People v. Doria People v.

Florencio Doria * Jun + and Violeta Gaddao [ Neneth ] 22 Jan 1999 / Puno / Appeal from a Pasig RTC decision Search and seizure > Nature, scope and definition > Types > Warrantless search and seizure > Plain view doctrine FACTS Members of the PNP Narcotics Command received information that one Jun [Doria] was engaged in illegal drug activities, so they decided to entrap and arrest him in a buy-bust operation. He was arrested. They frisked him but did not find the marked bills on him, and upon inquiry, he revealed that he left it at the house of his associate Neneth [Gaddao], so he led the police team to her house. The team found the door open and a woman inside the house. Jun identified her as Neneth, and she was asked by SPO1 Badua about the marked money as PO3 Manlangit looked over her house [he was still outside the house]. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. One of the box s flaps was open, and inside it was something wrapped in plastic, and it appeared similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by Jun. His suspicion aroused, so he entered the house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and saw 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth and they arrested her. The bricks were examined and they were found to be dried marijuana leaves. Florencio Doria and Violeta Gaddao were charged with violation of RA 6425 [Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972], Section 4 [Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs] in relation to Section 21 [Attempt and Conspiracy]. RTC convicted them. ISSUE AND HOLDING WON RTC correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid. NO RATIO Re: warrantless arrest Gaddao s warrantless arrest was illegal because she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by Doria. Doria did not point to her as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily mean that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs. If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of the criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. Plain view issue Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. Requisites a. The law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area b. The discovery of the evidence in plain view is

An object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. If the package is such that an experienced observer could infer from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." Each of the ten bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was marijuana; hence, it was not in plain view and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. The fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddao s house Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller and the presentation of the drug as evidence in court.

Prosecution established the fact that in consideration of the P1,600.00 he received, Doria sold and delivered 970 grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer Prosecution failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with accusedappellant Doria in the sale of said drug

In Gerente Case: The case is all about killing of certain person Clarito Blace by the appellant that was arrested by the police force. Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito. The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. Is the arrest valid? 'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: "(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;" "(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

inadvertent c. It is immediately apparent to the officer that the item

he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus: "To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."

required from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance of their duties. People v. Hernandez Facts: On January 21, 1992, at about 3:30 p.m., accused Lorenzo drove Eva to the Immaculate Concepcion Academy to get Sharleen. He parked the car in the school's parking lot and Eva alighted to get Sharleen. Minutes later, Eva and Sharleen returned to the car. Sharleen took the backseat, behind the driver. While Eva was starting to board beside Sharleen, an unidentified man sit beside her and warned her not to shout. After 20 minutes, the car slowed down in front of an iron gate and the man in the front seat and Sharleen got out of the car. After a couple of minutes, the man release the nanny to inform her employer of Sharleen's ransom. Eva called up her employer's house, recounted the incident and asked that she be picked up at Paterno Street. Minutes later, Samson Cheng, Sharleen's uncle, fetched Eva and brought her back to the Tan residence.[2] Sharleen's father, received a call from one of the kidnappers demanding a 10M ransom. They haggled in the amount and reached no agreement. The police then left Tan's house.[3] Thereafter, several phone calls were made by the kidnappers to the Tan family. Jacinto asked for a lower ransom in the amount of 409,000 wherein the kidnappers agreed and instructed Jacinto to leave the money in a garbage can in front of the Town and Country Lodge in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. Jacinto complied and then returned to his house to await the call of the kidnappers on Sharleen's release. A week later,the kidnappers again called up the Tan residence. They informed Jacinto that they had released Sharleen and left her at the Perpetual Help Hospital in Espaa, Manila. Jacinto rushed to the hospital and found Sharleen who was extremely traumatized by the incident. Jacinto himself suffered from nervous breakdown.[5] An intensive manhunt was launched to capture the kidnappers of Sharleen. CIS Chief Inspector Major Ruben Zacarias organized two (2) teams to conduct the hunt. The team composed of SPO3 Gregorio Cuachon and SPO1 Danilo T. Salas and headed by Inspector Warlito Platon was directed to verify the information that Sharleen was hidden by accused Alfredo Tumaneng in a house at #15 Kennedy Street, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City. Officers Cuachon and Salas conducted a discreet surveillance of the area and were able to verify the information. They also found out that accused Tumaneng had left the safehouse and has transferred to Mayupis, Malabon, Metro Manila. Seven (7) suspects were identified by the CIS. Five of them, namely, Hernandez, Tumaneng, Lorenzo, Jacob and Famodulan, were captured by the CIS operatives. Each executed an extrajudicial confession which became the basis of the criminal charge against them. Upon arraignment, the five accused pleaded not guilty. During pendency of the trial, accused Hernandez and Jacob escaped from detention. They were tried in absentia. Appellant Tumaneng and Lorenzo contends that their warrantless arrest was illegal and their extrajudicial confession were obtained without the benefit of a competent and independent counsel of their own choice. On the other hand, appellant Famodulan contends that he was not positively identified as one of the conspirators and he was arrested and investigated in violation f his constitutional rights.

