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DIGESTED CASES and ADDTNL NOTES FOR FINAL EXAMS IN LABOR RELATIONS: LUDO VS. SAORNIDO (VA AWARDED NOT CLAIMED IN THE SUBMISSION AGREEMENT) LUDO engaged the arrastre services of Cresencio Lu Arrastre Services (CLAS) for the loading and unloading of its finished products at the wharf. Accordingly, several arrastre workers were deployed by CLAS to perform the services needed by LUDO. These arrastre workers were subsequently hired, on different dates, as regular rank-and-file employees of LUDO every time the latter needed additional manpower services. Said employees joined respondent union, the LUDO Employees Union (LEU), which acted as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees. respondent union entered into a CBA with LUDO which provides certain benefits to the employees, the amount of which vary according to the length of service rendered by the availing employee. the union requested LUDO to include in its members period of service the time during which they rendered arrastre services to LUDO through the CLAS so that they could get higher benefits. LUDO failed to act on the request. Thus, the matter was submitted for voluntary arbitration. The parties accordingly executed a submission agreement raising the sole issue of the date of regularization of the workers for resolution by the Voluntary Arbitrator. the Voluntary Arbitrator ruled that: (1) the respondent employees were engaged in activities necessary and desirable to the business of petitioner, and (2) CLAS is a labor-only contractor of petitioner; (3) the said complainants, being entitled to the CBA benefits during the regular employment, are awarded a) sick leave, b) vacation leave & c) annual wage and salary increases during such period in the amount of (P5,707,261.61); Issue: whether or not a voluntary arbitrator can award benefits not claimed in the submission agreement? In construing the above provisions, we held in San Jose vs. NLRC, 9 that the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators over the cases enumerated in the Labor Code, Articles 217, 261 and 262 , can possibly include money claims in one form or another compulsory arbitration has been defined both as "the process of settlement of labor disputes by a government agency which has the authority to investigate and to make an award which is binding on all the parties, and as a mode of arbitration where the parties are compelled to accept the resolution of their dispute through arbitration by athird party (emphasis supplied)." While a voluntary arbitrator is not part of the governmental unit or labor departments personnel, said arbitrator renders arbitration services provided for under labor laws. Generally, the arbitrator is expected to decide only those questions expressly delineated by the submission agreement. Nevertheless, the arbitrator can assume that he has the necessary power to make a final settlement since arbitration is the final resort for the adjudication of disputes. The succinct reasoning enunciated by the CA in support of its holding, that the Voluntary Arbitrator in a labor controversy has jurisdiction to render the questioned arbitral awards: o By the same token, the issue of regularization should be viewed as two-tiered issue. While the submission agreement mentioned only the determination of the date or regularization, law and jurisprudence give the voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of authority as well as adequate prerogative to accomplish the reason for which the law on voluntary arbitration was created speedy labor justice. It bears stressing that the underlying reason why this case arose is to settle, once and for all, the ultimate question of whether respondent employees are entitled to higher benefits. To require them to file another action for payment of such benefits would certainly undermine labor proceedings and contravene the constitutional mandate providing full protection to labor . ______________________ Art. 217. Jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiters and the Commission a. Except as otherwise provided under this Code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the absence of stenographic notes, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or nonagricultural: 1. Unfair labor practice cases; 2. 3. Termination disputes; If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment; Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations; Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving the legality of strikes and

4. 5.

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lockouts; and 6. Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim for reinstatement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, upon agreement of the parties, shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. Art. 262-A. Procedures. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have the power to hold hearings, receive evidences and take whatever action is necessary to resolve the issue or issues subject of the dispute, including efforts to effect a voluntary settlement between parties. All parties to the dispute shall be entitled to attend the arbitration proceedings. The attendance of any third party or the exclusion of any witness from the proceedings shall be determined by the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. Hearing may be adjourned for cause or upon agreement by the parties. Unless the parties agree otherwise, it shall be mandatory for the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators to render an award or decision within twenty (20) calendar days from the date of submission of the dispute to voluntary arbitration. The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Upon motion of any interested party, the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators or the Labor Arbiter in the region where the movant resides, in case of the absence or incapacity of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators, for any reason, may issue a writ of execution requiring either the sheriff of the Commission or regular courts or any public official whom the parties may designate in the submission agreement to execute the final decision, order or award.

b. c.

The Commission shall have exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Labor Arbiters. Cases arising from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies shall be disposed of by the Labor Arbiter by referring the same to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as may be provided in said agreements. (As amended by Section 9, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

Art. 261. Jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies referred to in the immediately preceding article. Accordingly, violations of a Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair labor practice and shall be resolved as grievances under the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions of such agreement. The Commission, its Regional Offices and the Regional Directors of the Department of Labor and Employment shall not entertain disputes, grievances or matters under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall immediately dispose and refer the same to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary Arbitration provided in the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Art. 262. Jurisdiction over other labor disputes.

Title VIII STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS AND FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN TRADE UNION ACTIVITIES

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Chapter I STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. a. b. It is the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining. Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes. In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986) The notice must be in accordance with such implementing rules and regulations as the Minister of Labor and Employment may promulgate. During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the Ministry to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout. A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981 and further amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986) g. When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return-to-work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same. In line with the national concern for and the highest respect accorded to the right of patients to life and health, strikes and lockouts in hospitals, clinics and similar medical institutions shall, to every extent possible, be avoided, and all serious efforts, not only by labor and management but government as well, be exhausted to substantially minimize, if not prevent, their adverse effects on such life and health, through the exercise, however legitimate, by labor of its right to strike and by management to lockout. In labor disputes adversely affecting the continued operation of such hospitals, clinics or medical institutions, it shall be the duty of the striking union or locking-out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and other health personnel, whose movement and services shall be unhampered and unrestricted, as are necessary to insure the proper and adequate protection of the life and health of its patients, most especially

c.

d.

e.

f.

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emergency cases, for the duration of the strike or lockout. In such cases, therefore, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may immediately assume, within twenty four (24) hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such a strike or lockout, jurisdiction over the same or certify it to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. For this purpose, the contending parties are strictly enjoined to comply with such orders, prohibitions and/or injunctions as are issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Commission, under pain of immediate disciplinary action, including dismissal or loss of employment status or payment by the locking-out employer of backwages, damages and other affirmative relief, even criminal prosecution against either or both of them. The foregoing notwithstanding, the President of the Philippines shall not be precluded from determining the industries that, in his opinion, are indispensable to the national interest, and from intervening at any time and assuming jurisdiction over any such labor dispute in order to settle or terminate the same. h. Before or at any stage of the compulsory arbitration process, the parties may opt to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute, as the case may be. The decision of the President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties. (As amended by Section 27, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989) Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. b. No person shall obstruct, impede, or interfere with, by force, violence, coercion, threats or intimidation, any peaceful picketing by employees during any labor controversy or in the exercise of the right to selforganization or collective bargaining, or shall aid or abet such obstruction or interference. No employer shall use or employ any strike-breaker, nor shall any person be employed as a strike-breaker. No public official or employee, including officers and personnel of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Integrated National Police, or armed person, shall bring in, introduce or escort in any manner, any individual who seeks to replace strikers in entering or leaving the premises of a strike area, or work in place of the strikers. The police force shall keep out of the picket lines unless actual violence or other criminal acts occur therein: Provided, That nothing herein shall be interpreted to prevent any public officer from taking any measure necessary to maintain peace and order, protect life and property, and/or enforce the law and legal order. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public thoroughfares. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 227, June 1, 1982) Art. 265. Improved offer balloting. In an effort to settle a strike, the Department of Labor and Employment shall conduct a referendum by secret ballot on the improved offer of the employer on or before the 30th day of the strike. When at least a

c.

d.

i.

Art. 264. Prohibited activities. a. No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. e.

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majority of the union members vote to accept the improved offer the striking workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement. In case of a lockout, the Department of Labor and Employment shall also conduct a referendum by secret balloting on the reduced offer of the union on or before the 30th day of the lockout. When at least a majority of the board of directors or trustees or the partners holding the controlling interest in the case of a partnership vote to accept the reduced offer, the workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement. (Incorporated by Section 28, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989) _________________ TAKE NOTE OF 248 and 249 Chapter II UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF EMPLOYERS Art. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers. It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair labor practice: a. b. To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization; INTERFERENCE To require as a condition of employment that a person or an employee shall not join a labor organization or shall withdraw from one to which he belongs; YELLOW DOG CONTRACT To contract out services or functions being performed by union members when such will interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization; CONTRACTING OUT To initiate, dominate, assist or otherwise interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization, including the giving of financial or other support to it or its organizers or supporters; COMPANY UNIONISM To discriminate in regard to wages, hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. Nothing in this Code or in any other law shall stop the parties from requiring membership in a recognized collective bargaining agent as a condition for employment, except those employees who are already members of another union at the time of the signing of the collective bargaining agreement. The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers and agents of corporations, associations or partnerships who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981) Chapter III UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OF LABOR ORGANIZATIONS Art. 249. Unfair labor practices of labor organizations. It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization, its officers, agents or representatives: a. To restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization. However, a labor organization shall have the right to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership; To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual terms and conditions Employees of an appropriate bargaining unit who are not members of the recognized collective bargaining agent may be assessed a reasonable fee equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by members of the recognized collective bargaining agent, if such non-union members accept the benefits under the collective bargaining agreement: Provided, that the individual authorization required under Article 242, paragraph (o) of this Code shall not apply to the non-members of the recognized collective bargaining agent; DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MEMBERSHIP f. To dismiss, discharge or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having given or being about to give testimony under this Code; DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF TESTIMONY To violate the duty to bargain collectively as prescribed by this Code; VIOLATION OF DUTY TO BARGAIN To pay negotiation or attorneys fees to the union or its officers or agents as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or PAID NEGOTIATION To violate a collective bargaining agreement. GROSS VIOLATION OF CBA

g. h.

i.

c.

d.

e.

b.

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under which membership or continuation of membership is made available to other members; c. d. To violate the duty, or refuse to bargain collectively with the employer, provided it is the representative of the employees; To cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other things of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed, including the demand for fee for union negotiations; To ask for or accept negotiation or attorneys fees from employers as part of the settlement of any issue in collective bargaining or any other dispute; or To violate a collective bargaining agreement. The provisions of the preceding paragraph notwithstanding, only the officers, members of governing boards, representatives or agents or members of labor associations or organizations who have actually participated in, authorized or ratified unfair labor practices shall be held criminally liable. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981) __________________ Teng v. Pahagac: Where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs, guided by congressional intent. Quid hoc sibi vult? * SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES: TENG VS PAHAGAC FACTS: In the very recent case of Teng v. Pahagac, the VA rendered a decision declaring that no employer-employee relationship existed between the petitioner and the respondents. The respondents received the VAs decision on June 12, 2003. They filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on July 8, 2003. The VA reasoned out that Section 6, Rule VII of the 1989 Procedural Guidelines in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Proceedings (1989 Procedural Guidelines) does not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration to the party adversely affected by the Voluntary Arbitrators order or decision. According to the VA, an award or decision of the VA becomes final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the award or decision by the parties. On July 21, 2003, the respondents elevated the case to the CA In its decision of September 21, 2004, the CA reversed the VAs decision after finding sufficient evidence showing the existence of employer-employee relationship. The petitioner moved to reconsider the CAs decision, but the latter denied the motion. He, thereafter, filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with the Supreme Court alleging, inter alia, that the VAs decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration. Before the highest court of the land, Teng contended that the VAs decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration in the absence of any specific provision allowing this recourse under Article 262-A of the Labor Code. He cited the 1989 Procedural Guidelines which, as the VA declared, do not provide the remedy of a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner claimed that after the lapse of 10 days from his receipt, the VAs decision becomes final and executory unless an appeal is taken. He likewise argued that when the respondents received the VAs decision on June 12, 2003, they had only 10 days, or until June 22, 2003, to file an appeal. Therefore, as respondents opted instead to move for reconsideration, the 10-day period to appeal continued to run. Hence, the VAs decision had already become final and executory by the time respondents assailed it before the CA on July 21, 2003. ISSUE: WON the VAs decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration RULING: Our Supreme Court denied the petition for lack of merit, deciding that petitioners allegation that the VAs decision had become final and executory by the time the respondents filed an appeal with the CA was erroneous. Consequently, it held that the respondents seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the VAs decision and the VA erred in denying the said motion on the ground that no motion for reconsideration is allowed. In finding for the respondents, the Court emphasized that Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the VAs decision.[16] Initially expressing surprise that neither the VA nor petitioner cited DO 40-03 and the 2005 Procedural Guidelines as authorities for their cause considering that these were the governing rules while the case was pending and these directly and fully supported their theory, the Court thereafter quickly

e.

f.

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affirmed that (h)ad they done so, their reliance on the provisions would have nevertheless been unavailing for reasons we shall now discuss. And discuss the Supreme Court did the importance of filing a motion for reconsideration as the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Significantly, the Court announced that Article 262-A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing of a motion for reconsideration. As a matter of fact, it asserted that in a number of decisions promulgated earlier, the filing of such a motion was allowed. In the Courts own words: [box]Article 262-A of the Labor Code does not prohibit the filing of a motion for reconsideration. On March 21, 1989, Republic Act No. 6715 took effect, amending, among others, Article 263 of the Labor Code which was originally worded as: Art. 263 x x x Voluntary arbitration awards or decisions shall be final, unappealable, and executory. As amended, Article 263 is now Article 262-A, which states: Art. 262-A. x x x [T]he award or decision x x x shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Notably, Article 262-A deleted the word unappealable from Article 263. The deliberate selection of the language in the amendatory act differing from that of the original act indicates that the legislature intended a change in the law, and the court should endeavor to give effect to such intent. We recognized the intent of the change of phraseology in Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. Sampang,[17] where we ruled that: It is true that the present rule [Art. 262-A] makes the voluntary arbitration award final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties. Presumably, the decision may still be reconsidered by the Voluntary Arbitrator on the basis of a motion for reconsideration duly filed during that period. In Coca-Cola Bottlers Phil., Inc., Sales Force Union-PTGWO-Balais v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. we likewise ruled that the VAs decision may still be reconsidered on the basis of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed within 10 days from receipt thereof. The seasonable filing of a motion for reconsideration is a mandatory requirement to forestall the finality of such decision. We further cited the 1989 Procedural Guidelines which implemented Article 262-A, viz: [U]nder Section 6, Rule VII of the same guidelines implementing Article 262-A of the Labor Code, this Decision, as a matter of course, would become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of copies of the decision by the parties x x x unless, in the meantime, a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court is filed within the same 10-day period. These rulings fully establish that the absence of a categorical language in Article 262-A does not preclude the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the VAs decision within the 10-day period. Tengs allegation that the VAs decision had become final and executory by the time the respondent workers filed an appeal with the CA thus fails. We consequently rule that the respondent workers seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the VAs judgment, and the VA erred in denying the motion because no motion for reconsideration is allowed.[/box] Then the Court continued to analyze the motion for reconsideration as an essential element of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus: [box]By allowing a 10-day period, the obvious intent of Congress in amending Article 263 to Article 262-A is to provide an opportunity for the party adversely affected by the VAs decision to seek recourse via a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court filed with the CA. Indeed, a motion for reconsideration is the more appropriate remedy in line with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. For this reason, an appeal from administrative agencies to the CA via Rule 43 of the Rules of Court requires exhaustion of available remedies as a condition precedent to a petition under that Rule.

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The requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted is based on the doctrine that in providing for a remedy before an administrative agency, every opportunity must be given to the agency to resolve the matter and to exhaust all opportunities for a resolution under the given remedy before bringing an action in, or resorting to, the courts of justice. Where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial discretion governs, guided by congressional intent.[19] [/box] The Tribunal likewise emphasized that in the exercise of its power to promulgate implementing rules and regulations, an implementing agency, such as the Department of Labor and Employment, is restricted from going beyond the terms of the law it seeks to implement; it should neither modify nor improve the law. The agency formulating the rules and guidelines cannot exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the legislature. For this reason: By disallowing reconsideration of the VAs decision, Section 7, Rule XIX of DO 40-03 and Section 7 of the 2005 Procedural Guidelines went directly against the legislative intent behind Article 262-A of the Labor Code. These rules deny the VA the chance to correct himself and compel the courts of justice to prematurely intervene with the action of an administrative agency entrusted with the adjudication of controversies coming under its special knowledge, training and specific field of expertise. In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative agencies with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or intricate questions of facts, subject to judicial review, is indispensable. In Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[20] we ruled that relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.[/box] As already seen, the petitioner in Teng boldly and forcefully maintained that the VAs decision is not subject to a motion for reconsideration in the absence of any specific provision allowing this recourse under Article 262-A of the Labor Code. And even more critically, the Court itself conceded that DO 40-03 and the Revised Procedural Guidelines are the authorities for petitioners cause in the legal dispute. In other words, an actual controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power was brought up in this case. Now then, while a pronouncement was made that the agency formulating the rules and guidelines cannot exceed the statutory authority granted to it by the legislature and that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the VAs decision is a condition precedent to the institution of a petition for certiorari with the CA via Rule 43 to challenge the VAs ruling, the Court did not declare the said rules unlawful or illegal albeit a question concerning the validity thereof was squarely raised before it. ------------NO DIGEST FOR G.R. No. 149050 March 25, 2009 SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA HYATT - NUWHRAIN-APL, Petitioner, vs. VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR FROILAN M. BACUNGAN and HYATT REGENCY MANILA, Respondents __________________________ LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK EMPLOYEES and ATTY. ESTER S. GARCIA in her capacity as VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR, respondents G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995 Facts: From a submission agreement of the Luzon Development Bank (LDB) and the Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees (ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue: whether or not the company has violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision and the Memorandum of Agreement dated April 1994, on promotion. At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective Position Papers on December 1-15, 1994. Atty. Ester S. Garcia, in her capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE's Position Paper on January 18, 1995. LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995 no Position Paper had been filed by LDB. On May 24, 1995, without LDB's Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a decision disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, finding is hereby made that the Bank has not adhered to the Collective Bargaining Agreement provision nor the Memorandum of Agreement on promotion. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.

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Issue: Which court has the jurisdiction for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities Held: Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902 , provides that the Court of Appeals shall exercise: (B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in the aforequoted Sec. 9 of B.P. 129. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the exceptions to said Sec. 9 since he is a quasi-judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein A fortiori, the decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should likewise be appealable to the Court of Appeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised Administrative Circular No. 195, just like those of the quasi-judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein. This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial entities not expressly excepted from the coverage of Sec. 9 of B.P. 129 by either the Constitution or another statute. In the same vein, it is worth mentioning that under Section 22 of Republic Act No. 876, also known as the Arbitration Law, arbitration is deemed a special proceeding of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or if none be specified, the Regional Trial Court for the province or city in which one of the parties resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration is held, shall have jurisdiction. A party to the controversy may, at any time within one (1) month after an award is made, apply to the court having jurisdiction for an order confirming the award and the court must grant such order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected. In effect, this equates the award or decision of the voluntary arbitrator with that of the regional trial court. Consequently, in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court of Appeals. _____________________ STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS (Art. 263-266) SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES: b. No wholesale forfeiture of employment status. In Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, [G. R. Nos. 122743 and 127215, Dec. 12, 1997, 283 SCRA 145], it was held that declaration of a wholesale forfeiture of employment status of all those who participated in the strike is not allowed if there was inadequate service of the certification order on the union as of the date the strike was declared and there was no showing that the striking members had been apprised of such order by the union. The mere filing of charges against an employee for alleged illegal acts during a strike does not by itself justify his dismissal. The charges must be proved at an investigation duly called where the employee shall be given an opportunity to defend himself. This is true even if the alleged ground constitutes a criminal offense. (See also Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company vs. NLRC, G. R. No. 101858, Aug. 21, 1992, 212 SCRA 792, 799-801 ).

