&c.

BOOK
"

I.

INTRODUCTION.
Y
defign,
in the

inquire,

Whether

prefent treatife, is to the nature of fociety

admits of any fixed and equitable rules of government, fuppofing mankind to be fuch as they

and their laws fuch as they might be made. In this invelliigation I (liall endeavour conllantly to join the confiderations of natural right and
are,

public intereft, fo that juflice never be difunited.

and

utility

may

This being premifed,

1 ftiall enter
its

on

my

fubIf.
it

ject, witiiout expatiating on

importance.

^
it

TREATISE
I

on

the

be afked, Whether

am

lator, that I thus take

litics
?

upon me
j

a prince or legifto write on poit is

anfwer,

this reafon I write.

am neither and that Were I a prince or

;

for

legifla-

tor I

out what ought to be done 'it in praflice, or be filent.

would not throw away my time I would

in pointinf^

niyfelf

put

As

the citizen of a free

fl:ate,

and a member

of the fupreme pov/er, by birth, however weak may be the influence of my fmgle vote in public
affairs,

to impofe

the right of giving that vote is fufticient on me the duty of making thofe affiiirs

my

ftudy, thinking myfelf happy in difcuffing the various forms of government, to find every day

iiewreafoQS for admiring that of

my own

coun-

try*

CHAP.
The

I.

fuhje5l of the fi'ft hook,

T^ .^

AN

is

born

enflaved.

free, and yet is univerfally At the fame time, an indi-

vidual frequently conceives himfelf to be the lord and mafter over others, though only more emi-

nently deprived

of liberty.
lawful
?

Whence

can

this

change
it

arife

Are there any means by which

may be rendered
* Geneva.

The

former quef-

tion

SOCIAL COMPACT.
tion I cannot anfw-er,

though
latter.

imagine myfelf

capable of refolving the

If I took Into confideration only the exiflencc

and

eiFeffs of power, I fhould fliy, So long as a people are compelled to obey, they do well to be obedient but, as fooa as they are in a capa;

city to refift, they

:

do better

to

throw off the

For, in recovering their liyoke of reftraint on the fame berty plea by which they lofl it, either they have a jufl right to realTume it, or thofe

could have none

who deprived them of it. But an inviolable there is right founded on the very nature of fociety, which ferves as the bafis of all
otiiers.

Man

doth not derive

this

right,

how-

ever, immediately from nature; it is founded on We mufl proceed, then, to mutual convention.

inquire,

of what, kind fuch

convention

mufl

have been.
point,
I

But, before

we come
I

fhould eftablifli what

to argue this have already ad-

vanced.

C H A
On

P.

IL

the pn?ntiivj Jiate of fociety,

only natural one, is that of a family. And even in this, children are no longer connecTted with their father, than while they ftand
in

TH

mofl ancient of

all focieties,

and the

need of his

afTi

fiance.

When
,

this

becomes
needlefs.

TREATISE
the natural
tie
is

on

the

needlefs,

of coiirfe difTolved,

the children are exempted from the obedience they owe their father, and the father is equally (o from thefoliciiade due from him to his children ;

both ailume a
each other.

frate

of independence refpefling
continue, indeed, to live

They may

together afterwards ; but their connection, in fuch a cafe, is no longer natural, but voluntary; and even the family union is then maintained by

mutual convention.

This
kind,
is
i

libert}^

which

is

common

to all

man-

nature

the neceflary confequence of our very whofe firfl law being that of felf-pre-

fervation, our principal concerns are thofe

relate to ourfelves
;

which
doth

no fooner,

therefore,

snan arrive at years of difcretion, than he becomes the only proper judge of the means of that
prefervation,

and of courfe

his

own

mailer.

In a family, then,

we 'may
:

fee the firft

is

model

of political

focieties

their chief

reprefented

and the people by his children, them of while being free, and equal by birth, alienate their libert}^ but for their cannot they common interefl. All the difference between a fa-

by the

father,

all

mily and a
children
is

ftate, lies in this,

That,

the love which a father naturally bears

in the former, to his

a compenfation for his folicitude conin the latter, it is the pleafure cerning them \ andj

of

S
of

A L C O

MPA

C T.

command
a chief

that fiipplies the place of this love,

which

doth not entertain for his people.

that

Grotius

denies

government

is

invefted

with power folely for the benefit of thofe who are governed, and cites the cafe of (laves as an
example.
fafl *.
It is,

indeed, his conftant

pradlice,

to eftablidi the matter of right

on the matter of
a

He might have employed

more con-

clufive

method, though not a m.bre favourable

one for tyrannical governments.

It
is

then

doubtful,

according to Grotius,

except about an hundred individuals, belong to thofe individuals, or whether the latter belong to the

whether the whole

race of mankind,

whole race of mankind

throughout
his

and

he

appears,

mer

opinion.

whole work, to lean to the forThis is alfo the opinion of

Hobbes. Thus they divide the human fpecies into herds of cattle, each of which hath its keeper,

who
make
*

prote(fls

it

from others, only that he may

it

a property of

himfelf.

learned refearches into the laws of nature and naiions are often nothing more than the hiftory of ancient abufes ; fo that it is a ridiculous infatuation
to be too fond of
tife

" The

Manufcript Treaftudying them." en the Intenjis of France, the by Marquis d' A, This was exadly the cafe with Grotius.

B 3

As

A TRE
As
a fhepberd
fo

ATI S

E ON THE

is of a fuperior nature to his the herd-keepers of men, or their chiefs, are of a fuperior nature to the herd, over

flock,

which they

prefide.

Such was the reafoning,

Emperor Caligula, according who concluded logically enough from this analogy, that either kings were gods, or their fubjed-s

to

Philo, of the

no better than brutes.

This argument of Caligula bears much refemArifblance to thofe of Hobbes and Grotius.
totle

had

faid,

indeed, before either of them,

that

men were

not naturally
to
ii

equal
aver y,

but that

fome of them were born

to dominion.

and others

Ariftotle

was right

as to the fa6l,

but miftook
is

the

eifecfl

for the caufe.

Nothing

more

cer-

tain, than that every man born in flavery is born to be a flave. In fuch a fiate, men lofe even

the defire of freedom, and prefer fubjeftion, as the companions of UiylTes did their brutality *.
If there are
it is

any

flaves,

therefore,

by nature,

becaufe they are flaves contrary to nature. Power firil made flaves, and cowardice hath perpetuated them.
* See a
little

trad written by Plutarch, on the ra-

tionality of brutes,

have

so CI A L
I

COMPACT.

have

faid

nothing of king Adam, or the

emperor Noah, father of three monarchs, who, like the children of Saturn, as feme have imagined ihem to be, divided the world them. I hope my moderation alfo in

among
this re-

{pcS: will be efteemed fome merit; for, as I am defcended in a right line from one of thefe

and probably from the eldeft branch of the family, hov/ do I know, that, by a regular deduction of my defcent^ I might not find myprinces,
felf

the legitimate
this,

heir to univerfai
it

monarchy

Be

hov/ever, as
as

may,
a

it

cannot be denied,
to the fovereignty

that

Adam had

good

title

of the world, when he was the only perfon in it, as Robinfon Crufoc had to that of his ifland under the fame circnmflances. A very great conveniency alfo attended their government, in that
the monarch migin relt fecurely on his throne^ without fear of v/ars, confpiracies, or rebellion.

CHAP.
On
the right

III.

cf the Strongeft,

flrongefl: is not (Irong enough tocontinue always mafter, unlefs he transforms his power into a right of command, and obe-

ry^HE

dience into a duty. Hence is deduced the right of. the flronged ; a right taken ironically in ap13
.

4.

pearance,

A
in

TREATISE
down
But
?

on the

pearance, and laid

ciple
reality.

as

will

an eflablifhed printhis term never be

rightly explained
is

Force, in the fimpleft fenfe,

;

a phyfical

can refult
force
is

power nor can I fee what morality from its efFe^Sls. To yield to fuperior

moll

it is

an a6l of neceility, not of the will ; at but an a(5l of prudence. And in what

fenfe can this

be called a duty

Let us fuppofe, however, for a moment, this pretended right eftablifhed, and we fhall fee it attended with inexplicable abfurdities ; for, if it

be admitted, that power conflitutes right, the efFefl changes with the caufe, and every fucceeding power, if greater than the former, fucceeds alfo to the right ; fo that men may lawfully difobey, as foon as they can do it, with impunity ;

and, as right is always on the ftrongeft fide, they have nothing more to do, than to acquire
fuperior force.
that be,

Now

what kind of

right can

which vanifhes with the power of enIf obedience be only exadled by comit ? forcing is no need to make fuch obedience there puifion,
a duty, as

uhen we

are no longer compelled to

It apare no longer obliged to it. obey, adds noword the that right pe. rs, therefore, of in that this ca{q to in faift, force, and, thing
is

we

a term of

no fjgnlhcation.

Be

SOCIAL COMPACT.
Be
obedient
to

9
by
this

the

higher powers.

If

precept is meant, JubjeSl to a fuperior force^ the advice is good, though fuperfluous ; I will an-

fwer for

it,
I

fuch a rule will never be broken. All

is

power,

own,

derived from
is

corporeal malady fource. But are we therefore forbid

the phyfician the highway,
pulfion,
to
to
?

God ; but every derived alfo from the fame

to call

in

If a

am
in

robber (hould flop me on not only obliged, on compurfe, but

give him my
it

am

alfo

obliged point of confcience, though I might poflibly conceal it from him ? This will hardly be averred ; and yet the piflol he holds to

my

breail,

is,

in ^^td:,

a fuperior force.

On the whole, we mufl conclude, then, that mere power doth not conflitutc right, and that
men
are obliged only to

pay obedience to lawful

authority.

Thus we

are conftantly recurring to

my

iirfl:

queflion.

CHAP.
On

IV.

JIavery.

S no man hath any natural authority over the reft of his fpecies, and as power docii not confer right, the ba/is of all lawful authority
js

laid in

mutual convention.

If

10
If

TREATISE

on tpie

an individual, fays Grotius, can alienate his Hberty, and become the flave of a mafter, why

may

not a whole people coUefrively alienate theirs,

and become fubjel to a king ? This propofition, however, contains fome equivocal terms, which require explanation, but I Ihall confine myfelf to that of alienate. Whatever is alienated mufl be

Now a man difpofed of, either by gift or fale. who becomes the flave of another doth not give himfelf away, but fells himfelf, at leaft for his
whole people fell a king from furnifhing his fubjefls fubfiflence, that they maintain him ;
fubfiftence
;

but

why
far

fliould a

themfelves

So

is

and, as our friend Rabelais fays,

live

king doth not

fubjefls be fuppofed to give away their liberty, on condition that the receiver fhall take their property along with it ? After
a
little.

on

Can

this,

really

cannot fee any thing they have

faid,

left.

It

may be

monarch maintains among

;

Be it fo I his fubjeifts the public tranquillity. would be glad to know, of what they are gainers,
if

the wars in

which

his

ambition engages

them, if his infatiable avarice, or theoppreflions of his minifiers, are more defl:ru6live than civil Of what are they gainers, if even diffenfions?
this

tranquillity

prifoner
;

may

live tranquil

be one caufe of their mifery ? enough in his dun-

geon

but will
?

this

be

fufFicient

to

make him
were
ftiut

contented there

When

the Greeks

up

SOCIAL COMPAC
up
in the cave of the Cyclops,

T.

ii
there

they lived

unmolefted, in expedation of their tarn to be devoured.

To
muft

fay,

that a

to talk unintelligibly
necefTarily

give himfelf away, is and abfurdly fuch an a(ft be illegal and void, were it for
;

man can

no other reafon, than that it argues infanity of mind in the agent. To fay the fame thing of a whole people therefore, is to fuppofe a whole nation can be at once out of their fenfes
it
;

but were

fo,

fuch madnefs could not confer right.

it

Were

pofTible alfo

for
in the

man

to alienate
dif-

himfelf, he could not,

fame manner,

pofe of his children, who, as

human

beings, are

born

free

their

freedom

is

their

own, and no-

body hath any right to dlfpofe of it but themfeives. Before they arrive at years of difcretion,
indeed, their father may, for their fecurity, and in their name, flipulate the conditions of their
prefervation, but he cannot unconditionally and irrevocably difpofe of their perfons, fuch a gift being contrary to the intention of nature, and
It exceeding the bounds of paternal authority. requifite, therefore, in order to render an ar-

is

bitrary

government lawful, that every new generation fliculd be at liberty to admit or reje(fk
authority, in

its

which

cafe

it

would be no longer

an arbitrary government.

B 6

To

12

A
To

TREATISE
iiatural'

on the
liberty,
is

renounce one':

to

re-

nounce one's very being as a man ; it is to re-^ nounce not only the rights, but even the duties
of humanity. And what pofTible indemnification can be made the man who thus gives up his all ?
a renunciation is incompatible with our nature for to deprive us of the liberty of ; very the will, is to take away all morality from our In a word, a convention, which ftipujKHiions.
iates

Such

on the one part abfolute authority, and on

is,

the other implicit obedience,

tile

in

itfelf,

fu-

we

and contradi6lory. Is it not evident, that can lie under no reciprocal obligation what-

ever to a perfon, of

whom we have a right to demand every thing; and doth not this circumjflance,

againfl

ceflarily infer fuch

which he has no equivalent, nea(5l of convention to be void ?

Tor what claim can

my
all

flave

have upon me,

that belongs to him, himfelf, are mine ? His claims are of courfe my own, and
to fay thofe can be fet

when he

and

up againfl me,

is

to talk

abfurdly.

Again, Grotius and others have deduced the origin of this pretended right from the fuperiority

The conqueror, fay they, having a right to put the vanquifhed to death, the latter may equitably purchafe his life at the expence of his liberty j fuch an agreement being the 9
obtained in war.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
the

13

more

lawful, as

it

conduces to the mutual

advantage of both partieSi

It Is clear

and certani, however, that

vi<5lor

tended right of the

this preover the lives of the

vanquiQied is not, in any fhape, the natural reThis is plain, were it for fuit of a ftate of war.

no other reafon than

that the reciprocal relations

of mankind, while living together in their primitive independence, were not fufficiently durable, to conflitute a flate, either

of peace or

war

fo that

men cannot be

naturally enemies.

It is the relation fubfifling

between things, and

not between men, that gives rife to war ; which ariling thus, not from perfonal, but real, relations,
cannot fubfift between

man and man,

either

in

a Aate of natnre, in which there is no fettled property, or in a flate of fociety, in which

every thing

is

fecured by the laws.

The quarrels, encounters and duels of individuals are not fufficient toconflitute fucha flate
of war
;

and,

with regard to the particular

combats authorifed by the inflitutions of Lewis XI. King of France ; they were only fome of
the abufes

of the feudal government,

fyf-

tern truly abfurd, as contrary to the principles

of

natural juflice, as of

good

policy.

War

14

A
War
is

TREATISE
not,

ON the

man and man, but

flate,

therefore, any relation between a relation between ftate and

which individuals are enemies only accidentally, not as men, or even as citizens, but as
in
v

foldiers

not as

members of
as
its
its

their

particular

community, but
frate

can have for

;

In fhort, a enemy nothing but a ftate,

defenders.
efTentially different,

rot

men

as

between things

there can bs no

common

relation.

eftablilhed

This principle is, indeed, conformable to the maxims of all ages, and the conftant
of every civilized people;
Declarations

praflice of war are

made

lefs to

give notice to fovereigns,

than to

theii fubjcdts.

The
vidual,

foreigner,

whether a fovereign, an

indi-

or a people, who plunders, kills, or takes prifoner a fubjeft, without declaring war is not an enemy, but a robber. againft his prince, Even in a time of v/ar, a jufl prince may make
himfelf mafter, in an enemy's country, of whatever belongs to the public, but he will refpcvfl the perfons and private properties of individuals; he will refpel thofe rights on which his own are
founfled.

The

defign of war being the dellruc-

tion of an hofiile flate,

itS'

wc have

right to kill
j

defenders, while they are in arms

but

as, in

laying

down

their arms, they ceafe to be ene^iiics,

or

SOCIAL COMPACT.
murder them.

15

or inftruments of hoftility, they become, in that cafe, mere men, and we have not the leaft right
to
It is

tualiy to deftroy a flate,

fometimes pofTible efiecwithout killing even one

right

of its members

now war cannot confer any

is

or privilege, which
its

end and defign.

not necelTary to accompliih It is true, thefe are not the

are they founded OQ principles of Grotius, nor the authority of the poets i but they are fuch a3 are deduced from the nature of things, ana are

founded on reafon.

With regard

to the right of conqueft,

it

has

no other foundation than that of force, the law of the ftrongeft. But, if war doth not give the
Victor a right to mafllicre the vanquifhed,
this

pretended right, which docs not exift, cannot be the foundation of a right to enflave them. If

we
to

have no right to kill an cnem-y, unlefs we cannot by force reduce him to (lavery, our right

make him
to

Have never can be founded on our

It is,

right to kill him.

therefore, an iniquitous

bargain,

of liberty, take away.

make him purchafe, at the expence a life, which we ha 'e .^o right to
In eAablifhing

thus a right of

life

and death over others, on thai of enflavin^ : o ibem y on the other a of and, hand, right enfl..ving

them on that of life an.l death, we certainly into the abfurdity of reafoning in a circle.

rail

Let

i6

TREATISE

ON the

Let us fuppofe, however, that this fhocklng right of general maflacre exifted, I flill affirm* that a flave, made fo by the fortune of war, or
a conquered people, fo reduced to flavery, lie under no other obligations to their mafler, than to obey him fo long as he hath the power to

compel them
favour

to

it.

lent for their lives,

;

In accepting of an equivathe vicftor confers on them no

inflead

of killing

them

ufclefsly,

he

hath only varied the mode of their deflruc^tion to his own advantage. So far, therefore, from
his

having acquired over them any additional authority, the ftate of war fubfifls between them
;

as before

their relation to each other

it,

is

the evi-

dent efFefl of

and

his exertion of the rights

of war

is

a proofs that no treaty of peace hath

fucceeded.

Will
it

it

be
:

faid,

they have

made a
a

convention; be
truce, and
flate of
is

fo

This convention

is

mere

fo far

from putting an end

to the

war, that

it

necelTarily implies its

con-

tinuation.

Thus,

in

whatever light

we

confider this afflaves

is

fair, the right of

making men
it is

null

and

void, not only becaufe

it is

unjufl:,

but becaufe
tetmsjiavery

abfurdand

infignificant.

The

and

jujiice are contradi(ftory

and reciprocally ex-

clufive of each other.

Hence the following propofai

SOCIAL COMPACT.
pofal

17

would be

equally

ridiculous,

whether

made by one
vate

individual to another, or
a

by

a pri-

man

to

whole

people.

enter into

an

agreement with you, altogether at your cwn charge^

and

folely

for my

profit,

iihich

will
to

ohferve as
ohferve afo,

long as 1 1 leafe^

and which you are

as long as 1 think proper,

CHAP.
On

V.

the necejfity of recurring always to the prim!'

tive convention,

ON

the fuppofition, that

be true what

I fhould grant to have hitherto difproved,

^he advocate for defpotifm would, however, There will be always a great profit but little.
difference

between

governing

a fociety.

fubjecfling a multitude, Let individuals, in

and

number whatever, become

fively fubjecfl: to
cafe,

feverally

any and fuccefall,

one man, they are more than mafler and nothing

if
;

in that
;

flaves

they

are not a people governed

are

an

Aggregate
alTociation

by their chief; they you will, but do not

form an
neither

there fubfiAs among them commonwealth nor body politic. Such a fuperior, though he fhould become the mafler of half the world, would be flill a private perfon, and his intereft,

feparate and diilincfb

Hill

that of his people,

would be

from no more than a

private

28

TR E ATIS E
When

ON the

private interefl.

fuch a perfon dies, alfo

the empire over which

he prefided

is

diffolved,

component parts remain totally uncon-, nefled, jufj: as an oak falls into a heap of adies, wken it is confumed by the lire;
its

and

A
tius,

people, fays Grotius,

may

voluntarily bc-

Hovv themfelves on a king:

therefore,

According to Gro-

are a people before they thus give themfelves up to regal authority. Even this gift, however, is an acl of fociety, and

a people

prefuppofes a public deliberation on the matter. Hence, before we examine into the acl, by which a people make choice of a king, it is proper to examine into that by which a people became a
people, for, on this, which is ncceflarily prior to the other, reds the true foundation of fociety.

For,
tion,

if,

in

fafb,
arifes

there be no
(unlefs

prior conven-

whence

indeed the eleflion

was unanimous) the obligation of the fmaller number to fubmit to the choice of the greater ? and v.'hence comes it, that an hundred perfons,
forinftance,

who might
?

defire to

have a mafter,

had

a right to vote for ten otlit^rs

who might

de-

ilre to

have none
in itfelf

votes

is

choice by a plurality of an eflabliurment of convention,

at
leall:

The

and fuppofes, that unanim/ity muft

once have fnbfifted among them.

for

CHAP.

SOCIAL COMPACT.

19

CHAP.
On
the foetal

VI.
or covenant.

pa^

when Suppofe mankind arrived at that term,

the obftacles
to
their

prefervation

in

Bate of nature, prevail over the endeavours of a individuals, to maintain themfeives in fuch
ftate.

At fuch

a crifis this primitive fcate therefubfift,

if

fore could
rnuft
their

no longer

and the human race

have perifhed,

they had not changed

,

manner of
as

living.

Now
only
ift,

men cannot

create

new

pov/ers, but
really

compound and

direft

thofe which

ex-

they have no other means of prefervation, than that of forming, by their union, an accu-

mulation of forces, fufficient to oppofe the obftacies to their fecurity, and of putting thefe in
aftion by a
firft

mover, capable of making thena

zC: in concert with each other.

arife

This general accumulation of power cannot but from the concurrence of many particubut the force and liberty of each inbeing the principal inftruments of his
;

lar forces

dividual

own
the

is he to engage them in without intereft, hurting his own, and negledting the obligations he lies under to

prefervation,

how

common

himfelf

^o

A TRE
This
:

x^

E ON the

himfelf ?

difficulty,

prefent fubjefl,

may

being applied to my be exprefled in ihe follow-'

ing terms

" To

find that

form of

aflbciation

which

fhall

proteft and defend, with the whole force of the

community, theperfon and property of each individual, and in which each perfon, by uniting himfelf to the reil, fhall neverthelefs be obedient only to himfelf, and remain as fully at liber-Such is the fundamental proty as before."

blem, of "which the

lutioa.

focial

compadl gives the fo-

The claufes of this compaft are fo precifely^ determined by the nature of the a6l, that the
leafl:

reftridtion or modification renders

in

them void

and of noefFeft;
they

may

much, that, although perhaps never have been formally prothey are yet
univerfally

fo

mulgated,
received.

the

fame,

and are every where

When

acknowledged and the focial paft, however, is

tacitly

violated, individuals recover their natural liberty,

and are re-invefled with

their original rights,

by lofmg that conventional liberty for the fake of which they had renounced them.

Again

reducible to one, viz,

thefe claufes, well underflood, are all the total alienation of

all

every individual, with

his rights

and

privi-

leges.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
leges, to the

2t

whole community. For, in the firfl one gives himfelf up entirely and without referve, all are in the fame ciicumflances,
place, as every
fo that

no one can be interefted

in

making

their

common

conne(flion burthenfome to others.

Befides, as the alienation

ferve, the

is

made without

re-

union

is

as perfedl

as pofTible, nor

hath
claim

any particular afTociate any thing to reJ

whereas,

if

they fhould feverally retain any

peculiar privileges^ there being

pire to determine

no common um-

each being his

ture

between them and the public, own judge in fome cafes, would,
and their affociation would

in time, pretend to be fo in all, the ftate of na-

would

ftill

fubfift,

necelTarily

become

tyrannical or void.

In fine, the individual,

to
all,

by giving himfelf up

gives himfelf to none ; and, as he acquires the fame right over every other perfon in

the community, as he gives them over himfelf, he gains an equivalent for what he bellows, and ftill a greater power to preferve what he retains.

If,

therefore,

we
is

take from the focial compa(fl

every thing that

find
it

nor effential to

it,
:

we
"

fhall

reduced to the following terms

We,

the contraifting parties, do jointly and feverally fubmit our perfons and abilities, to the fupreme
direftion of the

general will of

all,

and, in a
collcflive

22

A T RE AT
as

E ON the

col!e(fbive

body,

body, receive each member into that an indivifible part of the whole."
accordingly
converts

This
the

a6l of afTocIatioii

feveral individual

contradling parties into

as

one moral collective body, compofed of

many

which receives alfo from the fame a6l its unity and exiftence. This public perfonage, which is thus formed by the union of all its members, ufed
as there are votes in the afTembly,

members

formerly to be denominated a

City

*,

and, at
prefent,

The
for

true fenfe

of

this

word
;

is

almoft

entirely

perverted

among
a
city,

the

moderns

moft people take a

citizen'

town

and an houfe-keeper for a

Such are ignorant, however, that, though houfea**, may form a town, it is the citizens only chat conftiThis fame errour formerly coft the Car* tute a city. I do not remember, in -the thaginians very dear.
courfe of my reading, to have ever found the title of Chves given to the fubjedls of a prince, not even formerly to the Macedonians, nor, in our times, to the
Englifh, though

more nearly bordering on

liberty

than any other nation.

people
ing, as

The French
on

who

familiarly take

are the only (hemfelves the name of

its

citi'^ens,

becaufe they have no jull idea of

feen in their didiionaries
;

meanwere
ic

may be

for,

otherwife, indeed, they vxould be guilty of high trea-

fon in ailuming

it.

This term

is

with them rather

cxprefTive of a virtue than a privilege.

Bodin fpoke of the

citizens

Hence, when and inhabitants of Geneva,

SOCIAL COMPACT.
prefent, takes the
litic.
a.

23

name of
called,

a rcpuhlic, or
its

kdy po-

It

Is

alfo
it is

by

feveral

members,
it

JIatey

when
with

pafTive;

iht fove reign ^

is

active; and

fimply a

power ^ when

when it is com-

pared

other

bodies of the fame nature.

With regard

to the afTociate?

take colleclively the

name of

the people^

themfelves, they and are

feparately called citizens, as partaking -of the fo*

vereiga authority, and fuhjeSiS, as fubje6led to Thefe terms, indeed, are the laws of the ftate.
'

frequently confounded, and mlAakcn one for the it is fufficient, however, to be able to other when are be to ufed with diflinguifh them, they
;

:precifion.

CHAP.
Of
is

VII.

the

fcvereign,

iT act of
neva,

plain

from the above formula, that the

includes a reciprocal en;

afTociation

gagement between particulars and the public

lie committed a wretched blunder, in midaking oneTor the other, Mr, d'Alembert indeed has avoided this miflake in the Encyclopcedia, where he has

properly diftinguifhed the four oiders of people (and

even

five,

in our city,

public

reckoning mere ftrangers) that are found and of which two Oi.ly compcfe the re~ No other French author that I know of hath
c.'ti^en.

ever comprehended the meaning of the word

and

24

TREATISE
In

ON the
contra(5ling, if I

and that each Individual,

may

engagement, ty toward particular perfons, and as a member That toward the fovereign. of the ftate

fo fay, "with himfelf, is laid under a twofold viz, as a member of the fovcreign-

maxim

of the

civil

law, however,

is

inapplicable

here, which

fays, that

no one

is

bound by the

engagements he enters into with himfelf j for there is a wide difference between entering into
a perfonal obligation with one's
felf,

and with a

whole, of which one may conftitute a part.

It

is

determination, which
jefl,

farther to be obferved, that the public is obligatory on the fub-

with regard to the fovereign, on account of the twofold relation by which each flands contrailed,
is

not, for the contrary reafon, obligaitfelf

:

towards tory on the fupreme power

that
it

and

confequently inconfiftent with the nature of the body pplitic, that fuch fupreme Ihould impofe a law, which it cannot
is

power

break.

For, as the fovereign ftands only in a fm^le relation, it is in the fame cafe as that of an individual contra6ling with himfelf; whence it
is

plain,

that there neither

lav/ obligatory

is,

nor can be, any

fundamental
being fuch.

on the whole body

of a people, even the

compaft itfelf not however, it is not meant, that fuch a body cannot enter into engagements with others, in matters that 6.0 not derogate from
fecial

By

this,

SOCIAL COMPACT.
from
this contiafl
it is
;

2$

for,

with refpe6l to foreiga

objedls,

a fimple

and individual perfon.

But, as the body politic, or the fovereign, derives its very exigence from this inviolable contra6l, it can enter into no lawful engagement,
even with any fimilar body, derogatory from the tenour of this primitive adl ; fuch as that of
of itfelf, or of fubmitting italienating any part violate felf intirely to a foreign fovereign.

To

the adl whereby

itfelf,

it

exifts

would be
arife

to annihilate

and from nothing can

nothing.

No
al

fooner are a multitude of individuals thus

it

united in a body, than

becomes impofTible to

ofFenfively againft any of the members, without attacking the whole, and Aill lefs to offend

the whole body, without injuring the members. Hence both duty and interefl equally oblige the

two contrafling

parties to

affift

each other, and

the fame perfons ought to endeavour to include, within this twofold relation, all the advantages

which depend on

it.

Now

the fovereign,

being formed only by

is

the feveral individuals of which the ftate

com-

pofed, can have no interefl contrary to theirs ; of courfe the fupreme power ftands in no need of any guarantee toward the fubje(5ls, becaufe it is

impofTible,

2S

TREATISE
it

ON

the

itnpofTible, that the

hurtmg
after,

all its

body fliould be capable of members; and we (hall fee herecan as

little

that
in

them

particular.

Hence

tend to injure any of the fovereign is

it

necefTarily,

and for the fame reafoa that

it

exifts,

always fuch ^s
-

ought

to be.

The
;

cafe

is

different,

however, as to the

re-

lation in

which the

fubjedls ftand to the fove-

reign
reft,

as,

notwithflanding their

common

inte-

the latter can

have no fecurity that the

former will difcharge their engagements, unlefs

means be found
In
facl,

to

engage their

fidelity.

tertain a particular will,

every individual may, as a man, eneither contradiflory or

as a
citizen.

diilimilar to his general will,

His

private

interefl:

may

influence him, in a

manner
of
as

diametrically oppofite to the

common

intereft

the fociety.
fitive

Reflecting on his own exiflence

po

and naturally independent, he may conceive what he owes to the common caufe, to be a free

and gratuitous contribution, the want of which

will be lefs hurtful to others, than the difcharge of it will be burthenfome to himfelf ; and, re-

garding the moral perfon of the flate as an imaginary being, becaufe it is not a man, he may

be defirous of enjoying
citizen, without

all

the
his

privileges

of a

fulfilling

engagement as a fubjed J

SOCIAL COMPACT.

s;

fubje^l J an injuftice, that, in its progrefs, mull necelTarily be the ruin of the body politic.

To

the end, therefore, that the focial

comtacitly

pa6l fliould not

prove an empty form,

it

includes this engagement, which only can enforce the reft, viz. that vvhofoever refufes to pay

obedience to the general

will,

fhall

be

liable to

be compelled to

by the force of the whole boAnd this is in effecTt nothing more, than dy. that they may be compelled to be free j for fuch
it

Is

the

the condition which, in uniting every citizen to ftate, fecured him from all perfonal dependJ

which forms the whole artifice machine it is this alone that renders all focial engagements juft and equitable which, without it, would be abfurd, tyranence
a condition,

and play of the

political

nical,

and fubjed to the moll enormous abufes,

CHAP.
'

viir.
in general.

0/

civil

focieiy

produflive of a very remarkable change in his being, by fubflituting juftice inflead of inftiniff, as the rule of
is

THE

tranfitlon of

man from

a ftate of na-

ture to a flate of fociety

his condu(St,

and attaching that morality to his

a6lions, of
is

which they were before

this

deftitute. It

in

immediate confequence of C 2

change,

when
the

2S

TREATISE
own

on

the

the voice of duty fucceeds to phyfical impulfe and the law of appetite, that man, who hitherto

regarded only his

gratification, finds himfelf

obliged to adl on other principles, and to confult his reafon, before he follows the di<5lates of
his paflions.

of fociety, he
tages

Although, by entering into a (late is deprived alfo of many advanthat of nature, he gains
faculties

which depend on
others

by

it

fo very confiderable, his

exert and expand themfelves, his ideas are enlarged, his fentiments ennobled, and his whole
foul
is

elevated to fo great a degree, that,

if

the

abufes of this nfew ftate do not degrade him be-

low the former, he ought incefTantly to blefs that happy moment in which he was refcued from it,
into an intelligent

and converted from a flupid and ignorant animal and wife Being.

To
ed by

flate the

balance of what

is

lofl
it

and gainto

this

change,

we

fhall

reduce

rative terms.

By

entering into the focial

compacom-

pa^l, man gives up his natural liberty, or unlirnited right to every thing v/hich he is defirous of,

and can
cial

attain.

In return for

this,

he gains fo-

liberty, and an exclufive property in all thofe things of which he is pofTefled. To avoid in the nature of thefe however, miftake, any

compenfations,
tin<5tion

it is

neceflliry to

make

juA

dif-

between naturalliberty, which a

is

limited

by

SOCIAL COMPACT.

^29

by nothing but the Inabilities of the individual, and fecial liberty, which is limited by the general will of the community ; and alfo, betweea
that poiTe/Iion, or follows the

which
right

is

only efFecfted by force, of prior occupancy, and

that property,
live title.

which

is

founded only on a pofi-

To

the preceding alfo

may h^ added,

as

the

acquifi'jon of a fecial flate, moral liberty, which,

only renders a man truly mafter of himfelf: for to be under the direcfiion of appetite alone Is to

be

in a flate of flavery, while to pay obedience only to thofe laws which we prefcribe to But I have faid too mucli ourfelves, is liberty.

already on this fubjecl, the philofophical meaning of the word Liberty being, in this place, out

of the queflion.

CHAP.
Of
member of

IX.

real demefnes*

EAch ing fuch,

with
ties
all his

devotes himlelf to
in

the community, In becomthe public

from that moment,

his pofTcffions

fuch a flate as he then

abilities,

is,

power and

of which

abili-

make

part.

Not

that in

confequence of

this al: the p^'fTeiTion changes' its

nature, by changing hands, and becomes afbual

property

3Q

A TREAT

E on the
;

property In thofe

of the fovereignty

but

as the

power of the community is incomparably greater

is in fa<ft

than that of an individual, the public pofTeflion more fixed and irrevocable, without

reigners.

being more lawful, at leaft with regard to foFor every Aate is, with refpeifl to its
all their poflTellions,

members, mafter of

by

vir-

tue of the fecial compaift, which, ferves as the bafis of all other rights

in a flate,
;

but, with

regard to other powers or

flates,

it

is

mafter of

them
which

only, by it derives

the right of prior occupancy,

from individuals.

The

right of prior occupancy, although

more

of the ftrongeft, becomes not an equitable right, till after the eftablifhment of property. Every man hath naturally a right to
real than that

every thing which is neceflary for his fubfiftence j but the pofitive a(ft by which he is made the
proprietor of a certain pofTeflion

excludes

him

from the property of any other. His portion being afligned him, he ought to confine himfelf to that, and hath no longer any right to a community of porfeiTion, Hence it is that the right
of prior occupancy, though but of little force in a Hate of nature, Is fo refpeflable in that of
fociety.

