A comparison between two leadership models for security checkpoints

Enhancing processes by optimizing crew performance

Wetter Olive Emil, Laube Ren, & Hofer Franziska
Zurich State Police, Airport Division, Security Control P.O. Box CH-8058 Zrich-Flughafen (Switzerland) weto@kapo.zh.ch, laur@kapo.zh.ch, hofr@kapo.zh.ch
AbstractThe impact of leadership structure and behavior on team or crew performance is well known and has been demonstrated in various studies (see e.g. Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Zaccaro, Rittmann, & Marks, 2001). However, as far as we know, there is no empirical study available on leadership structures and crew performance in the applied setting of airport security control. This study compares the structure and impact of two different leadership models for security control. The first (older) model consists of one supervisor per sector. In the supervisor's sector, there are three to eight crews at work, each consisting of five security officers (SOs). Each crew independently manages and operates one line of the checkpoint. One of the five SOs in a crew is the crew leader (CL), who works together with the crew as a normal crew member but has a few additional tasks to fulfill. The second (newer) model, which focuses more on integrated crew resource management (CRM) criteria, consists of one supervisor, assisted by two CLs per sector. Together, they form a cohesive leading team. The CLs do not work in the crews anymore but manage two to three lines from behind. The crews still consist of five SOs. It is the new CLs' task to quickly isolate and manage problematic cases so that those do not block the line anymore. Like this, the workload of each team member is reduced. Another task is to keep an eye on the working quality and to communicate with the crews in such a way that working quality is enhanced. The impact of this reinforced leadership on indicators of working quality such as compliance with rules and regulations, as well as its impact on passenger flow (throughput) are analyzed using different statistical procedures such as T-tests, U-tests and Chi-square tests. Moreover, the job models of the new leadership structure are presented in detail and SOs' ratings of their acceptance and liking of both systems are presented. In sum, this study offers another, different approach to the human factors perspective in airport security focusing on leadership structures, crew resource management, and their effects. Keywords-Leadership; team performance; crew performance; security control; airport security; aviation security; crew resource management; human factors

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, several terrorist attacks on civil aviation have highlighted the needs for an effective security control. As a consequence, large efforts have been made in this domain. It has become clear that enhancing security by investing into high-tech equipment such as X-ray scanners only makes sense if the human factor is not neglected. In this field, training (e.g. X-Ray Tutor [1, 2]) and competency assessment of X-ray screeners have been developed and are set down in official documents (e.g. EC regulation No 2320/2002 [3]). The above mentioned developments and investments in airport security focus on the security officer as an individual, and, more precisely, on his individual performance. Undoubtedly, in this area, noteworthy improvements have been achieved in the past. From a wide range of scientific publications, it is well known, however, that it is not only the individual level of performance which determines the overall level of performance. When crews are at work, effects such as social loafing (e.g. [4]) or the Ringelmann effect [5], both of them well known to social psychologists, can occur. Closely observing the work at the security checkpoints, as well as analyzing results from covert tests [6] and inspections by officials, made us speculate that SOs in crews do not tap their full individual potential. In other words, we had the impression that the overall crew performance was in some cases worse than what the individual best performance of a crew member would allow for. This might hint at process losses (e.g. [7]) in the team situation. These insights were the main reason why we chose to open up the perspective from the individual level to the crew level of performance. Up to the present, it is still unknown how big the amount of teamwork at a security control checkpoint really is and if an analysis of and investments into crew factors make sense. In order to find out more about that, we have to have a closer look at the task itself. The task of a typical security control crew is to ensure that no forbidden articles, be it weapons or dangerous goods, pass the checkpoint and find their way into the sterile area. A traditional security control crew consists of five SOs at four different positions: one person at the x-ray screen, one

