Joker Arroyo vs HRET & Augusto Syjuco HRETs Jurisdiction Excess and Lack Thereof After the May

y 11, 1992 elections, Arroyo was declared as the duly elected Congressman of the lone district of Makati. Arroyo won by 13,559 votes over his opponent. His opponent Syjuco protested the declaration before the HRET. Syjuco alleged that Arroyo won due to massive fraud hence he moved for revision and recounting. HRET gave way but during the process some HRET employees and personnel conducted some irregularities to ensure Syjucos win. After some paper battles between the two, Syjuco, realizing that mere revision and recounting would not suffice to overthrow the more than 12,000 votes lead of Arroyo over him, revised his complaint by including and introducing in his memorandum cum addendum that his complaint is actually based on a broader and more equitable non-traditional determination of the existence of the precinct-level documentbased anomalies and that the revision he initially sought is just incidental to such determination. The 3 justices members of the HRET ruled that such amendment is already beyond the tribunals jurisdiction and the 6 representative members ruled otherwise. Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Syjuco and the HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner. ISSUE: Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. HELD: However guised or justified by Syjuco, this innovative theory he introduced for the first time in his memorandum cum addendum indeed broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what he originally sought-the mere revision of ballots. From his initial prayer for revision which lays primary, if not exclusive emphasis on the physical recount and appreciation of ballots alone, private respondents belated attempt to inject th is theory at the memorandum stage calls for presentation of evidence (consisting of thousands of documents) aside from, or other than, the ballots themselves. By having done so, Syjuco in fact intended to completely abandon the process and results of the revision and thereafter sought to rely on his brainchild process he fondly coined as precinct -level documentbased evidence. This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules.

G.R. No. 189466 : February 11, 2010 DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 189506 CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES and JOSELITO USTAREZ, Respondents.

DECISION ABAD, J.: These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress. The Facts and the Case In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections. Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, in HRET Case 07-041. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004. Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office. Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo. On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its jurisdiction over the qualifications of 1 petitioner Abayon. cralaw The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET 2 denied the same on September 17, 2009, cralaw prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari . In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay, Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.

Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition for quowarranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, in HRET Case 07-040. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations. Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay's nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET. On July 23, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility or qualification of the partylist group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act. HRET, however, defended its jurisdiction over the question of 3 petitioner Palparan's qualifications. cralaw Palparan moved for reconsideration but 4 the HRET denied it by a resolution dated September 10, 2009, cralaw hence, the recourse to this Court through this petition for special civil action of certiorari and prohibition. Since the two cases raise a common issue, the Court has caused their consolidation. The Issue Presented The common issue presented in these two cases is: Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay partylist organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections. The Court's Ruling Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees. If at all, says petitioner Abayon, such authority belongs to the COMELEC which already upheld her qualification as nominee of Aangat Tayo for the women sector. For Palparan, Bantay's personality is so inseparable and intertwined with his own

person as its nominee so that the HRET cannot dismiss the quo warranto action against Bantay without dismissing the action against him. But, although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of 5 Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, cralaw identifies who the "members" of that House are: Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Underscoring supplied) Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitution's point of view, it is the party-list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations. These representatives are elected, however, through that peculiar party-list system that the Constitution authorized and that Congress by law established where the voters cast their votes for the organizations or parties to which such party-list representatives belong. Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated in like manner. They have the same deliberative rights, salaries, and emoluments. They can participate in the making of laws that will directly benefit their legislative districts or sectors. They are also subject to the same term limitation of three years for a maximum of three consecutive terms. It may not be amiss to point out that the Party-List System Act itself recognizes party-list nominees as "members of the House of Representatives," thus: Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a partylist system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (Underscoring supplied) As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on 6 Elections , cralaw a party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a

vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution, states: Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term. In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization 7 which he seeks to represent." cralaw It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organizationin the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparan's relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests that they presumably embody. Petitioners Abayon and Palparan of course point out that the authority to determine the qualifications of a party-list nominee belongs to the party or organization that nominated him. This is true, initially. The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five from among them after 8 all belongs to the party or organization that nominates them. cralaw But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the dispute is taken out of its hand. Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not been argued by the parties. 9 What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution cralaw provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of

Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction 10 begins. cralaw The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan. WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the consolidated petitions and AFFIRMS the Order dated July 16, 2009 and Resolution 09-183 dated September 17, 2009 in HRET Case 07-041 of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as well as its Order dated July 23, 2009 and Resolution 09-178 dated September 10, 2009 in HRET Case 07-040. SO ORDERED. Raul Daza vs Luis Singson on November 25, 2010 Tribunal and its Composition The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) was reorganized resulting to a political realignment in the lower house. LDP also changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments. They withdrew the seat occupied by Daza (LDP member) and gave it to the new LDP member. Thereafter the chamber elected a new set of representatives in the CoA which consisted of the original members except Daza who was replaced by Singson. Daza questioned such replacement. ISSUE: Whether or not a change resulting from a political realignment validly changes the composition of the Commission on Appointments. HELD: As provided in the constitution, there should be a Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve Senators and twelve members of the House of Representatives elected by each House respectively on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein, this necessarily connotes the authority of each house of Congress to see to it that the requirement is duly complied with. Therefore, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission but also subsequently thereto NOT the court. Teofisto Guingona vs Neptali Gonzales on November 25, 2010 HRETs Composition Rounding Off After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12

seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP PDP-LABAN should represent the same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional representation. ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the CoA. HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party. GUINGONA vs GONZALES on September 20, 2012 READ CASE DIGEST HERE. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993 TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and LAKAS-NATIONAL UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS-NUCD), petitioners, vs.

NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and WIGBERTO E. TAADA, respondents. NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION, petitioner-in-intervention. Ricardo G. Nepomuceno for petitioners. Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for respondents. RESOLUTION CAMPOS, JR., J.: In motions separately filed by respondent Senator Wigberto E. Taada on October 27, 1992 and respondents Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Senator Alberto Romulo on October 30, 1992, said respondents moved for a reconsideration of our decision dated October 20, 1992, on the following grounds: Senator Taada alleges that: 1) The decision was premised on an erroneous appreciation of relevant factual precedents; 2) The decision ignored the reality of the multi-party system recognized both by the letter and spirit of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions; 3) It is mandatory to fill up twelve (12) seats in the Commission on Appointments; 4) The Senate did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it elected respondent Taada to the Commission on Appointments. In their Motion for Reconsideration/Clarification, Senators Gonzales and Romulo allege: 1) That the decision is inconsistent with the Supreme Courts ruling in the two cases 1 2 of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. and Daza vs. Singson. 2) It is mandatory to have twelve (12) members of the Commission of Appointments to enable it to function as a constitutional body. 3) The Tolentino Compromise Formula was adopted by the Senate and accepted by all political parties and must govern the selection of respondent Senators to the Commission on Appointments. 4) The election of the respondents Senators is in compliance with the multi-party system which contemplates a realignment of political parties to remove fractional membership of any party in the Commission. On December 16, 1992, the petitioner-in intervention Nationalist Peoples Coalition (NPC) filed its separate Comments to the Motions of respondents Senators while the petitioners filed on January 7, 1993 their separate Comments on the Motion of the respondents. Considering the grounds set forth in the Motions of the respondents and in the light of the reasons/arguments submitted in refutation thereof, We deny both Motions for Reconsideration on the following grounds: 1) The decision is based on a simple interpretation and application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution and We quote pertinent portions thereof. It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in the Senate is as follows:

LDP 7.5 LP-PDP-LABAN .5 NPC 2.5 LAKAS-NUCD 1.5 It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of application than as above. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is a clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC. xxx xxx xxx We find the respondents claim to membership in the Commission on Appointments by nomination and election of the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the requirement that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will give the LDP an added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18 in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim more than what is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its will on the minority, who by the same 3 token, suffers a diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission.