Requirements of Strike SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES Art. 263 Strikes, picketing and lockouts. (b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection.

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The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intra-union disputes. The Constitution and the law set limitation for the exercise of the right to strike or lock-out. It is the most regulated activity. Constitution: In accordance with law Labor Code: Consistent with National Interest LIMITATIONS A strike be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation, conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance to a return-to-work order in industries affected with public interest, will render the strike illegal to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect. (BLT Bus Company v. NLRC, 1992) BLT BUS CO V NLRC 212 SCRA 792 CRUZ; August 21, 1992 NATURE Special civil action for certiorari FACTS - Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU, an affiliate of NAFLU, filed a Notice of Strike against the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB Co.) on the grounds of unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA. - BLTB Co. asked the Sec. of Labor to assume jurisdiction or to certify it to the NLRC. The Acting Sec of Labor later certified it to the NLRC. A copy of the certification order was served upon NAFLU. The union secretary, however, refused to receive it. - The officers and members of TL M-BLTBCo-NAFLU went on strike. The NLRC issued a resolution ordering the employees to stop the strike. BLTBCo caused the publication of the resolution and called on all striking workers to return to work. - Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike, only 1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen others were later re-admitted. Subsequently, about 614 employees, including those who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than the strike, filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal. Their common ground was that they were refused admission when they reported back for work. - The NLRC issued a resolution ordering the reinstatement of the union members. ISSUE/S 1. WON the union members who participated in the illegal strike should be reinstated HELD 1. YES. Reasoning - First, there was inadequate service of the certification order on the union as of the date the strike was declared and there was no showing that the striking members had been apprised of such order by the NAFLU. - Second, by virtue of the priniciple of vicarious liability, only the union officers deserve not to be reinstated. The leaders of the union are the moving force in the declaration of the strike and the Rank-in-file employees merely followed. Likewise, viewed in the light of Article 264, paragraph (e), those who participated in the commission of illegal acts who stood charged criminally thereof in court must be penalized - The contention of the petitioner that the private respondents abandoned their position is also not acceptable. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned his work. -The loss of employment status of striking union members is limited to those "who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts." (Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be presented to substantiate the commission thereof and not merely an unsubstantiated allegation - The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in industries affected with public interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect _____________________

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G.R. No. 101858 August 21, 1992BATANGAS LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS COMPANY, petitioner, Vs NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION FACTS: This case arose when on May 23, 1988, private respondent Tinig at Lakas ng Manggagawa sa BLTB Co. NAFLU (TLM-BLTB-NAFLU), an affiliate of the National Federation of Labor Unions. (NAFLU), filed a Notice of Strike against the Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company on the grounds of unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA. The reaction of BLTBCO was to ask the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over the dispute or to certify it to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration. The petitioner also moved to dismiss the notice of strike on August 3, 1988. Efforts at amicable settlement having failed, Acting Labor Secretary C. Castro certified the dispute to the NLRC on August 29, 1988. A copy of the certification order was served upon the NAFLU on August 29, 1988, and on the TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU on August 30, 1988. However, it was noted in the notice of order that union secretary Jerry Soriano refused to receive it. On August 31, 1988, the officers and members of TLM-BLTBCo-NAFLU went on strike and maintained picket lines blocking the premises of BLTBCo's terminals. On September 6, 1988, the NLRC issued an en banc resolution ordering the striking employees to lift their picket and to remove all obstructions and barricades. All striking employees on payroll as of May 23, 1988, were required to return to work. BLTBCo was directed to accept them back to work within 5 days under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. On September 15, 1988, the BLTBCo caused the publication of the resolution and called on all striking workers to return to work not later than September 18, 1988. It later extended the deadline to September 19, 1988. Of the some 1,730 BLTBCo employees who went on strike, only 1,116 reported back for work. Seventeen others were later re-admitted. Subsequently, about 614 employees, including those who were allegedly dismissed for causes other than the strike, filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal. Their common ground was that they were refused admission when they reported back for work. Among those who failed to comply with the return-to-work order were the respondent individual union members. The NLRC issued a resolution deciding the dispute that the respondent is directed to reinstate the union members specifically named in the questioned resolution and all those striking employees who have not committed illegal acts.This order of reinstatement is immediately executory. No further motions for reconsideration shall be allowed. BLTB then filed this special civil action for certiorari, claiming that the respondent NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and raised the following issues to wit; 1. WON NLRC committed (GAD) in ordering the reinstatement of the aforenamed 190 individual respondent union members notwithstanding the fact that they knowingly participated in a strike which was illegal from its inception as it was done in complete defiance and/or disobedience to the Assumption Order of August 29, 1988 and the ReturnTo-Work Order of September 6, 1988; HELD: NO. First, as the NLRC further explained, it was "not inclined to declare a wholesale forfeiture of employment status of all those who participated in the strike" because, first of all, there was inadequate service of the certification order on the union as of the date the strike was declared and there was no showing that the striking members had been apprised of such order by the NAFLU. Secondly, and more importantly, the resolution declared as follows: Applying the principle of vicarious liability, only the officers of the union deserved to be penalized with the loss of their employment status. The leaders of the union are the moving force in the declaration of the strike and the Rank-in-file employees merely followed. Likewise, viewed in the light of Article 264, paragraph (e), those who participated in the commission of illegal acts who stood charged criminally thereof in court must be penalized. BLTBCo will have to agree with Us that while the general membership of TLM-NAFLU may have joined the strike at its inception, We are convinced that they returned to work on September 19, 1988 or, immediately thereafter. And, We are not swayed that these employees have abandoned their job just because they reported late or, beyond the period required by the Commission and by BLTBCo. The circumstances of time and place of employment and the residences of the employees as well as the lack of individual notice to them are reasons enough to justify their failure to beat the deadline. True it is, that management of BLTBCo caused the publication of the Resolution of the Commission of September 5, 1988 in the Manila Bulletin, We cannot reasonably expect the complainants, who are ordinary workers, to be regular readers of such newspaper. Moreover, the publication of the said resolution was only made once. The mere fact that the majority of the strikers were able to return to work does not necessarily mean that the rest deliberately defied the return-to-work order or that they had been sufficiently notified thereof. As the Solicitor General correctly adds, some of them may have left Metro Manila and did not have enough time to return during the period given by the petitioner, which was only five days. 2. WON NLRC failed to consider that aforenamed individual union members have already abandoned their employment when they defied the Return-To-Work Order of September 6, 1988;

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HELD: The contention is not acceptable. An employee who forthwith takes steps to protest his lay-off cannot by any logic be said to have abandoned his work. For abandonment to constitute a valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his employment. This refusal must be clearly established. As we stressed in a recent case,mere absence is not sufficient; it must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore 3. WON it was correct in limiting the declaration of forfeiture of employment status to mere thirty-six (36) union officers and members of the striking union when BLTBCo was able to initially identify at least (a) one hundred (100) employees who committed illegal/violent acts during and after the strike; and (b) twenty (20)employees who reported back for work and later on abandoned it and resumed their strike activities; HELD: YES. The mere filing of charges against an employee for alleged illegal acts during a strike does not by itself justify his dismissal. The charges must be proved at an investigation duly called where the employee shall be given an opportunity to defend himself. This is true even if the alleged ground constitutes a criminal offense, as we held in Almira v. B.F. Goodrich Phil., Inc . In that case, we ordered the reinstatement of employees against whom criminal complaints had been filed but not yet proved. 4. WON the NLRC is correct in not including the recognized union officers Jerry Soriano, Serafin Soriano and Desiderio Comel among the union officers whose employment status have been declared forfeited; HELD: YES. These three have not been impleaded in this petition (unlike the others who have been individually named) and so have not been given an opportunity to defend themselves against the charges of BLTBCo. Absent such an opportunity, we are precluded from making any pronouncement regarding their alleged role in the strike for which their dismissal is sought. 5. WON the NLRC committed (GAD) grave abuse of discretion in incorporating in its subject Resolution a blanket order reinstating BLTBCo's striking employees who have not committed illegal acts.

HELD: NO. The key clause here is "who have not committed illegal acts." The loss of employment status of striking union members is limited to those "who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts." (Article 264, Labor Code) Evidence must be presented to substantiate the commission thereof and not merely an unsubstantiated allegation. He who asserts the commission of illegal acts, must prove the same, and it is on the basis of substantiated evidence that this Commission declares the loss of employment status of specific union members who have committed illegal acts. This Commission's order directing the reinstatement of all striking employees against whom no complaint of illegal acts having been committed during the strikes, and who were barred from returning to work and is similarly situated with those who have been directed to be reinstated, should, as a consequence and on the basis of the reasons discussed in the questioned resolution be reinstated. There is no denial of due process in this direction, for respondent has been given the chance to defend its position. The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution as an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By virtue of this right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as their reaction to the employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of the working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, such as a defiance of a return-to-work order in industries affected with public interest, will render the strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect. Even war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of the rules, for the benefit of all concerned. PETITION DISMISSED. _____________________ LEGALITY OF STRIKE 1. Statutory Prohibition

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G.R. No. 124678 July 31, 1997 DELIA BANGALISAN, vs CA, 1997 FACTS: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school teachers who staged "mass actions" on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances concerning, in the main, the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a just and correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit. On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) issued a Return-to-Work Order. Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the Secretary with "grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines." They were simultaneously placed under preventive suspension. Despite due notice, petitioners failed to submit their answer to the complaint. On October 30, 1990, the DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty as charged and dismissing them from the service effective immediately. Upom motion for recon filed by herein petitioners, the Secretary subsequently modified the penalty of dismissal to suspension for nine months without pay. Not satisfied with the aforestated adjudication of their respective cases, petitioners appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). CSC issued the following resolutions: 1) finding Cabalfin guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing on him a penalty of six months suspension without pay 2) affirming the penalty of nine months suspension without pay theretofore imposed on petitioners Montances and Pagpaguitan 3) With respect to the appeals of the other petitioners, the CSC also found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It, however, modified the penalty of nine months suspension previously meted to them to six months suspension with automatic reinstatement in the service but without payment of back wages All the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CSC resolutions but these were all denied, except that of petitioner Rodolfo Mariano who was found guilty only of a violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because of his failure to inform the school of his intended absence and to file an application for leave therefore. This petitioner was accordingly given only a reprimand. Petitioner was referred to appeal to CA, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was also denied by respondent court, hence the instant petition alleging that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the resolutions of the CSC (1) that penalized petitioners whose only offense was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances; (2) that penalized petitioner Mariano even after respondent commission found out that the specific basis of the charges that former Secretary Cario filed against him was a falsehood; and (3) that denied petitioners their right to back wages covering the period when they were illegally not allowed to teach. ISSUE: Whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the period from September up to the first half of October, 1990 was a strike? HELD: YES. It cited the case of Manila Public School Teachers Association, et al . vs. Laguio, Jr., supra. It was there held "that from the pleaded and admitted facts, these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons." It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by withholding their services . The fact that the conventional term "strike" was not used by the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling. The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, public employees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose. Further, herein petitioners, except Mariano, are being penalized not because they exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for redress of

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grievances but because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse effects upon their students for whose education they are responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations. As aptly stated by the Solicitor General, "It is not the exercise by the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage or disruption of public service and classes in various public schools in Metro Manila. For, indeed, there are efficient but non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for redress of grievances." It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to strike is denied government employees . It may be conceded that the petitioners had valid grievances and noble intentions in staging the "mass actions," but that will not justify their absences to the prejudice of innocent school children. Their righteous indignation does not legalize an illegal work stoppage. Petitioners' claim of denial of due process must also fail. The records of this case clearly show that they were given opportunity to refute the charges against them but they failed to avail themselves of the same. ISSUE 2: Whether or not petitioners may be entitled to back wages? HELD: Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified. With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his back wages is in order. A reading of the resolution of the Civil Service Commission will show that he was exonerated of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension. Mariano was not involved in the "mass actions" but was absent because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmothe r. To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his suspension would be tantamount to punishing him after his exoneration from the charges which caused his dismissal from the service With regard to the other petitioners, the payment of their back wages must be denied. Although the penalty imposed on them was only suspension, they were not completely exonerated of the charges against them. The CSC made specific findings that, unlike petitioner Mariano, they indeed participated in the mass actions. It will be noted that it was their participation in the mass actions that was the very basis of the charges against them and their subsequent suspension. The denial of salary to an employee during the period of his suspension, if he should later be found guilty, is proper because he had given ground for his suspension. It does not impair his constitutional rights because the Constitution itself allows suspension for cause as provided by law and the law provides that an employee may be suspended pending an investigation or by way of penalty. Moreover, the general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service. As he works, he shall earn. Since petitioners did not work during the period for which they are now claiming salaries, there can be no legal or equitable basis to order the payment of such salaries. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED, but with the MODIFICATION that petitioner Rodolfo Mariano shall be given back wages without deduction or qualification from the time he was suspended until his actual reinstatement which, under prevailing jurisprudence, should not exceed five years. _________________ 2. Purpose: Economic Strike and U.L.P. Strike Doctrine of ULP strike in good faith with rational reasons Guidelines and Balancing of Interest SHELL OIL WORKERS UNION V SHELL CO 00 SCRA 000 FERNANDO; May 31, 1971 NATURE Petition for review order of ca FACTS - Shell Company decided to dissolve its security guard section from its Pandacan Installation, notwithstanding the tenure of the said section being embraced in and assured by an existing collective bargaining contract - this resulted in a strike by the union (for unfair labor practice). During the strike, violent acts were committed by some of the members of the union - the CA declared the strike illegal, saying that there was no unfair labor practice for the dissolution was a a valid exercise of management prerogative and ordered the dismissal of the officers who participated in the strike)

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matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed. - on balancing of interests: the violent acts made by some union members does not render the strike illegal. The right of the management to prevent strike cannot override the right of the workers against ULP Disposition Petition is granted. Order is modified (order against individual members who committed violent acts affirmed. Shell OilWorkers Union v. Shell Co. of the Phils (1971) A strike otherwise valid, if violent in character, maybe placed beyond the pale. Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by such acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a matter of policy. It could be reasonably concluded then that even if justified as to ends, it becomes illegal because of the means employed'. This is not by any means to condone the utilization of force by labor to attain its objectives. It is only to show awareness that in labor conflicts, the tension that fills the air as well as the feeling of frustration and bitterness could break out in sporadic acts of violence. If there be in this case a weighing of interests in the balance, the ban the law imposes on unfair labor practices by management that could provoke a strike and its requirement that it be conducted peaceably, it would be, to repeat, unjustified, considering all the facts disclosed, to stamp the strike with illegality. It is enough that individual liability be incurred by those guilty of such acts of violence that call for loss of employee status. Such an approach is reflected in our recent decisions. __________________ Q: What is good faith (GF) strike doctrine? A: A strike may be considered legal where the union believed that the company committed ULP and the circumstances warranted such belief in GF, although subsequently such allegations of ULP are found out as not true. ( Bacus v. Ople, GR No. L56856, Oct. 23, 1984, Peoples Industrial and Commercial Ees and Organization (FFW) v. Peoples Industrial and Commercial Corp., G.R. No.37687, Mar. 15, 1982)NO DIGEST Gen. Rule: A strike based on non-strikeable grounds is illegal Exception: Employees believe in good faith that ULP acts exist so as

ISSUE 1. WON the strike was illegal HELD 1. NO Ratio The dissolution of the security guard section was in violation of the CBA, thus amounting to unfair labor practice. What was stipulated in an existing CBA certainly precluded Shell Company from carrying out what otherwise would have been within prerogative if to do so would be violative thereof. Reasoning there was specific inclusion of the category of the security guards in the CBA. Specific mention is made of the CBA covering rank and file personnel regularly employed by the Company, including the work area covered by the Pandacan Installation. There was likewise specific reference to such positions in the wage schedule as well as in the appendix of regular remuneration, premium pay and night compensation. Nonetheless, Shell Company was bent on doing away with the security guard section, to be replaced by an outside security agency. - Essentially, the freedom to manage the business remains with management. It still has plenty of elbow room for making its wishes prevail. In much the same way that labor unions may be expected to resist to the utmost what they consider to be an unwelcome intrusion into their exclusive domain, they cannot justly object to management equally being jealous of its prerogatives. Noncompliance With the CBA constitutes ULP - the ULP strike called by the Union did have the impress of validity. - the legality of the strike follows as a corollary to the finding of fact, made in the decision appealed from - which is supported by substantial evidence to the effect that the strike had been triggered by the Company's failure to abide by the terms and conditions of its CBA - The assumption is that labor can be trusted to determine for itself when the right to strike may be availed of in order to attain a successful fruition in their disputes with management. It is true that there is a requirement in the Act that before the employees may do so, they must file with the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor a notice of their intention to strike. Such a requisite however does not have to be complied with in case of ULP strike, which certainly is entitled to greater judicial protection if the Industrial Peace Act is to be rendered meaningful. - Care is to be taken, however, especially where an unfair labor practice is involved, to avoid stamping it with illegality just because it is tainted by violent acts. To avoid rendering illusory the recognition of the right to strike, responsibility in such a case should be individual and not collective. A different conclusion would be called for, of course, if the existence of force while the strike lasts is pervasive and widespread, consistently and deliberately resorted to as a

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to constitute a valid ground to strike ___________ Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 mandate the following procedural steps to be followed before a strike may be staged: 1. filing of notice of strike, 2. taking of strike vote, and 3. reporting of the strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment. #These requirements are mandatory, meaning, non-compliance therewith makes the strike illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the strike notice and strike-vote report is to reasonably regulate the right to strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. STRIKE ACTIVITY- DEFINITION Art. 212(o) "Strike" means any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. Strike - any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. Labor dispute - any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. Basic Concepts: 1. Initiating Party: Employer: Lockout Union: Strike 2. Cause: Labor dispute An inter-union and intra-union dispute cannot be a valid ground for a strike or lock-out since a labor dispute is technically defined under Art. 212. Welga ng Bayan (Political Strike) is not a valid strike under the Labor Code since no labor dispute is involved. A welga ng bayan for purpose of lowering oil price is not a valid strike under the Labor Code but it may be upheld as a valid exercise of right of speech. However, the employee may suffer the consequence of abandonment of work Wage distortion are not also a valid ground for a strike since the law provides for a procedure to settle wage distortion problems (see Ilaw at Buklod case) 3. Temporary in Nature 3. Employee-Employer relationship continues to exist. Mere participation in a strike is not a ground for termination GROUNDS Valid grounds for strike: 1) Bargaining Deadlock (BD) (Art. 263) 2) ULP (Art. 263) PROHIBITED STRIKES Art. 263 (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Effect of Assumption Order pursuant to Art. 263 (g): 1) Strike/Lockout automatically enjoined 2) Striking/Locked Out employees shall immediately return to work 3) Employer shall resume operations and readmit all workers No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. (Art. 264) Q: What are the different forms of strike? 1.Legal Strikeone called for a valid purpose and conducted through means allowed by law. 2. Illegal Strikeone staged for a purpose not recognized by law, or if for a valid purpose, conducted through means not sanctioned by law. 3. Economic Strike one staged by workers to force wage or other economic concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant (Consolidated Labor Association of the Phil. vs. Marsman, G.R. No. L17038, July 31, 1964)

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4. ULP Strikeone called to protest against the employers acts of unfair practice enumerated in Article 248 of the Labor Code, as amended, including gross violation of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and union busting. 5. Slow Down Strikeone staged without the workers quitting their work but by merely slackening or by reducing their normal work output. 6. WildCat Strikeone declared and staged without filing the required notice of strike and without the majority approval of the recognized bargaining agent. 7. Sit Down Strikeone where the workers stop working but do not leave their place of work. Who may declare a strike or lockout? 1. Any certified or duly recognized bargaining representative may declare a strike in cases of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice. Likewise, the employer may declare a lockout in the same cases. 2. In the absence of a certified or duly recognized bargaining representative, any legitimate labor organization in the establishment may declare a strike but only on the ground of unfair labor practice. (Section 2, Rule XIII Book V, Give examples of strike and explain their legality. 1. Sitdown strike Characterized by a temporary work stoppage of workers who seize or occupy property of the Er or refuse to vacate the premises of the Er. Illegal Amounts to a criminal act because of the Ees trespass on the premises of the Er 2. Wildcat strike A work stoppage that violates the labor contract and is not authorized by the union. Illegal Because it fails to comply with certain reqts of the law, to wit: notice of strike, vote and report on strike vote 3. Slowdown Strike on an installment plan; an activity by which workers, without complete stoppage of work, retard production or their performance of duties and functions to compel management to grant their demands Illegal Ees work on their own terms; while the Ees continue to work and remain in their positions and accept wages paid to them, they at the same time select what part on their allotted tasks they care to perform on their own volition or refuse openly or secretly

4. Sympathetic strike Work stoppages of workers of one company to make common cause with other strikers or other companies without demands or grievances of their own against the Er Illegal There is no labor dispute between the workers who are joining the strikers and the latters Er 5. Secondary strike Work stoppages of workers of one company to exert pressure on their Er so that the latter will in turn bring pressure upon the Er of another company with whom another union has a labor dispute Illegal There is no labor dispute involved. Note: A strike can validly take place only in the presence of and in relation to a labor dispute between Er and Ee. 1. Welga ng bayan (Cause Oriented Strikes) A political strike and therefore there is neither a bargaining deadlock nor any ULP Illegal It is a political rally 2) Quickie strikes brief and unannounced temporary work stoppage Illegal failure to comply with notice requirements and etc. NO STRIKE CLAUSE applicable only to economic strikes, not ULP strikes A "no strike, no lock-out" provision in the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") is a valid stipulation although the clause may be invoked by an employer only when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the employer that are not mandated to be granted by the law itself. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice. (Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Greenfield v. Ramos, 2000) Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Greenfield v. Ramos (2000) Petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissing them upon request by the federation, respondent company was guilty of unfair labor pratice in that it violated the petitioners right to selforganization . The strike was staged to protest respondent companys act of dismissing the union officers.

