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The heuristic application of explanatory theories in International Relations

Adam R. C Humphreys European Journal of International Relations published online 22 February 2010 DOI: 10.1177/1354066109344008 The online version of this article can be found at: http://ejt.sagepub.com/content/early/2010/02/22/1354066109344008

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European Journal of International Relations OnlineFirst, published on February 22, 2010 as doi:10.1177/1354066109344008

Article

The heuristic application of explanatory theories in International Relations

Adam R.C. Humphreys

European Journal of International Relations XX(X) 121 The Author(s) 2010 Reprints and permissions: sagepub. co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1354066109344008 ejt.sagepub.com

University of Oxford and Nuffield College, UK

Abstract Explanatory theorists increasingly insist that their theories are useful even though they cannot be deductively applied. But if so, then how do such theories contribute to our understanding of international relations? I argue that explanatory theories are typically heuristically applied: theorists accounts of specific empirical episodes are shaped by their theories thematic content, but are not inferred from putative causal generalizations or covering laws. These accounts therefore gain no weight from their purely rhetorical association with theories quasi-deductive arguments: they must be judged on the plausibility of their empirical claims. Moreover, the quasi-deductive form in which explanatory theories are typically presented obscures their actual explanatory role, which is to indicate what sort of explanation may be required, to provide conceptual categories, and to suggest an empirical focus. This account of how theoretical explanations are constructed subverts the nomotheticidiographic distinction that is often used to distinguish International Relations from History. Keywords explanation, explanatory theory, heuristic, International Relations theory, methodology

Introduction
Theoretical debates in International Relations are typically concerned with the scope and content of general theoretical claims and with recurring questions of ontology, epistemology and method. There is comparatively little concern with how theories are applied. Yet if theoretical ideas influence how we think about international relations, then it is crucial to ask how they are translated into substantive claims about specific empirical episodes.1 We cannot properly evaluate theories or the explanations associated with them without a clear understanding of how those theories are applied and, therefore, of how they contribute to our understanding of international relations.
Corresponding author: Adam R.C. Humphreys, Department of Politics and IR, University of Oxford and Nuffield College, Manor Road, Oxford, OX1 3UQ, UK. E-mail: adam.humphreys@politics.ox.ac.uk

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This article examines how explanatory theories are applied. It begins with a puzzle: although many explanatory theorists accept that their theories are not deductively applied, they do not offer any alternative account of how those theories are drawn upon. There has been little attempt to unpack what is involved in the non-deductive, or heuristic, application of such theories. I seek to fill this gap by arguing that explanatory theories in International Relations are typically heuristically applied: theorists accounts of specific empirical episodes are shaped by their theories thematic content but are not inferred from putative causal generalizations. Rather than identifying covering laws, theories indicate what sort of explanation is required, provide conceptual categories and suggest an empirical focus. I illustrate this by re-examining Waltzs well-known explanation of the lack of direct military conflict between the superpowers during the Cold War, showing how recognizing that neorealism is heuristically applied influences our understanding of Waltzs claims. I argue that despite explanatory theorists focus on developing abstract arguments, good judgement is central to the construction and evaluation of substantive explanatory claims. For some, the idea that theories are, or could be, deductively applied is part of what identifies them as explanatory theories. For others, it may seem self-evident that such theories are heuristically applied. Thus Buzan (2004: 24) notes that while some demand that a theory contains or is able to generate testable hypotheses of a causal nature, others use the term for anything that organises a field systematically, structures questions and establishes a coherent and rigorous set of interrelated concepts and categories. I show that the first view is descriptively false: theories do not contribute to the development of substantive explanatory claims by providing testable causal generalizations. I also argue that the implications of the second view have not been well worked out. Hence this article aims both to reveal explanatory theorists actual practices and to show how thinking of theories as heuristic resources might influence our attempts to assess and improve theories and the explanations that draw on them. My argument carries three main implications. First, substantive explanatory claims that draw on theories heuristically gain no additional weight from what is a purely rhetorical association with the theories quasi-deductive arguments. What must be assessed is the plausibility of the substantive empirical accounts, not abstract qualities of the theories. This suggests that explanatory claims should not be privileged just because they are theoretically derived. Second, the heuristic functions that theories perform may be rather limited: theories like neorealism offer little critical reflection upon the different sorts of questions that might be asked about particular episodes, the alternative conceptual categories that might be employed or the range of explanatory factors that might be examined. Addressing such deficiencies offers a more promising way of improving such theories than seeking to elaborate quasi-deductive arguments that are not directly drawn upon. Third, my account of how theories are applied undermines the nomotheticidiographic distinction that is often used to distinguish social scientific and historical approaches to international relations. This creates space for a deeper appreciation of the kinds of judgements that we rely upon in developing and assessing theoretical explanations.

