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NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS


UPON THE UNITED STATES

TEAM #6 WORKPLAN

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS


INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

Team Members: Barbara Grewe


Michael Jacobson
Peter Rundlet
Lance Cole

Premise Statement

Item 1 Key Questions of the Investigation

Item 2 Suggested Readings and Briefing Plan

Item 3 Document Requests

Item 4 Interview Candidates

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Team #6
Premise Statement

The September 11 terrorist attacks were carried out by 19 hijackers, who lived
openly and freely in the United States for varying periods of time prior to the attacks.
The six leaders of the plot spent considerable time training in the United States for the
attacks, traveling throughout the country during this time. The U.S. Intelligence
Community generally, and the FBI more specifically, were aware prior to attacks that
three of these individuals had ties to al-Qa'ida. Although the plot was primarily financed
and orchestrated from overseas, the hijackers also had contact with and received
assistance from a number of individuals in the United States. Some of the hijackers'
associates were known to the FBI prior to September 11 through its counterintelligence
and counterterrorism investigations. The FBI also had other indications of a possible
attack in the summer of 2001, including the Moussaoui investigation, the Phoenix EC,
and the U.S. Intelligence Community's heightened state of alert.

Based on previous reviews, it is now clear that the FBI did not respond
aggressively and appropriately to all of the available intelligence, and failed in many
respects to "connect the dots" prior to the attacks. Less closely studied is the extent to
which the FBI's inability to detect the hijackers' activities and associations while in the
United States represented a systemic intelligence failure. Was the hijackers' ability to
avoid detection by the FBI while in the United States an indication of excellent
operational tradecraft by the hijackers, or does it represent a failure on the part of the
FBI? If the former, can changes be made to detect this type of tradecraft in the future? If
the latter, what accounts for these failures?

To answer these questions, our team will have to develop a comprehensive


understanding of the U.S. Government's efforts pre-September 11 to collect, process,
analyze, and disseminate intelligence on terrorist activity in the United States. Our
review will focus not only on the FBI itself, which had primary responsibility for these
matters, but also on the FBI's relationship with other entities with important roles in this
process, such as state and local authorities, other federal agencies, and foreign
intelligence and law enforcement partners. By understanding the problems with the
system pre-September 11, it will be clearer what the specific failures were, why they
occurred, and will help us better explain why the FBI was unable to learn about or stop
the attacks.

Finally, we will review the current state of the U.S. Government's domestic
intelligence efforts, to assess whether they are adequate to remedy the pre-September 11
systemic problems identified through the course of our investigation. If not, we will
make recommendations to address these problems.

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Team #6
Item 1: Key Questions

1. What relevant information did the FBI have prior to the September 11 attacks?

• What information was available to U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement entities
prior to September 11 regarding the 19 hijackers and their associates? When was
this information known and by whom, and how was this information shared and
utilized prior to the attacks?

• Did the FBI have all of the information about the 19 hijackers available to other
U.S. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies, and their foreign intelligence and
law enforcement partners?

2. What was the FBI's approach to combating international terrorist activity in the
United States prior to September 11?

• How did the FBI collect, process, analyze and disseminate intelligence
information about foreign terrorist activity in the United States prior to September
11, and why did the FBI adopt this approach? What were the strengths and
weaknesses of the FBI's approach to information collection?

• How effectively did the FBI collaborate, coordinate, and share information with
foreign law enforcement and intelligence partners, local and state law
enforcement authorities, and other federal agencies prior to the attacks?

• How effective was the FBI's leadership and management in directing its
counterterrorism program prior to September 11 ?

• What role did the White House, Congress, the Director of Central Intelligence,
and the various Justice Department components play in the FBI's
counterterrorism program, from a policy, budgetary, and investigative standpoint,
prior to the September 11 attacks?

• To what extent did legal authorities and the resultant sensitivities regarding civil
liberties impact on the FBI's counterterrorism mission?

3. To what extent was the FBI's inability to prevent the September 11 attacks an
intelligence failure, and was the FBI's approach to combating terrorism a critical
factor in the overall failure to prevent the attacks?

• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collect, process, analyze and
disseminate information relevant to the September 11 attacks, and what accounts
for any failures in this regard?

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• In what ways did the FBI fail to adequately collaborate, coordinate, and share
information relevant to the September 11 attacks with foreign law enforcement
and intelligence partners, local and state law enforcement authorities, and other
federal agencies prior to the attacks, and what accounts for any failures in this
regard?

• What particularly glaring or significant failures stand out in terms of the FBI's
inability to prevent the September 11 attacks, and what accounts for these
failures?

• Are the FBI's traditional law enforcement mission and resulting organizational
structures and cultures incompatible with a successful counterterrorism program?

4. How is foreign intelligence information regarding terrorist activity in the United


States collected, processed, analyzed and disseminated today? What has changed
since September 11, and how effectively is the system currently working?

• What are the ingredients of a successful domestic intelligence/counterterrorism


system? What degree of collaboration, coordination, and information sharing is
required between the FBI, state and local authorities, foreign intelligence and
law enforcement partners, and other federal agencies to have a successful
system? What role should private sector entities (e.g., data aggregating and
information technology companies) play in this system?

• Does the current system provide for the adequate collection, processing,
analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism-related intelligence, and if not,
what are the primary barriers to success?

• What are the pros and cons, including transition costs and feasibility, of
establishing a separate agency to handle counterintelligence and foreign
intelligence collection within the United States?

• What can we learn from other countries' approaches to and experiences with
domestic intelligence issues?

• What additional legal and policy changes, if any, are necessary and appropriate
for the U.S. Government to establish a successful domestic intelligence
capability?

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Team #6
Item 2: Suggested Readings and Briefing Plan

A. Reading List

1. Relevant portions of the Joint Inquiry Classified Final Report, including Senator
Shelby's Additional Views [Why it is relevant: The Joint Inquiry has already
performed considerable investigation on the performance of the FBI relating to
the September 11 attacks. In determining the scope and focus of our
investigation, the Commission should be aware of what the Joint Inquiry found
and concluded. Senator Shelby's additional views contain important and relevant
conclusions about the systemic problems with the FBI prior to the attacks.]

2. Joint Inquiry Unclassified Staff Statements, dated: September 24, 2002 (as
supplemented on October 17, 2002) and October 8, 2002. [Why it is relevant:
these statements cover a number of topics relevant to our investigation including:
the Phoenix Electronic Communication, the Moussaoui investigation, the
information regarding aircraft as weapons, and the U.S. Intelligence Community's
handling of the information regarding the hijackers prior to the attacks.]

3. Selected portions of the October 2002 Markle Foundation Task Force report on
National Security in the Information Age. [Why it is relevant: contains important
policy recommendations for the U.S. Government relating to the impact of
information and information technology on national security.]

4. Senator John Edwards's February 2003 one page fact sheet on the proposed
creation of a Homeland Intelligence Agency. [Why it is relevant: the fact sheet
contains some of the arguments in favor of the creation of a new domestic
intelligence agency.]

5. Jeff Smith's June 18, 2002 Washington Post Op-Ed, entitled "Haste and the
Homeland Plan," on homeland security and domestic intelligence. [Why it is
relevant: the op-ed briefly describes the problems with the current system, and his
proposals to remedy these problems.]

6. "Mission Impossible," written by Jean Kumagai, published in IEEE Spectrum on-


line Journal, dated April 7, 2003 on the FBI's information sharing and
technological problems. [Why it is relevant: the article discusses the well-known
problems with the FBI's technology and information systems, and assesses
whether the current proposals are likely to remedy these problems.]

7. The Cell, by John Miller [Why it is relevant: the author provides a detailed
explanation of why he believes the FBI and CIA failed to prevent the September
11 attacks. He traces the origins of al-Qa'ida in the United States, beginning in
the early 1990s, and how the U.S. Government failed to adequately respond to
this growing threat.]