PEOPLE VS. SUCRO [195 SCRA 388; G.R. No. 93239; 18 Mar 1991]

Facts: Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalados house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from Regalados house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment, P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front of the chapel.

The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans. Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante.

Issues:

(1)

Whether

or

Not arrest without

warrant

is

lawful.

(2)

Whether

or

Not

evidence

from

such arrest is

admissible.

Issue: Held: Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec 12 of Rules of Criminal Procedureprovides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge Whether or not the warrantless arrests were illegal Ruling: The Supreme Court held that appellants were arrested without the benefit of a warrant and under circumstances other than justifying a warrantless arrest. Clearly, their warrantless arrests violated the Constitution but such was cured by the failure of the appellants to move for the quashing of the information before the arraignment. In the case at bar, by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial, appellants waived their right to challenge the legality of their arrest.

Asian Surety and Insurance Co. vs. HerreraG.R. No. 25232 December 20, 1973 Facts: Respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent CelsoZoleta, Jr., issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminalcase of estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the AsianSurety and Insurance Co. Asian Surety and Insurance Co. filed a petition to quash and annul the sea rch warrant issued, assailing the validity of the search warrant. Herein petitio nerclaimed that it was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of theConstitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 2, of Article VI of theNew Constitution, and Sections, 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126 of The Rules of Court. Asian Surety and Insurance Co. contended that the issuance of a searc h warrantfor more than one specific offense, vaguely describing and not particularizing the properties to be search and seized, and not providing the time for making search is clearly violative of the Rules of Court, not to mention the failure of theNBI agents to provide a detailed receipt of the things to be seized. Issue: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid. HELD: Petition to quash and annul the search warrant was granted. It was ruled that thesearch warrant was indeed issued for four separate and distinct offenses of :estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, and is clearly incontravention of the explicit command of Section 3 of Rule 126, of the Rules providing that : no s earch warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. To prohibit the so-called general warrants is the evil sought to beremedied by such provision. The search warrant herein involved reads in part: property (Subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used orintended to be used as the means committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned. It is plain and clear that there are three classes of properties intended for such search warrant and respondent Judge was not ableto specifically state which properties were to be searched and seized. The Courthad occasion to explain the purpose of the requiring that a warrant shouldparticularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to makesure that the things to be seized would be limited to those particularly described in the search warrant, to avoid unreasonable searches and seizures. And thus, adetailed receipt must also be given to do away with those conducting the search afield day for having been issued such a broad and unlimited search warrant. Pp v Acol FACTS:

responding police officers, upon seeing four persons, one of whom was wearing his stolen jacket, walking casually towards Fort Bonifacio, told the police authorities to accost said persons. After the CAPCOM officers introduced themselves, the four men scampered to different directions but three of them, namely, Tirso Acol, Pio Boses, and Albert Blanco, were apprehended. Tirso Acol and Pio Boses were each found in possession of an unlicensed .38 caliber revolver with bullets. After the arrest, the three men were brought to Fort Bonifacio and were identified by Percival Tan and the passengers who ganged up on the accused.

To reinforce the theory of unauthorized possession of firearms, Sgt. Garcia presented a certification (Exhibit I) issued by the Firearms and Explosives Unit stating that the accused are not licensed firearm holders.

On the other hand, Pio Boses and Tirso Acol pleaded innocent to the charges levelled against them, proferring a general denial.

Accused-appellant Pio Boses asserted on the witness stand that after establishing his residence at Pasay City for about six months, he engaged in the business of vending "balut". During the incident in question, he recalled that while so engaged in his trade, three persons allegedly acosted him, took his money, "balut" and "penoy", and that he was thereafter brought to a cell where he was forced to confess ownership of one gun which was shown to him. He nonetheless denied participation in the hold up.

