Ladera v. Hodges G.R. No. 8027-R, September 23, 1952, Vol. 48, No.

12, Official Gazette 5374 Reyes, J.B.L., J. FACTS: Paz G. Ladera entered into a contract with C.N. Hodges. Hodges promised to sell a lot with an area of 278 square meters to Ladera, subject to certain terms and conditions. The agreement called for a down payment of P 800.00 and monthly installments of P 5.00 each with interest of 1% per month, until P 2,085 is paid in full. In case of failure of the purchaser to make any monthly payment within 60 days after it fell due, the contract may be considered as rescinded or annulled. Ladera built a house on the lot. Later on, she defaulted in the payment of the agreed monthly installment. Hodges filed an action for the ejectment of Ladera. The court issued an alias writ of execution and pursuant thereto, the city sheriff levied upon all rights, interests, and participation over the house of Ladera. At the auction sale, Laderas house was sold to Avelino A. Magno. Manuel P. Villa, later on, purchased the house from Magno. Ladera filed an action against Hodges and the judgment sale purchasers. Judgment was rendered in favor of Ladera, setting aside the sale for non-compliance with Rule 39, Rules of Court regarding judicial sales of real property. On appeal, Hodges contends that the house, being built on a lot owned by another, should be regarded as movable or personal property. ISSUE: Whether or not Laderas house is an immovable property. HELD: YES. The old Civil Code numerates among the things declared by it as immovable property the following: lands, buildings, roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories to the land on which it is built, it is logical that said accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing. Mindanao Bus Company v. The City Assessor and Treasurer G.R. No. L-17870, September 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 197 Labrador, J. FACTS: Petitioner Mindanao Bus Company is a public utility solely engaged in transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks, over its authorized lines in the Island of Mindanao, collecting rates approved by the Public Service Commission. Respondent sought to assess the following real properties of the petitioner; (a) Hobart Electric Welder Machine, (b) Storm Boring Machine; (c) Lathe machine with motor; (d) Black and Decker Grinder; (e) PEMCO Hydraulic Press; (f) Battery charger (Tungar charge machine) and (g) D-Engine Waukesha-M-Fuel. It was alleged that these machineries are sitting on cement or wooden platforms, and that petitioner is the owner of the land where it maintains and operates a garage for its TPU motor trucks, a repair shop, blacksmith and carpentry shops, and with these machineries, which are placed therein. Respondent City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City assessed at P4, 400 petitioner's above-mentioned equipment. Petitioner appealed the assessment to the respondent Board of Tax Appeals on the ground that the same are not realty. Respondents contend that said equipments, though movable, are immobilized by destination, in accordance with paragraph 5 of Article 415 of the New Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether the equipments in question are immovable or movable properties.

HELD: The equipments in question are movable. So that movable equipments to be immobilized in contemplation of the law, it must first be "essential and principal elements" of an industry or works without which such industry or works would be "unable to function or carry on the industrial purpose for which it was established." Thus, the Court distinguished those movable which become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry from those which may not be so considered immobilized because they are merely incidental, not essential and principal. The tools and equipments in question in this instant case are, by their nature, not essential and principle municipal elements of petitioner's business of transporting passengers and cargoes by motor trucks. They are merely incidentalsacquired as movables and used only for expediency to facilitate and/or improve its service. Even without such tools and equipments, its business may be carried on, as petitioner has carried on, without such equipments, before the war. The transportation business could be carried on without the repair or service shop if its rolling equipment is repaired or serviced in another shop belonging to another. Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. G.R. No. L-58469, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 29 De Castro, J. FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from the Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation, the Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several receivables with them under a receivable purchase agreement. To secure the collection of receivables assigned, Wearever Textile executed a chattel mortgage over certain raw materials inventory, as well as machinery described as an aero dryer stentering range. Upon default of Wearever Textile, the Makati Leasing petitioned for extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged to it. When the sheriff failed to enter Wearever Textiles premises to seize the machinery, Makati Leasing applied for a replevin. Wearever Textile contended that it cannot be a subject of replevin or a chattel mortgage because it is a real property as it is attached to the ground by means of bolts and that the only way to remove it is to destroy the concrete floor. ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery is real or personal property. HELD: The machinery is a personal property. The Supreme Court explained that if a house of strong materials may be considered as personal property for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as such.

