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Genaro Gerona, et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et al.

106 Phil 2 FACTS: RA 1265 is a law that makes a flag ceremony compulsory for schools. The implementing rule

Dep. Order 8 says that the anthem must be played while the flag is raised. It also says that everyone must salute the flag and no one is to do anything while the ceremony is being held. After the flag everyone is to recite the patriotic pledge. Geronas children attending the Buenavista Community School in Uson, Masbate refused to salute the flag, sing the anthem and recite the pledge. They did not do so out of religious belief. They are Jehovah's Witnesses. They consider the flag to be an image in the context of what is prohibited in their religion and because of this they were expelled from the school. Gerona wrote to Sec of Ed that their children be exempt from the law and just be allowed to remain silent and stand at attention. Sec of Ed denied the petition. Writ of preliminary injunction was petitioned and issued.
ISSUE: Is Dep Order 8 unconstitutional? RULING: Flag salute ceremony is secular and the dep order non-

Discriminatory therefore it is constitutional. The freedom of belief is limitless and boundless but its exercise is not. If the belief clashes with law then the former must yield. Petitioners salute the flag during Boy Scout activities. Their objection then rests on the singing of anthem and recitation of pledge. The pledge is judged to be completely secular. It does not even pledge allegiance to the flag or to the Republic. The anthem is also secular. It talks about patriotism. It does not speak of resorting to force, military service or duty to defend the country. There was no compulsion involved in the enforcement of the flag salute. They were not criminally prosecuted under a penal sanction. If they chose not to obey the salute regulation they merely lost the benefits of public education.
Ebralinag v division superintendent of schools of Cebu 219 SCRA 256

FACTS: Respondents ordered expulsion of 68 HS and GS students of Cebu. Public school authorities expelled these students for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the pledge required by RA1265. They are Jehovahs Witnes ses believing that by doing these is religious worship/devotion akin to idolatry against their teachings. They contend that to compel transcends constitutional limits and invades protection against official control and religious freedom.
Issue: Has religious freedom been violated? Held: Religious freedom is a fundamental right of highest priority. The 2 fold aspect of right to religious

worship is: 1.) Freedom to believe which is an absolute act within the realm of thought. 2.) Freedom to act on ones belief regulated and translated to external acts. The only limitation to religious freedom is the existence of grave and present danger to public safety, morals, health and interests where State has right to prevent. The expulsion of the petitioners from t he school is not justified. Jehovahs Witnesses may be exempted from observing the flag ceremony but this right does not give them the right to disrupt such ceremonies. In the case at bar, the Students expelled were only standing quietly during ceremonies. By observing the ceremonies quietly, it doesnt present any danger so evil and imminent to justify their expulsion. What the petitioners request is exemption from flag ceremonies and not exclusion from public schools. The expulsion of the students by reason of their religious beliefs is also a violation of a citizens right to free education. The non -observance of the flag ceremony does not totally constitute ignorance of patriotism and civic consciousness. Love for country and admiration for national heroes, civic consciousness and form of government are part of the school curricula. Therefore, expulsion due to religious beliefs is unjustified. Expulsion is ANNULLED.
G.R. NO. 45459 MARCH 13, 1937

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ 64 PHIL 201 Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from

issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion. Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It

is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was not the aim or purpose of the Government.

G.R. NO. 68828 MARCH 27, 1985 GERMAN VS. BARANGAN 135 SCRA 514 Facts: Petitioners converged at J.P. Laurel Street to hear Mass at the St. Jude Chapel, which adjoined

Malacaang. Respondent barred them for security reasons. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus. Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the constitutional freedom. Held: Petitioners' intention was not really to perform an act of religious worship but to conduct an antigovernment demonstration since they wore yellow T-shirts, raised their clenched fists and shouted anti- government slogans. While every citizen has the right to religious freedom, the exercise must be done in good faith. Besides, the restriction was reasonable as it was designed to protect the lives of the President and his family, government officials and diplomatic and foreign guests transacting business with Malacanang. The restriction was also intended to secure the executive offices within the Malacanang grounds from possible external attacks and disturbances. (Minority opinion) The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of the freedom of religion is the existence of a grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right to prevent. The burden to show the existence of grave and imminent danger lies on the officials who would restrain petitioners. Respondents were in full control and had the capability to stop any untoward move. There was no clear and present danger of any serious evil to public safety or the security of Malacanang.