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Theories and perspectives

According to Smith (2000), explanatory theory includes neorealism, neoliberalism and much of mainstream constructivism. It is characterized, above all, by positivist premises: explanatory theorists are committed to the view that the social world is amenable to the same kinds of analysis as the natural world, to a separation between facts and values, to uncovering patterns and regularities and to empiricism as the arbiter of what counts as knowledge (Smith, 2000: 380, 383). Thus explanatory theorists might be expected to apply their theories in accordance with the covering law model of explanation, in which an episode is explained by subsuming it under general laws, i.e. by showing that it occurred in accordance with those laws, in virtue of the realization of certain specified antecedent conditions (Hempel, 1965: 246). In other words, they might be expected, first, to develop theories in which causal generalizations are inferred from properly specified assumptions; second, under appropriate conditions, to deduce explanatory claims from those generalizations; and, third, to test those claims against (what are said to be) the facts.2 Some explanatory theorists appear to endorse this model of theory application. For example, Waltz (1979: 17) argues that the theorist must contrive explanations from which hypotheses can then be inferred and tested, while Moravcsik (1997: 514) argues that any nontautological social scientific theory must be grounded in a set of positive assumptions from which arguments, explanations, and predictions can be derived. This model is also implicit in the form in which most explanatory theories are presented. The centrepiece of such theories is typically a sequence of quasi-deductive arguments culminating in a putative causal generalization: the theorys findings are claimed to follow from a specified set of assumptions that approximate real-world conditions. Thus neorealists seek to show how balancing behaviour is driven by the anarchic structure of the international system (see Waltz, 1979), neoliberals seek to show how institutions facilitate cooperation under anarchy (see Oye, 1986; Stein, 1990), and mainstream constructivists seek to show how states interests and identities are socially constructed (see Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1992). If applied in accordance with the covering law model, these theories would be used to show that an outcome was to be expected because the specified antecedent conditions were fulfilled. In such circumstances, the outcome could be deduced from the theorys putative covering laws. Some theorists have attempted to apply explanatory theories deductively. For example, Posen (1984: 8) seeks to compare organization theory and neorealist balance of power theory by deducing specific propositions about French, British and German military doctrine during the interwar period. However, he is unable to make these deductions: in order to construct neorealist hypotheses about military doctrine, he has to pull the theory in the direction of political realism or Realpolitik with which it is closely identified, but not synonymous. Thus he describes the two families of hypotheses that he tests not as propositions deduced from theoretical assumptions but as representing two distinct perspectives on state behaviour. In fact, he accepts that his use of the terms organization theory and balance of power theory may be somewhat misleading, though he insists that they do indicate the general origins of his hypotheses (Posen, 1984: 345). His problem is that neorealism does not specify balancing behaviour in sufficient detail that it is possible to deduce what sorts of military doctrines are required.

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Under-specification is not the only problem. Explanatory theories are often represented as deductive in form even though, when they are applied, no deductions are derived. For example, Mearsheimer (1990) is said to have applied neorealism deductively in predicting the demise of NATO and the EC after the end of the Cold War: this is cited, by critics, as evidence of neorealisms failings (see Keohane and Martin, 1995: 40). Mearsheimer insists that theorists should offer predictions and presents what he terms a deductive case that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity. He is also pessimistic about the prospects of continued institutional cooperation in Europe after the end of the Cold War. However, nowhere does he explicitly show, or even attempt to show, that the demise of NATO and the EC may be deduced from neorealist premises. He does surmise that NATO may disintegrate and he is sceptical that a more powerful EC will ensure peace, but these conclusions are derived from his reading of the Cold War, rather than from the deductive application of neorealist theory (Mearsheimer, 1990: 9, 18, 52, 48).3 In such cases, the rhetoric of deduction does not match the reality of how the theory is applied. The idea that explanatory theories are not in fact deductively applied is quite commonplace. Katzenstein (1996: 26) argues that although neorealism holds forth the promise of a tight, deductive theory, it cannot be directly applied to questions of national security: it is therefore employed only as an orienting framework. Zacher and Matthew (cited in Moravcsik, 1997: 515) argue that liberalisms propositions cannot be deduced from its assumptions. Jervis (1999: 43) suggests that neorealism and neoliberalism are better labelled schools of thought or approaches than theories: neither has the sort of integrity that would enable them to be falsified. Adler (1997: 3289) observes that constructivists seek to explain the social construction of reality, but argues that their reasoning cannot be assimilated to models of deductive proof or inductive generalization.4 The adequacy of the covering law model as a depiction of theorists explanatory practices has also been questioned.5 Kratochwil (1993: 66) argues that although most political scientists pay lip service to nomothetic/deductive explanation schemes, no general social science laws have been discovered. According to Ruggie (1998b: 861; see also Smith, 2000: 383), [v]irtually no theoretical account in International Relations fulfils the criteria of the covering law model and, moreover, when challenged most theorists readily admit that fact. This suggests that explanatory theorists believe that their theories are useful even though they cannot be deductively applied. A similar view is implicit in Walts observation that the social sciences are replete with inconsistent or incomplete but nonetheless highly useful theories (Walt, 1999: 17). The implication is that the utility of explanatory theories does not reside solely in their ability to generate deductive explanations. However, this idea has never been unpacked. It therefore creates a puzzle: if explanatory theories are not applied in accordance with the covering law model, then how are they applied? This puzzle is expressed in, but not resolved by, the emerging preference for terms such as perspective, approach and school of thought over the term theory. Some scholars employ such terms in order to highlight the variety of claims that may be categorized under a single theoretical heading. For example, Stein (1990: 4) terms realism a perspective in order to emphasize that it is a large body of work that includes quite different and disparate strands. Legro (1995: 8) describes realism, institutionalism and organizational culture as broad perspectives (he also employs the terms school

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and approach), but avoids the term theory because of the plurality of views within each. Nau (2007: 4) uses the term perspective because he is interested in what theories emphasize, not with all the variations of each theory. However, the issue is not just whether theorists wish to avoid getting bogged down in the detail of competing claims. A theory (or perspective) will encompass a variety of competing claims only if its terms are not uniquely defined, if its assumptions are not clearly identified or if putative causal generalizations are disputed. In such cases, the theory cannot possibly be deductively applied: if it is, nevertheless, claimed to be useful, we need to establish how this is so. Because under-specification is a common feature of explanatory theories in International Relations, some scholars distinguish between theories and perspectives. For example, Katzenstein (1996: 45) acknowledges that his theoretical perspective of sociological institutionalism does not constitute a theory of national security, but insists that no such theory exists in the field of national security studies. His point is that his approach is no less valuable because it has not been developed into a determinate theory: other approaches, including neorealism, are equally incapable of being deductively applied. This claim involves an implicit distinction between theories and perspectives, where the former can and the latter cannot be deductively applied. Katzenstein employs a variety of terms for approaches that are not, in the required sense, theories, including perspectives, paradigms, orientations, approaches and frameworks. However, none of these terms is clearly defined: they therefore provide no insight into how perspectives are drawn upon in substantive explanations. Some explanatory theorists use terms such as perspective in recognition that their theories cannot be deductively applied. For example, Keohane (1989: 2) accepts that liberal institutionalism is a school of thought that provides a perspective on world politics, rather than a logically connected deductive theory. Milner (1997: 4) acknowledges that the notion of two-level games, on which she draws, may be promising as a framework for analysis but does not constitute a theory with testable hypotheses. In both cases, a highly significant claim remains implicit and thus unelaborated: that their approaches offer explanatory value even though they cannot be deductively applied. Katzenstein et al. (1998: 6467) differentiate two meanings of theory in International Relations: general theoretical orientations and specific research programs. The former provide heuristics they suggest relevant variables and causal patterns that provide guidelines for developing specific research programs. The latter link explanatory variables to a set of outcomes, or dependent variables. Katzenstein et al. describe realism, liberalism and constructivism as general theoretical orientations but do not specify the connection between generic orientations and specific research programs. The manner in which these theories actually contribute to our understanding of international relations therefore remains unelaborated. The issue here is not just that some theories are well specified while others are not. To the extent that distinctions between theories and perspectives provide this impression, they obscure the deeper problem. This is, first, that existing explanatory theories are not deductively applied; second, that those theories are claimed to be nonetheless useful; and, third, that we lack any alternative account of how they contribute to our understanding of international relations. Keohane (1989: 2) hints that perspectives provide a set of distinctive questions and assumptions about the basic units and forces in world politics, while Nau (2007: xxiv)

