THE THE

SIllOHD
AND A N D THE THE

SHIELD

BY BY

CHRISTOPHER C H R I S T O P H E R ANDREW ANDREW

THEOPHILE THEOPHILEDELCASSE DELCASSE AND A N D THE THE MAKING M A K I N G OF OF THE THE ENTENTE ENTENTECORDIALE CORDIALE

THE FIRST F I R S T WO WORLD CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES THE RLDWAR: WAR: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES (VOLUME (VOLUME 19 1 9 OF OF THE THE HAMLYN HAMLYN HISTORY HISTORY OF OF THE THE WORLD) WORLD)

FRANCEOVERSEAS: THEGREAT WAR AND A N D THE THE CLI CLIMAX OF FRENCH FRENCHIMPERIAL FRANCE OVERSEAS: THE GREAT WAR MAX OF IMPERIAL EXPANSION (WITH A.S. KANYA-FORSTNER) EXPANSION(WITH A.S. KANYA-FORSTNER)
THE SSING DIMENSION: DIMENSION:GOVERNMENTS GOVERNMENTS AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES THE MI MISSING AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES ININ THE CENTURY (WITH DAVID DILKS) THE TWENTIETH TWENTIETH CENTURY (WITH DAVID DILKS) HER THE HER MAJESTY'S MAJESTY'S SECRET SECRET SERVICE: SERVICE: THE THE MAKING M A K I N G OF OF THE BRITISH BRITISH INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COMMUNITY CODEBREAKING CODEBREAKING AND AND SIGNALS SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE AND A N D INTERNATIONAl INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, RELATIONS, 1900-1945 1900-1 945 (WITH JEREMY NOAKES} (WITH JEREMY NOAKES} KGB: OF ITS ITS FOREIGN FOREIGN OPERATIONS OPERATIONS FROM FROM LENIN LENIN TO TO GORBACHEV GORBACHEV KGB: THE THE INSIDE INSIDE STORY STORY OF (WITH OLEG OLEG GORDIEVSKY) (WITH GORDIEVSKY) INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE THE CENTRE: CENTRE: TOP TOP SECRET SECRET FILES FILES ON ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM KGB KGB FOREIGN FOREIGN OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS, 1975-1985 1975-1 985 (PUBLISHED COMRADE KRYUCHKOV'S (PUBLISHED IN I N THE THE USA USA AS: AS: COMRADE KRYUCHKOV'S INSTRUCTIONS) INSTRUCTIONS) (WITH GORDIEVSKY) (WITH OLEG OLEG GORDIEVSKY) MORE FILES ON MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS 'INSTRUCTIONS FROM FROM THE THE CENTRE': CENTRE': TOP TOP SECRET SECRETFILES ON KGB KGB GLOBAL GLOBAL OPERATIONS, OPERATIONS, 1975-1985 1975-1 985

(WITH OLEG OLEG GORDIEVSKY) GORDIEVSKY) (WITH

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY: FORTHE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY: SECRET SECRET INTELLIGENCE INTELLIGENCE AND AND THE THE AMERICAN FROM WASHINGTON WASHINGTON TO TO BUSH BUSH AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PRESIDENCY FROM ETERNAL ETERNAL VIGILANCE? VIGILANCE? FIFTY YEARS OF CIA OF THE THE CIA FIFTYYEARS (WITH JEFFREYS-JONES) [WITH RHODRI RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES)

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CHRISTOPHER RnDREUJ
AND AND

V RSI L I IDITROHHIn

B E
BASIC

BOOKS
BOOKS

A A MEMBER M E M B E R OF OF

THE THE

PERSEUS BOOKS GROUP P E R S E U SB O O K SG R OUP

Copyright Copyright 01999 1999 by by Christopher ChristopherAndrew Andrew

Introduction Edition Introduction to to the thePaperback Paperback Edition 02001 2001

Published Published by by Basic BasicBooks, Books, A A Member Member of of the the Perseus PerseusBooks BooksGroup Group
rights reserved. reserved.Printed Printedin in the United States of America. of book this book All rights the United States of America. No No partpart of this may be bereproduced reproduced any manner whatsoever without written permission may inin any manner whatsoever without written permission except except in the the case case of of brief briefquotations quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For inforin embodied in critical articles and reviews. For intormation, address address Basic Basic Books, Books,10 10 East East 53rd 53rd Street, New NewYork, York, NY N Y 10022-5299. 10022-5299. mation, Street, Unless otherwise otherwise credited, credited, photos photos are arefrom fromthe theauthors' authors collections. Unless collections. Designed by by Victoria Victoria Kuskowski Designed Kuskowski catalog record recordfor for this book has been applied for from A CIP catalog A this book has been applied for from the the Library of ofCongress. Congress. Library ISBN 0-465-003 0-465-00312-5 ISBN 12-5

01 02 02/ 0 9 9 8 7 6 5 54 01 / 110 4 3

IN M MEMORY OF liM " MA A"" IN E MORY OF

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CONTENTS CONTENTS

Abbreviations Acronyms Abbreviationsand andAcronyms The of TheEvolution Evolution ofthe theKGB, KGB,1917-1991 r917-rpy The TheTransliteration Transliterationof ofRussian RussianNames Names

xi xi xv xv xvii xvii xix xix xxi xxi

F oreword Foreword
Introduction Introductionto tothe thePaperback PaperbackEdition Edition

11 22 33 44 55 66 77 88 99 10 1

The Mitrokhin Archive The Mitrokhin Archive From Lenin's Cheka Cheka FromLenins toto Stalin's StalinsOGPU OGPU The Great T h eG r e a t Illegals Illegals The Magnificent Five The Magnificent Five Terror Terror War War The Grand T h eG r a n d Alliance Alliance Victory Victory From toCold Cold War FromWar War to War The T h eMain M a i nAdversary Adversary
Part North Illegals 1950S PartI: r: NorthAmerican American Illegalsin inthe the r950 j .

11 23 23 42 42 56 56 68 68 89 89 104 1 04 122 122 137 137

162 1 62

11 11

The T h eMain M a i nAdversary Adversary

Part Legal Residencies Part2: 2:Walk-ins Walk-insand and Legal Residenciesin i nthe theEarly Early Cold ColdWar War
176 176

12 12

The Adversary T h eMain Main Adversary

Part 3: Illegals Fart3: Illegalsafter aftey/1.bel" Xbel
190 1 90

13 13

The T h eMain M a i nAdversary Adversary

Part Legal Residencies War Part4: 4:Walk-ins Walk-insand and Legal Residenciesin inthe theLater LaterCold Cold War
203 203 224 2 24

14 14 15 15

Political PoliticalWarfare: Warfare:Active ActiveMeasures Measures and and the the Main MainAdversary Adversary PROGRESS Operations PROGRESS Operations
Part Prague Spring PartI: I:Crushing Crushingthe the Prague Spring

247 247

16 16

PROGRESS PROGRESSOperations Operations

P art 2: Bloc Part 2 :Spying Spyingon onthe theSoviet Soviet Bloc
262 262

Co on nt te en nt ts s
17 17 18 18 19 19

x x

The and The KGB Western Communist and Western Parties Communist Parties
Eurocommunism Eurocommunism Ideological Ideological Subversion Subversion

276 2 76 294 2 94

Part I: War Dissidents I : The The the Against WarAgainst the Dissidents
20 20

307 307

Ideological Subversion Ideological Subversion

Part 2: of Victory 2 : The Victory Dissidents o f the Dissidents

21 the 21 22 22

322 322 37 3 337

SIGINT SIGINT in in the Cold War Special Special Tasks Tasks

Part I: Nureyev r: From From Marshal Tito Tito to t o Rudolf RudoYNureyev

23 23

356 356

Special Special Tasks Tasks

Part 2: Andropov 2 : The The Andropov Era Beyond and Beyond

24 24

374 374

Cold Against Britain Cold War War Operations Operations Against Britain
397 397

Part Magnzficent the I: r:After After the "Magnificent Five" Five

25 25

Cold Britain Cold War War Operations OperationsAgainst Against Britain

417 417 437 437

Part 2: Operation 2: After After Operation FOOT

26 26 27 27

The Republic T h e Federal Federal Republic of of Germany Germany France during the Cold War: Agent Penetration France and and Italy Italy during the Cold War: Agent Penetration and and Active Measures

460 460 486 486 508 508 517 517 544 544

28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31

The and Persecution of Soviet Churches T h e Penetration Penetration and Persecution of the the Soviet Churches The Polish Solidarity T of h Rise e the Polish and Pope Pope and the Rise of Solidarity The Crisis and the Crumbling of Soviet Bloc T h e Polish Polish Crisis and the Crumbling of the the Soviet Bloc Conclusion: One-Party State to the Yeltsin Presidency Conclusion: From From the the One-party State to the Yeltsin Presidency

Appendices Appendices
A A B B

KGB Chairmen, Chairmen, 19I7-z6 1917-26 Heads Intelligence, 19Z0-99 Heads of of Foreign ForeignIntelligence, 1920-99 The Organization of The Organization of the the KGB The Organization of ChiefDirectorate Directorate The Organization of the the KGB First First Chief The Organization of a The Organization a KGB Residency Residency

566 566 567 567 568 568 570 570 571 571

D D

E E

Notes Notes Bibliography Index Index

572 572

671 67 1

685 685

AB R E V IATIONS A T I O N SA AND N DA C A R CRONY O N Y M SMS A BB BREVI

AFSA
AKEL AKEL Amtorg Amtorg ASA ASA AVH AVH AVO AVO BN BfV BND BND CDU CDU Cheka C heka

Armed Armed Forces Forces Security Security[SIGINT] [SIGINT] Agency Agency [USA] [USA] Cyprus Cyprus Communist Communist Party Party American-Soviet New York American-Soviet Trading TradingCorporation, Corporation, New York Army Agency [USA] [USA] [SIGINT] Agency Army Security Security [SIGINT] Hungarian security agency Hungarian security and andintelligence intelligence agency predecessor A VB AVH predecessor of of FRG security security service service FRG foreign foreign intelligence intelligence agency agency Christian Christian Democratic Democratic Union Union [FRG] [FRG] All -Russian Extraordinary Combating All-Russian Extraordinary Commission Commissionfor for Combating Counter-Revolution and Sabotage: Sabotage: predecessor Counter-Revolution and predecessor KGB

CIA CIA COCOM COCOM Comecon Comecon Comintern Comintern CPC CPC CPC CPC CPCz CPCZ CPGB CPGB CPSU CPSU CPUSA CPUSA CSU DCI DCI DGS DGS

(1917-22) (1 9 17-22) Central [USA] Central Intelligence IntelligenceAgency Agency [USA]

Coordinating East-West Trade Coordinating Committee Committee for for East-West Trade [Soviet for Mutual Economic Aid [Soviet Bloc] Bloc]Council Council for Mutual Economic

Communist International International Communist Christian Peace Peace Conference Conference Christian Communist Party Partyofof Canada Communist Canada
Communist Czechoslovakia Communist Party Party of of Czechoslovakia Communist Great Britain Communist Party Partyof of Great Britain

Communist Party Party of the the Soviet SovietUnion Union Communist the United United States States America Communist Party Party of the Communist of of America
Christian Christian Social SocialUnion Union[FRG: [FRG: ally of of CDU] CDU] Director Director of Central Central Intelligence Intelligence [USA] [USA] Portuguese Portuguese security security service service French French foreign foreign intelligence intelligenceservice service Defense Defense Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency [USA] [USA]

csu

DGSE DGSE DIA DIA

DLB DLB

dead letter-box letter-box dead

Soviet group Soviet sabotage sabotageand andintelligence intelligence group Bulgarian service Bulgarian security securityand andintelligence intelligence service French French security security service service

DRG DRG
DS DS DST DST F F Line Line

SpecialActions" Actions department residencies "Special department inin KGB residencies

Ab bb br re ev v ii a a tt ii o on ns s and d A A cc r ro ony ms s A ym
FAPSI FAPSI FBI FBI FCD FCD FCO FCO FRG F R G GCHQ GCHQ GDR GDR GPU GPU GRU GRU GUGB GUGB Gulag Gulag HUMINT HUMINT H VA HVA ICBM ICBM IMINT IMlNT INO IN0 INU INU IRA IRA JIC J IC K-231 K-23 1 KAN KAN KGB KGB KHAD KHAD KI KI KKE KKE KKE-es KKE-es KOR KOR KPO KPO KR K R Line Line llB LLB MGB MGB

/ /

xi ti t x

Russian (post-Soviet) SIGINT agency Russian (post-Soviet) SIGINT agency Federal Bureau Federal Bureau of ofInvestigation Investigation [USA] First Chief Directorate, First Chief [Foreign [ForeignIntelligence] Intelligence] Directorate, KGB Foreign and Foreign and Commonwealth Commonwealth Office Office [UK] Federal Republic Germany Federal Republicof of Germany Government Government Communications Communications Head-Qyarters Head-Quarters [British [British SIGINT Agency] Agency] German Democratic German Democratic Republic Republic Soviet security intelligence service (within Soviet securityand and intelligence service (within NKVD,

1922-3) 1922-3)
Soviet Military Soviet MilitaryIntelligence Intelligence Soviet security service (within Soviet securityand andintelligence intelligence service (within NKVD, 1943-43) 1943-43) Labour Labour Camps Camps Directorate Directorate intelligence (espionage) intelligence from fromhuman humansources sources (espionage) GDR foreign foreign intelligence intelligenceservice service intercontinental intercontinental ballistic ballistic missile missile imagery imagery intelligence intelligence foreign department of Cheka/GPU/OGPU/ ChekalGPU/OGPUI foreign intelligence intelligence department GUGB, GUGB, 1920-1941; 1920-1941; predecessor predecessor of of INU foreign ofof NKGB/GUGB/MGB, foreign intelligence intelligencedirectorate directorate 1941-54; 1941-54; predecessor predecessor of of FCD Irish Irish Republican RepublicanArmy Army Joint [UK] Joint Intelligence Intelligence Committee Committee [UK] club prisoners jailed under Article 231 231 of of club of offormer formerpolitical political prisoners jailed under Article the code the Czechoslovak Czechoslovakcriminal criminal code Club [Czechoslovakia] Club of ofNon-Party Non-PartyActivists Activists [Czechoslovakia] (1954-1991) Soviet service Soviet security securityand andintelligence intelligence service (1954-1991) Mghan security service Afshan security service Soviet agency, initially combining foreign Soviet foreign foreignintelligence intelligence agency, initially combining foreign intelligence intelligence directorates directoratesof ofMGB and and GRU (1947-51) (1947-51) Greek Greek Communist Communist Party Party breakaway Greek Communist Party breakaway Eurocommunist Eurocommunist Greek Communist Party Workers Workers Defence Defence Committee Committee [Poland] [Poland] Austrian Communist Party Austrian Communist Party Counter-intelligence Counter-intelligence department department in in KGB residencies residencies live letter letter box box live Soviet State Security (1946-54) Soviet Ministry Ministryof of State Security (1946-54)

Ab bb br re v v ii a a tt ii o on na s na Anc y rm on A s d Ancdr o sy m s
MGIMO MGlMO MI5 MI5 MI6 MI6 MOR MOR N Line line N NATO NATO NKGB NKGB NKYD NKVD NSA NSA NSC NSC NSZRiS NSZRiS NTS NTS Okhrana Okhrana OMS OMS OSS oss OT OT OUN OUN OZNA OZNA PCF PCF PCI PC1 PCP PCP PFlP PFLP PIDE PlDE PLO P L O POUM POUM PR PR line Line PSOE PSOE PUWP PUWP RCMP RCMP ROYS ROVS RYAN RYAN SALT SALT SAM SAM

/ /

Xt t t

xaza

...

Moscow State International Relations Moscow State Institute Institutefor for International Relations
British security service service British security

alternative designation alternative designation for for SIS [UK]

Monarchist Association of of Central Russia (The Trust) Monarchist Association Central Russia ("The Trust")

KGB residencies Illegal support support department departmentin in

North Atlantic Treaty Organization North Treaty Organization People's Commisariat Commisariat for (Soviet security andand Peoples for State StateSecurity Security (Soviet security intelligence service, and 1943-6) 1943-6) intelligence service, 1941 and
Peoples for Internal InternalAffairs Affairs (incorporated state People's Commisariat Commisariat for (incorporated state

security, 1922-3, 1934-43) 1922-3,1934-43) National Security [SIGINT] Agency [USA] [USA] National Security [ SIGINT] Agency National Security National Security Council Council[USA] People's [anti-Bolshevik] Defence of Country Country and Peoples [anti-Bolshevik] Union Union for for Defence and Freedom Freedom National Labour Labour Alliance Alliance(Soviet (Soviet tmigri social-democratic emigre social-democratic movement) Tsarist security service, 1881-1917 Tsarist service,1881-1917 Comintern Department Comintern International International Liaison Liaison Department Office of [USA] [USA] of Strategic StrategicServices Services Operational Support (FCD) Operational Technical Technical Support (FCD) Organisation of of Ukrainian UkrainianNationalists Nationalists Organisation Yugoslav security securityand andintelligence intelligenceservice service French French Communist Communist Party Party Italian Communist Italian Communist Party Party Portuguese Communist Communist Party Party Popular Front the Liberation of Palestine Frontfor for the Liberation of Palestine Liberation Organization Organization Portuguese Liberation Palestine Palestine Liberation Liberation Organization Organization Workers Unification (Spanish Marxist Trotskyist Party UnificationParty Party (Spanish Mamist Trotskyist Party in in 1930s) political department inin KGB residences political intelligence intelligence department Spanish Socialist SocialistParty Party Polish United UnitedWorkers Workers[Communist] [Communist]Party Party Royal Royal Canadian CanadianMounted MountedPolice Police [W hite] Russian Combined [White] Combined Services Services Union Union Raketno-Yadernoye Na Napaaenie MissileAttack) Attack) Raketno-Yadernoye padenie (Nuclear Missile Strategic Talks Strategic Arms ArmsLimitation Limitation Talks Soviet surface-to-air surface-to-air missile missile

A bb br re vi a t t ii o ona n cdr o Anc y rm on Ab s nad A sy m s

SB SB SCD SCD SDECE SDECE SDI SDI SED SED SIGINT SlGlNT SIS SIS SK SK line Line SKP SKP SOE SOE SPD SPD

XlV

xiv

Spetsnuz Spetsnaz
SR SR S&T S&T

Stapo Stapo Stasi Stasi Stavka Stavka

StB StB SYR SVR TUC TUC UAR UAR UB UB UDBA UDBA YPK VPK WR VVR wee WCC

WPC
X line Line

Security and and intelligence intelligenceservice service Polish Security Second Chief and Counter-Intelligence] Chief [Internal [InternalSecurity Security and Counter-Intelligence] Directorate, Directorate, KGB French foreign predecessor of DGSE foreign intelligence intelligenceservice; service; predecessor of Strategic Defense Wars') Defense Initiative Initiative('Star (Star Wars) Socialist [GDR] Socialist Unity Unity[Communist] [Communist]Party Party[GDR] intelligence derived and analysis of of signals derivedfrom frominterception interception and analysis signals Secret Intelligence Intelligence Service Service[UK] Soviet inin KGB residencies Soviet colony colonydepartment department Communist Party Finland Partyofof Finland Special [UK] Special Operations Operations Executive Executive[UK] Social Social Democratic DemocraticParty Party[FRG] [FRG] Soviet special special forces forces Socialist Revolutionary Revolutionary scientific intelligence scientific and andtechnological technological intelligence Austrian police Austrian police security securityservice service GDR Ministry of of State StateSecurity Security Wartime Wartime Soviet SovietGHQLhigh GHQIhigh command command Czechoslovak security intelligence service securityand and intelligence service Russian (post-Soviet) foreign intelligence service foreign intelligence service Trades Union [UK] Trades Union Congress Congress [UK] United Arab Republic Republic United Arab security and andintelligence intelligence service; predecessor of Polish security service; predecessor of SB Yugoslav security successor to to security and andintelligence intelligenceservice; service; successor OZNA Soviet Military Commission MilitaryIndustrial Industrial Commission Supreme Military [anti-Bolshevik [anti-Bolshevik Ukranian Ukranianunder underMilitaryCouncil Council ground] ground] World Council Councilof Churches World World Peace Peace Council Council World S&T department in S&T in KGB residencies

T H E EVOLUTION E V O L U T I O N OF OF THE T H E KG KGB , 1917-1991 1917-1991 THE B,

December 1917 19 17

Cheka Cheka

J, \1

February 1922 1922 July 1923 1923 July 1934 1934

1941 February 1941

Incorporated into NKVD (as GPU) GPU)

\1 J,

OGPU

J, \1

Reincorporated (as G GUGB) Reincorporated in NKVD (as UGB)

\1 J,
J, &

NKGB Reincorporated GUGB) Reincorporated in NKVD N K V D (as G UGB)

July 1941 1941 April 1943 April 1943

1946 March 1946
~ ~ ~ ~

J, \1

NKGB

J, \1 J, \1

MGB Foreign Intelligence Intelligence transferred K I transferred to to KI

October 194719471951 November 1951

1953 Combined March 1953 with

\1 J,
Combined with MVD form toenlarged form enlarged MVD to MVD

J, \1

54 March 1954

KGB

is used used both denote the Soviet State Security The term term KGB is both generally generallyto to denote the Soviet State Security organisation throughout since its its foundation throughout its itshistory history since foundation as the Cheka Cheka in in 1917 and, specifically, to refer after 1954 when it and,more more refer to toState StateSecurity Security after 1954 when took name. took its its final final name.

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THE T H E TRANSLITERATION T R A N S L I T E R A T I O N OF OF RUSSIAN R U S S I A N NAMES NAMES

We We have have followed followeda a simplified simplified version version of of the the method methodused used by by the the U.S. Board Board on on Ge Geographic Monitering Service. Service. Simplifications Simplifications include include the the substitu substituographic Names Names and and BBe Monitering

BBC

tion Trotskiy) tion of"y" of Y,for for"iy" iyin in surnames surnames (Trotsky (Trotsky rather rather than than Trotskiy) and and of"i" of ifor for"iy" if in in first first "e" names he "y" names (Yuri (Yuri rather rather than than Yuriy). Yuriy). T The y between between the the letters letters "i" iand/or andlor eis is omitted omitted (for (for example, example, Andreev Andreev and and Dmitrievich-not Dmitrievich-not Andreyev Andreyev and and Dmitriyevich), Dmitriyevich), as as is is the the apostrophe apostrophe used used to to signify signify a a soft soft sign. sign. In In cases cases where where a a mildly mildly deviant deviant English English version version of of a a well-known well-known Russian Russian name name has have retained has become become firmly firmly established, established, we we have retained that that version, version, for for example: example: Beria, Beria, Evdokia Evdokia (Petrova), (Petrova),Izvestia, Izvestia,Joseph Joseph (Stalin), (Stalin), Khrushchev, Khrushchev, Nureyev Nureyev and and the the names names of of Tsars. Tsars.

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FO OR EW WOR F RE RD D

have written written this this book book in in consultation consultation with with Vasili Vasili Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin, based based on on the the exten extenI have sive top top secret secret material material (described in Chapter Chapter1) which he he has has smuggled smuggled out out from from the the sive (described in 1) which foreign intelligence intelligence archive. archive. For For the the past past quarter quarter of of a a century, century, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin has has KGB foreign passionately wanted wanted this this material, material, which which for for twelve twelve years yearshe he risked risked his his life life to to assempassionately assem ble, to to see see the the light lightof of day. day. He H e wished wished to to reveal reveal "how how thin thinthe the thread of of peace peaceactually actually ble, thread was during the Cold ColdWar." War. From From that that passion passion this this book book has has been been born. born. I have have felt felt it it was during the my duty duty to to ensure ensure that that this this material, material, which which offers offers detailed detailed and and often often unique unique insights insights my into Union, achieves into the the workings workings of of the the Soviet Soviet State State and and the the history history of of the the Soviet Soviet Union, achieves the level level of of public public awareness awareness and and recognition that it it deserves. the recognition that deserves. Like all all archives, archives,those those of of the the KGB require require interpretation interpretation in in the thelight light previous ofof previous Like research and and related related documents. The end end notes notes and and bibliography bibliography provide provide full details details research documents. The of the the additional additional sources sources used used to to place place Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins revelations revelations in in historical historical context. of context. These sources sources also alsoprovide provide overwhelming overwhelming corroborative corroborative evidence for his his genuineness genuineness These evidence for as a source. as a source. Codenames (also Codenames (also known known as as "worknames" worknames in in the the case case of of KGB KGB officers) officers) appear appear in in the text text in in capitals. capitals. Many Many KGB codenames codenames were were used usedmore more than than once. once. In I n such such cases, cases, the the text text and and index index make make clear clear which which individual individual is is referred referred to. to. It is is also also important important to to the note that, that, although although certain certain individuals individuals were were targeted targeted by by the the KGB, KGB, and and may may have havebeen been note given codenames, codenames, this this does does not not mean mean that that the thepersons persons named named were were conscious conscious or or wit witgiven ting agents agents or or sources-or even that that they they were were aware that they they were were being targeted ting sources-or even aware that being targeted for recruitment recruitment or or political political influence Similarly, the the fact fact that that an anindividual individual for influence operations. operations. Similarly, may have haveendorsed a position that was was favorable favorableto to the the Soviet Soviet Union not neces necesmay endorsed a position that Union does does not sarily mean mean that that this this person person was was working working as as an an agent, agent, or or agent agent of of influence, influence, for for the the sarily KGB. The The KGB frequently frequently gave gave prominent prominent policymakers codenames in in order to pro proKGB. policymakers codenames order to tect agents to to target target such such tect the the identity identity of of their their targets, targets, and and to to order order recruited recruited KGB agents individuals. individuals. For reasons, some identified in For legal legal reasons, some of of the the Soviet Soviet agents agents identified in KGB files files can can be be referred referred to in in this this book only by by their their codenames. codenames. In In a a limited limited number number of of cases, chiefly because because to book only cases, chiefly of the the risk risk of of prejudicing prejudicing a a possible possible prosecution, prosecution, no no reference reference can can be be made made to to them thematat of all. These These omissions do not, not, so so far far as as I am am aware, aware, significantly significantly affect affect the the main main conall. omissions do con clusions clusions of of any any chapter. chapter.
Christopher ChristopherAndrew Andrew

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OD DU UC CT T II O ON II N T R R O

TO T

THE EK DIE TD IO NI O N T EP A PP AE PR E B R A B C AK C I T

17, 1995, I was 17,1995, was invited invited to to the thepost-modern post-modern London London headquarters headquarters of of the the Secret Secret Intelligence Intelligence Service Service (better (better known known as as SIS SIS or or MI6) M16) at at Vauxhall Vawhall Cross Cross on on the briefed on intelligence the banks banks of of the the Thames Thamesto tobe be briefed on one one of of the the most most remarkable remarkable intelligence coups coups of of the thelate late twentieth twentieth century. century. SIS SIS told told me me how how in in 1992 1992it it had had ext1ltrated exfiltrated from from Russia Russia a a retired retired senior senior KGB archivist, archivist, Vasili VasiliMitrokhin, Mitrokhin, his his family familyand and six six large large cases cases of top-secret top-secret material material from from the the KGB's KGBs foreign foreign intelligence intelligence archive. archive.Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins stagof stag gering les almost twelve years gering feat feat in in noting noting KGB fi files almost every every working working day day for fora a period period of oftwelve years and smuggling smuggling his his notes notes out out of of its its foreign foreign intelligence intelligenceheadquarters headquarters at at enormous enormous per perand sonal risk is unique in in intelligence intelligence history. When first saw sonal is probably probably unique history. W hen I first saw Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's archive a a few few weeks after the the briefi briefing, both its its scope scope and and secrecy secrecy took took my my breath breath archive weeks after ng, both away. material on away. It I t contained contained important important new new material on KGB operations operations around around the the world. world. The The only only European European countries countries absent absent from from the the archive archive were werethe the pocket pocket states states of of An Andorra, Liechtenstein. (There dorra, Monaco Monaco and and Liechtenstein. (There was, was, however, however,some some interesting interesting material material on on San clear that Mitrokhin had had access to even the most highly San Marino.) Marino.) It was was clear that Mitrokhin had had access to even the most highly classified classified KGB KGB files files - among among them themthose those which which gave gave the the real real identities identities and and "legends" legends of living under of the the Soviet Soviet "illegals" illegals living under deep deep cover cover abroad abroad disguised disguised as as foreign foreign nationals.1 nationals. Soon Soon after after my my first firstexamination examination of of the the archive, archive, I met met Vasili Vasili Mitrokhin Mitrokhin over over tea tea in in a a a conference conference room room at at SIS SIS headquarters headquarters and and discussed discussed collaborating collaboratingwith with him himin in a his history material. Mitrokhin it later tory based based on on his his material. Mitrokhin said said little little about about himself. himself. Indeed Indeed it later re required quired some some persuasion persuasion to to convince convince him him tht that it itwas was worth worth including including his his own ownstory story at at the the beginning beginning of of our our book. book. But But Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was passionate passionateabout about his his archive archive and and anx amious KGB. ious that that as as much much of of it it as as possible possible be be used used to to expose expose the the record record of of the the KGB, Early Early in in 1996 1996 Mitrokhin Mitrokhin and and his his family family paid paid their their first first visit visit to to Cambridge Cambridge Uni University, History. I met versity, where where I am am Professor Professor of ofModern Modern and andContemporary Contemporary History. met them them out outside Christi College, I'm a of which which Im a Fellow, Fellow, and and we we had had side the the Porters' Porters Lodge Lodge at atCorpus Corpus Christi College, of lunch Old Court Court (the (the oldest lunch together together in in a a private private room room overlooking overlooking the the medieval medieval Old oldest complete court in Cambridge). After lunch we went to the College Hall to look complete court in Cambridge). After lunch we went to the College Hall to look at at what College's first what is is believed believedto to be be the the only only surviving surviving portrait portrait of ofthe the Colleges first spy spyand and great greatest Elizabethan dramatist Christopher Marlowe, est writer writer - the the Elizabethan dramatist Christopher Marlowe, who who had hadbeen been killed killedin in a a pub pub brawl brawl in in 1593 1593 at at the the age age of of only only twenty-nine, twenty-nine, probably probably while while working working for for the the secret 1. Then secret service serviceofQyeen of QueenElizabeth Elizabeth I. Then we we walked walked along alongthe the Backs Backs through through King's Kings and the colleges KGB's best bestand Clare Clare colleges colleges to to visit visit Trinity Trinity and andTrinity TrinityHall, Hall, the colleges of of the the KGBs known les Mitrokhin known British British recruits, recruits, the the "Magnificent Magnificent Five," Five, some some of of whose whose fi files Mitrokhin had had
On O n October October

Introduction Paperback I n t r o d u c t i o n to t o the the Pa perback E d i Edition tion

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noted.2Mitrokhin Mitrokhin had long long ago ago mastered the art artof of being inconspicuous. The The friends friends noted.2 had mastered the being inconspicuous. and did not him a and colleagues colleagues whom whom we we met met as as we we walked walked round round Cambridge Cambridge did not give give him asec second ond glance. glance. In 1996 the thethen then Foreign in In March March 1996 Foreign Secretary, Secretary, Malcolm Malcolm Rifkind, Rifkind, gave gave approval approval in principle (later (later confirmed confirmed by by his his successor, successor, Robin Robin Cook) Cook) for for me me to to write write a bookbased principle a book based on three and on Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins extraordinary extraordinary archive.3 a r ~ h i v eFor For . ~ the the next next three and a a half half years, years, because becausethe the archive none of colleagues in archive was was still still classified, classified, I was was able able to to discuss discuss none of it it with with colleagues in Corpus Corpus Christi of Christi College College and and the the Cambridge Cambridge History HistoryFaculty Faculty - or or even even to to reveal reveal the the nature nature of the archive the book book that that I was was writing. writing. In In Britain Britain at at least, least, the the secret secret of of the the Mitrokhin Mitrokhin archive Mitrokhin Archive went the publishers, was kept. Until was remarkably remarkably well well kept. Until The The Mitl-ukhin went to to the publishers, who who also also successfully successfully avoided avoided leaks, leaks, the the secret secret was was known, known, outside outside the the intelligence intelligence com community, munity, only only to to a asmall small number number of of senior senior ministers ministers and and civil civil servants. servants. Tony Tony Blair Blair was was first first briefed briefed on on Mitrokhin Mitrokhin while while Leader' Leader of of the the Opposition Opposition in in January January 1995. 1995. Three Three years publication project.4 years later, later, as as Prime Prime Minister, Minister, he he endorsed endorsed the the publication project.4 The secret secret of of the the Mitrokhin archive was rigorously preserved preserved by by some some of of The Mitrokhin archive wasless less rigorously Britain's But were Britains allies. allies. But though thoughthere there were a a few few partial partial leaks leaks by by foreign foreign governments governments and and intelligence access to intelligence agencies agencies which which had had been been given given access to parts parts of of the the archive, archive, none none had had much resonance resonance in in Britain. Britain. In In December December 1998, 1998, I received received out out of of the the blue blue a phonecall call much a phone from discovered both the codename which from a a German German journalist journalist who who had had discovered boththe codenarne by by which Mitrokhin was was known known in in Germany and the the contents of some fragments of of Mitrokhin Germany and contents of some fragments Mitrokhins German German material. material. He H e told told me me he he knew knew I was was completing completing a a first first volume volume Mitrokhin's based on the the Mitrokhin Mitrokhinarchive archive and and had had already already planned a second. second. For For the the next few based on planned a next few months I expected expected the the story story to break in the British British press. press. Somewhat Somewhat to my surprise, surprise, months to break in the to my it did did not not do do so. it so. O n Saturday, Saturday, September September 11, 11, 1999, 1999, after after three three and and a a half years of of secrecy secrecy and and si siOn half years lence, suddenly became became front-page front-page news news when when serialization serialization lence, The Mitrokhin Archive suddenly Between Friday Friday night night and and Saturday Saturday morning morning I moved moved from from a began in in The Times. Between a began long period in which which I had had not not talked talked at at all all about about The Mitrokhin Mitrukhin Archive in in public public to to long period in a seemed to else. Unsurprisingly, a month month in in which which I seemed to talk talk about about little little else. Unsurprisingly, the the revelations revelations which captured media attention were human-interest stories about Soviet spies in in which captured media attention were human-interest stories about Soviet spies Britain Britain rather rather than thanthe themore more important important but but less less parochial parochial disclosures disclosures about about KGB op operations against against NATO as as a a whole whole and and against against democratic democratic dissent dissent within within the the Soviet Soviet erations Bloc. Hitherto Hitherto the media stereotype stereotype of of a major Soviet Soviet spy spy in in Britain, Britain, modeled modeled on on Bloc. the media a major Kim Philby Philby and and his his friends, friends, had been of of a brightbut but subversive Cambridge graduate, Kim had been a bright subversive Cambridge graduate, preferably from from a a good public public school school and and with with an an exotic exotic sex sex life. September 1999 preferably life. In In September 1999 the stereotype stereotype changed changed almost almost overnight overnight with with Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins unmasking of Melita Melita the unmasking of Norwood, an an 87-year-old 87-year-old great-grandmother from Bexleyheath Bexleyheath memorably memorably deNorwood, great-grandmother from de scribed by by The Times Times as as "The The Spy Spy Who W h o Came Came In In from from the the Co-op" Co-op (where, (where, for for ideo ideoscribed logical reasons, reasons, she she does does most most of of her her shopping), shopping), as as the the longest-serving longest-serving of of all all Soviet Soviet logical spies spies in Britain. reporter was was with with Mrs. Mrs.Norwood Norwood early early on themorning morningof of September September 1 11 on the 1 A Times reporter rst recount as Humphrys on on the the Today program as she she listened listened to to John John Humphrys program fi first recount some some of of the the contents of ofher her KGB file file noted by Mitrokhin, theninterview myself and and Ann Ann Wid Widcontents KGB noted by Mitrokhin, then interview myself reporter. "This This is is all so different different from from my my decombe. Oh dear! she told told the the Times reporter. decombe. "Oh dear!" she all so

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quiet I'm not not that that surprised surprised it's finally quiet little little life. life. I thought thought I'd Id got got away away with with it. it. But But Im its finally come out." media scrum scrum had had gathered gathered expectantly expectantly outside outside Mrs. come out. Within Within a a few few hours, hours,a a media Mrs. Norwoods end-of-terrace end-of-terrace house, house,interviewing interviewing friends about how how she Norwood's friends and and neighbours neighbours about she drank tea tea from from a a Che Che Guevara Guevara mug, mug, put put Stop her window, sold drank "Stop Trident Trident" posters posters in in her window, sold home-made chutney chutney in in aid aid of of Cuban Cubansupport support groups, and delivered more thirty home-made groups, and delivered more than than thirty copies of of the the Morning Star every every Saturday Saturday morning to veterans the Bexleyheath morning to veterans of of the Bexleyheath copies Old Left. Left.Mrs. behaved with with extraordinary when she she emerged emerged Old Mrs. Norwood Norwood behaved extraordinary composure composure when later in in the the day day to to face face the the media media for for the the first first time herlife. life. The_ The-image thegreatlater time in in her image of of the great granny between well-tended to make granny spy spy walking walking down down her her garden garden path path between well-tended rose rose bushes bushesto,make a the imagination a confession confession of of sorts sorts to to a a large large crowd crowdof of reporters reporters caught caught the imagination of of millions millions of television television viewers viewers and and newspaper-readers. newspaper-readers. "I'm Im 87 and unfortunately unfortunately my my memory of 87 and memory is was," Mrs. Mrs. Norwood began. "I did not not to but is not not what what it it was, Norwood began. I did did what what I did to make make money money but to help help prevent prevent the the defeat defeat of of a a new new system system which had, at great cost, given ordinary to which had, at great cost, given ordinary people food and and fares fares which which they they could could afford, health people food afford, given given them them education education and and a a health " serVIce. service. As well well as as being being a a media media sensation, Mrs. Norwood's Norwoods guarded guarded public public confession As sensation, Mrs. confession was historical document. imagination before before was a a remarkable remarkable historical document. What What had had captured captured her her imagination the most other Soviet agents agents of of the time, was was not not the the Second Second World World War, War, like likethat that of of most other Soviet thetime, the brutal reality reality of Stalins Russia but the idealistic myth-image myth-image of of the the world's worlds first brutal of Stalin's Russia but the idealistic first worker-peasant for the first time time enen worker-peasant state state which which had had abolished abolished unemployment unemployment and and for the first abled working working people people to to realize realize their their full full potential the "new new system nostalgically abled potential - the system" nostalgically recalled by Mrs. Norwood she spoke spoke to reporters. In mid 1930s 1930s that that mythmyth recalled byMrs. Norwood when whenshe to reporters. In the themid image was that, for believers who, who, unlike unlike Melita Melita Sirnis (as she she then then image was so so powerful powerful that, for true true believers Sirnis (as was), were wereable able to go on on pilgrimage pilgrimage to to the theSoviet Soviet Union, itsurvived eventhe was), to Union, it survived even the contrary contrary evidence eyes. Malcolm probably the the best best of of the evidence of of their their own own eyes. Malcolm Muggeridge, Muggeridge, probably the British British journalists British pilgrims pilgrims he encountered: journalists then then in inMoscow, Moscow, later later wrote wrote of of the theBritish he encountered:
.

Their told, and and the the expression expression they Their delight delight in in all they they saw saw and and were were told, they gave gave to to that one of the wonders wonders of our age. that delight, delight, constitute constitute unquestionably unquestionably one of the of our age. There There were looked up up at at the were earnest earnest advocates advocates of of the, the,humane humane killing killing of of cattle cattle who who looked the massive the KGB] with tears of gratitude in in massive headquarters headquarters of of the the OGPU [later [later the with tears of gratitude their of proportional representation who eagerly asas their eyes, eyes, earnest earnest advocates advocates of proportional representation who eagerly sented of the the Proletariat Proletariat was sented when when the the necessity necessity for fora a Dictatorship Dictatorship of was explained explained to to them, the pages pages of atheistic literature, literature, them, earnest earnest clergymen clergymen who who reverently reverently turned turned the ofatheistic earnest who watched watched delightedly delightedly tanks rattle across earnest pacifists pacifists who tanks rattle across Red Red Square Square and and bombing earnest town-planning town-planning specialists specialists who who stood stood bombing planes planes darken darken the th.e sky, sky, earnest outside ramshackle tenements aJ:?d mutt!e:, "f only nly we we had had outside overcrowded overcrowded ramshackle tenements and muttered:.,,-If , ? something like this in almost unbelievable unbelievable credulity credulityof of these something like this in England!" England! The The almost these mostlyuniversity educated tourists tourists astounded astounded even officials used to mostly university educated evenSoviet Soviet officials used to handling visitors .. . . 5 handling foreign foreign visitors
.

When Sirnis became became a Soviet Union Union was was in in the When Melita Melita Sirnis a Soviet Soviet agent agent in in 1937, 1937,the theSoviet the midst of the Great Terror the greatest peacetime persecution in modern European midst of the GreatTerror the greatest peacetime persecution in modern European history.6 not seem seem to depravity of of the history.6 Mrs. Mrs. Norwood, Norwood, however, however, still still does does not to grasp grasp the the depravity the

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Stalinist entered. "Old Stalinist regime regime into into whose whose service service she she entered. Old Joe Joe [Stalin]," [Stalin], she she acknowl acknowledges, edges, "wasn't wasnta a hundred hundred percent, percent, but but then then the the people people around around him him might mighthave have been been making end of of her her press making things things awkward, awkward, as as folks folks do." do. At At the the end press statement, statement, she she was was asked asked if if she she had had any any regrets regrets about about her her career career as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. "No," No, she she replied, replied, then went back then went back inside inside her her house. house. In In another another interview interview she she declared, declared, "I I would would do do everything everything again."7 again. Another Another former former Soviet Soviet spy spyidentified identified in in The The Mitrokhin Mitrokhin Archive Archive who who made made front frontpage news in page news in Britain Britain was was ex-Detective ex-Detective Sergeant Sergeant John John Symonds. Symonds. Like Like Norwood, Norwood, Symonds Symonds gave gave a a number number of of interviews. interviews. Symonds Symonds confessed confessed to to being, being, as as Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes reveal, reveal, probably probably the the first first British British "Romeo Romeo spy" spy recruited recruited by by the the KGB. He H e said said that that he hehad had admitted admitted as as much much almost almost twenty twenty years years earlier earlier to to MI5 MI5 and and Scotland Scotland Yard Yard but but had hadbeen been disbelieved. disbelieved. Though Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes give give no no statistics statistics of of the the number number of of women women seduced seduced by by Symonds Symonds during during his his career career as as a a KGB KGB illegal, illegal, Symonds Symonds claims claims that B decided that there there were were "hundreds" hundredsof of them. them. Initially Initially the the KG KGB decided that that his his sexual sexual tech technique nique was was deficient deficient and, and, to to his his delight, delight, sent sent "two two extremely extremely beautiful beautiful girls" girlsto to act act as as his is his instructors. instructors. Symonds's Symondss recollection recollection of of his his subsequent subsequent career career as as. a a Romeo Romeo spy spy is rather rather rosier rosier than than suggested suggested by by his his KGB KGB file: file: I nice I just just had hada a nice life. life.I'd Id say sayjoin join the the KGB, KGB, see see the the world world - first first class. class. I I went went all the marvellous all over over the world world on on these these jobs jobs and and I I had had aa marvelloustime. time. I I stayed stayed in in the thebest best hotels, hotels, I I visited visited all all the the best best beaches. beaches. I've Ive had had access access to to beautiful beautiful women, women, unlim unlimited ited food, food, champagne, champagne, caviar, caviar, whatever whatever you you like, like, and and I I had had a a wonderful wonderful time. time. That That was was my my KGB KGB experience. experience. "The I hurt," hurt, Symonds Symonds now now claims, claims, "was was the the Metropolitan Metropolitan Police."8 Police.g The only only people people I Many Many of of the the women women he he seduced seduced on on KGB KGB instructions instructions would would doubtless doubtless disagree. disagree. Media Media reaction reaction to to Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins revelations revelations was was as as parochial parochial in in most most other other coun coun-

tries as as it it was was in in Britain. The public public appeal appeal of of the the Russian Russian agents agents identified identified by by tries Britain. The
Mitrokhin of Mitrokhin is is curiously curiously similar similar to to that that of Olympic Olympicmedal-winners. medal-winners. In In espionage espionage as as in in

athletics, most most of of the theworld's worlds media media are are interested interested first first and and foremost foremost in in the theexploits exploits athletics, of their their own own nationals. nationals. The The human-interest human-interest stories stories which which aroused aroused most most interest interest in in of
the States were the United United States were probably probably the the KGB KGB "active active measures" measures designed designed to to discredit discredit the the long-serving long-serving Director Director of of the the FBI, FBI, J. J. Edgar Edgar Hoover, Hoover, and and the the great great civil civil rights rights leader Luther King. stories that KGB was was among among the the first first to to spread spread stories that leader Martin Martin Luther King. The The KGB Hoover whom Hoover was was a apredatory predatory homosexual. homosexual. King, King, whom the theKGB KGB feared feared might might avert avert the the race race war be ignited war it it hoped hoped would would be ignited by by the the long long hot hot summers summers which which began began in in

1965, 1965, was was

probably the the only only American American to to be be the the target target of of both both KGB KGB and and FBI active active measures. measures. probably
The The topic topic in in The Mitrokhin Archive (published (published in in the the USA USA as as The Th7e Sword and the the ShieZd) which which attracted attracted most most attention attention in in Congress Congress concerned concerned KGB KGB preparations preparations for for Shield)

sabotage operations operations against against American American targets targets during during the the Cold ColdWar. War. On O n October October 26, 26, sabotage

1999, 1999, I I gave gave televised televised testimony testimony on on these these preparations preparations to to a a packed packed hearing hearing of of the the
House of of Representatives Representatives Armed Armed Services Services Committee. Committee. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins material material identi identiHouse fies the the approximate approximate locations locations of of a a number number of of the the secret secret sites sites in in the theUnited United States se sefies States

KGB arms arms and and radio radio caches caches for for use use in in sabotage sabotage operations. operations. On O n present lected for for KGB lected

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evidence, evidence,it it is is impossible impossible to to estimate estimate the the number number of of these these cches caches which which were were put put in in place. place. However, However, the the former former KGB KGB general general Oleg Oleg Kalugin, Kalugin, who who was was stationed stationed in in New New

York and and Washington Washington during during the the1960s 1960s and and early early 1970s, 1970s, has has confirmed confirmed the the existence existence York
of Europe, some KGB arms arms caches caches in in the the United United States.9 States. As As in in Europe, some caches caches were were of some some KGB probably reasons of probably booby-trapped booby-trapped and and may may now now be be in in a a dangerous dangerous condition. condition. For For reasons of public Amer public safety, safety, The The Mitrokhin Archive gave gave no no clues clues to to the thelocation location of of any any of of the the American ican sites sites selected selected for for KGB KGB arms arms caches. caches. ABC ABC TV News, News, however, however, revealed revealedthat that one one of of the the sites sites is is located located in in the theregion region of of Brainerd, Brainerd, Minnesota.1o Minnesota. Later Later press press reports, reports, cit citing the FBI FBI had a search ing "congressional congressional sources," sources, claimed claimed that that the had carried carried out out a search of of the the

Brainerd area.ll area. Brainerd

In The Mitrokhin Archive Archivegenerated generated more more front-page front-page stories stories in in In western western Europe, Europe, The Italy Italy than than it itdid did even even in in Britain Britain- though though almost almost all all the the stories, stories, unsurprisingly, unsurprisingly, were were on committee released on Italian Italiantopics. topics. In In October October 1999 1999 an an Italian Italianparliamentary parliamentary committee released 645 645 pages the Italians in pages of of reports reports (codenamed (codenamed IMPEDIAN) IMPEDIAN) on onthe Italians mentioned mentionedin thethe Mitrokhin earlier SIS to to Italian Italianin inMitrokhin archive archive which which had hadbeen been supplied supplied several several years years earlier by by SIS telligence. telligence. Most Most KGB KGB contacts contacts were were identified identified in in the thereports reports by by name name as as well well as as code codename. name. The The Italian Italian Foreign Foreign Ministry Ministry was was said said to to be be investigating investigating the the cases cases of of thirty thirty employees in Mitrokhin's employees referred referred to to in Mitrokhins notes. notes. Much Much of of the the furore furore aroused aroused by by The The consisted points-scoring MitrokhinArchive Archive in in Italy, Italy, however, however, consisted of of a a revival revival of of Cold Cold War War points-scoring which which produced produced more more political political heat heat than than historical historical light. light. Opponents Opponentsof of the the govern government ment headed headed by by the the former former Communist Communist Massimo Massimo D'Alema DAlema seized seizedon on the thereferences references to Cossutta, leader Communist PDCI to Armando Cossutta, leader of of the the Communist PDCI which which was was represented represented in in D'Alema's identification DAlemascoalition coalition government. government.The The Left Left retaliated retaliated by by pointing pointing to tothe the identification in EDIAN report senator right-wing a. The in an an IMP IMPEDIAN report of of a a senator of of the the right-wing Forza Forxa ltal Italia. The debate debate be became and came further further confused confbsedby by conspiracy conspiracytheorists theorists on on both bothright right and left. left. A A cartoon cartoon in in La

Repubblica, Alema denounced series RepubbZica, which which D' DAlema denounced as as libellous, libellous,showed showed him him blanking blanking out out aa series
of of (presumably (presumablyleft-wing) left-wing) names names from from the the IMPEDIAN IMPEDIAN reports reports before before their their release. release.

L'Unita, LUnita, by by contrast, contrast, claimed claimed that that left-wing left-wing ministers ministers were were increasingly increasingly convinced convinced
that that the thereports reports were were the the result result of of a a plot plotby by MIS MIS (which (which it it apparently apparently confused confused with with SIS): hat has KGB but but one one about the the KGB KGB con conSIS): "W What has arrived arrived is is not not a a dossierfrom dossierpornthe theKGB structed structed by by British British counter-espionage counter-espionage agents agents based based on on the theconfession confession of of an an ex-agent, ex-agent, if if there there is is one, one, and and 'Mitrokhin' Mitrokhinis is just just aacodename codename for for an an MI5 MIS operation."12 operation.12 The The political political controversy controversy provoked provoked in in Britain Britain by by the the publication publication of of The The Mitrokhin Mitrokhin Archive Archive centred centred chiefly chiefly on on the the behaviour behaviour of of ministers ministers and and the the intelligence intelligence commu community. hy, it nity, W Why, it was was asked, asked, had had Melita MelitaNorwood Norwood not not been been prosecuted prosecuted when when her her trech treachery ery had had been been known known at at least least since since Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins defection defection in in 1992? 1992? And And why why had had ministers the ministers not not been been better better briefed briefed about about her her and and other other traitors traitors identified identified in in the Mitrokhin Mitrokhin archive archive by by the the intelligence intelligence and and security security agencies? agencies? It It emerged, emerged, to to my my sur surprise, prise, that that I I had had known known about about the the Norwood Norwood case case for for considerably considerably longer longer than than either either the the Home Home Secretary Secretary or or the the Prime Prime Minister. Minister. Jack Jack Straw Straw was was informed informed in in December December 1998 1998 that that Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins information information might might lead lead to to the the prosecution prosecution of of "an an 86-year-old 86-year-old woman woman who who spied spied for for the the KGB forty forty years years ago," ago, but but was was not not told told her her identity identity until until

KGB

some shortly some months months later. later,Tony Tony Blair Blair was wasnot not briefed briefed about about Mrs. Mrs. Norwood Norwooduntil until shortly be before page of The The Times.13 Times.13 fore her her name name appeared appeared on on the thefront front page of

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The combined with with the The failure failure to to prosecute prosecute Mrs. Mrs. Norwood Norwood combined the delays delays in in briefing briefing ministers ministers aroused aroused deep deep suspicion suspicion in in some some of of the the media. media. The The Express Express denounced denounced "an an appalling culture of cover-ups and incompetence in Britain's secret services." The appalling culture of cover-ups and incompetence in Britains secret services. The Guardian Guardian suspected suspected an an MIS MIS plot: plot: We Norwood made made a a deal deal with with the the security security We need need to to know know whether whether Melita Melita Norwood services. Remember Blunt.14 Was the decision not to prosecute her based services. Remember Blunt.14Was the decision not to prosecute her based on on compassion, compassion, or or a a desire desire to to cover cover up up security security service serviceincompetence? incompetence? Less Less than than a a decade decade earlier earlierthere there would would have havebeen beenno no mechanism mechanism for for investigating investigating these charges capable of inspiring public and parliamentary confidence. these charges capable of inspiring public and parliamentary confidence. Until Until 1992 1992 successive British governments refused even to admit SIS's existence on the successive British governments refused even to admit SISs existence on theextraor extraordinary, dinary, though though traditional, traditional, grounds grounds that that such such an an admission admission would would put put national national secu secuofficially taboo later, no rity rity at at risk. risk. Had Had SIS SIS still still been been officially taboo seven seven years years later, no official official inquiry inquiry could possibly have produced public report the handling of the couldpossibly have produced a a credible crediblepublic report on onthe handlingof the Mitrokhin archive. In 1 999, however, there was an obvious body to conduct an in Mitrokhin archive. In 1999, however, there was an obvious body to conduct an inquiry: established quiry: the the Intelligence Intelligence and and Security Security Committee Committee (ISC), (ISC), established under under the the Intelli Intelligence examine gence Services Services Act Act of of 1994 1994toto examine "the the expenditure, expenditure, administration administration and and policy" policy of of the the intelligence intelligence and and security security agencies. agencies. Since been a Since it it began began work work in in 1994, 1994, the the ISC ISC has has been a largely largely unsung unsung success success story.1S story. Though technically Though not not technically a aparliamentary parliamentary committee, committee, since sinceit it reports reports to to Parliament Parliament only only through Minister, MPs. ninth through the the Prime Prime Minister, eight eight of of its its nine nine members members are are MPs. (The (The ninth is is a a mem member former ber of ofthe the House House of of Lords.) Lords.)Under Under the the chairmanship chairmanship of of the the former Conservative Conservative De Defense Secretary, Tom King, its membership spans the political spectrum. Its founder fense Secretary, Tom King, its membership spans the political spectrum. Its founder members members included included Dale Dale Campbell-Savours, Campbell-Savours, previously previouslya a leading leading Labour Labour critic critic of ofthe the intelligence who its failed intelligence community, community, who still still serves serveson on it. it. Largely Largely because because its members members have have failed either nd evidence either to to divide divide on on party party lines lines and and fall f d out out among among themselves themselves or or to to fi find evidence of of major intelligence abuses, the ISC has attracted relatively little media attention. Its major intelligence abuses, the ISC has attracted relatively little media attention. Its generally reports performance however, generally positive positive reports on on the the performance of of the the intelligence intelligence community, community, however, have been conspiracy theorists have inevitably inevitably been dismissed dismissed by bysome some conspiracy theorists as as evidence evidence of of a a cover-up. cover-up. On 1999, only O n Monday, Monday, September September 13, 13,1999, only two two days days after after The The Times Times had had begun begun seri seriCom alization alization of of The TheMitrokhin MitrokhinArchive, Archive,Jack Jack Straw Straw announced announced in in a a statement statement to to the the Commons that the ISC had been asked to conduct an inquiry into "the policies and mons that the ISC had been asked to conduct an inquiry into the policies and procedures procedures adopted adopted within within the the Security Security and and Intelligence Intelligence Agencies Agencies for for the the handling handling of of the the information information supplied supplied by by Mr M r Mitrokhin." Mitrokhin. Over Overthe the next next nine nine months months the the ISC ISC heard heard evidence evidence from from Jack Jack Straw, Straw, Robin Robin Cook Cook and and four four former former Conservative Conservative minis ministers, ters, from from the the heads heads and and other othersenior senior officers officersof of MIS MIS and and SIS, SIS,from from the the previous previous head head of MIS, and from the Cabinet Secretary, Permanent Under Secretaries at the Home of MIS, and from the Cabinet Secretary, Permanent Under Secretaries at the Home and and Foreign Foreign Offices Offices and and other other officials. officials.Among Among the the final final witnesses witnesses were were Mitrokhin Mitrokhin and and myself, myself,who who gave gave evidence evidenceto to the theISC ISC in in the theCabinet Cabinet Office Office at at 70 70Whitehall Whitehall one one after the morning ofMarch March 8, after the the other other on on the morning of 8, 2000. 2000. While While writing writing The The Mitrokhin Mitrokhin Archive, Archiwe, I I had had wrongly wrongly assumed assumed that that the the Committee Committee had had been been informed informed about about the the project. Some of the confusion which followed publication might well have been project. Some of the confusion which followed publication might well have been avoided avoided if ifthe the ISC ISC had had been been properly properly briefed briefed well wellbeforehand. beforehand.