Freedom of Expression Cases 1. Terminiello v. City of Chicago


Facts of the Case Father Arthur Terminiello, in an auditorium in Chicago, delivered a vitriolic speech in which he criticized various political and racial groups and viciously condemned the protesting crowd that had gathered outside the auditorium. Policemen assigned to the event were unable to prevent several disturbances by the "angry and turbulent" crowd. The police arrested Terminiello for "breach of the peace." He was then tried and convicted for his central role in inciting a riot. Question Did the Chicago ordinance violate Terminiello's right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment? Conclusion In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the "breach of the peace" ordinance unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedom of speech. Noting that "[t]he vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion," the Court held that speech could be restricted only in the event that it was "likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." Justice Douglas wrote that "a function of free speech under our system is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." Petitioner after jury trial was found guilty of disorderly conduct in violation of a city ordinance of Chicago 1 and fined. The case grew out of an address he delivered in an auditorium in Chicago under the auspices of the Christian Veterans of America. The meeting commanded considerable public attention. The auditorium was filled to capacity with over eight hundred persons present. Others were turned away. Outside of the auditorium a crowd o about one thousand persons gathered to protest against the meeting. A cordon of policemen was assigned to the meeting to maintain order; but they were not able to prevent several disturbances. The crowd outside was angry and turbulent. Petitioner in his speech condemned the conduct of the crowd outside and vigorously, if not viciously, criticized various political and racial groups whose activities he denounced as inimical to the nation's welfare. The trial court charged that 'breach of the peace' consists of any 'misbehavior which violates the public peace and decorum'; and that the 'misbehavior may constitute a breach of the peace if it stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it molests the inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm.' Petitioner did not take exception to that instruction. But he maintained at all times that the ordinance as applied to his conduct violated his right of free speech under the Federal Constitution, U.S.Const. Amend. 1. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court, 332 Ill.App. 17, 74 N.E.2d 45, and by the Illinois Supreme Court. 396 Ill. 41, 71 N.E.2d 2, 400 Ill. 23, 79 N.E.2d 39. The case is here on a petition for certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the question presented. The argument here has been focused on the issue of whether the content of petitioner's speech was composed of derisive, fighting words, which carried it outside the scope of the constitutional guarantees. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310, 60 S.Ct. 900, 906, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 128 A.L.R. 1352. We do not reach that question, for there is a preliminary question that is dispositive of the case. As we have noted, the statutory words 'breach of the peace' were defined in instructions to the jury to include speech which 'stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition or unrest, or creates a disturbance. * * *' That construction of the ordinance is a ruling on a question of state law that is as binding on us as though the precise words had been written into the ordinance. See Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 317, 47 S.Ct. 103, 104, 71 L.Ed. 270, 48 A.L.R. 1102; Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 514, 68 S.Ct. 665, 669, 92 L.Ed. 840.

