ROXAS VS CA FACTS: Melania is of legal age, married but living separately from husband, Antonio S.

Roxas is likewise of legal age and living separately from his wife, She discovered that her estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas, had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano covering a portion of their conjugal lot That on the same lot, she had planned to put up her flea market with at least twenty (20) stalls and mini-mart for grocery and dry goods items for which she had filed an application for the corresponding Mayor's Permit and Municipal License which had been approved since 1986, when she attempted to renew it for 1986, the same was disapproved last month due to the complaint lodged by defendant Antonio M. Cayetano whose application for renewal of Mayor's Permit and License for the same business of putting up a flea market, had been allegedly earlier approved; she had intended to operate partly by herself and lease the rest of the twenty (20) stalls thereon, she had spent some P135,000.00 for the said construction, including materials and labor, where she had expected to earn as daily net income in the minimum amount of P500.00 daily; due to the illegal lease contract entered into between the herein defendants and the resultant unlawful deprivation of plaintiff from operating her own legitimate business on the same lot of which she is a conjugal owner, plaintiff has been compelled to seek redress and ventilate her grievance to the court defendant Antonio M. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground that the complaint states no cause of action, respondent Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing plaintiff-petitioner's complaint for failure to state a sufficient cause of action. Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming in toto the Order of the trial court. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: whether or not a husband, as the administrator of the conjugal partnership, may legally enter into a contract of lease involving conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the wife. HELD: NO Under the New Civil Code (NCC), "Art. 165. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership," in view of the fact that the husband is principally responsible for

the support of the wife and the rest of the family. If the conjugal partnership does not have enough assets, it is the husband's capital that is responsible for such support, not the paraphernal property. Responsibility should carry authority with it. The husband is not an ordinary administrator, for while a mere administrator has no right to dispose of, sell, or otherwise alienate the property being administered, the husband can do so in certain cases allowed by law. He is not required by law to render an accounting. Acts done under administration do not need the prior consent of the wife. administration does not include acts of ownership. For while the husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered, he cannot alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of NCC "unless the wife has been declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same." This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband, and guarantees the rights of the wife, who is partly responsible for the acquisition of the property, particularly the real property. Contracts entered into by the husband in violation of this prohibition are voidable and subject to annulment at the instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code) The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not a lease is an encumbrance and/or alienation within the scope of Art. 166 of the New Civil Code. Under Art. 1643 of the New Civil Code "In the lease of things, one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of a thing for a price certain, and for a period which may be definite or indefinite. However, no lease for more than ninetynine years shall be valid." Under the law, lease is a grant of use and possession: it is not only a grant of possession as opined by the Court of Appeals. The right to possess does not always include the right to use. For while the bailee in the contract of deposit holds the property in trust, he is not granted by law the right to make use of the property in deposit. In case the wife's consent is not secured by the husband as required by law, the wife has the remedy of filing an action for the annulment of the contract. Art. 173 of the Civil Code states "the wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is required. . . . In the case at bar, petitioner's estranged husband, defendant Antonio S. Roxas had entered into a contract of lease with defendant Antonio M. Cayetano without her marital consent being secured as required by law under Art. 166 of the Civil Code. Petitioner, therefore, has a cause of action under Art. 173 to file a case for annulment of the contract of lease entered into without her consent. Petitioner has a cause of action not only against her husband but also against the lessee, Antonio M. Cayetano, who is a party to the contract of lease.

decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and this case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial court for further proceedings. GARCIA VS GONZALEZ FACTS: case arose from the complaint for recovery of real properties, partition and accounting filed by the nephews and nieces of a deceased childless couple against the transferees of two parcels of land which said couple had sold during their lifetime and another parcel of land which the wife sold to her own nephew after her husband's death. Agustin Manco Garcia donated to the spouses Fructuoso Garcia and Quintina Gonzales two parcels of land. Fructuoso and his wife executed an "escritura de venta" over said two parcels of land in favor of Sergio Eamiguel, a parish priest, The following year, 1922, Fructuoso died.