978-1-4244-4170-9/09/$25.00 2009 IEEE

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person in front of the x-ray tunnel, one person who searches suspicious bags manually and two persons at the WTMD1. As one can imagine, the tasks are quite different from each other. According to the typology by Steiner [8], the overall task of a security control crew could best be described as conjunctive. However, the individual subtasks (e.g. X-ray-screening task) can best be described as additive. Therefore, it makes sense to have a closer look at overall team performance. Teamwork and communication among the members of a security control crew become especially important in an emergency case. For example, upon detection of an improvised explosive device (IED), the crew has to follow a certain emergency procedure in which they can only be successful if they help each other and work together as a team. Those findings encouraged thoughts about leadership models for security control checkpoints. As a result of this, a new leadership model has been developed. Both the traditional and the new model shall be explained in detail in Section II. B. Certain shortcomings, which have been noticed and attributed to suboptimal team and leadership aspects, have been the starting point for the development of a new model. One of these shortcomings is that supervisors have repeatedly reported that they were sure that the quality of work be lower if they were absent. Due to the fact that one supervisor per sector cannot be present throughout the whole shift (breaks, office work to be done, etc.) and that he has a lot of other duties besides monitoring crew performance, the logical consequence would be to install more than one supervisor per sector in order to avoid situations in which no supervisor is on-site. Like this, supervisors can support and represent each other. With adequate and well functioning leadership structures, we can also ensure that classical criteria from crew resource management (CRM) are met. The importance of teamwork is well known in aviation safety and there is also recent empirical evidence that training on CRM really improves teamwork skills in the cockpit [9]. The term crew (or cockpit) resource management first appeared 1979 at a workshop sponsored by NASA [10]. This was the time when researchers pointed out that most of the aircraft accidents occurred because of human errors, e.g. communication or leadership failures or errors in decision making. In this context, Reason [11-12] developed a comprehensive and systemic model of human errors, which is also well known under the name Swiss Cheese Model of Human Errors. According to this model, errors occur because of a causal chain of failures or neglects and are never a product of one single reason. In other words an error rarely occurs because of one single individual but rather because of multiple circumstances. As stated above, research on human factors in airport security focused a lot on the individual cognitive abilities and knowledge (e.g. [13-14]). A lot of very important conclusions could be drawn from such and similar studies. In addition to this individual approach, future 1 One female and one male in order to conduct a gender-specific pat-down search.

research should not neglect the whole system. As Reason [12] argues, latent conditions (e.g. time pressure, structural weaknesses of the organization, leadership and management styles) may lie within the system for many years before they combine with active failures to evoke an accident opportunity. A systemic approach, similar to that in aviation safety, should therefore shape the content of future research in airport security. There lies a deep truth in the sentence We cannot change the human condition, but we can change the conditions under which humans work (after [12]). Research should try to find those factors that make a security system or organization resilient to individual errors. Last but not least, a live trial with the new leadership structure should yield further clues about the importance of leadership and crew aspects at security control checkpoints. II. METHOD

A. Disambiguation team vs. crew In English, the two words team and crew might both be used in order to describe the group of SOs working together at a checkpoint. In the past, several authors have sought to distinguish between teams and crews in order to allow for an accurate, clear and consistent nomenclature. To our understanding, the term team is broader and encompasses more different forms of groups of people than does the term crew. Teams can exist for several reasons, come in various forms and sizes and can be of different longevity [15]. Crews are defined in the literature by their performing of specialized tasks together effectively and the limited duration of working together [16-19]. Furthermore, they require to form and perform together immediately and effectively. They are characterized by high expertise, extensive training and standardized performance guidelines, thus probably rendering a group development process less important. Due to these findings, we would suggest that it be more accurate to talk of security control crews rather than teams. This nomenclature has been adopted throughout this research paper. B. Traditional vs. new leadership model Fig. 1 shows the traditional leadership model. In this configuration, there is one supervisor at work who manages one sector. In the supervisor's sector, there are about three to eight crews at work, each consisting of five SOs. Each crew independently manages and operates one line of the sector. One of the five SOs in a crew is the CL, who works together with the crew as a normal crew member but has some additional tasks and responsibilities to fulfill, e.g. taking over responsibility for minor problems within the security control line or when changing location.

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Sector 1 Supervisor

1 CL 1 CL 1 CL 1 CL 1 CL 4 SOs 4 SOs 4 SOs 4 SOs 4 SOs

D. Statistical analyses Apart from descriptive statistics, several other statistical procedures have been applied in order to assess if the obtained results are significant. T-tests (both one- and two-tailed) have been used to compare means, U-tests have been used to compare ranks and Chi-square tests have been used to compare frequencies. The methods used are presented in more detail in the standard literature on statistics (e.g. [20]). III. PROCEDURE AND MATERIALS

Figure 1. Traditional leadership model.