The vitality of civil and political institutions in our society depends on free discussion. As Chief Justice Hughes wrote in De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365, 57 S.Ct. 255, 260, 81 L.Ed. 278, it is only through free debate and free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people and peaceful change is effected. The right to speak freely and to promote diversity of ideas and programs is therefore one of the chief distinctions that sets us apart from totalitarian regimes. Accordingly a function of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. at pages 571 572, 62 S.Ct. at page 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031, is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to roduce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest. See Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262, 62 S.Ct. 190, 193, 86 L.Ed. 192, 159 A.L.R. 1346; Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 373, 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1253, 91 L.Ed. 1546. There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political or community groups. The ordinance as construed by the trial court seriously invaded this province. It permitted conviction of petitioner if his speech stirred people to anger, invited public dispute, or brought about a condition of unrest. A conviction resting on any of those grounds may not stand. The fact that petitioner took no exception to the instruction is immaterial. No exception to the instructions was taken in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 73 A.L.R. 1484. But a judgment of conviction based on a general verdict under a state statute was set aside in that case, because one part of the statute was unconstitutional. The statute had been challenged as unconstitutional and the instruction was framed in its language. The Court held that the attack on the statute as a whole was equally an attack on each of its individual parts. Since the verdict was a general one and did not specify the ground upon which it rested, it could not be sustained. For one part of the statute was unconstitutional and it could not be determined that the defendant was not convicted under that part. The principle of that case controls this one. As we have said, the gloss which Illinois placed on the ordinance gives it a meaning and application which are conclusive on us. We need not consider whether as construed it is defective in its entirety. As construed and applied it at least contains parts that are unconstitutional. The verdict was a general one; and we do not know on this record but what it may rest on the invalid clauses. The statute as construed in the charge to the jury was passed on by the Illinois courts and sustained by them over the objection that as so read it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The fact that the parties did not dispute its construction makes the adjudication no less ripe for our review, as the Stromberg decision indicates. We can only take the statute as the state courts read it. From our point of view it is immaterial whether the state law question as to its meaning was controverted or accepted. The pinch of the statute is in its application. It is that question which the petitioner has brought here. To say therefore that the question on this phase of the case is whether the trial judge gave a wrong charge is wholly to misconceive the issue. But it is said that throughout the appellate proceedings the Illinois courts assumed that the only conduct punishable and punished under the ordinance was conduct constituting 'fighting words.' That emphasizes, however, the importance of the rule of the Stromberg case. Petitioner was not convicted under a statute so narrowly construed. For all anyone knows he was convicted under the parts of the ordinance (as construed) which, for example, make it an offense merely to invite dispute or to bring about a condition of unrest. We cannot avoid that issue by saying that all Illinois did was to measure petitioner's conduct, not the ordinance, against the Constitution. Petitioner raised both points that his speech was protected by the consTitution; that the inclusion of his speech within the ordinance was a violation of the Constitution. We would, therefore, strain at technicalities to conclude that the constitutionality of the ordinance as construed and applied to petitioner was not before the Illinois courts. The

record makes clear that petitioner at all times challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance as construed and applied to him. Reversed.

2. Abrams v. US
Facts of the Case The defendants were convicted on the basis of two leaflets they printed and threw from windows of a building. One leaflet signed "revolutionists" denounced the sending of American troops to Russia. The second leaflet, written in Yiddish, denounced the war and US efforts to impede the Russian Revolution. The defendants were charged and convicted for inciting resistance to the war effort and for urging curtailment of production of essential war material. They were sentenced to 20 years in prison. Question Do the amendments to the Espionage Act or the application of those amendments in this case violate the free speech clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion No and no. The act's amendments are constitutional and the defendants' convictions are affirmed. In Clarke's majority opinion, the leaflets are an appeal to violent revolution, a call for a general strike, and an attempt to curtail production of munitions. The leaflets had a tendency to encourage war resistance and to curtail war production. Holmes and Brandeis dissented on narrow ground: the necessary intent had not been shown. These views were to become a classic libertarian pronouncement.

3. New York Times v. US


New York Times Co. v. United States (1971)
Historical Background Over the years the Supreme Court has disagreed on the limits that can be placed on the 1st Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press. In 1971, the Court faced these issues again in a case brought by the New York Times. The newspaper had obtained a copy of documents known as The Pentagon Papers an internal Defense Department report that detailed government deception with regard to the Vietnam War. The Pentagon Papers surfaced at a time when the American people were deeply divided on the question of United States involvement in the war. The New York Timesfought for the right to publish the papers under the umbrella of the 1st Amendment. Circumstances of the Case The Pentagon Papers, officially known as History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy, were illegally copied and then leaked to the press. The New York Times and the Washington Post had obtained the documents. Acting at the Government's request, the United States district court in New York issued a temporary injunctiona court orderthat directed the New York Times not to publish the documents. The Government claimed that the publication of the papers would endanger the security of the United States. The New York Times appealed the order to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that prior restraintpreventing publicationviolated the 1st Amendment. Constitutional Issues Are the freedoms provided by the 1st Amendment absolute? Did the threat to national security outweigh the freedom of press guaranteed by the 1st Amendment? Did the publication of the Pentagon Papers in fact pose a threat to national security? Arguments For the New York Times: The 1st Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press protects the newspaper in the publication of these documents. One of the few restraints on executive power in matters of national defense is a knowledgeable population. The press must be free to inform the American people. In addition, the Government has failed to show that publication of the Pentagon Papers would endanger national security. For the United States: The 1st Amendment does not guarantee an absolute freedom of the press, especially when the nation's security is involved. The Court must strike a balance between the fundamentally important right to a free press and the equally important duty of the Government to protect the nation. Allowing the publication of these documents would establish a dangerous precedent for future cases involving national security.