Santos Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. G.R. No. L-11139, April 23, 1958, 103 Phil. 401 Concepcion, J. FACTS: On June 4, 1949, Santos Evangelista instituted a civil case for a sum of money. On the same date, he obtained a writ of attachment, which was levied upon a house, built by Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him. In due course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction held in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. When Evangelista sought to take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he had leased the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the true owner of said property. It appears that on May 10, 1952, a definite deed of sale of the same house had been issued to Alto Surety, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held. Hence, Evangelista instituted an action against Alto Surety and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his title over said house, and securing

possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI Manila rendered judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question to Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally, P40.00 a month from October, 1952, until said delivery, plus costs. ISSUE: Whether or not a house constructed by the lessee of the land on which it is built, should be dealt with, for purposes of attachment, as immovable property or as personal property. HELD: The house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Ladera vs. Hodges (48 OG 5374), "a true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by a usufructuary or lessee. The opinion that the house of Rivera should have been attached in accordance with subsection (c) of said section 7, as "personal property capable of manual delivery, by taking and safely keeping in his custody", for it declared that "Evangelista could not have validly purchased Ricardo Rivera's house from the sheriff as the latter was not in possession thereof at the time he sold it at a public auction is untenable. Tsai v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120098, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 324 Quisumbing, J. FACTS: On November 26, 1975, respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained a three million peso (P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom). As security for the loan, EVERTEX executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and the chattels located therein. On April 23, 1979, PBCom granted a second loan to EVERTEX. The loan was secured by a chattel mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached thereto. After April 23, 1979, the date of the execution of the second mortgage mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipments. Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX. On December 15, 1982, the first public auction was held where petitioner PBCom emerged as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor on the same date. On March 7, 1984, PBCom consolidated its ownership over the lot and all the properties in it. In November 1986, it leased the entire factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai. On May 3, 1988, PBCom sold the factory, lock, stock, and barrel to Tsai, including the contested machineries. On March 16, 1989, EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom. EVERTEX claimed that no rights having been transmitted to PBCom over the assets of insolvent EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such assets sold to her, and should reconvey the assets. ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the questioned properties in the foreclosed properties is proper. HELD: Yes. While it is true that the questioned properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties gives a contrary indication. In the case at bar, the true intention of PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel. It has been held that an immovable may be considered a personal property if there

is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it, as in the case at bar. Sergs Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. G.R. No. 137705, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 499 Panganiban, J. FACTS: Respondent PCI Leasing and Finance Inc. filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for sum of money, with an application for a writ of replevin. A writ of replevin was issued, directing the sheriff to seize and deliver the machineries and equipment to PCI Leasing after five days and upon payment of the necessary expenses. The sheriff proceeded to petitioner's factory and seized one machinery. Petitioner filed a motion for special protective order invoking the power of the court to control the conduct of its officers and amend and control its processes, praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer enforcement of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by PCI on the ground that the properties were personal and therefore still subject to seizure and writ of replevin. In their reply, petitioners asserted that the properties were immovable as defined in Article 415 of the Civil Code, the parties' agreement to the contrary notwithstanding. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals via an original action for certiorari. The Court of Appeals ruled that the subject machines were personal property as provided by the agreement of the parties. ISSUE: Whether or not the subject machines were personal, not real, property, which may be a proper subject of a writ of replevin. HELD: The contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded from denying the truth of any material fact found therein. In the present case, the lease agreement clearly provides that the machines in question are to be considered as personal properties. Clearly then, petitioners were estopped from denying the characterization of the subject machines as personal property. Under the circumstances, they are proper subject of the writ of seizure. Accordingly, the petition was denied and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP G.R. No. 64261, December 26, 1984, 133 SCRA 800 Escolin, J. FACTS: On December 7, 1982, two search warrants where issued and the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers were searched. Office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. ISSUE: Whether or not real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. HELD: No. Under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code, "machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, it was said that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the