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suggests that they serve as disciplinary lenses. However, there has been no attempt to ask what is involved in the heuristic application of explanatory theories or to consider what it implies for how the resulting explanatory claims should be evaluated.

Heuristic theory application

The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993: 1228) defines heuristic as [s]erving to find out or discover something: a heuristic is a method for attempting the solution of problems or a rule or item of information used in such a process. In this sense, describing the application of an idea as heuristic implies only that the idea helps us to understand that to which it is applied. Plya (1990: 113) goes further, explicitly contrasting formal (deductive) and non-formal (heuristic) reasoning: he argues that [h]euristic reasoning is not regarded as final and strict but as provisional and plausible only, whose purpose is to discover the solution of the present problem. However, Gigerenzer and Todd (1999: 25) argue that heuristic refers to useful, even indispensable cognitive processes for solving problems that cannot be handled by logic and probability theory. This suggests that employing ideas heuristically is not just a prelude to applying them formally but is itself a profitable means of investigating problems: it should be understood as a significant alternative to the search for deductive solutions. Such distinctions are used by scholars from a variety of traditions. Almond (1970: 4) termed his work heuristic theory: its function was to facilitate research, to lay out variables and hypotheses about their relations, to suggest why a particular approach or method might be useful. He insisted that it should not be confused with scientific theory: its value was heuristic. Keohane (1989: 173) argues that rationalist approaches to international relations may be heuristically powerful even though they omit important explanatory factors, implying that explanatory power does not reside solely in a theorys deductive implications. Kratochwil (1994: 250) distinguishes development of a heuristically fruitful research agenda from pursuit of a mistaken ideal of parsimony. Abbott (2004) argues that methodological debates in the social sciences should not be construed as demanding determinate choices (between, say, positivism and interpretivism, or realism and constructionism) but as opening up a body of heuristic resources. Lakatos (1970: 155, 176; emphasis in original) argues that a research programme should be rejected only when it is superseded by a rival with greater heuristic power. He focuses on heuristic power because empirical tests cannot be decisive, noting that research programmes with no unifying idea, no heuristic power are, on the whole, worthless. The idea that explanatory theories in International Relations are better termed perspectives also implies a distinction between deductive reasoning and heuristic power. However, the question of how such theories are applied is not reducible to whether they are well specified. When explanatory theorists apply their theories heuristically, their accounts of specific empirical episodes are shaped by those theories thematic content, but are not inferred from any putative causal generalizations or covering laws. This captures how explanatory theories in International Relations are typically applied: it is not just an occasional short cut. Theories typically shape substantive explanatory claims without determining either their content or form. Thus although heuristic theory application is, by definition, non-deductive, this does not make it second best. Heuristic is not to be contrasted with explanatory: it describes one of the ways in which explanation works (Kaplan, 1964: 3578).
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When a theory is employed as a heuristic resource, it performs three main functions. First, it indicates what sort of explanation is required, for example by suggesting a particular level of analysis or a causal rather than an interpretive approach. Second, it provides the conceptual categories that are used to navigate through and to organize empirical material. Third, it indicates what mechanisms, actors, chance factors and background conditions are worth examining (see Suganami, 2008). Thus a theory tells us what we are looking for and where to look for it. Just as importantly, it also tells us what we are not looking for and where not to look for it. These functions strongly influence the kind of explanation that will be constructed, but they are not sufficient, in and of themselves, to determine its form or content: its form will depend largely on the nature of the specific research question, while its content will depend largely on what is discovered when the question is investigated. A theory that is heuristically applied is therefore a tool that aids inquiry, not a substitute for empirical research. This account of how theoretical explanations are generated is consistent with Hoffmanns plea for theory to be understood as a set of interrelated questions capable of guiding research: he argues that theory should concentrate research on the most important problems, help us order the data we have accumulated and identify the main factors or variables in the field (Hoffmann, 1960: v, 8). However, theory is more intimately involved in our understanding of the world than Hoffmanns list implies. In indicating what kinds of explanation are required to answer particular research questions, theories embody claims about what we already know and about what we still need to learn. The organizing role of conceptual categories is not only classificatory, but also constitutive: unless we can say what we are examining, we cannot relate anything to anything else. Because we cannot simply investigate everything, the role of theories in prioritizing certain mechanisms, actors and conditions involves implicit claims about what is (and is not) problematic. These issues, about what we already know, how it should be categorized and what can be treated as unproblematic, lie at the heart of the differences not only between competing interpretations of empirical episodes but also between rival theoretical approaches, including positivist and post-positivist approaches. Thus the thematic material that is drawn upon when a theory is heuristically applied is related to but far from identical with the putative causal generalizations that would be drawn on as covering laws if the theory were deductively applied. One key difference is that when this thematic material is conceived of as a heuristic resource, rather than as a determinate source of explanations, the theorys implicit assumptions about what is and is not problematic are brought to the fore. This exposes the limits of debates about whether explanatory theorists are really positivists (see Smith, 2000). It also reveals that a theorys heuristic resources cannot be determinately stated: we cannot say exactly what an individual researcher will draw from a theory in relation to a specific research question.6 This problem is particularly acute in relation to existing explanatory theories because they typically adopt a quasi-deductive form in which putative causal generalizations are presented as if they follow from a sequence of assumptions and arguments: the theories heuristic functions are thereby obscured. The single most important characteristic of the explanations generated when theories are heuristically applied is that the manner in which explanatory factors are combined is particular to individual episodes: it is not inferred from the theory being applied. This is apparent in applications of Keohanes functional theory of international regimes. Drawing
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upon [g]ame theory and discussions of collective action, which he describes as deductive theories based on assumptions of rationality, Keohane develops a theory in which rational self-interested actors value international regimes as a way of increasing their ability to make mutually beneficial agreements and hegemons seek to institute international regimes on an intergovernmental basis as a way of helping to control the actions of other states.7 However, Keohane applies the theory heuristically: he does not pretend that it is deductively adequate, maintaining only that we can improve our understanding of changes in regimes by thinking about cooperation in ways suggested by the theory (Keohane, 2005: x, 65, 135, 140, 213). Keohane accepts that [a]lthough regimes can facilitate cooperation among governments that seek to make agreements, they do not automatically produce it. One reason for the indeterminacy is that the theory treats states as units, without taking into account variations in domestic politics or in the ideas prevailing within them. Yet Keohane believes that domestic political concerns were critical to postwar US decisions about whether and how to cooperate. He argues, for example, that the US government pursued an oil regime, but that domestic politics got in the way. Moreover, although his theory ignores domestic politics, when he turns to his empirical cases Keohane seeks to show how domestic and systemic factors interacted to produce specific outcomes. Thus he argues that the proposal for an Anglo-American Petroleum Agreement failed due to a combination of the structure of American government, ideology, bureaucratic battles and domestic oil interests. This account of how explanatory factors combine to produce a specific outcome is particular to this case and cannot be inferred from Keohanes theory. His theory provides a framework for the analysis of these issues (it performs heuristic functions), but it is not a testable theory (Keohane, 2005: 214, xiii, 141, xv). The chief consequence of a theory being heuristically applied is that substantive explanatory claims gain no additional weight from what is a purely rhetorical association with the theorys quasi-deductive arguments. A theoretical explanation may be privileged vis-a-vis a competing account if there is reason to believe that a particular episode is an instance of a broader class that the theory is thought to be able to explain. This can only be the case when a theory is deductively applied. If it is heuristically applied, there can be no reason to privilege the theoretical explanation. In such cases, the question of whether the theory is useful can only be answered in the particular: by assessing whether it in fact helps to generate a persuasive answer to a specific research question. Such evaluations rely on good judgement: on asking whether explanatory claims constitute persuasive accounts of relevant episodes. This judgement turns on issues such as whether the account coheres with what we think we already know, whether it makes sense of the relevant empirical material, whether we are disposed to trust the author and whether her characterization of situations, actors and outcomes seems plausible. This contrasts with how explanations are assessed when a theory is deductively applied: then it is necessary to compare the theorys predictions to (what are said to be) the facts, or to evaluate the claim that the episode fulfils the theorys specified antecedent conditions, thereby justifying the claim that the outcome is explained by the putative covering law. This may require good judgement, but what is being evaluated is the correspondence between aspects of a particular episode and the theory. What is being evaluated when a theory is heuristically applied is the substance of particular empirical

