MIDTERM CASES IN TORTS (Atty. Dizon)

Table of Contents
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES .......................................................................... 3 Professional Services vs. Agana (Captain of the Ship Doctrine) ....................... 3 Orlando Garcia doing business under Community Diagnostic Center v. Ranida Salvador and Ramon Salvador (Liability of Clinical Labs) ................................. 4 Dr Milagros Cantre vs Spouses John Go and Nora Go ..................................... 6 Dr. Rubi Lim vs. Sps. Soliman (Doctrine of Informed Consent) ........................ 7 OTHER NEGLIGENCE CASES .............................................................................. 10 Filinvest Land Inc. vs. Flood-Affected Homeowners of Meritville Alliance (No Liability on part of Developer Against Floods)............................................... 10 Corinthian Gardens Association vs Sps Tanjangco and Sps Cuaso (Liability of Developer in Cases of Encroachment) .......................................................... 12 National Power Corp. vs Heirs of Noble Casionan (Sagging Transmission Lines are Accidents Waiting to Happen) ................................................................ 13 Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy vs Li Seng Giap & Sons Inc. and Contech Construction (Contributory Negligence of A Proprietor Will Mitigate Damages by Negligent Builder) .................................................................................... 14 Norman Gaid vs People of the Philippines (Simple Negligence, Defined) ...... 15 Sps. Guanio vs. Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort Inc (Liability of Hotels in Cases of Unexpected Increase of Guests) . ................................................... 16 Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corp. vs. Wildredo de los Santos, et. al (Vicarious Liability of Employers When Their Employees Are Overspeeding) . .............. 17 Rodolfo Regala vs Federico Carin (Bad Faith, Defined).................................. 19 Albert Tison and Claudio Jabon vs Sps Pomasin, et. al (No Causal Connection Between Lack of Drivers License to a Vehicular Accident Caused by Anothers Negligent Driving.) ........................................................................................ 20
1|the ELO digests on NEGLIGENCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,

HUMAN DIGNITY and TORTS WITH INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
Spouses Fernando and Lourdes Viloria vs. Continental Air (Torts of an Agent, When They Bind the Principal) ...................................................................... 21 AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES & MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES ...................................... 24 Rogelio Nogares vs. Capitol Medical Center (Hospitals Vicarious Liability) .. 24 DEFENSES IN NEGLIGENCE CASES .................................................................... 26 Tedeorico Manzanares vs People of the Philippines ..................................... 26 HUMAN DIGNITY.............................................................................................. 28 People vs Dante Gragasin (Torts in Rape Cases) ........................................... 28 Zenaida Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines, Inc. and Emma J. Datuin (Malicious Prosecution; Torts Under Art. 26 NCC) ............................. 29 PO3 Benito Sombilon Jr vs People (Torts in Acts of Lasciviousness) ............. 31 GMA Network Inc. and Rey Vidal vs. Jesus Bustos ,M.D. et. al (Nothing Libelous in Forgetting to Say File Video) . .................................................. 32