For his part, Tirso Acol, a laborer and at that time having resided in Metro Manila for about two months, recollected that he spent the night at his cousin's house in Paraaque on September 28, 1990, and that he left Paraaque at around 5 in the morning of September 29, 1990. According to him, the jeepney he was then riding developed engine trouble, and alighting therefrom he was arrested for no apparent reason. When he was brought to the cell, he was allegedly coerced into admiting possession of the other gun. Just like his co-accused, he too, denied knowledge of the hold up.

Two passengers who were apprehended after they supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger jeepney on September 29, 1990 were haled to court, not for the felonious asportation, but for possession of the two unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered from them which were inst rumental in the commission of the robo (pp. 7-8, Rollo.)

ON CrimPro

The court a quo was unpersuaded by these general denials, observing:

Of the two persons accused, only Pio Boses interposed an appeal from the trial court's judgment inasmuch as Tirso Acol y Barnubal had escaped from incarceration thereby abating any review of his culpability for the misdeed.

The People's inculpatory accusations during the joint trial were to the effect that at around 3:45 in the morning of September 29, 1990, when Percival Tan was driving his jeepney, two men boarded the vehicle in Cubao. When they crossed Pasay Road, the two wayfarers, together with two other companions, announced a hold-up. Percival Tan was instructed to proceed atop the Magallanes interchange where the other passengers were divested of their personal belongings, including the jacket of passenger Rene Araneta. Thereafter, the robbers alighted at the Shell Gas Station near the Magallanes Commercial Center after which Percival Tan and his passengers went to Fort Bonifacio to report the crime. A CAPCOM team was forthwith formed to track down the culprits. Victim Rene Araneta who went with the

As can be gathered from the foregoing testimonies of the accused, the line of defense they have adopted is one of denial. Indeed, they denied that the firearms and ammunition in question were found in their persons in the early morning of September 29, 1989. They also denied the truth of the testimonies of Sgt. Faltado, Percival Tan, and Rene Araneta. The defense however did not cite any valid reasons for the Court not to give credence to the testimonies. In the circumstance, the Court is constrained to consider the testimonies of the accused to be self-serving. In the face of the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court can only take their denials with the proverbial grain of salt.

RTC: re: Boses

Verily, it is simply hard for the Court to believe that the accused are simple provincial who are lost in the big city; that accused Pio Boses who is a resident of Pasay City, does not know well-known places in Metro Manila such as the South Super Highway and the Fort Bonifacio-Nichols interchange; that he did not know the streets where he plied his trade as a balut vendor. Indeed, how can this be true when he himself admitted that from 7:00 p.m. of September 28, 1989, he spent his time walking in the street in the area and yet he never claimed he had ever lost his way.

IV. . . IN CONVICTING BOTH ACCUSED AS THERE WAS NOT CLEAR SHOWING THAT EXHIBITS "F", "F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G-1" TO "G-4" WERE THE ONES USED BY THE ROBBERS IN COMMITTING THE CRIME OF ROBBERY/HOLD UP.

RULING:

RTC re: Acol

The same is true with accused Tirso Acol. The Court is convinced that he lied on the witness stand. He claimed that he was in the place where he was arrested because he had just come from the residence of his cousin, Genny Acol, and the passenger jeepney he had boarded on his way home just happened to break down at that place. In the mind of the Court this alibi of the accused is too much of a coincidence, and too convenient an excuse, for the Court to believe. In this connection, the Court notes his testimony on cross examination that he was unable to get in touch with his relatives, including Genny Acol, for possible assistance and to get Genny Acol to corroborate his testimony, because the latter had already left for the province and that none of his other relatives knew that he had been charged in this case. But when queried how he was able to say this, he testified that he had written to his uncle and that he received a reply letter from him and that it was from this reply letter of his uncle that he learned that Genny Acol had already left for the province. This testimony of accused Tirso Acol, if it accomplished anything, helped convinced the Court that he is given to lying. For sure, if he had written to his uncle and that the latter had replied to him, it is plain that he must have informed his uncle about the case and that the latter knew about the case and the fact that he was in jail and needed help. In any event, established jurisprudence dictates that between the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the denials of the accused the Court must place its reliance on the former. As a matter of fact, jurisprudence also indicates that greater weight must be given to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses when they are officers of the law. (People vs. Mostoles, Jr., 124 SCRA 906; People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 129).