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and historical claims. Of course, it might be claimed that even here our judgement feeds off putative covering laws.8 My contention, however, is that good judgement does not rely on or refer to putative causal generalizations: the idea that theories are heuristically applied not only depicts the relationship between theories and substantive explanatory claims, but also captures something of how our minds deal with an uncertain world (Gigerenzer and Todd, 1999: 5).

Waltz on the Cold War: A heuristic application of neorealism

Neorealism is often represented as generating covering law explanations (see Donnelly, 2000: 301; Mouritzen, 1997: 69; Ruggie, 1998a: 7). This reflects Waltzs account of how to construct a theory of international politics: first, one must conceive of international politics as a bounded realm or domain; second, one must discover some law-like regularities within it; and third, one must develop a way of explaining the observed regularities. However, Waltz also acknowledges the limits of explanatory approaches: he observes that the first big difficulty lies in finding or stating theories with enough precision and plausibility to make testing worthwhile (Waltz, 1979: 116, 14). He adds that when we have failed to predict, theory still helps us to understand and explain some things about the behaviour of states (Waltz, 1986: 332), implying that neorealism may be useful even without being deductively applied. Waltzs explanation of the absence of direct military confrontation between the superpowers during the Cold War draws on his account of how balancing differs in multipolar and bipolar systems. He distinguishes two balancing strategies: internal efforts (moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies) and external efforts (moves to strengthen and enlarge ones own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one). He observes, however, that the second strategy is only available in multipolar systems: Where two powers contend, imbalances can be righted only by their internal efforts. With more than two, shifts in alignment provide an additional means of adjustment, adding flexibility to the system (Waltz, 1979: 118, 163). Waltzs contention that bipolar systems are relatively stable (that is, peaceful) rests on their lack of flexibility: he overturned the conventional wisdom by arguing that the inflexibility of a bipolar world may promote a greater stability than flexible balances of power among a larger number of states (Waltz, 1964: 899900). If flexibility is to contribute to stability, Waltz argues, it must enable states to change sides in order to tilt the balance against the would-be aggressors: at least one powerful state must overcome the pressure of ideological preference, the pull of previous ties, and the conflict of present interests in order to add its weight to the side of the peaceful. Waltz accepts that this may not reliably happen: in multipolar systems, states may pass the buck, a dynamic he associates with the build-up to World War II. Even should states refrain from free-riding, the timing and content of the actions required to balance against would-be aggressors become more and more difficult to calculate as the number of great powers increases. Further, flexibility of alignment may make allies appear unreliable: great powers that depend on their allies for survival may be dragged into conflicts to defend those allies, a dynamic Waltz associates with the outbreak of World War I. His point is that uncertainty, arising from flexibility of alignment, amplifies unsettling

