TRANSPO CASES #1 Philamgem vs.

PKS Shippinf Company Facts: Davao Union Marketing Corporation (DUMC) contracted the services of respondent PKS Shipping Company (PKS Shipping) for the shipment to Tacloban City of seventyfive thousand (75,000) bags of cement worth Three Million Three Hundred SeventyFive Thousand Pesos (P3,375,000.00). DUMC insured the goods for its full value with petitioner Philippine American General Insurance Company (Philamgen). During the transport, the barge where the bags of cement were loaded, sank. Upon demand of payment by DUMC, Philamgen immediately paid them. Hence, it sought reimbursement from PKS Shipping but the latter refused. Issue: (1) Whether PKS Shipping is a common carrier or a private carrier; and (2) WON PKS Shipping exercised the required diligence over the goods they carry. Or, WON PKS Shipping is liable. Held: (1) PKS Shipping is a common carrier. PKS Shipping has engaged itself in the business of carrying goods for others, although for a limited clientele, undertaking to carry such goods for a fee. The regularity of its activities in this area indicates more than just a casual activity on its part. Neither can the concept of a common carrier change merely because individual contracts are executed or entered into with patrons of the carrier. (2) PKS Shipping is not liable. The vessel was suddenly tossed by waves of extraordinary height of six (6) to eight (8) feet and buffeted by strong winds of 1.5 knots resulting in the entry of water into the barges hatches. The official Certificate of Inspection of the barge issued by the Philippine Coastguard and the Coastwise Load Line Certificate would attest to the seaworthiness of Limar I. As such, under Art. 1733, NCC, common carriers are exempt from liability for loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods due to any of the following causes, among others: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity x x x Baritua vs. Mercader Facts: The late Dominador Mercader, a businessman engaged in the buy and sell of dry goods in Laoang, N. Samar, boarded the bus of herein petitioner JB Line bounded from Manila to N. Samar. However, while said bus was traversing the Beily Bridge in N. Samar, the bus fell into the river, as a result, D. Mercader died. Petitioner alleges, among others, that there is no statement in the complaint of Mercader that he was issued any passenger-freight ticket. Issue: WON a contract of carriage existed between petitioners and Mercader. Or, WON petitioners are liable for the death of Mercader. Held:

A contract of carriage exists, thus, petitioners are liable. Petitioners failed to transport D. Mercader to his destination, because the bus fell into a river while traversing the Bugko Bailey Bridge. Although he survived the fall, he later died of asphyxia secondary to drowning. The Court agreed with the findings of both the RTC and the CA that fateful morning. It must be noted that a common carrier, by the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide. It is supposed to do so by using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. In case of death or injuries to passengers, it is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code. United Airlines, Inc vs. CA Facts: Respondent Aniceto Fontanilla purchased from petitioner United Airlines, through the Philippine Travel Bureau in Manila three (3) Visit the U.S.A. tickets for himself, his wife and his minor son Mychal. The Fontanillas proceeded to the US as planned; they used the 1st coupon. Fontanilla then bought two (2) additional coupons each for himself, his wife and his son from petitioner at its office in Washington Dulles Airport. After paying the penalty for rewriting their tickets, the Fontanillas were issued tickets with corresponding boarding passes with the words CHECK-IN REQUIRED, for United Airlines Flight No. 1108. However, the Fontanillas were not able to board said flight but instead were able to board United Airlines Flight No. 803. Issue: (1) Whether or not private respondents were able to prove with adequate evidence his allegations of breach of contract in bad faith; and (2) What law is applicable, the Philippine Law or the US Law? Held: (1) No. Aniceto Fontanillas assertion that upon arrival at the airport at 9:45 a.m., he immediately proceeded to the check-in counter, and that Linda Allen punched in something into the computer is specious and not supported by the evidence on record. In support of their allegations, private respondents submitted a copy of the boarding pass. Explicitly printed on the boarding pass are the words Check-In Required. Curiously, the said pass did not indicate any seat number. If indeed the Fontanillas checked in at the designated time as they claimed, why then were they not assigned seat numbers? (2) The Philippine Law. The appellate court, however, erred in applying the laws of the United States as, in the case at bar, Philippine law is the applicable law. Although, the contract of carriage was to be performed in the United States, the tickets were purchased through petitioners agent in Manila. It is true that the tickets were rewritten in Washington, D.C. however, such fact did not change the nature of the original contract of carriage entered into by the parties in Manila. PhilAm vs. CA Facts:

Coca-Cola Bottlers loaded on board MV Asilda, a vessel owned by respondent FELMAN, 7,500 cases of 1-litter Coca-Cola softdrinks bottle to be transported from Zamboanga City to Cebu City. The shipment was insured by petitioner PHILAMGEN. The vessel left Zamboanga in a fine weather but the same sank in the waters of Zamboanga del Norte. Coca-Cola Bottlers filed a claim for damages against FELMAN which it denied, thus, filed an insurance claim with PHILAMGEN. PHILAMGEN now seeks recourse against FELMAN. Issue: WON FELMAN is liable for loss of the cargo due to its failure to observe the extraordinary diligence required by Art. 1733, NCC. Held: YES. Under Art 1733 of the Civil Code, (c)ommon carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case In the event of loss of goods, common carriers are presumed to have acted negligently. FELMAN, the shipowner, was not able to rebut this presumption. The sinking of the vessel was due to its unseaworthiness even at the time of its departure from the port of Zamboanga. It was top-heavy as an excessive amount of cargo was loaded on deck. Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company Facts: Herminio L. Nocum was a passenger in appellants Bus No. 120 then making a trip within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequence of the explosion of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger. The injuries suffered by Nocum were not due to mechanical defects but to the explosion of firecrackers. Issue: WON the bus company was negligent, hence liable for the injuries suffered by Nocum. Held: No. The Bus Company has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of negligence by showing that it has exercised extraordinary diligence for the safety of its passengers, according to the circumstances of the (each) case. Article 1733 qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be according to all the circumstances of each case. In this case, the circumstance that must be considered in measuring a common carriers duty towards its passengers is the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered must be the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. (Hence, the bus companys failure to confiscate the baggage cannot be considered as a negligent act, but in accord to the circumstance of the case.) N.B.

Thus, in other jurisdictions, and squarely applicable in the instant case: There is need for evidence of circumstances indicating cause or causes for apprehension that the passengers baggage is dangerous and that it is failure of the common carriers employee to act in the face of such evidence that constitutes the cornerstone of the common carriers liability in cases similar to the present one. Elite Shirt Factory vs. Hon. Cornejo Facts: Elite Shirt Factory (shipper) delivered to Compania Maritima (common carrier) several cartons of merchandise for shipment to several consignees. While such cargo was stored in the bodega owned by Compania Maritima, a fire broke. Elite Shirt, allegedly damaged, filed with the City Court of Manila a complaint against Compania Maritima for reimbursement. The latter filed an answer impleading Phil. Steam Navigation as third party defendant, on the ground that the fire started from the section occupied by such. Judge Cornejo of the city court favoured shipper Elite for the recovery of damages from common carrier Compania Maritima, but thereafter denied the judgment of execution and set aside its previous decision; the ground: Judge had no jurisdiction, but rather the CFI within its exclusive admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. Elite Shirt Factory contends that the liability of the carrier, Compaia Maritima, from the time the shipment was deposited in its warehouse, was no longer as a common carrier but as a depository, hence, it is the City Court which has jurisdiction. Issue: Does the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on a Court of First instance over admiralty and maritime cases include the suit where the shipper files a claim against the carrier, the goods having been landed, stored in its bodega but subsequently burned, no delivery having been made to the consignee as a result? Held: YES, the instant case is included in the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFI. THE REASON: the warehouse in which the cargo was deposited at the time it was burned was owned by the carrier, Compaia Maritima, itself. The cargo was burned before Compania Maritima could deliver it to the consignees. When, as in this case, the proceeding in effect is one for a breach of a contract of shipment, the jurisdiction of the court of first instance under the specific provision of the Judiciary Act is undeniable. N.B. Hence, if the bodega was owned NOT by Compania Maritima, it is the City Court which will have jurisdiction and not the CFI. City court will have jurisdiction when: the common carrier is liable as DEPOSITORY; CFI will have jurisdiction when: the carrier is liable as a common carrier, as in the instant case. Medina vs. Cresencia Facts: A passenger jeepney driven by Brigido Avorque smashed into a Meralco post resulting in the death of Vicente Medina, one of its passengers. Guillermo Cresencia

is the registered owner of the jeepney as well as the registered operator. On the other hand, Rosario Avorque, after the jeepney having been repeatedly sold from one buyer after another, is its current absolute owner as well as the employer of driver Brigido. Issue: (1) Who should be held liable for the death of Medina the registered owner or the absolute owner? (2) WON Rosario Avorque has a subsidiary liability under the RPC for damages arising from her drivers criminal act. Held: (1) The registered owner. The requires the approval of the Public Service Commission in order that a franchise, or any privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the certificate issued to the grantee x x x As the sale of the jeepney was admittedly without the approval of the Public Service Commission, Guillermo Cresencia, who is the registered owner and operator thereof, continued to be liable to the Commission and the public for the consequences incident to its operation. (2) No, she has no subsidiary liability.