It is axiomatic to the point of being elementary that herein accusedappellant can not feign denial of due process where he had the opportunity to present his defense, through his own narration on the witness stand (Domingo vs. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766 [1992]; Gonzales vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 595 [1992]. Withal, and as correctly pointed out by the People, the omission of a party to present witnesses to corroborate the principal basis for exculpation, on account of the witnesses' admitted tardiness in arriving in court, is a puerile proposition to support reopening of the case.

As initially intimated herein, Tirso Acol escaped from detention during the trial below, thus obviating any review of his conviction, as indeed, even if he had appealed and thereafter escaped, he would be considered as having abandoned his appeal (People vs. Quinitan, 197 SCRA 32 [1991]; Section 8, Rule 124, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure).

In regard to the second ascription aired by the accused-appellant, emphasis is laid on the fact that the court a quo should have relied more on the explanation offered by the defense rather than giving credence to the testimony of the People's witnesses. For one thing, accused- appellant asseverates that they could not have been positively identified by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta considering that it was then still dark when the accused boarded the jeep, up to the time they were apprehended. But counsel for accused-appellant concedes that the jeep was lighted subject to the caveat that it was not well lighted which does not entirely foreclose positive identification of the culprits who admittedly shared a ride with their victims and were thus seated within the closed quarters of the jeepney. Moreover, it was established by the prosecution that Rene Araneta's jacket was one of the items which was asported, that it was worn by one of the felons, and that the jacket was recognized by Rene Araneta from a distance of 1-1/2 meters. To lessen the impact of the affirmative statements uttered against accused- appellant, it is argued that the immediate propensity of a criminal is to move out from the scene of the locus criminis and not merely to walk casually within the vicinity. We said in People vs. Ocampo (G.R. No. 80262, September 1, 1993) that indeed, there can be no legal dispute to the legal proposition that flight from the scene of the felony is one of the indicia of a guilty conscience, but it is equally true, we proceeded to say, that culprits, in exceptional cases, have become bolder by returning to the scene of the crime to feign innocence. At any rate, it has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the factual findings of the trial court and the conclusions drawn therefrom are accorded utmost respect since the magistrate at the court of origin had the first hand impression of the demeanor and deportment of witnesses (People vs. Lim, 206 SCRA 176 [1992]; People vs. Castillo, 208 SCRA 62).

With respect to Pio Boses, he chose to articulate his protestation of innocence by claiming that the trial court below erred:

With respect to the so-called warrantless arrest of accused--appellant, we are of the view that the search falls within the purview of Section 5(b) of Rule 113 which serves as an exception to the requisite warrant prior to arrest:

I. . . IN NOT GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE URGENT MOTION OF ACCUSED PIO BOSES TO REOPEN THE CASE HENCE DEPRIVING HIM TO PRESENT HIS WITNESSES WHOSE TESTIMONIES WOULD HAVE BEEN MATERIAL TO HIS DEFENSE THEREBY AMOUNTING TO A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;

II. . . IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF BOTH ACCUSED PIO BOSES AND TIRSO ACOL; INSTEAD, IT RELIED SOLELY ON THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION'S WITNESSES.

III. . . IN ADMITTING THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF EXHIBITS "E", "F", "F-1" TO "F-5", "G", "G- 1" TO "G-5", SINCE THE ARRESTING OFFICERS ADMITTED THEY WERE NOT ARMED WITH A WARRANT OF ARREST, NOR A SEARCH WARRANT WHEN THEY CHASED AND FRISKED ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS AND PROCEEDED TO ARREST THEM.

inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan and Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed (People vs. Gerente, 219 SCRA 756 [1993]; People vs. Tonog, Jr., 205 SCRA 772 [1992]). And since accused-appellant's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was valid (People vs. Tanilon, 221 SCRA 671 [1993]). Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition (People vs. Cruz, 165 SCRA 135 [1988]). The principle imparted by Justice Padilla in Cruz was based on the ruling of this Court in Magoncia vs. Palacio (90 Phil. 771 [1948]) that:

. . . When, in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the offending police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from

performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the corpus delicti. Nonetheless, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment" as erroneously imposed by the lower court must be modified to read only as reclusion perpetua, as provided by Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, said penalty being distinct from life imprisonment. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with the slight modification that the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion perpetua. Further, the court orders the forfeiture of the firearms and other incidental paraphernalia in favor of the Philippine National Police to be disposed of in accordance with law. No pronouncement is made as to costs. MALALOAN vs CA

existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress shall likewise by subject to any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court. 4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the necessary safeguards and documentation therefor. 5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different information or complaints and filed in two or more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved,

FACTS: The crime alleged is a violation of PD 1866. The officers applied for a search warrant in Kalookan City. However, the place to be searched was in Quezon City. The officers executed the search and seized several firearms. After the search and seizure was conducted, the accused are now assailing the validity of the search warrant since they claim that it was void for lack of jurisdiction. The accused buttresses their claim arguing that the criminal case was filed in the Quezon City RTC, not in Kalookan City. ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant was valid. HELD: Yes, the search warrant was valid. A warrant merely constitutes criminal process. It is not a criminal action. The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action. Moreover, no law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. NOTE: Policy guidelines: 1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover. 2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original are subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived. 3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression of as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available,

such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on the applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case. SEPARATE OPINION: (J. Davide) The absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting a court from issuing a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction should not be construed as a grant of blanket authority to any court of justice in the country to issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. A search warranty is but an incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be co-extensive with the courts territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to the statutory (BP 129) defining the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would amount to judicial legislation.

Nolasco vs. Cruz Pano, 132 SCRA 152 (1985) FACTS: Milagros Aguilar-Roque was arrested together with Cynthia Nolasco by the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). Milagros had been wanted as a high ranking officer of the CPP. The arrest took place at 11:30 a.m. of August 6, 1984. At noon of the same day, her premises were searched and 428 documents, a portable typewriter and 2 boxes were seized. Earlier that day, Judge Cruz Pao issued a search warrant to be served at Aguilar-Roques leased residence allegedly an underground house of the CPP/NPA. On the basis of the documents seized, charges of subversion and rebellion by the CSG were filed by but the fiscals office merely charged her and Nolasco with illegal possession of subversive materials. Aguilar-Roque asked for suppression of the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained and that the search warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicants witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant was valid? HELD: NO. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or

affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and

It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an allembracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.

therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicants knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts

It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general.

ALVAREZ vs CFI Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void. Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable. Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is

is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts People vs. Sy Juco 64 Phil. 667 (1937) FACTS: The crime alleged is fraud of revenue against the Government. Pursuant to a search warrant issued, the officers searched the building occupied by Santiago Sy Juco. In the process, the authorities seized, among others, an art metal filing cabinet claimed by Atty. Remo to be his and contained some letters, documents and papers belonging to his clients. Also, books belonging to Salakam Lumber Co., Inc., were seized. ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure is valid. HELD: No, the search and seizure was not valid. It is not stated in the affidavit that the books, documents or records referred to therein are being used or are intended to be used in the commission of fraud against the Government and, notwithstanding the lack of such allegation, the warrant avers that they are actually being used for such purpose. Also, it assumes that the entire building is occupied by Santiago Sy Juco, when the only ground upon which such assumption is based is the BIR agents statement which is mere hearsay (coming from an informant) and when in fact part thereof was occupied by Atty. Remo. It was not asked that the things belonging to Atty. Remo and to others also be searched and seized.

Prudente vs Executive Judge Dayrit

Chester Cabalza recommends his visitors to please read the original & full text of the case cited. Xie xie!

Prudente vs Executive Judge Dayrit

G.R. No. 82870

knowledge of the applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.

December 14, 1989

Facts: Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it The case is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of failed to particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there respondent Judge dated 9 March 1988 which denied Dr. Nemesis E. were several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP. Prudentes (PUP President) motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as well as his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier order. In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, an application for the issuance of a search warrant, docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Dr. Nemesis E. Prudente, Defendant." In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw alleged the following: that in PUP he has in his control or possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and ammunition which are illegally possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring to the Honorable Court. Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes post facto that the search in question yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated in the application for search warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search warrant the Issue: supporting hand grenades were itself only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched premises of the PUP, according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party. Probable Cause captioned: "For Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives.

Whether or not the application for Search Warrant No. 87-14 filed is legal against the defendant in violation of PD No. 1866?

Held: The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of "probable cause" in the valid issuance of a search warrant, as enunciated in earlier cases. True, these requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the individual against Search Warrant unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.

