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PANEL: Warning of Transnational Threats

What is Warning?

(1) What are the essential principles and methods that the U.S. developed during the
Cold War for analyzing and preparing warnings of a surprise attack?

- Did the U.S. use these principles and methods before 9/11 concerning
terrorism?

(2) What does "warning" mean concerning counterterrorism?

- Is "warning" limited to instances in which the Intelligence Community knows a

terrorist attack's time and place?

- Doesn't "warning" also encompass when the Intelligence Community has

credible information concerning a threat, even in the absence of information on
time and place?

Is warning possible when the information is vague, fragmentary and general in

nature?

(3) Has the threshold for warning of terrorist attacks been too low?

Did recipients of warning ever experience "warning fatigue" prior to or after

9/11?

(4) Ms. McCarthy wrote in 1998 that "the likelihood of a cataclysmic warning failure
is growing." Do you believe that the attacks of 9/11 were "a cataclysmic warning
failure?"

Who is in Charge?

(5) Who was is in charge of warning of terrorist attacks against the U.S. prior to 9/11?

- Who is in charge today?

- Who should be in charge in the future?

(6) What entities within the Intelligence Community should have some responsibility
for warning of terrorist attacks?

What is the division of labor among the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, the
CIA's Counterterrorist Center, the National Intelligence Center, and other
agencies?

(7) What is the role of vulnerability assessments in warning?

 What is the Department of Homeland Security's role in warning as the
department identifies vulnerabilities in the U.S. homeland?

Role of the Policymaker

(8) What is policymakers' role in the warning process, and what should their role be?

When the system is working properly, how should policymakers respond to

warning information?

Can policymakers take meaningful action on warning information in the

absence of specificity on time, place, or method of attack?

(9) What entities and mechanisms currently exist within the government to ensure that
warning is connecting to timely and effective responses?

How can these entities and mechanisms be strengthened?

(10) Are there other ways we can improve our government's ability to provide warning?

Congress

(11) Has Congress met its responsibility in establishing priorities, providing resources,
and conducting oversight of the Intelligence Community?

- Do you recommend any changes to Congressional oversight?

 Former DCI and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger

(1) Is 9/11 evidence of systemic problems with the leadership, organization,

performance, or funding of the Intelligence Community?

- Was 9/11 an intelligence failure?

(2) Can the DCI fulfill his responsibilities as the President's principal advisor on
intelligence and head of the Intelligence Community if agencies responsible for
imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, and collection acquisition capabilities -
NIMA, NSA, and NRO respectively - are part of the Defense Department?

(3) Having served as both the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, what in your view is
the optimal relationship between these officials?

(4) The Congressional Joint Inquiry recommended the establishment of a Director of

National Intelligence. The two main elements of this proposal are that the DNI
should have enhanced authority over the Intelligence Community and that the DNI
should be separate from the CIA director.

- First, should the DNI have increased authority over NSA, NRO, and NIMA -
such as the authority to execute appropriations, to reallocate funds within the
Intelligence Community without the Secretary of Defense's consent, and to
consolidate and standardize intelligence personnel systems?

Second, should the DNI be separate from the CIA director?

- Third, should the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, which currently performs

all-source analysis, be taken out of the CIA and become an all-source analysis
agency that reports to the DNI or DCI directly - thus allowing the CIA director
to concentrate on improving human intelligence, while having another agency
concentrate on improving analysis?

(5) What is the impact of the Intelligence Community's current organizational

structure on the provision of intelligence to its major new customer, the Department
of Homeland Security?

(6) In the past, we have divided foreign and domestic intelligence, but global terrorism
is a transnational threat that transcends the U.S. border. Would the creation of a
Director of National Intelligence close that gap?

Should one official have responsibility for all foreign and domestic intelligence
related to counterterrorism?

(7) Do you recommend any other changes in the Intelligence Community?

(8) Has Congress effectively established priorities, provided resources, and conducted
oversight of the Intelligence Community?

- How can Congress's role be improved?

 Former DCI and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch

(1) Is 9/11 evidence of systemic problems with the leadership, organization,

performance, or funding of the Intelligence Community,

- Was 9/11 an intelligence failure?

(2) Can the DCI fulfill his responsibilities as the President's principal advisor on
intelligence and head of the Intelligence Community if agencies responsible for
imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, and collection acquisition capabilities -
NIMA, NSA, and NRO respectively - are part of the Defense Department?

(3) Having been the DCI and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, what is the optimal
relationship between the DCI and the Secretary and Deputy Secretaries of Defense?

(4) The Congressional Joint Inquiry recommended the establishment of a Director of

National Intelligence. The two main elements of this proposal are that the DNI
should have enhanced authority over the Intelligence Community and that the DNI
should be separate from the CIA director.

- First, should the DNI have increased authority over NSA, NRO, and NIMA -
such as the authority to execute appropriations, to reallocate funds within the
Intelligence Community without the Secretary of Defense's consent, and to
consolidate and standardize intelligence personnel systems?

Second, should the DNI be separate from the CIA director?

- Third, should the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, which currently performs

all-source analysis, be taken out of the CIA and become an all-source analysis
agency that reports to the DNI or DCI directly - thus allowing the CIA director
to concentrate on improving human intelligence, while having another agency
concentrate on improving analysis?
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(5) What is the impact of the Intelligence Community's current organizational

structure on the provision of intelligence to its major new customer, the Department
of Homeland Security?

(6) hi the past, we have divided foreign and domestic intelligence, but global terrorism
is a transnational threat that transcends the U.S. border. Would the creation of a
Director of National Intelligence close that gap?

Should one official have responsibility for all foreign and domestic intelligence
related to counterterrorism?

(7) Do you recommend any other changes in the Intelligence Community?

(8) Has Congress effectively established priorities, provided resources, and conducted
oversight of the Intelligence Community?

- How can Congress's role be improved?

 Questions for Former Deputy National Security Advisor James Steinberg

(1) Given that you endorse the creation of a DNI, what specific authorities should a
DNI have vis-a-vis the Defense and the Homeland Security Departments - such as:
- the authority to execute appropriations,
to reallocate funds within the Intelligence Community without a cabinet
secretary's consent, and
- to consolidate and standardize intelligence personnel systems?

(2) You also argue that the U.S. needs a single individual with responsibility and
accountability for all counterterrorism information, both foreign and domestic.

What would this mean for entities within the Homeland Security Department
such as the Secret Service, the Customs Service, legacy-INS, and the Coast
Guard?

- What would this mean for the FBI?

(3) You endorse the creation of a domestic security agency and note that placing the
agency in the Department of Homeland Security would connect the agency to other
homeland security functions, while having the agency report to the DNI would
make the agency independent from policy agencies.

Given that you call for a single official over all intelligence activities related to
counterterrorism, shouldn't the agency report to the DNI?

- Wouldn't having the agency report to the DNI facilitate transnational

intelligence collection and analysis?

(4) You call for the handling of information to be decentralized and modeled on a
"network approach," and you also advocate greater centralization of authority
within the Intelligence Community and more broadly.

- Is there a conflict between decentralization of information and centralization of

authority?

(5) You argue that effective counterterrorism requires dramatic organizational change
and recalibrating the balance between security and information-sharing. However,
the U.S. faces not just terrorism but also traditional state actors.

- Would the changes you advocate increase our counterterrorism effectiveness

while decreasing our Intelligence Community's capability vis-a-vis state
actors?
(6) In 1947, President Truman opted for a decentralized rather than a consolidated
Intelligence Community for fear of creating an American Gestapo.

Do you believe that there are risks to civil liberties from the manner of
organizing U.S. intelligence capabilities, such as having one person in charge?

Does the nature of the terrorist and WMD threat outweigh such risks?

(7) You suggest a number of changes in the architecture of the Intelligence

Community, the FBI, and the Executive Office of the President in order to meet the
challenges of the terrorist threat.

- Which of your recommendations do you consider to be essential?

- Can essential reforms be achieved without creating a DNI?