Fig. 2 shows the new leadership model. In this configuration, there is a cohesive leading team at work consisting of one supervisor, assisted by two CLs per sector. The main difference to the traditional model is that the CLs do not work in the crews anymore but manage two to three lines from behind. The crews still consist of five people, all of them being of equal status. It is the new CLs' task to quickly isolate and manage problematic cases so that these do not block the line anymore. Like this, the individual workload of each crew member should be reduced. Moreover, this reinforced leadership structure should offer better possibilities of monitoring the security control crews' working performance. Because the CL is taken out of the operational process of the crew, the probability of detecting failures but also outstanding performance should be higher compared to the traditional model.

The new leadership model described in Section II. B. has been put in place between March 11th and April 7th, 2009. Evaluations started not until March 20th in order to give the staff enough time to become reasonably familiar with the new model and the slightly different tasks. Evaluations took place on four days when the new leadership model was either active or not. All evaluations that later involved a comparison of data between the two leadership models took place in the same sector. Evaluation times consisted of phases with high passenger volume (rushhour) as well as phases with low passenger volume. The field of interest encompassed a comparison of both leadership models using objective and subjective measures. Quality of work as well as passenger throughput could be measured using objective indicators. Moreover, the different job profiles of supervisors in the traditional and the new leadership model were determined by observation as well. On a subjective level, the staff rated the perceived quality of work, current satisfaction with work and working atmosphere. Moreover, the staff indicated their liking of both leadership models in a combined scale. All staff working in the sector have been evaluated (population level) except for the evaluations of the quality of work and the CL's job models. In these domains, samples had to be evaluated due to limitations in the amount of available personnel for observation. Quality of work was operationalized for both observation and rating as compliance with internal and external regulations. Throughput was operationalized as how many passengers passed the Walk-Trough-Metal-Detector (WTMD) per hour. Job profiles have been defined by the management on setting up the new leadership model and have been observed during the daily operation accordingly. IV. RESULTS

1 Supervisor 1 CL 1 CL

Sector

5 SOs 5 SOs 5 SOs 5 SOs 5 SOs

Figure 2. New leadership model.

C. Participants The new leadership model is not an experiment conducted in a laboratory, but has been implemented in the daily business of operations. The participants were ordinary, trained SOs, CLs and supervisors with an age range from 20 to 64 years. The supervisors have been selected especially for this new task among the pool of supervisors, whereas all the other staff have been assigned to crews and checkpoints as usual. Staff involved, as well as their assignment to crews, changed on a daily basis. Crews always consisted of males and females. Overall, the total number of females was higher than that of males.

A. Job profiles It can be expected that supervisors' and CLs' job profiles change along with the new leadership structure. In order to assess job profiles, the tasks to be fulfilled have been analyzed and assigned to categories. Table I shows the category names as well as the tasks that are covered by the respective category. On designing the new leadership structure, the management set up a job profile for the new leading team that forecasts how much time might be invested for the different task categories (Fig. 3).

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TABLE I. Category Management Collaboration Briefing Taking over on request Taking over on own initiative Open tests

CATEGORIES AND TASKS COVERED Tasks covered Observing the situation, correcting and praising SOs Working with and helping crews Briefing Taking over a case on SO's request Taking over a case spontaneously and on own initiative Carrying out open tests with SOs. An open test consists of an interview, in which a SO is asked to explain the content of an x-ray image of a bag controlling,

team might not have been called for assistance as often as predicted.
2% 4% 7%

12%

75%
8%

13%

43%

Management Taking over on request

Collaboration Taking over on own initiative

Briefing Open tests

13%

Figure 4. Actual job profile.

13% 13% Management Taking over on request Collaboration Taking over on own initiative Briefing Open tests

As mentioned earlier, changing the leadership model also means a change in the responsibilities and tasks to be fulfilled by the leading team. Due to this, the traditional job models of the CLs (Fig. 5) and supervisors (Fig. 6) have been assessed as well.
1% 3%

Figure 3. Job profile forecast.