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Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails. _____________________ Who may file (IRR, Book V, Rule XXII, Sec. 6): 1) If based on ULP, any Legitimate Labor Organization (in the absence of SEBA) 2) If based on BD, SEBA Where to file (IRR, Book V, Rule XXII, Sec. 1): National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS Requisites of a valid strike/lockout: 1) Good faith bargaining has been conducted in accordance with Art. 250 (Art. 264, a) Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining: a. When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice; b. Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and reply, either party may request for a conference which shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days from the date of request. If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or both parties or at its own initiative and immediately call the parties to conciliation meetings. The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the parties to participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call; During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited from doing any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the disputes; and

(A)- No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. 2) The following procedural requisites are met: (Art. 263; c, f) Art. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. C) In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take action immediately. (As amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986) F) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In

c.

d.

The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the parties to submit their case to a voluntary arbitrator. (As amended by Section 20, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989 Art. 264. Prohibited activities.

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every case, the union or the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided. (As amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 130, August 21, 1981 and further amended by Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986) a. Notice of Strike/Lockout 0 (Union Busting) or 15 (ULP) or 30 (BD) days cooling-off period; filed with DOLE b. Strike/Lockout Vote approved by a majority of union members/board of directors or partners through secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose c. Notice of Result of Strike/Lockout Vote filed with DOLE at least 7 days before the intended date of strike 3) Must be based on valid grounds 4) The strike or lockout must be pursued within the bounds of the law (Art. 264) Also, take note of the following: 5) Statutory prohibition as to striking workers (i.e. Government employees can organize but cannot strike) 6) If an injunction is subsequently ordered, strike/lockout must cease 7) No-Strike Clause in CBA affects only economic strikes, not strikes based on ULP _________________________ Duty of DOLE during cooling-off period: to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a lockout. What are the tests in determining the legality of strike? The following must concur: 1. Purpose test the strike must be due to either bargaining deadlock and/or the ULP 2. Compliance with the procedural and substantive reqts of the law. (See requisites of a valid strike) 3. Means employed test It states that a strike may be legal at its inception but eventually be declared illegal if the strike is accompanied by violence which is widespread, pervasive and adopted as a matter of policy and not mere violence which is sporadic which normally occur in a strike area. What is the purpose of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before the meeting for the said purpose? 1. Inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct a strike vote; 2. Give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and or irregularities; 3. Ample time to prepare for the deployment of the requisite personnel. (Capitol Medical Center v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147080, April 26, 2005) _____________________ Doctrine of ULP strike in good faith no rational reason G.R. Nos. 86917-18 January 25, 1991 RELIANCE SURETY & INSURANCE CO., INC., vs NLRC FACTS Petition for certiorari RESP: Reliance surety union Nov. 21, 1986, company changed seating arrangement Molina, rubio, macapagal and cansino protested Alleged that change is to harass union and without prior notice Headed discussion with the man. Occurred Refused to stay at designated placed and still leveled insults to those who testified. Was placed on preventive suspension. Then dismissed. Union filed for illegal dismissal and ULP with NL-RC While complaint pending, filed notice for strike DOLE. March 12,1987 Began strike before initial conference could take place, march 17, 1987 Picketed in the bldg Harassed ESS March 31, 1987 company filed for declaration of illegal strike with NLRC - Strike illegal - Upon appeal, affirmed But ordered reinstatement of striking officers without loss of seniority. But without back wages.

Labor PCRC

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continuing hostility by the union members they were place under preventive suspension and finally dismissed. - Illegal dismissal complaints were filed. These were amended to include a charge of unfair labor practice. The members alleged that the seating arrangement was changed to pressure or intimidate labor union members. While the action was pending, the union filed a notice of strike. Before a conciliation conference can be held, the union struck and picketed the company premises thus preventing officials and other employees from doing their usual duties. - Company filed a petition to declare the strike illegal since there was no strike vote and the required cooling off period was not followed. The Arbiter found the strike illegal. The finding was modified by the NLRC and ruled that the strike while illegal should not result in the termination of the employees involved since the members truly believed that the company was committing unfair labor practice in terminating the other employees. It ruled that the employees be reinstated but without backwages. - Hence this appeal to the SC. ISSUE/S WON strikers who have found to have staged an illegal strike may be reinstated to work HELD No. There is no question that the strike itself was prompted by no actual, existing unfair labor practice committed by the petitioner. In effecting a change in the seating arrangement in the office of the underwriting department, the petitioner merely exercised a reasonable prerogative employees could not validly question, much less assail as an act of unfair labor practice. The Court is indeed at a loss how rearranging furniture, as it were, can justify a four-month-long strike. As to the private respondent's charges of harassment, the Commission found none, and as a general rule, we are bound by its findings of fact. Amid this background, the Court must grant the petition. In staging the strike in question, a strike that was illegal in more ways than one, the reinstated union officers were clearly in bad faith, and to reinstate them without, indeed, loss of seniority rights, is to reward them for an act public policy does not sanction. - As a general rule, the sympathy of the Court is on the side of the laboring classes, not only because the Constitution imposes sympathy but because of the one-sided relation between labor and capital. The Court must take care, however, that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the rules. We will not accomplish that objective here by approving the act of the National Labor Relations Commission which we hold to constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Disposition Petition is granted. ________________________________________

Dismissal of the 4, upheld. But ordered payment of 1 month sal. With benefits. ISSUE I. A. Whether or not strikers who have been found staged an illegal strike may be reinstated. Strike is illegal no question 3 Reqs: 1. 15 days prior notice 2. 2/3 vote by secret ballot 3. Submission of vote to dept of labor at least 7 days prior strike To reinstate officers who staged strike in bad faith is to reward an act against public policy Ferrer and almira cases. - Both strikes were not illegal and carried out in good faith Ferrer defective strike Almira violent strike doesnt make it illegal, and ground for dismissal Rubio admitted valid dismissal by accepting the sum of 2,448

B. C.

D. DISPO

Petition granted ______________________________ RELIANCE SURETY AND INSURANCE CO. INC. V NLRC 193 SCRA 365 Sarmiento, J; 1991 NATURE Petition for Ceriorari to review NLRC decision FACTS - It appears that to avoid unnecessary loss of productive working time due to personal and non-work-related conversations, personal telephone calls and nonwork-connected visits by personnel to other departments, the respondent Reliance Surety Insurance Co., Inc. (company for short) on 21 November 1986, thru the manager (Mr.Celso Eleazar) of its underwriting department, effected a change in the seating arrangement of its personnel in said department. - Among those affected were members of the labor union who claimed that the change was done merely to harass them. In the ensuing discussions, the manager and the union members apparently had heated words and the union members hurled unprintable insults. Some employees refused to stay at their designated places. The company then asked the recalcitrants to explain within 48 hours why no disciplinary action should be taken against them. Due to the

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G.R. No. 76219 May 27, 1991 GTE DIRECTORIES CORPORATION, vs. SANCHEZ FACTS: Minister Sanchez decided the dispute in the exercise of the jurisdiction assumed by his predecessor in accordance with Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code. Even that assumption is open to question. The production and publication of telephone directories, which is the principal activity of GTE, can scarcely be described as an industry affecting the national interest. GTE is a publishing firm chiefly dependent on the marketing and sale of advertising space for its not inconsiderable revenues. Its services, while of value, cannot be deemed to be in the same category of such essential activities as "the generation or distribution of energy" or those undertaken by "banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries." It cannot be regarded as playing as vital a role in communication as other mass media. The small number of employees involved in the dispute, the employer's payment of "P10 million in income tax alone to the Philippine government," and the fact that the "top officers of the union were dismissed during the conciliation process," obviously do not suffice to make the dispute in the case at bar one "adversely affecting the national interest." _______________________ G.R. No. 76219 May 27, 1991 GTE DIRECTORIES CORPORATION, petitioner , vs. HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ and GTE DIRECTORIES CORPORATION EMPLOYEES UNION, respondents. FACTS: 1. GTE Directories Corporation (hereafter, simply GTE) is a foreign corporation engaged in the Philippines in the business of publishing the PLDT (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company) telephone directories for Metro Manila and several provinces. 2. The practice was for its sales representatives to be given work assignments within specific territories by the so-called "draw method." 3. A territory was not fully released to the salesperson for handling at one time, but assigned in increments or partial releases of account. 4. This practice was observed. When GTE realized that competition among media for a share of the advertising revenue had become so keen as to require quick reaction. 5. new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was thereafter drawn up. 6. It appears that the new policy did not sit well with the union. It demanded that it be given 15 days "to raise questions or objections to or to seek reconsideration of the sales and administrative practices issued by the Company. 7. GTE next formulated a new set of "Sales Administrative Practices, 8. GTE's Sales Manager sent another Memorandum to "all premise sales personnel. 9. But as before, the sales representatives did not submit the reports. Instead their union, GTE Directories Corporation Employees Union (hereafter, simply the union), sent a letter to the Sales Manager. 10. The union filed in behalf of the sales representatives, a notice of strike grounded on alleged unfair labor practices of GTE 11. In due course, the Bureau of Labor Relations undertook to conciliate the dispute. 12. GTE sent still another memorandum to sixteen (16) of its premise sales representatives. 13. GTE gave its sales representatives an ultimatum. 14. During all this time, conciliation efforts were being exerted by the Bureau of Labor Relations, including attempts to prevent the imposition of sanctions by GTE on its employees, and the strike itself. When these proved futile, Acting Labor Minister Vicente Leogardo, Jr. issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the dispute. The Acting Secretary opined that the dispute "adversely affects the national interest 15. GTE, a "100% foreign owned" company, (was) being threatened because of the strike;" and "top officers of the union were dismissed during the conciliation process thereby compounding the dispute," 16. Reconsideration of this Order was sought by GTE 17. GTE however reiterated its previously declared "position that with or without the order now being questioned, it will accept all striking employees back to work except the fourteen (14) premise sales representatives who were dismissed for cause prior to the strike." 18. By Resolution of then Labor Minister Blas Ople, GTE's motion for reconsideration was denied. 19. In a clarificatory, Minister Ople reiterated the proposition that "promulgations of company policies and regulations are basic management prerogatives," and that "unless shown to be grossly oppressive or contrary to law," they are "generally binding and valid on the parties and must be complied with until finally revised or amended unilaterally or preferably, through negotiations or by competent authorities." 20. Adjudication of the dispute on the merits was made by Order of Minister Ople's successor, Augusto Sanchez. 21. GTE for its part, argued that the termination of the employment of its fourteen (14) premise sales representatives prior to the strike should have been upheld. It also filed an opposition to the union's motion for reconsideration. 22. The motions were resolved in a "Decision" handed down by Minister Sanchez. 23. Accordingly, he directed the Bureau of Labor Relations to hear said "other issues raised by the union and to submit its findings and recommendations thereon within 20 days from submission of the case for decision."

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24. Again GTE moved for reconsideration; again it was rebuffed. The Labor Minister denied its motion . 25. The Minister accordingly annulled and set aside his order for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct hearings on said issues since he had already resolved them, and affirmed his Order 26. GTE thereupon instituted the special civil action of certiorari at bar praying for invalidation, because rendered with grave abuse of discretion, of the Labor Minister's orders. 27. GTE had cause to dismiss the fourteen (14) premise sales representatives who had repeatedly and deliberately, not to say defiantly, refused to comply with its directive for submission of individual reports on specified matters. ISSUE: Whether or not the effectivity of an employer's regulations and policies is dependent upon the acceptance and consent of the employees thereby sought to be bound; or otherwise stated, whether or not the union's objections to, or request for reconsideration of those regulations or policies automatically suspend enforcement thereof and excuse the employees' refusal to comply with the same. RULING: In the case at bar, it must thus be conceded that its adoption of a new "Sales Evaluation and Production Policy" was within its management prerogative to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including the manner, procedure and processes by which particular work activities should be done. When the strike notice was filed by the union, the chain of events which culminated in the termination of the 14 sales persons' employment was already taking place, the series of defiant refusals by said sales representatives to comply with GTE's requirement to submit individual reports was already in progress. At that time, no less than three (3) of the ultimate six (6) direct orders of the employer for the submission of the reports had already been disobeyed. The filing of the strike notice, and the commencement of conciliation activities by the Bureau of Labor Relations did not operate to make GTE's orders illegal or unenforceable so as to excuse continued non-compliance therewith. It does not follow that just because the employees or their union are unable to realize or appreciate the desirability of their employers' policies or rules, the latter were laid down to oppress the former and subvert legitimate union activities. Indeed, the overt, direct, deliberate and continued defiance and disregard by the employees of the authority of their employer left the latter with no alternative except to impose sanctions. The sanction of suspension having proved futile, termination of employment was the only option left to the employer. To repeat, it would be dangerous doctrine indeed to allow employees to refuse to comply with rules and regulations, policies and procedures laid down by their employer by the simple expedient of formally challenging their reasonableness or the motives which inspired them, or filing a strike notice with the Department of Labor and Employment, or, what amounts to the same thing, to give the employees the power to suspend compliance with company rules or policies by requesting that they be first subject of collective bargaining, It would be well nigh impossible under these circumstances for any employer to maintain discipline in its establishment. This is, of course, intolerable. Minister Sanchez decided the dispute in the exercise of the jurisdiction assumed by his predecessor in accordance with Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, 8 providing in part as follows: (g) When in his opinion there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national interest, such as may occur in but not limited to public utilities, companies engaged in the generation or distribution of energy, banks, hospitals, and export-oriented industries, including those within export processing zones, the Minister of Labor and Employment shall assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. . . . Petition is GRANTED, and as prayed for, the Order dated October 1, 1986 of the public respondent is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. ________________________________ SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES: TEST OF LEGALITY LEGAL STRIKES Purpose and Means Test Luzon Marine Dept Union v. Roldan (1950) In the case of Rex Taxicab Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations (70 Phil., 621), wherein this Supreme Court held that "the employee, tenant or laborer is inhibited from striking or walking out of his employment only when so enjoined by the Court of Industrial Relations," c. it was also held that "in cases not falling within the prohibition, the legality or illegality of a strike depends, first, upon the purpose for which it is maintained, and, second, upon the means employed in carrying it on." d. Thus, if the purpose which the laborers intend to accomplish by means of a strike is trivial, unreasonable or unjust, or if in carrying on the strike the strikers should commit violence or cause injuries to persons or damage to property the strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may be declared by the court illegal, with the

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adverse consequences to the strikers. LUZON MARINE DEPT., UNION V ROLDAN (LUZON STEVEDORING CO.) 86 PHIL 507 OZAETA; MAY 30, 1950 NATURE Petition for certiorari to review a resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations. FACTS - June 17, 1948: Petitioner Luzon Marine Union (UNION) presented to respondent Luzon Stevedoring Co. (LSC) a petition containing demands, including that it be granted of full recognition with the right to collective bargaining, closed-shop and check-off. The Union initiated the petition in the CIR praying that LSC be directed to comply immediately with the demands. - The Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (UOEF) a labor organization divided into units of which Universal Marine Union is a part, intervened on behalf of the Union because it alleged that the demand of the Union for recognition with the right to collective bargaining, closed-shop, etc. would violate an agreement entered into between LSC and UOEF, where the company recognized UOEF as the labor organization of the workers rendering services to LSC., with full right of collective bargaining. - UOEF moved for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground that the Union did not count with more than 30 members employed in the LSC. Judge Bautista issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. Before the receipt of the order, 65 alleged members of the Union initiated a strike without notice (July 19). It was only on July 21 that the LSC received the notice of strike. - July 20, 1948: Union filed with CIR a petition alleging that all its members (more than 300) went on strike on July 19 due to the refusal of LSC to grant their demands, and prayed for the issuance of a restraining order to prevent the respondent from employing strike breakers. - August 16, 1948: Judge Bautista issued an order directing the strikers to return to work, and the LSC to reinstate them in their previous positions. Acting on a motion for reconsideration, the court set said order aside on the ground that the strike was unjustified and illegal. - Judges Roldan and Castillo held that although Sec. 19 of Commonwealth Act 103 provides that pending award or decision by the CIR, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not strike or walk out of his employment when so enjoined by the Court, and although the Court had not enjoined the petitioner NOT TO STRIKE, it does not necessarily follow that the strike was legal and justified xxx Although the Act recognizes the laborers right to strike, it also creates all the means by which a resort thereto may be avoided, because a strike is a remedy essentially coercive in character and general in its disturbing effects upon the social order and the public interests. - The CIR found out that the reason the members went on strike was because the opposite party claims or asserts that they had no members inside the company, and because they were becoming impatient. From The court concluded that the purpose of the strike was to influence the decision and to compel the Court to decide promptly. The union insists that the strike was called for a lawful purpose: 1) to show they had more than 30 members; 2) to answer the challenge of Alejo Villanueva that he will dismiss the members from the company. ISSUES WON the strike was called for a lawful purpose. HELD 1. NO Ratio In cases not falling within the prohibition against strikes, the legality or illegality of a strike depends upon the 1) purpose for which it is maintained, and 2) upon the means employed in carrying it on. - The law does not look with favor upon strikes and lockouts because of their disturbing and pernicious effects upon the social order and the public interests. Reasoning The reasons presented by the Union do not justify the drastic measure of a strike, which necessarily entails pernicious consequences not only to the company but also to the laborers themselves and public. - If the purpose of a strike is trivial, unreasonable or unjust, or if violence was committed, the strike, although not prohibited by injunction, may be declared by the court illegal, with adverse consequences to the strikers. - If the laborers resort to a strike to enforce their demands (instead of exhausting legal processes first) they do so at their own risk, and should the court find the strike was unjustified, the strikers would suffer the adverse consequences. DISPOSITION The petition appealed from is affirmed. __________________________ ILAW at BUKLOD ng MANGGAGAWA v NLRC