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developments: Rather than making states properly cautious and forwarding the chances of peace, uncertainty and miscalculation cause wars. Prior to the two world wars, he argues, flexibility of alignment made for rigidity of strategy or the limitation of freedom of decision. During the Cold War, rigidity of alignment made for flexibility of strategy and the enlargement of freedom of decision (Waltz, 1979: 16470). This cannot plausibly be construed as a covering law account. Neorealisms main candidate covering law, that states seeking to survive in anarchic systems engage in balancing behaviour, is disproven by Waltzs discussion of the dynamics of multipolar systems.9 Because he fails to specify the circumstances under which states in multipolar systems pass the buck or get locked into chain gangs (see Christensen and Snyder, 1990), Waltz cannot be construed as applying a more specific covering law concerning when states do or do not balance. Moreover, Bueno de Mesquita (2003: 1723) argues that neorealist assumptions imply nothing at all about how uncertainty affects stability: Waltz makes a logical leap from the association of uncertainty with multipolarity to the association of multipolarity with instability and bipolarity with stability. If so, then Waltzs claim that bipolar systems are more stable than multipolar systems is not deductively derived. Nevertheless, the argument is recognizably neorealist: the theory does perform important heuristic functions. First, it indicates that an explanation should be systemic in form: Waltz presents a structural argument even though this cannot, in the absence of further arguments about the impact of flexibility, resolve the issue. Second, the theory provides organizing concepts: Waltz treats categories like superpower and polarity as unproblematic, despite the fact that during the early Cold War the USSR was not a superpower and thus the international system was not bipolar (see Lebow, 1994). Third, the theory suggests a focus on alliance choices: Waltz emphasizes states strategic concerns, downplaying the importance of domestic structure. When he considers factors such as ideology, he represents them as working against strategic rationality. However, neorealisms heuristic functions are limited: it offers no insight into alternative responses to the research question, fails to problematize its central categories and ignores key mechanisms, conditions and actors. Thus showing that neorealism is heuristically applied also indicates how it might be improved: what is required is not refinement of its quasi-deductive arguments, but the development of a more critical understanding of the variety of possible explanatory forms, concepts and foci.10 Only when neorealism is conceived of as a heuristic resource is it possible to reconcile Waltzs insistence that it explains a small number of big and important things with his acceptance that its explanations are indeterminate because both unit-level and structural causes are in play (Waltz, 1986: 329, 343). His implicit claim is that any good explanation will refer to the structure of the system, but that the way in which structural and non-structural factors interact cannot be determinately stated: it will vary according to the specific problem being investigated. This makes it easier to understand why he abstracts from non-structural factors in his theory but refers to them in substantive explanatory claims, as in his acknowledgement that an apparently stable system can always be disrupted by the actions of a Hitler and the reactions of a Chamberlain (Waltz, 1979: 7980, 175). His account of the relationship between structural and non-structural factors in his discussion of the Cold War international system is specific

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to that case and is not derived from or captured in neorealisms quasi-deductive reasoning. Thus Waltz (1997: 916) observes that an explanation is not a theory: what goes into an explanation is not identical with what goes into a theory. This is what we would expect if a theory is employed as a tool that aids inquiry rather than as a source of deductive explanations. The conceptual and descriptive inadequacies of Waltzs approach to this subject are widely known (see Wagner, 1993). However, the idea that Waltz applies neorealism heuristically generates distinctive implications for how Waltzs substantive explanatory claims should be evaluated. It makes clear that his claims gain no weight from what is their purely rhetorical association with neorealisms quasi-deductive arguments: they stand or fall solely as interpretations of the nature of the Cold War system. This contrasts with the approach adopted by those who contend that later emendations of neorealism reveal it to be a degenerating research programme (see Legro and Moravcsik, 1999; Vasquez, 1997). They assume that explanatory theories can and should be deductively applied. Accepting that it is impossible to test theories definitively against the facts, they focus on how the assumptions and quasi-deductive arguments of realist theories evolved over time, asking if emendations were designed to explain away anomalies or if they also generated new insights (see Lakatos, 1970). When a theory is heuristically applied, the key question is whether it is in fact useful in relation to specific research questions. This can be established only by evaluating the resulting explanations. Because Waltzs substantive explanatory claims do not draw upon neorealism deductively, the validity of the theorys arguments cannot be cited as reason to accept those claims. Instead, we must reach a judgement about whether the claims themselves are persuasive. Waltzs contention that the bipolar structure of the Cold War system contributed to the absence of direct conflict between the superpowers rests on a sequence of historical claims.11 First, he argues that great powers were dragged into war in 1914: Because the defeat or the defection of a major ally would have shaken the balance, each state was constrained to adjust its strategy and the use of its forces to the aims and fears of its partners. Second, he argues that great powers passed the buck in the 1930s: British and French leaders hoped that if their countries remained aloof, Russia and Germany would balance each other off or fight each other to the finish. Third, he contends that such problems were not present during the Cold War: the US could withstand the loss of China in 1949; could afford to dissociate itself from its allies over the Suez crisis in 1956; and could accommodate French withdrawal from NATOs integrated military structure (Waltz, 1979: 16571). These are all plausible historical claims: it is not unreasonable to suggest that the dynamics of alliance politics contributed to the outbreak of World War I, that Britain and France might successfully have opposed Hitler prior to 1939, and that US survival during the Cold War did not depend upon allied support. However, they are also open to dispute: as we might expect from claims that draw on neorealism heuristically, they downplay the importance of domestic politics, international institutions and systemic norms. Despite neorealisms status as one of the leading explanatory approaches to international relations, the persuasiveness of Waltzs account of the lack of superpower conflict during the Cold War rests firmly on which way these judgements fall.