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The ISC report report in in June June2000 2000 identified a series of administrative administrative err()rs errors which, The identified a series of which, as as usual in Whitehall, Whitehall,had had more more to to do dowith with cock-up than with with conspiracy. usual in cock-up than conspiracy. The The first first se"se rious failure" failureidentified identified by by the the ISC was wds the the failure failure of of the theSecurity Security Service Service to rious to refer refer the the case of Mrs. Mrs.Norwood to the the Law Law Officers Officers in case of Norwood to in 1993: 1993: This failure failure .. .. .. resulted resulted in in the the decision or not This decision whether whether or not to to prosecute prosecute Mrs. Mrs. Norwood effectively effectively being being taken taken by by the the Security Service. The Norwood Security Service. The Committee Committee is is concerned that that the theService Service used usedpublic public interest interest reasons reasons to to justifY justify taking no furconcerned taking no fur ther action action against against Mrs. Norwood, when whenthis was for the Law Law Officers Officers to to dether Mrs. Norwood, this was for the de cide. We also also believe believe that that the the failure failure of of the Security Service cide. We the Security Service to to interview interview Mrs. Mrs. Norwood at at this this time time prevented prevented her her possible possible prosecution. Norwood prosecution. a further hrther serious serious failure For the next five years, owing to "a failure by the Security SerSer vice,the Norwood Norwood case case "slipped slipped out out of of sight."16 sight.16MIS may may not a great great deal of vice,"the not deserve deserve a deal of sympathy for for its its oversight, oversight, but but it itdoes does deserve deserve some. some. The The first first priority priority of any security sympathy of any security service are are actual, actual, followed followed by by potential, potential, threats. threats. Among the mass material proservice Among the mass of of material pro vided by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin in in 1992, 1992, the the case case of of the the eighty-year-old Norwood,who who had vided eighty-year-old Mrs. Mrs. Norwood, had last been in contact contact with with the theKGB over over a a decade decade earlier longer posed any con conlast been in earlier and and no no longer posed any ceivable danger danger to to national national security, security, must must have have seemed a very very low low priority priority - particuceivable seemed a particu larly caused by by cutbacks cutbacks at at the the Cold larly given given the the strain strain on on MIS's MISs resources resources caused the end end of of the Cold War and and the thethreat threat from Irish Irish terrorist terrorist groups. groups. War from Arguably, however, however, MIS underestimated underestimated Mrs. Mrs. Norwood's Nonvoods past past importance. importance. In In ev evArguably, MIS idence to to the the ISC, ISC, the the Security Security Service Service concluded concluded that that her her "value value as as an idence an atom atom spy spy to to the scientists scientists who who constructed constructed the the Soviet Soviet bomb have been, the bomb must must have been, at at most, most, marginal.17 marginal."17 That was was not not the view of of the That the view the NKGB (as the KGB was then known) known) in in the the final final (as the was then months of the Second World War. In March 1945 it described the atomic intellimonths of the Second World War. In March 1945 it described the atomic intelli of great great interest interest and valuable contribution toth the gence she she had had provided provided as as "of gence and aavaluable contribution to ,develdevel opment of work work in in this this field."18 field.18Though Though Mrs. Norwood was opment of Mrs. Norwood was not, not, of of course, course, an an atom atom spy in in the the same same class class as Ted Hall and and Klaus Klaus Fuchs, spy as Ted Fuchs, both both of whom whom provided provided intelliintelli gence from from inside the main main nuclear nuclear laboratory laboratory at the NKGB and and the the gence inside the at Los Los Alamos, Alamos, the Soviet scientists with whom whom. it was was in in close close touch Soviet scientists with touch plainly plainly regarded regarded her her intelligence intelligence as as . it somewhat better better than than "marginal." marginal.The The intelligence intelligence she was able able to urasomewhat she was to provide provide on on ura nium fuel he1 cladding cladding and and post-irradiation post-irradiation corrosion corrosion resistance resistance was was probably probably applicable applicable nium to weapons weapons development as well well as as to to the the construction construction of of nuclear reactors. Unt Until the l the to development as nuclear reactors.19 final months months of of the the War, War, the the NKGB rated rated the the atomic final atomic intelligence intelligence obtained obtained in in Britain Britain almost almost as as highly highly as as that that from from the the United United States.20 States.20 As Jack Jack Straw Straw told told the the Commons Commonswhen when announcing inquiry, There As announcing the the ISC ISC inquiry, "There is is no no reason to doubt .. .. .. that the KGB regarded Mrs. Norwood Norwood as as an important spy." reason to doubt that the regarded Mrs. an important spy. Nor reason to doubt that that she both the the KGB's British Nor is is there there reason to doubt she was was both KGBs longest-serving longest-serving British agent spy. From in her agent and and its its most most important important female female British British spy. From early early in her career, career, the the KGB had her in in 1938-39 1938-39 at at a a time had high high expectations expectations of of her. her. It maintained maintained contact contact with with her time when many of of whom were executed dur when the the shortage shortage of of foreign foreign intelligence intelligence officers, officers, many whom were executed during other agents agents - including including some some of of the the ing the the Terror, Terror, led led it it to to lose lose touch touch with with many many other Mitrokhin Archive, Viktor OsOsMagnificent of The Magnificent Five. Five. Since Since the the publication publication of Tbe Mitrokbin Archbe, Viktor

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hchenko, a a former former senior officer in in the theKGB scientific and technological technological intelligence intelligence hchenko, senior officer scientific and (S&T) directorate, directorate, has has kindly kindly given given me me his his recollections recollections of of the the Norwood Norwood case. case. While While (S&T) stationed at at the theLondon London residency in in 1 1975, Oshchenko recruited recruited Michael Michael Smith, Smith,the the stationed residency 975, Oshchenko KGBs most important British British S&T agent KGB's most important agent during during the the later later Cold Cold War.21 War.21He H e remem remembers Mrs. Mrs. Norwood's Norwoods career career as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent as as "a alegendary in the theannals annals of of the bers legendary case case in the KGB very agent," and was was deeply impressed - an an important, important, determined determinedand and very valuable valuable agent, and. deeply impressed both both by by her her ideological ideological commitment commitment and and by by her her remarkable remarkable access access to to her her boss's bosss pa papers. Among Among the intelligence which which Oshchenko Oshchenko believes believes Mrs. Mrs. Norwood supplied pers. the intelligence Norwood supplied were De were "valuable valuablepapers papers relating relating to to the thematerials materials involved involved in in missile missile production."22 prod~ction. De~~ tails of of the the use use made made of of Mrs. Mrs. Norwood's Norwoods intelligence intelligence within within the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, howtails how ever, remain scarce. scarce. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes from from her file, though though giving giving precise precise ever, remain her file, information on on Mrs. Mrs.Norwood's Norwoods controllers controllers and and other other operational operational matters, matters, give give little little information indication of of the the doubtless doubtless complex intelligence she she supplied supplied in in the of her her indication complex intelligence the course course of long career career as as a a Soviet agent. It It is is highly highly unlikely unlikely that that the the SVR will will reveal revealany any details long Soviet agent. details of this this intelligence until after after Mrs. death. of intelligence until Mrs. Norwoods Norwood's death. well as as criticizing criticizing MIS for for allowing allowing the the Norwood Norwood case case to to "slip slip out sight, the As well out of of sight," the ISC also seriousfailure failure also considered considered it it "a a serious of of the the Security Security Service Service not not to to refer refer Mr. Mr. Symonds case case to to the the Law Law Officers Officers in in mid-1993." mid-1993. This This too too was was plainly the result Symonds' plainly the result of of cock-up rather conspiracy - probably somewhere in in MISs middle management. management. cock-up rather than than conspiracy probably somewhere MIS's middle Even the the Director-General Director-General of of the the Security Security Service Service from from 1992 to 1996, 1996, Stella Stella Rim RimEven 1992 to ington, was was not not informed informed by by her her staff staff of either either the the Norwood Norwoodor or the the Symonds Symonds case, and ington, case, and was thus thus unable unable to to brief brief Michael Michael Howard, Howard, Home Home Secretary Secretary in theMajor Major government, was in the government, and his his Permanent Permanent Under Under Secretary. Secretary.Further Further confusion confusion arose arose as as a a result result of ofthe the fact fact that that and the "interdepartmental interdepartmental working working group" group in in Whitehall Whitehall responsible responsible for for monitoring monitoring the the the unaware of the significance of progress of the publication publication project wasitself itself "unaware of [Mitrokhins]UK material until late late 1998."23 1998.23 My own own direct direct contact with the the working working [Mitrokhin's] material until My contact with group was was limited to an an enjoyable enjoyable lunch lunch with with its its Chairman Chairman shortly shortly before before Christmas Christmas group limited to 1998. asked, when evidence to the ISC, whether, 1998. I was was asked, when giving giving evidence to the whether, while while writing writing The Archiwe, I would would have have liked liked greater greater contact contact with with the thegroup. group. I would would indeed. indeed. Mitrokhin Archive, The ISCs Mitrokhin inquiry found much to praise as well as criticize: The ISC's Mitrokhin inquiry found much to praise as well as criticize: Carrying the theinitial initial contact contact with with Mr. Mr.Mitrokhin Mitrokhin right through his to and and his his Carrying right through to his familys successhl exfiltration together together with with all all his his material material represents represents a a major major family's successful exfiltration achievement by by SIS. SIS. In In addition addition the the management management of of the the material material and and its its dis disachievement semination, as as appropriate, appropriate, to to foreign foreign liaison liaison [intelligence] [intelligence] services services was well semination, was well handled. The The Committee Committee wish wish to to pay pay tribute tribute to tothis this outstanding outstanding piece of intelhandled. piece ofintel ligence work. work.24 ligence 24

orsement of I was was heartened heartened by by the the ISC's ISCs end endorsement ofthe the 1996 decision to to authorize authorizeme me to to 1996 decision Mitrokbin Archive Archiwe in collaboration with Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin,as well as by by the Com Comwrite The Mitrokhin mittees conclusion (which I hope it is not too immodest to quote) quote) that that the the book bookis mittee's of tremendous value, as it gives gives a real insight into into the theKGB's KGBs work and the persecu persecu"of of the dissident^."^' The ISC's ISCs greatest praise was, rightly, reserved for tion of the dissidents."25 was, quite rightly, Vasili Mitrokhin:

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The remarkable commitment The Committee Committee believes believes that that he he is is a a man man of of remarkable commitment and and courage, courage, who who risked risked imprisonment imprisonment or or death death in in his his determination determination that that the the truth truth should and their their activities, should be be told told about about the the real real nature nature of of the the KGB and activities,which which he he be believed lieved were werebetraying betraying the the interests interests of of his his own own country country and and people. people. He He succeeded succeeded in in this, this, and and we we wish wish to to record record formally formallyour our admiration admiration for for his his achievement. achievement. The ISC report The ISC report regrets regrets that that "poor poor media media handling handling [presumably [presumably by by Whitehall] Whitehall] of of which the the publication publication of of The Mitrokhin Archive, Archive, which allowed allowed the the emphasis emphasis to to fall fall on on the the UK spies, spies, detracted detracted from from the the brave brave work work of of Mr. Mr. Mitrokhin Mitrokhinand and the the importance importance of of the the revelations initial media media cover revelations about about the the KGB's KGBs work work he he wanted wanted to to expose."26 In In the the initial coverage, book is age, there there was was little little mention mention of of the the fact fact that that vastly vastly more more of of the the book is devoted devoted to to the the KGB's KGBs war war against against the the dissidents dissidents and and its its attempts attempts to tostifle stifle dissent dissent throughout throughout the theSo Soviet viet Bloc Bloc than than to to the thecareers careers of ofMelita Melita Norwood Nonvood and and John John Symonds. Symonds. The The chief chief problem problem in in understanding understanding both both Mitrokhin Mitrokhin and and his his archive, archive, which which was was evident the media evident in in much much of of the media coverage, coverage, is is that that neither neither is is truly truly comprehensible comprehensible in in Western Western terms. terms. The The very very notion notion of of the the hero, hero, familiar familiar to to all all other other cultures cultures and and all all pre previous early vious Western Western generations, generations, arouses arouses greater greater scepticism scepticism in in the the early twenty-first twenty-first century century West West than than at at any any other other time time or or place place in in recorded recorded history. history. For For those those whose whose imagina imaginations the age, tions have have been beencorroded corroded by by the the cynicism cynicism of ofthe age, the the idea idea that that Mitrokhin Mitrokhinwas was will willing ing to to risk risk his his life life for for twenty twenty years years for for a a cause cause in in which which he he passionately passionately believed believed is is almost almost too too difficult difficult to to grasp. grasp. Almost Almost equally equally hard hard to to comprehend comprehend is is Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins will willingness himself throughout ingness to to devote devote himself throughout that thatperiod period to to compiling compiling and and preserving preserving a a secret secret archive archive which which he he knew knew might might never never see seethe the light light of of day. day. For For any anyWestern Western author author it itis is almost almost impossible impossible to to understand understand how how a a writer writer could could devote devote all all his his or or her her energy energy and and creative be publicly publiclyrere creative talent talent for for many many years years to to secret secret writing writing which which might might never never be vealed. as Chapter vealed. Yet, Yet, as Chapter 1 1 seeks seeks to to show, show, some some of of the the greatest greatest Russian Russian writers writers of of the the Soviet era did No biography biography of of any any Western Western writer writer contains contains any any Soviet era did precisely precisely that.27 that.27 No death-bed Bulgakov of of death-bed scene scene comparable comparable to to the the description description by by the the widow widow of of Mikhail MikhailBulgakov how bed for time so could satisfy how she she helped helped him him out out of of bed for the the last last time so that that.he he could satisfy himself himself before before and Margarita, arguably he he died died that that his his great, great, unpublished unpublished masterpiece, masterpiece, The Master andMargarita, arguably the twentieth century, still the greatest greatest novel novel of of the the twentieth century, was was still in in its its hiding hiding place. place. The The Master Master and and Margarita survived survived to to be be published published a a quarter quarter of of a a century century later. later. It I t is is a a sobering sobering thought, thought, however, however, that that for for every every forbidden forbidden masterpiece masterpiece of of the the Soviet Soviet era era which which sur survives, vives, there there must must be be a a larger larger number number which which have have failed failedto to survive survive or or which, which, even even now, now, are the Mitrokhin are mouldering mouldering in in their their forgotten forgotten hiding hiding places places - as as the Mitrokhinarchive archive might might well well have done ifMitrokhin removing it have done if Mitrokhin and and SIS SIS had had not not succeeded succeeded in in removing it to toBritain. Britain. The The Mitrokhin Mitrokhin archive archive is is no no more more comprehensible comprehensible in in purely purely Western Western terms terms than than Mitrokhin KGB is Mitrokhin himself. himself.The The commonest commonest error error in in interpreting interpretingthe the is to to suppose suppose that that it it was was roughly roughly equivalent equivalent to to its its main main Western Western rivals. rivals. There There were, were, of of course, course, similari similarities the operational East and ties in in the operational techniques techniques employed employed by by intelligence intelligence agencies agencies in in East and West, West, as as well well as as in in the the importance importance which which each each side side attached attached to to the the other otheras as an an intel intelligence ligence target. target. The The fundamental fundamental difference difference between between the the . Soviet Soviet one-party one-party state state and and the reflected in the Western Westerndemocracies, democracies, however, however, was was reflected in fundamental hndamental differences differences between between their their intelligence intelligence communities. communities.

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The The differences differences were were greatest greatest in in the the Stalinist Stalinist era. era. At At the the outbreak outbreak of of the the Second Second World World War, War, Stalin Stalin regarded regarded the the NKVD's NKVDs pursuit pursuit in in Mexico Mexico of of the the great, great, though though harmless, intelligence on harmless, heretic, heretic, Leon Leon Trotsky, Trotsky, as as a a higher higher priority priority than than collecting collecting intelligence on Adolf Hitler. In the middle of the War, the paranoid strain which regularly distorted Adolf Hitler. In the middle of the War, the paranoid strain which regularly distorted Soviet no doubt doubt Soviet intelligence intelligence assessment assessment persuaded persuaded Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence chiefs chiefs - and and no Stalin the Magnificent - that that the Magnificent Five, Five, probably probably its its ablest ablest group group of of foreign foreign Stalin himself himself agents, agents, were were part part of of aagigantic gigantic British British intelligence intelligence deception. deception. During During his his final final years years Stalin was sometimes obsessed with the hunting down of often imaginary Titoists Stalin was sometimes obsessed with the hunting down of often imaginary Titoists and and Zionists. Zionists. His His chief chief foreign foreign policy policy objective objective at at the the end endof of his his life life may may well well have have been Marshal Tito, been the the plan plan for for an an MGB MGB (later (later KGB) KGB) illegal illegal to to assassinate assassinate Marshal Tito, who who had had succeeded succeeded Trotsky Trotsky as as the the leading leading heretic heretic of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Bloc. Stalin Stalin once once called called Lavrenti Lavrenti Beria, Beria, the the most most powerful powerhl of of his his intelligence intelligence chiefs, chiefs,"my my Himmler." Himmler. But But there there was was no no Western Western intelligence intelligence chief chief with with whom whom Beria Beria - or or Himmler, Himmler, the the head head of of the the SS SS - could could be be credibly credibly compared. compared. Even Even after after Stalin's Stalins death death and and Beria's Berias execution execution in in 1953, 1953,there there remained remained basic basic dif differences ferences between between intelligence intelligence priorities priorities in in East East and and West. West. Perhaps Perhaps the the simplest simplest way way of judging whether ofjudging whetherany any intelligence intelligence report report is is of of critical critical importance importance is is to to ask ask the the ques question: arrives tion: If If itit arrives in in the themiddle middle of of the the night nightwould would you you wake wakethe the relevant relevant government government minister? minister? The The answer answer to to that thatquestion question in in Moscow Moscow was was often often quite quite different different from from that that in in Western Western capitals. capitals. On O n October October 27, 27, 1978, 1978, for for example, example, the the KGB resident resident in in Oslo, Oslo, Leonid Leonid Makarov, Makarov, rang rang Mikhail Mikhail Suslov, Suslov, the the member member of of the the Politburo Politburo chiefly chiefly respon responsible tell sible for for ideological ideological purity, purity, in in the the early early hours. hours. Why? Why? Not Nottoto tell him him that that some some great great international international crisis crisis was was about about to to break break but but to to report report that that the the Russian Russian dissident dissident Yuri Yuri Orlov Orlov had hadfailed failed to to win win the the Nobel Nobel Peace Peace Prize. Prize. The The Oslo Oslo residency residency was was warmly warmly con congratulated gratulated for for its its supposed supposed "operational operational effectiveness" effectivenessin in achieving achieving this this entirely entirely pre predictable dictable result.28 result.28It It is is simply simply not not possible possible to to imagine imagine any any Western Western minister minister being being woken woken for for any any comparable comparable reason. reason. The The KGB's KGBs domestic domestic obsession obsessionwith with the thedetection detection and and suppression suppression of"ideological of ideological subversion" its foreign to impress Party subversion spilled spilled over over into into its foreign operations. operations. It sought sought to impress the the Party leadership leadership by by its its zeal zeal in in discrediting discrediting dissidents dissidents abroad abroad as as well well as as at at home. home. In In the the sum summer mer of of 1978 1978 the theKGB First First Chief Chief(Foreign (Foreign Intelligence) Intelligence) and and Fifth Fifth (Ideological (Ideological Sub Subversion) version) Directorates Directorates jointly jointly arranged arranged the the secret secret screening screening in in Moscow Moscow to to an an audience audience of of KGB and and Party Party notables notables of of the the commencement commencement address address by by the the dissident dissident writer writer Aleksandr Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn at at Harvard HarvardUniversity. University.The The purpose purpose of of this this extraordinary extraordinary (by (by Western toto the efforts Western standards) standards) evening evening was was to to seek seek to to demonstrate demonstrate that, that,thanks thanks the efforts of of the the KGB, KGB, Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn was was now now a a largely largely discredited discredited figure figure in in the the United United States.29 States.29 The The KGB's KGBs mission mission to to discredit discredit dissidents dissidents who who had had emigrated emigrated to to the theWest West extended extended even even to to dissident dissident ballet ballet dancers, dancers, musicians musicians and and chess chess players. players. For For Western Western media media used used to to interpreting interpretingthe thesecret secret Cold Cold War Warin interms terms of of spy spy ver versus sus spy, spy,Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins material material on on the theKGB's KGBs war war against against ideological ideological subversion, subversion,unlike unlike the predictably, the revelations revelations about about individual individual spies, spies, had had little little interest. interest. There There was, was,predictably, greater greater interest interest in in this this material material in in the thecountries countries of of the the former former Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc - reflected, reflected, for of for example, example,in in the thenumber number of translations translations of of The TheMitrokhin Mitrokhin Archive into into Eastern EasternEu European ropean languages. languages.The The priority priority given given by by the the KGB KGB to to maintaining maintaining the the ideological ideological oror-

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thodoxy reflected by thodoxy of of the theSoviet Soviet Bloc Blocwas was reflected by the the fact fact that that it itdeployed deployed more more of of its its elite elite group of of illegals illegalsto to Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia during during the the Prague Prague Spring Spring of of 1968 1968than, than, so far far as as group so is known, known, were were ever ever used usedin any operation operation against against a a Western Western target. target. is in any The Cold Warchapters of The Mitrokhin Archive give give equal equalweight weight to to KGB oper operThe Cold War chapters of ations against against the the United United States States and and to to those those against against ideological subversion. ations ideological subversion. Mitrokhin intelligence headquarters Mitrokhin smuggled smuggled out out of of the the KGB foreign foreign intelligence headquarters important important material on on operations operations against against some of the the leaders leaders of the struggle struggle for for democracy democracy material some of of the within the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc whose whose extraordinary extraordinary moral moral courage courage eventually eventually prevailed prevailed over over within force of the KGB ap,d and its, its,alli. allies. T'Yg Two e, examples out. The the immense coercive coercive force xamples stand out. first is Sakharov, dubbed is the great Russian dissident and nuclear scientist scientist Andrei Sakh3:rov, Public Enemy Number Number One" One by Yuri Yuri Andropov (successively (successively KGB Chairman and "Public to become, become, in in Soviet leader), leader), who who survived survived persecution persecutionand and internal internal exile exile by bythe the KGB to Soviet Gorbachevs words, "unquestionably unquestionably the most outstanding personality" personality at the the 1989 1989 Gorbachev's Peoples Soviets. Soviets. One of the most striking visual images imagesof the crumbling Congress of People's deserves to be as well known as the destruction of the of the Soviet system, which deserves Berlin Wall, Wall, is of Gorbachev and other the PoliJl:mro Politburo standing bareother members of th tanqig bare Sakharovs open coffin after his sudden death in December 1989. 1989. headed by Sakharov's The second second outstanding outstanding case case is that of of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, Wojtyla, Archbishop Archbishop of of The is that Cardinal Karol Krakbw, whom whom the the KGB seems to have have identi, identified in t, the, ea$y 1970s 1970s as as its its most danKrakow, seems to fieci in he erly most dan gerous opponent opponent in the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Bloc. Wojtyla, Wojtyla, however, however, was was protected protected by by his his moral moral gerous in the authority and and eminence. eminence. The The KGB, like like the the Polish Polish SB, from the the immense immense authority SB, shrank shrank from Wojtylas election election public outcry which his arrest would provoke. Seen in hindsight, Wojtyla's in 1978 as Pope John Paul I1 marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet Bloc. 1978 II the end of the Bloc. difficulty, contained for the next decade, Though the Polish problem was, with difficulty, decade, it resolved. could not be resolved. attenThe organization which has studied The Mitrokhin Archive with the closest atten tion is the tion since since its its publication publication is the SVR, SVR, which which is is deeply deeply concerned concerned by by its its contents. contents. No agency can canexpect expect tomaintain intelligence agency either to recruit new agents or to maintain the loyalty itsexisting agents unless it can convince them that, that.it indefof its it can keep their secrets indef initely. The SVR is now ill-placed to do do so. toMitrokhin, no one who spied initely. so. Thanks to for the the Soviet Soviet Union at any any period period between between the the October October Revqlution Revolution and and the the eve eve of of for Union at the Gorbachev Gorbachev era era can now be confident confident that that his his or or her. secrets are still secure. the can now be her secrets are still secure. Mitrokhins material contains information information on Cold Wr War operations operations conducted conducted Mitrokhin's material also also contains on Colq by the the current current head head of of the the SVR, VyacheslavTrubnikov, VyacheslavTrubnikov, and and other otherformer former senior by senior KGB officers. Volume Volume Two will will contain contain a a chapter chapter on activities in India,where where Trub Trubofficers. Two on KGB activities in IIldi, nikov made made his his reputation. reputation. If If the thepast past secrets secrets of of the the SVR SVR leadership leadership have have proved provedin innikov secure, secure, SVR agents agents may may well wellconclude conclude that that theirs theirs are are also. also. From the the moment the Mit, Mitrokhin archive arrived arrived in realized that that its its From moment the rokhin archive in Britain, Britain, SIS SIS realized contents were were "of of exceptional counter-intelligence significance, not only illuminating illuminating contents exceptional counter-intelligence significance, not only past KGB activity activity against against Western Western countries countries but but also also promising to nullify nullifjr many many of of past promising to Russia's assets." The Russias current current assets. The CIA similarly similarly found found the the archive archive "the the biggest biggest CI [counter-intelligence] The FBI agreed. [counter-intelligence] bonanza bonanza of of the the post-war post-war period." period.The agreed. As the the ISC ISC report agencies have report reveals, reveals, other other Western Western intelligence intelligence agencies have also also been been "extremely extremely grate grateleads provided provided by bythe the Mitrokhin Mitrokhin archive.30 archive.30 ful for for the the numerous ful" numerous CI leads

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Some Some insight insight into into the theturmoil turmoil inside inside the the SVR which which must must have have been been provoked provoked by by the the publication publication of of The T h eMitrokhin Mitrukhin Archive Archive is is provided provided by bythe the file file (noted (noted by by Mitrokhin) Mitrokhin) on book on published by bythe the American American journalist journalist John John Barron Barron a a quarter quarter on the thebook on the theKGB published of of a a century century ago. ago. KGB headquarters headquarters ordered ordered no no fewer fewer than than 370 reports reports in in an an attempt attempt to assess the interestscaused caused by sections of bookY to assess the damage damage to to its its interests by various various sections of Barron's Barrons book. Mitrokhins revelations doubtless led to even even more damage assessments assessments than than Mitrokhin's revelationshave have doubtless led to more damage Barron's. attributable evidence Barrons. There There is is already alreadyun unattributable evidence of of efforts efforts by bythe the SVR to to ensure ensure that that no the unrestricted access access to les enjoyed no archivist archivist ever everagain againhas has the unrestricted to fi files enjoyedby by Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin. Like Directorate, the contains an sec Like the the KGB First First Chief ChiefDirectorate, the SVR contains an "active active measures" measures section, Department Department MS, specializing specializing in in disinformation, disinformation, which which was wasinevitably intion, inevitably in structed try to undermine structed to to try to undermine the the credibility credibility of of The T h e Mitrokhin Mitrukhin Archive.32 On O n two two occasions since sincethe the publication publication of thebook, book, it it has sent apparent apparent Russian Russian defectors defectors to to occasions of the has sent Western intelligence intelligence agencies, agencies,each each with the the same same story MitrokbinArchiue. Western with story about about The MitrokhinArchive. The claimed the the "defectors," defectors, had had decided decided on on a a massive massive clear-out clear-out of of redundant redundant The SVR, SVR, claimed and and had had therefore therefore chosen chosen a a and retired retired agents agents which which it it had had inherited inherited from from the the KGB, and retired transmit their their names names to the West.33 retired KGB archivist archivist - Vasili Vasili Mitrokhin Mitrokhin - to to transmit to the West.33 This poorly poorly conceived measure proved counter-productive for for two two reasons. reasons. This conceivedactive active measure proved counter-productive First, to First, a a series series of of Western Westernintelligence intelligence agencies agencies had had already already been beenable able to establish establish that that Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins material material was was far fartoo too valuable valuable to to them themfor for the the SVR to to have have willingly willinglymade made it available. available. Secondly, Secondly, both both the the bogus bogus defectors were quickly quickly and and conclusively conclusively ex exit "defectors" were posed as The whole whole episode to underline the SVR's SVRs posed as SVR plants. plants. The episode has has merely merely served served to underline the deep anxiety caused by material. Its deep anxiety at at the thedamage damage to to its its agent agent operations operations caused byMitrokhin's Mitrokhins material. Its mood will not not have have been been lightened by the the knowledge knowledge that that there there are are many many more more rev revmood will lightened by elations still to to come in Volume Volume Two. Two.Mitrokhin's Mitrokhinsambition for almost elations still come in ambition - unchanged unchanged for almost thirty years years - remains to publish as much much as as possible possible of of the the top-secret top-secret material material which which thirty remains to publish as he risked risked his his life life to to collect. collect. he
NOTES NOTES

1. By the the time time I gained to the thearchive, archive, the the greater greater part part had had been translated 1 . By gained access access to been translated and carefully carefully checked checkedby by SIS officers working working in in close collaborationwith with Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin. and SIS officers close collaboration The Security Security Service Service and and US intelligence intelligence officers officersalso also assisted in the thetranslation. The assisted in translation. The The translated archive archive was wasmade made available available to to me me in in an an SIS office both both in and on on translated SIS office in hard hard copy copy and a computer computer database database with with sophisticated sophisticated indexing indexing and and search search software. While I X was was a software. While SIS officer officer complet completwriting the the book, book, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin worked worked three three days days a a week week with with an an SIS writing ing ing the the translation translation and and checking checking process. process. O n the the Magnificent Magnificent Five, Five, see seebelow, below, Chapter 4. 4. 2. On Chapter Intelligence and and Security Security Committee, Committee, The Mitrokhin Mitrukhin Inquiry Report, C m 3. Intelligence Cm 4764,June June 13, 13,2000, 44-5,47. The authorization authorization doubtless doubtless had had something somethingto todo do 2000, pp. 44-5, 47. The 4764, with the the fact fact that that I had had earlier earlier written written a a KGB history history and and edited edited two two volumes volumes of of with KGB documents documents (listed (listed in the the Bibliography) Bibliography) with with Oleg Oleg Gordievsky, Gordievsky, a a former former KGB colonel who who for for eleven eleven years years had been one the most important SIS SIS agents colonel had been one of the most important agents of the the Cold War. 4. Some details details of thebriefing briefing of senior ministers ministers and servants are aregiven given in of the of senior and civil civil servants in Intelligence Intelligence and and Security Security Committee, Committee, The T6e Mitrokhin Mitrukhin Inquiry Report, Annex Annex E.

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5. Hollander, Hollander, Political Pulitical Pilgrims, PiZgrims, p. 102. 102. 6. 6. See See below, below, Chapter Chapter 5. 5.
David Rose, Rose, " I would do do everything everything again,' again, says says the the agent agent from from suburbia," suburbia, 7. David 'I would Telegraph, September 1999. While While interviewing interviewing Mrs. Mrs. Norwood Norwood on on Au AuSunday Telegraph, September 12, 12, 1999. 10 for a BBC2 documentary based on The MitrokhinArchive, Mitrukhin Archiwe, Rose had obtained gust 10 confession that she had been a Soviet spy. spy. the first confession John Symonds Symonds (interviewed (interviewed,by by David Rose), "I I told you I was was a a spy," spy, Guardian 8. John David Rose), told you (G2), September 14,1999. Cf. below, pp. 559-63. 559-63. (G2), 14, 1999. Cf Interview with with Oleg Oleg Kalugin Kalugin on on ABC Nightline, September September 9, 9,1999. 9. Interview 1999.

10. 1999. 10. ABC News News report report by by John John McWethy, McWethy, September September 9, 9,1999. 11. Eork Post, 7 November 1999. 1999. Philadelphia Philade4hia Daily DailyNews, Niws, 8 8 November 1999. 1999. 11. New York 12. For For a a selection selection of of Italian Italian newspaper newspaper articles, see: 12. articles, see: Dossier Stampa: LAfare L'A ffire Mitrokhhz (Rome: (Rome: Camera Camera dei dei Deputati, Deputati, Ufficia Ufficia Stampa, Stampa, October October22, 22,1999). Some Mitrokhin 1999). Some of of IMPEDIAN Mitrukhin the IMP EDIAN reports are published in the the Italian edition of The Mitrokhin Archiwe: LArchiwio Mitrukhin (Milan: Rizzoli, 1999), 1999), Appendix F. F. Archive: L'Archivio Mitrokhin Intelligence and and Security Security Committee, Committee, The Mitrokhin Mitrokhin Inquiry 13. Intelligence Inquiry Report, pp. pp. 48,

52-5. 52-5. 14. 14. In In 1963, 1963, after after a a long long investigation investigation had had failed failed to to find find enough enough usable usable evidence evidenceto to secure a a conviction, conviction, the the Soviet Soviet spy Anthony Blunt had been immunity secure spy Sir Sir Anthony Blunt had been offered offered immunity from prosecution prosecution in in return return for for a a full full confession confession (not (not a a bargain bargain he he seems to have have com comfrom seems to pletely honoured). honoured). It It was was later later alleged, alleged, on on no no adequate adequate evidence, evidence, that that the thereal real reason reason pletely for the the decision decision not not to toprosecute prosecute had had been been an an establishment establishment or or MIS coverup. coverup. for 15. In In stating statingthis this conclusion, conclusion, I should should perhaps declare an an interest. the late late 15. perhaps declare interest. Since Since the 1970s I had had argued argued the the case case for the establishment of a a parliamentary intelligence 1970s for the establishment of parliamentary intelligence committee present Intelligence committee with with roughly roughly the the role role of of the the present Intelligence and and Security Security Committee. Committee. (See, for for example, example,the the introduction introduction to to Andrew Andrew and andDilks Dilks [eds.], [eds.], Missing Dimension, (See, and conclusion to proposalwas was initially given a and the the conclusion to Andrew, Andrew, Secret Service.) The The proposal initially given a frosty reception reception in in Whitehall. Whitehall. frosty 16. 16. Intelligence Intelligence and and Security Security Committee, Committee, The Mitrokhin Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, p. 12. 12. 17. 17. Intelligence Intelligence and and Security Security Committee, Committee, The Mitrokhin Mitrukhin Inquiry Report, p. 69. 18. 18. See See below, below, p. p. 168. 168. It is is difficult difficult to to see see how how Mrs. Mrs. Norwood Nonvood could could have have provided provided atomic intelligence of "greatvalue value" in 1945 if, as atomic intelligence of such such great in March March 1945 as claimed claimed by by Phillip Phillip Knightley, not return British Non-Ferrous Research As Knightley she she did did not return to to work work in in the the British Non-Ferrous Metals Metals Research Association (BN-FMRA) after extended maternity leave until 1946 (Knightley, Norsociation (BN-FMRA) after extended maternity leave until 1946 (Knightley, "Nor 13, 1999). MIS wood: Statesman, December December 13,1999). MI5 evidence evidence to to wood: the the spy spy who who never never was," was,New Statesman, the ISC confirms confirms that that in in 1945 1945 Mrs. Mrs. Norwood Nonvood was was secretary to the the Chairman Chairman of of the the the secretary to (Intelligence and and Security Committee, The Mitrokhin Mitro-okhin Inquiry Report, BN-FMRA (Intelligence Security Committee, p. 67). 67). 19. This is is the the view view of of a a government government scientist scientist who who prefers prefers not not to to be be identified. identified. 19. This Precise details details of of the the atomic atomic intelligence intelligence provided provided by byMrs. Mrs. Norwood Norwood are are unavailable. unavailable. Precise Not Not until until they they have have been been carefully carefully analyzed analyzed and and compared compared with with the the other other atomic atomic in inintelligencewill will possibleto form a final judgement telligence obtained by Soviet intelligence it be possible on an atom Mrs. on the the importance importance of of her her role role as as an atom spy. spy. Atomic Atomic intelligence intelligence provided provided by by Mrs. Norwood qfter after 1945 1945 was was irrelevant irrelevant to to the the construction construction of of the the Soviet Soviet bomb bomb which, which, Norwood

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thanks replica of the thanks chiefly chiefly to to Hall Hall and and Fuchs, Fuchs, was was an an exact exact replica of the the American American - not not the British bomb. It remained, however, of some significance. Probably the most im British - bomb. It remained, however, of some significance. Probably the most important Clement -a a secret secret so so sensitive sensitive that that Prime PrimeMinister Minister Clement portant secret secret in in post-war post-war Britain Britain Attlee - concerned concerned the the construction construction of of the the Attlee withheld withheld it it from from most most of of his his cabinet cabinet British British atomic atomic bomb. bomb. Mrs. Mrs. Norwood's Norwoods intelligence intelligence must must have have provided provided some some insight insight into the highly below, into the highly classified classified progress progress of of British British atomic atomic scientists. scientists. (See (See below, pp. 1 8-19.) pp. 5 518-19.) 20. 20. According According to to aafile file noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin (vol. (vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 2, 2, item item 19), 19),up up to to Novem November 944 the ber 1 1944 theNKGB NKGBobtained obtained 1,167 1,167 documents documents on on "nuclear nuclear secrets" secrets from from the the USA USA and UK. Of these 88 from the USA and 79 from the UK were rated as "very valu and UK. O f these 88 from the USA and 79 from the UK were rated as very valuable." able. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes contain contain no no similar similar statistics statistics for for the the period period after after November November 1 944. Further 1944. Furtheratomic atomic intelligence intelligence was was received receivedfrom from the the GRU. GRU. 2 1 . See 567-8. 21. See below, below, pp. pp.550-53, 550-53,567-8. 22. In 1992, while head of 22. In 1992, while head of Line Line X X (S&T) (S&T) at at the the Paris Paris residency, residency, Oshchenko Oshchenko de defected fected to to Britain, Britain, where where he he now now lives. lives. 23. 23. Intelligence Intelligence and and Security Security Committee, Committee, The The Mitrokhin Mitrokhin Inquiry Inqzriry Report, Report, pp. pp. 13, 13, 20, 26. 20,26. 24. p. 24. Intelligence Intelligence and and Security Security Committee, Committee, The TheMitrokhin Mitrokbin Inquiry InquiryReport, Report, p. 4. 4. 25. 16. 25. Intelligence Intelligence and and Security Security Committee, Committee, The The Mitrokhin Mitrokhin Inquiry Inquiry Report, Report,pp. pp. 4, 4,16. The The government's governments response response welcomed welcomed the the ISC's ISCs endorsement. endorsement. 2 Q . Intelligence 26. Intelligence and and Security Security Committee, Committee, The The Mitrokhin Mitrokhin Inquiry Inquiry Report, Report,p. p. 4. 4. 27. 27. See See below, below,pp. pp. 13-14. 13-14. 28. 28. See See below, below,pp. pp.429-30. 429-30. 29. 29. See See below, below,pp. pp. 418-19. 418-19. 30. 30. Intelligence Intelligence and and Security Security Committee, Committee, The TheMitrokhin Mitrokhin Inquiry Inqzriry Report, Report,p. p. 4. 4. 31. 31. See See below, below, p. p. 25. 25. 32. discredit 32.The The KGB KGB had had similarly similarlysought sought to to discredit Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB: KGB: The The Inside Inside St07), Story, after after its its publication publication in in 1990, 1990,by by claiming claiming that that its its best-publicized best-publicized revela revelation and tion - the the identification identification of of John John Cairncross Cairncross as as the the "Fifth FifthMan" Man and the the first first agent agent to to provide provide warning warning of of plans plans to to build build the the atomic atomic bomb bomb -was was wrong. wrong. The The SVR SVR now now ac acknowledges knowledges that that the theidentification identification was was correct correct on on both bothcounts. counts. 33. active measure, have been 33. In In devising devising this this ill-advised ill-advised active measure, Department Department MS MS may may have been encouraged encouraged by by the the fact fact that that two two somewhat somewhat similar similar suggestions suggestionshad had surfaced surfaced indepen independently the Western Western media. . .. ..The The dently in in the media. A A writer writer in in Le L e Monde Mondc had had suggested suggested that that " . Mitrokhin Mitrokhin archive archive operation operation was was organized organized in in Moscow Moscow either either by by an an undisciplined undisciplined Stalinist Stalinist faction faction in in the the KGB KGB or or by by the the provisional provisional leadership leadership of of the the [intelligence] [intelligence] agencies agencies between between November November 1991 1991and and February February 1992." 1992.("Voyages (Voyagesen en memoire mimoire sovie soviC1999.) In tique," tique, Le Monde, Monde, November November 5, 5,1999.) In her her review review of ofThe TheMitrokhin Archive Archiwe in in The The Amy Knight Knight also Times Times Literary Literary Supplement Supplement (November (November 26, 26, 1999), 1999), Dr. Dr. Amy also could could not not "help wonder whether [Mitrokhin] had bployers in helpbut but wonder whether [Mitrokhin] had a alittle little help help from from his his former former e eLployers in making making known known the the KGB's KGBs archival archival secrets." secrets."This," This,she she added, added, "is isby by no no means means a a far farfetched fetched suggestion." suggestion.Dr. Dr. Knight's Knights earlier earlier review review of of my my book book with with Oleg Oleg Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB: KGB: The TheInside Inside Story, Story, had had included included the the eccentric eccentric suggestion suggestion that that I might might not not have have

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written written the the lengthy lengthy introduction introduction ((TLS, TLS, December December 7, 7, 1990). 1990). My My own own review review of of Dr. Dr. Knight's Knights book, book, Spies Spies Without Without Cloaks, Cloaks, makes makes clear clearmy my respect respect for for her her research research on on Rus Russian intelligence. intelligence.There There is, is, however, however, occasionally a mild mild element element of of conspiracy conspiracy theory theory sian occasionally a in - as as evidenced, evidenced, for for example, example, by her her suggestion suggestion in in Spies Spies Without Without Cloaks Cloaks in her her work work that that Gorbachev Gorbachev was was complicit complicit in in the the attempted attemptedcoup coup against against him him in inAugust August 1991. 1991.

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This book is is based based on on unprecedented unprecedented and and unrestricted unrestricted access access to to one one of of the the world's worlds T his book

most and closely closely guarded guarded archives-that archives-that ofof the the foreign foreign intelligence intelligence arm arm of of the the most secret secret and the First Chief Directorate (FCD). Hitherto foreign KGB, the First Chief Directorate (FCD). Hitherto the the present present Russian Russian foreign intelligence service, service, the the SVR (Sluzhba Vneshnei Vneshnei Razvedki) Raxwedki), has been supremely con con, has been supremely intelligence fident that that a book such such as as this this could could not not be be written. written. When When the the German German magazine magazine fident a book Focus Foczcs reported reported in in December December 1996 1996 that thata a former former KGB officer officer had had defected defected to to Britain Britain with "the the names names of of hundreds hundreds of of Russian Russian spies," spies,Tatyana Tatyana Samolis, spokeswoman for for with Samolis, spokeswoman the SVR, the SVR, instantly "Hundreds of instantly ridiculed ridiculed the the whole whole story story as as "absolute absolute nonsense." nonsense. Hundreds of people! That just doesn't people! That just doesnt happen!" happen! she she declared. declared. ''Any Any defector defector could could get get the the name name of of one, two, two, perhaps perhaps three three agents-but agents-but not not hundreds!"l hundreds! one, The facts, facts, however, however, are far more more sensational sensational even even than than the dismissed as as The are far thestory story dismissed impossible by by the the SVR. SVR. The The KGB defector defector had had brought brought with withhim himto toBritain Britain details details impossible not thousands of not of of a a few few hundred hundred but butof of thousands of Soviet Soviet agents agents and and intelligence intelligence officers officers in in all all parts of of the the globe, globe, some of them them "illegals" illegalsliving living under deep cover cover abroad, abroad, disguised disguised parts some of under deep as foreign foreign citizens. citizens. No one one who who spied spied for for the the Soviet Soviet Union Union at atany any period period between between the the as October October Revolution Revolution and and the the eve eve of of the the Gorbachev Gorbachev era era can can now now be be confident confident that that his his or her her secrets secrets are still secure. secure. When When the the British British Secret Secret Intelligence Intelligence Service Service (SIS) or are still exfiltrated the the defector defector and and his his family family from from Russia Russia in in 1992, it also also brought brought out out six six exfiltrated 1992, it cases notes he almost daily cases containing containing the the copious copious notes he had had taken taken almost daily for for twelve twelve years, years,before before his retirement retirement in in 1984, 1984, on on top top secret secret KGB files files going going as as far far back as 1918. 1918. The The con conhis back as tents of of the the cases cases have have since since been been described described by by the the American American FBI as as "the the most most com comtents plete and and extensive extensive intelligence intelligence ever ever received receivedfrom from any any source." source. plete The KGB KGB officer officer who who assembled assembled this this extraordinary extraordinary archive, archive, Vasili Vasili Nikitich Nikitich The Mitrokhin, is is now now a a British British citizen. citizen. Born in central central Russia Russia in in 1922, 1922, he he began began his his Mitrokhin, Born in career as as a a Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence intelligence officer officer in in 1948, when the foreign career 1948, at ataatime time when the foreign intelligence arms arms of the the MGB (the future future KGB) and the the GRU (Soviet (Soviet military military intel intelintelligence MGB (the KGB) and ligence) were were temporarily temporarily combined combined in in the the Committee Committeeof of Information.2 By By the the time time ligence) lnformation.2 Mitrokhin was was sent sent on on his his first first foreign foreign posting posting in in 1952,3 1952,3the the Committee Committee had haddisinMitrokhin disin tegrated and and the the MGB had had resumed resumed its its traditional traditional rivalry rivalry with with the His first first tegrated the GRU. His five in intelligence intelligence were were spent spent in paranoid atmosphere atmosphere generated generated by by the the fi ve years years in in the the paranoid final final phase phase of of Stalin's Stdins dictatorship, dictatorship, when when the the intelligence intelligence agencies agencies were were ordered ordered to to

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conduct throughout the the Soviet conduct witch-hunts witch-hunts throughout Soviet Bloc Bloc against against mostly mostly imaginary imaginary Titoist Titoist and and Zionist Zionist conspiracies. conspiracies. In of In January January 1953 1953 the theMGB was was officially officiallyaccused accused of "lack lack of of vigilance" vigilance in in hunting hunting down conspirators. The down the the conspirators. The Soviet Soviet news news agency agencyTass Tass made made the the sensational sensational announce announcement ment that that for for the the past past few few years years world world Zionism Zionism and and Western Western intelligence intelligence agencies agencies had had been been conspiring conspiring with with "a a terrorist terrorist group" group of of Jewish Jewish doctors doctors "to to wipe wipe out out the the lead leadership ership of of the the Soviet Soviet Union." Union. During During the the final final two two months months of of Stalin's Stalins rule, rule, the the MGB struggled struggled to to demonstrate demonstrate its itsheightened heightened vigilance vigilance by by pursuing pursuing the the perpetrators perpetrators of of this this non-existent plot. Its was, in non-existent plot. Its anti-Zionist anti-Zionist campaign campaign was, in reality, reality, little little more more than than a a thinly thinly disguised March 1953, disguised anti-Semitic anti-Semitic pogrom. pogrom. Shortly Shortly before before Stalin's Stalins sudden sudden death deathin in March 1953, Mitrokhin was was ordered ordered to to investigate investigate the the alleged alleged Zionist Zionist connections connections of of the the Pravda Mitrokhin correspondent in Paris, Yuri Yuri Zhukov, Zhukov, who had come come under under suspicion suspicion because because of his correspondent in Paris, who had of his wifes Jewish Jewish origins. origins. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin had the that Stalin's Stalins brutal brutal security security wife's had the impression impression that supremo, Lavrenti Lavrenti Pavlovich Pavlovich Beria, was planning planning to to implicate implicate Zhukov Zhukov in supremo, Beria, was in the the supsup posed Jewish doctors' doctors plot. plot. A few few weeks weeks after after Stalin's Stalins funeral, hneral, however, however, Beria posed Jewish Beria sudsud denly announced the the plot plot had had never never existed, existed, and and exonerated exonerated the the alleged alleged denly announcedthat that conspirators. conspirators. By the the summer summer of of 1953 1953 most most of of Beria's Berias colleagues colleagues in in the thePresidium Presidium were were united united in in By their fear fear of of another another conspiracy-that conspiracy-that he he might might be be planning planning a a coup to step step into coup d'itat ditat to into their Stalin's Stalins shoes. shoes.While While visiting visiting a a foreign foreign capital capital in in July, July, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin received received a a top top secret secret telegram with with instructions instructions to to decipher decipher it it himself, himself, and and was was astonished astonished to to discover discover that that telegram Beria had been charged with with "criminal criminal anti-Party anti-Party and and anti-state activities. Only later Beria had been charged anti-state activities." later did Mitrokhin learn learn that special meeting meeting of did Mitrokhin that Beria Beria had had been been arrested arrested at at a a special of the the Presidium Presidium on on June June 26 after after a a plot plot organized organized by by his his chief chief rival, rival, Nikita Nikita Sergeyevich Sergeyevich Khrushchev. Khrushchev. From his his prison prison cell, cell, Beria wrote begging begging letters letters to to his his former former colleagues, colleagues, pleading pleading From Beria wrote pathetically for for them them to to spare spare his his life life and and "find find the the smallest smallest job job for for me": me: pathetically You You will see see that that in in two two or or three three years years I'll Ill have have straightened straightened out out fine fine and and will will still be be useful useful to to you you .. .. .. I ask ask the the comrades to forgive forgive me me for for writing writingsomewhat still comrades to somewhat disjointedly because of disjointedly and and badly badly because of my my condition, condition, and and also also because because of of the the poor poor andnot nothaving my pince-nez. lighting and
longer in in awe awe of of him, him,the the comrades simply simply mocked mocked his his loss loss of of nerve. nerve. No longer comrades O n December December 24 it it was was announced announced that that Beria Beria had had been been executed executed after after trial trial by by the the On theStalin era nor Supreme Court. Since neither his responsibility for mass murder in the of under-age girls could be publicly mentioned for his own record as a serial rapist of fear of of bringing bringing the Communist regime into into disrepute, he was was declared declared guilty guilty instead instead fear the Communist regime disrepute, he to revive capitalism and to restore the rule of of the bourgeoisie" bourgeoisie in of a surreal plot "to association with with British British and and other other Western Westernintelligence intelligence services. services. Beria Beria thus thus became, became, association following Yagoda Yagoda and and Yezhov Yezhov in in the the 1930s, the third Soviet Soviet security chief to be shot shot following the third security chief to be for crimes which included serving as an (imaginary) British secret agent. In true StalStal inist tradition, subscribers to the Soviet Encyclopedia Encyclopedia were advised advised to to use use a were "a inist tradition, subscribers to the Great Soviet entryon on thento insert a replace replacesmall knife or razor blade blade" to remove the entry Beria, and then ment article on the the Bering Sea.4 Sea.4

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The Stalinism was secret The first first official official repudiation repudiation of of Stalinism was Khrushchev's Khrushchevsno-celebrated now-celebrated secret speech to closed session Congress of Party of the speech to a a closed sessionof of the theTwentieth Twentieth Congress of the theCommunist Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in in February "cult of of personality," Khrushchev Soviet Union (CPSU) February 1956. 1956. Stalin's Stalins cult personality, Khrushchev declared, been responsible responsible for series of declared, had had been for "a a whole whole series of exceedingly exceedingly serious serious and and grave grave perversions revolutionary legality." The perversions of of Party Party principles, principles, of of Party Party democracy, democracy, of of revolutionary legality. The speech letter from the Cen speech was was reported reported to to the the KGB KGB Party Party organization organization in in a a secret secret letter from the Central Mitrokhin belonged belonged took to debate tral Committee. Committee. The The section section to to which which Mitrokhin took two two days days to debate its contents. H e still still vividly vividly recalls recallsthe the conclusion the section's sections chairman, chairman, Vladimir Vladimir its contents. He conclusion of of the Vasilyevich Finland): "Stalin a bandit!" Some Vasilyevich Zhenikhov Zhenikhov (later (later KGB resident resident in in Finland): Stalin was was a bandit! Some Party members members were were too too shocked-or shocked-or cautious-to say say anything. Others agreed agreed with with Party cautious-to anything. Others Zhenikhov. dared ask the question which Mitrokhin was convinced was in in all all Zhenikhov. None None dared ask the question which Mitrokhin was c9nviflced as their minds: Where was Khrushchev Khrushchev while all these crimes were were taking place? their minds: "Where was while all these crimes taking place?" In the aftermath aftermath of ofthe the secret speech Mitrokhin became too outspoken for his own good. good. Though Though his his criticisms criticisms of the the way way the were mild mild by by own the KGB had had been been run run were Western standards, standards, late late in in 1956 1956Mitrokhin Mitrokhinwas was moved moved from the FCD Western from operations operations to to the archives, where where his his main main job job was was answering answering queries queries from other departments archives, from other departmentsand and provincial KGBs.5 KGBs. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin discovered discovered that that Beria's Berias personal personal archive archive had had been provincial been destroyed on on Khrushchev's Khrushchevs orders orders so as to leave leave no trace of the destroyed as to no trace he compromising c<?mpromising matemate rial he he had had collected collected on on his his former former colleagues. colleagues. Ivan Ivan Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Serov, Serov, chairman chairman rial of dutifully reported that the of the the KGB from from 1954 1954 to to 1958, 1958,dutifully reported to to Khrushchev Khrushchev that the files files had had contained much much "provocative provocative and and libelous" libelous material.6 material.6 contained Mitrokhin was was an an avid avid reader reader of of the the Russian Russian writers writers who who had hadfallen out of of favor favor in Mitrokhin fallen out in the final final years years of of Stalinist Stalinist rule rule and and began began to to be published again again during the be published during the the midmid1950s. The The first first great great literary literary event event in in Moscow Moscow after after Stalin's Stalins death death was was the the publica publica1950s. tion in in 1954, 1954, for for the the first first time time since since 1945, 1945, of new new poems by Boris Boris Pasternak, Pasternak, the tion poems by the last last leading Russian Russian author author to to have have begun begun his his career career before before the the Revolution. Revolution. Published leading Published in in a "Poems from a literary literary magazine magazine under under the the title title Poems from the the Novel Novel Dgctor Doctor Zhivago," Zhivago, they they were were accompanied they accompanied by by a a brief brief description description of of the the epic epic but but still still unfinished unfinished work work in in which which they Zhivago, which followed the were to to appear. However, the the completed completed text text of of Doctor Zhivago, which followed the were appear. However, meandering final phase early meandering life life of of its its enigmatic enigmatic hero hero from from the the final phase ofTsarist ofTsarist rule rule to to the the early years of the theSoviet regime, was was judged judged far far too too subversive for publication publication and was offi offiyears of Soviet regime, subversive for and was cially rejected rejected in in 1956. 1956. In In the the novel, novel, when when Zhivago Zhivago hears hears the the news of the the Bolshevik Bolshevik cially news of Revolution, "He He was was shaken shaken and and overwhelmed overwhelmed by by the the greatness greatness of of the the moment, moment, and and Revolution, thought goes con thought of of its its significance significance for for the the centuries centuries to to come." come. But But Pasterak Pasternak . . goes on on to toconvey sense of emptiness of emerged vey an an unmistakable unmistakable sense of the the spiritual spiritual emptiness of the the regime regime which which emerged from from it. it. Lenin Leninis is "vengeance vengeance incarnate" incarnate and and Stalin Stalin a a "pockmarked pockmarked Caligula." Caligula. Pasternak since the Pasternak became became the the first first Soviet Soviet author author ,since the 1920s 1920s to to circumvent circumvent the the ban banning ning of of his his work work in in Russia Russia by by publishing publishing it it abroad. abroad. As he he handed handed the the typescript typescript of of ZzJivagoto to a a representative representative of of his his Italian Italian publisher, publisher, Giangiacomo Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, Feltrinelli, Doctor Zhivago he the he told told him him with with a a melancholy melancholy laugh: laugh: "You You are are hereby hereby invited invited to to watch watch me me face face the firing squad!" squad! Soon Soon afterwards, afterwards, acting acting on on official official instructions, instructions, Pasternak Pasternak sent a firing sent a telegram to to Feltrinelli Feltrinelli insisting that his his novel novel be be withdrawn withdrawn from from publication; telegram insisting that publication; pripri vately, he ahead. Published in Published first first in in Italian Italian in vately, however, however, he wrote wrote a a letter letter telling telling him him to to go ahead. Zhivago became became a a bestseller bestseller in in twenty-four twenty-four languages. languages. Some November 1957, 1957, Doctor Zhivago Some November

