National Intelligence Reforms

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 exposed severe shortcomings in our
intelligence capabilities. We did not have effective access in countries where we have no official
presence; we were unable to penetrate hard targets like terrorist organizations operating abroad
or cells established in the United States.
Our investigations have confirmed grave dysfunctions in our national security intelligence
establishment. They are of two kinds, structural and cultural.
The structural problems are the simplest to understand and their remedies straightforward. The
government agencies charged with foreign and domestic intelligence are the creatures of a
different age with laws, regulations and organization fashioned for external wars and internal
threats of the last century where strict separation of foreign and domestic activities was desired.
That legacy of nation-state focus, legislated walls and compartmentalized information cannot
deal with the kinds of transnational threats operating seamlessly at home and abroad with speed
and agility. Our most senior intelligence officials do not have authorities, access and
accountability to do what is expected of them. Nor do they have the power to make the great
organizational changes necessary to correct these problems.
The Commission therefore recommends specific sweeping organizational changes.
1. Organize the national intelligence agencies - CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO, and the FBI's
counterterrorism/counterintelligence elements - into a new structure where responsibility,
authority and accountability for the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence
are aligned under one official.
2. Array these agencies around national security missions, not collection capabilities, and
appoint senior, experienced officials from throughout the government to head these
missions (e.g., transnational terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, China,
Russia, etc.)
3. Appoint an official separate from the head of the CIA to lead this new structure with a
small executive staff; this official will recommend to the President nominees to be
appointed as the directors of the national agencies and the leaders of the national mission
areas. He/She will be the President's senior intelligence advisor, and be held accountable
for integrating the intelligence agencies into a fully integrated, global network.
4. Strengthen human source intelligence overseas through a 36-month phased national
strategy to deploy a thousand case officers to operate under non-official cover that can
facilitate greater access to those that can more effectively address transnational threats
than is accomplished through official cover.
5. Establish within the Federal Bureau of Investigation a National Security Intelligence
Service responsible for the intelligence missions of the Bureau, in particular
counterterrorism and counterintelligence. NSIS would be responsible to the Director of
the FBI and the head of national intelligence.
6. Appoint one official responsible for rationalizing the multiple personnel systems across
the national intelligence agencies and to create incentives for working across agencies on
national security missions, such as transnational terrorism.
 7. Improve information sharing while maintaining security by appointing one official to set
standards and establish protocols and be responsible for the efficient sharing of
information and to change the security culture from one of restricting information
because of a "need to know" to on that creates incentives for the "need to share."
8. Strengthen financial controls and accountability of the national intelligence agencies -
CIA, NSA, NGA, NRO and the FBI's counterterrorism/ counterintelligence elements -
by establishing one appropriation for national intelligence and appointing an official as
Chief Financial Officer for national intelligence.
9. Strengthen competitive analysis by ensuring the independence of and full access to
collection by the departmental intelligence entities of the Departments of State, Treasury,
Defense, Energy and Homeland Security; and establish an Executive Research Service to
support the National Security Council with analysis of openly available information and
by facilitating outside experts to advise the government through independent analysis of
pressing national security challenges.

To implement its recommendations, the Commission urges the President to immediately

establish, through Executive Order, an eighteen-month Intelligence Transition Task Force to
develop legislation and implement the reforms. The Task Force should include selected
commissioners from the 9/11 and Iraq commissions and a staff selected from the law
enforcement and intelligence communities. The Task Force should report to the President
through an advisory board consisting of the White House Chief of Staff, the National Security
Advisor, and the Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The Task Force would be responsible for the following:

1) Drafting legislation and/or an Executive Order to implement the reforms through the FY
2005 Intelligence Authorization Act prior to September 30, 2004;

2) Develop a detailed strategy and timeline for implementing the reforms within 12 months
of passage of the legislation; and

3) Report regularly to the board to resolve any conflicts or to elevate institutional resistance
to the reforms requiring the attention of the President.