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES

Professional Services vs. Agana (Captain of the Ship Doctrine)
Facts: Dr. Ampil (did anterior resection surgery) and Dr. Fuentes (did only hysterectomy) of Medical City operated on Natividad Agana. The operation was flawed, because the nurse recorded that two sponges were lacking despite her announcing this to the surgeon ("announced to surgeon, searched done but to no avail continue for closure). Because Natividad continued experiencing pain in her anal region, she consulted Dr Ampil and Dr Fuentes about it. Dr Ampil said that the pain is a natural consequence of the surgery. Later, Natividad went to the US to seek further treatment, but to no avail. She returned to the PH. Later her daughter removed a piece of gauze from her protruding from her vagina. Dr Ampil further told her that the pain would later subside. Natividad sought further treatment from Polymedic General Hospital, where Dr Gutierrez detected another foreign object in her vagina, a gauze, and that another surgical operation needed to be done to her to remedy the damage to her. Thus, she and her husband filed a complaint for damages vs the owner of Medical City (Professional Services Inc.), Dr Ampil and Dr Fuentes, alleging negligence for leaving 2 pieces of gauze inside her body and concealing their acts of negligence. Her husband Enrique also filed with the PRC an admin complaint vs the two doctors for gross negligence and malpractice. These were later consolidated. RTC found for the Aganas, CA affirmed. Hence this petition. Held: 1. Dr. Ampil is the negligent party. The surgeons used gauzes as sponges to control the bleeding, and immediately thereafter the nurses who assisted noted in their report that the sponge was lacking, and that such anomaly was announced to surgeon but to no avail. Later, 2 gauzes were extracted from the same spot of Natividads body. Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad about the missing two pieces of gauze. Worse, he even misled her that the pain she was experiencing was the ordinary consequence of her operation. Had he been more candid, Natividad could have taken the immediate and appropriate medical remedy to remove the gauzes from her body. To our mind, what was initially an act of negligence by Dr. Ampil has ripened into a deliberate wrongful act of deceiving his patient. 2. Dr Fuentes is cleared of any liability. It was duly established that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon (hence, captain of the ship) during the operation of Natividad. He requested the assistance of Dr. Fuentes only to perform hysterectomy when Dr. Ampil found that the malignancy in her sigmoid area had spread to her left ovary. Dr. Fuentes performed
the surgery and thereafter reported and showed his work to Dr. Ampil. The latter examined it and finding everything to be in order, allowed Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. Dr. Ampil then resumed operating on Natividad. He was about to finish the procedure when the attending nurses informed him that two pieces of gauze were missing. A "diligent search" was conducted, but the misplaced gauzes were not found. Dr. Ampil then directed that the incision be closed. During this entire period, Dr. Fuentes was no longer in the operating room and had, in fact, left the hospital. Under the "Captain of the Ship" rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. Their duty is to obey his orders.16 As stated before, Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon. In other words, he was the "Captain of the Ship." That he discharged such role is evident from his following conduct: (1) calling Dr. Fuentes to perform a hysterectomy; (2) examining the work of Dr. Fuentes and finding it in order; (3) granting Dr. Fuentes permission to leave; and (4) ordering the closure of the incision. To our mind, it was this act of ordering the closure of the incision notwithstanding that two pieces of gauze remained unaccounted for, that caused injury to Natividads body. Clearly, the control and management of the thing which caused the injury was in the hands of Dr. Ampil, not Dr. Fuentes. 3. PSI liable. Hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for consultant slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications, generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not, technically employees, x x x, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages.
Orlando Garcia doing business under Community Diagnostic Center v. Ranida Salvador and Ramon Salvador (Liability of Clinical Labs)
Ranida Salvador is a trainee in the Accounting Dept of LImay Bulk Handling Terminal Inc. As prereq for her regular employment she underwent a medical exam at CDC, where she was found suffering from Hepa B, and thus, she was terminated from her job. When she told her father Ramon about the same, he got a heart attack and was
hospitalized at Bataan Doctors Hospital, where she also took another HBs Ag test, which revealed she didnt have Hepa B. She went back to Limay, where she sought to be reinstated, and had another HBs Ag test at CDC which confirmed she didnt have Hepa B. She was reinstated. Yay! Ranida and Ramon thus filed a complaint vs Garcia and a purportedly unknown pathologist (later identified as Dr Castro) of CDC for damages, claiming that by reason of the erroneous interpretation of her medical exam she lost her job. RTC dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence. CA reversed RTC. Hence this petition. Held: CDC and Dr Castro liable. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused injury to the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence. Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate causation. All the elements are present in the case at bar. Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical Laboratory Law, provides: Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be professionally in-charge of a registered clinical laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly qualified in laboratory medicine and authorized by the Secretary of Health, such authorization to be renewed annually. No license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary of Health for the operation and maintenance of a clinical laboratory unless such laboratory is under the administration, direction and supervision of an authorized physician, as provided for in the preceding paragraph. A clinical laboratory must be administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a pathologist who is specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that the results of any examination may be released only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist.
These rules are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of substandard clinical examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised. The public demands no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory examinations through compliance with the quality standards set by laws and regulations.
We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards. Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of the HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and issued for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a reasonably prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Dr Milagros Cantre vs Spouses John Go and Nora Go
Dr Milagros Cantre is an OB-Gyne at Dr Jesus Delgado Memorial Hospital, and also the attending physician of Nora Go who gave birth to her fourth child therein. Nora suffered profuse bleeding inside her womb due to some parts of the placenta which werent completely expelled. She suffered altaprecion, and a gaping wound allegedly caused by the blood pressure cuff. Dr Cantre ordered a droplight to warm Nora and the baby. John Go took his wifey to the NBI, where the medico-legal said the wound was caused by the droplight. Later, the injury was treated by a plastic surgeon at the same hospital, the cost of which was borne by the hospital. Unfortunately, Noras arm would never be the same. Aside from the unsightly mark, the pain remained and her movements became restricted. They sued the hospital, Dr. Cantre and Dr. Abad. RTC found in favor of Spouses Go. CA affirmed with modifs on awards of damages. Hence this petition. Held: In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury, provided that the following requisites concur: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence; 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated. Whether the injury was caused by the droplight or by the blood pressure cuff is of no moment. Both instruments are deemed within the exclusive control of the physician in charge under the "captain of the ship" doctrine. This doctrine holds the surgeon in charge of an operation liable for the negligence of his assistants during the time when those assistants are under the surgeons control. In this particular case, it can be logically inferred that petitioner, the senior consultant in charge during the delivery of Noras baby, exercised control over the assistants assigned to both the use of the droplight and the taking of Noras blood pressure. Hence, the use of the droplight and the blood pressure cuff is also within petitioners exclusive control. The gaping wound on Noras left arm, by its very nature and considering her condition, could only be caused by something external to her and outside her control as she was unconscious while in hypovolemic shock. Hence, Nora could not, by any stretch of the imagination, have contributed to her own injury. Petitioners argument that the failed plastic surgery was not intended as a cosmetic procedure, but rather as a measure to prevent complication does not help her case. It does not negate negligence on her part. We note, however, that petitioner has served well as Noras obstetrician for her past three successful deliveries. This is the first time petitioner is being held liable for damages due to negligence in the practice of her profession. The fact that petitioner promptly took care of Noras wound before infection and other complications set in is also indicative of petitioners good intentions. We also take note of the fact that Nora was suffering from a critical condition when the injury happened, such that saving her life became petitioners elemental concern. Nonetheless, it should be stressed that all these could not justify negligence on the part of petitioner.
Dr. Rubi Lim vs. Sps. Soliman (Doctrine of Informed Consent)
Angelica Soliman, 11, underwent a biopsy of the mass located in her lower extremity at St Lukes Medical Center. She was suffering from highly malignant cancer of the bone. Her right leg was amputated by Dr Tamayo to remove the tumor, and she was referred to Dr. Rubi Lim, another St Lukes doctor, who is an oncologist. Angelica was again admitted to the hospital, but died 11 days later after an IV admin of her chemo. Because St Lukes refused to release her death certificate without full payment of the bills, her parents brought her
cadaver to the PNP Crime Lab for post-mortem. The cause of death was Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation. The Cert of Death of St. Lukes stated that the underlying cause of death was the cancer. Later, the parents filed a damage suit vs Dr Lim, Dr Marbella, Mr Ledesma, Dr Arriete (the three allegedly helped in the admin of the chemo drugs) and St. Lukes, charging them with negligence and disregard of Angelicas safety, health and welfare by careless administration of her chemo drugs, failure to observe the essential precautions in detecting the early symptoms of the fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the chemo, which bleeding led to the hypovolemic shock that led to Angelicas demise.
Further, it was specifically averred that petitioner assured the respondents that Angelica would recover in view of 95% chance of healing with chemotherapy (Magiging normal na ang anak nyo basta ma-chemo. 95% ang healing) and when asked regarding the side effects, petitioner mentioned only slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness (Magsusuka ng kaunti. Malulugas ang buhok. Manghihina). Respondents thus claimed that they would not have given their consent to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assured them of its side effects. Dr. Lim answered that she was not negligent in administering the chemo drugs and that she fully explained to the parents chemos effects, including the lowering of the WBC, RBC and platelets. She claimed that she explained to respondents that even when a tumor is removed, there are still small lesions undetectable to the naked eye, and that adjuvant chemotherapy is needed to clean out the small lesions in order to lessen the chance of the cancer to recur. She did not give the respondents any assurance that chemotherapy will cure Angelicas cancer. During these consultations with respondents, she explained the following side effects of chemotherapy treatment. Dr. Balmaceda (expert witness) stressed that the patient or relatives must be informed of all known side effects based on studies and observations, even if such will aggravate the patients condition. Dr. Jaime Tamayo, the orthopaedic surgeon who operated on Angelicas lower extremity, testified for the defendants. He explained that in case of malignant tumors, there is no guarantee that the ablation or removal of the amputated part will completely cure the cancer. Thus, surgery is not enough. The mortality rate of osteosarcoma at the time of modern
chemotherapy and early diagnosis still remains at 80% to 90%. On cross-examination, Dr. Tamayo stated that of the more than 50 child patients who had osteogenic sarcoma he had handled, he thought that probably all of them died within six months from amputation because he did not see them anymore after follow-up; it is either they died or had seen another doctor. RTC dismissed the complaint: she wasnt liable as she observed the best known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the admin of chemo on Angelica, but despite her best efforts the child still died. The patient in this case was afflicted with a very aggressive type of cancer, and that a wrong decision is not by itself negligence. CA modified: had Dr Lim made known to the parents the chemos side effects, including sepsis, they couldve adopted a different course of action which couldve delayed or prevented the early death of their child. Hence this petition. As to the cause of death, petitioner insists that Angelica did not die of platelet depletion but of sepsis which is a complication of the cancer itself. Sepsis itself leads to bleeding and death. She explains that the response rate to chemotherapy of patients with osteosarcoma is high, so much so that survival rate is favorable to the patient. Petitioner then points to some probable consequences if Angelica had not undergone chemotherapy. Thus, without chemotherapy, other medicines and supportive treatment, the patient might have died the next day because of massive infection, or the cancer cells might have spread to the brain and brought the patient into a coma, or into the lungs that the patient could have been hooked to a respirator, or into her kidneys that she would have to undergo dialysis. Indeed, respondents could have spent as much because of these complications. The patient would have been deprived of the chance to survive the ailment, of any hope for life and her quality of life surely compromised. Since she had not been shown to be at fault, petitioner maintains that the CA erred in holding her liable for the damages suffered by the respondents. Issue: Is Dr. Lim liable for Angelicas untimely death? Held: No. The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove that a health care provider, in
most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient. Issue: Is Dr. Lim liable for violating the informed consent doctrine? Held: No. As a physician, petitioner can reasonably expect the respondents to have considered the variables in the recommended treatment for their daughter afflicted with a life-threatening illness. On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence to respondents claim that petitioner told them of 95% chance of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner who were dealing with grave conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of chemotherapys success rate. Elements of Malpractice Based on the Doctrine of Informed Consent: (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment. The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to point to significant undisclosed information relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.
OTHER NEGLIGENCE CASES