The

point to

which we

are chiefly diis

re(5led in the confideration

of this right,

ra-

ther

SOCIAL COMPACT.
ther what belongs to another, not belong to us.

31

than what does

To

neral terms,
ditions.

define the right of prior occupancy In geit is founded on the following conIt is requifite,

in

the

firfl

place, that

the lands in queflion fhould be unoccnpled ; fecondly, that no greater quantity of it fhould be

occupied than
the occupiers
feilion
;

is

necelfary for the fubfiflence of and, in the third place, that pofit,

(hould be taken of

not by a vain cere-

mony, but by

a6lual cultivation, the only

mark
titles,

of property, which, in defefl of juridical fhould be at all refpe(fted.

territory as

iirfl occupier a right to as much he may cultivate, and is neceffary to his fubfiflence, is certainly carrying the matter as far as is reafonable. Otherwife we know not

To

allow the

how
for a

to fet

bounds

to this right.

Is

it

fuificient

man

to fet foot

on an uninhabited

territory,

to pretend immediately an exclufive right to it ? Is it fufficient for him to have power enough at

one time to drive others from the fpot, to deprive

them
to
it
?

for ever afterwards of the right of returning

can a man, or even a whole people, themfelves of an immenfe territory, and poflefs exclude from it the refl of mankind, without

How

being

32

A T

Pv

E A

E ON the
fince, by mankind of an
;

being guilty of an

illegal

ufurpation

fo doing, they deprive the refl of

habitation, and thofe

means of

fnbfiflence,

which

nature hath given in common to them all ? Whea Nunez Balbao flood on the fea-Ihore, and, in

the name of the crown of Caftile, took pofTeffion of the Pacific Ocean, and of all South-

America, was this fufficient to difpoflefs all the inhabitants of thatvaft country, and exclude all the other fovereigns in the world ? On fuch a
fuppofition, the like idle ceremonie? might have

been ridiculouily multiplied, and his Catholic Majefly would have had no more to do, than to have taken
tries in

poffeiTion in his clofet of all the

coun-

the world, and to have afterwards only dedu(fted from his empire fuch as were before
pofTefTed

by other

princes.

It

is

eafy

to conceive,

how

the united and

become the tercontiguous manner the of the and in what ritory public, itfelf from the of fovereiguty, cAiending right
eftates of individuals

once both

fubj<^3 to the lands they occupy, becomes at real and perfonal; a circumftance

which

lays the

pofleflbrs

under a

flate

of the

greatefl dependence, and makes even

abilities

their

own
is

a fecurity for their fidelity.

This

an

advantage

SOCIAL COMPACT.
advantage which does not appear
duly attended
cients,
to,

33
been

to have

by fovereigns among the anftiling

who, by

themfelves only kings of

Scythians, the Macedonians, feemed to look on themfelves only as chief of

the Perfians, the

men, rather than as matters of a country. Modern princes more artfully flile themfelves the
kings of England, France, Spain, ^i-. and thus, by claiming the territory itfelf, are fecure of the
inhabitants.

What is very lingular in this alienation is, that the community, in accepting the poflellions of individuals, is fo far from defpoiling them thereof,

that,

on the contrary,

in fuch poireffions,

into an

a(fl:ual

only confirms them by converting an ufurpatioa right, and a bare pofleflion into a
it

real property.

The

pofiefTors alfo being confi-

dered as the depofitaries of the public wealth,

while their rights are refpetfled by all the members of the ftate, and maintained by all its force
againll

any foreign power,

fay,

may
thing

fo

by
ft ill

public, and

they acquire, if I a ccilion advantageous to the more fo to themfelves, every

it
:

they ceded by

to be eafily explained by the difiindlion

paradox which is made be-

tween the rights whicb the fovefeign and the

proprietor

S4

TREATISE

on

the
kta

proprietor have in the fame fund, as will be

hereafter.

It

may
;

alfo

happen, that men may form them-

felves into
feffions

a fociety, before they have any pofand that, acquiring a territory fufficient

may pofTefs it in common, or diamong them, either equally, or in fuch different proportions as may be determined by the fovereign. Now, in whatfoever manner fuch acquiHtion may be made, the right which each individual has to his own eftate, muft be alall,
it

for

they

vide

ways fubordinate

to the right

which the com-.

munity hath over the pofTeilions of all ; for, "without this, there would be nothing binding
in the focial tie, nor
cife

any real force in the exer-^ of the fupreme power.

I ihall ccid

this

ought

to ferve as the bafis of the

book, with a remark, whole

that
focial

fyftem : and this is, that, inftead of annHiilating the natural equality among mankind, the funda-

mental

compal

fublVitutes,

on the contrary, a

moral and legal equality, to make up for that natural and phyfical difference which prevails

among

individuals,

who, though uaecj^ual

in per-

fonal

SOCIAL COMPACT.
fonal flrength and mental abilities,
all

35

become thus

equal by convention and right *.

This equality, indeed, is under fome govern* ments merely apparent and delufive, ferving only ta keep the poor Hill in mifery, and favour the oppreffion of the rich.

And,

in faft, the laws are

always

ufeful to perfons of fortune,

and hurtful

to thofe

who

are
ciety

deftitute
is

whence

it

follows, that a ftate of fo-

when

advantageous to mankind in general, only they all pofTefs fomething, and none f ihcnv

have any thing too much.

The End

of the First

Book,

BOOK

3^

TREATISE
B O O K
C

on the

II.

H A P.

I.

Thai

the Sovereignty

is

unaTtenahle.

eftablifhad,

principles already that the general w/7/only can dire6l the forces of the flate agreeable to the end
is,

THE
of
its
j

firil:

and mofl important confequence

to be

drawn from the

original inflitution,

which

is

the

common

good

for, though the oppofition of private in-

terefts

neceffary,

might make the eftablilhment of focieties it muil have been through the coalifuch eftablifhment

tion of thofe interefts, that

became

poffible.

The

bonds of fociety muft

have been formed out of fomething

to

common

to

thofe feveral interefts, for, if there had been

no

point
ciled,

which they could have been reconfociety

no
it is

could poffibly have fubfified.

Now

only on thefe points that the govern-

ment of
I fay,

fociety

fhouldbe founded.

therefore, that

the fovereignty, being

only the exertion of the general will, cannot be alienated, and that the fovereign, which is only

a colle<^ive being, cannot be reprefented but by

itfelf
:

SOCIAL COMPACT.
itfelf
:

fj

the power of a people may be tranfmitted or delegated, but not their will.
It

may not be

abfolutely impoffible, that the

will of an individual (hould agree, in

ticular point,

fome par-

with the general will of a whole it is, however, impoffible, that fuch ; people be conftant and durable, for (hould agreement
the will of particulars always tends to make diftinctions of preference, and the general will to It is further flill more ima perfe(fl: equality.
poffible,
fubfif!:,

fuppofing fuch agreement might always

to have

as

it

any fecurity that it would do {o^ could never be the effecSt of art, but of

chance.

The

fovereign

may fay. My

will is

now

agreeable to the will of fuch an individual, or at leaft to what he pretends to be his will ; but it

cannot pretend to fay, I agree to whatever may be the will of fuch individual to-morrow ; as it
is

abfurd for the will to lay

itfelf

under any re-

ftraint regarding the future, and as it is impoffible for the will to confent to any thing contrary

to ithe intereft of the

being v/hofe will

it

is.

Should a people therefore enter into the engage-

ment of fimply promifing obedience, they would

lofe their quality, as a people,

and be virtually
there

difTolved

by

that very

acft.

The moment

exifts a rhafter,

there can be no longer a fovepolitic

reign, the

body

being thereby deflroyed.

I

would

38
I

TREATISE

ON
to

the

would not be underftood

mean, that the

orders of a chief

of the general In contradil> does not oppofe it. fuch a cafe, it is to be prelumed* from the uniat liberty to

may not pafs for the dilates will, when the fovereign, though

verfal filence of the people, that they give their

confent.

This

will be farther explained in the

end.

CHAP.
^at
the fovereignty
is

II.

indtviftble,

F OR
will
is

unalienable,

the fame reafon that the fovereignty is it is alfo indivifible ; for the
it

general *, or

is

not

it is

that of the

body of the people, or only that of a part. In the firft cafe, this will, when declared, is an a<f^ in the feof fovereignty, and becomes- a law
:

cond, only a particular will, or an afl of the and is at mofl a decree. magiflracy,
it is

But our

politicians, incapable

of dividing th
it

fovereignty in its firft principles, divide

in

its

not always neceflary

ceffary,

In order that this will Ihould be general, it Is it fhould be unanimous it is nc:

however,
;

that every individual

fhould

be

permitted to vote tke generality.

every formal exclufion infringing

objc^ 5

SOCIAL COMPACT.
obje<fl:
; they diftinguifh it into into a legiflative and executive

39

power and will ; power ; into the

of executing juftice, prerogatives of taxation, into departments of doand of making war Sometimes meftic and foreign adminiftration.
;

they blend all thefe confufedly together, and, at others, confider them as diftin<fl: and feparate,,

making out the fovereign to be a fantaftic compound, jufl as if they (hould compofe a man out of feveral bodies, of which one fhould have onanother arms, a third feet, and nothing of the jugglers in Japan, that more. and cut it into pieces in a take will child, they the of the prefence fpeflators, then, throwing its difmembered limbs one after another into
ly eyes,
It is faid

up

they are united, and the child defcends The legerdemain of alive, and well as before. refembles this trick modern our politicians greatly
the
air,

of the Japonefe; for they, after having difmem' bered the body politic with equal dexterity,
bring
all its parts
it

and reprefent

together by hocus pocus again,, the fame as before.

This error

arifes

from their not having form-

ed precife ideas of the fovereign authority, and from their miftaking the fimple emanations of
this authority, for parts of

for inftance, the

king peace are

its effence. Thus, als of declaring war and ma of foveufually regarded as als

reignty.

40

A TREAT

E ON the

relgnty, which they are not ; for neither of thefe afls are laws, but confifl: only of the application

of the law.

Each

is

a particular

a<5l,

determi-

nate only of the meaning of the law in fuch cafe, as will be feen more clearly, when the idea

attached
fettled.

to

the

word law

fhall

be'precifely

By
fions,

tracing, in like

manner, their other

divi-

we
;

(hall find,

that

we

taken, whenever

we

think

are condanily mifthe fovereignty di-

vided

and that the prerogatives, which are fup--

pofed to be parts of the fovereignty, are all fubordinate to it, and always fuppofc the predeter-

mination of a fuperior will, which thofe preroferve to put in execution. gatives only

It is impoflible to fay, in

how much

obfcurity

want of precifion hnth involved the reafonings c^ authors, on the fubjefl of political law, when they came to examine into the refpe(fiive rights of kings and people, on the principles
this

By turning to the third they had eftablifhed. of the firft book of Grotius,^. fourth and chapters
the reader
his

may

fee,

how

that learned author

and

tranflator,

Barbeyrac, bewildered and en-

in their tangled themfelves

own
or

fear of faying too

much

fophifms, through too Ihtle for their

iaterefts
clafli,

purpofe,

and of making thofe

which

SOCIAL COMPACT.
which
being
it

41

was

their bufinefs to reconcile. Grotius,

difllitisfied

with his

own countrymen, a

"ffuiJUM^

refugee in France, and willing to pay his court to Lewis XIII. to whom his book is dedicated,

fpared no art nor pains to ftrip the people of

their
privileges,

and

to inveft kings with preroalfo

^
licliOBif^,

gative.

Barbeyrac

wrote with

fimilar

view, dedicating his tranflation to George I. of But, unluckily, the expulfion of England.
II. which he calls an abdication, obliged him to be much on the referve, to turn and wind about, as he faw occafion, in order not to

James

make William
culties

III.

an ufurper.
vaniflied,

Had
all

thefe

two

writers adopted

true principles,

thefe diffi-

would have

and they would

have written confiftently 5 in fuch a cafe, however, they could only, in fober fadnefs, have told
the truth, and

would have paid

their court only

to the people. Now, to tell the truth, is not the way to make a fortune ; nor are ambafTadors

appointed, or places and penfions given away by the populace.

CHAP.

42

TREATISE
CHAP.

ON the

III.

JVhether the general IVill can he in the xvrong,

^
'Y

T T follows,
"*'

from what has been

faid, that

the

general Will is always in the right, and conftantly tends to the public good ; it does not fol-

low,

however,

that the

deliberations of

the

people will always be attended with the fame recare ever defirous of our own good, titude.

We

but
fifts.

we do

A whole

not always diftinguifh in what it conpeople never can be corrupted,

fndii ?W*f

^^^^

jflaJcy*^

^^

^^^^ ^"^y ^^^^

^^^y "^^y be often miflaken, and it is in fuch ^^^y appear to feek their own

'6i*f^^^

difadvantage.

There
tween the
ral will

is

often a confrderable difference be-

will of all the

members and the gene;

of the whole body

only the

common

the latter regards intereft, the other refpefVs the

is

private intereft of individuals, and

the aggrebut,
if

>rA>
1/ y,

*.

j^fn

S^^^^ ^^^
.take

f ^^^^'^
this

particular wills;

we

JticsJ^ *AC^

thofe contradicftory wills that mutually deftroy each other*, the fum of tlie

from

fum

**7/

remaining differences

is

the general will.

Ea:}} interej^y fnys the

Marquis d'A. has

a

different

trinciphs..

A coalition betaven

tviO particular interefts

third.

tnay

he forn:d, out of oppoJi:ion to that of

He

might

SOCIAL COMPACT.
If a people, fuffidently

43

Informed of the natheir

ture of the

fubje<5i:

under

confideration,

fliould deliberate,

without having any communi-

cation with each other, the general will would always refult from the greater number of their
little

differences,
as
it

and

their

deliberation

would

be fuch

into cabals,

ought and form

to be.

But when they enter

at the partial aflbciations,

expence of the general one, the will of each of thefe affociations becomes general, v/ith regard
to the particular
felf,

members of each, and,

regard
it

in it-

particular, with

to the flate.

la

fuch a cafe, therefore,

may

be faid, there is

no longer
ly as

as

many

voters as individuals, but on-

many

voices as there are affociations.

The

differences then become lefs numerous, and give a lefs general refult. Again, fhould one of thefe
fo great, as to influence all partial affociations be the refl, the refult would no longer be the fum

of many little differences, but that of one great one; in which cafe, a general will^would^ ^^^.jh^ no longer fubfifl.

n^ t^ ^

of all is formed inight have added, that a coalition Were there oiu of oppofuion to the intereft of each.
different and clafhing intertfh, th .t of the whole would be hardly dilVmguifhable, as it would meet All things would go regularly on with no obftacle. of their own accord, and civil policy would ceafe to

DO

be an

art.

It

44

TREATISE
may be
dliflated

ON the
order that each re-

It is requl/ite, therefore, in

by the general will, no fuch partial foci eties fhould be formed in a for fi^tH^ <i^i% flate, and that each citizen (liould think yAU/,*<^f**^himfeIf *. Such was the fublime inftitution of
folution that

^^^Uilli'f^.

the

great

cieties

Lycurgus. muft and will

But,
exifl,

if
it

fuch partial fois

then expedient

to multiply their number, and

equality, as

prevent their in-

Servius,

was done by Solon, Numa, and Thefe are the only falutary precautions

that can be taken, in order that the general will

may be

properly informed, and the people not be miftaken as to their true intereft.

CHAP.
Of
F
the
the limits
flate,

IV.

of the foverctgn power*

or the city, be a mere moral whofe life depends on the union of perfon, its members, and. if the moft important of its concerns be that of its own prefervation, it

* Vera cofa

e,

fays Machiavel, che alcuni divifi

oni nuocono alle republiche, e alcune giovano : quelle nuocono che fono dalle fetre e da partigiani accom-

pagnate
giani
fi

quelle giovano che fenza fette, fenzapartimanrengono, Non potendo adunque provedere un fondatored*una republica che non fiano nimicizle in quella, ha da proveder almeao che non vifia:

no

fette,

Hiil. Fiorent,

1.

vii.

fhould

SOCIAL COMPACT.
in

45

/hould certainly be poflelTed of an unlverfal compulfive force,, to move and difpofe each part
fuch a manner as
all.
is

mod

conducive to the

good of

As nature hath given every man an abfolute power over his limbs, to move and dire6l them at pleafure, fo the focial compact
gives to the
all its

body politic an abfolute power Qver members, and it is this power which, direfled by the general will, bears the name, as I have already obferved, of the fovereignty.
But, befides
this public perfon,

we are

to

conit

lider farther the private perfons of

which

is

compofed, and whofe

rally

life

and

liberty are natu-

independent of

it.

We

come

nov/, there-

fore, to

a proper diftin<Slion between the and the foverefpecSiive privileges of the citizens the well as as between the *, obligations reign

make

former

lie

under

as

fubje(fts,

and the natural

rights they claim as men.

It is agreed, that what an individual alienates of his power, his poHeiTion, or his liberty, by the focial compa^, is only fuch parts of them

whofe

ufe

is

of importance to

the

community j
accufe

* Be not

in hafle,

attentive reader, to
I

me

cannct avoid the feeming contradi(5lion in terms, from the native poverty of the
here of contradilion.

Imguage.

But have a

little

patience.

but

46
but
is
it

TREATISE
alfo,

on the
that the fovefeigui

mufl be confefTed

the only proper judge of this importance.

to perform all the fervices of to a flate, whenever the be poflibly demands them but the fovereign, on ; fovereign
citizen
Is

bound

he can

his part,

jefl that

is

cannot require any thing of the fubufelefs to the community ; he cannot

even be defirous of fo doing ; for, under the laws of reafon, nothing can be produced without a caufe, any more than under the law of na
ture.

engagements, in which we are bound to the body of fociety, are obligatory, only becaufe

The

they are mutual

and

their nature

is

fuch

that

we

cannot, in difcharging them, labour for the good of others, without, at the fame time, la-

bouring for that of ourfelves.

deed,
is it,

Wherefore, in-

that the general will is always in the right, and that all conflantly defire the good of each, unlefs it be, becaufe there is no one that

does not appropriate the term each to himfelf,

and who does not think of his own intereil, in voting for that of all ? This ferves to prove alfo, that an equality of privilege, and the notion of
juftice
it produces, are derived from that preference which each naturally gives himfelf, and of

courfe from
I

the very nature of

man

that the

general

SOCIAL COMPACT.
general will, to be fo in its
that
it

47

in

order to be truly fuch, ought efFecH:, as well as in its efTence ;

ought to flow from all, in order to be applicable to all ; and that it mull: lofe its natural
redlitude,

when

it

tends to any individual

and

determinate obje(5^ ; becaufe judging, in fuch a cafe, of what is foreign to ourfelves, we have

Eo

real principle

of equity for our guide.

In

fa(l:,

particular

facSl

no fooner do we come to treat of a or privilege, on a point which

has not been fettled by a general and prior conIt is vention, than the affair becomes litigious.
a procefs, in which the particulars interefted are

one party, and the public the other but in which I fee no law to decide, nor judge to de;

It would be abfurd, termine. therefore, in fuch a cafe, to think of referring it to any exprefs decifion of the general will, which could be no

other than the deciiion of one of the very parties ; and therefore muft be, with regard to the
other,
foreign and partial, leaning to injuftice, In the fame manner, alfo, andfubje6l to error. that a partial and particular will cannot reprefent the general will, fo the latter, in its turn,

changes

its

nature,

when employed on

a parti-

cular objel,

and cannot,

in its general capacity,

pronounce concerning any particular man or fa6l. Thus, when the people of Athens, for inftance,
took

48

TREATISE

on the

to decree

took upon them to appoint or cafhier their chiefs, honours to one, and infliil pains and
exercifed indifcriminately
all

penahies on another, and thus, by numerous

decrees,

the

ads

of government, they had then, properly fpeakno general will at all: the Athenian ing,
people, in this cafe, did not
a(5l

in the capacity

of fovereign, but

in that

of magiftrate.

This
notions

may

appear contradictory to the

I

common

of things, but plain mine.

mufl be allowed time to ex-

We

may

learn

hence,

that the general will

votes,

confifts lefs in the

number of

than in
for,

the.

common

intereft that unites

them

in this

inftitution, every

to thofe conditions

one fubje6is himfelf neceiTarily which he impofes on others

:

hence the admirable conformity between interefl and juftice, which ilamps on public declarations
that characteriftic of equity, which we fee va^ nilh in the difcuiTion of particular fubjefls, for

want of that common intereft which unites and. makes the criterion of the judge the fame with
that of the party.

In what manner foever

arrive principle, we always fion, viz. that the fecial

we

recur to the

fir ft

at the

fame conclueftablifhes

compafl

fuch an equality among the

citizens, that all lay

themfelves

SOCIAL COMPACT.

49

'themfelves under the fame obligations, and ought all to Thus, from enjoy the fame privileges.

the very nature of this compa6l, every a6t of fovereignty, that is to fay, every authentic a (51 of
is equally obligatory on, or fathe to, citizens, without diftlncftion ; in fo much that the fovereign knows only the whole

the general will,

all

vourable

body of the
individuals

nation, but diflinguidies none of the

then is pronot an agreement made between a fuperior and an inferior, but a convention between a whole body with each of
it.
?

who compofe

What

perly an

a<ft

of fovereignty

It is

its

becaufe founded

members, which convention is a lawful one, on the focial contra6t it is

;

equitable, becaufe
ful,

it is

common

to all;

it is

ufe-

becaufe

it

general good j caufe fecured by the public flrength

can have no other object than the and it is foHd and durable, be-

and the fu'

preme power.
is owing only they pay in fa6b obedience to none but their own will, and to afk hov/ far

When

the fubmiilion of fubjec^ls

to fuch conventions,

the refpecSlive privileges of the fovereign and citizens extend, is to afk merely how far the latter

may

enter into engagements with themfelves, vix^ each individual with all collecflively, and allcollediively

with each individual.

Hence

so

TREATISE
fee,

on'

the

Hence we
folute,

that the fovcreign power, ab-

inviolable,

and

flicred

as

it

is,

neither

does nor can furpafs the bounds of fuch genera^ conventions, and that every man hath a riaht to

he pleafes, of that liberty and property which the terms oi fuch conventions have
dirpofe,
as
-left

to his

own

difpoCd

fo

that the

fovereign

hath not any right to Liy a greater burthen on one fubje61: than on another, becaufe, in fuch a

becomes a particular affair, fovereign hath no power to a6l.

cafe,
it

in

which the

Thefe

difllnfiions

being once admitted,

is

it

i'S

fo far from being true, that there

any

real re-

nunciation on

the

part of individuals,

when

they enter into the fecial compaf^, that their firaation becomes, by means of that very compa6l,

much
any

better than before

as,

inflead of

making

alienation,

they only make an

advantageotis

exchange of an uncertain and precarious mode

of fubfiftence, for a more fettled and determinate one ; they exchange their natural inde-

pendence, for

focial liberty,

the

power of

inju-

of fecuring themfelves from ring others for that their own natural flrength, which and injury; mif^ht be overcom.e by that of others, for a civil

power v;hich the focial union renders invincible. Their very lives, which they have by thefe -means
de~

SOCIAL COMPACT.
d-cvcted to the flate,

5^

are continunlly pi'pte<5lejd

are'
irs

;
'

and even when f hey

fclves
to.

bb%ed'

to expofe

them-

death, in

defence,

what do they

more than render back to foclcty what they have before received of it ? What do ihey more,
iriYifquii-fg

their

lives for

their
to

country, than

they woidd have been obliged

of nature

do more

frein

quently, and with mucli greater danger

f'ate
;

when,

fubje<fl taiatvitable outra-

ge^, they

would have been obliged

lies

to defend their
?

means of

fubfiftance at the hazard of their lives

That everyone
ing in

under the obligation of fightdefence of his country, is true ; but then

he

is

relieved by the laws

from the

neceffity

of

fighting to defend himfelf.

gainers, on
ritks,
tlie

And

are not

men

who!-?,

for

their

common

by running part of thofe fecurity, which they

mufl feverally run for themfelves,

deprived of 'that fecurity
?

were they

C
On

HA

P.

V.

capital puyiifi/nents.

hiUh been afked,

how

individuals, having
lives,

no right to difpofe of their own

tranfmit that right to the fovereign
?

can
diffi-

The

culty of rcfolving this qucPuon, ariies only

E) 2

from
i;.

52

A TREAT

E ON

th-e

its being badly exprefTed. Every man hath an undoubted right to hazard his Hfe for its prefervation. Was a man ever charged with fuicide, for throwing himfelf from the top of an houfe in flames, in

order to avoid being burnt? Was puted as a crime to a man, who

it

ever im-

away

at fea,

that

might be caft he knew the danger of the

?

voyage when he embarked

The

end of the
of
the

focial compa<5l,

is

the pre-

fervation

contrafling

parties.

Such,

'therefore, as

mufl afTent from fome dangers and lofTes. He that w^ould preferve his life at the expence of others, ought
to rifk
it

would reap the benefit of the end, to the means, which are infeparable

for

their
is

fafety

when

it is

necefTary.

Now,
ger to

no longer a judge of the danwhich the law requires him to be expofed :

the citizen

but when the prince declares that the good of the (late requires his life, he ought to refign it ; fmce it is only on thofe conditions he hath hitherto lived in fecurity, and his life is not folely the gift of nature, but a conditional gift of the flate.

punifhment of death infli6>ed on malefaftors may be confidered alfo in the fame point it is to of view prevent our falling by the
:

The

hands

SOCIAL
hrtnds of an aflafnn,

C
tbcU

M
we

P A C T.

53

confent to die, on
are io
treaty,
:

becoming fuch
enter into
to be
it

oiiifelves.
lives,

Wc
this

far

from

giving away our

by

th.at
is

we
net

only for our prefervation

.as't

prefumed that any one of the contra^ling parties formed therein a premeditated deiign to

get himfelf hanged.

Add
and

to this,

ing the laws of

that every malefasflor, by breakhis country, becomes a rel>el

traitor; ceafing,

from that time, to

be

.a

member
war
two
the flate

of the community,
it.

and even declaring

againft
is

In this cafe, the prefervation of

muA

incompatible with his; one of the and thus when a criminal is perifh
:

executed, he doth not fuiier in the quality of a His trial nnc? citizen, but in that of an enemy.
fentence are the evidence and declaration of his

having broken the focial compa(5f, and that, q confequence, he is no longer a member of the
flate.

Now,
by

as

at

leafl:

his refidence,

he had profefTed himfelf fuch, it is right that he (hould

befep.irated from the ftate, either by banilliment as a violator of the focial compact, or by death as
a

public

enemy

for fuch
is

an

enemy

is

not

i^

moral perfonage, he
this cafe

mere man, and it is In only that the right of war takes place of
a

killing

an enemy.

But,

54
Cut,
,

rA
it

Pv

E A

on the

may be
it

fald,

cihTiinal

is

a particular

ac^.

the condemuati'^a of a It is To, and for

that reafo'n
it

is

an

aci:,

for doing

does not belong to the fovcreign : which the fupieme power

authority, though
it

'may Confer the

ercife

cannot ex-

fuch authority itfelf. My ideas on thisare confiftcnt, though' I cannot explain fubje6l

them

all at

once.

It is to

be obferved, however, that the

is

fre-

qnency of ex'ecntions
is

always a
not be

Hgn

of the

"weaknefs or indolence of government.

no

malefa(5lor
:

who might

There made good

-fo-r

ic^mething

Nor

otight any perfon to be put

unlefs fuch

'to death, even by

as could not

way of example,

be preferved without endangering

the communit}\

With regard
their country,

-to

the prerogative

of granting

pardons to crimimVls,

condemned by the laws of

it

and fentenced by the judges,

belongs only to that power which is fuperior 'both to the judges and the laws, viz. the fove-

Not that it is very clear that reign authority. even the fupreme power is veiled with fuch a it right, or that the circumftances in which
might be exerted are frequent or determinate. In a well-governed fiate there are but few execulionsj

SOCIAL COMPACT.
lions
;

55

not becaufe rhere are

becaufe there, are a Hate is on the decline, the

many pardoned, but few criminals Whereas when

:

muliipiicity

of

crimes occafions their

R-oman republic, neither

fuls ever

Under the impunity. the Senate nor the Con-

the attempted' to grant pardons ; even did never this, although they fori^times people The frequency recalled their ov/a fentence.

of pardons indicates that in a fiiort time crimes will not ftand in need of them, and every one may
fee the

confequence of fuch conduct.

;

But

my

reiu<ftant heart reffrainsmy pen

let

us leave the
juH:

difculTion

of

thefe

queftions to the
cii.ninal,

man

u ho

liath never

been

and who never

Aijod hi need of pardon.

CHAP.
On

vr.

the law,

AVING
body

mven
it

exifience and

life to

the

politic,

by

a focial

compact,

we'

come now
tuie.
is

to give

a6lion and wiP, by a legiHa-

For the

primitive a^i,

by which fuch

formed, determines nothing as yet with body refpecl to the means of its prefervaiicn.

js

Whatever is ricrhl and conformable to order, fuch from the nature of things, independent

Q^

j6
of
all

A TREAT
human

E ON the
All juAIce
it
;

conventions.
is

comes

from God,

who

the fountain of

but could

we receive it immediately from fo fublime a fource, we ftiould fland in no need of government or

laws.

There

is

ing from reafon alone

this to

indeed an univerfal juflice fpring; but, in order to admit

take place

among mankind,
juflice

it

fhould be

reciprocal.

To

confider things as they appear,

we
to

find

the

maxims of

among mankind,
a natural

be vain and

fruitlefs, for

want of

fupportj they tend only to the advantage of the wicked, and the difadvantage of the juil:, while
the latter obferves them in his behavour to others* but no body regards them in their condufl to him. Laws and conventions, therefore, arc
neceflary in order to unite duties with privileges, and confine juftice to its proper obje(51:s. In a

of nature, where every thing is common, to thofe I have promifed nothing; I acknowlege nothing to be the property of anfiate

owe nothing

In a f^ate other, but Vv'hat is ufelcfs to myfelf. of fociety the cafe is different, where the

rights

of each are fixed by law.

We
what
is

come
law.

at

length,
as

therefore, to conllder

So long

we

content ouifelves

with the metaphyfical idea annexed to this term, we mufl talk unintelligibly and though we
;.

fhould

SOCIAL COMPACT.
fliould

57

come
I

to a -definition of natural law,

we

fhould not
law.
will

know thence any thing more of political have already faid there can be no general In faft relative to a particular objeft.

every particular object muft be within or withIf without, a will that is foreign, out the (late.

and if the cannot with regard to it be general the within be it a part muft make flate, objecfl: in which cafe there arifes between the of it
;
:

-whole and the part, a relation that conftitutes

two feparate beings, one of which

is

the part,

and the whole wanting fuch part, is the other. But the whole wanting fuch part, is not the
whole, and fo long as that relation fabhfls, there is no whole, but only two unequal parts whence the will of the one is no longer it follows that
:

general \vith regard to that of the other.

But when

whole people decree concerninfr

a whole people, they confider only their whole body; and, if it then forms any relation, it muft be between the entire object conlidered in

one point of view, and

fidered in another

the entire objecfl con-

point of view, without any divifion of the whole. In this cafe, the matter

of the decree

is

g^neraP as the will that decrees

call a

Sue It is the

a^fl

whichi

law.

I> 5

When

.58
,

A
V/hen
I

TREATISE.
I

ON the
is

fay that the object of the laws

al-

ways general,
.

mean

that -the

law confiders the

body, and their actions but never concerns itfelf with inabllracflediy, dividual perfons, nor particular actions. Thus
fubje61s in a colle6live

the Law

may decree

certain

privileges,

but
:

it

cannot befiow them on particular perfons the law may conftitute feveral claiTes of citizens,

and
.

affign even the qualities to

which may
;

entitle

them

rank in thefe

clafies

but
to

it

cannot noadmitted

minate fuch or fuch perfons

therein
^

be

It

may

eflabliili

legal

and appoint an hereditary

.

fucceffion, but

government, it can-

not

make choice of
in a

a king, nor appoint the royal

family

; word, every function that relates to an individual object, doth not belong to the le-

giflative

power.
things in this light,
it is

Taking
feen
to

it is

immediately
it is

how
;

abfurd
?

to afk in

whofe power

make laws
is

will

of the general or whether the prince be above the laws ?

as they are
a(fts

as he
it is

but a

member

of the

fl:ate.

Hence

alfo,

plain, the law cannot be unjuft, as nothing

to itfelf;
as alfo

can be unjuft
free,

what

it

is

to be

and

at

the fame time fubjedt to the laws>

as

the

laws are only the records of our

own
It

will.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
It is

59

hence farther evident, the law re-uniting

its

the univerfality of the will to that of

that whatever
ever,

objeft

an individual, of what rank fohis

may
:

decree of

own

head, cannot be

law

indeed, whatever

the fupreme

power

itfelf
is

ordain concerning a particular obje<5l not a law, but a fimple decree ; it is not an

may

a(5l

of the fovereignty, but of the magiltracy.

I call every flate, therefore, which is governed by laws, a Republic, whatever be the form of its adminlftration ; for in fuch a cafe only,
it is

the public interefl that governs,

is

and what-

ever

public

is is

fomething.
republican
*.

Thus
I

every lawful
explain

government
hereafter

fiiall

what

mean by

a government.

The

laws are,

flri(flly

fpeaking, only the con-

ditions of civil fociety.

*

The

people

who

fub-

do not here mean, by the term republican, either

;

an ariftocracy or democracy

but in general every go-^

vernment influenced by the general will of the people, which is the law. To make a government legal, it is not necefTary that it fhould be confounded with the
fovereign,

but that

it

fhould

be
is

the

minifter

fo

that in this fenfe even a

will be

monarchy

a republic*

This

more

fully explained in

the fubfequent book,

mit

6o

TREATISE
it

on

tke

mit to them fhould therefore be the authors of

them

as

parties, to

fettle

certainly belongs to the afTomting the conditions on which

they

But agree to form a fociety. be fettled ? is it to be done by

how are common

they to

confent

or by a fudden infpi ration ? hath the body politic an organ by which to make known its will i
it with the necefTary prefcience determinations, and to- publifn them before-hand, or how fhall it divulge them in the

who
to

{hall furnifh
its

form

time of need

who

they cute an enterprize

that of a

how fliall an ignorant multitude^ know not what they chufe, becaufe feldom know what is for their good, exe?

often

(o great

and

fo

difficult as

fyftem of legiflature ? neceiliirily be defirous of their

people muTt own good, but

confifls.

they do not always fee in what

general will
is

it

The

always
it

in

the

right,
is

but the

judgment by which
fufficiently

is

directed
is

not always
it

informed.

It

necellary

fliould

fee objefls fuch as they are,

and fometimes fuch

fhould be direfJed

as they

ought to appear
it

it

to the falutary end

would purfue, fhould be

fecured from

the

fedu6iion of private intereHs,

fhould have an infight into the circumftances of time and place ; and fhould be enabled to
fet

and perceptible advantages of the diilant and concealed evil things, againil
the prefent
that

SOCIAL COMPACT.
that

65
(cq

may
good

attend them.
Vv'hich

Individuals often
;

the

they rejecl
it is

the public

is

de..