As can be seen, most of the time was expected to be spent for management tasks such as keeping an eye on the working quality in the sector, communicating with crews in order to keep them motivated and providing them feedback on their work. As an innovation, the leading team should conduct open tests with their crews during phases with low passenger volume (see Table 1 for more details on the procedure of an open test). In the daily operation, the actual job profile (Fig. 4) has been assessed during 267 min. of observation, both in phases with high and low passenger volume. Interestingly, much more time than predicted has been spent for management tasks. Raters had the impression that especially at times with low passenger volume, some members of the leading team have been idle rather than using this time for briefings, instructions, open tests, etc. As a consequence of this, no open tests have taken place during the time span evaluated. Moreover, it can be noted that the time spent for dealing with cases is much lower than predicted by the management. This might have several reasons: For example, there could have been less cases than expected or the leading

97% Management Taking over on request Collaboration Taking over on own initiative Briefing Open tests

Figure 5. Traditional CL job profile.

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4% 10%

3%

11%

% PAX

p < .05

72%

Old
Management Taking over on request Collaboration Taking over on own initiative Briefing Open tests

New Leadership structure

Figure 7. Random pat-down search rate (means and standard deviations). Figure 6. Traditional supervisor job profile.

On comparing Fig. 4 with Fig. 5 or Fig. 6 respectively, it becomes clear that there would be no big change for supervisors in case the new leadership model should be adopted in the future. For CLs, however, there will be a big change in their daily work. They will no more spend most of their time working in the crew like an ordinary SO, but will dedicate a big amount of their time for management tasks. This might hint at the necessity for particularly preparing, instructing and training the CLs for the new tasks. B. Quality of work objective data In both the old and the new leadership model, the number of random pat-down searches of passengers was measured. Since a passenger cannot predict whether he will be subject to a patdown search or not, the higher the number of random pat-down searches, the better for the quality of work with regard to security. In order to be compliant with the current regulation, SOs partly rely on technical equipment (the quota alarm of the WTMD) and partly on their own feeling in order to select the required number of passengers for an additional pat-down search. Fig. 7 shows the rate of random pat-down searches in both leadership models. In the new leadership structure, more 2 random pat-down searches have been carried out compared to the old leadership structure. This result is in keeping with the hypotheses. A one-tailed T-test reveals a significant result with t(13) = 2.06, p < .05. This implies that the quality of work was higher in the new leadership structure.

As described before, SOs partly rely on technical equipment (the WTMD) to select a passenger for a pat-down search. On conducting this study, we assumed the number of selected people by the WTMD be equally distributed in the new and old leadership model. On having a closer look at the data, we found out that this was probably not the case. Fig. 8 shows that the random alarm of the WTMD appears3 to have been higher during the evaluation phase of the new model.
Additional body search independent of quota or metal alarm Quota alarm of WTMD

% PAX

Old Leadership structure

New

Figure 8. Random pat-down search rate for quota alarms (WTMD) and manually selected passengers separately.

There seems to be no difference between the number of manually selected passengers in both leadership models3, i.e. the rate of manually selected passengers appears to be independent of the number of technical alarms. Taking into account that the 3 No statistical analyses have been calculated due to too low numbers within cells.

2 Since all numbers are considered security sensitive information, they are not indicated throughout this paper.

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technical alarm rate seems to have been higher during the evaluation of the new leadership model, one can argue that SOs did not compensate this higher rate of technical alarms. This can be interpreted as an increase in working quality: although the technical alarm rate appears to have been higher, the manually selected number of passengers appears not to have decreased in the new model. Different internal process instructions are to be followed depending on the alarm a passenger raises on passing the WTMD. It has been analyzed how well these different instructions are followed by the SOs. As can be seen in Fig. 9, compliance with WTMD process instructions is significantly better in the new leadership model than in the traditional one (2 (1, N = 173) = 4.94, p < .05).

new model or they overestimate the working quality of the traditional system. At the same time, supervisors have been asked to provide ratings as well. On a scale from 1 (very poor) to 6 (excellent), they rated the overall working quality in the sector, as well as the working quality concerning the WTMD and the carry-on baggage in particular (Fig. 10).
6 5.5 5 4.5

Quality

4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 Overall WTMD Carry-on baggage

Old structure

New structure

% correct

p < .05

Figure 10. Supervisors' ratings of quality of work (means and standard deviations).

Old

New

Leadership structure

Figure 9. Rate of correctly following WTMD process instructions.