Since then, Gonzales has declared said property as his own and paid taxes thereon. herein petitioners, nephews and nieces of Fructuoso, filed the aforementioned complaint against Andres Gonzales for the recovery of parcels Nos. 1 and 2, on the premise that under Article 995 of the New Civil Code, as such relatives of Fructuoso, they are entitled to one-half of the intestate estate of Quintina who allegedly misrepresented in the deed of sale in favor of Gonzales that parcels Nos. 1 and 2 were her paraphernal properties. The complaint was later amended to include parcels Nos. 3 and 4 as subjects of the complaint and to include Ramon Eamiguel and Nicasio Parilla as defendants. With regard to these two defendants, the complaint alleged that Eamiguel a grandnephew of Quintina, took possession of parcel No. 4 after Quintina's death and that Parilla was also unlawfully in possession of parcel No. 3. The trial court ruled that: Parcel No. 1, "the same has remained the property of the plaintiffs since nobody claims it Parcel No. 2 in favor of defendant Andres Gonzales; Parcel No. 3 in favor of Nicasio Parilla; Parcel No. 4 in favor of defendant Ramon Eamiguel with cost

Father Eamiguel declared as his own parcel No. 3 under tax declaration and parcel No. 4 under tax declaration Father then executed an "escritura de donacion" bestowing ownership over said property to his nephews, Pedro and Ramon Eamiguel. Pedro later exchanged his share over parcel No. 3 with another parcel owned by his 5 brother Rosendo thereby making the latter a co-owner of said property. While thus in possession of parcel No. 3, the Eamiguel brothers, through Ramon, executed deeds of sale with right to repurchase over portions of the property in favor 6 of different persons. after the properties had been repurchased, Rosendo sold a one-half portion of parcel No. 3 to the spouses Nicasio Parilla and Purificacion Manco Ramon also sold his one-half portion of the property to the Parilla spouses Since then, the Parilla spouses have been in possession of the 3-hectare property paying taxes thereon. On the other hand, parcel No. 4 remained in the possession of Ramon. Fructuoso Garcia also owned a 1.7 hectare lot in Anas, Antipolo, Fructuoso's widow, Quintina Gonzales Garcia, who was then a centenarian, sold parcel No. 2 to her nephew, Andres Gonzales,

plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals. CA ruled that: Declaring Andres Gonzales as owner of one-half portion of Parcel No. 2 and plaintiffs herein as the owners of the other half, Ordering Andres Gonzales to deliver and convey the one-half portion of Parcel No. 2 to the plaintiffs; and Eliminating the award of moral damages as well as attorney's fees. The rest of the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Without costs.

Hence, this petition: As to parcel 1, failure to make a declaration as to the ownership of parcel No. 1 is attributable to the trial court As to parcel No. 2, we disagree with the Court of Appeals that Gonzales is entitled to only one-half thereof. The deed of sale was personally acknowledged before Pedro Mate, then justice of the peace, as Quintina's free act and deed. Although the petitioners attempted to question the validity and due execution of said deed of sale through oral testimony, they were unable to buttress it with other evidence which might obviate the apparent biased nature of the testimony.

The deed of sale having been executed before the effectivity of the New Civil Code, the law governing the transaction was the Code of Civil Procedure, which specifically provides: Sec. 685. Community Property. :Any sale, transfer, alienation or disposition of said property effected without said formalities shall be null and void, except as regards the portion that belonged to the vendor at the time the liquidation and partition was made More so because there is no proof that the sale of parcel No. 2 was necessary to pay the partnership debts and obligations. Pursuant to said law, therefore, the sale to Andres Gonzales may be considered as valid only with respect to the one-half portion of parcel No. 2 rightfully belonging to Quintina. petitioners may not validly lay claim to the other half portion of the property corresponding to their share as heirs of Fructuoso considering that for forty-five (45) years after Fructuoso's death and twenty-two (22) from the execution of the deed of sale, petitioners slept on their rights. Although the records do not show that Gonzales had been issued a Torrens title to parcel No. 2 and hence, the 10 year prescriptive period may not be invoked against petitioners, their inordinate and undue delay in asserting their claim to said parcel of land led to their undoing. With regard to parcels Nos. 3 and 4, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the controverted sale of said parcels of land was embodied in a public document, executed with all the formalities and solemnities of law. in the case at bar and there is no valid ground on which petitioners' claim to said parcels of land could stand. They failed to successfully attack the validity of the transfer of said properties to Father Eamiguel, the predecessor-in-interest of Ramon Eamiguel and Nicasio Parilla. Additionally, the transaction was executed by both Fructuoso and Quintina, and therefore must be respected. as correctly found by the Court of Appeals, prescription has set in. It was only after more than 45 years after the sale Lastly, we make no award of damages to any of the parties. the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed insofar as it eliminates the award of moral damages as well as attorney's fees. It is modified as follows: parcel No. 1 is hereby declared as absolutely owned by petitioners in their respective capacities as heirs of Fructuoso Garcia; parcel No. 2 shall exclusively belong to Andres Gonzales; and parcels Nos. 3 and 4 shall be under the absolute ownership of Nicasio Parilla and Ramon Eamiguel respectively.