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Western critics critics hailed hailed it it as as the the greatest greatest Russian novel since Tolstoys Resurrection, Resurrection, Western Russian novel since Tolstoy's published 899. Offi cial outrage outrage in published in in 1 1899. Official in Moscow Moscow at at Doctor Doctor Zhivago's Zhivagos success success was was com compounded pounded by by the the award award to to Pasternak Pasternak of of the the 1958 1958Nobel Nobel Prize Prize for for Literature. Literature. In In a a cable cable to the the Swedish Academy, Pasternak himself immensely thankful, thankful, touched, touched, to Swedish Academy, Pasternak declared declared himself"immensely proud, abashed." The newspaper proud, astonished, astonished, abashed.The newspaper of of the the Soviet Soviet Writers' Writers Union, Union, the theLiter Literatzmzaya Gazeta, Gazeta, however, however, denounced denounced him him as as "a a literary who betrayed aturnaya literary Judas Judas who betrayed his his peopeo ple for for thirty thirty pieces pieces of of silver-the silver-the Nobel Nobel Prize." Prize. Under Under immense immense official official pressure, pressure, ple Pasternak Pasternak cabled cabled Stockholm Stockholm withdrawing withdrawing his his acceptance acceptance of of the theprize prize "in in view view of of the the significance given to to this this award award in in the the society to which which I belong. be10ng.~ "7 significance given society to Though Pasternak was not not one his own own favorite favorite authors, authors, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin saw saw the the Though Pasternak was one of of his bar official official condemnation condemnation of of Doctor Zhivago as as typifying typifying Khrushchev's Khrushchevs cultural cultural barbarism. art in in a socialist society," barism. "The The development development of of literature literature and and art a socialist society, Khrushchev Khrushchev boorishly boorishly insisted, insisted, "proceeds proceeds .. .. .. as as directed directed by by the the Party." Party. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was so so outraged outraged by the the neo-Stalinist neo-Stalinist denunciations denunciations of of Pasternak Pasternak by by Moscow's Moscowsliterary literary establishment establishment by that in anonymous letter letter of that in October October 1958 1958 he he sent sent an an anonymous of protest protest to to the the Literaturnaya Gazeta. Though the letter his left his hand Gaxeta. Though he he wrote wrotethe letter with with his left hand hand in in order order to to disguise disguise his handwriting, that his might be writing, he he remained remained anxious anxious for for some some time time that his identity identity might be discovered. discovered. Mitrokhin knew knew from from KGB fi files the immense immense resources resources which which were were frequently frequently Mitrokhin les the deployed to to track track down down anonymous anonymous letter-writers. e was was even evenworried worried that, that, by by lickdeployed letter-writers. H He lick thegum gum on theenvelope envelope before sealing it, he hehad had ing the on thethe back of the made it possible for his saliva saliva to to be be identified by a a KGB laboratory. laboratory. The The whole whole episode strengthened his his his identified by episode strengthened resentment at Khrushchev's Khrushchevs failure failure to to follow follow his his secret secret speech of 1956 1956 by by a a thor thorresentment at speech of oughgoing program program of of de-Stalinization. de-Stalinization. Khrushchev, Khrushchev, he he suspected, suspected, had had personally personally oughgoing ordered Pasternak's Pasternaks persecution persecution as as a a warning warning to all those those inclined inclined to to challenge challenge his his ordered to all authority. authority. As yet, yet, however, however, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin pinned pinned his his faith faith not not on on the the overthrow overthrow of of the the Soviet Soviet As regime but but on on the the emergence of a a new new leader leader less less tainted tainted than Khrushchev by by his his regime emergence of than Khrushchev Stalinist past. late in in 1958, 1958,Serov Serov was was replaced as KGB chairman chairman by by one one of of his his Stalinist past. When, When, late replaced as leading critics, critics, Aleksandr Aleksandr Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Shelepin, Shelepin, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin believed believed that that the the new new leading leader had had emerged. emerged. Aged Aged only only forty, forty, Shelepin Shelepin had had made made his his reputation reputation as as a a guerrilla guerrilla leader commander the Second the Communist Youth commander during during the Second World World War. War. As head head of of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol) (Komsomol) from from 1952 1952 to to 1958, 1958, he had mobilized thousands thousands of of young peoLeague he had mobilized young peo ple Lands" campaign turn vast areas of ple from from Khrushchev's Khrushchevs "Virgin Virgin Lands campaign to to turn vast areas of steppe steppe into into arable farmland. farmland. Though Though many many of of the the new new collective collective farms farms were later ruined ruined by arable were later by soil soil erosion, in in the the short short term term the the campaign campaign seemed a spectacular spectacular success. success. Soviet Soviet news newserosion, seemed a reels showed showed endless lines of of combine-harvesters combine-harvesters as as they they advanced advanced through through prairies prairies reels endless lines see. rippling with grain and stretching as far as the eye could see. As Mitrokhin had hoped, Shelepin rapidly established himself as a new broom within the the KGB, replacing replacing many many veteran veteran Stalinists Stalinists with with bright brightyoung young graduates graduates from from within Komsomol. Mitrokhin was impressed by the way that when when Shelepin gave televised televised KomsomoL speeches, he he looked looked briefl briefly at his his notes, then spoke spoke directly directly to to the theviewer-:-instead viewer-instead ofof speeches, y at notes, then woodenly from a a prepared text like like most most Soviet leaders. Shelepin Shelepin sought to woodenly reading reading from prepared text Soviet leaders. sought to of socialist legality,, he claimed in give the KGB a new public image. "Violations Violations socialist legality," 1961, "have have been completely eliminated .. .. .. The Chekists [KGB offi officers] 1961, cers] can look

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the the Party Party and and the the Soviet Soviet people people in in the the eye eye with with a a clear clear conscience." conscience. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin also also remembers Shelepin Shelepin for personal kindness kindness to to aaclose remembers for an an act act of of personal close relative. relative. andAndropov after him, Shelepin's Shelepins ambitions stretched far Like Beria before him and beyond the the chairmanship chairmanship of the KGB. As a twenty-year-old twenty-year-old university university student, student, he he beyond of the As a he wanted to become. was once asked what he become. According to the Russian historian Roy Medvedev, he he instantly instantly replied, replied, ''A A chief?@ Shelepin saw saw the the KGB as as a steppingstone stone Medvedev, chief1"g Shelepin a stepping in aacareer career which which he he intended intendedto to take take him him to to the thepost of First of the the CPSU. in post of First Secretary Secretary of CPSU. In December 1961 he he left the but continued continued to to oversee oversee its its work work as as chairman chairman of In December 1961 left the KGB but of the The the powerful powerful new new Committee Committee of of Party Party and andState StateControl. Control. The new new KGB chairman chairman was Shelepin's youthful less dynamic was Shelepins youthful but but less dynamic protege, protkgk, thirty-seven-year-old thirty-seven-year-old Vladimir Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny. O n Khrushchev's Khrushchevs instructions, instructions, Semichastny Semichastny resumed the Yefimovich Semichastny. On resumed the work of of pruning pruning the the archives archives of of material material which which too too vividly vividly recalled recalled the the Presidium's Presidiums work Stalinist ordering the the destruction destruction of of nine nine volumes volumes of of files on the the liquidation of liquidation of Stalinist past, past, ordering fues 011 Central Committee members, senior intelligence officers and foreign Communists Central Committee members, senior intelligence officers and foreign Communists living in in Moscow Moscow during during the the Stalin Stalin era. living era.9 Mitrokhin Mitrokhin continued continued to to see see Shelepin Shelepin as as a a future future First First Secretary, Secretary, and and was was not not sur surprised when when he he became became one one of ofthe the leaders of of the the coup coup which which toppled toppled Khrushchev Khrushchev in in prised leaders 1964. Memories of Beria, however, were still too fresh in the minds of most of the 1964. Memories of Beria, however, were still too fresh in the minds of most of the Presidium for for them them to tobe be prepared prepared to to accept accept a a security security chief chief as as Party Party leader. leader. For For most Presidium most of his his colleagues, colleagues, Leonid Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, who who had succeeded Khrushchev Khrushchev as as First First of Ilich Brezhnev, had succeeded (later General) Secretary, was wasa a far far more more reassuring figure-affable, lightweight lightweight and (later General) Secretary, reassuring figure-affable, and patient inreconciling opposing factions, factions, though though skillful skillful in in outmaneuvering outmaneuvering his his polit politpatient in reconciling opposing ical ical rivals. rivals. By 1967 1967 Brezhnev Brezhnev felt felt strong strong enough enough to tosack sack the the unpopular unpopular Semichastny Semichastny and sideline sideline the the still-ambitious still-ambitious Shelepin, Shelepin, who who was was demoted from heading heading the the Com Comand demoted from mittee of of Party Party and and State State Control Controlto to become chairman chairman of of the the comparatively comparatively uninflu uninflumittee become ential Trade Trade Union Union Council. Council. On O n arriving arriving in in his his spacious spacious new new office, office, Shelepin Shelepin found found ential that his his predecessor, predecessor, Viktor Viktor Grishin, Grishin, had what Medvedev later later euphemistically euphemistically that had what Medvedev described "a specially described as as a specially equipped equipped massage massage parlor" parlor in in an an adjoining adjoining room. room. Shelepin Shelepin took revenge revenge for for his his demotion demotion by by circulating circulating stories stories about about Grishin's Grishins sexual sexual exploits exploits took around around Moscow.lo Moscow.l0 The main main beneficiary of the downfall of of Semichastny Semichastny and and the The beneficiary of the downfall the sidelining sidelining of of Shelepin was Yuri Vladimirovich became chairman the KGB. Shelepin was Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, Andropov, who who became chairman of of the Andropov what some "Hungarian complex. complex." As Andropov had had what some of of his his staff staff called called a a Hungarian As Soviet Soviet ambassador in watched in in ambassador in Budapest Budapest during during the the Hungarian HungarianUprising Uprising in in 1956, 1956, he he had had watched horror embassy as Hungarian security horror from from the the windows windows of of his his embassy as officers officers of of the thehated hated Hungarian security service were were strung strung up up from from lampposts. lampposts. Andropov Andropov remained haunted for for the the rest rest of of service remained haunted his by the Communist one-party his life life by the speed speed with with which which an an apparently apparently all-powerful all-powerful Communist one-party state had had begun When other other Communist later seemed state begun to to topple. topple. When Communist regimes regimes later seemed at at risk-in risk-in Prague in in 1968, 1968,in inKabul Kabul in in 1979, 1979,in in Warsaw in in 1981-he 1981-he was convinced that, that, as as in in Prague Warsaw was convinced 11 Since Since leaving Budapest Budapest in in 1956, 1956, only only armed armed force force could could ensure ensure their their survival. survival.* leaving Hun Hungary in in 1957 Andropov had had been been head head of of the the Central Committee Department gary 1957 Andropov Central Committee Department responsible for for relations relations with with Communist parties in in the Soviet Bloc. appointresponsible Communist parties the Soviet Bloc. His His appoint ment in1967 1967 as Party official in to the KGB ment in as the the first first senior senior Party official brought brought in to head head the KGB was was intended by by Brezhnev Brezhnev to to secure secure political political control control of of the the security security and and intelligence intelligence syssysintended

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terns. become the tems. Andropov Andropov went went on ontoto become the longest-serving longest-serving and and most most politically politically astute astute of of all all KGB chiefs, chiefs, crowning crowning his his fifteen fifteen years years as as chairman chairman by by succeeding succeeding Brezhnev Brezhnev as as General General Secretary Secretary in in 1982. 1982. crisis years at attempt by crisis of of Andropov's Andropovs years at the the KGB was was the the attempt by the the Czechoslovak Spring to Czechoslovak reformers reformers of of the the Prague Prague Spring to create create what what the the Kremlin Kremlin saw saw as as an an unacceptably unacceptably unorthodox unorthodox "socialism socialism with with a a human human face." face. Like Like Khrushchev's Khrushchevs Secret Secret Speech, forces of in August Speech, the the invasion invasion of of Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia by by the the forces of the the Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact in August 1968 important staging post in what Mitrokhin calls 1968 was was an animportant staging post inwhat Mitrokhin calls his his "intellectual intellectual odyssey." Stationed in during the Prague Spring, Mitrokhin odyssey. Stationed in East EastGermany Germany during the Prague Spring, Mitrokhin was was able able to listen to the Russian-language services of of the to listen to reports reports from from Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia on on the Russian-language services the World Service, Radio Liberty, Liberty, Deutsche Welle and and the the Canadian Canadian Broadcasting Broadcasting BBC World Service, Radio Deutsche Welle Company, but but had with whom he he felt felt able able to to share share his his sympathy sympathy for for the Company, hadno noone one with whom the Prague One episode episode about entered Prague Prague reforms. reforms. One about a a month month before before Soviet Soviet tanks tanks entered Prague left left a particular particular impression impression on on him. An FCD Department V (special a him. An FCD Department ("special tasks) tasks") officer, officer, Colonel said to Sweden for for a Colonel Viktor Viktor Ryabov, Ryabov, said to Mitrokhin Mitrokhin that thathe he was was "just just off off to to Sweden a few few days," days, but but made made clear clear by by his his expression expression that that Sweden Sweden was was not not his his real real destination. destination. A few days days after after Ryabov's Ryabovs return, return, he he told told Mitrokhin would be be an an interesting interesting artifew Mitrokhin there there would arti cle cle in in the the following following day's days Pravda, implying implying that that it it was was connected connected with with his his mission. mission. When Mitrokhin Mitrokhin read read the the report report the the next next day day that that an an "imperialist imperialist arms arms dump" dump had had When been discovered it had been planted been discovered in in Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, he he realized realized at at once once that that it had been planted by by Ryabov Ryabov and and other other Department DepartmentV officers officers to to discredit discredit the the reformers. reformers. Soon after Soon after the the crushing crushing of of the the Prague Prague Spring, Spring, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin heard heard a a speech speech given given by by Andropov Andropov in in the the KGB's KGBs East East German German headquarters headquarters at at Karlshorst Karlshorst in in the the Berlin Berlin sub suburbs. most urbs. Like Like Shelepin, Shelepin, Andropov Andropov spoke spoke directly directly to to the theaudience, audience, rather rather than-like than-like most Soviet Soviet officials-sticking officials-sticking to to a a prepared prepared platitudinous platitudinous text. text. With With an an ascetic ascetic appear appearance, steel-rimmed glasses ance, silver silver hair hair swept swept back back over over a a large large forehead, forehead, steel-rimmed glasses and and an an intel intellectual as Beria Beria and lectual manner, manner, Andropov Andropov seemed seemed far far removed removedfrom from Stalinist Stalinist thugs thugs such such as and Serov. His His explanation explanation for for the the invasion invasion of ofCzechoslovakia Czechoslovakia was was far far more sophisticated Serov. more sophisticated than that thatgiven given to to the the Soviet Soviet public. public. It It had, had, he he insisted, been the the only way to preserve than insisted, been only way to preserve Soviet security security and and the the new new European European order order which which had had emerged emerged from from the the Great Soviet Great Patriotic War. War. That That objective objective political political necessity, necessity, Andropov Andropov claimed, was accepted Patriotic claimed, was accepted even by by such such unorthodox unorthodox figures figures as as the the great great physicist physicist Pyotr Pyotr Kapitza, Kapitza, who who had had ini inieven tially shown shown some some sympathy sympathy for for the the Prague Prague revisionists. revisionists. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin drew drew quite quite differ differtially ent conclusions conclusions from from the the Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact invasion. invasion. The The destruction destruction of of Czechoslovak ent Czechoslovak socialism with with a a human face proved, believed, that that the the Soviet was unre unre"socialism human face" proved, he he believed, Soviet system system was H e still vividly recalls recalls formable. He a curiously mythological image, which henceforth henceforth he minds eye, eye,of theRussian thrall to "a a three-headed saw increasingly in his mind's of the Russian people in thrall three-headed hydra: the the Communist Communist Party, Party, the privileged nomenklatura and and the the KGB. hydra": the privileged After his his return return to to Moscow Moscow from from East East Germany, Germany, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin continued continued to to listen listen to to Mter Western broadcasts, broadcasts, although, although, because Soviet jamming, jamming, he had frequently to Western because of of Soviet he had frequently to switch find an station. Often only switch wavelengths wavelengths in in order order to to find an audible audible station. Often he he ended endedup up with with only news stories. stories. Among the news news which which made the greatest impression on on fragments of fragments of news Among the made the greatest impression Cu,rrent Events, a him were were items items on on the the Chronicle oj ofCqrrent a samizdat samizdat journal journal first first produced produced him
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by Soviet Soviet dissidents dissidents in in 1968 1968toto circulate circulate news news on on the the struggle struggle against against abuses abuses of of by human human rights. rights. The The Chronicle carried carried on on its its masthead masthead the the guarantee guarantee of of freedom freedom of of expression United Nations Rights, daily expression in in the the United Nations Universal Universal Declaration Declaration of of Human Human Rights, daily abused the Soviet abused in in the Soviet Union. Union. As the struggle As the struggle against against ideological "ideological subversion subversion" intensified, intensified, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin saw saw numerous way in numerous examples examples of of the the way in which which the the KGB manipulated, manipulated, virtually virtually at at will, will, the the Soviet justice e later Soviet justice system. system. H He later copied copied down down the the sycophantic sycophantic congratulations congratulations sent sent to to Andropov Andropov by by A. F. Gorkhin, Gorkhin, chairman chairman of of the the Soviet Soviet Supreme Supreme Court, Court, on fiftieth on the thefiftieth anniversary foundingof of the Cheka in 1967: anniversary of of the the founding the Cheka in December December 1967:
The Soviet and the theUSSR Committee The Soviet Courts Courts and Committee of of State State Security Security [KGB] [KGB] are are of of the age. But But this this is is not thing which which brings brings us us together; together; the main the same same age. not the themain main thing the main thing is is the the identity of our our tasks tasks . .. .. . thing identity of We the State State Security Courtssolve all We are are glad glad to to note note that that the Security agencies agencies and and the the Courts solve all their complicated complicated tasks tasks in in a a spirit spirit of of mutual mutual understanding understanding and sound profesprofes their and sound sional sional relations.12 relations.12

Mitrokhin saw mounting mounting evidence evidence both bothin in the classified classified in-house in-house journal, journal, KGB Mitrokhin saw the Sbornik, and and in in FCD files fues of personal obsession obsession with with the destruction of of Sbornik, of Andropov's Andropovs personal the destruction dissent in all its its forms and his his insistence insistence that that the struggle for for human human rights rights was was part dissent in forms and the struggle of imperialist plot undermine the of a a wide-ranging wide-ranging imperialist plot to to undermine the foundations foundations of of the the Soviet Soviet state. state. In In 1968 issued KGB Chairman's Order No. "On the tasks 1968 Andropov Andropov issued Chairmans Order No. 0051, 0051, On the tasks of of State State secu security the adversary," adversary,calling calling for for greater greater rity agencies agencies in in combating combating ideological ideological sabotage sabotage by the aggression in in the the struggle struggle against both dissidents dissidents at at home and their their imperialist imperialist supaggression against both home and sup porters.13 One Mitrokhin, as p o r t e r ~ One . ~ ~ example example of of this this greater greater aggression aggression which which left left Mitrokhin, as an an ardent ardent admirer admirer of of the the Kirov Kirov Ballet, Ballet,with with a a sense sense of of personal personal outrage outrage was was the the plan plan which which he he discovered discovered in in FCD mes files to to maim maim the the ballet's ballets star star defector, defector, Rudolf Rudolf Nureyev.14 Nureyev.14 By the the beginning beginning of of the the 1970s 1970s Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins political political views views were were deeply deeply influenced influenced records and and by the the dissident dissident struggle, struggle, which which he was able to follow follow both both in by he was able to in KGB records Western Western broadcasts. broadcasts. "I Iwas was a a loner," loner,he he recalls, recalls, "but but I now now knew knew that that I was was not not aloe." alone. Though of aligning the Though Mitrokhin Mitrokhin never never had had any any thought thought of aligning himself himself openly openly with with the human human rights rights movement, movement, the the example example of of the the Chronicle of Current Events and and other other samizdat samizdat productions productions helped helped to to inspire inspire him him with with the the idea idea of of producing producing a a classified classified variant dissidents' attempts variant of of the the dissidents attempts to to document document the the iniquities iniquities of of the the Soviet Soviet system. system. Gradually Gradually the the project project began began to to form form in inhis his mind mind of of compiling compiling his his own own private private record record of of the the foreign foreign operations operations of of the the KGB. KGB. Mitrokhin's (Foreign Mitrokhins opportunity opportunity came came in in June June 1972 1972 when when the the First FirstChief Chief (Foreign Intelli Intelligence) gence) Directorate Directorate left left its its overcrowded overcrowdedcentral central Moscow Moscow offi<:s ofices in in the theQB KGB adquar headquarters the Lubyanka ters at at the Lubyanka (once (once the the pre-Revolutionary pre-Revolutionary home home of of the the Rossiya Rossiya Insurance Insurance Company) Company) and and moved moved to to a a new new building building south-east south-east of of Moscow Moscow at at Yasenevo, Yasenevo, half half a a mile mile beyond beyond the the outer outer ringroad. ringroad. Designed Designed by by a a Finnish Finnish architect, architect, the the main main Y-shaped Y-shaped seven-story seven-story office officebuilding building was was flanked flanked on on one one side side by by an an assembly assembly hall hall and and library, library, on on the the other otherby by a a polyclinic, polyclinic, sports sports complex complex and and swimming swimming pool, pool,with with pleasant pleasant views views over over hills summefields of hills covered covered with with birch birch trees, trees, green green pastures, pastures, and-in and-in summer-fields of wheat wheat and and

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rye. most of rye. To To the the other other KGB directorates, directorates, most of which which worked worked in in cramped cramped conditions conditions in in central Moscow, Moscow,Yasenevo was known-with more envy envy than than condescension-as condescension-as central Yasenevo was known-with more "The The Woods." Woods. For For the the next next ten ten years, years, working working from from private private offices offices both both in in the theLubyanka Lubyanka and and at at Yasenevo, Yasenevo, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was alone alone responsible responsible for for checking checking and and sealing sealing the the approxi approximately mately 300,000 300,000 files15 files in in the the FCD archive archive prior prior to to their their transfer transfer to to the the new new head headquarters. While While supervising supervising the the checking checking of of files, files, the the compilation compilation of of inventories inventories and and quarters. the les he the writing writingof of index index cards, cards, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was able ableto to inspect inspect what what fi files he wished wished in in one one or ever spent or other other of of his his offIces. offices. Few Few KGB officers officers apart apart from from Mitrokhin Mitrokhin have have ever spent as as much files. Outside the FCD much time time reading, reading, let let alone alone noting, noting, foreign foreign intelligence intelligence files. Outside the archives, access, and archives, only only the the most most senior senior officers officers shared shared his his unrestricted unrestricted access, and none none had had the him. the time time to to read read more more than than a a fraction fraction of of the the material material noted noted by by him. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins usual usual weekly weekly routine routine was was to to spend spend each each Monday, Monday, Tuesday Tuesday and and Friday Friday in office. O On went to to the the Lubyanka the in his his Yasenevo Yasenevo office. n Wednesdays Wednesdays he he went Lubyanka to to work work on on the FCD's and FCDs most most secret secret files, files, those those of of Directorate DirectorateS S which which ran ran illegals-KGB illegals-KGB officers officers and agents, most most of of Soviet Soviet nationality, nationality, working working under deep cover cover abroad disguised disguised as as for foragents, eign citizens. citizens. Once reviewed reviewed by by Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin, each batch of of files files was was placed placed in in sealed sealed eign containers which which were were transported transported to to Yasenevo Yasenevo on on Thursday Thursdaymornings, mornings, accompanied accompanied containers by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin who checked them them on arrival.16 Unlike Unlike the the other by who checked on arrival.16 other departments, departments,who who moved to the the new new FCD headquarters headquarters in in 1972, 1972, Directorate Directorate S remained remained based based in in the the moved to Lubyanka for for a a further decade. Lubyanka further decade. Mitrokhin thus thusfound found himself spending spending more more time time dealing dealing with with the thefiles files ofDirec of DirecMitrokhin himself torate of any other section torate S, S, the the most most secret secret in in the the FCD, than than with with those those of any other section of of Soviet Soviet foreign intelligence. intelligence. The The illegals illegals retained a curious curious mystique mystique within within the the KGB. Before Before foreign retained a being posted abroad, every illegal illegal officer was required to swear swear a a solemn, solemn, if if somewhat somewhat being posted abroad, every officer was required to melodramatic, melodramatic, oath: oath: Deeply Deeply valuing valuing the the trust trust placed placed upon upon me me by by the the Party Party and and the the fatherland, fatherland, and and imbued intense gratitude send me imbued with with a a sense sense of of intense gratitude for for the the decision decision to to send me to to the the sharp . .. as sharp edge edge of of the the struggle struggle for for the the interest interest of of my my people people .. . as a a worthy worthy son son of of would rather rather perish perish than than betray betray the the secrets secrets entrusted entrusted to to me me or or the homeland, homeland, I would the put into into the thehand hand of the adversary materials materials which which could could cause cause political political harm harm put of the adversary to the the interests interests of of the the State. State. With With every every heartbeat, with with every every day day that that passes, passes, to I swear swear to to serve serve the the Party, Party, the the homeland, homeland, and and the the Soviet Soviet people.17 pe0p1e.l~

The files files showed showed that that before before the the Second Second World World War War the greatest greatest foreign foreign successes successes The had been been achieved achieved by by a a legendary legendary group group of of intelligence intelligence officers, officers, often often referred referred to to as as had GreatIllegals." Illegals.After the the Second World War, the KGB had tried to recreate its the "Great pre-war triumphs triumphs by by establishing an an elaborate elaborate network network of of "illegal illegal residencies" residenciesalong alongpre-war side the the "legal legal residencies" residencieswhich which operated operated under under diplomatic diplomatic or or other otherofficial official cover coverin in side foreign capitals. capitals. remarkable individual individual achievements. achievements. The records of of Directorate S revealed some remarkable illegals successfully successfully established established bogus identities as foreign nationals in a great KGB illegals ambassador to piano tuner to the variety of professions ranging from Costa Rican ambassador

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Governor Governor of of New New York. York. Even Even in in the the Gqrbachev Gorbachev era, era, KGB KGB propaganda propaganda continued continued to to depict supreme embodiment depict the the Soviet Soviet illegal illegalas as the the supreme embodiment of of the the chivalric chivalric ideal idealin in the the ser service vice of of secret secret intelligence. intelligence.The The retired retired British British KGB KGB agent agent George George Blake Blake wrote wrote in in 1990: 1990: Only Only a a man man who who believes believes very very strongly strongly in in an an ideal ideal and and serves serves a a great great cause cause will will agree agree to to embark embark on on such such a a career, career, though though the the word word "calling" callingis is perhaps perhaps appro appropriate priate here. here. Only Only an anintelligence intelligence service service which which works works for for a a great great cause cause can can ask ask for such such a a sacrifice sacrifice from from its its officers. officers.That That is is why, why, as asfar far as as I know, know, at at any any rate rate in in for peacetime, only the Soviet intelligence service has "illegal residents."18 peacetime, only the Soviet intelligence service hasillegal residents.* The The SVR continues continues the the KGB KGB tradition tradition of of illegal illegal hagiography. hagiography.In In July July 1995, 1995, a a month month after after the the death death of of the the best-known best-known American-born American-born illegal, illegal, Morris Morris Cohen, Cohen, President President Yeltsin Yeltsin conferred conferred on on him himthe theposthumous posthumous title title of of Hero Hero of of the the Russian Russian Federation. Federation. The The files files of ofDirectorate Directorate S S noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin reveal reveal a a quite quite different different kind kind ofille of illegal. gal. Alongside Alongside the the committed committed FCD officers officers who who maintained maintained their their cover cover and and profes professional sional discipline discipline throughout throughout their their postings, posting, there there were were others others who who could could not not cope cope when confronted confronted by by the the contrast contrast between between the the Soviet Soviet propaganda propaganda image image of of capitalist capitalist when exploitation even exploitation and and the the reality reality of of life life in in the the West. West.An An even darker darker secret secret of of the the Direc Directorate the principal torate S S records records was was that that one oneof of the principal uses uses of of the the illegals illegals during during the thelast last quar quarter ter of of a a century century of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union was was to to search search out out and and compromise compromise dissidents dissidents in in the other countries the other countries of of the the Warsaw Warsaw Pact. Pact. The The squalid squalid struggle struggle against against "ideological ideological subversion" as subversionwas was as much much a a responsibility responsibility of of Directorate Directorate S S as as of of the the rest rest of of the the FCD. FCD. he he set set out out in, in 1972 1972 to to compile compile his his forbidden FCD archive. archive. For For a a few few weeks weeks he he tried tried to to commit commit names, names, codenames codenames and and forbidden FCD key key facts facts from from the the files filesto to memory memory and and transcribe transcribe them them each each evening eveningwhen when he he returned returned home. home. Abandoning Abandoning that that process process as as too too slow slow and and cumbersome, cumbersome, he he began began to to take take notes notes in his in minuscule minuscule handwriting handwriting on on scraps scraps of of paper paper which which he he crumpled crumpled up up and and threw threw into into his wastepaper wastepaper basket. basket. Each Each evening, evening, he he retrieved retrieved his his notes notes from from the the wastepaper wastepaper and and smuggled smuggled them them out outofYasenevo of Yasenevo concealed concealed in in his his shoes. shoes. Gradually Gradually Mitrokhin Mitrokhin became became more the Yasnevo more confident confident as as he he satisfied satisfied himself himself that that the Yasenevo security security guards guards confined confined themselves themselves to to occasional occasional inspections inspections of of bags bags and and briefcases briefcases without without attempting attempting body body searches. searches.Mter After a a few few months months he hestarted started taking taking notes notes on on ordinary ordinary sheets sheets of of office office paper paper which which he he took took out outof of his his office office in in his his jacket jacket and and trouser trouser pockets. pockets. Not which noting thethe FCD archives Not once once in in the thetwelve twelve years years which Mitrokhin Mitrokhin spent spent noting archiveswas was he he stopped stopped and and searched. searched. There There were, were, however, however, some some desperately desperately anxious anxious moments. moments. From From time time to to time time he he realized realized that, that, like like other other FCD officers, officers, he he was was being being tailed tailedprobably (Counter probably by by teams teams from from the the Seventh Seventh (Surveillance) (Surveillance) or or Second Second Chief Chief (Counterintelligence) intelligence) Directorates. Directorates, On O n one one occasion occasion while while he he was was being being followed, followed, he he visited visited the Dynamo Football the Dynamo Football Club Club sports sports shop shop and, and, to to his his horror, horror, found found himself himself standing standing next next to to two two English English visitors visitors whom whom his his watchers watchers might might suspect suspect were were spies spieswith with whom whom he he had hadarranged arranged a a rendezvous. rendezvous, Ifhe If he was was searched, searched, his his notes notes on on top topsecret secret files files would would be sports be instantly instantly discovered. discovered. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin quickly quickly moved moved on on to toother other sports shops, shops, hoping hoping to to convince watchers that he was convince his his watchers thathe was on on a a genuine genuine shopping shopping expedition. expedition. As As he he
M ITRO N D E R S TA N DA OK KH HIIN N WAS WAS U UNDERS TAND AB BLY L Y cautious cautious as as

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approached approached his his apartment apartment block, block, however, however, he he noticed noticed two two men men standing standing near near the the door to his ninth-floor flat. By the time he arrived, they had disappeared. FeD offi door to his ninth-floor flat. By the time he arrived, they had disappeared. FCD officers standing instructions report suspicious cers had hadstanding instructions to toreport suspicious incidents incidents such such as as this, this, but but Mitrokhin Mitrokhin did did not not do do so so for for fear fear of of prompting prompting an an investigation investigation which which would would draw draw attention been attention to to the thefact fact that that he hehad had been seen seen standing standing next next to to English Englishvisitors. visitors. Each when he he returned his Each night night when returned to to his his Moscow Moscow flat, flat,Mitrokhin Mitrokhin hid hid his notes notes beneath beneath his mattress. On weekends he took them to a family dacha thirty-six kilometers his mattress. O n weekends he took them to family a dacha thirty-six kilometers from from Moscow Moscow and and typed typed up up as as many many as as possible, possible, though though the the notes notes became became so so numerous numerous that that Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was forced forced to to leave leave some some of of them them in in handwritten handwritten form. form. He H e hid hid the the first a milk-churn first batches batches of of typescripts typescripts and and notes notes in in a milk-churn which which he he buried buried below below the the floor.19 The dacha fl00r.l~ The dacha was was built built on on raised raised foundations, foundations, leaving leaving just just enough enough room room for for Mitrokhin to crawl the fl oorboards and dig aa hole a short-handled short-handled Mitrokhin to crawl beneath beneath the floorboards and dig hole with with a spade. spade. He H e frequently frequently found found himself himself crawling crawling through through dog dog and and cat cat feces feces and and some sometimes times disturbed disturbed rats rats while while he he was was digging, digging, but but he heconsoled consoled himself himself with with the thethought thought that that burglars burglars were were unlikely unlikely to to follow follow him. him. When When the the milk-churn milk-churn was was full, full, he he began began concealing tin clothes-boiler. concealinghis his notes notes and and typescripts typescripts in in aa tin clothes-boiler. Eventually Eventually his his archive archive also also filled filledtwo two tin tin trunks trunksand and two two aluminum aluminum cases, cases, all allof of them themburied buried beneath beneath the the dacha.20 dacha.20 Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins most most anxious anxious moment moment came came when when he he arrived arrived at at his his weekend weekend dacha dacha to to find a stranger hiding in the attic. He was instantly reminded of the incident a few find a stranger hiding in the attic. H e was instantly reminded of the incident a few years in , when friend years earlier, earlier, in August August 1971 1971, when aa friend of of the the writer writer Aleksandr Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn had had called away and called unexpectedly unexpectedly at at his his dacha dacha while while Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn was was away and surprised surprised two two KGB KGB officers officers in in the the attic attic who who were were probably probably searching searching for for subversive subversive manuscripts. manuscripts. Other KGB men had quickly arrived on the scene and Solzhenitsyn's friend Other KGB men had quickly arrived on thescene and Solzhenitsyns friend had had been been badly badly beaten. beaten. Andropov Andropov cynically cynicallyordered ordered Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn to to be be "informed informed that that the thepar participation KGB ofof his The ticipation of of the the KGB in in this this incident incident is is a a figment figment his imagination."21 imagination.21 The incident incident was the dacha had was still still fresh fresh in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins mind mind when when he he arrived arrived at at the dacha because because he he had recently noted files which recorded minutely detailed plans for the persecution recently noted files which recorded minutely detailed plans for the persecution of of Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn and and the the"active activemeasures" measures by by which which the theKGB KGB hoped hoped to to discredit discredit him him in in the press. the attic the Western Western press.To To his his immense immense relief, relief,however, however,the the intruder intruderinin the attic turned turned out out to to be be a a homeless homeless squatter. squatter. During During summer summer holidays holidays Mitrokhin Mitrokhin worked worked on on batches batches of of his his notes notes at at a a second second family dacha near Penza, carrying them in an old haversack and dressing in peasant family dacha near Penza, carrying them in an old haversack and dressing in peasant clothes clothes in in order order not not to toattract attract attention. attention.In In the the summer summer of of 1918 1918Penza, Penza, 630 630 kilome kilometers of ters southeast southeast of of Moscow, Moscow,had had been been the the site site of of one one of the the first first peasant peasant risings risings against against Bolshevik Bolshevik rule. rule. Lenin Lenin blamed blamed the the revolt revolt on on the thekulaks kulaks (better-off (better-off peasants) peasants) and and furi furiously instructed the local Party leaders to hang in public at least one hundred of them ously instructed the local Party leaders to hang in public at least one hundred of them so "22 By so that that ((for for hundreds hundreds of ofkilometers kilometers around around the the people people may may see seeand and tremble tremble .. .. ..22 the forgotten, and the 1970s, 1970s, however, however, Penza's Penzas counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary past past was was long longforgotten, and Lenin's Lenins bloodthirsty bloodthirsty orders orders for for mass mass executions executions were were kept kept from from public public view view in in the the secret secret section section of of the the Lenin Leninarchive. archive. One One of of the themost most striking striking characteristics characteristics of of the the best best literature literature produced produced under under the the Soviet in secret. Soviet regime regime is is how how much much of of it it was was written written in secret. ((To To plunge plunge underground," underground, wrote wrote Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn, ((to to make make it it your your concern concern not not to to win win the the world's worlds recognition recognitionHeaven writer's Heaven forbid!-but forbid!-but on on the thecontrary contrary to to shun shunit: it: this this variant variant of of the the writers lot lot is is pecupecu-

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liarly Between liarly our our own, own, purely purely Russian, Russian, Russian Russian and and Soviet!"23 Soviet!23 Between the the wars wars Mikhail Mikhail Bul BulMargarita, one gakov gakov had had spent spent twelve twelve years yearswriting writing The The Master Masterand andMargarita, one of of the thegreatest greatest novels novels of of the the twentieth twentiethcentury, century,knowing knowing that that it itcould could not not be be published published in in his his lifetime lifetime and might just and fearing fearing that that itit might never never appear appear at at all. all. His His widow widow later later recalled recalled how, how, just before before his his death death in in 1940, 1940,Bulgakov Bulgakov "made made me me get get out out of of bed bed and and then, then,leaning leaning on on my my arm, arm, he dressing gown, he walked walked through through all all the the rooms, rooms, barefoot barefoot and and in in his his dressing gown, to to make make sure sure that that place.24 Though the the manuscript manuscript of of The TheMaster Master was was still still there" there in in its itshiding hiding place.24 Though Bulgakov's Bulgakovs great great work work survived, survived, it it was was not not published published until until aaquarter quarter of of a a century century after after his his death. death. As As late late as as 1978, 1978, it it was was denounced denounced in in a a KGB memorandum memorandum to to Andropov Andropov as as "a a dan dangerous gerous weapon weapon in in the the hands hands of of [Western] [Western] ideological ideological centers centers engaged engaged in in ideological ideological sabotage sabotage against against the the Soviet Soviet Union."25 Union.25 When When Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn began began writing writing in in the the 1950s, 1950s, he he told told himself himself he he had had "entered entered into truth": into the theinheritance inheritance of of every every modern modern writer writer intent intent on onthe the truth: I posterity might I must must write write simply simply to to ensure ensure that that it it was was not not forgotten, forgotten, that that posterity might some Publication in some day day come come to to know know of of it. it. Publication in my my own own lifetime lifetime I must must shut shut out out of of my my mind, mind, out out of of my my dreams. dreams. Just in aa milk-churn Just as as Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins first first notes notes were were hidden hidden in milk-churn beneath beneath his his dacha, dacha, so so Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns earliest earliest writings, writings, in in minuscule minuscule handwriting, handwriting, were were squeezed squeezed into into an an empty Mter early empty champagne champagne bottle bottle and and buried buried in in his his garden.26 garden.26 After the thebrief brief thaw thaw in inthe the early years made possible years of of "de-Stalinization" de-Stalinization which which made possible the the publication publication of of Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns One Day Life of waged a story of story of life life in in the the gulag, gulag, One Day in in the Life o f Ivan Ivan Denisovich, Denisovich, he he waged a time timeconsuming try to to prevent consuming struggle struggle to to try prevent the the KGB from from seizing seizing his his other other manuscripts manuscripts until It com until he hewas was finally finally forced forced into into exile exile in in 1974.27 1974.27 It did did not not occur occur to to Mitrokhin Mitrokhin to tocompare pare himself himself with with such such literary literary giants giants as as Bulgakov Bulgakov and and S0lzhenitsyn. Solzhenitsyn. But, But, like like them, them, he was he began began assembling assembling his his archive archive "to to ensure ensure that that the thetruth truth was not not forgotten, forgotten, that that pos posterity terity might mightsome some day day come come to to know know of of it." it. which which had had the the greatest greatest emotional emotional impact impact on on Mitrokhin Mitrokhin were were those those on the war in Mghanistan. On December 28, 1979 Babrak Karmal, the new Mghan on thewar in Afghanistan. O n December 28,1979 Babrak Karmal, the new Afghan leader assistance" by leader chosen chosen by by Moscow Moscow to to request request "fraternal fraternal assistance by the the Red Red Army Army which which had had already already invaded invaded his his country, country, announced announced over over Kabul Kabul Radio Radio that that his his predecessor, predecessor, Hafizullah Amin, an American imperialism," been tried Hafizullah Amin, an "agent agent of of American imperialism, had had been tried by by a a "revolu revolutionary death. MitrokJ:1in fues tionary tribunal" tribunal and and sentenced sentenced to to death. Mitrokhin quickly quickly discovered discovered from from the the files on ha4 !11Ja.lity been on the the war war which which flooded flooded into into the the an;hives archives ,that that.Arp.iIl Amin had i n , r e d l t y been assassi assassinated, nated, together together with with his his family family and and entourage, entourage, in in an an assault assault on on the theKabul Kabul presidential presidential palace palace by byKGB special special forces forcesdisguised disguised in in Mghan Afghan uniforms.28 uniforms.28 The The female female clerks clerks who who filed filed KGB reports reports on on the thewar war in in the thearchives archives after after they they had had been circulated to the Politburo and other sections of the Soviet hierarchy had been circulated to the Politburo and other sections of the Soviet hierarchy had so so much much material material to to deal deal with with that that they they sometimes sometimes submitted submitted to to Mitrokhin Mitrokhin thirty thirty files files at the. files at a a time timefor for his his approval. approval. The The horrors horrors recorded recorded in in the, files were were carefully carefully concealed concealed from from the the Soviet Soviet people. people. The The Soviet Soviet media media preserved preserved a a conspiracy conspiracy of of silence silence about about the the systematic systematic destruction destruction of of thousands thousands of of Afghan Afghan villages, villages, reduced reduced to to forlorn forlorn groups groups of of
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uninhabited, uninhabited, roofless roofless mud-brick mud-brick houses; houses; the the flight flight of of four four million million refugees; refugees; and and the the death of of a a million Afghans Afghans in in aawar war which which Gorbachev Gorbachev later described described as as a a "mistake." mistake. The the conflict The coffins coffins of of the the 15,000 15,000 Red Red Army Army troops troops killed killed in in the conflict were were unloaded unloaded Soviet airfields, airfields, with none of the military pomp and and solemn music which silently at Soviet traditionally traditionally awaited awaited fallen fallen heroes heroes returning returning to to the the Motherland. Motherland. Funerals Funerals were were held held in in secret, secret, and and families families told told simply simply that that their theirloved loved ones ones had had died died "fulfilling hlfilling their their inter internationalist Some were nationalist duty." duty. Some were buried buried in in plots plots near near the the graves graves ofMitrokhin's of Mitrokhins parents parents in in the cemetery cemetery at at Kuzminsky Kuzminsky Monastery. Monastery. No No reference reference to to Afghanistan Afghanistan was was allowed allowedon on the their tombstones. tombstones. During During the the Afghan Afghan War War Mitrokhin Mitrokhin heard heard the the first first open open criticism criticism their of Soviet Soviet policy policy by by his his more more outspoken outspoken colleagues colleagues at at Yasenevo. Yasenevo. "Doesn't Doesntthe the war war make make of you ashamed to be be Russian?" Russian? an an FCD colonel colonel asked asked him him one day. "Ashamed Ashamed to to be be you ashamed to one day. Soviet, you you mean! Mitrokhin blurted blurted out. out. Soviet, mean!" Mitrokhin When Mitrokhin Mitrokhin retired retired in in 1984, 1984,he he was still still preoccupied preoccupied with with the the Afghan Afghan War. War. When was He of his H e spent spent the thefirst first year year and and aahalf half of his retirement retirement sorting sorting through throughhis his notes, notes, extract extracting the the material on on Mghanistan, Afghanistan, and and assembling assembling it it in in a alarge large volume volume with with a a linking linking ing narrative. Despite Despite Gorbachev's Gorbachevs call callfor for glasnost after he became Party leader in 1985, 1985, narrative. allowthe truth truthabout about the Mitrokhin did not believe the Soviet system would ever allow the war to be told. told. Increasingly, Increasingly, however, he began to to think of ways ofof transporting transporting his his to however, he think of ways archive to to the theWest West and publishing it it there. there. archive and publishing One novel novel method method suggested suggested itself itself on on May 1987, when when a a single-engine single-engine One May 28, 1987, Cessna piloted piloted by by a a nineteen-year-old West West German, Rust, crossed the the Cessna German, Matthias Matthias Rust, Finnish border into Soviet airspace and and flew flew undetected undetected for for 450 miles before landing Finnish border into Soviet airspace miles before landing in Red Red Square. After an an hour hour of of confusion, during which which Kremlin Kremlin security security guards guards in Square. After confusion, during wondered whether Rust was an an actor actor in in a he was was taken taken away away to to the Rust was a film, film, he the KGBs KGB's Lefortovo Prison. Prison. Mitrokhin briefly considered considered but but quickly quickly abandoned abandoned the the idea of Lefortovo Mitrokhin briefly idea of using a a microlite microlite from from a a KGB sports sports club club to to fly with with his his archive archive in in the theopposite opposite direc direcusing tion to to Finland. Finland. tion The most practical practical of of the the various various schemes considered by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin before before the the The schemes considered collapse of ofthe the Soviet Soviet Union Union was was to to get geta position a on the thelocal local Party Party committee committee which which collapse on issued permits for foreign foreign travel, travel, obtain for himself and his his family, family, then then book book issued permits for obtain permits permits for himself and reservations on on a a cruise cruise from from Leningrad Leningrad to to Odessa Odessa in in the the Black Black Sea. Sea. At At one one of of the the reservations cruises West European Europeanports of of call, call, Mitrokhin would would make make contact with with the theauthor authorcruise's West ities and arrange arrange to to leave leave his his archive archive in in a a dead letter-box near near Moscow for for collection collection ities and Western intelligence agency. agency. He H e eventually eventually abandoned the idea because of the by a Western himself from the Soviet Soviet tour group difficulty of separating himself group and and the ever-watchful group leaders for long longenough enough to to tell tell his his story and arrange arrange the the hand-over. hand-over. group leaders for story and As came down began to As the the Berlin Berlin Wall Wall came down in in November November 1989 1989 and and the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc began to disintegrate, Mitrokhin told himself to be patient and wait for his opportunity. In the meantime he carried on typing up his handwritten notes in his Moscow flat and at assembling some in volumes covering the FCDs the two family dachas, dachas, assembling some of them in volumes FCD's chief countries-first and foremost the United United States, known known in KGB jargon as the target countries-first Main Adversary." Adversary.He H e shared the relief of most Muscovites at the thefailure failure of the thehard hard"Main to depose depose Gorbachev Gorbachev and and reestablish the one-party one-party Soviet Soviet line coup coup in in August August 1991 1991 to line reestablish the

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state. cht;:f in the coup state. It It came came as as no no surprise surprise to to Mitrokhin Mitrokhin that thatthe the chief r.I1gleader ringleader in thefailed failed coup was FeD from the FCD from 1974 1974 to to 1988 1988and and was Vladimir Vladimir Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, head head of the chairman of coup. chairman of the the KGB from from 1988 1988 until untilthe thecoup. Though Kryuchkov Kryuchkov proved proved better better at at public public relations relations than than most previous previous KGB Though chairmen, he had long represented much much of of what what Mitrokhin in the chairmen, he long represented Mitrokhin most detested in FCD. diplomat at the Soviet had FCD. As As a a young young diplomat at the Soviet embassy embassy in in Budapest, Budapest, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov had caught caught the the eye eye of of the the ambassador, ambassador,Yuri Yuri Andropov, Andropov, by by his his uncompromising uncompromising opposition opposition tothe counter-revolutionary Hungarian Hungarian Uprising Uprising of of 1956. 1956. When When Andropov Andropov to the "counter-revolutionary" became KGB chairman chairman in in 1967, 1967, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov became head of of his his personal secretariat became head personal secretariat obsessive campaign against "ideological ideologicalsubversion" subversionin all and a loyal supporter of his obsessive forms. The files files seen seenby Mitrokhin Mitrokhin showed that, as head of the FCD, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov its forms. collaborated collaborated closely closely with with the the KGB Fifth Fifth (Ideological (Ideological Subversion) Subversion) Directorate Directorate in in the the home and abroad.29 abroad.29He H e had made a sellior senior member of the war against dissidents at home Fifth Directorate, Directorate, I. A. Markelov, Markelov, one one of of the thedeputy deputy heads of of the theFCD with with respon responFifth 1. A. sibility for for coordinating coordinating the the struggle struggle against against ideological ideological subversion.30 sub~ersion.~ failed coup coup sibility TheThe failed of August August 1991 1991 marked marked an an appropriately appropriately discreditable discreditable end end to Kryuchkovs KGB of to Kryuchkov's career. Instead of of shoring shoring up up the the Soviet Union and and the the one-party one-party state, state, it it served career. Instead Soviet Union served only only to hasten hasten their collapse. collapse. to O n October 1 11,1991, State Council Councilof of the disintegrating Soviet Soviet Union abolOn 1 , 1991, the State abol ished the KGB in its existing form. The former FCD was reconstituted as the SVR, the foreign foreign intelligence intelligence service service of of the the Russian Russian Federation, Federation, independent independent of of the the inter interthe nal security service. Instead of repudiating its Soviet past, however, the SVR saw saw nal security service. Instead of repudiating its Soviet past, however, the itself P fil the SVR's itself as as the the heir heir of of the the old FCD. FCD. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin had h,ad seen seen the the Fc:: FCD file on on the SVRs newly head, Academician Maksimovich Primakov, previously newly appointed appointed head, Academician Yevgeni Yevgeni Maksimovich Primakov,previously Director of World Economics Relations and one of Director of the the Institute Instituteof of World Economics and and International International Relations and one of Gorbachev's leading leading foreign policy advisers. Gorbachevs foreign policy advisers.The The file file identified identified Primakov Primakov as as a a KGB co-optee, named MAKSIM, had been been sent sent on intelligence mis co-optee, code codenamed MAKSIM, who who had on frequent frequent intelligence missions States sions to to the theUnited United States and and the the Middle MiddleEast.31 East.31Primakov Primakov went went on onto to become become Boris Boris Yeltsin's Prime Minister in in 1998. Yeltsins Foreign Foreign Minister Minister in in 1996 1996and and Prime Minister 1998.
HE F I N A L months months of of 1991, 1991, the the breakup breakup of of the Soviet Union Union and and the the relative relative IN T THE FINAL the Soviet weakness controls at the new F,qeraign, at at last R u s s i a n Federatjon last weakness of of frontier frontier controls at the new borders borders of of the the RsS!g opened West for 1992he he opened the the way way to to the the West for Mitrokhin Mitrokhin and and his his archive. archive. In In March March 1992 boarded in Moscow boarded an an overnight overnight train train in Moscow bound bound for for the the capital capital of of one one of of the the newly newly independent With him he a independent Baltic Baltic republics.32 republics.32 With him hetook took a case case on on wheels, wheels, containing containing bread, bread, sausages and and drink drink for forhis his journey journey on on top, top, clothes clothes underneath, underneath, and-at and-at the the bottom bottomsausages samples notes. The samples of of his his notes. The next next day dayhe he arrived arrived unannounced unannounced at at the theBritish British embassy embassy in in the "someone in the Baltic Baltic capital capital and and asked asked to to speak speak to to someone in authority." authority. Hitherto Hitherto Mitrokhin Mitrokhin had had had an an image image of of the the British as rather rather formal formal and and "a a bit bit . of of a a mystery." mystery. But But the had British as the young at the embassy embassy struck him as young female female diplomat diplomat who who received received him him at the struck him as "young, young, attractive fluent in Mitrokhin told attractive and and sympathetic," sympathetic, as as well well as as fluent in Russian. Russian. Mitrokhin told her her he he had had brought him important important material material from While he brought with with him from KGB KGB files. files. While he rummaged rummaged at at the the bottom beneath the clothes, the bottom of of his his bag bag to to extract extract his his notes notes from from beneath the sausages sausages and and clothes, the

