Effects of Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances RPC 62 RPC 63 RPC 64 RPC 67 RPC 69 Lacanilao v CA Facts: The CFI found

the accused, a policeman, guilty of homicide. On appeal before the CA, the CA found that the accused acted in the performance of a duty but that the shooting of the victim was not the necessary consequence of the due performance thereof, therefore crediting to him the mitigating circumstance consisting of the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty. The CA lowered the penalty merely by one period applying Art. 64 (2) appreciating incomplete fulfillment of duty as a mere generic mitigating circumstance lowering the penalty to minimum period. Held: CA erred because incomplete fulfillment of duty is a privileged mitigating circumstance which not only cannot be offset by aggravating circumstances but also reduces the penalty by one or two degrees than that prescribed b law. The governing provision is Art. 69 of the RPC. COMPLEX CRIMES People v Hernandez Facts: The case is a motion for bail pending the judgment of the CFI of Manila. Hernandez, et. al. were charged with the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons, and robberies. The said defendants are alleged, as officers and/or members or otherwise associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (an organization instrument of the Communist Party of the Philippines, and affiliated with Hukbong Mapagpalayang Bayan), to have masterminded or promoted the cooperative efforts between the abovementioned organizations in pursuance of the armed rebellion against the Republic of the Philippines. Murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, etc. have also been committed in the rebellion. On June 26, 1954, Hernandez et. al. filed a second petition for bail, which they renewed on December 22, 1955. In this petition they argued that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with murder thus they should receive punishment commensurate to the penalty for simple rebellion. The Solicitor General countered by asserting the ascendancy of the Manila CFIs earlier decision. This resolution refers to the second petition. Defendant-appellants contend that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, and robbery. Issue: Whether or not the defendant-appellants are guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson, and robbery Held: No. The defendant-appellants are guilty only of simple rebellion. Motion for bail granted. Ratio: Citing precedents for the similar crime of treason, the SC ruled that murder, arson, and robbery are essential parts of the crime of rebellion. They were done in the course of committing the crime of rebellion. The common nature of the said crimes of murder, arson, and robbery, acquired the political nature of rebellion as they were committed in connection to it. Thus, the said offenses cannot be tried separately. Art. 4 would not apply in this case because the said provision only applies when there are two or more crimes. Since the maximum penalty that can be imposed for simple robbery is only 12 years, as opposed to lifetime imprisonment which was the sentence given by the lower court, the defendant may be allowed bail. RATIO: Felonies such as murder, arson and robbery are inherent in the commission of rebellion. [T]reason may be committed by executing either a single of similar intentional overt acts, different or similar but distinct. The act of public rising and taking of arms against the government requires the commission of the aforesaid felonies and are subject to a single penalty. Padilla, dissenting: The Court must not allow the defendants to post bail, since the security of the State is at stake. Montemayor, dissenting: The felony of rebellion is consummated once a group of persons rise up in public, take arms and assemble. Murder, arson, and robbery are not inherent in the crime of rebellion and the former felonies cannot be absorbed by the latter. RULING: Defendants are allowed to post bail, which the Court set at PhP 30,000. Note: Hernandez was later acquitted of the charge (People v Hernandez, GR#L-6025, May 30, 1964) and became a National Artist for Literature. o

Enrile v Salazar FACTS: ISSUE: Feb 27 1990: Juan Ponce Enrile is arrested, the warrant issued on an information charging Enrile, along with Gregorio Honasan and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder Feb 28 1990: Enrile files for habeas corpus on HELD: following grounds o Rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder does not exist in the statute books RATIO: o No preliminary investigation for the information, ergo no due process o Denied bail o Judge did not personally determine the existence of a probable cause in the warrant Hernandez doctrine: crimes committed to further, or necessary to rebellion, are absorbed under the offense of rebellion; rebellion complexed with other crimes does not exist (see People v. Hernandez, et al.)