Both incapable to fee. the former f\and equally, in need of a guide fhould be compelled to conform their defires ta
firous of that
:

which

reafon,

and the

latter

Ihould be inllrufled in the

It is thus uom the difcovery of what it defires. of the that there reinformation public, proper

fults

an union of the undcrilanding and the will

of
focicty,
its

in the body

and thence the exa6l

concurrence of
greated: force

parts,

and

in

the end
arifcs

the

of the whole.

Hence

the

aecelTrcy of a legiflator.

CHAP.
Of
r*!^
the genius

VII.
legiJJator,

and char a Her of a

thofe

invefligate

conditions of

fociety

which may beft anfwer the purpofes of JL Bations, would require the abilities of fome fuperior intelligence,

who

fiiould be witnefs to all

the palTions

of men, but
fhould

be

fubjedi:

itfelf

to

none;

who
it

have no

conne(?iion

with

human

nature, but (liould have a perfefl

;

know-

fliort, whofe happilege being, nefs fhould be independent of us, and who

of

in

would

62

A
is

TREATISE

ON the
ours *.

would neverthelefs employ

.

itfelf .-feoiit

It

the province of

Gods indeed

to

make laws

for

men.
fame argument which Caligula made ufe
of fa6t, Plato himfelf employs, in when he goes about to de-

The
of,

in point

civil or royal perfonage, in treating of But if it be certain that a great prince a king. is a perfonage rarely to be met with, what is

point of fine the

right,

that of a great legillator

The

former hath nothe

thing more

to

do than

to follow

model de-

The one is the mechanical figned by the latter. the machine, the other only genius who invents the workman who puis it into execution. In
the

commencement of
it

focieties,

fiys

Montef-

the principal perfons in republics quieu, which form their inftitution ; and afterwards it
is is

the iniVitution

which forms the

chiefs of re-

publics.

He who
litic,

fhould undertake to form a body poought to perceive himfelf capable of work-

in ing a total change

human

nature

of tranffolitary

forming every individual, of himfelf a

*

Nanons become famous only

as their

legiHature

declines.

The

inftitution

for Spartans happy Greece.

Lycurgus made the ages before they were famous in

of

and

SOCIAL

iM

A C

T.

63

and independent being, into a part of whole, from which fuch individual is
in one fenfe his
life

a greater to receive

and exigence

he muft be

of the man, capable or altering the conflitution in order to flrengthen it ; and to fubfiitute a
partial

and moral exigence

in

the

room of

that

exiftence which we phyfical and independent In a word, of Nature. hands the receive from

he muft be able
tural
abilities,

to deprive

man

of his

nafo-

in

order

to

invefl

him with

which he cannot makeufe of withreign powers The more fnch out the affiftance of others.
natural
force
is

annihilated

and

extin(n:,

the

and more durable are thofe which are greater the more perfefl and folid is the acquired, and
focial inflitutlon.

So that

if

each citizen be

effedl nothing but by the exnothing, and can igence and afliftance of all the refl:, and that the force acquired by the whole body be equal, or

fuperior, to the
its

fum of the

natural forces of

all

individuals, the legiflature

have reached
it is

may be faid to the higheft pitch of perfection

capable 10 attain.

The
edly
{o
fo,

legiflator

is

in

every refpecft a mofl exIf

traordinary perfon in a flatc.

he be undoubthe
is

on account of
his fun<5iion.

his genius,

not

lefs

from

Yet

this is

not that of the

ma-

64

TREATISE
the

on the

maglfiratc or

which
into

conftitutes

That fiintR ion fovereign. the republic, doth not enter

It
is,

its

conllitution.

on the contrary,
that hath
:

a particular and fuperior

in

employment

common with human government nothing for if he who hath the command over the citizens, fliould not be entrufled with the command over the laws, he who hath the power over the laws,
ought
tizens
:

as little to
for

have the power over the

ci-

otherwife, his laws, being made inilrument;il to his pafHons, would often ferve to
it

were

perpetuate his injuftice, and he could never prevent pa-iticular views from altering his fyflem.

When Lycurgus gave laws to his country, he It was the began by abdicating the throne. cuflom of molt of the Grecian cities to entrult
their

eflablifhment

that hath

been

with flrangers ; a cuflom often imitated by the modern

:

republics of Italy

that of
in

Geneva did the fime,

it

and found
* Thofe

its

account

*.

In

the mod:
theoloein:

who
little

confidcr Calvin only as a

The comprehenfive genius. digefl of cur laws, in which he had a confderable (hare, do him as much honour as his religious ilcm and what revolution foever time may sf:cCt f)
knew
but

of

his

in

our public vvorihip, tlie memory of this greu man wil! continue to be revered To long as patiiotifm and a fenfe of liberty furvive among us.
flo.urifii

SOCIAL COMPACT.
llourlfhing age of

6?
:?

Rome,

that

city fuffered

unitfelf

der flagitious

a<51s

of tyranny, and beheld

on the brink of ruin, for having entruHed the Sovereign power and the legiflative authority ia
the fame hands.

^^durt'dl
^

Even the decemviri themfelves, however, never afllimed the right of pafling any law merely

on

their

own

authority.

NAh'ing that

we

pro-

pofe,

faid they to the people, can pafs into a law wiih-Ait your Be yourfelues, ye Romans^ confent. the authors laws en which

of

thcfe

your happ'mefs

depends.

The leglQator, therefore, who digefls the laws, fliould have no right to make them pafs
for fuch
;

inclined to

nor indeed can the people, though do it, deprive themfelves of that in:

communicable right

becaufe, according to the. fundamental compaif^, it is the general will only that is obllgatojy on individuals, and it is im-

poflible to be afTured that any particular will is conformable to the general, till it be fubmitted to on the free fufFrage of the people. I have faid
this before,

but perhaps have not unnecefTarlly

Jicpeated

it.

Thu-3

66

A T REA T
Thus
la the bufinefs

on the

of a legifiaturc,

we

Find

things apparently incompatible ; fuperior to human abilities, carried into execution by an. authority

two

a dtfign

which

is-

nothing.
attention

Another

difficulty

which merits

is,

.that -wife Tiien,

in talking their

the vulgar, fpeak are many kinds of ideas which

to

own language to And yet there unintelligibly.

it

is

impofTible

convey in the language of the people.

their

Views

too general, andobjei5ts too diilant, are equally

beyond
reiifning

comprehenfion ; the individual, no other plan of government than that

conducive
to
his to

which
with

is

private intereft,
fee

is

difficulty

which are
checks he

to

brought be deduced from the continual

receive

thofe advantages

may

from falutary laws.

In

order to give the found maxims of policy, and induce them to follow the fundamental rules of fociety, it
Is

a newly- formed people a tafie for

neceflary

that

the effect fnould in a

;

become the caufe

iliould be the
to

that the fpirit of union

manner which

efte(fi:

of foclal inflltutlons fliould

inftitution itfelf,

prefide

form that

and that

men
as

(liould

be fuch before the laws are made

are deilgned to

the laws

make them.

For

this reafon therefore, the legiHator being capa-

ble of employing neither force nor

argument, he

SOCIAL COM? A
he
is:

C T.

67

of neceffity obliged to recur to an autho-

of an higher order, which may compel without violence, and pcrfuade without convicftion. Hence it is that the founders of narity

fA

tions

have
to the

been

recur

ages, obliged, intervention of celeflial powers,

their

in

all

to

and have honoured

wifdom,
in

gods wiih their

own

order that the

tins themfelves

people, by fubmitto the laws of the Ilate in the

fame manner
leging the
city
as

as to thofe of nature,

and acknow-

fvtrac

power

in

the formation of the

more

the formation of man, might bend freely, and bear more traflably the yoke
in
felicity.

of obedience and public

Now
fon,

the determinations of that fublime reafoars

which

above the comprehenfion of

vulgar minds, are thofe

into the

which the

legiflator puts

mouths of

his

immortal perfonages,

in order to influence thofe

which could not be

prudence.
It

by a divine authoiity, by maxims of human does not belong to every man,

led

however, to make the gods his oracles, nor even to be believed when he pretends lobe their
interpreter.

The

comprehenfive genius of the

leghlator, is: the miracle that proves the truth of his. miflion. Any man -may engrave tables of
Ifone, hire

an oracle^ pretend to a fecret communica-

68

A TREAT
in his

E ON the
teach
a

municatlon uith fome deity,

bird

to

whifper

ear, or hit

to impofe on

a people.

upon But he who knows no-

other devices^

thing more, though he may be lucky enough to get together an aflembly of fools and madmen,
will never

lay

the foundations of an Empire

the fabrick raifed by his extravagance prefcntly

falling

and often burying him in its tranfitory union may be formed from
connections
;

ruins.
flight

A
and

futile

nothinfr but

the didfates of

wifdom, hov/ever, can render it durable. The Jewilh law, ilill fubfifting, and that of the fon of
Ifmael,

hath governed world, are (landing proofs of the fuperior genius of thofe great m.en by whom they were dicftated and though the vanity of phifor ten centuries

which

half the

iofophy, and

the blind prejudice of party fee

their
charaiflers

nothing O

in

but fortunate im-

poftors, the true politician admires, in their re-

fpeflive

inflitutions,

that

fagacious

and

com-

prehen.five power of mind which muft ever lay the lalling foundation of human eflablidiments.

muftnct, from all this, be concluded, however, that religion and government have, in our times, as Warburton alleges, one common obIt
je(5f

but. only jhat in the firfl eftabliiliment of focietiesj the one was made inftrumental to the
;

ether.

C H A

P-

SOCIAL COMPACT.

69

CHAP.
Of

VIII.

the people,

\
*^^

S the archlte^l, before he begins to raifc an edifice, examines into the ground
he
is

%vhere

to

lay

the foundation,

that he

may be
weight

able to judge whether it will bear the of the fuperflrufture \ fo the prudent

legiflator

falutary

does not begin by making a digell of laws, but examines firfl whether the

people for whom fuch laws are deilgned, arc It was for this capable of fupporting them. reafon Plato refufed to give laws to the Arcadians

and Cyrenians, knowing they were rich and luxurious, and could not admit of the inIt was for trodu(5lion of equality among them.
this reafon that

Crete, though

it

boafted
;

laws, was inhabited

by fuch bad men

to

good Minos

had only endeavoured

govern a people already

Various have been the nadepraved by vice. tions that have made a dillinguiflied figure in

have not been capable of being governed by good laws ; and even thofe who were capable of being fo governed, continued fo but a
fliort time.

the world, and yet

Nations,

as well as
:

individuals, are docile only in their inf^incy

they

be.

70

TREATISE

o?i

the

become
have

cuftoms are
rous and

When Incorriglbje as they grow old. once ertabiilhed and prejudices

among them,
it

taken root

is

a dange-

fruitlefs

enterprize to attempt to re-

form them.
their vvounds

people cannot even bear to have probed, though in order to be

but refemble thofe weak and cowardly fhudder at the Tight of their phypatients fician. Not, but that fomctimcs, as there are

cured

who

diftempers which affe6l the brain of individuals and deprive them of the capacity of remembering what is pad", there happen in ftates fuch revolutions as province the fame effefl on a peowhen the horror of the paft fupplies the ple,
place of oblivion,

and the
v/ars,

flate,
rifes

inflamed and
if
I

exhaufied

by

civil

again,

may
re-

fo exprefs myfelf, out of

its

own

aHies,

and

afTumes

the vigour of youth in forfaking the This was the cafe with Sparta arms of death.
in the

time of Lycurgus, and of Rome after the Tarquins-; and fuch hath been the cafe in mov/iih

dern times

Holland and Switzerland after

But thefe events the expulfion of their tyrants. are fuch are rare ; and exceptions as have their
caufe in the particular conflitution of the flate They cannot even take place twice excepted. among the fame people: for though they may

be made free when they are only barbarous and

un-

SOCIAL COMPACT.
uncivilized
;

71

yet,

when

the refources of fociety

are exhauiled, In that they cannot be renewed. faction revolutions canbut cafe, may deftroy,

not re-eflablifli their freedom

j they require for ever afcer a mafter, and .not a deliverer. Every

free

people, therefore, fliould

that
tho' nations

remember

this

may acquire liberty, yet if once this inellimable acquifition is loft, it

is

maxim,

abfolutely irrecoverable.

There

is

in

nations, as well as individuals,

a term of maturity, at which

they (liould be

permitted to arrive before they are fubjc(fl:ed to laws. This term, however, is not always eafy
to

be

known

and yet

if it

be anticipated

it

may be of dangerous confequence. Again, one people may be formed to difcipline in their infancy.; while
fiibjeflion
till

another
after

may not be many centuries.

ripened for

The

Ruf-

fians, for inflance, will never

be truly polidied
Peter

becaufe they were difciplined too foon.

;

had only an imitative turn he had nothing of that true genius, whofe creative power forms

Some of his meafures, things out of nothing. indeed, were proper enough, but moft of them were ill-timed or ill-placed. He faw that his
fubjcds were mere barbarians, but he did not
fee

72
fee
lite.

A TR E
that they

x^

E ON the
made pofliould

were not

ripe for being

He wanted

to civilize

them, when he

only have checked their brutality.

to

He wanted

make them,
whereas

at once,

Germans and Englifh

;

men,
vented

he ought to
firfl

making them
otherwife

Ruffians

have begun by and thus he pre-

his fubje6ts

from ever becoming what

fuading them
not.
It is

might have been, by perthey were fuch as they were thus a French tutor forms his pupil
they
for

make a make none

to
to
Its

figure in his child-hood, ever afterwards. The

it

and

to

Empire

of Ruffia, while

is

am.bitious of reducing ali

will

Europe
itfelf.

its

fubje6lion,

be

fubjefted

neighbours, the Tartars, will in time This event both its mafters and ours. become ^^^i*^i<^
ffY

yCitu/'
'

feerns

to

me

inevitable;
acSl,

all

the monarchs

in

Europe

feeming to

in concert,

to accelerate

fuch a revolution.

C H A

P.

IX.

The fubjeJf ccniinied,

the fame manner as nature
the IN

hath limited

dimenfions

of

well-

formed human

body, beyond which flie produces only giants or dwarfs, fo in the body poUtic there are
limits^

SOCIAL COMPACT.
Um'its,

73

within or beyond which

a (late

to be confined or

extended

to the

ought not end that it

may not be
little to
is

too big to be well governed, nor too

irs

maintain

own

independency.
a

in

every
it

body

politic

There maximum of force

it

which

cannot exceed, and from which

its

often

dominion. recedes by extending the focial knot is extended, the

The more
more lax
is it

grows

and

in

general, a

little

ft

ate

always,

proportionably Wronger than a^reat one.

A
of

this

thoiifand reafons might be given in fupport maxim. In the fir^ place, the admini-

Aration of government
difficult as the

becomes aJways more

the feat of
it

difiance from
as

in-

creafes,

even
at the

body

has

the

greatefl:

end of the longeO: \&\ev. It be* comes alfo m.ore burthenfome in proportion as it is divided into parts ; for every town hath

weight

firfl;

its

own

of each
ple
;

diflri'fl

particular government to pay ; that again is paid by the fame peo-

next that of the

province, then

that

of
all

particular governments with their viceroys, of whom are to be paid as they rife in

dignity,

and always
people
J

at

whom,
iifelf

niftration

the expence of the unhappv laft of all, the fuprcme adsnicru(hes with the whole wcirrht
It
is

of

its

oppreHion.

impoilible

{o

many
need^

74

TREATISE
charges (hould
the people

on
tend

the
eontinually
(o
far

needlefs
to

not
;

impoverifh

who,

from

^MU ^^ ^*^7
\.^^
y

being
^'^

better governed

by

ihefe

different ranks

^^^*

'J

fo, than if they ^^ ^^^^^' of governors in the flate. And yet with this multiplicity of rulers, they are far from being furniihed with proper re-

fnperiors, are

much worfe

^^^ ^"^

fources

for extraordinary

occafions

but,

oa

the contrary,
to

when they have

flate
is

occafion to recur

them, the

always on the brink of

rum
Nor
is

this all

the government not only bea^flive

Jfd^

comes
laws

Itfs

vigorous and

in

putting the

removing private opprcfTion, correcting abufes, or preventing the fediiious enterprifes of rebellion in diflant provinces j

in execution,

whom
for

but the people have lefs affecfion for their chiefs, they never have an opportunity to fee ;
their

country, which to them

;

is

like

the

whole world

and for their fellow-fubjefts, of

which the greater part are utter Grangers. The fame laws cannot be convenient for fo many various people of dilferent manners, and climates,

and

who

cannot be fuppofed to

live

equally happy under the fame form of govern-

ment.

And

yet different laws

mufl occafion

much

SOCIAL COMPACT.
much
who,
trouble

75

and confufion among people,

and living under the fame adminiftration, a on intercourfe, frequently perpetual carrying
change
their habitations, inter-

marry with each

other, and, being educated under different cuftoms, hardly ever know when their property
is

fecure.

Great talents He buried, virtue

lives

obfcured, and vice prevails with impunity, amidfl; that multitude of Grangers, which dock i:ogether round
the

chief

feat

of

adminiftraiion.

7'he principals, overwhelmed with a multiplicity of bufinefs, can look into nothing themfelves ; the government of the Aate being left
to their

meafures to

In a word, the deputies and clerks. -be taken, in order to maintain the

general authority, on which fo many diftant olHcers are ever ready to encroach or impofe
engrofs
ii

the

public attention

there

is

none of

employed about {he happinefs o^ the people, and indeed hardly any for their dethus it is, that a body too fence in cafe of need
left to

be

unwieldy for

its
its

conftitution

grows

debilitated

and fmks. under

own

weight.

On

on fome
to refifl

the other hand, a (late ought to be fixed bafis, to fecure its folidiiy, to be able
thofe fiiocks

which
2

it

v/ill

not

fail

to
it

encounter,

and

to

make

thofe efforts

which

will

7.6

TREATISE
all

on tke

will find

Nniions have

independence. of centrifugal force by u'hich they a6f continually againil each other,
a kind
like the vortices of Defcartes,

nei:eflary to maintain its

and tend,
bours.

toagsran-

dize ihemfelves at the expence

I'hus the weak

of their neighrun in danger of being

prefently fwallowed up by the ftrong ; nor is there any fecurity for them, but by keeping themrclves in^quilibrio \\iLh the reA, and makon.every fide equal. iitg the compreiiion

Hence we
extend, and ftate ; nor is
lity to

fee

it

is

prudent

in

fome

cafes

to

in others to refirnin, the limits of a

it

one of the

lead: arts in civil

po-

diflinguifh
fix

between one and the other,

to

iind

to

on that advantageous
the

which tends mofl

Hate.

prefervation

proportion of the

It may be obferved in general, that the reafons for extending dominion, relating to ob-

je6\s external

and

relative,

ought
it,

to be fubor-<

dinate to thofe for .contracting are internal and abfolute.

conftitution
is

whofe objefls
and vigorous
confidered,

A found
is

the

firfl

thing to be
to be

and

much

greater reliance

made on

good government, than on the refources which .are to be drswn from an extenfive territory.

Not

SOCIAL COMPACT.
Not but
il:ates (o

77
of

that

there

have been

inftanccs

conftitiUed,

that the necefTity of their

makuig conquel^s hath

been

eiTential

to

their

It is pofilble alfo they might very conftitution. felicitare themfelves on that happy neceflity,

which pointed out, nevertheJefs, with the lummit of their grandeur, the inevitable moment of their fail.

C H A
The
fuIjeSf

P.

X.

continued,

HE
territory,

taken

magnitude of two ways

;

body

politic

may be
;

viz.

by the extent of

certain proportional relation

a and the number of the people between them conIt is

/lituting the real greatnefs of a ftate.

the

people which form the flate, and the territory which aiiords fubfiflence to tiie people this
;

relation,
fufficient

therefore,

exill-s

when

the

tenitory

i^

for the fubfiflence of the inhabitants,

as

and the inhabitants are

ritory can maintain.

numerous

as the ter-

In this proportion confifts

the

maximum of
;

of people
iVQ,

for

if

the force of any given number the territory be too extcnit

the

defence of
infufficient,

cultivation

is burthcnfome, the and the produce fuper-

fluous

78
fluous
j

TREATISE
under the
its

on the

'

war.

hence the proximate caufes of defenfive If, on the other hand, the territory be too
is

fmall, the flate

necciTity of to
its

being
neigh-

obliged for part of

fubfiflence

bours
H'ar.

hence the proximate caufes of offeafive

Every people who, by their fituaiion, have no other ahernaiive than commerce or
Wiiv,

luuCi

pend on

their

be neceffarily feeble they mull deneighbours, on adventitious cir:

cumilances, and can only have a fhort and un-

They muft conquer others, and thereby change their fituation, or be conquered therafelves, and thence be reduced to nothing.
its

certain exigence.

impoffible fuch a ftate can preferve independency but by its infignificancy or its
It is

grcatnefs.

not eafy to calculate the determinate relation between the extent of territory and numIt is

ber of inhabitants, fnfficient for each

other

rot only on account of the difference in the qualities of the foil, in its degrees of fertility, in
its productions, and in the influence of climate, but alfo on account of the re-

the nature of

markable difference
little in a fertile

in the

ftitution of the inhabitants

temperament and con; fome confuming but

alfo

country, and others a great deal

on a barren

foil.

Regard mufl

be had to
the

SOCIAL COMPACT.
the

79

degree of fecundity among the females, to the circumilances favourable or deftru6tive

to

population, and
legiflator

to

the

which the

may hope

number of people to draw from

other countries by the advantages attending his fcheme of government ; fo that he ought not to

found
but
after

his

on
;

judgment on what acftually what he forefees may exift

exifts

here-

not on the prefent iiate of population, In but on that which will naturally fucceed.
fine,

there are a thoufand occafions, on

accidents

which

local

poJfTcfs

acquire, or permit, a ilate to a larger fliare of territory than may ap-

Thus pear aiflually neceflary for prefent ufe. a people may fpread themfelves over a large fpot
in

a mountainous country, whofe natural pro* duce, of wood or pafture, requires lefs labour of cultivation ; where experience teaches us that

women
tries
;

are

and

in

more fruitful than in the which a large inclined

flat

coun-

fuperficies

a fmail horizontal bafe, by which only gives but the land mull be eflimated in the affair of ve-

getation.

habit a

lefs

people, on the contrary, may infpace on the fea-diore, or even a-

mong
the

rocks and almoft

barren fands
v/ith

becaufe

fi(hery fupplies inftead of the produce

eafily

them

fuflenance,
;

of the earth

they can

difbunhen

their

community by fending
out

E 4

&o

TREATISE
of
Its

ON the
;

out colonies

fnperniimerary inhabitants
necefTary for

and

Jafily,

becaufe

it is

them

in

fuch

a cafe to live near to each other, in order lorepel the invafions of pyrates.

We
.JfoL

may add

to thefe conrltionrd prccainion':.

n

rcfpecUng the
all

formation of

people, one that

can be fnpplied by no other, but without which

the reft are nfelefs
:

this

is,

that they fhoiild

in

a Aate

enjoy peace and plenty. is forming, refembles

For the time

that
;

in

which which

foldiers are

ment

in

it is the moforming a battalion which they are leaA capable of refifK

ance, and the moft eafily defeated. They would even make a greater refiRance when put into

abfolute diforder afterwards, than during the interval of

their

firli:

fermentation,

when each

is

taken up more about his ov, n particular janlv than the common danger. Should a war, a famine,
or a rebellion, break out at fuch a
crifis,

the flate

would be

infallibly fubverted.

Not but there have been many governments

eftabliflied

in

times

of

diforder

and confuvery go-

fion

in

fuch cafes, however,

thofe

vernments

fubverted
rife

the
to,

flate.

have always given

or

Ufurpers took the advan-

ortage of, thofe rimes of general confufion, in

der

SOCIAL COMPACT.
der to

8i

procure fuch cleflru6>ive laws, which the people never could have been prevailed oa
to pafs
at a

more difpadionate

feafon.

The

choice of the proper lime for the laws, is one of themoft certain tokens by which

inAitalion of

we may

diflinguifh the
a tyrant.

defign of a

IcgiQator

from that of

be adzed then, what people are in a fituation to receive a fyflem of laws ? I anfwer,
If
it

thofe

who, though connected by fome primitive

or

union either of interefl

compaft,

are

not

ihofe whofs yet truly fuhje61ed to regular lav/s ; cuAoms and prejudices are not deeply rooted ;

thofe

who
a

up by

are under no fear of being fwallowed fudden invafion, and who, without

engage

the quarrels of their neighbours, are able to encounter feparatcly uith each, or to the affiftance of one to repel the other ;
entering, into

whofe individuals may be known to >ach other, and among whom it is not necefa people

fary to

charge a
is

man with
for

greater burthen

than

a people poffible can fubfifl without others, and without whom all others m/ight fubfjfl: * 5 a people neiit

him

to bear;

who

ther
* If two neighbouring people were fo fituated tha^ fubfiil without the other, the circum-

one could not

llaaces

82

TREATISE
;

OM the

ther rich nor poor, but pofTefled of a compe-

tence within themfelves

people,

in

fhort,

once the confiflency of an anpofTefs and cient nation, the docility of a nev/ly-created
at

who

one.

The

great difficulty in legiflation, con-

knowing what ought to be eAabliflied and what than what ought to be eradicated
fifts lefs in
;

the impoilibiof nature in the lity of finding the fimplicity wants of fociety. It is true that all thel'e cir-

renders

it

fo

feldom fuccefsful,

is

cumflances are very rarely united ; and it is for this reafon that fo few ftates have much to
boaft of, in their conftitution.

There

is

flill

cj

one country in Europe capabje of laws: this is the idand of Corfic-a.

receiving

The

va-

lour and conHancy, with which thofe brave people recovered, and have defended their liber-

ftances of the

flrft

would be very hard, and of the

Every wife nation,
in

latter

very dangerou?.

fuch a cafe,

would

extricate itfelf as

a Hate of dependence

foon as polnble from fuc!i The republic of Thiafcala,

fituated in the heart of the

Mexican empire, chofe

purchafe
it,

rather to be without
receive
it

fait

than

or even

prudent Thlafcalans faw through the fnare of fuch hlerality. 1 hus they preferved their liberty ; this petty ftate,
gratis

of

the

Mexicans.

The

included within that great empire, being, in the end,

the caufe of
its

ruin.

ty,

SOCIAL COMPACT.
ty,

83

might defervedly excite fome wife man to teach them how to preferve it. I cannot he\p
furmifing, that this
little

Jt

UtJS 'b-/ux,
^

iflaad will,

one day ox

,j^^^/ if; 1$,

other, be the aflonilliment of Europe.

C H A

P.

XI.
of
legtjlature,

Of

the various fyjiem i

we were

IFcifely the

to enquire, in

what

confifls pre-

greateft good, or

what ought

to

be the end of every fyftem of legiflature ; we fhould find it reducible to two principal obje(5ls, liberty and equality:, liberty, becaufe all
partial

dependence deprives the whole body of

the ft ate of fo much ftrength ; equality, becaufe liberty cannot fubfid without it.

have already explained the nature of fecial liberty j and with regard to equality, we are_ not to underftand by that term, that individuals
I

fhould

all

abfolutely

wealth and power;

Jo

the latter,

it

fame degree of but only that, with refpe(5t ftiould never be exercifed con*
pofTefs the

trary to

refpedt to the former, that

good order and the laws ; and with no one citizen fhould
to

be

ri^ch

enough

buy another, and

be obliged to
6

that
fell

none
him-

ftiould

be fo poor

as to

Mi.

84
h^ (aM '^rU/'n gY
r

TREATISE

ON the

v^fU/1

C^

This fuppofes a moderation of pofrefTions credit on the fide of the great, and the moe y r^"^^ dui/fiuU deration of defires and covetoufnefs on the part
^^^^^ '

yfiaitialM ut/Y
ee^^.
!

of the

little.

^ W^^iulcU,

fmu^i; r^^f^^

This equality, th^y tell us, is a mere fpecuUiive chim.era, which cannot exift in pratfiice :
it
is

^t^^/ ^UikA,

but though abnfes are inevitable, does tollow they are not to be corrected ? It
this equality,

thence
for the

^ery reafon that things always tend to deflroy that the laws ftiould be calculated
it.

to preferve

Thefe general objef^s of

legiflature,

how-

ever, fhould be varioufly modified in different

countries, agreeable to local fituaiion, the chara<5i;er of the inhabitants, and thofe other cir-

cumflances

which require
particular
In itfelf,

(hould have a

always the beft

every people fyfiem of laws, not but the beft adapted to

that

^Uf/'
^*

(yct^^^ ^
j^^^,^^i^

^i^hrf
y
.

Would you give a Hate conil'lency and llrength, as much as poffible ; let prevent the two extremes Thefe two ff .CiA\\^^^ he no rich perfons nor bee^ars.
/coudjtions, naturally inleparable, are equally deiiruccommonwealth: the one furnifhes tyrants,
t, is

*H/T J^JI^
.

*fL

l^h

/J/

*^^***^tive to the

v^
/ y'

y4W^^^^*'*^
jj

r^

^^ ^^^ other the fupporters of of pubhc liberty fUiA^^^^^ the trafTiC the other felling it. one / buying,

ranny.
carried

It is

by
the

on

/;.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
that ftate for

85
for ex-

which

it IS

calculated.

If,

ample, the

foil

be ungrateful and barren, or the

its

country too fmall for

inhabitants, cherllh in-

may be exchanged

Vv^hich duflry and the arts, the produ(Elions of for the commodities required.

On

the other hand,

fertile hills

a rich
felves

if your country abounds in and plenteous vales if you live on foil in want of inhabitants; apply yourto agriculture, which affords the means
;

of population

and

banifli

the deflru<5live arts

by gathering the few inhabitants of ic. together in one particular fpot or two, to the depopulation of all Do you occupy an extenfive and the refl: *.
fituation by the fea fide ? Cover the with ocean your fliips, cultivate the arts of you will by thefe navigation and commerce
:

which

ferve

only to ruin a country,

commodious

means enjoy
ftrenglh

a brilliant but fliort exidence.

On
their

the contrary,

do the waves only wafle

r

Rq* againil: your inacceffibie rocks main barbarous and illiterate you will live out
;

the
*

more

at

eafe,

perhaps more virtuous,

af- /hm-

Zaj^
-}

The advantage cf foreign commerce, fiys the Marquis d'A. is produdlive only of a delulive util.ty
to the

'/

VlV^
.

/
^

kingdom

in

general.

It

may

enrich a few

in-^^

iy^f^j^

dividuals, and perhaps fomc cities; but the whole nation gains nothing by it, nor are the people the
better for
it.

/^rw.^^

fure^dly

86

A T REAT
to all

E ON the

'

furedly more happy.

In a word,
naiions,

befides the

every people are pofTefTed in themfeives of foine caufe which

influences

maxims common
them

in

particular

manner,

aid

renders their
for themfeives.

own fydem

of laws

proper only

among

It is thus thac in. ancient times, the Hebrews, and in modcin. times, a-

mong
ce
,

^ J'ci
'

cipal

the .'rablans, religion was made the prinobjeft of national concern; among the
this object
it

Athenians

was

literature;
at

thage and T^ re was navigation,

public virtue.

was commerce.,
v/ar,

at CarRhodes it

at Spai ta

and

at

Rome

The
a

hath (liewn, by

author of the Spirit cf laws number of examples, in what

fhould model his fyflem

manner the
agreeable to

legiflator

each of thefe objefls.

AVhat renders the conflitution of a

A nAi

^'^^'^'^

''^^^^

durable,

is

flate truly that agreement maintained

therein

between

natural

and

focial

relations,

which occaiions the

to confirm and

legiflature always to a6f in

concert with nature, while

rectify,

as

it

the laws ferve only were, the di(5lates

legiflator,

of the former.
in his objeft,

But

if

the

deceived

(liould alTume a principle different

arifes from the nature of things; tend to flavery and the other to

from that which

fhould the o
liberiy,
.?

one

to

riches, the other to population,

one

SOCIAL COMPACT.
one
to peace

Sy

the other to

war and conqueAs,

would infenfibly lofe their force, the conflitution would alter, and the ftate continue
the laws
to be

agitated

till

it

(hould be totally changed nature have

or

deftroyed,

and

refumed

its

empire.

CHAP.
On

xir.

the divijlon of the laivs.

whole, or give the beft polTible form to the conflitutlon, various circumftances are to be
taken into confideration.

IN the

order to provide for the government

of

Of

thefe

the

firft is

the adion of the whole

felf
;

that

is

the relation

body operating on itof the whole to the

whole, or of the fovereign to the flate, which relation is compofed of thofe between the intermediate terms
^

as will

be feen hereafter.

The

name of

laws which govern this relation bear the fa^u^<^'^^^, fundacalled and alfo are laws, politic

mental laws, not without fome rcafon when they

For if there be only one are wifely ordained. good method of government in a (fate, the people,

who

have been fo happy as to

to abide

hit

on that

method, ought

by

it

but, wherefore

fhould

A
^yy
'

TREATISEoN
Iav,'s

the

fliould a

people, whofe
^"C^^ ^^^^2
is
f

to'^'^^

- ^^^'^'

^^^^"^

are bad or defecbe fundamental ? Beat

it

r>-uy^
a.

^^M^^^Mides,

a nation

in

any cafe

Jiberty to chanfye
pleafes
:

e^*<^rt^l, even the beft

laws,
mi'^^d

when

for

if

777ic/fi^iti^t49^^'9^^^^^'^^^

even to do thcmfelves an'

injury,

who

hath any right to prevent them?

i(

'^^'^^

fecond

circumflance

is

the

relations

'

which the members or the community bear to each other and to the whole body, the firft of which fliould be as little, and the laA as r^reat,
:

fo that every citizen (hould live in a ^^^ ad^rrv/tt^^ pofTible /f/ ^ / Aate of perfect independence on all the reft,
'

''

-^^ ^^
A /7\
:

'/

\/

^^^

h.x^lufi^%j^^^^
'

^ greateit dependence on tlie^ Both thefe are ever effeaed by the fame
:

means

for

It

is

the

power of the

flate

only

J/ 7.FA^

^^^ liberty of its members. Oa /^^^^^^'^^'^'^^^^^^ cub^^fu^r j|,jg fecond kind of relation is laid the imm.ediate
civil

fg v\sdl rtMini foundation of the

laws.

p)

f a.aS

b^ proper to confider alfo a third relation of between the individual and fpecies
^t
^''^y

the law

which gives immediate

the

life to lefs

penal
a di-

Aatutes

thefe, however, are in fa^t

ftin^t fpecies of laws than the others.

fancllcn

of

all

To

SOCIAL COMPACT,
ro
thefe three kinds of laws,
a fourth,

89

may be added
the reil
;

more uTiportant than

all

and
;

which are neither enr^raven on

but
real
in

brafs or marble
;

the hearts of the citizens

forminj^

ihe
the

conflitution

of the

flare,

'rhefc are

laws which acquire daily frefli influence, and when otheis grow old and obfolcte, invigorate

and revive them

alive in
fpirit

thefe are the laws

which keep

the hearts of the people, the original

fibly

the

of their inftitiuion, and fubflitute infenforce, of habit to that of authority.