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drankhis first cup of English tea, she read some diplomat ordered tea. As Mitrokhin drank of his his notes, notes, then then questioned questioned him him about about them. them. Mitrokhin Mitrokhintold told her her they they were were only only part part of of a a large large personal personal archive archive which which included included material material on on KGB operations operations in in Britain. Britain. of He H e agreed agreed to to return return to to the the embassy embassy a a month month later later to to meet meet representatives representatives from from the the Secret Secret Intelligence Intelligence Service. Service. Emboldened ease with crossed the Russian frontier frontier in in Emboldened by by the the ease with which which he he had had crossed the Russian March, Mitrokhin Mitrokhinbrought brought with his on next trip trip to tothe the Baltic capital capital 2,000 2,000 typed typed March, with himhim on his next Baltic pages which which he he had had removed removed from from the the hiding hidingplace place beneath beneath his his dacha dacha near near Moscow. Moscow. pages Arriving at at the the British British embassy embassy on on the the morning morning of of April April 9, he he identified identified himself himself to to Arriving the SIS officers officers by by producing producing his passport, Communist Communist Party Partycard pension the his passport, card and and KGB pension certificate, handed handed over over his his bulky bulky typescript typescript and and spent spent a day answering answering questions questions certificate, a day about himself, himself, his his archive archive and and how how he he had had compiled compiled it. it. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin accepted accepted an an invi inviabout tation months later arrangements for tation to to return returnto to the the embassy embassy about about two two months later to to discuss discuss arrangements for a a visit to to Britain. Britain. Early Early in the SIS Moscow Moscow stat station reported to to London inMay May the SIS ion reported Londonthat that , Mitrokhin planned to leave leave Moscow Moscow on on an an overnight overnighttrain on June 10. On O n June June 1 1 1 Mitrokhin planned to train on June 10. 1 he arrived arrived in in the theBaltic Baltic capital capital carrying carrying a a rucksack rucksack containing containing more more material material from from his his he archive. Most of his his meeting meeting with with SIS officers was wasspent spent discussing discussing plans plans for for him him to to archive. Most of SIS officers be debriefed debriefed in in Britain Britain during the the following following autumn. autumn. be O n September September 7, escorted by by SIS, SIS, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin arrived arrived in in England Englandfor for the the fi first time. On rst time. After the the near near chaos chaos of of post-Communist post-Communist Moscow, Moscow, London London made made an an extraordinary extraordinary After him-the model of what a a capital city should be." be. At the time, even impression on him-"the traffic, dotted with with the theblack cabs and red doubledecker buses he had had seen the heavy traffic, only in in photographs, photographs, seemed seemed but but proof proof of of the the capital's capitalsprosperity. While being being only prosperity. While debriefed at at anonymous anonymous safe safe houses houses in in London Londonand and the the countryside, countryside, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin took took debriefed the fi final to leave leave Russia Russiafor for Britain, Britain, and and agreed agreed with with SIS SISon on arrangements to to the nal decision decision to arrangements exfiltrate himself, his his family family and his archive. archive. O n October October 13 he was was infiltrated infiltrated back back exfiltrate himself, On 13 he into Russia Russia to to make make final final arrangements arrangements for for his his departure. departure. into On 1992, the fth anniversary O n November November 7, 7,1992, theseventy-fi seventy-fifth anniversary of of the the Bolshevik Bolshevik Revolution, Revolution, theBaltic capital where he had first made con conMitrokhin arrived with his family in the Londonto to tact with SIS. SIS. A few days later they arrived in London begin a new life in Britain. It was a bittersweet moment. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was safe safe and secure for the first time since he had had begun begun assembling assembling his his secret secret archive archive eighteen eighteen years years previously, previously,but but at atthe the same he same time he hefelt felt a a sense sense of of bereavement bereavement at at separation separation from from a homeland homeland he knew knew he he would would time probably never see see again. again. The bereavement has passed, though his attachment to to Russia remains. Mitrokhin is now a British citizen. Using his senior citizens citizen's railcard to travel travel the the length lengthand and breadth of the the country, country, he he has has seen more of of Britain than than most most to breadth of seen more 1992 he has spent several several days a week working on his who were born here. Since 1992 archive, typing up the remaining handwritten notes, and responding to questions services from five continents. Late in in1995 1995 had about his archive from intelligence services hehe had with Christopher Christopher Andrew Andrew to todiscuss the preparation of of this book. his first meeting with Though The T h e Sword and the the Shield could could not not have have been written in in Russia, Russia, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin Though been written remains as convinced convinced as he was in 1972 1972 that that the thesecret history of of the KGB is a cencen ofthe the right to know. He H e also tral part of Soviet past which the Russian people have the right

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believes operations form essential, believes that that the theKGB's KGBs worldwide worldwide fo.reign foreign operations form an an, essential, though though often often neglected, history relations. neglected, part part of ofthe the history of of twentieth-century twentieth-centuryinternational international relations.

out in in the the British British media media about or his his archive. archive. out about either either Mitrokhin Mitrokhin or Because material material from from the the archive archive was was passed to so so many many other other intelligence intelligence and secuBecause passed to secu rity services, services, however, however, there were, were, unsurprisingly, unsurprisingly, some some partial partial leaks leaks abroad. abroad. The fi first, rity there rst, slightly garbled reference archive occurred occurred in in the States nine nine slightly garbled reference to to Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins archive the United United States months 1993 the well-known Washington Washington investigainvestiga months after after his his defection. defection. In In August August 1993 the well-known tive journalist journalist Ronald Ronald Kessler a bestselling bestselling book on the the FBI based tive Kessler published published a book on based in in part part sources inside the Bureau. revelations was a brief sensaon sources Bureau. Among his revelations brief reference to a sensa: probe by the FBI into information from a former KGB employee who had tional "probe had access to KGB files": files: had access
N O WO R D L AK NO LE EA KE ED D

According to to his his account, account, the the KGB had hadmany many hundreds Americans and and According had had hundreds of of Americans possibly more more than than a a thousand thousand spying spying for for them them in in recent years. years. So specific was was possibly the information information that that the theFBI was was quickly quicklyable able to to establish establish the the source's sources credibilthe credibil ity.. .. .. By By the the summer summer of of 1993, 1993, the the FBI had had mobilized mobilized agents agents in in most major ity cities to to pursue pursue the the cases. cases. A top top secret secret meeting meeting was was called calledat Qyantico Quantico[the [the cities FBI National Academy] to to plot plot strategy.33 strategy.33 N ational Academy] Kessler did did not not name name any any of of the the "many many hundreds hundreds of of Americans" Americans identified identified by by the the Kessler defector. An An unnamed US intelligence official" official interviewed by by the the W Washington ashington Post defector. "US intelligence confirmed that the FBI had received specific specific information information that a 'signifi signifi"confirmed that the had received that has has led led to to a cant ongoing ongoing investigation investigation into into past activities in in the United States, but but cant' past KGB activities the United States," declined to to be be drawn drawn in in on on "how howmany many people people are are implicated."34 impli~ated. ~ ~ reported reported that declined Time that sources familiar familiar with with the the case ofthe the KGB KGB,defector defector had had identified him as as a a former "sources case" of identified him former employee described Kessler's employee of of the the First First Chief Chief Directorate, Directorate, but but had had described Kesslers figures figures for for the the number of of "recent" recent Soviet Soviet spies the United UnitedStates as,highly e~aggerated.~ number spies in in the States as "highly exaggerated."35 Mitrokhins notes notes do do indeed indeed contain the .names of many of KGB offiMitrokhin's contain the names of "many hundreds hundreds" of offi cers, agents and in the theUnited United States cers, agents and contacts contacts in States active active at at various various periods periods since since the the 1920s. Kessler, however, wrongly suggested suggested that this number to recent 1920s. Kessler, however, wrongly that this number applied applied to "recent years years" rather the whole espionage in States. his rather than thantoto the whole history history of of Soviet Soviet espionage in the theUnited United States. Though Though his figures to the figures were were publicly publicly disputed, disputed, the the suggestion suggestion that that the theKGB defector defector had had gone gone to the United Britain went When no further informa United States States rather rather than than to toBritain went unchallenged.36 ~nchallenged.~~ When no furtherinformation on onthe the unidentified defector defector was was forthcoming, media interest interest in in the thestory story quickly quickly tion unidentified forthcoming, media died away. died away. There was no further furtherleak leak from from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins archive archive for for over three three years. years. In Octo OctoThere ber Defence ber 1996, 1996, however, however, reports reports in in the the French French press press alleged alleged that that Charles Charles Hernu, Hernu, Defence Minister from Bloc intelligence services from Minister from 1981 1981 to to 1985, 1985,had hadworked worked for for Soviet Soviet Bloc intelligence services from 1953 until untilat at least 1963, and that, that,when when informed informed by by the the French French security security service, service, the the 1953 least 1963, and reported DST, President hushed the Up.37 Le Monde President Fran<;:ois Franqois Mitterrand Mitterrand had had hushed the scandal scandal up.37 Munde reported that British intelligence DST "a of about that from from 1993 1993 onwards onwards British intelligence had had passed passed on on to tothe the a list list of about 300 names names of d'Orsay alleged 300 of diplomats diplomats and and officials officials of of the the Qyai QuaidOrsay alleged to to have have worked worked for for

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S oviet Bloc In reality, Soviet Bloc intdligence."3s intelligen~e.~~ reality, In French French diplomats diplomats and and Foreign Foreign Ministry Ministry offi offcials cials made made up up only only a a minority minority of of the the names names in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes supplied supplied by by the the SIS SIS T. Charles to to the the DS DST. Charles Hernu Hernu was was not not among among them.39 them.39None None of of the the media media reports reports on on either either side side of of the the Channel Channelrelated related the the SIS SIS lists lists of of Soviet Soviet agents agents in in France France to to Kessler's Kesslers earlier defector KGB files. files. earlier story story of ofa a defector with with extensive extensive access accessto to KGB In weekly In December December 1996 1996the theGerman German weekly Focus Fucus reported reported that, that, according according to to "reliable reliable sources," sources,SIS SIS had had also also provided provided the the BN, BN, the the German Germansecurity security service, service,with with the thenames names of of several severalhundred hundred German Germanpoliticians, politicians, businessmen, businessmen, lawyers lawyers and and police police officers officerswho who had been involved with the KGB. On this occasion the SIS source was identified had been involved with the KGB. O n this occasion the SIS source was identified as as a extensive a Russian Russian defector defector who who had hadhad had extensive access accessto to the theKGB KGB archives. archives. A later later article article in in Focus Focus reported: reported: The The Federal Federal Prosecutor Prosecutor has has been been examining examining numerous numerous detailed detailed new new leads leads to to aa hitherto hitherto undiscovered undiscovered agent agent network network of of the the former former Soviet Soviet secret secret service, service, the the KGB, KGB, in in Germany. Germany. The The researchers researchers in in Karlsruhe Karlsruhe are are primarily primarily concentrating concentrating on on Moscow Moscow sources sources who who were were taken taken on on by by the the successors successors to to the the KGB KGB and and have have probably been reactivated since the end of the Cold War. probably been reactivated since the end of the Cold War. The The basis basis for for the the research research is is extensive extensiveinformation information on on agents agents which which a a Rus Russian London from sian defector defector smuggled smuggled into into London from the the Moscow Moscow secret secret service. service. After After intensive passed all all information intensive analysis, analysis, the the British British secret secret service service passed information on on KGB KGB connections in Germany to the BN in Cologne in early 1996.40 connections in Germany to theBfV in Cologne inearly 1996.40 In another leak In July July 1997 1997 another leak from from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins archive archive occurred occurred in in Austria. Austria. Press Press reports reports quoted quoted aaKGB KGB document document giving giving directions directions for for locating locating a a secret secret arms arms dump dump of of mines, explosives and detonators, codenamed GROT, hidden in a dead letter-box mines, explosives and detonators, codenamed GROT, hidden in a dead letter-box near near Salzburg Salzburg in in 1963, 1963, which which had had been been intended intended for for use use in in sabotage sabotage operations: operations: Leave Leave the the town town of of Salzburg Salzburg by by the the SchaIlmoser Schallmoser Haupstrasse Haupstrasse leading leading to to High Highway No. 158. At a distance of 8 km from the town limit, in the direction of way No. 153. At a distance of 8 km from the town limit, in the direction of Bad Bad Ischl-Graz, Ischl-Graz, there thereis is a a large large stone stone bridge bridge across across a a narrow narrow valley. valley. Before Before reaching reaching this toto a local this bridge, bridge, leave leave the the federal federal highway highway by by turning turning right righton on local a road road which which follows direction end follows the the valley valley in in the the direction of of Ebenau; Ebenau; then then go go on on 200 200 meters meters to to the the end of left-hand of the the metal metal parapet, parapet, which which stands stands on on the the left-hand side side of of the the road. road. On O n reach reaching of once ing the theend end of the the parapet, parapet, turn turn left leftatat once and and follow follow a a village village road road leading leading in in the the opposite opposite direction. direction. The The DLB DLB is is located located about about 50 50 meters meters (60 (60 paces) paces) from from the village .41 the turn-off turn-off point point leading leading from from the the main main road road on on to tothe the village road road .. .Y
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Though the document came Though the theAustrian Austrian press press did did not not mention mentionit, it, the document came from from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins archive, archive,which which also also revealed revealedthat that in in1964 1964road road repair repair works works had had covered covered the the entrance entrance to to the the DLB, DLB,raised raised the the ground groundlevel, level, and and changed changed the the layout layout of of the the surrounding surroundingarea. area. The KGB had had decided decided not not to to try try to to recover recover and and relocate relocate the the GROT GROT arms arms dump. dump. The KGB Attempts find the dump Attempts by by the the Austrian Austrian authorities authorities to tofind thedump in1997in 1997 also also failed.42 failed.42 Mitrokhin's notes reveal that similar KGB arms and radio caches, some of Mitrokhins notes reveal that similar KGB arms and radio caches, some of them them booby-trapped, booby-trapped, are are scattered scattered around around much much of of Europe Europe and and North North America.43 America.43

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of Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins The press leak which came closest to revealing the existence of was hrther article in the theGerman German F o c u s ,in June 1998. 1998. Focus F o c u s reported archive was a further weekly Focus, that a colonel colonel in the the FCD registry with access access to "all all the files on Moscow's Moscows agents" agents of KGB headquarters to his dacha had smuggled handwritten copies of them out of 1992 hehad defected to Britain and, according to Focus, F o c u s ,SIS near Moscow. In 1 992 he SIS agents had brought brought the the"explosive" explosivenotes notes hidden hidden in in th thedacha back to to LQndofl L0nd0.n.~~ Four years years had dacha. back .44 Four later, in an operation codenamed WEEKEND, WEEKEND, SIS B N on SIS had allegedly briefed the BfV Germanmaterial in the thearchive. archive. According to Focus, F o c u s ,"The The defector has presented the German the BfV B N with with hundreds hundreds of of leads leads to to Moscow's Moscows spy spynetwork network in in the theFederal Federal Republic Republic of of the Germany. A "high-ranking high-ranking BfV B N official" official was was said said to to have have commented, commented, "We We were were Germany." quite shocked shocked at how much [the defector] knew. Moscow clearly possesses possesses tons of blackmail material. The The B N was was reported reported to to have have received received new new leads on fifty f i f v espi espiblackmail material." BfV leads on onage cases cases and and to to have have begun begun twelve twelve new new investigations. investigation^.^^ onage 45 The Focus F o c u s article, article, however, however, inspired inspired widespread widespread skepticism-partly skepticism-partly because the because the The of a top topsecret KGB archive exfiltrated from a Russian dacha seemed inherently story of F o c u s of of the the intelli intelliimprobable, partly because the only only detailed detailed example example given given by Focus improbable, partly because the C.hancellor, Willy gence it contained was the sensational allegation that the former Chancellor, theicon of Germany's GermanysSocial Social Democrats, the Brandt, "the Democrats," had been a Soviet spy during the Second World World War. War. The The Brandt Brandt story story was instantly instantly dismissed as as "completely completely absurd" absurd Second was by press bureau. instance by Yuri Yuri Kobaladze, Kobaladze, head head of of the the SVR press bureau. When When asked asked why why in in this this instance the SVR was was abandoning abandoning its its usual usual practice practice of of not not commenting commentingon on individuals alleged alleged the individuals to be be Russian spies, Kobaladze Kobaladze replied: replied: to Russian spies,
It I t would would naturally naturally be be very veryflattering flattering to tohave have such such a a high-ranking high-ranking politician politician on on our list list of of credits, credits, but but in in the the interests interests of of preserving historical truth truth we felt it it our preserving historical we felt necessary necessary to to reject reject this this fiction, fiction, which which could could be be misused misused for for political political purposes. purposes. Kobaladze colonels dacha dacha as as Kobaladze also also dismissed dismissed the the story story of of the the secret secret archive archive in in a a KGB colonel's a Brandt story, a myth. myth. The The source source of of the the Brandt story, he he insisted, insisted, could could only only be be a a former former KGB major residency, Mikhail Butkov, to Britain in 1991 .46 major in in the the Oslo Oslo residency, Mikhail Butkov, who who had had defected defected to Britain in 1991.46 Though Though wrong wrong about about the the secret secret archive, archive, Kobaladze Kobaladze was was right right to to reject reject the the allega allegation that Brandt had been been a notes reveal the KGB tion that Brandt had a Soviet Soviet spy. spy. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes reveal that that the archives Brandt (codenamed which archives do do indeed indeed contain contain a a file file on on Brandt (codenamed POLYARNIK), POLYARNIK), which shows that that while while in in Stockholm Stockholm during during the the Second Second World World War War he he passed passed on on infor inforshows mation to But, as makes clear, clear, Brandt Brandt was in touch touch mation to the theNKVD residency. residency. But, as the the file file makes was also alsoin with British British and and American American intelligence intelligence officers-as officers-as well well as as with with the the Norwegian forwith Norwegian for mer secretary traitor in in mer secretary of of Leon Leon Trotsky, Trotsky, regarded regarded by by the the NKVD as as the the greatest greatest traitor Soviet motive was provide any Soviet history.47 hist01-y.~ Brandt's Brandts overriding overriding motive was to to provide any information information to to all three members of the the wartime wartimeGrand Grand Alliance Alliance which which might might hasten of three members of hasten the the defeat defeat of Adolf Hitler. In the he calculated-accurately-that his Adolf Hitler. In the case case of of the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, he calculated-accurately-that his best th(! reside n,cy. The The best channel channel of of communication communication with with Moscow Moscow was was.via via the Soc Stockholm . olIl1 residency. real ARNIK file concerns the Branqt bl,lt POLYARNIK file concerns the role role not not <?f of Brandt but of of real embarrassment embarrassment in in the the POLY In 1962, 1962, almost almost certainly certainly with with Khrushchev's Khrushchevs personal approval, the the KGB the KGB. In the personal approval, embarked Brandt by threatening to the evidence of embarked on on an an operation operation to to blackmail blackmail Brandt by threatening to use use the evidence of
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his his wartime wartime dealings dealings with with the the Stockholm Stockholm residency residency to to "cause causeunpleasantness" unpleasantnessunless unless he he agreed agreed to to cooperate. cooperate. The The attempted attempted blackmail blackmail failed.48 failed.48 counter security counter intelligence, intelligence, a a number number of ofother other security services services and apan have and intelligence intelligence agencies agencies around around the the world world from from Scandinavia Scandinaviato] to Japan have been been pur pursuing suing leads leads from from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins archive archive for for several several years-usually years-usually unnoticed unnoticed by by the the media. media. Most Most of of the the leads leads have have been been used used for for counterintelligence counterintelligence purposes-to purposes-to help help resolve resolve unsolved unsolved cases cases and and neutralize neutralize SVR SVR operations operations begun begun in in the theKGB KGB era-rather era-rather than to mount mount prosecutions. however, been than to prosecutions. There There have, have, however, been a a number number of of convictions convictions which which derive derive from from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins evidence. evidence. On O n one one occasion, occasion,Mitrokhin Mitrokhin himself himself was was almost almost called called to to give give evidence evidence in in court. court. The case concerned Robert Lipka, an army clerk assigned in the mid-1 960s to The case concerned Robert Lipka, an army clerk assigned in the mid-1960s to the the National had National Security Security Agency Agency (NSA, (NSA, the the US US SIGINT SIGINT service), service), whom whom Mitrokhin Mitrokhin had identified identified as as a a KGB KGB agent.49 agent.49In In May May 1993 1993 FBI FBI agent agent Dmitri Dmitri Droujinsky Droujinsky contacted contacted Lipka, Lipka, posing posing as as "Sergei Sergei Nikitin," Nikitin, a a GRU GRU officer officer based based in in Washington. Washington.Lipka Lipka com complained was a plained that that he he was still still owed owed money money for for his his espionage espionageover over a a quarter quarter of of a century century ear earlier, lier, and and was was given given a a total total of of $10,000 $10,000 by by "Nikitin" Nikitin over over the the next next few few months. months. He He appeared appeared confident confident that that he he could could no no longer longer be be prosecuted. prosecuted. "The The statute statute of of limita limitations," tions,he he told told "Nikitin," Nikitin,"has has run run out." out."Nikitin" Nikitincorrected corrected him: him: "In InAmerican American law law the the statute statute of oflimitations limitations for for espionage espionage never never runs runs out." out. Lipka Lipka replied replied that, that, whatever whatever the the legal position, he "would never admit to anything." After a lengthy FBI investigation, legal position, he would never admit toanything. After a lengthy FBI investigation, Lipka 996 at Lipka was was arrested arrested in in February February 1 1996 at his his home home in in Millersville, Millersville, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, and and charged charged with with handing handing classified classified documents documents to to the the Soviet Soviet Union.50 Union. Since Since Lipka Lipka denied denied all all charges charges against against him, him, Mitrokhin Mitrokhinexpected expected to to give give evidence evidence at his trial in the U.S. District Court, Philadelphia, in May 1997. But, in what the at his trial in the U.S. District Court, Philadelphia, in May 1997. But, in what the Philadelphia in the courtroom, PhiZade@ia Inquirer Inquirer termed termed "a a surprising surprising turnaround" turnaround in the courtroom, Lipka Lipka "exploded exploded into into tears tears as as he he confessed confessed that that he he had had handed handedover over classified classified information information to to KGB KGB agents." agents. Lipka Lipka had had been been persuaded persuaded by by his his lawyer, lawyer, Ronald Ronald F. F. Kidd, Kidd, to to accept accept a prosecution offer of a plea bargain which would limit his sentence to eighteen a prosecution offer of a plea bargain which would limit his sentence to eighteen years' years imprisonment time off than continue imprisonment with with time off for for good good behavior, behavior, rather rather than continue to to plead plead not not guilty the rest guilty and and face face the the prospect prospect of of spending spending the rest of of his his life life in in jail. jail.Though Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins name name was was never nevermentioned mentioned in in court, court, it it was was the the evidence evidence he he had hadobtained obtained from from KGB KGB files fileswhich which seems seems to to have have prompted prompted Lipka's Lipkas change change of of heart. heart. "We We saw sawhow how significant significant the the evidence evidence was," was, his his lawyer lawyer told told reporters. reporters. "But But the the government government also also realized realized they they couldn't The "mys couldnt go go through through a a full full trial trial and and not not have have the the mystery mystery witness witness exposed." exposed.The mystery Assistant Attorney Attorney Bar Bartery witness" witnesswas was Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin. After After Lipka's Lipkas confession, confession, U.S. Assistant bara]. "We had had to bara J. Cohan Cohan admitted, admitted, We had a avery very sensitive sensitivewitness witness who, who, ifhe if he had had had to testify, testify, would would have have had had to to testify testify behind behind a a screen screen and and under under an an assumed assumed name, name, and and now now we we don't Spy," said dont have have to to surface surface him him at at all."51 all.51 "I Ifeel feel like like Rip Rip Van Van Spy, said Lipka Lipka when when he he was was sentenced 997. "I Ithought thought I I had had put put this this to to bed bed many many years years ago ago and and I I sentenced in in September September 1 1997. never never dreamed dreamed it it would would turn turn out out like like this." this. As As well well as as being being sentenced sentenced to to eighteen eighteen years' yearsimprisonment imprisonment and andfined fined 10,000 10,000dollars, dollars, Lipka Lipka was was ordered ordered to to repay repay the the further further 10,000 dollars from FBI funds given him by "Nikitin."52 10,000 dollars from FBI funds given him by Nikitin.2
L E B LIIK KE ET TH HE BFV F V and and Austrian Austrian

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There are are many many other other "Rip Rip Van Van Spies whose memories memories of of Cold Cold War War espionage espionage There Spies" whose are likely likely to to be be reawakened reawakened by by Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins archive. archive. Some will recognize recognize themselves themselves are Some will in the which follow. follow. About important cases cases which which are are still still being being in the pages pages which About aa dozen dozen important actively pursued-including pursued-including several in leading leading NATO NATO countries-cannot countries-cannot be be referred referred actively several in to for for legal legal reasons until they they come come to to court. court. Only Only a small minority minority of of the the Soviet Soviet to reasons until a small agents appear in agents whose whose codenames codenames appear in this this volume, volume, however, however, are are likely likely to to be be prosecuted. prosecuted. But, the biggest assessment in But, as as the the SVR embarks embarks on on the biggest and and most most complex complex damage damage assessment in Russian Russian intelligence intelligence history, history, it it has has to to face face the the unsettling unsettling possibility possibility that that some some of of the the spies identified been turned turned into agents. spies identified by by lVIitrokhin Mitrokhin have have since since been into double double agents. After each each of of the therevelations revelations from from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins archive archive mentioned above, above, the SVR Mter undoubtedly exercise in an attempt undoubtedly conducted conducted the the usual usual damage damage assessment assessment exercise in an attempt to to deter deterin. 19.?6 1996 (effectively mine the the source source and and seriousness of the the leak. leak. Its official. official sttement statement in mine seriousness of (effectively . reaffirmed recently as "absolute nonsense" sug reaffirmed as as recently as June June 1998), 1998),which which dismissed dismissed as as absolute nonsense the the suggestion that that the names names of of several Soviet agents could possibly possibly have been been gestion several hundred Soviet given by by a a defector defector to to any any Western Western intelligence intelligence agency, agency, demonstrates demonstrates that that the the con congiven clusions of of these these exercises exercises were were very very wide wide of of the the mark. mark. Not Not until until the the publication of of clusions this 1999 did this book book was was announced announced in in 1999 did the the SVR seem seem to to begin begin to to grasp grasp the the massive massive hemorrhage had occurred. hemorrhage of of intelligence intelligence which which had occurred.
. .

S SO OM M E OF T H E files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin give give a a vivid vivid indication indication of of the the ferocity ferocity with with which the the Centre headquarters) has traditionally traditionally responded responded to intelligence intelligence which Centre (KGB (KGB headquarters) leaks about about its its past past foreign foreign operations. The publication publication in in 1974 of John Barrons leaks operations. The 1974 of John Barron's KGB: The ork Agents,53 based Soviet The Secret W W o r k of Soviet Secret Agents,53 based on on information information from from Soviet defectors agencies, generated dam defectors and and Western Western intelligence intelligence agencies, generated no no fewer fewer than than 370 KGB damage and reports. The resident in Mikhail Korneyevich age assessments assessments and other other reports. The resident in Washington, Washington, Mikhail Korneyevich Polonik obtain all on Polonik (codenamed (codenamed ARDOV), ARDOV), was was instructed instructed to to obtain all available availableinformation information on compromise Barron, editor at Barron, then then a a senior senior editor at Reader's ReadersDigest, and and to to suggest suggest ways ways "to to compromise him."54 Most to discredit him.54 Most of of the the "active active measures" measures used used by by the the KGB in in its its attempts attempts to discredit Barron Barron made made much much of of his his Jewish Jewish origins, origins, but but its its fabricated fabricated claim,s claims that that he hewas was part part of of a had a Zionist Zionist conspiracy conspiracy (a (a favorite favorite theme theme in in Soviet Soviet disinformation) disinformation) appear appear to to have have had little little resonance resonance outside outside the the Middle MiddleEast.55 East. The The active active measures measures employed employed against against some some of of the the journalists journalists who who wrote wrote articles articles based on book were Doctored versions of blank based on Barron's Barrons book were more more imaginative. imaginative. Doctored versions of blank "infor information mation cards" cards from from the the Austrian Austrian Stapo Stapo (security (security police) police) registry registry previously previously obtained obtained by used to compromise Austrian used by KGB agents agents were were used to compromise Austrian journalists journalists judged judged to to have have used material ork of Agents to material from from KGB: The Secret W W o r ko f Soviet Secret Agents to undermine undermine the the"peace peaceloving" cards prepared loving policies policies of of the the USSR. USSR. Fabricated Fabricated entries entries on on the the cards prepared by by Service ServiceA, the to show the FCD active active measures measures specialists, specialists, purported purported to show that that the the Stapo Stapo believed believed the the journalists concerned to be hand-in-glove with the CIA. Photocopies of the cards journalists concerned to be hand-in-glove with the CIA. Photocopies of the cards were media. The files noted noted by were then then circulated circulated among among the the Austrian Austrian media. The files by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin list list other bookin in countries afield as other KGB countermeasures countermeasures against against Barron's Barrons book countries as as far farafield as Turkey, Cyprus, Libya, Egypt, Iran, Iran, Kuwait, Kuwait, Somalia, Uganda, India, Sri Turkey, Cyprus, Libya, Lebanon, Lebanon, Egypt, Somalia, Uganda, India, Sri Lanka Lanka and and Mghanistan.56 Afghani~tan.~

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The The other other study study of of the the KGB which which did did the the most most to to arouse arouse the the ire ire of of the the Centre Centre was 1990 by Andrewand andOleg Oleg Gordievsky, was the the history history published published in in 1990 by Christopher Christopher Andrew Gordievsky, of Its Foreign Operations Operationsfiom Lenin to t o Gorbachev, Gorbachev, which KGB: The Inside Story of from Lenin which drew drew on KGB documents and other while working working as as on documents and otherinformation information obtained obtained by by Gordievsky Gordievsky while a agent inside a British British agent inside the the KGB from from 1974 to to 1985.57 1985. The The Centre Centre predictably predictably responded with with active active measures against both both the the book and its its authors.58 authors. (Some (Some indi indiresponded measures against book and cation of of its its continuing continuing hostility hostility to to Gordievsky Gordievsky is is provided provided by by the the fact fact that, that, at cation at the the time is Moscow.) time of of this this writing, writing,he he is still still under under sentence sentence of of death deathin in Moscow.) There There was, was, how however, one important new new element element in in the reaction of of the the KGB, and ever, one important the reaction and of of its its chairman chairman Kryuchkov in in particular, particular, to to the the publication publication of of the thehistory history by by Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky. Gordievsky. Kryuchkov In a top top secret secret "Chairman's Chairmans Order" Order of ofSeptember September 1990 emphasizing emphasizing the the importance importance In a of influence influence operations operations and and other other active active measures measures("one (one of the the most most important important func funcof of tions of of the the KGB's KGBs foreign foreign intelligence intelligence service"), service), Kryuchkov Kryuchkov instructed instructed that that "wider wider tions use should be be made made of of archive archive material to publicize publicize a a "positive" positive image image of of the the KGB use should material" to and celebrated cases."59 and "its its more more celebrated ca~es.~ The first first approach approach to to a a Western offering material material from from KGB archives archives The Westernwriter writer offering intended to to create create this this "positive" positiveimage image was was to to the John Costello, Costello, a a free freeintended the mercurial mercurial John lance lance British British historian historian who who combined combined flair flair for for research research with with a a penchant penchantfor for conspir conspiracy acy theory.6o theory6 In In 1991 1991 Costello Costello published published a a book book on on the the mysterious mysterious flight flight to to Britain Britain fifty years years previously previously of of Hitler's Hitlers deputy deputy Fiihrer, Fuhrer, Rudolf Rudolf Hess, which drew drew on on KGB fifty Hess, which records selected selected by by the the SVR as as well well as as Western Western sources, sources, and argued argued (implausibly, (implausibly, in in records the experts on a plot the view view of of most most experts on the theperiod) period) that that the thekey key to to the thewhole whole affair affair was wasa plotby by British intelligence.61 intelligence.61 Two years years later, later, in in collaboration collaboration with with the the SVR consultant consultant (and (and British Two former FCD offi officer) Oleg Tsarev, Tsarev, Costello Costello published published a a somewhat somewhat less less controversial controversial former cer) Oleg biography of of the the inter-war inter-war Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence officer officer Aleksandr Aleksandr Orlov Orlov which which was was biography described on the dust jacket as book from archives-the KGB described on the dustjacket as "The The first first book from the the KGB archives-the secrets the the British government doesn't doesnt want want you you to to read." read.The began with with trib tribsecrets British government The book book began utes to to the thedisgraced disgraced former former chairman chairman of of the the KGB, Vladimir Vladimir Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, and and the the last last utes head of of the the FCD, Vladimirovich Shebarshin, Shebarshin, for for initiating initiating the the project. project. head FCD, Leonid Leonid Vladimirovich Costello added added a a note note of of "personal personal gratitude" gratitude to to the the SVR "for for the the ongoing ongoing support support Costello given to this project which has established a new precedent for openthat they have given open objectivity in the study of intelligence history, history, not only in Russia, but the ness and objectivity world.62 rest of the world."62 Costello-Tsarev combination set the pattern The Costello-Tsarev pattern for other collaborations bebe tween Russian Russian authors authors selected selected or or approved approved by by the the SVR and and Western Western writers writers (who (who tween officer): have included both well-known historians and a senior retired CIA offi cer): a project initially initially sponsored, sponsored, but but later later abandoned, abandoned, by by Crown Crown Books Books in in the the United United States. States. For For each volume in in the the series, series, which topics from from the the inter-war inter-war period period to to the the early early each volume which covers covers topics Cold War, War, the the SVR has has given giventhe the authors authors exclusive exclusive access accessto to copies of previously previously top top Cold copies of so far secret secret documents selected by it from KGB archives. archives. All the books published so several are also have contained interesting and sometimes important new material; several impressive for the quality of of their historical analysis. analysis. Their main weakness, weakness, for which impressive the choice the authors cannot be blamed, is that the choice of KGB documents on which they has been made not by them but but by the SVR.63 SVR.63 are based has

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The choice choice is is sometimes sometimes highly highly selective. selective. During During the the1990s, 1990s,for for example, the SVR The example, the has Western authors tranches from has made made available available to to Russian Russian and and Western authors four four successive successive tranches from the the bulky KGB's most order to preserve preserve bulky file file of ofthe the KGBs most famous famous British British agent, agent, Kim Kim Philby.64 P h i l b ~ In . ~ order ~ In to both both Philby's Philbys heroic heroic image image and and the the reputation reputation of of Russian Russian foreign foreign intelligence, intelligence, how however, the SVR has has been not to release the the record of Philby's Philbys final ever, been careful careful not to release record of final weeks weeks as as head of the SIS SISstation in the the United UnitedStates (the climax of of his career as a Soviet spy), spy), when money and instructions intended for Philby were mislaid, he fell out with with mislaid, and he his incompetent controller who was subsequently recalled to Moscow in disgrace. disgrace. Mitrokhins notes notes on on those parts parts of of the the Philby Philby file still still considered by by the the SVR unsuitMitrokhin's unsuit able for for public public consumption reveal this this farcical farcical episode for the the first first time.65 time.65 able consumption reveal episode for ofsome of the files files which it fi finds The SVR has publicly denied even the existence of nds embarrassing.While While writing writing aahistory history of of KGB-CIA rivalry rivalry in in Berlin before the the con conembarrassing. Berlin before struction of of the the Wall, Wall, based based partly partly on on documents documents selected selected by by the the SVR, the the Russian Russian struction and American American authors authors (one (one of of them them a a former former deputy deputy head head of of the the FCD) asked asked to to see see and the file file of of the the KGB agent agent Aleksandr Aleksandr Grigoryevich Grigoryevich Kopatzky Kopatzky (alias (alias Igor Igor Orlov). Orlov).The The the replied that that it ithad had no no record record of of any any agent agent of of that thatname. name. Its only only record record of of "Igor Igor SVR replied Orlov was, it claimed, of a visit made by him to the Soviet embassy in Washington Orlov" was, it claimed, of a visit made by him to the Soviet embassy in Washington in 1965, 1965, when when he he complained of of FBI harassment harassment and and enquired enquired about about asylum asylum in in the the in USSR.66 Though still still officially officially an an unperson in in the the SVR version of of Russian Russian intelli intelliUSSR.66 Though gence history, history, Kopatzky Kopatzky was was in in reality reality one one of of the the KGB's KGBs most highly rated rated agents. agents. His His gence most highly supposedly no supposedly non-existent non-existent KGB file, file, noted noted by by Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin, reveals reveals that that he hehad had no fewer fewer than than twenty-three twenty-three controllers.67 controller^.^^ As well well as as initiating initiating an an unprecedented unprecedented series series of of collaborative collaborative histories histories for for publica publicaAs tion West, ofless sophisticated works for the tion in inthe the West, the the SVR has has produced produced a a number number of less sophisticated works for the Russian In 1995, 1995, to to mark mark the the seventy-fi seventy-fifth anniversary of of the the foundation foundation of Russian market. In fth anniversary of the Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence of which it it sees itself as the heir, heir, the the SVR pubthe intelligence service, service, of which sees itself as the pub lished a a volume volume on on the careers of of seventy-five seventy-five intelligence intelligence officers-all, officers-all, it it appears, appears, lished the careers sanspeur e t sans r reproche-which differs little from the the uncritical uncritical hagiographies of the the sans peur et eproche-which differs little from hagiographies of era.68In In 1995 1995 the the SVR also also began began the the publication publication of of a multi-volume official KGB era.68 a multi-volume official history of of KG KGB foreign operations operations which which by by 1997 1997 had had reached reached the the beginning beginning of of the the history B foreign Great Patriotic Patriotic War.69 War.69 Though a a mine mine of of mostly mostly reliable reliable factual factual information, too Great Though information, it it too presents a a selective selective and and sanitized sanitized view view of of Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence history. history. It I t also also preserves, preserves, presents in in a mercifully mercifully diluted diluted form, form, some some of of the the traditional traditional conspiracy conspiracy theories theories of of the the KGB. The was formerly The literary literary editor editor of of the the official official history, history, Lolly Lolly Zamoysky, Zamoysky, was formerly a a senior senior FCD analyst, analyst, well well known known within within the the Centre Centre and and foreign foreign residencies residencies for for his his belief belief in in a Masonic-Zionist plot.70 he published a global global Masonic-Zionist plot.70 In In 1989 1989 he published a a volume volume grandly grandly entitled entitled Behind the Temple, the Freemasons Freemasons for, for, inter alia, the Farade Fafade of o f the Masonic Ma~onic Temple, which which blamed blamed the the outbreak the Cold 71 the outbreak of of the ColdWar. War.71 The underlying underlying rationale rationale for for the the SVR's SVRs selection selection of of topics topics and and documents documents for for his hisThe tories of of past past operations operations is is to to present present Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence intelligence as as a a dedicated dedicated and and tories highly highly professional professional service, service, performing performing much much the the same same functions functions as as its its Western Western counterparts thannot, not, winning the contest them.72 Even counterparts but, but, more more often often than winning the contest against against them.72 Even under Stalin, foreign intelligence is presented as the victim rather than the perpetra under Stalin, foreign intelligence is presented as the victim rather than theperpetrator the later 1930s "enetor of of the the Terror73-despite Terr~r~~-despite the fact fact that that during during the thelater 1930s hunting hunting down down ene-

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mies of of the the people" people abroad abroad became became its its main main priority.74 pri~rity.~ Similarly, the the SVR seeks seeks to to mies Similarly, distance during the distance the the foreign foreign intelligence intelligence operations operations of of the the FCD during the Cold Cold War War from from the however, the the abuse abuse of of human human rights rights by by the the domestic domestic KGB. In In reality, reality, however, the struggle struggle against ideological subversion" subversion both at home homeand and abroad was carefully carefdly coordinated. coordinated. against "ideological both at abroad was The The KGB took took a acentral central role role in in the the suppression suppression of of the the Hungarian Hungarian Uprising Uprising in in 1956, 1956, the the the crushing crushing of of the the Prague Prague Spring Spring in in1968, 1968, the invasion invasion of of Afghanistan Afghanistan in in 1979, 1979,and and the pressure pressure on on the thePolish Polish regime regime to to destroy destroy Solidarity Solidarity in in 198 1981. Closely linked linked to to the the the 1 . Closely persecution of of dissidents dissidents within within the Soviet Union Union were were the the FCD's FCDs PROGRESS PROGRESS persecution the Soviet operations operations against against dissidents dissidents in in the the rest rest of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc and and its its constant constant harass harassment who had taken ment of ofthose those who had taken refuge refuge in in the theWest.75 West.75By By the the mid-1970s mid-1970s the the FCD's FCDs war war against against ideological ideological subversion subversion extended extended even even to to operations operations against against Western Western Commu Communist nist leaders leaders who who were were judged judged to to have have deviated deviated from from Moscow's Moscows rigid rigid Party Party line.76 line.76 On O n these these and and many many other other operations, operations, Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins archive archive contains contains much much material material from from KGB files files which which the the SVR is is still still anxious anxious to to keep keep from from public public view. view. Unlike Unlike the the documents selected selected for documents for declassification declassification by by the the SVR, none none of of which which are are more more recent recent than than the theearly early 1960s, 1960s, his his archive archive covers coversalmost almost the the whole whole of of the the Cold ColdWar. War. Most Most of of it it is is still still highly highly classified classified in in Moscow. Moscow. The The originals originals of of some some of of the the most most important important doc documents noted noted or or transcribed transcribed by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin may may no no longer longer exist. exist. In In 1989 1989 most most of of the the uments huge multi-volume multi-volume file file on on the dissident Andrei Andrei Sakharov, Sakharov, earlier earlier branded branded "Public Public huge the dissident Enemy Number by Andropov, Andropov, was was destroyed. destroyed. Soon afterwards, afterwards, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov Enemy Number One One" by announced that all a l l files on other otherdissidents dissidents charged charged under under the the infamous infamous Article Article 70 70 of announced files on of the criminal criminal code (anti-Soviet agitation agitation and and propaganda) propaganda) were were being being shredded.77 shredded.77In a a the code (anti-Soviet number of of cases, cases, Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes on on them them may may now now be be all that that survives. survives. number John Costello praised Vasili Mitrokhin has thus made it possible to extend what John 1993 new precedent for openness and objectivity objectivity in the study of of intelligence in 1993 as the "new history set set by by Kryuchkov Kryuchkov and and his his SVR successors successors far far beyond beyond the the limits limits any any of of them them history" could have have envisaged. envisaged. could

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or most For most of of Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins career career in in the the KGB, KGB, the the history history of of its its domestic domestic operations operations was its own was something something of of an an embarrassment embarrassment even even to to its own historians. his!orians. During During the the late late 1930s been 1930s the the KGB KGB (then (then known known as as the the NKVD) NKVD)had had been the the chief chief instrument instrument of of Stalin's Stdins Great KGB offi offiGreat Terror, Terror, the the greatest greatest peacetime peacetime persecution persecution in in European Europeanhistory. history. The The KGB cers club in the Lubyanka, its Moscow headquarters, lacked even the usual board cers club in the Lubyanka, its Moscow headquarters, lacked even the usual boardroom room photographs photographs of of past past chairmen; chairmen; most most were were more more suited suited to to aachamber chamber of of horrors horrors than a than to to a hall hall of of fame. fame.Three Three had had been been shot shot after after being being found found guilty guilty of of horrific horrific crimes crimes (some 938, Nikolai (some real, real, others others imaginary): imaginary): Genrikh Genrikh Yagoda Yagoda in in 1 1938, Nikolai Yezhov Yezhov in in 1940 1940and and Lavrenti Beria in 1953. A fourth-Ivan Serov-blew his brains out in 1963. KGB Lavrenti Beria in 1953. fourth-Ivan Serov-blew his brains out in 1963. KGB historians historians in in the thepost-Stalin post-Stalin era era tended tended to to take take refuge refuge from from the the blood-stained blood-stained reality reality of to an of their their Stalinist Stalinist past past and and homicidal homicidal former former chairmen chairmen by by returning returning to an earlier, earlier, mostly mostly mythical, mythical, Leninist Leninist golden golden age age of ofrevolutionary revolutionary purity. purity. The KGB traced its origins to the foundation on December 1 9 1 7, six The KGB traced its origins to the foundation on December20, 20,1917, six weeks weeks after first after the the Bolshevik Bolshevik Revolution, Revolution, of of the the Cheka, Cheka,the the first Soviet Soviet security security and and intelli intelligence gence agency. agency. Throughout Throughout Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins career, career, KGB KGB officers officers styled styled themselves themselves Chekists first twenti Chekists (Chekisty) (Chekisty) and andwere were paid paid their their salaries salaries not not on onthe the first but but on onthe the twentieth of each month ("Chekists' Day") in honor of the Cheka's birthday. The eth of each month (Chekists Day) in honor ofthe Chekas birthday. The KGB KGB also defend also adopted adopted the the Cheka Cheka symbols symbols of of the the sword sword and and the the shield: shield: the the shield shield to to .defend the its foes. the Lubyanka, the revolution, revolution, the the sword sword to to smite smiteits foes. Outside Outside the Lubyanka, the the KGB's KGBs Moscow of the the Cheka, Cheka, Moscow headquarters, headquarters, stood stoodaahuge huge statue statue of of the thePolish-born Polish-born head head of Feliks in countless Feliks Dzerzhinsky, Dzerzhinsky, venerated venerated in countless official official hagiographies hagiographies as as the the selfless, selfless, incorruptible "Knight of of counter incorruptible Knight of the the Revolution" Revolution who who slew slew the the dragon dragon of counterrevolution threatened the revolution which which threatened the young young Soviet Soviet state. state. He H e had had been been a a professional professional revolutionary revolutionary for for over over twenty twenty years years before before the the Revolution, Revolution, spending spending eleven eleven of of those those years years in in Tsarist Tsaristprisons, prisons, penal penal servitude servitude or or exile. exile. KGB KGB training training manuals manuals quoted quoted his his description of the Chekist as a man with "a warm heart, a cool head and clean description of the Chekist as a man with ,a warm heart, a cool head and clean hands." was hands. Like Like Lenin, Lenin,he he was an an incorruptible incorruptibleworkaholic, workaholic, prepared prepared to to sacrifice sacrifice both both himself others in in the himself and and others the defense defense of of the the Revolution.1 Revolution. In In the the headquarters headquarters of of the the KGB Yasenevo, KGB First First Chief Chief (Foreign (Foreign Intelligence) Intelligence) Directorate Directorateat at Yasenevo,the the main mainobject object of of veneration on a a marble veneration was was a a large large bust bust of of Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky on marble pedestal pedestal constantly constantly sur surrounded rounded by by fresh fresh flowers. flowers.

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The The KGB's KGBs effusive effusive public public tributes tributes to to its its saintly saintly founding founding father father concealed concealed the the degree degree to to which which Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky derived derived his his intelligence intelligence tradecraft tradecraft from from the the Cheka's Chekas much much smaller smaller Tsarist Tsarist predecessor, predecessor, the the Okhrana. Okhrana. The The Bolsheviks Bolsheviks had had extensive extensive first firsthand the use of penetration hand experience experience of of the the Okhrana's Okhranas expertise expertise in in the use of penetration agents agents and and agents provocateurs. In Lenin had discussed agentsprovocateurs. In July July 1913 1913Lenin had discussed the the difficult difficult problem problem of of Okhrana Okhrana penetration penetration with with two two of of his his chief chief lieutenants, lieutenants, Lev Lev Kamenev Kamenev and and Grigori Grigori Zinovyev, leader Bolshevik Zinovyev,and and the the leader of of the the Bolshevik deputies deputies in in the theDuma, Duma, Roman Roman Malinovsky. Malinovsky. All A l lwere were agreed agreed that that there there must must be be an an unidentified unidentified Okhrana Okhrana agent agent in in close close contact contact with the Bolshevik deputies. The agent was in even closer contact than Lenin with the Bolshevik deputies. The agent was in even closer contact than Lenin real realized. fi les later ized. It It was was Roman Roman Malinovsky. Malinovsky.Mter After Okhrana Okhrana files later revealed revealed his his identity, identity, he he was was shot Kremlin shot in inthe the Kremlin gardens gardens on on the thefirst first anniversary anniversary of of the theBolshevik Bolshevik Revolution.2 Revolution.2 The its opponents opponents derived The Cheka's Chekas success success in in penetrating penetrating its derived in in large large part part from from its its imitation of the techniques employed by Malinovsky and other Tsarist agents. imitation of the techniques employed by Malinovsky and other Tsarist agents. Dmitri Dmitri Gavrilovich Gavrilovich Yevseyev, Yevseyev, the the author author of of two two of of the the Cheka's C.hekas earliest earliest operational operational manuals, Intelligence and Instructionsfor manuals,Basic Basic Tenets Tenets of $Intelligence and Brief BriejYnstructions for the the Cheka Cheka on on How How to t o Con Conduct duct Intelligence, InteZZigence, based based his his writings writings on on detailed detailed study study of of Okhrana Okhrana tradecraft. tradecraft. Though Though the the Cheka Cheka was was "an an organ organ for for building building the the dictatorship dictatorship of of the the proletariat," proletariat, Yevseyev Yevseyev insisted-like insisted-like Dzerzhinsky-that Dzerzhinsky-that it it must must not not hesitate hesitate to to learn learn from from the the experience experienceof of "bourgeois" bourgeoisintelligence intelligence agencies.3 agen~ies.~ The early priorities The Cheka's Chekas early priorities were were overwhelmingly overwhelmingly domestic. domestic. Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky described it as "an organ for the revolutionary settlement of accounts with described it as an organ for the revolutionary settlement of accounts with counter counterrevolutionaries,"4 a revol~tionaries,~ a label label increasingly increasingly applied applied to to all all the the Bolsheviks' Bolsheviks opponents opponents and and "class classenemies." enemies.Within Within days days of of its its foundation, foundation, however, however, the the Cheka Chekahad had also also taken taken its its first first first tentative tentative steps steps in in foreign foreign intelligence intelligence collection. collection.The The career career of of the the first agent agent sent sent on mission sadly on a a mission abroad, abroad,Aleksei Aleksei Frolovich FrolovichFilippov, Filippov,was was sadly at at variance variancewith with the theheroic heroic image their descriptions image which which KGB KGB historians historians struggled struggled to to maintain maintain in in their descriptions of of the the Leninist Leninist era. era. Born Born in in 1870 1870and and trained trained as as a a lawyer, lawyer,Filippov Filippov had had made made a a career career before before the end of of 1917 the Revolution Revolution as as a a newspaper newspaper publisher. publisher. At At the the end 1917 he he was was recruited recruited by by Dzerzhinsky ournalist go on on intelligence intelligence assignments assignments to to Finland Finland under undercover cover as as a aj journalist Dzerzhinsky to to go and on his and businessman. businessman. Before Before departing departing on his first first mission mission in in January January 1918, 1918, Filippov Filippov gave "on gave a a written writtenundertaking undertaking on a a voluntary voluntary basis, basis, without without receiving receiving payment, payment, to to pass pass on on all all the the information information which which I I hear hear in in industrial, industrial, banking banking and and particularly particularly in in conser conservative vative [nationalist] [nationalist] circles."5 circle^."^ 4 Lenin On January O n January 4 Lenin publicly publicly recognized recognized the the independence independence of of Finland, Finland, formerly formerly part part of of the the Tsarist Tsarist Empire, Empire, then thenimmediately immediately set set about about trying trying to tosubvert subvert it. it. A A putsch putsch at of at the theend end of the the month monthby by Finnish Finnish Communists, Communists,supported supported by by the the Russian Russian military military and and naval naval garrison garrison in in Helsinki, Helsinki, seized seized control control of of the the capital capital and and much much of of southern southern Finland. Finland. The The Communists Communists were were quickly quickly challenged challenged by by a a defense defense corps corps of of Finnish Finnish nationalists led by the former Tsarist officer General Karl Mannerheim.6 Filippov's nationalists led by the former Tsarist officer General Karl Mannerheim.6 Filippovs main main Cheka Cheka assignment assignment was was to to report report on on Mannerheim, Mannerheim, his his dealings dealings with with the the Ger Germans, had supported April mans, and and the the mood mood of of the the sailors sailors who who had supported the the putsch. putsch. Early Early in in April 1918, 1918, however, however, German German forces forces intervened intervened in in Finland, Finland, and and by by the the end end of of the themonth month both the Communist putsch and Filippov's brief career as the first Soviet foreign both the Communist putsch and Filippovs brief career as the first Soviet foreign agent agent were were at at an an end.7 end.7

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DU RI IN NG GT THE C CI IV VI IL L war, war, which which began began in in May May1918 1918 and and continued continued for for two two and and a a half half D years, years, the the Bolshevik Bolshevik regime regime had had to to fight fight for for its its survival survival against against powerful powerhl but but divided divided White White Russian Russian armies. armies. Behind Behind all all the the forces forces arraigned arraigned against against them, them, the the Bolshevik Bolshevik leaders leaders saw saw a a vast vast conspiracy conspiracy orchestrated orchestrated by by Western Western capitalism. capitalism. "What What we we are are fac facing," ing, declared declared Lenin Lenin in inJuly, July, "is is a a systematic, systematic, methodical methodical and and evidently evidently long-planned long-planned military military and and financial financial counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary campaign campaign against against the the Soviet Soviet Republic, Republic, which the representatives representatives of of Anglo-French Anglo-French imperialism imperialism have have been been preparing preparing for for which all the months."g the young enemies both at months. In In reality, reality, though though the young Soviet Soviet regime regime had had many many enemies both at home imperialist plot home and and abroad, abroad, there there was was no no carefully carefully planned, planned, well well coordinated coordinated imperialist plot to bring it down. plot existed, bring it down. The The illusion illusion that that such such a a plot existed, however, however, helped helped to to shape shape the the Cheka's Chekas early early operations operations against against its its imperialist imperialist foes. foes. In In the the course course of of the the civil civil war, war,the the Cheka Cheka claimed claimed to to have have uncovered uncovered and and defeated defeated a series of major conspiracies by Western governments and their intelligence a series of major conspiraciesby Western governments and their intelligence agencies agencies to of 8 to overthrow overthrow the the Bolshevik Bolshevik regime. regime. The The first first such such conspiracy conspiracy in in the thesummer summer of 191 1918 was s the (after was the the "envoys' envoysplot," plot, also also known known a as the "Lockhart Lockhartplot" plot (after its its instigator, instigator, Robert Robert Bruce junior British Bruce Lockhart, Lockhart, aa junior British diplomat). diplomat). According According to to aaKGB history history published published in in 1979, theshattering shattering blow 1979, "One One could could say say without without exaggeration exaggeration that that the blow dealt dealt by by the the Chekists a major Chekists to to the the conspirators conspirators was was equivalent equivalent to to victory victory in in a major military military battle."9 battle. That the Cheka Chekahad had claimed 1918 and and what what most most of of Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins col colThat is is what what the claimed in in 1918 leagues leagues continued continued to to believe believe over overhalf half a a century century later. later. In In reality, reality, however, however,the the "envoys' envoys plot" not by plot was was mounted mounted not by a a coalition coalition of of capitalist capitalist governments governments but but by by a a group group of of politically politically naive naive Western Western diplomats diplomats and and adventurous adventurous secret secret agents agents who who were were left left largely largely to to their theirown own devices devices during during the thechaotic chaotic early early months months of of the the Bolshevik Bolshevik regime regime and overthrow and became became involved involved in in farcically fiarcically inept inept attempts attemptsto to overthrow it. it. The The best-known best-known of of the the secret secret agents agents was was Sidney Sidney Reilly Reilly of of the the British British Secret Secret Intelligence Intelligence Service Service (then (then known known as as MIlc), MIlc), whose whose exploits exploits oscillated oscillated between between high high adventure adventure and and low low farce, farce, and SIS. Reilly and whose whose increasing increasing tendency tendency to to fantasy fantasy later later led led to to his his exclusion exclusion from from SIS. Reilly announced 1918 in announced his his arrival arrival in in Moscow Moscow on on May May 7, 7,1918 in bizarre bizarre but but characteristic characteristic fash fashion ion by by marching marching up up to to the theKremlin Kremlin gates, gates, announcing announcing that that he hewas was an an emissary emissary from from the the British British prime prime minister, minister, Lloyd Lloyd George George (who (who had had probably probably never never heard heard of of him), him), and and unsuccessfully unsuccessfully demanding demanding to to see see Lenin. Lenin. By devised not By far far the the most most sophisticated sophisticated part part of of the the "envoys' envoysplot" plot was was devised not by by the the envoys envoys themselves themselves or or their their secret secret agents agents but but by by the the Cheka, Cheka, possibly possibly at at Lenin's Lenins sug suggestion, Cheka officer gestion, as as a a trap trap for for Western Western conspirators. conspirators. In In August August 1918 1918 the the Cheka officer Yan Yan Buikis, Shmidkhen, succeeded succeeded in Buikis, posing posing as as an an anti-Bolshevik anti-Bolshevik conspirator conspirator named named Shmidkhen, in persuading the French consul-general that persuading Lockhart, Lockhart, Reilly Reilly and and the French consul-general that Colonel Colonel Eduard Eduard Berzin, Berzin, commander commander of of a a Latvian Latvian regiment regiment in in the the Kremlin Kremlin (in (in reality reality a a Cheka Cheka agent agent provocateur), provocateur), was was ready readyto to lead lead an an anti-Bolshevik anti-Bolshevik rising. rising. To To finance finance Berzin's Berzins proposed proposed ,200,000 roubles to the the coup, gave him coup, Reilly Reilly gave him 1 1,200,000 roubles which which Berzin Berzin promptly promptly passed passed on on to Cheka.10 point he he imagined one point imagined himself himself Cheka. Reilly's Reillys schemes schemes for for the the coup coup varied. varied. At one leading leading a a detachment detachment of of Latvian Latvian troops troops on on to to the thestage stage of of the the Bolshoi Bolshoi Theatre Theatre dur during the theCongress Congress of of Soviets, Soviets,seizing seizing Lenin, Lenin, Trotsky Trotsky and and other otherBolshevik Bolshevik leaders, leaders, and and ing