It becomes clear that supervisors are somewhat less optimistic about the quality of work than the SOs. There are several possible reasons for this finding. It might be the case that the supervisors are in general more pessimistic and have higher levels of aspirations than the SOs. To us, this appears to be unlikely based on our personal experiences. The more likely explanation seems to be that the supervisors have an overview of the checkpoint processes from outside and are thus more likely to get a realistic and accurate view of the quality of work. However, that remains to be proven in detail. D. Employee satisfaction and model preference One of the most important aspects for the implementation of a new leadership model is its acceptance among the employees. If a model has too little support, it can be expected that the quality and the amount of work decrease and absenteeism increases. Due to that, it has been evaluated how good the reputation of the new leadership model is among the employees. Firstly, the employees' present satisfaction of work has been assessed in the traditional and the new leadership model. A total of 41 employees rated their current satisfaction on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 6 (excellent) (Fig. 11). The current satisfaction of the employees working in the new leadership model (M = 4.90, SD = 0.77) is higher than the one of the employees working in the traditional model (M = 3.57, SD = 1.04). In a two-tailed t-test, this result is significant with t(36.83) = 4.66, p < .001. However, with this study, it cannot clearly be determined to what this effect can be attributed. Most likely, it has to do with the leadership structure. It cannot be ruled out, however, that the supervisors in the new system managed to create a better atmosphere (e.g. they

Last but not least, it has been evaluated whether the correct procedures for manual cabin baggage search have more closely been followed in the new leadership model than in the traditional one. However, this has not been the case: there have been no significant differences (2 (1, N = 180) = 0.29, p = .59). C. Quality of work subjective ratings Right after the analyses stated in Section IV. B., all SOs of the respective sector (N = 41) have been asked to provide ratings of the current working quality at the place on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 6 (excellent). Like this, objective data and subjective impressions can be directly compared. Ratings in the traditional and the new leadership model do not significantly differ from each other (U = 167.50, p = .21). This means, that the SOs do not think that the working quality is higher in the new leadership model than in the traditional one. However, the objective data stated in Section IV. B. show an advantage of the new model over the traditional one. Apparently, the SOs do not notice this difference. They either underestimate the working quality of the

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might have been especially nice to the employees) than the ones in the traditional model. If this was the case, the effect would have come about because of characteristics of the supervisors instead of the two different leadership models.

suggest that it cannot be ruled out that the old model is preferred as often as the new model (2 (1, N = 46) = 0.55, p = .36), thereby indicating no clear model preference by the employees. E. Passenger throughput From an operational perspective, analyses on passenger throughput are interesting as well, although throughput is neither a perfect measure for efficiency nor for productivity. If it should turn out that throughput can be positively influenced by a new leadership structure, for example by preventing blocked lines, this would be a major advantage weighing up against the additional costs created. One problem is that, up to now, it is unclear to which extent throughput is influenced by factors of the security control itself (i.e. internal factors) versus by factors coming from the outside to the checkpoint (i.e. external factors), or even by interactions of both types of factors. In an ongoing study, we are about to analyze this more closely because this issue is of major importance to further studies in the field of passenger throughput at security checkpoints. Having analyzed data collected automatically by the WTMDs, we have come to the conclusion that the new leadership model as it was set up in the experimental phase had no effect on throughput. That is to say, it neither influenced passenger throughput positively, nor negatively. Taking into account that the leadership model was new and that the supervisors as well as the SOs have not been instructed to care for high throughput as a goal, the results are noteworthy all the same. V. DISCUSSION

6 5.5

Current satisfaction

5 4.5 4 3.5 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 Old New

p < .001

Leadership structure
Figure 11. Employees' current satisfaction (means and standard deviations).

Secondly, 47 employees have been asked explicitly how they like the new leadership model in comparison to the traditional one. The employees' model preference has been assessed based on ratings on a scale from 1 (strong preference for old model) to 6 (strong preference for new model). In order to produce an intuitively intelligible Figure, the scale has been chosen as follows: A rating of 3.5, representing the middle of the rating scale, has been set to 0, thereby indicating no preference for either system. Negative values indicate a preference for the traditional model and positive values indicate a preference for the new leadership model.
2.5 2 1.5 SOs' model preference (ipsative) 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -1 -1.5 -2 -2.5

In this study, two models for security control checkpoints are described: A traditional one with one supervisor per sector and CLs working in the crews, as well as a new one with a leading team of one supervisor and two CLs per sector leading from outside. From the new leadership model, positive effects on security as well as on facilitation have been expected. Additionally, the change in job profiles of supervisors and CLs, as well as the acceptance of the new model among the SOs have been assessed. Evaluating both models, we found some first results that favor the new leadership model, which in fact is an enhanced leadership on-site with regard to security. Results show that the rate of random pat-down searches, as an operationalization of the security standards, has indeed been significantly higher in the new leadership model. A closer look at the data shows that this was mainly due to differences in the technical alarms (quota alarms). SOs did not compensate these differences in the new model, which can be regarded as an increase in working quality. One could assume an inverse relationship between the number of technical alarms (quota and metal alarms) raised and the probability that a SO manually picks out a passenger for a patdown search. This was obviously not the case in the new model. Therefore, one can argue that we experienced an increase in

Figure 12. Employees' model preference (mean and standard deviations).