I

The

laws

lierc
all

and above
difiegarded

fpeak of, are manners, cu[\om?., J^i ^Z?^yU^, all unknow^n or public opinion
;

by our modern poUcicians, but on

reft.

which depends the fuccefs of all the are the objefls on which the real

Thefe

legiflator is

employed
confine

in

fecret,

while he appears folely to

particular regulations

himfelf to thofe

which compofe only the preparatory centre of the vault, of which manners, more flow in
their progrefs,

form

in the

end the immoveable

arch.

Of

thefe clafTes, politic laws, or thofe

which
relative

conftitute the

form of government, are

only to

my

prefent fubjeft.

The End

of the

Second Book.

BOOK

f/Q

A TREAT

E ON the

BOOK
EFORE
we

III.

enter on a difciiilion of the

feveral forms of government, it will not be improper to afcertain the precife meaning of hat term ; which as jet hath not been well ex-

plained.

CHAP.

X.

Ofi government in general;

TMUST previoufly caution

rufe this chapter impo/Tible to render
**

the reader to peit

very deliberately, as
myfelf clearly

is

intelligible

to fuch as are not attentive.

Every
cur to

free a<5lion hath

its

two

caufes,

which con-

viz. produdlion, the one moral, the will which determines the aft j the other
elFecft

phyfical, viz. the

power which puts

walk,
it is

it

in

exe-

cution.

When

for indance,

toward

firfl: necefTary that I any particular object, fliould will to go; and fecondly that my feet

fhould bear

me

forward.

paralytic

may

will

to run, and an

be unwilling ; the want of power in the one hath the fame effeft
a6live racer

as

SOCIAL COMPACT.
as the

91

want of

will

in

the other
politic

both remahi

in their place.

The body
;

hath the fame

diiUnguifhed
:

principles
alfo In

of motion

which

are

the

the fame manner by power and will latter under the name of the leg'^Jlat'tve

power, and the former under that oi \\\z executive power. Nothing is or ought to be done without the concurrence of both.

We
power
belong
it is

have already feen

to

that

the

leglHative

belongs to the people in general,

and can

none

elfe.

On

the

other

hand,

conclude, from the principles already eftablifhed, that the executive power caneafy
to

not appertain
or fovereign
;

to

the

generality,

as legiflator

becaufe this power is exerted only in particular a6ls which are not the province of the law, nor of courfe that of the fovereign,

whofe

a(5ls

can be no other than laws.

To the public force, therefore, /hould be annexed a proper agent, which may re-unite and put it in acflion, agreeable to the directions
tion

of the general will ; ferving as a communicabetween the flate and the fovereign, and

eiFe<5ling the

as the
is

fame purpofe in the body politic, union of the foul and body in man. Such

the rationale of government, fo generally con-

founded

fp.

TREATISE

on the
v.lTich
It is

founded with the fovercign, of

the miniflry.

only

What
diate

then

is

jToverntrient

It is

an internnefubjeci:

body

tfl.ibliihed

between the

and

the fovereign, for their mutual conefpondence ; charoed with the execution of the laws, and with

the maintenance of

civil

and

political liberty.

The members

of which this

body

is

comcof-

eJ, are called magidrates or ^igs, that is to bears the fay, gove^ncrSi and the whole body

Thofe, therefore, who prince*. the al, by which a people profefs fubmifiion to their chiefs or governors, is not a

name of
affirm

\.h.Q

that

contra<fV,

are certainly right ; it being in fadl a fimple comnothing more than the conferring xniHion on the faid chiefs ; an employ, in the

xJifcharge of

which they a^l as mere officers of the fovereign, exercifing in its name the power

which
it

it

may

hath placed in their hands, and which limit, modify or refume whenever it
alienation

pleafes; the

of

its

right

fo

to do.,

nature and being incompatible with the very of fociety. being

* Thus
at

Venice the college of

fera'.ors

is

called
is

the moll' ferene. prin.e^ even

prefent. ^

when

the

doge

not

I call

SO<:iAL COMPACT.
'I

93

call therefore,

the legal exercife of the exe-

cutive power, the Government or fupreme adminiftration

and the individual or body, charged with that adminiftraiion, the prince or the
;

maniftrate.

In the government are to be found thofe-in-

termediate forces, whofe relations compofe that of the whole to the whole, or of the fovereign
to the
ftate.

This

lafi

relation

may be

repre-

fcntcd

by that of the extremes of

a conftnnt

proportion, the mean proportional of which is The government receives from the government. the fovereign thofe orders, which it gives to the people ; io that, in order to keep the flate in

fidered,

due equiiibrio, there ihould, every thing cor. be the fame equality between the mo-

mentum
it-felf,

or

force

of the government taken In

or force of the
citi-

and the

momentum

zens,
]y

who

are the fovereign confidered colle<^ivefide,

on one

and fubjefts confidered

feverally

on the

other.

It is,

befides,

"three terms,

portions. to govern, or

impofTible to vary any of thefe without inflanily deAroying the proIf the fovereign fhould be defirous
the magiflrate
to

to give

laws, or

-the fubjedts refufe

obey

diforder muft im-

94

TREATISE

on

tfie

mediately take

place; the will and the

power

thus no longer ailing in concert, the flate would be difTolved, and fall into defpotifm or anarchy.

Add

to this,

that as there can be but one

mean

proportional

between each

relation,

there can

be but one good government for a Aate. But as a thoufand events may change the relations
fubfifting

among

people

different

govern-

ments may not only be good for different people, but even for the fame people at different
periods of time.

Tn order to give the reader an idea of the various relations that

may

exifl

between thefe two

by way of example, make ufe of the number of people, as a relation the mofl
extremes,
I

fhall,

eafily exprelfed.

We
IS

will

fuppofc, for in/lance, that a

flatc

The compofed of ten thoufand citizens. as be confidered muft only colledively fovereign and in a body but every particular in quality
:

of fubje^l

is

confidered as an indivirlual: thus

is

ihc fovereign

in this cafe to the fnbje<fi: as ten

is to fay, every member thoufandih part the ten only of the fovereign authority, whiie at the fame

thoufand to one: That

(late (hares

of the

time he

is

fubjeifled

to

it

in

his

whole perfon.
to

Again, fhould the number of people be increafed

SOCIAL COMPACT.
to an

>

hundred

thoiinind, the fubmliTion of the

fubjefls

would

receive

no

alteration

each of

them being
and vote
tenth

totally

{"ubjecled to the authority of

the laws, while

his

fhare In

the

fovereignty,

in the enaflion

of thefe laws, would

j

be reduced
leis

to the

hundred -thoufandth part

than before.

Thus

the fubjeif^, re-

maining always a fingle integer, the proportion between him and the fovereign increafes as the number of citizens is augmented whence it
:

follows,

that as a

ftate

increafes, the liberty

of the

fubje(5l diminiilies.

When
that
lity.
it

I fay the proportion Increafes, I mean recedes farther from the point of equaThus the greater the proportion, in the
it

language of the geometricians,

the
lefs

is

reckoned
:

according to

common

greeable to the former,

in point

aacceptation the relation, confidered

and according
of
tion.

of quantity, is eftimated by its extent ; to the latter, confidered in point it is eflimated identity, by Its proxima-

voices bear

proportion which particular the general, that is to fay, the manners to the laws, the more ought the genelefs

Now,

the

to

ral rellriftive force to

be augmented.

Thus

the

government

iliould

be relatively more powerful

as the people are

more numerous.

Oa

pd

A TRE
On

AT

IS

on the

of a
lic

ftate affording

the other hand, the increafing greatnefs the guardians of the pub-

authority greater temptations and means to abufe their power, the more force a govern-

ment is pofTeffed of to reflrain more ought the fovereign to be

its

the people, the pofTelled of in

I

turn to retrain

the government.

am

not

of abfolute power, but of the fpeaking relative forces of the component parts of the

here

flate.

It

follows, from

this two-fold relation,

that

the conftant

proportion between the fovereign, the people, is not a mere arand the prince,

a ncceffary confequence of the bitrary idea, but of the body politic. It follows very exiftence
alfo, that,

as fubjefls, being

one of the extremes, viz. the people a fixed term reprefented by two- fold ratio is increafed the wherever unity, or dlmlnifhed, that the fimple ratio mull increafe or diminifbin like manner,

and of courfe

the

mean term
is

will

be changed.

Hence

it

ap-

pears there

no one

fettled conflitution of

go-

vernment, but that there may be as many governments different

in their nature as

there are

ftatesdiifering in magnitude.

If

SOCIAL COMPACT.
If any

97

one fliould

afFe(ft to

turn

my

fyflem into,

ridicule,

and fay that, in order to find this mean proportional, and form thegovernment as it ought to be> we have no more to do than to find the
root of
I

fquare

the

anfwer that

here

number of make ufe of

the people;
the

number of

people only by tions of which

eflimated

way of example;
I

that the rela-

have been fpeaking, are not

by the number of individuals, only but in general by the momentum or quantity of action, which arifes from a combination of various caufes ; and though, in order to exprefs
inyfelf concifely, I

borrow the terms of geo-

metry,
cifion

I
is

am

not ignorant that geometrical pre-

not to be expcvSled in treating of

mo'

ral quantities.

The government
body
moral
politic

is

in
it,

miniature what the

is

containing

at large,

ft is

perfon endued with certain faculties* a(flive as the fovereign, pallive as the Rate, and capable of being refolved into other fenfible
relations,
fcale of
this,

from which of courfe

and
ftili

arifes

new

according
till

proportion, to the order of the courts of

another

within

juOice,
that
is

we
fay,

arrive at the lafl irdivifible term,

to

the

fole

giflratCj

which may be reprefented

chief or fupreme main the centre

of

98
of
this

TREATISE
as

ON

the
between the

progrefTion,

an

unity

ferles of fra'flions,

and that of whole numbers.

But, without embarraffing the reader with a mul'Liplicity of terms, we fliall content ourfelves

with confideiing the government as a new body in the ftate, diflin<5l from the fubje<fls and the
fovereign,

and exifling between both.

There is this elTential difference, however, between the government and the ftate, that the latter exifts of itfeif, and the former only by means of the fovereign. Thus as the ruling
will of the prince
is,

general
prince

will, or
is

the

or ought to be, only the law, the power of the

only

that

of the public centered in

him

fo that

whenever he would derive from

himfelf any abfolute and independent aft, the combination of the whole is affefled. And if,
at length, the prince
will of his
(liould

own, more
fliould

active

have a particular than that of the

ufe of the public

fovereign, and

make
as

power

in his

hands

to enforce

obedience to fuch
it

were, two foparticular will, forming, vereigns, the one of right and the other of fa6l, the fecial union immediately vanidies, and
the body politic
is

dillolved.

In

SOCIAL COMPACT.
thelefs,

99

In order that the body of government, nevermay have an exigence, a real life to diAin-

guifhitfromthatof the ftate, and that its members may ad^ in concert to anfvver the end for which
It
is

inftituted,

it Is

necefTary that

it

Aioiild

be

pofTcfled

of a particular

common to all its of its own for the fake

identity, a fenfibility members, a power and will

of its prefervation.

Such

a particular exigence necefTarily fuppofes that of affemblies and councils ; of a power to deliberate

and refolve

of the eights,

titles

and

l^elong exclufively to the privileges fituation of a magiftrate the and render prince,

which

the

more

honour^ible

in

proportion
lies in

as

it

is

more

laborious.

The
all

difficuky

the

me,

thod of difpofing

the inferior
\yhile
it it is

parts of the

whole body
its

fo

that,

Arengthening

own

conflitution,

may

the

ftate.

At the fame
its

not injure that of time alfo, it fliould

always
defiined

diftinguifli

to

own

between the peculiar force, prefervation, and the public

;

force
in a
fice

deftined to the prefervation of the Hate

it

be always ready to facrithe government to the people, and not the

word,

fliould

people to the government.

'

To
tificial

this

add, that, although the arof body government be the work of anF z other

we may

100
other

TREATISE
body, nnd
is

ON the

artificial

pofTefled only of a
;

borrowed and fubordinate exigence

this

doth

not prevent it from acfling with different degrees of vigour and celerity, or from enjoying, if I

may

fo

exprefs

myfelf,

a greater

or

lefs

fharc

of health and ftrength. In fhort, it may, without running diametrically oppofite to the purpofes of
its infiitution,

deviate

from them more

in

or

lefs,

according

to

the

mode

which

it is

conflituted.
m

It is

from

all

thcfe differences that arife thofe

various relations and proportions, which the go-

vernment ought

to bear

toward the

flate,

ac-

cording to thefe accidental and particular reFor the lations in which the ftate is modified.
beft

government
if

in itfelf

may
its

often

become the

worfl:,

the

relation

of

component parts

are not altered according to the defeats of the

body

politic to

which

it

belongs.

CHAP.

SOCIAL COMPACT.

loi

CHAP.
On
the prindple

II.

whi.h

conjiitutes

the different forms

of government,
the general cauTj of thefe difit is

TO

explain

ferences,

necefTary to didinguifh here

between the prince and the government, in the fame manner as I have already done between
the fovereign and the flate.

The body

of the

magiflracy may be compofed of a greater or a lefs number of members. It hath been obfcrv-

ed

alfo

that

the relation the fovereign

in

bears to

the fubjc(fb increafes

ber of people

we may

proportion to the numby an evident analogy, the of the relation betweea fame fay
;

thus,

the government and the magiflrates.

the tofal force of the government, being always equal to that of the ftate, fufRrs no alteration ; whence it follows that the more fuch

Now

force

is

fpent by

the diflribution

of
the

it

among
lefs

the

members of the government,

re-

mains to be excited
people.

on the whole body of

That

IC2

TREATISE
therefore,

on the
which
is

That government,
mull:.
tal

in

the

hands of the greateft number of

be the moll: feeble.
Hiali

magidrates

As

this is a

fundamento illuf-

maxim, we
it.

take

fome pains

trate

In the perfon of the magiftrate may be diAinIn the gulfhed three wills eiTentially different. lirfl: will of the the individual, place particular

which tends only

condly, that will

to his private advantage

fe-

which

is

common

to

him

as

the advantage of the prince j being general with refpedl to the government, and particular with regard to the
a magiflrate, tending folely to
flate,

and

of which the government is only a part > the will of the people or the fovereign will, which is general as well
in the third place,

with regard to the flate confidered as a whole, as with regard to the government confidered
as a part of that whole.

ticular will

In a compleat fyftem of Icgiflature, the paror that of the individual fhould

to

amount

government

nothing; the will of the body of fliould be very limited, and of

courfe the general or fovereign will the ruling and fole dire61or of all the others.

Ao

SOCIAL COMPACT.
According
to the order of nature,
wills are

103
however,
contrary
they are

thefe different

ranged

in

a
as

manner
will

being always- more

active

concentrated in themrclves.
is

Thus

the

general

always

the mod: feeble,^ that of the gowill

vernment next, and the

the ftronp-eft of
adminiflration
all
is
:

of the individual

fo that each

member
firft

of the

to

be confidered

of

all

as an individual, fecs^idly as

a magiflrate,

and
op-

laiHy as
pofite
quires.
to

citizen:

gradation

dire^lly

that

which the order gf

fociety re-

This point being fettled, let us fuppofe the adminiflration of government committed to the
hands of one man.
In this cafe the will of the
individual, and that of the body of the magiflracy are perfectly united, and of confequence the latter pofTeffes the greateft degree of intenfity.

Now,

as

it

is

on the degree of the

will

that the exertion of force depends, and as the abfolute force of the povernment never variety
it

follows

that

the moil aflive of

all

a J mini-

flrations

mufl be that of a Tingle peifon.

On
tion

the contrary,

if

we
F
4,

unlic the
if

adminiflrathe prince

and the legillaturei

wc make

the

I04

TREATISE

on

the

t^e foyereign, and the ciiizcns all (o many main this the wiU'of the cafe, gilrrates: govern-

ment, confounded with the general will, would P'jilek no greater fhare of afiivity, but would

kavt the particular will of individuals to exert its whole force. 7"hus the government, having always the fame degree of abfolute force, Avoald be at its minim::m of relative force or
atfiivify,

7
is

hefe relations are inconteftible,

and may be
It

farther

confirmed

by other

confi)i;erations.

evident, for example, that the magiftrate^ is more aftive in that capacity than the citizen in
bis,

and that of courfe the

will of the
ftiare

indivi-

dual muft have a more confiderable

/liTcnce

of in-

in

the adminiftration

of

government,

th^n in

the a6lions of the

magiflrate being fome fundlioa of

tizen, conlidered

almoft

; every always charged with

fovereign

government, whereas no
as

ci-

an individual,

difcharges

any

fun(fl:ion of the fovereignty. Befide this, the real force of a flate increafes, as the Hate

increafes in magnitude,

the ratio of that

flate

though not always in but while the magnitude

;

remains the fame,

it

is

in

vain to increafe

the

number of

maglftrates, as the

government
becaufe

will not thereby acquire any additional ftrength,

SOCIAL COMPACT.
becaufe
Aate,
is its

105
the

force,

being always
equal.

that of

conft.intly

And

thus
is

the rcLi-

tive force or aftivity

of government

diminifh-

ed, without

its

real

and abfojute force being

augmented.
It is

farther certain that public affairs mufl be

tranfacfed
to

more or
of

lefs

expeditiouily accordinfr

the

number
;

difpatch

people, charged with their that by laying too great a Orefs on

little
is

prudence, too
the
lofl,

trufled
is

to fortune;

thac

opportunity

of

fuccefs

thus frequently

and that by the mere force of deliberaiion the end of it is defeated.

This may

ferve to prove that the

reins
as

of
the

government are

relaxed

in proportion

magiflrates are multiplied ; and I have before deraonflrated that the more numerous the
ple are, the

peo-

more fhould

the
:

retraining

power

of government be increafed
that the proportion
giflrates (hould

Hence it follows which the number of maof the fubjecfls

to

hold to the government rnouIJ'

the
is

be

in the
j

inverfe ratio

fovereign
the

that

to fay, the

more extenfive the

flate more contrafled fhould be the government, the number of chiefs diminiihing as that of the people increafes.

5.

fpeak.

io6
I

TREATISE

ON

the

fpeak here only of the relative force of the government, and not of the re<fl:itude or proP^or, otherwife, itjs certain that priety of it.
the more numerous the magiftracy
is,

the nearer
to

doth the

will

of that

body approach

the

general will of the whole people ; whereas under a fole chief, the will of the magifiracy is, as I

have before obferved, only

dual.
loft

that of an indiviin

Thus what
j

is

gained

one

refpecSl,

is

on the other

and the

art of the legiflator

confills in tracing the fixed point, at

which the

of the government, always in a reciprocal proportion to each other, unite

force
will
in that proportion

and the

which

is

moft advantageous

to the Hate.

CHAP.
Of
the aulual dijlln^lons

III.

cf governments,

"^T T E

in the preceding chapof the reafons for diftinguifhing the fevcral f]:>ecie and fornis of government, by the

have treated

VV

ter

number of

the

members compofing them

made.

it

remains therefore to fhew, in the prefent,

thefe diftiQ^llons are actually

how

The

so CI A L CO
The
fovereign

iMP

AC

T.
in

[07

authority may,

the

firft

place, commit the charge of the government to the whole people or to the greater part of them ;

the number of maglllrates in fuch cafe exceedThis form of going that of private citizens. vernment is difiinguiflied by the name of a de-='

mocracy.

Or, otherwlfe, the fupreme power

may com-

mit the office of government into the hands of a

few, fo that the number of private citizens may exceed that of magiflrates ; and this form bears
the

name of an

ariftocracy.

laftly, the government may be entrufied one magidrate only, who delegates his power This third form is the mofk to all the reft.

Or

to

common, and
government.

is

called

monarchy or

a regal

It

is

to

be obferved that

all

thefe forms,

and

two former, are fufceptible of particularly the different degrees of perfecflion, and admit indeed of confiderable latitude
tion
:

in their modifica-

for

democracy may comprehend the

to

\^-'hole

people, or be limited

the

half.

An
from

ariftocracy alfo

may comprehend any F 6

quantity

ic8

TREATISE
the

ON the
to

from the half of

people

the

fmallt-ft
iifelf is

number

indefinitely.

Nay

monarchy

fufceptible

of fome diftribution.

Sparta, for

inOance, had confritutionally two kings at a time; and the Romans had even eight emperors
at once,
tually

without the empire having

been acis

divided.

Thus, we

fee,

there

cer-

tain point, at
is

which each form of government confounded with that to which it is neareA re;

laied

and thus under three diftinguidiing de-

nominations only, government is really fufceptible of as many different forms, as there are
citizens in the fiate.

To

go

jQill

farther

as

even one and the fame

government
tion

is

capable, in

many

refpe6ls, of

being

fubdivided into parts, of which the adminiftra-

may

refpeflively

differ,

there

may refuk

from the varied combinations of

thefe forms a

multitude of others, every one of which

be again multiplied by
all

may

the fimple forms.

Politicians

have in

all

ages

difputed

much

about the beft form

of

government,

without

confidering that each different form may poffibly be the beft in fome cafes, and the worfl in
others.
^

If

O C

A L

COMP

A C T.

109

If in different

ftates the

number of fuprcme

in the inverfe ratio to that magiftrates fhould be of the citizens, it follows that -the democratical

government
to fmall
ftates,

is

generally fpeaking better fuited

ftates,

the ariftocratical

to

middling

and

the monarchical to great flates.

his

rule

is
,

deduced immediately from

but
it is

our prin-

ciples

impofTible to particularize the

multiplicity of circumftances

which may furnifh

exceptions againft

it.

CHAP.
Of

IV.

a Demccracy,

TH
it

E inftitutor of a law (hould certainly know better than any other perfon, how

fliould

ought to be underftood and executed.. It feem therefore that the beft conftitution,
in

muft be that
tive
is

which the

legiflative

and execuIt

powers are lodged

in the

fame hands.

this very circumftance,

however, that renders

becaufe
there

fuch a

government imperfeft;
exift

doth not

the neceftary diftindlon,

which

ought to be made in its parts ; while the prince and the fovereign, being one and the fame
perfon, only form, if I may fo exprefs myfelf, a government without a government.
It

no
It is

TREATISE

on

the

not proper that the power which makes laws fhouid execute them, or that the atthe
tention of the

whole body of the people fhouid

to particular obis

be diverted from- general views

je(5ls.

Nothing
of

m'ore^dangercus than the inpublick

affairs
;

fluence

private intereft in

the abufe of the laws by the government, being a lefs evil than the corruption of the legidature;

which

is

infallibly the

confequence of

its

being

governed by particular views.

For
all

in that cafe,

the ftate being effentially altered,

reformation

becomes impofTible.
abufe the

more

not people of would be no government, power to abufe their independence and propenfe
;

who would

a people

who

fhouid always govern well, would

at all.

have no occafion to be governed

To

take the term in

its ftrifteft

fenfe,

there

never exifted, and never

will exift, a real deIt is

mocracy

in the

world.

contrary to

the

natural order of things, that the majority of a

be the governors, and the minopeople ihould the governed. It is not to be conceived rity
a whole people fhouid remain perfonally afTembled to manage the affairs of the pubhc ; and it is evident, that no fooner are deputies or
that

than the reprefentatives appointed,

adminiflration
is

form of the
It

changed.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
It

iii

may be laid down indeed as a maxim, that when the fun6lions of government are divided among
feveral

courts, that
will,
;

which

is

compofed.
it

of the feweft perfons

fooner or later, ac-

quire the greateft authority

though

were for
it

no other reafon than the

is

facility

with which

calculated to expedite affairs.

Such a form of government fuppofes,

the concurrence of a
rarely united.

alfo,

number of circumflances
firft

In the

place,

it

is

rcquiiite

that the flate itfelf fhould be

fo that the people
all

of fmall extent,
aflembled and

might be

eafily

perfonally
fi

known

to each other.

Secondly,

the

mplicity of their manners fliould be fuch

multiplicity of affairs,

as to prevent a

and per-

plexity in

difcufling

them

And

thirdly, there

fliould fubfift a great

degree of equality between

;

the rank and fortunes of individuals

without

which there cannot

tween

exift

long any equality be-

them

in

point of right and authority,

little

Lafily, there Oiould be

or no luxury

for

luxury mufl either be the

it

effect
;

of wealth, or

mull:

make

it

neceffary

it

corrupts at once

both rich and poor ; the one by means of the poffeffion of wealth, and the other by means of
the

want of

it.

Luxury makes

a facrifice

of

pa-

112

TREATISE
to

ON

the
;

patrlotifm
llate of
its

Indolence and

vanity

it

robs
to

a;

citizens

by fu'^e^ling them
all

each

other, and by fubjefling

to

the influence of

public prejudice.

It is

for this reafon

laid

that a certain celebrated

virtue as

author hath

down

the
:

firft

prin-

for all thefe ciple of a republican government circuraHances cannot concur without the exi-

flence

of public virtue.

For want, however,

of making proper diAinfiions, this great genius hath been led into frequent miftakes, as well not having'obferved that, as want of precifion
;

the fovereign authority being every where the

fame, the fame principle muft take place

well conftituted flate
greater or
lefs
;

in

though

it

is

true in

every a

degree, according to the form of

government.

To
is

this

it

may be added,

that no

government

[o fubjefl to civil

wars and

intefline

commo.
popular

tions

as
;

that

of the democratical or

becaufe no other tends fo flrongly and fo conftantly to alter, nor requires fo much vi-

form

gilance
tion.

and fortitude to preferve

It is,

it

from altera-

indeed, in fuch a conftitution parthe citizen fhould always be arm-

ticularly that

ed

SOCIAL COMPACT.

113

ed with force and coiiAancy, and fhould repeat every day, in the fincerlty of his heart, the
faying of the virtuous palatine
cuifa?n litertalem
*.

Malo

pcri^

quam

qu'ietum f.rvitium,

Did there exift a nation of Gods, their government would doubtkfs be democratical ; it
is

too perfect a fornij however, for mankind.

CHAP.
Of

V.

an Arlfoira-y,
exifl

this

form of government

two moral
viz.

ptrfons, very palpably diflinct, miniflration and the fovereign

polTcfs
;

the ad-

which of couifc

two general

wills,
:

the one regarding the

citl/cns univcrfally

the other only the

of the adminiflraiion.

members Thus, although the gointerior

vernment may regulate the

fhe Aate as
it

police

of

pleafes,

it

cannot addrefs the peo-

ple but in the name of the fovereign, that is to fay, the people themfelves ; which is a circum-

flance never to be om.itted.

cietles

The

primitive

fo-

of mankind

were governed aridocrati-

The Pahuine
Duke

of Pofnania, father of the king of

Poland,

or Lorra"n.

cally.

114
cally.

A
The

TREATISE

ON the
among
young

heads of families deliberated

;

themfelves concerning public affairs

the

people readily fubmitting

experience. Fathers, the

Hence
Senat.^,

authority of the names of Priejis, the

to

the

&c.

The

favagcs of North
to .this

America are o governed in the fame manner and are extremely well governed. day,

But, in proportion as the inequality arifing from fecial inQitutions prevailed over natural

were preferred to inequality, riches and power At elective. and became the ariflocracy age*,
length power, tranfmitted with property
father to fon,
froixi

making whole

families patrician,

rendered the government hereditary, and boys

of twenty became fenators.

Ariftocracy therefore
ral,
ele<51:ive

is

of three kinds

natu-

and hereditary.
the

The
of

firfl, is

ap-

to the moil: fimple ftate of fociety, plicable only

while the

laft

is

word
is

all- .kinds
;

of gois

vernment.
is

The

fecond

the beft

and

what

moft properly denominated an arlftocracy.

*
rerm opiimates among the bell:, but moil powerful.

It is evident that the

ancients, did not rrxsan the

Befidc

SOCIAL COMPACT.

irs

Eefide the advantage of the abovemeniloned dlHindion, this form hath alfo that of the
choice of
its

members

in

popular govern-

the citizens are born magiflrates ; but in this the number of the latter are very limited, and they become fuch only by ele61:ion * ; a method by which ;hc?ir probity, their talents,
all

ment

their

experience,

and

all

thofe

other

reafons

for preference in

ditional

fecurity

the public efleem, are an adthat the people ihall be wifely

governed.

Again, their public afTemblles are attended with more decorum ; affairs of ftate are more
regularly difculTed, and bufinefs executed with

greater order and expedition ; while the credit of the flate is better fupported, In the eyes of
foreigners,

by a
by

felefl:

number

of

venerable

fenatorsj than

a promifcuous or contemptible

mob.
*

h is

of great importance to regulate by law the

magillrates
;

method of chufing
to the prince,
it

for, in

leaving this

is

impoffible to avoid falling into

an

hereditary arifiocracy, as happened

,

to the republics

of Venice and Berne. Hence the firft has been lonofmce difTolved, but the fecond hath been fupported by the great prudence of tiie Senate. This is an exception, however, as dangerous as iionourable,

IQ

ii6

TREATISE
and- moH:

on the

In a word, that order

ly

would be undoubtednatural,

the befl

according to

wliich the wife and experienced few dlre(fl the multitude, were it certain that the few would
in

government confult the intereft of the It is abmajority governed, and not their own. furd to multiply the fprings of a(fl:ion to no purtheir

pofe,

or to
that,

doing

employ twenty thoufand men in which an hundred properly fele(fled

would Q^c^i much better.

With regard
requifite to
this

to

the particular circumflances

form of government ; the flate Hiould not be fo fmall, nor the manners of the
people (o fimple or fo virtuous as that the execution of the laws fliould coincide with the
public Will, as in a well founded democracy. On the other hand alfo, the (late Hiould not be
fo exienfive that

and down

its

governors, difiributed up provinces, might be able to render

the
in

themfelves,

each

his

feparate

d-epartment,

independant of the fovereign.

But
than
a

if

an

ariftocracy requires fewer virtues

;

there are yet fome popular government which are peculiar to it fuch as moderation in
;

the rich and content in the poor

an exaift equality

SOCIAL COMPACT.
lity

117

of condition

would
:

in fuch a
it

government

be quite improper
Sparta.

nor was

obferved even at

If a certain degree however, of inequality in the fortunes of the people, be proper in fuch a government ; the reafon of it is, that in general the adminiflration of public aflairs, ought

to be put

into the hands of thofe

perfons
;

who
not,

can beft devote their time to fuch fervice

as Ariftotle pretends,

that the rich

ought always

to

be preferred

merely on account of their

On the contrary, it is very necelTary that an oppofite choice fhould fometimes teach
wealth.
ference

the people that there exift other motives of premuch more important than riches.

CHAP.
On

VI.

monarchy.

we have

confidered

HITHERTO prince
as

the

moral and

collecSlive pcrfo-

nage, formed by the force of the laws, and as the depofitory of the executive power of the ftate.

At

our bufmefs to confider this hands of a phyfical perlodged power, real man or 5 fonage pofTefTed of the right of exprefent,
as
it

is

in the

iiS

TREATISE

ON the

Such a per* exerting it agreeable to the laws. fon is denominated a monarch or king.
In other adminiftrations
collective
it is

common

for a
;

body
in

to reprefent an individual being

whereas
trary,

this

an individual

is,

on the con-

the reprefentative of a collective

body

fo

that the moral

is

unity which

conftitutes

the

prince,

which
in

all

fame time a phylical unity, in the faculties which the law combines
at the

the

former are combined naturally in the'

latter.

the will of the people and that of the the prince, together with the public force of flate, and the particular force of the govern-

Thus

ment,
all

all depend on the fame principle of adlion the fprings of the machine are in the fame hand, are exerted to the fame end ; there are no
:

oppofite

motions

counteracting and deftroying

each other; nor is it poiTible to conceive any fpecies of government in which the leaft effbrt
is
\

productive of fo great a quantity of aClion.

Archimedes, fitting at his eafe on the fl:jore, and moving about a large veflel on the ocean
at pleafure,

reprefents to
in

my imagination

an able

monarch

fitting

his

cabinet, and

governing
in

his diilant provinces,

by keeping every thing

motion.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
motion,
But,
fo
if

119

while

he himfelf

fcems

immoveable.

no other kind of government hath much aftivity, there is none in which the
is

particular will of the individual

nant,

predomitrue, proceeds toward Every thing, the fame end ; but this end is not th^it of public happinefs ; and hence the force of the admiit is

(o

niftration operates incelTantly to the prejudice of

the

ftate.

Kings would be abfolute, and they arc fome-

way to become (o^ is make themfelves beloved by the people. This maxim is doubtlefs a very fine one, and even in
times told that their beft
to

fome refpe6ls
at
in

true.

But unhappily
is

it is

courts.

That power which

it is

arifes

laughed from

the

\oY& of the people

:

without doubt the

greateft

but

fo precarious'

and conditional,
faiisfied

that

princes have never been

with

it.

Even the

beft kings are defirous of having it in their power to do ill when they pleafe, without
It
is

lofing their prerogatives.

to

no purpofe

that r?i4eclaiming politician tells them that the Arength of the people being theirs, it is their
greatefl intereft to have

the people flourifliing,

:

numerous and
is

refpecftable

they

know

that this
interefl:
is,

not true.

Their perfonal and private

120
is,

TREATISE
as to

on the

in the firft place,

that the people fhould be

fo

weak and mlferable

be incapable of makI

ing any refiftance

to government.

confefs

indeed that, fuppofing the people to be held in perfect rubje(flion, it would be to the intereft

of the

prince

powerful,
his,

that they fhould be rich becaufe their ftrength, being

and
alfo

ferves to

make him
this

refpecftable to his
is

neigh-

bours; but as

intereft

only fecondary

and fubordinate, and that

thefe fuppofitions are

incompatible, it is natural for princes to give the preference always to that maxim which is
the

moft immediately

ufeful.

This

is

what

Samuel hath reprefented very forcibly to the Hebrews and Machiavel hath made evident to a
;

demonftration.

In afFe(fting to give inltrucflions

lefTons
is

to kings, he hath given the moft flriking to the people

:

His book entitled the Prince^

particularly adapted to the fervice of Republics.

We

have already (hewn from the general re-

lations of things, that a

to great ftates, and

we

fliall

monarchy is fuitable only be more partiOarly

convinced of

it,

on

a further examination.

The

more numerous the members of the public adminiftration, the more is the relation beween
the prince and the fubje(n:s diminifhed, and the nearer

SOCIAL COMPACT.
nearer
it

lit

approaches to nothing, or that point of

fubfifls in a

equah'ty which

democracy.

This

relation increafes in proportion as the

is

government

contra^ed

and arrives
is

at its

max'unum

when

the adminiftration
perfon.
a didance

in the

hands of a Tingle
there
is

In

this

cafe,

then,

too great

between the prince and people, and

void of conne(flion.
Is

the Aate
place,

is

To
to

therefore, recourfe

had

fupply its the interfeveral

mediate ranks
orders
is

of

people.

Hence the

of nobility.

fuitable to a

But nothing of this kind fmall Oate, to which thefc diffe-

rent ranks are very dcAruclive.

If the
ter

good government of

a flate

be

mat

of difficulty under any

it is

mode of admlnidrathe

tion,

more
perfon

particularly fo in the hands of

;

a fingle

and every body knows

confequences when

a king reigns by fubftliutes.