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shooting them spot. However, However, Reilly Reilly was attracted by by an an alternative alternative shooting them on onthe the spot.ll was also also attracted scheme their trousers, scheme not not to to execute execute Lenin Lenin and and Trotsky, Trotsky,but but instead instead to to remove remove their trousers, parade parade them in their them in their underpants underpants through through the the streets streets of of Moscow, Moscow, and and so so "hold hold them them up up to to "12 ridicule ridicule before before the the world. world.12 Reillys fantasies fantasies however however were wereovertaken overtaken by by events. events. On O n August August 30 the the head head of of the the Reilly's Petro grad Cheka, Cheka, Moisei Petrograd MoiseiSolomonovich Solomonovich Uritsky, Uritsky, was wasassassinated assassinated by by a a former former mem member ber of of the the moderate moderate Workers' Workers Popular Popular Socialist Socialist Party, Party, Leonid Leonid Kannegiser.13 Kannegiser.13 In In an an unrelated onthe the same unrelated attack attack on same day, day, Lenin Lenin was was shot shot and and seriously seriously wounded wounded by by the the Socialist Kaplan. "I shot Lenin Socialist Revolutionary, Revolutionary,Fanya Fanya (Dora) (Dora) Kaplan. I shot Leninbecause because I believe believe him him to to be be a a traitor traitor [to [to Socialism]," Socialism], Kaplan Kaplan told told her her Cheka Cheka interrogators.14 interrogators.14In In the the aftermath aftermath of both both shootings, shootings, Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky decided to wind wind up up the envoys plot, which the the of decided to the "envoys' plot," which Cheka itself itself had been largely Cheka had been largely responsible responsible for for orchestrating. orchestrating. On O n September September 2 it it was was announced Anglo announced that that the the Cheka Cheka had had "liquidated liquidated .. .. .. the the conspiracy conspiracy organized organized by by AngloFrench capture of French diplomats diplomats .. .. .. to to organize organize the the capture of the the Council Council of of People's Peoples Commissars Commissars and the proclamation of of military military dictatorship dictatorship in in Moscow; Moscow; this this was was to to be be done done by by and the proclamation bribing Soviet Soviet troops." troops. Predictably, Predictably, the the statement statement made made no no mention mention of of the the fact fact that that bribing the plan plan to to bribe bribe Soviet Soviet troops troops and and stage stage a a military military coup coup had had been by the the the been devised devised by Cheka and that that the diplomats had had been drawn into into the conspiracy by by agents agents Cheka itself itself and the diplomats been drawn the conspiracy relying on Okhrana tradecraft. On provocateurs provocateurs relying onOkhrana tradecraft. O n September September 5 5 Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky and and Zinovyev, boss, issued issued a statement declaring the Zinovyev, the the Petrograd Petrograd Party Party boss, a further further statement declaring that that the Anglo-French Anglo-French conspirators conspirators had had been been the the "organizers" organizersof of the the attempt attempt on on Lenin's Lenins life life and ofUritsky. Dzerzhinsky did however, Reilly's and the the "real real murderers" murderers of Uritsky. Dzerzhinsky did not, not, however, reveal reveal Reillys plan plan to Lenin's and to remove remove Lenins and Trotsky's Trotskys trousers. trousers. Though Though happy happy to to publicize, publicize, or or invent, invent, Western involvement involvement in in assassination assassination plots plots against against Lenin, the Cheka Cheka dared dared not not disWestern Lenin, the dis IS close close a a plot plot to to hold hold him him up up to toridicule. ridi~u1e.l~ The The attempt attempt on on Lenin's Lenins life, life, the the killing killing of of Uritsky Uritsky and and the the announcement announcement of of the the liquidationof of "the the envoys' envoysplot" plot were quickly quickly followed followed by by the declaration of of the the Red Red "liquidation" were the Terror. ene Terror. With With the the Bolsheviks Bolsheviks engaged engaged in in a a bitter bitter civil civil war war against against their their White White enemies, the Cheka set out to terrorize the regime's opponents. Lenin himself, only three mies, the Chekaset out toterrorize the regimes opponents. Lenin himself, only three weeks his the Bolsheviks Penza, and weeks before before the the attempt attempton on his own own life, life, had had written writtento to the Bolsheviks in in Penza, and probably to organize probably elsewhere, elsewhere, urging urging them them to organize public public executions executions to to make make the the people people tremble "for for hundreds of of kilometers around." around. While still recovering recovering from his "tremble" urgently-to prepare wounds, wounds, he he instructed, instructed, "It It is is necessary necessary secretly-and secretly-and urgently-to prepare the the ter terr0r.I6On O n October October 15 15Uritsky's Uritskys successor successor in Petrograd, Petrograd, Gleb Gleb Ivanovich Ivanovich Boky, Boky, proudly proudly in ror."16 alleged counterrevolutionaries counterrevolutionaries had had been shot and reported to to Moscow Moscow that that 800 800 alleged and reported another 6,229 imprisoned. imprisoned. Among Among those those arrested, arrested, and and probably probably executed, executed, in in Petro Petroanother 6,229 grad was was the the Cheka's Chekas first first foreign foreign agent, agent, Alexei Alexei Filippov. Filippov. His His liquidation was was due, due, in in grad probability, not to the failure failure of his Finnish missions bourgeois ori oriall probability, missions but to his "bourgeois" gins, gins, which which marked marked him him down down as as an an enemy enemy of of the the people people in in the theparanoid paranoid atmosphere atmosphere of the the Red Red Terror.17 Terror.17Twenty Twenty years years later later Boky was was himself himself to to fall fall victim victim to to the the even even of Stahs Terror.18 Terror.* greater paranoia of Stalin's " < -Berzin provocateurs who ,Benin and and Buikis, Buikis, the the Cheka Cheka agents agentsprovocateurs who had had helped helped orchestrate orchestrate the the "envoys' plot," subsequently envoys plot, subsequently became became victims Berzins career victims of their own deception. Berzin's initially prospered. He initially prospered. H e was was awarded awarded the the Order Orderof of the the Red Red Banner for his role as agent
L

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provocatezlr, joined joined the the Cheka Cheka and and later later became became head head of of a a for.cl forced .... labor .c camp in the the provocateur, a,mp in Kolyma goldfields which one of highest death death rates 7, Kolyma goldfields which had had one of the the highest rates in in Stalin's Stalins gulag. *lag. In In 193 1937, however, he he was was arrested arrested and and shot as an an enemy enemy of of the the people. The The exact exact charges levhowever, shot as people.19 charges lev eled against against Berzin Berzin are are not not known, known, but but it it is is likely likely that that they they included included accusations that eled accusations that he para he had had actually actually collaborated collaborated with with Western Western plotters plotters in in 1918. 1918. In In the the somewhat somewhat paranoid Stalinist interpretation plot," his (alias noid Stalinist interpretation of of the the "envoys' envoys plot, his collaborator collaborator Buikis Buikis(alias Shmidkhen) was was portrayed portrayed as as a a covert covert counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary rather rather than than a a Cheka Cheka "Shmidkhen") officer orders. That officer carrying carrying out out his his orders. That remained remained the the . accepted accepted interpretation interpretation even even in in classified classified KGB histories histories during during Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins early early career. career. Buikis Buikis survived survived the the Terror Terror only by by concealing his identity. identity. Not until the mid-1960s did did research in the only concealing his Not until the mid-1960s research in the KGB archives true archives reestablish reestablish "Shmidkhen's" Shmidkhens true !q.ntity identity and andhis his real real role role in in 1918.20 191L20 Throughout Throughout Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins career, career, KGB historians historians continud continued to. to. interpret interpret all all plots plots and attacks attacks against against the the young young Soviet Soviet regime regime as as "manifestations manifestations of of a a unifl,ed unified,conspirand .c:onspir acy by by its its class class enemies enemies at at home home and and the the "imperialist imperialist powers" powersabroad.21 abroad.21 The reality reality acy" The was very very different. different. Had Had there there been a unified conspiracy, the the regime regime would would surely surely was been "a unified conspiracy," have lost lost the the civil civil war. war.If If two two or or three three divisions divisions of of Western Westerntroops had landed in the the have tro?ps had landed in Gulf of of Finland Finland in in 1919, 1919,they they could could probably probably have have forced forced their their way way to to Moscow Moscow and and Gulf overthrown First World overthrown the the Bolsheviks. Bolsheviks. But But in in the the aftermath aftermath of of the the First World War War not .noteven even two two or or three three divisions divisions could could be be found found, Thos.e ThoseAmerican, American, British, British, French French and and Japanese Japanese iniy ' to d troops iscredit the troops who who intervened intervened against against the the Red Red Army Army served served ma mainly.to discredit the White White cause and mil cause and thus thus actually actually to to assist assist the the Bolsheviks. Bolsheviks. They They were were too too few few to to affect affect the the military outcome of of the the civil civil war war but but quite quite sufficient sufficient to to allow allow the the Bolsheviks Bolsheviks to brand brand itary their opponents opponents as as the the tools tools of of Western Western imperialism. imperialism. Most Most Bolshevik. Bolsheviks were, in in any any their s were, case, sincerely convinced that that during during the civil they had had faced case, sincerely convinced the civil war war they faced a a determined determined onslaught from from the the full f d l might might of of Western Western capitalism. capitalism.That That illusion illusion continued continued to to color color onslaught Soviet era. Soviet attitudes attitudes to to the the West West throughout, throughout,and and even even beyond, beyond, the the Stalin Stalin era.
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operations operations both both at athome home and and abroad abroad were were profoundly profoundly khrana but influenced not influenced not merely merely by by the the legacy legacy of of the the 0 Okhrana butalso also by by the the Bolsheviks' Bolsheviks own own pre-Revolutionary largely illegal Many of of pre-Revolutionary experience experience as as a a largely illegal clandestine clandestine underground. underground. Many the Bolshevik living under the Bolshevik leadership leadership had had become become so so used used to to living under false false identitie identities before before 1917 Rus 1917 that thatthey they retained retained their their aliases aliases even evenafter after the the RevolutioIl: Revolution: among among them themthe the Rusd the sian Lenin, an sian nobleman nobleman Vladimir Vladimir Ilyich Ilyich Ulyanov,22 Ulyanov,22who who kept kept the the pseudonym pseudonym Lenin, and the Georgian Joseph Vissarionovich continued to Georgian Joseph VissarionovichDzhugashvili, Dzhugashvili, who who continued to be be known known as as Stalin. Stah. Both Both Lenin Lenin and and Stalin Stalin retained retained many many of of the the habits habits of of mind mind developed developed during during their their underground existence. existence. On O n highly highly sensitive sensitive matters matters Lenin Lenin would would insist insist no no copy copy be be underground made destruc made of of his his instructions instructions and and that that the the original original either either be be returned returned to to him him f()r for.destruction tion or ordestroyed destroyed by by the the recipient. recipient. Happily Happily for for the the historian, historian, his his instructions instructions were were not not always always carried carried out.23 Stalin the 1920s, 1920s, Stalin continued continued to to doctor doctor his his own. own pre-Revolutionary pre-Revolutionary record record during during the changing date (December 1878) was changing even even the the day day and and year year of of his his birth; birth; the thecorrect correct date (December 6, 6,1878) was not made public public until until 1996.24 During a visit to the secret secret section section of of the the Moscow Moscow not made 1996.24During a visit to the Main Okhrana Main Archives Archives Directorate Directorate (Glavarkhiv), (Glavarkhiv), Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was once once shown shown an an Okhrana fi le on standard Okhrana format, but, but, file on Dzhugashvili. Dzhugashvili. The The file file cover coverand and title title followed followed standard Okhranaformat,.

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on looking looking inside, inside, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin discovered discovered that thatthe contents had had been been entirely entirely on the contents removed. The the Okhrana Okhrana had had compromising materials on the removed. The probability probability is is that that the compromising materials on the young young Dzhugashvili, Dzhugashvili, and and that that at at the thefirst first opportunity opportunity Stalin Stalin arranged arranged for for the the file file to to be In typical Soviet bureaucratic preserved be gutted. gutted. In typical Soviet bureaucratic fashion, fashion, however, however, the the cover cover was was preserved since the since the existence existence of of the thefile file was wasindelibly indelibly recorded recorded in in the thesecret secret registers. registers. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin suspects that emptied the instructions, was suspects that whoever whoever emptied the file, file, presumably presumably on on Stalin's Stalins instructions, was later later eliminated to secret of missing contents.25 What eliminated to preserve preserve the the dark darksecret of its its missing contents.25 What Stalin Stalin was was most most anxious well have been he had anxious to to destroy destroy may maywell have been evidence evidence that that he had been been an an Okhrana Okhrana informer. Though Though it itfalls falls well well short short of of conclusive conclusive proof, proof, aapossible trace of of that that evi eviinformer. possible trace dence still dence still survives. survives. According According to to reports reports from from an an Okhrana Okhrana agent agent discovered discovered in in the the State Archive of of the the Russian Federation, Baku Baku Bolsheviks Bolsheviks before before the the First State Archive Russian Federation, First World World War "confronted confronted Dzhugashvili-Stalin Dzhugashvili-Stah with with the the accusation accusation that that he he was was a a provocateur provocateur War and an an agent agent of of the the Security Security Police. Police. And And that that he he had had embezzled embezzled Party Party hnds.26 and funds."26 From almost almost the the beginning beginning of of the the civil civil war war in in 1918, 1918, in inkeeping keeping with with the the Bolshe BolsheFrom vik false vik tradition tradition of of operating operating under under false identities, identities, the the Cheka Chekabegan began sending sending officers officers and and agents agents under under various various disguises disguisesand and pseudonyms pseudonyms behind behind enemy enemy lines lines to to gather gatherintelli intelligence. By 1919 the these "illegals" gence. By June June 1919 the number number of of these illegalswas wassufficiently sufficiently large large to to require require the operations department department (later the foundation foundationof of an an illegals illegals operations (later to to become become Directorate Directorate S S of of the Chief Directorate).27 KGB classified the KGB First First Chief Dire~torate).~ classified histories histories note note that that henceforth henceforth "illegal" operations became became "an illegal operations an inseparable inseparable part part of offoreign foreign intelligence." intelligence. On O n Decem December 1920, the ber 20, 20,1920, the third third anniversary anniversary of of the the Cheka's Chekas foundation, foundation, a a new new foreign foreign depart department ment (Innostranyi (Innostranyi Otdel Otdel or or INO) INO) was was set set up up to to direct direct all operations operations beyond beyond Soviet Soviet of Soviet Soviet Russia, when the Communist regime borders. During During the early years years of borders. the early Russia, when the Communist regime remained an an international it had had few few official official missions missions abroad abroad capable capable of of pro proremained international pariah, pariah, it viding Cheka jargon) viding official official cover cover for for "legal" legal intelligence intelligence stations stations ("residencies" ((residenciesin in Cheka jargon) and thus thus relied relied chiefly chiefly on on illegals. As diplomatic and trade trade missions missions were were established established and illegals. As diplomatic and capitals, each was was given given a "legal legal residency" residency headed by a "resident" resident whose in foreign capitals, identity was was officially officiallycommunicated communicated only only to to the theambassador ambassador or or head head of of the the mission. mission. identity Illegals, Illegals, sometimes sometimes grouped grouped in in "illegal illegal residencies," residencies, operated operated without without the the benefit benefit of of diplomatic or or official official cover coverand and reported reported directly directly to to IN I N0 0 in in Moscow.28 Moscow.28 diplomatic During During the the civil civil war war of of 1918-20, 1918-20, foreign foreign intelligence intelligence collection collection was was of of minor minor importance by by comparison comparison with with the the Cheka's Chekas role role in in assisting assisting the the victory victory of of the the Red Red importance Army over over its its White White enemies. enemies. Like Like the the KGB later, later, the the Cheka Cheka liked liked to to quantify its its Army successes. In In the autumn of of 1919, 1919, probably probably the the turning inin the civil war, it successes. the autumn turningpoint point the civil war, it proudly claimed that during during the thefirst first nineteen months of of its its existence existence it it had had discov discovproudly claimed that nineteen months ered and and neutralized neutralized "412 412 underground underground anti-Soviet anti-Soviet organizations."29 organization^."^^ The The Cheka's Chekas ered most effective method of of most effective method of dealing dealing with with opposition opposition was was terror. terror. Though Though its its liking liking of quantification did not not extend extend to to calculating calculating the the number number of of its its victims, victims, it it is is clear clear that that quantification did Cheka enormously outstripped the Okhrana Okhrana in in both the scale of the Cheka both the scale and the ferocity of its onslaught onslaught on on political political opposition. In 1901, 1901, 4,113 Russians Russians were were in in internal internal exile exile its opposition. In crimes, of whom only 1 180 80 were on hard labor. Executions Executions for political for political crimes, crimes were were limited limited to to those those involved involved in in actual actual or or attempted attempted assassinations. assassinations. During crimes During the civil civil war, war,by bycontrast, contrast, Cheka Cheka executions executions probably probably numbered numbered as as many many as as 250,000, the exceededthe number number of of battle.30 and may well have exceeded deaths in battle.3o

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At the thetime time of ofthe the October Revolution, it it had had never never occurred occurred to to Lenin Leninthat that. and he At October Revolution, he and the responsible for Okhrana in in a a the Bolshevik Bolshevik leadership leadership would would be be responsible for the the rebirth rebirth of of the the Okhrana new and and far far more more terrible terrible form. form. In In The Tbe State and Revolution, Revolution, which which he he had had almost new completed no need completed in in the the summer summerof of 1917, 1917, he he had had claimed claimed that that there there would would be be no need for for aa force,let alone a political police, after the Revolution. Though it it police force, would be necnec essary suppression of the minority exploiters by the majority of essary to to arrange arrange for for "the the suppression of the minority of of exploiters by the majority of wage slaves slavesof of yesterday," yesterday,such such suppression suppression would would be be "comparatively comparativelyeasy." easy.The The "pro prowage letarian dictatorship" dictatorshipwhich which would would preside over the the rapid destruction of of the the bourgeois bourgeois letarian preside over rapid destruction order would would require require a a minimum of rules, rules, regulation regulation and and bureaucracy. bureaucracy. Lenin had order minimum of had never foreseen foreseen the the possibility possibility of of mass mass opposition to a carried out out in in the the never opposition to a revolution revolution carried name of of the the people.31 people.31But, But, once once in in power, power, he he used whatever whatever methods methods were were necessary necessary name always that the theBolsheviks were weredefending "the the people's peoples power" power to retain it, claiming always and refusing to accept the reality that he hehad had made himself the infallible infallible leader ( Vozhd) of (Y,zbd) of the the world's worlds first first one-party one-party state. state.
erected the Lubyanka the closing erected next next to to the Lubyanka in in the closing years (in repression" years of of the the Soviet Soviet era era to to cOI'l1memorate commemorate "the the victims victims of of totalitari, totalitarian repressioncon consists of ofa a large large block block of of granite granite taken taken not not from from Stalin's Stalins gulag gulag but but from from a concentration concentration sists camp Lenin on Sea in 1918. camp established established by by Lenin on the the shores shores of of the the White White Sea in the the autumn autumn of of 1918. Many Chekists regarded brutality against their class enemies as a revolutionary Many Chekists regarded brutality against their class enemies as a revolutionary virtue. According According to to aareport report from from the the Cheka Cheka in inMorshansk: Morshansk virtue.
A P P R O P R I AT E LY, T H HE EMM EM IA APPROPRIATELY, EM OO RR IA LL

H e who who fights fights for for a a better better future future will will be towards his his enemies. enemies. He He He be merciless merciless towards who who seeks seeks to to protect protect poor poor people people will will harden harden his his heart heart against against pity pity and and will will become become cruel. 32
Even at when the the Soviet its survival survival during civil Even at a a time time when Soviet regime regime was was fighting fighting for for its during the the civil war, many of its own the scale war, many of its own supporters supporters were were sickened sickened by by the scale of of the the Cheka's Chekas brutality. brutality. A number in their of number of of Cheka Cheka interrogators, interrogators, some some only only in their teens,33 teens,33employed employed tortures tortures of scarcely In Kharkhov the skin was peeled to scarcely believable believablebarbarity. barbarity.In Kharkhov the skin was peeled off off victims' victims hands hands to produce of human in Voronezh produce "gloves" glovesof human skin; skin; in Voronezh naked naked prisoners prisoners were were rolled rolled around around in in barrels captured barrels studded studded with with nails; nails; in in Poltava Poltava priests priests were were impaled; impaled; in in Odessa, Odessa, captured White slowly into furnaces; in of rats White officers officers were weretied tied to to planks planks and and fed fed slowly into furnaces; in Kiev Kiev cages cagesof rats were fixed to bodies and were fixed to prisoners' prisoners bodies and heated heated until until the the rats rats gnawed gnawed their their way way into into the the victims' victims intestines.34 intestine^.^' Though sadism, he Though Lenin Lenin did did not not approve approve of of such such sadism, he was was content content to to leave leave "excesses" excesses to be corrected by Dzerzhinsky. Brushing aside complaints of Cheka brutality, to be corrected by Dzerzhinsky. Brushing aside complaints of Cheka brutality, he he paid The Cheka, he claimed, paid fulsome fulsome tribute tribute to to its its role role in in helping helping to to win win the the civil civilwar. war. The Cheka, heclaimed, had and countless had proved proved a a "devastating devastating weapon weapon against against countless countless conspiracies conspiracies and countless attempts than us: us": attempts against against Soviet Soviet power powerby by people people who who are are infinitely infinitely stronger stronger than Gentlemen Gentlemen capitalists capitalists of of Russia Russia and and abroad! abroad! We We know know that that it iti is not not possible possible for for you Cheka] has been able to you to to love love this this establishment. establishment. Indeed, Indeed, it it is is not! not! [The [The Cheka] has been able to counter machinations as as no no one else could done counter your your intrigues intrigues and and your your machinations one else could have have done

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when when you you were weresmothering smothering us, us, when when you you had had surrounded surrounded us us with with invaders, invaders, and and when you you were were organizing organizing internal internal conspiracies and would would stop stop at at no no crime crime in in when conspiracies and order 35 order to to wreck wreck our our peaceful peacefbl work. work.5

Some of the the most secret documents in Dzerzhinsky's Dzerzhinskys archive archive carry carry a a note note that that only only Some of most secret documents in ten copies were made: one Lenin, the ten copies were to to be be made: one for for Lenin, the rest rest for for Cheka Cheka department department chiefs.36 chiefs.36 Lenins absorption absorption in in the theaffairs affairs of of the the Cheka Chekaextended extended even even to to operational operational detail. detail. He He Lenin's sent sent Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky advice advice on on how how to to carry carry out out searches searches and and conduct conduct surveillance, surveillance, and and instructed him him that that arrests arrests were were best carried out out at at night.37 night.37Lenin also took took a a some someinstructed best carried Lenin also what naive naive interest interest in in the application of of new new technology technology to to the the hunt hunt for for counter counterwhat the application revolutionaries, revolutionaries, telling telling Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky to to construct construct a a large large electromagnet electromagnet capable capable of of detecting detecting hidden hidden weapons weapons in in house-to-house house-to-house searches. searches. Though Though the the experiment experiment was was tried and failed, failed, Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky had hadsome some difficulty difficulty in in persuading persuading Lenin Lenin that, that,"Magnets Magnets tried and are are not not much much use use in in searches."38 searches.38 Far more more important important than Lenins sometimes sometimes eccentric eccentric interest interest in in intelligence intelligence Far than Lenin's techniques and technology technology was was his his belief belief in in the the central central importance of the the Cheka Cheka to to techniques and importance of the defense defense of of the the Bolshevik Bolshevik one-party one-party state against imperialism imperialism and and counter counterthe state against revolution. The The extent extent of of Lenin's Lenins and and Dzerzhinsky's Dzerzhinskys fear fear of of imperialist subversion is is revolution. imperialist subversion well illustrated illustrated by by their their deep deep suspicion suspicion of of the the aid aid which which they they felt felt forced forced to to accept accept in in well August August 1921 1921 from from the the American American Relief Relief Association Association (ARA) ( A M ) to to feed feed millions millions of of starv starving United States ing Soviet Soviet citizens. citizens. Lenin Lenin was was convinced convincedthat that the theARA was was a a front frontfor for United States intelligence, closest surveillance its members. intelligence, and and ordered ordered the the closest surveillance of of all all its members. Once Once the the ARA AM began work, work, he he was was equally equally convinced that it itwas was using using food food as as an an instrument instrument of of subbegan convinced that sub version. He H e complained to Dzerzhinsk'y's Dzerzhinskys deputy, deputy, Iosif Iosif Stanislavovich Stanislavovich Unshlikht, Unshlikht, that that version. complained to foreign agents agents were were "engaged engaged in in massive massive bribery bribery of hungry and tatteredChekists foreign and tattered Chekists [Lenin's . The The danger is extremely that urgent [Lenins emphasis] emphasis]. danger here here is extremely great." great. Lenin Lenin insisted insisted that urgent steps be taken taken to to ')ed dothe the the Chekists in order order to to remove from imperisteps be 'feed and clothe Chekists" in remove them them from imperi alist alist temptation.39 temptati~n.~~ Though the the United States still still had had no peacetime espionage espionage agency, agency, the the Cheka Though United States no peacetime Cheka reported reported that that over over 200 200 of of the the 300 ARA staff, staff, who who were were devoting devoting all all their their energies energies to to dealing with one of the most terrible famines in modern European history, were in reality undercover undercover intelligence intelligence officers officers who who "could could become become fi first-class instructors for for a a reality rst-class instructors counter-revolutionary uprising. The Cheka Cheka also also alleged allegedthat that the theARA was was building building counter-revolutionary uprising." The up a large food food supply supply in in Vienna so that that "in in the the event event of of a a coup coup [it] [it] could could provide provide up a large Vienna so immediate support support to to the the White government.4o Lenin was was far far more more exercised exercised by bythe the White government."40 A M s non-existent intelligence operations than by by the the approximately approximately five five million million ARA's non-existent intelligence operations than ians who Russians and Ukrai Ukrainians who starved starved to to death. Without Without the themassive massive aid aid program program of of Russians and 1922 was feeding up to to eleven million people a day, the the.famine famine the ARA, which in 1922 would have have been been far far worse. worse. Even Even after after the the ARA A M had had departed, departed, however, however, Soviet Soviet intel intelwould it had hadbeen, first and foremost, an espionage espionage rather ligence remained convinced that it humanitarian agency. A quarter of of a century later, all surviving Russian thana a humanitarian agency. employees A M were were made made to to sign sign confessions confessions that that they they had had been been American American employees of of ARA spies.41 spies.41 The priorities priorities of of Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence under under Lenin, Lenin, and and still more more under under Stalin, Stalin, conconThe still

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tinued tinued to to be be shaped shaped by by greatly greatly exaggerated exaggerated beliefs beliefs in in an an unrelenting unrelenting conspiracy conspiracy by by Western governments governments and and their their intelligence agencies. To To understand understand Soviet Soviet intelli intelliWestern intelligence agencies. is frequently frequently necessary to enter world of gence operations between the the wars, wars, it it is gence operations between necessary to enter a a world of smoke smoke and and mirrors mirrors where where the the target target is is as as much much the the product product of of Bolshevik Bolshevik delusions delusions as as realcounter-revolutionary conspiracy. conspiracy.The Soviet propensity to conspiracy conspiracy theory of real derived derived both both from from the the nature nature of of the the one-party one-party state state and and from from its its Marxist-Leninist Marxist-Leninist ideology. ideology. All A l l authoritarian authoritarian regimes, regimes, since since they they regard regard opposition opposition as as fundamentally fundamentally illegitimate, tend to see their their opponents engaged in Bolshe illegitimate, tend to see opponentsas as engaged in subversive subversive conspiracy. conspiracy. Bolshevik vik ideology ideology further further dictated dictated that that capitalist capitalist regimes regimes could could not not fail fail to to be be plotting plotting the the worlds first and only worker-peasant worker-peasant state. If they were not visibly overthrow of the world's state. If preparing an an armed invasion, invasion, then then their intelligence agencies must necessarily necessarily be be their intelligence agencies must secretly secretly conspiring conspiring to to subvert subvert Soviet Soviet Russia Russia from from within. within. heads months. heads served served between between them them for for a a total total of of barely barely eighteen eighteen months. The The first first foreign foreign intelligence intelligence chief chief to to make make his his mark mark was was Mikhail Mikhail Abramovich Abramovich Trilisser, INO Trilisser, appointed appointed as as head head of of I N 0 in in 1922-undoubtedly 1922-undoubtedly with with Lenin's Lenins personal personal approval. approval.Trilisser Trilisser was was a a Russian Russian Jew Jew who who had had become become a a professional professional revolutionary revolutionary in in 1901 1901 at atthe theage age of of only only eighteen. eighteen. Like Like Dzerzhinsky, Dzerzhinsky, he he had had spent spent much much of of his his early early career in War, career in exile exile or or in in Tsarist Tsarist prisons. prisons. Before Before the the First FirstWorld World War, he he had had specialized specialized in in tracking tracking down down police police spies spiesamong among Bolshevik Bolshevik emigres. CmigrCs. While While serving serving with with the the Cheka Cheka in 1918, 1918, he he was was reputed reputed to to have have been been caught caught by by "bandits" banditsand and hung hung from from a a tree, tree, but but to to in have have been been cut cut down down just just in in time time by by Red Red forces forces who who successfully successfidly revived revived him. him. Unlike Unlike any meet INO At any of of his his successors, successors,Trilisser Trilissersometimes sometimes traveled traveled abroad abroad to to meet I N 0 agents.42 agents.42 least least until until Lenin Leninwas was incapacitated incapacitated by by his his third third stroke stroke in in March March1923, 1923, he he continued continued to to take though sometimes ill-informed, take an anactive, active, though sometimes ill-informed, interest, interest, in in INO I N 0 reports. reports. He H e noted, noted, for for example, 1922 fr9m example, that that somewhat somewhat inaccurate inaccurate information information received received in in . 1922 from one one of of the the Cheka's British sources, sources, the Chekas few few early early British the journalist journalist Arthur Arthur Ransome Ransome (later (later famous famous as as a a children's "very childrens novelist), novelist),was was veryimportant important and, and, probably, probably, fundamentally fimdamentally true."43 true.43 The priorities of operations, approved Lenin, were: The early early priorities of INO I N 0 foreign foreign operations, approved by by Lenin, were: the of each each state, state, of of counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary groups groups the identification, identification, on on the theterritory territory of operating Russian Socialist Republic; operating against against the the Russian Socialist Federal FederalSoviet Soviet Republic; the thorough study engaged in against our the thorough study of of all all organizations organizations engaged in espionage espionage against our country; country; the economic situation; the elucidation elucidation of of the the political political course course of of each each state state and and its its economic situation; the requirement^.^^ the acquisition acquisition of of documentary documentary material material on on all all the the above above requirements.44 The The "counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary groups" groupswhich which were were of of most most immediate immediate concern concern to to Lenin Lenin the Cheka Cheka after after the the civil civil war war were were the the remnant remnants of of th. the defeaed defeated White White armies armies and the late . in and the the Ukrainian Ukrainian nationalists. nationalists. Mter After the the last last WhitJqfc:es White.,forceslf!-.R:l:!, left-.Russi?n.S?l soil late in . and serious challenge 1920, they they stood stood no no realistic realistic chance chance of of mounting mounting another another serious challenge to to Bol Bol1920, declared, "learns not Abeaten beaten army," army, he he declared, learns That, however, however,was was not Lenin's Leninsview. view. ''A shevik rule. That, much. estimated that that there there were were one one and and a a hal.f half to to two two million million . . anti-Bolshevik anti-Bolshevik much." He estimated Russian emigres: Russian CmigrCs:
' I Na s FI RS INOS ST T TWO

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We We can can observe observe them them all all working working together together irrespective irrespective of of their their former former political political parties They are are skillfully skillfdly taking taking advantage advantage of of every every opportunity opportunity in in order, order, parties .. .. .. They in one way Soviet Russia smash her pieces .. .. .. in one way or or another, another, to to attack attack Soviet Russia and and smash her to to pieces These These counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary emigres CmigrCs are are very verywell wellinformed, informed, excellently excellently orga organized good strategists.45 nized and and good strategist^.^' In In the the early early and and mid-1920s mid-1920s INO's INOs chief chief target target thus thus became became the the emigre CmigrC White White Guards, based mainly continued to less Guards, based mainly in in Berlin, Berlin, Paris Paris and and Warsaw, Warsaw, who who continued to plot-far plot-far less effectively effectively than than Lenin Lenin supposed-the supposed-the overthrow overthrow of of the the Bolshevik Bolshevik regime. regime. The which most The other other "counter-revolutionary" counter-revolutionary threat threat which most concerned concerned Lenin Lenin and and the the Bolshevik had fought fought both both Red Bolshevik leadership leadership came came from from Ukrainian Ukrainian nationalists, nationalists, who who had Red and and White White forces forces in in an an attempt attempt to towin win their their independence. independence. In In the the winter winter of of 1920 1920 and and the the spring spring of of 1921 1921 the the entire entire Ukrainian Ukrainian countryside countryside was was in in revolt revolt against against Bolshevik Bolshevik rule. Even Ukraine by rule. Even after after the the brutal brutal"pacification" pacificationof of Ukraine by the the Red Red Army Army and and the the Cheka, Cheka, partisan had taken partisan groups groups who who had taken refuge refuge in in Poland Poland and and Romania Romania continued continued to to make make cross-border raids.46 In the the spring spring of of1922 1922 the Ukrainian GPU received received intelligence intelligence cross-border raids.46 In the Ukrainian Simon Petlyura's Petlyuras Ukrainian government-in-exile had established parreports that Simon established a "par tisan headquarters" headquarters under under General GeneralYurko Yurko Tutyunnik Tutyunnik which which was was sending sending secret secret emis emistisan saries to to the the Ukraine Ukraine to to establish establish a a nationalist nationalist underground.47 ~nderground.~~ saries The GPU was was ordered ordered not not merely merely to to collect collect intelligence intelligence on on the CmigrC White White The the emigre Guards and and Ukrainian Ukrainian nationalists nationalists but but also also to to penetrate and destabilize destabilize them.48 them.48Its Its Guards penetrate and opponents-to establish bogus anti-Bolshevik strategy was the same against both opponents-to undergrounds under under GPU control control which which could could be be used to to lure lure General Tutyunnik Tutyunnik undergrounds and the the leading leading White White generals generals back back across across the the frontier. frontier. and The fi first step in in enticing enticing Tutyunnik Tutyunnik back back to to Ukraine Ukraine (an (an operation codenamed The rst step operation codenamed was the the capture capture of of Zayarny, Zayarny, one one of of his his "special special duties" duties officers, officers, who who was was CASE 39) 39) was caught crossing the frontier in 1922. 1922. Zayarny was successfully successfully turned back by the and sent to to Tutyunnik's Tutyunniks headquarters headquarters with with bogus bogus reports that that an an underground underground GPU and Supreme Military Council (Vysshaya Voyskovaya Rada or W R ) had been estab estabCouncil (Vysshaya VVR) lished in in Ukraine and was wasanxious to set set up up an an operational operational headquarters headquarters under under lished Ukraine and anxious to Tutyunniks leadership leadership to to wage wage war war against against the the Bolsheviks. Bolsheviks. Tutyunnik Tutyunnik was was too too cau cauTutyunnik's tious to to return return immediately immediately but but sent sent several several emissaries who attended attended stage-managed stage-managed tious emissaries who meetings of of the W R , at at which which GPU officers officers disguised disguised as as Ukrainian Ukrainian nationalists nationalists meetings the VVR, reported the the rapid rapid growth growth of of underground underground opposition opposition to to Bolshevik Bolshevik rule rule and and agreed agreed reported on the the urgent urgent need need for for Tutyunnik's Tutyunniks leadership. leadership. Like Like Zayarny, Zayarny, one one of of the the emissaries, emissaries, on Pyotr Stakhov, Stakhov, a a close close associate associateofTutyunnik, of Tutyunnik, was was recruited recruited by by the the GPU GPU and and used used as as Pyotr a double double agent. agent. a Attempts to to persuade persuade Tutyunnik Tutyunnik himself himself to to return returntoto Ukraine finally succeeded on on Attempts Ukraine fi nally succeeded June 26, 1923.49 Tutyunnik, with with his his bodyguard bodyguard and and aides, aides, arrived arrived at at a a remote remote ham hamJune 26, 1923.49 Tutyunnik, let on the Romanian bank of the river Dniester, where Zayarny met him with the theVVR W R and Pyotr Pyotr Stakhov were waiting on the other other side. 11 news that the side. At 1 1 p.m. a signaled that it light from the Ukrainian bank signaled it was safe safe for Tutyunnik Tutyunnik and his entourage entourage to to cross cross the the river. river. Still Still cautious, cautious,Tutyunnik Tutyunnik sent senthis his bodyguard bodyguard to to make make sure sure that no no trap trap had hadbeen laid laid for for him. Stakhov Stakhov returned returned with with the the bodyguard bodyguard to to reassure that reassure

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him. told know you and you him. According According to to an an OGPU report, report, Tutyunnik Tutyunnik told him, him, "Pyotr, Pyotr, I know you and you W R is a a fiction, fiction, isnt it?"That That is impossi impossiknow me. me. We We won't wont fool fool each each other. other. The The VVR know isn't it?" is ble, Stakhov replied. replied. "I I know them all a l, who are with me [today]. , particularly those who [today] ' ble," You know know you you can can rely rely on on me me .. .. ..7 Tutyunnik got into the boat with with Stakhov Stakhov and You " Tutyunnik the boat crossed the the Dniester. Dniester. Once Once he he was was in in the hands of of the the OGPU, OGPU, letters letters written written by by crossed the hands sayTutyunnik or in his name were sent to prominent Ukrainian nationalists abroad say ing that thattheir their struggle was was hopeless hopeless and and that thathe he had aligned himself himself irrevocably irrevocably with with ing struggle had the Soviet Soviet cause. cause. He H e was was executed executed six six years later. the years later. 50
A T I O N S AGA A G AI IN NS ST T TH E O PER RAT

White Guards Guards resembled those against Ukrainian White resembled those against Ukrainian nationalists. In 1922 1922the Berlin residency recruited the former Tsarist General the residency Zelenin as as a a penetration penetration agent agent within within the the emigre CmigrC community. community. A later later OGPU report report Zelenin claimed, Zelenin had engineered claimed, possibly possibly with with some some exaggeration, exaggeration, that that Zelenin had engineered "a a huge huge schism within the the ranks ranks of of the the Whites" Whitesand and had caused caused a a large large number number of of offi officers to schism cers to break away away from from Baron Baron Peter Wrangel, Wrangel, the thelast of of the the White generals generals to to be be defeated defeated in the the civil civil war. war.Other Other OGPU moles moles praised praised for for their their work work in in disrupting disrupting the theWhite White in Guards I. Guards included included General General Zaitsev, Zaitsev, former former chief chief of of staff staff to to the the Cossack Cossack Ataman Ataman A. I. Dutov, and and the the ex-Tsarist ex-Tsarist General General Yakhontov, Yakhontov, who who emigrated emigrated to to the theUnited United States.l Dutov, States.51 The The OGPU's OGPUs greatest greatest successes successes against against the the White White Guards, Guards, however, however, were were two two elaborate deception deception operations, operations, codenamed codenamed SINDIKAT SINDIKAT ("Syndicate") (Syndicate) and and TREST TREST elaborate (Trust), both bothof of which which made made imaginative imaginative use use of of agents agentspro~ocateurs.~~ SINDIKAT provocateurs. 52 SINDIKAT ("Trust"), was targeted targeted against against the the man man believed believed to be the the most most dangerous dangerous of of all all the the White White was to be Guards: Boris Savinkov, a former Socialist Boris Savinkov, Socialist Revolutionary terrorist who had served as deputy minister minister of of war war in in the the provisional government government overthrown overthrown in in the the Bolshevik Bolshevik deputy Revolution. Winston Winston Churchill, Churchill, among amongothers, others, was was captivated captivated by by his anti-Bolshevik Revolution. his anti-Bolshevik fervor. and fervor. "When When all all is is said said and and done," done, Churchill Churchill wrote wrote later, later, "and and with with all the the stains stains and tarnishes there be, few more, dared tarnishes there be, few men men tried tried more, more, gave gave more, dared more more and and suffered suffered more more for for the Russian Russian people." people. During During the War of of 1920, 1920, Savinkov was largely the the Russo-Polish Russo-Polish War Savinkov was largely responsible recruiting the People's Army under Polish Polish responsible for for recruiting the Russian Russian Peoples Army which which fought fought under command against the Red Red Army. Army. Early Early in in 1921 he founded founded a a new new organization organization in in command against the 1921 he Warsaw Warsaw dedicated dedicated to to the the overthrow overthrow of of the the Bolshevik Bolshevik regime: regime: the the People's Peoples Union Union for for Defence of Country and Freedom which ran ran an Defence of Country and Freedom (NSZRiS), (NSZRiS), which an agent agent network network inside inside Soviet Russia Russia to to collect collect intelligence intelligence on on the the Bolsheviks Bolsheviks and and plan plan uprisings uprisings against against the the Soviet regime. regime. The The first first stage stage of of the the operation operation against against Savinkov, Savinkov, SINDIKAT-1, SINDIKAT-1,successfully successfully neu neutralized his orga tralized the the NSZRiS NSZRiS agent agent network network with with the the help help of of a a Cheka Cheka mole mole within within his organization. nization. Forty-four Forty-four leading leading members members of of the the NSZRiS NSZRiSwere were paraded paraded at at aashow show trial trial in in Moscow .53 SINDIKAT-2 Moscow in in August August 1921 1921.53 SINDIKAT-2 was was aimed aimed at at luring luringSavinkov Savinkov back back to to Rus Russia show sia to to star star in in a afurther further show trial trial and and complete complete the the demoralization demoralization of of his his emigre Cmigr6 sup supporters. Classified KGB histories head porters. Classified histories give give the the main main credit credit for for the the operation operation to to the the head of OGPU counter-intelligence counter-intelligence department, department, Artur ArturKhristyanovich Khristyanovich Artuzov Artuzov (later (later of the theOGPU head head of of INO), INO), the the Russian Russian son son of of an an immigrant immigrant Swiss-Italian Swiss-Italian cheesemaker, cheesemaker, assisted assisted by Grigori Sergeyevich Though by Andrei Andrei Pavlovich Pavlovich Fyodorov Fyodorov and andGrigori Sergeyevich Syroyezhkin.54 Syroye~hkin.~~ Though provocateurs, however, records fail fail to SINDIKAT-2 made skillful use of SINDIKAT-2 made skillhl use of agents agentsproaocateurs, however, KGB records to

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acknowledge Savinkov's own acknowledge how how much much they they were were assisted assistedby by Savinkovs own increasing increasing tendency tendency to to improbably that fantasize. visit to late in fantasize. During During a a visit to London Londonlate in 1921 1921he he claimed claimed improbably that the thehead head of of the the Russian Russian trade trade delegation delegation had had suggested suggested that that he he join join the the Soviet Soviet government. government. Savinkov also also alleged allegedthat that Lloyd Lloyd George George and and his his family family had had welcomed welcomed him him at at Che CheSavinkov quers by by singing singing "God God Save Save the the Tsar"; Tsar; in in reality, reality, the song was was a hymn sung inWelsh quers the song a hymn sung in Welsh by by a a Welsh Welsh choir choir at at a a pre-Christmas pre-Christmas celebration. celebration. In In July July 1923 1923 Fedorov, Fedorov, posing posing as as a a member of underground, visited member of an an anti-Bolshevik anti-Bolshevik underground, visited Savinkov Savinkov in in Paris, Paris, where where he he had had installed his persuaded him installed his headquarters headquarters after after the the collapse collapse of of the the NSZRiS, and and persuaded him to to send his aide, Sergei Pavlovsky, Pavlovsky, back to Russia with Fedorov Fedorov for for secret secret talks talks send his aide, Colonel Colonel Sergei back to Russia with with the thenon-existent non-existent underground. underground. Once Onceinin Moscow, Pavlovsky Pavlovsky was turned inby by the the with Moscow, was turned in OGPU and used to further talks. talks. O On and used to lure lure Savinkov Savinkov himself himself to to Russia Russia for for further n August August 15 15 Savinkov Savinkov crossed crossed the the Russian Russian border border with with some some of of his his supporters supporters and and walked walked straight straight into Under OGPU interrogation interrogation Savinkov's col into an an OGPU trap. trap. Under Savinkovs resistance resistance swiftly swiftly col27 Savinkov made an his lapsed. lapsed. At a a show show trial trial on on August August 27 Savinkov made an abject abject confession confession of of his counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary sins: sins: I unconditionally unconditionally recognize recognize Soviet Soviet power power and and no no other. other. To To every every Russian Russian who who loves his country country I, I, who entire road heavy loves his who have have traversed traversed the the entire road of of this this bloody, bloody, heavy struggle against you, refuted you else did, did, I tell struggle against you, I who who refbted you as as no no one oneelse tell you you that that if if you you are are a a Russian, Russian, if if you you love love your your people, people, you you will will bow bow down down to to worker-peasant worker-peasant reservation^.^^ power and and recognize recognize it it without without any any reservations.55 power
The deception deception of of Savinkov Savinkov continued continued even even after after he he was was sentenced sentenced to to fifteen fifteen years years in in The jail. He H e failed failed to to realize realize that that his his cellmate, cellmate, V. 1. jail. I. Speransky, Speransky,was wasan an OGPU officer, officer, later later promoted for promoted for his his success success in in gaining gaining Savinkov's Savinkovs confidence confidence and and surreptitiously surreptitiously debriefing him him over over a a period of eight eight months.56 months.56Savinkov Savinkov did did not not long longsurvive survive Sper Sperdebriding period of anskys final final report report on on him. him. KGB fi files appear to to contain contain no no contemporary contemporary record record of of ansky's les appear how he he met met his his death. death. According According to to the the SVR's SVRs implausible implausible current current version version of of events, events, how Savinkov fell or jumped jumped from from an an upper-story upper-story window window after after a a congenial congenial "drinking drinking Savinkov fell or bout with a group of Chekists-despite a heroic attempt to save him by Grigori bout with a group of Chekists"-despite a heroic attempt to save him by Grigori S y r o y e ~ h k i nIt . ~seems ~ I t more more likely likely that that Syroyezhkin Syroyezhkin pushed him to to his his death.58 death.5s Syroyezhkin.57 seems pushed him Even more more successful successful than than SINDIKAT SINDIKAT was was operation operation TREST, TREST, the the cover cover name name Even given to to a a fi fictitious monarchist underground, underground, the theMonarchist Monarchist Association of of Central Central given ctitious monarchist Association Russia (MOR), (MOR), first first invented invented by by Artuzov Artuzov in in 1921 1921and and used used as as the the basis of a a six-year six-year basis of Russia de~eption.~ By 1923 1923 the G P U officer officer Aleksandr Yakushev, posing posing as as a a secret secret deception.59 By the O OGPU Aleksandr Yakushev, MOR member member able able to to travel travel abroad abroad in in his his official official capacity capacity as as a a Soviet Soviet foreign foreign trade trade representative, the confidence representative, had had won won the confidence during during visits visits to to Paris Paris of of both both Grand Grand Duke Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, Nikolayevich, cousin cousin of of the the late late Tsar Tsar Nicholas Nicholas 11, and General Aleksandr Nikolai II, and General Aleksandr Kutepov of of the the [White] [White] Russian Combined Services Services Union Union (ROVS). (ROVS). The The leading Kutepov Russian Combined leading victim of of the the deception, however, was was the the former former SIS agent Sidney Reilly, an an even even victim deception, however, SIS agent Sidney Reilly, greater fantasist fantasist than than Savinkov. Savinkov. Reilly Reillyhad had become become a a tragicomic figure whose whose hold hold on on greater tragicomic figure reality was was increasingly increasingly uncertain. uncertain. According According to to one one of of his his secretaries, secretaries, Eleanor Toye, reality Eleanor Toye, Reilly used to suffer suffer from from severe severe mental mental crises crises amounting amounting to to delusion. Once he "Reilly used to delusion. Once he thought he was Jesus Christ. The OGPU, however, however, failed failed to to grasp grasp that that Reilly Reilly was was thought he was Jesus Christ." The OGPU,

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now now of of little little significance, significance, regarding regarding him him instead instead as as a a British British masterspy masterspy and and one oneof of its its most dangerous 26, 1925 it succeeded in most dangerous opponents. opponents. On O n September September 26,1925 it succeeded in luring luring him, him,like like Savinkov Russian frontier meeting with Savinkov a a year year before, before, across across the the Russian frontier to to a a meeting with bogus bogus MOR conspirators.60 conspirators.6o Reilly's Reillys resistance resistance after after his his arrest arrest did did not not last last much much longer longer than than Savinkov's. Savinkovs. His His KGB file October 30, 30, file contains contains a a letter, letter, probably probably authentic, authentic, to to Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky dated dated October 1925, and American intel 1925, in inwhich which he he promised promised to to reveal reveal all allhe he knew knew about about British British and American intelligence ligence as as well well as as Russian Russian emigres CmigrCs in in the the West. West.Six S i x days days later later Reilly Reilly was was taken taken for for a a walk in in the thewoods woods near near Moscow Moscow and, and, without without warning, warning, shot shot from from behind. behind. According According walk to deep those to an an OGPU report, report, he he "let let out outa a deep breath breath and and fell fell without without a a cry." cry. Among Among those who accompanied him on on his his final final walk walk in in the the woods woods was was Grigori Grigori Syroyezhkin, Syroyezhkin, the the who accompanied him probable assassin assassin of of Savinkov Savinkov a a year year earlier. earlier.Reilly's Reillys corpse was put put on onprivate private display display probable corpse was in the Lubyanka their triumph.61 inthe Lubyanka sickbay sickbay to to allow allow OGPU officers officers to to celebrate celebrate their triumph.61 Appropriately Appropriately for for a a career career in in which which myth myth and and reality reality had had become become inextricably inextricably con confused, that Reilly execution &sed, rumors rumors circulated circulated for for many many years years in in the theWest West that Reilly had had escaped escaped execution and deception was and adopted adopted a a new new identity. identity. The The TREST TRESTdeception was finally finally exposed exposed in in 1927, 1927, to to the Britain, France, France, Poland, the embarrassment embarrassment of of the the intelligence intelligence services services of of Britain, Poland, Finland Finland and been taken and the the Baltic Baltic states states who who had had all, all, in in varying varying degrees, degrees, been taken in in by by it.62 it.62 engaging engaging in in permanent permanent conflict conflict with with counter-revolution, counter-revolution, both both real real and and imagined, imagined, Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence between between the the wars wars also alsobecame became increasingly increasinglysuccessful successful in in penetrating the main penetrating the main imperialist imperialist powers. powers. It had had two two major major operational operational advantages advantages over intelligence agencies. First, while security in Moscow became over Western Western intelligence agencies. First, while security in Moscow became obses obsessional, much Western security remained feeble. Secondly, the Communist parties sional, much Western security remained feeble. Secondly, the Communist parties and in gave ide and their their "fellow fellow travelers" travelers in the theWest West gave Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence a a major major source source of of ideological ological recruits recruits of of which which it it took took increasing increasing advantage. advantage. While INO, the While operation operation TREST was was at at its its height, height, INO, the OGPU's OGPUs foreign foreign intelligence intelligence service, major penetration service. service, succeeded succeededin in making making its its first first major penetration of of the the British British foreign foreign service. The the British The penetration penetration agent agent was was an an Italian Italian messenger messenger in in the British embassy embassy in in Rome, Rome, Francesco 1924 by Francesco Constantini Constantini (codenamed (codenamed DUNCAN), DUNCAN), who who was was recruited recruited in in 1924 by the the OGPU residency residency with with the thehelp help of of an an Italian Communist, Alfredo Alfred0 Allegretti, who had Italian Communist, Allegretti, who had worked embassy clerk clerk before worked as as a a Russian Russian embassy before the the Revolution. Revolution. Despite Despite his his lowly lowly status, status, Constantini had had access access to to aaremarkable remarkable range range of of diplomatic diplomatic secrets.63 secrets.63 Until the theSecond Second Constantini Until World World War, War, the the Foreign Foreign Office Office did did not not possess possess a a single single security security officer, officer, let let alone alone a a security embassies was remarkably lax.lax. In Rome, security department. department. Security Security in in many many British British embassies was remarkably In Rome, according according to to Sir Sir Andrew Andrew Noble, Noble, who who was was stationed stationed at at the theembassy embassy in in the the mid-1930s, mid-l930s, it was "virtually non-existent." Embassy servants had access to the keys to boxes it was virtually non-existent. Embassy servants had access to the keys to red red boxes and classified documents, num and filing filing cabinets cabinets containing containing classified documents, as as well well as-probably-the as-probably-the number embassy safe. copies of diplo ber of of the the combination combination lock lock on on the the embassy safe. Even Even when when two two copies of a a diplomatic missing in British diplomats matic cipher cipher were were missing in 1925, 1925, it it did did not not occur occur to to British diplomats that that they they might Constantini-as 64 might have have been been removed removedby by Constantini-as they they almost almost certainly certainly were. were.64 For a decade For more more than than a decade Francesco Francesco Constantini Constantini handed handed over over a a great great variety variety of of diplomatic diplomatic documents documents and and cipher cipher material. material. Probably Probably from from an an early early stage stage he he also also involved embassy servant, the theft theft of of involved his his brother, brother, Secondo, Secondo, who who worked worked as as an an embassy servant, in in the
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documents. documents. In In addition addition to to despatches despatches on on Anglo-Italian Anglo-Italian relations relations exchanged exchanged between between London and Rome "confiden London andthe the Rome embassy, embassy, Constantini Constantini was was often often able able to to supply supply the the confidential British missions tial print" print of of selected selected documents documents from from the the Foreign Foreign Office Office and and major major British missions designed designed to to give give ambassadors ambassadors an an overview overview of of current current foreign foreign policy.65 policy.65By By January January 1925 was pages of classified material a week. Constan 1925 he he was providing, providing, on on average, average, 150 150 pages of classified material a week. Constantini "He tini made made no no secret secret of of his his motives. motives. The The Rome Rome residency residency reported reported to to the theCentre, Centre, He collaborates collaborates with with us us exclusively exclusively for for money, money, and and does does not not conceal conceal the the fact. fact. He H e has has set set himself the the goal goal of of becoming becoming a a rich rich man, man, and and that thatis is what what he hestrives strives for." for. In In 1925 1925 the the himself Centre most valuable agent. Convinced vast, nonex Centre pronounced pronounced Constantini Constantini its its most valuable agent. Convinced of of a a vast, nonexistent British istent British plot plot to to destroy destroy the the Soviet Soviet state, state, it it counted counted on on agent agent DUNCAN to to pro provide vide early early warning warning of of a a British British attack, attack, and and instructed instructed the the Rome Rome residency: residency: England England is is now now the the organizing organizing force force behind behind a aprobable probable attack attack on on the the USSR in in the the near near future. future. A continuous continuous hostile hostile cordon cordon [of [of states] states] is is being being formed formed against against us Persia, China we us in in the theWest. West. In In the the East, East,inin Persia, Mghanistan Afghanistan and and China we observe observe a a sim similar ilar picture picture .. .. .. Your Your task task (and (and consider consider it it a a priority) priority) is is to to provide provide documentary documentary and and agent agent materials materials which which reveal reveal the the details details of of the the English English plan. plan. The ected in The Rome Rome residency's residencys pride pride in in running running the the OGPU's OGPUsleading leading agent agent is is refl reflected in its its flattering flattering descriptions descriptions of of him. him. Constantini Constantini was was said said to to have have the the face face of of "an an ancient ancient Roman," and be By Roman, andto to be known known to to his his many many female female admirers admirers as as "the the handsome handsome one."66 one.66 1928 OGPU suspected also 1928 the the suspected him-accurately-of him-accurately-of also supplying supplying documents documents to to Italian Italian intelligence. Despite suspicions suspicions about intelligence. Despite about Constantini's Constantinis honesty, honesty, however, however, there there was was no no mistaking mistaking the the importance importance of of the the material material he he supplied. supplied. Maksim Maksim Litvinov, Litvinov, who who by by the the late 1920s was the People's late 1920s was the the dominating dominating figure figure in in the Peoples Commissariat Commissariat for for Foreign Foreign Affairs, pronounced pronounced it it "of of great great use to me."67 me.67 Affairs, use to
\

successful penetration penetration of of the the British British foreign foreign service service was successful was overover shadowed in 1927 1927by by an an embarrassing embarrassing series series of of well-publicized well-publicized intelligence intelligence failures. failures. shadowed in The security security of of the the rapidly rapidly expanding expanding foreign foreign network network of of OGPU and andFourth The Fourth Department (Military (Military Intelligence) residencies residencies was was threatened threatened by by the the vulnerability vulnerability of of Department Intelligence) early Soviet Soviet cipher cipher systems systems to to Western Western cryptanalysts, cryptanalysts, by by the the inexperience inexperience of of some some of of early I N 0 officers, officers, and by errors in the theselection and training trainingof of for forthe first generation of ofINO eign Communists Communists as as agents. agents. The The International International Liaison Liaison Department Department (OMS) (OMS) of the the eign Communist International provided a ready pool of enthusiastic volunteers for Soviet Communist International provided a ready pool of enthusiastic volunteers for Soviet German Richard Sorge, intelligence operations. Some, such as the German Sorge, were to be numnum bered among among the the greatest greatest spies of the the century. century. Others Others ignored ignored orthodox orthodox tradecraft tradecraft bered spies of and neglected neglected standard standard security security procedures. procedures. and In the the spring spring of of 1927 1927 there there were were dramatic dramatic revelations revelations of of Soviet Soviet espionage espionage in in eight eight In different countries. countries. In In March March a major OGPU spy spy ring ring was was uncovered uncovered in in Poland; Poland; a a different a major Soviet trade trade official officialwas arrested for for espionage espionage in in Turkey; Turkey; and and the the Swiss Swiss police police Soviet was arrested on the Soviet consulate consulate spies. announced the arrest oftwo Russian spies. In April a police raid on uncovereda mass of incriminating intelligence intelligence documents; in Beijing uncovered documents; and the French Sfiretk, arrested spyring in Paris run by Jean Cremet, Crkmet, a leading Surete, arrested members of a Soviet Soviet spy