owner. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. The machineries, while in fact bolted to the ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. Lopez v. Orosa, Jr., and Plaza Theatre, Inc. G.R. No. L-10817-18, February 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 98 Felix, J. FACTS: Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill. Orosa approached Lopez and invited the latter to make an investment in the theatre business he was forming, the Plaza Theatre. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to invest. Nonetheless, Lopez agreed to supply the lumber for the construction of the theatre. Lopez further agreed that that the payment therefore would be on demand and not cash on delivery basis. Lopex delivered the lumber which was used for the construction of the Plaza Theatre. However, of the total cost of materials amounting to P62, 255.85, Lopez was paid only P 20, 848.50, thus leaving a balance of P 41, 771.35. Due to Lopez demands, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a case against Orosa and Plaza Theatre. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be held liable solidarily for the unpaid balance, and in case defendants failed to pay, the land and building should be sold in public auction with the proceeds to be applied to the balance, or that the shares of stock be sold in public auction. ISSUE: Whether or not the lien for the value of the materials used in the construction of the building attaches to said structure alone and does not extend to the land on which the building is adhered to. HELD: No. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties could only mean one thingthat a building is by itself an immovable property. In view of the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. The lien so created attaches merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure and to no other property of the obligors. Yap v. Taada G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988, 163 SCRA 464 Narvasa, J. FACTS: Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. filed a complaint against Yap and his wife seeking recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in the latter's premises. Goulds presented evidence ex parte and judgment by default was rendered by Judge Taada requiring Yap to pay to Goulds the unpaid balance of the pump purchased by him and interest of 12% per annum. Thereafter, the water pump in question was levied by the sheriff and by notice dated November 4, 1969, scheduled the execution sale thereof. But in view of the pendency of Yap's motion for reconsideration, suspension of the sale was directed. It appears however that a copy of the order suspending the sale was not transmitted to the sheriff Hence, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff

went ahead with the scheduled auction sale and sold the property levied on to Goulds as the highest bidder. Yap argues that "the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of the New Rules of Court," i.e., notice by publication in case of execution sale of real property, the pump and its accessories being immovable because attached to the ground with character of permanency (Art. 415, Civil Code). ISSUE: Whether or not the water pump in question is an immovable property. HELD: No. Yap's argument is untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously, the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners. Machinery and Engineering Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-7057, October 29, 1954, 96 Phil. 70 Concepcion, J. FACTS: Petitioner Machinery and Engineering Supplies filed a complaint for replevin for the recovery of the machinery and equipment sold and delivered to Ipo Limestone Co. An order was issued to seize and take immediate possession of the properties specified in the order. Upon carrying out the courts order, Roco, the companys President, along with a crew of technical men and labourers, proceeded to the factory. The manager of Ipo Limestone Co. and Torres protested against the seizure of the properties on the ground that they are not personal properties. However, since the sheriff contended that his duty is purely ministerial, they all went to the factory and dismantled the equipment despite the fact that the equipment could not be dismantled without causing damage or injuries to the wooden frames attached to them. Consequently, they had to cut some of the supports of the equipment which rendered its use impracticable. ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery and equipment in question could be the subject of replevin. HELD: No. Replevin is applicable only to personal property. The machinery and equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former could not be separated from the latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the object. Hence, in order to remove the said outfit, it became necessary not only to unbolt the same, but also to cut some of its wooden supports. Moreover, said machinery and equipment were intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry carried on said immovable. For these reasons, they were already immovable pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code. Laurel v. Garcia G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 797 Gutierrez, J. FACTS: In view of the Reparations Agreement between the Philippines and Japan, four properties located in Japan were given to the Philippines. One of these properties is the Roppongi property. The said property was formerly the location of the Chancery of the Philippine