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B. Recommended Briefers

1. Eleanor Hill, Staff Director, Joint Inquiry Staff

2. Glenn Fine, Inspector General, Department of Justice

3. Jeff Smith, former General Counsel, Central Intelligence Agency

4. Mike Leavitt, Governor of Utah during 2002 Salt Lake Olympics

5. Jeff Jonas, CEO of Systems Research and Development

6. Bill Crowell, former Deputy Director of NSA

7. Oilman Louie, In-Q-Tel

8. Professor Philip Heymann, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University

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Team #6
Item 3: Document Requests

1. In consultation with team #1, requests on hijackers' associates, al-Qa'ida


detainees, and updated timelines and lists of pending investigations from the
FBI's 9/11 investigation (codenamed "PENTTBOM.")

2. Training curricula from new agent training, counterterrorism in-services, and


from FBI College of Analytical Studies.

3. Statistics from select FBI Field Offices, regarding agent assignments to


counterterrorism investigations (referred to as "bum rates," which indicate agent
man-hours actually spent on particular matters) from 1993-Present.

4. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Investigative and


Operational Guidelines.

5. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Manual of Administrative


and Operational Procedures.

6. Internal FBI documents on the post-9/11 counterterrorism reforms, including


documents relating to the creation of the Office of Intelligence and the Reports
Officer program.

7. Memoranda of Understanding between the FBI and state/local law enforcement


agencies in cities where the hijackers resided or operated.

8. In consultation with team #3, written communications from the National


Security Council to the FBI or the Department of Justice containing
counterterrorism strategy, policy and guidance, 1998-September 20, 2001

9. Written communications from the FBI to the National Security Council on


international terrorism matters, 1998-September 20, 2001

10. Any DOJ or NSC briefing materials relating to counterterrorism or domestic


intelligence issues created for the Bush-Cheney Transition Team.

11. Any policy statements, directives, or guidance from the Attorney General,
Deputy Attorney General, or Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division
to the FBI or to U.S. Attorneys' Offices on Counterterrorism matters from 1998-
Present, not relating to individual investigations.

12. Annual Field Office Reports or other documents outlining annual


counterterrorism priorities and strategies from select from FBI Field Offices,
1998-Present.

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13. Copy of the pre-September 11 and most up to date Attorney General


Guidelines for Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Investigations.

14. Copy of policy directives regarding the creation of the Department of


Homeland Security, and its role in counterterrorism policy, operations, analysis,
and collection.

15. Copy of annual report on the FBI's National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget, produced by the Director of Central Intelligence's Community
Management Staff, FY1995-FY2004.

16. FBI's annual Congressional Budget Justification Books, FY1995-FY2004

17. Department of Homeland Security's budget request for FY2003-FY2004

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Team #6:
Item 4: Interview Candidates

*List of possible interviews at FBI field office in the areas where the hijackers
lived and operated relating to: (1) the hijackers' activities and associations in the
United States; (2) the way that these field offices collected, processed, analyzed,
and disseminated information about potential terrorist activity prior to 9/11,
(3) the offices' focus on counterterrorism and al-Qa'ida prior to the attacks:

• FBI agents involved in the investigation of hijackers' activities and


associations (in conjunction with team #1), analytic personnel, language
specialists, counterterrorism managers.

*List of possible interviews related to pre-9/11 coordination and information


sharing between the FBI and state/local law enforcement in the cities where the
hijackers resided, and between FBI Legal Attaches and their foreign law
enforcement and intelligence partners in countries where the hijackers lived and
operated:

• State/local law enforcement personnel, including those who have served


on FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces in Los Angeles, Phoenix, San
Diego, Newark, Miami, Washington, D.C., Tampa, and Jacksonville.

• Current FBI Legal Attaches inj |


| \d Legal Attaches in place prior to 9/11.

*Ljst of possible interviews related to Justice Department leadership in setting


FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, and budget, and in directing FBI
investigative activity prior to September 11:

• DOJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General


Larry Thompson, former Attorney General Reno, former Deputy Attorney
General Holder, Jim Reynolds, former Deputy Attorney General Gorelick,
Barry Sabin, Chris Wray, David Kris, Assistant Attorney General Viet
Dinh, DOJ budget personnel, Ronnie Edelman, former Assistant Attorney
General Jim Robinson, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fischer,
Counsel David Nahmias, Fran Townsend, Ron Lee, Bruce Schwartz, Mark
Richard, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, USAs and AUSAs
in relevant jurisdictions.

