Constitutional Law 1 (Hand Out 7)

HAND OUT No.
7 - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
By; Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Constitutional Law 1, l"t Semester SY 2012-2013 P.U.P. College ofLaw'
C. The Judicial Department

Ba~iongay: Of ttie three departments of government, two departments (Executive and
Legislative) are considered as active. On the other hand, the Judiciary is considered as passive. It is passive in the sense that it has to wait for a case to be filed before it can act.
Cruz:
To maintain the independence of the Judiciary, the following safeguards have been embodied in the Constitution: (1) The SC is a constitutional body. It cannot be aboiished nor may its membership or the manner of its meetings be changed by mere legislation. {Art. VIII, Sec, 4 (l)] The members of the judiciary are not subject to confirmation by the CA. The members of the SC may not be removed except by impeachment. (Art. IX, Sec. 2.) The SC may not be deprived of its minimum original and appellate jurisdiction as prescribed in Art. X, Sec. 5 of the Constitution. (Art. VIII, Sec. 2.) The appellate jurisdiction of the SC may not be increased by law without its advice and concurrence, (Art. VI, Sec. 30.) The SC now has administrative supervision over all lower courts and their personnel. (Art. VIII, Sec. 6.) The SC has exclusive power to discipline judges of lower courts. (Art. , VIII, Sec, 11.) The members of the SC and all lower courts have security of tenure, which cannot be undermined by a law reorganizing the judiciary.
(Id.)
(2) (3) (4)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
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i ,
'
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(9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
They shall not be designated to any agency per.forming quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Art. VIII, Sec, 12,) The salaries of judges may not be reduced during their continuance in office. (Art. VIII, Sec. 10.) The judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. (Art. VIII, Sec. 3.) The SC alone may initiate rules of court. {Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (5),J Only the SC may order the temporary detail of judges. {Art. VIII, Sec.
5 (3)] .. , ,
,(14) The SC can appoint all officials and employees of the judiciary. {Art, VIII, Sec. 5 (6)] 1. THE SUPREME COURT A.COMPOSITION Art. VIII, Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices . It may sit en bane or its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. Cre~tion The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. (Art. VIII, Sec1,par. 1.)
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Cal!anta, Jr.
Page 2 of 44 The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. As such it cannot be abolished by the Congress for the power to destroy only resides in the one who has the power to create. The lower courts (Court of Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts), on the other hand, are established by law, and so could be abolished by law, provided the security of tenure is not undermined. Composition The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(l)[ Under the 193.5Constitution, the Supreme Court was composed of eleven (11) justices in all; in 1973, fifteen (15) Justices. Mode of Sitting It may sit en bane, or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5 or 7 members (or 5, 3 or 2 divisions). [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(1)J In 1935, the rule was that the SC may sit en bane or in 2 divisions, "unless otherwise provided by law." Congress decided against allowing the SC to sit in 2 divisions on the theory that there is only one Supreme Court. And so, it provided in the Judiciary Act of 1948 the rule that the SC may only sit en bane. But the reality was that the dockets were crowded. This prompted the framers to eliminate one phrase "unless otherwise provided by law" in 1956, and in effect leave the decision to the SC on whether to sit en bane or in 2 divisions, if it sat on divisions. In 1987, not only was the discretion retained, but also the divisions were increased. There may be 5, 3 or 2 divisions made up of 3, 5 or 7 members, respectively. At present, the SC sits either en bane or in 3 divisions. One Supreme Court When the SC sits in divisions, it does not violate the concept of a "one Supreme Court" beqlUse, according the United States v. Limsiongco, 41 Phil 94 (1920), the divisions of the SC do not diminish its authority, because although it sits in divisions, it remains and cofunctions as one body. This "one Supreme Court" doctrine is strengthened by the prOVIsion that "when the required number (in a division) is not obtained, the case shall be decided en bane: provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en bane or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en bane. (Art. VIII, Sec.4(3)[ Strict Composition In Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil 297 (1948), the SC held that tlie temporary designation of judges of the CFI and the Court of Appeals in the Supreme Court to constitute a quorum due to disqualification of some of the justices, is unconstitutional. There is but one Supreme Court whose membership appointments are permanent.
Vargas v. Rilloraza, 80 Phil 297 (1948) FACTS: Petitioner Vargas filed a motion assailing the constitutionality of People's Court Act which provides that any justice of the SCwho held any office or position under the Philippine Executive Commission or under the government called Philippine Republic, may not sit and vote in any case brought to that court under sec. 13 hereof in which the accused is a person who held any office or position under either both the Philippine Executive Commission and the Philippine Republic or any branch, instrumentality or agency thereof. If on
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account of such disqualification, or because of any of the grounds of disqualification of judges, in R 126, sec. 1 of the ROC, or on account of illness, absence of temporary disability, the requisite number of justices necessaryto constitute a quorom in any case is not present, the President may designate such no. of judges of th,eCFI, judges at large of CFI, cadastral judges, having none of the disqualification set forth in the above law,:as may be necessaryto sit temporarily as justice of theSC in order to form a quorom.
HELD: (1) Congress does not have the power to add to the existing grounds for disqualification of a justice of the Sc. To disqualify any of these constitutional component member of the court- especially as in this case, a majority of them-- in a treason case, is nothing short of depriving the court itself of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law. Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. It would seem evident that if Congress could disqualify members of SC in taking part in the hearing and determination of certain "collaboration" cases, it could extend the disqualification to other cases.
(2) The designation provided (a CFI-judge to sit as a SCjustice if the SCdoes not have the required quorum) is repugnant to the constitutional requirement that members be appointed by the Pres. wi the consent of the CA. (This was under the 1935 Constitution wlc required confirmation from the Commission on Appointments.) It will result in a situation wherein 6 members sitting will not be appointee and confirmed in accordance with the Constitution. (3) However brief or temporary may be the action or participation of a judge designated, there is no escaping the fact that he would be participating in the deliberations and acts of the SC and if allowed to do so, his vote woul,dcount as much as any regular justice.
B. APPOINTMENT AND QUALIFICATIONS

Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or m ore a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. Art. VIII, Judicial and Bar Council
Id., Sec. 8. (5)
The (Judicial and Bar) Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Id., Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointments within ninety days from the submission of the list.
Qua I ifications (1) Natural-born citizen {Art. VIII, Sec. 7(1)f (2) At least 40 years of age (itL) (3) At least 15 years of experience as a judge of lower court, Philippines (itL) (4)iOf proven competence, integrity, probity and independence
or practice {Art. VIII,Sec.
of law in the 7(3)f
C. SALARY
Art. VIII, Sec. 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court and of judges of lower
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Cal1anta, Jr. Page 4 0/44 courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. Unless the Congress provides otherwise, the CJ shall receive an annual salary of P 240,000 and the Associate Justices shall receive P 204,000 each. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 17.) The salary of lower court judges is not initially fixed by the Constitution but by the law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. (Art. VIII, Sec. 10.) But it may be increased by law, to take effect at once. Reasons are: [1] the Constitution does not prohibit it; [2] the Judiciary plays no part in the passage of the law increasing their salary unlike the Congress and the Executive, and so there can be no conflict of interest; and [3] this will promote the indepen.dence of the Judiciary. Query: Is the imposition of income tax on the salary of the Justices and Judges a diminution of their salary as prohibited by the Constitution? Unqer the 1935 Constitution (Art. VIIL Sec. 9), it was provided that the members of the JudIciary "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." In Petfeeto v. Meer, 85 Phil 552 (1950), the SC ruled that salaries of judges were not subject to income tax, for such would be a diminution of their salary, in contravention of the Constitution. This happened after Justice Perfecto refused to pay the assessment of income tax made upon him by the Collector. Responding to this, Congress passed a law providing that the constitutional provIsion against the diminution of salaries of members of the judiciary should not be interpreted to mean an exemption from income tax. (Sec. 13,RA 590.) But the Court struck this statute down as unconstitutional when as in the previous case, Judge Endencia refused to pay his taxes; thereby giving the SC an opportunity to make the pronouncement in the case of Endencia v. David, 93 Phil 696 (1953). The SC ruling invalidating the statute was based on the reason that the legislature had no power to inte'rpret the Constitution, such power being lodged in the judicial branch, and so when it did, it violated the separation of powers under the Constitution. Compare the 1973 Constitution. Art. XV, Sec. 6 Aware of this ruling, the framers of the 1973 Constitution clearly provided in Art. XV, Sec. 6 that: Art., Sec. 6. No salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from the payment of income tax. thereby avoiding a SC contrary, self-defensive ruling. This provision in the 1973 Constitution, however, is not found in the 1987 Constitution, prompting some judges including Nitafan, to contend that the old ruling in Perfecto and Endencia is thereby deemed revived. But the SC this time did not uphold the old ruling. Not exempt from income tax In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (July 1987), the Court ruled that under the 1987 Constitution, the salaries of members of the Judiciary are not exempt from taxes.
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 . Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 5 of44 It anchored its decision on the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission, that is, on the !Iegislative history of the present Art. VIII, Sec. 10. A draft of the present Art. VIII, Sec. 10 when originally presented to the body, expressly exempted the salary of judges from taxation. But when this draft was discussed on second reading, the sentiment was against the exemption, the reason being that like any other citizen, judges and justices must pay their share in the burden of maintaining the government. So this express exemption was deleted from Art. VIII, Sec. 10 and so it was when the draft was adopted by the body. There was a plan to insert a similar provision as that found in Art. XV, Sec. 6 of 1973, but through oversight, the constitutional commission failed to insert one. Yet, the intent was clear to have one, and so it must be read into the Constitution, the SC concluded.
Nitafan v. CIR, G.R. No. L-78780. July 23, 1987
FACTS: Petitioners, the duly appointed and qualified, Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respkctively, of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila, seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries. In a nutshell, they submit that "any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution mandating that '(d)uring their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased: even as it is anathema to the ideal of an independent judiciary envisioned in and by said Constitution."
HELD: The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.
StatJd otherwise, we accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of general income taxation equitably.
D. SECURITY OF TENURE Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Id., Sec. 2. xxx No law shall be passed reorganlzmg the Judiciary undermines the security of tenure of its Members. Reorganization It is highly doubtful if this provIsion applies to the SC.. The power to reorganize involves the power to create and destroy. Since the SC is a creation of the Constitution and not of Congress, it may not be created nor destroyed, and ultimately reorganized by Congress.
when
it
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law'l, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Ca/lanta, Jr. Page 6 of 44
De IIIlIana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)