The membership of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada in the Commission on Appointments for the year alluded to by respondents is not disputed. The questioned decision however refers to the former Senators Membership in the 4 Commission during his first election as Senator in 1953-1954. In the following years the composition of the Commission on Appointments showed varying membership from the Nacionalista Party and Liberal Party, not discounting the various coalitions of the rival groups within their own ranks. During this period, his membership in the Commission was acquiesced to by the other members of the Senate, including the Nationalista Party which had a fractional vote. His membership in the Commission was never contested nor disputed by any party nor member of the Senate so that the question of whether his sitting as member of the Commission was constitutionality valid or not never reached the Court. The older Taadas membership in the Commission on Appointments cannot thus be considered by respondent Senator Taada as a precedent sufficient to overrule the clear mandate of Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution. It is a matter of record that in the political ventures of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada, he had his Citizens Party coalesce with the Nationalista Party and got himself elected as Senator under the banner of the latter party. His election to the Commission was principally due to the alliance of his Citizens Party with the Nationalista Party and not because he was elected thereto on the strength of his 5 being the lone representative of the Citizens Party. Senator Taada was included in the Nationalista Party ticket in 1953 until he parted ways temporarily with the same before the end of 1955. In 1959 he ran as a guest candidate of the Nationalista Party for a term of 6 years and again got re-elected in 1965 for another 6-year term under the Nationalista Party. The Nationalista-Citizens Party coalition of 12 Senators in the Senate from 1965-1967 gave the coalition 6 members in the Commission on Appointments, including the late Senator Lorenzo Taada. As early as those years, the Senate recognized the rule on proportional representation in the Commission by resorting to a coalition of political parties in order to resolve and avoid fractional membership in the Commission. This practice was repeated in 1968-1970 where the lone elected Senator of the Citizens Party was nominated and elected to the Commission on Appointments as the Senator to complete a whole number in the proportional representation to the Commission, with the late Senator Taada becoming the 16th Senator of the Coalition, enabling it to put 8 members in the Commission. Likewise, in 1970, the late Senator Taada filled up the 18th membership of the Coalition to become the 9th member representing the Coalition in the Commission. The election of the late Senator Lorenzo Taada to the Commission on Appointments does not reflect any practice or tradition in the Senate which can be considered as a precedent in the interpretation of the constitutional provision on proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments. No practice or tradition, established by a mere tolerance, can, without judicial acquiescence, ripen into a doctrine of practical construction of the fundamental law. In the absence of judicial confirmation of the constitutionality of the challenged legislative practice

the repeated erroneous legislative interpretation of a constitutional provision, does 6 not vest power on the legislature. 2) We take note of an erroneous reference in our decision to the listing of the party affiliation of the Senators based on the result of the election on May 11, 1992, giving the LDP only 15 members and including Senator Teofisto Guingona as a member of the Lakas-NUCDP. Respondents, however, accepted the fact that for purposes of determining the proportional representatives of each political party to the Commission on Appointments, the basis thereof is the actual number of members of each political party at the time of election of the members of the 7 Commission on Appointments in the Senate. In fact, respondents affirmed that the affiliation of Senator Guingona with the Lakas-NUCDP upheld the doctrine 8 enunciated in Daza vs. Singson, recognizing changes in alignments of membership in the Commission based on changing political alignments at the time of the organization of the Commission on Appointments. The issue therefore has no significance as an argument to set aside our decision. 3) Senator Taada was actually nominated by the LP because the house rules require that the party must make the nomination. In fact he nominated himself as representative of the LP-LDP-LABAN. It was the Majority Leader, an LDP Senator, (Senator Romulo) who presented the motion to elect respondent Senator Taada (along with the Senators belonging to the other Minority parties NPC and LAKASNUCD) as part of his function or duty to present for election and votation those previously nominated by the various political parties. In nominating the twelve (12) Senators to the membership in the Commission on Appointments, Senator Romulo moved: Mr. President, pursuant to the Motion just approved, I have the honor to submit for election to the Commission on Appointments the 12 Senators to compose its membership : Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople, Sotto and Romulo for the LDP; Senators Tolentino and Osmea for NPC; Senator Rasul, for 9 Lakas-NUCD; and Senator Taada for LP-PDP, Mr. President. 4) This Court has ruled that, under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution providing for a multi-party system, entitlement to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership in each 10 11 house. The statement of this Court in Daza vs. Singson to the effect that under the Constitutional provision on membership of the Commission on Appointments, the members thereof are NOT limited to the majority and minority parties therein but extends to all the political parties represented in each house of Congress, does not and should not be construed to mean that all political parties, irrespective of numerical representation in the Senate, are entitled by Constitutional fiat to at least one representation in the Commission. The Supreme Court in the subsequent case 12 of Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr. made this clear where it ruled that proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments requires a minimum membership of a party in each house. The mere presence of one Senator belonging to a political party does not ipso facto entitle such a party to membership in the Commission on Appointments.