Whether or not the Hernandez doctrine holds in this case. Whether or not Enrile is entitled to bail. Yes. Yes. President Aquino repealed (via EO 187) President Marcos attempt to nullify the Hernandez doctrine by having crimes complexed with rebellion (PD 942 Sec. 8, inserting Art. 142A into the RPC) Enrile can only be charged with simple rebellion, which is bailable (as opposed to if he were charged with rebellion complexed with murder, as murder, which is not bailable, would count as the most grave offense)

MONTEVERDE v PEOPLE Facts: Monteverde was purportedly charged with the complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document for allegedly falsifying the document she had submitted to show that the money donated by PAGCOR was used and spent for lighting materials for her barangay. Held: Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for committing the other (or others). Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other (or others). Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed to petitioner in the present case cannot constitute a complex crime. Specifically, her alleged actions showing falsification of a public and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa. Neither were the two crimes the result of a single act. PEOPLE v COMADRE Facts: Robert Agbanlog, Wabe, Bullanday, Camat and Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Roberts father, Jaime Agbanlog, Jaime was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the companions of his son. As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants George and Antonio Comadre and Lozano walking. The 3 stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed a hand grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled. The hand grenade exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert died while his father, Jaime, Wabe, Camat, and Bullanday sustained shrapnel injuries.. Held: Antonio is guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes nare committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions. The single act by appellant of detonating hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a single criminal impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity. PEOPLE v DELOS SANTOS

Facts: Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends went to Bukidnon on his Isuzu Elf truck. On their way, they decided to pass by a restaurant where Glenn had 3 bottles of beer. On their way to Cagayan de Oro City from Bukidnon, Glenns truck, hit, bumped, seriously wounded and claimed the lives of several members of the PNP who were undergoing an endurance run on a highway wearing black shirts and shorts and green combat shoes. Twelve trainees were killed on the spot, 12 were seriously wounded, 1 of whom eventually died and 10 sustained minor injuries. At the time of the occurrence, the place of the incident was very dark as there was no moon. Neither were there lamp posts that illuminated the highway. The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex crime of multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. Held: Considering that the incident was not a product of a malicious intent but rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. The slight physical injuries caused by Glenn to the ten other victims through reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have, therefore, been filed SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIMES PEOPLE v FABON The trial court inaccurately designated the crime committed as robbery with homicide and rape. When the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is accompanied b another offense like rape or intentional mutilation, such additional offense is treated as an aggravating circumstance which would result in the imposition of the maximum of the penalty of death. The proper designation is robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. When rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, it is the first paragraph of Art. 294 of the RPC which applies, the rape is considered as an aggravating circumstance. EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF PENALTIES In the Matter of the petition for Habeas Corpus of Pete Lagran (2001) Facts: The accused was convicted of 3 counts of violating BP22 and was sentenced to imprisonment of 1 year for each count. He was detained on Feb. 24, 1999. On Mar. 19, 2001, he filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming he completed the service of his sentence. Citing Art. 70, RPC, he claimed that he shall serve the penalties simultaneously. Thus, there is no more legal basis for his detention. Held: Art. 70 allows simultaneous service of two or more penalties only if the nature of the penalties so permit. In the case at bar, the petitioner was sentenced to suffer one year imprisonment for every count of the offense committed. The nature of the sentence does not allow petitioner to serve all the terms simultaneously. The rule of successive service of sentence must be applied. The penalties that can be simultaneously served are: (1) perpetual absolute disqualification, (2) perpetual special disqualification, (3) temporary absolute disqualification, (4) temporary special disqualification, (5) suspension, (6) destierro, (7) public censure, (8) fine and bond to keep the peace, (9) civil interdiction, and (10) confiscation and payment of costs. These penalties, except destierro, can be served simultaneously with imprisonment. The penalties consisting in deprivation of liberty cannot be served simultaneously by reason of the nature of such penalties. EFFECTS OF PROBATION LAW SALGADO v CA There is no question that the decision convicting Salgado of the crime of serious physical injuries had become final and executory because the filing by respondent of an application for probation is deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. The grant of probation does not extinguish the civil liability of the offender. The order of probation with one of the conditions providing for the manner of payment of the civil liability during the period of probation, did not increase or decrease the civil liability adjudged. The conditions listed under Sec. 10 of the Probation law are not exclusive. Courts are allowed to impose practically any term it chooses, the only limitation being that it does not jeopardize the constitutional rights of the accused. Office of the Court Administrator v. Librado (1996) Facts: The respondent is a deputy sheriff who was charged of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act and is now claiming he is in probation. The OCA filed an administrative case against him and he was suspended from office. Held: While indeed the purpose of the Probation Law is to save valuable human material, it must not be forgotten that unlike pardon probation does not obliterate the crime of which the person under probation has been convicted. The image of the judiciary is tarnished by conduct involving moral turpitude. The reform and rehabilitation of the probationer cannot justify his retention in the government service.

EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY BEHEST LOANS v DESIERTO The applicable law in the computation of the prescriptive period for RA 3019 is Section 2 of Act No. 3326 which provides that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. DEL CASTILLO v TORRECAMPO Facts: The trial court rendered judgment and declared Torrecampo guilty of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election Code, for striking the electric bulb and 2 kerosene petromax lamps during the counting of the votes room in a voting center plunging the room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers. Torrecampo appealed his conviction to the CAwhich eventually affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto. Said decision became final and executory. Thus, the execution of judgment was scheduled on October 14, 1987. During the execution of judgment, petitioner failed to appear which prompted the presiding judge to issue an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner was never apprehended. He remained at large. Ten years later, on October 24, 1997, Torrecampo filed a motion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him. Held: Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. "Escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. In the instant case, Torrecampo was never brought to prison. In fact, even before the execution of the judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. Now Torrecampo begs for the compassion of the Court because he has ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it was Torrecampo who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving. Torrecampo guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is therefore not to be rewarded therefor. PEOPLE v PATRIARCA Facts: Patriarca with the alias of Ka Django, an NPA, with ten (10) armed companions, requested permission to rest in the house, of Malto. They had with them Arevalo who was hogtied. Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be extinguished. Patriarca then ordered Arevalo to lie down then shot the latter two times. The trial court convicted Patriarca of murder. Patriarca then applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board Held: Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. The Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon Patriarca. Once granted, it is binding and effective. Hence, the grant of amnesty extinguishes the liability of Patriarca in the present case. Civil Liability Arising From Felony CHUA v CA Facts: Hao, treasurer of Siena Realty Corporation, filed a prosecutors. Chua moved to exclude complainant's complaint-affidavit with the City Prosecutor of Manila counsels as private prosecutors in the case on the ground charging Spouses Francis and Elsa Chua, of 4 counts of that Hao failed to allege and prove any civil liability in the falsification of public documents pursuant to Article 172 in case. Petitioner cites the case of Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo, relation to Article 171 of the RPC. Accused allegedly holding that where from the nature of the offense or where prepared, certified, and falsified the Minutes of the Annual the law defining and punishing the offense charged does Stockholders meeting of the not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not BOD of the Siena Realty Corporation by causing it to intervene in the prosecution of the offense. appear in said Minutes that Hao was present and has Held: Petitioner's contention lacks merit. participated in said proceedings. During the trial in the Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the MeTC, Atty. Sua-Kho and Atty. Rivera appeared as private fundamental postulate that every man criminally liable is

also civilly liable. When a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of the society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property has been actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. An act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Additionally, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of the crime. The civil action involves the civil liability arising from the offense charged which includes restitution, reparation of

the damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages. Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. 31 Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that, "[w]hen a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." Hao did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT v PEOPLE Facts: Accused Roman, an employee of Philippine Rabbit was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The court further ruled that Philippine Rabbit, in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for his civil liabilities. Accused then jumped bail and remained at-large. Philippine Rabbit filed a notice of appeal. It argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion including the appeal. Held: The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed solely against Roman, its employee. The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latter's lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused. When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has become final and executory.