FACTS: Sec. 144 of BP 129 replaced the existing court system, wi the exception of the SCand the SB, with a
new one and provided that upon the completion of the reorganization by the Pres., the courts affected "shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office." Petitioner, judge of the city court of Olongapo, and 7 members of the Bar questioned the validity of the Act in an action for prohibition, on the ground that it contravened the security of tenure of judges. They sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of GF in the enactment of the Act and by characterizing it as an undue delegation of legisiative power bec. of Sec. 41, wlc authorizes the Pres. to fix the compensation of those who would be appointed under it "along the guidelines set forth in Lor No. 93, pursuant to PD 98S, as amended by PD 1597."
HELD: The imputation of lack of GF disregards the fact that the Act wa> the product of careful study and deliberation not only by the BP but also by a Presidential study committee (composed of the Chief Justice and Minister of Justice as co-chairmen, wi members drawn from the SCand Ministry of Justice.) The study group called attention to the clogged dockets of the courts and the possible worsening of the situation as a result of population growth and rising expectations, and the adverse effect of this on the developmental programs of the ~ovt. It was this problem wlc the Act seeks to solve. xxx mhe abolition of an office is wlin the competence of a legislative body if done in GF. The test is whether the abolition is in GF. As that element is present in the enactment of BP 129, the lack of merit of the petition becomes apparent.
(2) However, while there can be no claim to security of tenure where the office no longer exists, in their effect there is no difference bet. removal and the abolition of office. In either case, the effect on the incumbent is one of separation. Accordingly, in the implementation of the law it would be in keeping wi the spirit of the Consti. that, as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, the SC be consulted and that its view be accorded fullest consideration. This is not rendering advisory opinion bee. there is no question of law involved. Neither is there intrusion into the appointing process bec. only incumbents are involved. (3) As to the charge of undue delegation, the provisions of Sec. 41 that the Pres. should fix the compensation of those who will be appointed to the new courts "along the guidelines set forth in Lor No. 93, pursuant to PD 985'9s amended by PD 1597" constitutes a sufficient ground.
E. REMOVAL Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Art. XI, Sec. 2. The xxx Members of the Supreme Court xxx may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
* See procedure for
impeachment under Other Powers of Congress.
Merhbers of the SC cannot be removed except by impeachment. Thus, a SC justice cannot be charged in a criminal case or a disbarment proceeding, because the ultimate effect of either is to remove him from office, and thus circumvent the provision on impeachment.
In Re: Raul Gonzales, A.M. Nos. 88-4-5433. April 15, 1988
HELD: A public officer who under the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer. Further, such public officer, during his
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Cal1anta, Jr.
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incumbency, cannot be charged criminally before the sandiganbayan or any other court with any offense whic11carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of which would amount to removal from office. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively (by.disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or misbehaviour that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings. The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and separation of powers. The rule is important becausejudicial independence is important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court would be vulnerable to all manner of charges which might be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial authority by the Court.
F. FISCAL AUTONOMY The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Art. VIII, Sec. 3.
Bengzon v. Orilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992) HELD: As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for cqmpensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
FISCAL AUTONOMY means freedom from outside control. The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and ,the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabriC of our constitutional system is based.
G. JURISDICTION (1) The Power of Judicial Review

Art. VIII, Sec. 5. xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
The judicial power may be established Scope of the Judicial shall be vested in one Supreme by law. (Art. VIII, Sec. I, par. 1.) Power Court and in such lower courts as
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to: (Art. VIIL Sec. 1, par. 2)
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Cal1anta, Jr. Page 80f44
1. Settle actual controversies, involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable; and
This is the classical definition of judicial power that contemplates a case where the party-plaintiff has a cause of action against the party-defendant, that is, the plaintiff has a right corresponding to the defendant's obligation, which right was violated by the defendant, thereby resulting in injury.
2. Determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
As early as Angara v. Electoral Tribunal, the SC held that when it performs his checking function of the co-equal branches, it is merely performing a duty imposed upon it by the ,Constitution; that it acts as the mechanism that implements the "supremacy of the Constitution." The extent to which it exercises this function, however, has been limited by the political question doctrine. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil 139 {1936} FACTS: In 1935, the National Assembly adopted a resolution that "all members-elect,with no election protest filed on or before 3 December 1935 are deemed elected." The Electoral Commission, a constitutional body, on the other hand set the 9 December 1935 as the deadline for the filing of election protest. Ynsua, who lost to Angara, filed a motion of protest (complaint) on 8 December 1935. This was entertained by the Electoral Commission. Angara contended that the deadline set by the National Assembly was controlling. Who prevailed? HELD: The SC, through J. Laurel, ruled for Ynsua, thereby upholding the authority of the Electoral Commission, in view of the constitutional provision granting the electoral Commissionjurisdiction over election protests. In iJstifying the power of judicial review, J. Laurel pointed out that when the court al/ocatedconstitutional boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy, nor annuls the acts of the legislature. It simply carries out the solemn and sacred obligations imposed upon it by the constitution to determine conflicting claims and to establish for the parties the rights which the constitution grants to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full . opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. Tocao v. CA, GR No. 127405, september 20, 2001
HELD: The inherent powers of a Court to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice includes the right to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party Iitiga,nt. a. Conditions In People v. Vera, 66 can only be exercised for the Exercise of Judicial Review that judicial review
Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine

in an actual case and controversy.
This means (1) a party with a personal and substantial interest, (2) an appropriate case, (3) a constitutional question raised at the earliest possible time, and (4) a constitutional question that is the very lis mota of the case, i.e. an unavoidable question.
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IBP v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) HELD: An "ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY" means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe for resolution and susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. A petition raising a constitutional question does not present an "actual controversy," unless it alleges a legal right or power. Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term "controversy" is the presence of opposing views or contentions. Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused because they lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed from a clash of adversary arguments exploring every aspect of a multi-faceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding interests. The controversy must also be justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination. X x x "LEGAL STANDING" or LOCUS STANDI has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adversenesswhich sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." ABAKADA Party List vs. Purisima, GR No. 166715, August 14, 2008 An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial adjudication. A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision of the Court. In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act, petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is procydurally infirm. Cutaran v. DENR, 350 SCRA 697 (2001) HELD: From a reading of the records it appears to us that the petition was prematurely filed. Under the undisputed facts there is as yet no justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the appellate court on this ground. We gather from the allegations of the petition and that of the petitioner's memorandum that the alleged application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC)filed by the heirs of carantes under the assailed DENR special orders has not been granted nor the CALC applied for, issued. The DENR is still processing the application of the heirs of carantes for a certificate of ancestral land claim, which the DENRmayor may not grant. It is evident that the adverse legal interests involved in this case are the competing claims of the petitioners and that of the heirs of carantes to possess a common portion of a piece of land. As the undisputed facts stand there is no justiciable controversy between the petitioners and the respondents as there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioners' asserted right to possessthe land by reason of the implementation of the questioned administrative issuance. A JUSTICIABLE CONTROVERSY has been defined as, "a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests" which may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law. Courts have no judicial power to review cases involving political questions and as a rule,
wiN desist from taking cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases that has become moot. Subject to certain well-defined exceptions courts will not touch an issue involving the validity
of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person contesting its validity. In the case of PACU v. Secretary of Education the petition contesting the validity of a regulation issued by the Secretary of Education requiring private schools to secure a permit to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners have permits and are actually operating under the same. The petitioners questioned the regulation because of the possibility that the permit might be denied them in the future. This Court held that there was no justiciable controversy because the petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not entitled to relief. A mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit does not
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amount to justiciable controversy. The questioned regulation in the PACU case may be questioned by a private school whose permit to operate has been revoked or one whose application therefore has been denied. This Court cannot rule on the basis of petitioners' speculation that the DENRwill approve the application of the heirs of carantes. There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possessthe land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners were being evicted from the land by the heirs of carantes under orders from the DENR. The petitioners' allegation that certain documents from the DENR were shown to them by the heirs of carantes to justify eviction is vague, and it would appear that the petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent DENR or its officers .authorized the attempted eviction. Suffice it to say that by the petitioners' own admission that the respondents are still processing and have not approved the application of the heirs of carantes, the petitioners alleged right to possess the land is not violated nor is in imminent danger of being violated, as the DENR mayor may not approve carantes' application. Until such time, the petitioners are simply speculating that they might be evicted from the prell)ises at some future time. Borrowing from the pronouncements of this Court in the PACUcase, ''They (the 'petitioners) have suffered no wrong under the terms of the law - and, naturally need no relief in the form they now seek to obtain." If indeed the heirs of Carantes are trying to enter the land and disturbing the petitioners' possessionthereof even without prior approval by the DENRof the claim of the heirs of carantes, the case is simply one of forcible entry. Cruz v. sec. of DENR, 347 SCRA 128 (2000) FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. A preliminary issue resolved by the SCwas whether the petition presents an actual controversy. HELD: Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. The threshold issue, therefore, is whether an "appropriate case" exists for the exercise of judicial review in the present case. In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the government agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that we should await the adverse consequencesof the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possessessufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are
heid in common by all the citizens, the violation of which may result only in a "generalized grievance". Yet, in a sense, all citizen's and taxpayer's suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the allocation of power. . David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR No. 171396, May 3, 2006 HELD: An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal right, an opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest;" a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief. The Solicitor General refutes the existence of such actual case or controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered "moot and academic' by President Arroyo's issuanceof PP 1021. Such contention lacks merit. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness.
The Cowt holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitionsmoot and academic. During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the poli~e officers, according to petitioners,
committed illegal acts in implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. NO.5 constitutional or valid? Do they justify
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these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed that "an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal contemplation, inoperative." The "moot and academic' principle is not a magical fonmula that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify this Court's assum'ptionof jurisdiction over the instant petitions. Petitioners alleged that the issuanceof PP 1017 and G.O. NO.5 violates the Constitution. There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public's interest, involving as they do the people's basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate guidi1ng and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar, and in the present petitions, the military and the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly, respondents' contested actions are capable of repetition. Certainly, the petitions are subject to judicial review. In their attempt to prove the alleged mootness of this case, respondents cited Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban's Separate Opinion in sanlakas v. Executive Secretary. However, they failed to take into account the Chief Justice's very statement that an otherwise "moot" case may still be decided "provided the party raising it in a proper case has been and/or continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance." The present case falls right within this exception to the mootness rule pointed out by the Chief Justice. Gonzales v. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733 (2000) HELD: It is alleged by respondent that, with respect to the PCCR[Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform], this case has become moot and academic. Weagree. An action is considered "moot" when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involwed have become academic or dead. Under E.O. No. 43, the PCCRwas instructed to complete its task on or before June 30, 1999. However, on February 19, 1999, the President issued Executive Order No. 70 (E.O. No. 70), which extended the time frame for the completion of the commission's work x x x. The PCCR submitted its recommendations to the President on December 20, 1999 and was dissolved by the President on the same day. It had likewise spent the funds allocated to it. Thus, the PCCRhas ceased to exist, having lost its raison d' etre. Subsequent events have overtaken the petition and the Court has nothing left to resolve. The staleness of the issue before us is made more manifest by the impossibility of granting the relief prayed for by petitioner. Basically, petitioner asks this Court to enjoin the PCCRfrom acting as such. Clearly, prohibition is an inappropriate remedy since the body sought to be enjoined no longer exists. It is wellestablished that prohibition is a preventive remedy and does not lie to restrain an act that is already fait accompli. At this point, any ruling regarding the PCCRwould simply be in the nature of an advisory opinion, which is definitely beyond the permissible scope of judicial power. ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)
FACTS: In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, the COMELECissued a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls on the ground, among others, that it might cause disorder and confusion considering the randbmness of selecting interviewees, which further makes the exit polls unreliable. The constitutionality of this resolution was challenged by ABS-CBNBroadcasting Corporation as violative of freedom of expression. The Solicitor General contends that the petition has been rendered moot and academic because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with and, therefore, there is no longer any actual controversy to be resolved. Resolve.
HELD: The issue is not totally moot While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections. In any event, in salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the SYMBOLIC
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FUNCTIONof educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees." Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom. University of San Agustin v. CA, 230 SCRA 761 (1994)
HELD: The petition which was filed by private respondents before the trial court sought the issuance of a writ of mandamus, to command petitioners to admit them for enrolment. Taking into account the admission of private respondents that they have finished their Nursing course at the Lanting College of Nursing even before the promulgation of the questioned decision, this case has clearly been overtaken by events and should therefore be dismissed. However, the case of Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans is the authority for the view that "even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated." We shall adhere to this view and proceed to dwell on the merits of this petition.
City of Pasig v. COMELEC, 314 SCRA 179 (1999)