Filinvest Land Inc. vs. Flood-Affected Homeowners of Meritville Alliance
Filinvest is the developer of Meritville Townhouse Subdivision in PulangLupa near the heavily-silted Naga River. Respondents (Floodies) are the buyers of the housing units of Filinvest in Meritville. Subsequently, the area around Meritville was developed in such a way that Meritville became a catchbasin from rains during the wet season and the waters of Naga River every time it overflows. As such, despite the pumping stations installed by Filinvest, the houses was declared as unacceptable collaterals by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation. Respondents Floodies filed with Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board a complaint vs Filinvest praying to upgrade the elevation of the
10 | t h e E L O d i g e s t s o n N E G L I G E N C E , M E D I C A L M A L P R A C T I C E ,
affected areas and to repair the units, OR to transfer them to the other flood-free housing units, allowing them to sell-back their affected units. Filinvest answered that the pumping station and its other measures were appropriate enough to control the floods in Meritville, the same being approved by the LGU of Las Pinas City. HLURB Arbiter ofund that the floods recur in the area, that the pump couldnt accommodate the volume of the flood water, and the pump was creating disturbingly loud noises. Arbiter also found that Fiinvest failed to secure the conformity of the affected homeowners before it installed its drainage system, thus, failing to observe honesty and good faith in solving the issue at bar. Thus it ruled that Filinvest should be enjoined from collecting amortizations until such time as the flooding problem is rectified; ordered Filinvest to upgrade the physical elevation of the affected streets; OR move the affected homeowners to flood-free areas; OR sell-back of the affected units. Appeal with the Board of Commissioners and the Office of the President adopted the Arbiters. CA affirmed this too. Hence this petition. Issue: Is the flooding in Meritville caused Filinvests negligence? Held: NO. Negligence is "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would do." It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the circumstances just demand, whereby that other person suffers injury. In Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Casa Montessori Internationale, we reiterated the rule that negligence is never presumed but must be proven by whoever alleges it. In determining whether or not a party acted negligently, the constant test is: "Did the defendant in doing the negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence." Why? 1. Meritville isnt the first subdivision in the area, and subsequent developments elevated the surrounding areas. Naturally, the waters from these elevated areas would flow to Meritville, though prior to these developments there was no flooding there. 2. Naga River is heavily silted and undredged, causing the flooding in Meritville. Filinvest is not liable for addressing the silting problem of the Naga River, which remains public property and responsibility of the government to address.
3. MMDA is the one which should shoulder the flooding problems, based on its charter. See RA 7924.
Corinthian Gardens Association vs Sps Tanjangco and Sps Cuaso
Sps Tanjancos and Sps Cuasos own lots 68-69 and 65, respectively, in Corinthian (wow soshal). The builders employed by Cuasos made a mistake in the measurement of the lot, and encroached the perimeter of Sps Tanjancos. No amicable settlement was reached between the parties, wherein the Tanjancos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the fence but the Cuasos didnt. Tanjancos filed with RTC a suit for recovery of possession. The Cuasos filed a third-party complaint against Corinthian, CB Paraz (the house builder) and Engr De Dios (the geodetic engineer who made the measurements). RTC ruled in favor of Tanjancos, but ordering the demolition of the fence and ruling that CB Paraz grossly negligent for not taking into account the correct boundaries of the Cuasos lot. Third party complaint vs Corinthian and Engr De Dios dismissed. CA reversed: Cuasos builders IBF, CB Paraz, Corinthian and Engr De Dios negligent. Only Corinthian filed MOR, which was denied, hence this petition. The area sought to be demolished is part of the Cuasos residence. Issue: Is there negligence on part of Corinthian in allowing the Cuasos to build on the land of the Tanjancos? Held: Yes. Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by claiming that its approval of the Cuasos building plans was only limited to a so-called "table inspection;" and not actual site measurement. To accept some such postulate is to put a premium on negligence. Corinthian was not organized solely for the defendants Cuasos. It is also the subdivision of the plaintiffs-spouses Tanjangcos - and of all others who have their dwelling units or abodes therein. Pertinently, its Manual of Rules and Regulations stipulates in Section 3 thereof (under the heading Construction). By its Manual of Rules and Regulations, it is reasonable to assume that Corinthian, through its representative, in the approval of building plans, and in the conduct of periodic inspections of on-going construction projects within the subdivision, is responsible in insuring compliance with the approved plans, inclusive of the construction of perimeter walls, which in this case is the subject of dispute between the Tanjangcos and the Cuasos. It is not just or equitable to relieve Corinthian of any liability when, by its very own rules, it imposes its authority over all its members to the end that "no new construction can be started unless the plans are approved by the Association and the appropriate cash bond and pre-construction
fees are paid." Moreover, Corinthian can impose sanctions for violating these rules. Thus, the proposition that the inspection is merely a "table inspection" and, therefore, should exempt Corinthian from liability, is unacceptable. After all, if the supposed inspection is merely a "table inspection" and the approval granted to every member is a mere formality, then the purpose of the rules would be defeated. Compliance therewith would not be mandatory, and sanctions imposed for violations could be disregarded. Corinthian's imprimatur on the construction of the Cuasos' perimeter wall over the property of the Tanjangcos assured the Cuasos that everything was in order. In sum, Corinthians failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos perimeter wall into Tanjangcos property despite the inspection conducted constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury suffered by the Tanjangcos.
National Power Corp. vs Heirs of Noble Casionan (Sagging Transmission
Lines case) Noble Casionan, 19, an unlicensed pocket miner in Itogon, Benguet was on his way to the mine using the trail leading to it. Thereon was built high-tension electrical transmission lines which sagged and dangled 810 feet from the ground. The leaders of Itogon had made written and verbal requests to the NPC re sagging lines posing a danger to the miners, which fell on deaf ears. One day, Noble and another miner, both carrying bamboo poles for their pocket mining, were walking on the trail when the pole Noble was carrying touched the dangling line. He was electrocuted, and died. The police who inspected the area saw no danger warning signs. It was only after this incident that the NPC repaired the sagging lines and put warning signs in the area. The NPC averred that Noble died due to his own negligence. RTC, CA held NPC liable. Held: Noble died from the electrocution by the high tension wires. The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As established during trial, the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the transmission lines were properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble would not have touched the wires. He would not have been electrocuted. Nor was there contributory negligence on his part. Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is contributory negligence when the partys act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. In Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. In said case, the allegation of contributory negligence on the part of the injured party who violated traffic regulations when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon was struck down. That the pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for petitioner to leave their transmission lines dangling. (i.e. walang kunek ang pagiging unlicensed miner sa negligence ng NPC re sagging lines.)
Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy vs Li Seng Giap & Sons Inc. and Contech Construction
Spouses Ngo Sin Sing and Ticia Dy Ngo owned a lot in Binondo, decided to construct a 5-storey building thereon, the NSS. They hired Contech for the project. Adjacent to their lot was the Li Seng Giap Building (LSG Building) owned by respondent. During the construction of NSS, the respondent received complaints from their tenants about defects in the LSG Buildingcracks on the floor, bent steel door, concrete slabs falling down, distorted window frames. The LSG Building later became unsafe for occupation. Later, Li Seng Giap consulted engineers, ES de Castro PhD and Associates, which concluded that the LSG Building was unsafe for occupation and urged its demolition. The cause of that was the excavation during the construction of the NSS Building. Thereafter, petitioners and Contech were sued by respondents. Trial court found defendants negligent but plaintiff also with contributory negligence because the LSG Building was originally a 2-storey building that added 2 more floors without the proper reinforcements for its structural integrity. CA affirmed. Hence this petition.