Fig. 12 shows that there is no preference for either system among the employees (see Fig. 12). Further statistical analyses

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working quality in the new model. We also found that internal process regulations at the WTMD were more closely followed the new model. Here, a significantly higher standard could be observed in the new leadership model. However, we found no effect of the leadership model on the quality of the hand search of cabin baggage. Although still to be considered as first results, they all point in the same direction and indicate that the new leadership model influences working quality and security level in a rather positive way. In our view, it is important that a longitudinal study replicates these first tentative results. Rather unexpectedly, it has turned out that SOs seem to overestimate the working quality at their workplace. Only the supervisors in the new leadership model have been able to gain a somewhat more realistic view on this subject. This might hint at the necessity of having have enough personnel (supervisors) behind or outside the control lines in order to constantly monitor working quality and compliance with process instructions. This also reflects our personal experiences, which are based on many discussions with SOs: Standing behind or outside the security process is totally different compared to working within a crew at a specific position. It is not possible to get a comprehensive or rather holistic impression of the security control process if one is an active part of it. Furthermore, working within a crew at the checkpoint can be stressful and there might not be any cognitive resources left for observing the whole process. It could be argued that employees would not accept such a close monitoring of their work. Contrary to such expectations, we have found that the employees' satisfaction with the current working situation was even better in the new leadership model. On directly asking employees to indicate how much they like the two systems in comparison to each other, it turns out that there exists no overall preference for either system. Taking into account the human tendency to rather stick with what is well known and familiar, this is no bad result at all and as such rather speaking for the new model. Monitoring activities do not have to have a negative connotation. Without any monitoring or controlling, good or outstanding work would never be detected. This is another argument for the presence of enough supervisors on-site. We have not been able to find an overall effect of the new leadership model on facilitation in terms of passenger throughput. It is a good sign that the new leadership model, in which more pat-down searches have been done and which the SOs were not at all used to, provided no lower figures for throughput than the well-known traditional model. Moreover, caring for high throughput had not been declared as a goal to neither the SOs nor to the supervisors. Longitudinal studies could clarify whether the new leadership model increases throughput in the long term. In future research, it should also be kept in mind that on assessing performance and maybe also working quality, a Hawthorne effect [21] is very likely to occur. On assessing the amount of change which the new leadership model would bring to the supervisors' and CLs' daily routine, it

was found that the supervisors' job would not change that much. Their new job profile would look quite similar to the one they had up to now. For the CLs, however, there would be major changes. They would no more be working in the crews but monitor the situation from the outside. As a consequence, their job profile would contain much more leadership tasks than up to the present. In our view, this change in job profiles would justify a new selection process for the future CLs. Selection criteria might be different (e.g. focusing more on leadership qualities) from the ones that are applied up to now. There is still some work to be done on what the new selection criteria should look like and what they should consist of. The present study is an applied study which has been carried out at an airport during daily business. In comparison with a laboratory study, this offers much more insights into the practical aspects such as feasibility and acceptance by the employees. Moreover, we have been able to run some analyses on the population level (assessing all SOs working in the respective sector), which is certainly an advantage compared to the use of samples, which is the case in most laboratory studies. On the other hand, we also have to openly acknowledge some shortcomings of this first study. In some analyses, it cannot be proved if the positive effect found is attributable to the leadership structure alone. We for example cannot completely rule out alternative explanations for the positive effects found on current employee satisfaction and working quality. Bearing these shortcomings in mind, we would like to conclude that it makes sense to think about leadership aspects at security checkpoints. This study hints at the possibility of positive effects of leadership structure on variables such as working quality, security level, and employee satisfaction. More work will be done in the near future in order to understand more about the impact of leadership aspects at security control checkpoints. REFERENCES
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