Decision and Rationale By a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled in favor of the New York Times. In the judgment, the Court cited a prevailing precedent, noting: Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. In other words, the Court would not be favorably disposed to stifling the press on the order of the government. Justices Hugo Black and William Douglas, members of the majority, held that the 1st Amendment is absolute. Justice Black called it unfortunate in his view that some of my Brethren [fellow justices] are apparently willing to hold that the publication of news may sometimes be enjoined. Such a holding, he wrote, would make a shambles of the First Amendment. Justice Byron White, joined by Justice Potter Stewart, believed that while there are situations in which the 1st Amendment may be abridged, they had to concur in today's judgments, but only because of the concededly extraordinary protection against prior restraints enjoyed by the press under our constitutional system. Although the justices thought that the New York Times had probably gone too far in publishing the Pentagon Papers, they found nothing in the law to prevent the newspaper from doing so. Deferring to responsibilities of the Executive, Chief Justice Warren Burger dissented. Given those vast responsibilities, Burger noted, the Executive also had to be given broader authority. In these cases, the imperative of a free and unfettered press comes into collision with another imperative, the effective functioning of a complex modern government and specifically the effective exercise of certain constitutional powers of the Executive, Burger wrote. Only those who view the First Amendment as an absolute in all circumstancesa view I respect, but rejectcan find such cases as these to be simple or easy. The decision reinforced the Court's stance against prior restraint and has often been noted in subsequent prior restraint cases. In the spring of 2000, a Texas district court judge ordered the Associated Press (AP) not to publish a story about a state-guaranteed loan to a Texas shrimp farm. Lawyers for the AP cited the New York Times case in their argument. The judge lifted the order after two days of hearings.

4. Primicias v. Fugoso
PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO [80 PHIL 71; L-1800; 27 JAN 1948]

Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government. Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet anycongregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. Issue: Whether 1119, or Not Free the use freedom of of speech Public was Place. violated.

Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically, Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder. The court favored the second construction. First construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of government no such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency.

The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one . The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury to the state.

5. Schenck v. U.S
Facts of the Case During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars suggested that the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. Question Are Schenck's actions (words, expression) protected by the free speech clause of the First Amendment? Conclusion Decision: 9 votes for United States, 0 vote(s) against Legal provision: 1917 Espionage Act; US Const Amend 1 Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, concluded that Schenck is not protected in this situation. The character of every act depends on the circumstances. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime can be punished.

6. Navarro v. Villegas.
FACTS: On February 24, 1970, the petitioner, acting in behalf of the Movement of a DemocraticPhilippines, wrote a letter to the respondent, the Mayor of the city of Manila, applying tohold a rally at Plaza Miranda February 26, 1970, from 4-11pm.On the same day, the respondent wrote a reply, denying his request on the grounds that,the have temporarily adopted the policy of not issuing any permit for the used of PlazaMiranda for rallies or demonstration during weekdays due to the events that happenedfrom the past week.On the same letter, the respondent gave the petitioner an option to use the Sunken Gardennear Intamuros for its rally, and for it to be held earlier for it to end before dark.The petitioner filed suit contesting the Mayors action on the ground that it violates the petitioners right to peaceable assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances (ART. 3, sec 1(8)) and of the petitioners right to the equal protection of thelaw (art. 3, sec. 1). ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents act on denying the request of the petitioner violates the petitioners Right to peaceable assembly and right to the equal protection of the law. Held: The right of peaceable assemble is subject to regulation under the police power of thestate.The right to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly, though granted by theConstitution, is not absolute for it may be regulated in order that it may not be injuriousto the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right of community and society, This power may be exercised under the police power of the state, which is the power of thestate, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,education, and good order, safety and general welfare of the people.While the privilege of the citizen to use streets and parks for communication may beregulated in the interest of all, said privilege is not absolute. It must be exercised insubordination to the general comfort and convenience and in consonance with peace andgood order, but it must not guise of regulation be abridged or denied.