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The role of judgement in History and International Relations

The idea that explanatory theories in International Relations are typically heuristically applied subverts the idiographicnomothetic distinction that is often thought to distinguish History from International Relations. According to Levy, for example, historians describe, explain, and interpret individual events whereas political scientists generalize about the relationship between variables and construct lawlike statements about social behaviour (Levy, 1997: 22). Such claims focus on the form in which theories are presented, rather than on how they are actually drawn upon in substantive explanations. In International Relations, an explanatory theorys putative causal generalizations are not typically deductively applied. Such theories may be drawn upon as heuristic resources, but historians also require a certain sense for how things work (Trachtenberg, 2006: 30). Moreover, like historians, political scientists often draw on theories heuristic resources in order to interpret individual events. What distinguishes historians from political scientists who apply explanatory theories heuristically is not the explanatory activity each engages in, but the form in which they present their sense of how things work.12 It is therefore ironic that the form in which explanatory theories are typically presented (as quasi-deductive arguments that generate covering laws) tends to obscure the explanatory functions that those theories actually perform. When a theory is deductively applied, an empirical episode is represented as an instance of a class of such episodes. An explanation is generated by showing that the empirical conditions specified in the theory are fulfilled, but explanatory power resides in the causal generalization under which the episode is subsumed. In contrast, when a theory is heuristically applied, an explanation is generated through empirical or historical inquiry, guided by the theorys heuristic resources. Explanatory power resides in the ensuing account of the specific episode, not in the theorys quasi-deductive arguments. There is no attempt to show that conditions specified prior to the inquiry are fulfilled: the focus is on developing an account of the episode that provides a persuasive answer to the research question. There are two prerequisites for developing such an account. The first is a theory that provides a clear understanding of the sort of explanation required, useful conceptual categories and an appropriate empirical focus. The second is good judgement as to what constitutes a plausible account: judgement plays a key role not only in assessment of competing explanatory claims, but also in their construction. Some insight into the kind of judgement required is provided by historians understanding of the role of judgement in History. Debates about the nature of historical explanation tend to revolve around Hempels claim that it follows the covering law model: that historical explanations demonstrate why events were to be expected in view of certain antecedent or simultaneous conditions (Hempel, 1965: 235). Hempels contention is that although historians tend to examine individual events rather than classes of events, their explanations still draw on general laws (see also Levy, 1997: 25). However, his view is subject to numerous objections (see Trachtenberg, 2006: 111), of which two are particularly pertinent. First, Trachtenbergs defence of historians reliance on judgement involves the contention that the covering law model is unsatisfactory even as an account of scientific explanation. Second, Mink (1987: 82) argues that historical understanding is achieved through a type of judgement which cannot be replaced by any analytic technique.

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Trachtenberg argues that the historians goal is to make sense of the past and that in order to do this she endeavours to see how things fit together, to understand the logic underlying the course of events. In this sense, he suggests, a historical interpretation is the analogue of a physical theory. However, Trachtenberg doubts whether the covering law model provides an adequate account of how explanation proceeds in science. He observes that, even in science, the facts never just speak for themselves: theory choice is never fully determined by the facts. Moreover, in History, as in science, the fact that the choice between competing interpretations is made by a scientific community the fact that the decision is rooted in the mature judgement exercised by the members of that community is the closest we can come to guaranteeing the rationality of the process. Thus Trachtenberg argues that historical and scientific explanations are analogous not in the sense that both rely on covering laws, but in the sense that both rely on good judgement: Historians exercise judgement, but so do scientists. Moreover, the process of judgement is not governed by logical rules, but draws on the mature sensibility of the trained scholar (Trachtenberg, 2006: 6, 27, 17, 22, 44). Trachtenberg accepts that all historical interpretations draw on a kind of theory. However, he describes theory not as a sequence of quasi-deductive arguments but as an engine of analysis. Theory does not provide ready-made answers, but instead serves to generate a series of specific questions you can only answer by doing empirical research. Theory is not a substitute for empirical analysis (especially, one might add, if it consists of putative causal generalizations that are liable to be refuted if drawn upon deductively). Trachtenberg also observes that when theories of international politics are applied, it is really the spirit of a theory that is being assessed (Trachtenberg, 2006: 30, 32, 43). The notion of a theorys heuristic usefulness is preferable to that of its spirit, but what matters in each case is whether the theory contributes to persuasive accounts of specific empirical episodes: this is a matter of judgement. Mink (1987) distinguishes even more strongly between deductive explanation and the kind of understanding generated in historical interpretations.13 He argues that historical explanations do not consist of propositions that can be detached from specific episodes (as covering laws can): historians do not first collect facts and later synthesize them into historical interpretations. Rather, historical understanding consists of comprehending a complex event by seeing things together in a total and synoptic judgement. This synoptic judgement, or the ability to comprehend an array of facts in a single act of understanding, forms both the process of historical understanding and its outcome: the historian relies on judgement in reaching understanding, but understanding also consists in the ability to see things together. Mink accepts that theory may help us to see things together, but he insists that success depends at least as much on the ability to make synoptic judgements as on the correctness of the theory. He also warns that the role of synoptic judgement may be obscured by the historians need to set forth in sequence a narrative which he understands or tries to understand as a whole (Mink, 1987: 814 [emphasis on original]; see also Schroeder, 1997: 6870). These accounts of the role of judgement in historical explanation illuminate the heuristic role of explanatory theories in International Relations in two ways. First, they suggest that theory has a role to play in generating historical understanding, but that our ability to understand consists in our ability to arrive at good judgements. Theory does not