Again, there
defedt,

is

one

effential

which

will ev^er render a

;

and unavoidable monarchical go*

vernment

inferior to a republic

and

this is, that

in the latter, the public voice hardly ever raifes

unworthy perfons
ftration
;

to

high pofts

in the

admini-

making choice only of

men of knowfundions

lege and abilities,

who

difcharge their refpccflive

i22

TREATISE
then-

on

the
who
ge-

funf^ions with honour: whereas thofe

nerally

make

way

to

fuch

polls

under a

monarchical government, are

men

of little minds

and rnean

talents,

who owe

their preferment to

themeritricioiis arts of flattery and intrigue. The public are lefs apt to be deceived in their choice

than the prince; and a man of real merit is as rarely to be found in the miniflry of a king, as a block-

head

at

the head of a republic.

Thus, when

accident, a genius born for government, takes the lead in a monarchy, brought

by any fortunate
to the verge

world

is

amazed

of ruin by fuch petty rulers, the at the refources he difcovers,

and

his

adminiruation ftands as a fingular epoch

in the hiflory of his country.

To
it is

have a monarchical
its

flate well

governed,

requifite that

magnitude or extent (hould

It is

be proponioned to the abilities of the regent. more eafy U> conquer than to govern. By
means of
fibJe
a lever

fufFiciently

long,
to

it

were pofthe globe

;

wiih a

fingle finger
it

move

but to fupport
Hercules.

requires the
a

fhoulders of an

When

Hate

may with any pro-

the prince is alpriety be denominated great, And when, en the conmofl: always too little.
trary, it hnppenf,

which however

is

very feldom,
that

SOCIAL COMPACT.
that the ftate
is

123

too

little
;

for

its

muft be ever ill-governed

becaufe

regent, it the chief,

a^Liatcd by the greatnefs of his own ideas, is apt to forget the intereft of his people, and

makes them no

unhappy from the abufe of his fnperfluous talents, than would another of a more liaiited capacity, for want of thofe talents
lefs

which fhould be
iite, that a

necefiary.

It

is

thence requi-

kingdom
dilate

rhonl(]> if I
itfelf,

may

fo

fay,

contral and

on every

fuccefiicn,

according to the capacity of the reigning pi-ince : whereas the abilities of a fenate being more fixt,
the fiate, under a republican government,

may

be confined or extended to any determinate limits, and the adminiilration be equaily good.

The mod

palpable

inconvenience in
is

the*

go-

vernment of a

fole magiflrate,

the default of

that continued fucceffion,

which, in the

two

other kinds, forms an uninterrupted conne(fl:ion

in the ftate.

When
;

to

have another

one king dies, it is neceffary but when kings are eledive,

fuch e]e<ftions form very turbulent and dangerous intervals ; and unlefs the citizens are pof-

feded of a difintercftedncfs and integrity, incompatible with this mode of government, venality

and corruption Influence over them.

v/ill

necefTarily
ir,

have an

It
?.

very rare that he,

to

124
to

A T REAT
the Rate
is

E ON the
fell it

whom

fold,

does not

again

in his

turn, and

make

the

weak repay him the

extorted from him by the firong. Every one becomes, fooner or lafer, venal and corrupt, under fuch an adminifiration ; while even the

money

tranquillity,

which

is

enjoyed under the kings,

is

worfe than the diforder attending their wur."

repium.

To
made
been

remedy

thefe

evils,

crowns have

been

hereditary, and an order of fucccffion hath

efiablidied, which prevents any difputes on the death of kings that is to fay, by fub:

Aituting the inconvenience of regencies to

that

of

ele<flions,

an apparent tranquillity
;

is

preferred

to a wife adminiflration
ter to run

and

it

is

thought bet-

the riik of having the throne fup-

plied

to have any
kings.
llate

by children, monflers, and ideots, thf,n difpute about the choice of good
It is

not conf'iered,

to the rifk
is

that in expofing a of fuch an alternative, almoft

it.

every chaace

again II

Almofl everything confpires to deprive ayouth, educated to the command over others, of the
principles of reafon and judice.
faid, are taken

Great pains,

it is

to teach

young princes the

art

of

SOCIAL COMPACTof reigning;

It

125

they profit be better to legln by teaching them fubjevStion; The greateil monarchs that have been celebrated in hillory, are
thofe

much by

docs not appear however that their education. It w^iild

who were

not edu-

cated to govern. This is a fciecce of which thofe Icnow the lead who hnve been taught the

moft, and

is

better

acquired by lUid}lng cbe*

dicnce than
brev'ijjwius

command.

.Nam

utillijjinius

idem ac

honarum malarumnue rerum aehliuSf

fnh
aJlc

cogitars quid aut nclun-'is

prlricipe aut

VQ"

lucrU,

A
i$

confequence of

this

the inconAancy of regal government,

want of coherence, which

Js

fometimes purfued on

one plan, and fomcof thofe

times en another, according to the chara(rter of

the prince the

its

who
of
is

governs, or

who hold
;

reins

adminiHration for him

as inconfidenl as the

fo

that
its

condu<5l

objeflof

It is this inconflancy which purfuit is wavering. keeps the Aate ever fludliwilng from maxim to

maxim, and from

tainty

project to project

an uncer-

which

does not take place in other kinds

is

of government, where the prince

fame.

always the

Thus we

fee,

in general,

that if there
is

be more cunning

in a coutt,

there

more true

wifdom

126

TREATISE
;

on the

^vifdom in a fenate
plifh their

ends, by
:

and that republics accommeans more conftant and

better purfued while on the contrary, 'every levolutlon in the miniftry of a court, produces

one'in the fiate

Vvith
all

it

being the condant

all

maxim

miaiflers, and aimoA wiih

in

to

engage

meafures

direiTily

kings, oppofite to thofe

of their imnaediate predecellcrs. Again, it is from this very incoherence that \V may detiuce
the folution of a fcphifm very common wiih regal politicians j and this is not only the practice of comparing the civil government of fociety to the domeflic

government of
father

family,

and the prince

to the

of

it,

(an error

already expofed) but alfo that of Hberally beftowing on the reigning magiQrate all the virtues

need of, and of fuppofing the as he ought to be. fuch With prince ahvays the help of this fuppofition, indeed^ the regal

he llands

in

government
becaufe
it is

is

evidently preferable to

all
;

others,

inconieftably the flrongcfl:

and no-

thing more is required to make it alfo the beft, than that the will of the prince fhould be con:

formable to the general will of the people.

But
ture
is

if,

according to Plato, the king by nafo very rare a perfonage, how feldom
nature
?

may we fuppofe
concurred
to

and

fortune

hath

crown him

If a regal educatioo
alfo

SOCIAL COMPACT.
alfo

I27
receive
it,

necelTarily

corrupts

thofe

who

what hope^ can we

thus educated
to
?

have from a race

a wilful

of

men

It is

error, therefore,
in

confound

a regal

government

general with

the government of a good king. what this fpecies of government is in

But, to fee
itfelf, it

muft

be confidered under the

dire<rtion of

weak and

wicked princes
they come make them.

for fuch ihey generally are

when

to the throne, or fuch the throne will

Thefe

difficulties

have not efcaped

the notice of fome writers, but they do not feem

to have

been

much

embarralfed by them.
is

The

obey without murmurremedy, fay they, us bad things in his wrath, and fends God ing.
to

we oueht

to

bear with them

as

chaflifemcnts
is

from on high.
very edifying
v^ith greater
;

This way of
but
I

talk
it

certainly

conceive

would come
pulpit,

propriety from
a
politician.

the

than

from the pen of

What

fhoukl

we

fay of a phyfician

who

might promife miracles,

It

and whofe whole

art Hiould confifl in

up patience and
enough

refignation

is

preaching obvious

that we mufl bear with we live under it when ment,

j

bad governis

the queflion

to find a

good

one.

CHAP.

S23

TREATISE
C

on the

H A

P.

VII.

Of

mixed Gcvernments,

is

THERE
ing,
lole chief

no fnch thing, properly fpeakgovernment.

as

a fiinple

Even a
and a
in the diis al-

mull have

inferior magiftrates,

popular government a chief.

fhibuticn of the executive

Thus

power

there

number to the ways a gradation from the greater with tliis difference that fometimes the iefs, number depends on the Iefs, and at
greater others the
Iefs

on the greater.
is

Sometimes indeed the diftribution

either
ally

when

equal, the conftituent parts depend mutuas in the

on each other,
;

Englifli

governpart
is

ment

or vvhen the authority

of each

as in Poland. independent, though imperfe<fl, This laft form is a bad one, becaufe there is no

union in fuch a government, and the feveral of the ftate want a due connedlion.
parts

It is a queftion

m.uch agitated by politicians

Which

is

beft,

fimple or mixt government?

it,

The

fame anfwer however might be given to

as

SOCIAL COMPACT.
as I have before

129

made to the like queftion conof government hi general. forms the cerning

A /imple government is the befl in itfelf, though for no other reafon than that it Is fimple. But when the executive power is not fufficiently dependent on the legiflative, that is to fay, when there is a greater difproportion between the
prince and the fovereign, than between the people and the prince, this defecfl muft be remedied by dividing the government ; in which cafe all
its

parts

would have no
and yet
their
lefs

lefs

authority over the

fubjeft,

divifion

would render

them

colleflively

powerful to oppofe thcijc

fovereign.

The

fame inconvenience

is

prevented alfo by
magiftrates,

cfl:abli(hing a

number of

inferior

which tend

to preferve a ballance

between the
refpcfftive

two powers, and

prerogatives.

to maintain
this
cafe,

their

however, the government is not properly of a mixt kind 3 it is only moderated.

In

The
medy

like

means may

alfo

be employed

to re-

an oppofite inconvenience, as
is

wben

a go-

vernnneQt

too feeble,

by ere<^ing of propel

trlbunais

130

A
is

TREATISE
concentrate
its

on the
This meIn the
firft

tribunals to

force.

thod

pra(Stifed in all democracies.

cafe, the

adminiflration

is

divided in order to
it
:

weaken

it,

and

in the

fecond to enforce

For
is

a maxhfiiitn both of flrength and

equally

weaknefs,

common

to

fimple governments, while

thofe of mixt forms always give a tional to both.

mean propor-

CHAP.
^hat every form

VIIL
is

of government

not

equally
^

properfor every country

AS

liberty
it

is

not the produce of

reflc(5ls

all all

climates,
people.,

fo

is

not alike attainable by

The more
blifhed by

one

on

this

principle, eila-

Montefquieu, the more fenfible U'e

its truth.

become of
the more

The more

it

is

c'cinteftedj

we

find

it

confirmed by new proofs.

the poconfumes mwch,

Under every kind of government,

litical

perfonage,

the public,

but produces nothing.

derive the fubflaiKe

Whence
?

then

doth

it

confumed

the labour of

its

members.

It

Evidently from is from the fu-

that the neceiTities of perfiuity of individuals are Hence it follows the public provided.

ihat

SOCIAL COMPACT.

/131

that a focial Aate cannot fubfifl longer than the induflry of its members conthiues to produce

fuch fuperfluity.

is

The quantity of this fuperfluity, however, It is in many not the fame in all countries.

proportion mate, the fpecies of labour required in the cultivation of the foil, the nature of its produce,
the ftrengih of
its

very confiderable, in feme but moderate, ia The others null, and again in others negative. of the the clion fertility depends

inhabitants, the confumption

necefTary to their fubfiflence,

fimiiar circumftances.

with many other

On

the other hand,

;

of the fame nature

all governments are not fome devour much more

is

than others, and their difference

this principle,
viz.

fc)unded on

that the farther public contheir fource, the

It is

tributions

are

removed from

more burthenfome they grow.

not by the

that we are to efliquau'iity of the impoiition but of the burthen mate it, by the time or fpace

taken up in from which

is

its
it

retuinrng back
exa(flcd.

to

the hands
this

is

When

return

quick and eafy, it matters little whether fuch irDpofitioa be fmall or great ; tke people are

al.

132

TREATISE

ON the

always rich, and the finances in good condition. Ou the contrary, however low a people be taxed,
if

the

money never
to

returns, they are

fure
;

by

condantly paying a Rate can never

duals of
it

be foon exhaufted
be rich,

fnch

and the indivi-

mufl be always beggars.

follows hence that the farther the people are removed from the feat of government, the
It

inore

burthenfome are their taxes

their

thus in a
:

democracy

weight

is

leaft
;

felt

in

an

ariftocracy they

fall

more heavy
is

and

in a

mo-

narchical flate they have the greatefl weight of

all.

Monarchy, therefore,
;

proper only for

opulent nations

ariftocracy for

middling

flates

and

democracy for thofe which are mean and

poor.

In fa<^, the
fiance, the

more we
plainly

refle(5l

on

this

circum-

more

we

perceive the difFe

rence in this

refpe(?t

between a monarchical and

all
its

a free Hate,

In the latter,
;

force

is

ex-

erted for the public utility

in the former, the

public intereft of the flate and the private intereft of the prince are reciprocally

oppofed
of

the

one increafing by the

decreafie

the other.

In

SOCIAL COMPACT.
.

133

In a word, inftead of governing fubje6^s in fuch a manner as to make them happy, defpoiifm makes them miferable, in order to be able to

govern them

at

all.

Thus may we
tural caufes,

trace in every climate tliofe na-

which point out that particular form of government which is bcA adapted to
it,

as well

as even the peculiar kind of people

it. barren and ungrateful whofe produce will not pay for the labour of cultivation, would remain uncultivated and uninhabited, or, at befl, would be peoThofe countries from pled only with favages. which the inhabitants mi^ht draw the neo cefTaries of life, and no more, would be peo-

that fliould inhabit

foils,

pled by barbarians,

among whom
would be

ihe eftabiifh-

ment of

civil polity

places as might

Such impoffible. yield to their inhabitants a mo-

derate fuperfluity, would be befl adapted to a free people ; while the country where ferule
plains

and plenteous

vaies

mere

bounteoufly

reward the labours of the

beft fuitwith a monarchical
in order

culiivator,

would

form of government,
:

that

confume the
is

luxury of the prince might for it fuperfluity' of the fubjccfls

this fuperfluity

the

much

better that

fliould

be

expended by government than

dividuals.
I

am

by innot rnftniible that fome exdiffipa^ed

ceptions

134
ceptions

TREATISE
to

ON the
is

might be made

what

here ad-

vanced

thefe very exceptions, to confirm the general rule, in

;

however, ferve
that they are

fooner or later conftantly

lutions,

produiflive of revotheir

which reduce things to

natural

order.

fhould always make a diAin<fiion between general laws, and thofe particular caufes which

We

may

diverfify

their

efFe(5is.

For,

though the

fouthern

climates fhould be adlually filled with and the northern with republics, defpotic monarchies, it would be neverthelefs true in

theory,

that, fo far as climate

is

concerned, def-

potifm agrees hot, barbarifm with a cold, and good polity with a temperate reI am aware farrher that, even granting gion.
the piinciple, the application of
it

befl w^ith an

may be

dif-

puted.
tries are

It

may be

faid,

that

fome cold coun-

very

fertile,

while others

more warm

and fouthern are very barren. This objef^ion, however, hath weight only with fuch as do not examine the matter in every point of view. It
is requifiie

to take into confideration, as I be-

fore obfcrved, the labour of the people, their

ftrength, thtir

confumption, with

every oiher

drcumAaoce

that afFt<^s the point in queftion.

Let

SOCIAL COMPACT.

135-

Let us fuppofe two countries of equal extent, the

ten.

proportion of whofe producfl: fhould be as five to It is plain that, if the inhabitants of the firll

confume four, and of tb.e latiernine, the fuperiiuity of the one would be -, and that of the
Their different fuperfluities being alfo y. an inverfe ratio to that of their produce, the territory whofe produce Oiould amount only to
other
in
five,

would have near double the

which fhould amount
to ten.

fuperfluity of

that

But the argument does not refl upon a double produce nay I doubt whether any perfon will
;

place the actual

neral,
in a

fertility

bare equality

of cold countries in gewith that of warmer

climates.

We

will fuppofe

them, however, to
;

be

in this

refpe^ fimply equal

fcttiog
Sicily,

England,

for inflance,

on a balance with
Still

and Po-

land with Egypt.

farther to the South

we

have Africa and the Indies, and to fhe North

hardly any thing.
in the produce,

But

to

effedl this equality

what
!

a difference in the labour

Sicily

of

cultivation
to

In

they have

nothing
:

more
in

do than barely turn up

is

the earth

England agriculture
.

extremely toilfome
a greater

and

laborious,

Now, where

aumber of
hands

126
hands
is

TREATISE
to raife

on the

required

the fame produce,

lefs.

the fuperfluity muft necelTarily be

Add to this, con fa me much cold one. An

that the fame

lefs

number of people

in a warm country than in a hot climate requires men lo be

temperate, if they would preferve their health. Of this the Europeans are made fenfible, by feeing thofe
living in

who do

not

alter

their

manner of
off

hot countries,

daily

carried

by

Chardin reprefents us, as beafls of prey, as mere wolves in comand thinks thofe parifon of the Afiatics ; have attributed the writers miftaken, who
temperance of the Perfians, to the uncultivated His opinion is that flate of their country.
their country wns fo little cultivated, becaufe the inhabitants required fo little for their fub-

dyfenteries and indigeftion^

were merely the efFel of the barrcnnefs of their country, he obfiftence.

If

their

frugality

ferves,

it

would be only the poorer

little
;

fort of

them

that fnould eat

is

whereas their abftinence

general.
lefs

Again, they would in fuch cafe be

abftemious in different provinces,
general, and pre-

more or
si-s

thofe provinces differed in degrees of fleri;

Hty

whereas their fobriety

is

vails equally throughout the kingdom.

-

He

tells

ws,

SOeiAL COMPACT.
us, alfo, that

137
their

the Perfians
;

boad much of
of

manner of
only to

living

pretending their

complexions
its

be a

fufficient indication,

being
the

preferable to that

of the Chriftians.

At

fame time, he admits that their complexions are very line and fmooth ; that their (kin is of
a
foft

texture,

while, on the

and polifhed appearance ; other hand, the complexion of

fnbjed^s,
is

the Armenians, their

who

live

after

the European manner,

rough and pimply,

and their bodies grofs and unwieldy.

The
ple.

nearer

certain, the

we approach to the line, it is more abllemious we find the peo;

They

hardly ever eat meat

rice

and maize

are their ordinary food.

There

are millions of

amount

people in the Indies, whofe fubfiftence does not to the value of a penny a day.

Wc

fee even in

in this refpeft,

Europe, between

very fenfible difference,

the inhabitants of the

North and South.

at a
fingle meal.

Spaniard will

fubfift

whole week, on what a German would

ple are voracious, even luxury
to

eat

up

In countries v.'here the peohath a tendency

in

confumption.

itfelf in

England it difplays the number of diflies and quantity of

;

Thus

folid

meat oa the table

while la Italy, a repaft

138
pafl

A
h

TREATISE
out

ON the
fweetmeats

furnifhed

with

and

lloweis.

The
fimllar

luxury of drefs prefents us,

differences.

alfo,

with

In

climates,

where the

change of the weather is fudden and violent, the people wear better and plainer clothes 3
while
in thofe

where the inhabitants

is

drefs only

for ornament, brilliancy

more confulted than

article

ufe

eten clothes themfclves are an

of

luxury.

Naples, you will daily fee gentlemen walking about in laced clothes without Aockings, It is the fame with regard to
at

Thus

buildings
is

nothing the weather.

to

magnificence only is confulted, where be feared from the inclemencies of

At

Paris and

London people

are

defirous of warm and commodious apartments. At Madrid, they have fuperb faloons, but no
falhes nor cafements
;

and

their beds lie

open

to the rats that harbour in the roof.

The

aliment

is

alfo

more

fubflantial

and nou-

than in cold ; this is a third rifliingin hot countries difference that cannot fail to have an influence

over the fecond. Whei"efore

is it

that the Italians

?

eat fuch a quantity of vegetables are good,

Becaufe they
In France,

and of an excellent favour.

where

SOCIAL COMPACT.

139

where they are themfelves nourifhed chiefly by water, they are lefs nutritive, and are held of
little

as

confequence. They occupy never thelcfs much ground, and coft as much pains to

^ijltivate

them.

It

hath

been experimentally
other re-

proved

that the corn of Barbary, in

fpecSls inferior to that

of France, gives a greater quantity of meal, and that the French corn yields

Aill

more than

that of the

North.

Hence
is

it

may

be inferred that a

fmiilar gradation

car-

ried on in

the fame dire(5lion from the line to

the pole.

Now
?

is

it

not an evident difadvana lefs

tage to have, in an equal produce,

tity

quan-

of aliment

To

all

thefe

different -confideratlons, I
arifes

may

add another, which

ionfirm them;

from, and ferves to

this is, that

hot countries require

fewer inhabitants than the cold, and yet afford fubfiftence for more ; a circum fiance that caufes
two-fold fuperfiuity, always to the The m.ore the fame tage of defpotifm.
a

advan-

number

of people are diHributedover the face of a large territory, the more difficult becomes a revolt ;
as

they

cannot meet together fo readily or fe-

cretly,

and

it is

always eafy for the government

to cut off their afTomtions,

^'.

and/uin

their proje(^s.

140
je6ls.
roirs

A
On

TREATISE
the other hand, the

on the
more
the
a

numecan
the

people are coUecfled together,

lefs
;

the government afTume over the fovereign

chiefs of a facTtion

may
as

deliberate

as fecurely

at their meetings, as

and the raob are

the prince in his council ; readily afTembled in- the

public fquares as the troops in their quarters.

It
is

therefore, to

the advantage of a tyrannical government, a6l at great diilances ; its force

Increafing with the dlQance like that of a lever*, by the afhflance of a proper center. That of

the people, on the contrary,

concentrated
dilated, even

only by being evaporates and lofcs itfclf when as gunpowder fcattered on the
a(fi:s

it

ground, takes fire, particle by particle, and is Countries thinly inproductive of no Gf^G6i,
* This doth not contradict what
is

advanced

In,

the inconvenience of Chap. ix. Book II. concerning in matter queilion there being the great ftates ; the and of the authority government over its members,

here of

its

influence over the fubjeds.

places,

Its

members,

fcattered about in different

ferve as points

of fupport
ple
;

to enable
it

it

to act at a diftance

on the peoaftion

but

hath no fuch props to

diemfelves.

affil its

on

its

members

Thus

in
its

one cafe the

flrength,

caufe of length of the lever is the in the other of its weaknefs.

and

habited

SOCIAL COMPACT.
wild beads reiga only ia defarts.

141
j

habited are the moll proper places for tyrants

CHAP.
Of
the

IX.

marks of a good Government,

it is

WHEN
vernment
?

terms, what

aiked, therefore, In general is the befl form of gois it

the queflion
:

as Indeterminate

as

unanfwerable

or rather

may

be reafonably

anfwered as many different ways as there are pofTible combinations of the abfolute and relative circumllances of a people.

But

if it

be aO^ed, by what figns

it

may be

Known whether any

governed
?

This

is

given people are well or ill quite another thing, and

faift,
is

the queflioji, as to the

to berefolved.

This queAion, however,

folved, becaufe every one
his
is

Is

never afftually refor

doing

it

after

up the public the the citizen of individuals j tranquillity, liberty

fubje(ft: cries

own manner.

The

the one prefers the fecurlty of property, the other that of his perfon ; the one maintains the bed government to be the

mod
is

fevere,

the

other affirms that to be befV which

mod

agreeable 3

142
able
;

A
the

TREATISE
latter
is
:

ON the
crimes,

for punlfhing

the

former for preventing them the one thinks it a fine thing to be dreaded by his neighbours;
the other
thinks
it
is

better
fatisfied

to be
if

unknown

to

them

; money does but circulate, the other requires the people fhould have bread. Were they even agreed alfo on

the one

thefe and other fimilar points,

they would not

be much nearer the end of the difpute.

Moral

quantities are deficient in point of precifion ; fo that, were men agreed on the fign, they

would

fill]

differ

about

its

eflimation.

For

my

part,

am
be

aflcnill-ied that a figh

fo

mifiaken, or that any very fimple (hould be f) difingenuous as not to acknowlcge

it.

ftiould

What
the

is

the end of political focicty

doubt-

lefs

prcfervation

and
is

meml^ers.

And what
?

its profperity of the moft certain fign

it is

or proof of thefe

Certainly

their

number

population. then, for this difputed proof; fince

and

Let us not io.k elfewhere,

it is

plain,

that government

muA

be the

befi:,

under which

the citizens increafe and multiply mofi:, fuppofing

all

other circumfiances

equal,

and no

foreigners
to

naturalized or colonies
increafe
:

introduced,

caufe fucii

and

that,

on the
contrary

SOCIAL COMPACT,
contrary,
that

143

government mufl be the worfl,

ccstrris

under
people

which,
fliould

par^but^

the

number of

dimH>ifti.

ted, the decifion

affiiir

This behig admitof the queftion becomes an

I

of calculation *, and as fuch

give

it

up

to the arithmeticians.

CHAP.
*
It is

on the fame principle that we oug'nt

ofill

to

judge

of the feveral periocs

ference,

time that dcferve the pre-

mankind.
thofe, in

being difLiriguiihed for the prof^erity of We have in general too much adi^ured
literature

which

and the

fine arts

have flou-

rifhed, without penetrating inio the

their cultivation, or duly
feels
;

fecret caiife
tlieir

of

confidering

fatal -df*

pars

/cr-x'itiiti!

iJque apud if?peritcs Shall ejfeu

through the maxims laid refted motives of their authors

hum nltas --j-jcahatur^ cum we never be able to fee down in books, the inter

No,
all

let

writers fay

what they

will,
it

whenever the 'nhabitants of a counis

try decreafe,

not true that

things

go

well,

whatever be

i^s

external profperity

year, does

poet pofllflld not necefTariiy

all

and fpiendour ; of an hundred thoufand livres a

make

the age

he

lives in

the bell of

others.

We

ihould not fo

much

re-

gard
tions,

quillity

the apparent repofe of the w rid, and the tranof its chiefs, as the well being of whole na-

and

p:.nicularly

of the

mod

populous

ftates^

ftorm of hail
it

may

lay

walle (ome few provinces,

but

fe^dom caufes a famine. Teipporary tumults and

civil

144

A TREAT

E on

the

CHAP.
Of
the ahufi of government^

X.
and
Its

tendency

to

degenerate,

A
XJL

S the particular

of the prince acfls conftantly againfl the general will of the

will

people, the governnaent necefliirily makes a continual effort againfl: the fovereignty. 7 he greater this effort is, the more is the conflitution altered
flinift
;

and

as in

this cafe there is

no other

di-

librio,

Will to keep that of the prince in equiit muft fooner or later infallibly happen
that

civil wars may give rniich diflurbance to rulers but they do not conltitute the real misfortunes of a peoeven enjoy feme refpite, while they ple> who may are difputing who Ihall play the tyrant over them.
;

It

is

profperity

from their permanent or calamity muft

to the

iituaticn
arife
:

that

their real
all

when

fubmit
;

tamely then it is that their

yoke, then
chiefs,.

it is

that all are

periihing

ceRroying them

at their eafe,

ubi foiituVinem faciimt facem apfellani.

When

the in-

trio-uesof the nobility agitated ihe kingdom of France, and the coa ijutor of Paris carried a poignnrd in his
all this did not hinder the bulk pocket to parliament of the French nation from growing numerous and en*
;

SOCIAL COMPACT.

145

that the prince will opprefs the fovereign, and This is an inherent break the focial compaifl.

and unavoidable
birth of the

defe6>,

which from the

very-

body, inceffantly tends to old age and death tend as even its diflblution, the natural of to the diflblution body.
political

There
which
a

two general methods according to government degenerates viz. when it

are
;

contrails

itfelf,

or

when

the flate
itfelf,

is

dlfTohed,

The

its memgovernment a from to a few i bers are reduced great number that is to fay, from a democracy to an ariflo-

contrafls

when

cracy, and

from an arillocracy

to

a royalty.

Ancient enjoying themfelves in happinefs and eafe. Greece flourifhcd in the midft of the moil cruel wars :

human blood was

try

fpilt in torrents,

fwarmed with inhabitants.

It

and yet the counappears, fays Ma.-

chiavel, that, in the midil of murders, profcriptions and civil wars, our republic became only the more

powerful,

the virtue of the citizens, their manners,

their independence
it,

than

all its

diifenticns

had a greater eiFecl to Hrengthea had to weaken it. A litde

agitadon gives vigour to the mind, and liberty, not peace, is the real fource of the prcfperity of our
ipecies.

This

146

A TREAT

E ON

the

This is Its natural tendency *. Should it make a retrogrelTive change, by having the number
of

* The
lic

flow formation and progrefs of the repub-

of Venice, prefent a notable example of this fucceffion ; and it is very furprifing that in the fpace of zoo years the Venetians fhould be got no farther
I

than

to the

1198.

With regard

fecond term, which began in the year to the ancient dukes, Vi'ith
is

v/hich their conllitution

reproached,
fay,

it is

certain,

whatever feme writers may

fovereigns.

that they

were not

The Roman
progrefs

republic will, doubtkfs, be

made an
its

objelion, as having

taken a contrary route, in

arillocracy,
I

from monarchy to
this

and from
far

ariflocracy to democracy.

am, however,

from

thinking

was the

real cafe.

The firfl eftablifhment of Romulus was a mixt government, which degenerated prefently into deCpotifm.

From
its

ed before

very particular caufes the flate perifhtime, as a new born infant, before it

The expulfion of the attained the age of manhood. was the true era of the rife of that repubTarquins,
lic
;

although it did not aiTumc at firft a determinate form ; becaufe the work was but half done, in not
order of patricians. For hence, having abolifhed the adminiof all the vvorH aa hereditary arilloc.riiCy,
ftrations.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
of
its

147
fald

members

Increafed,
itfelf
;

it

might be

to

relax or dilate
is

but

this

inverfe progrefs

impoillble.

except

In fadl, a government never changes its form, its fpring of adlion be too much worn to
its

fupport

own.

Now,
its

if it

relaxes

ftill

more,

by being extended,

force becomes abfolutely

nothing:-

i^rations,

ai:ing oppof.ticn to the democracy, the of government remained indeterminate ; not being fixed, as Machiavel obfervcs, till the eRablifliment of the tribunes ; when, and not before, it was
in

form

a real government under the form of a true democraIn faft, the people were then not cy. only
foverei^n,

but alfo magiflrate and judge; the fenate being a tribunal of an inferior order, formed to temper and
collccl the
fclves

government
in

while even the confuls themfiril

although

patrician-j,

magiftratcs,

and

as

ge-

nerals abfolute

the iield, yet at

Rome

they were

only prefidents of the afTembiies of tha people.

From
lowed
its

this

time

it

is

evident the government fol-

natural byafs,

ariilocracy.
felf,

The

and tended ftrongly toward patrician order dying away of it-

the arillocracy fubfifled no longer in the

as at

members

Venice and Genoa, but in the body of the fenate compofed of Patricians and Plebeians, and even in the body of tribunes when they
of that body,

began

A
nothing, and
itfelf.

TREATISE
is

on

the

Aill lefs

capable of fupporting

It

is

necellary therefore to
in

wind up and

renew fuch fpring

way

proportion as it gives otherwife the liate it is intended to fupfall.

port, mufl necefTarily

The
not

diflblulion

of
FirA,

the

Hate indeed

may

happen two ways.

govern

when
to

according

the prince does law ; but arro-

gates the fovereign power to himfelf: in which cafe he eifefls a remarkable change, whereby

not the government, but the

trafled.
ftate is

flate itfelf is
is,

con-

What

mean

to fay

that the great

other within

thence diflblved, and that he forms anitj compofed only of the members

of the government, who are only the mailers and tyrants over the reft of the people. So
began to ufurp an aftive power. For words make no alteration in things. When the people have chiefs

who govern
given to
Sriflocracy.

in their flead,

whatever denomination be

thofe chiefs, the

government
of
the

is

always an

From

the

abufe

arillocratical

form, arofe the civil wars and the triumvirate. Sylla, Csefar and Auguftus indeed became real moJulius

narchs, and at length under the derpotifm of Tiberius

the

flate

was

finally dilTolved.

The Roman

doth not tend to di/prove hiftory, therefore, to confirm it, but ciple,

my

prin-

that

SOCIAL COMPACT.
that
ty,

149

when

the government ufurps the fovereign-

at that inflant the {Social

compact

is

broken^

and the individuals,

are reflored to

who were

citizens before*

the rights

of natural

liberty,

and

are

compelled,

not legally

obliged,

to

obedience.

It is

the fame thing,

when

the

members of
power they which

government aiTume feparately the

is

are entitled to exerclfe only colle^ively;

an infringement of the laws, and is For, produ<flive of flill worfe confequenccs. in this cafe, there may be faid to be as many

no

Jefs

princes as magiflrates

while the
is

ftate

no

lefs

divided than the government, or changes its form.

totally difTolved

When

the

flate Is

difTolved,

the
it

nbufe
be,

of

government, of whatever nature the common name of anarchy.

takes

To

diQinguifU

more

nicely, dcmosracy
;

is

faid to

degenerate into
;

ochlocracy

ariftocracy

into

ol'garchy
:

and
this

may add monarchy

term
tion.
is is

Into

tyranny

but

lafl:

equivocal, and requires fome explanaIn the vulgar fenfe of the w^ord, a tyrant

a king

who

governs by force and without

In the

regard to juAice or the laws.

cife

more preindi-

and determinate

fenfe,

it

means any

vidual

350
vidual

TREATISE

on the

who

out havinp- a rkht to

ailumes ihe royal authority, withIn this latter fenfe the it.
;

Greeks under ftood the word tyrant

it

and give

bad princes indifcriminately both to good and whofe authority was not legal *. Thus, iyrant and are two words perfectly {^vjurper
aonlmous.
I

to diffegive dilTcrent names, however, of rent things, I call the ufurpation regal au-

To

thority, tyranny^
defpotifm.

and that of fovereign power

takes is he, who tyrant to to law, govern acupon himfelf, contrary the and to law defpotic chief, one ; cording

The

who places himfelf above the laws themfelves. Thus a tyrant cannot be defpotic, though a
defpotic prince

muH
et

always be a tyrant.
et

* Omnes enim

hahentur

dicunlur tyranni qui

ciiitate qu<e iihtrtate
It is true

in ea pctrjiate utimtur perpetud,

ufaeji.

Corn. Nepos. in Miltiadh.

that Ariflctle

makes a diftinaion between the tyrant

and king, in that the one governs for his own good, and the other for the good of his fubjeas: but, befides

that all the

Greek

writers ufe the

word tyrant
by the
Ariftotle's

\n a different

fenfe, as appears

particularly

Hiercn of Zenophon, it would follow from diftinaion that no king ever exifted on the face of
the earth.

^ CHAP.
.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
G H A
P.

151

XL

Of

the dijjolution of the body politic^

UCH

is

the natural and unavoidable ten-

dency of even the beft conlHtutcd governwhat If Rome and Sparta perifhed, ments. ftate can hope to laA for ever ? In our endea
vours to form a durable eilabllfhrnent,

not think, therefore,

to

make

it

eternal.

we mufl If we

would hope
impOiTibiiities,

to

fucceed,
ilatter

we muft

not attempfi-

nor

ourfelves to give that

permanency

to

human

inftituiions,

which

is

in-

compatible with their nature.

The body
begins to die
caufes of
polTefs
its

politic,

as

well

as

at its birth,

and bears

the phyfical, in itfelf the

.

deflru^llon.

Both, howevci
lefs

may
and

conftitution

more or

robuft,

adapted
of the

to different periods of d-iration.