No. The questioned orders dated 9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No. 87-14 were annulled and set aside.

In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, the Court laid the following test in determining whether the allegations in an application for search warrant or Under Oath in a supporting deposition, are based on personal knowledge or not, stating that true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the applicant to state, under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search warrant, his application having been filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's Circular No. 19,

dated 14 August 1987, which reads: That applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that the issuance is urgent.

Case Digest on WILLIAM GARAYGAY VS. PEOPLE G.R. NO. 135503 (2000) Motion to quash Facts: The Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila issued a search warrant authorizing the search of As house in Lapu-Lapu City. By virtue of the warrant, As house was searched. A filed in the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City a motion to quash the search warrant and to exclude illegally seized evidence. Issue: Whether the motion to quash should have been filed with the RTC of Manila which issued the warrant. Held: No. When a search warrant is issued by one court, if the criminal case by virtue of the warrant is raffled off to a branch other than the one which issued the warrant, all incidents relating to the validity of the warrant should be consolidated with the branch trying the criminal case.

Papa vs. Mago [GR L-27360, 28 February 1968] En Banc, Zaldivar (J): 9 concur Facts: Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police Department, acting upon a reliable information received on 3 November 1966 to the effect that a certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs, conducted surveillance at gate 1 of the customs zone. When the trucks left gate 1 at about 4:30 p.m. of 4 November 1966, elements of the counter-intelligence unit went after the trucks and intercepted them at the Agrifina Circle, Ermita, Manila. The load of the two trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized on instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila a petition "for mandamus with restraining order or preliminary injunction (Civil Case 67496), praying for the issuance of a restraining order, ex parte, enjoining the police and customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and exemplary damages in their favor. On 10 November 1966, Judge Hilarion Jarencio issued an order ex parte restraining Ricardo Papa (as Chief of Police of Manila) and Juan Ponce Enrile (as Commissioner of Customs) in Civil Case 67496. However, when the restraining order was received by Papa. et. al., some bales had already been opened by the examiners of the Bureau of Customs in the presence of officials of the Manila Police Department, an assistant city fiscal and a representative of Remedios Mago. Under date of 15 November 1966, Mago filed an amended petition, including as party defendants Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis of the Port of Manila and Lt. Martin Alagao of the Manila Police Department. At the hearing on 9 December 1966, the lower court, with the conformity of the parties, ordered that an inventory of the goods be made by its clerk of court in the presence of the representatives of the claimant of the goods, the Bureau of Customs, and the Anti- Smuggling Center of the Manila Police Department. On 23 December 1966, Mago filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that since

the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same should be released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court. On 7 March 1967, the Judge issued an order releasing the goods to Mago upon her filing of a bond in the amount of P40,000.00. On 13 March 1967, Papa, on his own behalf, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court releasing the goods under bond, upon the ground that the Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila to hold the goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings. Without waiting for the court's action on the motion for reconsideration, and alleging that they had no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Papa, et. al. filed the action for prohibition and certiorari with preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court. Held: The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that Papa, Chief of Police of Manila, could lawfully effect the search and seizure of the goods in question. The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance. This was what happened precisely in the case of Lt. Martin Alagao who, with his unit, made the search and seizure of the two trucks loaded with the nine bales of goods in question at the Agrifina Circle. He was given authority by the Chief of Police to make the interception of the cargo. Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant herein. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace." Except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws. Herein, Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances obtaining herein. The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Having declared that the seizure by the members of the Manila Police Department of the goods in question was in accordance with law and by that seizure the Bureau of Customs had acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, to the exclusion of the Court of First Instance of Manila

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant. Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently, certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and 7. Issue: If defendants arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and several NPA-related documents are lawful. Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendants house to arrest him upon the information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with themin wanton violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the state, however powerful, doesnt have access to a mans home, his haven of refuge where his individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around him. In the traditional formulation, a mans house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government. The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC: a) b) c) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12: A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendants arrest, he wasnt in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any subversive acthe was plowing his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it isnt enough to suspect a crime may have been committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against selfincrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence. Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are all

inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law. The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion. Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, while the government should continue to repel the communists, the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.

PEOPLE VS. ARUTA [288 SCRA 626; G.R. NO. 120515; 13 APR 1998]

Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa will be arriving from Baguio Citywith a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked cash katutak.

Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie Balweg. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented.

The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.

Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence

2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they

are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

112.

RULE

126,

RULES

OF

COURT

Section 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. An 4. Consented warrantless search; application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

5.

Customs

search;

a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed. b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within

6.

Stop

and

Frisk;

the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicialregion

7.

Exigent

and

Emergency

Circumstances.

where

the

warrant

shall

be

enforced.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence. Section 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and proceedings thereon.

RULE

113,

RULES

OF

COURT

(a) The officer must forthwith deliver the property seized to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory thereof duly verified

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

under

oath.

(b) Ten (10) days after issuance of the search warrant, the issuing judge shall ascertain if the return has been made, and if none, shall summon the person

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

to whom the warrant was issued and require him to explain why no return was made. If the return has been made, the judge shall ascertain whether section 11 of this Rule has been complained with and shall require that the property seized be delivered to him. The judge shall see to it that subsection (a) hereof has been complied with.

(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

(c) The return on the search warrant shall be filed and kept by the custodian of the log book on search warrants who shall enter therein the date of the return, the result, and other actions of the judge.

A violation of this section shall constitute contempt of court.

Facts: Idel Aminnudin, accused-appellant was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him because of a tip from one their informers simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBIlaboratory for examination. It was found to contain three kilos of whatwere later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner. An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. Both were arraigned and

plastic bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it. Charges against Roberto Salanguit y Ko for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425, i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, (Criminal Cases Q-95-64357 and Q-95-64358, respectively) were filed, and after hearing, the trial court convicted him in Criminal Cases Q-9564357 and Q-95-64358 for violation of Section 16 and 8, respectively.

The accused-appellant contended that the evidence against him was inadmissible because the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.

ISSUES:

Whether the warrant was invalid for failure of providing evidence to support pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana,the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. However the RTC rejected his allegations. Saying that he only has two watches during that time and that he did not sufficiently proved the injuries allegedly sustained. Yes. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. In sum, with respect to the seizure of shabu from Salanguits residence, Search Warrant 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be Issue: Whether or not search of defendants bag is legal. seized. With respect to, and in light of the plain view doctrine, the police failed to allege the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered on Salanguits person or in an area within his immediate Held: The search was illegal. Defendant was not caught in flagrante delicto, which could allow warrantless arrest or search. At the moment of his arrest, he was not committing a crime. Nor was he about to do so or had just done so. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. The said marijuana therefore could not be appreciated as evidence against thedefendant, and furthermore he is acquitted of the crime as charged. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition, was invalid. Thus, the Court affirmed the decision as to Criminal Case Q-95-64357 only. HELD: the seizure of drug paraphernalia, and whether the marijuana may be included as evidence in light of the plain view doctrine.

PEOPLE VS. MAQUEDA [242 SCRA 565; G.R. NO.112983; 22 MAR 1994] Tuesday, February 10, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: British Horace William Barker (consultant of WB) was slain inside his house in Tuba, Benguet while his Filipino wife, TeresitaMendoza was badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Two household

FACTS:

A search warrant was shown to the accused-appellant and the police operatives started searching the house. They found heat-sealed transparent

helpers of the victims identified Salvamante (a former houseboy of the victims) and Maqueda as the robbers. Mike Tabayan and his friend also saw

the two accused a kilometer away from the house of the victims that same morning, when the two accused asked them for directions.

because such testimony was objected to as hearsay. Maqueda voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course of an investigation, but in connection with Maqueda's plea to be utilized as a state

Maqueda was then arrested in Guinyangan, Quezon. He was taken to Calauag, Quezon where he signed a Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated his participation in the crime. According to SPO3 Molleno, he informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before he signed such document. Afterwards he was brought to the Benguet Provincial Jail. While he was under detention, Maqueda filed a Motion to Grant Bail. He stated therein that "he is willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the above entitled case, it appearing that he is the least guilty among the accused in this case."

witness; and as to the other admission (Salvosa), it was given to a private person therefore admissible.

Note: a distinction between a confession and admission has been made by the SC:

Admission of a party. The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.

Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given

Maqueda also admitted his involvement in the commission of the robbery to Prosecutor Zarate and to Salvosa.

in evidence against him. People v. Serzo Rights of the Accused Facts:

Issue: Whether or Not the trial court was correct in holding that the Sinumpaan Salaysay is admissible as evidence.

