Human Security: A World View of Homicide and Rape

Graeme R. Newman Commissioned by the Human Security Centre

A Primer on International Crime Statistics There are generally four sets of internationally constructed crime data: The UNCJS (The United Nations Survey of Crime and Criminal Justice Systems),; The homicide data generated by the WHO as part of its international recording of diseases; The INTERPOL (International Police Organization) The International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS). Each of these has particular strengths and weaknesses. The WHO data

represent statistics that are generated by a different kind of bureaucracy (the medical and hospital organizations) so that they give a different picture of homicide than do either the UNCJS or INTERPOL data. While WHO uses the legal- sounding definition of homicide of intentional homicide the recording of the crime is based on a diagnosis as to the cause of death. The UNCJS and INTERPOL data produce statistics that have been generated by policing and criminal justice organizations of various kinds, so in general terms. The UNCJS and the INTERPOL data produce roughly similar data, though there are some significant differences in places, particularly in regard to the definitions of offences1. The UNCJS data are highly political in nature, since they represent the official statement by each country of its crime and justice situation. Thus, the data may be filtered through a countrys diplomatic or foreign relations bureaucracies. INTERPOL data may be slightly less official in the sense that the reporting agencies are essentially policing agencies, so that the data, in some instances, may represent more closely the policing activity of each country. The levels of homicide reported by the UNCJS and INTERPOL tend to be higher than those for WHO, which may be caused by a variety of factors, including reporting and recording practices. The ICVS obtains data by interviewing samples of
The problems of interpreting international crime statistics have been extensively discussed in the literature. See: Newman, Graeme R. (1999). Global Report on Crime and Justice. UNODC. New York: Oxford.
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individuals concerning their experience of crime victimization. It therefore provides a different unofficial measure of crime. The main drawback in regard to the present chapter is that, obviously, homicide data cannot be collected.

For this chapter we use the INTERPOL data because we want to show crime trends for as long a period as possible. The INTERPOL data have been collected since the 1950s, whereas the UNCJS data began collection in 1970, and reliably since 19752 and the ICVS has only been conducted since 1987

Introduction In this chapter we examine the extent and distribution of two major threats to human security, homicide and rape. These are crimes that resonate strongly in any community and that contribute heavily to peoples perception of the danger of crime and threats to their security. We have chosen homicide as the main indicator of a crime that is a threat to communities because it is generally accepted as the more reliably and highly reported crime in most countries and the crime that has least difficulties in variation in definition across countries. Rape, a high profile crime when it is reported in the media, is a crime with a history of low reporting by victims so it provides a contrast to homicide statistics. Nevertheless, even taking into account the difficulties in reporting and comparing these statistics across nations, the statistics of both these crimes provide a rough insight into the extent to which violent crimes of the most frightening nature are distributed around the world.

A World View of Homicide While there are some well known difficulties in collecting and interpreting international crime statistics, such as differing reporting and recording practices,
Combining the data sets was not feasible because the data sets are sufficiently different that this would have created an artificial split in 1970.
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recent world events have accentuated these difficulties even more. Figure 1, displaying the homicide rate for the world,3 serves to introduce this problem. We may make the following observations: The most striking characteristics of the trend line are the two peaks that occur in 1976 and 1994. If we ignore the two spikes, we could conclude that the homicide rate has been relatively stable over time. The decade of the 1990s appears to show an increase in the homicide rate, even if we excluded the peak of 1994, though this increase simply brings the rate back to what it was in the 1950s.

Figure 1: World homicide rate 1959-2001

Of course, the data presented do not contain data from every country of the world. There are several methodological difficulties here: First, the number of countries for each year changes from year to year. Only about 20 per cent of countries report data every year. Thus, the makeup of the world each year is composed of a different array of countries. Second, over the 40 year period, the number of countries in the world has increased dramatically. Some countries have also ceased to exist, and others have been reborn as new countries. Borders have been redrawn. Thus, what countries constitute the world is always in flux.

The peaks are largely caused by two countries: Rwanda in 1994 and Lesotho in 1976 when both countries experienced genocide and civil strife. World crime rates can be influenced greatly by one or two extreme cases. For example, a serial killer committing crimes for a period of one or two years is not going to influence the murder rate in any particular country to any serious degree. However, events in a nation such as mass killings resulting from civil war or genocide may influence the world rate of violent crime markedly. The effects of these different recording practices are clearly apparent when trends are examined according to region (Figure 2) and level of development (Figure 3). The differing recording practices according to region or level of development are most likely the result of bureaucratic smoothing. Countries that do not have a well established independent bureaucracy for the maintenance of social accounts are less resistant to external forces, so are more likely to adhere to established practices of statistical recording. Bureaucracies, particularly those in western democracies, are well known for their resilience and their resistance to external events, even political influences. They have established procedures and systems 5

that respond to new events slowly. Countries with less sophisticated or entrenched bureaucracies are more easily affected by major events such as genocide or civil strife, and may also be less independent of political manipulation. Thus, homicides that occur as a result of terrorist events are more easily incorporated into the records of crime4. Furthermore, in many countries there is no clear distinction between the military bureaucracy and the policing bureaucracies, so that social accounts may more easily reflect casualties of war or civil strife as records of criminal activity. In the USA for example, the distinction between the military and the policing bureaucracies (and even those between local policing bureaucracies and national or regional policing bureaucracies) has been assiduously maintained, though there are current attempts to overcome these bureaucratic divisions in the US governments war against terrorism. Therefore, it is much more difficult for such killings that result from terrorism to make their way into the national crime statistics of such a country. To different degrees, this observation probably applies to all countries with well established traditional policing and social accounting bureaucracies. We should expect,

therefore, that the trend lines of such countries will show much smoother lines, without sudden peaks and valleys. This differential patterning in homicide rates is well demonstrated in Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2: Regional5 homicide rate, 1961-2001

It should be noted that in the case of international statistics of INTERPOL and the UNCJS both sets of homicide statistics are essentially reflective of a countrys national statistics and are prepared by officers within that country. Officers working for the international organizations that collate the statistics are generally not free to add or otherwise change the categories of statistics reported to them by contributing nations. 5 One of the difficulties in comparing regions over time is that borders change and so do regions. In addition, it is difficult to infer from some of the regional breakdowns what exactly each region represents whether a geographic, cultural or economic attribute. The regions that we have adopted, which are largely those used by major international organizations are a mixture of geographic and cultural attributes. See the appendix for the regional classification of countries.