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French French Communist. Communist. In In May May Austrian Austrian foreign foreign ministry ministry officirus officialswere were found found passing passing classified OGPU classifiedinformation informationto tothe the OGPUresidency, residency,and andthe the British BritishHome HomeSecretary Secretaryindig indignantly of discovery nantlyannounced announcedto to the theHouse House ofCommons Commons the the discoveryof of"one oneof ofthe the most most com complete systems that has been meet."68 pleteand and one oneof ofthe the most most nefarious nefariousspy spy systems that itit hasever ever beenmy mylot lot to to meet.68 Following Followingthis this last last discovery, discovery,Britain-still Britain-still regarded regarded in in the the Soviet SovietUnion Union as as the the leading leadingworld world power power and and its its most most dangerous dangerous enemy-formally enemy-formally broke broke off off diplomatic diplomatic relations, Cornmolls decrypted relations, and and senior senior ministers ministers read read out out to to the the Commons decrypted extracts extracts from from intercepted the security intercepted Soviet Soviet telegrams. telegrams. To To tighten tightenthe security of of Soviet Soviet diplomatic diplomatic and and OG PU communications OGPU communications after after the the dramatic dramatic revelation revelation of of British British cociebreaking codebreaking suc successes, was cesses, the the laborious laborious but but virtually virtually unbreakable unbreakable "one-time one-time pad" pad cipher cipher system system was introduced. introduced. As As a aresult, result,Western Western cryptanalysts cryptanalystswere wereable ableto todecrypt decrypt almost almost no no further further high-grade high-grade Soviet Sovietcommunications communications until until after after the the Second SecondWorld World War.69 War.69
T OST W O M E TH HE E M MOST WO OR RRYS RYS O M E as

927 as well well as as the the most most plentiful plentiful foreign foreign intelligence intelligence in in 1 1927

concerned concernedJapan. Japan. Since Since 1925 1925INO I N 0had had been been able ableto to intercept intercept the the secret secret communica communications tions of ofboth bothJapan's Japans military militarymission mission and and its its consulate-general consulate-generalin in the thenortheast northeast Chi Chinese nese city city of of Harbin. Harbin. Remarkably, Remarkably, instead instead of of using using diplomatic diplomatic bags bags and and their their own own couriers, official representatives in couriers,Japanese Japanese official representatives in Harbin Harbincorresponded correspondedwith with Tokyo Tokyovia via the the Chinese The OGPU to Chinesepostal postalservice. service.The OGPUrecruited recruitedthe the Chinese Chinese employees employeeswho whowere wereused used to take despatches Harbin post takeJapanese Japanese official official despatchesto to the the Harbin postoffice, office,and and sent sent expert expertteams teamsoflet of letter-openers ter-openers to to examine examineand and photograph photograph the the despatches, despatches,before before sending sendingthem them on on their their way way in in new new envelopes envelopeswith with copies copies of ofJapanese Japanese seals. seals.Professor ProfessorMatsokin, Matsokin, a aJapanese Japanese specialist was employed by peruse specialistfrom from Moscow,7o Moscow,70 was employed by INO I N 0 in in Harbin Harbinto to peruse the the despatches despatches and and send sendtranslations translationsof of the the most most important important promptly promptly to to the the Centre. Centre.There There was was ample ample evidence intercepts the evidencein in the the interceptsforwarded forwardedto to Moscow Moscowof of designs designsby by theJapanese Japanese military militaryon on China China and and the the Soviet SovietFar Far East. East. But But the themost most tr()ubling troubling document, document, intercepted intercepted in inJuly July
1927, 1927,was was a asecret secretmemorandum memorandum written written by by Baron Baron Gi-ishi Gi-ishi Tanaka, Tanaka,the theJapanese Japanese prime prime

minister minister and and foreign foreignminister, minister,which which advocated advocated the the conquest conquest of of Manchuria Manchuria and and Mon Mongolia golia as as a aprelude preludeto toJapanese Japanese domination domination over over the the whole whole of of China, China, and and predicted predicted that that Japan have to with Japan "would wouldonce once again again have to cross crossswords swords with Russia."71 Ru~sia.~ A A second second copy copyof ofthe the memorandum mem.orandumwas was obtained obtained in in Japanese-occupied Japanese-occupied Korea Koreaby by the the residency residencyat at Seoul, Seoul,headed headed by by Ivan Ivan Andreevich Andreevich Chichayev Chichayev(later (later wartime wartime resident resident in in London). London). A AJapanese Japanese interpreter, interpreter,codenamed codenamedANO, ANO,recruited recruitedby by the the INO I N 0 residency, residency, succeeded succeededin in extracting extractingthe the document, document, along along with with other other secret secret material, material,from fromthe the safe safe of police chief of the of the the Japanese Japanesepolice chief in in Seoul.72 A A copy copyof the Tanaka Tanaka memorandum memorandum was was later later leaked leakedby by INO I N 0 to to the theAmerican American press press to to give give the the impression impression that that itithad had been been obtained obtained by As As recently recently as as 1997 1997 an an SVR SVR official official his hisby an an agent agent working working for for the the United United States.73 States.73 tory tory continued continued to to celebrate celebrate the the simultaneous simultaneous acquisition acquisition of of the the memorandum memorandum in in Though the Though somewhat somewhatexaggerated, exaggerated,this thisjudgment judgment accurately accuratelyreflects reflects the enormous enormousimpor importance discovery tance attached attached at at the thetime time to to the the discoveryof ofTanaka's Tanakas prediction prediction of ofwar war with with Russia. Russia. The The acute acute anxiety anxiety in in Moscow Moscow caused caused by by the the breach breach of of diplomatic diplomatic relations relations with with Britain Britain and and the the apparent apparent threat threat from fromJapan Japan was was clearly clearlyreflected reflected in in an an alarmist alarmist article article by by Stalin, Stalin, published published a a few few days daysafter after he he received received the the Tana Tanaka memorandum: memorandum:

Harbin Harbin and and Seoul Seoul as as "an an absolutely absolutely unique unique occurrence occurrence in in intelligence ,intelligenceoperations."74 operation~.~

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open open to to doubt doubt that that the the chief chief contemporary contemporary question question is is that that of of the the threat threat of of a a new new imperialist imperialist war. war. It It is is not not a a question question of of some some indefinite indefinite and and immaterial immaterial "danger" dangerof of aanew new war. war. It I t is is a a matter matterof of a a real real and and material material threat threat of of a new war in general, and war against the USSR in particular.75 a new war in general, and war against the USSR in ~articular.~

The Constantini had had failed The fact fact that that Constantini failed to to provide provide anything anything remotely remotely resembling resembling a a British lead British version version of of the the Tanaka Tanaka memorandum memorandum did didnot not lead either either Stalin Stalin or or the the conspir conspiracy toto conclude acy theorists theorists of of the theCentre Centre conclude that that Britain Britain had had no no plans plans to to attack attack the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. They They believed believed instead instead that that greater greater efforts efforts were were required required to to penetrate penetrate the the secret warmongers. secret councils councils of of the the Western Western warmongers. Stalin, Stalin, who who had had emerged emerged as as the the clear clear vic victor tor in in the the three-year three-year power power struggle struggle which which followed followed Lenin's Lenins death, death, demanded demanded more more intelligence intelligence on on the the(mostly (mostly imaginary) imaginary) Western Western plots plots against against the the Soviet Soviet Union Union which which he he was was sure sure existed. existed. In In an an effort effort to to make make Soviet Soviet espionage espionage less less detectable detectable and and more more deniable, deniable, the the main main responsibility responsibility for for intelligence intelligence collection collection was was shifted shifted from from "legal" legalto to "illegal" illegalresiden residencies, cies,which which operated operated independently independently of of Soviet Soviet diplomatic diplomatic and and trade trade missions. missions. In In later later years years the the establishment establishment of of a a new new illegal illegal residency residency became became an an immensely immensely time timeconsuming consuming operation operation which which involved involved years years of of detailed detailed training training and and the the painstaking painstaking construction construction of of "legends" legendsto to give give the the illegals illegals false falseidentities. identities. The The largely largely improvised improvised attempt expand attempt to to expand the the illegal illegal network network rapidly rapidly in in the thelate late 1920s 1920s and and early early 1930s, 1930s,with without the detailed preparation which later became mandatory, brought into OGPU out the detailed preparation which later became mandatory, brought into O G P U foreign foreign operations operations both both unconventional unconventional talent talent and and aanumber number of of confidence confidence tricksters. tricksters. Among that the ille Among the thesecret secret scandals scandalsdiscovered discovered by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin in inKGB KGB files fileswas was that of of the illegal with the Austrian gal residency residency established established in in Berlin Berlin in in 1927 1927 with the Austrian Bertold Bertold Karl Karl Ilk Ilk as as res resident and Moritz Weinstein as his deputy. A later investigation concluded that ident and Moritz Weinstein as his deputy. later investigation concluded that the the Centre Centre should should have have noted noted the the "suspicious suspicious speed" speedwith with which which the the Ilk-Weinstein Ilk-Weinstein resi residency dency claimed claimed to to be be expanding expanding its its agent agent network. network. Within Within two two months months it itwas was report reporting ing operations operations in in Britain, Britain, France France and and Poland Poland as as well well as as in in Germany. Germany. Ilk Ilk refused refused to to provide more than sketchy information on his agents' identity on security grounds. provide more than sketchy information on his agents identity on security grounds. His Centre, His failure failure to to supply supply detailed detailed biographies biographies was was reluctantly reluctantly accepted accepted by by the the Centre, which which was was still still reeling reeling from from the the widespread widespread unmasking unmasking of of OGPU OGPU networks networks in in the the spring that spring of of 1927. 1927.It gradually graduallybecame became clear, clear, however, however, that the thecore core of of the the Ilk-Weinstein Ilk-Weinstein illegal illegal network network consisted consisted of of their their own own relatives relatives and and that that some some elements elements of of it it were were pure pure invention. Its agent operations in Britain and France were discovered to be "plain invention. Its agent operations in Britain and France were discovered to be plain bluff," of bluff,though though an aneffective effectiveway way of obtaining obtaining funds funds from from the the Centre Centrefor for Ilk Ilk and and Wein Weinstein. stein. The The network network in in Germany Germany and and Poland, Poland, while while not not wholly wholly fictitious, fictitious, was was under under surveillance surveillance by by the the local local police police and and security security services. services. The The Centre Centre closed closed down down the the entire entire residency residency in in 1933, 1933, though though without without attracting attractingthe thepublicity publicity occasioned occasioned by by the the intelligence 927.76 intelligence failures failures of of1 1927.76
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on on the theevolution evolution of of the theOGPU OGPU and and its its successors successorsduring during the the Stalinist Stalinist era era was was the the change change in in the thenature nature of of the the Soviet Soviet state. state. Much Much of of what what was was later later

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called "Stalinism" Stalinismwas was in in reality reality the the creation creation of of Lenin: Lenin: the thenIlt cult qf o f the the infalliple infallible.leader, called leadr, the one-party one-party state state and and a a huge huge security security service service with with a a ubiquitous ubiquitous system system of of surveil surveilthe of concentration camps regimes opponents. But lance and aanetwork of camps to terrorize the regime's Lenins one-party one-party state left leftroom for comradely debate within the the ruling ruling while Lenin's party, Stalin to stifle Stalin used used the the OGPU OGPU to stifle that that debate, debate, enforce enforce his his own own narrow narrow orthodoxy orthodoxy and and pursue vendettas vendettas against against opponents both real real and and imagined. The most vicious and and pursue opponents both imagined. The most vicious long-lasting of of those those vendettas vendettas was was against against Leon Leon Trotsky, Trotsky, Lenin's Lenins former Commissar Commissar long-lasting former for War. In early stages stages at at least, least, the OGPUscampaign campaign against against Trotsky Trotsky and and his supportIn its its early the OGPU's his support ers was wascharacterized characterized by by a a bizarre bizarre combination combination of of brutality brutality and and farce. farce. When When Trotsky Trotsky ers rehsed to to recant recant and and admit admit his his "crimes against the the Party," Party, he he was was sent sent into into internal internal refused crimes against exile at Alma-Ata, a town in a a remote corner of Kazakhstan Kazakhstan on on the the Chinese Chineseborder. border. exile The OGPU which came came to to his his Moscow flat Of} on the the,,morning of January January , .9tl]..ing of The OGPU detachment detachment which Moscow flat 17, 1928 1928 to to take take him him into into exile exile found found Trotsky Trotsky still still in in his his pajamas. refused 17, pajamas. When When he he refused to to come come out, out, the theOGPU broke broke down down the the door. door. Trotsky Trotsky was was surprised surprised to to recognize recognize the the officer leading leading the the detachment detachment as as one one of of his his former former bodyguards bodyguards from from the the civil civil war. war. officer Overcome with with emotion emotion at at the thesight of the the ex-Commissar for War, War, the the officer officer broke broke Overcome sight of ex-Commissar for down and and sobbed, Shoot me, me, Comrade Trotsky, shoot me. Trotsky Trotsky calmed down sobbed, "Shoot Comrade Trotsky, shoot me." calmed him him down, reprehensible, and down, told told him him it it was was his his duty duty to to obey obey orders orders however however reprehensible, and adopted adopted a a posture passive resistance resistance while on his posture of ofpassive while the the OGPU removed removed his his pajamas, pajamas, put put on his clothes himtoto the Trans-Siberian clothes and and carried carried him him to to aa car car waiting waiting to to transport transport him the Trans-Siberian Express.77 77 Express. Save time in Save for for a a few few hunting hunting trips, trips, Trotsky Trotsky spent spent most most of of his his time in Alma-Ata Alma-Ata at at his his desk. Between April April and and October he sent sent his his supporters about 550 telegrams desk. Between October 1928 1928 he supporters about 550 telegrams and 800 political letters, of them them lengthy lengthy polemical polemical tracts. tracts. During the same same and 800 "political letters," some some of During the period he he received received 700 telegrams telegrams and and 1,000 1,000 letters letters from from various various parts parts of of the the Soviet Soviet period Union, butbelieved believed that that at atleast least as as many many more more had had been en route.78 Every Union, but been confiscated confiscated en route.78 Every item in in Trotsky's Trotskys intercepted intercepted correspondence correspondence was was carefully carefullynoted noted by by the the OGPU, OGPU, and and item monthly digests digests of of them them were were sent sent both both to Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Rudolfovich Menzhinsky monthly to Vyacheslav Menzhinsky (Dzerzhinskys successor) successor) and and to to S t a l i r ~ Stalin, Stalin, . ~ ~ who who never never failed to overreact overreact to to (Dzerzhinsky's Stalin.79 failed to opposition, cannot but have been unfavorably impressed by letters which regularly opposition, cannot but have been unfavorably impressed by letters which regularly described him him and and his his supporters supporters as as "degenerates." degenerates. described reports on on Trotsky Trotsky and and his his followers followers were written, in ,tone selfOGPU reports were written, inaa .. one of of self righteous outrage. outrage. No counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary group group since the October October Revolution, Revolution, it it righteous since the declared, and defiantly" as the Trotskyists. declared, had had dared dared to to behave behave "as as insolently, insolently, boldly boldly and defiantly as the Trotskyists. Even when when brought brought in for interrogation, interrogation, Trotsky's Trotskys supporters supporters refused refused to to be be intimiEven in for intimi dated by by their their interrogators. interrogators. Most Most declined declined to to reply reply to to questions. questions. Instead they sub subdated Instead they mitted impudent impudent written written protests, protests, such such as: as: "I I consider consider the the struggle struggle I am am engaged engaged in in mitted to Commission, shall explain explain myself myself to to the the Central CentralControl Control Commission, not not to be be a a Party Party matter. matter. I shall 1928 the the OGPU carried carried out out its its first first mass mass arrests of Trotto the the OGPU." OGPU. Early Early in in 1928 to arrests of Trot skyists, theminin Moscow's prison. The skyists, incarcerating incarcerating several several hundred hundred of of them Moscows utyrka Butyrka prison. The Butyrka, descended into Butyrka, however, however, had had not not yet yet descended into the thebrutal brutal squalor squalor for for which which it it became became infamous during during the the Great GreatTerror Terror a a decade decade later, later, nor nor had had the the spirit spiritofTrots1... of Trotskys folinfamous '}" s fol lowers been been broken. broken. On O n their their first first night night in in prison prison the the Trotskyists Trotskyists staged staged a riot,kickkicklowers a riot,

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chantingpolitically incorrect slogans. "Such," Such, ing down doors, breaking windows and chanting reported the the OGPU indignantly, indignantly, "was was the the behavior behavior of of the the embittered embittered enemies enemies of of the the reported Party Soviet power."80 Party and and Soviet power.8o The The liquidation liquidation of of the theTrotskyist Trotskyist heresy heresy and and the the maintenance maintenance of of ideological ideological ortho orthoCommunist required, in Stalin's Stalinsview, Trotskys doxy withinthe the Communist one-party state required, view, Trotsky's removal from from the the Soviet Union. In February 1929 1929 the the great great heretic heretic was was deported to removal Soviet Union. In February deported to dollars by OGPU escort enable him him to "settle abroad."81 Turkey and and given given 1,500 1,500 dollars by an an OGPU escort to to enable tosettle abroad. Turkey With ofOGPU destabilization With Trotsky Trotsky out out of of the the country, country, the the tone tone of OGPU reports reports on on the the destabilization and and liquidation liquidation of of his his rapidly rapidly dwindling dwindling band band of of increasingly increasingly demoralized demoralized followers followers became more confident. According According to to one a massive massive retreat retreat from from Trotskyism Trotskylsm became more confident. one report, report, "a began in in the the second second half half of of 1929." 1929. Some of those those who who recanted recanted were were turned turned into began Some of into OGPU agents agents to to inform inform on on their their friends. friends. The The same same report report boasts boasts of of the the subtlety subtlety of of the the methods used used to to undermine undermine the the credibility credibility of of the the "counter-revolutionary" counter-revolutionaryhard hard core. core. methods Individual Trotskyists Trotskylsts were were summoned to OGPU offices offkes from from their their workplaces, workplaces, left left Individual summoned to standing around around in in the the corridors corridors for for several several hours, hours, then then released released without without explanation. explanation. standing O n returning returning to to work work they they could could give give no no credible credible account account of of what what had had happened. On happened. When the the process process was was repeated repeated their their workmates workmates became increasingly suspicious suspicious and and When became increasingly tended to to believe believe rumors rumors planted planted by by the the OGPU that that they they were were employed employedby bythem them as as tended informers. Once counter-revolutionaries were were discredited, discredited, they they were were then then informers. Oncethe the "counter-revolutionaries" arrested for for their their political political crimes.82 crimes.82 arrested Stdin, however, was wasfar farfrom from reassured. e increasingly increasingly regretted regretted the the decision to Stalin, however, reassured. H He decision to send Trotsky Trotsky abroad abroad rather than keep keep him inthe theSoviet Union, where he could have send rather than him in Soviet Union, where he could have been put put under underconstant constant surveillance. One episode only months after after Trotsky Trotsky was been surveillance. One episode only six six months was sent exile seems seems to to have have made made a a particular particular impression impression on on Stalin. Stalin. In In the the summer summer sent into into exile of 1929 1929Trotsky Trotsky received received a a secret secret visit visit from from a a sympathizer sympathizer within within the the OGPU, OGPU, Yakov of Yakov Socialist Revolutionary in the the Cheka Chekain in 1918, Blyumkin. As a young and impetuous Socialist 1918, Blyumkin had had assassinated assassinated the the German ambassador in in defiance defiance of of orders orders from from Blyumkin German ambassador Dzerzhinsky. With With Trotsky's Trotskys help, help, however, however, he he had had been been rehabilitated rehabilitated and and had had risen risen Dzerzhinsky. to become become chief chief illegal illegal resident resident in in the the Middle Middle East. East.Blyumkin Blyumkin agreed agreed to to transmit transmit a a to of his most important former supporters, message from Trotsky to Karl Radek, one of to of communication with what COand to try try to set up lines of what Trotsky termed his "co thinkers in in the theSoviet Soviet Union.83 Union.83Trilisser, Trilisser, the the head head of of foreign intelligence, was probathinkers" foreign intelligence, was proba bly alerted alerted to to Blyumkin's Blyumkins visit visit by by an an OGPU agent agent in in Trotsky's Trotskys entourage. entourage. He did not, not, bly He did however, order Blyumkin's Blyumkins immediate arrest. Instead he he arranged an early version of of however, what later later became known as as a a honey Trilisser instructed an attractive what became known "honey trap. trap." Trilisser instructed an attractive OGPU agent, Yelizaveta YelizavetaYulyevna Yulyevna Gorskaya (better (better known known as as "Lisa," Lisa,or or "Vixen"),84 Vixen),84 to abanagent, Gorskaya to "aban don bourgeois bourgeois prejudices," prejudices,seduce seduce Blyumkin, Blyumkin, discover discover the the full fill extent extent of of his his collabora collaboradon tion with with Trotsky, and ensure his return to to the the Soviet Soviet Union. Once lured back to Moscow, Blyumkin was interrogated, interrogated, tried in secret secret and and shot. shot. According According to to the thelater later Moscow, Blyumkin was tried in OGPU defector Aleksandr Mikhailovich Orlov, Blyumkins Blyumkin's last words before his execution were, were, Long live Trotsky!" Trotsky! Soon Soon afterwards afterwards Lisa Gorskaya married married the the execution "Long live ((Lisa" Gorskaya OGPU resident in Berlin (and later in New NewYork), York), Vasili Mikhailovich Zarubin.85 Zarubin. increasingly preoccupied during the the early 1930s the oppo oppoAs Stalin became increasingly 1930s with the sition to him within the the Communist Communist Party, he began to fear that there were other,

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Blyumkins within IN INO. notyet been targeted undiscovered Blyumkins O. But Trotsky himself had not assassination. The main enemies the people Soviet Union were for assassination. "enemies of tbe people" outside the Soviet still considered considered to be the White Guards. General GeneralKutepov, Kutepov, the head of the ROVS ROVS in still Paris, was was brave, brave,upright, upright, teetotal, teetotal, politically politically naive naive and and an an easy easy target target for for the the OGPU. OGPU. Paris, was skillfblly Soviet agents, and agents provocateurs His entourage was skillfully penetrated by Soviet provocateurs brought him optimistic brought him optimistic news news of of a a nonexistent nonexistent anti-Bolshevik anti-Bolshevik underground. underground. "Great Great movements are are spreading spreading across acrossRussia! Kutepov declared declared in in November November 1929. 1929. movements Russia!" Kutepov Never have have so so many many people people come come from from 'over over there' there to to see see me me and and ask ask me me to to collabo collabo"Never rate with with their clandestine organizations." organizations. Unlike Unlike Savinkov Savinkov and and Reilly, Reilly,however, rate their clandestine however, Kutepov resisted resisted attempts attempts to lure him back to to Russia Russia for for meetings meetings with with the bogus Kutepov to lure him back the bogus anti-Communist conspirators. With OGPU thus decided to anti-Communist conspirators. With Stalin's Stalins approval, approval, the the OGPU thus decided to himback for interrogation and execution in Moscow.86 Moscow.86 kidnap him instead and bring him Overall planning thethe Kutepov Kutepov operation operation was wasgiven to Yakov Yakov Isaakovich Isaakovich Overall planningof of given to (Yasha)Serebryansky, Serebryansky, head of of the the euphemistically euphemistically titled titled "Administration Administration for for Spe Spe("Yasha") head Before parcial Tasks."87 Before the Second Second World War, the administration administration functioned functioned as a par allel theCentre Centre with special allel foreign foreign intelligence intelligence service, service, reporting reporting directly directly to to the with special responsibility for for sabotage, abduction and and assassination assassination operations operations on on foreign foreign soil. 88 responsibility sabotage, abduction Serebryansky later later became became a a severe severe embarrassment embarrassment to to official official historians historians anxious anxious to Serebryansky to distance Soviet foreign intelligence intelligence from from the the blood-letting blood-letting of the late distance Soviet foreign of the late 1930s 1930s and and porpor tray it it as as a victim rather rather than than a a perpetrator of the the Great Great Terror. Terror. An SVR-sponsored tray a victim perpetrator of An SVR-sponsored history published published in in 1993 1993 claimed that Serebryansky Serebryansky was was not not a a regular regular member history claimed that member of of State Security," Security, but but only only brought broughtin files show show that, that,on the State in for for special special jobs."89 KGB files on the contrary, contrary, he he was was a a senior senior OGPU officer officer whose whose Administration Administration for for SpecialTasks Special Tasks grew grew into an klite service, more than 200-strong, dedicated to hunting down enemies elite service, enemies of the people people" on on both sides of of the Atlantic. 90 the bothsides theAtlantic. Detailed thekidnaping kidnaping of Detailed preparations preparations for for the of Kutepov Kutepov were were entrusted entrusted by by SerebryanSerebryan sky had taken in the thedeception sky to to his his illegal illegal Paris Paris resident, resident, V. I. Speransky, Speransky, who who had taken part part in deception of Savinkov Savinkov six years On the morning Sunday, January 26, 1930 Kutepov Kutepov of years earlier.91 earlier.91 O n the morning of of Sunday, January 26,1930 was bundled into a taxi in the middle of a street in Pariss fashionable was bundled into a taxi in the middle of a street in Pru:is's fa,hi9nable seventh sev<.:!nth Standing nearby nearby was was a a Communist Communist Paris Paris policeman policeman who who had had been been arrondissement. Standing asked to to assist assist by by Speransky Speransky so so that any bystander bystander who saw the the kidnaping kidnaping (one (one did) did) asked that any who saw would mistake mistake it it for for a a police police arrest. arrest. Though Though the the Centre Centre commended commended the the kidnaping kidnaping would as a a brilliant operation, operation," the chloroform used to overpower Kutepov proved too much e died much for for the the generals general's weak weak heart. heart. H He died aboard aboard a a Soviet,steamer Soviet stamr while whil bejng be,ing taken taken back to to Russia.92 Russia.92 back The important precedent. early and Kutepov operation operation was was to to set set an an important precedent. In In the the early and midmidThe Kutepov 1930s 1930s the the chief chief Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence intelligence priority priority remained remained intelligence intelligence collection. collection. During the later years years of of the the decade, decade, however, however, all other operations operations were were to to be be suborsubor During thelater allother dinated tasks. dinated to to special special tasks."

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n January 1930 the body of of both both the and On January 30, 30,1930 the Politburo Politburo (effectively (effectively the the ruling ruling body the Party Party and the Soviet Soviet Union) Union) met met to to review review INO I N 0 operations operations and and ordered ordered it to increase intellithe it to increase intelli gence three target Britain, France Germany (the (the leading leading gence collection collection in in three target areas: areas: Britain, France and and Germany European Poland, Romania, Finland European powers); powers); the the Soviet Soviet Union's Unions western western neighbors, neighbors, Poland, Romania, Finland and Japan, its The United States, which and the the Baltic Baltic states; states; and and Japan, its main main Asian Asian rivaU rival. The United States, which established Union only only in in 1933, 1933, was not menmen established diplomatic diplomatic relations relations with with the the Soviet Soviet Union was not tioned. Though Though the the first first Soviet Soviet illegal illegal had had been been sent sent across the Atlantic Atlantic as early as tioned. across the as early as 1921,2 American intelligence 1921; the the USA's USAs relative relative isolation isolation from from world world affairs affairs made made American intelligence collection secondary priority. collection still still a a secondary p r i ~ r i t3 y.~ On expansion of of I INO operations was was achieved achieved O n Politburo Politburo instructions, instructions, the the main main expansion N 0 operations through increasing the each with with up up to to seven seven (in (in a few through increasing the number number of of illegal illegal residencies, residencies, each a few cases as many as nine) in Britain and France France legal legal cases as many as nine) illegal illegal officers. officers. By contrast, contrast, even even in Britain and residencies operating under diplomatic cover embassies had had three officers at at residencies operating underdiplomatic cover in in Soviet Soviet embassies threeofficers most Their main to provide provide channels channels of of comcom most and and sometimes sometimes only only one. one. Their main function hnction was was to munications the Centre and other technical for the highly munications with withthe Centre andother technical support support for the more more highly regarded illegals.4 the 1920s both legal illegal residencies residencies had had had had the the regarded illegal^.^ During During the 1920s both legal and and illegal right to to decide decide what what agents to recruit recruit and how to to recruit them. O n succeeding right agents to and how recruit them. On succeeding Trilisser as as head head of I N 0 in in1930, however, Artur Artur Artuzov, the Trilisser INO 1930, however, Artuzov, the the hero hero of of the SINDIKAT and and TREST TREST operations, complained that that the existing agent SINDIKAT operations, complained the existing agent network network contained agent recruitment recruitment required required contained "undesirable undesirable elements." elements.He H e decreed decreed that that future fbture agent the authorization authorization of of the the Centre. Centre. Partly Partly because of problems the because of problems of of communication, communication, his his instructions out.5 instructions were were not not always always carried carried out. The in the history of of Soviet foreign The early early and and mid-1930s mid-1930s were were to to be be remembered remembered in the history Soviet foreign intelligence as the the era era of of the the "Great GreatIllegals," Illegals, a a diverse diverse group intelligence as group of of remarkably remarkably talented talented individuals recruitment and individuals who who collectively collectively transformed transformed OGPU agent agent recruitment and intelligence intelligence collection. Post-war Post-war illegals illegals had had to toendure endure long long training trainingperiods collection. periods designed designed to to establish establish their bogus bogus identities, protect their their cover cover and and prepare prepare them their identities, protect them for for operations operations in in the the West. predecessors were weresuccessful successful partly because they they had had greater West. Their Their pre-war pre-war predecessors partly because greater freedom from from bureaucratic bureaucratic routine routine and and more more opportunity opportunity to use their their own initiative. freedom to use own initiative. tocontend contend with theirsuccessors. stanBut they also had to with far softer targets than their successors. By the stan dards of the Cold ColdWar, most inter-war inter-war Western security systems were primitive. The the Great GreatIllegals Illegals combined with the the relative vulnerability of individual flair of the of their

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targets a much times even targets to to give give some some of of their their operations operations a much more more unorthodox, unorthodox, at at times even eccentric, eccentric, character character than than those those of of the the Cold Cold War. War. Some of ablest of Great Illegals Illegals were were not not Russians Russians at at all, all, but but cosmopoliSome of the the ablest of the the Great cosmopoli tan, multilingual multilingual Central Central Europeans Europeans who who ha.d h d worked worked in in the Comintern undertan, the Comintern under ground before before joining joining the and shared shared a a visionary visionary faith faith in in the ground the OGPU and the Communist Communist millennium.6 chief millennium.6Arnold Arnold Deutsch, Deutsch,the the chief recruiter recruiter of of students students and and young young graduates graduates at at Cambridge most sucsuc Cambridge University University (discussed (discussed in in chapter chapter 4), was was an an Austrian Austrian Jew. Jew. The The most cessful of Fourth Department Department(Military (Military Intelligence) Intelligence) illegals was the German cessful of the the Fourth illegals was the German Richard Richard Sorge, Sorge, later later described described by by one one of of his his Comintern Comintern admirers admirers as as a a "startlingly startlingly good-looking .. .. .. romantic, romantic, idealistic idealistic scholar, who exuded exuded charm.? charm. While While Sorge's Sorges good-looking scholar," who main successes wereachieved achieved posing Nazi journalist those of main successes were posing as as a a Nazi journalist in in Japan, Japan, those of the the OGPU/NKVD illegals illegals mostly mostly took place in in Europe. Europe. OGPUINKVD took place Though the the Great Great Illegals Illegals are are nowadays nowadaysbest best remembered, remembered, particularly particularly in in Britain, Britain, Though for their their recruitment recruitment of of young, young, talented, talented, ideological ideological agents, agents, their their first first major major successes for successes were were the the less less glamorous glamorous but but scarcely scarcely less lessimportant important acquisition acquisition of of diplomatic diplomatic ciphers ciphers and documents from sex rather ideology. Code and documents from agents agents motivated motivated by by money money and and sex rather than thanideology. Codebreaking is is often often supposed supposed to to depend depend on on little little more more than than the the cryptanalytic cryptanalytic genius genius of of breaking brilliant brilliant mathematicians, mathematicians, nowadays nowadays assisted assistedby by huge huge networks networks of of computers. computers. In In real reality, most major twentieth-century twentieth-century codebreaking coups on on which is avail availity, most major codebreaking coups which information information is able have been assisted-sometimes assisted-sometimes crucially-by intelligence on on code able have been crucially-by agent agent intelligence code and and cipher systems.Tsarist Tsarist codebreakers codebreakers had had led world chiefly becauseof of their skill in cipher systems. led the the world chiefly because their skill in stealing or or purchasing purchasing the the codes codes and ciphers of of foreign foreign powers. powers. Ten Ten years before the stealing and ciphers years before the First World War British ambassador ambassador in St.Petersburg, Petersburg, Sir Charles Hardinge, Hardinge,dis disFirst World War thethe British in St. Sir Charles covered that that his his head head Chancery Chancery servant servant had had been been offered offered the the then then enormous enormous sum sum of of covered 1,000 pounds to steal the embassy's main cipher. Though the Okhrana failed on this 1,000 pounds to steal the embassys main cipher. Though the Okhrana failed on this occasion, succeeded on others. Hardinge occasion, it it succeeded on many many others. Hardinge was was disconcerted disconcerted to to be be told told by by a a Russian statesman statesman that Russian that he he "did did not not mind mind how how much much I reported reported in in writing writing what what he he had as all had told told me me in in conversation, conversation, but but he he begged begged me me on on no no account account to to telegraph telegraph as all our our [ciphered] The Okhrana became the intelligence [ciphered] telegrams telegrams are are known!" known!The Okhrana became the first first modern modern intelligence service theft of of foreign to assist assist its service to to make make one one of of its its major major priorities priorities the the theft foreign ciphers ciphers to its codebreakers. In precedent for codebreakers. In so so doing doing it it set set an an important important precedent for its its Soviet Soviet successors.8 successors.8 Research to take Research on on the the making making of of Stalin's Stalins foreign foreign policy policy has, has, as as yet, yet, barely barely begun begun to take account of the the large large volume volume of of Western Western diplomatic diplomatic traffic traffic which the Great Great Illegals account of which the Illegals and and the the codebreakers codebreakers were were instrumental instrumental in in providing. providing. from Constantini in in from Francesco Francesco Constantini inthe British mbassy embassyin .the Bri.tish Rome Rome from from 1924 1924 onwards onwards included included important important cipher cipher materia1.9 material. KGB KGB records, records, how however, main credit credit for ever, give givethe the main for the the OGPU's OGPUs early early successes successes in in obtaining obtaining foreign foreign diplo diplomatic most flamboyant Great Illegals, matic ciphers ciphers to to the the most flamboyant of of the the Great Illegals, Dmitri Dmitri Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Bystroletov, ANDREI, who under a series of Bystroletov, codenamed codenamed HANS HANS or or ANDREI, who operated operated abroad abroad under a series of aliases, aliases, including including several several bogus bogus titles titles of of nobility. nobility. His His was was one one of of the the portraits portraits of of the the leading later chosen walls leading heroes heroes of of foreign foreign intelligence intelligence later chosen to to hang hang on onthe the walls of of the the secret secret "memory room" at the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate memory room atthe FirstChief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorateinin Yasenevo Yasenevo (now (now the the headquarters headquarters of of the the SVR). SVR). Bystroletov Bystroletovwas was a a strikingly strikingly handsome, handsome,
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multilingual the illegitimate multilingual extrovert, extrovert, born born in in 1901, 1901, the illegitimate son son of of a a Kuban Kuban Cossack Cossack mother mother and-Bystroletov persuaded himself-the and-Bystroletov later later persuaded himsel6"the celebrated celebrated novelist novelist Aleksei Aleksei Tolstoy.lo To1stoy.l' A hagiography hagiography of of By Bystroletov's careerpublished published by by the the SVR SVR in in 1995 1995 unsurprisingly A stroletov's career unsurprisingly fails to mention his fantasy the identity his father the fact that one fails to mention either either his fantasy abo,!lt a b o p the identity of of his father or or the fact that one of of his his first first claims claims to to fame fame within within the the OGPU OGPU was was the the seduction seduction of of female female staff staff with with access later access to to classified classified documents documents in in foreign foreign embassies embassies and and ministries:l1 ministries:" a a technique technique later employed larger scale employed on on a a larger scale by by Soviet Soviet Bloc Blocintelligence intelligence agencies agencies in in operations operations such such as as the Germany. A noted by the "secretaries '(secretaries offensive" offensive"in in West West Germany. A report report noted by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin quaintly quaintly records that became on close terms terms with women and their records that Bystroletov Bystroletov "quickly "quickly became on close with women and shared shared their beds." His first major conquest conquest for for the the OGPU beds." His fi rst major OGPU occurred occurred in in Prague, Prague, where where in in 1927 1927he he seduced seduced a a 29-year-old 29-year-old woman woman in in the the French French embassy embassy whom whom the the OGPU OGPU codenamed codenamed LAROCHE.12 of LAROCHE.12Over Over the thenext next two two years years LAROCHE LAROCHE gave gave Bystroletov Bystroletovcopies copies of both both French diplomatic diplomatic ciphers ciphers and and classified classified communications.13 communications.13 French Bystroletov's Bystroletov's unconventional unconventional flamboyance flamboyance may may help help to to explain explain why why he he never never achieved offi officer rank in Soviet intelligence intelligence and and remained simply an an illegal illegal agent,14 achieved cer rank in Soviet remained simply agent,14 attached the early the illegal attached in in the early 1920s 1920s and and late late 1930s 1930s to to the illegal Berlin Berlin residency residency of of Boris Boris Bazarov Bazarov (codenamed (codenamed KIN).15 KIN).15Unlike Unlike Bystroletov, Bystroletov, more more conventional conventional OGPU OGPU officers officers missed a ciphers. missed a number number of of opportunities opportunities to torecruit recruit agents agents with with access access to to diplomatic diplomatic ciphers. One personal rebuke OGPU One such such opportunity, opportunity, which which later later led led to to a a personal rebuke by by Stalin S t a h to to the the OGPU personnel occurred in in Paris Paris in in August August 1928. 1928. A A stranger, stranger, later later identified personnel responsible, responsible, occurred identified as as the the Swiss Swiss businessman businessman and and adventurer adventurer Giovanni Giovanni de de Ry Ry (codenamed (codenamed ROSSI), ROSSI), pre presented himself the military sented himself at at the theSoviet Soviet embassy embassy and and asked asked to to see see the military attache, attachC, or or the the first first secretary.I6 based on embassy report, secretary.16 According According to to a a later later account account by by Bystroletov Bystroletov based on an an embassy report, de de Ry Ry was was a a short short man man whose whose red red nose nose contrasted contrasted colorfully colorhlly with with his his yellow yellow brief briefcase.I? OGPU resident, resident, Vladimir case.17 He H e allegedly allegedly told told the the OGPU Vladimir Voynovich:18 Voynovich:'*

This briefcase briefcase contains contains the the codes and ciphers ciphers of of Italy. Italy. You, You, no no doubt, doubt, have have This codes and copies of of the ciphered telegrams telegrams of of the the local Italian embassy. embassy.Take Take the briefcase copies the ciphered local Italian the briefcase and and check check the the authenticity authenticity ofits of its contents. contents. Once Once you you have havesatisfied satisfied yourself yourself that that they are are genuine, genuine, photograph them and andgive give me me 200,000 200,000 French French francs. francs. they photograph them De Ry Ry also also offered offered to to provide provide future future Italian Italian diplomatic diplomatic ciphers ciphers for for a a similar similar sum. sum. De Voynovich took took the the ciphers ciphers into into a a back back room, room, where where they they were were photographed photographed by his Voynovich by his wife. He H e then then returned returned the the originals originals to to de de Ry, Ry, denounced denounced them them as as forgeries, forgeries, ordered ordered wife. him out out of of the the embassy and threatened threatened to to call call the the police. Though the the Centre Centre later later him embassy and police. Though changed its its mind, mind, at atthe the time it commended commended Voynovich Voynovich for for his his astuteness in obtain obtainchanged time it astuteness in ing Italian Italian ciphers ciphers at at no no cost cost to to the the OGPU.19 OGPU.19 ing Exactly a a year year later, later,in in August August 1929, 1929, there there was was another, another, similar similar walk-in walk-in at at the theParis Paris Exactly embassy. On O n this this occasion occasion the the visitor visitor was was a a cipher clerk from from the the Foreign Foreign Office Office Com Comembassy. cipher clerk munications Department, Department, Ernest Holloway Oldham, Oldham, then accompanying a a British British munications Ernest Holloway then accompanying trade delegation delegation in in Paris. Paris. Voynovich Voynovich seems seemsto to have have tried tried to to repeat repeat the the deception deception prac practrade ticed on on de de Ry Ry a a year year earlier. earlier. Oldham, however, was was more cautious cautious than than de de Ry, Ry, brought brought ticed Oldham, however, more no cipher cipher material material with with him, him, tried tried to to prevent prevent his his identity identity being being discovered discovered and and sought sought no to limit limit his his contact contact with with the theOGPU to to a a single single transaction. transaction. He H e identified identified himself himself only only to

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as Voynovich by by claiming ce printing as "Charlie," Charlie, misled misled Voynovich claiming to to work work in in the the Foreign Foreign Offi Office printing department, and and announced announced that that he could obtain obtain a copy of the British British diplomatic diplomatic department, he could a copy of the cipher. for 50,000 pounds, Voynovich 10,000 pounds pounds cipher. Oldham Oldham asked asked for 50,000 pounds, Voynovich beat beat him him down down to to 10,000 20 and they they agreed agreed on on a a meeting meeting in Berlin early early the year.20 and in Berlin the following following year. Before that took place, the work of the the Paris Paris embassy embassy and and OGPU Before that meeting meeting took place, the work of OGPU resiresi dency was Bese dency was disrupted disrupted by by the the defection defection of of the the Soviet Soviet charge char& d'affaires, daffaires, Grigori Grigori Besedovsky, in in October Accused of dovsky, October 1929. 1929. Accused of counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary plotting, "plotting," Besedovsky Besedovsky made a dramatic dramatic escape escape over over the the embassy wall, pursued by OGPU who had made a embassy wall, pursued by OGPD guards guards who had orders return him him to Moscow for interrogation and, almost certainly, orders to to return to Moscow for interrogation and, almost certainly, execution. execution. Besedovsky's memoirs, in 1930, outrage in inthe the Centre. They They Besedovsl$s memoirs, published published in 1930, caused caused outrage Centre. denounced Stalin as of the most senseless of oriental oriental despodespo denounced Stalin as "the the embodiment embodiment of the most senseless type type of tism of OGPU OGPD secrets: offers of of Italian Italian and tism, and revealed revealed a a number number of secrets: among among them themthe the offers and , " and British ciphers ciphers to to the the Paris residency by walk-ins.21 British Paris residency by unidentified unidentified walk-ins.21 These revelations led to to Bystroletov's Bystroletovs urgent urgent recall recall to to Moscow. Moscow. At At the the Lubyanka, These revelations led Lubyanka, Abram Aronovich (later head head of of foreign intelligence) showed him a a copy copy of Abram Aronovich Slutsky Slutsky (later foreign intelligence) showed him of Besedovsky's memoirs. Opposite deception of de Ry, Ry, the the unidenuniden Besedovskyb memoirs. Opposite the thereference reference to to the thedeception of de tified walk-in walk-in who who had provided Italian Italian ciphers ciphers in the instruction instruction Reopen! tified had provided in 1928, 1928, the "Reopen!" had been to had been penciled penciled in in the the margin margin by by Stalin Stalin himself. himself. Slutsky Slutsky instructed instructed Bystroletov Bystroletov to return to once, discover swindled two years ear return to Paris Paris at at once, discover the the identity identity of of the thewalk-in walk-in swindled two years earlier, renew renew contact contact and and obtain obtain further further ciphers from him. Where can can I lier, ciphers from him. "Where I find find him? him?" Bystroletov "That's your to Bystroletov asked. asked. Thats your business," business, Slutsky Slutsky replied. replied. "You You have have six six months months to "22 track him him down. down.2 track Bystroletov to ground ground in in a a Geneva Geneva bar. bar. Believing Believing that, that, after after the the fraud fraud Bystroletov ran ran de de Ry Ry to practiced on reject an from the practiced on him him in inParis Paris two two years years earlier, earlier,de de Ry Ry might might reject an approach approach from the OGPD, use what known as OGPU, Bystroletov Bystroletov decided decided to to use what later later became became known as the the "false false fl,ag" flag tech technique Though de nique and and pretended pretended to to be be working working for for the the Japanese Japanese intelligence intelligence service. service. Though de Ry was not flag," he Ry was not deceived deceived for for long long by by the the "false false flag, he agreed agreed to to sell sell further further Italian Italian ciphers obtain from diplomat. Future Future ciphers which which he he claimed claimed to to be be able ableto to obtain from .a a corrupt corruptItalian Italian diplomat. meetings took place place in where the meetings with with de de Ry Ry usually usually took in Berlin, Berlin, where the diplomat diplomat was was allegedly allegedly stationed. de Ry paid at at least stationed. KGB KGB records, records, possibly possibly incomplete, incomplete, show show that that de Ry was was paid least 200,000 200,000 French French francs.23 francs.23 Bystroletov alsogiven given the Bystroletov was was also the task task of of tracing tracing the the unidentified unidentified British British walk-in walk-in (Ernest Oldham) who had offered to the the Paris (Ernest Oldham) who had offered to to sell sell Foreign Foreign Office Office ciphers ciphers to Paris resi residency. previous year, Oldham (code(code dency. In In April April 1930, 1930, at at the the meeting meeting arranged arranged in in the the previous year, Oldham named part of a diplomatic named ARNO ARNO by by the the OGPD) OGPU) handed handed over over only only part of a diplomatic cipher, cipher, probably as as a a precaution against being double-crossed, and and demanded 6,000-dollar probably precaution against being double-crossed, demanded aa6,000-dollar down-payment providing the rest. The OGPU tried him after the down-payment before before providing the rest. The OGPU tried to to locate locate him after the meeting but address.24 meeting but discovered discovered that that he he had had given given a a false false address.24 Probably soon soon after after his his first first meeting meeting with with de de Ry, Ry, Bystroletov Bystroletov succeeded succeeded in in track trackProbably ing Oldham in bar, struck struck up his confi ing down down Oldham in aaParis Paris .bar, up a a conversation conversation with with him, him, won won his confidence and and booked booked into into the the hotel hotel where where he staying. There There Bystroletov Bystroletov revealed revealed dence he was was staying. himself to an impoverished impoverished Hungarian aristocrat who himself to Oldham Oldham and andhis his wife wife Lucy Lucy as as an Hungarian aristocrat who had Oldham, into into the the clutches Soviet intelligence. With his had fallen, fallen, like like Oldham, clutches of of Soviet intelligence. With his wife's wifes approval, and other approval, Oldham Oldham agreed agreed to to provide provide Foreign Foreign Office Office ciphers ciphers and other classified classified docdoc-

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uments OGPU. Oldham was uments to toBystroletov Bystroletov to to pass pass on on to tothe the OGPU. Oldham was given givena a first first payment payment of of 6,000 dollars, a second of 5,000 dollars, then 1,000 dollars a month. Bystroletov por 6,000 dollars, a second of 5,000 dollars, then 1,000 dollars a month. Bystroletov portrayed himself throughout as as a a sympathetic sympathetic friend, friend, visiting visiting the the Oldhams Oldhams on on several several trayed himself throughout occasions their London occasions at at their London home home in in Pembroke Pembroke Gardens, Gardens, Kensington. Kensington. Oldham's Oldhams doc documents, uments, however, however, were werehanded handed over over at at meetings meetings in in France France and and Germany. Germany. Having the OGPU at arm's length, Oldham became Having originally originally tried tried to to hold hold the at arms length, Oldham became increasingly nervous about put increasingly nervous about the the risks risks of of working working as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. In In order order to to put pressure was accompanied accompanied to of their pressure on on him, him, Bystroletov Bystroletov was to several several of their meetings meetings by by the the head KIN), head of of the the illegal illegal residency residency in in Berlin, Berlin, Boris Boris Bazarov Bazarov (codenamed (codenamed H N ) , who who posed posed as as a a rather rather menacing menacing Italian Italian Communist Communist named named da da Vinci. Vinci. With With Bazarov Bazarov and and Bystro Bystroletov man routine, took letov playing playing the the hard hard man/soft manlsoft man routine, Oldham Oldham agreed agreed to to continue continue but but took increasingly to to drink. drink. Bystroletov Bystroletov strengthened strengthened his his hold hold over over Lucy Lucy Oldham Oldham (hence (henceincreasingly forth codenamed codenamed MADAM) MADAM) by by putting putting his his relationship relationship with with her heron on what what an an OGPU forth report coyly coyly describes describesas as "an an intimate intimate footing."25 footing.2s report Though successfully deceived deceived the Oldhams, he been Though Bystroletov Bystroletov successfully the Oldhams, he seems seems to to have have been unaware that that the the Oldhams Oldhams were also also deceiving deceiving him. him. At At their their first first meeting, meeting, Oldham Oldham unaware were explained worked explained that that he he was was "a alord, lord, who who worked out out ciphers ciphers for for the the Foreign Foreign Office Office and and was was a very very influential influential person," person,, rather rather than, than, in inreality, reality, a a minor minor functionary. functionary. At later later meeta meet ings ings Oldham Oldham claimed claimed that that he he traveled traveled abroad abroad on on a a diplomatic diplomatic passport passport illegally illegally pro provided for him by by a a Foreign Foreign Office friend named Kemp whom whom he alleged, almost almost vided for him Office friend named Kemp he alleged, certainly in certainly falsely, falsely,was was in the the Secret Secret Intelligence Intelligence Service. Service. Having Having helped helped Bystroletov Bystroletov to to acquire a a British British passport in the thename name of of Robert Robert Grenville, Grenville, Oldham told him him that the acquire passport in Oldham told that the passport had personally issued issued by by the Secretary, Sir Simon, who passport had been been personally the Foreign Foreign Secretary, Sir John John Simon, who believed it it to be for for a a minor minor British British aristocrat aristocrat of of his Lord Robert Robert believed to be hisacquaintance, acquaintance, Lord Grenville, then then resident in Canada. I didn't didnt know know Lord Lord Robert Robert was was here here in in Britain," Britain, Grenville, resident in Canada. "I Simon Mrs. Oldham also in tall Simon was was alleged allegedto to have have remarked remarked to to Oldham. Oldham. Mrs. Oldham also specialized specializedin tall stories. She She told Bystroletov that that she was the the sister sister of of an an army army officer officer named named Mont Montstories. told Bystroletov she was gomery who, she she claimed, claimed, held heldthe the (non-existent) (non-existent) post post of of head head of of the the intelligence sergomerywho, intelligence ser vice at at the the Foreign Foreign Office;26 a later later note note on on the the KGB file, probably dating dating from the vice Office;26 a file, probably from the 1940s, identified identified the the mysterious mysterious and and possibly possibly mythical mythical Montgomery Montgomery as as Field 1940s, Field MarMar shal Viscount Montgomery of Expert though though Bystroletov Bystroletov proved as an an shal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein! Alamein! Expert proved as agent controller, his ignorance of the of the Office and agent controller, his ignorance of the ways ways of the Foreign Foreign Office and the the British British establishment made made him him curiously curiously gullible-though perhaps no no more more so so than than the establishment gullible-though perhaps the Centre, which was also also taken in.27 Centre, which was taken in.27 De Ry, meanwhile, meanwhile, was wasproviding providing Bystroletov at in Berlin with a a mixture mixture De Bystroletov at meetings meetings in Berlin with of genuine diplomatic documents (Italian ciphers probably chief among them) and colorful inventions. inventions. According According to to Bystroletov, Bystroletov, when when asked whether some some of colorful asked whether of his his matemate What kind of question is that? that? O f course rial was genuine, he replied indignantly, "What Of they are are .. .. .. Your Your Japanese Japanese are are idiots. idiots.Write and tell tell them them to tostart start printing American they Write and printing American dollars. Instead of paying paying me me 200,000 200,000 genuine genuine francs, francs, give give me me a a million million forged forged dol doldollars. Instead of well be quits." quits.The Centre was taken in by at least some of de Ry's Rys inven invenlars and we'll tions. Possibly to the tions. Possibly to to disguise disguise the the fact fiact that that he he was was also also trying trying to tosell sell Italian Italian ciphers ciphers to the French and and other purchasers, he he claimed claimed that that Mussolini's Mussolinis son-in-law, Count French other purchasers, son-in-law, Count an Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo (later Italian foreign minister), had organized "an