The
^lOt

conftitution of
flate,
is

man
the

is

the v/ork of nature; that

art.
It

work of

doth

depend en men to prolong theiii lives, >'ic it depends on them to prolong that :^ 'he fu'ce
as much as pofTiblc, by giving the beft adapted to longevity.
it

a contiiruticii'

The

moil

c c;

fcl

conititution,

it

is

true, will

have an end

H' 4,

ituv

J52
but
flill

A
fo

TREATISE
much
later

ON the

forefecn
folutlon.

accident

than others, if no unbring it to an untimely dif-

The

principle of political

life,

lies

in

the
is
is

fovereign authority. the heart of the flate

7 he
;

legillativc

power

the executive pov/er

the

brain,

which puts every

part in motion.

The

brain

may be rendered

ufelefs

by the
live

palfy,

and yet the individual

furvive.

A man may
:

be*

come an
is

infenfible

driveller

and yet

bat

as foon as the heart ceafes to beat, the animal

dead.

The

flate

doth not

fubfif^

by virtue of the

The HalawS; but by the legiflative power. tutes of yefterday are not in themfelves neeffarily

binding to day, but the tacit confirmation of them is prefumed from the filence of the
inlegiflaturej the fovereign being fuppofed renot laws confirm the actually cefTantly to

Whatever is once declared to be the pealed. will of the fovereign, continues always fo, unlefs it

be abrogated.

Wherefore, then,

is

there fo

much

rcfpe(5>

It paid to ancient laws ? Even for this reafon. the that is rational to fuppofe, nothing but
ex."

SOCIAL COMPACT.
excellence of the ancient laws,

15 j

could preferv&

long in being ; for that, if the fovereign had not found them always falutary and Vifefulj they would have been repealed.
fo

them

Hence we
their

fee that the laws, inflead

of lofing;

acquire additional authority by time, in every well formed flate ; the prepoffeflion of their antiquity renders them every day
force,

more venerable whereas, in every country where the laws grow obfolete and lofe their force as they grow old, this alone is a proof that the legiQative power iifclf is decayed, and
;

the ilate extind.

CHAP.
By what tmam
iained,.

XIT,
authority

the foverclgn

main"

THE
mera
?

fovereign, having no other force than the leglflative power, a(5ls only by the laws ; while the laws being only the authentic a6ts of the general will, the fo7ereign cannot a<St unlefs the people are aflembled. The

people afTemble
It
it

you
not

will fay.

What
at
fo

a chi-

is

indeed

chimerical

prefentj

though

was

reckoned

two thoufand

ij'4

TREATISE

on

the

Are mankind changed in their fand years ago. nature fince that time ?

The bounds
lefs

of pofTibility in moral

affairs are
:

confined than
foibles,

we

are apt to imagine

It is

our

our vices, our prejudices that con-

Mean fouls give no credit to the fentiments of heroic minds ; while flaves alfet:
tract them.

to turn the notion of liberty, into ridicule.

hath been done, however, we may of what may be done again. I (hall not: judge fpeak of the petty republics of ancient Greece; but the Roman republic was, undoubtedly, a

By what

great ftate, and the city of Rome a great city. By the lafl: regifler of the citizens of Rome,
their

number amounted

to four

hundred

thvju-

fand perfons capable of bearing arms j and the lafl regifler of the Empire amounted to more

than four millions of citizens, without reckon^ing fubjets5

women,

children or flaves.

How very difficult, you will fay, muft It have been, to affemble frequently the people of that capital and its environs ? And yet hardly a week
which the Roman people were not nflembkd, and on fome occasions feveral times
pafTed
in

a week,
J

SOCIAL COMPACT.
a

1^5

week.

This
fome

numerous body indeed not

functions of
thofe

only

exercifed
alfo

the

fovereigntyj

but

in

cafes

of government..
the whole

They fometimes
at

deliberated on ftate affairs, and

;

others decided in judicial caufes

people being quently in the capacity of

tizens.

publicly a(fembled almoft as fre-

magiflrates as

ci-^

By recurring
tions,

to the

primitive

ftate

of na-ancient*

we

fliall

find

that moft of

the

governments,
affemblies.
fa(ft

even the monarchical, as that of

like
it

the Macedon and others, had the

popular

Be

this,

however,

as

may, the

being once inconteilibiy proved, obviates

difficulties
;

all

for, to

deduce the

poiTibility of:

a thing from its having ad:ually happened, admit of no obje<51ion

w?il

H^

CHAR.

156

A TREAT

E om the

C H A

P.

XIII.

*rhe JuhjcSi

continued,

TT

not enough, however, that the people once aflfembled fliould fix the conftitution
Is

of the

rtate,

by giving

their fancSlion to a certain

:

code or

fyfl:em

of Jaws

it

is

not enough that

they Jfhould eflablilh a perpetual govemment, or provide once for all by the cic'<5tion of magiftrates.

Befides the extraordinary alTemblies,

accidents

which
riodical

iinforefeen

may

require,

it

is

neceifary they fhould

have certain fixed and pe-

meetings, which nothing might abolifh or prorogue fo that the people (hould, on a
:

certain day, be legally

fummoned by

law, with-

out any exprefs ftatute being required for their

formal convocation.
ar

But, excepting thefe regular alTemblies, rendered legal by the date, all others, unlefs con-

voked by the proper magilhate previoufly appointed to that end, agreeable to prefcribed formsj fhould be held illegal, and all their determinations

declared null and void

becaufe

the very manner

of

the

people's

afTembling

Hiould be determined by law.

As

C
the

A L CO

M P A C T.

157
it

As
that
rules

to

frequency of legal afTembllcs,

fo

depends on
it
is

many
It

different
to

confiderations,.

impoffible

lay

down any

precife
in

on

this

head.

can only be faid

ge-

neral that the

more powerful the governmentj

to difplay

the

more often ought ths fovereignty

itfelf.

All this,
fingle

it

may be
city
;

faid,

is

very well for

a;

town or

but what

mud
?

be done ia

a flaie comprehending feveral

cities

Mufl the

fovereign authority be diflributed, or ought it to centre in one, to the total fubje(flion of the
reft
>

anfwer. neither one nor

firft

the other.
is

In

the

place, the fovereign authority

fo that
it

and uniform,

fimple cannot be divided with-

out deftroying it. In the next place, one city cannot be legally fubjedl to another, any more
than one nation to another
;

becaufe the efTence

in

of the body

politic

eonfifts
in

the

union of

obedience and liberty, and

ViVidi

the terms fubje^

correlatives,,

fovereign being thofe identical

the ideas of which are united in the iingle term

citizen,

anfwer

1:58
I

TREATISE
that
it

on

the

anfwer farther,

Is

fundamentally

wrong, to unite feveral towns to form one city ; and that fuch union being made, the natural inconveniences of it muft enfue. The abufes
peculiar to great flates muft not be made objections to the fyiiem of one, who maintains

the

exclufive
it

propriety of
faid,

little

ones.

But

how,

will be

can

little

flates

be made

powerful enough ta relift the great ? Even as the cities of ancient Greece Were able to refift
the arms of a powerful monarch; and, as
in

times, Switzerland and Holland, have refiAed the power of the houfe of Auftria.

more modern

In cafes, alfo, where the flate cannot be re-

rcfource

duced within proper bounds, there remains one and this is by not permitting the ex;

iftence of a capital, but removing the feat of government from one town to another, and affemb-

ling the flates of the country in each alternately.

People a country equally

fufe the fame privileges

in

every part

dlf^

out

and the

flate

and advantages throughwill become at once the

flrongeft

and the

beft governed.

Remember

that the walls of

cities

are

founded on the ruins

of the

villages,

and that the fplendid palaces

23

SOCIAL COMPACT.
In

159

town

are raifed at the expence of miferable-

cottages in the country.

G H A

P.

XIV.

Subjc^ continued,

NO

in a fovereign

fooner are the people legally afiembled^. body, than the jurifdi(ftion'

of government ceafes, the executive power of the (late is fufpended, and the perfon of the
meaneil: citizen

becomes

as facred
;

and inviolable

as the greateffc magiflrate

becaufe
it is

when

the

body reprefented appears,

that the reprefentatives of
it

not requifite {hould exift. Mofl

of the tumults which happened in the Comiiia

at

Rome, were owing

to

or

negleft the confuls were only prefidents of the afTembly of the people, the tribunes merely orators*,

of this rule.

the general ignorance On thofe occafions,

and the fenate abfolutely nothing.

Thefe

intervals

of

fufpenfron,

when

the

prince acknowleges,

or at

leafl:

ought

to ac-

Nearly

in

the fenfe given to

in the parliament

thofe

who
the

fpeak^

on any queftion

of England.
fet

The
their

refemhlance of their

employments

confuls

and tribunes together by the ears;. even when

jurifdidion v/as fufpended.

knowlegg

i6o

A TREAT

E ON the

Rnowlege an actual fuperior, have been always

formidable, while fuch

formidable

aflemblies,

the fecurity of the body politie and the reftraint

of government, have been held in honour by fo that they never have been fparlng the chiefs
:

raifing obje^lions and difficulties, or of making fair promifes in order to difguft the citizens with fach meetings. When the

of pains,

in.

latter,

therefore,

have been avaritious,

mean,

or cowardly, preferring their cafe to liberty, they have nox been able to withQand long the repeated efforts of government.: and thus it is
that, this

encroaching power incefTantly

the

aug-

menting,
tinft,

and

fovereignty becomes totally exthus molt cities come to an un-

timely end.

Sometimes, however, there

is

introduced be-

tween fovereign authority and arbitrary government, a mean term of power, of which it
is

necelTary to treat.

eHA

P.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
C

i6i

H A

P.

XV.

Of
to

deputies or rtprefentaiives*
t

HEN the fervlce of

tizens,

ne public ceafes
ci-

be the principal concern of the

it

and they had rather difcharge

the ftate

by
al-

their purfes than their perfons,

is

ready far advanced

toward ruin. When they fhould march out to fight, they pay troops to

fight for them,

fliould

and

flay at

home.

When

they

go they fend deputies, and jQay at home. Thus, in confequence of their indolence and wealth, they in the end employ
to council,
foldiers to en (lave their country, tatives to betray it.

and reprefen-

It is
it is

the buflle of

commerce and the

arts

the fordid love of gain, of luxury and eafe, that thus convert perfonal into pecuniary fervices.

A'len readily
to

profit,

increafe

give up one part of their the reft unmoleiied. But

fupply

an

adminiftration

with money,

and

they will prefently fupply you with chains.

The
in

very term
a free city.

of taxes

is

flavifh,

and unknown

In a flate truly free, the citizens

difcharge

their

duty to the public with their

own

i62

x\

TR

z^

TI

E ON the

own

So far from hands, and not by money. paying for being exempted from fuch duty, they would pay to be permitted to difcharge it
ihemfelves.
I

am

ceived opinions, and

very far from adopting rethink the fervices exacted

of liberty than

by

force

a lefs infringement

taj^es.

The

better the

conftitntion

of a ftate, the

greater influence have public affairs over private, in the minds of the cilizeuo They will have,
:

alfo,

much fewer
;

private

affitlrs

to

concern

them

becaufe the fum total of their

common
the
lefs

happinefs, furnifhing a
tion to each individual,

more confiderable porthere remains

for each to feek

private concernSo In a city well governed, every one is ready to bad governfly to its public afFfmblies ; under a ment they are cure lefs about going thither at
fi

om

his

own

all
is

becaufe no
-,

une

interefts

hlmfelf in

what

will

5t known that the general is doing there does not inrluence them,, and hence at

all their atlength domefiiC concerns engage Good lav/s tend to the making better, tention.

while bad ones are introdutftory of Worfe. No fooner doth a citizen fay, what ctre ftate-affalrs
to

me

than the

ftate

may be

given

up

for

It

SOCIAL COMPACT.
It Is this

103

want of public
interefl:,

fpirit,

the influence

of private

the

extent of flates, con-

given
ple
V

quers and abufes in government, that have rife to the method of afiembling the peoby deputies and
reprefentatives.

The

af-

fembly of thefe reprefentauves is called in fome countries, the third eftate of the nation ; fo
that the particular interefts of the two orders arc placed in the firft and fecond rank, and the public interefl only in the third.

The
fented,

fovereignty, however, cannot

be repreit

and that

for

the fame
It

reafon that
eflentially

cannot be alienated.
the general will, and

cenfifts

of

the will cannot be repre-

sented

it is

either identically the fame, or

fome

other

there can be no

mean term

in the cafe.

The

deputies of the people, therefore, neither are nor can be their reprefentatives ; they are

only mere commiffioners, and can conclude definitively on nothing. Every law that is not

void

confirmed by the people in perfon is null and it is not in facSl a law. The Engliih
;,

imagine they are a free people

ever miflaken
eleflion
:

they

are

; they are howfuch only during the

members of parliament. Whea flaves become they again ; and indeed they make fo bad a ufe of the few
of
thefe
are

chofcn,

traa-

i64

TREATISE
mcments of
it.

on the
that they richly

tranfitory

liberty,

deferve to lofe

of reprefentatives is modem ; defccnding to us from the feudal fyftem tnar mofk iniquitous and abfurd form of government, by

The notion

which human nature wasfo

fliamefuV.y degraded.

In the ancient republics, and even monarchies, the people had no reprefentatives i they were it is even very fingular /^rangers to the term,
that,
at

Rome, where
revered,
it

the

Tribunes were fo

much

was never imagln<'d they and as could ufurp the funlions of the people
;

One ftrange that they never once attempted it. embarraflinent the of may judge, however,
fometimes caufed

by the multitude,

by what

happened

in

the

time of the Gracchi,

when

part of the citizens gave their votes from their

houfe-tops.

Where men
ties are

value their liberty and privileges

difficul-

above every thing, inconveniences and

nothing.
in

Among
a to

this wife

people things
;

were held
mitted

proper eftlmation

they

per-

the Li6^ors

do

what
j

they

woufd

aot fuffer the Tribunes to attempt

they were not

afraid

SOCIAL COMPACT.
afraid the
Ll<5lors

165
repre-

would ever think of

fenting them.

To
thefe
it

explain,

neverthelefs,

in

what manner

Tribunes did fometimes reprefent them,

be fufficient
to

will

conceive

how

ment
only

reprefents the fovereign.

a

The

governlaw being
it is

declaration of the general will,

clear

that the people cannot be reprefented in the legiflative

but they may, and ought to be, in the executive ; which is only the application of

power

power
jf

to law.

And

this

makes

it

evident that,

things to the bottom, we fhall find very few nations that have any laws. But,

we examine
this

be

as

it

may,

it

is

certain

that the

Tri-

bunes, having no part of the executive power, could not reprefent the Roman people, by virtue of their office, but only in ufurping thofe of the fenate.

Among

the Greeks, whatever the people

it

had
per-

to do, they did

in

perfon

they were

petually afTembled in public.

a mild
flaves

They

inhabited

climate,

were
their

free

from avarice, their

bufmefs,

managed

domeflic
liberty.

and

their great concern

was

As you do not
can you expert

polTefs the fame advantages,

how

i66

TREATISE

ON the
?

pcS: to prefer ve the fame privileges

Your

cli-

mate being more fevere, creates more wants * ; for fix months in the year your public fquares
are too wet or cold to be frequented ; your hoarfe tongues cannot make themfelves heard in the open air ; you apply yourfelves more to gain than to liberty, and are lefs afraid of flavery

than poverty.

On
me,

this

occafion,

if liberty

it will probably be afked cannot fupport itfelf without the

affiftance of flavery ? Perhaps not. At leaft the 'two extremes approach very near. What-ever does not exift in nature, mult have its

conveniences, and

civil

fociety

flill

more than

any thing
their

elfe.

There

are

fome circumftances

(o critically

unhappy

that

men cannot

preferve

liberty but at the expence of the liof others and in which a citizen cannot berty be perfedly free without aggravating the fub;

own

jelion of his
of Sparta.

flaves.

Such was the

fituaiion

no

flaves,

moderns, 5^ou have but are flaves yourfelves, and purchafe

for you, ye

As

To adopt in cold countries the luxury and effeminacy of the Eaft, is to appear defirous of flavery, without having the fame excufe for fubipitting
to
it.

their

SOCIAL COMPACT.
their liberty
boafl:

167
if

by your own.

You may

you

of this preference ; for my part> pleafe I find more meannefs in it than humanity.

do not intend, however, by

this to inculcate
it is

that

we

fliould have flaves, or that

equit-

able to reduce

to a ftate of flavery ; havI am here ing already proved the contrary. the reafons certain namodern only giving why
tions

men

who
let

imagine themfelves

prefentatives,

But

this

free, employ reand why the ancients did not. be as it will, I affirm that when

once a people make choice of reprefentatives,

they are no longer free.

Every thing duly confidered,

poflibility

do not

fee a

of the fovereign maintaining its rights, and the exercife of its prerogatives, for the
future
fmall.

among
But
to
it

us, unlefs the ftate be indeed very

if it

be fo very fmall, will independency

?

it

not
I

be
will

liable

lofe its

No.

hereafter appear in what the exterior power of a great people

make

manner may be
little

united with the policy and good order of a

ODe.

CH A

i6B

TUEATISE
CHAP.

on the

XVI.
is

T!?at ihi Injlitutlon of government

not a

compa^,
well

^T^HE
-*

leglflative

power

being
to

once

eftabllflied,

we proceed

fettle
:

the exe-

cutive
latter

for the power in the fame manner which operates only by particular a(n:s,
effentially different
it.

being

from turally divided for the fovereign, confidered as fuch, to pofTefs the executive pov/er, the matter of right and
faft
{o confounded, that we fhould to diflinguifh what is law and able be no longer the what is not ; body politic alfo being thus

from the other, is naIf it were pofTible

would be

unnaturally fituated, would foon

to that violence,

become

a prey

which

it

was

originally infli-

tuted to correi^n:.

The
all

citizens
all

compadl,

being, by virtue of the focial equal, that which all may perfornij

may

prefcribe,

whereas none can have a

another to do right to require

himfelf.

what he does not

Now
motion,

it is

properly this right, indifpen-

to fibly necefTary
litic in

animate and put the body po-

with which the fovereign

in-

vefts

SOCIAL COMPACT.
vei^s the prince in

169

the

inflitution

of govern-

ment.

It

has been pretended by Tome that the

this inflitution,

at
they

forming
the

was

contrad between
of

people and made choice : a

the

chiefs
in

which

contract

which the two

parties flipulated the

conditions on

which the

one obliged themfelves to command, and the I am perfuaded every one will other to obey.
agree with me that this was a very ftrange mode But let us fee whether this opiof contraft.

nion

is

in itfelf well

founded.

In the

no more
alienate

place the fupreme authority can modify or alter its form than it can
firfl:

itfelf;
it.

to limit or reftrain,
It
is

would be

abfurd and contradiflory to fay the fovereign made choice of a fuperior:

to deftroy

to oblige
its

own

obey a mafter, conftitution, and reftore

itfelf to

is

to

difTolve

its

members

to their natural liberty.

trail

Again, it is plain that fach a fuppofed conbetween the people in general and certain

particular perfons

would be
it

particular
a

aft

whence

it

follows that

would not be

f law
nor

70

A T
-a(5t

Pv

E A

o^r

the

nor an

of fovereignty, and of confeqiience

would be

illegal.

It

is

farther

evident,

that

the

contra<filng

parti-es

would remain, refpefting each other,

iimpiy und^r the laws

of nature, without any fecurit}^ for the performance of their reciprocal engagements, a circumftance totally repugnant
i:o

a {\^tQ of

civil fociety.

The

party only

who

might have the power, could enforce the execufo that we might as well give tion of the terms the name of a contract, to the a(5t of a maa
;

*who fliould fiiy to another, " I give you whole property, on condition that you will
ilore

my
re-

me

juft as

much

of

it

as

you pleafe."
flate,

There
is

is

but one compa(fi: in a

and that
is

the acl of afToclation,

;

which alone
as
it

ex-

clufive of every other

is

impo/Tible to

Imagine any fubfequent public .would not be a =:7iolation of the original.

contrad): which,

CHAP.

SOCIAL COMPACT,
CHAP.
Of
notion,

171

XVII.

the inJliiutiGn of gr.vernment,

WHAT
inftituted
firil
?

of the a6l,

are we ^to form which by government is

then,

In anfwer
that
this

to

this queftion,
is

fliall

remark

ad

compofed of two

others, viz

complicated, or the eftablifliment

it.

of the law and the execution of-

'By -the vernment

form
that
;

rfl',

fiiall
it

be eftablifhed
is

the fovereign cnads that a goin fiich or fuch a

clear,

and

this

being a general acl,

it is

a law.

By

who

are

the fecond, the people name the chiefs to be charged with the adminiftratioa

of the government ^o eflablifhed.

Now

this
a fefirfl:,

nomination, being a particular ac^l, is not cond law, but only a confcquence of the

and

in reality

an

ad

of governaient.

The difFiculty lies in being able to comprehend how an ad of government can take place
before the government
I

exifled,,and
2

how

the

people,

172
people,

A'

Pv.

E A

E on

the

who

mnfl:

be always either fovereign or

magiflrate, in cerr

fubjec^s,

become prince or

tain circumftances.

We

have here made a

difcovery of one of

thefe aftonifhing properties of the

body

politic,

by which
fected

it

reconciles

operations
;

apparently

contradictory to each other

this a6\

being

ef-

fudden converfion of the fovereignty fo that, without into a democracy any fenfible

by

change, and only by means of a new relation of

all

to

all,

the citizens, becoming magiitrates,

to particular ones,

pafs

from general afts

and

from enacting laws

to the execution of

them.

This change of relation is not a matter of mere fpeculation, unexemplified in pra*Rice:

pbce very frequently in the parliament of England, where among the commons, the whole houfe is formed on certain occafions, into
it

takes

a committee, for the better enquiry into, and the members difcufTion of the matter in hand
;

become mere
court
they
to

commifTioners of
a

the fovereign
before.

conftituted but

moment

Agreeable
they
of'

which, the enquiry being ended,

the houfe

make

a report to themfelves, as

Commons,

of their proceedings as a grand

com-

SOCIAL COMPACT.
committee,

173
the

and

deliberate

anew under

former

title

on what they had already determined

under the

latter.

Such, indeed,

is

the peculiar advantage of a

it

democratical government, that

in
fadl

is

eftablidied

by the fimple act of the

general will.

After which, this provifional government continues, if fuch be the intended form ; or eflablidies, in

the

name of

the foverciga, the form

;

of government adopted by law

thing proceeds

and thus every

It is

according
a

to

order.
in

im-

pofTible' to inflitute
legal

government manner, without renouncing the principles

any other

before eflablidied.

CHAP.
Of
the

XVIIL
the ufurpations

means of preveyiting
gGvernmcnt*

of

FROM
XVIth
tutes

the foregoing illuftrations rcfuhs the

confirmaiion of
chapter,

what

is

alTerted

in

the

viz. that
is

the

a6l

which

inAi-?
;

government

not a contract but a law

f the
1

that the depofitories

executive

power

are

not

174

A TREAT

E ON tre

not the mafters, but the fervants of the people that the people may appoint or remove them
at pleafnre
;-

that they have

no pretence

to a con-

tra6l

with the people, but are bound to obey them ; and that in accepting the offices the
ftate

impofes
as

on

them,

their duty

citizens,

they only difcharge without having any fort

of right to difpute the conditions.

"When
people

it

fo

eflablifh

happens, therefore, that the an hereditary government,

whether

monarchical,

and confined

to

one

pardcular family, or ariftocratical, and divided among a certain order of citizens, they do not enter thereby into any formal engagement they
;.

only give the adminiftration a provifional foim,

which remains
change
it.

legal

till

they

think proper to

It

is

certain that

fuch changes
a

are

always
eilait

dangerous, and that

government once

blifhed (hould not be meddled with, unlefs

be found incompatible

witfi
is

the public

good

but

circumfpelion and not a matter of right.

ever,
is

this

maxim of

policy,

The

flate,

how-

no more bound

to refign the civil au-

thorhy

SOCIAL COMPACT.
rhorlty
chiefs,

17S

into

the

bands of

its

than 'the military aiuhority

magillrates or into thofe

of

its

generals.

It Is

certain, alfo,
all

that great care flionld

be

taken to obferve
fiich a cafe,

thofe formalities, which, ia

are requifite to diftlnguifn a regular

act

and

legal

from a feditious commotion

to

diftinguirn

between the general will of a whole

In which
'

people and the clamours of a fa6fion>

latter

cafe,

a people are particularly obliged to

give the beft founded remonflrances

no

farther*

countenance, than
juftice

in the

utmoft

flri(flnefs

of

they

may

deferve.

Of

this obligation,

however, the prince may take great advantages,

in order to preferve his

power
the

in fpite of the
rilk

people,

without

running
it.

of

being

charged with ufurping

only to

For

in

appearing

make

ufe of his prerogatives^

he may

extend them, and under the pretence of maintaining the

afTemblies

public

peace,

may prevent

thofe

which mioht otherwife be calculated

10 re-eftablifh the
fo that

he might profit

good order of government by that fi lence which

:

he keeps from being broken, and by

I

thofe

ir-

regu-

ijo

TREATISE
;

cn the

which he himfclf might canfc to be committed pleading in his favour the taregularities
cit

approbation of thofe whofe fears keep them

;

jfiient

and

punifhing
It

thofe

who

are

bold

enough
at
iirfl:

to fpeak.

was thus the decemviri,

year only, and
after-

ele^led

for OEe

wards continued

for another, attempted to pertheir power, by prefrom affembling as ufual ; cafy means that all the go-

petuate the duration of

venting the

Ccfj'iii'a

and

it is

by

fr.ch

vernments

in

the world,

when once

inveflied

with power,
authority.

ufurp fooner or later the fovereign

Thofe

periodical

affemblles,

of which

have fpoken above, are very proper to prevent,

or protrafV, this misfortune, particularly

when
then

they require no formal

the
-

convocation

-y

for

prince cannot prevent

them without de-

daring himfelf openly a violator of the laws,

and an enemy to the Aate.

The
focial

opening of thefe affemblies, which have

no other objeft than the prefervation of the

contrafV, ought always
to

be made by

two

SOCIAL COMPACT.
two
propofitions,

177
be fup-

which

can never

prefled, and (hould

pafs feparately by vote.

First

Whether

It

be the determination

of the fovereign to preferve the prefent form of government.

Second

Whether

it

be the determinatioa

of the people to continue the adminiilration in the hands of thofe, who are at
prefent charged with
it.

It is

to

granted,

what
in

be obferved, that I here take for I conceive has already been

viz.

demonflrated,
tal

that

there

is

no fundamenflate

law

any

fiate,

which fuch

cannot

repeal, not excepting even the fecial compatTl : for, fhould all the citizens aiTemble w'ith one

accord to break

this

compact,

it

would un-

Grotlus doubtedly be very legally dillolved. an that individual thinks even may renounce
the Hate of which he
is

member, and

re-

fume

his

natural

independence and

property

by

leaving the country *.

Now

it

would be
very

*
fiy,

With

this

exception, however, that he does not

duty, and

to elude his

avoid ferving his country

I 5

178

TREATISE

on the

very abfurd to fuppofe that the whole body of citizens united, could not do that in concert,

which any one of them might do

fepa-

rately.

try

on any emergency, when

his fervice

is

required.

In this cafe his flight would be criminal and highly

defcrving of punilhment.
It

would not be a

retreat

but defertion.

The End

of the

Third Book.

BOOK

SOCIAL eOMPACT.
B O O

179

IV.

CHAP.
That

I.

the general will cannot he

as a

ann.hilated%

C
*^

long

number of

individuals

remain

perfeflly united and confider themfelves as

one body, they can have but one will; which relates to their common prefervation and welfare.

All the refources of the flate, are then

its

fimple and vigorous,

political

maxims

clear

and obvious
oppofite

it

comprehends no
but
that
all,

intricate

and
'

interefts;

of the

public

is

demonflrably evident to
the
gift

and requires only

to

of

common

fenfe

underfland

it.

Peace, concord, and equality are enemies to political refinements. "When men are hcneH:, and
fimple, their very fimplicity prevents
their de-

ception

they

are

not 10

be impofed on by

fophiftry, but are

When
people

it is

too artkfs even to be duped. known, that, among the happicft

in the

world, a number of peafants meet

an oak, and
re-

together under the Ihade of

gulate the
afFaii s

of flate, with the mo'r dfuis it

dential ceconomy,

pofTible

to forbear

de-

ipifini 'S

i8o
fpifing

A
the
fo

TREATISE
much
artifice

ON

the
nations,
to

refinements of other

who

employ

and myitery
?

render

themfelves fpiendidjy miferable

but few

thus fimply governed hath need of while in proportion as it becomes to neceflary promulgate new ones, that neceflity
flate
]av/s,

is

univerfally apparent.

The

firfl

perfon

who

propofes them, takes on

himfelf to

fpeak only
;

what every one hath already thought

and nei-

ther eloquence nor intrigue is requifite to make that pafs into a law, which every one had already refolved to do, as foon as he fhould be
alTured others

would do the fame.

That
fubje6l,

v/hlch
is,

deceives

our reafoners on

this

that, feeing

none but fuch dates as

were badly conftituted at their beginning, they are Aruck with the impoffibility of maintaining
/

fuch a police in them. They fmile to think of the abfurdities, into which a defigning knave
or infinuating orator might lead the people of Paris and London. They are not apprized that
a Cromwell, and a Beaufort,
treated as

would have been

and Geneva, due to their

incendiaries at Berne
difcipline

and have underwent the

demerit.

But

SOCIAL COMPACT.
and the
that

i8i

But when the bonds of fociety begin to relax, flate to grow weak ; when the private

of individuals begin to appear, and of parties to influence the flate, the objects of public good meet with oppofition ; uninterells

animity no longer prefides in the afTemblies of the people j the general will is no longer the will of all ; contradi(flions and debates arife,

and the mofl

falutary

counfel

is

not adopted

wjthout dlfpute.

Again, when the

flate

is

bordering on ruin,
focial

and
lie

exifts only

in

empty form, when the

no longer
the

conne<fl:s

when

bafefl:

the hearts of the people, motives of intereft impudently

alTume the facred name of the public good ; then is the general will altogether filent ; individuals, actuated

by private motives, cherilh no

citizens,

more the fentiments of

flate

than

if

the

had never
pafs,

exifted, while the

mock

legif-

under the name of laws, thofe inidecrees which have no other end than quitous
lature

private intereflr

Doth
No.

it

follow from hence,

is

however, that
corrupted
?

the general will

annihilated or

This remains ever conAant,

invariable,

and

i82
and pure

A
;

TRE ATI S E
though
it is

ON the
of party.
fee,

fubjecfted to that

There

is

not an individual

who

doth not

while he detaches his

own

interell

from that

of the public, that he cannot feparate himfelf

from
evil
it

entirely

but
in

his

ihare in

the
to

common
the

feems nothing

companion

which he propof^s
felf.

to lecure exclufively to

good him-

Setting

to concur in meaiures for the

lic,

and

is as ready of the pubgood hat even tor his own fake as any one.

this

motive afide

he

Nay. even
all fenfe

in

ftllin^ hi-

vote, he doth not lofe

,

of the geneial will

he only eludes
in

it.

changing the f^ate of i.he queOion, and making an anfwer to what is not af^ed him ; fo that, inllead of adis

The

fiult

be

guilty of,

lies

mitting by his vote, .hut

the fiutt\

it

is

to

the

imerejt of

he

fays,

//

/j

to the

in'ereft
this

of Juch an

individual or fuch a party^ that

or that iaiv

Jhould

ptifs

Thus

the order

which (hould prefnould

preferve the geit

vail in the public alTemblies of the (fate,

not be calculated fo
interrogated, and

much
make
it

to

neral will inviolate, as to caufe

to

to be

always

anfwer.

I might here make a variety of refle<5fions on the fimp 'e right of voting in every adf of the fovereignty ; a right which the citizens

cannot be deprived of

as alfo

on the rights of
think-

SOCIAL COMPACT.
thinking,

183
public
is

propofing and

debating on

matters

privileges whicli government folicitous enough to confine to its own

-,

ever

memitfelf
;

bers.

Tbiis fubjecft, however,

to deferve
a

is

of importance

enough and it is impoffible for

the prefent.

whole

treatife

of

me

to fay every thing in

C H A
On
is

P.

II.

Votes,

evident,

from what hath been

carried on,

faid

in

IT the preceding
which public
concord there
animity in
lent
is

chapter, that the manner in

affairs are

may

afford

a fure indicaaon of the actual f>ate of manners, and the health of the body politic. The more
is

in public aflcmllies,

that

is

to

the fay, the nearer

the

members approach to untheir votes, the more prevagiving will among them but long general
:

and commotions, evince debates, the afcendency of particular intereiis and the dediffentions
cline of

the ftate.

This appears lefs evident, Indeed, when two or more orders of men, enter into the ronflitution
;

as at

Rome, where

the quarrels of the

Pa-

iS4

TREATISE

ON the

and Plebeians occafioned frequent diflurbances in the Comitia^ even in the moft flouPatricians

rifhing times of the

republic.

This exception
real
:

however,

is

more apparent than

two
ftates in

as in that

cafe there exifls, by a defefl inherent in the

body
is

politic,

one

and that which

not true of both together, may neverthelefs be true of each apart. It is alfo true in fat
that, even during

the mofl

turbulent times of

the republic, the decrees of the Plebeians, when he Senate did not intermeddle, were pafTed

with
lity

great tranquillity agreeable to the pluraThe citizens having but o^Je of voices.
intereft, the

common
will.

people could have but one

Unanimity returns again and tremity of the circle

;

at
this

the oppofite exis where the ci-

tizens,

nor will.

reduced to flavery, have neither liberty In fuch a fituation, fear and flattery

no pervert their votes into acclamations ; they but either themfelves ; longer deliberate among
adore
or curfe their
tyrants.

Such were the

debafed principles of the Senate under the Roman emperors. Under thefe circumffances alfo,
the
fentiments

of the
the

public were

frequently

cxprefTed,
tion
J

precauTacitus obferving that, under OthO; the

with

moil ridiculous

SOCIAL COMPACT,

185

Senators, while they loaded Vitellius with execrations, they aHecfted at the fame time to

make
to

a confufed
his

and clamorous

noife, in

order

prevent

their mafter,

knowing, what any individual had

fliould

he become
faid.

From

thefe

confiderations

may be deduced

the maxims, on which the manner of counting votes, and comparing diiferent fafFrages, (hould

or
or

be regulated, according as the general will is more lefs eafy to be difcovered, and the ftate more
lefs

advanced towards

its

decline.

There

is

but one law, which in its own nature, requires unanimous confent and this is the fecial com :

pact.
tary
free,

For
in

civil

aflbciation
:

is

the moft volun-

al

the world

every

man being born

and mafter of himfelf, no one can lay him under reftraint, on any pretence whatever,

without his

own
is

confent.

To*affirm that the

is

fon of a Have

born a Have,

to affirm

he

is

not bori^a man.'

If there

be any perfons, however, who opitfelf,

pofe this

contrail

their
;

oppofition

does

not invalidate that contrail:

their being

k
;

only

hinders

comprehended
in the

therein

and they re-

main

aliens

midfl of citizens.