5) We have declared that the Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 Senators be elected to the membership in the Commission on Appointments before it can discharge its functions and that it is not mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission. The overriding directive of Article VI, Section 18 is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the membership of the Commission on Appointments and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional membership in unusual situations like the case at bar. Section 18 provides, in part, as follows: There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve Senators, and . . . , elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation . . . . The respondents contention that the use of the word shall in Section 18 indicating the composition of the Commission on Appointments makes the election of the Senators mandatory, omitting that part of Section 18 which provides that (they shall be) elected by each house on the basis of proportional representation. 13 This interpretation finds support in the case of Taada vs. Cuenco, where this Court held that the constitutional provision makes mandatory the election of the specified number of Senators to the Commission on Appointments but also ruled that they should be elected on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties. In case of conflict in interpretation, the latter mandate requiring proportional representation must prevail. Such interpretation is the only correct and rational interpretation which the court can adopt in consonance with its solemn duty to uphold the Constitution and give effect the meaning intended by its framers to every clause and word thereof. The Constitution does not require the election and presence of twelve Senators and twelve Representatives in order that the Commission may function. Article VI, Section 18 which deals with the Commission on Appointments, provides that the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the members, and in Section 19 of the same Article, it is provided that the Commission shall meet only while Congress is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its Members, to discharge such powers and functions as are herein conferred upon it. In implementing these provisions, the Rules of the Commission on Appointments provide that the presence of at least thirteen (13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum, Provided however, that at least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum 14 should come from either house. Even if the composition of the Commission is fixed by the Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has the required quorum, which is less than the full complement fixed by the Constitution. And the Commission can validly perform its functions and transact its business even if only ten (10) Senators are elected thereto. Even if respondent Senator Taada is excluded from the Commission on Appointments for violation of the rule on proportional representation, the party he represents still

has representation in the Commission in the presence of house members from the LP-LDP-LABAN such as Congressman Juan Ponce Enrile. Respondents ask for a clarification of our statement which suggested a practical solution to break the impasse in the membership of the Senate in the Commission on Appointments, which we quote: . . . On the other hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political parties from forming a coalition with another political party in order to fill up the two vacancies 15 resulting from this decision. The statement is merely a suggestion but not an exclusive solution. It is not part of the disposition of the case. It does not contemplate a realignment of political parties, as otherwise this Court would have explicitly said so. What we intimated is merely this: That those entitled to fractional memberships may join their halfmemberships to form a full membership and together nominate one from their coalition to the Commission on Appointments. For example, the NPC and the LAKAS-NUCD may join their half-memberships and jointly nominate one of their own Senators to the Commission. In the same way the LDP and the LP-PDP-LABAN may nominate Senator Wigberto Taada to fill up the other slot to complete the membership to twelve. But the latter, as a coalition, may not insist in electing both Senator Taada and Senator Romulo to fill up two slots because this is certainly a violation of the rule on proportional representation. Who decides the question of proportionality? The power to choose who among them will sit as members of the Commission on Appointments belongs to the Senate. The number of senators is fixed by the Constitution to twelve, but the numbers of senators to be chosen must comply with the rule on proportional representation. The question of who interprets what is meant by proportional representation has been a settled rule that it belongs to this Court. The acceptance by the Senate of Senator Tolentinos formula to settle temporarily the impasse concerning the membership in the Commission on Appointments by leaving the final decision to the Supreme Court is a Senate recognition that the determination of proportional representation under Article VI, Section 18 of the Constitution is a function of this Court. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court, it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by Constitutional mandate to decide. The framers of our Constitution, in borrowing from constitutions of other states, thought it wise to vest in the Supreme Court the role in final arbiter in cases of conflicts in the interpretation of the fundamental law. In this role, the Court serves as a check on the unbridled use of power by the legislative majority to silence the minority. Democracy may breed but it will not sanction tyranny by force of numbers. The election of respondents Senators Taada and Romulo is a clear disregard of the constitutional provision and when done over the objections of their colleagues in the Senate, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion. We quote from our decision: . . . The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Taada as members of the Commission on Appointments by the LDP Majority in the Senate was clearly a

violation of Section 18 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP Majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law and grave 16 abuse of discretion is properly found to exist. For lack of merit, the Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED with FINALITY. SO ORDERED.