Executive Case Digest - Complete

1
SECTION 1 Marcos v Manglapus FACTS: Former president Marcos and his family wanted to return to the Philippines, however, their return was barred by the incumbent president Aquino because under the present circumstances, their return poses a threat to national interest. ISSUE: Whether or not the President have the power to impose a ban without a statute authorizing it? HELD: Yes. The president, upon whom the executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the present Constitution. Neither RA 8981 (PRC) that provides for the power of the PRC to regulate review centers. OSGs contented that PGMA was merely exercising her executive power to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed and further argues that PGMA was exercising her residual powers under EO 292, particularly Sec. 20, Title I of Book III which provides: Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws ISSUE: 2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power. HELD: Yes. RATIO: The President has no inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722. Legislative powers is the authority to make laws and alter or repeal them, and this power is vested with the Congress under Sec. 1, Art VI, 1987 Constitution.
Soliven v Makasiar FACTS: Petitioner Beltran argues that the reason which necessitates presidential immunity from suit impose a correlative disability to file suit. He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of a complaint-affidavit, she may be bringing herself under the trial courts jurisdiction. ISSUE: Does the incumbent Presidents immunity from suit prevent her from suing? HELD: No. The grant to the president of the privilege of immunity from suit is to ensure the exercise of presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distractions, considering that being the Chief Executive, require all the office-holders time and undivided attention. However, this privilege may be invoked only by the holder of the office, not by any other person in the Presidents behalf.
Province of North Cotabato v GRP Peace Panel FACTS: The Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and MILF, through their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD). The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not materialized. ISSUE: What [subject of these consolidated cases] is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process? HELD/RATIO: The authority of the President to conduct peace negotiation with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas, the issue was the authority of the President to declare state of rebellion an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The SC held in Marcos v. Manglapus, xxx unstated residual powers which are impled from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power. [the MOA-AD was declared unconstitutional on the ground that the same exceeded what is allowed in the Constitution autonomous regions and not BJE]
Review Center Association of the Phils v Ermita FACTS: On June 2006, the PRC conducted the Nursing Board Examinations nationwide. A report reach the PRC that handwritten copies of two sets of examination were circulated during the examination period among examinees reviewing at the Gapuz Rewview Center and Inress Review Center. On September 8, 2005, PGMA issued EO566 which authorized the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and similar entities in the Philippines. On November 3, 2006, the chairman of CHED approved CHED Memo Order 49, s2006. ISSUE: 1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise of Executive of legislative power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction HELD: Yes. EO 566 expands the coverage of RA 7722 (CHED) which includes both public and private institutions of higher education as well as degree-granting programs in all post-secondary educational institution. A review center is not an institution of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722.
Bariago v. Philippine Truth Commission FACTS: President Aquino III found a need for a special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T
2
committed during the previous administration. On July 30, 2010, he signed EO No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 ISSUE: Whether the creation of the Truth Commission is within the powers of the Chief Executive? HELD: Yes. Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers so enumerated in the Constitution. The Truth Commission is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President primarily tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed during the Arroyo administration. In DOH v. Camposano, it was held that the Chief Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. [EO No. 1 was declared unconstitutional insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause] absence, whther it be for a fixed or indefinite period, is not a bar to his preventive suspension]
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary FACTS: On July 25, 1987, President Aquino Issued EO 284, allowing members of the Cabinet, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive Department to hold two positions (not more than two positions) in the government and government corporations, and received corresponding compensation. Petitioners seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of EO 284. ISSUE: Whether or not, EO 284 runs counter to Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides: The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office. HELD:
SECTION 13 Doromal v Sandiganbayan FACTS: Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commisioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA3019) Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supple P61M worth of electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and air-conditioning equipment to the DECS and NMYC. Doromal contented that the information should be quashed because of the absence of any document signed and/or submitted to the DECS bearing his signature. ISSUE: Does the fact that the accused, a PCGG Commissioner, has not signed any document submitting to DECS a bid of the family corporation of which he is a member justify quashing the information? HELD: The quashal is not justified. RATIO: Sec. 13, Art VII, of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not during (their) tenure, directly or indirectly participate in any business. The constitutional ban is similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD 807, Sec. 36, subpar.24) that Pursuit of private business without the permission required by Civil Service Rules and Regulations shall be a ground for disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the civil service. [On suspension, the laws command that he shall be suspended from office pendente lite. His approved leave of EO 284 is unconstitutional as it expand the exceptions under which the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants, may hold other office. It should be noted that the Constitution provides for officials designated an as ex-officio officer.
Dennis Funa v Executive Secretary FACTS: On October 4, 2006, PGMA appointed respondent Maria Elena Bautista as Undersecretary of the DOTC and was designated as Undersecretary for Marine Transport of the said department. On September 1, 2008, Bautista was designed as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC Undersecretary. Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of Bautistas appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants to hold any other office or employment. Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility of two posts (DOTC Usec for Maritime Transport and MARINA Administrator). On February 2, 2009, Bautista assumed the MARINA Administration post and relinquish of her post as DOTC Usec. Hence, rendering the current issue moot and academic. Also, the respondent contended that it was designation, and temporary at that, and was never really appointed as OIC Administration of MARINA. ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Usec for Maritime Transport and MARINA Administrator to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription against duel or multiple offices of Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
3
HELD: [The issue is moot and academic, but for the sake of argument, the Court opted to resolve the issue at once] The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as OIC Administrator of MARINA, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. Her reliance on the appointive and designation is misplaced. The Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to the nature of appointment of designation. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 15, Art VII, applies on the appointment of Valenzuela and Vallarta as RTC judges? HELD: Yes. Sec 15, Art VII applies to the judiciary. The appointments of Messrs. Valenzuela and Vallarta on March 30, 1998 (transmitted to the Office of the Chief Justice on May 14, 998) were unquestionably made during the period of the ban. Consequently, they come within the operation of the first prohibition relating to appointments which are considered to be for the purpose of buying votes or influencing the election. While the filling of vacancies in the judiciary is undoubtedly in the public interest, there is no showing in this case of any compelling reason to justify the making of the appointments during the period of the ban. On the other hand, as already discussed, there is a strong public policy for the prohibition against appointments made within the period of the ban.
SECTION 15 Aytona v Castillo FACTS: Outgoing President Garcia on December 19, 1961, made about three hundred fifty (350) midnight or last minute appointments. These appointments were ad interim, made during the Congress is not in session. On December 30, 1961, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office and the next day issued AO 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961 (date of Macapagal proclamation). Aytona was appointed ad interim Governor of the Central Bank by President Garcia on December 29, 196 and took his corresponding oath. On January 1, 1961, President Macapagal appointed Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona was prevented from holding office and as a consequence he instituted a quo warranto, challenging Castillos right to office. Castillo contended that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by AO 2 of Macapagal. ISSUE: Whether the new President had the power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by the past President, even after the appointees had already qualified? HELD: Yes (given the circumstances) Normally, when the President makes appointments the consent of CA, he has benefit of their advice. When he makes ad interim appointments, he exercises special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the Commission or thereafter explaining to them the reason of such selection. The Court is aware of many precedents to the effect that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot be reconsidered, especially where the appointee has qualified. Under the given circumstances, mass ad interim appointments (350), the authorities must admit of exceptional circumstances justifying revocation.
Arturo de Castro v JBC and PGMA FACTS: The compulsory retirement of CJ R. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming of presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. ISSUES: 1. May the incumbent President appoint his successor, considering that Sec 15, Art VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President or Acting President from making appointments within two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety? What is the relevance of Sec 4 (1), Art. VIII (Judiciary Department) of the Constitution, which provides that any vacancy in the SC shall be filled within 90 days from the occurrence there if, to the matter of appointment of his successor?
2.
HELD: Prohibition under Sec. 15, Art VII does not apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary (in effect holding that In Re: Appointments of Valenzuela and Vallarta superseded . The Court held that the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commissions reveal that the framers devoted time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the Constitution. Such meticulousness indicated that the organization and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not arbitrary or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made to reflect the intention and manifest their vision of what the Constitution should contain. Article VI (Legislative Department), Article VII (Executive Department) and Article VIII (The Judicial Department) the arrangement is a recognition of the principle of separation of powers.
In Re: Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. MA Valenzuela and Hon. PB Villarta as RTC Judges FACTS: Valenzuela and Vallarta received from Malacanang their copy of appointment dated March 30, 1998 as RTC Judges (within two months preceding the next Presidential elections, May 11, 1998). Binamira v Garrucho FACTS:
SECTION 16
A petition for quo warranto by Ramon Binamira which seeks his reinstatement too the office of the General
4
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority which he caims to have been removed without just cause in violation of his security of tenure. Binamira was designated by Jose Gonzales (then Minister of Tourism and Chairman of PTA Board). On January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho (new Sec of Tourism). PD 564 (Philippine Tourism Authority) provides that the General Manager shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines. It appearing that Binamira was designated by the then Minister of Tourism, not by the President, the latter issued a memorandum invalidating the designation of Binamira and further designating in concurrent capacity as general manager Garrucho. ISSUE: Is the removal of petitioner Binamira a violation of his security of tenure? HELD: No. Binamira was merely designated to the position and not appointment. Moreso, that he was designated by the then Minister of Tourism, to which under the law, should be appointed by the President. Appointment involves the exercise of discretion, which because of its nature cannot be delegated. Legally speaking, it was no possible for Minister Gonzales to assume the exercise of that discretion as an alter ego of the President. Bautista v Salonga FACTS: On August 27, 1987, the President designated herein petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as Acting Chairman of CHR and on December 17, 1988 extended to her permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. On January 13, 1989, Bautista received a letter from the CA requesting her to submit to the CA certain information and documents as required by its rules in connection with the confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of CHR. Bautista, in her letter reply, stated that CA does not have jurisdiction to review her appointment. In turn, the CA Secretary informed petitioner Bautista that her ad interim appointment as Chairman of CHR was disapproved. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Commissioner of Human Rights requires the consent of CA? HELD: The appointment of the Chairman and Commissioners of the CHR does not require the consent of the CA, as it does not belong to the group where CAs consent is necessary for their appointment.
Quintos-Deles v Commission on Appointment Sarmiento v Mison FACTS: The petitioner, Sarmiento, seek to enjoin the respondent Mison from performing the functions of the Office of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, on the ground that the latters appointment is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on appointment. ISSUE: Whether or not Misons appointment is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on appointment? HELD: The respondents appointment is constitutional and valid. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four groups of officers whom the President shall appoint: 1. The heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provide for by law; 3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; 4. Officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officer are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by CA, the president appoints. The second, third and fourth groups, does not require the consent of CA. The position Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (bureau head) is not among the first group, and may be appointed without the necessity of CAs consent. FACTS: Petitioner Teresita Quintos-Deles were appointed as Sectoral Representatives by the President pursuant to Art VII, Sec 16, par 2 and Art XVIII, Sec 7 of the Constitution. On April 18, 1988, the petitioner with four other appointed sectoral representatives were scheduled to take their oaths. Due to the opposition insisted of some congressmen-members of the CA, who insisted that sectoral representatives must first be confirmed by the CA before they could take their oaths and assume office. Quintos-Deles, in a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with injunction seeking to compel the respondent CA to allow the her to perform and discharge her duties as a member of House of the Representative representing the Womens Sector and to restrain the respondent from subjecting her appointment to the confirmation process. ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the CA? HELD: The power of the President to appoint sectoral representatives remains directly derived from Section 7, Article XVIII of the Constitution (and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution) which is quoted in the second "Whereas' clause of Executive Order No. 198. Thus, appointments by the President of sectoral representatives require the consent of the Commission on Appointments in accordance with the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII of the Constitution. More to the point, petitioner Deles' appointment was issued not by virtue of Executive Order No. 198 but pursuant to Art. VII, Section 16, paragraph 2 and Art. XVIII, Section 7 of the Constitution which require submission to the confirmation process.
5
Calderon v Carale FACTS: Sometime in March 1989, RAA 6715, amending the Labor Code (PD442) was approved, which provides xxx The Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments xxx Pursuant to said law (RA 6715), President Aquino appointed the Chairman and Commissioners of the NLRC representing the public, workers and employers sectors. The appointments stated that the appointees may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office. After said appointments, then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon issued Administrative Order No. 161, series of 1989, designating the places of assignment of the newly appointed commissioners. This petition for prohibition questions the constitutionality and legality of the permanent appointments extended by the President of the Philippines to the respondents Chairman and Members of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), without submitting the same to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation pursuant to Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by said RA 6715. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. HELD: No, Congress may not, by law, add to the list of officers that requires that confirmation of the CA. As interpreted in the Mison case, confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required exclusively for the heads of executive departments, ambassadors, public ministers, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, such as the members of the various Constitutional Commissions. With respect to the other officers whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the law and to those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint, no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments is required. Had it been the intention to allow Congress to expand the list of officers whose appointments must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the Constitution would have said so by adding the phrase "and other officers required by law" at the end of the first sentence, or the phrase, "with the consent of the Commission on Appointments" at the end of the second sentence. Evidently, our Constitution has significantly omitted to provide for such additions FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Petitioners, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 xxx That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority xxx infringes on the constitutional and statutory provision: Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . . appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts. Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. (a) The Governor of the Bangko Sentral, who shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board. The Governor of the Bangko Sentral shall be head of a department and his appointment shall be subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. xxx ISSUES: Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of appointments extended by the president to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. HELD: As held in Calderon v. Carale, Congress cannot by law expand the confirmation powers of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of appointment of other government officials not expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
Flores v Drilon
ISSUES: Whether or not Congress pursuant to Sec 13, par (d) of RA 7227 encroached the appointing authority of the President. HELD: Yes. The power of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to appoint; it is not a ministerial act of issuing appointment papers to the appointee. In other words, the choice of the appointee is a fundamental component of the appointing power. When Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer, it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications
Tarrosa v Singson FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner questioning the appointment of respondent Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The petition is anchored on the provisions of Section 6 of R.A. No. 7653, which established the Bangko Sentral as the Central Monetary Authority of the Philippines. Section 6, Article II of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
6
of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal," whereby the legality of Pobre's appointment as PRC Chairman may be determined. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the President to appoint "those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint." The law that authorizes him to appoint the PRC Commissioner and Associate Commissioners, is P.D. 223, Section 2, which provides that the Commissioner and Associate Commissioners of the PRC are "all to be appointed by the President for a term of nine (9) years, without reappointment, to start from the time they assume office ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of Pobre violative any provision of PD 223. HELD: The appointment is valid and is not violative of any provision of PD 223. P.D. 223 applies only to the unexpired term of the Chairman/Commissioner, the underlined clause: "at the expiration of his term, resignation or removal" can not possibly refer to the Chairman/Commissioner for it would contradict the first clause providing that he will be succeeded by the senior Associate Commissioner "for the unexpired portion of his term only." There can be no more "unexpired term" to speak of if the Chairman stepped down "at the expiration of his term." It is more logical to assume that the underlined clause refers to the senior Associate Commissioner who should serve only up to "the expiration of his term, resignation or removal." Hence, the preposition "at," which appears to have been used inadvertently, should be understood to mean "until" so that the provision will read thus: . . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term only with the most Senior of the Associate Commissioners succeeding the Commissioner until the expiration of his term, resignation or removal. (Sec. 2. P.D. 223)
Luego v Civil Service Commission FACTS: The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11, Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon on February 18, 1983. 1 The appointment was described as permanent" but the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary," subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the private respondent and another employee, and provided "there (was) no pending administrative case against the appointee, no pending protest against the appointment nor any decision by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of the appointment." On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the legality of which does not have to be decided here, the Civil Service Commission found the private respondent better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and, accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the position of Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked." The private respondent was so appointed on June 28, 1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte. The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent appointment, is now before us to question that order and the private respondent's title ISSUE: Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latter? HELD: The appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service Commission to reverse him and call it temporary.
Arturo de Castro v JBC and PGMA FACTS: The compulsory retirement of CJ R. Puno by May 17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming of presidential elections on May 10, 2010. Even before the event actually happens, it is giving rise to many legal dilemmas. ISSUE: Whether the President any president may appoint a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and does not counter run to the provision of the Constitution? HELD: Yes. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court. She is now
Pobre v Mendieta FACTS: The controversy started, on January 2, 1992, when the term of office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A. Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate Commissioner of the PRC. On February 15, 1992, President Corazon C. Aquino appointed the petitioner, then an Associate Commissioner, as the PRC Commissioner/ Chairman. Mariano A. Mendieta, as the Senior Associate Commissioner, contended that he was legally entitled to succeed Francia as Chairman of the PRC. Pobre disputed Mendieta's claim on the ground that only the President of the Philippines, in whom the appointing power is vested by law and the Constitution, may name the successor. The petition raises an issue regarding the proper construction of the provision in Section 2 of P.D. No. 223 that: ". . . any vacancy in the Commission shall be filled for the
7
left with an imperative duty under the Constitution to fill up the vacancies created by such inexorable retirements within 90 days from their occurrence. Her official duty she must comply with. So must we ours who are tasked by the Constitution to settle the controversy. the conduct of Mayor Villena, as a result of which the latter was found to have committed bribery, extortion, malicious abuse of authority and unauthorized practice of law profession. The respondent recommended to the President of the Philippines the suspension of Villena to prevent possible coercion of witnesses and such was granted. Villena petitioned for the issuance of preliminary injunction. Among others, he argued that the act of respondent in suspending him from office and in preferring charges against him and in designating a special investigator is null and void. He contended that the respondent by suspending him, has exercised control over local government when that power has been taken away from the President of the Philippines by the Constitution. The petitioner argues that the power of suspension is expressly granted by section 2188 of the Administrative Code to the provincial governor. It does not however mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to law. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior has the power of suspension of the petitioner, an exercise of the power of control over local government and hence violative of local autonomy? HELD: HELD: No. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed , but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. The President of the Philippines is invested with the authority to suspend the petitioner, and it appearing that he had verbally approved or at least acquiesced in the action taken by the Secretary of the Interior, the suspension of the petitioner should be sustained on the principle of approval or ratification of the act of the Secretary of the Interior by the President of the Philippines. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts; he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secretaries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for the acts of administration of the entire Executive Department.
SECTION 17 Drilon v Lim FACTS: Drilon, the Secretary of Justice, on appeal to him, declared the Ordinance No. 7794 or the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. The City of Manila, in a petition for certiorari, RTC revoked the Secretarys resolution, sustained the said ordinance, and more importantly declared Sec 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional be of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice the power of control over local governments in violation of local autonomy as mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines power of supervision over local governments. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 187 of the LGC is violative of the Constitution provisions of local autonomy and the Presidents power of supervision of local governments?
Lacson-Magallanes Co Inc v Pano FACTS: In 1932, Jose Magallanes as a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in Davao. Magallanes, in 1953, ceded his rights and interest to a portion of the above public land to plaintiff, the said portion was officially released from the forest zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land in 1954. In 1955, Pano and nineteen others applied for the purchase of 90 hectares of the released area. Plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire released area and this was protested by Pano and other upon averment that they actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application. The Director of Lands rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff and a motion for reconsideration by Pano was denied. On appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, held that the appeal was without merit. The case was elevated to the President. On 1958, The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President decided the controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff contented that the decision of the Director of Lands as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Villena v Secretary of Interior FACTS: The Division of Investigation of the DOJ, upon the request of the Secretary of Interior, conducted an inquiry into
8
Resources (Sec. 4 CA 141), claiming that this statute is controlling not only upon courts but also upon the President. ISSUE: Whether or not the President has no power to modify, affirm, revise, reverse or set aside the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Sec of Agriculture and Natural Resource pursuant to Sec 4 of CA 141? Whether or not the power exercised by the Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power? HELD: The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order". Gascon v Arroyo FACTS: An Agreement to Arbitrate was entered into by and between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Executive Secretary Joker Arroyo, and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr. This is an action to annul and set aside the said agreement entered into by the Executive Secretary. HELD: As Chief Executive, the President was (and even now) "assisted by a Cabinet" composed of Ministers (now Secretaries), who were appointed by and accountable to the President. In other words, the Members of the cabinet, as heads of the various departments, are the assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or the law to act in person, or where the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the heads of such departments performed in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. Executive Secretary had the power and authority to enter into the "Agreement to Arbitrate" with the ABS- CBN Broadcasting Corporation, as he acted for and in behalf of the President when he signed it; hence, the aforesaid agreement is valid and binding upon the Republic of the Philippines, as a party thereto. RE: CONTROL. Director of Lands who has direct executive control among others in the lease, sale or any form of concession or disposition of the land of the public domain subject to the immediate control of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and considering that under the Constitution the President of the Philippines has control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices, etc., 15 the President of the Philippines has therefore the same authority to dispose of portions of the public domain as his subordinates, the Director of Lands, and his alter ego the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
City of Iligan v Director of Lands FACTS: On October 5, 1965, The President Macapagal issued Proclamation 469 providing for the grant, donation and transfer of parcels of land in favor of Iligan City. On October 22, the Mayor of Iligan wrote the Director of Lands to inform him that the City of Iligan is the owner in fee simple of loats by virtue of Proclamation 469 and requested that the said property be excluded from the proposed auction sale. No action was taken on this request for exclusion. A preliminary injunction was issued by the court as prayed for in the complaint on December 1965. On August 1966, President Marcosissued Proclamation 94 excluding from the operation of Proclamation 469 certain portions of the land embraced therein, situated in Iligan and declaring the same open to disposition under Public Land Act. After trial on merits, the trial court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction of December 1965. Appeal to the CA, in a resolution issued wherein the records of the case were certified to this Court as the issue of the validity of any executive order and the errors or the questions of the law raised are within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the authority to donate the said public land to such a province, municipality, branch or subdivision of the government? HELD: Yes. Such power of the President is recognized under Section 69 aforecited of the Public Land Act. The President of the Philippines may execute contracts in favor of any province, municipality or other branch or subdivision of the government who shall need any portion of the land of the public domain open to concession for educational, charitable or other similar purposes, in the form of donation, sale, lease, exchange, or any other form.
Kilosbayan v Dominguez
Supervision and control include only the authority to: a) act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; d) determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to: a. generally oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with day-to-day activities; b. require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department;
9
c. take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of maladministration; review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase or add to them. the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. It is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the Presidents exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court.
d.
SECTION 18 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v Zamora FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (the "AFP"), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila. Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis. HELD: Under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers. The President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-
Olaguer v Military Commission FACTS: On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were charged for subversion upon the recommendation of the respondent Judge Advocate General and the approval of the respondent Minister of National Defense. ISSUE: Whether or not military commissions or tribunals have the jurisdiction to try civilians for offenses allegedly committed during martial law when civil courts are open and functioning. HELD: Civilians placed on trial for offenses under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are duly established by law. Military commissions, or tribunals, are not courts and do not form part of the judicial system. A military commission or tribunal cannot try and exercise jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them as long as the civil courts are open and functioning, and that any judgment rendered by such body relating to a civilian is null and void for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunal concerned.
Sanlakas v Executive Secretary FACTS: They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of rebellion" and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. HELD: It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-inChief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
10
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it. The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twentyfour hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing. A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be released.
peace and order during the 2004 elections in the provinces of Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur. On 27 September 2005, a directive from PGMA was received by Gen. Senga, subsequently, the latter, through a letter, informing the senator that "no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear" before the hearing scheduled on that day. Nonetheless, both Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were present as the hearing started, and they both testified as to the conduct of the 2004 elections. Petitioners seek the annulment of a directive from President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo enjoining them and other military officers from testifying before Congress without the Presidents consent. Petitioners also pray for injunctive relief against a pending preliminary investigation against them, in preparation for possible court-martial proceedings, initiated within the military justice system in connection with petitioners violation of the aforementioned directive. On the very day of the hearing, 28 September 2005, President Gloria-Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464). The OSG notes that the E.O. "enjoined officials of the executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her approval." HELD: The ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege. The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. We believe and hold that our constitutional and legal order sanctions a modality by which members of the military may be compelled to attend legislative inquiries even if the President desires otherwise, a modality which does not offend the Chief Executives prerogatives as commander -in-chief. The remedy lies with the courts.
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of "graduated powers." From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of such power. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'" Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive powers
David v Arroyo FACTS: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017. These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. Hence, such issuances are void for being unconstitutional. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
Gudani v Senga (HELLO GARCI SCANDAL) FACTS: On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited several senior officers of the AFP to appear at a public hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security (Senate Committee) scheduled on 28 September 2005. The hearing was scheduled after topics concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections emerged in the public eye, particularly allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone conversation between President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and an official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) widely reputed as then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano. At the time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member, of "Joint Task Force Ranao" by the AFP Southern Command. "Joint Task Force Ranao" was tasked with the maintenance of
11
take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger. Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales stated that political rallies, which to the Presidents mind were organized for purposes of destabilization, are cancelled. ISSUE: Constitutionality of PP 1017 and GO 5. RATIO/SUMMARY: In sum, the lifting of PP 1017 through the issuance of PP 1021 a supervening event would have normally rendered this case moot and academic. However, while PP 1017 was still operative, illegal acts were committed allegedly in pursuance thereof. Besides, there is no guarantee that PP 1017, or one similar to it, may not again be issued. Already, there have been media reports on April 30, 2006 that allegedly PP 1017 would be reimposed "if the May 1 rallies" become "unruly and violent." Consequently, the transcendental issues raised by the parties should not be "evaded;" they must now be resolved to prevent future constitutional aberration. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander-inChief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFPs authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5. On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. Other than this declaration of invalidity, this Court cannot impose any civil, criminal or administrative sanctions on the individual police officers concerned. They have not been individually identified and given their day in court. The civil complaints or causes of action and/or relevant criminal Informations have not been presented before this Court. Elementary due process bars this Court from making any specific pronouncement of civil, criminal or administrative liabilities. It is well to remember that military power is a means to an end and substantive civil rights are ends in themselves. How to give the military the power it needs to protect the Republic without unnecessarily trampling individual rights is one of the eternal balancing tasks of a democratic state. During emergency, governmental action may vary in breadth and intensity from normal times, yet they should not be arbitrary as to unduly restrain our peoples liberty. Perhaps, the vital lesson that we must learn from the theorists who studied the various competing political philosophies is that, it is possible to grant government the authority to cope with crises without surrendering the two vital principles of constitutionalism: the maintenance of legal limits to arbitrary power, and political responsibility of the government to the governed. HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition, the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest without prior legislation. G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence." Considering that "acts of terrorism" have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Kulay-an v Tan FACTS: On 15 January 2009, three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu. On 21 January 2009, a task force was created by the ICRC and the Philippine National Police (PNP), which then organized a parallel local group known as the Local Crisis Committee later called Sulu Crisis Management Committee, convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu. Its armed forces component was headed by respondents General Juancho Saban, and his deputy, Colonel Eugenio Clemen. The PNP component was headed by respondent Police Superintendent Bienvenido G. Latag, the Police Deputy Director for Operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).
12
Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul. The organization of the CEF was embodied in a "Memorandum of understanding" entered into between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag. On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. 13 It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. ISSUE: Whether or not issued by Provincial Governor Tan, Proclamation No. 1 and its Implementing Guidelines were issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Whether or not the Provincial Governor is not authorized by any law to create civilian armed forces under his command, nor regulate and limit the issuances of PTCFORs to his own private army. HELD: The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by O ne President. Springing from the well-entrenched constitutional precept of One President is the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to which the "calling-out" powers constitutes a portion. The Presidents Emergency Powers, on the other hand, is balanced only by the legislative act of Congress, as embodied in the second paragraph of Section 23, Article 6 of the Constitution. Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. Provincial governor is not authorized to convene CEF pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force; the organization of private citizen armies is proscribed. Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates that: Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces including Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) not consistent with the citizen armed force established in this Constitution shall be dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force. SECTION 19 Torres v Gonzales FACTS: Before 1979, Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa (2 counts) and was sentenced to imprisonment and to pay an indemnity. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted the petitioner by the President on condition that petitioner would not again violate any penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was released. On September 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons. The record before the Board showed that petitioner had been charged with 20 counts of estafa, convicted with sedition which is subject of an appeal, and a letter report from the NBI showing a long list of charges brought against the petitioner. The petitioner was subsequently arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence. Petitioner claims that he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition. He contends that he was not given am opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and this deprived of due process. ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly arrested and recommitted to for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence. HELD: No. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a conditional pardon, and the proper consequence of such breach may either be purely executive act (under Sec 64(i) of the Revised Adm Code) which is not subject to judicial scrutiny, or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon (Art 159 of the RPC). Where the President opts to proceed under Sec 64(i), RAC, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Monsanto v Factoran FACTS: Petitioner Monsanto was Assistant Treasurer of Calbayog City. She was convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents and sentenced to imprisonment, to pay a fine and to indemnify the government in a decision by the Sandiganbayan. While the case was pending appeal in the SC, she was granted absolute pardon and restored to full civil and political rights by the then President Marcos. The Ministry of Finance agreed to reinstate her without necessity of a new appointment provided this was done not earlier than the date of her pardon. However, on April 15, 1986, the new administration held that she was not entitled to automatic reinstatement on the basis of the pardon
13
granted to her. Her motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner brought this action to the SC. Petitioners theory is that general rule on pardon does not apply to her because she was extended clemency while her case was pending in the SC. She contended that without final judgment on conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office did not match. HELD: (1) Petitioner was granted pardon under the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which by deleting the requirement that pardon could be granted only after final conviction, impliedly authorized it to be granted even before conviction. The 1987 Constitution reverted back to the former rule, requiring final conviction as a condition for the grant by the President of pardon, However, it is immaterial when the pardon was granted. For the result would be the same. By accepting the pardon, the petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal, which result that the judgment of conviction of the Sandiganbayan became final. (2) Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. ... A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance. A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. NOTES ON THE CASE: Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the persons innocence (which is rare), it cannot bring back lost of reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we wise track of the true character and purpose of the privilege. HELD: The conviction by final judgment limitation under Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from conviction by the trial court. Government agencies and instrumentality concerned must require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal before an application shall be processed. The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or waiver of the appeal.
Garcia v COA FACTS: Petitioner was summarily dismissed from service on the ground of dishonesty in accordance with the decision of the then Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication in administrative cases for the loss of several telegraph poles. Petitioner did not appeal from the decision. Based on the same facts obtaining in the administrative action, a criminal case for qualified theft was filed against petitioner. The court rendered its decision acquitting the petitioner of the offense charged. The acquittal of the petitioner was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. Petitioner sought reinstatement to his former position, but was denied by the Bureau of Telecommunications. Hence, he pleaded to the President for executive clemency which was then granted. Petitioner thereafter filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries effective 1 April 1975 (date of dismissal) to March 12, 1985 (date of reinstatement). It was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been reinstated to the grant of executive clemency? HELD: Yes. we have firmly established the general rule that while a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt and not forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence, it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages. If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of the offense charged. When a person is given pardon because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of guilt. In the case at bar, petitioner was found administratively liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of the charge of qualified theft based on the
People v Salle Jr FACTS: On November 18, 1991, Francisco Salle Jr and Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as coprincipals of a compound crime of murder and destructive arson and were each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay indemnity. The appellant seasonably filed their notice of appeal. However, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The court required his counsel to verify the voluntariness of the said motion. In the manifestation of his counsel, she informed the court that her verification disclosed that Salle signed the motion without the assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion was merely a bureaucratic requirement necessary for his early release following the grant of a conditional pardon by the President on December 9, 1993. She further informed that Court the Mengote was, on same dates granted a conditional pardon and released him from confinement, and that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. The Court granted Salles motion to withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawn upon his acceptance of the conditional pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not the conditional pardon granted to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is enforceable?
14
very same acts for which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not commit the offense imputed to him. consolidated petitions asks to reconsider whether petitioner are immune from prosecution for Alay-ay/Olalia slayings byy reason of a general grant of amnesty issued by the President Ramos to rebels, insurgents and other person who had committed crimes in furtherance of political ends. CA had held that they had not. ISSUE: FACTS: Petitioner Llamas was Vice-Governor of Tarlac who assumed the position of governor when Governor Ocampo was found guilty by DILG of a violation of Ra 3019 and meted a penalty of suspension of 90 days. Administrative conviction was based on complaint filed by petitioners and other charging Ocampo with executing loan agreement with Lingkod Tarlac Foundation for the amount of P20M, which is a non-stock and non-profit organization headed by the governor as chairman and his brother-in-law as executive director, trustee, and secretary. Loan was claimed to be advantageous to the government. Motion for reconsideration was filed by Ocampo and was denied by DILG. On March 19, 1991, Ocampo issued admistrative order wherein he signified intention to continue in the office at his residence in the belief that pendency of appeal to the Executive Secretary precluded finality as executor of the DILG order. The Executive Secretary issued a resolution granting executive clemency to Ocampo, Llamas filed petition claiming that executive clemency could only be granted by the President in criminal cases, and not administrative cases. ISSUE: Whether or not executive clemency may be granted on either criminal case or in administrative case? HELD: According to the petitioner, after conviction by final judgment applies solely to criminal cases, but he himself describes the governor as one convicted in an administrative case and thus actually concedes that conviction may be used either in a criminal or administrative case. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President which is sole exclusion of impeachment cases. If the President can grant reprieves, commutation and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases which are less serious than criminal offenses? However, the power of the President to grant executive clemency in administrative cases refers only to administrative cases in the Executive branch and not in the Judicial and Legislative branches of the government. Under the doctrine of Qualified Political Agency, the different Executive departments are mere adjuncts of the President. Their acts are presumptively the acts of the President until countermanded or reprobated by her. In this case, the President in the exercise of her power of supervision and control over all executive departments may substitute her decision for that of her subordinate. It is clearly within the power of the President not only to grant executive clemency but also to reverse or modify a ruling issued by a subordinate against an erring public official, where a reconsideration of the facts alleged would support the same. It is in this sense that the alleged executive clemency was granted. Whether or not the grant of amnesty extinguished their criminal liability? HELD: Kapunans Certificate of Amnesty states: This is to certify that EDUARDO E. KAPUNAN, JR. was granted AMNESTY for acts constituting Rebellion on March 23, 1995 pursuant to the provisions of Proclamation No. 347, issued on March 25, 1994 by His Excellency, President Fidel