HELD: Neither do we agree that mereiy because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issue raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELECagainst the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo RegionalTrial Court.
In Tan v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the moot and academic argument as follows "Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been' held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which . petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief. Respondents'submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli." Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49 (2002)
FACTS: Respondents assert that the petition fails to satisfy all the four requisites before this Court may exercise its power of judicial review in constitutional cases. Out of respect for the acts of the Executive department, which is co-equal with this Court, respondents urge this Court to refrain from reviewing the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments issued by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason unless all ttje four requisites are present. X x x
Respondentsargue that the second, third and fourth requisites are absent in this case. Respondents maintain that petitioner does not have a personal and substantial interest in the case because she has not sustained a direct injury as a result of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason and their assumption of office. Respondents point out that petitioner does not claim to be lawfully entitled to any of the positions assumed by Benipayo, Borra or Tuason. Neither does petitioner claim to be directly injured by the appointments of these three respondents. Respondents also contend that petitioner failed to question the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments at the earliest opportunity. Petitioner filed the petition only on August 3, 2001 despite the fact that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were issued as early as March 22, 2001. Moreover, the petition was filed after the third time that these three respondents were issued ad interim appointments.
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Respondents insist that the real issue in this case is the legality of petitioner's reassignment from the EID to the Law Department. Consequently, the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments is not the lis mota of this case.
HELD: We are not persuaded.
Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID, where she was Acting Director, to the Law Department, where she was placed on detail. Respondents claim that the reassignment was "pursuant to x x x Benipayos authority as Chairman of the Commission on Elections, and as the Commissions Chief Executive Officer." Evidently, respondents' anchor the legality of petitioner's reassignment on Benipayo's authority as Chairman of the CbMELEC. The real issue then turns on whether or not Benipayo is the lawful Chairman of the COMELEC. Even if petitioner is only an Acting director of the EID, her reassignment is without legal basis if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, an office created by the Constitution. On the other hand, if Benipayo is the lawful COMELECChairman because he assumed office in accordance with the Constitution, then petitioner's reassignment is legal and she has no cause to complain provided the reassignment is in accordance with the Civil service Law. Clearly, petitioner has a personal and material stake in the resolution of the constitutionality of Benipayo's assumption of office. Petitioner's personal and substantial injury, if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman, clothes her with the requisite locus standi to raise the constitutional issue in this petition. Respondents harp on petitioner's belated act of questioning the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. Petitioner filed the instant petition only on August 3, 2001, when the first ad interim appointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, "if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered on appeal." Petitioner questioned the constitutionality of the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason when she filed her petition before this Court, which is the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a competent body. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in ttie exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed upon. There is no doubt petitioner raised the constitutional issue on time.
Moreover, the legality of petitioner's reassignment hinges on the constitutionality of Benipayo's ad interim appointment and assumption of office. Unless the constitutionality of Benipayo's ad interim appointment and assumption of office is resolved, the legality of petitioners reassignment from the EID to the Law Department cannot be determined. Clearly, the lis mota of this case is the very constitutional issue raised by petitioner. In any event, the issue raised by petitioner is of paramount importance to the public. The legality of the directives and decisions made by the COMELEC in the conduct of the May 14, 2001 national elections may be put in doubt if the constitutional issue raised by petitioner is left unresolved. In keeping with this Court's duty to determine whether other agencies of government have remained within the limits of the Constitution and have not abused the discretion given them, this Court may even brush aside technicalities of procedure and resolve any constitutional issue raised. Here the petitioner has complied with all.the requisite technicalities. Moreover, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
GENERAL RULE: A request
for advisory opinion cannot come in the category of an actual case or controversy since the issue raised does not involve any conflict in law that has assumed the proportions of a full-blown dispute. The court in this case is being asked only to counsel and not to decide.
EXCEPTION: When the purpose is to solicit from the court a declaratory judgment involving the interpretation of the rights and duties of a person under the provisions of a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, or a statute or ordinance, the case is deemed an actual controversy over which the courts may validly assume jurisdiction.
I.B.P. v. zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) FACTS: Asserting itself as the official organization of Filipino lawyers tasked with the bounden duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed a petition before the SC questioning the validity of the order of the President commanding the' deployment and utilization of the Philippine Marines to assist the Philippine National Police (PNP) in law enforcement by joining the latter in
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viSibility patrols around the metropolis. The Solicitor General questioned the legal standing of the IBP to file the petition? Resolve. HELD: "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standinq is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adversenesswhich sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while unddubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general.an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Basedon the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. Liberal attitude on locus standi: Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitude on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may brush aside technicalities of procedure. In this case, a reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. ~oreover, because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue now, rather than later.
I
b. All courts can exercise judicial review

The review power of the SC implies that it has appellate jurisdiction over final judgments of lower courts on cases with constitutional issues. If so, inferior courts have original jurisdiction over constitutional cases although they decide the case only at first instance, their decision being always reviewable by the sc. Thus, for instance an RTCcan rule on the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion Law. In J.M. Tuason & Co. v. CA, 3 SCRA 696(1961),RA 2616, which provided for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate, was claimed to be unconstitutional. This issue said the SC, could be resolved by the CFI in the ejectment case filed before it by the evictees of the estate, since the 1935 Constitution contemplated that inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality issues, that it spoke of appellate review
",
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of "final judgment of inferior courts" in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. The 2/3 vote of the SC required by Sec. 10 of Art. VII restricted the decisions of that Court only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Said the court: The Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving the constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of the final judgment of inferior courts, in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue. The 2/3 vote of the SC, required by Sec. 10, Art. VIII, of the 1935 Constitution, conditions only decisions of that court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994) r
HELD: We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of Section
187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article VIII, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the st:ability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its!discussion. In Ynot v. lAC, 148 SCRA 659, the SC reversed the RTC's holding that it had no authority to rule on the validity of EO 626-A, banning the transporting of carabaos from one province to another. The Court pointed out, that since it has jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm final judgments of lower courts in constitutional cases, then the lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. The SC then struck legislative power. down the law for being arbitrary and for unduly delegating
Ynot v. lAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)

FACTS: Petitioners' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to
Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the lAC. Hencethis petition for review.
!
HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SCjurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance.
(2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. We do not see, however, how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed any where, with no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
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prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. (3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond which was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner wiyhout giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him elementary fair play. .
(2) Judicial Review and political questions.

Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The second aspect of the definition of judicial power modifies the political question doctrine. As enunciated in Tanada v. Cuenco, a political question is one to be decided by the.people in their sovereign capacity, or one in respect to which full discretionary capacity is given to the other branches of the government. It does not mean, however, that the political question doctrine has been completely abr<?gated by the Constitution, such that if those cases where the SC invoked the doctrine were decided now it would have to decide the case on its merits. It is submitted that what the Constitution overrules is only the ruling in Garcia Padilla v. POl1ce-Enrile, supra, where the SC held that the question on the validity of the proclamation of martial law is beyond judicial review, so that when the President says that there is a need for such proclamation, his words are binding on the Courts, and all that the citizen can do is trust in the good faith of the President. Indeed, as already noted in the Commander-in-Chief power of the President above, Art. VII, Sec. 18 authorizes the SC to review, in an appropriate proceeding (like a habeas corpus petition), filed by a citizen (who, under the Rules of Court, could be the detainee himself, or anyone else in his behalf), the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension. Beyond this, the political question Court continues to invoke it as in doctrine is not a dead issue. In fact, the Supreme
Lawyers' League/or a Better Philippines v. Aquino, In re
Ber~lIdez and Marcos v. Mang/apus.