7. Reyes v. Bagatsing
Retired Justice Reyes in behalf of the members of the Anti-Bases Coalition sought a permit to rally from Luneta Park until the front gate of the US embassy which is less than two blocks apart. The permit has been denied by then Manila mayor Bagatsing. The mayor claimed that there have been intelligence reports that indicated that the rally would be infiltrated by lawless elements. He also issued City Ordinance No. 7295 to prohibit the staging of rallies within the 500 meter radius of the US embassy. Bagatsing pointed out that it was his intention to provide protection to the US embassy from such lawless elements in pursuant to Art 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. And that under our constitution we adhere to generally accepted principles ofinternational law. www.uberdigests.info ISSUE: Whether or not a constitutional right is being violated by the mayors ordinance. HELD: Indeed, the receiving state is tasked for the protection of foreign diplomats from any lawless element. And indeed theVienna Convention is a restatement of the generally accepted principles of international law. But the same cannot be invoked as defense to the primacy of the Philippine Constitution which upholds and guarantees the rights to free speech and peacable assembly. At the same time, the City Ordinance issued by respondent mayor cannot be invoked if the application thereof would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right/s.

NAACPA vs. Alabama


Facts. The Respondent, Alabama (Respondent), demanded that the Petitioner, the NAACP (Petitioner), provide a list of all of the Alabama NAACP members based on the states foreign corporation registration law made in the course of an injunction action brought to stop the Petitioner from conducting activities in the state. Respondent moved for the production of a large number of the Petitioners records. The Petitioner produced almost all the requested data except for membership lists. The trial court adjudged the Petitioner in contempt and imposed a $100,000.00 fine. Issue. Whether compelled disclosure of membership lists violates the Petitioners members rights of freedom of association? Whether Respondent has demonstrated an interest in obtaining the membership lists, which is sufficient to justify the deterrent effect which releasing this lists would have on the free exercise of the constitutionally protected right of association? Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court reversed. In the domain of indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, or association, abridgments of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action. Compelled disclosure of affiliation with groups engaged in advocacy may constitute an effective restraint on freedom of association. There is a vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in ones associations. This production order must be regarded as entailing the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by the Petitioners members of their freedom of association. Further, it is apparent that forced disclosure would result in adversely affecting the members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs, which they have the right to advocate. Therefore, compelled disclosure of membership lists violates the Petitioners members rights of freedom of association. No. Judgment of the lower court reversed. The Petitioner has not objected to divulging the identity of its members who are employed or hold office positions. There is no justification for the interest of obtaining membership lists.
US VS. BUSTOS [37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918] Facts: In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him. Issue: Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and free press. Held: Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free pressinclude the right to criticize judicial conduct. The

administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest inthe pure and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. Significance: The ruling in this case reaffirmed freedom of the press. The Supreme Court determined Metromedia was not guilty of libel according to the New York Times v. Sullivan standard. This verdict allowed the press "breathing space" in their pursuit of the truth. George Rosenbloom was a magazine and book distributor who sold nudist magazines. Philadelphia police arrested him and some of his employees on obscenity charges October 1, 1963, after collecting materials from his news stands to use as evidence. A Philadelphia radio station reported this information without using the word "alleged" when referring to the materials as obscene. Rosenbloom sought a Federal District Court injunction to stop police interference with his business and prevent more publicity about his arrest, on the grounds the materials he sold were not obscene. In reaction to the suit, the station broadcast statements referring to Rosenbloom as a "girlie-book peddler" who ran a "smut literature racket." His name was not used. After he was acquitted of criminal obscenity charges, Rosenbloom sued Metromedia . He contended descriptions of his material as "obscene" were false, and constituted libel per se. He also claimed the second set of broadcasts was false and defamatory. Key defenses for Metromedia were the station's timely correction of the first broadcast error and the fact that Rosenbloom's activities were of public interest. Another consideration was that the reports were "hot" news written under deadline pressure. Rosenbloom failed to prove actual malice on the part of Metromedia. Although lower courts ruled in favor of Rosenbloom, this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court upheld the reversal in favor of Metromedia.

Miller v. California
Facts. The Defendant was convicted under the California Penal Code for mailing advertisements for adult material to non-soliciting recipients. Issue. Whether state statutes may regulate obscene material without limits? Held. No. Judgment of the lower court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. In determining whether speech is obscene, the basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find the material, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest of sex, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined

by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literacy, artistic, political, or scientific value. The Supreme Court of the Untied States (Supreme Court) does not adopt as a constitutional standard the utterly without redeeming social value test. If a state law that regulates obscene material is thus limited, as written or construed, First Amendment constitutional values are adequately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review of constitutional claims when necessary.
PBM EMPLOYEES VS. PBM [51 SCRA 189; G.R. NO. L-31195; 5 JUN 1993] Facts: The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills EmployeesOrganization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union composed of theemployees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and otheremployees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.