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198 SCRA 586 NARVASA; June 27, 1991 FACTS -The controversy at bar had its origin in the "wage distortions" affecting the employees of respondent San Miguel Corporation allegedly caused by Republic Act No. 6727, otherwise known as the Wage Rationalization Act. -Upon the effectivity of the Act on June 5, 1989, the union known as "Ilaw at Buklod Ng Manggagawa (IBM)" said to represent 4,500 employees of San Miguel Corporation, more or less, "working at the various plants, offices, and warehouses located at the National Capital Region" - presented to the company a "demand" for correction of the "significant distortion in . . . (the workers') wages." -Union claims that demand was ignored - The Union's position (set out in the petition subsequently filed in this Court, infra) was that the workers' refusal "to work beyond eight (8) hours everyday as a legitimate means of compelling SMC to correct "the distortion in their wages brought about by the implementation of the said laws (R.A. 6640 and R.A. 6727) to newly-hired employees." There ensued thereby a change in the work schedule which had been observed by daily-paid workers at the Polo Plant for the past five (5) years, i.e., "ten (10) hours for the first shift and ten (10) to fourteen (14) hours for the second shift, from Mondays to Fridays . . .; (and on) Saturdays, . . . eight (8) hours for both shifts" a work schedule which, SMC says, the workers had "welcomed, and encouraged" because the automatic overtime built into the schedule "gave them a steady source of extra-income," and pursuant to which it (SMC) "planned its production targets and budgets. -This abandonment of the long-standing schedule of work and the reversion to the eight-hour shift apparently caused substantial losses to SMC. -SMC filed with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission a complaint against the Union and its members "to declare the strike or slowdown illegal" and to terminate the employment of the union officers and shop stewards. -it is SMC's submittal that the coordinated reduction by the Union's members of the work time theretofore willingly and consistently observed by them, thereby causing financial losses to the employer in order to compel it to yield to the demand for correction of "wage distortions," is an illegal and "unprotected" activity. It is, SMC argues, contrary to the law and to the collective bargaining agreement between it and the Union. ISSUE WON the strike is illegal HELD YES. Among the rights guaranteed to employees by the Labor Code is that of engaging in concerted activities in order to attain their legitimate objectives. Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, declares that in line with "the policy of the State to encourage free trade unionism and free collective bargaining, . . . (w)orkers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection." A similar right to engage in concerted activities for mutual benefit and protection is tacitly and traditionally recognized in respect of employers. The more common of these concerted activities as far as employees are concerned are: strikes the temporary stoppage of work as a result of an industrial or labor dispute; picketing the marching to and fro at the employer's premises, usually accompanied by the display of placards and other signs making known the facts involved in a labor dispute; and boycotts the concerted refusal to patronize an employer's goods or services and to persuade others to a like refusal. On the other hand, the counterpart activity that management may licitly undertake is the lockout the temporary refusal to furnish work on account of a labor dispute. In this connection, the same Article 263 provides that the "right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employer to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected." The legality of these activities is usually dependent on the legality of the purposes sought to be attained and the means employed therefor (ON TEST OF LEGALITY). It goes without saying that these joint or coordinated activities may be forbidden or restricted by law or contract. In the particular instance of "distortions of the wage structure within an establishment" resulting from "the application of any prescribed wage increase by virtue of a law or wage order," Section 3 of Republic Act No. 6727 prescribes a specific, detailed and comprehensive procedure for the correction thereof, thereby implicitly excluding strikes or lockouts or other concerted activities as modes of settlement of the issue. The legislative intent that solution of the problem of wage distortions shall be sought by voluntary negotiation or arbitration, and not by strikes, lockouts, or other concerted activities of the employees or management, is made clear in the rules implementing RA 6727 issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment pursuant to the authority granted by Section 13 of the Act. Section 16, Chapter I of these implementing rules, after reiterating the policy that wage distortions be first settled voluntarily by the parties and eventually by compulsory arbitration, declares that, "Any issue involving wage distortion shall not be a ground for a strike/lockout." -Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement between the SMC and the Union, relevant provisions of which are quoted by the former without the latter s demurring to the accuracy of the quotation, also prescribes a similar eschewal of strikes or other similar or related concerted activities as a mode of resolving disputes or controversies, generally, said agreement clearly stating that settlement of "all disputes, disagreements or controversies of any kind" should be achieved by the stipulated grievance procedure and ultimately by arbitration. Disposition PETITION DENIED

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________________________ 3. Procedural Requirements a. Notice of Strike G.R. No. 168406 July 13, 2009 CLUB FILIPINO, INC. and ATTY. ROBERTO F. DE LEON, Benjamin Bautista, Facts : Petitioner and the union had a CBA which expired on May 31, 2000. Within the freedom period, the union made several demands for negotiation but the company replied that it could not muster a quorum, thus no CBA negotiations could be held. In order to compel the company to negotiate, union filed a request for preventive mediation with NCMB but again failed. On April 2001, a notice of strike was filed by the union and thereafter, a strike was held. Petitioner filed before the NLRC a petition to declare the strike illegal. The LA, in its decision, declared that the strike is illegal. On appeal, the NLRC decision is affirmed the LA decision. Upon elevation to CA, the court set aside the ruling of the LA and NLRC as far as other respondent but dismissed the other respondent. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the strike staged by respondent is legal. Ruling: The court ruled in affirmative. It is undisputed that the notice of strike was filed by the union without attaching the counter-proposal of the company. In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the notice shall, as far as practicable, further state the unresolved issues in the bargaining negotiations and be accompanied by the written proposals of the union, the counter-proposals of the employer and the proof of a request for conference to settle differences. In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice shall, as far as practicable, state the acts complained of, and efforts taken to resolve the dispute amicable. Any notice which does not conform with the requirements of this and the foregoing section shall be deemed as not having been filed and the party concerned shall be so informed by the regional branch of the Board. The union cannot be faulted for its omission. The union could not have attached the counter-proposal of the company in the notice of strike it submitted -versus to the NCMB as there was no such counter-proposal. The union filed a notice of strike, after several request for negotiation proved futile. It was only after two weeks, when the company formally responded to the union by submitting the first part of its counter-proposal. Nowhere in the ruling of the LA can we find any discussion of how respondents, as union officers, knowingly participated in the alleged illegal strike. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the strike was illegal, their automatic dismissal had no basis. The petitioner is denied. ____________________________ Gold City Integrated Port Service v. NLRC, 245 SCRA 627 (1995) Note: A strike can only happen when there is a labor dispute. In this case a strike occurred. It was an illegal strike for not complying with formal requisites. A STRIKE, considered as the most effective weapon of labor is defined as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment of the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employers and employees. Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action to press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.4. Types of labor dispute a. rights dispute b. interest dispute _______________________________ b. Cooling-off period G.R. No. 88210 January 23, 1991 PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT FACTS: The 1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) in addition to pay increases also provided for the formation of a

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PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel. Accordingly, the PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel was formed in due time and went to work. During the conferences of the panel however, there was no meeting of minds between the parties. As a result, PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith and consequently filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of strike on account of: (1) bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith. The PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss PALEA's notice of strike for being premature as the issues raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PAL-PALEA CBA which would not yet expire until September 30, 1989 or with nine (9) more months to run. On January 6, 1989, the NCMB-NCR Executive Conciliator/Mediator, advised PALEA president, George Pulido, that the issues raised in the notice of strike were "appropriate only for preventive mediation," hence, not valid grounds for a lawful strike. However, when subsequently a representative of NCMB supervised the conduct of PALEA'S strike vote, PAL's counsel was baffled for it was inconsistent with the NCMB order treating the strike notice as preventive mediation. PAL's counsel sought clarification from the NCMB. He assured PAL that the NCMB representatives could not certify the strike vote. On January 12, 1989, PALEA submitted the strike vote results to the NCMB. The next day, January 13, 1989, PAL petitioned the Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to immediately assume jurisdiction over the dispute in order to avert the impending strike. Inexplicably, the Secretary failed to act promptly on PAL's petition for his assumption of jurisdiction. Seven (7) days passed with no reaction from Secretary Drilon. Thus, on January 20, 1989, PALEA declared a strike paralyzing PAL's entire operations the next day, resulting in serious inconvenience to thousands of passengers who were stranded in 43 airports throughout the country, and the loss of millions of pesos in unearned revenue for PAL. Late in the day, at 7:50 P.M., Secretary Drilon issued an order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute which had already exploded into a full-blown strike, ordering the strikers to lift their pickets and return to work, directing management to accept all returning employees, and resolving the issues subject of the strike, by awarding the monetary benefits to the strikers, while prohibiting the company from taking retaliatory action against them. ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has authority to order the petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to reinstate officers and members of the union who participated in an illegal strike and to desist from taking any disciplinary or retaliatory action against them? HELD: The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary action against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike, but not the company's right to take action against union officers who participated in the illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property and denial of due process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property losses that it suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass action. Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary's authority to resolve a labor dispute within 30 days from the date of assumption of jurisdiction, encompasses only the issues in the dispute, not the legality or illegality of any strike that may have been resorted to in the meantime. _____________________________ What is a preventive mediation case? A: It involves labor disputes which are the subject of a formal or informal request for conciliation and mediation assistance sought by either or both parties or upon the initiative of the NCMB. (Sec. 1 [mm], Rule I, Book V, IRR) Note: The regional branch may treat the notice as preventive mediation case upon agreement of the parties. Basis Illegality In essence (based on Arts. 263-264), a strike is illegal if: 1) No good faith bargaining has been conducted yet 2) The strike is not based on valid grounds 3) Procedural requirements are not met 4) Any of the prohibited acts stated in Art. 264 is done Effect of Illegality Effect of Illegal Strike (Art. 264): 1) To Union Officer loss of employment 2) To Union Member None (loss of employment ONLY IF illegal acts are committed during such strike) Effect of Illegal Lockout (Art. 264): 1) To Dismissed Employees reinstatement with full backwages Art. 212(r) "Strike-breaker" means any person who obstructs, impedes, or interferes with by force, violence, coercion, threats, or intimidation any peaceful picketing affecting wages, hours or conditions of work or in the exercise of the right of self-organization or collective bargaining. _____________________

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CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER VS NLRC (CMC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION) 320 SCRA 478 CALLEJO; April 26, 2005 FACTS -Whether respondent Capitol Medical Center Employees Association (The Union) was the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file EEs of petitioner had been the bone of contention between the 2 parties. Another union, CMC-ACE demanded a certification election which was granted by the Med-Arbiter which was later appealed to SOLE and granted by Usec Laguesma. SOLE denied the MFR filed by ACE which the Court affirmed. -Petitioner rejected a meeting proposed by the Union to negotiate a CBA, and later filed a Petition for the Cancellation of the Unions Certificate Registration with DOLE on the grounds that the Union failed for several years to submit its Annual financial statements and engaged in an illegal strike. The Union filed a notice of strike with the NCMB due to petitioners refusal to bargain but failed to later furnish the NCMB with a copy of the notice of the meeting where the strike was conducted. The Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes of the alleged strike vote, supposedly held in a parking lot in front of CMC. -The Union filed an ex parte motion with DOLE to assume jurisdiction and impose sanctions against the hospital director/corporate officers for refusal to bargain. SOLE assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute, and issued a return to work order to which the EEs complied. Meanwhile, DOLE denied the petition for cancellation of the Unions certificate registration. -The Labor Arbiter then declared the strike illegal, ruling that no strike vote had actually taken place as evidenced by witnesses presented by CMC (the overseer of the purported parking lot and sworn statements from 17 union members) and no mandatory notice was furnished to NCMB at least 24 hours prior to the strike vote. He also held that instead of staging a strike, the Union should have filed a motion for a writ of execution of the resolution of Usec Laguesma in accordance with Art. 263. The NLRC reversed said decision upon appeal and denied the petition to declare the strike illegal. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was dismissed hence this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. ISSUE/s WON the CA erred in upholding NLRCs finding that the Union complied with the legal requirements for staging a strike HELD YES. Sec. 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC requires that a majority vote by secret ballot be obtained before declaring a strike. Article 263 further provides that a union intending to strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting (date, place and time) for the conduct of strike vote, at least 24 hours prior to such meeting. NCMB is to call the parties to a conference to assist them in an amicable settlement and in the event of its failure, voluntary arbitration is encouraged. If the parties refuse, the union may hold a strike vote to ensure the decision to strike rests on the majority of the union members. -Such requirement is designed to inform the NCMB of the intent to strike, and to give it ample time to decide WON there is a need to supervise the strike vote to prevent violence/irregularities. Failure to comply with such requirement renders the subsequent strike staged illegal; in the instant case, the Union failed to comply with said requirement. -The NLRC held that although the parking lot overseer attested to not having witnessed any such strike vote, it did not mean no strike vote occurred at all. It also furthered that the 17 sworn statements seemed coerced as they were pro forma. This Court however, held that the respondents failed to prove the existence of a parking lot other than the parking lot across CMC which the overseer, in an affidavit, stated that no voting or election was conducted on the date of the alleged strike vote. Also, the respondents failed to adduce substantial evidence that the affiants, the 17 union members who executed separate affidavits that no secret balloting took place, were coerced into executing the same. The fact that some portions of the affidavit are similarly worded is no proof that petitioner forced said members into executing said affidavits. Disposition The petition is granted __________________________ Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. NLRC (2005) Aside from the mandatory notices embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24) hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the meeting of the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision. The requirement of giving notice of the conduct of a strike vote to the NCMB at least 24 hours before the meeting for the said purpose is designed to (a) inform the NCMB of the intent of the union to conduct a strike vote; (b) give the NCMB ample time to decide on whether or not there is a need to supervise the conduct of the strike vote to prevent any acts of violence and/or irregularities attendant thereto; and (c) should the NCMB decide on its own initiative or upon the request of an interested party including the employer, to supervise the strike vote, to give it ample

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time to prepare for the deployment of the requisite personnel, including peace officers if need be. ___________________________ .) Strike Vote Report G.R. No. 119467 February 1, 2000 SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA MOLDEX PRODUCTS, INC. vs. NLRC SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA MOLDEX PRODUCTS, INC. VS. NLRC 324 SCRA 242 1 February 2000 FACTS: After the negotiations for the renewal of the collective bargaining agreement between petitioner union and private respondent Moldex Products, Inc. ended in a deadlock, petitioner filed a notice of strike before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). A strike vote was conducted, but the results thereof were never submitted to NCMB. Petitioner went on strike. On private respondents petition, it was declared as illegal by the Labor Arbiter. On appeal to the NLRC, the case was remanded for the Labor Arbiter for reception of additional evidence, thus this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the strike staged by petitioner was illegal. RULING: Yes, the strike was illegal. Article 264 of the Labor Code provides in part that no strike shall be conducted without first having filed a notice of strike or without first having filed a notice of strike, or without the necessary lockout or strike vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry. In this case, the result of the strike vote was not submitted to the NCMB making the strike staged illegal. Also, they committed acts of violence, threats, coercion and intimidation during the strike. The employment of the officers and of the members who committed prohibited acts in the course of the strike were declared forfeited. The NLRC resolution was set aside _______________________ Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Moldex Products, Inc. v. NLRC [G.R. No. 119467, February 1, 2000] FACTS: Petitioners and private respondents were faced with a bargaining deadlock. Petitioners then filed a notice of strike with the NCMB. Later, the union conducted a strike vote among its members and the results were submitted to the Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization for submission to the NCMB, but which was not made. Petitioners went on strike without the report of the strike vote submitted to the NCMB. Private respondents filed a petition to declare the strike illegal alleging that petitioners barricaded gates of private respondent and committed acts of violence, threats and coercion. Trial on the merits was conducted wherein Private respondent presented witnesses and evidence. Petitioners did not present any witness but instead relied on their memorandum contending that respondents evidence are inadmissible. The NLRC remanded the cause to the Labor Arbiter. ISSUE: Whether or not the case was properly remanded and whether petitioners strike was illegal. HELD: The Court is of the opinion that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in remanding the case as the facts are already clear and complete. The records of the case and the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter confirm that the strike was illegal for failure to submit the strike vote to the NCMB and due to the acts of violence, threats and coercion committed during the strike. The requirements of procedural due process were complied with as both parties were allowed to present their witnesses and evidence, although petitioner opted instead to file a memorandum. ___________________ National Federation of Sugar Workers vs. Ovejera GR No. L-59743, May 31, 1982 ; 114 SCRA 354 PLANA, J: FACTS: National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) has concluded with Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC) a CBA effective February 16, 1981 to February 15, 1984 which provided that the parties agree to maintain the present practice on the grant of Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is required by law. The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1 months' salary. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly,

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to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) a notice of strike based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck. One day after the commencement of the strike, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW5 with MOLE. CAC filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration Branch of MOLE to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of BP 130, that is, the strike was declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling- off period for ULP strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote After the submission of position papers and hearing, Labor Arbiter Ovejara declared the strike illegal. On February 26, 1982, the NFSW, by passing the NLRC filed the instant Petition for prohibition. ISSUE: Whether or not the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainly depends on the mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after report to MOLE of the result of a strikevote, as prescribed in the Labor Code. HELD: When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period. If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by law, the purposes for which the filing of the strike notice and strike-vote report is required would not be achieved, as when a strike is declared immediately after a strike notice is served, or when as in the instant case the strike-vote report is filed with MOLE after the strike had actually commenced Such interpretation of the law ought not and cannot be countenanced. It would indeed be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a strike notice and strike-vote report without at the same time making the prescribed waiting periods mandatory. _________________________________

1) Basis Illegality
ART. 263. Strikes, picketing and lockouts. xxx(b) Workers shall have the right to engage in concerted activities for purposes of collective bargaining or for their mutual benefit and protection. The right of legitimate labor organizations to strike and picket and of employers to lockout, consistent with the national interest, shall continue to be recognized and respected. However, no labor union may strike and no employer may declare a lockout on grounds involving inter-union and intraunion disputes. (c) In case of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 day before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor (contd A264) practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the Any worker whose employment has been terminated as notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization a consequence of any unlawful lockout shall be entitled in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from to reinstatement with full backwages. Any union officer employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the busting, where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15commission of illegal acts during a strike may be day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, action immediately. That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his ART. 264. Prohibited activities. - (a) No labor organization or employment, even if a replacement had been hired by employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having the employer during such lawful strike. bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or ART. 265. Improved offer balloting. - In an effort to settle without first having filed the notice required in the preceding a strike, the Department of Labor and Employment shall Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having conduct a referendum by secret ballot on the improved been obtained and reported to the Ministry. offer of the employer on or before the 30th day of the strike. When at least a majority of the union members No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of vote to accept the improved offer the striking workers jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification shall immediately return to work and the employer shall or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same agreement. grounds for the strike or lockout. In case of a lockout, the Department of Labor and Employment shall also conduct a referendum by secret balloting on the reduced offer of the union on or before the 30th day of the lockout. When at least a majority of the board of directors or trustees or the partners holding the controlling interest in the case of a partnership vote to accept the reduced offer, the workers shall immediately return to work and the employer shall thereupon readmit them upon the signing of the agreement.

9. ILLEGAL STRIKES

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Council [PLAC], and designated as PLAC local 460 Sukhothai chapter) filed a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on the ground of unfair labor practice (ULP) and particularly, acts of harassment, faultfinding, and union busting through coercion and interference with union affairs. - In a subsequent conciliation conference, representatives of the petitioner agreed and guaranteed that there will be no termination of the services of private respondents during the pendency of the case, with the reservation of the management prerogative to issue memos to erring employees for the infraction, or violation of company policies. - In a Submission Agreement, the issue of unfair labor practice was later submitted for voluntary arbitration, during the pendency of which, the petitioner, through its president, Ernesto Garcia, dismissed Eugene Lucente, a union member, due to an alleged petty quarrel with a co-employee. In view of this termination, private respondent Union filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. Another employee, private respondent Jose Lanorias, likewise a union member, was relieved from his post and terminated from employment. Shortly thereafter, respondents staged a wildcat strike which was later transformed into an actual strike. - On June 29, 1999, the petitioner filed a complaint for illegal strike with the NLRC against private respondents, and for a declaration that respondents who participated in the commission of illegal acts have lost their employment status. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and held that the Notice of Strike and the Strike Vote referred to a prior dispute submitted for voluntary arbitration and cannot apply to the strike staged about six months later; that, instead of resorting to a strike, private respondents should have availed of the proper legal remedies such as the filing of complaints for illegal suspension or illegal dismissal with the NLRC; and that even if private respondents complied with all the requisites of a valid strike, the strike is still illegal due to the commission of prohibited acts, including the obstruction of free ingress and egress of the premises, intimidation, and threat inflicted upon non-striking employees. - Private respondents appealed to the NLRC which decided in their favor and held that the petitioner is guilty of union busting; of violating the Submission Agreement that no termination shall be effected during the voluntary arbitration proceedings; that the Notice of Strike and Strike Vote are applicable to the strike of June 24, 25, and 26, 1999 since the same issues of ULP were involved and that ULPs are continuing offenses. - After the NLRC denied the MFR, petitioner appealed to the CA, which later denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC hence this case. ISSUES 1. WON the strike was illegal 2. WON private respondents are deemed to have lost their employment status by participating in the commission of illegal acts during the strike. 3. WON the requisites for a valid strike may be dispensed with in case of unionbusting.

SUKHOTHAI CUISINE v CA (NLRC, PLAC) 495 SCRA 336 NATURE Appeal by certiorari FACTS - On December 3, 1998, employees of Sukhothai Cuisine and Restaurant (duly organized as a union, affiliated with private respondent Philippine Labor Alliance

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have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. - The evidence in the record clearly and extensively shows that the individual respondents engaged in illegal acts during the strike, such as the intimidation and harassment of a considerable number of customers to turn them away and discourage them from patronizing the business of the petitioner; waving their arms and shouting at the passersby, Huwag kayong pumasok sa Sukhothai! and Nilagyan na namin ng lason ang pagkain dyan! as well as numerous other statements made to discredit the reputation of the establishment; preventing the entry of customers; angry and unruly behavior calculated to cause commotion which affected neighboring establishments within the mall; openly cursing and shouting at the president in front of customers and using loud and abusive language, such as Putang ina niyong lahat!, toward the rest of the management as well as their co-workers who refused to go on strike; physically preventing non-strikers from entering the premises, as well as deliberately blocking their movements inside the restaurant, at times by sharply bumping into them or through indecent physical contact; openly threatening non-strikers with bodily harm, such as Pag hindi sila pumayag, upakan mo!; and shouting at the security guard Granada! which caused panic among the customers and prompted security to report a possible death threat to management and the security agency. 3. NO. Reasoning In case of alleged union busting, it is only the 15-day cooling-off period that may be dispensed with, the three remaining requirements notice, strike vote, and seven-day report period cannot be dispensed with. Disposition Petition GRANTED. Decisions of the CA and the NLRC are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Decision of the LA REINSTATED. The strike held ILLEGAL and Union officers who participated in the illegal strike and in the commission of illegal acts, as well as the union members who participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike, are declared to have lost their employment status. ________________________ When is a strike illegal?

HELD 1. YES. The strike was illegal. Ratio Art.264 of the LC provides: No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the Pres. or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. - Strikes staged in violation of agreements providing for arbitration are illegal, since these agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends are to be achieved, for it is among the chief policies of the State to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations, including voluntary arbitration, mediation, and conciliation, as modes of settling labor, or industrial disputes. Reasoning Once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. - The alleged dismissals of Lucente and respondent Lanorias, both union members, which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike, are not sufficient grounds to justify the radical recourse on the part of the private respondents. These matters should have been raised and resolved in the voluntary arbitration proceedings that were commenced precisely to address them. - Private respondents should have first availed of the appropriate remedies under the Labor Code, such as the institution of cases of illegal dismissal or, by agreement of the parties, the submission of the cases to the grievance machinery of the CBA, if one is available, so that they may be subjected to separate voluntary arbitration proceedings, or simply seek to terminate the pending voluntary arbitration case and complete the mandatory procedure for a lawful strike. Private respondents should have availed themselves of any of these alternative remedies instead of resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, the holding a wildcat strike. And because of the fact that the Union was fully aware that the arbitration proceedings were pending, good faith cannot be invoked as a defense. - Moreover, even if the strike were to be declared valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where the means employed are illegal. Among such limits are the prohibited activities under Art. 264(e) of the LC, which states that no person engaged in picketing shall: a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes, or (c) obstruct public thoroughfares. 2. YES. The strike had been attended by the widespread commission of prohibited acts. Reasoning Under Art.264(a) of the LC: Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to

1) Contrary to specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees (Ees) performing governmental functions; 2. Violates a specific reqt of law; 3) Declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer (Er) to commit ULP against nonunion Ees; 4) Employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as widespread terrorism of nonstrikers;

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5) Declared in violation of an existing injunction; 6) Contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause What is the effect of the GF of strikers on the legality of strike? GR: A strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no such acts actually exist. XPN: Even if no ULP acts are committed by the Er, if the Ees believe in GF that ULP acts exist so as to constitute a valid ground to strike, then the strike held pursuant to such belief may be legal. Where the union believed that the Er committed ULP and the circumstances warranted such belief in GF, the resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of ULP were found to be groundless. (NUWHRAINInterim Junta v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125561, Mar. 6, 1998)
Liability of Officers of the Union and Ordinary Workers Q: Should separation pay and backwages be awarded to the participants of an illegal strike? A: No backwages will be awarded to union members as a penalty for their participation in the illegal strike. As for the union officers, for knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from employment and they are not entitled to any relief. (Gold City Integrated Port Services, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 86000, Sep. 21, 1990 ) What is the rule on reinstatement of striking workers? Striking employees are entitled to reinstatement, regardless of whether or not the strike was the consequence of the employers ULP because while out on strike, the strikers are not considered to have abandoned their employment, but rather have only ceased from their labor; the declaration of a strike is not a renunciation of employment relation. Q: Who are not entitled to reinstatement? 1) Union officers who knowingly participate in the illegal strike 2) Any striker or union who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during the strike Note: Those union members who have joined an illegal strike but have not committed any illegal act shall be reinstated but without back wages. The responsibility for the illegal acts committed during the strike must be on an individual and not on a collective basis. (First City Interlink Transportation Co., Inc. v. Confesor, G.R. No. 106316, May 5, 1997) Q: Are strikers entitled to their backwages or strike duration pay? A: GR: No, even if such strike was legal. XPN: 1. Where the strikers voluntarily and unconditionally offered to return to work, but the employer refused to accept the offer workers are entitled to back wages from the date their offer was made 2. When there is a returntowork order and the Ees are discriminated against other Ees, workers are entitled to back wages from the date of discrimination 3. In case of a ULP strike, in the discretion of the authority deciding the case Q: What is the rule in strikes in hospitals? 1. It shall be the duty of the striking employees or locking out employer to provide and maintain an effective skeletal workforce of medical and health personnel for the duration of the strike or lockout. 2. SLE may immediately assume jurisdiction within 24 hours from knowledge of the occurrence of such strike or lockout certify it to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. Q: 2 days after the union struck, the SLE ordered the striking workers to return to work within 24 hours. But the striking union failed to return to work and instead they continued their pickets. As a result, violence erupted in the picket lines. The service bus ferrying non striking workers was stoned causing injuries to its passengers. Threats, defamation, illegal detention, and physical injuries also occurred. The company was directed to accept back all striking workers, except the union officers, shop stewards, and those with pending criminal charges. Was the SLE correct in not including the union officers, shop stewards and those with pending criminal charges in the returntowork order? A: No, to exclude union officers, shop stewards and those with pending criminal charges in the directive to the company to accept back the striking workers without first determining whether they knowingly committed illegal acts would be tantamount to dismissal without due process of law. (Telefunken Semiconductors Ees UnionFFW v. SLE, G.R. No. 122743 & 127215, Dec. 12, 1997)

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Whether the strike staged by respondent is illegal due to the alleged commission of illegal acts and violation of the No-Strike, No-Lockout clause of the CBA. Ruling: While the strike is the most preeminent weapon of workers to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor and capital, it exerts some disquieting effects not only the relationship between labor and management, but also on the general peace and progress of society and economic well-being of the State. If such weapon has to be used at all, it must be used sparingly and within the bounds of law in the interest of industrial peace and public welfare. The petition is granted. _____________________ Q: What is the substitutionary doctrine? A: It is where there occurs a shift in the Ees union allegiance after the execution of a collective bargaining (CB) contract with the Er, the Ees can change their agent (labor union) but the CB contract which is still subsisting continues to bind the Ees up to its expiration date. They may however, bargain for the shortening of said expiration date. Note: The Er cannot revoke the validly executed CB contract with their Er by the simple expedient of changing their bargaining agent. The new agent must respect the contract. (Benguet Consolidated Inc. v. BCI Ees and Workers Union PAFLU, G.R. No. L24711, April 30, 1968) It cannot be invoked to support the contention that a newly certified CB agent automatically assumes all the personal undertakings of the former agent like the no strike clause in the CBA executed by the latter. The substitute can avail for the shortening period, but if the provisions of the CBA are not economic provisions but a personal provisions (that applies only to EBA) Like Union Security Clauses, No Strike No Lock Out Clause. If there is a substitute they can already hace a strike. SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES: WHAT MAKES A STRIKE VIOLENT? A strike that is pervasive and widespread. Is a no strike/lockout clause legal?

Q: When is there a waiver of the illegality of a strike by the employer? A: When an employer accedes to the peaceful settlement brokered by the NLRC by agreeing to accept all employees who had not yet returned to work, it waives the issue of the illegality of the strike. (Reformist Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120482,Jan. 27, 1997) ____________________ G.R. No. L-4834 March 28, 1952 LIBERAL LABOR UNION, -versus PHILIPPINE CAN COMPANY NO DIGEST ____________________ NO DIGEST FOR INSUREFCO vs INSULAR SUGAR, 1954 _______________________ A. Soriano Aviation v. Employees Association of A. Soriano Aviation Cooperative G.R. No. 166879, August 14, 2009 Facts: On May 1997, petitioner and respondent entered into a CBA effective until December 1999. The CBA included No-Strke, No-Lock-out clause. On several dates, which were legal holidays and peak season, some of the members of the union refused to rendered overtime work. Petitioner treated the refusal as a concerted action which is a violation of the No-Strike, No-Lock-out Clause. Thus, it meted the workers 30-day suspension and filed an illegal strike against them. The attempted settlement having been futile, the union filed a Notice of Strike. Despite the conciliation no amicable settlement of the dispute was arrived, the union went on strike. The company filed a motion to re-open the case which was granted by LA. In its decision, LA declared that the strike is illegal. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed it in per curiam decision. In the interim, into the second strike, petitioner filed a complaint before LA for illegal strike on the ground of alleged force and violence. In its decision, LA declare the second strike illegal. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed in toto the LAs decision. On appeal to CA, the CA reversed and set aside the NLRC ruling. Hence, the present position. Issue:

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Yes, but it is applicable only to economic strikes, not ULP strikes. As a provision in the CBA, it is a valid stipulation although the clause may be invoked by an employer (Er) only when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted to force wage or other concessions from the Er that are not mandated to be granted by the law itself. It would be inapplicable to prevent a strike which is grounded on ULP. (Panay Electric Co. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 102672, Oct. 4, 1995; Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Greenfield v. Ramos, G.R. No. 113907, Feb. 28, 2000) MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA M. GREENFIELD V RAMOS, NLRC, M. GREENFIELD 326 SCRA 248 PURISIMA; February 28, 2000 NATURE Petition for Certiorari to annul the NLRC decision FACTS - Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M. Greenfield, Inc. (MSMG) (Local Union) is an affiliate of United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP) (Federation). - The CBA between MSMG and M. Greenfield, Inc. states that it is entered into by the corporation and MSMG / ULGWP. - The CBA includes a Union Security Clause requiring all employees who are covered by the CBA and presently members of the UNION to remain members of the UNION for the duration of the CBA as a condition precedent to continued employment. - Local union imposed a P50 fine on non-attending union members which became the subject of bitter disagreement between the Federation and the local union. MSMG then declared general autonomy from the ULGWP. In retaliation, the national federation asked respondent company to stop the remittance of the local union's share in the education funds. It also disauthorized incumbent union officers from representing the employees. - Petitioner union officers were expelled by the federation for allegedly committing acts of disloyalty and/or inimical to the interest of ULGWP and in violation of its Constitution and By-laws. The federation advised respondent company of the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their separation from employment pursuant to the Union Security Clause in their CBA. - Upon demand of the federation, the company terminated the petitioners without conducting a separate and independent investigation. The expelled union officers assigned in the first shift were physically or bodily brought out of the company premises by the company's security guards. Those assigned to the second shift were not allowed to report for work. This provoked some of the members of the local union to demonstrate their protest for the dismissal of the said union officers. Some union members left their work posts and walked out of the company premises. - Labor Arbiter ruled that the dismissed union officers were validly and legally terminated because the dismissal was effected in compliance with the union security clause of the CBA which is the law between the parties. This was affirmed by the NLRC on appeal. > On the ISSUE of STRIKE: - Labor Arbiter held that the strike was illegal for the following reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-union dispute which cannot properly be the subject of a strike, the right to strike being limited to cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) it was made in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out" clause in the CBA, and (3) it was attended with violence, force and intimidation upon the persons of the company officials, other employees reporting for work and third persons having legitimate business with the company, resulting to serious physical injuries to several employees and damage to company property . ISSUE/S * WON the union officers were validly terminated 1. WON the strike was illegal for being grounded on a non-strikeable issue (intra-union conflict between the federation and the local union) 2. WON the no strike, no lock-out clause in the CBA was violated 3. WON the strike was attended with violence force and intimidation HELD * NO Reasoning Although this Court has ruled that union security clauses embodied in the collective bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that dismissals pursuant thereto may likewise be valid, this does not erode the fundamental requirement of due process. The reason behind the enforcement of union security clauses which is the sanctity and inviolability of contracts cannot override one's right to due process. 1. NO Reasoning When respondent company dismissed the union officers, the issue was transformed into a termination dispute and brought respondent company into the picture. Petitioners believed in good faith that in dismissing them upon request by the federation, respondent company was guilty of unfair labor practice in that it violated the petitioner's right to self-organization. The strike was staged to protest respondent company's act of dismissing the union officers. Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are subsequently found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike prevails. 2. NO Reasoning A no strike, no lock out provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in nature, i.e. to force wage or other concessions from the employer which he is not required by law to grant. Such a provision cannot be used to assail the legality of a strike which is grounded on unfair labor practice,

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as was the honest belief of herein petitioners. Again, whether or not there was indeed unfair labor practice does not affect the strike. 3. NO Reasoning The Labor Arbiter and the Commission found that "the parties are agreed that there were violent incidents resulting to injuries to both sides, the union and management." The evidence on record show that the violence cannot be attributed to the striking employees alone for the company itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers. With violence committed on both sides, the management and the employees, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the strike as illegal. PETITION GRANTED. __________________ FIRST CITY INTERLINK VS. ROL-DAN CONGRESSOR, 1997 FACTS: Tthe Fil Transit Employees Union filed a notice of strike with the (BLR) because of alleged ULP of petitioner. Despite several conciliation conferences, the parties failed to reach an agreement, so that the Union went on strike. As a result several workers were dismissed. The Union filed another notice of strike alleging ULP, massive dismissal of union officers and members, coercion of employees and violation of workers rights to self-organization. Conciliation conferences were again held but, the Union again went on strike, lifting their picket. the then Minister of Labor and Employment, after assuming jurisdiction over the dispute under Art. 264(g) and Art. 278(b) of the Labor Code, ordered (1) all striking employees including those who were dismissed prior to the June 17, 1986 strike to return to work within (48) hours from receipt of the order; and (2) petitioner to accept all the returning employees under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to the dispute. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration contending that no strike vote had been obtained before the strike was called and the result of strike vote was not reported to the Ministry of Labor and Employment. Its motion was, however, not acted upon for the reason that petitioner had already brought the matter to this Court on certiorari, resulting in the issuance of a temporary restraining order. DOLE issued a writ of execution, ordering the chief of the execution arm of the NLRC to cause the actual and physical return to work of all striking employees, including those dismissed prior to the June 17, 1986 strike under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to the dispute, and to secure certification that the parties have complied with such return to work order. The Union then filed a motion for the award of backwages in the total amount of P1,364,800.00 for the period December 9, 1987 up to February 9, 1988 and for the issuance of a writ of execution. the Sheriff reported in his return that only 66 employees reported back to work and were accepted by petitioner on condition that they submit certain requirements. the Secretary of Labor issued the order awarding backwages Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but its motion was denied Petitioner questioned the order in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with this Court which, however, dismissed the petition on for lack of showing that the Secretary of Labor committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the questioned order.[3] Sole ordered Fil Transit Co., Inc., to pay the dismissed striking employees the following: 1. Backwages for three (3) years without qualification and deduction and; 2. Separation pay equivalent to one-half month pay for every year of service in lieu of reinstatement, the date of this offices order as the cut-off date. Held: decision set aside First . Petitioners main contention is that the strike called by the Union was illegal . Pursuant to Art. 263(c)(f) of the Labor Code, the requisites for a valid strike are as follows: (1) a notice of strike filed with the Department of Labor at least 30 days before the intended date thereof or 15 days in case of unfair labor practice; (2) strike vote approved by a majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose; (3) notice given to the Department of Labor and Employment of the results of the voting at least 7 days before the intended strike. These requirements are mandatory.[4] Petitioner contends that the strike staged by the Union was illegal because no strike vote had been taken before the strike was called. This matter was raised by petitioner before the Secretary of Labor and now in this petition. However, in none of the numerous pleadings filed by respondent Union before this Court, has it been shown that a strike vote had been taken before declaring a strike. As between petitioner and respondent Union, the latter is in a better position to present proof of such fact . The Unions failure to do so raises the strong probability that there was no strike vote taken . The first and only instance it is mentioned that such a vote had been taken before the strike was called was in the order dated July 23, 1992 of the Secretary of Labor in which she stated:

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. . . the records show that a notice of strike was filed by the union with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on May 27, 1986, and after a failure of several conciliation conferences due to managements consistent refusal to appear, the union went on strike on June 17, 1986, after a strike vote was obtained.[5] (Emphasis added) But the Secretary of Labor did not indicate the basis for her statement nor the date the strike vote was allegedly taken. Neither did she mention whether her office had been notified of the strike vote as required by law. For that matter the statement in the same order that a notice of strike had been filed because several conciliation conferences failed due to managements consistent refusal to appear is contrary to evidence in the record. Annexes E and F of the petition show that management was duly represented during the conciliation proceeding prior to the strike on June 17, 1986. Annex G likewise shows that at the conciliation conference held on July 17, 1986, management actively participated, contrary to the statement in the order of the Secretary of Labor that the failure of the second set of conciliation conferences was due to managements refusal to attend. Moreover, even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, we agree with petitioner that the Union nevertheless failed to observe the required seven-day strike ban from the date the strike vote should have been reported to the DOLE up to the time the Union staged the strike on June 17, 1986 . As petitioner contends: It must be noted in this regard that as shown in the minutes of conciliation conferences (Annex F), the parties met in a conciliation conference on June 13, 1986, four (4) days before the June 17, 1986 strike. So even if it is conceded that a strike vote was taken, there would have been non-compliance with the requisite cooling off period and the 7-day strike ban for the simple reason that between June 13, 1986, the day the parties met for conciliation conference and June 17, 1986, the day of the strike, there were only four (4) days.[6] It is nonetheless contended by the Solicitor General that [a] strike inspired by good faith is not illegal simply because certain requirements were not followed, citing the case of Ferrer v. CIR.[7] The contention has no merit. In Ferrer, the strikers failed to observe the 30-day cooling off period, but this Court found the strike legal because of the strikers belief in good faith that the employer committed unfair labor practice. But, in the case at bar, what is lacking is the strike vote which should have been reported to the DOLE seven days before staging the strike. The importance of the strike vote and reporting of the results to the DOLE cannot be gainsaid as it is the Union itself that the law seeks to protect by ensuring that the majority of its members voted in favor of the strike. As held in National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW) v. Ovejera:[8] When the law says the labor union may strike should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the mandatory filing of the notice, the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that in any case, the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period . It must be stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-off period. Moreover, petitioner is right that good faith cannot be invoked by the Union in this case. As the records will bear out, the private respondent had clearly acted in bad faith when it went on strike. Indeed, there is no finding in this case that petitioner was guilty of the alleged unfair labor practices as charged by the Union. The award of backwages and separation pay was based solely on the alleged refusal of petitioner to comply with the Return to Work Order - an issue which will be discussed in the latter part of this decision. Hence, the ruling in Ferrer v. CIR - that the strike staged before the expiration of the 30-day cooling off period is not illegal because of what the strikers perceived in good faith to be unfair labor practices of the employer - does not apply. Second . Petitioner contends that the strikers, having engaged in violent, illegal, and criminal acts, have lost their employment status. The Labor Code considers the commission of these acts a prohibited activity [10 ] and any worker or union officer, who knowingly participates in their commission during a strike, may be declared to have lost his employment status. Not every form of violence suffices to affix the seal of illegality on a strike as to cause the loss of employment of the guilty party. Where acts of violence while the strike lasts are sporadic and not pervasive by design and policy, responsibility therefore is individual and not collective.[11] Contrary to respondent Secretarys finding, the strike declared by the Union was attended by pervasive and widespread violence. The acts of violence committed were not mere isolated incidents which could normally occur during any strike. The hijacking of Fil-Transit Bus No. 148 at the intersection of EDSA and Quezon Avenue on Sunday, July 27, 1986, three days before the scheduled conciliation conference, reveals that it was staged in pursuance of a preconceived plan. This was followed by the barricading of the terminal in Alabang by means of five buses which had also been hijacked. In the days that followed, the strikers persisted in their violent acts, (1) the hijacking of 26 more buses which resulted in injuries to some employees and panic to the commuters; (2) the puncturing of tires; (3) the cutting of electric wirings, water hoses and fan belts; and (4) the alleged theft of expensive equipment such as fuel injections worth P30,000 each. The commission of these illegal acts was neither isolated nor accidental but deliberately employed to intimidate and harass the employer and the public. The strikers even resorted to the use of molotov bombs which were thrown into the petitioners compound.

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Nevertheless, we are constrained to uphold the respondent Secretarys ruling that responsibility for these illegal acts must be on an individual and not collective basis. Therefore, although the strike was illegal because of the commission of illegal acts, only the union officers and strikers who engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts against the employer are deemed to have lost their employment status . Union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently . [12 ] Third . As already noted, respondent Secretary awarded backwages on the ground that petitioner had refused to comply with the Return to Work Order of September 16, 1986. On the other hand, the Union contends that petitioner imposed certain requirements as condition for reinstatement which amounted to a refusal to comply with the Return to Work Order. These were:xxx Some requirements are indeed unreasonable considering that the strikers were not being hired for the first time but merely being reinstated. Reinstatement connotes a continuity of the employer-employee relationship as prerogatives and those which are unreasonable. On the other hand, there are certain conditions which are valid. The requirement to submit NBI, Police and Barangay clearances is reasonable to enable management to determine whether the returning employees have pending charges of illegal acts especially those committed during the strike. So also is the requirement to have drivers and conductors/conductress license, to enable them to perform their tasks. The pictures required are necessary for the employers personnel records and so can validly be required. With respect to the required medical examination, the same can be justified as management prerogative since it is the employers right to ensure that the employees are physically fit to resume the performance of their duties. This is especially true in this case, because two years had elapsed since the time of dismissal of the employees. As held in Jackbilt Concrete Block Co., Inc. v. Norton & Harrison Co.,[13] an employer should not be compelled to reinstate an employee who is no longer physically fit for the job from which he was ousted. It is true that in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR,[14] it was held that the medical examination could not be required as a condition for reinstatement, but that is in cases where the employer is guilty of unfair labor practice. In the present case, although the Union has charged petitioner with unfair labor practice, the matter is still to be resolved. Hence, the ruling in Davao Free Workers Front v. CIR[16] does not apply. With respect to some of the requirements (i.e., P1,000. cash bond, birth/baptismal certificate, residence certificate, high school diploma/transcript of records, certification of employment, and marriage contract ) , we agree with respondent Union that these requirements cannot be imposed being more appropriate for employees who are being hired for the first time. However, the imposition of such requirements by the employer did not amount to a refusal to admit workers back to work or an illegal lock-out so as to entitle the workers to the payment of backwages under Art. 264(g) of the Labor Code, the pertinent portion of which states: From the foregoing, undersigned is of the opinion that the Order has been complied with upon completion of the above-requirements being requested by Management. . . . Consequently, petitioner is not liable for backwages . Employees, who are not guilty of illegal acts and, therefore , are entitled to reinstatement would only be entitled to backwages if they were refused readmission . As none of such employees was refused readmission, no backwages are due from petitioner. On the other hand, employees who are entitled to be reinstated because they did not take part in illegal acts would be entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement in view of the fact that, after all the time that this case has been pending, reinstatement is no longer feasible. Separation pay should be computed only up to March 8, 1988, the date when employees were supposed to return as agreed upon by the parties. Those who failed to return on March 8, 1988, will not be entitled to separation pay after such date. To summarize, this Court holds that: 1) The respondent Secretary of Labor erred in declaring the strike legal. There is no evidence to show that a strike vote had in fact been taken before a strike was called. Even assuming that a strike vote had been taken, the strike called by the Union was illegal because of nonobservance by the Union of the mandatory seven-day strike ban counted from the date the strike vote should have been reported to the Department of Labor and Employment up to the time the Union staged the strike on June 17, 1986. In accordance with Art. 264 of the Labor Code, any union officer who knowingly participated in the illegal strike is deemed to have lost his employment status. 2) The commission of the illegal acts during the strike rendered it illegal. However, only officers and leaders of the Union and workers guilty of illegal acts are liable. Such employees are deemed to have lost their employment status in accordance with Art. 264 of the Labor Code. 3) Petitioner substantially complied with the Return to Work Order. The medical examination, NBI, Police and Barangay Clearances as well as the drivers and conductors/conductress licenses and photographs required as conditions for reinstatement were reasonable management prerogatives. However, the other requirements imposed as condition for reinstatement were unreasonable considering that the employees were not being hired for the first time, although the imposition of such requirements did not amount to refusal on the part of the employer to comply with the Return to Work Order or constitute illegal lockout so as to warrant payment of backwages to the strikers. If at all, it is the employees refusal to return to work that may be deemed a refusal to comply with the Return to Work Order resulting in loss of their employment status. As both the employer and the employees were, in a sense, at fault or in

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pari delicto, the nonreturning employees, provided they did not participate in illegal acts, should be considered entitled to reinstatement. But since reinstatement is no longer feasible, they should be given separation pay computed up to March 8, 1988 (the date set for the return of the employees) in lieu of reinstatement. 4) Because the award of backwages was based on the alleged refusal of the employer to comply with the Return to Work Order, the same should be set aside for being without basis. commission of illegal acts are deemed to have lost their employment status. Petitioner is ORDERED to pay the employees who did not participate in the commission of illegal acts during the strike separation pay. FIRST CITY INTERLINK TRANSPORTATION vs. MA. NIEVES ROLDANCONFESOR GRN 106316, 272 SCRA 124 (May 5, 1997) Facts: Petitioner First City Interlink Transportation Co, Inc is a public utility while respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Fil Transit-National Federation of Labor is the labor union of Fil Transit employees. The union filed a notice of strike with the BLR for ULP against petitioner. The parties failed to reach an agreement so that the union went on strike. Consequently, several workers were dismissed. The union filed another notice of strike alleging ULP, massive dismissal of union officers and members, coercion of employees and violation of workers' rights to self-organization. Conciliation conferences were held but the union again went on strike. The MOLE ordered the striking workers to return to work. Only 66 employees were accepted by petitioner conditioned on the submission of certain requirements. The Secretary of Labor ruled for the legality of the strike and awarded backwages and separation pay to the strikers. Petitioner alleged that no strike vote was obtained, the result thereof was not reported to the MOLE, the strikers engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts, and it complied with the return to work order. Issue: WON the strike was illegal. Held: Yes. It was not shown in the pleadings that a strike vote was obtained before the declaration of strike. The statement in the same order of the Labor Secretary that a notice of strike had been filed because several conciliation conferences failed due to management's consistent refusal to appear is contrary to evidence because management was duly represented during the conciliation proceedings prior to the strike. Further, the union failed to comply with the required 7-day strike ban. The union was in bad faith when it conducted the strike because instead of attending the conciliation meetings with petitioner, it went on strike. The strike was attended by pervasive and widespread violence such as the hijacking of Fil-Transit buses, barricading of the terminal in Alabang, puncturing of tires, cutting of electric wirings, water hoses and fan belts, use of Molotov bombs, and theft of expensive equipment such as fuel injections. The commission of these illegal acts was neither isolated nor accidental but deliberately employed to intimidate and harass the employer and the public. However, only the union officers and strikers who engaged in violent, illegal and criminal acts against the employer are deemed to have lost their employment status. Union members who were merely instigated to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently. Some requirements in the reinstatement of the striking workers were unreasonable considering that the strikers were not being hired for the first time but merely being reinstated. These are the P1T cash bond, birth/baptismal certificate, residence certificate, high school diploma or transcript of records, certification of employment, and marriage contract. But the requirement to submit NBI, Police and Barangay clearances is reasonable to enable management to determine whether the returning employees have pending charges of illegal acts especially those committed during the strike. The driver's and conductor's/conductress' license is also reasonable to enable them to perform their tasks. The pictures are necessary for the employer's personnel records. The medical examination is justified to ensure that the employees are physically fit to resume the performance of their duties since it has been 2 years from the time of their dismissal. The imposition of such requirements did not amount to a refusal to admit workers back or an illegal lock-out so as to entitle them to payment of backwages. In fact, none of such employees was refused readmission. _______________________ Nature of Assumption Order or Certification Order Q: What is the nature of the power of SLE under Art. 263(g)? A: The assumption of jurisdiction is in the nature of a police power measure. This is done for the promotion of the common good considering that a prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy. The SLE acts to maintain industrial peace. Thus, his certification for compulsory arbitration is not intended to impede the workers right to strike but to obtain a speedy settlement of the dispute. (Philtread Workers Union v. Confesor, G.R. No. 117169, Mar. 12, 1997) Art. 263(g) does not interfere with the workers right to strike but merely regulates it, when in the exercise of such right national interest will be affected. The LC vests upon the SLE the discretion to determine what industries are indispensable to national interest. Q: What is the nature of assumption and certification orders of the Secretary of Labor? A: The underlying principle embodied in Art. 264 (g) on the settlement of labor disputes is that assumption and certification orders are executor in character and are strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition

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questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. Q: A notice of strike was filed by the PSBA Ees UnionFFW, alleging union busting, coercion of Ees and harassment on the part of PSBA. The conciliation being ineffective, the strike pushed through. A complaint for ULP and for a declaration of illegality of the strike with a prayer for preliminary injunction was filed by PSBA against the union. While the cases were pending, a complaint was filed in the RTC of Manila by some PSBA students against PSBA and the union, seeking to enjoin the union and its members from picketing and from barricading themselves in front of the schools main gate. A TRO was then issued by the RTC, which the union opposed on the ground that the case involves a labor dispute over which the RTC had no jurisdiction. The Acting SLE later on assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and ordered the striking Ees to return to work. Was the SLE correct in ordering the striking Ees to return to work? A: Yes. In the opinion of the Acting SLE, the labor dispute adversely affected the national interest, affecting as it did 9,000 students. He is authorized by law to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute, after finding that it adversely affected the national interest. This power is expressly granted by Art. 263 (g) of the LC, as amended by B.P. Blg. 227. Q: Does the RTC have jurisdiction to decide on the case filed by the PSBA students? A: No, the RTC was without jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case filed by some PSBA students, involving as it does a labor dispute over which the labor agencies had exclusive jurisdiction. That the regular courts have no jurisdiction over labor disputes and to issue injunctions against strikes is well settled. (PSBA v. Noriel, G.R. No. 80648, Aug. 15, 1988) Q: Members of the union learned that a redundancy program would be implemented by the company. Thereupon it filed a Notice of strike on the grounds of ULP. A number of conciliation meetings were conducted but to no avail so the union staged a strike while the company terminated 383 union members from service pursuant to its redundancy program. Pursuant to Art. 263(g) of the LC the SLE certified the labor dispute for compulsory arbitration. Accordingly the SLE enjoined the strike staged by the union and all striking workers were directed to return to work within 24 hours except for those who were terminated due to redundancy. Was the SLE correct in excepting from the returntowork order those who were terminated due to redundancy? A: No, Art. 263(g) is clear and unequivocal in stating that all striking or lock out Ees shall immediately return to work and the Er shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. Records of the case would show that the strike occurred one day before the members of the union were dismissed due to alleged redundancy. Thus the abovementioned article directs that the Er must readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. (PLDT v. Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas, G.R. No. 162783, July 14, 2005) Q: What is the effect of defiance to the return to work order? A: It shall be considered an illegal act committed in the course of the strike or lockout and shall authorize the SLE or the NLRC, as the case may be, to enforce the same under pain or loss of employment status or entitlement to full employment benefits from the lockingout Er or backwages, damages and/or other positive and/or affirmative reliefs, even to criminal prosecution against the liable parties. (Sec. 6, Rule IX, of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC; St. Scholasticas College v. Torres, G.R. No. 100158, June 2, 1992 ) ____________ UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES v. NESTLE 192 SCRA 396 MEDIALDEA; December 19, 1990 NATURE This petition assails the decision of the NLRC, dated November 2, 1988 on the consolidated appeals of petitioners FACTS - UFE filed a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations against Filipro (now Nestle Philippines). - UFE filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) against Nestle and its officials for violation of the Labor Code (Art. 94) on Holiday Pay, nonimplementation of the CBA provisions (Labor Management Corporation scheme), Financial Assistance and other unfair labor practice. - Acting on Nestle's petition seeking assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute or its certification to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, then Minister of Labor and Employment Blas F. Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and issued the following order enjoining any strike, lockout, or any other form of concerted action such as slowdowns, sitdowns, noise barrages during office hours, which tend to disrupt company operations.

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- UFE filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order, with this Court assailing the assumption of jurisdiction by the Minister. Notwithstanding the automatic injunction against any concerted activity, and an absence of a restraining order, the union members, at the instigation of its leaders, and in clear defiance of Minister Ople's Order of December 11, 1986, staged a strike and continued to man picket lines at the Makati Administrative Office and all of Nestle's factories and warehouses at Alabang, Muntinlupa, Cabuyao, Laguna, and Cagayan de Oro City. Likewise, the union officers and members distributed leaflets to employees and passersby advocating a boycott of company products. - Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal premised on violation of the CBA provisions on "no strike/no lockout" clause and the grievance machinery provisions on settlement of disputes. - Despite receipt of the second order dated January 30, 1986, and knowledge of a notice caused to be published by Nestle in the Bulletin on February 1, 1986, advising all workers to report to work not later than February 3, 1986, the officers and members of UFE continued with the strike. - Minister B. Ople denied their motion for reconsideration of the return-to-work order. - UFE defied the Minister and continued with their strike. Nestle filed criminal charges against those involved. ISSUE WON the strike is legal. HELD NO. UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 264(g) on the settlement of labor disputes and this is, that assumption and certification orders are executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests. - Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions. - The return to work order does not so much confer a right as it imposes a duty; and while as a right it may be waived, it must be discharged as a duty even against the worker's will. Returning to work in this situation is not a matter of option or voluntariness but of obligation. The worker must return to his job together with his co-workers so the operations of the company can be resumed and it can continue serving the public and promoting its interest." - An assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of Labor automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers, whether or not a corresponding order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, the striking workers erred when they continued with their strike alleging absence of a return-to-work order. Article 264(g) is clear. - Once an assumption/certification order is issued, strikes are enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall immediately return to work. - A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal, pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended. The Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act. - Thus, the NLRC correctly upheld the illegality of the strikes and the corresponding dismissal of the individual complainants because of their "brazen disregard of successive lawful orders of then Labor Ministers Blas F. Ople, Augusto Sanchez and Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon dated December 11, 1985, January 30, 1986 and February 4, 1986, respectively, and the cavalier treatment of the provisions of the Labor Code and the return-to-work orders of the Minister (now Secretary) of Labor and Employment, or Articles 264 and 265 (now renumbered Arts. 263 and 264). - No strike or lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency o f cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout. Disposition ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED, and the decision of public respondent NLRC, dated November 2, 1988, and its Resolution, dated March 7, 1989, are both AFFIRMED in their entirety. No costs. ___________________________ University of San Agustin, Inc. v. University of San Agustin Employees Union-FWW G.R. No. 177594, July 23, 2009 Facts: On July 2000, petitioner forged with the union a CBA effective for five (5) years or until July 2005. Among agreed was to include a provision on salary increase based on the incremental tuition fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) and pursuant to RA 6728, Tuition Fee Law. The union refused to accept the proposed across-the-board salary increase of P1,500.00 per month. Likewise, union rejected petitioners interpretation of term salary increase as referring not only to the increase in salary but also to corresponding increases in other benefits. Parties agreed to submit the case to voluntary arbitration (VA). By decision, the VA held that the salary increase shall be paid out of 80% of the TIP should be same be higher

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than P1,500.00. On appeal, CA sustained the VAs interpretation of the questioned CBA but reversed its finding on the TIP computation. Hence, the present petition seeks only the review of the appellate court s interpretation of the questioned provision of CBA. Issue: Whether appellate court erred in interpreting the questioned provision of the CBA? Ruling: It is familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract, in this case the CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control. It is axiomatic that labor laws setting employees benefits only mandate the minimum that an employer must comply with, but the latter is not proscribed from granting higher or additional benefits if it so desires, whether as an act of generosity or by virtue of company policy or a CBA, as it would appear in this case. While, in following to the letter the subject CBA provision petitioner will, in effect, be giving more than 80% of the TIP as its personnels share in the tuition fee increase, petitioners remedy lies not in the Courts invalidating the provision, but in the parties clarifying the same in the subsequent CBA negotiations. The decision of CA is affirmed. ____________________________ UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN compare to the case of PNOC - Acting Secretary Nieves Confesor certified the dispute subject of the notice of strike to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. - the day when respondent union was poised to strike, its officers and members decided to report for work but petitioner thru its Operations Manager, Nemesio Guillermo, padlocked the gate and refused entry to the employees. Some officers and members of respondent union were able to enter the premises of petitioner and punch-in their timecards; however, they were immediately escorted back outside - Confesor issued a return to work order directing all striking workers to return to work within 24 hours form receipt of the Order and for the Company to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the work stoppage. - respondent union thru its President, Felimon Paglinawan filed before the NLRC a complaint against petitioner for Illegal Lock-out - all members of the private respondent union reported and were accepted back to work - Subsequently, petitioner filed before the DOLE a petition to declare the strike illegal with a motion to cite the striking workers in contempt for defying the DOLE Orders. - the President, Secretary, Auditor and Treasurer of the respondent union, after due notice and investigation, were dismissed by petitioner from their employment on the ground, among others of their participation in the work stoppage on December 18 to 21, 1991 - the dismissed union officers filed before the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal. The cases were consolidated and in the herein challenged Decision, public respondent ordered the reinstatement of the dismissed officers of private respondent union. The same Decision further ruled that, where reinstatement was no longer feasible "on account of the sale of any of respondent companies," separation pay shall be awarded, equivalent to "1 month's pay for every year of service, a fraction of at least 6 months considered as 1 whole year, in addition to the award of backwages." - The parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration. In its December 9, 1994 Decision, the NLRC modified its earlier disposition and ordered PNOC to pay its separated employees severance benefit equivalent to "two months for every year of service" in accordance with the company's established business practice. The separate motions of PNOC and its subsidiaries were all denied. ISSUES 1. WON KMM-PDEC and its officers are guilty of illegal strike. 2. WON the termination of KMM-PDEC union officers, who led the illegal strike, was legal and for just cause. 3. WON PNOC is entitled to the award of damages. HELD 1. NO. Ratio A strike does not automatically carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice were committed by the employer. It suffices if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike. Indeed, the presumption of legality prevails even if the allegation of unfair labor practice is subsequently found to be untrue, provided that the union and its members believed in good faith in the truth of such averment. Reasoning In resolving that the strike was legal, the labor tribunal took note of the following facts: (1) the notice of strike was filed only after the union members lost hope for the redress

PNOC DOCKYARD AND ENGINEERING CORPORATION v. NLRC (BATAAN REFINERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES et al) G.R. No. 118223 PANGANIBAN; June 26, 1998
NATURE Petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court FACTS - private respondent (KMM-PDEC), among unions namely: BRUP, PEDEA, PCC-ELU and PSTCEA, filed with the DOLE a notice of strike against Phil. National Oil Company (PNOC) and Monico Jacob as President/Chairman, on the ground of discrimination constituting ULP. The dispute arose from the grant by petitioner and PNOC of the amount of P2,500.00 increase in monthly salaries to Managerial, Professionals and Technical Employees (MPT) but not to Non-Managerial, Professional and Technical Employees (NMPT).