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provide answers, but it can bring questions into focus (Trachtenberg, 2006: 33). The test of such a theory is whether it helps to generate a plausible account of a particular episode, but what is tested is the theorys heuristic usefulness in relation to that episode, not its abstract arguments. Second, Mink warns that the form in which historians present their interpretations may obscure the nature of their understanding. This illuminates the disjunction between the covering law model of explanation and theorists actual explanatory practices, for, as Trachtenberg observes, in trying to explain something we try to show how one thing led to another, how one thing followed from another as a matter of course (Trachtenberg, 2006: 185). In other words, our attempts to communicate why we understand a substantive episode in a particular way may obscure the manner in which theory contributed to that understanding. The central role of judgement when explanatory theories are heuristically applied is revealed in Keohane and Nyes introduction to a collection of studies on the impact of institutions in Europe immediately after the Cold War. Keohane and Nye (1993: 7) acknowledge that institutionalist theory is not sufficiently precisely formulated to permit rigorous testing of hypotheses. The contributors are therefore asked to examine in detail processes of policy-making and bargaining, to determine the roles that international institutions have played in affecting state strategies and the outcomes of interstate negotiations. Explaining why they adopted this approach, Keohane and Nye argue that institutionalist arguments have value only insofar as they facilitate more sophisticated empirical investigations. In other words, they treat institutionalist theory as a heuristic resource, placing the explanatory burden on the substance of the individual explanatory accounts that are generated when it is heuristically applied, rather than on the theorys abstract qualities. The resulting accounts inevitably reflect their authors judgements about the roles played by international institutions, judgements that cannot be reduced to the application of covering laws. Any assessment of those accounts must also involve judgements of their individual plausibility: abstract analysis of institutionalist arguments will not suffice. The importance of good judgement may be obscured by the rhetorical structure of theorists arguments, which often imply that their theories are in fact deductively applied. For example, Risse-Kappen (1996) seeks to explain NATOs origins and endurance after the Cold War through a social constructivist interpretation of republican liberalism which emphasizes collective identities and norms of appropriate behaviour and links domestic politics systematically to the foreign policy of states. He starts by criticizing the realist conventional wisdom, arguing that realism is indeterminate with regard to the origins of, the interaction patterns in, and the endurance of NATO almost every single choice of states can be accommodated somehow by realist thinking (RisseKappen, 1996: 3589, 364; emphasis in original). This critique implies that good theories should be deductively applied: that realism is flawed because it fails to generate determinate explanations. Risse-Kappens next moves are also consistent with the idea that theories should be deductively applied: he outlines the core assumptions of liberal theories of international relations, specifies his constructivist interpretation of republican liberalism, summarizes it in abstract terms and seeks to illustrate it in relation to key stages in NATOs evolution (see Risse-Kappen, 1996: 36571).

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However, Risse-Kappen does not apply his approach deductively (see Dessler, 1999: 1345). His basic position is that NATOs origins and evolution are best understood if we think of NATO as institutionalizing a community of states united by a collective democratic identity. His substantive arguments do revolve around this theme, but they largely consist of specific historical claims, which draw on his theoretical approach heuristically. For example, he argues that NATO institutionalized the transatlantic security community in response to the Soviet threat. His abstract presentation of his theory incorporates a general account of why democracies form pluralistic security communities of shared values, but he does not attempt to show how that played out in this particular case, instead satisfying himself with the interpretive judgement that the Soviet threat did not create the community in the first place (Risse-Kappen, 1996: 3712). Similarly, while outlining how US attitudes towards the USSR changed during the 1940s, he acknowledges that NATO was only one of several possible US choices. Yet none of the historical reasons he offers for why NATO was in fact chosen is prominent in his abstract presentation of his theory (see Risse-Kappen, 1996: 3727). The only way of assessing his substantive explanatory claims is therefore to reach a judgement about whether he tells a persuasive story about his subject matter: this will turn on substantive interpretive issues, such as whether a transatlantic security community already existed in 1949. Risse-Kappens application of his constructivist approach to NATO shares important characteristics with Waltzs application of neorealism to the Cold War and Keohanes application of liberal institutionalism to the international oil regime. First, each of these theories is employed as a heuristic resource: accounts of specific episodes are shaped by the theories thematic content, but are not inferred from any putative causal generalizations. Second, the resulting accounts do not gain any weight from their purely rhetorical association with their theories quasi-deductive arguments. They must be assessed on the basis of their substantive empirical claims and this requires good judgement. Third, the way in which the theories are drawn upon and the nature of the resulting accounts are obscured by the quasi-deductive form in which these theories are presented. This makes it difficult accurately to assess each theorys usefulness and to recognize how the heuristic resources offered by each theory might be enhanced.

Conclusion
Bull (1969) described the classical approach to theorizing as being characterized above all by explicit reliance on the exercise of judgement. He argued, moreover, that when faced with complex problems advocates of scientific approaches resort suddenly and without acknowledging that this is what they are doing to the methods of the classical approach (Bull, 1969: 20, 28). This holds some resonance for todays explanatory theorists. They typically present their theories in a quasi-deductive form, even while acknowledging that those theories (or perspectives) cannot in fact be deductively applied. Moreover, they typically apply their theories heuristically and hence rely on the exercise of judgement whatever the problems they face, complex or not. Thus the theories quasideductive form obscures the manner in which they contribute to our understanding of international relations, the particular heuristic resources offered by each individual