Garcia v. BOI, 191 SeRA 288 (1990) HELD: In this case, the court ruled that it has a constitutional duty to step into the controversy and determine the paramount issue. said the court, "[t]here is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should remain in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/ or Iiquified petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corp. (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical admission of the BOl that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of discretion for the BOl to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest notwithstanding. The Supreme Court held that the BOl committed a grave abuse of discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPGfor the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the
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contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the Constitution to run its own affairs and the way it deems best for the national interest. Dissenting: The decision of the BOl may be extremely unwise and inadvisable, but the SC may not, for that reason annul the BOI's action or prohibit it from acting on the manner that lies within its particular sphere of competence, for the Court is not a judge of the wisdom and soundness of the actions of the two other coequal branchesof the Government, but only of their legality and constitutionality. I.B.P. v. zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000) HELD: As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court review. It pertains to issueswhich are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are "political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom. not the legalitv. of a particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution. As Tanada v. Angara puts it, POUTICAL QUESTIONS refer "to those questions which. under the Constitution. are to be decided bv the people in their sovereign capacitv. or in regard to which full discretionary authoritv has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." Thus, if an issue is clearly identified by the text of the Constitution as matters for discretionary action by a particular branch of government or to the people themselves then it is held to be'a political question. In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. carr, "[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the {mpossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one question." The 1987 Constitution expands the concept of judicial review by providing that u[T]he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." (Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution) Under this definition, the Court cannot agree x x x that the issue involved is a political question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. When the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the limitations respected, is justiciable - the problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom. Moreover, the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination as to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being quesj:ioned. By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Under this definition, a court is without power to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated. But while this Court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of Congress or of the President, it may look into the question of whether such exercise has been made in grave abuse of discretion. A showing that plenary power is granted either department of government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or abuse thereof may give rise to justiciable controversy. ISSUE: Is the President's power to call out the armed forces as their Commander-in-Chief in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion subject to judicial review; or is it a political question? HELD: When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the
Page 18 of 44
intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court's duty of "purposeful hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discr,otionis clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President'sjudgment. To doubt is to sustain Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001
ISSUE: Is the legitimacy of the assumption to the Presidencyof President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo a political question and, therefore, not subject to judicial review? Distinguish EDSAPeople Power I from EDSAPeople Power II. HELD: Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C Aquino, and related cases to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than the Freedom Constitution declared' that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people "in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 COnstitution, as amended." It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSAShrine is the oath under the 1987 Constitution. In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 COnstitution. Indeed, she has stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution. In fine, the leaal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrows the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the successionof the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented a political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. X x x Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions: The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably Section 1 of Article II, and Section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Section 11 of Article VII. The issues likewise.call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that ''it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is x x x." Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of political question is but a foray in the dark.
(3)
Jurisdiction over criminal cases where penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua
Art. VIII, Sec. 5.
The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or the Rules of Court .may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
Page 19 of 44
In People v. Daniel, 86 SCRA 511(1978)and as affirmed in People v. Ramos, 88 SCRA 466(1979), both being rape cases where the trial court imposed lesser penalties because of misappreciation of the aggravating and qualifying circumstances and on appeal the penalty was increased. The majority opinion held that "henceforth, should the CA be of the opinion that the penalty of death or ree/usion perpetua should be imposed in any criminal case appealed to it where the penalty imposed by the trial court is less than ree/usion perpetua, the said Court, with comprehensive written analysis of the evidence and discussion of the law involved (should) render judgment expressly and explicitly impbsing the penalty of either death or ree/usion perpetua as the circumstances warrant, refrain from entering judgment, and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereto to this Court for review." Chief Justice Castro, for the majority, explained: Art. X, Sec. 5 (2) (d) [now Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (2) (d)] provides that the SC shall have appellate jurisdiction over "final judgements and decrees of inferior courts" in criminal in which the "penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment." Unless the CA renders judgment and imposes the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua, there would be no judgment for SC to review. Indeed, Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the present Rule 124, Sec. 13 provide that, whenever the CA should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, "the said court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon, and shall forthwith certify the case brought before it on appeal," which that it is not prohibited from renderingjudgment. In other words, the CA is not prohibited from rendering judgment but from "entering judgment." The distinction bet. the two is well established. The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated with an "entry of judgment" as the/latter is understood in Rule 36 in relation to Sec. 8, Rule 121 and Sec. 16, Rule 124, ROC. "Entry of judgment" presupposes a final judgment-- final in the sense that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court or appellate court within the reglamentary period. A judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal. It is only then that there is a judgment which is to be entered or recorded in the book of entries of judgments. Rule 124, Sec. 13. xxx Whenever the Court of Appeals should be of the opinion that the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher should be imposed in a. case, the Court after discussionof the evidenceand the law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or higher as the circumstanceswarrant, refrain from entering judgment and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the SupremeCourt for review.
I
(4)
Article VII, Sec. 18, par. 3 Art. VII, Sec. 18. xxx xxx The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
(5) Article VII, Sec. 4, par. 7 Art. VII, Sec. 4. xxx xxx The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
-I
Page 20 of 44 President, Vice-President, purpose. Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA756 (1966)
FACTS: In 1965, the 2 Houses of Congress in joint session proclaimed petitioner Fernando Lopez elected to the Office of the Vice-President of the Philippines. His closest opponent, respondent Gerardo Roxas, then filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) an election protest contesting the election of petitioner herein as VP upon the ground that it was not he, but said respondent, who had obtained the largest number of votes for said office. Petitioner Lopez then instituted this Original Action to prevent the PET from hearing and deciding the aforementioned election contest, upon the ground that R.A. No. 1793, creating said Tribunal, is "unconstitutional" and that, "all proceedings taken by it are a nullity". ISSUE: Whether R.A. 1793 is unconstitutional
HELD: NO. Section 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution vests in the judicial branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but the entirety or "all" of said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency, such as the power to "judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications' of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives, which is vested by the Constitution solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal, respectively. R.A 1793, creating the PET, has the effect of giving a defeated candidate. the legal right to contest judicially the election of the President-elect or the VP-elect. By providing that the PET "shall be composed of the Chief Justice and the other 10 Members of the SC", R.A. 1793 has conferred upon such court an additional exclusive original jurisdiction. It has not created a new and separate court. It has merely conferred upon the SC the functions of a PET. The PET is not inferior to the SC since it is the same court, although the functions peculiar to si1id Tribunal are more limited in scope than those of the SC in the exercise of its ordinary functions. The authority of the PET to declare who has the better right to office does not abridge constitutional tenure. If the evidence introduced in the election protest shows that the person really elected is the protestant, not the person declared elected by Congress, then the latter had legally no constitutional tenure whatsoever, and, hence, he can claim no abridgment thereof. Moreover, in the imposition of new duties upon the SC, the Congress has not, through R.A. 1793, encroached upon the appointing power of the Executive. It constitutes neither the creation of an office, nor the appointment of an officer. Said law is constitutional.
and may promulgate
its rule for the
(6)
Article IX, A, Sec. 7
Art. IX, A, Sec. 7.
Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of the copy thereof.
H. CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREMECOURT
Art. VIII, Sec. 2.
The Congress shall have the power the define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.
xxx
But while the jurisdiction of courts is a matter of legislative apportionment, Constitution sets certain limitations on this prerogative: 1. It cannot decrease the
the constitutionally
set jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Page 21 of44
(It may not deprive in Section 5 hereof.)
the Supreme
Court
of its jurisdiction
over cases enumerated
2. It cannot Court.
increase
the
constitutionally
set
appellate
jurisdiction
of the
Supreme
Art. VI, Sec. 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
3. It can increase 4. It can make general power).
the original the jurisdiction
jurisdiction
of the SC (pursuant with
to its general courts
power). to its
of the SC concurrent
lower
(pursuant
Thus, under the Rules of Court, the original jurisdiction with the RTC and in the case of the special civil actions,
of the SC is concurrent with the CA. the security of
5. It cannot pass a law reorganizing the judiciary tenure of its members. (Art. VI, Sec. 2,par. 2)
Mantruste Systems, Inc. v. CA, G.R. Nos. 86540-41.
when
it undermines
November 6, 1989
FACTS: Mantruste (MSI) entered into an interim lease agreement with DBP, owner of Bayview Plaza Hotel whenein the former would operate the hotel for a minimum of 3 months or until such time that the said properties are sold to MSI or other third parties by DBP. Subsequently, the President issued Proclamation SO which sought to the expeditious privatization of government assets. The Bayview Hotel properties were among the government assets identified for privatization and were consequently transferred from DBP to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for disposition. The properties were subsequently awarded to the Makati-Agro Trading and La Filipina Corp. MSI filed a complaint for the issuance of a restraining order enjoining APT from approving the winning bid and awarding the Bayview property to private petitioners and from ejecting MSI from the property or from terminating the contract of lease. The CA nullified the lower court's decision for being violative of Sec. 31 of Procl. 50-A. HELD: Section 31 of Proclamation No. 5-A prohibited courts and administrative agencies from issuing any
restraining order or injunction against the Asset Privatization Trust in connection with the acquisition, sale or disposition of assets transferred to it, nor against any purchaser of assets sold by the Trust to prevent such purchaser from taking possession of any assets purchased by him. said section does not infringe any provision of the Constitution. It does not impair the inherent power of the courts "to settle actual controversies which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the govt." The President, in the exercise of her legislative power under the Freedom ConStitution, issued said Proclamation to prevent courts from interfering in the discharge of the Executive Department of its task of carrying out the expeditious disposition and privatization of certain govt. corporations and/or the assets thereof, absent any grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on its part. This proclamation, not being inconsistent with the Constitution and not having been repealed or revoked by Congress, has remained operative. While the judicial power may appear to be pervasive, the truth is that under the system of separation or powers, the powers of the courts over the other branches and instrumentalities of government is limited to the determination of whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in the exercise of their authority and in the performance of their assigned tasks. Courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the APT, nor block, by an injunction, the discharge of its functions and the implementation of its decisions in connection with the acquisition, sale, or disposition of assets transferred to it. Villavert v. Desierto, GR No. 133715, February 13, 2000
HELD: In Fabian v. Desierto, Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec.'30, Art. VI, of the Constitution 20 against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial' Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 22 of 44 withoutits adviceandconsent. In addition,the Courtnotedthat Rule45 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure precludes appealsfrom quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals fromdecisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shouldbetaken to the Courtof Appeals underRule43, as reiterated in the subsequent caseof Namuhe v. Ombudsman. The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction A} 9riginal jurisdiction {Art. VIII, Sec. 5(1)] (I) Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls. (2) Petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. (3) Sufficiency of factual basis of proclamation privilege of writ of HC of martial law and suspension of
Note that the SC does not have jurisdiction over declaratory relief cases, which must be filed with the RTC (In Re Bermudez said so too, and yet gave due course to the petition.) The first case (ambassadors, etc.) is made concurrent with RTCs by law (Judiciary Act of 1948). The second case (special civil actions) is concurrent with the CA and the RTC, with respect to inferior bodies. B} Appellate Jurisdiction The Supreme Court shall have the power to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on (i) ordinary appeal, or (ii) petition for review on certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgment and orders of lower courts in the following cases: (I) Cases questioning the constitutionality or validity of any (a) treaty, (b) international and executive agreement, (c) law or statute, (d) presidential decree, (e) proclamation, (f) order, "(g) instruction, (h) ordinance, or (i) regulation.
I
(2) Cases questioning the legality of an (a) tax, (b) impost, (c) assessment, or (d) toll, or (e) any penalty imposed in relation thereto. (3) Cases in which the jurisdiction of lower courts is in issue. (4}rCriminal (S) cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
Cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(6) Orders of the Constitutional Commissions. Appellate jurisdiction may be exercised in two ways: 1. Ordinary appeal This is obligatory on the courts, so the appellant possesses this "as a matter of right". Under this mode, the SC can pass on both questions of fact and law. Ordinary appeal to the SC is allowed by law in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, including those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been cOrl)mitted by the accused on the same occasion (to ensure uniformity of decision).
(Sec 17, Judiciary Act of 1948).
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 23 of44 The other case is the automatic review by the SC of criminal cases where the death penalty is imposed. This is unlike the ordinary appeal taken where the penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher, for in this case, the review is .automatic. The reason why it is not automatic in the first case (reclusion perpetua) is that on appeal, the appellate court may increase the penalty imposed by the trial court (to death) so that the convict must first waive his right against double jeopardy, precisely by voluntarily making the appeal, before the SC can reopen the case on appeal. But the case is different when death is imposed because the worst that could happen on automatic appeal is that the judgment is affirmed. Naturalization and denaturalization cases under the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Sec. 17) used to be directly appealable to the Sc. But this is deemed to have been amended by the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129) which, in Sec. 5(3), makes all cases decided by the RTC, appealable to the CA, except those made directly appealable to the SC by (i) the Constitution, (Ii) BP 129 and (iii) Sec. 17 [3(i)] and Sec. 17 [4(4)]of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Naturalization and denaturalization cases do not fall under any of the exceptions. 2. Petition for review on certiorari This is not discretionary on the Sc. It has the authority not to give due course to the petition, if the petition shows no merit on its face. Thus, mode provided for in Rule 45, is limited to pure questions of law. All other cases can be appealed to the SC using this mode. The Constitution now provides that "no petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor." (Art. VIII, Sec. 14,par. 2) The four other cases falling under the appellate jurisdiction of the SC (viz, constitutionality, tax, jurisdiction and pure questions of law), are appealable to the SC by petition for review on certiorari. However, in cases involving constitutionality, tax, or jurisdiction, when the resolution of the main issue depends on a controverted question of fact, the case must be' appealed to the CA on both, questions of fact and law, and the decision of the CA is then raised to the SC by petition for review on certiorari on pure questions of law. (Sec. 17of the Judiciary Act of 1948) Certiorari The! certiorari referred to in 5(1) (when the SC exercises original jurisdiction) is the spe'cial civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, where the question raised is a "jurisdictional question," that is, (a) lack of jurisdiction, (b) excess of jurisdiction, or (c) grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The certiorari referred to in 5(2) (when the SC exercises appellate jurisdiction) is certiorari as an ordinary mode of appeal, where the issue raised is "error of judgment" or error of law. I. ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS
(1) Supervision of lower courts Art. VIII, Sec. 6. The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. In Woblejas v. Teehankee, the SC held that although the Commissioner of Land Registration is given the rank of judge of the CFI, he is still an administrative official,
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 24 of44 hence outside the jurisdiction of the SC and cannot be investigated bOy it as if he were a lower court judge. Otherwise, the SC would be performing a non-judicial work. (2) Temporarily assign judges to other stations in the public interest Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the xxx power (to) xxx (3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(3) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid miscarriage of justice [Art.
VIII, Sec. 5 (4)J
(4) Discipline of lower court judges Art. VIII, Sec. 11. xxx The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal, by a vote of a majority of the members who a'ctually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.
De Vera v. Pelayo, 335 SCRA281 (2000) ISSUE: May the Ombudsman validly entertain criminal charges against a judge of the regional trial court in connection with his handling of cases before the court?
HELD: Petitioner criticizes the jurisprudence (Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464 [1993) and Dolalas v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, 26S SCRA 818 [1996}) cited by the Office of the Ombudsman as erroneous and
I
not applicable to his complaint. He insists that since his complaint involved a criminal charge against a judge, it was within the authority of the Ombudsman not the Supreme Court to resolve whether a crime was committed and the judge prosecuted therefor. The petition cannot succeed. We agree with the Solicitor General that the Ombudsman committed no grave abuse of discretion warranting the writs prayed for. The issues have been settled in the case of In Re:.Joaquin Borromeo. There, we laid down" the rule that before a civil or criminal action against a judge for a violation of Arts. 204 and 205 (knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order) can be entertained, there must first be "a final and authoritative judicial declaration" that the decision or order in question is indeed "unjust." The pronouncement may result from either: ! (a) an action of certiorari or prohibition in a higher court impugning the validity of the judgment; or (b) an administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court against the judge precisely for promulgating an unjust judgment or order. Likewise, the determination of whether a judge has maliciously delayed the disposition of the case is also an exclusive judicial function (In Re: Borromeo, supra, at 461). "To repeat, no other entity or official of the government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision - whether final and executory or not - and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone. . This having been said, we find that the Ombudsman acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence when he referred the cases against Judge Pelayoto the Supreme Court for appropriate action. People v. Gacott, 246 SeRA 52 (199S)
HELD: The very text of the present Section 11 of Article VIII clearly shows that there are actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that "the Supreme Court en banc shall have the
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 25 of44
power to discipline judges of lower courts," is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banco it was not therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in an absurdity, as will hereafter be explained. The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is intentionally separated from! the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc can "order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein." Evidently, in this instance, the administrative case must be deliberated upon decided by the full Court itself. Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en banc, on February 9, 1993 a Court En Banc resolution was adopted, entitled "Bar Matter No. 209. - In the Matter of the Amendment and/or Clarification of various Supreme Courts Rules and Resolutions," and providing inter alia: For said purpose, the following are considered en banc cases: xxx xxx xxx 6. cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000.00, or both. xxx xxx xxx This resolution was amended on March 16, 1993 and November 23, 1993, but the aforequoted maintained.
!
provision was
Indeed, ,to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banco This would subvert the constitutional injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the Supreme Court of the lower courts, and the very purpose of authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five or seven members. Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be d~cided in division.
(5) Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary
Art. VIII, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the xxx power (to) xxx
(6) Appoint all officials and employees accordance with the Civil Service Law. J. RULE MAKING of the Judiciary in
l ,
J
Art. VIiI, Sec. 5.