Held: Contributory negligence on part of LSG. The building was supposed to be only 2 storeys. Verily, the foundation of the LSG Building which was good to support only two floors remained the same and could not support the weight of the present 4-storey building. Adding more floors without touching or reinforcing the building's bottom line or foundation are already manifestive of some negligence or ignorance on the part of said building owner. x x x Had plaintiff stuck to his original building 2-storey with its kind of foundation, the excavation by its adjacent neighbor would not matter much or affect the building in question at the outset. Negligence on part of Contech-- Contech failed to observe his procedure of providing lateral and subjacent support prior to excavation. Contech's negligence was the proximate cause of the damage. Construction is a field requiring technical expertise. The petitioners, as ordinary laymen, would understandably have no knowledge at all about the technical aspect of constructing a building. This was precisely the reason why they contracted the services of a reputable construction firm to undertake the project. Petitioners had every right to rely on the warranties and representations of their contractor.
Norman Gaid vs People of the Philippines (Simple Negligence)
Norman Gaid was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to homicidedriving a passenger jeep and running over and killing Michael Dayata. Gaid was driving his jeep along a 2-lane road near the Laguindingan National HS, and students were coming out of it. Dayata was siting near a store on the left side of the road, and hailed Gaids jeep. Neither the driver nor the conductor see anybody hail the jeep. Next thing the witness saw, Dayatas feet were pinned to the rear wheel of the jeep, lying down on the ground. The first hospital where he was rushed was closed; the second pronounced him dead on arrival. HELD: NOT LIABLE. The prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victims death was petitioners alleged negligence. In this case, the courts below zeroed in on the fact that petitioner did not stop the jeepney when he felt the bouncing of his vehicle, a circum-stance which the appellate court equates with negligence. Petitioner contends that he did not immediately stop because he did not see anybody go near his vehicle at the time of the incident. In an American case, Hernandez v. Lukas, a motorist traveling within the speed limit and did all was possible to avoid striking a child who was then six years old only. The place of the incident was a neighborhood where children were playing in the parkways on prior occasions. The
court ruled that it must be still proven that the driver did not exercise due care. The evidence showed that the driver was proceeding in lawful manner within the speed limit when the child ran into the street and was struck by the drivers vehicle. Clearly, this was an emergency situation thrust upon the driver too suddenly to avoid. If at all again, petitioners failure to render assistance to the victim would constitute abandonment of ones victim punishable under Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the omission is not covered by the information. Thus, to hold petitioner criminally liable under the provision would be tantamount to a denial of due process Simple negligence. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The elements of simple negligence: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Sps. Guanio vs. Makati Shangri-La Hotel & Resort Inc.
For their wedding, Sps Guanio booked at the Makati Shangri-La Hotel. They claimed that during the reception, the guests complained of delay in service of the food, the salmon were small and didnt correspond to the ones in the food tasting, and that they were compelled to pay for their drinks despite the open bar agreement. Thus, despite receiving a letter of apology from the hotel, they filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages before the RTC Makati. In their answer, the hotel alleged that the reason for the delay was the spiking up of the guest list from 370 max to 480. RTC found for the Sps Guanio, relying on the apology letter that said that the hotel disappointed the spouses. CA reversed RTC, holding that
the proximate cause of the injury was the unexpected increasein the guests, entirely attributable to the Sps Guanio. Hence this petition. Held: Hotel partially liable. The Court recognizes that every person is entitled to the respect of his dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. The hotels lack of prudence is an affront to this right. The hotel could have managed the situation better, it being held in high esteem in the hotel and service industry, and in light of its vast experience. It is safe to presume that this isnt the first time that it encountered booked events that exceeded the guaranteed cover. It is not audacious to expect that certain measures have been placed in case this predicament cropped up. However, there is contributory negligence on part of the Sps Guanio. In their contract: 5. The Engager must inform the Hotel (WHICH THEY DIDNT DO) at least forty eight (48) hours before the scheduled date and time of the Function of any change in the minimum guaranteed covers. In case the actual number of attendees exceed the minimum guaranteed number by ten percent (10%), the HOTEL shall not in any way be held liable for any damage or inconvenience which may be caused thereby. The ENGAGER shall also undertake to advise the guests of the situation and take positive steps to remedy the same. Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
Filipinas Synthetic Fiber Corp. vs. Wildredo de los Santos, et. al.
Teresa Elena, wife of WIlfredo de los Santos, performed at the Rizal Theater. Armando, husband of Carmina, went there to fetch Teresa. Two other cast members of the play rode with them. Around 11:30 PM while travelling along Katipunan, they collided with a Filipinas Synthetic shuttlebus driven by Mejia. Armandos Galant car burst into flame as a result and all therein died. Mejia was sued for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property. RTC, CA decided in favor of the respondents. Hence this petition. HELD: FilSyn and Mejia solidarily liable. Mejia was running really fast along EDSA when he saw the vehicle on the opposite side turn left suddenly towards White Plains. Mejia was driving at a speed beyond the rate of speed required by law, specifically Section 35 of Republic Act No. (RA) 4136. Given the circumstances, the allowed rate of speed for Mejia's vehicle was 50 kilometers per
hour, while the records show that he was driving at the speed of 70 kilometers per hour. Under the New Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. Apparently, in the present case, Mejia's violation of the traffic rules does not erase the presumption that he was the one negligent at the time of the collision. Even apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid injury to others using the highway. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee. Due diligence in the supervision of employees on the other hand, includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions. In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such presumption.
Rodolfo Regala vs Federico Carin
Magkapitbahay ang dalawang bugok in BF Resort Village, Las Pinas City. When Regala decided to renovate his bungalow by constructing a second floor, he under the guise of merely building an extension to his residence approached Carin for permission to bore a hole thru their perimeter wall, to which Carin verbally consented on condition that Regala should clean the area affected by the work. Regalas real intention was to build a second floor with a terrace atop the dividing wall. In the course of the construction, Carin and his wife suffered from the dust and dirt that fell on their property, and because Regala failed to address this problem, the Carins filed a letter-complaint with the City Engineer and Building Official of Las Pinas City. He likewise made sumbong with the Barangay for encroachment, rampant invasion of privacy, and damages arising from the construction, and for illegal construction of scaffoldings inside Carins property; instead of boring just one hole as agreed upon, Regala demolished the entire wall for the purpose of constructing a second floor with terrace, and that the debris and dust piled upon Carins property ruined his garden and forced him to shut his windows. RTC found for Carin, holding that Regala knowingly commenced his houses renovation sans the requisite building permit, and misrepresented to Carin his true intentionsinstead of boring one hole in the perimeter wall, he divided it to serve as foundation for his firewall and the second storey of his house. Furthermore, the Carin family had to contend with the noise, dust and debris of the construction, and Regala didnt clean up as he promised. Applying Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts, the trial court ruled that petitioner was at fault and negligent for failing to undertake sufficient safety measures to prevent inconvenience and damage to respondent to thus entitle respondent to moral and exemplary damages. CA affirmed this with modifications to the damages. HELD: Carin failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained were the proximate effect of Regalas act or omission. Regala was engaged in the lawful exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his house. While he didnt have a building permit and may have misrepresented his true intent when he sought Carins consent, the lack of permit is inconsequential since it rendered Regala liable to admin sanctions or penalties. Moreover, the perimeter wall was within Regalas property, and that he took measures to prevent debris from falling into Carins property such as installations of GI sheet strainers, scaffoldings, etc. Regalas
