POTUS Watch

Survey of the Advisors to the President Of The United States

Issue nº5 – AFGHANISTAN

Paris, 11 March 2009

The inauguration of Barack Obama on January 20, 2009 began a new, historic chapter in
American politics. Yet international challenges have not relented, nor will inevitable
internal struggles that accompany high-level political decision-making. Modeling his
administration after Lincoln’s “team of rivals,” President Obama has brought on the
most experienced players, with big personalities and vehement convictions. As policy is
crafted, some advisors will have close proximity to the president while others will not
have the necessary relationship to move an agenda on critical policy matters.

Twice monthly, POTUS Watch will systematically assemble key positions in the Obama
administration on central foreign and economic policy issues in order to highlight
tendencies among his Cabinet and closest advisors. POTUS Watch will define majority
and minority opinions, examine who holds those views, and identify the relative power
of these actors in the decision-making process. By outlining major political currents,
POTUS Watch aims to spotlight the emergence of power blocs and trends in order to
better understand the foreign policy-making mechanisms in the Obama administration.

Amy Greene

Amy K. Greene
potuswatch@gmail.com
POTUS Watch, nº5 - Afghanistan 2

 Introduction

Despite increased attention being paid recently to other hot-button international events
and developments, the burning question of American foreign policy remains: What do to
in Afghanistan? Clearly, the administration’s consensus for a new plan comes from
Obama himself. It is he, after all, who fixed the focus on Afghanistan’s centrality.
Obama declared that Afghanistan is the crucial front and merits the use of all available
tools to turn around a losing situation.

President Obama announced the launch of a sixty-day review of the strategy in

Afghanistan. The principal actors conducting this review are the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and it is based largely on their recommendations that the President will fill in the
contours of his approach. More recently, Obama announced, to both praise and
criticism, the deployment of 17,000 additional American troops during spring and
summer 2009 – all of this before the strategic review has even been completed.

A classified report authored by the Joint Chiefs leaked to the press in February 2009 and
was purportedly seen by Gates himself. Among the recommendations are the following:
 Warn against sending a “surge” of troops, without eliminating possibility for
further soldier increases in future
 End efforts to create Western-style democracy and also lessen fight against
narcotics trafficking in order to focus on establishing – and achieving – pragmatic,
modest goals on the ground to restore basic order and security
 Bolster training of Pakistani security forces to conduct counter-insurgency
missions in tribal areas
 Secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal

Among the relevant national security actors in the Obama camp that deal directly with
the situation in Afghanistan, the biggest differences are not so much on the overarching
matters – such as the need to diversify tactics and strategic orientations – but rather on
the central prisms through which they axe the problem.

 Administration Actors

Vice President Joe Biden

Biden has been laying the groundwork for Obama, both by cultivating support among
allies in the lead-up to the 2009 NATO summit and by giving strong indications of
Obama’s broad orientations to test the political waters. At the Munich Conference in
February 2009, Biden told Allies, “We'll need your help. […] Our security is shared.
And so, too, I respectfully suggest, is our responsibility to defend it.”

During his January 2009 trip to Afghanistan as outgoing Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Joe Biden informed President Hamid Karzai that he
could no longer rely on the preferential presidential treatment granted by Bush and also

Amy K. Greene
potuswatch@gmail.com
POTUS Watch, nº5 - Afghanistan 3

foretold the end of regular video conferences, also a Bush custom. In 2008, Biden
abruptly walked out of a dinner with Karzai after the Afghan president insisted that no
Afghan government corruption existed and, should it, fault would not lie with him.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton

While assuring that she would still oversee Holbrooke as Special Envoy (though he also
reports directly to Obama), Clinton understood what Condoleezza Rice did not – by
attempting to oversee every major dossier, real action on the important ones becomes
more difficult. Clinton’s role in this conflict, while not minor, is not as strongly
implicated in policy minutia as that of Holbrooke.

During her confirmation hearing, Clinton, for her part, called Afghanistan a “narco-
state” with a government “plagued by limited capacity and widespread corruption.”
Recently, as Secretary of State, Clinton announced regular three-way meetings with top
officials from both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are presumed to be more
substantive on policy than the Bush meetings. On March 5, 2009, Clinton called for a
high-level international conference (a “big-tent meeting”) to discuss Afghanistan with
representatives from the United Nations, NATO, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other
strategic regional allies (Russia and India?).

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates

In January 2009, Gates summarized his core view on Afghanistan victory in these terms:
“My own personal view is that our primary goal is to prevent Afghanistan from being
used as a base for terrorists and extremists to attack the United States and our allies, and
whatever else we need to do flows from that objective.”

Gates is “very skeptical” that sending more than General David McKiernan’s requested
troop reinforcements will prove useful in a country with a tradition of resisting foreign
occupation. He wants to strip the ideology from the war redefine success through
modest, concrete, and winnable goals. Otherwise, Gates has been acutely critical of
NATO allies for being unwilling to contribute an equal share, calling them “unwilling to
step up to the plate” and “disappointing” in their performance. In 2008, Gates publicly
admonished Germany for exercising the “luxury” to keep troops out of Afghanistan
“thereby forcing other partners to carry an unproportionately high share of the fighting
and dying.” Since Obama’s inauguration, Gates has warned that the new American
administration was “prepared” to make greater commitments, “but there clearly will be
expectations that the allies must do more as well."