powers:
The Supreme
Court shall have the following
xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rights of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 26 0/44 Power of Congress to repeal Rules of Court Article XVIII, Sec. 10. All courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue to exercise their jurisdiction, until otherwise provided by law. The provisions of the existing Rules of Court, judiciary acts, and procedural laws not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative unless amended or repealed by the Supreme Court or the Congress. Co-Judicial powers Aside from the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court mentioned above the following are its other powers related to, though not exactly constituting, its judicial function: 1. Order a change of venue or place of trial, in order to avoid a miscarriage of justice. {Arl. VIII, Sec. 5(4)[
2. Rule making - Promulgate rules concerning (a) the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, (b). pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, (c) the administration to the practice of law, (d) the Integrated Bar, and (e) legal assistance to the underprivileged.
I
Limitations to this power: Such rules shall (i) provide simplified and inexpensive procedure, for the speedy disposition of cases, (ii) be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and (iii) not diminish, increase or modify substantiv,e rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective uniess disapproved by the Sc. {Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5)[ It is on the basis of this power, that the Rules of Court, the Bar, IBP, Legal Aid Office were adopted. In 1935, as affirmed in the case of In re Cunanan, the Congress was given the power to alter, supplement or modify the Rules of Court. Thus, if the SC set the passing grade in the bar at 75%, Congress could lower it to 70%, provided this has no retroactive effect, This is no longer true in 1987. Rule-making power and the corollary amending the rules are now lodged exclusively on the SC. Practice of Professions Art. XII, Sec. 14. xxx The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law. Martial Law Art. VII, Sec. 18. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of Martial Law or the 'suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days form its filing. (par. 3 thereof.)
I
power of
K.NO
QUASI-JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORK OF JUDGES
Generally: No non-judicial work for judges; No quasi- judicial and administrative work for judges.
Page 27 of 44
As general rule, members of the judiciary shall only have judicial functions, in line with the separation of powers principle of the Constitution. Thus: Art. VIII, Sec. 12. The members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function. Thus, in Meralco v. Pasay Transportation Co., 57Phil 600 (1932),the SC held that justices of the SC could not be constituted into a Board of Arbitration to determine reasonable compensation for the use of a bridge, for this is a non-judicial work.
Meralco v. Pasay Transportation Co., 57 Phil 600 (1932)
The issue concerns the legal right of the members of the SC,sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to act in that capacity. HELD: The SC and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected w/ the administering of judicial functions.
In Garcia v. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 (1971),the SC said that it did not look with favor at the pra<i=tice of long standing of judges being detailed with the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, even if it were only in connection with his work of exercising administrative authority over courts. The basis of this rule is the separation of powers. In this case, respondent Macaraig was appointed to one of the newly-created CFI branches with station at Calamba Laguna. At the time of his appointment, respondent was the chief of Technical Staff of the DOJ and concurrently member of the Board of Pardons and Parole.
In Re : Rodolfo Manzano, 166 SCRA 246 (1988)
FACTS: EO No. 856 created the Provincial/City Committees on Justice to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of said committee are to receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for proper action, to recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice. Judg~ Manzano, Executive Judge Of Ilocos Norte was appointed as member of said Committee. accePting the appointment, it sought the opinion of the SCas to the propriety of such appointment. Before
HELD: Such committee performs administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence. Under the Constitution, the members of the courts shall not be designated to any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions. Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in such committee, will violate the Constitution, the Supreme Court is constrained to deny his request that he be allowed to serve therein. He can only render assistance to such committee to help promote the laudable purposes of said committee, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of his judicial duties.
Exceptions: Constitutionally appointed non-judicial functions of the Supreme Court a. Act as Presidential Electoral Tribunal While Congress acts as the National Board of Canvassers for the Presidential election, the Supreme Court acts as the Electoral Tribunal for such election. The Constitution provides: "The Supreme Court, sitting en bane, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose." (Art. Art. VII, Sec. 4, last par.)
I
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 28 of 44 This means that before the proclamation by the Congress of the winner, Congress is the judge of any electoral issue, but the proclamation, when there is an electoral contest already, then the SC becomes the sole judge. The11935 Constitution did not provide this power. And so RA 1793 gave the SC the power to act as judge in presidential electoral contests. It was challenged in the case of Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SeRA 756(1966),but the SC upheld the law, reasoning that it did not constitute the SC as a separate body but only added to its powers the power to be the judge of election contests. With the express provision in Art. VII, Sec. 4, par. 7, this is no longer a problem.
b. Chief Justice as presiding officer in impeachment trial of the President. {Art. XI,
Sec. 3(6){
c. Chief Justice as Chairman of the Judicial and Bar Council.

L. REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY Art. VIII, Sec. 16. The Supreme Court shall, within thirty days from the opening of each regular session of the Congress, submit to the President and the Congress an annual report on the operations and activities of the Judiciary. M. MANNER OF SITTING AND VOTES REQUIRED Art. VIII, Sec. 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en bane or its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof. (2) All cases involving' the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court, en bane, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en bane: Provided, that no doctrine or principle or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en bane or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en bane. The Supreme Court may sit en bane or in its discretion, in divisions of 3, 5, or 7 members. {Art. VIII. Sec. 4(1){
,1
1 ;
I.
I'
The following cases shall be heard by the SC en bane: 1. Cases involving the constitutionality agreement or law. {Id., Sec. 4(2){ of a treaty, international or executive
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 29 of 44
2. Cases involving the (a) constitutionality, (b) application, or (c) operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances and other regulations. [Id., Sec. 4(2)J
1
3. All other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard by the SC
en banco [Id., Sec. 4(2)J 4. Cases or matters heard by a division where the required number of votes to decide or resolve (the majority of those who took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case less than 3 members) is not met. [Id., Sec. 4(3)J
S.
To modify or reverse a doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division. [Id., Sec. 4(3)J 6. Administrative disciplinary cases involving judges of lower courts. (Id.,Sec.ll.) 7. Actions instituted by citizen to test the validity of a proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ. (Art. VII, Sec. 18.) 8. The court sitting as Presidential Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VII, Sec.
4, par.
7.)
Firestone
Ceramics,
Inc. v. CA, 334 SCRA 465 (2000)
HELD: Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, dated February 7, 1989, as amended by the Resolution of
November 18, 1993:
x x x [t]he
following are considered en banc cases:
1) cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question; 2) Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty; 3) cases raising novel questions of law; 4) cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; 5) cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission, Commissionon Elections, and Commissionon Audit; 6) cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding PlO,OOO.OO or both; 7) cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the court en banc or in division may be modified or reversed; 8) . cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members thereof merit the attention of the court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of the actual membership of the court en banc; and 9) All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.
Rule 56, Sec. 11 Sec. 11. Procedure if opinion is equally divided.-Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be re-heard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the action shall be dismissed if originally commenced in the court; in appealed cases, the judgement or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. Rule 125, Sec. 3
Page 30 of 44 Sec. 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided.-When the court en bane is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall be re-heard, and if on rehearing no decision is reached, the judgment of conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted. N. REQUIREMENT AS TO DECISIONS Deliberations Art. VIII, Sec. 13. The conclusions of the Supreme Court in any case submitted to it for decision en bane or in division shall be reached in consultation before the case is assigned to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court. A certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice shall be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case and served upon the parties. Any Member who took no part, or dissented, or abstained from a decision or resolution must state the reason therefor. The same requirements shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts.
-,
The reason for the requirement that the decision must be reached "in consulta" (i.e., after deliberations by the group) is to emphasize that the SC is one body, albeit collegiate, so that the decision of the case is by the court itself and not the ponente. The writer of the opinion is merely the spokesman of the body.
Consing v. CA, 177 SCRA 14 (1989) ISSUE: WIN absence of certification by the Court of Appeals renders that decision invalid.
HELD: NO. The certification requirement imposed by the 1987 constitution was meant to ensure the implementation of the constitutional requirement that decisions of the Supreme Court and lower collegiate courts, such as the CA, Sandiganbayan and CTA, are reached after consultation with the members of the court sitting en bancor in a division before the case is assigned to a member thereof for decision writing.
The absence would not necessarily mean that the case submitted for decision had not been reached in consultation before being assigned to one member for the writing of the opinion of the court since the regular perfqrmance of official duty is presumed. The lack of certification serves as an evidence of failure to observe the certification requirement but it would not have the effect of invalidating the decision. Prudential Bankv. Castro, 158 SCRA646 (1988)
HELD: The certification requirement refers to decisions in judicia~ not administrative cases. From the very beginning, resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have not been accompanied by any formal certification. In fact, such a certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases, which by their very nature, have to be deliberated upon considering the collegiate composition of this Court.
Art. VIII, Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. Voting Votes required to "render a decision or resolution" A) En bane
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 31 of44 Concurrence of a majority of the members who (i) actually took part in the deliberations (Le., the consultation) on the issues in the case, and (ii) voted thereon.
[Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2) and Sec. 11.}
a. The lowest possible votes needed to render a decision is 5, since quorum of 15 is 8, and majority of 8 is 5. This number may increase as the number of justices present increase;
b. One who abstained is deemed to have voted for the purpose of computing the majority vote needed. For an abstention is really a form of casting a vote with its own repercussions on the outcome of the case.
One who was present but kept silent during the deliberations and did not vote is still included in the counting for the purpose of determining the majority. For it may happen that he has already made up his mind on how to decide and influence the outcome of the case.
C.
d. But one who expressly inhibited or is disqualified from taking part (for instance because of conflict of interest) is not included.
e. There must be a quorum before a valid decision can be made. quorum, there can be no valid business to begin with.
Without a
f. In case, the necessary majority cannot be mustered, then there is no decision rendered. (See effect of failure to reach a majority below.)
* This provision thus, overrules the requirement of (a) 10 votes (2/3) to declare a law unconstitutional under 1973 (a constitutional requirement), and (b) 10 votes to impose or affirm the death penalty (by internal rules of the SC, although constitutionally 8 votes were enough). The presumption of constitutionality of laws under the Judiciary Act of 1948, however, remains valid.
B) In divisions
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved (a) with the con!=urrenceof a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and (b) in no case without the concurrence of at least 3 of such members. When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en bane. No doctrine or principle of law laid by the court in a decision rendered en bane or in division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en bane. [Art. VIII, Sec. 4(3)]
a. In a division of 7 members, the majority if all are present is 4. If only 6 are

present, 4. If only 5 or 4, 3. If only 3, no quorum.
b. In a division of 5 members, 3 votes are needed regardless of whether 5, 4, or

3 are present.
C.
In division of 3 members, 3 votes are needed.
d. In any of these cases, when the votes cannot be mustered, the case must be
raised to the court en bane. Effect of failure to muster the necessary majority: If the necessary majority cannot be had, the case is again reheard. If upon rehearing, no majority is still had, the following are the effects: .
Page 32 of 44
a. If a case is on appeal, the judgment appealed from is deemed affirmed except:

(i) Criminal cases where the judgment is that of conviction: the conviction is reversed, and the accused is acquitted. (ii) Cases where the lower court declared a law, etc. unconstitutional: the judgment is reversed, and the validity of the law is deemed sustained, pursuant to the presumption of constitutionality under Sec. 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. (If the lower court declared the law as not unconstitutional, this judgment is deemed affirmed pursuant to the general rule above.) (Thus, if 12 are present, 5 voted the law unconstitutional, 4 voted for its validity, and 3 abstained, there is no decision and so the law remains valid.)
b. If the case is an original petition, then the case is deemed dismissed.