Medinas action for damages is independent of the criminal case filed against Brigido Avorque, and based, not on the employers subsidiary liability under the Revised Penal Code, but on a breach of the carriers contractual obligation to carry his passengers safely to their destination (culpa contractual). And it is also for this reason that there is no need of first proving the insolvency of the driver Brigido Avorque before damages can be recovered from the carrier, for in culpa contractual, the liability of the carrier is not merely subsidiary or secondary, but direct and immediate (Articles 1755, 1756, and 1759, New Civil Code). Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Facts: Jose Cangco was an employee of the Manila Railroad Co. As an employee of the company, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the companys train free of charge. One day, while Cangco stepped off the car, one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His arm was badly crashed and lacerated. Issue: Whether the liability of Manila Railroad constitutes culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. Held: The liability constitutes culpa contractual (Contract of Carriage). The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and

immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendants servants. N.B. Contributory Negligence on the part of Cangco: None. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence. Culpa Contractual and Culpa Aquiliana Distinguished: (read from full text) 1. culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract 2. those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of noncontractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.

3. the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it. On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the masters negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract. Test in determining Contributory Negligence of plaintiff: Thompsons work on negligenceThe test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury.

PAL vs. CA Facts: Private respondent Jesus Samson was a regular co-pilot of PAL. During one of his flights from Manila to Legazpi with Captain Delfin Bustamante, they made a crash landing at Daet where Samson suffered physical injuries in the head. Samson alleges that the accident was due to the gross negligence of PAL in allowing Bustamante who was suffering from a long standing tumor of the Nasopharynx but was also allowed by the Civil Aeronautics Administration to fly as a copilot; and that because of the tumor Bustamante has a slow reaction and poor judgment. Issue:

WON PAL was negligent as a common carrier in allowing Bustamante to fly as a First Officer the day of the accident. Or, WON the same carrier is liable for the accident even if Bustamante was not sick. Held: YES and YES. For having allowed Bustamante to fly as a First Officer on January 8, 1951, defendant is guilty of gross negligence and therefore should be made liable for the resulting accident. (Even) assuming that the pilot was not sick or that the tumor did not affect the pilot in managing the plane, the evidence shows that overshooting of the runway and crash-landing at the mangrove was caused by the pilot for which acts the defendant must answer for damages caused thereby. And for the negligence of defendants employee, it is liable. At least, the law presumes the employer negligent imposing upon it the burden of proving that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees. As defined in Art. 1732, NCC, petitioner is a common carrier. The law is clear in requiring a common carrier to exercise the highest degree of care in the discharge of its duty and business of carriage and transportation under Art. 1733, 1755 and 1756, NCC. The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the part of common carriers is for the safety of passengers as well as for the members of the crew or the complement operating the carrier, the airplane in the case at bar. And this must be so for any omission, lapse or neglect thereof will certainly result to the damage, prejudice, nay injuries and even death to all aboard the plane, passengers and crew members alike.

Sarkies Tours Phil vs. IAC Facts: The Dizons purchased 6 round trip tickets from Sarkies for a tour to Corregidor form Manila, and back. They were given two tickets both with the name SARKIES appearing therein. The word Edisco was however handwritten on the white ticket. The white tickets were collected on board by Julian Mendoza, while the blue tickets were collected upon boarding the Sarkies bus. The MV Edisco owned and operated by Mendoza was not registered nor was it licensed to operate as a watercraft. On return to Manila, the weather was the same as when they left. After about thirty minutes of cruising, the boat leaned towards the starboard; the boat capsized. As a result, Merceditas, the daughter of the spouses Dizon, among others, died. The Dizons filed a complaint for damages against Sarkies. Sarkies, as an answer, included a cross-claim against Mendoza. Issue: WON, under the Civil Code, Sarkies should have a right of action against Mendoza. Held: Yes. Considering that actual negligence for the drowning of Merceditas was the responsibility of Mendoza, it is but fair that Sarkies should have a right of action against Mendoza for reimbursement. Although Article 2181 of the Civil Code is not technically invocable, its principle should be applied in favor of Sarkies. The provision of the Civil Code on common carriers is based on Anglo-American Law. In Grand Trunk R. Co. vs Latham, 63 Me. 177, the following was said:

Where a railroad company had been compelled to pay a judgment for damages for injuries sustained by a passenger as a result of the maltreatment and misconduct of the conductorthe Court (held) that the servant was liable to his master for all loss and damage sustained by it.