construction workers also duly cleaned up the area before leaving at 5PM, until animosity developed between the parties. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. While the Court harbors no doubt that the incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to respondent, it is unconvinced that the damage inflicted upon respondents property was malicious or willful, an element crucial to merit an award of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.
Albert Tison and Claudio Jabon vs Sps Pomasin, et. al. (No causal
connection between lack of drivers license to a vehicular accident caused by anothers negligent driving.)
A tractor-trailer and a jeepney (jitney, lol) collided in Maharlika Highway I Alabay. Laarni was driving the jeep towards the direction of Legaspi City while Jabons tractor-trailer was driving on the opposite direction towards Naga City. Multiple deaths and injury resulted. Respondents, who rode the jeep, alleged that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of the petitioners. Petitioners contend that it was the Pomasins driver Laarnis negligence which was the proximate cause. RTC considered that Laarni (jeep) caused the accident. CA reversed, it was Jabons (tractor-trailer) fault because he was speeding, and Tison, the employer, was also at fault. Issue: Who is at fault? Held: The jeep was negligent, despite the tractor driver not having a license to drive, because there is no causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. In the case at bar, there is no causal connection between the tractor trailer drivers restriction on his license to the vehicular collision. The fact that the jitney easily fell into the road shoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial courts conclusion that the jitney was indeed going downhill which, it may be repeated, was the original testimony of Gregorio that the road was curving and downward.[25] It is this conclusion, prodded by the inconsistency of Gregorios testimony, that gives credence to the further testimony of Jabon that the herein
respondents jitney, loaded with passengers with top-load was running in a zigzag manner.[26] Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control of the jitney, which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit the tractor-trailer. There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its size and the weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney which was running downhill in a zigzagging manner. Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it can be argued that Jabon should have swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging before it collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though, happen in an instant, and, understandably in this case, leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to maneuver a vehicle the size of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill.
Spouses Fernando and Lourdes Viloria vs. Continental Air
While in the US, Fernando bought 2 roundtrip tickets for himself and his wifey from San Diego, CA to Newark, NJ from a travel agency (Holiday Travel) and attended by a certain Mager. Mager informed them that there were no seats at Amtrak. Subsequently, Fernando requested Mager to reschedule their flight to Newark to an earlier date via Continental Air, but because it was fully booked the alternative was Frontier Air, which cost more. Fernando then opted for a refund. Mager denied this as the tickets were non-refundable and Continental Air can only offer the reissuance of new tickets within 1 year from the date of the purchase of the tickets. Fernando then decided to reserve 2 seats with Frontier Air. Later, Fernando discovered that Mager misprepresented that Amtrak was fully booked, and reiterated his demand for a refund. Mager was firm that the tickets were non-refundable. Upon return to the PH in 1998, Fernando wrote Continental Air demanding a refund and alleging that Mager had deluded them into purchasing the subject tickets. Continental Micronesia denied his request and advised him that he may take the subject tickets to any Continental ticketing location for the reissuance of new tickets within 2 years; the subject tickets may be used as a form of payment for the purchase of another Continental ticket, albeit with a re-issuance fee.
Fernando then went to Continental ticketing at Ayala to have a single roundtrip ticket to Los Angeles, CA, where he was informed that Lourdes ticket was non-transferable. Irked, he demanded the refund of the tickets as he no longer wished them replaced. In addition to the dubious circumstances under which the tickets were issued, he claimed that Continentals act of charging him with US$1k for a roundtrip ticket to Los Angeles and refusal to allow him to use his wifes ticket is a breach of the 1998 undertaking. The spouses filed a complaint vs Continental, praying for the refund of the value of the tickets, with legal interest, as well as moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees. Continental interposed the following defenses: (a) Spouses Viloria have no right to ask for a refund as the subject tickets are non-refundable; (b) Fernando cannot insist on using the ticket in Lourdes name for the purchase of a round trip ticket to Los Angeles since the same is non-transferable; (c) as Mager is not a CAI employee, CAI is not liable for any of her acts; (d) CAI, its employees and agents did not act in bad faith as to entitle Spouses Viloria to moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Moreover, the tickets were non-transferable and non-refundable, as printed on them. RTC held that the Sps Viloria are entitled to a refund in view of Magers misrepresentation in obtaining their consent in the purchase of the tickets. Citing Articles 1868 and 1869 of the Civil Code, the RTC ruled that Mager is CAIs agent, hence, bound by her bad faith and misrepresentation. As far as the RTC is concerned, there is no issue as to whether Mager was CAIs agent in view of CAIs implied recognition of her status as such in its March 24, 1998 letter. Furthermore, the RTC ruled that CAI acted in bad faith in reneging on its undertaking to replace the subject tickets within two (2) years from their date of issue when it charged Fernando with the amount of US$1,867.40 for a round trip ticket to Los Angeles and when it refused to allow Fernando to use Lourdes ticket. CA reversed RTC. Spouses Viloria, who have the burden of proof to establish the fact of agency, failed to present evidence demonstrating that Holiday Travel is CAIs agent. Furthermore, contrary to Spouses Vilorias claim, the contractual relationship between Holiday Travel and CAI is not an agency but that of a sale. The CA also ruled that refund is not available to Spouses Viloria as the word non-refundable was clearly printed on the face of the subject tickets, which constitute their contract with CAI. Therefore, the grant of their prayer for a refund would violate the proscription against impairment of contracts. Hence this petition.
Held: 1. There is an agent-principal relationship between Holiday Travel and Continental. CAI never refuted that it gave Holiday Travel the power and authority to conclude contracts of carriage on its behalf. As clearly extant from the records, CAI recognized the validity of the contracts of carriage that Holiday Travel entered into with Spouses Viloria and considered itself bound with Spouses Viloria by the terms and conditions thereof; and this constitutes an unequivocal testament to Holiday Travels authority to act as its agent. This Court cannot therefore allow CAI to take an altogether different position and deny that Holiday Travel is its agent without condoning or giving imprimatur to whatever damage or prejudice that may result from such denial or retraction to Spouses Viloria, who relied on good faith on CAIs acts in recognition of Holiday Travels authority. 2. Continental is not completely exonerated from any liability from the tort committed by its agents employee. Therefore, without a modicum of evidence that Continental exercised control over Holiday Travels employees or that Continental was equally at fault, no liability can be imposed on it for Magers supposed misrepresentation. 3. Spouses Viloria arent entitled to a refund. Magers misrepresentation is not a causal fraud that would justify the annulment of contract that would oblige Continental to indemnify the Vilorias and return their money. The misrepresentation constituting the fraud must be established by full, clear, and convincing evidence, and not merely by a preponderance thereof. The deceit must be serious. The fraud is serious when it is sufficient to impress, or to lead an ordinarily prudent person into error; that which cannot deceive a prudent person cannot be a ground for nullity. The circumstances of each case should be considered, taking into account the personal conditions of the victim. 4. Assuming the contrary, the Sps Viloria are deemed to have ratified the contracts when they decided to exercise their right to use the subject tickets for the purchase of new ones. 5. Contracts cannot be rescinded for a slight or casual breach. Continentals refusal to accept Lourdes ticket for the purchase of a new ticket for Fernando is only a casual breach. Therefore, CAIs liability for damages for its refusal to accept Lourdes ticket for the purchase of Fernandos round trip ticket is offset by Spouses Vilorias liability for their refusal to pay the amount, which is not covered by the subject tickets. Moreover, the contract between them remains, hence, CAI is duty bound to issue new tickets for a destination chosen by Spouses Viloria upon their surrender of the subject tickets
and Spouses Viloria are obliged to pay whatever amount is not covered by the value of the subject tickets.
AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES & MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES

Rogelio Nogares vs. Capitol Medical Center
Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon, 37, was under the exclusive prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as December 1975. Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and her hubby Rogelio Nogales to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center at 6:13 a.m., Corazon started to experience convulsions. At 6:22 a.m., Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to extract Corazon's baby. In the process, a 1.0 x 2.5 cm. piece of cervical tissue was allegedly torn. At 6:27 a.m., Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse. Corazon died at 9:15 a.m. The cause of death was "hemorrhage, post partum. Case was filed vs CMC and Drs Estrada, Villaflor, Uy, Enriquez, Lacson, Espinola and a nurse for the death of Corazon. RTC found only Dr. Estrada liable for damages. The victim was under his pre-natal care, apparently, his fault began from his incorrect and inadequate management and lack of treatment of the pre-eclamptic condition of his patient. It is not disputed that he misapplied the forceps in causing the delivery because it resulted in a large cervical tear which had caused the profuse bleeding which he also failed to control with the application of inadequate injection of magnesium sulfate by his assistant Dra. Ely Villaflor. Dr. Estrada even failed to notice the erroneous administration by nurse Dumlao of hemacel by way of side drip, instead of direct intravenous injection, and his failure to consult a senior obstetrician at an early stage of the problem. On the part however of Dra. Ely Villaflor, Dra. Rosa Uy, Dr. Joel Enriquez, Dr. Lacson, Dr. Espinola, nurse J. Dumlao and CMC, the Court finds no legal justification to find them civilly liable. On the part of Dra. Ely Villaflor, she was only taking orders from Dr. Estrada, the principal physician of Corazon Nogales. She can only make suggestions in the manner the patient maybe treated but she cannot impose her will as to do so would be to substitute her good judgment to that of Dr. Estrada. If she failed to correctly diagnose the true cause of the bleeding which in this case appears to be a cervical laceration, it
cannot be safely concluded by the Court that Dra. Villaflor had the correct diagnosis and she failed to inform Dr. Estrada. No evidence was introduced to show that indeed Dra. Villaflor had discovered that there was laceration at the cervical area of the patient's internal organ. Petitioners appealed the trial court's decision. Petitioners claimed that aside from Dr. Estrada, the remaining respondents should be held equally liable for negligence. Petitioners pointed out the extent of each respondent's alleged liability. CA: Citing other American cases, the Court of Appeals further held that the mere fact that a hospital permitted a physician to practice medicine and use its facilities is not sufficient to render the hospital liable for the physician's negligence. A hospital is not responsible for the negligence of a physician who is an independent contractor. The Court of Appeals concluded that since Rogelio engaged Dr. Estrada as the attending physician of his wife, any liability for malpractice must be Dr. Estrada's sole responsibility. Dr. Estrada no longer appealed. Issue: Is the hospital CMC vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr Estrada? On the other hand, CMC disclaims liability by asserting that Dr. Estrada was a mere visiting physician and that it admitted Corazon because her physical condition then was classified an emergency obstetrics case. CMC alleges that Dr. Estrada is an independent contractor "for whose actuations CMC would be a total stranger." CMC maintains that it had no control or supervision over Dr. Estrada in the exercise of his medical profession. HELD: Hospital liable. Hospitals exercise significant control in the hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the hospital premises. Doctors who apply for "consultant" slots, visiting or attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their educational qualifications; generally, evidence of accreditation by the appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who either accept or reject the application. This is particularly true with respondent hospital. While "consultants" are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In
assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria potestas. The doctrine of apparent authority is a species of the doctrine of estoppel. Article 1431 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]hrough estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Estoppel rests on this rule: "Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it." In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff. Through CMC's acts, CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr. Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority.
DEFENSES IN NEGLIGENCE CASES