MAXEY VS CA FACTS petition for review involves the rights of a woman over properties acquired in 1912 principally through the efforts of the man she was living with and at a time when the two were not yet legally married. Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) lived together as husband and wife, that out of said union were born six (6) children, among them are the herein plaintiffs, namely: John or Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence, Fred and George, all surnamed Maxey; during the period of their (Melbourne and Regina) cohabitation, , the late Melbourne Maxey acquired the parcels of land Melbourne Maxey, through his attorney-in-fact Julia Pamatluan Maxey (his new wife after Regina died), sold in favor of the defendants-spouses Macayra the parcels of land since thereof, the defendants-spouses have taken immediate possession thereof continuously up to the present. Plaintiffs instituted the present case praying for the annulment of the documents of sale covering the subject parcels of land and to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid realties were common properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital; and that the sales of the of the said lands in favor of the defendants-spouses, after the death of their mother, Regina Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey, without their knowledge and consent;. defendants-spouses deny the material allegations of the complaint and assert by way of affirmative defenses that they are the true and lawful owners and possessors of the properties in question having purchased the same in good faith and for value from Melbourne Maxey during his lifetime in, based upon the reasonable belief that the latter is the me and exclusive owner of the said parcels of land and that since then, they have been in possession thereof openly, exclusively and continuously in concept of owners. Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in 1903. Their children claim that their parents were united in 1903 in a marriage performed "in the military fashion". Both the trial court and the appellate court rejected this claim of a "military fashion" marriage. the disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church wedding.

The husband remarried and in 1953, his second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney, sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato C. Macayra. The court ruled in favor of petitioner but Ca reversed it. The Court of Appeals, however, found the parcels of, land to be exclusive properties of the late Melbourne Maxey. It set aside the decision of the trial court, because no proof that the properties in question were acquired through the joint efforts of Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales. ISSUE: WON THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION IS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY OF MELBOURNE MAXEY. HELD: NO The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals correctly rejected the argument that Act No. 3613, the Revised Marriage Law, recognized "military fashion" marriages as legal. The Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals both ruled that Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales were married only in 1919. This is a finding of fact which we do not disturb at this stage of the case. Considerations of justice dictate the retroactive application of Article 144 of the Civil Code to the case at bar. Commenting on Article 2252 of the Civil Code which provides that changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by the Code which may prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation shall have no retroactive effect, Prior to the effectivity of the present Civil Code on August 30, 1950, the formation of an informal civil partnership between a man and wife not legally married and their corresponding right to an equal share in properties acquired through their joint efforts and industry during cohabitation was recognized through decisions of this Court. With the enactment of the new Civil Code, Article 144 codified the law established through judicial precedents but with the modification that the property governed by the rules on co-ownership may be acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only the man who works, the property acquired during the man and wife relationship belongs through a fifty-fifty sharing to the two of them. This new article in the Civil Code recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply.

This article is particularly relevant in this case where the "common-law" relationship was legitimated through a valid marriage 34 years before the properties were sold. No matter how large the income of a working wife compared to that of her husband, the major, if not the full responsibility of running the household remains with the woman. She is the administrator of the household. The fact that the two involved in this case were not legally married at the time does not change the nature of their respective roles. Should Article 144 of the Civil Code be applied in this case? Our answer is "Yes" because there is no showing that vested rights would be impaired or prejudiced through its application. The disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. petitioners should return one-half of the P1,300.00 purchase price of the land while the private respondents should pay some form of rentals for their use of one-half of the properties. the petition for review on certiorari is hereby granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside insofar as one-half of the disputed properties are concerned. The private respondents are ordered to return one-half of said properties to the heirs of Regina Morales. OPENA VS CA FACTS Spouses Julian Gotgotao and Guillerma Opena are the registered owners of Lot in Pangasinan, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title they mortgaged it to the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. when spouses Gotgotao went to the Bank to check on their Certificate of Title, they got the shock of their life when the bank employees said that Telesforo Opena, the half brother of Guillerma Opena, withdrew the said Certificate of Title from the bank by presenting a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by the Gotgotao spouses in favor of Telesforo Opena. they were informed that Telesforo Opena had caused the transfer of the title in his name by presenting a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by them. Consequently, a complaint for falsification of public documents was filed against Telesforo Opena resulting in his conviction of said crime. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, accused-appellant's conviction was affirmed in toto.

Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: WON That said courts erred in not finding that spouses Julian Gotgotao and Guillerma Opena validly conveyed the land in question in favor of petitioner; HELD no merit in the instant petition. But while this may be true with respect to Julian Gotgotao's thumbmark on the Deed of Sale, the fact remains that Guillerma Gotgotao's signature on the same document was indubitably confirmed to be counterfeit and forged, both by the testimony of Guillerma herself and by the testimony of the handwriting expert Jovito R. Gutierrez of 5 the P.C. Crime Laboratory who examined the same. former Barangay Captain Esteban Valdez's testimonies that both did not see the complaining witness Guillerma Opea (sic) sign her name on the aforesaid deed of absolute sale because she was not present during the preparation and execution of the said deed of absolute sale at the law office Even assuming arguendo that Julian Gotgotao's thumbmark on the subject document is genuine, still the counterfeit signature of Guillerma Gotgotao invalidates the whole instrument, since her signature thereon is essential to the validity of the alleged deed of sale, as warranted by Article 165 and 166 of the Civil Code which provides: Art. 165 The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. Article 166 Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same. there being no reversible error in the decision appealed herefrom, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto JOSEFA FERRER VS SPS MAUEL AND VIRGINIA FERRER FACTS: In her Complaint for payment of conjugal improvements, sum of money, and accounting with prayer for injunction and damages, petitioner, Josefa alleged that she is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer (Alfredo), a halfbrother of respondents Manuel M. Ferrer (Manuel) and Ismael M. Ferrer (Ismael). Before her marriage to Alfredo, the latter acquired a piece of lot,

He applied for a loan with the Social Security System (SSS) to build improvements thereon, including a residential house and a two-door apartment building. However, it was during their marriage that payment of the loan was made using the couple's conjugal funds. From their conjugal funds, petitioner posited, they constructed a warehouse on the lot. Moreover, petitioner averred that respondent Manuel occupied one door of the apartment building, as well as the warehouse; however, he stopped paying rentals thereon, alleging that he had acquired ownership over the property by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by Alfredo in favor of respondents, Manuel and Ismael and their spouses. when her husband was already bedridden, respondents Ismael and Flora Ferrer made him sign a document, purported to be his last will and testament. The document, however, was a Deed of Sale covering Alfredo's lot and the improvements thereon. Learning of this development, Alfredo filed with the RTC of Pasig, a Complaint for Annulment of the said sale against respondents, RTC dismissed the same. RTC found that the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, and public policy, and should be complied with by the parties in good faith, there being no compelling reason under the law to do otherwise. The dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. According to petitioner, the ruling of the RTC shows that, when Alfredo died on 29 September 1999, or at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, she had the right to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements on Alfredo's lot. She alleged that the cost of the improvements amounted to P500,000.00; hence, onehalf thereof should be reimbursed and paid by respondents as they are now the registered owners of Alfredo's lot. She averred that respondents cannot claim lack of knowledge about the fact that the improvements were constructed using conjugal funds as they had occupied one of the apartment buildings on Alfredo's lot, and even paid rentals to petitioner. In petitioner prayed that respondents be ordered to render an accounting from September, 1991, on the income of the boarding house constructed thereon which they had appropriated for themselves, and to remit one-half thereof as her share.

Finally, petitioner sought from respondents moral and exemplary damages, litigation and incidental expenses. respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, 9 contending that petitioner had no cause of action against them, and that the cause of action was barred by prior judgment. RTC rendered an Order, 10 denying the Motion to Dismiss Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the Petition. It held that petitioner's the instant complaint is not the proper action for the respondent to enforce her right of reimbursement of the cost of the improvement[s] on the subject property Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration Court of Appeals rendered a Resolution 14 denying the motion. Hence, the present recourse. ISSUE: WON respondents have an obligation to respect her right to be reimbursed HELD: NO While it made a reference to the right of the spouse as contemplated in Article 120 22 of the Family Code to be reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-spouse. Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the improvement. The subject property was precisely declared as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article 120 of the Family Code. What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioner's spouse nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested.

It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioner's right to be reimbursed. we do not find an act or omission on the part of respondents in violation of petitioner's rights. The right of the respondents to acquire as buyers the subject premises from Alfredo under the assailed Deed of Sale in Civil Case No. 61327 had been laid to rest. This is because the validity of the Deed of Sale had already been determined and upheld with finality. the Petition is DENIED UY VS CA CIVIL LAW; FAMILY CODE; PROPERTY REGIME OF UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE; CO-OWNERSHIP; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. The action for partition in Civil Case No. 91-573 is predicated on an alleged co-ownership between private respondent Natividad Calaunan-Uy and deceased Menilo, Sr., of property evidently acquired during the period of their common-law relationship. The governing provisions, applicable to their case, are now found in Article 147 and Article 148 of the Family Code, considering that Menilo Uy, Sr., died on 27 September 1990, well after the effectivity of Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of the Philippines) on 03 August 1988. "Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. cdll "In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household. "Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. "When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving

descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation." "Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit. "If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.