Held: Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind theirfreedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstratingemployees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

In re Edilion Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP since the latters constitution notwithstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. Issue: WON the payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity? NO Held: All legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice as an officer of the court. When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. Why? The right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

TAADA V. TUVERA No. L-63915136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) Facts : In procuring the enforcement of public duty, a petition was sought by Taada,Sarmiento, and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc(MABINI) seeking a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. There is a need for Publication of Laws tostrengthen its binding force and effect: giving access to legislative records, givingawareness to the public of the law promulgated. The Official Gazette, however, does notcontain publications of administrative and executive orders that affect only a particular class of persons. The Official Gazette, as mandated by law, presents all presidentialissuances of a public nature or of general applicability. Also, Article 2 of the CivilCode expressly recognized that the rule as to laws takes effect after 15 days unless it isotherwise (for some do specify the date of effectivity) following the completion of thepublication in the Official Gazette. However, the decree has been misread by many; for ithas no juridical force, but a mere legislative enactment of RA 386.

Issue : WON to provide publications of the law elsewhere, aside from the Official Gazette, as itwould be essential to the effectivity of the said legislative or executive act that regulatesthe acts and conduct of people as citizens. Held : Respondents were granted petition to publish all unpublished issuances in the OfficialGazette, serving as a response to the maxim ignorance as an excuse for noncompliance. The effectivity of laws shall follow the notice to parties concerned, for such is a public right. There will be no retroactive effect for laws with dates which appliedthe 15-day rule of publication in the Official Gazette Non VS. Dames Case Digest Facts: Petitioners, students in private respondent Mabini Colleges, Inc. in Daet, Camarines Norte, were not allowed to re-enroll by the school for the academic year 1988-1989 for leading or participating in student mass actions against the school in the preceding semester. The subject of the protests is not, however, made clear in the pleadings. Petitioners filed a petition in the court seeking their readmission or re-enrollment to the school, but the trial court dismissed the petition. They now petition the court to reverse its ruling in Alcuaz vs. PSBA1, which was also applied in the case. The court said that petitioners waived their privilege to be admitted for re-enrollment with respondent college when they adopted, signed, and used its enrollment form for the first semester of school year 1988-89, which states that: The Mabini College reserves the right to deny admission of students whose scholarship and attendance are unsatisfactory and to require withdrawal of students whose conduct discredits the institution and/or whose activities unduly disrupts or interfere with the efficient operation of the college. Students, therefore, are required to behave in accord with the Mabini College code of conduct and discipline. Issue: Whether or Not the students right to freedom of speech and assembly infringed. Held: Yes. The protection to the cognate rights of speech and assembly guaranteed by the Constitution is similarly available to students is well-settled in our jurisdiction. However there are limitations. The permissible limitation on Student Exercise of Constitutional Rights within the school presupposes that conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior should not materially disrupt classwork or must not involve substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I-The Constitutional Commissions-The Commission on Elections-Extraordinary Powers-Art. IX-C, 4National Press Club v. COMELEC 207 SCRA 1-March 5, 1992Ponente: Feliciano Case: 3 consolidated petitions, with the common question: the constitutionality of11(b), of RA6646Petitoners: representatives of mass media which are prevented from sellingor donating space and time for political advertisements; 2 candidates for office (1national, 1 provincial) in the coming May 1992 elections; taxpayers and voters whoclaim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of thecandidates is being curtailed. (I will refer to these folks as Petitoners (P)) Facts: Petitioners argument: T h a t 1 1 ( b ) , o f R A 6 6 4 6 i n v a d e s a n d v i o l a t e d t h e constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression; That the prohibition imposed by 11(b) amounts tocensorship, because it selects and singles out for suppression andrepression with criminal sanctions, only publications of a particularcontent, namely, media-based election or political propaganda duringthe election pd. of 1992; That the prohibition is in derogation of medias role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public informationand public opinion relevant to election issues; T h a t 1 1 ( b ) a b r i d g e s t h e f r e e d o m o f s p e e c h o f candidates, and that the suppression of media-based campaign orpolitical propaganda except those appearing in the Comelec space ofthe newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and tv broadcasts, would bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume ofinfo concerning candidates and issues in the election, therebycurtailing and limiting the right of voters to info and opinion. Issue: WON 11(b) of RA 6646 has gone beyond the permissible supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of freedom of speech & freedom of the press SC says: Nope. It has not gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during election periods. Ratio:

The assailed statute T h e s t a t u t o r y t e x t t h e P w a n t t o s t r i k e d o w n a s unconstitutional is 11(b) of RA 6646, aka the Electoral Reforms Lawof 1987Section 11. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda -in addition to theforms of election propaganda prohibited under Section 85 of Batas Pambansa Blg.881, it shall be unlawful;(b) for any newspapers, radio broadcasting or television station,other mass media, or any person making use of the mass media to sell or to give free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes e x c e p t to the Commission as provided under Sections 90 and 92 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, orpersonality who is candidate for any elective public office shall take a leave ofabsence from his work as such during the campaign period. 11(b) of RA 6646 should be taken together withSections 90 & 92 of BP 881 aka O m n i b u s E l e c t i o n C o d e o f t h e Philippines. (for the full text, see p. 7) 90 refers to the Comelec space - space in the newspaper to beallocated equally and impartially to all the candidates within the area of coverage,free of charge 92 refers to the Comelec time air time in radio and tv to be allocatedequally and impartially to all the candidates within the area of coverage, free ofcharge.

Objective of the statute Objective of 11(b)-to equalize, as far as practicable,the situations of rich and poor candidates by preventing the richfrom enjoying undue advantage offered by huge campaign warchests. It prohibits the sale or donation of print space and airtime for campaign or other political purposes except to Comelec. 90&92 of the OEC on the other hand, require theComelec to procure Comelec space and Comelec time to be allocatedto all candidates for free. N o o n e s e r i o u s l y d i s p u t e s t h e l e g i t i m a c y o r t h e importance of the objective sought to be secured by 11(b) of RA6646 in relation to 90&92 of the OEC. The objective is of special importance and urgency in acountry which, like ours, is characterized by extreme disparity

Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996

I. THE FACTS Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC) were rated X i.e., not for public viewing by the respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions which is expressly prohibited by law because of petitioner INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its attacks against contrary religious beliefs. Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs. But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground that the materials constitute an attack against another religion. The CA also found the subject TV series indecent, contrary to law and contrary to good customs. Dissatisfied with the CA decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court. II. THE ISSUES (1) Does respondent Board have the power to review petitioners TV program? (2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program?

III. THE RULING [The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as the CA sustained the action of the respondent Boards X-rating petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also voted 10 -4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioners TV program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.] 1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review petitioners TV program. Petitioner contends that the term television program [in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the power to review and classify] should not include religious programs like its program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A contrary interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of the Constitution which guarantees that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. [The Court however] reject petitioners postulate. Petitioners public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of religious freedom can be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court] shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not stand still. 2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious program. [A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar. The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated petitioners TV series for attacking either religions, especially the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will show that the so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to free exercise of religion. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule. In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held: The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. In Victoriano

vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled that . . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid the danger. The records show that the decision of the respondent Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a reality already on ground.

Senate v. Ermita
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. --------------------------------------

Bayan MUna vs. Ermita In 2005, EO 420 was passed. This law sought to harmonize and streamline the countrys id system. KMU, BM et al sought to have the said EO be declared as unconstitutional for it infringes upon the right to privacy of the people and that the same is ausurpation of legislative power by the president. ISSUE: Whether or not the said EO is unconstitutional. HELD: Sec 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to adopt a unified multi -purpose ID system. Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format. The President may byexecutive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive

department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Sec 17, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices. The same Section also mandates the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability,compatibility, and convenience to the public. legislation. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the

not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions.

Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

David v. Arroyo
Facts: In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate GMA she declared PP 1017 and is to be implemented by GO 5. The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government. Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, KMU head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest. Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5. In March, GMA issued PP 1021 w/c declared that the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP 1021. The SolGen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power. ISSUE:Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional. HELD:The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way; Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty. Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a

call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation. Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met. Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine Pursuant to the 2ndsentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted form er President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws. Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following: 1 There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only. (3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe. (4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.

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