1. Appellant Mario Serzo was convicted of murder by the lower court for the stabbing/killing of Alfredo Casabal after the latter rescued minors being held by the former. 2. Pre-trial was waived and the case proceeded to trial on the merits. 3. The accused alleged that he was denied the right to counsel. During the arraignment he appeared without counsel,so the court appointed a counsel

Held: No. The Sinumpaang Salaysay is inadmissible because it was in clear violation of the constitutional rights of the accused. First, he was not informed of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Second, he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such

de officio. Thereafter, he moved that the arraignment be reset so he can engage the services of his own counsel however, during the arraignment, he still appeared without one. The arraignment proceeded with him being assisted by the counsel de officio. 4. During the trial, the same counsel appeared and cross-examined for the accused. Issue: Whether or not the accused was denied of his right to counsel HELD: NO. Herein, the accused was provided with a counsel de officio who

refusal. And yet, despite his knowing fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to do so.

assisted him in all stages of the proceedings.The option to hire ones counsel cannot be used to sanction reprehensible dilatory tactics, trifle with the Rules or prejudice the equally important right of the State and the offended party to speedy and adequate justice.

The contention of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to such rights anymore because the information has been filed and awarrant of arrest has been issued already, is untenable. The exerciseof the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1) of the Bill of Rights are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is "under investigation for the commission of an offense." The right covers the period from custodial investigation until judgment is rendered, even on appeal. RA 7438 provides that any person arrested or detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. Pursuant to Section 12(3) of the Bill of Rights therefore, such extra-judicial admission is inadmissible as evidence. The right is however not absolute and is waivable; a) the state must balance the private against the state's and offended party's equally important rightto speedy and adequate justice, and b) the right is waivable as long as the waiver is unequivocal, knowing, and intelligently made. As to the admissions made by Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa, the trial court admitted their testimony thereon only to prove the tenor of their conversation but not to prove the truth of the admission PEOPLE VS. JUDGE AYSON [175 SCRA 216; G.R. NO. 85215; 7 JUL 1989] The right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial system where an accused is pitted against the awesome prosecution machinery of the state. It is also a recognition of the accused not having the skill to protect himself before a tribunal which has the power to take his life or liberty.

2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conductand Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal. The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him. The People of the Philippines vs Ruben Montilla y Gatdula Political Law Search and Seizure Informers Tip Warrantless Arrest On 19 June 1994 at about 2pm, police officers Talingting and Clarin were informed by an asset that a drug courier would be arriving from Baguio to Dasmarias carrying an undetermined amount of marijuana. The next day, the informant pointed at Montilla as the courier who was waiting in a waiting shed Brgy Salitran, Dasmarias. Montilla was then apprehended and he was caught in possession of a bag and a carton worth 28 kilos of marijuana. Montilla denied the allegation and he said he came to Cavite from Baguio for work and he does not have any effects with him at that time except for some pocket money. He was sentenced to death thereafter. He averred that the search and seizure conducted was illegal for there was no warrant and that Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused. he should have been given the opportunity to cross examine the informant. He said that if the informant has given the cops the information about his arrival as early as the day before his apprehension, the cops should have ample time to secure a search warrant. Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar). ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest conducted is legal. HELD: The SC ruled that the warrantless arrest is legal and so was the warrantless search. Sec 2 Art 3 of the Constitution has its exception when it This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against (2) searches of moving vehicles, himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived. (6) stop and frisk measures have been invariably recognized as the traditional exceptions. Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include: In the case at bar, it should be noted that the information relayed by informant to the cops was that there would be delivery of marijuana at 1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio in the early morning of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, (4) consented searches; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; comes to warrantless searches, they are: (1) customs searches; the free will shall be used against him.

3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

(5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;

this would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.

hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible. Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid: ? Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant) ? ? Search of moving vehicle Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas.

section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest. Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender

(1) dangerous weapons, and

No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from

(2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of an offense.

PADILLA vs CA Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession: 1. 2. 3. 4. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver

petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian. 3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner. Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.

Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro). Issues: 1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum. Stonehill Vs. Diokno Case Digest Stonehill Vs. Diokno 20 SCRA 383 L-19550 June 19, 1967 Facts: Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates, a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and/or the corporations of which they were officers, directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers). as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Petitioners contentions are: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law Respondents-prosecutors contentions (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein. Issue: Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained legally. Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally. Held: The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the

simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws.