B.M. No.

712

July 13, 1995

Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office. On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar. The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. 2 The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard as having persuasive effect: In Re Farmer: 3 xxx xxx xxx

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATHTAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner. RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.: A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years. Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . . xxx xxx xxx

Page 1 of 50

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . . xxx xxx xxx 4

has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it. Re Rouss: 7 Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness. Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8 Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice. It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning: . . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187): The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal

In Re Application of Kaufman, 5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710: It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license. In Re Keenan: 6 The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery

Page 2 of 50

learning may be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling a curse instead of a benefit to his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin. 9 All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment: Re Stepsay: 10 The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding. Re Wells: 11 . . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment. The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it. 12

Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character. Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office. Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and

Page 3 of 50

learned profession of the law. Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan. Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ., concur. Bellosillo, J. is on leave.

Page 4 of 50

CORDOVA vs. CORDOVA [A.C. No. 3249. August 9, 2004] Gentlemen: Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 9 2004. A.C. No. 3249 (Salvacion Delizo-Cordova vs. Atty. Lawrence D. Cordova.) In the Resolution of November 29, 1989, the Court indefinitely suspended Atty. Lawrence D. Cordova from the practice of law after finding him guilty of immorality. The Court likewise resolved to consider lifting the suspension upon submission by respondent of proof satisfactory to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), that he has and continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has given up his immoral course of conduct. On January 15, 1992 and February 12, 1992, respondent and complainant, respectively, filed separate petitions with this Court praying that the suspension of respondent be lifted. In his petition, respondent explained that the allegations of maltreatment and failure to provide support were products of complainant's imagination and were unsubstantiated. He alleged that his eldest daughter, Lorraine Salve, who was living with him after complainant left their home in 1989, was enrolled in school and was provided with material and emotional support. Respondent also submitted the affidavit of desistance executed by complainant on December 27, 1991, attesting that he has reformed, living in the conjugal home and provides love and paternal affection to his family. On the other hand, complainant contended in her petition that she and respondent have reconciled, and that respondent has given up his immoral conduct and is supporting his legitimate family. Appended to her petition is the affidavit of respondent which was also executed on December 27, 1991. In the Resolutions of February 13, 1992 and March 5, 1992, these petitions were referred to the IBP for appropriate action and recommendation. However, on March 17, 1992, complainant wrote separate letters to Chief

Justice Andres R. Narvasa and the IBP negating her earlier petition to lift respondent's suspension. Complainant claimed that respondent still goes home to his live-in partner, Cita Magallanes; does not support his family, and made it appear that he had changed his ways so she would sign an affidavit of desistance.[1]cralaw In the months following, complainant sent two other letters of a similar tenor.[2]cralaw At about the same time, Lorraine Salve Cordova wrote the Court in support of her father's petition. [3]cralaw On January 30, 1998, the CBD received a Manifestation/Motion from respondent reiterating his plea that his suspension be lifted. Respondent stated: 4. That on December 15, 1994, then Chapter President, Atty. MAMERTO B. ALCISO, JR., in compliance with the directive, submitted with the Supreme Court for its consideration Resolution No. 6, Series of 1994 of the IBP Surigao del Sur Chapter recommending the Lifting of the Suspension of the herein Respondent for having sufficiently proven to have regained the fitness to be allowed to resume the practice of law as an officer of the Court by commendably supporting and taking care of his children despite the absence, neglect and abandonment of his wife (Complainant) who is now living with another man, not her husband in Cebu City.... 5. That on February 18, 1995, the Honorable Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) passed Resolution No. XI- 95-293 ... resolving to adopt and direct the IBP Surigao del Sur Chapter to report on the behavior and substantiation of Respondent's activities pending his indefinite suspension .... 6. That upon receipt of the copy of the above-cited notice, Respondent wrote a letter under oath to Atty. Antonia C. Buenaflor, President of the IBP Surigao del Sur Chapter categorically explaining the details and story about Complainant's continued clandestine extra-marital affair painfully kept secret by the herein Respodnent in the hope of saving the shuttered [sic] marriage.... 7. In compliance with the directive of the Board of Governors of IBP, a

Page 5 of 50

report of the Committee dated August 31, 1996 chaired by Atty. Teresita P. Donasco was submitted to the Chapter President Recommending that Respondent's Suspension from the practice of law be NOW LIFTED ... [4]cralaw In a Report dated April 5, 2000, CBD Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo recommended that the suspension of respondent be lifted, noting that: ... complainant has always informed the Supreme Court as well as this office of any further acts of immorality committed by respondent. The latest letter from the complainant was received in June 1992. Since then up to the present, complainant has been silent on her husband's conduct. The silence could only be interpreted that respondent has made amends and has reformed. It has been more than 10 years that respondent has suffered the effect of his suspension from the practice of his legal profession. Such suspension has not only affected him but it has also an adverse effect to [sic] his family particularly to [sic] his children. This office is convinced that respondent has reformed as reported by his IBP Chapter. Furthermore, more than ten years suspension from the practice of law appears to be sufficient penalty for the acts complained of. [5]cralaw On May 29, 2000, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XIV000-318,[6]cralaw adopting and approving the report and recommendation of Commissioner Elamparo, lifting the suspension of respondent, copy of which was furnished this Court. In view thereof, the Court directed complainant to comment thereon. [7]cralaw In a letter dated January 18, 2002, complainant expressed disappointment over the move of the Surigao del Sur Chapter in extending assistance to respondent. She contended that the Surigao del Sur Chapter is not in a position to know that respondent has already reformed, and claimed that respondent is cohabiting with his mistress, Isabelita Cinciro, with whom he has a seven-year old son. She also opined that all the

allegations in respondent's motion for early resolution were lies, and that in 1992, respondent tried to reconcile with her so that his suspension would be lifted. Complainant thought that respondent had turned in a new leaf but later discovered that this was not so. She also recounted the hardships that she endured with respondent. The Court referred this matter to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and recommendation. In its Report dated January 13, 2003, the OBC submitted that the Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP nor obliged to accept the same as a matter of course. It also considered the protestation of respondent that the length of his suspension is more than sufficient punishment and his insistence that he has fully reformed are not fully meritorious since respondent has not submitted proof satisfactory to the Court that he has met the standards imposed in the Resolution of November 29, 1989. On January 27, 2003, upon the recommendation of the OBC, the Court required respondent to comment on the letter dated January 18, 2002 of complainant and to submit satisfactory proof that he has continuously provided for the support of his family and that he has given up his immoral conduct. Respondent received a copy of said resolution on March 21, 2003 but failed to comply therewith. In the Resolution of October 8, 2003, respondent was required to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for his non-compliance, a copy of which was received by respondent on November 12, 2003. Considering that up to this late date, respondent has neither commented on the letter dated January 18, 2002 of complainant by way of opposition to his motion to lift suspension nor submitted satisfactory proof that he has continuously provided for the support of his legitimate family and given up his immoral conduct, the Court Resolves to DENY the motion of respondent that his indefinite suspension from the practice of law be lifted. SO ORDERED. Very truly yours, (Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG Clerk of Court

Page 6 of 50

LESLIE UI, complainant, vs. ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent. [A.C. No. 3319. June 8, 2000]

1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company. A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer,[2] respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in 1985[3]. Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together.[4] In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June 1988, respondent was surprised when she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July 1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported to work with the law firm[5] she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.

DE LEON, JR., J.: Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui. The relevant facts are: On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City[1] and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin, all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband, Carlos Ui, was carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in 1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City. Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1982. Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however, that everything was over between her and Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end. However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued, and that sometime in December

Page 7 of 50

It is respondents contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and that after June 1988 when respondent discovered Carlos Uis true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him. Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents funds.[6] By way of counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent. In her Reply[7] dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui. During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads: Complainants evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part of 1989. It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26 Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, MetroManila and they, admittedly, continued to live together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts it, had been prima facie established by complainants evidence, this same evidence had failed to even prima facie establish the "fact of respondents cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the 527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainants evidence thereto any better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178). It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation. WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged. RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.[8] Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same was dismissed [9] on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in Contempt of the Commission [10] wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22, 1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of Marriage [11] duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file

Page 8 of 50

in the Hawaii State Department of Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985 as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the wedlock.[12] It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183[13] and 184[14] of the Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar. In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt),[15] respondent averred that she did not have the original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her possession. Respondent filed her Memorandum [16] on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely: (i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for the practice of the legal profession; and (ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.[17] In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that

there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in his courtship.[18] On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of Carlos Ui on this matter. Respondent posits that complainants evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No. PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage,[19] does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged [20] and the dismissal of the appeal by the Department of Justice [21] to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference. She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status, she parted ways with him.

Page 9 of 50

In the Memorandum [22] filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondents mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio, personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager.[23] It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man. Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date. In her Reply to Complainants Memorandum [24], respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to respondent. Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and Recommendation, finding that: In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of contemporary human experience. Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated, or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very nature, single women prefer single men. The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for the United States (in July of 1988). She

broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together. Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by every single girl. x..........................x..........................x" Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a more severe penalty." We agree with the findings aforequoted. The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the practice of law are:

Page 10 of 50

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines; b. a resident thereof; c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age; d. a person of good moral character; e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court; f. possess the required educational qualifications; and g. pass the bar examinations.[25] (Italics supplied) Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege. It has been held If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865). A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants

disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S. 959).[26] In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him. Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple, they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos Uis personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him. Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondents suspicion that something was amiss in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987, Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible considering respondents allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her. All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However, the

Page 11 of 50

fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[27] Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[28] We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships x x x but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."[29] Respondents act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainants bare assertions to the contrary deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[30] This, herein complainant miserably failed to do. On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable. Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of morality. WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman and Acting C.J.), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

$$$$$$$$&&&&&&&&&&&&&@@

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

Page 12 of 50

vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent. A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances. Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading: My everdearest Irene, By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do. Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us? I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU! I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together again. Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS . . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

PER CURIAM: Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath." In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account: He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) thenfiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children. After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND

Page 13 of 50

YOURS ALONE! I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!"2 Eternally yours, NOLI Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant. In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten. On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading: 14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied), respondent, in his ANSWER, stated: 4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that

Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading: 15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied), respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows: 5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family: 5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene. xxxx 5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Page 14 of 50

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading: 18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9 And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading: 19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), respondent, in his ANSWER, stated: 7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital. Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his

marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's ComplaintAffidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17 After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven. The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading: Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied), and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading: Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied) The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading: RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06 CBD Case No. 02-936 Joselano C. Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala

Page 15 of 50

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original) Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court. The petition is impressed with merit. Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows. Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed: While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent. It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families." In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring

Page 16 of 50

supplied) A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a "lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child. Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31 Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer. Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. . . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied) Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the

Revised Rules of Court, reading: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated. The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), under scandalous circumstances.34 The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading: ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. x x x x,

Page 17 of 50

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere. "Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36 On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree. xxxx While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38 The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married

woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied) Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes: I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied) Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40 Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any

Page 18 of 50

"conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn. The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads: Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant) That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer. As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ

had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held: Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital vows with complainant. It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and

Page 19 of 50

Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint. Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz: x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original), this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held: Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part

of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts. This Decision takes effect immediately. SO ORDERED. Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, ChicoNazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., concur.

&&@@&@@&@@&&@&@"&@

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant, vs.

Page 20 of 50

ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent. A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963 BARRERA, J.: In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows: The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).

She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959). The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2). The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents' intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960). xxx xxx xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

Page 21 of 50

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor .... But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him. The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.." But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage still subsists.

This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer. xxx xxx xxx

RECOMMENDATION Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys. In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys." In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be

Page 22 of 50

dismissed. On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar. Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his commonlaw wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows: ... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as 'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27].

Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]." Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:. ... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his commonlaw wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her'

Page 23 of 50

(Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962). After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed. It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present. The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant

Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment. It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1 Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or nonprofessional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover

Page 24 of 50

practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose. Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a member of the bar. The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:. The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be

removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied). Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of the bar. The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned.

Page 25 of 50

Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735). The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:. SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently. SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days. The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation.. The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own opinion and estimation

of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys. Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur. Padilla, Reyes, J.B.L., and Dizon, JJ., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, complainant, vs.

Page 26 of 50

JUDGE PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 108, PASAY CITY, respondent. [A.M. No. RTJ-98-1402. April 3, 1998]

KAPUNAN, J.: Through a verified letter-complaint dated 12 September 1995, retired Justice of the Court of Appeals Onofre A. Villaluz charged Judge Priscilla C. Mijares, incumbent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 108, with dishonesty, corrupt practices, grave misconduct and immorality, allegedly committed as follows: 1. In Consignation Case No. 0940, Tengco Homeowners Association vs. Susana Realty, Inc., assigned to and tried in her Branch, Judge Mijares placed the plaintiff associations rental deposits in her private bank account, instead of turning them over as she should have done, to the City Treasurer; only some time in September, 1989 when some members of the association sought a certification that they had in fact been depositing rentals in Court, did she turn over to the City Treasurer the accumulated amount of P222,377.18 by way of UCPB Cashiers Check No. 0996682 dated September 14, 1989; Judge Mijares kept for herself the interests earned by said deposits while they were in her personal bank account. 2. Judge Mijares took cognizance of and decided Special Proceedings No. 3946, a petition for correction of entry in the birth record of her grandson, Joshua Anthony M. Gurango, the child of her daughter Ma. Pilita M. Gurango, notwithstanding such close relationship; and this notwithstanding the fact that even if said petition had regularly been raffled off to her sala, a sense of propriety, if not the letter and spirit of the Code of Judicial Ethics, should have made her refuse the assignment and procure the transfer of the case to any of the five other branches of the Court equally qualified to take over and decide the case; and to compound and aggravate the corrupt practice of taking on and deciding the case of a very close relative, she also dispensed with the required publication of the petition which sought to correct the entry of the subjects citizenship from the stated Filipino to American. 3. In Special Proceedings No. 90-54652, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26, entitled: In Re: Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of

Primitivo Mijares, where Judge Mijares was the petitioner, she falsely declared her residence to be at No. 2247 Coral St., San Andres Bukid, Manila, which in fact is the residence of Teresita Arceo, formerly employed at Branch 7 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, which was at one time presided by her (Judge Mijares); and this, to illegally vest jurisdiction over the petition in the proper Manila Regional Trial Court, rather in Quezon City where she actually resides for decades; 4. Judge Mijares made a false declaration of her residence as at No. 869 Pestanas Street, Pasay City, in her application for Marriage License No. 0572927 accomplished as of December 20, 1993, on the strength of which she contracted a sham marriage with me, solemnized by Judge Myrna Lim Verano of Carmona, Cavite, a former trial fiscal in her sala; her purpose in procuring such sham marriage with me, was to use the same as a defense to charges of immorality brought against her by one Joseph Ligorio Naval before the Supreme Court.[1] In a resolution dated 14 February 1996, the Court directed the respondent to comment on the letter-complaint. On 16 May 1996, respondent filed her Comment on the afore-quoted charges in this wise: On the first charge, respondent denied any participation in the collection of deposits from the Tengco Homeowners Association claiming that the accusation was the concoction of her disgruntled employees, Joseph Ligorio Naval and Anita Domingo, who had a falling-out with her. Specifically, respondent maintained that: xxx. [I]t is never the duty of a Presiding Judge to collect from litigants any money or amount for deposit with the court. It is, as always, the duty of the Branch Clerk of Court or the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) for that matter. The reason why the Branch Clerk or the OIC is provided with a cabinet-safe vault is to safeguard the loss of properties/evidence, whether money or otherwise, in his/her custody. Anita Domingo was then the property and records custodian as well as OIC when the Tengco Homeowners deposited with her. The individual collections were duly receipted by her as reflected in Annexes A, B, C, D & E (samplings of receipts Anita Domingo issued). In no occasion did the respondent receive money and/or issue receipts to any litigants, and particularly in this case where the Homeowners individually paid their dues regularly or once in every month

Page 27 of 50

with Anita Domingo (as reflected in the Joint Affidavit [See Annex F]). On request of Cris Agtuca, she issued a certification (See Annex G) that the deposit was made with her. Respondent, upon receipt of the copy of the letter complaint of Villaluz, took time out to secure from the UCPB Holiday Plaza Branch, a certification regarding a Cashiers Check as indicated in the complaint and UCPB Holiday Plaza Branch obliged and delivered to respondent the CERTIFICATION requested (See Annex H). The certification clearly states as follows: TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that our branch (nor UCPB) does not issue an instrument named CASHIERS CHECK. The name of the instrument we issue is a MANAGERS CHECK. Moreover, check number 996682 is not in our branch managers check (MC) number series. We further certify that our branch has no record of the issuance of a Cashiers Check No. 996682 on September 14, 1989. This certification is issued upon request of (Judge) Priscilla C. Mijares for whatever purpose it may serve her. AUTHORIZED SIGNATURES: (Sgd.) Illegible FERDINAND C. MUYARGAS Asst. Manager/BOO (Sgd.) Illegible RAMON B. HENSON, JR. AVP & Branch Head[2]

The attendant/clerk who testified admitted that she really committed a big mistake when she placed Filipino as the nationality of the father of minor Joshua Anthony Gurango. The passport (Annex I) very clearly showed the real nationality, that of a citizen of the United States of America. Both in her sworn statement (Annex J) and her open court testimony, the clerk, Liza A. Peano, admitted her mistake. Her apologetic attitude was reflected in both words and action while testifying as witness in the case. Regarding the publication, respondent granted the exemption after considering the nature of the case. The publication fee of from P4,000.00 to P6,000.00 was saved by the spouses (parents of the minor) who are just starting to have a family.[3] Anent the third accusation, respondent staunchly denied that she made a false declaration regarding her residence in the proceedings she filed for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband Primitivo Mijares. She explained, thus: Regarding Coral Street, the same was the former residence of complainants husband, Primitivo Mijares. This fact is not known to respondent. And considering too the service of complainant for the City of Manila from 1957 to 1986, as employee, as Fiscal and later as Judge, including the services of her own children in PGH, Manila Doctors, COMELEC and Manila Hotel, nobody could refute complainants statement that she is a Manila resident. It is also a place where complainant may be served with summons.[4] As to the last imputation, respondent declared that she considers Pasay City her second home for the following reasons: Complainants appointment to RTC Pasay dated as far back as 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. Add to this fact her stay in the same place since graduation from High School in 1953. Even until now complainants letters addressed to 869 Pestaas Street are delivered to her by her cousins as a lasting arrangement.[5] On 4 September 1996, the Court resolved to refer the instant case to Justice Salvador J. Valdez of the Court of Appeals for investigation, evaluation, report and recommendation.

On the second charge, respondent asserted that the rule on disqualification of judges under Sec. 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court does not apply since the proceedings called simply for the clarification and correction of an erroneous entry in the birth certificate of Joshua Anthony M. Gurango regarding his fathers nationality. Respondent averred that:

Page 28 of 50

On 13 May 1997, Justice Salvador J. Valdez submitted to the Court the results of his investigation and the following recommendation: WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that JUDGE PRISCILLA C. MIJARES be found guilty of grave misconduct under Charges No. 1 and No. 2, and that she be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits and privileges, and with prejudice to reinstatement in any branch of the Government service, whether pertaining to the national or local Government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations, instrumentalities and agencies.[6] It is regrettable that the instant case be clothed in so much personal enmity. However, shorn of its emotional trappings, the Court concurs with the report of Justice Valdez but finds the recommended penalty of dismissal from service to be too severe. We shall deal with the imputed misdeeds in seriatim. I Reproduced hereunder are the testimonies and evidence adduced by the parties regarding the first charge as succinctly summarized by Justice Valdez in his Report and Recommendation: The parties agreed to the reproduction of the testimony of Anita Domingo in the earlier administrative complaint initiated by Joseph S. Ligorio Naval, Jr. Anita Domingo had therein testified that she used to be the court officer-incharge and property custodian of Judge Mijares of Branch 108 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. She declared that in the consignation case in their court involving the Tengco Homeowners Association, the petitioners offered to deposit with her office the rentals falling due but she referred them to the Clerk of Court because she was not tasked with receiving such deposits. However, the Clerk of Court refused to receive the rental deposits since there was no order to that effect from the presiding judge. Thereafter, Judge Mijares gave instruction to her (Anita Domingo), and to other employees in her Branch, like Mrs. Gatdula and Mrs. Villamater, to receive and receipt for the rental deposits, and turn over the money to her (Judge Mijares). Once deposits were thus made, they were given to Judge Mijares who, in turn, asked Mrs. Villamater to deposit them, in her (Judge Mijares') personal account with the United Coconut Planters

Bank, Holiday Plaza Branch. Anita Domingo claimed that on February 14, 1990, the rental deposits accumulated in the aggregate amount of P222,377.18. Judge Mijares turned over the amount to the Clerk of Court in the form of a check, which the latter, then deposited with the City Treasurer of Pasay City. In this connection, the complainant presented in evidence these documents, to wit: Exhibit E Official Receipt No. 1204413, dated February 14, 1990, issued by the Clerk of Court, RTC, Pasay City, for the payment of P222,377.18 in the form of UCPB Check No. FB-11-014578 dated 2-14-90 (Exhibits E-1 and E-2). F Report of Collections for Fiduciary Fund Deposited with the City Treasurer, Pasay City for the Period from February 13 & 14, 1990 which includes the P222,377.18 (Exhibit E-1). G Cashier/Treasurers Report of the Daily Collections & Deposits, February 14, 1990. H Voucher No. 401-9002-269 dated February 14, 1990. J Certification issued by Anita Domingo on August 18, 1989 that the rental deposits in the total amount of P222,377.18 has been deposited with the Court. In the affidavit of respondent Judge Mijares, which the parties stipulated to constitute her direct testimony, she stated by way of defense, viz: That in 1986, November, upon respondents assumption as Presiding Judge of Branch 108, RTC, Pasay City, Anita Domingo, who was OIC, continued her designation and worked as administrative head of the Branch; That as OIC and concurrent property custodian, she was the Chief of all employees and keeper of all evidence and other valuable properties deposited with the Court;

Page 29 of 50

That the case of Tengco Homeowners Association was one of the cases then pending in Branch 108, and the case being civil in nature, respondent tried to intervene in the hope that the suit will end in a compromise agreement; That the parties intended compromise was reflected in the Order of then Judge Manuel Valenzuela dated February 22, 1984 (Annex "C"); the Order of March 29, 1984 (Annex D); the Order of May 24, 1984 (Annex E); the Order of Judge Baltazar Dizon dated February 18, 1986 (Annex "F"); the Order dated March 5, 1987; (Annex G); the Order dated September 3, 1987 (Annex H); the Order dated October 11, 1988 (Annex I); the Order dated October 18, 1988 (Annex I-1); That a copy of the Compromise Agreement (Annex J) was submitted to this Court on October 18, 1988; That on October 27, 1988, the officers and members of the Tengco Homeowners Association were directed to appear to thresh out whatever problem/s there will be in connection with the proposed Compromise Agreement (Annex L); That the Tengco Homeowners requested that their money be deposited in Court for immediate turn-over to Susana Realty the moment the compromise agreement is signed. That the pleading of the homeowners was granted and Anita Domingo, as OIC and property custodian, received their money. Receipts were issued to the members duly signed by Anita Domingo (Annex K, K-1 up to K4), and as in all other courts, she kept the money in the cabinet/safe where she keeps the evidence and other properties of the Branch; That on February 14, 1990, Atty. Antonio Rosales submitted a Manifestation Motion (Annex M), but by midday of February 14, 1990, the Court was informed confidentially by one of the Homeowners that the negotiation failed; That on the same day, February 14, 1990, this respondent, also Presiding

Judge of Branch 108, directed Anita Domingo to turn-over the money of the homeowners to the Clerk of Court; That on the same day, February 14, 1990, after she counted the money entrusted to her by the homeowners, Anita Domingo told respondent that there were salary checks included with the cash; That respondent told Anita Domingo that the solution is to have one check delivered to the Clerk of Court, and respondent issued one check for the amount of P222,377.18 dated February 14, 1990; That Anita Domingo delivered respondents check to the OCC on the same date in exchange for the cash and check, which circumstance account for the issuance of the voucher, and the preparation of the Official Receipt (OR) in the name of Tengco Homeowners Association, and the Official Receipt (OR) is dated February 14, 1990 (Annex N); Supplementing her affidavit, Judge Mijares testified that she first issued her personal check for the P222,377.18, but since it was not accepted by the Clerk of Court, Mrs. Lucia Villamater, a social worker in her staff and liaison with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Libertad Branch, ran to the bank and purchased a managers check with the Judges personal check. It was this managers check that was used to cover the P222,377.18. Lucia Villamater corroborated Judge Mijares. The parties further stipulated on the truth of the contents of the affidavit of Isabel Gabriel, a member of the Tengco Homeowners Association, that during the negotiations for the amicable settlement of the consignation case, they requested that they be allowed to deposit the rentals due from them with the court presided over by the respondent Judge and that Anita Domingo had since been receiving their deposits. By way of rebuttal, Anita Domingo deposed that Judge Mijares order for her to accept the subject rental deposits was verbal and never reduced into writing; that she never kept the rental deposits in her safety cabinet because that was not intended for money but only for evidence such as

Page 30 of 50

titles, guns and other documents; that she never changed any salary checks of her co-employees as she did not keep cash from any source, whether in trust or otherwise; and that she never delivered Judge Mijares personal check for P222,377.18 to the office of the Clerk of Court but the said check passed through her when their cashier, Mrs. Marina Garcia, returned it because they do not accept a personal check and, besides, the Clerk of Court was demanding payment of the commission due on the rental deposits, plus legal research fees, which deposits she had all turned over to Judge Mijares on the very same days that she had received them. But on sur-rebuttal, Felicisima Gatdula, a court stenographer of Judge Mijares, insisted that Anita Domingo presumably kept the rental deposits in her safety cabinet and that she had never seen Anita giving the rentals to Judge Mijares.[7] On the basis of the foregoing, Justice Valdez did not find credence in respondents evidence that she did not take possession of the rental deposits and used them for her personal benefit. He pertinently pointed out the following: 1. There was a marked variance between respondents comment and rejoinder on one hand, and her affidavit which served as her direct testimony and her testimony during cross-examination, on the other. In the former, respondent denied any involvement in the rentals deposited by the Tengco Homeowners Association with Anita Domingo. Particularly in her rejoinder, respondent stated that she never had the chance to order Anita Domingo to receive or issue receipt for the deposits made by the members of Tengco Homeowners. However, in her affidavit and during her crossexamination, respondent admitted that she ordered Domingo to receive and issue receipts for said rental deposits. Further, in her affidavit, respondent disclosed that it was her personal check for P222,377.18, representing the accumulated rental deposits, that was first transmitted to the Clerk of Court and when it was refused, respondent had it replaced with a managers check;[8] 2. It was highly irregular for respondent to have issued her own check for the rental deposits. Assuming arguendo that salary checks of the other court employees got mixed with the deposits, respondent should have

issued her check only for the amount of said salary checks;[9] 3. The safety cabinets provided the Branch Clerks of Court are meant for exhibits and other important documents and are not fit for keeping cash, especially big sums of money.[10] 4. There was no justification for respondent in not requiring the Clerk of Court to collect the rental deposits and in allowing instead her OIC Branch Clerk of Court to make the collection. She explained that if the rentals were deposited with the Clerk of Court, who would in turn deposit them with the City Treasurer, it would take 21 signatures to have the deposits withdrawn in the event a settlement would be reached by the parties who were then in the process of negotiation. However, her motive cannot be rationalized in the face of the strict requirement of a Supreme Court Circular relative to the optimum protection of deposits which are fiduciary funds. We quote the relevant portion of Justice Valdezs conclusions on the matter: Truly, except for the testimony of Anita Domingo, there is no direct and hard evidence that Judge Mijares got and made personal use of the rental deposits before they were turned over to the Clerk of Court. However, the proofs on hand produce a moral certainly that she did so. For why did she issue her personal check for the deposits? Her explanation that that was the solution she had thought of when Anita Domingo disclosed that there were salary checks of her co-employees that were included in the cash deposits in her possession, wont wash for if that were the situation she (Judge Mijares) could have issued her check only for the amount of the salary checks. After all, Lucia Villamater, her social worker, bank liaison and witness, testified that Anita Domingo encashed the salary checks of her co-employees but once and that could have amounted to only about P15,000.00 to P20,000.00, or, the salary checks could have easily been encashed with the drawee bank, instead of Villamater buying a managers check for P222,377.18, the aggregate amount of the rental deposits. Besides, the so-called safety cabinets provided the Branch Clerks of Court are not really fit for keeping cash, especially such big sums as hundreds of thousands of pesos; these cabinets are meant only for exhibits and other important papers and documents. So, it is more likely that Anita Domingo had really been turning over her collections to Judge Mijares, following the

Page 31 of 50

latters instruction. Then, too, Judge Mijares initial false claim that she never had the chance to order Anita Domingo to receive or issue receipt for the deposits, can not but bring to light her lack of sincerity to tell the truth, if not an insidious ploy to conceal her hand that had been in the cookie jar. Had not the complainant been able to track down her managers check, in all probability she would have forever kept mum about the matter. In other words, the alleged bias of Anita Domingo, assuming it to be true, can not alter the fact that it was the managers check which Judge Mijares caused to be bought with her own personal check that was turned over to the Clerk of Court instead of the cash rental deposits. Where had the cash been all along? Why did she have to buy the managers check with her own personal check?[11] In any case, Justice Valdez opined that respondent violated certain circulars of this Court specifically, Circular No. 9 dated March 29, 1977 and Circular No. 5 dated November 25, 1982: What is more, under Supreme Court Circular No. 9, dated March 29, 1977, it is the Clerk of Court who has been constituted as cashier and disbursing officer; and as such, he/she receives by himself/herself, or through a duly appointed cashier, deposits, fines, and dues. Judge Mijares violated Circular No. 9 in ordering Anita Domingo, who was then merely her Branch Clerk of Court OIC, to collect and receipt for the rental deposits. She tried to cover this up by not reducing her order into writing although the case was for consignation. Also, before the revocation of Circular No. 5 dated November 25, 1982 by Circular No. 13-92 dated March 1, 1992, all collections of funds of fiduciary character, including rental deposits, were to be deposited immediately upon receipt thereof by the Clerk of Court concerned with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his/her Court is located. There was, therefore, no justification for Judge Mijares in not ordering the Clerk of Court to do the collection and in allowing instead her OIC Branch Clerk of Court to collect and, worse, keep the rental deposits in her safety cabinet, if this is true, for such a long period of time from 1986 or 1987 to February 14, 1990. She offered the explanation that the parties were then in the thick of negotiations for an amicable settlement and if the rentals were deposited

with the Clerk of Court who would, in turn, deposit them with the City Treasurer, it would take 21 signatures to have the deposits withdrawn in the event that settlement was reached; and so to help the parties cut the red tape, she ordered her OIC Branch Clerk of Court to accept and keep the rental deposits. But the explanation flies in the face of the rationale behind the Supreme Court Circular which was to provide the optimum protection to the integrity of the deposits as fiduciary funds.[12] We affirm the above findings of Justice Valdez which, after an exhausting review, we find to be amply supported by the evidence on record. However, we take note of Justice Valdezs own admission that except for the testimony of Anita Domingo, there is no direct and hard evidence that Judge Mijares got and made personal use of the rental deposits before they were turned over to the Clerk of Court.[13] Despite the foregoing statement, his conclusion that respondent deposited the rentals in her private bank account and kept for herself the interests earned is based, nonetheless, on circumstantial evidence. In Dia-Aonuevo v. Bercallo,[14] we made a pronouncement that: While the court does not make a categorical finding that respondent made use of the money deposited with him, nonetheless, We hold that by his actuations, respondent placed his honesty and integrity under serious doubt. and consequently penalized the erring judge. In addition, we find Anita Domingo to have been remiss in her duties as acting Branch Clerk of Court. She should have strictly adhered to the clear and mandatory procedure under Circular No. 5 (before it was replaced by Circular No. 13-92) regarding the collection and deposit of rentals with the court. Being a responsible officer of the court she should not have swayed to do otherwise. II Relative to Special Proceedings No. 3946 involving a petition for correction of entry in the birth record of her grandson, respondent claims that she was not disqualified under Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court from taking cognizance of and deciding said case ratiocinating that: (a) she, her daughter, son-in-law and grandson do not have pecuniary interest in the case; (b) the case was not controversial in nature and; (c) with respect to

Page 32 of 50

respondents dispensing with the requirement of publication of the petition which have cost P4,000.00 to P6,000.00, the amount was unnecessary expense on the part of the petitioner that will not inure to the benefit of the government, anyway.[15] Respondent conduct is inexcusable. Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniary interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Respondent is clearly disqualified from trying the case under the aforequoted section and also under Rule 3.12 (d), Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.[16] Being related within the sixth degree of consanguinity to one of the parties (petitioner) in Special Proceedings No. 9346, it was mandatory for respondent to have inhibited herself from hearing the case. While respondent or her daughter may not have pecuniary interest in the case as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, which is her contention for her exculpation, what is violated in Section 1 of Rule 137 was her taking cognizance of the case despite her relationship to a party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity. Apart from the rules already cited, respondent violated Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of Code of Judicial Conduct which states that: A judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

In Garcia v. De la Pea,[17] we expounded on the rationale behind the rule on compulsory disqualification of judges in this wise: The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the peoples faith and confidence in the courts of justice. Respondent contends that the petition for correction of entry of the birth record of her grandson does not involve controversial matters such as those relating to civil status, citizenship or nationality, but merely pertain to innocuous or clerical errors and, therefore, the correction can be done through summary proceedings under Article 412 of the Civil Code[18] in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Even on the assumption that the petition for correction of entry of respondents grandson is not controversial in nature, this does not detract from the fact that she cannot be free from bias or partiality in resolving the case by reason of her close blood relationship to him. In fact, bias was clearly demonstrated when she waived the requirement of publication of the petition on the dubious ground of enabling the parents of the minor (her daughter and son-in-law) to save the publication fee as they were then just starting to have a family. In any case, notice and publication of the hearing of the petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandatory and cannot be waived, particularly Sections 3,4 and 5 thereof: SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claimed any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

Page 33 of 50

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place of the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the person named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. Even if the proceedings contemplated in Rule 108 are not controversial in nature, they are still adversarial, hence, the need of notice and publication of the hearing. As the Court in Republic v. Valencia[19] elucidated: The courts role in hearing the petition to correct certain entries in the Civil Registry is to ascertain the truth about the facts recorded therein. Under our system of administering justice, truth is best ascertained or approximated by trial conducted under the adversary system. Being properly an adversary proceeding, respondents flawed logic that her relationship to the petitioner does not disqualify her from deciding the case because there are no opposing parties is untenable. Respondent has neither the authority nor the discretion to dispense with the publication of the notice of hearing of the petition as provided in the aforequoted Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Respondent knows or ought to know that said requisite is mandatory, without which the court acquires no jurisdiction over the case. How the case was raffled to the sala of respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City when the petition should have been filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, where the civil registry involved is located is baffling enough. But for the respondent to waive with the required publication to enable the parents of the minor who are just starting to have a family to save the publication fee does not speak well of respondents grasp of the law. We agree with Justice Valdez in his observation that: The relationship could account for the alacrity of Judge Mijares in favorably

acting on the petition although the civil registrar was not impleaded who, in this case, should have been the Civil Registrar of Manila since the minor Joshua Anthony M. Gurango, whose birth certificate was sought to be corrected, was born and registered in Manila, and although the petition was erroneously filed with her court as it should have filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 108 which directs that such a petition shall be filed with the Court of First Instance (now RTC) of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. The relationship furthermore led her to dispense with the publication requirement, which is jurisdictional, just to enable the parents of the minor (her daughter and son-in-law), who are just starting to have a family to save the publication fee of P4,000.00 to P6,000.00. Any of these flaws should have, instead, caused the outright dismissal of the petition. The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was to render the proceeding of the trial court, so far as the correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of jurisdiction both as to party and as to subject matter.[20] The Court, once again, earnestly reminds judges to be extra prudent and circumspect in the performance of their duties for (a) judge owes it to the public and to the legal profession to know the factual basis of the complaint and the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more than cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have greater faith in the administration of justice if judges are not cursorily excused of apparent deficiency in the analysis of the facts of the case and in the grasp of the legal principles. For service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end (Roa vs. Imbing, 231 SCRA 58 [1984]; Wingarts vs. Mejia, 242 SCRA 436 [1995]). A member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments because the learning process in law never ceases.[21] III Alleging that Quezon City is respondents actual residence, complainant accused respondent of falsely declaring her residence (in the latters petition for declaration of presumptive death of her husband Primitivo

Page 34 of 50

Mijares) to be at No. 2247 Coral St., San Andres Bukid, Manila, in order, allegedly, to lay the venue over said petition in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, instead of Quezon City. Complainants charge has not been sufficiently substantiated. We find adequate respondents testimony that it was at this address that her husband Primitivo Mijares resided and this was where respondent and her husband established their family residence after getting married and before the latters unfortunate disappearance. IV Finally, we find to be similarly baseless complainants last charge that respondent falsely stated in her application for marriage license (with herein complainant) filed on 20 December 1993 that her residence was at No. 869 Pestaas St., Pasay City. We adopt in toto the findings of justice Valdez, thus: On the other hand, when she testified, Judge Mijares maintained that she has three places of residence, to wit: No. 869 Pestaas St., Pasay City, the house of the older sister of her mother, where she had resided for more than 20 years since graduation from high school in 1953; and No. 72, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, where she migrated. But she went to Pasay City in November 1986, when she assumed office as RTC Judge in the City. She also considered No. 2447 Coral Street, San Andres Bukid, Manila, as her third place or residence because it was the residence of her husband, Primitivo Mijares, and he brought her there. However, in 1990, when she filed her petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of her husband, she was no longer residing there. In fact, the place has already been demolished but before that, Teresita Arceo, a member of her (Judge Mijares) staff when she was yet a Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, had also resided there. Through Wilfredo Rejano, chairman of Barangay 69, Zone 09, which encompases Pestaas Street in Pasay City, the complainant endeavored to show that No. 869 Pestaas Street and, for that matter, No. 185 T. Pestaas Street, are non-existent. However, Virginia Pestaas-Victa belied the claim of Rejano. She said that T. Petaas St., Pasay City, was named after her grandfather Tomas Pestaas, the father of her father. She was born on October 20, 1928 at

No. 185 T. Pestaas, as indicated in her marriage contract dated October 30, 1955. Her oldest son, Virgilio Pestaas, was born there. Her mother Emilia de Villa Pestaas, and her sister, Victoria Pestaas, likewise lived there. Subsequently, the place was re-numbered 163 T. Pestaas, then 169 T. Pestaas, but that she had mistakenly told Judge Mijares that the number is 869 T. Pestaas. So, that explain why Judge Mijares indicated No. 869 Pestaas Street, Pasay City, as her residence both in her application for marriage license and in her marriage contract with the complainant. As between Wilfredo Rejano, who claimed that there is no such address as No. 869 or No. 185 T. Pestaas Street, Pasay City, and Virginia Pestaas, who declared that there had been No. 185 T. Pestaas Street but subsequently re-numbered No. 163 and, presently, 169 T. Pestaas Street; and that No. 869 T. Pestaas Street was just her honest mistake, the undersigned readily gives credence to the latter. The former was only 31 years old when he testified on January 8, 1997, so he must have been born in 1966, and could not be familiar with the full history of Pestaas Street, Pasay City. On the other hand, the latter was 68 years old and was born at 185 T. Pestaas Street on October 20, 1928, an address which she maintained up to her marriage on October 30, 1955, and even thereafter. She claimed, without contradiction, that the street was named after her grandfather, Tomas Pestaas, and that Judge Mijares, her niece, used to live with them there. The falsities attributed to Judge Mijares in these charges have not, therefore, been substantiated. The complainant has not refuted her assertion that she considered Manila as her residence at one time because that was where her husband established their family residence. She treats Pasay City and Quezon City as her present places of residence since the former is where she has been working up to now as a judge and where she had lived when still a student, and the latter is where she goes home after her work. In this connection, in distinguishing domicile from residence, it has been held that, It is xxx quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residence in various places. So, she could have acted in utmost good faith in filing her petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of her husband with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for it was in Manila

Page 35 of 50

where her husband established their conjugal residence. After her husband was declared presumptively dead, she could no longer consider Manila as a place of residence; hence, when she applied for a marriage license to marry the complainant, she filed it with Pasay City where she works and which she presently treats as a place of residence aside from Quezon City.[22] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent guilty of grave misconduct and resolves that: (1) Under the first charge, respondent Judge Priscilla C. Mijares is hereby FINED in the amount of P20,000.00. (2) Under the second charge, respondent Judge Mijares is hereby FINED P10,000.00 for violating Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. (3) Respondent Judge is further WARNED that the commission of the same or a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely. Further, the OCA is instructed to institute appropriate administrative charges against Anita Domingo, former Acting Branch Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, Branch 108. SO ORDERED. Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Purisima, JJ., concur. Narvasa, CJ., No part. Close relation to a party. Romero, J., No part. Closely

$&&$@$&@@@&&$@&$&@

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent. A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

Page 36 of 50

3) PER CURIAM: This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross immorality. Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University (Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times under threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced abortion. In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special defense, averred that complainant is a woman of loose morality. On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows: EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that: 1) she was a second year medical student of the Southwestern University, the Chairman of the Board of which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn, June 6, 1975); 2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which prompted her to approach respondent in the latter's house who assured her that she would pass the said subject (pp. 15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that she should go with him to Manila, otherwise, she would flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ... ; 5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1" to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975); 6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for around three hours (pp 5657, tsn, June 6, 1975); 7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock midnight, where respondent had carnal knowledge of her twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6, 1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975); 8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of respondent because for her, she would sacrifice her personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn, June 6, 1975); ... ... ...; 9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy because she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ...; 10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an instructor in the college of medicine) that respondent wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn, July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ; 11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent, and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her boarding house on the pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas (pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975); 12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given an injection and

Page 37 of 50

an inhalation mask was placed on her mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975); 13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke up, an abortion had already been performed upon her and she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body (pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40) Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41). Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. Artemio Ingco, witnesses for the complainant, testified that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbrosacral region of complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42). The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is summarized as follows: Edilberto Caban testified that: 1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children; respondent never came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977); 2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp. 42-43). Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that: 1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to meet respondent; the latter had male companions at the hotel but he did not see any woman companion of respondent Aznar; 2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador Hotel and ate with him outside the hotel together with Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations made against him. In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that the charge levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for the school year 19731974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit: From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go to Manila with respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant had every reason to believe him. It has been established also that complainant was brought by respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59, tsn, June 6, 1975); xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar Salangsang who

Page 38 of 50

testified that respondent usually slept with them every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that they stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973 at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12 to 14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44). In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years. On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the premises to determine whether any intervening event occurred which would render the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69). On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report and recommendation previously submitted together with the record of the case and the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75). After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf, the records are bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less contradict, on material points, the testimonies of

complainant herself. While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced. It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once pronounced by the Court: When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In the case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said: An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty, he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439 [1967]). The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a married man ,with children, respondent should merely be suspended from the practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).

Page 39 of 50

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18, 1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a three (3) years suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period and the case dismissed for being moot and academic. We disagree. Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's knowledge of of respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar. Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled, the latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats. Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the the Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70), mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court) and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,

or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v. Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept of immoral conduct, as follows: A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity. It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment. Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959). Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896). In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all her subjects in case she refused. WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.SO ORDERED. JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, respondent. A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998

Page 40 of 50

PER CURIAM: Good moral character is a continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her privilege to practice law. On November 13, 1989, Mrs. Julieta B. Narag filed an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment against her husband, Atty. Dominador M. Narag, whom she accused of having violated Canons 1 and 6, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Ethics for Lawyers. 2 The complainant narrated: The St. Louis College of Tuguegarao engaged the services of Atty. Dominador M. Narag in the early seventies as a full-time college instructor in the College of Arts and Sciences and as a professor in the Graduate School. In 1984, Ms. Gina Espita, 17 years old and a first year college student, enrolled in subjects handled by Atty. Narag. Exerting his influence as her teacher, and as a prominent member of the legal profession and then member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tuguegarao, Atty. Narag courted Ms. Espita, gradually lessening her resistance until the student acceded to his wishes. They then maintained an illicit relationship known in various circles in the community, but which they managed to from me. It therefore came as a terrible embar[r]assment to me, with unspeakable grief and pain when my husband abandoned us, his family, to live with Ms. Espita, in utterly scandalous circumstances. It appears that Atty. Narag used his power and influence as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cagayan to cause the employment of Ms. Espita at the Department of Trade and Industry Central Office at Makati, Metro Manila. Out of gratitude perhaps, for this gesture, Ms. Espita agreed to live with Atty. Narag, her sense of right[e]ousness and morals completely corrupted by a member of the Bar.

It is now a common knowledge in the community that Atty. Dominador M. Narag has abandoned us, his family, to live with a 22-year-old woman, who was his former student in the tertiary level[.] 3 This Court, in a Resolution dated December 18, 1989, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 4 On June 26, 1990, the office of then Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan received from complainant another letter seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint. She alleged therein that (1) she fabricated the allegations in her complaint to humiliate and spite her husband; (2) all the love letters between the respondent and Gina Espita were forgeries; and (3) she was suffering from "emotional confusion arising from extreme jealousy." The truth, she stated, was that her husband had remained a faithful and responsible family man. She further asserted that he had neither entered into an amorous relationship with one Gina Espita nor abandoned his family. 5 Supporting her letter were an Affidavit of Desistance 6 and a Motion to Dismiss, 7 attached as Annexes A and B, which she filed before the IBP commission on bar discipline. 8 In a Decision dared October 8, 1991, the IBP Board of Governors 9dismissed the complaint of Mrs. Narag for failure to prosecute. 10 The case took an unexpected turn when, on November 25, 1991, this Court 11 received another letter 12 from the complainant, with her seven children 13 as co-signatories, again appealing for the disbarment of her husband. She explained that she had earlier dropped the case against him because of his continuous threats against her. 14 In his Comment on the complainant's letter of November 11, 1991, filed in compliance with this Court's Resolution issued on July 6, 1992, 15 respondent prayed that the decision of the Board of Governors be affirmed. Denying that he had threatened, harassed or intimidated his wife, he alleged that she had voluntarily executed her Affidavit of Desistance 16 and Motion to Dismiss, 17 even appearing before the investigating officer, Commissioner Racela, to testify under oath "that she prepared the Motion to Dismiss and Affidavit of Desistance on her own free will and affirmed the contents thereof."

Page 41 of 50

In addition, he professed his love for his wife and his children and denied abandoning his family to live with his paramour. However, he described his wife as a person emotionally disturbed, viz: What is pitiable here is the fact that Complainant is an incurably jealous and possessive woman, and every time the streak of jealousy rears its head, she fires off letters or complaints against her husband in every conceivable forum, all without basis, and purely on impulse, just to satisfy the consuming demands of her "loving" jealousy. Then, as is her nature, a few hours afterwards, when her jealousy cools off, she repents and feels sorry for her acts against the Respondent. Thus, when she wrote the Letter of November 11, 1991, she was then in the grips of one of her bouts of jealousy. 18 On August 24, 1992, this Court issued another Resolution referring the Comment of respondent to the IBP. 19 In the hearing before IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose, respondent alleged the following: 20 2. Your Respondent comes from very poor parents who have left him not even a square meter of land, but gave him the best legacy in life: a purposeful and meaningful education. Complainant comes from what she claims to be very rich parents who value material possession more than education and the higher and nobler aspirations in life. Complainant abhors the poor. 3. Your Respondent has a loving upbringing, nurtured in the gentle ways of love, forgiveness, humility, and concern for the poor. Complainant was reared and raised in an entirely different environment. Her value system is the very opposite. 4. Your Respondent loves his family very dearly, and has done all he could in thirty-eight (38) years of marriage to protect and preserve his family. He gave his family sustenance, a comfortable home, love, education, companionship, and most of all, a good and respected name. He was always gentle and compassionate to his wife and children. Even in the most trying times, he

remained calm and never inflicted violence on them. His children are all now full-fledged professionals, mature, and gainfully employed. . . . xxx xxx xxx Your Respondent subscribes to the sanctity of marriage as a social institution. On the other hand, consumed by insane and unbearable jealousy, Complainant has been systematically and unceasingly destroying the very foundations of their marriage and their family. Their marriage has become a torture chamber in which Your Respondent has been incessantly BEATEN, BATTERED, BRUTALIZED, TORTURED, ABUSED, and HUMILIATED, physically, mentally, and emotionally, by the Complainant, in public and at home. Their marriage has become a nightmare. For thirty-eight years, your Respondent suffered in silence and bore the pain of his misfortune with dignity and with almost infinite patience, if only to preserve their family and their marriage. But this is not to be. The Complainant never mellowed and never became gentl[e], loving, and understanding. In fact, she became more fierce and predatory. Hence, at this point in time, the light at the tunnel for Your Respondent does not seem in sight. The darkness continues to shroud the marital and familial landscape. Your Respondent has to undergo a catharsis, a liberation from enslavement. Paraphrasing Dorfman in "Death and the Maiden", can the torturer and the tortured co-exist and live together? Hence, faced with an absolutely uncomprehending and uncompromising mind whose only obsession now is to destroy, destroy, and destroy, Your Respondent, with perpetual regret and with great sorrow, filed a Petition for

Page 42 of 50

Annulment of Marriage, Spl. Proc. No. 566, RTC, Branch III, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. . . . 5. Complainant is a violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending. But your Respondent never revealed these destructive qualities to other people. He preserved the good name and dignity of his wife. This is in compliance with the marital vow to love, honor or obey your spouse, for better or for worse, in sickness and in health . . . Even in this case, Your Respondent never revealed anything derogatory to his wife. It is only now that he is constrained to reveal all these things to defend himself. On the other hand, for no reason at all, except a jealous rage, Complainant tells everyone, everywhere, that her husband is worthless, good-for-nothing, evil and immoral. She goes to colleges and universities, professional organizations, religious societies, and all other sectors of the community to tell them how evil, bad and immoral her husband is. She tells them not to hire him as professor, as Counsel, or any other capacity because her husband is evil, bad, and immoral. Is this love? Since when did love become an instrument to destroy a man's dearest possession in life his good name, reputation and dignity? Because of Complainant's virulent disinformation campaign against her husband, employing every unethical and immoral means to attain his ends, Your Respondent has been irreparably and irreversibly disgraced, shamed, and humiliated. Your Respondent is not a scandalous man. It is he who has been mercilessly scandalized and crucified by the Complainant. 21 To prove the alleged propensity of his wife to file false charges, respondent presented as evidence the following list of the complaints she had filed against him and Gina Espita: 3.1 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty . . .

3.2 Complaint for Immorality/Neglect of Duty, DILG, Adm. Case No. P-5-90. . . . 3.3 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S No. 89-114. . . . 3.4 Complaint for Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices and concubinage. OMBUDSMAN Case No. 1-92-0083. . . . 3.5 Complaint for Civil Support. RTC, Tuguegarao, Civil Case No. 4061. DISMISSED. 3.6 Complaint for Concubinage. Provincial Prosecutor's Office of Cagayan. I.S. No. 92-109. DISMISSED. (. . .). Complainant filed Motion for Reconsideration. DENIED. (. . .). 3.7 Complaint for Disbarment (. . .) with S[upreme] C[ourt]. Withdrawn (. . .). DISMISSED by IBP Board of Governors (. . .). Re-instituted (. . .). 3.8 Complaint for Disbarment, again (. . .). Adm. Case No. 3405. Pending. 3.9 Complaint for Concubinage, again (. . .). Third MCTC, Tumauini, Isabela. Pending. . . . 22 In his desperate effort to exculpate himself, he averred: I. That all the alleged love letters and envelopes (. . .), picture (. . .) are inadmissible in evidence as enunciated by the Supreme Court in "Cecilia Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, et.al.", G.R. No. 107383, February 20, 1996. (. . .).

Page 43 of 50

xxx xxx xxx II. That respondent is totally innocent of the charges: He never courted Gina Espita in the Saint Louis College of Tuguegarao. He never caused the employment of said woman in the DTI. He never had or is having any illicit relationship with her anywhere, at any time. He never lived with her as husband and wife anywhere at any time, be it in Centro Tumauini or any of its barangays, or in any other place. He never begot a child or children with her. Finally, respondent submits that all the other allegations of Mrs. Narag are false and fabricated, . . . xxx xxx xxx III. Respondent never abandoned his family[.] Mrs. Narag and her two sons forcibly drove respondent Narag out of the conjugal home. After that, Atty. Narag tried to return to the conjugal home many times with the help of mutual friends to save the marriage and the family from collapse. He tried several times to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. In fact, in one of the hearings of the disbarment case, he offered to return home and to reconcile with Mrs. Narag. But Mrs. Narag refused all these efforts of respondent Narag. . . . IV. Complainant Julieta B. Narag is an unbearably jealous, violent, vindictive, scandalous, virulent and merciless wife since the beginning of the marriage, who incessantly beat, battered, brutalized, tortured, abuse[d], scandalized, and humiliated respondent Atty. Narag, physically, mentally, emotionally, and psychologically, . . . V. Complainant Julieta Narag's claim in her countermanifestation dated March 28, 1996, to the effect that the affidavit of Dominador B. Narag, Jr., dated February 27, 1996 was obtained through force and intimidation, is not true. Dominador, Jr., executed his affidavit freely, voluntarily, and absolutely without force or intimidation, as shown by the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of Respondent Atty. Narag and Tuguegarao MTC Judge Dominador Garcia during the trial of Criminal

Case No. 12439, People vs. Dominador M. Narag, et. al., before the Tuguegarao MTC on May 3, 1996. . . . xxx xxx xxx VI. Respondent Atty. Narag is now an old man a senior citizen of 63 years sickly, abandoned, disgraced, weakened and debilitated by progressively degenerative gout and arthritis, and hardly able to earn his own keep. His very physical, medical, psychological, and economic conditions render him unfit and unable to do the things attributed to him by the complainant. Please see the attached medical certificates, . . ., among many other similar certificates touching on the same ailments. Respondent is also suffering from hypertension.23 On July 18, 1997, the investigating officer submitted his report, 24 recommending the indefinite suspension of Atty. Narag from the practice of law. The material portions of said report read as follows: Culled from the voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence submitted by the contending parties, two (2) issues are relevant for the disposition of the case, namely: a) Whether there was indeed a commission of alleged abandonment of respondent's own family and [whether he was] living with his paramour, Gina Espita; b) Whether the denial under oath that his illegitimate children with Gina Espita (Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) as appearing on paragraph 1(g) of respondent's Comment vis-a-vis his handwritten love letters, the due execution and contents of which, although he objected to their admissibility for being allegedly forgeries, were never denied by him on the witness stand much less presented and offered proof to support otherwise. Except for the testimonies of respondent's witnesses whose testimonies tend to depict the complaining wife, Mrs. Narag, as an incurably jealous wife and possessive

Page 44 of 50

woman suffering everytime with streaks of jealousy, respondent did not present himself on the witness stand to testify and be cross-examined on his sworn comment; much less did he present his alleged paramour, Gina Espita, to disprove the adulterous relationship between him and their having begotten their illegitimate children, namely: Aurelle Dominic N. Espita and Kyle Dominador N. Espita. Worse, respondent's denial that he is the father of the two is a ground for disciplinary sanction (Morcayda v. Naz, 125 SCRA 467). Viewed from all the evidence presented, we find the respondent subject to disciplinary action as a member of the legal profession. 25 In its Resolution 26 issued on August 23, 1997, the IBP adopted and approved the investigating commissioner's recommendation for the indefinite suspension of the respondent. 27 Subsequently the complaint sought the disbarment of her husband in a Manifestation/Comment she filed on October 20, 1997. The IBP granted this stiffer penalty and, in its Resolution dated November 30, 1997, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration. After a careful scrutiny of the records of the proceedings and the evidence presented by the parties, we find that the conduct of respondent warrants the imposition of the penalty of disbarment. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Thus, good moral character is not only a condition precedent 28 to the practice of law, but a continuingqualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred. 29 Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. 30 Furthermore, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree 31 or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. 32 We explained in Barrientos vs. Daarol 33 that, "as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards." Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for abandoning his family in order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. 34 Presented by complainant as witnesses, aside from herself. 35 were: Charlie Espita, 36 Magdalena Bautista, 37Bienvenido Eugenio, 38 Alice Carag, 39 Dr. Jervis B. Narag, 40 Dominador Narag, Jr., 41 and Nieves F. Reyes. 42 Charlie Espita, brother of the alleged paramour Gina Espita, corroborated complainant's charge against respondent in these categorical statements he gave to the investigating officer: Q Mr. Witness, do you know Atty. Narag? A Yes, Your Honor, he is the live-in partner of my sister, Gina Espita.

Page 45 of 50

Q If Atty. Narag is here, can you point [to] him? A Yes, sir. (Witness pointed to the respondent, Atty. Dominador Narag) Q Why do you know Atty. Narag? ATTY. NARAG: Already answered. He said I am the live-in partner. CONTINUATION OF THE DIRECT A Because he is the live-in partner of my sister and that they are now living together as husband and wife and that they already have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador. xxx xxx xxx During cross-examination conducted by the respondent himself, Charlie Espita repeated his account that his sister Gina was living with the respondent, with whom she had two children: Q Mr. Espita, you claim that Atty. Narag is now living with your sister as husband and wife. You claim that? A Yes, sir. Q Why do you say that? A Because at present you are living together as husband and wife and you xxx xxx xxx

have already two children and I know that is really an immoral act which you cannot just allow me to follow since my moral values don't allow me that my sister is living with a married man like you. Q How do you know that Atty. Narag is living with your sister? Did you see them in the house? A Yes, si[r].

Q You said also that Atty. Narag and your sister have two children, Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, is it not? A Yes, sir. Q How do you know that they are the children of Atty. Narag? A Because you are staying together in that house and you have left your family. 44 In addition, Charlie Espita admitted (1) that it was he who handed to Mrs. Narag the love letters respondent had sent to his sister, and (2) that Atty. Narag tried to dissuade him from appearing at the disbarment proceedings. 45 Witness Bienvenido Eugenio strengthened the testimony of Charlie Espita in this wise: Q Mr. Witness, do you know the respondent in this case? A I know him very well, sir.

Page 46 of 50

Q Could you please tell us why do you know him? A Because he was always going to the house of my son-in-law by the name of Charlie Espita. xxx xxx xxx Q Mr. Eugenio, do you know the residence of Atty. Dominador M. Narag? A At that time, he [was] residing in the house of Reynaldo Angubong, sir. Q And this is located where? A Centro Tamauini, Isabela, sir. Q And you specifically, categorically state under oath that this is the residence of Atty. Narag? A Yes, sir. xxx xxx xxx Q And under oath this is where Atty. Narag and Gina Espita are allegedly living as husband and wife, is it not? A Yes, sir. 46 Witness Nieves Reyes, a neighbor and friend of the estranged couple, testified that she learned from the Narag children Randy, Bong and Rowena that their father left his family, that she and her husband prodded the complainant to accept the respondent back, that the Narag couple again separated when the respondent "went back to his woman," and that Atty. Narag had maltreated his wife. 47

On the strength of the testimony of her witnesses, the complainant was able to establish that respondent abandoned his family and lived with another woman. Absent any evidence showing that these witnesses had an ill motive to testify falsely against the respondent, their testimonies are deemed worthy of belief. Further, the complainant presented as evidence the love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant, also submitted as evidence the cards that she herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two sets of evidence were written by one and the same person. 48Besides, respondent did not present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really written by him; he merely denied that he wrote them. While the burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. 49 This he failed to do. Respondent adamantly denies abandoning his family to live with Gina Espita. At the same time, he depicts his wife as a "violent husband-beater, vitriolic and unbending," and as an "insanely and pathologically jealous woman," whose only obsession was to "destroy, destroy and destroy" him as shown by her filing of a series of allegedly unfounded charges against him (and Gina Espita). To prove his allegation, he presented ninety-eight (98) pieces of documentary evidence 50 and ten (10) witnesses. 51 We note, however, that the testimonies of the witnesses of respondent did not establish the fact that he maintained that moral integrity required by the profession that would render him fit to continue practicing law. Neither did their testimonies destroy the fact, as proven by the complainant, that he had abandoned his family and lived with Gina Espita, with whom he had two children. Some of them testified on matters which they had no actual knowledge of, but merely relied on information from either respondent

Page 47 of 50

himself or other people, while others were presented to impeach the good character of his wife. Respondent may have provided well for his family they enjoyed a comfortable life and his children finished their education. He may have also established himself as a successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the noble profession of law. We remind respondent that parents have not only rights but also duties e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. 52 As a husband, he is also obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; and to render help and support. 53 Respondent himself admitted that his work required him to be often away from home. But the evidence shows that he was away not only because of his work; instead, he abandoned his family to live with her paramour, who bore him two children. It would appear, then, that he was hardly in a position to be a good husband or a good father. His children, who grew up mostly under the care of their mother, must have scarcely felt the warmth of their father's love. Respondent's son, Jervis B. Narag, showed his resentment towards his father's moral frailties in his testimony: Q My question is this, is there any sin so grievous that it cannot be forgiven, is there a fault that is so serious that it is incapable of forgiveness? A That depends upon the sin or fault, sir, but if the sin or fault is with the emotional part of myself, I suppose I cannot forgive a person although am a God-fearing person, but I h[av]e to give the person a lesson in order for him or her to at least realize his mistakes, sir. xxx xxx xxx

COMR. JOSE: I think it sounds like this. Assuming for the sake of argument that your father is the worst, hardened criminal on earth, would you send him to jail and have him disbarred? That is the question. CONTINUATION. A With the reputation that he had removed from us, I suppose he has to be given a lesson. At this point in time, I might just forgive him if he will have to experience all the pains that we have also suffered for quite sometime. Q Dr. Narag, your father gave you life, his blood runs in your veins, his flesh is your flesh, his bones are your bones and you now disown him because he is the worst man on earth, is that what you are saying. A Sort of, sir. Q You are now telling that as far [as] you are concerned because your father has sinned, you have no more father, am I correct? A Long before, sir, I did not feel much from my father even when I was still a kid because my father is not always staying with us at home. So, how can you say that? Yes, he gave me life, why not? But for sure, sir, you did not give me love. 54 Another son, Dominador Narag, Jr., narrated before the investigating officer the trauma he went through:

Page 48 of 50

Q In connection with that affidavit, Mr. Witness, which contains the fact that your father is maintaining a paramour, could you please tell this Honorable Commission the effect on you? A This has a very strong effect on me and this includes my brothers and sisters, especially my married life, sir. And it also affected my children so much, that I and my wife ha[ve] parted ways. It hurts to say that I and my wife parted ways. This is one reason that affected us. Q Will you please tell us specifically why you and your wife parted ways? A Because my wife wa[s] ashamed of what happened to my family and that she could not face the people, our community, especially because my wife belongs to a well-known family in our community. Q How about the effect on your brothers and sisters? Please tell us what are those. A Well, sir, this has also affected the health of my elder sister because she knows so well that my mother suffered so much and she kept on thinking about my mother. xxx xxx xxx Q Why did your wife leave you? A The truth is because of the things that had happened in our family, Your Honor. Q In your wife's family?

A In our family, sir. Q And what do you mean by that? A What meant by that is my father had an illicit relationship and that my father went to the extent of scolding my wife and calling my wife a "puta" in provincial government, which my mother-in-law hated him so much for this, which really affected us. And then my wife knew for a fact that my father has an illicit relationship with Gina Espita, whom he bore two children by the name of Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador, which I could prove and I stand firm to this, Your Honor. 55 Although respondent piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise. A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova 56: "The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage." In Toledo vs. Toledo, 57 the respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. Likewise, in Obusan vs. Obusan, 58 the respondent was disbarred after the complainant proved that he had abandoned her and maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This Court declared that respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar. In the present case, the complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa

Page 49 of 50

vs. Cabanting, 59 "a lawyer may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court." WHEREFORE, Dominador M. Narag is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let copies of this Decision be in the personal record of Respondent Narag; and furnished to all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED.

Page 50 of 50