V. Ramos. The amnesty granted to Kapunan extends to acts constituting only one crime, rebellion. Thus, any inquiry whether he is liable for prosecution in connection with the Olalia killings will necessarily rely not on the list of acts or crimes enumerated in Section 1 of Proclamation No. 347, but on the definition of rebellion and its component acts. Legaspis Certificate of Amnesty states: This is to certify that the amnesty application (No. A270) under Proclamation No. 347 of MR. OSCAR E. LEGASPI, filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Metro Manila, was GRANTED by the NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION en banc on 13 November 1995 subject to the qualification that the grant of amnesty shall cover only those offenses which Mr. Legaspi disclosed in his application. In his application, Mr. Legaspi stated that he participated in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts, for which respective acts, he was charged with mutiny before a General Court Martial and Rebellion (which was archived) before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court. Mr. Legaspi further stated in his application that he went on AWOL in 198. The limited scope of the amnesty granted to Legaspi is even more apparent. At most, it could only cover offenses connected with his participation in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts. Proclamation No. 347 operates only to the extent of entitling the criminal to apply for amnesty. The actual grant of amnesty still depends on the NACs determination as to whether the applicant is indeed entitled to amnesty. In Kapunans case, the grant of amnesty extended to him pertains only to the crime of rebellion. the grant of amnesty was specifically limited to his participation in the 1987 and 1989 coup attempts against the Aquino administration. The murders took place in November 1986. They were supposedly intended to create an atmosphere that would facilitate an immediate coup detat. It is difficult for the Court to appreciate at this point how the Olalia/Alay-ay killings were connected with the 1987 or 1991 coup attempts, though Legaspi is free to establish such a connection through a trial on the merits.
Llamas v Orbos
SECTION 21 Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading FACTS:
Kapunan v CA FACTS: Petitioners face criminal charges in connection with the 1986 killing of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Chairman Rolando Olalia and his driver, Leonor Alay-ay. These
Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and garlic .Some shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. In as much as none of the shipments had the certificate required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof, the
15
goods thus imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture proceedings. The Collector of Customs of Manila rendered a decision on September 4, 1956, declaring said goods forfeited to the Government and the goods having been, in the meantime, released to the consignees on surety bonds. Decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of Customs on December 27, 1956. Court of Tax Appeals, which reversed the decision of the Commissioner of Customs and ordered that the aforementioned bonds be cancelled and withdrawn. The forfeiture of the goods imported from Japan cannot be justified under Executive Order No. 328, not only because the same seeks to implement an executive agreement extending the effectivity of our Trades and Financial Agreements with Japan. (the said executive agreement was made without the concurrence of 2/3 of the Senate). ISSUE: Treaties v Executive Agreement HELD: The concurrence of said House of Congress is required by our fundamental law in the making of "treaties" (Constitution of the Philippines, Article VII, Section 10[7]), which are, however, distinct and different from "executive agreements," which may be validly entered into without such concurrence. Treaties are formal documents which require ratification with the approval of two thirds of the Senate. Executive agreements become binding through executive action without the need of a vote by the Senate or by Congress. International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy and those involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements. Philippines and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon are directed to regularly update petitioners and this Court on the status of their investigation. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent? HELD: The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her tenure.9 The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President enjoys immunity during her incumbency, and why this must be so: Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY Lourders Rubrico et. al. v PGMA et. al. FACTS: This case started with the alleged abduction of Lourdes Rubrico and the alleged harassments and threats she and her daughters were made to endure by military men. The petition for the writ of amparo dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this Court. After issuing the desired writ and directing the respondents to file a verified written return, the Court referred the petition to the CA for summary hearing and appropriate action. After due proceedings, the CA rendered, on July 31, 2008, its partial judgment, subject of this review, disposing of the petition but only insofar as the answering respondents were concerned. The fallo of the CA decision reads as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, partial judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant petition with respect to respondent Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, in order that petitioners complaint will not end up as another unsolved case, the heads of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police are directed to ensure that the investigations already commenced are diligently pursued to bring the perpetrators to justice. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the

Executive Case Digest - Complete

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Executive Case Digest - Complete

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

SECTION 21 Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea Trading FACTS:

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW CASES: E X E C U T I V E D E P A R T M E N T

You might also like