Regional comparisons In Figure 2 we see that the trend lines of the New World, Western Europe, and Asia do not display any major peaks and valleys. However, those for Latin America and Africa display considerable numbers of peaks, most likely caused by the incorporation of killings resulting from civil strife that occurred in those regions over the past 40 years6. It is of interest that the trend lines of Central and Eastern Europe remained relatively smooth until the civil strife of the 1990s that brought about the development of new states. These Central and East European states had well entrenched bureaucracies. Thus there are no sudden peaks and valleys, but a steep increase at the beginning of hostilities then a leveling off. The great diversity in rates of homicide among the various regions of the world suggests that not a lot can be concluded in regard to a true homicide rate of the world by examining a combined world rate as shown in Figure 1, except that as noted earlier, if we ignore the volatility the overall trend is relatively flat. It is apparent also that it may be misleading to infer from examining even the regional
The year 1959-60 has been excluded from this graph because it was dominated by Colombias extremely high rate of almost 200 per 100,000 which would have made the rest of the chart difficult to read because of the necessity to extend the X axis.
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rates that all the countries in a particular region display the same kinds of rates, whether it be overall level or volatility. This is because as we have seen,

individual countries, if they report the homicides resulting from civil strife, may dominate a particular regional rate. Nevertheless, it would also be a mistake to dismiss the data completely, since they do at some level, represent the countries experience of homicide. In each case, the data are not so much an invention of crime reporting bureaucracies, but are in fact a response to actual homicides (or attempted homicides, depending on the circumstances) that have, after a complex system of reporting and recording, ended up in the nations official statistical records.

Developing and industrial comparisons Another way to examine the diversity of rates that lie behind the overall world rate is to compare the rates of industrial and non-industrial countries, sometimes called developing and industrial countries. This classification can only be very rough, and is usually based on various indicators such as gross domestic product, levels of employment in agriculture, industrial output, etc. The economies of countries become more complex with industrial and technological development. This results in many different changes in their societies: population movements from country to city, increases in the amount of civil and criminal law to cope with the more complex relationships among people and institutions, and thus the expansion of governmental and non-governmental bureaucracies to cope with the increased demands of civil, criminal and administrative law. Comparing countries roughly divided into developing and industrial over time is especially difficult, since some countries (unfortunately relatively few) have in fact developed considerably over the 42 years in question. Prime examples are Singapore and Hong Kong (not to mention of course, that Hong Kong is no longer a separate country, but is part of China). Both these countries were categorized as developing countries well up until the 1970s. Today, they are clearly well placed in the industrial group. Thus, Figure 4 should be taken only as

a rough indication of the differences between developing and industrial countries in the production of homicide rates. We would expect, however, that those countries with well developed economies and therefore bureaucracies, to show smoother trend lines, and those of developing countries to display more volatility. We can see in Figure 3 that this expectation is clearly confirmed.

Figure 3: Homicide rate, 1959-2001 by development

Finally, we should understand that the volatility of homicide rates is relative. One could conclude from the data presented so far that Western Europe a bastion of industrialized nations would display little if any volatility. If we examine the trends of homicide rates for each of these regions we see that they display their own peaks and valleys, though of course in the scale of things, the fluctuations for industrial countries is nowhere near as great as for less developed regions such as Africa and Latin America. Figure 4 shows that Western Europe experienced a big spike in 1959, largely affected by Spain which reported a homicide rate of 80.01 in 1959, and 78.69 in 1960. The Basque ETA Militar

movement became active in 1959, and Spain at that time was a much less developed country than today. Figure 4: Homicide rate, 1959-2001, Western Europe

A World View of Rape7 It is well known that the reportability of rape that is, the extent to which individuals or victims report this crime to the police or authorities is very low in many countries less than 50%. However, the U.N. Global Report on Crime and Justice observed that the reporting by countries (not individuals) of their rape statistics had increased dramatically during the 1990s. This was taken to indicate an increased awareness of countries of the seriousness with which this crime is now viewed throughout the world. Thus, the trend displayed in Figure 5 should be interpreted with care. It may not indicate a true increase in the world rape rate, but rather the increased reporting of rape and sexual assault.

See appendix for supporting data.

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There are also difficulties in definition. Until 1976, INTERPOL collected only sex offences statistics from countries, with no indication as to what portion of these offences was rape. After 1976, INTERPOL collected statistics on both rape and sex offences, thus making the trend line for the 40 year period difficult to interpret. Furthermore, the category sex offences is highly ambiguous and difficult to define cross nationally. In fact it reveals a major difficulty in interpreting rape statistics: there may be vastly different cultural standards as to how sexual assault is perceived, and what it constitutes to either a victim or witness of a sexual assault. Thus, the complex process of how such a crime becomes a crime that is, the factors that contribute to an event being reported to the police as a crime, and subsequently the police recording that event as a rape or sexual assault may differ substantially across countries. Finally, the actual legal definitions of countries of rape may vary accordingly. For example in Canada8, rape is classified as an assault and is not recorded as a separate crime. Figure 5: World rape rate, 1977-2001

See Statistics Canada: http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/legal02.htm.