FBI personnel: Louis Freehl I Rose Rudden, Assistant


Director Finance Division, Tom Pickard, former Section Chief Michael
..Rolince, former Executive Assistant Director Dale Watson.

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9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy
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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONL# \N SENSITIVE \t of possible interviews related to White $buse

counterterrorism priorities, policy, and in directing FBI investigative activity prior


to September 11 (in conjunction with team #3): \ personnel',\_ /

i iDale Watsoh, Louis Freeh, Tom Pickardf"'

• NSC personnel: Daniel Benjamin; Steve Simon, MaraRudman\y


McCarthy, Jamie Baker, Jim Steinberg, General Kerrick, Dick Clarke.

*List of.possible interviews related/to fte Director of Central Intelligence's,


leadership in setting FBI counterterrorism priorities, policy, budget, and in .
directing FBI investigative activity prior to September 11 (in conjunction with,
team #2): \ / \ FBI pers&nnei.\_

Dale Watsbn, Michael Rolince

• CIA personnel.] / |, George Tenet, Joan Dempsey, Mike S.,


"Gang of Eight" (FBI ar/d CIA executives' group) \t of possible interviews to/understand and ev

current approach to dothestic.intelligence/counterrorism.

FBI / / \ FBI Executives: j

Medford,,Chuck Frahm. \ Office of Intelligence:

' / /ru ^ \
[Maureen Baginski. \ Information Dissemination/reports

intelligence unit personnel; customers for FBI intelligence products (CIA,


White Ho^se)

• FBI technology Issues:


| )user management group, TRILOGY user management group, FBI
Headquarters and field analysts, former CIO Bob Dies, CIO Darwin John,
Mitretek personnel.

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9/11 Law Enforcement Privacy

• Training for agents and atfaiyticpersonnel:


Training Division officials, Office of .Intelligence personnel, field and
headquarters analysts. i \ ..

Centralization of intelligence operations:


Selected Special Agents in;(
| \l Joint Terrorism Task
Force personnel. \ Joint Terrorism fash Force Efforts/Coordination vvith

State/local: i \ of private sector data gathering and mining capabilities:

Officials from Choicepoint arid Axioin.

Other U.S. Government Agencies \ Threat Integration 6enter (in conjunction with team #2):

| | relevant NSC officials ,

Central Intelligence Agency:


George Tenet, Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Homeland
Security Winston Wilevl |

Department of Homeland Security: '•


\ Department, including legal and policy reform:
DQJ personnel: Attorney General Ashcroft, Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, Assistant
Attorney General Viet Dinh, Barry Sabin, David Nahmias

FBI personnel: Director Bob Muellerj \

Legislative branch personnel: Senators: Graham, Shelby, Specter,


Grassley, Edwards, Gregg; Congressmen: Sensenbrenner, Goss, Conyers.
Current and former staff: Vicki Divoll, Steve Cash, Chris Ford, Bruce
Cohen. John Gannon, Suzanne Spalding, Beryl Howard. John Gannon.
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*List of possible interviews related to current and future domestic intelligence


policy issues and considerations: \ and former FBI and CIA officials]

JJudge Webster,
I
Dale Watson, James I
Current and former White House officials:
John Podesta, Jim Steinberg, Jamie Baker£ iDan Benjamin,
Dick Clarke

• Civil liberties organizations:


Jerry Berman, Jim Dempsey, Tim Edgar, Kate Martin, David Cole, Joe
Onek, Ann Beeson

• Other current and former government officials:


Brent Scowcroft, James Gilmore, Zoe Baird, John Hamre, Gary
Hart, Senator Edwards' staff, Ambassador Bremer, Warren
Rudman, former Chief Judge of the FISA Court, Royce Lamberth

• Officials from other agencies with a role in domestic intelligence


collection and analysis:

officials; intelligence officials from: DEA, Secret Service, ENS, Coast


Guard and Customs, Homeland Security

Foreign intelligence and law enforcement personnel:

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