Tedeorico Manzanares vs People of the Philippines
Around 2:30 PM in January 1983, vehicular head-on collision involving a six-wheeler truck owned by Manhattan Enterprises driven by Manzanares, and a passenger jeep owned by Teodoro Basallo. It resulted in the deaths and physical injuries to some of the passengers of the jeep. The civil cases filed vs Manzanares alleged that he drove the truck in a grossly negligent, reckless, careless and imprudent manner without due regard to traffic rules and ordinances. As for Manhattan Enterprises, the complaints alleged that they failed to exercise DOAGFOAF in the selection and supervision of their employee Manzanares. Basallo was sued on breach of contract of carriage. Petitioners insist that the prosecution failed to discharge its duty of establishing petitioner Manzanares guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the decisions both of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals were
based only on mere assumptions. They pointed out that if it were true that petitioner Manzanares swerved farther to the left of the highway while he was overtaking, as found by the trial court, then, there was no reason why it still ended up on the asphalted portion of the highway. Moreover, they claim that petitioner Manzanares exercised caution before he proceeded to overtake the passenger jeepney on his side of the road by making sure that there was no oncoming vehicle on the opposite side of the highway. It was only after petitioner Manzanares was certain that he could successfully overtake that he did so but Jesus Basallo suddenly and unexpectedly maneuvered his passenger jeepney into the highway forcing petitioner Manzanares to apply the brakes of his truck. Unfortunately, the Isuzu truck skidded and rammed into the passenger jeepney driven by Jesus Basallo. Petitioners also maintain that at the time of the incident, the passenger jeepney owned by Teodoro Basallo was not covered by any franchise to operate and that Jesus Basallo was driving with an expired license. Thus, under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, Jesus Basallo is presumed negligent. Trial court found Manzanares guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical injuries and damage to property. CA affirmed this. HELD: Petition unmeritorious. Manzanares was caught by surprise when the passenger jeepney he intended to overtake started moving alongside him causing him to hesitate and to step on his brakepedal. But as he was running at such a fast pace, the momentum of the Isuzu truck overpowered his brakes such that the truck still continued with its motion until it bumped the passenger jeepney driven by Jesus Basallo right at the edge of the asphalted portion of the highway. The location of the debris, as illustrated by the sketch prepared by Patrolman Macapagal, and his testimony confirm that there were more pieces of broken glass on the shoulder of the road than there were on the highway itself. Evidence tending to illustrate the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the accident tends to throw light on the issue of speed and direction of the vehicles movements prior to, and at the same time of, the accident. As to petitioners argument that Jesus Basallo should be presumed negligent because he was driving with an expired license and the passenger jeepney owned by his brother Teodorico did not have a franchise to operate, we hold that the same fails to convince. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.
HUMAN DIGNITY
People vs Dante Gragasin
BBB, AAAs mother, narrated that at around 9:00 oclock in the evening of 23 September 2001, AAA, then 9 years old, sought permission from her so she could go to her grandmothers house to see the dress AAA was going to wear during the fiesta. BBBs house was about 50 meters away from her grandmothers house. After some time and AAA had not returned home, BBB followed her daughter to the house of her motherin-law and saw her daughter in the kitchen "jumping and putting on her short pants." BBB then saw accused-appellant, a helper in said house, lying on his bed totally naked and pretending to be asleep. By that time, AAA had already run out of the house. Thereafter, BBB went out to ask the help of a councilwoman in XXX and Omar Saturno, a policeman from XXX, and asked them to go check on the appearance of accusedappellant who was totally naked, and the appearance of AAA. Saturno tried but failed to contact the police station. Afterwards, they proceeded to BBBs house where BBB asked her daughter AAA what happened to her. In the presence of the councilwoman and the policeman, AAA narrated that she was raped by accused-appellant. Because they could not reach the police station as it was nighttime already, the policeman advised them to wait until the next morning to have accused-appellant summoned by the barangay officials. BBB and her husband CCC controlled their urge to confront and kill the accused, and decided to leave him alone so he would not escape. RTC found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape. CA affirmed. Hence this appeal where accused poses as defense that since there is no sperm found in the victim, there is no rape. Held: Accused-appellants contention that there can be no consummated rape, considering the absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina, is of no merit. The absence of spermatozoa does not negate the conclusion that it was his penis that was inserted into the victim's vagina. Jurisprudence is replete with examples where, despite the absence of spermatozoa, the accused was still found guilty of consummated rape. People v. Dones held that the important consideration in rape cases is not the emission of semen, but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. In People v. Bato, this Court affirmed that the presence or absence of spermatozoa is immaterial in a prosecution for rape, the important consideration not being the emission of semen, but the unlawful penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ. Similarly, this Court stressed in People v. Arivan that the absence of spermatozoa in the private complainant's sex organ does not disprove rape. It could be that the victim washed or urinated prior to her examination, which may well explain the absence of spermatozoa.
Zenaida Gregorio vs. Court of Appeals, Sansio Philippines, Inc. and Emma J. Datuin
Emma J. Datuin and Sansio Philippines, Inc. filed an affidavit of complaint for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio, proprietor of Alvi Marketing, for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for appliances Alvi Marketing bought from Sansio. Gregorio was then indicted for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before MTC, which issued a warrant of arrest. Gregorio was subsequently arrested by armed operatives while visiting her family house in Quezon City. Gregorio filed before the MTC a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation. She alleged that she could not have issued the bounced checks as she did not have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn, which was certified by the manager of the bank. Gregorio also alleged that the signature on the bounced checks were radically and patently different from her own signature. Subsequently, the MTC ordered the B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed. Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin before the RTC: as a result of her wrongful arrest and arraignment, she suffered helplessness, hunger and humiliation and being distraught. Datuin and Sansio meanwhile filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that Gregorios complaint arose from grounds of compensation arising from malicious prosecution. RTC denied this Motion to Dismiss. Sansio and Datuin then filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was again denied in January 5, 2001. They went to the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the presiding judge of the RTC in denying their motions to dismiss and for reconsideration. On January 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision granting the petition and ordering Gregorios damage suit to be dismissed. RTC ruled in favor of Gregorio, on her action for damages based on quasi-delict but not on malicious prosecution. CA ordered the dismissal of the HELD: In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond; (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred; and (4) that there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties.
On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind. A scrutiny of Gregorios civil complaint reveals that the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill the elements of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code. Gregorios rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Pearanda St., Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and Sansio. Gregorio is filing vs Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin. These allegations, assuming them to be true, sufficiently constituted a cause of action against Sansio and Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct when it denied respondents motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: Is there malicious prosecution? HELD: NO. Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insist that Gregorios complaint is based on malicious prosecution. In an action to recover damages for malicious prosecution, it must be alleged and established that Sansio and Datuin were impelled by legal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating an action against Gregorio, knowing that the charges were false and groundless, intending to vex and humiliate her.