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The constant volatility in the rape rates displayed in Figure 5 is probably the result of the haphazard reporting and hence the recording -- of the crime in many countries. Nevertheless, the trend line of Figure 5 is highly suggestive of an overall increase in the rape rate throughout the world. We should repeat, however, that this increase may be a function of the increase in numbers of countries reporting this crime, not an increase in the true prevalence of rape. Perhaps a better way to think of this increase is that it displays an increasing awareness of countries (and individuals) of the seriousness of rape as a crime and the increased willingness to report it. In other words, the world is discovering the extent of rape that has always been there. It is possible to discern some contrasting patterns according to regions, some of which are quite striking. Figure 6 displays the rape rates according to world regions. We can see that the

Figure 6: Regional rape rate, 1977-2001

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rates are highly volatile in the new world, Africa and Latin America. The peaks in rape for Africa occur in 1994 and 1997 years in which civil strife resulted in mass rapes in Rwanda and Lesotho respectively. However, the most striking finding is that of the rape rate for the New World which is overall higher than any other region. This finding is consistent with that reported in the UN Global Report. It also holds even if we use the broader definition of sex offences and include the additional years from 1959-1976 (Figure 7). Thus, it is likely not a function of the differing definition of rape or sex offences in the new world countries. It may, however, indicate one or both of two possibilities: that rape is a more highly reported crime in those countries than in other countries of the world, or that the true rape rate in these countries is in fact higher than other regions. Since in many respects countries of the new world are similar economically and perhaps culturally to those of Western Europe, it is highly likely that the rape rates of the New World do, to some degree, reflect higher true rates of rape. This finding is also supported by the International Crime

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Victimization Surveys9 though this measure of rape is also in question, since it surveys sexual assaults not rape, and it is very likely that the answers individuals provide to this question are strongly affected by cultural perceptions as to what constitutes a sexual assault. Cultures where sensitivity to the issue of rape is high are more likely to report rape to officials, whether these are police or victim survey interviewers. Figure 7: Regional rates of sex offences, 1959-2000

Thus it is likely that these regional differences shield other factors that contribute to the higher reporting of rape. Figure 8 suggests that this may be in fact the case. Industrial countries report a much higher rate of rape than do developing countries. It is likely that this dramatic difference is the result of two factors: The

Van Dijk, Jan (1999). The experience of crime and justice. In, Graeme R. Newman (Ed.) Global Report on Crime and Justice. UNODC. New York: Oxford.

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higher official sensitivity to rape as a crime in developed countries, and the well established bureaucratic recording of the crime. It is likely that many more crimes of rape and sexual assault are recorded in countries that have a highly sophisticated crime recording bureaucracy. In many of these countries public campaigns by various interest groups have fought for many years to raise the sensitivity and awareness of policing bureaucracies to the problem of rape. Second, it is widely reported that the status of women in many developing countries, especially countries of the African Continent, is one where women are exploited and cannot say no to men, where much rape of women and young girls occurs in domestic situations and is seen as normal behavior.10 It is also apparent from Figure 8 that the rape rate of developing countries has increased substantially in the last 5 years, suggesting that the campaign to increase awareness of individuals and authorities concerning rape may be having an effect.

Figure 8: Rape rate, 1977-2001 by development

South Africa has extensively documented this problem. See: Rape: Silent War on South African women. BBC. April 9, 2002.. 24,892 rapes were reported in South Africa in 2002, many of these against children. The cultural attitudes of men against women, particularly that men do not see their acts as criminal, is identified as a prime reason for the extent of rape in this country.

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We have mentioned the spikes in rape rate in the African region, and its effect on the overall world rape rate. The relationship between rape and wars of all kinds is well established.11 We can see in Figure 9 that a bulge in the rape rate of Central and Eastern Europe has found its way into the official reporting of rape during the Balkan wars, where rape as an act of war and genocide has been well documented.

11

For a theoretical and historical overview see: Rape as a Weapon of War by Claudia Card. Hypatia Vol. 11, No. 4 (Fall 1996)

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Figure 9: Rape in Central and Eastern Europe

Are rape and homicide increasing throughout the world?

It depends which countries and regions. The volatility of the rape statistics makes it difficult to draw any firm conclusions. However, if we examine the rape rate for Western Europe (Figure 10) we see a typical trend produced by bureaucratic smoothing. In this case, it is quite clear that the rape rate is increasing steadily but there is no way to determine whether this is a result of better reporting and recording procedures, or because the incidence of rape has in fact increased. As for homicide, because of the extreme volatility of the rates, it is impossible to determine. If we exclude the countries in which the homicide rates have been dramatically increased by civil strife, the overall world rate and even regional trends show no substantial increases.

Figure 10: Rape in Western Europe

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Are homicide and rape linked? If we count those countries showing any indication of an increase in either rape or homicide in the last decade of the 20th century, there is a firm indication that both these crimes have increased during that decade for close to half the countries (Figure 11) but also evidence of decreases in a substantial number of countries too. Of those countries reporting an increase in homicide at any point in the 1990s decade, half also reported increases in rape12. An examination of specific countries reporting increases in both crimes does not reveal any particular profiles that would link the two. This does not of course mean that rape is not linked to homicide in countries experiencing civil strife simply that in countries where civil strife is not dominant (the majority of countries) the rape rate does not appear to be linked to homicide rate.

12

See Appendix 1 for classification of countries.

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Figure 11: Percent of countries reporting increase or decrease in rape and homicide, 1990-2000

Are rape and homicide connected by region? Figure 12 shows the overall rankings from highest to lowest rates of homicide and rape according to geographical region. There is not a lot of consistency, except to show that two regions, those of Africa and Latin America are ranked at the top of the chart for both homicide and rape.

Figure 12: Rankings of regions according to overall rape (1977-2001) and homicide (1959-2001) rates13. Ranking High Homicide Africa Latin America Middle Central and Rape New World Africa, Latin America Eastern Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe

Europe, New World

13

These are computed from the means of all years reported. However, the differences are clearly discernible in the regional charts. See Appendix for supporting data.