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of their grievance arising from their exclusion from the P2,500 salary increase; (2) the union members honesty believed that they were discriminated against, since the company practice in the past was to grant salary increases to all employees regardless of whether they were MPTs or NMPTs; (3) such discriminatory grant appeared to be an unfair labor practice intended to discourage union membership, since MPTs were non-union members; and (4) the labor unions complied with the legal requirements before going on strike, such as the members' strike vote by secret ballot, the submission of the results thereof to the National Conciliation and Meditation Board, the filing of a notice to strike and the observance of the 15-day cooling-off period. Respondent Commission opined that the unions had a reason to regard the salary discrimination, believed to discourage membership in the labor organization, as an unfair labor practice. - The NLRC noted further that the strike was peaceful and orderly, unmarred by any form of violence or untoward incident. 2. NO. Ratio Having ruled that the strike staged by respondent unions was legal, the subsequent dismissals of their officers due to their staging of said strike cannot be countenanced. - The NLRC correctly observed that, although petitioner averred that the dismissals of individual respondent were due to infractions of company rules and regulations, the alleged infractions actually arose from their participation in the strike. This is crystal clear from the charges leveled against the union officers, such as "active participation in the illegal work stoppage." "disruption of company operations resulting [in] losses." "violation of the 'NO STRIKE' clause of the existing CBA," among others, cited in their similarly worded notices of investigation that eventually led to their dismissals. - The issues relating to the strike and lockout were already submitted before the NLRC through the corresponding complaints filed by petitioner itself and private respondents. By filing a formal complaint for illegal strike, it behooved petitioner to desist from undertaking its own investigation on the same matter, concluding upon the illegality of the union activity and dismissing outright the union officers involved. - Moreover, the MOA, other than enjoining the striking workers to return to work, likewise ordered the management to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the work stoppage. In glaring defiance, petitioner arbitrarily undertook to change the work schedule of some employee on the very day they resumed work, aside from deducting in full the wages and holiday pays of the striking employees pertaining to the strike period, even before the LMC could convene. 3. NO. The actual and exemplary damages sought by petitioner have no basis in law, much less in equity and fair play. From the foregoing discussion, the strike was staged by respondent unions in the honest belief that petitioner, among the other PNOC subsidiaries involved, was guilty of unfair labor practice due to the discrimination in the grant of salary increase believed to discourage union membership, and to its refusal to bargain collectively on the matter. There was good faith on the part of the striking unions. Thus, they cannot be penalized by imposing upon them payment of damages. Disposition WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decisions are AFFIRMED. ___________________ SUPPLEMENTAL NOTES:

PNOC Dockyard v. NLRC (1998) Although rejecting that PNOC and its subsidiaries were guilty of discrimination, the NLRC reiterated the policy enunciated in several labor cases "that a strike does not automatically carry the stigma of illegality even if no unfair labor practice were committed by the employer. It suffices if such a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a strike." Indeed, the presumption of legality prevails even if the allegation of unfair labor practice is subsequently found to be untrue, provided that the union and its members believed in good faith in the truth of such averment. __________________ Telefunken Semi-Conductor Employees Union v. CA (2000) It is clear from Art. 263 that the moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to national interest, such assumption shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of Labor to issue another order directing them to return to work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is not expressly stated in the assumption order. However, petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the Secretary of Labor on September 8, 1995 thereby necessitating the issuance of another order expressly directing the striking workers to cease and desist from their actual strike, and to immediately return to work but which directive the herein petitioners opted to ignore. In this connection, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code clearly provides that: Article 264. Prohibited Activities. (a) x x x No strike or lock out shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction by the President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of or lockout. Any union officer who knowingly participates in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, that mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. The rationale of this prohibition is that once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been properly acquired by the competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes of a strike. We have held in a number of cases that defiance to the assumption and

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return-to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the employment status of any striking union officer or member. Having thus resolved the threshold issue as hereinabove discussed, it necessarily follows that the strike of the Union cannot be viewed as anything but illegal for having been staged in open and knowing defiance of the assumption and return-to-work orders. The necessary consequence thereof are also detailed by the Supreme Court in its various rulings. In Marcopper Mining Corp. v. Brillantes (254 SCRA 595), the High Tribunal stated in no uncertain terms that by staging a strike after the assumption of jurisdiction or certification for arbitration, workers forfeited their right to; be readmitted to work, having abandoned their employment, and so could be validly replaced. Disini: RULES REGARDING RETURN TO WORK ORDER 1) The moment there is Presidential (or by Secretary of Labor) assumption of jurisdiction, whether a return to work order is issued or not, the return to work order is an integral part of the assumption of jurisidiction. (Sarmiento v. Tuico) 2) A return to work order does not violate the Involuntary Servitude clause (Sarmiento v. Tuico) 3) A return-to-work order must be complied with as a matter of duty not just a right. 4) A return-to-work order may be appealed but even pending appeal the returnto-work order must still be followed. 5) According to the Bagiou Colleges case: If there is doubt, take note of the duty to comply. One merely has to file a motion for clarification. TAKE NOTE: The extent of authority of the compulsory arbitration are those that may be necessary to settle the dispute. AWARDS AND ORDERS Art. 263 Strikes, picketing and lockouts.i. The Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute, as the case may be. The decision of the President, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties. Art. 277 i. To ensure speedy labor justice, the periods provided in this Code within which decisions or resolutions of labor relations cases or matters should be rendered shall be mandatory. For this purpose, a case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself, or the Labor Arbiter, or the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations or Med-Arbiter, or the Regional Director. Upon expiration of the corresponding period, a certification stating why a decision or resolution has not been rendered within the said period shall be issued forthwith by the Chairman of the Commission, the Executive Labor Arbiter, or the Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations or Med- Arbiter, or the Regional Director, as the case may be, and a copy thereof served upon the parties. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the aforesaid officials shall, without prejudice to any liability which may have been incurred as a consequence thereof, see to it that the case or matter shall be decided or resolved without any further delay. Telefunken Semi-Conductor Employees Union v. CA (2000) SOLE OFFICE OF THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS THE CORRECTION OF ERRORS OF JURISDICTION INCLUDING THE COMMISSION OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION In Meralco v. The Honorable Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing. we ruled that: The extent of judicial review over the Secretary of Labors arbitral award is not limited to a determination of grave abuse in the manner of the secretarys exercise of his statutory powers. This Court is entitled to, and must in the exercise of its judicial power review the substance of the Secretarys award when grave abuse of discretion is alleged to exist in the award, i.e., in the appreciation of and the conclusions the Secretary drew from the evidence presented. However, this Courts review of the substance does not mean a re-calibration of the evidence presented before the DOLE but only a determination of whether the Secretary of Labors award passed the test of reasonableness when he arrived at his conclusions made thereon. The main thrust of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is only the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, for this Court to properly exercise the power of judicial review over a decision of an administrative agency, such as the DOLE, it must first be shown that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has indeed acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, and that there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the absence of any showing of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction, judicial review may not be had over an administrative agencys decision. We have gone over the records of the case at bar and we see no cogent basis to hold that the Secretary of Labor has abused his discretion.

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The grant of plenary powers to the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263(g) makes it incumbent for him to bring about soonest, a fair and just solution to the differences between the employer and the employees so that the damage such labor dispute might cause upon the national interest may be minimized as much as possible, if not totally averted, by avoiding stoppage of work or any lagging of the activities of the industry or the possibility of these contingencies which might cause detriment to such national interest. On Backwages Since, as correctly found by the Secretary of Labor, the strikers were not illegally dismissed, the COMPANY is under no obligation to pay backwages to them. It is simply inconsistent, nay, absurd, to award backwages when there is no finding of illegal dismissal (Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation, 286 SCRA 245) when the record shows that the striking workers did not comply with lawful orders for them to return to work during said periods of time. In fact, the Secretary of Labor observed that while it was obligatory on the part of both parties to restore, in the meantime, the status quo obtaining in the workplace, the same was not possible considering the strikers had defied the return-to-work Order of this Office. With such blatant disregard by the strikers of official edicts ordering their temporary reinstatement, there is no basis to award them backwages corresponding to said time frames. Otherwise, they will recover something they have not or could not have earned by their willful defiance of the return-to-work order, a patently incongruous and unjust situation (Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission, 154 SCRA 166). On Award of Financial Assistance or Separation pay The same view holds with respect to the award of financial assistance or separation pay. The assumption for granting financial assistance or separation pay, which is, that there is an illegally dismissed employee and that illegally dismissed employee would otherwise have been entitled to reinstatement, is not present in the case at bench. We are of course aware that financial assistance may be allowed as a measure of social justice in exceptional circumstances and as an equitable concession. We are likewise mindful that financial assistance is allowed only in those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character o However, the attendant facts show that such exceptional circumstances do not obtain in the instant cases to warrant the grant of financial assistance to the striking workers. o To our mind, the strikers open and willful defiance of the assumption order dated September 16, 1995 constitute serious misconduct as well as reflective of their moral character, hence, granting financial assistance to them is not and cannot be justified 7. OPTION SUBMIT CASE VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION AFTER CERTIFICATION Art. 263 Strikes, picketing and lockouts. (h) Before or at any stage of the compulsory arbitration process, the parties may opt to submit their dispute to voluntary arbitration _______________________ Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union v. CA (2004) The CA based its decision on this Courts ruling in UST v. NLRC. There, the Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between striking teachers and the university. He ordered the striking teachers to return to work and the university to accept them under the same terms and conditions. However, in a subsequent order, the NLRC provided payroll reinstatement for the striking teachers as an alternative remedy to actual reinstatement. True, this Court held therein that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in providing for the alternative remedy of payroll reinstatement. This Court found that it was merely an error of judgment, which is not correctible by a special civil action for certiorari. The NLRC was only trying its best to work out a satisfactory ad hoc solution to a festering and serious problem. However, this Court notes that the UST ruling was made in the light of one very important fact: the teachers could not be given back their academic assignments since the order of the Secretary for them to return to work was given in the middle of the first semester of the academic year. The NLRC was, therefore, faced with a situation where the striking teachers were entitled to a return to work order, but the university could not immediately reinstate them since it would be impracticable and detrimental to the students to change teachers at that point in time. In the present case, there is no showing that the facts called for payroll reinstatement as an alternative remedy. A strained relationship between the striking employees and management is no reason for payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement. Petitioner correctly points out that labor disputes naturally involve strained relations between labor and management, and that in most strikes, the relations between the strikers and the non-strikers will similarly be tense. Nevertheless, the government must still perform its function and apply the law, especially if, as in this case, national interest is involved. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Secretary did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement? This question is answered by the nature of Article 263(g).

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_________________ 49. G.R. No. 89920 October 18, 1990 UNIVERSITY OF STO.TOMAS, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, UST FACULTY UNION, respondents. FACTS: The University of Sto. Tomas (UST) terminated the employment of all 16 union officers and directors of respondent UST Faculty Union on the ground that in publishing or causing to be published in Strike the libelous and defamatory attacks against the Father Rector, has committed the offenses of grave misconduct, serious disrespect to a superior and conduct unbecoming a faculty member. As a result of the dismissal of said employees, some faculty members staged mass leaves of absence and several days thereafter, disrupting classes in all levels at the University. The faculty union filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the DOLE. The labor arbiter certified the matter to the Secretary of Labor and Employment for a possible suspension of the effects of termination. Secretary Franklin Drilon subsequently issued an order suspending the termination of the 16 employees. Petitioner UST filed a motion for reconsideration. Secretary Drilon issued another order modifying his previous order, ordering UST to readmit all its faculty members under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the present dispute. The NLRC subsequently caned the parties to a conference. The respondent union filed before the NLRC a motion to implement the orders of the Honorable Secretary of Labor and Employment; while petitioner filed its opposition to the private respondent's motion. The NLRC issued a resolution, which is the subject of this petition for certiorari. ISSUES: Whether or not the order of the alternative remedies of actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement of the dismissed faculty members is proper? Whether or not the University can be required to pay full backwages of the dismissed employees? Whether or not NLRC is correct when it arrogated upon itself the exercise of the right and prerogatives reposed by law to the petitioner university in the latters capacity as employer? HELD: (1) It was held that it was error for the NLRC to order the alternative remedies of payroll reinstatement or actual reinstatement. However, the order did not amount to grave abuse of discretion. Such error is merely an error of judgment which is not correctible by a special civil action for certiorari. The NLRC was only trying its best to work out a satisfactory ad hoc solution to a festering and serious problem. The payroll reinstatement will actually minimize the petitioners problems in the payment of full backwages.

As a general rule, the State encourages an environment wherein employers and employees themselves must deal with their problems in a manner that mutually suits them best. This is the basic policy embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution, which was further echoed in Article 211 of the Labor Code. Hence, a voluntary, instead of compulsory, mode of dispute settlement is the general rule. However, Article 263(g), which allows the Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute involving an industry indispensable to the national interest, provides an exception: (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. x x x This provision is viewed as an exercise of the police power of the State. A prolonged strike or lockout can be inimical to the national economy and, therefore, the situation is imbued with public necessity and involves the right of the State and the public to self-protection. Under Article 263(g), all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. This Court must point out that the law uses the precise phrase of under the same terms and conditions, revealing that it contemplates only actual reinstatement. This is in keeping with the rationale that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be inimical to the national economy. It is clear that Article 263(g) was not written to protect labor from the excesses of management, nor was it written to ease management from expenses, which it normally incurs during a work stoppage or slowdown. It is, therefore, evident from the foregoing that the Secretarys subsequent order for mere payroll reinstatement constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Even in the exercise of his discretion under Article 236(g), the Secretary must always keep in mind the purpose of the law. Time and again, this Court has held that when official by-passes the law on the asserted ground of attaining a laudable objective, the same will not be maintained if the intendment or purpose of the law would be defeated.

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(2) A return-to-work order is immediately effective and executory despite the filing of a motion for reconsideration by the petitioner. Additionally, although the Secretary's order was modified, the return-to-work portion of the earlier order which states that "the faculty members should be admitted under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the dispute" was affirmed. Since the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC are generally accorded not only respect but even finality if such findings are supported by substantial evidence. There is no showing that such substantial evidence is not present. The reinstated faculty members' refusal to assume their substantially equivalent academic assignments does not contravene the Secretary's return-to-work order. They were merely insisting on being given actual teaching loads, on the returnto-work order being followed. It was found that their persistence justified as they are rightfully and legally entitled to actual reinstatement. Since the petitioner failed to comply with the Secretary's order of actual reinstatement, it was adjudged that the NLRC's award of backwages until actual reinstatement is correct. (3) The hiring, firing, transfer, demotion and promotion of employees are traditionally Identified as management prerogatives. However, these are not absolute prerogatives. They are subject to limitations found in law, a CBA, or general principles of fair play and justice. Article 263(g) is one such limitation provided by law. To the extent that Art. 263(g) calls for the admission of all workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike, the petitioner University is restricted from exercising its generally unbounded right to transfer or reassign its employees. The petitioner manifests the fear that if the temporarily reinstated faculty members will be allowed to handle actual teaching assignments in the classroom, the latter would take advantage of the situation by making the classroom the forum not for the purpose of imparting knowledge to the students but for the purpose of assailing and lambasting the administration. There may be a basis for such a fear. However, such a fear is speculative and does not warrant a deviation from the principle that the dismissed faculty members must be actually reinstated pending resolution of the labor dispute. ______________________________ NO DIGEST in NUWHRAIN-Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter-APL-IUF, 2008 Read the Fulltext as this is a controversial case!!! In G.R. No. 163942, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the National Union of Workers in the Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries Dusit Hotel Nikko Chapter (Union) seeks to set aside the January 19, 2004 Decision[1] and June 1, 2004 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 which affirmed the October 9, 2002 Decision [3] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02. In G.R. No. 166295, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Union seeks to nullify the May 6, 2004 Decision[4] and November 25, 2004 Resolution[5] of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 which affirmed the January 31, 2002[6] and March 15, 2002[7]Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment, Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (Secretary). Evolution of the Present Petitions The Union is the certified bargaining agent of the regular rank-and-file employees of Dusit Hotel Nikko (Hotel), a five star service establishment owned and operated by Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. located in Makati City. Chiyuki Fuijimoto and Esperanza V. Alvez are impleaded in their official capacities as the Hotel's General Manager and Director of Human Resources, respectively. On October 24, 2000, the Union submitted its Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiation proposals to the Hotel. As negotiations ensued, the parties failed to arrive at mutually acceptable terms and conditions. Due to the bargaining deadlock, the Union, on December 20, 2001, filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of the bargaining deadlock with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB), which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-12-369-01. Thereafter, conciliation hearings were conducted which proved unsuccessful. Consequently, a Strike Vote[8] was conducted by the Union on January 14, 2002 on which it was decided that the Union would wage a strike. Soon thereafter, in the afternoon of January 17, 2002, the Union held a general assembly at its office located in the Hotel's basement, where some members sported closely cropped hair or cleanly shaven heads. The next day, or on January 18, 2002, more male Union members came to work sporting the same hair style. The Hotel prevented these workers from entering the premises claiming that they violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards. In view of the Hotel's action, the Union staged a picket outside the Hotel premises. Later, other workers were also prevented from entering the Hotel causing them to join the picket. For this reason the Hotel experienced a severe lack of manpower which forced them to temporarily cease operations in three restaurants. Subsequently, on January 20, 2002, the Hotel issued notices to Union members, preventively suspending them and charging them with the following offenses: (1) violation of the duty to bargain in good faith; (2) illegal picket; (3) unfair labor practice; (4) violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards; (5) illegal strike; and (6) commission of illegal acts during the illegal strike. The next day, the Union filed with the NCMB a second Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair labor practice and violation of Article 248(a) of the Labor Code on illegal lockout, which

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was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-019-02. In the meantime, the Union officers and members submitted their explanations to the charges alleged by the Hotel, while they continued to stage a picket just inside the Hotel's compound. On January 26, 2002, the Hotel terminated the services of twenty-nine (29) Union officers and sixty-one (61) members; and suspended eighty-one (81) employees for 30 days, forty-eight (48) employees for 15 days, four (4) employees for 10 days, and three (3) employees for five days. On the same day, the Union declared a strike. Starting that day, the Union engaged in picketing the premises of the Hotel. During the picket, the Union officials and members unlawfully blocked the ingress and egress of the Hotel premises. Consequently, on January 31, 2002, the Union filed its third Notice of Strike with the NCMB which was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-01-050-02, this time on the ground of unfair labor practice and union-busting. On the same day, the Secretary, through her January 31, 2002 Order, assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, which was docketed as NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02. The Secretary's Order partly reads: WHEREFORE, in order to have a complete determination of the bargaining deadlock and the other incidents of the dispute, this Office hereby consolidates the two Notices of Strike - NCMB-NCR-NS-12-369-01 and NCMB-NCR-NS-01019-02 - and CERTIFIES the entire labor dispute covered by these Notices and the intervening events, to the NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION for compulsory arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, under the following terms: xxxx d. the Hotel is given the option, in lieu of actual reinstatement, to merelyreinstate the dismissed or suspended workers in the payroll in light of the special circumstances attendant to their reinstatement; xxxx SO ORDERED. (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to the Secretary's Order, the Hotel, on February 1, 2002, issued an Inter-Office Memorandum,[9] directing some of the employees to return to work, while advising others not to do so, as they were placed under payroll reinstatement. Unhappy with the Secretary's January 31, 2002 Order, the Union moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied per the Secretary's subsequent March 15, 2002 Order. Affronted by the Secretary's January 31, 2002 and March 15, 2002 Orders, the Union filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70778. Meanwhile, after due proceedings, the NLRC issued its October 9, 2002 Decision in NLRC NCR CC No. 000215-02, in which it ordered the Hotel and the Union to execute a CBA within 30 days from the receipt of the decision. The NLRC also held that the January 18, 2002 concerted action was an illegal strike in which illegal acts were committed by the Union; and that the strike violated the "No Strike, No Lockout" provision of the CBA, which thereby caused the dismissal of 29 Union officers and 61 Union members. The NLRC ordered the Hotel to grant the 61 dismissed Union members financial assistance in the amount of month's pay for every year of service or their retirement benefits under their retirement plan whichever was higher. The NLRC explained that the strike which occurred on January 18, 2002 was illegal because it failed to comply with the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period[10] and the seven-day strike ban,[11] as the strike occurred only 29 days after the submission of the notice of strike on December 20, 2001 and only four days after the submission of the strike vote on January 14, 2002. The NLRC also ruled that even if the Union had complied with the temporal requirements mandated by law, the strike would nonetheless be declared illegal because it was attended by illegal acts committed by the Union officers and members. The Union then filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the NLRC's Decision which was denied in the February 7, 2003 NLRC Resolution. Unfazed, the Union filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76568, and assailed both the October 9, 2002 Decision and the February 7, 2003 Resolution of the NLRC. Soon thereafter, the CA promulgated its January 19, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 which dismissed the Union's petition and affirmed the rulings of the NLRC. The CA ratiocinated that the Union failed to demonstrate that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and capriciously exercised its judgment or exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner. For this reason, the Union filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the CA, in its June 1, 2004 Resolution, denied for lack of merit. In the meantime, the CA promulgated its May 6, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 which denied due course to and consequently dismissed the Union's petition. The Union moved to reconsider the Decision, but the CA was unconvinced and denied the motion for reconsideration in its November 25, 2004 Resolution. Thus, the Union filed the present petitions.

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power and jurisdiction of the Secretary in assumption of jurisdiction cases, we now decide the issue on the merits instead of relying on mere technicalities. We held in University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor : With respect to the Secretary's Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement for the individual respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders issued by her office, the same is usually not allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work and all employers must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The phrase "under the same terms and conditions" makes it clear that the norm is actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that particular industry can be detrimental to the national interest.
[13]

The Union raises several interwoven issues in G.R. No. 163942, most eminent of which is whether the Union conducted an illegal strike. The issues presented for resolution are: -AWHETHER OR NOT THE UNION, THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61 MEMBERS MAY BE ADJUDGED GUILTY OF STAGING AN ILLEGAL STRIKE ON JANUARY 18, 2002 DESPITE RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION THAT THEY PREVENTED SAID OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK FOR ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE HOTEL'S GROOMING STANDARDS -BWHETHER OR NOT THE 29 UNION OFFICERS AND 61 MEMBERS MAY VALIDLY BE DISMISSED AND MORE THAN 200 MEMBERS BE VALIDLY SUSPENDED ON THE BASIS OF FOUR (4) SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVITS OF RESPONDENTS -CWHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS IN PREVENTING UNION OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FROM REPORTING FOR WORK COMMITTED AN ILLEGAL LOCK-OUT[12] In G.R. No. 166295, the Union solicits a riposte from this Court on whether the Secretary has discretion to impose "payroll" reinstatement when he assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes. The Court's Ruling The Court shall first dispose of G.R. No. 166295. According to the Union, there is no legal basis for allowing payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual or physical reinstatement. As argued, Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code is clear on this point. The Hotel, on the other hand, claims that the issue is now moot and any decision would be impossible to execute in view of the Decision of the NLRC which upheld the dismissal of the Union officers and members. The Union's position is untenable. The Hotel correctly raises the argument that the issue was rendered moot when the NLRC upheld the dismissal of the Union officers and members. In order, however, to settle this relevant and novel issue involving the breadth of the

Thus, it was settled that in assumption of jurisdiction cases, the Secretary should impose actual reinstatement in accordance with the intent and spirit of Art. 263(g) of the Labor Code. As with most rules, however, this one is subject to exceptions. We held in Manila Diamond Hotel Employees' Union v. Court of Appeals that payroll reinstatement is a departure from the rule, and special circumstances which make actual reinstatement impracticable must be shown. [14] In one case, payroll reinstatement was allowed where the employees previously occupied confidential positions, because their actual reinstatement, the Court said, would be impracticable and would only serve to exacerbate the situation. [15] In another case, this Court held that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it allowed payroll reinstatement as an option in lieu of actual reinstatement for teachers who were to be reinstated in the middle of the first term.[16] We held that the NLRC was merely trying its best to work out a satisfactory ad hoc solution to a festering and serious problem. [17] The peculiar circumstances in the present case validate the Secretary's decision to order payroll reinstatement instead of actual reinstatement. It is obviously impracticable for the Hotel to actually reinstate the employees who shaved their heads or cropped their hair because this was exactly the reason they were prevented from working in the first place. Further, as with most labor disputes which have resulted in strikes, there is mutual antagonism, enmity, and animosity between the union and the management. Payroll reinstatement, most especially in this case, would have been the only avenue where further incidents and damages could be avoided. Public officials entrusted with specific jurisdictions enjoy great confidence from this Court. The Secretary surely meant only to ensure industrial peace as she assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. In this case, we are not ready to substitute our own findings in the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion on her part. The issues raised in G.R. No. 163942, being interrelated, shall be

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discussed concurrently. To be determined whether legal or not are the following acts of the Union: (1) Reporting for work with their bald or cropped hair style on January 18, 2002; and (2) The picketing of the Hotel premises on January 26, 2002. The Union maintains that the mass picket conducted by its officers and members did not constitute a strike and was merely an expression of their grievance resulting from the lockout effected by the Hotel management. On the other hand, the Hotel argues that the Union's deliberate defiance of the company rules and regulations was a concerted effort to paralyze the operations of the Hotel, as the Union officers and members knew pretty well that they would not be allowed to work in their bald or cropped hair style. For this reason, the Hotel argues that the Union committed an illegal strike on January 18, 2002 and on January 26, 2002. We rule for the Hotel. Art. 212(o) of the Labor Code defines a strike as "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute." In Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. National Labor Relations Commission, we cited the various categories of an illegal strike, to wit: Noted authority on labor law, Ludwig Teller, lists six (6) categories of an illegal strike, viz.: (1) [when it] is contrary to a specific prohibition of law, such as strike by employees performing governmental functions; or (2) [when it] violates a specific requirement of law[, such as Article 263 of the Labor Code on the requisites of a valid strike]; or (3) [when it] is declared for an unlawful purpose, such as inducing the employer to commit an unfair labor practice against non-union employees; or (4) [when it] employs unlawful means in the pursuit of its objective, such as a widespread terrorism of non-strikers [for example, prohibited acts under Art. 264(e) of the Labor Code]; or (5) [when it] is declared in violation of an existing injunction[, such as injunction, prohibition, or order issued by the DOLE Secretary and the NLRC under Art. 263 of the Labor Code]; or (6) [when it] is contrary to an existing agreement, such as a no-strike clause or conclusive arbitration clause.[18] With the foregoing parameters as guide and the following grounds as basis, we hold that the Union is liable for conducting an illegal strike for the following reasons: First, the Union's violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards was clearly a deliberate and concerted action to undermine the authority of and to embarrass the Hotel and was, therefore, not a protected action. The appearances of the Hotel employees directly reflect the character and well-being of the Hotel, being a five-star hotel that provides service to top-notch clients. Being bald or having cropped hair per se does not evoke negative or unpleasant feelings. The reality that a substantial number of employees assigned to the food and beverage outlets of the Hotel with full heads of hair suddenly decided to come to work bald-headed or with cropped hair, however, suggests that something is amiss and insinuates a sense that something out of the ordinary is afoot. Obviously, the Hotel does not need to advertise its labor problems with its clients. It can be gleaned from the records before us that the Union officers and members deliberately and in apparent concert shaved their heads or cropped their hair. This was shown by the fact that after coming to work on January 18, 2002, some Union members even had their heads shaved or their hair cropped at the Union office in the Hotel's basement. Clearly, the decision to violate the company rule on grooming was designed and calculated to place the Hotel management on its heels and to force it to agree to the Union's proposals. In view of the Union's collaborative effort to violate the Hotel's Grooming Standards, it succeeded in forcing the Hotel to choose between allowing its inappropriately hair styled employees to continue working, to the detriment of its reputation, or to refuse them work, even if it had to cease operations in affected departments or service units, which in either way would disrupt the operations of the Hotel. This Court is of the opinion, therefore, that the act of the Union was not merely an expression of their grievance or displeasure but, indeed, a calibrated and calculated act designed to inflict serious damage to the Hotel's finances or its reputation. Thus, we hold that the Union's concerted violation of the Hotel's Grooming Standards which resulted in the temporary cessation and disruption of the Hotel's operations is an unprotected act and should be considered as an illegal strike. Second, the Union's concerted action which disrupted the Hotel's operations clearly violated the CBA's "No Strike, No Lockout" provision, which reads: ARTICLE XXII - NO STRIKE/WORK STOPPAGE AND LOCKOUT SECTION 1. No Strikes The Union agrees that there shall be no strikes, walkouts, stoppage or slow-down of work, boycott, refusal to handle accounts, picketing, sit-down strikes, sympathy strikes or any other form of interference and/or interruptions with any of the normal operations of the HOTEL during the life of this Agreement.

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The facts are clear that the strike arose out of a bargaining deadlock in the CBA negotiations with the Hotel. The concerted action is an economic strike upon which the afore-quoted "no strike/work stoppage and lockout" prohibition is squarely applicable and legally binding.[19] Third, the Union officers and members' concerted action to shave their heads and crop their hair not only violated the Hotel's Grooming Standards but also violated the Union's duty and responsibility to bargain in good faith. By shaving their heads and cropping their hair, the Union officers and members violated then Section 6, Rule XIII of the Implementing Rules of Book V of the Labor Code. [20] This rule prohibits the commission of any act which will disrupt or impede the early settlement of the labor disputes that are under conciliation. Since the bargaining deadlock is being conciliated by the NCMB, the Union's action to have their officers and members' heads shaved was manifestly calculated to antagonize and embarrass the Hotel management and in doing so effectively disrupted the operations of the Hotel and violated their duty to bargain collectively in good faith. Fourth, the Union failed to observe the mandatory 30-day cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban before it conducted the strike on January 18, 2002. The NLRC correctly held that the Union failed to observe the mandatory periods before conducting or holding a strike. Records reveal that the Union filed its Notice of Strike on the ground of bargaining deadlock on December 20, 2001. The 30-day cooling-off period should have been until January 19, 2002. On top of that, the strike vote was held on January 14, 2002 and was submitted to the NCMB only on January 18, 2002; therefore, the 7-day strike ban should have prevented them from holding a strike until January 25, 2002. The concerted action committed by the Union on January 18, 2002 which resulted in the disruption of the Hotel's operations clearly violated the above-stated mandatory periods. Last, the Union committed illegal acts in the conduct of its strike. The NLRC ruled that the strike was illegal since, as shown by the pictures [21] presented by the Hotel, the Union officers and members formed human barricades and obstructed the driveway of the Hotel. There is no merit in the Union's argument that it was not its members but the Hotel's security guards and the police officers who blocked the driveway, as it can be seen that the guards and/or police officers were just trying to secure the entrance to the Hotel. The pictures clearly demonstrate the tense and highly explosive situation brought about by the strikers' presence in the Hotel's driveway. Furthermore, this Court, not being a trier of facts, finds no reason to alter or disturb the NLRC findings on this matter, these findings being based on substantial evidence and affirmed by the CA.[22] Factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality, and bind us when supported by substantial evidence.[23] Likewise, we are not duty-bound to delve into the accuracy of the factual findings of the NLRC in the absence of clear showing that these were arrived at arbitrarily and/or bereft of any rational basis.[24] What then are the consequent liabilities of the Union officers and members for their participation in the illegal strike? Regarding the Union officers and members' liabilities for their participation in the illegal picket and strike, Art. 264(a), paragraph 3 of the Labor Code provides that "[a]ny union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status x x x." The law makes a distinction between union officers and mere union members. Union officers may be validly terminated from employment for their participation in an illegal strike, while union members have to participate in and commit illegal acts for them to lose their employment status. [25] Thus, it is necessary for the company to adduce proof of the participation of the striking employees in the commission of illegal acts during the strikes. [26] Clearly, the 29 Union officers may be dismissed pursuant to Art. 264(a), par. 3 of the Labor Code which imposes the penalty of dismissal on " any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike ." We, however, are of the opinion that there is room for leniency with respect to the Union members. It is pertinent to note that the Hotel was able to prove before the NLRC that the strikers blocked the ingress to and egress from the Hotel. But it is quite apparent that the Hotel failed to specifically point out the participation of each of the Union members in the commission of illegal acts during the picket and the strike. For this lapse in judgment or diligence, we are constrained to reinstate the 61 Union members. Further, we held in one case that union members who participated in an illegal strike but were not identified to have committed illegal acts are entitled to be reinstated to their former positions but without backwages. [27] We then held in G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante: With respect to backwages, the principle of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally prevented from working. While it was found that respondents expressed their intention to report back to work, the latter exception cannot apply in this case. In Philippine Marine Officer's Guild v. Compaia Maritima, as affirmed in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila

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Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the Court stressed that for this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal, a situation that does not obtain in the case at bar.[28] In this light, we stand by our recent rulings and reinstate the 61 Union members without backwages. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the CA's May 6, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 70778 is hereby AFFIRMED. The CA's January 19, 2004 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 76568 is hereby SET ASIDE. The October 9, 2002 Decision of the NLRC in NLRC NCR CC No. 00021502 is herebyAFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows: The 29 Union officials are hereby declared to have lost their employment status, to wit. The 61 Union members are hereby REINSTATED to their former positions without backwages. In view of the possibility that the Hotel might have already hired regular replacements for the afore-listed 61 employees, the Hotel may opt to pay SEPARATION PAYcomputed at one (1) month's pay for every year of service in lieu ofREINSTATEMENT, a fraction of six (6) months being considered one year of service. SO ORDERED. _____________________ YOLITO FADRIQUELAN, ET AL. VS. MONTEREY FOODS CORPORATION/MONTEREY FOODS CORPORATION V. BUKLURAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MONTEREY-ILAW, ET AL., G.R. NO. 178409/G.R. NO. 178434, JUNE 8, 2011." DOLE assumption of jurisdiction; effects. (J. Abad) A strike conducted after the Secretary of Labor has assumed jurisdiction over a labor dispute is illegal and any union officer who knowingly participates in the strike may be declared as having lost his employment. The present case involved a slowdown strike. Unlike other forms of strike, the employees involved in a slowdown do not walk out of their jobs to hurt the company. They need only to stop work or reduce the rate of their work while generally remaining in their assigned post. The Supreme Court upheld the finding that the union officers committed illegal acts that warranted their dismissal from work when they refused to work or abandoned their work to join union assemblies after the Labor Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute. __________ G.R. No. 177594 July 23, 2009 UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN, INC. Petitioners, vs. UNIVERSITY OF SAN AGUSTIN EMPLOYEES UNION- FFW, Respondent. FACTS: Petitioner forged with the University of San Agustin Employees UnionFFW a CBA effective for 5 years. Among other things, the parties agreed to include a provision on salary increases based on the incremental tuition fee increases or tuition incremental proceeds (TIP) and pursuant to Republic Act No. 6728, The Tuition Fee Law. It appears that for the School Year 2001-2002, the parties disagreed on the computation of the salary increases. Respondent refused to accept petitioners proposed across-the-board salary increase of P1,500 per month and its subtraction from the computation of the TIP of the scholarships and tuition fee discounts it grants to deserving students and its employees and their dependents. Respondent likewise rejected petitioners interpretation of the term "salary increases" as referring not only to the increase in salary but also to corresponding increases in other benefits. Respondent argued that the provision in question referred to "salary increases" alone, hence, the phrase "P1,500.00 or 80% of the TIP, whichever is higher," should apply only to salary increases and should not include the other increases in benefits received by employees. Resort to the existing grievance machinery having failed, the parties agreed to submit the case to voluntary arbitration. ISSUE: Whether or not the salary increase of P1500 or 80% of the TIP is correct? HELD: Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the 2000-20005 CBA reads: Salary Increases. The following shall be the increases under this Agreement: SY 2000-2001 P2,000.00 per month, across the board. SY 2001-2002 P1,500.00 per month or 80% of the TIP, whichever is higher, across the board. SY 2002-2003 P1,500.00 per month or 80% of the TIP, whichever is higher, across the board. (Emphasis supplied) It is a familiar and fundamental doctrine in labor law that the CBA is the law between the parties and they are obliged to comply with its provisions. If the terms of a contract, in this case the CBA, are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of their stipulations shall control. A reading of the above-quoted provision of the CBA shows that the parties agreed that 80% of the TIP or at the least the amount of P1,500 is to be allocated for individual salary increases. The CBA does not speak of any other benefits or increases which would be covered by the employees share in the TIP, except salary increases. The CBA reflects the incorporation of different provisions to cover other benefits such as Christmas bonus (Art. VIII, Sec. 1), service award (Art. VIII, Sec.5), leaves (Article IX), educational benefits (Sec.2, Art. X), medical and hospitalization benefits (Secs. 3, 4 and 5, Art. 10), bereavement

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assistance (Sec. 6, Art. X), and signing bonus (Sec. 8, Art. VIII), without mentioning that these will likewise be sourced from the TIP. Thus, petitioners belated claim that the 80% TIP should be taken to mean as covering ALL increases and not merely the salary increases as categorically stated in Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the CBA does not lie. In the present case, petitioner could have, during the CBA negotiations, opposed the inclusion of or renegotiated the provision allotting 80% of the TIP to salary increases alone, as it was and is not under any obligation to accept respondents demands hook, line and sinker. Art. 252 of the Labor Code is clear on the matter: The duty to bargain collectively means the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours, of work and all other terms and conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession. The records are thus bereft of any showing that petitioner had made it clear during the CBA negotiations that it intended to source not only the salary increases but also the increases in other employee benefits from the 80% of the TIP. Absent any proof that petitioners consent was vitiated by fraud, mistake or duress, it is presumed that it entered into the CBA voluntarily, had full knowledge of the contents thereof, and was aware of its commitments under the contract. Even a perusal of the law will show that it does not make 70% as the mandated ceiling. Unmistakably, what the law sets is the minimum, not the maximum percentage, and there is even a 10% portion the disposition of which the law does not regulate. Hence, if academic institutions wish to allot a higher percentage for salary increases and other benefits, nothing in the law prohibits them from doing so. _________________ ( Ipahabol ko lang cases sa Jurisdiction..God bless!)