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theory and the extent to which we rely on a community of experts to judge what constitutes a persuasive account of particular episodes.14 There is a consequent risk that quasi-deductive argument is inappropriately privileged in International Relations. If it is presumed that good explanations draw on covering laws, then there is a risk that weight may be attributed to an explanation of some episode because it draws on a theory that claims to identify causal generalizations, regardless of whether those generalizations are actually applied to the episode in question. Lebow (2000: 106) worries that theory may confer an aura of scientific legitimacy on subjective political beliefs and prejudices. Such a problem will be particularly acute if explanatory claims are granted credence simply because they are said to be deductively derived. An associated risk is that intellectual energy is focused on developing quasi-deductive arguments at the expense of, or even as a substitute for, empirical inquiry. This would be a mistake not only because theories are typically heuristically, not deductively, applied, but also because when they are heuristically applied their utility resides in their ability to guide empirical inquiry: the resulting explanations cannot be detached from their empirical content. Turner (1987: 158) argues that much apparently deductive reasoning in scientific theories is really folk-reasoning: theories are not applied according to a strict calculus, but in conformity with what seems reasonable to a community of scholars. It is helpful to think of the quasi-deductive arguments that underpin most explanatory theories in this way: they are not really concerned with what follows deductively from certain assumptions, but with what sorts of behaviour are consistent with, or might constitute a reasonable response to, the conditions specified in those assumptions. This provides further reason to think that theory should be understood as an aid to empirical inquiry rather than as a source of determinate explanations. It also suggests that even when constructing abstract arguments theorists encounter questions of plausibility analogous to those that arise when we attempt to evaluate substantive explanatory claims: here, too, theorists rely on the judgement of an expert community. A useful theory is one that provides a clear understanding of the sort of explanation required, helpful conceptual categories and an appropriate empirical focus. Such a theory, when allied to good judgement, facilitates the development of persuasive explanations. However, the utility of a theory cannot be established in the abstract: if theories are heuristically applied, then we can evaluate their utility only by applying them to specific empirical problems and asking whether they in fact help us to develop persuasive explanations of those problems. Thus a theory can be said to be useful in general only if it is in fact found to be useful across a range of cases or if it is shown to be particularly useful in certain cases. This indicates that the traditional emphasis on subjecting theories to hard tests is still relevant when theories are heuristically applied, but with the qualification that the theory is tested not by comparing inferred predictions with reality, but by employing it heuristically. Thus, for example, Schroeders aim is not to test neo-realist theory with historical evidence but to establish whether it provides a sound model or paradigm for understanding the general nature of international politics (Schroeder, 1994: 11112; emphasis in original). One advantage of thinking of theories as being heuristically applied is that it also helps us to think about how they may be improved. Existing explanatory theories are unlikely to be improved through refinement of their quasi-deductive arguments given that those arguments are not actually drawn upon in a deductive fashion. However, the

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heuristic resources they provide are very limited. They offer little insight into the different kinds of questions we may wish to ask about similar cases, are largely uncritical about the conceptual categories they employ and offer a restricted empirical focus. This indicates that theories could be improved if their authors adopted a more critical approach to these issues, something that would be facilitated by a reduced emphasis on the importance of defining terms in a manner that permits the construction of deductive arguments. In particular, explanatory theorists should think more about the different kinds of questions we might wish to have answered and about how explanatory narratives combine mechanisms, actors, chance factors and background conditions (see Suganami, 1996). This account of how explanatory theories are applied carries strong implications for how theoretical explanations should be assessed, for how theories should be assessed and for how existing theories might be improved. It also invites scepticism about the nomotheticidiographic distinction as an account of the distinction between historical and theoretical approaches to international relations. However, it is not anti-theory and does not entail scepticism about the possibility of developing causal explanations.15 What it does entail is scepticism about whether the ideal of deductive explanation is itself heuristically useful: about whether it identifies appropriate standards for theorists to aspire to. My contention is that the idea that explanatory theories are deductively applied obscures the actual contribution that they make to our understanding of international relations. Moreover, the idea that they should be deductively applied points us in the wrong direction when thinking about the qualities of good theories and of good explanations. Acknowledgement This research was partly funded by a British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellowship, PDF/2007/76, which is gratefully acknowledged. The author is also grateful to Andrew Hurrell, Lucas Kello and participants at an International Relations Faculty Seminar in the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, for comments on earlier drafts. Notes
1 I use the term episode to encompass any event, action or state of affairs in international relations, whether historical or contemporary, for which a theoretical explanation is sought. 2 Covering laws may in fact be inductively derived, but when used in an explanatory capacity they are deductively applied: outcomes may be deduced from the (inductively derived) covering law when the specified antecedent conditions are fulfilled. 3 A similar case may be made in relation to Waltz (1993). 4 There is disagreement about whether constructivism should be treated as an explanatory theory. Wendt (1999) seeks to develop a positivist constructivism, and Dessler (1999) treats constructivism as a positivist approach, but Ruggie (1998b: 856) insists that it is a philosophically and theoretically informed perspective on and approach to the empirical study of international relations rather than a fully fledged theory. 5 It is doubtful whether a covering law explanation in fact explains an episode, as distinct from showing that it was to be expected because that is what always happens (see Scriven, 1959; Suganami, 2008: 331). However, I am concerned only with whether the model accurately captures explanatory theorists practices.

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6 This may partly explain why so many competing claims are sometimes categorized under a single theoretical heading. 7 Keohane (2005: 69) also describes game theory and the theory of collective action as having great heuristic value. 8 Scriven (1959) suggests that judgement feeds off normic statements: claims about what is normal and, as a corollary, what does and does not need explaining. This is more plausible than the idea that judgement feeds off putative covering laws. 9 Waltz (2000: 38) acknowledges that neorealism does not lead one to expect that states will always or even usually engage in balancing behaviour. 10 Nevertheless, later realists have focused on neorealisms deductive adequacy, most prominently in the debate about what follows from anarchy (see, for example, Schweller, 1996). 11 These claims constitute evidence for the specific case Waltz is making, rather than for any putative causal generalization that may lie at the heart of neorealist theory. 12 Historians and political scientists also have distinct disciplinary identities (see Levy, 1997: 23). For a fuller discussion of the relationship between History and International Relations see Elman and Elman (2001). 13 This understanding is not to be contrasted with explanation, as in Drays claim that historians try to understand actors reasons for their actions (see Dray, 1974), but is the kind of understanding that enables one to explain something (see Suganami, 2008). 14 The claim that we rely on a community of experts is comparable to the critical realist contention that although knowledge is a social product we are capable of adjudicating between rival accounts (see Patomaki and Wight, 2000: 224). 15 It does imply that causal explanations do not derive from the development and application of covering laws (see Kurki, 2006; Suganami, 1996).

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Biographical note Adam R.C. Humphreys is a British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Department of Politics and International Relations, Oxford University and a Research Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. His research interests are in International Relations theory, the nature of explanation, the work of Kenneth Waltz and the relationship between History and International Relations.

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