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Low

Western Europe, Asia

Asia

These rankings generally confirm findings from other data such as those of the UN Global Report. In general, it does appear that countries that have a strong traditional culture such as those of Western Europe and Asia may exhibit lower rates of homicide and rape than countries that are new that is to say, formed within the last 200-300 years (North America, Central and Eastern Europe).

Speculations concerning the rates of homicide and rape throughout the world Sociologists have argued that over long periods of time crime is a stable phenomenon that shows intermittent fluctuations that depend on particular historical periods or events14. Its stability is guaranteed by the routine behaviors of the organizations set up to police crime, and the fluctuations in the response of those organizations to political, religious and other aspects of social and economic life. The theory is that crime control, of which the reporting and recording of crimes is an integral part, helps define the boundaries of acceptable behavior. From a world perspective, this means that we should see an ebb and flow of rape and homicide (and other kinds of crime as well) across time and place, but that the overall trend should be relatively flat. There should be considerable geographical variations in the extent of crime, depending upon the frontiers of social life that are being tested. As we noted above, the world homicide rate since 1959 is roughly stable over time, with intermittent fluctuations, and variation according to region. If there has been a slight increase in the rate, it is just as likely that this increase is a result of increasing reporting and recording of crime rather than an increase in the crime itself.

14

Erikson, Kai T. (1968). Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance. NY: Allyn and Bacon..

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It is, perhaps, an understatement to call homicide and rape types of behavior that explore the boundaries of acceptable behavior, for these behaviors threaten the very security of individuals, and as well where homicide and rape are part of terrorism and war, threaten whole societies, cultures and even nations. Yet there are, and have been, societies where rape and homicide are seen as acceptable ways of regulating social life15. We would like to think that the latter kinds of societies are typical of primitive societies. But a moments reflection reveals that this is a serious mistake. For the extent to which humans are able to justify the use of violence in order to achieve particular political, ideological or religious ends has never been so sophisticated as it is in the 21st century. And the extent to which civil societies have collapsed under major historical forces into violence has been nothing short of remarkable in recent years.

Ten historical changes influencing world and regional crime trends The following factors, obviously interrelated, have been shown to have affected crime rates throughout the world, or may be expected to do so in the foreseeable future.

1. Civil strife Civil wars and insurrections resulting in killing, rapes and genocide have affected the human security of peoples throughout the world and throughout history. Whereas, before World War 2, most wars were wars fought between countries (foreign wars) the majority of wars in the late 20th century and in the 21st century are internal. The majority of civil wars reached their height in the 1980s, declined somewhat in the 1990s, but have remained at close to double the number and duration compared to the 1960s and 1970s.16 The forms of this civil strife are fairly standard. Their appearance is most commonly in conflict between ethnic
15

Marongiu, Pietro and Graeme R. Newman (1987 ). Vengeance: The Fight Against Injustice. NJ: Littlefield Adams. 16 Staff (2003). The global menace of local strife The Economist, May 24, pp.23-25.

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groups, but their sustenance and underlying force is that of loot and pillage. Many insurrections are begun or led by unpaid soldiers who depend on looting villages for their livelihood. Where countries are blessed with rich resources, these resources are typically converted into weapons of war, and by the common soldier into the acquisition of personal items and food. Theft, rape, murder,

assault, robbery all these traditional crimes are part of civil strife.

2. Globalization There are four significant aspects of globalization that have affected world crime trends: (a) the globalization of mass media, (b) the expansion of world trade and capital markets (first started in the building of the Suez Canal in 1858), (c) the tremendous advances in transportation of people and products around the world, and (d) the revolution in communications technology. Much civil strife could not

be sustained without the help of multi-national organizations, particularly the banking structure that makes it possible for money to be moved quickly and efficiently around the world17. The globalization of mass media has exported many highly effective techniques of propaganda and opinion influence. Much of this can be traced back the USA of the 1960s and 1970s, when the riots and demonstrations of the peace movement helped bring the Vietnam war to a halt. Mass demonstrations staged for TV have been a common ploy ever since, and applied expertly in the Middle East demonstrations against Israel, the US and others. Graphic displays of the results of civil strife and war are commonly shown on the mass media: mutilated bodies, explosions, shooting to death, to name just a few. People throughout the world have experienced or seen these images as much or more than those of the public executions common in many countries up to and throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. Unless one lives in a closed

society, it is hard not to be affected by the constant presence of the mass media. Finally, people and products can be moved efficiently around the world, making

17

Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering. http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/FATDocs_en.htm.

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trade in people18, weapons19, and stolen goods much easier. Globalization has produced wonderful opportunities for trade and commerce, but it has also brought new opportunities for criminal activity, whether by rogue states with their own agendas, or non-state organizations such as Al-queda.

3. The international illicit drug trade Many of the least developed countries have resorted to the cultivation of drugs that can be sold on the illicit drug markets. The globalization of world trade and new efficiencies in shipping and transportation, have served to increase the opportunities for international drug trade considerably over the last twenty years20. Organized crime of various kinds promotes this trade, which has

become a prime area of activity in which organized crime and terrorist organizations have joined forces, or at least worked together according to their mutual interests. This occurred, of course, in Afghanistan where local and international organized crime groups worked with the Taliban and Al-Queda21. Collaboration between terrorists, organized crime and local farmers in producing illicit drugs also occurs in many parts of Latin America22 and shows no signs of abating, in spite of bilateral and multilateral efforts to reduce it.