Writing of the decision No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and dis~lnctly the facts and the law on which it is based. (Art. VIII, Sec. 14.) In the case of the SC and lower collegiate court, this rule is addressed to the one to whom the writing of the opinion was assigned after consultation, that is, the ponente. In the case by other courts, this rule is addressed to the judge. Decisions on the merit. The rule requiring statement of the relevant facts, the issues, the ruling, and the reasoned opinion in support of the ruling, applies only to decisions on the merit by a court of record, based on the following rulings of the SC:
a. In Valladolid v. Inciong, 121 SeRA 205 (1983),it was held that the Order of the Deputy
Minister of Labor did not contain a statement of facts and conclusions of law is not covered by the constitutional requirement because it is not a decision of a court of record, the Ministry of Labor being an administrative agency with quasi-judicial fun~tions, with rules of procedure mandated to be non-litigious, summary and nontechnical. Section 14, Chapter 3, Book VII. Administrative Code of 1987 Section 14. Decision.-- Every decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. xxx
Air Manila v. Balatbat, 38 SeRA 489 {1971}
HELD: Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation. of certain basic and fundamental procedure principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials. Administrative due process includes:
(a) The right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a pers\,n's legal rights; . (b) .Reasonableopportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; (c) A tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) A finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected.
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Cal1anta, Jr. . Page 33 of 44
b. In Bae%d Murcia Milling Co. v. Henares, 107 Phil. 560 (1960), the SC ruled that orders of a court on an incidental matter (in this case, the order imposing the payment of attqrney's fees) need not state the legal basis of the ruling. Minute Resolution
Cruz: In justifying SCRA 1:
the so-called
minute
resolution,
the SC said in Borromeo
v. CA, 186 .
"The SC disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord wi the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to forsetall the early execution of judgment and (or non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis. The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions andl or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case." And neither does the rule apply to administrative cases decided held in Prudential Bank v. Castro, 158 SCRA 646, thus: by the SC itself, as it
"No constitutional provision is disregarded in the SC's Minute Resolution denying a motion for reconsideration 'for lack of merit, the issues raised therein having been previously duly considered and passed upon. In an administrative case, the constitutional mandate that 'no *** motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be *** denied without stating the legal basis therefor is inapplicable. And even if it were, said resolution stated the legal basis for the denial, and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the constitutional requirement. 'Lack of merit: as a ground for denial is legal basis. . Memorandum Decisions
Fra'1cisco v. Permskul, 173 SCRA 324 (1989) HELD:. A MEMORANDUM DEQSION is a "specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts in accordance with the provisions of Section 40, B.P. Big. 129 on the grounds of expediency, practicality, convenienceand docket status of our courts:' The distinctive features of a memorandumdecisionare, first, it is rendered by an appellate court, second, it incorporatesby referencethe findings of fact or the conclusionsof law contained in the decision, order, or ruling under review. Most likely, the purposeis to affirm the decision, although it is not impossiblethat the approval of the findings of facts by the lower court may lead to a different conclusionof law by the higher court. At any rate, the reason for allowing the incorporation by reference is evidently to avoid the cumbersomereproductionof the decisionof the lower court, or portions thereof, in the decisionof the higher court. The idea is to avoid having to repeat in the body of the latter decisionthe findings or conclusionsof the lower court sincethey are being approvedor adoptedanyway. Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. CA, 293 SCRA 26 (1998) HELD: The constitutionalmandatethat no decisionshall be renderedby any court without expressingtherein c1eal1yand distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions"which adopt by referencethe findings of fact and conclusionsof law contained in the decisionsof inferior tribunals. X x x Hence, even in this jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to avoid the cumbersome reproductionof the decisionof the lower courts, or portionsthereof, in the decisionsof the higher court. This is particularlytrue when the decisionsought to be incorporatedis a lengthy and thorough discussionof the facts and conclusions arrived at x x x.
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Cal!anta, Jr. Page 34 oJ 44 Yao v. CA, 344 SCRA 202 (2000) HELb: We have sustained decisions of lower courts as having substantially or sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction notwithstanding the laconic and terse manner in which they were written and even if "there [was left] much to be desired in terms of [their] clarity, coherence and comprehensibility" provided that they eventually set out the facts and the law on which they were based, as when they stated the legal qualifications of the offense constituted by the facts proved, the modifying circumstances, the participation of the accused, the penalty imposed and the civil liability; or discussed the facts comprising the elements of the offense that was charged in the information, and accordingly rendered a verdict and imposed the corresponding penalty; or quoted the facts narrated in the prosecution's memorandum but made their own findings and assessmentof evidence, before finally agreeing with the prosecution's evaluation of the case. We have also sanctioned the use of memorandum decisions x x x. We have also declared that memorandum decisions comply with the constitutional mandate. In Fmncisco v. Permskul, however, we laid the conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions, thus: The memorandum decision, to be valid, cannot incorporate the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court only by remote reference, which is to say that the challenged decision is not easily and immediately available to the person reading the memorandum decision. For the incorporation by reference to be allowed, it must provide for direct accessto the facts and the law being adopted, which must be contained in a statement attached to the said decision. In other words, the memorandum decision authorized under Section 40 of B.P. Big. 129 should actually embody the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the lower court in an annex attached to and made an indispensable part of the decision. It is expected that this requirement will allay the suspicion that no study was made of the decision of the lower court and that its decision was merely affirmed without a prior examination of the facts and the law on which it is based. The proximity at least of the annexed statement should suggest that such examination has been undertaken. It is, of course, also understood that the decision being adopted should, to begin with, comply with Article VIII, section 14 as no amount of incorporation or adoption will rectify its violation. The Court finds necessary to emphasize that the memorandum decision should be sparingly used lest it become an additive excuse for judicial sloth. It is an additional condition for the validity of this kind of decision may be resorted to only in cases where the facts are in the main accepted by both parties and easily determinable by the judge and there are no doctrinal complications involved that will require an extended discussion of the laws involved. The memorandum decision may be employed in simple litigations only, such as ordinary collection cases, where the appeal is obviously groundless and deserves no more than the time needed to dismiss it. X x x Henceforth, all memorandum decisions shall comply with the requirements herein set forth as to the form prescribed and the occasions when they may be rendered. Any deviation will summon the strict enforcement of Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution and strike down the flawed judgment as a lawless disobedience. Tested against these standards, we find that the RTC decision at bar miserably failed to meet them and, therefore, fell short of the constitutional injunction. The RTCdecision is brief indeed, but it is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing, not even.at a simple summation of facts which could easily be done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself. We cannot even consider or affirm said RTC decision as a memorandum decision because it failed to comply with the measures of validity laid down in Francisco v. Permskul. It merely affirmed in toto the MeTCdecision without saying more. A decision or resolution, especially one resolving an appeal, should directly meet the iSsu~sfor resolution; otherwise, the appeal would be pointless We therefore reiterate our admonition in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, in that while we conceded that brevity in the writing of decisions is an admirable trait, it should not and cannot be substituted for substance; and again in Francisco v. Permskul, where we cautioned that expediency alone, no matter how compelling, cannot excuse non-compliance with the constitutional requirements. This is not to discourage the lower courts to write abbreviated and concise decisions, but never at the expense of scholarly analysis, and more significantly, of justice and fair play, lest the fears expressed by Justice Feria as the ponente in Romero v. Court of Appeals_come true, i.e., if an appellate court failed to provide the appeal
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law.1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 35 0[44
the attention it rightfully deserved, said court deprived the appellant of due process since he was accorded a fair /Opportunityto be heard by a fair and responsible magistrate. This situation becomes more ominous in criminal cases, as in this case, where not only property rights are at stake but also the liberty if not the life of a human being. Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal. More than that, the requirement is an assurance to the' parties that, in reaching judgment, the judge did so through the processesof legal reasoning. It is, thus, a safeguard against the impetuosity of the judge, preventing him from deciding ipse dixit. Vouchsafed neither the sword nor the purse by the Constitution but nonetheless vested with the sovereign prerogative of passing judgment on the life, liberty or property of his fellowmen, the judge must ultimately depend on the power of reason for sustained public confidence in the justness of his decision. Thus the Court has struck down as void, decisions of lower courts and even of the Court of Appeals whose careless disregard of the constitutional behest exposed their sometimes cavalier attitude not only to their magisterial responsibilities but likewise to their avowed fealty to the Constitution. Thus, we nullified or deemed to have failed to comply with Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, a decision, resolution or order which: contained no analysis of the evidence of the parties nor reference to any legal basis in reaching its conclusions; contained nothing more than a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses of both parties; convicted the accused of libel but failed to cite any legal authority or principle to support conclusions that the letter in question was libelous; consisted merely of one (1) paragraph with mostly sweeping generalizations and failed to support its conclusion of parricide; consisted of five (S) pages, three (3) pages of which were quotations from the labor arbiter's decision including .the dispositive portion and barely a page (two [2] short paragraphs of two [2] sentences each) of its own discussion or reasonings; was merely based on the findings of another court sans transcript of stenographic notes, or failed to explain the factual and legal basesfor the award of moral damages. In t same vein do we strike down as a nullity the RTCdecision in question. Petitions for review and motions for reconsideration
No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied, without stating the legal basis therefor. (Art. VIII, Sec. 14, par. 2.) This rule applies to a dismissal of a motion for reconsideration of a "decision on the merits", said the SC in Mendoza v. CF1, 51 SCRA 369 (1973). It does not apply, as in this case, to a dismissal of a motion for reconsideration of a previous dismissal ofa petition for habeas corpus. (The dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus is not a decision on the merits, but is similar to a dismissal of a petition for review, which is a decision not to give due course to the petition.) The past practice used to be or c1enied a MFR, it simply dismissed for lack of basis. spend days preparing pages by a one-liner "Dismissed for that when the appellate court denied a petition for review, did so in a Minute Resolution, stating that the case was This aggrieved many a lawyer, specially those who would of briefs, only to find out that all their effort was answered lack of basis".
This prompted the framers of the 1987 Constitution to force the Court to at least write down the legal basis for the denial. This means that while a fully detailed decision is not required, neither is a skimpy one-liner is allowed. The legal reason for the dismissal must be written.
Page 36 0/44 Dissenters and Abstainers In the case of a decision on the merits, if a member (a) took no part, or (b) dissented, or (c) abstained from a decision or resolution, he must state his reason therefor. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 13.)
Before, only those who dissented were required to write an opinion. Now, even those who took no part in the deliberations but were present, and those who abstained are required to write their reasons for these are really forms of casting their vote. Those who inhibited themselves are, of course, not required to vote, since they did not really participate. Procedurally, the purpose is to enable the party to find out the reason for the action taken. For courts lower than the SC, and even the SC itself, this is important for appeal or motion for reconsideration purposes, as the basis for the assignment of error. Thebretically, since the SC is not an elective branch it must explain the reason being its ultimate source of authority. Congress need not explain its action since it has been delegated the legislative power by the people.
O. MANDATORY PERIOD FOR DECIDING CASES Art. VIII, Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all othel: lower courts. (2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. (3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. (4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determinatiQn, without further delay. Art. VII, Sec. 18. xxx xxx The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. xxx (par. 3 thereof.) Art. XVIII, Sec. 12. The Supreme Court shall, within one year after the ratification of this Constitution, adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in
Hand OUt No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Cal1anta, Jr. Page 37 of 44 the Supreme Court or the lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. Id., Sec. 13. The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification this Constitution, of the applicable period for the decision resolution of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication the courts, shall be determined by the Supreme Court as soon practicable. of or by as
Id., Sec. 14. The provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4), Section 15 of Article VIII of this Constitution shall apply to cases or matters filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification. A) Cases filed after February 2, 1987 , All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided within twenty-four months counted from the date of submission." [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1)[ A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(2)[ Mandatory period in the Supreme Court: 24 months [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(1)[ Except: A proper case questioning the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege which must be decided 30 days from filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18,par. 1.)
Query: But what happens if the judge or court fails to meet the deadline anyway?
The' Constitution provides: Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding Judge shall forthwith be issued, and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has been rendered or issued within said period. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15 (3)[ Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility (administrative disciplinary action against the judge or justices) shall qecide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determination without furti}er delay. [Art. VIII, Sec. 15(4)[ In other words, failure to decide the case [for reasons other than the inability to reach the necessary majority] has no consequence on the case. Thus, a certification is reqyired that the period has lapsed without any decision being made, stating the reaSon for such inaction. Then the court must decide without any further delay. The consequences are on the judge: (a) he could not draw out his salary, since he would not be able to certify that he has resolved all cases submitted to him in 90 days and (b) he is subject to administrative sanctions. B) Cases filed before February 2, 1987 but expire after this date The provisions of Art. VIII, Sec, 15(3) - (4) shall apply to. cases or matters filed before the ratification of this Constitution, when the applicable period lapses after such ratification. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 14)
Hand OUt No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 . Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 38 of 44
In dther words, it is as if these cases were filed after February 2, 1987. C) Cases that expired before February 2, 1987 The legal effect of the lapse, before the ratification of this Constitution, of the applicable period for the decision or resolution of the cases or matters submitted for adjudication by the courts, shall be determined by the SC as soon as practicable. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 13.) The Supreme Court shall, within 1 year from February 2, 1987 adopt a systematic plan to expedite the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the SC or lower courts prior to the effectivity of this Constitution. A similar plan shall be adopted for all spec;ial courts and quasi-judicial bodies. (Art. XVIII, Sec. 12.) .
Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the sandiganbayan, A.M. No. 00-8-05-SC, Nov. 28, 2001 apply to the
ISSUE: Does the period for decision making under Section 15, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution,
sandiganbayan?
HELD: The above provision does not apply to the Sandiganbayan. The provision refers to regular courts of lower collegiate level that in the present hierarchy applies only to the Court of Appeals. The Sandiganbayan is a special court of the same level as the Court of Appeals and possessing all the inherent powers of a court of justice, with functions of a trial court. Thus, the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special one.
2. LOWER COURTS A. QUALIFICATIONS AND APPOINTMENT Art. VIII, Sec. 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he is a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. A member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines. (2) the Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar. Id., Sec. 8. (5) The (Judicial and Bar) Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Id., Sec. 9. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at list three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation. For the lower courts, the President shall issue the appointment within ninety days from the submission of the list. Composition The composition of lower courts shall be provided by law. The laws are the Judiciary Act of 1948 and BP 129.
Hand OlJ.t No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Cal1anta, Jr.
Page 39 of 44 Qu~lifications Lower Collegiate Court (Court of Appeals) (1) No person shall be appointed member of any lower collegiate court unless he is a natural-born citizen. {Art. VIII, Sec. 7(l)J and a member of Philippine Bar. (2) The Congress shall prescribe qualifications of judges of lower courts. {Art. VIII, Sec. 7(2)J (3) A member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. {Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)J Lower Courts (1) The Congress shall prescribe qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person ma1 be appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine bar. {Art. VIII, Sec. 7(2)J (2) He must be a person.of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. {Art. VIII, Sec. 7(3)J
QUALIFICATIONS OF RTC JUDGES 1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines; 2. At least 35 years of age; 3. For at least 10 years has been engaged in the practice of law in the Phil. or has held public office in the Phil. requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite. QUALIFICATIONS OF MTC JUDGES 1. Natural-born citizen of the Philippines; 2. At least 30 years of age; 3. For at least 5 years has been engaged in the practice of law in the Phil. or has 'held public office in the Phil. requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
B. SALARY Art. VIII, Sec. 10. The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme court and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased. C. CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REORGANIZE AND SECURITY OF TENURE Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Id., Sec. 2. xxx No law shall be passed reorgamzmg the Judiciary undermines the security of tenure of its Members.
when
it
The power of Congress to reorganize lower courts has been upheld by the SC prior to 1987.
Hand oUt No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Cal1anta, Jr.
Page 40 of 44
I
In Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice, 51 OG 147(1955), the SC by failing to muster the 2/3 vote required then to declare a law unconstitutional in effect sustained the validity of the law passed by Congress abolishing the offices of "judges-at-Iarge" and "cadastral judges" and the consequent removal of judges occupying these posts. Noting that the purpose of the law was to promote the independence of the judiciary (by avoiding forumshopping), it held that an abolition of an office made in good faith does not violate security of tenure. Security of tenure presupposes the continued existence of the office from which one was removed not removal from an office that has been abolished in good faith and not merely partisan political reasons. In De La Llana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982), the SC again upheld the Reorganization Act of 1980 (BP 129), on the ground that the abolition of an office, is within the competence of the legislature if done in good faith. That there was good faith was shown by the fact that the Act was the product of careful study and deliberation by the Batasan and the Presidential study committee, the membership of which includes SC justices, and was, the means to upgrade the administration of justice in the Philippines. The SC reiterated that there can be no claim for security of tenure where the office no longer exists, and that the abolition of office is not removal, although their effects may be the same. It is doubtful whether these rulings remain valid in toto in view of the new express provision prohibiting a reorganization law that undermines the security of tenure of the Judiciary. One compromise view is that Congress has the power to pass a reorganization law concerning the lower courts, but it can only take effect until the post has been vacated by the incumbent judge. D. REMOVAL Art. VIII, Sec. 11. The members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. The Supreme Court en bane shall have the power to discipline judges of lower courts, or order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. Cruz: "Judges of lower court," as here used, includes justices of the Sandiganbayan. This rule casts much doubt on the legality of the presidential decree making them removable only by the legislature through the process of impeachment. E. JURISDICTION Art. VIII, Sec. 1. Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
r
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
As ruled in J.M. Tuason & Co. v. CA and in Ynot v. MC. supra, there is in effect a " constitutional conferment of original jurisdiction on the lower courts in those five cases for which the Supreme Court is granted appellate jurisdiction in 5(2)."
Hand OUt No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 41 0/44 Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction "to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or Rules of Court may provide, judgments of lower courts," lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. F. REQUIREMENTS AS TO PREPARATION OF DECISIONS Art. VIII, Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. Manner of sitting The Court of Appeals sits in divisions when it hears cases; the only time it convenes as one body is to take up matters of administration. The trial and inferior courts, of course, do not have this problem since there is only one judge. Deliberations The same requirements (for consulta) shall be observed by all lower collegiate courts. (Arl. VIII, Sec. 13) For obvious reasons, this requirement does not apply to the trial and inferior courts. Voting For Icollegiate courts, like the Court of Appeals, the law provides that it sits only in divisions when deciding cases. For trial and inferior courts, no problem arises since only one judge is involved. Effect of failure to muster the necessary majority Court of Appeals -- The same rules apply, except that the decision can now be appealed to the Sc. Inferior Courts -- Failure to decide has no consequence on the decision of the court. The Court is not ousted of its jurisdiction, but the judge suffers administrative consequences. G. MANDATORY PERIOD FOR DECIDING Art. VIII, Sec. 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from the date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. (2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution . upon the filing of the last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
I I
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 42 of 44 (3) Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period. (4) Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or matter submitted thereto for determinaticm, without further delay. Mandatory Period Lo~er collegiate courts: 12 months, unless reduced by the SC Other lower courts: 3 months, unless reduced by the SC The Constitution now explicitly provides in Sec. 15 (1) that the periods are mandatory, aside from using the word "must" (not "shall" as in 1973) in Sec. 15 (1). The case of Marcelino v. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983), which held that the periods in the 1973 Constitution were only directory, is thus now, overruled. It should be noted that, although decision within the maximum period is now mandatory, failure to arrive at the same will not divest the court of jurisdiction, without prejudice to any responsibility that may attach to the judge. The court must still resolve the case wlo further delay, unlike the old rule when the decision appealed was deemed automatically affirmed and the petition was deemed automatically dismissed as a result of the inaction of the court.
CrIlZ:
MarCelino v. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983) FACTS: Judgement in a criminal case was rendered before the clerk of court within 85 days after the case was concluded. But judgement was promulgated after lapse of 90 days from the day the case was submitted for decision. ISSUE: WIN trial court lost jurisdiction over the case for failure to decide the same within 90 days from submission thereof.
WIN constitutional provision is mandatory.
HELD: No to both. The constitutional provision refers to rendition of judgement which refers to the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court. By the phrase "unless reduced by the Supreme Court," it is evident that the period prescribed is subject to modification by the SC under its prerogative power to promulgate rules concerning procedure in all courts. Constitutional provisions are directory, where they refer to matters merely procedural. But failure to decide a case/within 90 days constitute a ground for administrative sanction against the defaulting judge .. De Roma v. CA, 152 SCRA 205 (1987)
,\
\
The CA decided the case beyond the 12 month period prescribed by the 1973 Constitution. Said provision in the Constitution was merely directory and failure to decide on time would not deprive the corresponding courts of jurisdiction or render their decisions invalid.
I
\
\
Gonzales-Decano v.Siapno,
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1279.
March 1, 2001
.J
HELD: The Court has consistently emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within .the mandated periods. The failure of a judge to render a decision within such time constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05 of the
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, lsi Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 43 of 44
Code of Judicial Conduct, which requires that a judge dispose of the court's business promptly and decide caseswithin the required periods. It amounts to gross inefficiency and warrants administrative sanction. That the transcript of stenographic notes in cases already deemed submitted for decision has not yet been completed does not excuse such failure. This Court has directed judges to take down notes of salient portions of the hearing and proceed in the preparation of decisions without waiting for the transcribed stenographic notes. The argument that such notes are not "official" would not relieve judges of their duty to render a decision within the required periods. The solution is not to await the transcription of the stenographic notes but for the judge to pay careful attention to the proceedings and take accurate notes. sanchez v. Vestil, AM No. RTJ-98-1419. October 13, 1998
HELD: Justice delayed is justice denied. This oft-repeated adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes. Hence, judges are mandated to decide cases seasonably. Judges who cannot comply with such mandate should ask for additional time, explaining in their request the reasons for the delay.
The .fule is that the ninety-day period for deciding cases should be observed by all judges, unless they have been granted additional time. Failure of a judge to resolve a case within the prescribed period constitutes gross dereliction of duty. For this, respondent judge must be sanctioned. . We reiterate that judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads which prevent them from disposing their cases within the reglementary period, may ask for additional time.
3 .. THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL Art. VIII, Sec. 8. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, it professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year. (3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a record of its proceedings. (4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the Supreme Court. The the Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget appropriations for the Council. (5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other function and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
Ex-officio members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(I)}