National Security Advisor James Jones

Jones’ influence over American security policy is central and his views on Afghanistan
well defined. “Symbolically, [Afghanistan is] more the epicenter of terrorism than Iraq.
If we don’t succeed in Afghanistan, you’re sending a very clear message to the terrorist

Amy K. Greene
potuswatch@gmail.com
POTUS Watch, nº5 - Afghanistan 4

organizations that the U.S., the U.N. and the 37 countries with troops on the ground can
be defeated.” Jones warns that a loss in Afghanistan would be disastrous for the
irreversible damage it would cause the NATO alliance. In a 2007 letter to the
Washington Post, Jones argued, “cohesion will be at grave risk. A moribund or unraveled
NATO will have profoundly negative geostrategic impact.” That said, he recognizes
that a core weakness of NATO is its lack of an effective strategy: the U.S. and NATO
have not developed an effective plan to deliver aid and to reconstruct newly-liberated
localities enough to prevent the return of the Taliban. Jones suggests that effective
training of local security forces is as critical to success as removing the focus from
military solutions only.

Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke

Holbrooke assumes his position armed with a reputation for frankness, blunt honesty,
and credibility. He acknowledges that the challenge in Afghanistan is entirely more
difficult than the challenge in Iraq, notably due to the role of Pakistan. He reports to
Clinton, but insisted on having direct contact with the White House because the
deployment of up to 30,000 additional troops will impact policymaking such that his role
will require interdepartmental coordination. He has also said that part of his job will be
to coordinate “what is clearly a chaotic foreign assistance program” in Afghanistan.
Holbrooke summed up the central challenges by insisting, “massive, officially sanctioned
corruption and the drug trade are the most serious problems the country faces, and they
offer the Taliban its only exploitable opportunity to gain support.” (Washington Post,
2008)

General David McKiernan

The head U.S. Commander in Afghanistan argues need to send 30,000 additional U.S.
troops in Afghanistan to “change the dynamics of the security situation, predominantly
in southern Afghanistan” where the situation is at a stalemate (February 2009). In
addition, he advocates an additional 4,000-soldier Army brigade to train the Afghan
Army. McKiernan warns against sending too many troops, however, without the
appropriate emphasis placed on reinforcing civil agencies within both the U.S. and
foreign governments. “There’s a point where you have too many foreign forces,” he said
(February 2009).

Head of U.S. Central Command General David Petraeus

Petraeus currently leads a 100-day strategic review of the situation in Afghanistan that
includes more than 100 members from State, the Pentagon, and the private sector split
among six sub-regional teams to investigate root causes of insecurity in the region as well
as solutions that integrate military, diplomacy, and development. Two of Petraeus’ focal
points are government-led reconciliation of Taliban insurgents in both Pakistan and
Afghanistan, and the use of diplomatic and economic tools to stimulate regional
development initiatives. He also seems to favor approaches that advocate cooperating

Amy K. Greene
potuswatch@gmail.com
POTUS Watch, nº5 - Afghanistan 5

with China and Saudi Arabia - Pakistan’s biggest investors – as well as creating a
contract group formed by the U.N. Security Council. The result of the strategic review
will be a new military plan for the region.

 External Actors

Afghan President Hamid Karzai

Karzai’s situation is delicate. The preferential relationship he enjoyed with George W.

Bush has made way for public admonitions by the Obama administration, including
Obama calling Karzai “unreliable” and “ineffective.” This looks to amount to the early
signs of a tough dialogue resembling the U.S.’s approach to South Vietnam.

Karzai’s depends largely on the Americans and is disappointing them, but Obama needs
Karzai. In spite of his waning popularity at home, and questions of his governing
competency, Karzai remains the most popular of possible candidates to lead
Afghanistan. In a test of wills, Karzai has proposed moving the elections up from
August 2009 to May, hoping to legitimize his power amidst the uncertainty of America’s
next step. Rush elections are expected to favor him, as opponents will not have had time
to mount challenges. Karzai tows a precarious line, positioning himself against the
Americans to appeal to a disgruntled Afghan people while also trying to keep America
pleased. All the while he evades responsibility for the failure of Afghan reconstruction.

Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari

Zardari has legitimacy in Pakistan but lacks the authority he needs to transform its
society. His country being inextricably linked to Afghanistan’s security, Zardari has the
difficult task of managing American presence in his country, while also being sufficiently
critical to please growing anti-American sentiment. Following an ineffective Musharraf,
Zardari has increasing pressure coming from the Obama administration to produce
results, notably in the border zones. In February 2009, Zardari called for increased
funding from allies, insisting that the Pakistani military has the might, technology, and
manpower to fight Taliban more inexpensively and efficiently than Allies.

 Points for Reflection

The roles and organization of the major actors is not yet clear, but certain questions
nonetheless emerge. What will be Joe Biden’s role vis-à-vis allies and policymaking?
How strictly will Hillary Clinton follow Obama’s directives? What will the relationship
between Jones and Clinton look like? How much authority will Hillary Clinton have
over Richard Holbrooke? What sort of power politics will Holbrooke play to reinforce
his position? Will Obama, Biden, and Clinton delegate relations with Karzai and
Zardari to Holbrooke? Given the Clinton’s recent proposal for an international
conference, how important of a role will the United States give to others in the
development and direction of a new policy in Afghanistan?

Amy K. Greene
potuswatch@gmail.com