4. The ready availability of weapons The world seems awash in weapons of all kinds23. There is little doubt that the ready availability of weapons made possible by extensive arms trading in Africa
Project on Trafficking in Women and Children. Johns Hopkins University. http://www.protectionproject.org/main1.htm. 19 Small Arms Survey. Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/. 20 United Nations Office of Drug Control (UNODC). (2003). Global Illicit Drug Trends. http://www.unodc.org/unodc/global_illicit_drug_trends.html. 21 Perl, Raphael F. (2000). Taliban and the Drug Trade. US Department of State. CRS Report for Congress, October. http://www.fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6210.pdf. 22 Tate, Winifred (1999). Colombias Role in International Drug Industry. Foreign Policy in Focus. Volume 4, Number 30. November (updated June 2001). 23 Small Arms Survey. Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/.
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has fuelled African wars. In 1999, Central African countries were importing weapons from Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, China and North Korea, South Africa and Brazil. In some African countries an AK47 automatic rifle could be bought for as little as $6.24 Developing nations are the major recipients of arms exports from the leading arms manufacturers which are (in order) USA , Russia and France. From 1994 to 2001, developing countries accounted for 68% of all arms deliveries (and of these Middle Eastern states were the highest importers). In 2001 the value of all arms transfer world wide was $26.4 billion.25 Although this amount was down substantially from previous years because of the global recession, it nevertheless remains an incredibly lucrative business and ensures the ready availability of weapons for those who want them (if they have the cash).

5. The revolution in information technology The revolution in communications technology has made it far easier for criminal organizations to communicate and organize their activities. The ubiquitous cell phone is seen in the hands of terrorists almost as commonly as is the AK47. Laurent Kabila the infamous guerilla fighter who overthrew Mobutu Sese Seku boasted that all he needed was $10,000 and a satellite phone to start a revolution.26 Cell phones are a small part in the revolution in communications technology, which in turn is a small part of the broad revolution in information technology. It is hardly a revolution but more an ongoing, relentless force for innovation. It has created many avenues for terrorism: whether through easier communication across borders, making it easier to organize terrorist cells in many different countries, or the availability of information concerning a range of terrorist activities, not to mention simple and sophisticated bomb making. It has also created the opportunity for a new kind of terrorism: cyber-terrorism that can
BBC News (1999). World: Africa Light weapons trade 'fuels African wars'. Thursday, July 15. Published at 14:17 GMT 15:17 UK: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/394786.stm. 25 Grimmett, Richard F. (2002). Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1994-2001. US Department of State. Report for Congress.: http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/12632.pdf. 26 Staff (2003). The global menace of local strife The Economist, May 24, pp.23-25.
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attack the backbone of financial markets by bringing down major computing facilities. However, the revolution in information technology has also made it possible to collect information and thus data concerning crime and criminals in a much more systematic and pervasive manner than ever before. Since 9/11 the US alone has developed sophisticated ways of tracking expenditures and banking patterns of suspected terrorist groups. This information is extracted from trillions of transactions that occur every day in banking throughout the world27.

6. The rise in instrumental violence The above factors have facilitated both the technological means and ideological means for committing violence. Rational justifications for violence are readily available, drawing on the popular ideologies of the 20th and 21st centuries. These are those of religious fundamentalism and what may generally be described as an assorted collection of movements that oppose globalization for a variety of reasons. Effective platforms for the use of instrumental violence are Marxism and various forms of anti-capitalism, environmentalism, anti-colonialism, nationalism in various forms, and independence movements of various kinds where ethnic, cultural, linguistic, or politically self defined groups struggle to establish independent nations. The increase in independent states (nation-states) in the past twenty years is quite remarkable. It is however likely that political/religious fundamentalism offers the most pervasive justification for the use of violence, as exhibited by the Al-Queda and the many factions loosely tied to this non-state terrorist organization. However, the division between religion and the state a division that came after bloody conflict of civil wars and strife throughout Europe for many centuries prior to the 18th century are currently in the process of being fought throughout much of the Middle East. Whatever the ideology or religion, the late 20th century and now the 21st century has seen a massive increase in justifications or excuses for committing violence. These have, in fact, been

Farmer, Dan and Charles C. Mann. (2003). Surveillance Nation. Technology Review. Vol. 106. No. 3. 34-43.

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taught in the many privately funded -- though in some instances with heavy governmental subsidies -- religious schools that promote fundamentalism and instrumental violence as part of their educational program. These schools operate throughout the Middle East, including Israel28 and in Southeast Asia.

7. Population transformation. Perhaps the most fundamental change ongoing in societies today and few regions of the world are exempt from it is the massive transformation of populations in regions and countries. This is occurring as a result of three significant facts: (a) the general decline in the birth rates of populations in the developed world, with some countries such as Italy having a negative rate, (b) the extremely high proportion of populations in many north African countries that are young, and (c) the tremendous movement of peoples from poorer countries to richer countries through migration whether legal or illegal. In Europe, the change has been swift and dramatic, though governments have been slow to recognize it29. As far as crime is concerned, a couple of simple facts tell it all. There are twice as many Albanians in Italian prisons as there are Albanians in Albanian prisons and over 50% of inmates in prison in the Netherlands are foreign born30. What these statistics say about the immigrants who are in prison and about the governments who have put them there is another matter. We simply point to this transformation as an indication that the radical changes in population must affect crime trends both nationally and internationally. And finally, the rising numbers of refugees that have resulted from civil strife, which in turn is related to other serious problems such as the spread of diseases that thrive as a result of that strife: malarial strains transported from one region of the world to another, or HIV spread by terrorist soldiers add to the misery of migrants

28 29

Armstrong, Karen (2000). The Battle for God. NY: Alfred A. Knopf. Brenninkmeijer, Olivier (2001). Internal Security Beyond Borders: Public security in Europe and the new challenges to state and society. Berlin: Peter Lang. Chapters 5 and 6. 30 Newman, Graeme R., Joshua Freilich and Gregory Howard (2003). Exporting and Importing Criminality: Incarceration of the Foreign Born. International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice. January.

