US VS. TAN TENG [23 PHIL 145; G.R. NO.

7081; 7 SEP 1912] Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sister about what had happened and reported it to the police. Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights against self-incrimination.

Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him. VILLAFLOR VS. SUMMERS [41 PHIL 62; G.R. NO. 16444; 8 SEP 1920] Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery. The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physical examination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the

determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights against self-incrimination.

Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. BELTRAN VS. SAMSON [53 PHIL 570; G.R. NO. 32025; 23 SEPT 1929] Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.

Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against

himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons. Pascual Vs. BME Case Digest Pascual Vs. BME 28 SCRA 345 G.R. No. 25018 May 26, 1969

Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination.

The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.

Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the SelfIncrimination Clause.

Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the selfincrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.

PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA [23 SCRA 1249; G.R. L-24447; 29 JUN 1968] Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.

Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal. PEOPLE VS. BALISACAN [17 SCRA 1119; G.R. NO. L-26376; 31 AUG 1966] Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. Upon being arraigned, he entered into a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was assisted y counsel. At his counsel de officio, he was allowed to present evidence and consequently testified that he stabbed the deceased in self-defense. In addition, he stated that he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities. On the basis of the testimony of the accused, he was acquitted. Thus, the prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy.

Held: The Supreme Court held that it is settled that the existence of plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. The accused had first entered a plea of guilty but however testified that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. Therefore, there has been no standing of plea during the judgment of acquittal, so there can be no double jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. Paulin Vs. Gimenez Case Digest Paulin Vs. Gimenez 217 SCRA 386 G.R. No. 103323 January 21, 1993

Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and block road to prevent the petitioners escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended.

A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue: 1. Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal.

2. Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB9207. Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Where the dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach.

Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.

The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied. ESMENA VS. POGOY [102 SCRA 861; G.R. NO. L-54110; 20 FEB 1981] Wednesday, February 18, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the accused and that the priests telegram did not have a medical certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the complainants reason to be valid in order to reschedule again another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving the fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was dismissed earlier due to complainants failure to appear at the trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy

Held: Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed already without the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to complainants incapability to present its evidence due to non appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites should be present, that one, there is a valid complaint or information filed second, that it is done before a court of competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to where the coercion took place and last the accused were arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information. When these three conditions are present then the acquittal, conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its termination which would mean that respondents had no expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution. PEOPLE VS. RELOVA [149 SCRA 292; G.R. NO.L-45129; 6 MAR 1987] Sunday, February 15, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the

approval and necessary authority from the City Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.

Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same act. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.