Embassy until it was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976. The Roppongi property has remained abandoned from the time of the transfer due to lack of funds to develop the said property. Consequently, Administrative orders were issued by the President authorizing the study of the condition of the properties of the Philippines in Japan. Subsequently, Executive Order 296 was issued by President Aquino allowing non-Filipinos to buy or lease some of the properties of the Philippines located in Japan, including Roppongi. Petitioners now contend that the Roppongi property cannot be alienated as it is classified as public dominion and not of private ownership because it is a property intended for public service under paragraph 2, article 420 of the Civil Code. On the other hand, respondents aver that it has already become part of the patrimonial property of the State which can be alienated because it has not been used for public service for over 13 years. They further contend that EO 296 converted the subject property to patrimonial property. ISSUE: Whether or not the Roppongi property still forms part of the public dominion hence cannot be disposed nor alienated. HELD: Yes. The respondents failed to convincingly show that the property has already become patrimonial. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Under Art. 422 of the Civil Code, there must be a definite and a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being public. Abandonment must be a certain and a positive act based on correct legal premises. The mere transfer of the embassy to Nampeidai is not a relinquishment of the propertys original purpose. The Administrative orders authorizing the study of the conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties. Likewise, EO 296 did not declare that the properties lost their public character; it merely made them available to foreigners in case of sale, lease or other disposition. Thus, since there is no law authorizing its conveyance, the Roppongi property still remains part of the inalienable properties of the State. Rabuco v. Villegas G.R. No. L-24916, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 658 Teehankee, J. FACTS: The issue in this case involves the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 3120 whereby the Congress converted the lots in question together with another lot in San Andres, Malate that are reserved as communal property into disposable or alienable lands of the State. Such lands are to be placed under the administration and disposal of the Land Tenure Administration for subdivision into small lots not exceeding 120 square meters per lot for sale on instalment basis to the tenants or bona fide occupants thereof and expressly prohibited ejectment and demolition of petitioners' homes under Section 2 of the Act. Respondent contends that the Act is invalid and unconstitutional for it constitutes deprivation of property without due process of law and without just compensation. ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 3120 is constitutional.

intended to implement the social justice policy of the Constitution and the government program of land for the landless and that they were not intended to expropriate the property involved but merely to confirm its character as communal land of the State and to make it available for disposition by the National Government. The subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection (2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and power to deal with state property. Macasiano v. Diokno G.R. No. 97764, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 464 Medialdea, J. FACTS: The Municipality of Paranque passed an ordinance that authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Paranaque Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea market thereon. Thereafter, the municipal council of Paranaque issued a resolution authorizing Paranaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into a contract with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or vending areas. By virtue of this, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Paranaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by Palanyag on the said streets. Petitioner Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, then ordered the destruction and confiscation of the stalls along the abovementioned streets. Hence, respondents filed with the trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer for preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The trial court upheld the validity of the ordinance in question. ISSUE: Whether or not an ordinance or resolution which authorizes the lease and use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid. HELD: No. The aforementioned streets are local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Article 424 of the Civil Code provides that properties of public dominion devoted for public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, LGUs have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 100709, November 14, 1997, 281 SCRA 639 Panganiban, J. FACTS: Morato filed for a patent on a parcel of land located in Calauag, Quezon, which was approved, provided that the land shall not be encumbered or alienated within a period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent. Later on, the land was established to be a portion of Calauag Bay, which was five to six feet deep during high tides and three feet deep on low tides. The water level rose because of the ebb and flow of tides from the bay and the storms

HELD: Yes. The lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process and without just compensation. It is established doctrine that the act of classifying State property calls for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power, which will not be interfered with by the courts. The Acts in question were

that frequently passed through the area. Furthermore, it was observed by the Director of Lands from his investigation, that the land of Morato was leased to Advincula for P100 per month and it was also mortgaged to Co for P10,000. The Director of Lands filed a suit with the contention that Morato violated the 5-year prohibitory period and thus the patent should be cancelled and the land should revert back to the State. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of the prohibition of the patent, and thus, the subject land should revert back to the ownership of the State. HELD: Yes. The lease was an encumbrance included in the prohibitions of the patent because it impairs the use of the land by Morato herself. As for the mortgage, it is a legal limit on the title and if there will be foreclosure because Morato was not able to pay her debts, the property will be auctioned. It is also a limitation on Morato's right to enjoy and possess the land for herself. Encumbrance, as defined, is an impairment on the use or transfer of property, or a claim or lien on the property where there is a burden on the title. Thus, Morato clearly violated the terms of the patent on these points. Moreover, the property became a foreshore land because it turned into a portion of land which was covered most of the time with water, whether it was low or high tide. Foreshore is defined as land between high and low waters which is dry depending on the reflux or ebb of the tides. In accordance with this land reclassification, the land can no longer be subject to a pending patent application and must be returned to the State. Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga G.R. No. L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334 Bengzon, J.P., J. FACTS: On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. Republic Act 3039 was approved providing that all buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of Zamboanga. Plaintiff-appellee Zamboanga del Norte filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City, the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was prayed that Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff province of property without due process and just compensation. Included in the properties were the capital site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high school playground. ISSUE: Whether or not the properties mentioned are properties for public use or patrimonial. HELD: The subject properties are properties for public use. The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the lots and buildings in question. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation. Applying the norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public education, public health, etc.

Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of the former Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at their own expense, it can be assumed that said buildings were erected by the National Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the lots in question. Chavez v. Public Estates Authority G.R. No. 133250, July 9, 2002 Carpio, J. FACTS: In 1973, the Government through the Commissioner of Public Highways and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) signed a contract to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. PD 1084 was issued, creating Public Estates Authority (PEA), and PD 1085, transferring the reclaimed lands under the MCCRRP to PEA. In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private corporation to develop the Freedom Islands, and the JVA was approved by President Ramos. However, PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. A Legal Task Force was created to look into the issue. The said task force upheld the legality of the JVA. In 1998, Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed a petition to compel PEA to disclose all facts on its negotiations with AMARI, invoking the constitutional right of the people to information on matters of public concern. He assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domain as a blatant violation of the constitutional prohibiting in the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Despite the ongoing court petitions, PEA and AMARI signed an Amended Joint Venture Agreement (Amended JVA) in 1999, and such was approved by President Estrada. The Amended JVA seeks to convey to AMARI the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. ISSUE: Whether AMARI has the capacity to acquire the lands held by PEA. HELD: No. Under the 1987 Constitution, private corporations such as AMARI cannot acquire alienable land of the public domain. Reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, which are covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Thus, the Amended Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA was null and void. Villarico v. Sarmiento 442 SCRA 110 Facts: Villarico here is an owner of a lot that is separated from the Ninoy Aquino Avenue hig hway by a strip of land belonging to the government. Vivencio Sarmiento had a building constructed on a portion of the saidgovernment land and a part thereof was occupied by Andoks LitsonCorp.

In 1993, by means of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, Villarico acquired a portion of the same area owned by the government. He then filed an accion publiciana alleging that respondents(Vivencio) on the government land closed his right of way tothe Ninoy Aquino Avenue and encroached on a portion of his lot

Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land. Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term foreshore land than that in the definition provided by the dictionary.

Issue: Whether or not VIllarico has a right of way to the NAA. Held: No. It is not disputed in this case that the alleged right of way to the lot belongs to the state or property of public dominion. It is intended for public use meaning that it is not confined toprivileged individuals but is open to the indefinite public.Records show that the lot on which the stairways were built isfor the use of the people as passageway hence, it is a property for public dominion. Public dominion property is outside the commerce of man and hence, it cannot be: Alienated or leased or otherwise be the subject matterof contracts Acquired by prescription against the state Cannot be the subject of attachment and execution Be burdened by any voluntary easement It cannot be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in favorof the petitioner and petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself andhe cannot claim any right of possession over it. REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998

RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the CA with modifications.

ISSUE: I. II. Whether or not the term foreshore land includes the submerged area. Whether or not foreshore land and the reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.

HELD: The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent court that the term foreshore land includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to: The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.

FACTS: On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.

A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary) The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term foreshore lands.

Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.

It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

Chavez v. National Housing Authority G.R. No. 164527, August 15, 2007

Velasco, Jr., J. FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 161 approving and directing the implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan. Respondent National Housing Authority was ordered to conduct feasibility studies and develop lowcost housing projects at the dumpsite and absorb scavengers in NHA resettlement/lowcost housing projects, particularly in the Smokey Mountain. It produced the Smokey Mountain Development Plan and Reclamation of the Area Across R-10 or the Smoke Mountain Development and Reclamation Project. The Project aimed to covert Smokey mountain dumpsite into a habitable housing project, inclusive of the reclamation of the area. President Aquino approved the said Project through MO 415. After President Aquinos term, President Fidel Ramos, through Proclamation No. 39, authorized the NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) for the implementation of the project. Afterwards, President Ramos issued Proclamation No. 465 increasing the proposed area for reclamation across R-10 from 40 hectares to 79 hectares. The petitioner Francisco Chavez contended that the respondent NHA or respondent RBI has no authority to reclaim foreshore and submerged land. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent NHA has the authority to reclaim foreshore and submerged land. HELD: Yes. The National Housing Authority (NHA) is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its charter it is an end-user agency authorized by law to administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to the National Housing Authority (NHA) by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The combined and collective effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is tantamount to and can be considered to be an official declaration that the reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that the reclaimed areas are not necessary anymore for public use or public service when President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the National Housing Authority (NHA) partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the project.