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and the demands on governments to cope with these public health issues which, it is now clear, interface with security and crime prevention issues (see following chapter).

8. Rise of the surveillance society All of the above historical processes combine to produce the conditions under which the surveillance society societies based on the necessity to maintain close control over their populations will rise and flourish. While there are many aspects of the surveillance that concern critics of society, the one that is most relevant to the production of crime trends is the increasing use of technologies that allow for the tracking of persons and objects such as electronic tracking tags, geographic positioning systems, data-mining and tracking of spending patterns31. All of these technologies are increasingly used by governments, private individuals, corporations and businesses. There are many thousands of cameras distributed throughout large cities of the world, monitoring traffic patterns, watching individuals pay for items at a check-out, monitoring activity at major shopping areas and crowded streets. The internet has also allowed for the unique possibility of individuals, using fake names (usernames) to hang out in any chat room of their choice and pretend to be someone they are not. The scene is in fact one of mutual surveillance. It is not one so much of big brother but of little brothers spying on each other32. This general ambience of surveillance and the socialization of individuals into accepting it (since they participate both as observers and as the observed) has laid the foundation for the widespread use of surveillance technologies by governments and businesses. This has made it possible for police departments to adopt surveillance technologies to an extent that would have been unimaginable just ten years ago.

31 32

Huang, Gregory T. (2003). Casting the wireless sensor net. Technology Review. July/August. 51-56. Newman, Graeme R. and Ronald V. Clarke (2003). Superhighway Robbery: Preventing ecommerce crime. London: Willan.

27

9. Merging of policing with intelligence. Although relatively common in some Asian police forces, the collection, maintenance and use of data concerning all individuals, and tracking where they go, is increasingly becoming a policing function. This has been fuelled by the recent application of mapping to identify hot spots of crime, and the discovery by police departments that simply mapping crime data was not enough to allow the development of effective police action. Needed also was information concerning many other attributes of a geographic area, including highways, detailed traffic and street information, power grids, railways, population density, shopping mall locations, etc. all of this information not necessarily related to a particular crime, but all of it needed in order to get an overall picture of a crime scene, and more importantly to take steps in order to prevent crime from occurring. One can easily recognize that this information is in fact the kind of information that those working in intelligence collect and analyze. So here the sheer availability of the technology has created the opportunity for police to spread their interests into the realm of an area traditionally thought of as that of intelligence. Since 9/11 in the USA the extreme concern created by possible terrorist acts has created an ambience of fear and the acceptance by citizens for as much surveillance and control as needed to prevent another 9/11 even though there are continuing public debates concerning excessive use of surveillance by the federal government.

10. The merging of political with traditional crime. Not only is policing merging with intelligence, but also political crime is merging with traditional crime, which of course feeds back into the merging of policing with intelligence as the police are pressured more and more by governments to respond to terrorism as well as perform their other traditional policing functions. As we have already noted, much civil strife is in fact perpetrated by individuals who act and behave like violent criminals. The results are the same, if not far more serious in consequences for victims. Furthermore, the evidence for the

28

merging of terrorism with organized crime whether in the realm of drug dealing, people smuggling, or terrorism claiming political or religious justifications is now clear. Individuals move between these activities easily. For example, Jonas Savimbi, Angola guerilla leader amassed a multi billion dollar fortune selling alluvial diamonds and ivory stolen by his men. As some have suggested, rebellion in many instances has become a business venture33. Terrorist groups use traditional organized crime techniques such as kidnapping and extortion to raise money for weapons. The cultivation and sale of drugs is used by organized crime to raise much needed cash for weapons that are then used to topple governments not friendly towards their drug trade34. Thus, just as organized crime has become part of the fabric of many societies developed and developing alike -- terrorism has also blended into organized crime and has in some countries become routinized, providing long term career opportunities for young men who have little prospect of doing anything else with their lives. These historical forces, viewed negatively (creating opportunities for violence and crime) feed a sense of powerlessness of each successive generation. But

viewed positively, the incredible progress in technology and globalization has brought peoples of the world closer together than ever before. The opportunities to help each other have never been so great, and the opportunities to prevent and reduce crime are greater now than any other time in human history. The

following chapter outlines an approach to make the best of these opportunities.

33 34

Staff (2003). The global menace of local strife The Economist, May 24, pp.23-25. RFE/RL Organized Crime and Terrorism Watch: http://www.rferl.org/corruptionwatch/.