When
a flate

i86
a ftate

A
is

TREATISE
formed, a confent to

ON
its

the
inftltutlon
:

is

inferred

by the refjdence of the party

in

to fub-its

mrt to refidence
fovereignly
*.

any country

is

to

fubmit to

If we except this primitive eontra^ft, the determination of the majority is- always obligathis is a neceHary confequence tory on the refl
:

of the

contra(5l itfelf.

how

can a

man be

free,

But it may be afked, and yet be obliged to

conform to the

will of others.

How

can the

members of an oppofition be

called free-men,

who

are compelled to fubmit to laws which have not confented to ? I anfwer that this they is not The citizen queftion properly jfirated.

confents to

all

Ibme of them

laws pafTed by a majority, though in particular may have paiTed con;

trary to his inclination

by which he

is

punifhable for

nay he confents to thofe the breach of

* This mull always be underdood, however, of a free flate, from which people have the liberty to deFor in others the part with their eifetls at pleafure. confideration of their family, their property, the

want of an afylum,
tain an

neceffity

or

violence,

may

de-

inhabitant in a country contrary to his will ;. In which cafe, his fimple refidence neither implies
bis confent to the con trad, nor his violation of
it.

any

SOCIAL COMPACT.
any one.
this alone

187

The
that

conftant will of
is

all

the
;

memit is

bers of a Aare,

the general

will

and

freemen*.

makes them either citizens or When a law is propofed in the

precifely

afTembly of the people, they are not

demanded, whether they

reject

feverally

approve or

the propofition ; but whether it be conformable or not to the general will, which is theirs as a colletfiive body ; each perfon, therefore,
this
in

giving his vote declares his opinion on

head, and on counting the votes, the degeneral will,

a
is

claration of the

inferred frorii
pafles contrary

the majority.
to

When
it

law thus

my
I

that

nothing more thaa was miilaken, and that I concluded the

opinion,

proves

general will to be what

that,
if

it

really

was

not.

So

my

particular advice had been follow-

ed,

it

would have beea contrary

to

my

will,

we fee the word Lihertas infcribed on the chains of the galley flaves, and on the doors of the prifoners the application of which device is
:

* At Genoa

beautiful and jult; as

it is

in

fad only the criminals

of

all ftates

that infringe the liberty of the citizen.

all

country, whofe malefadors Ihculd be

to

adually

chained

the oar,

would be a country of the moft

jierfed: liberty.

which

l88

A
as a

TREATISE

ON^

the

which
and

citizen is the fame as the general, that in cafe I fhould not have been free.

This argument fuppofes, indeed, that

ed
in

all

the

chara5leriftics of the general will, are contain-

the plurality
to

of votes: and
take

when

this

ceafes

be the
is

cafe,

what courfe you

will, there

an end of

liberty.

In having (hewn
parties
is

how

the will of particulars

and

fubfdtuted for the general,

in public

deliberations, I have already fufficiently pointed

out the practicable means of preventing fuch abufes ; of this, however, I fliall fpeak further hereafter.

With regard

to the proportional

number of
it

votes that indicate this general will,

I have alfo laid

down

the principles on

which

may be determined.

The

difference of a

ilngle voice

is enough to break the unanimity ; but between unanimity and an equality there is a variety of proportions ; to each of which the

number

in

queflion

may be

applied, according

to the circumftances of the body politic.

There

are

two general maxims, which may

theone
is, that

ferve to regulate thefe proportions:

the more grave and important the deliberations, the

SOCIAL COMPACT.
:

189

the nearer ought the determination to approach to unanimity .the other is, that the more exthe lefs fliould unpedition the affair requires,, In on. dehberations where infifted be iinimity the matter
iliould

be immediately determined,

the majority of a fingle vote fliould be fufficicnt. The firfl of thefe maxims feems mofl applicable
to permanent laws, and

the fecond
as
it

to matters
It is

of bufinefs.

But be

this

may,

from

their judicious combination, that the bell

tions
lity
fifl

propormuft be deduced, concerning that plurain whofe votes fliould be fuppofed to coav/ill.

the general

CHAP.
Of

III.

Ekclions,

ITH
cbfervcd
is

regard to the elecflion of a prince or of magiflrates, which, as I before

a

complicated
;

a<5l;

there

are

two

methods of proceeding
lot.

viz.

by choice and by
In dif-

They have
;

each been made ufe of

ferent republics

and we

fee in

our

own

times,

a very intricate mixture of both in the ekdlion

of the doge of Venice.
8

Jh

igo
T'he

TREATISE

on the
ts

the fiaiure

preference by lot ^ fays cf a democ<a>:y.

Montefquleu,

of

This
The

admit, but
choice
;

not for
fays he,

the
is

reafons given.

by

Ict^

a method which fffendi no-baJy

hy per--

mitting each citizen to entertain the reafonahle hope

qJ being preferred to the fcrvice cf his country.

This, however,

is

not the true reafon. of chiefs

is

If

we

refle6l that the ele<lion

fundion

of government and not of the fovcreignty, we iliall fee the reafon why this method is of the
nature of a democracy, in
flration
is

which the adminiits

^o

much

the better, as

acls

are

fewer.

In

every real democracy

the office of

ma-

is not advantageous but expenfive and burthenfome, io that it were unjufl: to impofe it on one perfon rather than another. The

giftrate

Jaw, therefore, impofes that charge on him, to

whofe

lot

it falls.

For

in this cafe,

all

ffandin!^

an equal chance, the choice doth not depend on human will, nor can any particular application change the univerfality of the law.

In an ariflocracy the prince makes choice of

the prince

and, the gove;:mnent piroviding for

it-

SOCIAL COMPACT.
itfelf,

i^i

properly applicable. apparent exception, in the election of the doge of Venice, confirms this diIs

here

it

that

votes

are

The

fUnvSlIon, inflead of deftroylng

it

fuch a mixt

form

as

is

ufed by the Venetians

is

adapted to

a mixt government.

For

it

is

a miflake to fup-

pofe the government of Venice a true arilloIf the lower order of people, indeed, cracy.

have no

fliare in

the government, the nobility

{land in their place, and

become the people

in

refpefl to the adminlftratlon.

is

What
into

number

there

of the inferior order

of nobles,
the

who
ma-

{land no chance of ever

,

getting

giftracy, and reap no other advantage from their rank than the empty title of Excellency,

-and the privilege of fitting in the great

.cil.

Coun-

This great council being as numerous as our general council at Geneva, its illullrious members have no greater privileges tl^erefore
It is certain, that than our ordinary citizens. extreme the afide difparity of the two refettlng

of publics, the burghers

a6lly the Patricians

Geneva reprefent ex;

of Venice
the

our natives and

fojomners

and people* and our peafants the inhabitants Df the terra

reprefent
citizens

frma belonging

to that

ftate.

In a word, con-

sider their Veoetian republic in

what

light

you
wili.

192
will,

A TR EAT
abftra6led
is

S.E

ON the

from

its

vernmentj Geneva. All the difference

no more

ariflocratlcal
is

grandeur, its go= than that of

that

we

have no

occafion for this kind of ele^^ion.

choice by lot, is attended with very inconvenience in a real democracy, when all
to

The

little

men

being nearly on an equality, as well with regard

manners

and

abilities,

as

to

fentiment^

and fortune, the matter of choice is indifferent. But I have already obferved a true democracy is
only imaginary.

When

the

eledlion

is

of a mixt form,

viz.

by vote and by lot, the firfl ought to provide for thofe ofHcers which require proper talents, as in military affairs ; the other being bell: adapted

which require only common fenfe, honefly and integrity j fuch as the offices of
to thofe
in a

judicature; becaufe are poffefTed qualities

well-formed

ffate,

thofe
ia

by

all

the

citizens

common.

No eleflion either by vote or lot, hath place under a monarchical government the monarch himfelf being the only rightful prince and legal
;
,

magiflrate,

the choice of his fubftitute

is

veiled
in

SOCIAL COMPACT.
in

193

him

alone.

When
to

the

Abbe de

St. Pierre,

therefore, propofed the khig's councils in France, and to

increafe the

number of
ele(5l

their

members by

ballot, he was not aware that he

propofed to change the form of the French government.

It

remains

to fpeak
in

of the manner of giving

popular afTemblies
will
;

and coUecling votes

but,

perhaps, an hillorical fketch of the

lice relating to this point,

Roman
it

po-

explain

better

than
blifh.

all

the
It is

maxims

fhould endeavour to eftarea-

worth the pains of a judicious

little

der, to attend a ner, in

particularly
affairs,

to the

man-

which they treated

in

both general

and

particular,

a council of two

hundred

thoufand perfons.

CHAP.

194

TREATISE
C H A
Of
the

on

the

P.

IV.
Comitia,

Roman

have no authentic monuments of the

ages of

earliefl

Rome

there

is

even

great reafon
told

to believe that moft of the ftories

us

of

them are fabulous*; and indeed,

the moft interefting and inftruflive part of the annals of nations in general, which is that of
their eflablifliment,
is

the moft imperfe<ft.

to

Ex-

perience daily owing the revolutions

pires
;

teaches us

what caufes are

but as

we

fee

of kingdoms and emno inflances of the original

formation of

ftates,

we

can only proceed on

conje(5lures in treating this fubje<5l.

The

cuftoms

we

find

a(n:::ally

eftablifhed,

however, fufficiently atteft, there muA have been Thofe traditions, an origin of thofe cufloms.
*

1 he name of Romey which

from Romulus^
is

it is

pretended was

taken
the

name of

Numa
is

is

Gieek, and fignifies /lr<:<f ; Greek alfo, and fignifies /^jw.

What
this

probability

there that the

two

firft

kings of

have been called by names fo excity fhould

preflive

of

their future

anions

alfo.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
a!fo, relating to fuch

19^

origin, which appear the moft rational, and of the befl authority ought

Thefe are the to pafs for the mofl: certain. maxims I have adopted in tracing the manner in which the moft powerful and free people ia
the univerfe, exercifed the fovereign authority.

After the foundation of

public, that
is

Rome,

the rifing re-

to fay, the

army of the founder,

Sabines and foreigners, compofed was divided into three clafTes ; which, from that

of Albans,

divifion, took

the

name of

tribes.

thefe tribes

was fubdivided

into ten Curled,

Each of and

each Curia into decurits, at the head of which

were placed chiefs refpe<51ively denominated cu" rlones and decunotitS,

Befide this, there

tribe a

were

fele(fled

from

each

called

body of an hundred cavaliers or knights, centurions', by which it is evident that

eflential
firfl:

thefe divifions, not being

to the

good

order of a

city,

were

at

only

military.

But

it

feems

as if the prefaging inflincfl of future

greatnefs, induced

the

little

town of Rome to

adopt

at firfl a

fydem of police proper for the

metropolis of the world.

From

ig6

TREATISE
ar>

on the
however, there

From
that the

this primitive divifion,

fpeedily refulted

inconvenience.

This was

tribe of Albans, and that of the Sa-

bines always remaining the fame,

while that of

the flrangers Vv^as perpetually encreafing by the concourfe of foreigners, the latter foon furpafTed The remedy the number of the two former.

which Servius applied to abufe was to change the

flitute, in the

corre<fl: this

divifion

dangerous and to fub-

room of

diftinflion of race,

which

he aboliflied, another taken from the parts of Inflead of the town occupied by each tribe.
three tribes, he conflituted four
;

each of which

occupied one of the Thus by its name.

for the prefent,

hills

of

Rome, and bore

this

removing
it

inequality

he prevented

alfo for

the fu-

ture

and

in

order that fuch divifion fhould not

only be local but perfonal, he prohibited the inhabitants of one quarter of the city, from removing to the other, and thereby prevented the

mixture of families.

He doubled
of
cavalry,

alfo

the three ancient

centuries

and made an addition of twelve

their old

others, but always under

denomina-

tion; a fimple and judicious method, by which he compleatly diilinguifhed the body of knights

from

SOCIAL COMPACT.
murmurs of
the latter.

197

fVom that of the people, without exciting the

added Again, to thefefour city tribes, Servius becaufe fifteen others, called rurlic tribes, they
were formed of the inhabitants of the country, diIn the fequel were vided into as many cantons.

made an
tlie

equal

number of new
the

divifions,

and

Roman

people found themfelves divided into

tribes
;

thirty-five

number
till

at

which

theif

divifions

remained fixed,

the

final dilTolu-

lion of the republic.

From

the diflln<fllon

between the

tribes

of

city and country, refulted an efFeft worthy of becaufe we have no other example obfervation
;

of
to

it,
it

and becaufe

Rome was
of
It
its

at

once indebted

for the prefervation

its

manners and the

increafe of

empire.

the city

tribes

might be conceived would foon arrogate to them-

felves, the power and honours of the ftate, and treat the ruftics with contempt. The efFe(ft'^

neverthelefs,

was

dire(Elly

contrary.

The
life is

tafte

of the ancient

Romans

for a country
this tafle

well

known,
inftitutor,

l^hey derived

from the wife

who

joined to liberty the labours of

the peafant and the foldier,

and configned, as
it

ipS
it

TREATISE
city,

on the

were, to the

the cultivation of the arts,

tradcj intrigue, fortune and flavery.

Thus
in the

the moft illuHiious perfonages of Rome,

living in the country,

and employing themfelves

of agriculture, it was among thefe only the Romans looked for the defenders of their republic. This ftation, being that of
bufinefs
verfal efteem

the moft worthy patricians, was held in unithe fimple and laborious life of
:

the villager was preferred to the mean and lazy life of the citizen ; and a perfon who, having been a labourer in the country, became a refpelable houfe-keeper in town,

was yet held

in

con-

tempt.

It is

with reafon,

fi^ys

Varro, that our

magnanimous

anceflors eftablifhed in the coun-

try the nurfery for ihofe robuft^and brave

men,
in

who

defended them

in

time of war and che-

rifiied

them

in

peace.

Again, Pliny fays

ex-

prefs terms, the country tribes were honoured

becaufe of the perfons of which they were compofed ; whereas fuch of their individuals as

were

to be treated with ignominy,

tribes

were removthe Sa-

ed into the
bine,

of the city.

When

Appius Claudius, came

to fettle in

Rome,

he was loaded with honours, and regiftered in one of the ruAic tribes, which afterwards took
the

SOCIAL COMPACT.
the

199

name of
all
;

his

family.

LaAIy, the freed-mcn

were
rural

entered in the city tribes, never in the

is

nor

there one fingle inflance, during

republic, of any one of thefe freedrnen being preferred to the magiflra-

the exiftence

of the

cy, although

become

a citizen.

ried fofar,

This was an excellent maxim, but was carthat it effe<5fed an alteration, and unftate.

doubtedly an abufe in the police of the

Cenfors, after having long arrogated the right of arbitrarily removing the citizens from one tribe to another, perfirft

In the

place, the

mitted
in

the greater part to regifler themfelves

tribe

whatever

they

pleafed

permilTiori

that could furely anfvver

it

deprived thefe officers

no good end, and yet of one of their fevereft

the great and

methods of cenfure.

Befides, as

powerful thus got themfelves regiflered in the rural tribes; and the freedmen, with the populace, only filled up thofc of the city; the
tribes in

general had no longer a local dillinfo

^ion

but were

together,

that their refpe(fl:ive

Arangely mixed and jumbled members could

;

be known only by appealing to the regifters

fo that

the idea attached to

the

word

tribe,

was

20

TREATISE

ON the
-rather

was changed from real to perfonal, or became altogether chimerical.

It

happened

alfo that

the tribes of the city,

being nearer at hand, had generally the greatefl

influence in the Comitia, and

made
them.

a property

by were bafe enough

of the flate,

felling their votes to thofe

who

to purchafe

With

inflituted in

regard to the Curia, ten having been each tribe, the whole Roman peothe walls,

ple, included within

made up

thirty

Curia, each of which had their peculiar temples, their gods, officers

and

feafts called

Cm-

pitaiia, rcfembling the poganala, afterwards iniiituted among the ruflic tribes.

At the new

divifion

made by

Servius,

the

number

thirty not being equally divifible

among

the four tribes, he forbore to meddle with this

mode

of diftribution

and the Curiae, thus in-

dependent of the

tribes,

formed another di-

Tilion of the inhabitants.

Ko

notice,

however,
the ruftic
;

T/as taken of the Curicie, either

tribes,

among

or the people ccmpofing them

a

becaufe

the tribes

eftablifhment, becoming aad another method having been introduced for

railing

mere

civil

SOCIAL COMPACT.
raifing

20f
of

the troops, the

military diftiiKftions
as

Romulus were dropt

though every
tribe,

fuperfluous.
regirtered
in

Thus,,

citizen

was

fome
iii

yet

many

of them were not included

any

curia.

Servius

made

flili

a third divifion,

which had no

relation

to the

two former, and

became
of
all.

in

its

He

confeqaences the mofi: important, divided the whole Roman people

into fix

clafll^s,

which he

diftinguifiied, neither

by

perfons

nor place, but by property,

Of

by the rich^ the lower by the poor, and the middle clafTes by thofe of middling fortunes. Thefe fix clafTes
thefe the higher claffes
filled

were

other bodies called centuries;

were fubdivided into one hundred ninety-three and thefe were

diftributed

again fo

that the

firft

clafs

alone

comprehended more than half the number of

centuries,
tury.

and the

laft clafs

In this

method

only one fmgle centhe clafs that contained

the feweft perfons, had the greater number a centuries ; and the lafl clafs was in numbe?

only a fabdivifion, although

it

contained mor^-

than half the inhabltanis of

Rome.

into the
tion,

In order that the people fliould penetrate lefe defign of this latter form of diflribuServius afFe^fted to give
it

the air of a

ml*

lltarf

202

TREATISE
of

ON the

litary one.

In the fecond clafs he incorporated

two
clafs,

centuries of armourers,

and annexed two

In each

inftruments

war

to the fourth.

except the laft, he diAinguifhed alfo between the young and the old, that is to fay,

who were obliged to bear arms, from thofe were exempted from it on account of their age a diftin(ftion which gave more frequent rife to the repetition of the cenfus or enumerathofe

who

tion of them, than even the fhifting of proper-

ty

laftly,

he required their afTembly to be made

on the Campus A^crtius^ where all thofe who were of age for the fcrvicewere to appear under
arms.

why he did not purfue the fame of age in the lafl clafs, was, that the populace, of which it was compofed, were not permitted to have the honour of bearing arms
reafon,
dlflin<5^ion

The

in the fervice of their country.

It was neceffary to be houfe-keepers, in order to attain the pri-

vilege of defending themfelves.

private able troops, that
centinel

There

is

not one

perhaps, of

all

thofe innumer-

the armies of
for

make (o brilliant a figure in modern princes, who would not,

have been
Cohort,
driven out

want of property,

with difdain from a

diers

Roman

when

fol-

were the defenders of

liberty.

In

SOCIAL COMPACT.
In the
61:ion
laft clafs,

203
diAiii-

however, there was a

made between what they called

cenft.

proktarii

and

thofe denominated capite

The

former,

not quite reduced to nothing, fupplied the fiate at leaft with citizens, and fometimes on preiFing
occafions with foldiers.
totally

As

to thofe,

who were

deftitute

of

fubftance,

and could be
they were difrefirft

numbered only by
garded
deigned
as nothing to enroll
;

capitation,

Marius being the them.

who

Without taking upon me here

ther this
third
ill
;

to decide,

whe-

good or
nothing
their

be in itfclf fpecies of dlvifion to that venture affirm, fafely may

that llmplicity

lefs

than

of manners,

which prevailed
ture, their

among

the
t-heir

ancient
tafie

Romans^
agricul-

difintereftednefs,

for

contempt

for trade
it

and the ihird of

gain, could have rendered

is

practicable.
in

Where

the nation

among

the m.oderns,

which vofluctuation

racious avarice, a
fpirit

turbulence of difpofition, a

of artifice,

and the continual

fuch

of property, would permit ment to continue for twenty years without overmufl be well obiervcd turning the flate ? Nay it that the purity of the Roman manners, and the
force of a cenfure

an eAablifli-

more

efficacious than the iuftitutioa

204

TREATISE
a rich
clafs

on the
of

ilitution itfelf, ferved

to correct the defe^ls

Rome, where moved from his own

it

at

man was

often re-

and ranked among the

his

poor, for making wealth.

an

improper parade of

comprehend from this, why mention is hardly ever made of more than five clafTes, though there were in reality fix. The fixth,
It IS eafy to

furniQiing neither the army with foldiers, nor the Campus Martins * with voters, and being

of hardly any ufe in the republic, was hardly in'^er accounted any thing.

Such were the

different diviflons of the

will

Ro-

man

people.

We
7

now examine into

when

the de-

fers, of which they were

affemblies.

producftive, in their
legally

hefe afTemblies,

con-

voked, were denominated Comitia, and were held in the Campus Martins and other parts of Rom.e; being diAinguidied into tw/W^, centuriata^ and
tributa, according

to

the

three grand divifions

fay

the

mpus Marti us, becaufe

it

was there

jhe Cornitia afiembled by centuries ; in the two other forms, they affembled in iht forum and other places,

where the
portance

capite cenji hr.d as

priucijf

much inHuence and im-

as the

al citizens.

of

SOCIAL COMPACT.
of the people into Curia, Centuries,

205

and Tribes^

The

C'^ni.ia curiata

were

inftitnted

by Romulus,

the Centuriata by Servius, and ihe Tributa by the tribunes of the people. Nothing could pafs
into a law, nor could any magiftrate be choferi

but in the Ccw/V/V, and as there was no citizen

who was not

it

enrolled in a Curia, Century or Tribe ^

follows
his

that

no
;

citizen
fo

was excluded from

the

giving

vote

that

Roman
and

people

were

truly fovereign both

in right

fa6t.

To make
and give
it

iheir determinations

the aflembly of the Crmitia legal, the force of laws,

requifite.

three conditions were

place

In the

firft

was ncceflary that the magiftrate or

invefled

body convoking them, (hould be

with

proper authority for fo doing : Secondly, that the afiembly ftiould occur on the days permitted

by law; and thirdly, that the augurs

favourable to their meeting.

fliouid

be

The
thus
it

reafon
:

of the

firft
is

condition needs no

explanation

The

fecond

an

affair

of police

was not permitted the Cornitia to afTemble on market days, when the country people, coming to Rome on bufmefs, would be prevented from tranfacSting it. By the third, the Senate kept a fierce and turbulent multitude

under

2o6

A TREAT
reflraint,

E ON the

under fome

and opportunely checked

;

the ardour of the feditious tribunes

the latter,

however, found more ways than one to elude

the force of this expedient.

But the laws and the elef^Ion of the chiefs were not the only matters fubmitted to the dethe Roman people having ufiirped the moft important fun<5lions of government, the fate of Europe might be faid

termination of the Cornitla

to

depend on

their afTemblies.

Hence the vagave

the form of

riety of obje(fts that came

before them,

occaficn for divers

alterations in

thefe ademblies, according to the nature of ihofe

obje(fts.

To judge

of thefe diverfities,

it

is

fufficlent

The defign of Roto compare them together. the mulus in inAituting Curiee, was to reftrain the Senate by means of the people, and the
people by the Senate, while he himfelf maintained his influence equally over both.

By
all

this

form, therefore, he gave to the people

authority of

the

number to counterballance that of and riches, which he left in the hands power
But, agreeable to the
fpirit

of the Patricians,

of monarchy, he gave more advantage to the Patricians, by the influence of their clients to obtain

SOCIAL COMPACT.
tain the majority of votes.

207

This admirable in-

flitution of patrons

and

clients,

was

a mafter-

piece of politics and humanity, without which the order of Patricians, fo contrary to the fpirit

of the republic, could not have fubfifted. Rome alone hath the honour of giving to the world this fine example, of which no abufe is known
to have

been made, and which neverthelefs hath

never been adopted by other nations.

This dWifionhy Curia having

fubfifted

under

the kings till the time of Servius, and the rejgn of the laft Tarqutn being accounted illegal, the
regal

laws came hence to be generally diflin-

guifhed by the

name of

leges curiata.

Under the republic, the Curia^ always confined to the four city tribes, and comprehending only the populace of Rome, could not arrive either at the honour of fitting in the Senate, which was at the head of the Patricians,

or at that of being Tribunes, which, notwith-

Aanding they were Plebeians, were yet at the head of the citizens in eafy circumftances. They fell, therefore, into difcredit, and were reduced to
fo

contemptible a
to

flate

that their thirty

Lidlors afTembled
the Comitia cur lata.

do the whole bufinefs of

The

2c8

TREATISE
by
centuries^

on the
fo favourable

The

divifion

was

to ariliocracy, that it is not at firft eafy to comprehend why the Senate did not always carry their point in the Ccmitia ccniuriaia^ by which

the Confuls, Cenfors, and Praetors were chofen.

It
is

in fa(fl certain that out

of the hundred and

the fix clafTes
firfl clafs

ninety three

centuries, forming

of the whole
taining

people, ninety eight of them,

Roman

the

convotes

and

the

being reckoned only centuiies, this firll clafs alone had more votes than all the others. When
the centuries of this clafs, therefore, were found
to be unanimous, they

proceeded no farther in

counting votes ; whatever might be determined by the minority being confidered as the opinion

of the mob.

So

that

it

might be juflly

faid,

that in the Coiuita certuriaia matiers were carried rather by

the greater quantiiy of than the majority of votes.

money,

But two

this

extreme authority was moderated by

In the

firft place, the TribuneSg and always a confiderable generally fpeaking, number of wealthy citizens, being in this clafs of the rich, they counterpoized the credit of

caufes.

the Patricians

in

the fame clafs.

The

fecond

caufe lay in the

this
;

manner 9f voting, which was

to

the centuries, inilead of voting according

SOCIAL COMPACT.
to order, beginning with the
lots
firfl

209

in rank, cafl:

And

which fhould proceed firil to this the century whofe

;

to the elecflion.
lot
it

was, pro-

the other centuries being called upon another day to give their votes accord* ing to their rank, when they repeated the fame
eledlion,

ceeded * alone

and ufually confirmed the choice of

the former.

By

this
in

method the preference of

order to give
it

rank was

fet afide,

according

to lot, agreeable to the principles of democracy.

There
this

is
;

another advantage

refulting

from

cuftom

which

is

that the citizens refiding

elec-

in the country
tions to

had time between the two

nominated

inform themfelves of the merit of the

provifionally
;

candidates thus

by
to of
a-

which means they might be better enabled But under the pretence give their vote. expediting aifaixs, this cuftom- was in time
bolilhed,

and the two eleflions were made the

fame day.
7 he century thus preferred by lot was called frof bccaufe it was the iirft whofe fuitrage was demanded j and hence is derived the v/ord prerogarogari-za
;

ti-ve.

The

210

TREATISE

ON the

C'imltia hy Tribes, were properly fpeakthe ing great council of the Roman people. T'hefe were convoked only by the Tribunes ;

The

by

thefe alfo the

thefe the pUbifdta or laws of the

pafTed.

Tribunes were chofen, and by people were

they had not even
in

The
in

Senators w^ere not only deftitute

;

of rank

thefe affemblies

the right to be
to pay

prefent at

them; but, obliged

the ena<fting of
in that re-

obedience to laws

which they had no vote, they were

fpe(ft lefs free

than the lowefl citizens.

ill

This

in-

jufiice,

however, was very

itfelf

underflood, and
to

was

in

alone fufficient

invalidate the

decrees
all

of a body, whofe members were not admitted to vote. Had all the Patricians
as

a/Tifled at thefe Comitia,

they had

right>

in

quality of citizens, they could have had no undue influence where every man's vote was

equal, even from

the loweft of the people to

the highed perfonage of the flate.

It

is

evident,

therefore,

that,

exclufive

of

the good order that refulted from thefe feveral divifions, in colle(5ling the votes of fo nume-

rous a people, the form and method of thefe divifions were not indifferent in themfelves ;

each

being produ6\ive of

effecls,

adapted to
certaia

SOCIAL COMPACT.
certain views
in

2ii

regard to which

it

was prefer-

able 10 any other.

But without entering into

tial

more circumftan-

account of thefe matters, it is plain from what hath been advanced, that the Comltia iri-

mod favourable to a popular the Comiia ccninrlata to an and government, With refpetfl to the Comitia curia a aiiilocracy.
hunaia were the

of which the populace formed the majority, as they were good for nothing but to favour tyrannical defigns,

ible

flate,

into

they remained in this contemptwhich they were fallen j even

the contrivers of fedition themfelves not chufjng

to

employ means,

which muft

have expofcd

It is very certain that too openly their defigns. all the Roman of the people was difmajedy

played only in the Comltia centuriata^ which only were compleat; the f^/r/tf/a wanting the ruHic
Tribes, and
tricians.

the tribunaia

the Senate and Pa-

With
votes,

regard to the method of collecfling the

it was, among the primitive Romans, fimple as their manners, though flill lefs fnnple than that of Sparta. Every one gave his vote

aloud, which the regifter took down in writing ; the plurality of votes in each tribe, determined the

vote of that tribe, and the plurality of votes in the

tribes

212

TREATISE

cn the

tribes determined the fuffrage of the people. In the fame mianner alfo they proceeded with reThis gard to the Curies and the centuries.

cufiom was
grity

a very

good one,

fo long as inte-

prevailed

among

the citizens, and every

his public fanftion to

one was aihamed to give

an unworthy

perfon or caufe.

But when the

people grew corrupt and fold their votes, it became neceffary to make them 'give their votes

more

privately,

in

order

to

re drain

the pur-

chafers by dinrufl:, and afford knaves an expedient to avoid being traitors.

I know that Cicero cenfures this alteration, and attributes to it in a great degree the ruin of the republic. But, though I am fenfible of
all

the weight of Cicero's authority in this cafe,

cannot be of his opinion. I conceive, on the contrary, that the ruin of the ftate would have

been accelerated,

had the Romans

negledlcd

making

this

alteration.

As

the

regimen of

people in health, is not proper for the fick, {o of governing a corrupt it is abfurd to think

people by the fame laws as were expedient for them before they were corrupted. There cannot be a flronger proof of this maxim, than the duration of the republic of Venice, the fliadov/ of which ftill exifrs, folely becaufe its laws are

adapted only to bad men.

Oa

SOCIAL COMPACT.
On
blets

213

this change in the manner of voting, tawere diflributed among the citizens, by means of which they could give their fuffrage

without its being known On this occafioa other methods were of courfe made ufe of in
coUefling votes, fuch as counting the number of voices, comparing it with that of the tablets,
Sec.

Not

that

thefe

methods were

fo

returning officers from being often fufpe^led of partiality and it is plain in the fequel, by the multiplicity of
:

effectual as to prevent the

laws
in

made

to

eleC:tions,

that they

prevent bribery and corruption could not efFefl this

point.

Toward
was had

the decline of the republic, recourfc

to

to very extraordinary expedients,

make up
digies

for the infufficiency of the laws.

Pro-

but

this

were fometimes played off with fuccefs ; fcheme, though it impofed on the muldid not impofe on thofe

titude,

who

influenced

them.

Sometimes aflemblies were

called fud-

denly, and ifi great halte, that the candidates might not have time to create an undue interefl : others again the whole feffions was fpent in declamation, when it was feen that the people
at

Cullodcs, ditibitores, rogatores, fuiFragiorum.

were

214
were and
fo

TREATISE
wrong
all

on
fide.

the
At length,

biafTed to take a

however, ambition eluded

it

thefe precautions,

is

almoll incredible that, in the midfl of

many

abufes, this immenfe

people

flill

con-

tinued,

by

virtue of their ancient laws, to eleft

to judge caufes, both and and to expedite public private aifairs, with as much facility as could have been done in the Senate
itfelf.

their magiflrates, to pafs laws,

CHAP.
On

V.

a Trihur;atf

exafl proportion between the component parts of a fiate, or that inevitable caufes
perpetually operate
to

WHEN

it is

impracticable to

eflabliili

an

change
is

their

relations,

a particular magiftracy incorporating with the reft, replaces every term in its true relation, and conftitutes in itfelf a

inHituted which, not

due medium

either

between the prince and the

the prince and the fovereign, people, between of cafes or, in neceflity, at once between both.

This body, which

I fhall

call a Tribt4nate^

is

the preferver of the laws and of the

legiflative

jpower.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
power.
It ferves

215

fometimes to prote6l the fothe government, as the tribunes vereign againft of the people did at Rome ; fometimes to prote<5t

the government againft the people, as at the ten do at Venice ; and prefent the council of

again at others to maintain an equilibrium both

on the one pait and the other,

at Sparta.

as did the

Ephori

The
of the

Tribunate
city,

is

not a conftitutional

part

and ought not, therefore, to have

:

any (liare in the legiOative or executive power even in this however, its own is much greater
for being able to

do nothing itfelf, it may prevent any thing from being done by others. It is more facred and revered, as defender of the
laws, than the prince

who

executes

them, or

the fovereign
evident at

This was very Rome, when the haughty Patricians,

enafls them.
defpifed

who

who

always

the

people colledlively,
to their

were neverthelefs obliged to give place

common
didlion.

ofHcers, without

command

or

jurif-

The
is

Tribunate when judicioufly moderated

a

the firmeft fupport of

if it

good

conftitution

but

have ever fo

little

afcendency of power,
it

2i6
it

TREATISE
thing.

ON the.
to Its

fubverts every
it is

With regard
it it
;

weaknefs
it

not natural to
all,

have any exigence at

little

provided can never have

for,

too

power.
ufurps only the would interpret the
it

It degetierates into tyranny the executive power, of which

when
is

it

moderator, laws which

and when
it

it

ftiould only protedi.

The

enor-

mous power of the Ephori, which was exercifed without danger, while Sparta retained its puferved only to increafe the when once begun. The them of corruption blood of Agis fpilt by thofe tyrants was revenged by his fucceflbr the crime and the punifliment
rity
:

of manners,

of the Ephori accelerated equally the ruin of that republic ; for after the time of Cleomenes
Sparta was nothing.

The

deflru(51:ion

of the

Roman
ner
:

republic was

efFe<5>ed in

the fame

man-

power which the Tribunes by degrees ufurped, ferved at length, with the
the exceffive

help of the laws

as a fecurity to
it.

made
the

in

defence of

liberty,

Emperors who deftroyed

;

As

for the council of ten at Venice

it is

a
to

fangulnary the Patricians and the people, and which is fo far from openly protecting the laws, that it now
ferves but fccretly to efFedl the breach of them.

mofl:

tribunal, equally

horrible

The

SOCIAL COMPACT.
The Tribunate
is

217

enfeebled, as well as the

government, by increafing the number of its members. When the Roman Tribunes, at firfl
two, and afterwards
Vheir
five,

had

mind
not

to

double

oppofe it; being well afTared they fhould be able to make one a curb to another which was actually the cafe.
;

number, the Senate did

Thebefl way to prevent the ufurpations of fo formidable a body, a way that no government hath hitherto adopted, would be to render fuch
a

body not permanent, but to regulate the intervals during which it fhould remain dilTolved.

Thefe

intervals

which fhould not be

a

fo great

as to give abufes time to ftrengthen into cuftoms,

might be fixed by law, in fuch it would be eafy to abridge them,

ceflity

manner

that

in cafe of n-e-

by extraordinary commifTion.