As previously mentioned, Gregorio did not allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the fact that she prayed for moral damages did not change the nature of her action based on quasi-delict. She might have acted on the mistaken notion that she was entitled to moral damages, considering that she suffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation on account of her indictment and her sudden arrest. Verily, Gregorio was only acting within her right when she instituted against Sansio and Datuin an action she perceived to be proper, given the factual antecedents of the case. Thus, no malicious prosecution.
PO3 Benito Sombilon Jr vs People
Sambilon allegedly took AAA, 15, into a room while investigating a theft case involving a necklace owned by one Aileen Dagoc, where she was electrocuted to force her into admitting the theft, and was molested: she was fondled on her breasts, belly and private parts. AAA was later taken by her mother to a medical clinic where Dr Garcia gave her a tranquilizer to help her calm down. Petitioner was thus charged with Acts of Lasciviousness. RTC found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed this. Petitioner poses the defense that he merely touched the victim, and this mere act of touching didnt constitute lewdness. At most, he says, he could only be convicted of unjust vexation. HELD: Liable for acts of lasciviousness. ART. 336. Acts of lasciviousness.- Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional. Elements: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; and (2) that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation; (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age. The term lewd is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of which can be inferred by overt acts
carrying out such intention, i.e., by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a precise definition. Undoubtedly, petitioner committed acts which fall within the above described lascivious conduct. It cannot be viewed as mere unjust vexation as petitioner would have the Court do. The intention of petitioner was intended neither to merely annoy or irritate the victim nor to force her to confess the theft. He could have easily achieved that when he electrocuted the latter. Petitioner intended to gratify his sexual desires. As found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, petitioners acts of kissing the victim, fondling her breasts and touching her private parts constitute lascivious conduct intended to quench his salacious desire. Petitioners lewd intent was betrayed when he asked AAA, Dalaga ka na ba? as a prelude to his lustful advances on the victim, and thereafter conveyed to her that I am single too.
GMA Network Inc. and Rey Vidal vs. Jesus Bustos ,M.D. et. al.
Libel suit vs GMA and newscaster Rey Vidal, who covered the petition for mandamus filed by unsuccessful examinees led by Abello of the Physicians Licensure Exams before the RTC to compel the PRC to recheck their test papers. Respondents allege that as a measure to make a forceful impact on their audience, the defendants made use of an unrelated and old footage (showing physicians wearing black armbands) to make it appear that other doctors were supporting and sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees. According to the plaintiffs, the video footage in question actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by doctors and personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding wage and economic dispute with hospital management. ISSUE 1: If the footage without the caption file video is libelous. HELD: No. In the instant case, there can be no quibbling that what petitioner corporation aired in its Channel 7 in the February 10, 1988 late evening newscast was basically a narration of the contents of the aforementioned petition for mandamus. This is borne by the records of the case and was likewise the finding of the trial court. And the narration had for its subject nothing more than the purported
mistakes in paper checking and the errors in the counting and tallying of the scores in the August 1987 physicians licensure examinations attributable to the then chairman and members of the Board of Medicine. Conceding hypothetically that some failing specifically against the respondents had been ascribed in that news telecast, it bears to stress that not all imputations of some discreditable act or omission, if there be any, are considered malicious thus supplying the ground for actionable libel. For, although every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered privileged. In fine, the privilege destroys the presumption. Actual malice, as a concept in libel, cannot plausibly be deduced from the fact of petitioners having dubbed in their February 10, 1988 telecast an old unrelated video footage. As it were, nothing in the said footage, be it taken in isolation or in relation to the narrated Vidal report, can be viewed as reputation impeaching; it did not contain an attack, let alone a false one, on the honesty, character or integrity or like personal qualities of any of the respondents, who were not even named or specifically identified in the telecast. It has been said that if the matter is not per se libelous, malice cannot be inferred from the mere fact of publication. And as records tend to indicate, the petitioners, particularly Vidal, do not personally know or had dealings with any of the respondents. The Court thus perceives no reason or motive on the part of either petitioner for malice. The respondents too had failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioners were animated by a desire to inflict them unjustifiable harm or at least to place them in a discomforting light. ISSUE 2: If the insertion of the old film footage depicting the doctors and personnel of PGH in their 1982 demonstrations constitutes malice to warrant the award of damages to the respondents. HELD: NO. An award of damages under the premises presupposes the commission of an act amounting to defamatory imputation or libel, which, in turn, presupposes malice. Libel is the public and malicious imputation to another of a discreditable act or condition tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person. Elements of Libel: (a) an allegation or imputation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.
Malice or ill-will in libel must either be proven (malice in fact) or may be taken for granted in view of the grossness of the imputation (malice in law). Malice, as we wrote in Brillante v. Court of Appeals, is a term used to indicate the fact that the offender is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Malice implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. It is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous or defamatory remarks made the same with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof. The identifying character-generated words "file video" appeared to have been superimposed on screen, doubtless to disabuse the minds of televiewers of the idea that a particular footage is current. In the words of the trial court, the phrase "file video" was "indicated on screen purposely to prevent misrepresentation so as not to confuse the viewing public." The trial court added the observation that "the use of file footage in TV news reporting is a standard practice. At any rate, the absence of the accompanying character-generated words "file video" would not change the legal situation insofar as the privileged nature of the audio-video publication complained of is concerned. For, with the view we take of the state of things, the video footage was not libel in disguise; standing without accompanying sounds or voices, it was meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature. And lest it be overlooked, personal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation. The law against defamation protects ones interest in acquiring, retaining and enjoying a reputation "as good as ones character and conduct warrant" in the community. Clearly then, it is the community, not personal standards, which shall be taken into account in evaluating any allegations of libel and any claims for damages on account thereof. It cannot be over-emphasized furthermore that the showing of the 1982 film footage, assuming for argument that it contained demeaning features, was actually accompanied or simultaneously voiced over by the narration of the news report lifted from the filing of the mandamus petition.

MIDTERM CASES IN TORTS (Atty. Dizon)

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MIDTERM CASES IN TORTS (Atty. Dizon)

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Table of Contents

1|the ELO digests on NEGLIGENCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,

2|the ELO digests on NEGLIGENCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CASES

Dr Milagros Cantre vs Spouses John Go and Nora Go

Dr. Rubi Lim vs. Sps. Soliman (Doctrine of Informed Consent)

OTHER NEGLIGENCE CASES

Corinthian Gardens Association vs Sps Tanjangco and Sps Cuaso

National Power Corp. vs Heirs of Noble Casionan (Sagging Transmission

Norman Gaid vs People of the Philippines (Simple Negligence)

Rodolfo Regala vs Federico Carin

Spouses Fernando and Lourdes Viloria vs. Continental Air

AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES & MISCELLANEOUS ACTIVITIES

DEFENSES IN NEGLIGENCE CASES

PO3 Benito Sombilon Jr vs People

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