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APPENDIX SUPPORTING DATA FOR HOMICIDE GRAPHS (FIGURES 1-4) Homicide Rates by Year and Region* WORL D 11.04 9.14 5.35 5.22 5.23 5.43 4.89 5.22 5.61 5.62 5.72 6.02 4.63 4.55 3.70 3.33 10.34 11.74 5.04 3.51 4.09 4.45 5.24 3.32 5.44 5.21 5.10 4.17 5.88 4.43 4.44 4.43 5.81 5.62 4.46 35.86 8.70 7.41 AFRIC A 8.53 5.41 7.81 6.98 6.61 7.65 4.23 6.98 4.55 4.87 4.80 4.60 7.03 7.83 4.51 5.18 46.59 45.90 3.89 7.61 3.75 3.97 16.44 6.66 4.15 5.70 5.05 5.68 4.80 8.84 3.89 4.42 4.17 5.39 6.33 605.45 20.02 27.70 ASIA 6.31 5.68 5.67 5.60 5.62 5.91 5.85 5.88 6.24 6.13 6.53 6.77 4.67 3.82 3.66 3.09 3.25 4.61 4.41 3.57 3.12 3.63 5.46 1.79 5.14 4.95 4.88 3.21 6.47 3.37 3.43 3.05 3.71 2.62 2.15 .92 2.21 2.20 LATIN CEEUR WEST EUR 177.09 . 12.39 116.19 . 11.33 7.67 . 2.93 10.52 . 2.69 10.26 . 2.58 12.93 . 2.30 4.90 . 2.28 5.21 . 2.15 25.71 . 2.45 28.17 . 2.50 13.52 . 2.53 16.01 . 2.69 5.19 1.59 2.82 5.71 2.20 3.04 7.53 . 2.93 5.93 . 3.06 5.19 . 3.17 32.23 . 3.11 9.53 . 3.40 11.33 . 2.81 7.13 3.45 3.17 5.11 . 3.53 5.01 . 3.93 5.04 . 3.82 10.79 3.75 4.08 4.09 3.72 4.33 6.31 3.50 3.58 6.24 5.00 3.48 6.88 3.80 3.26 6.69 3.80 3.51 8.27 6.62 3.83 8.31 7.22 4.41 25.10 7.53 4.73 7.13 10.65 5.04 9.98 13.12 5.37 13.50 13.97 5.09 31.34 13.79 4.89 21.65 13.15 4.65 NEW WORLD 1.94 4.88 4.58 1.95 1.87 1.93 2.19 2.19 2.03 2.26 2.55 3.01 3.23 . 3.42 2.52 2.66 2.79 8.70 2.48 9.15 9.49 4.88 5.09 7.72 7.46 7.47 8.04 7.88 7.91 8.41 8.73 9.04 9.24 9.12 8.51 7.60 6.90 INDUSTRIAL 9.53 7.55 3.49 2.54 2.37 2.26 2.21 2.09 2.25 2.31 2.32 2.43 2.47 2.59 2.53 2.56 2.58 2.53 4.61 2.27 4.91 5.16 3.10 3.22 4.75 4.84 4.49 4.64 4.45 4.58 5.37 5.83 6.15 6.92 7.77 7.69 7.54 7.07 DEVELOPING 11.94 10.29 6.41 6.28 6.33 6.82 6.05 6.50 6.95 6.89 7.31 7.67 5.61 6.44 4.24 3.70 26.58 30.16 5.77 4.75 3.60 4.05 7.90 3.45 5.80 5.37 5.42 3.96 7.23 4.36 3.91 3.62 5.60 4.02 2.70 51.21 10.42 7.59

1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996

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WORL AFRIC ASIA LATIN CEEUR WEST D A EUR 28.91 3.03 20.24 13.39 3.89 1997 6.54 23.98 12.73 4.01 1998 10.49 24.19 3.70 25.35 2.62 11.52 13.89 3.09 1999 8.89 6.16 3.67 33.43 14.12 2.88 2000 8.26 25.47 20.78 3.15 2001 10.62 46.19 2.26 43 43 43 22 43 Total 43 Mean 6.7480 24.9949 4.2056 18.9303 8.7170 3.8335 Media 5.3538 6.3292 3.7107 9.9782 7.3716 3.2582 n * Numbers in red are estimates.

NEW WORLD 6.38 4.00 3.88 5.31 5.46 42 5.3531 4.9840

INDUST- DEVELOPRIAL ING 6.64 6.50 6.49 13.22 7.04 10.17 6.55 11.23 6.45 31.63 43 43 4.5386 9.0605 4.5781 6.4139

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Countries reporting homicide from 1959-2001 CASES Included Excluded N PercentN Percent 41 20.8% 156 79.2% 51 25.9% 146 74.1% 56 28.4% 141 71.6% 58 29.4% 139 70.6% 54 27.4% 143 72.6% 59 29.9% 138 70.1% 63 32.0% 134 68.0% 67 34.0% 130 66.0% 68 34.5% 129 65.5% 72 36.5% 125 63.5% 72 36.5% 125 63.5% 69 35.0% 128 65.0% 65 33.0% 132 67.0% 60 30.5% 137 69.5% 56 28.4% 141 71.6% 53 26.9% 144 73.1% 39 19.8% 158 80.2% 38 19.3% 159 80.7% 56 28.4% 141 71.6% 37 18.8% 160 81.2% 69 35.0% 128 65.0% 63 32.0% 134 68.0% 45 22.8% 152 77.2% 40 20.3% 157 79.7% 88 44.7% 109 55.3% 86 43.7% 111 56.3% 92 46.7% 105 53.3% 89 45.2% 108 54.8% 83 42.1% 114 57.9% 76 38.6% 121 61.4% 91 46.2% 106 53.8% 89 45.2% 108 54.8% 103 52.3% 94 47.7% 91 46.2% 106 53.8% 84 42.6% 113 57.4% 98 49.7% 99 50.3% 93 47.2% 104 52.8% 112 56.9% 85 43.1% 117 59.4% 80 40.6% 114 57.9% 83 42.1%

Year 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

Total N 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197 197

Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

32

1999 2000 2001

89 65 32

45.2% 108 33.0% 132 16.2% 165

54.8% 67.0% 83.8%

197 197 197

100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

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SUPPORTING DATA FOR RAPE GRAPHS (FIGURES 5-9)