This method appears to me, to be attended with no inconvenience; becaufe, as I have already obferved, the Tribunate making no effential

part

of the conftitution,
injury
:

may be
newly

fup'

prelfed without
efiecftual,

and

it

appears to

mc

becaufe a

ma.giilrate

re-el\a-

blifhed doth

not

fucceed to the power of his

predecefibr, but to that

which the law confers

pa him.

CHAP.

ziS

TREATISE
CHAP.
Of

ON

the

vr.

the D'lSfaiure,

^^ HAT inflexibility of
in

the laws, which pre-

vents their yielding to circumftances,

may

fome

cafes render

critical juncflure

them hurtful, and in fome bring on the ruin of the ilate.

order and prolixity of forms, take up a length of time, of which the occafion will not al-

The

ways admit. A thoufand accidents may happen for which the legiflature hath not provided
;

and
it is

that

it is a very neceffary forefight to fee impoffible to provide for every thing.

We
efFe(n:s.

fhould not be

defirous,

therefore,

of

eftablifliing the

laws fo firmly as to fufpend their

itfelf

Even Sparta
lie

foraetimes permitted

the laws to

dormant.

Nothing, however, but the certainty of greater

danger ftiould induce a people to make any
teration in
al-

government
is

nor fliould the facred

unlefs the

power of the laws be ever retrained

public fafety
cafes,

concerned.

In fuch
manifefl:,

uncommon

lic fafety m.ay

the pubbe provided for by a particular afl, ^vhich commits the charge of it to thofe who

when

the

danger

is

are

SOCIAL COMPACT.
are moO: worthy.
in

219
pafs,

Such

commliTion

may

two

ditFerent ways, according to

the nature

of the danger.
If the cafe require only a greater activity in the government, it fliould be confined to one or two members ; in which cafe it would not be

the authority of the laws, but the form of the adminiftration only that would be changed^

But

if

the

danger be of fuch a nature,

that
a re-

the formality of the laws

would prevent

who

medy, then a fupreme chief might be nominated fliould filence the laws, and fufpend for a
the

moment
the

fovereign

authority.

In fuch a

cafe, general Will cannot be doubted, it being evident that the principal intention of the

people mufl: be to fave the (late from perdition, By this mode of temporary fufpenfion the legidative authority
girtrate
is

not abolilhed
it,

the
it

ma-

who

filences

cannot make

fpeak,
;

and though he over-rules cannot reprefent it he may do every thing indeed but make laws.

The
Senate,

firfl

method was taken by the Romaa when it charged the confuls, in a fafor the
fafety of the

cred manner, to provide

com-

220

A T REAT
The

E ON the
when

common- wealth.

fecond took place

one of the confuls nominated adiflator*; a cuftom which Rome adopted from the example
of Alba.
In the early times of the republic, the Ro-

mans had frequent recourfe

becaufe the
ftate

to the diiSatorfhip,
fufficient ftabilicy

had not then

to fupport itfelf

The

by the force of its conftitution. manners of the people, alio, rendering

there

thofe precautions unnecefTary, which were taken

in after- times,

was no

fear that a diffator

would abufe
be tempted
the term.
(o '^reat a

his authority, or

that

he would

to

keep

it

in his
it

hands, beyond

On

the contrary,

appeared that

power was burthenfome to the perfon invefted with it, (b enger were they to refi<^n it; as if it were a difncnlt and dangerous
pcfi;,

to

be fuperior

to the laws.

was not the danger of the abufe, but of the debafement of this fupreme magiftracy,

Thus

it

* This nomination wasfecredy made in the night, as if they were afhamed of the adlion of placing ary man
fo

much above

the laws.

that

SOCIAL COMPACT.
of
it,

221

that gave occafion to cenfure the indifcreet ufe

in ancient times.
it

to proflitute

in

the

affiiir

For when they came of e]e(fl:ions and oit

ther matters of
to

mere formality,

was veryjuflly

be apprehended that it would become kfs refpetSlable on prefiing occafions ; and that the
people would be apt to look rspon an office as

merely

titular,

which was

infliiuted to afnfl at

empty ceremonies.

Toward

the end of the

republic, the

Rc^

mans, becoming more circumfpect, were as fparing of the di<5lature, as they had before been prodigal of it. Ir was eafy to fee, however, that their fears

were groundlefs, that the

that a dictator

weaknefs of the capital was their fecurity againd

the
in

internal

magifirates

might
li-

fome

cafes have afled in defence of public

berty, without ever making encroachments on it; and that the Roman chains were not forged
in

Rome

itfelf,

but

in its

armies abroad.

The
and
litde
cjo

weak

refinance which Marius

to

made

to Sylla

Pompey

C^far,

fhewed

plainly
city

how

the authority
againfl the

from within the

could

power from without.

L3

T'--

222

A TREAT
]^d

E ON the
commit great blun-

This error
ders.

them

to

Such

for inftance,

was

ilieir

neglecting

to appoint a dicflator in the afFair

of Catalineor at moft a

For, as

it

engaged only the

city,

province in Italy, a dif^ator inveiled with that

unlimited authority which the laws conferred

on him, might
fpiracy,
a'

eafily

have diflipated that con-

which was with difnculty fupprefTed by numerous concurrence of fortunate circum;

llances

which human prudence had no reafoa

Inftead of
that,

to expe<5l.

the Senate conall its

it

tented

itfelf

with committing
;

power

into

the hands of confuls

whence

Cicero, in order to afl effeftually,

to

happened that was obliged

circumftance
^

exceed that power

in a capital

and though the public,

approved of
his

in their firft tranfports,

condu(51:,

he was very

juftly

called to an account afterwards for the blood

he

had

fpilt

contrary to the laws

a reproach they

could not not have made to a di6lator.

But the
before
his
it ;

eloquence

of the conful

carried
a

all

and preferring,
glory to
his

though

Roman,

own
of the

country, he

thought

lefs

mofl
flate,

legal,

and certain method of faving the than the means of fecuring all the honour
of

SOCIAL COMPACT.
'of fuch a
tranfacflion to

223

himfelf *.

Thus was
of

he very juftly and as juftly pimifiied

honoured

as the deliverer

Rome,
it

as the violator of its laws.

For, however honcnrable

was

his

repeal,

was

certainly a matter of favour.

After

all,

in

whatever manner
conferred,

this
it is

commiliion

may be

important of confe-

quence to limit its duration to a fhort term ; which fhould on no occaiion be prolonged. In
thofe conjiinflures,

when

it is

necelTary to ap-

point a diiftator, the Hate

is

prefently faved or

deflroyed, which caufcs t>eing over, the didature becomes ufclcfs and tyrannical.

At Rome,
for
fix

the

ditflators
;

held their

office

only

and the greater part refigned before Had the time appointed that term expired.

months

been longer, it is to be apprehended they would have been tempted to make it longer flill ; as
did the decemvir whofe office lafled a
year.

whole

The

did^ator had

no more time allotted

for

him than was necelTary to difpatch the bufmefs which he was appointed fo that he had
;

not leifure to think of other projedls.

what he could not be certain of, in propofing a didator; not daring to nominate himfelfr and not being aiTured his colleague would do it.
is

* This

CHAP,

224

A TR

E A

E ON the

C H A

P.

VII.

Of

the

Cinforjkip,

AS

by the laws,
is

the declaration of the general will is made (o the declaration of the

public judgment

made by
a

their cenfure.

The

the law, public opinion Cenfor puts in execution, in particular cafej, after the example of the prince.'
is

kind of

which

far,

therefore, ^s

the cenforial

tribunal

from being the arbiter of popular opinions, it: and, whenever it departs only declares them
;

from them,
fe61ua}.

its

decifions

are

vain

and

inef-

It

is

ufelcfs to difiinguirti

the manners of a

nation

by the objedls of

its

efteem

for

thefe

depend on the fame principle, and Among rily confounded together.

in the

arc neceUaall

people
opinion,

world,

it

is

not nature, but

which determines the choice of

their pleafures.

Correal the prejudices and opinions of men, and We altheir manners will corre6l themfelves.

ways admire what

is

beautiful, or

what appears

SOCIAL COMPACT.
lb
it
;

225,

but
is

it is

this

our judgment we are mifJaken 7. judgment then we are to regulate;

in

manners, takes upon himto judge of honour; and whoever judges of honour, decides from opinion.
of

Whoever judges

The opinions of a people depend on the condo not govern Aitution ; though the laws
manners, it is the legiflature that gives rife to them. As the legidature grows feeble, manner's

degenerate, but the judgment of the cenfors will not then effel what the power of the. laws-:,

have not before

efFe(fled*

It follows,

hence, that the

office

of a cenfor
.

may

be ufeful to the prefervation of manners.,

their, re-eftabllfhment.

but never to
cenfors
this
is

Eftablifh.

during the vigour of the laws ; whens pad, all is over ; no legal meansi can be

effecSlual

when

the laws have loft their force.

The

cenfor

is

prefervative

of manners, by

preventing the corruption of opinions, by maintaining their- morality and

propriety by judici--

ous applications, and.even fometimes by fettling

them when

in a flu<5luating

fituation.

The

ure..

L.5_,

oJ

226

TREATISE

ON the

of feconds in duels, though carried to the greateft excefs in France, was abolifhed by the following words inferted in one of the kings edifts ; As to who have the covjardice to call thofe

ihemfelves feconds*

that of the public,

This judgment, anticipating was efFeflual and put an end

once.
it

to that cuftom

at

But when the

fame,

edifls pronounced

though
trary

it

is

cowardice to fight a duel ; certainly true, yet as ic was conthe public laughfo

to the popular opinion,

ed at a determination

contrary to their own.

have obferved elfewhere * that

the

public

opinion, being fubjccfled to

no
it

conftraint, there
in

fhould

be no appearance of
to

the tribunal

eftabliflied

reprefent

it.

One cannot too

moderns, was em-

much admire with what

ployed by the

art this fpring of aflion,

entirely neglected a'mong the

Romans, and

ftill

more

efFedlually

by the Lacedemonians.

A
*

man

of bad morals, having

made an exthe

cellent

propofal in

the council at Sparta,

do but

(lightly

mention here^ what

in

have

treated
bert,

more

at large

my

letter to

M.

d'Alem*.

Ephori,

SOCIAL COMPACT.

227

notice of it, caufed Ephori, without taking any the fame propofal to be made by a citizen of

charadler

and

virtue.

How

honourable was

this proceeding to the one, and how difgracefa^ to the other j and that without dire6lly praifmg

or blaming

either

Some drunkards of Samos,

in the tribunal

having behaved indecently

Ephori,
it

of the

was the next day permitted, by a

that

public edicl,
flaves.

the Samians might becomeadual Would an punifhment have beea

fo fevere as fuch

impunity
their

tans

had once pafTed

When the Spar? judgment on the deall

cency or propriety of any behaviour,

iiibmitted to their opinion.

Greece,

CHAP.
Of poUtkal
the

VIII.

ReUgion

firft

INother kings

ages of the world, men had nothan gods, nor any other

go-

vernment than what was purely

theocratical.

It

required a great alteration in their fentiments and ideas, before they could prevail on themfelves,
fter,

to look

and think

upon a fellow creature as it went well with them.

a ma^*

Hence^

228

TREATISE

on the

Hence, a deity being conftantly placed at the head of every polhical fociety, it followed that

Two

as many different gods as people. communities, perfonally ftrangers to each other, imd almofl always at variance, could not
;

there was

long acknowlege the fame mailer

nor could
other
in

two armies, drawn np

battle,

againft

each

obey the fame

chief.

Thus
civil

Polytheifm

became

a natural confequence of the divifion of

nations, and thence the want of

logical toleration, as will be

and theo-

which

r.re

perfedly the fame?

/hewn

hereafter.

The
trace

their

notion of the Greeks, in pretending to own gods among thofe of the Barits rife

barian nations, took

evidently from the

ambition of being thought

reigns of thofe

the natural fove-

people.

In this age, however,

we

think that a mofl abfurd part of erudition,

relates

which

to the identity of the deities of

different

nations,

and according

to

which

it is

Moloch, fuppofed were one and the fame god and that the Baal of the Phenicians, the Zeus of the Greeks, and
;

that

Saturn and

Chronos

the Jupiter of the Latins were the fame deity

as
if

any thing could be found in

common
be*

SOCIAL COMPACT.
between
chimerical

229
diiFereiit

beings

bearing

names

If

it

be

aflced

why

there

were no

religions

wars among the Pagans, when every flate had thus its peculiar deity and worfhip ? I anfwer,,

was

plainly
its

for

this

very reafon, that each

having government, no diftindlion was made between the obedience paid to their gods, and that due
to their laws.

ftate

own

peculiar religion as well as

Thus

their political

were

at the

fame time theological wars; and the departments of their deities were prefcribed by the limits of ihdr refpe(5live nations.. The god of one peo*
pie

had no authority over another people

thefe
;

nor

were

Pagan
but

deities jealous

of their pre'

rogatives

divided the adoration of

kind

amicably

between them.

manEven Mofes

himfelf fometimes fpcaks in the fame manner of the god of Ifrael. It is true the Hebrews de-

gods of the Canaanites, a people profcribed and devoted to deflrucfion, whofe poffeflions were given them for an inheritance
fpifed the
:

but they fpeak with more reverence of the deities

of

the neighbouring nations

to attack.
Tfilt

whom
mi

they
poJJ'efs

were forbidden
ihaty fays

thou

Jeptha to Sihon, king of the Arfimoiiites.

.4

230

TREATISE

on the

mtes, whiJ} Chetnoth thy God glveth thee to pof? So whomfoever the Lcrd our God fhall drive fefs
out from before us^ them will ive poffep.

There

i&

in this pafTage, I

think, an acknowleged llmilithofe.

of the
^

tude between the rights of Chemofh, and God of Ifrael.

But when the Jews, being fubje(fled to the afterwards to ihofe of kings of Babylon, and
Syria,

god
an

to acknowlege any perfifled in refufing refufal was efteemed this but their own,

of rebellion againft their conquerer, and drew upon them thofe perfecutions we read of

al

in their hiftory,
is

and of which no other example

extant previous to the eflablifliment of chri-

*
flianlty

The

religion of every people being thus ex-

clufively

annexed to the laws of the Hate, the

only method of converting nations was to fubdue them ; warriors were the only miflionaries ;

and the obligation of changing their religion being a law to the vanquifhed, they were firfl to be conquered before they were folicited on
*
It is

evident that the war of the Phocians, called

Its

an holy war was not a religious war. to facrilege, and not to fubdue
punilh

objed was

infidels.

this

SOCIAL COMPACT.
this head.

231

So

far

were men from fighting

for the gods, that their gods, like thofe of

Ho-

mer,

fought people demanded the victory from

in

behalf

of

mankind.
its

Each
it

refpedlive

deity,

and exprelTed
of

their gratitude for

altars.

by
beits

the erection
fore

new
it

The Romans
fummoned
It

they befieged any fortrefs

;

gods to abandon
left

the

people of

be true they Tarentum in pofTeffion of

it is

and though

their angry deities,

plain they looked

upon

thofe gods as fubje(fled and obliged to do homage to their own They left the vanquifhed
:

in pofTclTion of their religion as

they fometimes

did in that of their laws

of the Capitol, they exafled.

a wreathe for ; Jupiter being often the only tribute

Romans having extended their with their religion empire, and fometimes even
length, the

At

adopted the deities of the vanquifhed, the people of this vafl empire found themfelves iri
pofTefTion of a

multiplicity

of gods

and

reli-

from each other, Paganifm became infenfibly one and the fame religion throughout the world.
gions
;

which not

difTering efTentially

Things were
efliablifh his

in this flate,

when

Jefus

came
5

to

fpiritual

kingdom on earth

a de-

fign

232

TREATISE
gave

ON the
theological
to thofe in-

^gn which,
from the

neceflarily dividing the

rife

political fyflem,

teftine divifions

which have ever

fince continued

to embroil the profeflion of Chriflianity.

Nov/

this new idea of a kingdom in the other worlds having never entered into the head of the Pathe ChriHians as a5!ual gans, they regarded
rebels,,

who,

under an hypocritical fhew of

humility, waited only a proper opportunity to

render then^felves independent, and artfully to

ufurp that authority, which in their weak and
infant (late they

pretended to

refpe(n:

and

this

was undoubtedly
fe.cuted.

the caufe. of their being per-

What
did, in

the Pagans were apprehenfive of, alfo,

procefs of time, adually
a

come

to pafs.

Things put on
flians,

new

face,

and the meek Chrir

as their number increafed, changed their their invifible kingdom of the other while tone, world, became, under a vifible head, the moOt

in this. defpotic and tyrannical

As
vil

in all countries,

however, there were

cl^

governors, and laws, there reiulted from this two-fold power a perpetual ftruggle for a perfedl fyAem of juiifdidtion, which renders

SOCIAL COMPACT.
;

233

domeftic policy almoft impoflible in Chriflian and prevents us from ever coming to a ilates
determination, whether
prieil
it

be the prince or the

we

are

bound

to obey.

Some

nations indeed, even

in

Europe or

its

Beighbourhood,
fuccefs

have endeavoured to prefeive

or rc-eftablilh the
;

ancient fyftem, but without the fpirit of Chriflianity hath univer-

fally prevailed.

Religious worfliip hath always

remained, or again become independent of the fovereign, and without any neceffary conneclion

with

the body of

the

Aate.

Mahomet had
his

very falutary and

political

well-connefled views in his

fyftem, and fo
fubfifted

long as

modes of

under the caliphs and their government fucceffors, that government remained perfe<f^Iy
uniform, and fo far good.

But the Arabians

becoming wealthy, learned, polite, indolent and cowardly, were fubdued by the Barbarians then the divifion between the two powers re:

commenced

and

though
to

it

be

lefs

apparent

among
it

the

Mahometans than among

of Ali
:

Chriflians,

is

neverthelefs

larly in the fec^

alfo,

be diflinguilhed, particuthere are fome dates,

this

as in

Perfia,

where

divifion

is

con-

llantly perceptible.

Among;

.234

A TREAT

E ON the

us, the kings of England are placed head of the church, as are alfo the Czars inRuflia but by this title they are not fo pro-

Among
:

at the

countries
to

perly mailers as miniflers of the religion of thofe they are not pofTefTed of the power
:

change

it,

but only to maintain

its

prefent

Wherever the Clergy conftitute a colledive body *, they will be both matters and There are therelegiflators in their own caufe. fore two in fovereigns England and RufTia, as
form.
well as elfewhere.

Of

all

Chriftian

authors,

Mr. Hobbes was

the only one

who faw

the evil and the remedy,

to propofe the re -union

and that hath ventured

*
It

muft be obferved^ that

it

is

not fo

much

the

formal afTemblies of the clergy, fuch as are held in France, which unite ihera together in a body, as
the

communion of

their churches.

Communion and compad of

will

excommunication form
clergy
;

the

focial

the
al-

a compa6l by
their

means of which they

ways maintain
people.

afcendency over both kings and

Ail the priefts that communicate together

are fellow-citizens, though they fiiould be perfonally as diftant, as the extremities of the world. This in-

vention
priefts

is

a mafter-piece in
it;

had nothing like

body.

The Pagan policy. and therefore never had

of

any

clerical

SOCIAL COMPACT.
that political

235

oF the two heads of this eagle, and to rcAore

union,

without which

no

ftate

But he or government can be well conftituted. the prevailing fpirit of ought to have feen that

was incompatible with his fyftem, and that the intereil of the Church would be It was not always too powerful for the flate.
Chriftianity
fo

much

that

which was

really falfe

and fhock-

jng in the writings

of this philofopher, as what was really jull and true, that rendered him odious *.

florical

conceive that, by a proper difplay of hifacSls, in this point of view, it would be eafy to refute the oppofite fentiments both
I

of Bayle and Warburton

-,

the former of which

pretends that no religion whatever can be of fervice to the body politic, and the latter that
Chriftianity
is

its

beft

and firmeft fupport.

the
firfl,

It

might be proved againft

that every

nth

* In a letter of Grotius to his brother, dated the of April, 1643, may be feen what that great

Civilian approved and

It is true^that

blamed

in his

book

de ci-vC'

Grotius, being indulgent, feems inclined to forgive the author, the faults of his book, for the
its

fake of

merits, the rell

of the world, however^

were not

fo candid,.
flate-

236
flate

TREATISE
;

on the

the world

hath been founded on the

bafis of religion

and againft the fecond, that the precepts of Chriftianity are at the bottom

more
of the

prejudicial than conducive to the ilrengtli

ftate.

make myfelf fully underdood, need only give a little more precifion to the
In

order

to

vague ideas, generally entertained of

religion.

political

Religion, confidered as

it

relates

to fociety,

which

general or particular, may be diftinguiflied into two kinds, viz. the religion of the man and that of the citizen. The firft,
is

either

deftitute of temples, altars,

or

rites,

confined

purely to the internal

worfhip of the fupreme

of the
eternal
re-,

Being, and to the performance

duties
ligion

of morality, of the gofpel

is
;

the pure and fimple

this
is

genuine theifm,
divinity.

and may be called the law of natural

The
gods
felf,

other, adopted only in one country, whofe and tutelary faints are hence peculiar to itis

external

compofed of certain dogmas, rites, and modes of worfhip prefcribed by the

;

laws of fuch country

all

foreigners being ac;

counted

Infidels^

Aliens and Barbarians

this

kind

SOCIAL COMPACT.
kind of religion extends the duties and leges of men no farther than to its own

237
privialtars.

Such were
to
civil

all

which may be

the religions of primitive ages, of given, the name of the

Uw

or pofitive divinity.

There

is

a third kind of religion

Aill

more

extraordinary, which dividing fociety into two legiflatures, two chiefs, and two parties, fubjecfts

mankind to contradicSlory obligations, and prevents them from being at once devotees and citizens. Such is the religion of the Lamas,
of the Japanefe, and of the Roman Catholics ; which may be denominated the religion of the priefls, and is productive of a fort of mixed

and unfociable obligation, for which we have no name.

If

we examine

thefe three kinds of rellgioti

in a political

light,

they

have

all

their faults.
it

The

third

is

fo palpably defedlive that

would

of time, to point them out. Whatbe mere ever contributes to dilTolve the focial union is
lofs

good

for
in

nothing

all

inflitutions

which

fet

man
ufe.

coiitradi<Stion

with himfelf are of

no

The

238

TREATISE
is

on

the
as
it

The

fecond

fo far

commendable

unites

divine worfhip with a refpefl for the laws, and that, making the country the objedl of the people's adoration, the citizen
is

taught that to ferve

the flate
is

is

to ferve

its

tutelary divinity.

This
fliould

a fpecies of theocracy, in

which there

be no other pontiff than the prince, no other

priefts

than the magiflrates.

is

To
;

die, in

fuch
;

ftate, for their country,

is

to fufFer

martyrdom

to violate the laws

impiety

and to doom a
to

criminal to public execration

to the anger of the gods.

is

devote him

It is blameable, however, in that, being founded on falfehood and deceit, it leads man-

kind Into error

fuperflitious,
it

rendering them credulous and

vain ceremonies
It

fubftitutes

inis

ftead of the true worfhip of the deity.

further blameable, in that, becoming

exclufive

and tyrannical,
perfecuting;
fo

it

makes people fanguinary and

nation
fliall

that a

fometimes

breathe nothing but murd.er and maffacre, and think, at the fame time, they are doing an holy
a(ftion in cutting the throats
ftilp

of thofe

who wor-

the gods in a different

manner from themplaces fuch a people

in

feives.

This circumllance

SOCIAL COMPACT.
in a natural flate
is

239
which

of war with

all

others,
fafety.

very unfavourable to their

own

There remains then only the

manly
as
it is

rational

and

religion

of
in

Chriftianity

not however,
it is

profefTed

modern
this

times, but as
is

difplayed in the gofpel,

thing.

which

quite another

According to

holy, fublime, and

all

true religion, mankind, being

the children

of the fame God, acknowlege themfelves to be

brothers, and the fociety
folves only in death.

which

unites

them

dif -

But

tion to the
felTion

having no particular relabody politic, leaves the laws in pofonly of their own force, without adding
,this religion,

any thing to it ; by which means the firmeft bonds of fuch particular fociety are of no effect.

Add

to

this, that

Chriftianity

is

fo

far

from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the ilate, that it detaches them from it, as well as
from
than which worldly objefls in general to the fpirit of more be can contrary nothing
all
:

fociety.

It

is

faid

that a nation

of true Chriftians

would form the moll

perfect fociety imaginable.

To

240

A
this

TREATISE
aflertion,
;

on the
is

To

however, there
that
a

one great

objediion

and

this is,

fociety of true

Chriflians
I will

would not be
to
its

a fociety

of men.
this

Nay,

go fo far as fociety, with all

afHrm,

that

fuppofed

perfection,

would neither

be of the greatefl flrength nor duration. la confequence of its being perfe(Sl:, it would want
the (Irongeft
ties

of connexion

and thus
it.

this

very circumftance would deflroy

do their duty, the people to the laws, the chiefs obedient be might might
Individuals might

be

jufl:,

the magiflrate incorrupt, the foldiery

might look upon death with contempt, and there might prevail neither vanity nor luxury, in fuch
a ftate.

So

far all

would go well

but

let

us

look farther.

Chrlftianity

is

fplritual
:

religion, relative

ritance,

only to celeflial objects is not of this world. duty,

it is

the ChriAian's inhe-

He

performs his

true, but this he does with a

profound

indifference for the

good
It

or

ill

fuccefs of his en-

deavours.

Provided

proach himfelf with,

to

he hath nothing to reis of little importance

ill

him whether matters go well or

here be-

low

SOCIAL COMPACT.
low.
If the ftatc be in

241

a flomifhing fjtiiation,

lie can hardly venture to rejoice in the public

felicity,

kit he fhould be puffed up with the incountry's glory ; if the blefTes the hand of God that

ordinate pride of his

I\ate decline,

he

humbles

his people to the dufi:.

It

Is

farther neceiTary to

mony

of fociety, that

all

the peace and harthe citizens fhould

be without exception equally good Chriflians ; for, if unhappily there fhould be one of them
ambitious or
hypocritical, if

there ihould be

found among them a Cataline or a Cromwell, it is certain he would make an eafy prey of his Chriftian charity doth not pious countrymen.
eafily

permit the thinking

evil

of one's neigh-

bour.
the
art

No

fooner fnould an individual difcover

of impofing on the majority, and be

invefted with fome portion of public authorityj

Chriftians than he would become a dignitary. muft not fpeak evil of dignities ; thus refpedted,

he would thence affume power

Chriftians mufl

obey the fuperior powers. Does the depofiiary of power abufe it ? he becomes the rod by

which

it

pleafes

God

to chaftife his children.

And

24^

A TREAT

E ON the
them to

And, would
drive

their confciences permit

mud be broken,
ceed
;

out the ufurper, the public tranquillity and violence and blood-fhed fucall this

agrees but
J

ill

with the meeknefs

all,

of true Chriftians

and, after

what

is it

to

them, whether they are freemen or Haves in this vale of mifery ? Their efiential concern is
to

work out

their falvation,

and obtain happiwhich,

their

nefs in another

world
is

to efFeft

refignation in this,

held to be their duty.

Should fuch a ftatebe forced into a war with

any neighbouring power ? The citizens might march readily to the combat, without thinking of flight they might do their duty in the field,
J

but

they

would have no ardour

to die than
is
it

being better inflrucled

for victory ; to conquer.

Of what confequence
vantages

to
?

them, whether

they are vi6lors or vanquifhed

Think what adfanguine

!

an

impetuous
of
their

and

might

take

ftoicifm

draw

enemy them

out againft a brave and generous people, arlove of glory and their dently infpired with the
inftance, your truly country; fuppofe, for Chriftian republic againfl that of Sparta or of

Rome

what would be the confequence

3

Your
de-

SOCIAL COMPACT.

243

devout Chriftians would be beaten, difcomfited

and knocked on the head, before they had time

to look about them
;

their only fecurity

depend-

ing on the contempt which their enemy might It was, in my opinion, a entertain for them. fine oath that was taken by the foldiers of Fabius.

They
,

did not

make

vow

cither to die

or conquer

they fwore they would return con-

querors, and

pundlually performed

their oath.

Chriftian troops could not have

made

fuch a

vow,
ths

they would have been Lord their God.

afraid of templing

But

am

all this

while committing a blunder,

in fpeaking of a Chriftian republic ; one of thefe terms neceflarily excluding the other. Chii-

ftianity

inculcates

fervitude

and dependence

the

fpirit

of

it

is

too favourable to tyrants, for

flians are

them not fometimes to profit by it. True Chriformed for fiaves they know it, and
;

never trouble themfelves about confpiracies and

infurredlions
;

this

tranfitory life

is

of too

little

value in their efieem.

Will
foldiers

it
?

be
I

faid,
it.

the Chrifilans are excellent

deny

Produce me your Chrr-

fiiaa

244

A TREAT
For my

oNT

the
of no true

ilian troops,

part, I

know

Chriiiian foldiers.

Do

you name

thofe of the

Crufades
the
far

anfwer, that, not to call in queflioa

valour of the Crufaders, they

ftom being ChriAian

foldiers

citizens:

were very they were

the

of the priefl,

the citizens of the

its
it

church; they fought for which fome how or other,

a temporal one.
ligln,
it

fpirimai country,

had converted

int-o^-

To

fet

this

matter in the bell

was

kind of return to Paganifm; for

did not eilabiiih any national re-

as i.hc gofpt-l

ligion,

an holy war could notpofTibly be carried

on by true Chrifllans,

Under
diers

the Pagan emperors, the Chriflian folwere brave ; of this all the Chiiflian wrius,

ters afFure
tive

and

believe

them

the

mo-

of their bravery was a

fpirit

of honour or

emulation, excited

by the Pagan troops.

when
tive

the emperors became Chriftians, this

;

of emulation no longer fubfifled

But moand when

the

the

Crofs

had put the

Eagle to

flight,

Roman

valour difappeared.

But, laying a/ide political confiderations, let us return to the matter of and afcertain
right,
if

SOCIAL COMPACT.
its

245

true principles with regard to this important The right which the focial compafl conpoint.
fers

on the fovereign, extending no farther than

fubjed
is

to public utility *, the

not accountof any opi-

able to that fovereign, on account

nions he

may

entertain, that have nothing to

do with the community.

Now,

it

is

of great

importance to a flate, be of a religion that may infpire him with a regard for his duty; but the tenets of that religion are

that every citizen (hould

no farther interefilng

to the

commuto the

nity than as they relate to

morals, and

difcharge of thofe obligations, which

fefTor lies

the

pro-

under to his fellow

citizens.

If

ws
is

In a repuhli:, fays the Marquis d*A. e^sry one

libei
ty^

ferfeSlly at

becaufe no one

may

injure another.

This
is it

the invariable limit of republican liberty, nor to (late the cafe more precifely. J canpoffible
is

not

deny

rnyfelf the pleafure of

fometimes quotinpr

this manafcript,

order to

though unknown to the public, ia do honour to the memory of an ilkiilricus

and refpedable perfonsge,

grity

who

preferved

ttie

inte-

of the citizen even

in the

miniRrv, and auo'Dted

the

mod

unpright and laluvary views in the governhis country. /

ment of

tl 3

except

^j^6

TREATISE

on the

except thefe, the individual may profefs what others he pleales, without the fovereign's baring any right to interfere ; for, having no jurifdiclion in the other world, it is nothing to
the fovereign what becomes of the citizens in a future life, provided they difcharge the duties

incumbent on &nm.

in the prefent.

There

is

a
;

profefTion

of Faith,

therefore,
it

purely* political

the articles of which

is

in^

the province of the fovereign to afcertain, not precifely as articles of religion, but as the fentiments due to &ciety,
poffible to

without which

it is

im-

be a good citizen or faithful fubjeft *.

Without compelling any one to adopt thefe fentiments, the fovereign may alfo equitably baniih him the fociety not indeed as impious, but as
;

unfociable, as incapable of having a fincere re*

Csefar, in pVaoir.g for Cataline,

endeavoured to

edablifh the do6\rine of the Pv^ortal'ty of the Soul : Cato and Cicero, in anfwer to him, did not enter in o

a philofophical difcufiion of tlie argumeni, but contentedticmfebes with fhevving that Csfar had fpoken
like a

bad

citiz^^n,

to the ftate.

And

this

and advanced a dogma pernicious was in fact the Doint only that

come

before the Senate of RoiT.e, and not a queftion

in theology.

gard

SOCIAL
gard to
quired,
after
juftlce,

M PACT.

147

and of
duty.
a

facrlficing his life, if re-

to his

having made

Again, (liould any one, public profefTion of fuch

fentiments, betray

his difbelief of

them by

his

may equitably be punifhed with death ; having committed the greateft of all crimes, that of belying his heart in the face of
mifcondu<fl, he

the laws.

The

tenets of polirical religion fhould be

;

fevi?

and fimple
precifion,

they (hould be laid

down

alfo

wit

The
fiate

and without explication or comment. exiftence of a powerful, intelligent, beneprefcient and provident Deity ; a future' the reward of the virtuous and the pu;

ficent,
;

Bifnment of the wicked

the
fecial

the facred nature of

the

contraift,
its

and of

laws

thefe

As to thofe of apohtive tenets. I would confine kind myfelf folely to negative

fliould

be

one, by forbidding perfecution.

txveen civil

Thofe who and

nffe^l to

make

a diflincftion

be-

religious
It
is

toleration, are, in

my

opinion miftaken.
dially in

impofTible to

live cor-

lieve

peace with thofe devoted to damnation

whom we
:

firmly be-

to love

them would
it

be

to

hate the Deity for punifaing them,

abfolutely
neceilary for

Is

therefore

us

either to

per-

5148

TR

EA

TI

E ON the
Wherever the

perfecute or to convert them.

fpirit

of religious perfecution fubfifls, it is impofTible it fhould not have fome efFeft on the
civil police,

in

which

cafe,

the fovereign

is

no

longer fovereign even in a fecular view ; the priefts become the real maflers, and kings only their
officers.

In modern governments, where it is impoffible to fupport an exclufive national religion, it

is

requifite to

tolerate all fuch, as breathe the

fpirit

of toleration toward others, provided their tenets are notcontradiftory to the duty of a good
citizen.

But whofoever fhould prefume

to fay,

n^re
ought

is

no fahation out of the pale of our churchy to be banifhed the flate ;. unlefs indeed

the Aate be an ecclefiaftical one, and the prince Such a dogma is of ufe only in a a
pontiiF.

theocratical government; in every other

iflru(flive.

it is

de-

The

reafon

which

it is

faid

Henry

ligion,
it,

IV. gave, for embracing the Roman Catholic reought to have made an honeft man reje<5^

and more particularly a prince capable of

reafoning on the fubjedl^

C H A

F.

SOCIAL COMPACT.
e H A
P.

249

IX.

The Conclufwn,
thus flated the true principles
to

HAVING
the ftate on
in
its

of politic law, and endeavoured

fix

proper
it is

bafis,

it

remains to fhevv

what manner

fupported by external re-

lations.

head would be comprehended, the laws of nations and commerce, the laws of

Under

this

war and conqueft, leagues, negotiations, treaBut thefe prefent a new profpeft, ties, &c.
too
vafl:

and extenfive for fo (hort a fight

as

mine ;.
diflant

which

fliould be confined to

objeds

lefs

sad more adapted to

my

limited capacity.

FINIS.

in

the Prefs,

and fpeedtly will he puhUJhed^

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