(1) Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (2) Secretary of Justice (3) Representative of Congress
Regular members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(I)}

(4) Representative of the Integrated Bar
Hand Out No. 7 - Judicial Department Constitutional Law 1, 1st Semester SY 2012-2013 Atty. Rene Callanta, Jr. Page 44 of 44 (5) Professor of Law (6) Retired member of the SC (7) Representative of private sector Secretary ex-officio [Art. VIlL Sec. 8(3)} > Clerk of the SC, who shall keep a record of its proceedings Appointment, Tenure, Salary Ex-officio members > For obvious reasons this does not apply since the position in the Council is good only while the person is the occupant of the office. Re ular members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)J >he regular members shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. > The term of the regular members is 4 years. > But the term of those initially appointed shall be staggered in the following way so as to create continuity in the council: rBP representative - 4 years Law professor - 3 years Retired justice - 2 yea rs Private sector - 1 year Regular members shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the sc. The SC shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the Council. [Art. VIII,
Sec.8(4)J
Functions 1. Recommend appointees to the Judiciary [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5)J . 2. 8ecommend appointees to the Office of the Ombudsman and his 5 deputies. (Art. Xl,
Sec. 9)
3. Such other functions and duties as the SC may assign [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(5)J
4. AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF APPROPRIATION
FOR THE JUDICIARY
Art. VIII, Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.

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HAND OUT No.

C. The Judicial Department

(2) (3) (4)

(5) (6) (7) (8)

(9) (10) (11) (12) (13)

B. APPOINTMENT AND QUALIFICATIONS

Id., Sec. 8. (5)

or practice {Art. VIII,Sec.

of law in the 7(3)f

De IIIlIana v. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)

* See procedure for

impeachment under Other Powers of Congress.

G. JURISDICTION (1) The Power of Judicial Review

Phil 56 (1937), J. Laurel laid down the doctrine

City of Pasig v. COMELEC, 314 SCRA 179 (1999)

GENERAL RULE: A request

b. All courts can exercise judicial review

Ynot v. lAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)

(2) Judicial Review and political questions.

Lawyers' League/or a Better Philippines v. Aquino, In re

Ber~lIdez and Marcos v. Mang/apus.

Jurisdiction over criminal cases where penalty imposed is reclusion

The Supreme Court shall have the following

and may promulgate

its rule for the

Article IX, A, Sec. 7

Art. IX, A, Sec. 7.

H. CONGRESSIONAL POWER OVER JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREMECOURT

Art. VIII, Sec. 2.

set jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

(It may not deprive in Section 5 hereof.)

over cases enumerated

3. It can increase 4. It can make general power).

the original the jurisdiction

of the SC (pursuant with

to its general courts

of the SC is concurrent with the CA. the security of

Cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(5) Appointment of officials and employees of entire judiciary

Art. VIiI, Sec. 5.

Court shall have the following

QUASI-JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE WORK OF JUDGES

c. Chief Justice as Chairman of the Judicial and Bar Council.

Inc. v. CA, 334 SCRA 465 (2000)

November 18, 1993:

following are considered en banc cases:

a. In a division of 7 members, the majority if all are present is 4. If only 6 are

b. In a division of 5 members, 3 votes are needed regardless of whether 5, 4, or

In division of 3 members, 3 votes are needed.

a. If a case is on appeal, the judgment appealed from is deemed affirmed except:

b. If the case is an original petition, then the case is deemed dismissed.

Cruz: In justifying SCRA 1:

the SC said in Borromeo

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1279.

Ex-officio members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(I)}

Regular members [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(I)}

4. AUTOMATIC RELEASE OF APPROPRIATION

FOR THE JUDICIARY

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