Rape Rates by Year and Region WORL AFRIC ASIA LATIN CEEU WEST NEW D A R EUR WORLD 7.08 1.59 12.96 . 4.23 27.37 1977 6.27 1978 3.81 1979 6.33 1980 6.89 1981 4.73 1982 4.02 1983 6.27 1984 6.57 1985 6.41 1986 7.19 1987 9.24 1988 6.84 1989 7.13 1990 8.59 1991 8.05 1992 10.29 1993 7.43 1994 9.08 1995 11.91 8.13 4.58 4.83 13.51 3.79 4.92 5.13 3.33 4.49 2.65 2.59 3.09 3.67 3.50 3.98 4.20 46.52 32.50 2.55 1.34 1.41 2.75 1.65 1.58 1.53 1.51 3.36 2.20 2.82 2.98 3.36 1.27 1.66 3.10 3.10 1.75 16.72 11.11 10.67 9.23 8.37 6.55 6.26 5.38 5.40 5.60 8.40 10.57 5.58 5.91 6.73 9.04 8.72 5.81 . . 4.38 . . 5.82 6.11 5.60 5.80 4.60 4.10 6.98 7.26 7.51 7.35 7.59 7.16 6.66 4.90 4.84 5.27 5.01 4.93 5.16 6.36 6.00 6.07 6.08 6.52 7.02 7.23 7.53 7.70 8.04 8.32 8.63 6.58 32.92 32.17 12.45 10.20 32.09 34.06 34.94 35.91 37.40 37.60 38.10 49.16 50.61 42.59 40.64 39.16 37.03 INDUST- DEVELO RIAL P-ING 11.65 1.75 4.36 3.03 14.13 1.81 14.88 2.03 5.22 3.99 4.50 3.32 13.55 2.19 15.96 2.10 15.67 1.92 16.04 3.62 16.24 2.86 16.24 3.04 13.46 3.37 16.53 3.67 18.28 1.99 15.60 2.85 15.38 3.31 15.39 5.91 14.05 9.00

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1996 11.00 1997 8.63 1998 5.77 1999 7.16 2000 9.21 2001 13.01

23.46 34.16 4.41 26.60 32.10 10.54

1.70 1.72 2.38 1.43 2.37 2.98

12.48 7.99 8.82 5.16 8.06 9.16

4.79 5.54 5.17 5.25 5.14 5.48

8.54 9.75 10.27 8.68 10.42 14.58

36.08 35.69 . . . 31.77

14.29 8.11 13.51 5.99 6.37 5.22 5.63 8.33 6.42 12.59 15.98 7.29 25 12.7730 4.3714 14.2909 3.3238 25

25 25 25 Total 25 Mean 7.6726 11.7503 2.164 8.4272 1 Media 7.1584 4.8314 1.753 8.3693 n 9

20 25 22 5.913 7.2843 33.3870 6 5.700 7.0236 35.8034 0

35

Countries Reporting Rape Rates from 1977 to 2001 Cases Included N 51 37 59 60 39 37 79 77 86 84 71 70 80 82 94 83 74 82 88 104 105 100 81 64 36

1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Excluded Percent N Percent 25.5% 149 74.5% 18.5% 163 81.5% 29.5% 141 70.5% 30.0% 140 70.0% 19.5% 161 80.5% 18.5% 163 81.5% 39.5% 121 60.5% 38.5% 123 61.5% 43.0% 114 57.0% 42.0% 116 58.0% 35.5% 129 64.5% 35.0% 130 65.0% 40.0% 120 60.0% 41.0% 118 59.0% 47.0% 106 53.0% 41.5% 117 58.5% 37.0% 126 63.0% 41.0% 118 59.0% 44.0% 112 56.0% 52.0% 96 48.0% 52.5% 95 47.5% 50.0% 100 50.0% 40.5% 119 59.5% 32.0% 136 68.0% 18.0% 164 82.0%

Total N 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200

Percent 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%

36

Supporting data for Figure 10 Countries showing any indication of an increase from 1990 to the last year in the decade for which there were data available were counted as having increased. Those showing no increase or a decrease were counted as decreased. The countries were as follows: Homicide* Albania, Angola, Argentina, , Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Botswana, Brunei, Burundi, Canada, China, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Djibuti, Dominica, Ecuador, Estonia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Indonesia, Kenya, Korea, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Scotland, Venezuela, Zambia Rape Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bermuda, Botswana, Cameroon, Chile, Cyprus, Columbia, Cote Divoire, Ecuador, Estonia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Nepal, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Arab Republic, Romania, England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Swaziland, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Turks and Caicos, Zambia, Zimbabwe Algeria, Andorra, Antigua Andorra, Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and Barbuda, Armenia, Armenia, Bulgaria, Austria, Azerbaijan. Barbados,

Increase

Decrease

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Bahamas, Bermuda, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Cayman, Chile, Columbia, Cote Divoire, Denmark, Fiji, France, Gabon, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungry, India, Italy, Kiribati, Libya, Macao, Maldives, Malta, Myanmar, Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Turks and Caicos, Uganda, England and Wales, Northern Ireland, USA, Zimbabwe. *Countries in red also reported increases in rape

Brunei, Burundi, Cayman, China, Korea, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Spain, USA, Greece, Hong Kong, Hungry, Indonesia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Monaco, Mongolia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Peru, Qatar, Russian Federation, Samoa, Slovenia, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Lithuania, Macao

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CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES Developing Countries Aden, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda , Argentina, Armenia, Aruba, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia, Botswana, Brazil, Solomon, West Indies, Brunei, Burkina, Burma, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cayman, Central Africa, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Columbia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cote Divoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Dahomey, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer, Kiribati, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Macao, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malaya, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montserrat, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Samoa, Sao Tome & Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syria, Tanganyika, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkey, Turks and Caicos, Uganda, Uruguay, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe, British Virgin Islands,* Guiana* Industrial Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Countries Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Hong Kong, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, England and Wales, Scotland, North Ireland, USA, USSR Note: * only included in the rape analysis, but not in the homicide analysis

39

Region Africa

Countries Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina, Burundi, Cameroon, Central Africa, Chad, Congo, Cote Divoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe Asia Aden, United Arab Emirates, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, China, Cyprus, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Khmer, Korea, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Macao, Malaya, Malaysia, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Philippine, Qatar, Saudi Arab, Singapore, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen Latin Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Cayman, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, Surinam, Trinidad, Turks and Caicos, Uruguay, Venezuela, Guiana* Central and Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Europe Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovenia, Ukraine, USSR, Yugoslavia Western Europe Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, England and Wales, Scotland, North Ireland New World Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA Note: * only included in the rape analysis, but not in the homicide analysis

40