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extensive trade trade in in ciphers" ciphers and, and, when when aacipher cipher was was missing missing from from the the Berlin Berlin embassy, embassy, extensive had ordered ordered the liquidation of an innocent innocent scapegoat scapegoat to divert attention attention from from him himhad the liquidation of an to divert self believed that intelligence agencies, self. Since Since the the OGPU OGPU believed that Western Western intelligence agencies, like like itself, itself, orga organized secret secret assassinations, assassinations, it it had surprisingly little little diffi difficulty in crediting de Rys nized had surprisingly culty in crediting de Ry's improbable tale.28 tale.28De Ry appears appears to to have have tried tried to to deceive deceive the on two other improbable De Ry the OGPU on two other occasions by putting putting it itin in contact contact with with bogus bogus officials who claimed claimed to to have have German occasions by officials who German and British British diplomatic diplomatic ciphers for sale.29 sale.29 and ciphers for The Centre Centre attached attached great great importance, importance, however, however, to to an an introduction introduction provided provided by by The de Ry Ry to to his his friend friend the the Paris Paris businessman businessman Rodolphe Rodolphe Lemoine, an agent agent and and recruiter recruiter de Lemoine, an of the the French French foreign foreign intelligence intelligence service, the military military Deuxikme Bureau.30Born Born of service, the Deuxieme Bureau.3o Rudolf Stallmann, Stallmann, the the son son of of a a wealthy wealthy Berlin Berlin jeweler, jeweler, Lemoine Lemoine had hadbegun begun working working Rudolf for the the Deuxikme Bureau in in 1918 and acquired acquired French French citizenship. citizenship. Intelligence Intelligence for for for Deuxieme Bureau 1918 and Lemoine was was a a passion passion as as well well as as a a second career. According According to one of of his his chiefs Lemoine second career. to one chiefs in in the Deuxikme Bureau, He was as hooked on on espionage as a a drunk drunk is is on on alcohol. the Deuxieme Bureau, "He was as hooked espionage as alcohol." Lemoines greatest greatest coup coup was was the the recruitment recruitment in in 1931 1931 of of a a German German cipher and SIGLemoine's cipher and SIG INT clerk, clerk, Hans-Thilo Hans-Thilo Schmidt, whose compulsive compulsive womanizing womanizing had had run run him INT Schmidt, whose him into into debt. (codenamed HE ,qnd ASCHE. by debt. For For the the next next decade decade Schmdt Schmidt (codenamed HE.and.ASCHE. by the the French) French) was was the Deuxieme Deuxikme Bureau's Bureaus most most irnportant important foreign foreign agent.31 agent.31Some of the the intelligence intelligence he he the Some of provided laid laid the the foundations foundations for for the the breaking breaking of of the the German machine provided GermanEnigma Enigma machine cipher by by British British cryptanalysts cryptanalysts in in the the Second World War. War,32 cipher Second World 32 After Bystroletov Bystroletov had had made made the the initial initial contact contact with with Lemoin ,Lemoine (codenamed (codenamed REX Mter by instructed to by the the Deuxieme Deuxikme Bureau Bureau and and JOSEPH JOSEPH by by the the OGPU), OGPU), he he was was instructed to hand hand the case case over to another, another, less less flamboyant flamboyant Soviet Soviet illegal, illegal, Ignace Ignace Reiss Reiss (alias the over to (alias Ignace "Ignace Poretsky," codenamed RAYMOND) Poretsky, codenamed RAYMOND) so so that that he he could could concentrate concentrate on on running running Old Oldham. At At meetings meetings with with Lemoine, Lemoine,Reiss Reiss posed posed initially initially as as an an American American military military intel intelham. ligence Lemoine appeared on ligence officer. officer. Lemoine appeared anxious anxious to to set set up up an an exchange exchange of of intelligence intelligence on Germany systems, and bad Germany and and foreign foreign cipher cipher systems, and supplied supplied a a curious curious mixture mixture of of good good and and bad intelligence cooperate. An intelligence as as evidence evidence of of the the Deuxieme Deuxikme Bureau's Bureaus willingness willingness to to cooperate. An Ital Italian cipher cipher which which he he provided provided in in May May 193 1931 to have have been In February ian 1 seems seems to been genuine. genuine. In February 1932, reported the inaccurate news 1932, however, however, Lemoine Lemoine reported the sensationally sensationally inaccurate news that that Hitler Hitler(who (who became later) had made two secret visits to became German German chancellor chancellor less less than than a a year year later) had made two secret visits, to Paris Paris and Bureau. "We and was was in in the the pay pay of of the the Deuxieme Deuxikme Bureau. We French," French, he he claimed, claimed, "are are doing doing everything dismissed the everything to to hasten hasten his his rise rise to to power." power.The The Centre Centre dismissed the report report as as disinfor disinformation, but ordered Lemoine to him to mation, but ordered meetings meetings with with Lemoine to continue continue and, and,for for him to be be paid, paid, probably probably with with the the intention intentionof of laying laying a a trap trapwhich which would would end end in inhis his recruitment.33 re~ruitment.~~ In November November 1933 1933 Lemoine him toto meet meet Reiss Reiss the the head head of of the the In Lemoine brought broughtwith with him SIGINT the Deuxikme Deuxieme Bureau, Bureau, Gustave SIGINT section section of of the Gustave Bertrand, Bertrand, codenamed codenamed OREL OREL ("Eagle") (Eagle)by by the the Centre. Centre.To To try try to toconvince convince Bertrand Bertrand that that he hewas was an an American American intel intelligence ligence officer officer willing willing to to exchange exchange cipher cipher material, material, Reiss Reiss offered offered him him Latin Latin AIIleri American diplomatic diplomatic ciphers. ciphers. Bertrand, Bertrand, predictably, predictably,was more interested interested in inEuropean can was more European cipher^.'^ Soon after his his first first meeting meeting with with Bertrand, Reiss informed Lemoine that ciphers.34 Soon after Bertrand, Reiss informed Lemoine that he but for probably he worked worked not not for for American American intelligence intelligence but for the the OGPU. OGPU. The The Centre Centre probably calculated him either admit to calculated that that it it had had caught caught Lemoine Lemoine in in a a trap, trap, forcing forcing him either to to admit to his his superiors been both OG PU or that superiors that that he he had hadbeen both paid paid and and deceived deceived by by the the OGPU or to to conceal conceal that

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information information and and risk risk being being blackmailed blackmailed into into working working for for the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. The The blackmail Lemoine blackmail failed.35 failed.35 Lemoine had hadprobably probably realized realized for for some some time time that thatReiss, Reiss, whom whom he he knew Scott," worked knew as as "Walter Walter Scott, worked for for Soviet Soviet intelligence. intelligence. Reiss Reiss had had several several further further meetings meetings with with Lemoine Lemoine and and Bertrand, Bertrand, at atwhich which they they exchanged exchanged intelligence intelligence on on Ital Italian, ian, Czechoslovak Czechoslovak and and Hungarian Hungarian ciphers.36 ciphers.36 maintaining Lemoine, Bystroletov maintaining contact contact with withLemoine, Bystroletov was was finding finding Oldham OGPU. By By the the summer summer Oldham increasingly increasingly desperate desperate to to extricate extricate himself himself from from the the OGPU. of of 1932 1932 Bystroletov Bystroletov feared feared that that Oldham's Oldhams worsening worsening alcoholism alcoholism and and carelessness carelessness at at work the attention work would would attract attract the attention of of MI5. MIS. The The Centre Centre concluded concluded that that Oldham's Oldhams increasingly increasingly erratic erratic behavior behavior also also risked risked exposing exposing Bystroletov Bystroletov to to a a terrible terrible revenge revenge from from the the supposedly supposedly ruthless ruthless British British intelligence intelligence services. services. On O n September September 17, 17, in in recognition of his bravery in the face of nonexistent British assassination squads, recognition of his bravery in the face of nonexistent British assassination squads, it it presented a rifl e carrying presented him him with with a rifle carrying the the inscription inscription "For For unstinting unstinting struggle struggle against against Counter-Revolution, Counter-Revolution, from from your your colleagues colleagues in in the the OGPU."37 OGPU.37 On e, O n September September 30, 30, 1932, 1932, less less than than a a fortnight fortnight after after Bystroletov Bystroletov received received his his rifl rifle, Oldham resigned from the Foreign Office, unable to stand the pressures of his double Oldham resigned from the Foreign Office, unable to stand the pressures of his double life.38 To peace. Over life.38 To his his despair, despair,the the OGPU OGPU still still refused refused to to leave leave him him in in peace. Over the thenext next year year Bystroletov Bystroletov extracted extracted from from him him details details of of all his his former former colleagues colleagues in in the the Communi Communications cations Department, Department, hoping hoping to to recruit recruit at at least least one one of of them them as as Oldham's Oldhams successor. successor.As As his drinking got further out of control, Oldham became convinced that his arrest was his drinking got further out control, of Oldham became convincedthat his arrest was only only a a matter matter of of time. time. His His wife wife told told Bystroletov Bystroletov that that her her husband husband believed believed that that the the permanent Robert Vansittart, permanent under-secretary under-secretary at at the the Foreign Foreign Office, Office, Sir Sir Robert Vansittart, had had person personally also on ally put put him him under under observation observation and and that that British British intelligence intelligence was was also on the the trail trail of of Bystroletov.39 Though there was probably no substance to these fears, the Centre took by st role to^.^^ Though there was probably no substance to these fears, the Centre took them trouble-shooter Teodor them seriously. seriously.The The OGPU OGPU trouble-shooter and and "flying flying illegal" illegal Teodor Maly Maly reported reported to from to the theCentre Centre from London London on onJuly July 6 6 that that Bystroletov Bystroletov was wasin in great great danger: danger:
W H I LE LE R E I S S WA S REISS WAS

It REI [Bystroletov] It is is possible possible that that AND ANDREI [Bystroletov] will will be be liquidated liquidated by by the the enemy. enemy. None I have have not not given given an an order order for for his his immediate immediate departure. departure. For For him him None the the less less I to to depart depart now now would would mean mean the the loss loss of of a a source source of of such such importance importance [Oldham] [Oldham] that would the that itit would weaken weaken our our defense defense and and increase increase the the power power of of the enemy. enemy.The The loss loss of possible today, today, as of ANDREI ANDREI is is possible as is is that that of of other other colleagues colleagues tomorrow. tomorrow. The The nature nature of of their their work work makes makes such such risks risks unavoidable.40 ~navoidable.~ The The Centre Centre replied replied on on August August 10: 10: Please Please inform inform ANDREI ANDREI that that we we here here are are fully fully aware awareof of the the self-denial, self-denial, disci discipline, pline, resourcefulness resourcefulness and and courage courage that that he he has has shown shown in in the the very very difficult difficult and and dangerous dangerous conditions conditions of of recent recent days days while while working working with with ARNO.41 ARN0.41

Bystroletov continued continued to to receive receive high high praise praise for for his his skill skill in in outwitting outwitting aaBritish British ver verBystroletov sion of of the the Serebryansk Serebryansky Service which which existed existed only only in in the theconspiratorial conspiratorial imagination imagination sion -y Service of the the OGPU. OGPU. of

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O n September September 29, 29,1933, almost a a year year to to the theday day after after his his resignation resignation from from the the For ForOn 1933, almost eign ce, Oldham eign Offi Office, Oldham was was found found unconscious unconscious in in the the gas-filled gas-filled kitchen kitchen of of his his house house in in Pembroke dead on Pembroke Gardens, Gardens, rushed rushed to to the thehospital hospital and and pronounced pronounced dead on arrival. arrival. An inquest inquest found while of found that that he he had had taken taken his his life life by by "coal coal gas gassuffocation" suffocation while of "unsound unsound mind."42 mind.742 The Oldham had The Centre Centre had had no no doubt doubt that that Oldham had been been murcI.red. murdered. Its Its report report on on his his death death concluded: "In order to avoid a scandal the [British] intelligence service had ARNO concluded: In order to avoid a scandal the [British] intelligence service had ARNO physically It that physically eliminated, eliminated,making making his his death death appear appear to to be be suicide." suicide. It believed, believed, however, however, that Bystroletov Bystroletov had had disguised disguised his his identity identity so so successfully successfdly that that the the Foreign Foreign Office Office believed believed Oldham Oldham had had been been working working for for French French rather rather than than Soviet Soviet intelligence.43 intelligen~e.~ Oldham's suicide did little if anything to alert the Foreign Oldhams suicide did little if anything to alert the Foreign Office Office to to the the chronic chronic problems problems of of its its own own sequity security and and that that of of British British embassies embassies abroad.44 abroad.44Still Still concerned concernedby by fears fears that that he he was was being being pursued pursued by by a a secret secret British British assassination assassination squad, squad, however, however, Bystroletov Bystroletov failed failed to to grasp grasp how how relatively relatively unprotected unprotected a a target target the the Foreign Foreign Office Office remained. remained. He H e concluded concluded that that aasafer safer recruiting recruiting ground ground was was Geneva, Geneva, where where several several of of Oldham's working Oldhams former former colleagues colleagueswere were working as as cipher cipher clerks clerks with with the theBritish British delegation delegation to Raymond to the the League League of of Nations. Nations. In In December December 1933 1933 he he made made contact contact there there with with,Raymond Oake Oake (codenamed (codenamed SHELLEY), SHELLEY),one one of of the themost most promising promising potential potential recruits recruits in in the the communications Oake had communications department department identified identified by by Oldham.45 Oldham.45Oake had good good reason reason to to resent the Foreign 1920 he he had had resent his his underprivileged underprivileged status. status. Since Since joining joining the Foreign Office Office in in 1920 remained remained in in the the lowly lowly rank rank of of "temporary temporary clerk" clerkwithout without pension pension rights.46 rights.46Bystrole Bystroletov Dutch :hristian ("Han" ) tov handed handed over over the the cultivation cultivation of of Oake Oake to tothe the Dutch artst artist JI.eJ:}ri Henri <::: Christian (Han) Pieck, Pieck, who who operated operated as as an an OGPU OGPU illegal illegal codenamed codenamed COOPER.47 COOPER.47 Pieck Pieck was was almost almost as as flamboyant flamboyant an an extrovert extrovert as as Bystroletov, Bystroletov,with with aaconvivial convivial man manner wide ner which which won won him him aa wide circle circle of of friends friends and and acquaintances acquaintances among among British British officials officials and and journalists journalists in in Geneva. Geneva. He H e invited invited Oake Oake and and othr other cipher cipher clerks clerks to to stay stay at at his his house house in in The The Hague Hague where where he he lavished lavished charm charm and and hospitality hospitality on on them them while while assess assessing ing them them as as possible possible recruits. recruits. Oake's Oakes main main service service to to Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence was was to to pro provide introduction Captain John H. joined the Foreign vide an an introduction toto Captain John H. King, King, who who joined the Foreign Office Office communications communications department department as as a a "temporary temporary clerk" clerk in in 193448 193445and and subsequently subsequently became than Oake that King became a a far far more more important important agent agent than Oakehimself. himself. Pieck Pieck reported reported that King had had been born in Ireland, considered himself Irish rather than British and, though anti been born in Ireland, considered himself Irish rather than British and, though antiSoviet, Soviet, also also "hated hated the theEnglish." English. Estranged Estranged from from his his wife wife and and with with an an American American mis mistress he found it difficult to tress to to support, support, he found difficult it to live live on on his his modet modest F'oreign Foreign Office Office salary. salary. Pieck Pieck cultivated cultivated King King with with patience patience and and skill. skill. On O n one one occasion occasion he he and and his his fe wife !ook took KiIlg King and his lover for an expensive touring holiday in Spain, staying at the best hotels. and his lover for an expensive touring holiday in Spain, staying at the best hotels. Mrs. Mrs. Pieck Pieck complained complained that that the thewhole whole holiday holiday had had been been "a a real real ordeal" ordealand and that that King King and The paid off and his his mistress mistress were were "incredibly incrediblyboring."49 boring.749 The Piecks' Pieckshospitality, hospitdlty, however, however, paid off handsomely. meeting with Pieck, King handsomely. Seven Seven months months after after his his first first meeting with Pieck, King (henceforth (henceforth codenamed codenamed MAG) MAG) began began to to hand hand over over large large amounts amounts of of classified classified material, material, includ including ing Foreign Foreign Office Office telegrams, telegrams, ciphers ciphers and and secret secret daily daily and and weekly weekly summaries summaries of of diplomatic 50 diplomatic correspondence. corre~pondence.~
AN LY AN A AN NAL YS SI IS S BY BY

the u3Q the Centre Centreconcluded concluded that that apo, abo,ut 30 percent percent of of King's Kings material material was was the same as that provided by Francesco Constantini (DUNCAN), the long-serving the same as that provided by Francesco Constantini (DUNCAN), the long-serving

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OGPU OGPU agent agent in in the the British British embassy embassy at at Rome.51 Rome. The The overlap overlap was, was, almost almost certainly, certainly, regarded the authenticity the documents regarded as as useful useful for for checking checking the authenticityof of the documents received received from from both both agents. the importance agents. It It was was a a sign sign of of the importance attached attached to to Constantini's Constantinis intelligence intelligence that that Abram head ofINO in 1934, 1934, decided decided Abram Aronovich Aronovich Slutsky, Slutsky, who who succeeded succeeded Artuzov Artuzov as as head of I N 0 in to another of Great I1legals, to transfer transfer him him from from the the legal legal residency residency in in Rome Rome to to another of the the Great Illegals, Moisei Markovich Moisei Markovich Akselrod Akselrod (codenamed (codenamed OST OST or or OSTO), OSTO), one one of of the the leading leading Soviet Soviet agent controllers. Born Born into Jewish 898, Akselrod been agent controllers. into aa Jewish family family in in Smolensk Smolensk in in 11898, Akselrod had had been a Zionist socialist a member member of of the the Russian Russian branch branch of of the the Zionist socialist organization organization Poale Poale Zion, Zion, until joinedthe the Bolsheviks in 1925 1925 began a until its its dissolution dissolution in in 1922. 1922. He H e then then joined Bolsheviks and and in began a career in in INO.52 INO. Like Like most of the the Great Illegals, Akselrod Akselrod was was a remarkable lin lincareer most of Great Illegals, a remarkable guist-fluent and Italian-and, guist-fluent in in Arabic, Arabic, English, English, French, French, German German and Italian-and, according according to to a a ,,53 In In fellow fellow illegal, illegal, a a man man of of"extraordinary extraordinary culture" culture with with "a a fine fine indifference indifference to to risk. ri~k.~ 1934 traveled Rome on establish a residency 1934 he he traveled to to Rome onan an Austrian Austrian passport passport to to establish a new new illegal illegal residency and Jan and act act as as Constantini's Constantinis controller. controller. He H e had had his his first first meeting meeting with with Constantini Constantini in in January uary 1935.54 1935.54 Few-if any-Soviet controllers Few-if any-Soviet controllers ever ever met met an an agent agent as as frequently frequently as as Akselrod Akselrod saw saw Constantini. had almost On October 27, 1935 the the Cen Constantini. At At times times they they had almost daily daily meetings. meetings. O n October 27,1935 Centre cabled cabled Akselrod: Akselrod: "Between Between September and October October 14 14 you you met [Constantini] tre September 24 24 and met [Constantini] 16 times. times. There more than is not diffi 16 There must must be be no no more than two two or or three three meetings meetings a a week." week. It It is not diffiDUNCAN. Constantini Constantini supplied cult to to understand understand Akselrod's Akselrods enthusiasm enthusiasm for for agent agent DUNCAN. cult supplied him with with a remarkable range range of of documents documents and and cipher cipher material material from from embassy embassy red him a remarkable red boxes, diplomatic diplomatic bags, bags, filing filing cabinets cabinets and-probably-the and-probably-the embassy Far from from boxes, embassy safe. safe. Far consisting consisting simply simply of of material material on on British-Italian British-Italian relations, relations, the the documents documents included included Foreign Office Office reports reports and and British British ambassadors despatches on on aa great variety variety of major Foreign ambassadors' despatches great of major international issues, issues, which which were were sent sent for for information information to to the theRome Rome embassy. embassy. A A Centre Centre international report noted noted on on November November 15, 15,1935 thatno no fewer fewer than than 101 101 of of the the British British documents documents report 1935 that obtained been judged obtained from from Constantini Constantini since since the the beginning beginning of of the the year year had had been judged suffi sufficiently to be be "sent Comrade Stalin" : among them the the Foreign Foreign Office ciently important important to sent to to Comrade Stalin: among them Office records Secretary, Anthony records of of talks talks between between Sir Sir John John Simon, Simon, the the British British Foreign Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, Foreign at the of Eden, junior junior Foreign Office Office minister minister (who (who became became Foreign ForeignSecretary Secretary at theend end of the the year), and Hitler Berlin; between Litvinov, the the Soviet Soviet Commissar Commissar for for year), and Hitler in in Berlin; between Eden Eden and and Litvinov, Foreign Mfairs, Affairs, in in Moscow; Moscow; between between Eden Eden and and Joseph Joseph Beck, the Polish Polish foreign foreign min minForeign Beck, the ister, ister, in in Warsaw; Warsaw; between between Eden Eden and and Edvard Edvard Benes, Beneg, the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak foreign foreign minis minister, in in Prague; Prague; and and between between Eden Eden and and Mussolini Mussolini in in Rome.55 Rome. ter, A striking striking omission omission from from the the Centre's Centres list list of of the the most most important important Foreign Foreign Office Office A documents Eden's account his talks him during during his documents supplied supplied to to Stalin Stalin was was Edens account of of his talks with with him his visit to to Moscow Moscow in in March March1935-despite 1935despite the the fact that that this this document document was was sent sent to to the the visit fact Rome embassy embassy and and was was probably probably among among those thoseobtained obtained by by C~nstantini.~ Since this this Rome Constantini.56 Since was Stalins first meeting meeting with with a from a a Western government, their their talks talks was Stalin's first a minister minister from Western government, were of of unusual unusual significance. significance.The The most most likely likely explanation explanation for for the the Centre's Centres failure failure to to were send the the British British record of the the meeting meeting to to the the Kremlin Kremlin is is that that Slutsky Slutsky feared feared to to pass pass send record of on to to Stalin Stalin some some of of Eden's Edens comments comments about about him. him. INO I N 0 would would have have been been unembar unembaron rassed to to report report the thefact fact that that Eden Eden was was impressed impressed by by Stalin's Stalins "remarkable remarkable knowledge knowledge rassed and understanding of international affairs. But But it it doubtless doubtless lacked lacked the the nerve nerve to to and understanding of international affairs."

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repeat Eden's Edens conclusion that Stalin Stalin w:a, was a mal} man of. of,strong oriental traits traits of repeat conclusion that. S "a !r(:mg oriental of character character with unshakeable unshakeable assurance and contg>l control 'Ypost:! whose <:o:tJ:rt, courtesy in no way hid hid from from us us an an with assurance and sy in no way implacable ruthlessness." ruthlessness. The The Centre Centre was was probably probably also alsonervous about reporting reporting implacable nervous about some of the the opinions opinions attributed attributed by by Eden to Stalin-for Stalin-for example, example, that that he he was was "per persome of Eden to haps more more appreciative appreciative of of [the] [the] German German point pointof of view viewthan than Monsieur Monsieur Litvino[v] LitvinoI]~].~~ haps ."57 There was was no no more more dangerous dangerous activity activity in in Moscow Moscow than than repeating repeating criticisms criticisms of of Stalin Stalin There or attributing attributing heretical heretical opinions opinions to to him. him. or The British British ambassador ambassador in in Moscow, Moscow, Viscount Viscount Chilston, Chilston, optimistically optimistically reported The reported that, as as a a result result of of Eden's Edensvisit, visit, "the the Soviet Soviet Government Government appears appears to to have have got got rid rid of of the the that, bogey in in their minds, that that we we were encouraging Germany Germany against against Soviet Soviet plans plans for for bogey their minds, were encouraging Eastern ~ecurity.~ Stalin, however, rarely-if rarely-if ever-abandoned a conspiracy theory Eastern security."58 Stalin, however, ever-abandoned a conspiracy theory and remained remained deeply deeply suspicious ofBritish British policy. policy. In In a a communique communiquk at at the the end end of his his and suspicious of of talks in in Moscow, Moscow, Eden Eden had had welcomed welcomed the the Soviet Soviet Union's Unions support support for for the the principle principle of of talks collective security, security, following following its its entry entry the the previous previous year year into the League League of of Nations collective into the Nations (hitherto denounced denounced by by Moscow Moscow as as the the "League League of of Burglars"). Burglars). But But Stalin Stalin must must have have (hitherto learned from from Foreign Foreign Office Office documents documents that that Eden was disinclil1ed disinclined to to involve learned Eden was involve the the Soviet Union Union in in any any collective collective security security arrangements arrangements designed designed to to contain contain Nazi Nazi Ger GerSoviet m a n ~To To . ~Stalin's Stalins ~ deeply suspicious suspicious mind, mind, this this reluctance reluctance ws was further hrther evidence evidence of of a a many.59 deeply British plot to to focus focus , German aggression in in the east.60Though he was was content content to Though he to British plot German aggression the east.60 entrust more pragmatic entrust most most day-to-day day-to-day diplomacy diplomacy to to the the efficient efficient and and far far more pragmatic Litvinov, Litvinov, it Stalin who determined the thestrategic strategic thrust thrust of Soviet foreign policy. it was was Stalin who determined of Soviet foreign policy. The Centre Centre had had suspected suspected for for some some time time that thatits its principal principal source source of British diplo diploThe of British matic documents documents over over the the last last decade, decade, the the mercenary mercenary agent agent Francesco Francesco Constantini Constantini matic (DUNCAN), had had been selling some some material material to to Italian Italian iIltelligence intelligence as as well well as as to to the the (DUNCAN), been selling NKVD. It confirmation of NKVD. It had had dramatic dramatic confirmation of these these suspicions suspicions in in February February 1936, 1936, when whenaa British British assessment assessment of of the the Italo-Ethiopian Italo-Ethiopian war-purloined war-purloined byby Constantini Constantini from from the the Giornale dltalia.61 On British the front page British embassy-was embassy-was published published on on the front page of of the the Giornale dItaZia.61 On being challenged challenged by by Akselrod, Akselrod, Constantini Constantini was was forced forcedto to admit admit that thathe he had had supplied supplied being some documents documents to to the the Italians, Italians, but but concealed concealed the the large large scale on which which he had done done some scale on he had so. that hehe had lost British embassy, so. Constantini Constantini also also admitted admitted in in 1936 1936 that had lost his his job job in inthe the British embassy, though he apparently that he he had dishonsty. H He to though he apparently omitted omitted that had been been sacked sacked for for dishonesty. e tried tried to reassure a former former colleague in in the embassy who reassure Akselrod Akselrod by by telling telling him him that that he hehad had a colleague the embassy who would continue him with with classifi ed documents. The colleague colleague was was later would continue to to supply supply him classified documents. The later identified as Constantini's Constantinis brother brother Secondo (codenamed DQDLEY), DUDLEY), who who had had identified as Secqndo (cod(!named worked embassy Chancery Chancery for years. 62 worked as as a a servant servant in in the the embassy for the the previous previous twenty twenty years.62 Secondo Constantini, however, however, took took fewer fewer precautions than his his brother Secondo Constantini, precautions than brother Francesco. diamond necklace the ambassadors ambassador's Francesco. In In January January he he stole stole a a diamond necklace belonging belonging to to the wife from from a a locked locked red red box box (normally (normally used used for thanjewwife for diplomatic diplomatic documents documnts rather rather than jew elery) which was kept in the ambassador's apartment next to the Chancery. The elery) which was kept in the ambassadors apartment next to the Chancery. The ambassador, (soon to had previously ambassador, Sir Sir Eric Eric Drummond Drummond (soon to become become Lord Lord Perth), Perth),who who had previously dismissed the the idea that the in the dismissed idea that the British British diplomatic diplomatic documents documents appearing appearing in the Italian Italian press might been purloined purloined from to grasp grasp that embassy press might have have been from his his embassy, embassy, now nowbegan began to that embassy security attention. Since Foreign Office no security might, might, after after all, all, require require serious serious attention. Since the the Foreign Office had had no security cer, it Major Valentine Vivian, the head of of security offi officer, it was was forced forced to to seek seek th the help help of of Major Valentine Vivian, the head

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SIS cant expertise SIS counter-intelligence. counter-intelligence. Vivian Vivian modestly modestly disclaimed disclaimed signifi significant expertise In in embassy in view the Foreign embassy security security but, but, in view of of the the even even greater greater lack lack of of expertise expertise in in the Foreign Office, Once Office, agreed agreed to to carry carry out out an an investigation.63 in~estigation.~~ Once in in Rome, Rome, he he quickly quickly discovered discovered an appalling series of basic lapses. The embassy files, safe and red boxes were an appalling series of basic lapses. The embassy files, safe and red boxes wereall all inse insecure cure and and "it it would would not not be be impossible impossible or or even even difficult difficult for for unauthorized unauthorized persons persons to to spend spend long long periods periods in in the theChancery Chancery or or Registry Registry rooms." rooms. Vivian Vivian quickly quickly identified identified Secondo Secondo Constantini Constantini as as the the man man probably probably responsible responsible for for the the theft theft both both of of the the diamond diamond necklace necklace and and of of at at least least some some of of the the documents documents supplied supplied to to Italian Italianintelligence: intelligence: S. S. Constantini Constantini .. .. ..has has been been employed employed in in the the Chancery Chancery for for twenty-one twenty-one years. years. He H e might, might, therefore, therefore, have have been been directly directly or or indirectly indirectly responsible responsible for for any, any, or or all, all, of the thefts of papers or valuables which have taken place, or are thought of the thefts of papers or valuables which have taken place, or are thought to to have I understand, understand, not not quite quite free free of of have taken taken place, place, from from this this Mission. Mission. He H e was, was, I suspicion suspicion of of being being himself himself concerned concerned in in a a dishonest dishonest transaction transaction for for which which his his brother brother [Francesco], [Francesco], then then also also a a Chancery Chanceryservant, servant, was was dismissed dismissed a a short short time time ago. ago. Moreover, Moreover, though though the the Diplomatic Diplomatic Staff Staff at at the the time time did did not not connect connect him him with with the the matter, matter, I I am am clear clearin in my my own own mind mind that that the the circumstances circumstances of of the the loss loss of the "R" filing cabinet] the of two two copies copies of of the R Code Code from from a a locked locked press press [ [filing cabinet] in in the Chancery towards S. Constantini, Constantini, or or his his brother, brother, or or both, both, as as the the Chancery in in 1925 1925point point towards S. culprits. 64 culprits.64 Though Drummond politely Though Sir Sir Eric EricDrummond politely welcomed welcomed Vivian's Vivians recommendations recommendations for for improvements action.65 In improvements in in the thesecurity security of of his his embassy, embassy,he he took tooklittle little action.65 In particular, particular, nei neither ther he he nor nor most most of of his his staff staff could could credit credit the the charges charges against against Secondo Secondo Constantini, Constantini, whom Instead whom they theyregarded regarded as as "a asort sort of of friend friend of of the the family."66 family.66 Instead of of being being dismissed, dismissed, ht DUDLEY age to as agent DUDLEY and and his his wife wife were-amazingly-invited were-amazingly-invited to London Londonin in May May1937 1937 as the the guests guests of of His His Majesty's Majestys Government Government at at the the coronation coronation of of King King George George VI, VI, as as a a reward reward for for his his long long and andsupposedly supposedly faithful faithhl service.67 service.67 When London, he he When Secondo Secondo Constantini Constantini returned returned from from his his expense-paid expense-paid junket junket in in London, was was able able to to resume resume supplying supplying classified classified British British documents documents to to his his brother brother Francesco, Francesco, who on for illegal residency who passed passed them them on for copying copying by by both both Akselrod's Akselrods illegal residency and and Italian Italian intelligence les. The intelligence before before returning returning them them to to embassy embassy fi files. The Centre Centre regarded regarded the the whole whole improbable story of Constantini's continued access to embassy files after Vivian's improbable story of Constantinis continued access to embassy files after Vivians investigation investigation as as deeply deeply suspicious. suspicious.Unable Unable to to comprehend comprehend the the naivety naivety of of the the British British foreign foreign service service in in matters matters of of embassy embassy security, security, it it suspected suspected instead instead some some deep-laid deep-laid plot plot by by British British andlor andor Italian Italian intelligence. intelligence. Regular Regular meetings meetings with with Francesco Francesco Con Constantini stantini were were suspended suspended in in August August 1937.68 1937.68 obtained obtained from from the the Constantini Constantini brothers, brothers, Captain Captain King King and and other passed to other agents agents in in Western Western embassies embassies and and foreign foreign ministries ministries was was passed to the the most most secret Department SIGINT secret section section of of Soviet Soviet intelligence, intelligence, a a joint joint OGPU/Fourth OGPU/Fourth Department SIGINT unit unit housed housed not not in in the the Lubyanka Lubyanka but but in in the the Foreign Foreign Mfairs Affairs building building on on Kuznetsky Kuznetsky Bridge. unit inin 1933, Bridge. According According to to Evdokia Evdokia Kartseva Kartseva (later (later Petrova), Petrova), who who joined joinedthe the unit 1933,
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its personnel personnel were were forbidden forbidden to to reveal reveal even eventhe the location of their their office office to to their theirclosest closest its location of relative^.^^ Like Like most most young young women women in in the the unit, unit, Kartseva Kartseva was was terrified terrified of of its its head, head, relatives.69 Gleb Ivanovich Ivanovich Boky, Boky, who who had had made made his his reputation reputation first first in in conducting conducting the the "Red Red TerGleb Ter ror in in Petrograd Petrograd in in 1918, then in in terrorizing terrorizing Turkestan Turkestan later later in in the civilwar.7o ror" 1918, then the civil war.70 Though in in his his mid-fifties, mid-fifties, Boky still prided on his his sexual Though Boky still prided himself himself on sexual athleticism athleticism and and arranged group group sex sex weekends weekends at at his his dacha. Kartseva lived lived in in.fear fear of of being invited to to arranged dacha. Kartseva being invited the orgies. night shift, shift, when when she she felt felt most vulnerable, she she wore wore her her the orgies. During During the the night most vulnerable, plainest and and dullest dullest clothes for fear fear of attracting [Bokys] unwelcome attention.'m attenti~n.~ "plainest clothes for of attracting [Boky's] unwelcome Despite the thepersonal personal depravity depravity of of its its chief, the combined combined OGPU/Fourth OGPU/Fourth Depart DepartDespite chief, the ment unit was the worlds largest and best-resourced SIGINT agency. agency. In particular, ment unit was the world's largest and best-resourced SIGINT In particular, thanks to toBystroletov Bystroletov and and others, others, it it received received more more assistance assistance from from espionage espionage than than any any thanks similar agency agency in in the theWest. West. The The records seen by by Mitrokhin show that that Bokys was similar records seen Mitrokhin show Boky's unit unit was able to to decrypt at least least some some of of the the diplomatic diplomatic traffic traffic of of Britain, Britain, Austria, Austria, Germany Germany able decrypt at and Italy.72 Italy.72Other Other evidence evidence shows showsthat that Boky's Bokys unit unit was was also alsoable able to to decrypt decrypt some some Jap Japand anese, and-almost certainly-American7 and French75 French7 cables. Westanese, Turkish73 and-almost certainly-American74 and cables. No No West ern SIGINT SIGINT agency agency during during the the 1930s 1930s seems seems to to have have collected collected so so much political and and ern much political diplomatic intelligence. intelligence. diplomatic The unavailability unavailability of of most most of of the the decrypts decrypts produced produced by by Boky's Bokysunit unit makes makes detailed detailed The analysis of of their their influence influence on on Soviet Soviet foreign foreign policy policy impossible. impossible. Soviet Soviet SIGINT sucanalysis SIGINT suc cesses, included important important Japanese Japanese decrypts decrypts on on the negotiation of of the the cesses, however, however, included the negotiation Anti-Comintern Pact Pact between between Germany Germany and and Japan. Japan. The The published published version version of of the the Anti-Comintern Pact, concluded concluded in in November November 1936, 1936, merely merely provided provided for for an an exchange exchange of of information information Pact, on Comintern activities on Comintern activities and and cooperation cooperation on on preventive preventive measures measures against against them. them. A A secret protocol, protocol, however, signatories became became the of secret however, added added that that if if either either of ofthe the signatories the victim victim of "an an unprovoked unprovoked [Soviet] [Soviet] attack attack or or threat threat of of attack," attack, both both would would immediately immediately consult consult together together on on the the action action to to take take and and do do "nothing nothing to to ease ease the the situation situation of of the the USSR." USSR. Moscow, unsurprisingly, unsurprisingly, read read sinister sinister intentions intentions into this tortuous tortuous formula, formula, though though Moscow, into this Japan was, in anxious not be drawn Japan was, in reality, reality, still still anxious not to to be drawn into into a a European European war war and and had had no no intention of concluding concluding a a military military alliance. alliance. Three Three days days after after the the signing signing of of the the Anti Antiintention of Comintern Pact, Litvinov Litvinov publicly publicly announced in a a speech speech to to a a Congress Congress of of Soviets Soviets Comintern Pact, announced in that speech also that Moscow Moscow knew knew its its secret secret protocol. protocol. His His speech also contained contained a a curious curious veiled veiled allusion allusion to to codebreaking: codebreaking:
It it is assumed by the German-Japanese It is is not not surprising surprising that that it is assumed by many many that that the German-Japanese agreement in agreement is is written writtenin a a special special code code in in which which anti-Communism anti-Communism means means something something entirely entirely different different from from the the dictionary dictionary definition definition of of this this word, word, and and that that people people decipher decipher this this code code in in different different ways.76 ways.76 The The success success of of Boky's Bokys unit unit in indecrypting decrypting Italian Italian diplomatic diplomatic traffic traffic probably probably provided provided intelligence on Italy's decision to join the Anti-Comintern Pact in the following intelligence on Italys decision to join the Anti-Comintern Pact in thefollowing year. year.
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penetration codebreakers, as primitive Foreign penetration agents agents and and codebreakers, as well well as as to to primitive Foreign Office intelligence was gather vastly intelligence on Office security, security, Soviet Soviet intelligence was able able to to gather vastly more more intelligence on the the foreign policy of main Western target, Great Great Britain, Britain, than the much foreign policy of its its main Western target, than the much smaller smaller

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British able to n Soviet British intelligence intelligence community community was wasable to obtain obtain o on Soviet policy. policy. Since Since 1927 1927 British British codebreakers codebreakers had had been been unable unable to to decrypt decrypt any any high-level high-level Soviet Soviet communica communications tions (though (though they they had had some some success successwith with the the less less sophisticated sophisticated Comintern Comintern ciphers). ciphers). SIS British SIS did did not not even even possess possessa a Moscow Moscow station. station. In In 1936 1936the the British ambassador, ambassador,Viscount Viscount Chilston, grounds would Chilston, vetoed vetoed a a proposal proposal to to establish establish one one on onthe the grounds that that itit would be be "liable liableto to cause cause severe severeembarrassment." embarrassment. But But without withoutan an SIS SIS presence presence he he despaired despaired of of discover discovering ing anything anythingof of importance importance about about Soviet Soviet policy-making.77 p~licy-making.~~ The The Soviet Soviet capacity capacity to to understand understand the the political political and and diplomatic diplomatic intelligence intelligence it it col collected, however, never approached its ability to collect that intelligence in the fi rst lected, however, never approached its ability to collect that intelligence in the first place. place. Its Its natural natural tendency tendency to to substitute substitute conspiracy conspiracy theory theory for for pragmatic pragmatic analysis analysis when when assessing assessing the the intentions intentions of of the the encircling encircling imperialist imperialist powers powers was was made made worse worse during 930s by during the the 1 1930s by Stalin's Stalins increasing increasing tendency tendency to to act act as as his his own own intelligence intelligence ana analyst. others, which lyst. Stalin, Stalin, indeed, indeed, actively actively discouraged discouraged intelligence intelligence analysis analysis by by others, which he he condemned condemned as as "dangerous dangerousguesswork." guesswork."Don't Donttell tell me me what what you you think," think, he heis is reported reported to to have have said. said. "Give Give me me the the facts facts and and the the source!" source!As As a a result, result, IN I N0 0 had had no no analytical analytical department. department. Intelligence Intelligence reports reports throughout throughout and and even even beyond beyond the the Stalin Stalin era era charac characteristically teristically consisted consisted of of compilations compilations of of relevant relevant information information on on particular particular topics topics with with little argument or analysis.78 Those who compiled them increasingly feared for their little argument or analysis.7sThose who compiled them increasingly feared for their life life expectancy expectancy if if they they failed failed to to tell tell Stalin Stalin what what he he expected expected to to hear. hear. Their Their main main pri priority ority as as they they trawled trawled through through the the Centre's Centres treasure treasure trove trove of of British British diplomatic diplomatic docu documents ments and and decrypts decrypts was was to to discover discover the the anti-Soviet anti-Soviet conspiracies conspiracies which which Comrade Comrade Stalin, "Lenin's outstanding pupil, the best son of the Bolshevik Party, the Stalin, Lenins outstanding pupil, the best son of the Bolshevik Party, the worthy worthy successor knew successor and and great great continuer continuer of of Lenin's Lenins cause," cause, knew were were there. there. The The main main function function of of Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence intelligence was was thus thus to to reinforce reinforce rather rather than than to to challenge challenge Stalin's Stalins misunderstanding misunderstanding of of the the West. West. A A characteristic characteristic example example of of the the Centre's Centresdistorted distorted but butpolitically politicallycorrect correct presenta presentation tion of of important important intelligence intelligence was was its its treatment treatment of of the the Foreign Foreign Office Office record record of of the the meeting 1935 Anthony Eden and meeting in in March March 1935between between Sir SirJohn John Simon, Simon, Anthony Eden and Adolf Adolf Hitler Hitler in in Berlin. Berlin. Copies Copies of of the the minutes minutes were were supplied supplied both both by by Captain Captain King King in in the the Foreign Foreign Offi ce and the Rome Nine Office and by by Francesco Francesco Constantini Constantini in in the Rome embassy.79 emba~sy.~ Nine days days before before the the meeting, post-First World World War War Treaty meeting, in in defiance defiance of of the the post-First Treaty of of Versailles, Versailles, Hitler Hitler had had announced introduction of the meeting-the rst announced the the introduction of conscription. conscription. The The fact fact that that the meeting-the fi first between between Hitler Hitler and and a a British British foreign foreign secretary-went secretary-went ahead ahead at at all all was, was, in in itself, itself, cause cause for for suspicion suspicion in in Moscow. Moscow. On O n the the British British side side the the talks talks were were mainly mainly exploratory-to exploratory-to discover what the extent of Hitler's demands for the revision of the discover what the extent of Hitlers demands for the revision of the Treaty Treaty of of Ver Versailles sailles really really was, was, and and what what prospect prospect there there was was of of accommodating accommodating them. them. Moscow, Moscow, however, however,saw sawgrounds grounds for for deep deep suspicion. suspicion.While While disclaiming disclaiming any any intention intention of of attack attacking ing the theSoviet Soviet Union, Union, Hitler Hitlerclaimed claimed that that there there was was a a distinct distinct danger danger of of Russia Russia start starting a war, one day ing a war, and and declared declared himself himself "firmly firmly convinced convinced that that one day cooperation cooperation and and solidarity would be urgently necessary to defend Europe against the . . . Bolshevik solidarity would be urgently necessary to defend Europe against the . . . Bolshevik menace." Eden showed the slightest menace. Simon Simon and and Eden showed not not the slightest interest interest in in an an anti-Bolshevik anti-Bolshevik agreement, of diplomatic diplomatic pleasantries pleasantries had had sin sinagreement, but but their theirfairly fairly conventional conventional exchange exchange of ister the Foreign ister overtones overtones in in Moscow. Moscow. According According to to the Foreign Office Office record, record, "The The British British Ministers Ministers were were sincerely sincerely thankful thankful for for the the way way in in which which they they had had been been received received in in

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Berlin, and and would would take take away away very very pleasant pleasant memories memories of of the the kindness kindness and and hospitality hospitality Berlin, shown shown them."80 them."" The 23,000 words. The Russian Russian translation translation The British British record record of of the the talks talks ran ran to to over over 23,000 words. The circulated others in came to circulated by by the the Centre Centre to to Stalin Stalin and and others in the the Soviet Soviet leadership leadership came to fewer fewer than 4,000. 4,000. Instead of producing producing a a conventional conventional precis the Centre Centre selected selected a a series of than Instead of precis the series of statements by by Simon, Eden,Hitler Hitler and other participants in in the thetalks, talks, and and assembled statements Simon, Eden, and other participants assembled them into appeared as as a a continuous continuous conversation. conversation. The The significance significance of of some some them intowhat what appeared individual individual statements statements was was thus thus distorted distorted by by removing removing them them from from their their detailed detailed con context. Probably Probably at at the thetime, time, certainly certainly subsequently, subsequently,one one of of Simon's Simon's comments comments was was mis mistext. construed construed as as giving giving Germany Germany carte blanche to to take take over over Austria.81 Austria." Doubtless in theories, the the Doubtless in line line with with Stalin's Stalin's own own conspiracy conspiracy theories, the Centre Centre interpreted interpreted the visit Simon and Eden to Berlin as series of of meetings at which visit by by Simon and Eden toBerlin as the the first first in in aaseries meetings at which British British statesmen statesmen not not only only sought sought to to appease appease Hitler Hitler but but gave gave him him encouragement encouragement to to attack attack Russia.82In In reality, reality, though though some would have have been been content to see see Russia.82 some British British diplomats diplomats would content to the their own accord, no foreign secretary secretary and the two two dictators dictators come come to to blows blows of of their own accord, no British British foreign and no British British government government would would have have contemplated contemplated orchestrating orchestrating such such a a conflict. conflict. The The no conspiracy theories theories which which were were born born in Stalin's Moscow Moscow in 1930s, however, however, conspiracy in Stalin's in the the 1930s, have-remarkably-survived the An SVR SVR official history pubpub official history have-remarkably-survived the end endof of the the Soviet Soviet era. era. An lished lished in in 1997 1997 insists insists that that the themany many volumes volumes of of published published Foreign Foreign Office Office documents documents as in the the Public Public Record Record Office as well well as as the the even even more more voluminous voluminous unpublished unpublished files files in Office cannot it maintains, maintains, is con cannot be be relied reliedupon. upon. The The British British government, government, it is still still engaged engaged in in aaconspiracy reveal the spiracy to to conceal conceal the the existence existence of of documents documents which which reveal the terrible terrible truth truth . about about British British foreign foreign policy policy before before the the Second Second World World War: War:
Some the negotiations of British Some documents documents from from the the 1930s 1930s having having to to do dowith with the negotiations of British leaders Germany, including leaders with with the thehighest highest leadership leadership of of Fascist Fascist Germany, including directly directly with with Hitler, been kept secret archives Hitler, have have been kept to to this this day day in in secret archives of of the the British British Foreign Foreign Office. British do thethe indiscreet peering peering at proof pol Office. The The British do not notwant want indiscreet at the the proof of of their their policy of of collusion collusion with with Hitler Hitlerand and spurring spurring Germany Germany on ontoto eastern icy its its eastern ~ampaign.'~ campaign.83

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mong the select group of inter-war heroes of foreign intelligence whose portraits hang Memory Room hang today today on on the thewalls walls of of the the SVR's SVRs Memory Room at at Yasenevo Yasenevo is isthe the Austrian Austrian Jew Jew Arnold most talented talented of Illegals. According Arnold Deutsch, Deutsch,probably probably the the most of all all the the Great GreatIllegals. According to to an an SVR SVR official official eulogy, eulogy, the the portrait portrait immediately immediately "attracts attracts the the visitor's visitors attention" attentionto to "its its intelligent, penetrating penetrating eyes, eyes, and and strong-willed strong-willed countenance." countenance. Deutsch's Deutschs role as an an intelligent, role as illegal was not KGB until until 1990.1 1990. Even Even now, now, some some illegal was not publicly publicly acknowledged acknowledged by by the the KGB aspects aspects of of his his career career are are considered considered unsuitable unsuitable for for publication publication in in Moscow. Moscow. Deutsch's the most most brilliant in the the history of Soviet Deutschs academic academic career career was was one one of of the brilliant in history of Soviet intelligence. after his intelligence. In In July July 1928, 1928, two two months months after his twenty-fourth twenty-fourth birthday birthday and and less less than than five five years years after after entering entering Vienna Vienna University University as as an an undergraduate, undergraduate, he he was was awarded awarded the the degree of of PhD PhD with with distinction. distinction. Though Though his his thesis thesis had had been been on on chemistry, chemistry, Deutsch Deutsch degree had become deeply had also also become deeply immersed immersed in in philosophy philosophy and and psychology. psychology. His His description description of of himself in in university university documents documents throughout throughout his his student student years years as observant Jew Jew himself as an an observant (mosaisch)2 was the Communist (m~saisch)~ was probably probably intended intended to to conceal conceal his his membership membership of of the Communist Party. Deutsch's religious religious faith to the the Party. Deutschs faith had had been been replaced replaced by by an an ardent ardent commitment commitment to Communist International's Internationals vision vision of of a a new new world world order order which which would would free free the the human human Communist race race from from exploitation exploitation and and alienation. alienation. The The revolutionary revolutionary myth myth image image of of the the world's worlds first worker-peasant both Deutsch Deutsch and later first worker-peasant state state blinded blinded both and the the ideological ideological agents agents he he later recruited to the the increasingly increasingly brutal brutal reality reality of of Stalin's Stalins Russia. Russia.Immediately Immediately after after leaving leaving recruited to Vienna University, University, Deutsch Deutsch began work as as a a courier for OMS, OMS, Comintern's Corninterns Vienna began secret secret work courier for international Palestine and international liaison liaison department, department, traveling traveling to to Romania, Romania, Greece, Greece, Palestine and Syria. Syria. His Austrian Austrian wife, wife, Josefine, Josefine, whom whom he he married married in in 1929, 1929, was was also also recruited recruited by by OMS.3 OMS.3 His Deutsch's Deutschs vision vision of of a a new new world world order order included included sexual sexual as as well well as as political political libera liberation. the time time he he began he became became publicly tion. At At about about the began covert covert work work for for Comintern, Comintern, he publicly involved involved in in the the "sex-pol" sex-pol (sexual (sexualpolitics) politics) movement, movement, founded founded by by the the German German Com Communist bring munist psychologist psychologist and and sexologist sexologist Wilhelm Wilhelm Reich, Reich, which which opened opened clinics clinics to to bring birth control sexual enlightenment enlightenment to worker^.^ At At this this stage stage of of his birth control and and sexual to Viennese Viennese workers.4 his career, Reich Reich was was engaged engaged in in an an ambitious ambitious attempt attempt to to integrate integrate Freudianism Freudianism with with career, Marxism and in stages of program on on human sexual Marxism and in the the early early stages of an an eccentric eccentric research research program human sexual behavior which which later earned him him an an undeserved undeserved reputation reputation as as "the the prophet prophetof of betbehavior later earned thethe bet ter orgasm."5 ~rgasm. Deutsch ~ enthusiastically embraced embraced Reich's Reichs teaching teaching that that political political and and ter Deutsch enthusiastically

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sexual repression repression were were different different sides sides of ofthe the same same cq. c,oin,and~together paved the sexual ip a,p.9:,together paved the way way for for fascism. Munster Verlag Vienna which published Reich's fascism. He H e ran ran the the Munster Verlag in in Vienna which published Reichs work work and and other "sex-pol" sex-pol literature.6 literature.6 Though Though the police were were probably probably unaware unaware of of other the Viennese Viennese police Deutschs secret secretwork work for for OMS, its anti-pornography anti-pornography section section took took a keen interest interest in in Deutsch's OMS, its a keen his involvement involvement with with the the"sex-pol" sex-polmovement. movement. his 7 Remarkably, Deutsch Deutsch combined, combined, at at least for a a few years, his role as as an Remarkably, least for few years, his role an open open discidisci ple of Reich with with secret secret work work as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. In In 1932 1932 he was transferred transferred from from ple of Reich he was OMS to tothe the INO, INO, and and trained trained in Moscow as as an an OGPU OGPU illegal illegal with with the the alias alias Stefan OMS in Moscow "Stefan Lange and the codename codename STEFAN. STEFAN. (Later, (Later, he he also also used the codename codename OTTO.) Lange" and the used the OTTO.) His first first posting posting was was in in France, France, where where he he established established secret secret crossing crossing points points on on the the His Belgian, Dutch Dutch and and German German borders, borders, and and made made preparations preparations to to install install radio radio equip equipBelgian, ment on French ment on French fishing fishing boats boats to to be be used used for for OGPU OGPU communications communications in in times times of of war.* Deutsch Deutsch owed owed his his posthumous posthumous promotion promotion to to the the ranks ranks of of KGB KGB immortals immortals to to war.s his his second second posting posting in in England. England. The rules rules protecting protecting the the identities identities and and legends legends of of illegals illegals in in the the mid-1930s mid-1930s were were The far less rigid than they Early in 1934 Deutsch far less rigid and and elaborate elaborate than they were were to to become become later. later. Early in 1934 Deutsch traveled traveled to to London London under under his his real real name, name, giving giving his his profession profession as as "university university lecturer" lecturer and using his academic credentials circles. After and using his academic credentials to to mix mix in in uniyersity university circles. After living living in in tempo temporary heartland of rary accommodation, accommodation, he he moved moved to to a a flat flat in in Lawn Lawn Road, Road, Hampstead, Hampstead, the theheartland of London's Londons radical radical intelligentsia. intelligentsia. The The "Lawn Lawn Road Road Flats," Flats, as as they they were were then then known, known, were be built built in were the the first first "deck-access" deck-accessapartments apartments with withexternal external walkways walkways to to be in England England (a (a type type of of construction construction later later imitated imitated in in countless countless blocks. blocks. of ofco;-til council flats) flats) and, and, at at the the time, Hampstead's most most avant-garde Deutsch moved time, were were probably probably Hampsteads avant-garde building. building. Deutsch moved into into number 7, next next to to a a flat flat owned owned by by the the celebrated celebrated crime crime novelist novelist Agatha Christie,then then number 7, Agatha Christie, is tempting Deutsch and writing Murder on the Orient Express. Express. Though Though it itis tempting to to imagine imagine Deutsch and writing Murder Christie plot of never have have met. Christie discussing discussing the the plot of her her latest latest novel, novel, they they may may never met. Christie Christie lived elsewhere and 1930s. lived elsewhere and probably probably visited visited Lawn Lawn Road Road rarely, rarely, if if at at all, all, in in the the midmid-1930s. Deutsch, is likely likely to a low While the Deutsch, in in any any case, case, is to have have kept kept a low profile. profile. While the front front doors doors of of most which most flats flats were were visible visible from from the the street, street, Deutsch's Deutschs was wasconcealed concealed by by a a stairwell stairwell which made enter and leave unobserved.9, u1].obsrved.9 Deutsch made it it possible possible for for him him and and his his visitors visitors to to enter and .leave Deutsch strengthened by taking strengthened his his academic academic cover cover by taking a a postgraduate postgraduate course course in in psychology psychology at at London University part-time teaching.10 was joined joined by London University and and possibly possibly by by part-time teaching. In In 1935 1935 he he was by his been trained radio operator.ll his wife, wife, who who had had been trained in in Moscow Moscow as as a a radio operator. KGB during his the recruitment KGB files files credit credit Deutsch Deutsch during his British British posting posting with with the recruitment of of twenty of twenty-nine.12 twenty-nineY By far the most celebrated twenty agents agents and and contact contact with with a a total total of By far the most celebrated of of these five young these agents agents were were a a group group of of five young Cambridge Cambridge graduates, graduates, who who by by the the Second Second World Anhny Blunt, Burgess, World War Warwere were known known in in the the Centre Centreas as "The The Five": Five: Anthony Blunt,Guy Guy Burgess, John Philby. After the release the enor John Cairncross, Cairncross, Donald Donald Maclean Maclean and and Kim Kim Philby. After the release of of the enormously Magnificent Seven referred to mously popular popular Western Western The Magnzjknt Seven in in 1960, 1960,they they were were often often referred to success was was . his as the the "Magnificent Magnificent Five." Five. The The key key to to Deutsch's Deutschs success his new new strategy strategy of of as recruitment, based on high recruitment, approved approved by by the the Centre, Centre,based on the thecultivation cultivation of of young young radical radical highfliers leading universities universities before entered the corridors of fliers from from leading before . they they entered the corridors of power. power. As As Deutsch Deutsch wrote wrote to to the the Centre: Centre:

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Given Given that that the the Communist Communist movement movement in in these these universities universities is is on on a a mass mass scale scale and thatthere there is constant turnover and that is a a constant turnover of of students, students, it it follows follows that that individual individual Communists pluck out remain will pass unnoticed, Communists whom whomwe we pluck out of of the the Party Partyremain will pass unnoticed, both both by the Party itself and by the outside world. People forget about them. And by the Party itself and by the outside world. People forget about them. And if if at time they once Communists, at some some time they do do remember remember that that they they were were once Communists, this thiswill will be be put put down down to to a a passing passing fancy fancy of of youth, youth, especially especially as as those those concerned concerned are are scions scions of a new of the the bourgeoisie. bourgeoisie. It It is is up up to to us us to to give give the the individual individual [recruit] [recruit] a new [non [nonCommunist] communist] political political personality.13 per~onality.~

Since the the universities universities of of Oxford Oxford and andCambridge Cambridge provided a a disproportionate disproportionate number number Since provided of Whitehall's Whitehalls highest highest fliers, fliers, it it was was plainly plainly logical logical to to target target Oxbridge Oxbridge rather rather than than the the of red brick universities elsewhere. elsewhere.The The fact fact that that the the new new recruitment recruitment was was based based chiefly chiefly red brick universities on Cambridge Cambridge rather rather than than Oxford Oxford was was due due largely largely to to chance: chance: the the fact fact that that the the first on first potential recruit to come to Deutsch's Deutschs attention, attention, Kim Kim Philby, Philby, was a graduate graduate ofTrin ofTrinpotential recruit to come to was a ity College, College, Cambridge. Cambridge. Of Of the theother members of of the theMagnificent Five, all all ity other members "Magnificent Five," recruited as as a a direct or indirect indirect consequence consequence of of Philby's Philbys own own recruitment, recruitment, three recruited direct or three (Blunt, Burgess Burgess and Cairncross) also also came from Trinity Trinity College College and and the the fourth (Blunt, and Cairncross) came from fourth (Maclean) from from the the neighboring neighboring Trinity Trinity Hall.14 Hall.14 (Maclean) Deutschs recruitment recruitment strategy strategy was was to to prove prove a a spectacular spectacular success. success. By the early early Deutsch's By the years years of of the the Second Second World World War Warall all of of the the Five Five were were to to succeed succeed in in penetrating penetrating either either the Foreign Foreign Office Office or or the the intelligence intelligence community. community. The The volume volume of of high-grade high-grade intelli intellithe gence become so gence which which they they supplied supplied was was to to become so large large that that Moscow Moscow sometimes sometimes had had dif difficulty coping with it. it. ficulty coping with Cambridge in in June June 1933 1933 with with the the conviction conviction that that "my my Cambridge life must must be be devoted devoted to to Communism," Communism, Philby Philby spent spent most most of of the the next next year year in in Vienna life Vienna (the Russian Russian acronym acronym of of the the International International Workers Workers Relief Relief working for for the the MOPR (the working Organization) and and acting acting as as a a courier courier for for the the underground underground Austrian Austrian Communist Communist Organization) Party. While While in in Vienna Vienna he he met married a a young young Communist Communist divorcee, divorcee, Litzi Litzi Party.15 met and and married Friedman, after after a a brief but passionate passionate love love affair affair which his first experience Friedman, brief but which included included his first experience of making making love love in in the the snow snow ("actually (actually quite quite warm, warm, once once you you got got used to it, he later later of used to it," he recalled).16 The first first to to identify identify Philby's Philbys potential potential as as a a Soviet Soviet agent-and agent-and probably probably to recalled).16 The to draw him to Arnold Deutsch-was Litzi's friend Edith Suschitsky, draw him to the the attention attention of of Arnold Deutsch-was Litzis friend Edith Suschitsky, who was was herself herself recruited recruited by by Deutsch and given given the the unimaginative unimaginative codename codename who Deutsch and EDITH.I7 EDITH. 17 In May May 1934 1934 Kim Kim and and Litzi Litzi Philby Philby returned returned to to London, London, arriving arriving some some weeks weeks after after In Deutsch. Several Several months months earlier earlier Edith Edith Suschitsky Suschitsky had had also also taken taken up up residence in Deutsch. residence in London, marrying marrying another another recruit recruit of of Deutsch's, Deutschs, an an English English doctor doctor named named Alex Alex London, Tudor Hart. Hart. The The newly newly married married couple couple were were given the joint joint codename codename STRELA STRELA Tudor given the (Arr~w).~~ June In 1934 1934 Edith Tudor Hart Philby to to his his first first meeting meeting with with ("Arrow") .18 In June Edith Tudor Hart took took Philby Deutsch on on aabench bench in in Regents Park, London. London. According to a alater later memoir memoir written Deutsch Regent's Park, According to written by Philby Philby for for the the KGB, KGB, Deutsch Deutsch instructed instructed him, We need who could could pene peneby him, "We need people people who trate into bourgeois institutions. institutions. Penetrate Penetrate them them for for US!"19 us!? At At this this early early stage, stage, trate intothe the bourgeois however, Deutsch Deutsch did did not not tell tell Philby Philby that that he he was was embarking embarking on on a a career career as as a a Soviet Soviet however,
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agent. the initial agent. Instead, Instead, he he gave gave him him the initial impression impression that that he he was was joining joining Comintern's Cominterns underground war against international Philby's immediate underground war against international fascism. fascism. Philbys immediate task, task, Deutsch Deutsch told him, him, was was to to break break all all visible visiblecontact contact with with the theCommunist Communist Party and to to try win told Party and to try to win the pro-German and not uncomuncom the confidence confidence of of British British pro-German and pro-fascist pro-fascist circles.20 circles.20As As was was not mon codename, given mon at at this this period, period, Philby's Philbys first first codename, given him him immediately immediately after after his his meeting meeting with S OHNCHEN in Germanor or ,SYNOK SYNOK in with Deutsch, Deutsch, had had two two versions: versions: SOHNCHEN in German in Rus Russian-both sian-both roughly roughly equivalent equivalent to to "Sonny" Sonnyin in English.21 EnglishS2 Half man he he Half a a century century later, later, Philby Philby still still remembered remembered his his first first meeting meeting with with the the man knew as as "Otto" Ottoas amazing: knew as "amazing": He man. Simply H e was was a a marvelous marvelous man. Simply marvelous. marvelous. I I felt felt that that immediately. immediately. And And [the [the The first first thing thing you you noticed about him were his his eyes. feeling] never never left left me me .. . feeling] . .. The noticed about him were eyes. He than you you and He looked looked at at you you as as if if nothing nothing more more important important in in life life than and talking talking to to you And he marvelous sense of you existed existed at at that that moment moment.. .. .. And he had hada a marvelous sense of humor.22 humor.22 It in the KGB as as ide ideI t is is difficult difficult to to imagine imagine any any other other controller controller in the entire entire history history of of the the KGB ally to the the Cambridge Cambridge Five. Five. Though graduated ally suited suited as as Deutsch Deutsch to Though four four of of the the Five Five graduated from Cambridge with honors,23 Deutsch's academic career from Cambridge with first-class first-class honors,23 Deutschs academic career was was even evenmore more brilliant than understanding of human character his brilliant than theirs, theirs, his his understanding of human character more more profound profound and and his experience combined a a . chrismatic deep experience of of life life much much broader. broader. He H e combined charismatic personality personality and and deep psychological future psychological insight insight with with visionary visionary faith faith in inthe the future of of a a human humanrace race freed freed from from the the exploitation of liberation had all exploitation and and alienation alienation of of the the capitalist capitalist system. system. His His message message of liberation had all the greater appeal appeal to sexual as well as a political the greater to the the Cambridge CambridgeFive Five because because it it had had a a sexual as well as a political sexual mores dimension. dimension. All the the Five Five were were rebels rebels against against the the strict strict sexual mores as as ell well as as the the anti antiquated system of Blunt were quated class classsystem of inter-war inter-war Britain. Britain. Burgess Burgess and and Blunt were homosexuals, homosexuals, Maclean Cairncross, a Maclean a a bisexual bisexual and and Philby Philby a a heterosexual heterosexual athlete. athlete. Cairncross, a committed committed het heterosexual, erosexual, later later wrote wrote a a history history of of polygamy polygamywhich which concluded concluded with with a a quotation quotation from from George a 10 a first-rate first-rate George Bernard Bernard Shaw: Shaw: "Women Women will will always always prefer prefer a 10 percent percent share share of of a man man."24 Cairncross himself man to to sole sole ownership ownership of of a a mediocre mediocre man,24 Cairncross plainly plainly considered considered himself first-rate rather rather than than mediocre. mediocre. Graham Graham Greene Greene was was charmed charmed by by Cairncross's Cairncrosss book. first-rate book. "Here appeal strongly Here at at last," last, he he wrote wrote to to Cairncross, Cairncross, "is is a a book book which which will will appeal strongly to to all all polygamists. "25 polygarni~ts.~~ During as an During almost almost four four years years as an illegal illegal controlling controlling British British agents, agents, Deutsch Deutsch served served under residents, each of whom under aavariety under three three illegal illegal residents, each of whom operated operated under variety of of aliases: aliases: Ignati Ignati Reif, codenamed MARR; Reif, codenamed MARR; Aleksandr Aleksandr Orlov, Orlov, codenamed codenamed SCHWED SCHWED ("Swede"); (Swede);and and Teodor THEO and MANN. By Teodor Maly, Maly, successively successivelycodenamed codenamed PAUL, PAUL,THE0 and MANN. By 1938 1938 all all three three were imaginary crimes. were to to become become victims victims of of the the Terror. Terror. Reif Reif and and Maly Maly were were shot shot for for imaginary crimes. Orlov to North America, Orlov defected defected just just in intime time to North America, securing securing his his survival survival by by threatening threatening to to arrange be pursued pursued arrange for for the the revelation revelation of of all allhe he knew knew abo.ut abo.ut Soviet Soviet epionage espionage should should he he be by a KGB/SVR-sponsored by an an NKVD NKVD assassination assassination squad.26 squad.26Somewhat Somewhat misleadingly, misleadingly, a KGBISVR-sponsored biography he was biography of of Orlov Orlov published published in in 1993 1993claimed claimed that that-he was "the the maste mastermind responmil1d" respon sible There two reasons sible for for the the recruitment recruitment of of the the Cambridge Cambridgeagents.27 agents.27 There are are probably probably two reasons for nomenklatura senior senior for this this exaggeration. exaggeration.The The first first is is hierarchical. hierarchical.Within Within the theSoviet Soviet nomenkZaatz/ra bureaucrats commonly commonly claimed, claimed, and and were were accorded, accorded, the the credit credit for for their theirsubordinates' subordinates bureaucrats

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successes. involved in successes. The The claim claim that that Orlov, Orlov, the the most most senior senior intelligence intelligence officer officer involved in British British operations operations in in the the 1930s, 1930s, "recruited" "recruited" Philby Philby is is a a characteristic characteristic example example of of this this common common phenomenon.28 phenomenon.2gBut But there thereare are also alsomore more contemporary contemporary reasons reasons for for the theinfla inflation of of Orlov's Orlov's historical historical importance. importance. It tion It suits suits the the SVR, SVR,which which sees sees itself itself as as the the inher inheritor of the finest finest traditions the KGB Chief Directorate, itorofthe traditions of ofthe KGB First FirstChief Directorate, to to seek seek to to demonstrate demonstrate the thefoolishness foolishness of of Western Western intelligence intelligence and and security security services services by by claiming claiming that they they failed failed for for over over thirty thirty years years to to notice notice that that the the leading leading recruiter recruiter of of the the Cam Camthat bridge bridge Five Five and and other other agents agents was was living living under under their their noses noses in in the the United United States. States. For For several years yearsbefore before his death in in 1973, 1973,the theKGB KGB tried tried to to persuade persuade Orlov Orlov to to return returnto to several his death a at and a comfortable comfortable fl flat and generous generous pension pension in in Russia, Russia, where where he he would would doubtless doubtless have have been portrayed for been portrayed for propaganda propaganda purposes purposes as as a a man man who, who, despite despite being being forced forced to to flee flee from Stalin's Stalin's Terror, Terror, had-like had-likePhilby-"kept faith with Lenin's Revolution" Revolution" and and from Philby-"kept faith with Lenin's used his his superior superior intelligence intelligence training training to take in in Western intelligence agencies agencies for for used to take Western intelligence many many years.29 years.29 In reality, reality, Orlov Orlov spent spentonly only just over a a year year in in London-ten London-ten days in July July 1934, 1934, fol folIn just over days in lowed by the October 1935.30 lowed by the period period from from September September 1934 1934 to to October 1935.30During During that that period period Deutsch, was Deutsch, who who was subordinate subordinate in in rank rankto to Orlov, Orlov, had had to to seek seek his his approval approval for for his his intel intelligence operations. O n occasion Orlov took initiative in in giving giving instructions instructions to to ligence operations. On occasion Orlov took the the initiative Deutsch. But the thefiles files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin make make clear clear that that the the grand grand strategy which which Deutsch. But strategy led to of Philby and led to the thetargeting targeting of Philby and other otheryoung young Cambridge Cambridge high-fliers high-fliers was was devised devisednot not by Orlov Orlov but but by Deutsch.31 D e ~ t s c h . And, And, ~ ' as as Philby Philby himself himself acknowledged, acknowledged, no no other othercontroller controller by by equaled equaled Deutsch's Deutsch's tactical tactical skill skill in in implementing implementing that thatstrategy. strategy. Philby's first major service to Soviet intelligence was was to to direct Deutsch to Philby's first major service to Soviet intelligence direct Deutsch to two two other potential Cambridge recruits, Maclean and Guy Burgess.32 If not not other potential Cambridge recruits, Donald Donald Maclean and Guy Burgess.32 If already already a a committed committed Communist Communist by by the the time time he he entered entered Trinity Trinity Hall, Hall,Cambridge, Cambridge, in in 193 1 , Donald became 1931, DonaldMaclean Maclean became one one during duringhis his first first year. year. As As the the handsome, handsome, academ academically gifted gifted son son of of a a former former Liberal Liberal cabinet cabinet minister, minister, Maclean Maclean must must have have seemed seemed to to ically Deutsch an an almost almost ideal ideal candidate candidate to to penetrate penetrate the corridors of of power. power. O n his gradDeutsch the corridors On his grad uation with with first-class first-class honors in modern modern languages languages in in June June 1934, 1934, however, however, Maclean Maclean uation honors in showed no no immediate immediatesign sign of of wanting wantinga career career a in Whitehall. Whitehall.His His ambition ambition was was either either showed in to teach teach English English in in the the Soviet Soviet Union Union or or to to stay stay at at Cambridge Cambridge to towork work for for a a PhD. PhD. In In to the course course of of the the summer summer he he changed changed his his mind, mind, telling telling his his mother mother that that he he intended intended the to That to prepare prepare for for the the Foreign Foreign Office Office entrance entrance examinations examinations in in the the following following year.33 year.33 That change of of heart heart reflected reflected the the influence influence of of Deutsch. Deutsch. The The first first approach approach to to Maclean Maclean change was in August been was made made through through Philby Philby in August 1934. 1933. Deutsch Deutsch reported reported that that Phi1by Philby had had been ' to meet Maclean, discuss discuss his his job job prospects prospects and and contacts contacts and and ask ask him him to ,'instructed instructed to meet Maclean, to open Communist Party Party and and begin open contact contact with with the the Communist begin work work for for the the NKVD. NKVD. Maclean Maclean agreed. time being, Centre refused agreed. For For the thetime being, however, however, the theCentre refused to to sanction sanction meetings meetings two months months was was between Deutsch Deutsch and and Maclean, Maclean, and and contact contact with with him him for for the the next next two between maintained through through Philby. Philby. Maclean's Maclean'sfirst first codename, like Phi1by's, Philby's, had had two two versions: versions: maintained codename, like WAISE in in German, German, SIROTA SIROTA in inRussian-both Russian-both meaning meaning "Orphan" "Orphan" (an (an allusion allusion to to WAISE the death death of of his his father father two two years years earlier).34 earlier).34 the For stuFor some some months months Guy Guy Burgess, Burgess, then then in in his his second second year year as as a a history history research research stu dent at at Trinity College never to complete, had dent Trinity College preparing preparing a a thesis thesis he he was wasnever to complete, had been been

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enthused by by the the idea idea of of conducting conducting an an underground underground war war against against fascism fascism on on behalf behalf of of enthused the CommunistInternational. International. Ironically, that he soon to the Communist Ironically, in in view view of of the the fact fact that he was was soon to become by the become one one of of the the Magnificent Magnificent Five, Five, he he seems seems to to have have been been inspired inspired by the example example of fergruppen, the secret "groups being formed formed by by German German Commu of the the Fun Fiinfergruppen, the secret groups of of five" five being Communists nists to to organize organize opposition opposition to to Hitler. Hitler. Maclean Maclean was, was, very very probably, probably, among among the the Com Communist munist friends friends with with whom whom he he discussed discussed the the (in (in reality reality rather rather unsuccessful) unsuccesshl) German German groups When been groups of of five.35 five.35 When Maclean Maclean admitted, admitted, against against his his instructions, instructions, that that he he had had been asked was desperate joinhim. him. asked to to engage engage in in secret secret work,36 Burgess Burgesswas desperate for for an an invitation invitation to to join In December December 1934 1934 Maclean Maclean arranged arranged a a fi first meeting between between Deutsch Deutsch and and Bur BurIn rst meeting ge~s.~ Deutsch already knew knew that that Burgess Burgess was wasone one of of the the most most fl flamboyant figures in gess.3? Deutsch already amboyant fi gures in Cambridge: a a brilliant, brilliant, gregarious gregarious conversationalist conversationalist equally equally at at home home with with the the teetotal Cambridge: teetotal intellectual discussions discussions of of the the Apostles, Apostles, the the socially socially exclusive exclusiveand and heavy-drinking intellectual heavy-drinking Pitt Pitt Club and the irreverent satirical revues of the Footlights. H e made no secret either Club and the irreverent satirical revues of the Footlights. He made no secret either of of his Communist Communist sympathies sympathies or or of of his hisenjoyment enjoyment of of the thenillegal illegal pleasures pleasures of homo homohis the then of sexual "rough rough trade" trade with with young young working-class working-class men. sexual men. A A more more doctrinaire doctrinaire and and less less imaginative controller controller than than Deutsch Deutsch might might well well have have concluded concluded that that the the outrageous outrageous imaginative Burgess would would be be a a liability liability rather rather than than an an asset. asset. But well have have sensed sensed Burgess But Deutsch Deutsch may may well that Burgess's Burgesss very very outrageousness outrageousness would would give give him him good, good, if unconventional, cover cover for for that if unconventional, his work work as as a a secret secret agent. agent. No No existing existing stereotype stereotype of of a spyremotely remotely resembled his a Soviet Soviet spy resembled Burgess.38When When invited invited to to join Cominterns underground underground struggle struggle against against fas fasBurgess.38 join the the Comintern's cism, Burgess Burgesstold told Deutsch Deutsch that thathe he was was "honored honored and and ready ready to to sacrifice everything for for cism, sacrifice everything A the cause." cause. His His codename MADCHEN39 (Little Girl, by contrast contrast with with Philby's Philbys the codename M DCHEN39 ("Little Girl," by codename "Sonny") Sonny) was wasan obvious reference referenceto to his codename an obvious his homose-ruality. homosexuality. Deutsch initially initially told told both both Maclean Maclean and and Burgess, Burgess, like like Philby, Philby, that that their their first first task task Deutsch was to to distance distance themselves themselves from from the left and and conform conform to the ideas f the establish. .. was the lft t9 theide, as o of th , ,establish 0 Maclean mentin order to to penetrate penetrateitit successfully.4 successh1ly4 successfully persuaded persuaded his ment in order Maclean successfully his mother, Lady Lady Maclean, Maclean, that gone off" off his his undergraduate undergraduate flirtation flirtation mother, that he he had had rather "rather gone with passed the exams with with Communism. Communism. In In August August 1935 1935 he he passed the Foreign Foreign Office Office exams with flying flying colors. When about his his "Communist views at at Cambridge, Cambridge, Maclean to colors. When asked asked about Communist views" Maclean decided decided to "brazen brazen it it out": out:
.

"Yes," shaken them them off. of" I Yes,I I said, said, "I Idid did have have such such views-and views-and I I haven't havent entirely entirely shaken I think honesty because because they nodded, looked looked at at each each think they they must must have have liked liked my my honesty they nodded, other smiled. Then chairman said: "That:l;k you, all, Mr. other and and smiled. Then the the chairman sed:.., .Thank you, that that will will be be all, Mr. Maclean."41 Ma~lean.~ In October October 1935, 1935, as In as a a new new member member of of His His Majesty's Majestys Diplomatic Diplomatic Service, Service, Maclean Maclean became of the of power. power. became the the first first of the Magnificent Magnificent Five Five to to penetrate penetrate the the corridors corridors of Burgess burying his his Communist past with flamboyance. Burgess went went about aboutburying Communist past with characteristic characteristic flamboyance. Late became personal to the rightwing gay Late in in 1935 1935he he became personal assistant assistant to the young young rightwing gay Conservative Conservative MP Captain Together they went on on fact-finding fact-finding missions missions to to MP Captain "Jack" Jack Macnamara. Macnamara. Together they went Nazi Germany which, which, according consisted largely largely of NaziGermany according to to Burgess, Burgess, consisted of homosexual homosexual escapades like-minded members members of of the the Hitle_ r yqu_ h)urgess built built up remark escapades with with like-minded Hitler YouJh.,Burgess up aaremarkable continental Homintern. "Homintern." Chief was able range range of of contacts contacts among among the the continental Chief among amongthem them was

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Edouard Edouard Daladier, Edouard Pfeiffer, Pfeiffer, chef chef de de cabinet cabinet to to Edouard Daladier, French French war war minister minister from from January 1936 to toMay May 1940 and 1938 to toMarch March 1940. January 1936 1940 and prime prime minister minister from from April April 1938 1940. Burgess Burgess boasted boasted to to friends friends that, that, "He He and and Pfeiffer Pfeiffer and and two two members members of of the the French French cabinet spent an an evening a male in Paris. cabinet .. .. .. had had spent evening together together at at a male brothel brothel in Paris. Singing Singing and and dancing, dancing, they they had had danced danced around around a a table, table, lashing lashing a a naked naked boy, boy, who who was was strapped strapped to to it, it, , , with leather whips. 42 with leather whips.12 In alert at In February February 1935 1935 there there was was a a security security alert at the the London London illegal illegal residency. residency. Rei, Reif, operating under the the alias the operating under alias "Max Max Wolisch," Wolisch, was was summoned summoned for for an an interview interview at at the Home ce and Home Offi Office and observed observed a a large large file file in in the the name name of of Wolisch Wolisch on on his his interviewer's interviewers desk. that the British desk. Orlov Orlov reported reported to to the theCentre Centre that the British authorities authorities appeared appeared to to have have been been "digging digging around around but but could could not not come come up up with with anything anythingand and decided decided to to get getrid rid of of him." him. Reif Reif obeyed obeyed Home Home Office Office instructions instructions to to arrange arrange for for his his prompt prompt departure. departure. Orlov Orlov feared feared that that MIS MIS might might also also be be on on the the trail trail of of Deutsch Deutsch and and announced announced that that as as a a pre precaution by now caution he he was was taking taking personal personal control control of of Philby, Philby, Maclean Maclean and and Burgess, Burgess, by now sometimes sometimes referred referred to to as as the the "Three ThreeMusketeers." Musketeers. Orlov Orlov believed believed that that his his own own cover cover as as an an American American businessman businessman selling selling imported imported refrigerators refrigerators from from an an office office in in Regent Regent Street Street was was still still secure. secure. In In October, October, however, however, there there was was another another security security alert alert when when he he accidentally man who, earlier, had accidentally encountered encountered a a man who, some some years years earlier, had given given him him English English lessons lessons in in Vienna Vienna and and knew knew his his real real identity. identity. Orlov Orlov made made a a hasty hasty exit exit from from London, London, never never to to return, return, leaving leaving Deutsch Deutsch to to resume resume the the running running of of the the Cambridge Cambridge recruits.43 recruits.43 Under Under Deutsch's Deutschs control, control, Philby, Philby, Maclean Maclean and and Burgess Burgess rapidly rapidly graduated graduated as as fully fully fl edged Soviet Soviet agents. fledged agents. They They may may not not have have been been told told explicitly explicitly that that they they were were working working for for the the NKVD NKVD rather rather than than assisting assisting Comintern Comintern in in its itsunderground underground struggle struggle against against fascism, cation. As no longer longer needed needed formal formal notifi notification. As Deutsch Deutsch wrote wrote later later in in a a fascism, but but they they no report Centre, "They report for for the the Centre, They all all know know that that they they are are working working for for the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. This This was was absolutely absolutely understood understood by by them. them. My My relations relations with with them them were were based based upon upon our Party membership." In other words, Deutsch treated them not as subordinate our Party membership. In other words, Deutsch treated them not as subordinate agents agents but but as as comrades comrades working working under under his his guidance guidance in in a a common common cause cause and and for for the the same same ideals. ideals. Later, Later, less less flexible flexible controllers controllers than than Deutsch Deutsch were were unhappy unhappy that that Philby, Philby, Burgess cers, rather Burgess and and Maclean Maclean appeared appeared to to consider consider themselves themselves as as offi officers, rather than thanagents, agents, of lt of Soviet Soviet intelligence.44 intelligence.44 It came came as as a a considerable considerable shock shock to to Philby Philby after after his his defection defection to to Moscow Moscow in in 1963 1963to to discover discover that, that, like like other other foreign foreign agents, agents, he he did did not not possess, possess, and and would cer rank-hence would never never be be allowed allowed to to acquire, acquire, offi officer rank-hence his his various various attempts attempts to to mis mislead Western Western journalists journalists into into believing believing that that he hewas was Colonel, Colonel, or or even even General, General, Philby Philby lead of of the the KGB.45 KGB.45In In his his memoirs, memoirs, published published in in 1968, 1968,Philby Philby repeated repeated the the lie lie that that he he had had offi c er for some thirty-odd years."46 "been a Soviet intelligence been a Soviet intelligence oflcer for some thirty-odd years.46
A FTE R SE EC CU UR IT Y scares scaresof 1935,Deutsch and the the illegal illegal residency residency took took AF R THE S TY of 1935, Deutsch and increased precautions precautions to to evade evade MIS MI5 and and Special Special Branch Branch surveillance. surveillance. Before Before prepar preparincreased a meeting meeting with with an an agent, agent, usually usually in in London, London,Deutsch Deutsch would be be driven driven out out of of ing for for a ing would town, watching carefully to see if the car was being followed. Once satisfied that he town, watching carefully to see if the car was being followed. Once satisfied that he was not not being being tailed, tailed, he he returned returned to to London by public public transport, transport, changing changing several several was London by times en en route. route. During During his his travels travels Deutsch Deutsch concealed concealed film film of of secret secret documents documents inside inside times

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hairbrushes, were hairbrushes, travel travel requisites requisitesand and household household utensils. utensils. Reports Reports to to the theCentre Centre were usu usually ally sent sent in insecret secret ink ink to toan an address address in in Copenhagen Copenhagen for for forwarding forwarding to to Moscow.47 MOSCOW.~~ Though the the KGB KGB and and SVR released released interesting interesting material material in in the theearly early 1990s 1990s on on the the Though "Three anyreference reference to Norman John Klug Three Musketeers," Musketeers, they they avoided avoided any to Norman John ("James") (James) Klugmann, poet John mann, recruited recruited by by Deutsch Deutsch in in 1936.48 1936.* Klugmann Klugmann and and the the young young Marxist Marxist poet John Cornford, the Cornford, "James Jamesand and John," John,were were the two two most most prominent prominent Communist Communist Party Party activists activists in 1937, just in Cambridge. Cambridge. Though Though Cornford Cornford was was killed killed in in the the Spanish Spanish Civil Civil War War in in 1937, just after his his twenty-first twenty-first birthday, birthday, Klugmann Klugmann went went on onto to become become head head of of the the Party's Partys Pro Proafter paganda member of political committee committee (in paganda and and Education Education Department, Department, a a member of the the political (in effect effect its Politburo) Politburo) and and the the Party's Partys official official historian. He He had had become become a a Communist at Gre Greits historian. Communist at sham's shams School, School, Holt, Holt, where where he he had had been been a a friend friend and and contemporary contemporary of of Donald Donald Maclean. Maclean. Klugmann Klugmann won won an an open open scholarship scholarship in in modern modern languages languages to to Trinity Trinity Col College, lege, Maclean Maclean a a slightly slightly less less prestigious prestigious exhibition exhibition to to the the neighboring neighboring Trinity Trinity Hall. Hall. Both to Both graduated graduated with with first-class first-class honors. honors. Like Like Maclean, Maclean, Anthony Anthony Blunt's Blunts conversion conversion to Communism Communism owed owed something something to to Klugmann's Klugmanns influence. influence. Blunt Blunt found found him him "an an extremely extremely good good political political theorist" theorist who who "ran ran the the administration administration of of the the Party Party with with great great skill skill and and energy energy .. .. .. It It was was primarily primarily he he who who decided decided what what organizations organizations and and societies societies in ."49 Klugmann communist^]."^^ Klugmann had had an an in Cambridge Cambridge were were worth worth penetrating penetrating [by [by the the Communists] unshakable unshakable conviction conviction that that British British capitalism capitalismwas was close closeto to collapse. collapse."We We simply simply knew, knew, all of ofus, us, that the therevolution revolutionwas was at at hand," hand,he he later later recalled. recalled. "If If anyone anyone had had suggested suggested it it all that wouldn't wouldnt happen happen in in Britain Britain for for say say thirty thirty years, years, I'd Id have have laughed laughed myself myself sick."50 sick. Since Since Klugmann Klugmann was was one one of of Britain's Britains most most activ active young young Communists, Communists, there there was was little little prospect prospect that, that, like like the the Five, Five, he he could could convincingly convincingly distance distance himself himself from from the the Party Party and and penetrate penetrate the the "bourgeois bourgeois apparatus." apparatus.Deutsch Deutsch saw saw another another role role for for Klug Klugmann: NKVD, capable, mann: as as a a talent-spotter talent-spotter for for the the NKVD, capable, when when necessary, necessary, of of persuading persuading Communist students to engage in underground work rather than conventional Communist students to engage in underground work rather than conventional Party Party militancy. militancy. Before BeforeDeutsch Deutsch recruited recruited Klugmann, Klugmann, the the NKVD obtained obtained the the approval approval of of the the British British Party Party leadership. leadership. There There was was never never any any likelihood likelihood that that the the British British general general secretary, Communist le.:Iders secretary, Harry Harry Pollitt, Pollitt, would would object. object. Like Like most most Western Western Communist leaders he he believed Communist International International required believed that that the the interests interests of of the the Communist required unconditional unconditional support in support for for the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, whatever whatever the the twists twists of of policy policy in the theKremlin. Kremlin. With With Pol Pollitt's litts consent, consent, Klugmann Klugmann was was recruited recruited by by Deutsch Deutsch as as agent agent MER.51 MER. The The refusal refusal by by the 1998 to to admit admit Klugmann's the involvement the SVR until until 1998 Klugmanns recruitment recruitment was was due due to to the involvement of 52 One of the the British British Communist Communist Party. Party.52 One of of the the KGB's KGBs most most closely closely guarded guarded secrets secrets was was the the extent extent to to which, which, as as late late as as the the 1980s, 1980s, it it expected expected the the leaders leaders of of "fraternal fraternal par parties" West to assist tiesin in the the West assist to in in the therecruitment recruitment of of agents agents and and the the fabrication fabrication of of "legends" legends for for its itsillegals.53 illegal^.'^ of appointed Great Illegals, of 1936 1936 the theCentre Centre appointed another another of ofthe the Great Illegals,Teodor Teodor Maly Maly (codenamed (codenamed MANN), MANN), head head of of the the illegal illegal London London residency.54 residencys4 Like Like Deutsch, Deutsch, Maly Maly was was later later included included among among the the intelligence intelligence immortals immortals whose whose portraits portraits hung hung on on the the walls walls of of the the First First Chief Chief Directorate DirectorateMemory MemoryRoom. Room. Hungarian Hungarian by by birth, birth, Maly Maly had had entered entered a a Catholic Catholic monastic monastic order order before before the the First First W()rl World War War but but had had volunvolunIN IN THE S SP PR I NG

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teered teered for for military military service service in in 1914.55 1914. He H e was was taken taken prisoner prisoner while while serving serving as as second second lieutenant in the the Austro-Hungarian Austro-Hungarian army the Russian in 1916, lieutenant in army on on the Russian front front in 1916, and and spent spent the agents: the rest rest of of the thewar war in in aaseries series of of POW camps. camps. Maly Maly later later told told one one of of his his agents:
saw all a l l the the horrors, horrors, young young men men with with frozen frozen limbs limbs dying dying in in the the trenches trenches .. . I saw . .. I lost God and lost my my faith faith in in God and when when the the Revolution Revolution broke broke out out I joined joined the the Bolshe Bolsheviks. Communist and viks. I broke broke with with my my past past completely completely.. .. .. I became became a a Communist and have have always always remained remained one. one?56 was originally originally posted posted to to London London in in January 1936 1936 to torun runthe the Foreign Foreign Office Office Maly was January with clerk Captain with cipher cipher clerk Captain King King (previously (previously controlled controlled by by Pieck), Pieck), to to whom whom he he intro introduced himself himself as as an an executive executive of ofthe the fictitious fictitious Dutch Dutch bank which King King believed believed was was duced bank which paying him for classified documents. In April Maly was appointed illegal resident paying him for classified documents. In April Maly was appointed illegal resident and and henceforth henceforth shared shared with with Deutsch Deutsch in in the the running running of of the the Cambridge Cambridge agents. agents. Like Like Deutsch, he he impressed them with with both both his his human human sympathy sympathy and and his his visionary visionary faith faith Deutsch, impressed them in 57 in the the Communist Communistmillennium. millenni~m.~ During the early early months of 1937 1937 Deutsch Deutsch and and Maly Malycom completed the recruitment recruitment During the months of pleted the of the theMagnificent Magnificent Five. At At the the beginning of the theyear, year, Burgess, Burgess, by then aaproducer producer at at of Five. beginning of by then the BBC, arranged arranged a a first first meeting between Deutsch and Anthony Anthony Blunt, Blunt,French French linthe meeting between Deutsch and lin guist, art art historian and Fellow Fellow of of Trinity Trinity College, College, Cambridge.58 Cambridge.58Though Though the the title title of of guist, historian and Fourth Man" Manlater accorded Blunt was a media invention rather than than aaKGB sobri sobri"Fourth quet, he hewas was both both the thefourth fourth of ofthe the Five to to be berecruited recruited and, and, over over forty forty years years later, later, the quet, Five the fourth to tobe be publicly publicly exposed. exposed. Until Until the thewar war Blunt's Blunts chief chief role role for for the the NKVD was was that that fourth Deutsch, was a wealthy young of talent-spotter. His first recruit, by agreement with Deutsch, American Communist undergraduate at Trinity, MichaelStraight Straight (codenamed NIGEL).59 Shortly Shortly with Deutsch, Deutsch,Blunt Blunt NIGEL).s9 after his own first meeting with invited Straight to his elegant rooms in Trinity. Straight was still shattered by the news a fortnight earlier heros death in the earlier that his close close friend, John Cornford, Cornford, had had died a hero's the Spanish Our friends," friends, Blunt told had Civil War. "Our toldhim, him, had been giving much thought to to his future. "They They have have instructed instructed me me to to tell tell you you .. .. .. what what you you must must do." do. "What What friends?" friends? future. Straight asked. asked. "Our Our friends friends in in the the Communist International, Straight theInternational, International, the Communist International," friends had decided that Straight's Straights duty was to break all all overt Blunt replied. The "friends" connection with with the the Party, Party, get get aajob job Wall Street after his his graduation later that that year year connection in in Wall Street after graduation later and provide Comintern Comintern with with inside inside information. information. Straight Straight protested. protested. Cornford Cornford had and provide had given his his life life for for the the International. told him. him. A few few days days given International. Remember " Remember that, that," Blunt Blunt told later, agreed. "In the course of a week," week, Straight wrote later, I had moved later, Straight agreed. In the later, "I of Cambridge into into aa shadows and echoes." echoes. out of the noisy, crowded world of world of shadows Deutsch,whom whom LonHis only meeting with Deutsch, hehe mistook for a Russian, took place in Lon don just after his graduation. Deutsch asked him for some personal documents. don just after his graduation. Deutsch asked him for some personal documents. two, gave him one half back and told Straight gave him aadrawing. Deutsch tore it in two, halfback the other half half would be returned returned to him him by a man who would contact him in him the York.60 New York.60 Magnificent Five to be recruited, and later the last to be publicly The last of the Magnificent exposed, was the Fifth Man, John Cairncross, a brilliant Scot who in 1934 exposed, "Fifth Man," 1934 had had

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entered at the the age of twenty-one a scholarship n modern entered Trinity Trinity at age of twenty-one with with a scholarship iin modern languages, languages, having having already already studied studied for for two two years years at at Glasgow Glasgow University University and and gained gained a a licence es 2s lel ZetIres His passionate tres at at the the Sorbonne.61 Sorbonne.61His passionate Marxism Marxism led led the the Trinity Trinity Magazine Magazineto to give give him him the Cross," while the nickname nickname "The The Fiery Fiery Cross, while his his remarkable remarkable facility facility as as a a linguist linguist led led the the same same magazine magazine to to complain, complain, "Cairncross Cairncross .. .. .. learns learns a a new new language language every every fort fortnight."62 Among though night.62 Among his his college college teachers teachers in in French French literature literature was was Anthony Anthony Blunt, Blunt, though Cairncross discussed Communism.63 Cairncross later later claimed claimed that that they they never never discussed Communism.63 In In 1936, 1936, after after graduating first-class honors, honors, Cairncross Cairncross passed graduating with with first-class passed top top of of the the Foreign Foreign Office Office entrance entrance examinations, examinations, one one hundred hundred marks marks ahead ahead of of the the next next candidate candidate (though (though he he did did less less well wellat at the theinterview).64 interview).64 After After Blunt Blunt had hadacted acted as as talent-spotter, talent-spotter, the the initial initial approach approach to to Cairncross Cairncross early early in in 1937 to Burgess65-much 1937 was was entrusted entrusted by by Deutsch Deutsch to Burgess65-much asas Philby Philby had had made made the the first first recruitment recruitment overture overture to to Maclean Maclean in in 1934. 1934. The The actual actual recruitment recruitment of of Cairncross Cairncross shortly shortly afterwards afterwards was was entrusted entrusted to to James James Klugmann.66 Klugmann.66On O n April April 9 9 Maly Maly informed informed the Centrethat that Cairncross the Centre Cairncross had had been been formally formally recruited recruited and and given given the the codename codename ERE.67 Had MOLI MOLIERE.67 Had Cairncross Cairncross known known his his codename, codename, he he might mightwell well have have objected objected to to its its transparency transparency but but would would undoubtedly undoubtedly have have found found appropriate appropriate the the choice choice of of his his favorite favorite French French writer, writer, on on whom whom he helater later published published two two scholarly scholarly studies studies in in French. French. E RE was For For reasons reasons not not recorded recorded in in KGB files, files, the the codename codename MOLI MOLIERE was later later replaced replaced by In by that that of of LISZT.68 LISZT.68 In May May Klugmann Klugmann arranged arranged Cairncross's Cairncrosss first first rendezvous rendezvous with with Deutsch. Deutsch. According According to to Cairncross's Cairncrosssadmittedly admittedly unreliable unreliable memoirs, memoirs, the the meeting meeting took took place place one one evening evening in in Regent's Regents Park: Park Suddenly there the trees short, stocky stocky figure Suddenly there emerged emerged from from behind behind the trees a a short, figure aged aged around introduced to around forty, forty, whom whom Klugmann Klugmann introduced to me me as as Otto. Otto. Thereupon, Thereupon, Klug Klugmann 69 mann promptly promptly disappeared disappeared .. .. ..69 Deutsch Deutsch reported reported to to Moscow Moscow that that Cairncross Cairncross "was was very very happy happy that that we we had had estab established lished contact contact with with him him and and was was ready readyto to start startworking working for for us us at at once."70 once.7o Among Among the the pre-Second pre-Second World World War War Foreign Foreign Office Office documents docoments available available to to both both Maclean were Maclean and and Cairncross, Cairncross, and and thus thus to to the theNKVD, NKVD, were what what Cairncross Cairncross described described as as "a Only a wealth wealth of of valuable valuable information information on on the theprogress progress of of the the Civil Civil War War in inSpain."71 Spain.71 Only in in a a few few cases, cases, however, however, is is it it possible possible to to identify identify individual individual documents documents supplied supplied by by Maclean Maclean and and Cairncross Cairncross which which the the Centre Centreforwarded forwarded to to Stalin, Stalin, probably probably in in the the form form of of edited edited extracts.72 extracts.72One One such such document, document, which which seems seems to to have have made made a a particular particular Lord impression impression on on Stalin, Stalin, is is the the record record of of talks talks with with Hitler Hitler in in NoveIl1br November 1937 1937 by by Lord Halifax, Lord President of the Council (who, three months later, was to succeed Halifax, Lord President of the Council (who, three months later, was to succeed Eden visit to Eden as as Foreign Foreign Secretary).73 S e ~ r e t a r y )Halifax's Halifaxs .~~ visit to Hitler's Hitlers mountain mountain lair, lair, the the "Eagle's Eagles Nest" start. As aristocratic Nest at atBerchtesgaden, Berchtesgaden, got got off off to to a a farcical farcical start. Asthe the aristocratic Halifax Halifax stepped stepped from hi. from his his car, car, he he mistook mistook Hitler Hitler for for a a footman footmanand and was was.about about to to hand handhim him his,hat hat afld and The coat coat when when a a German Germanminister minister hissed hissed in in his his ear, ear, "Der DerFuhrer! Fiibrer! Der Der Fuhrer!74 Fiibre~ The f ~ ~Cen Centre, tre, however, however, saw saw the the whole whole meeting meeting as as deeply deeply sinister. sinister. The The extracts extracts from from Halifax's Halifaxs record tailored to record of of his his talks talks with with Hitler, Hitler,tailored to fit fit Stalin's Stalins profound profound distrust distrust of of British British pol policy, Germany as West icy, emphasized emphasized that that Britain Britain viewed viewed Nazi Nazi Germany as "the the bastion bastion of of the the West

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against against Bolshevism" Bolshevism and and would would take take a a sympathetic sympathetic view view of of German German expansion expansion to to the the east.75 regarded as very sincere," east.75Though Though Halifax's Halifaxs assessment assessment of of Hitler, Hitler, whom whom he he regarded as "very sincere, was was lamentably lamentably naive, naive, his his record record of of his his comments comments on on Germany's Germanysrole role in in defending defending the the West West against against Communism Communism were were much much more more qualified qualified than than the the Centre's Centres version version of of them. He them. H e told told Hitler: Hitler:
Although there was much much in in the Nazi system system that that offended offended British opinion Although there was the Nazi British opinion (treatment of of the the Church; perhaps lesser lesser extent, extent, the the treatment of Jews; Jews; (treatment Church; to to a a perhaps treatment of treatment of ofTrade Unions), was not not blind to what whathe he had done for Germany treatment Trade Unions), I was blind to had done for Germany and to to the the achievement achievement from from his his point of view view of of keeping keeping Communism Communism out out of of and point of his his country country and, and,as as he he would would feel, feel, of of blocking blocking its its passage passage West. West. Halifax also also said said nothing nothing to to support supportGerman Germanaggression aggression in in eastern eastern Europe. Europe. Halifax His aim-unrealistic aim-unrealistic though though it it was-was was-was to to turn a good good Euro EuroHis turnHitler Hitlerinto into "a pean by by offering offering him him colonial colonial concessions concessions in in order order to to persuade persuade him him to tolimit limit his pean" his European ambitions ambitions to to those those he he could could achieve achieve peacefully. Halifax made made clear, clear, European peacefully. Halifax however, that that Britain Britain was was prepared to contemplate contemplate the the peaceful peaceful revision revisionofVer of Verhowever, prepared to sailles: sailles: I said doubt .. .. .. questions said that that there there were were no no doubt questions arising arising out out of of the the Versailles Versailles settlement which settlement which seemed seemed to to us us capable capable of of causing causing trouble trouble if if they they were were unwisely unwisely handled, e.g. e.g. Danzig, Czechoslovakia. O n all these matters we we were handled, Danzig, Austria, Austria, Czechoslovakia. On these matters were not necessarily status quo not necessarily concerned concerned to to stand standfor for the the status quo as as today, today,but but we we were werecon concerned cerned to to avoid avoid such such trouble trouble of of them them as as would would be be likely likely to to cause cause trouble. trouble. If If rea reasonable settlements settlements could could be be reached reached with with the thefree free assent assent and and goodwill goodwill of of those those sonable primarily them. primarily concerned concerned we we certainly certainly had had no no desire desire to to block block them.

Such music to Such statements statements were were music to Hitler's Hitlers ears-not ears-not because because he he was was interested interested in in the the peaceful revision of of Versailles, Versailles, but but because he interpreted Halifaxs rather rather feeble feeble peaceful revision because he interpreted Halifax's attempt at at conciliation as evidence evidence that that Britain lacked the the nerve nerve to to fight fight when when the the attempt conciliation as Britain lacked time came for him him to tobegin begin a a war war of of conquest.76 characteristically,saw saw a a much much time came for conquest. 76 Stalin, Stalin, characteristically, more sinister Halifaxs remarks remarks and and persuaded that Britain Britain more sinister purpose purpose behind behind Halifax's persuaded himself himself that had deliberately deliberately given given the the green green light light to aggression in in the east. The The Foreign Foreign had to Nazi Nazi aggression the east. Office documents documents supplied by Maclean and Cairncross Cairncross which which recorded British Office supplied by Maclean and recorded British attempts to to appease appease Hitler Hitler were were used the Centre Centre to to provide provide the the evidence evidence which which attempts used by by the to turn turnHitler Hitler on the Stalin demanded of a deep-laid British plot to on the Soviet Union. ultimately ultimately became became the the most most important important of of the the Magnificent Magnificent Five, his his career career took took off off more more slowly slowly than than those those of of the the other other four. four. He H e abandoned an Five, abandoned an attempt to tojoin join the civil service serviceafter after both both his his referees referees (his (his Trinity Trinity director director of of studies attempt the civil studies and a a family family friend) friend) warned warned him him that, that, while they they admired admired his his energy energy and and intelligence, intelligence, and while they would would feel feel bound bound to to add add that that his his sense of political political injustice injustice might might well well unfit unfit they "sense of him for administrative work. His only minor successes before 1937 were to gain a him for administrative work." His only minor successes before 1937 were to gain a job on an an uninfluential uninfluential liberal liberal monthly, monthly, the the Review of o f Reviews, Reviews, and and become a mem membecome a job on ber of of the theAnglo-German Anglo-German Fellowship, contemptuously contemptuously described described by by Churchill Churchill as as the the ber Fellowship, Heil Hitler Brigade. As Philby Philby later acknowledged, he he would would often often turn for "Heil Hitler Brigade." later acknowledged, turn up up for
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meetings nothing to to offer" and in in need of reassurance. The outout meetings with with Deutsch Deutsch "with with nothing offer and need of reassurance.The break Spanish Civil important intelligence He break of of the the Spanish Civil War War gave gave him him his his first first important intelligence mission. mission. H e eventually of accreditation as a a eventually persuaded persuaded a a London Londonnews news agency agencyto to give give him him a aletter letter of accreditation as freelance war correspondent and arrived in Spain in February 1937. My immediate freelance war correspondent and arrived in Spain in February 1937. "My immediate assignment," memoirs, "was to get get first-hand first-hand information on all all assignment, he he wrote wrote later later in in his his memoirs, was to information on aspects of of the the fascist fascist war wareffort." effort. As usual, usual, his r~th.~ aspects his memoirs memoirs fail fail to to tell tell the the whole whole t truth.77 few weeks weeks after after Philby's Philbys departure, departure, the theLondon A few London illegal illegal residency residency received received instructions, undoubtedly undoubtedly approved approved by by Stalin Stalin himself, order Philby instructions, himself, to to order Philby to to assassinate assassinate General Maly passed on on the General Francisco Francisco Franco, Franco, leader leader of of the thenationalist nationalist forces.78 forces.78 Maly duly duly passed the order but but made made clear clear to to the theCentre Centre that he did did not not believe capable of order that he believe ,Philby Philby capable of fulfilling fulfilling it.79Philby Philby arrived arrived back in London London in inMay Maywithout without even having set it.79 back in even having set eyes eyes on on Franco Franco and, Centre, "in depressed state. state." Philbys Philby's fortunes fortunes improved, and, Maly Maly told told the the Centre, in a a very very depressed improved, however, after after he he was was taken taken on on by by The Times two correspondents Times as as one one of of its its two correspondents in in however, nationalist Spain.80 At became a a minor minor war hero. Three nationalist Spain.* At the the end end of of the the year year he he became war hero. Three jour journalists sitting sitting in car in in which which he he had had been were fatally fatally injured nalists inaa car been traveling traveling were injured by by an an artillery shell. shell. Philby Philby himself himself was was slightly slightly wounded. wounded. He H e reported reported modestly artillery modestly to to Times readers, taken to to a a first station where whe):"e light readers, "Your Your correspondent correspondent .. .. .. was was taken first aid aid station light head head injuries Spain," wrote "helped injuries were were speedily speedily treated." treated. "My My wounding wounding in in Spain, wrote Philby Philby later, later, helped my end." For first time my work-both work-both journalism journalism and and intelligence-no intelligence-no end. For the the first time he he gained gained access to to Franco, Franco, who who on on March March 2, 2,1938 breast the the Red 1938 pinned pinned on on his his breast Red Cross Cross of of MilMil access itary doors opened opened for for me."81 itary Merit. Merit. Then, Then,as as Philby Philby reported, reported, "all all sorts sorts of of doors me.* The doors, doors, however, however, opened opened too too late. late. By By the the time access to to Franco, Franco, The time Philby Philby gained gained access the NKVD assassination assassination plot plot had had been been abandoned. abandoned. Since Since the the spring spring of the of 1937 1937 the the Centre had had been been increasingly increasingly diverted diverted from from the the war what became Centre war against against Franco Franco by by what became known as as the the civil civil war war within within the the Civil Civil War. War. The known The destruction destruction ofTrotskyists ofTrotskyists became became a a higher By the the end 1937 the the hunt for ene"ene higher priority priority than than the the liquidation liquidation of of Franco. Franco. By end of of 1937 huntfor mies intelligence collection. collection. The remark mies of of the the people" people abroad abroad took took precedence precedence over over intelligence The remarkable Magnificent Five to be befully fully exploited. INO was in in able talents talents of of the the Magnificent Five had had yet yet to exploited, I N 0 was turmoil, inthe the paranoia Great Terror, Terror, with most of of its officers turmoil, caught caught up up in paranoia of of the the Great with most its officers abroad withthe the enemy. the Great Great Illegals I1legals was was abroad suspected suspected of of plotting plotting with enemy. The The age age of of the rapidly rapidly drawing drawing to to a a brutal brutalclose. close.

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the the problem problem of of "enemies enemies of of the thepeople" people abroad abroad had had loomed loomed steadily steadily larger larger in in Stalin's Stalins mind mind since since the the early early 1930s 1930s as as he he became became increasingly increasingly obsessed obsessed with with the theopposition opposition to to him him inside inside the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. The The most most daring daring denunciation denunciation of of the thegrowing growing brutality brutality of sent to Committee in the of Stalin's Stdins Russia Russia was was a a letter letter of of protest protest sent tothe the Central Central Committee in autumn autumn the of of 1932 1932 by by a a former former Party Party secretary secretary in in Moscow, Moscow, Mikhail Mikhail Ryutin, Ryutin, and and a a small small band band of of supporters. supporters. The The "Ryutin Ryutin platform," platform, whose whose text text was was made made public public only only in in 1989, 1989, con contained tained such such an an uncompromising uncompromising attack attack on on Stalin Stalin and and the thehorrors horrors which which had had accom accompanied panied collectivization collectivization and and the the First First Five Five Year Year Plan Plan over over the the previous previous few few years years that that some some Trotskyists Trotskyists who who saw saw the the document document believed believed it it was was an an OGPU provocation.1 provocation. It It denounced denounced Stalin Stalin as as "the the evil evil genius genius of of the the Russian Russian Revolution, Revolution, motivated motivated by by vindic vindictiveness for tiveness and and lust lust for power, power, who who has has brought brought the theRevolution Revolution to to the theedge edge of of the the abyss," abyss, and and demanded demanded his his removal removal from from power: power: "It It is is shameful shameful for for proletarian proletarian revolutionar revolutionaries ies to to tolerate tolerate any any longer longer Stalin's Stalins yoke, yoke, his his arbitrariness, arbitrariness, his his scorn scorn for for the the Party Party and and the the laboring laboring masses."2 masse^."^ At At a a meeting meeting of of the the Politburo Politburo Stalin Stalin called called for for Ryutin's Ryutins execution. execution. Only Only Sergei Sergei Mironovich mustn't Mironovich Kirov Kirov dared dared to to contradict contradict him. him. "We We mustnt do do that!" that! he he insisted. insisted. "Ryutin Ryutin is a hopeless For the being Stalin is not not a hopeless case, case, he's hes merely merely gone gone astray." astray. For the time time being Stalin backed backed down 3 Five down and and Ryutin Ryutin was was sentenced sentenced to to ten ten years years in in jail. jail.3 Five years years later, later, during during the theGreat Great Terror, Terror, when when Stalin Stalin had had gained gained the the virtually virtually unchallenged unchallenged power power of of life life and and death death over over Soviet Soviet citizens, citizens, Ryutin Ryutin was was shot. shot. During early During the the early 1930s 1930s Stalin Stalin lost lost whatever whatever capacity capacity he he had hadonce once possessed possessed to to dis distinguish tinguish personal personal opponents opponents from from "enemies enemies of of the the people." people. By far far the the most most danger dangerous Leon Trotsky ous of of these these enemies, enemies, he he believed, believed, were were the the exiled exiled Leon Trotsky (codenamed (codenamed STARIK, by the and his STANK, "Old Old Man," Man, the Centre)4 Centre)4 and his followers. followers. "No No normal normal 'constitutional' constitutional paths remain," wrote paths for for the the removal removal of ofthe the governing governing [Stalinist] [Stalinist] clique clique now now remain, wrote Trotsky Trotsky in in 1933. 1933. "The The only only way way to to compel compel the the bureaucracy bureaucracy to to hand hand over over power power to to the the prole proletarian vanguard vanguard is is by by force." force. Henceforth Henceforth Stalin Stalin used used that that assertion assertion to to argue argue that that the the tarian Soviet faced with threat of Soviet state state was was faced with aathreat of forcible forcible overthrow, overthrow, which which must must itself itself be be forcibly prevented.5 prevented. forcibly Opposition Opposition to toStalin Stalin resurfaced resurfaced at at the the1934 1934 Party Party Congress, Congress, though though in in so so muted muted a a form unnoticed by population. In form that that it it passed passed unnoticed by the the mass mass of of the the population. In the the elections elections to to the the

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Central Central Committee, Committee, Stalin Stalin polled polled several several hundred hundred votes votes fewer fewer than than Kirov, Kirov, who who was was assassinated, assassinated, probably probably on on Stalin's Stalins orders, orders, at at the the end end of of the the year. year. What What increasingly increasingly obsessed the obsessed Stalin, Stalin, however, however,were wereless less the powerless powerless remnants remnants of ofreal real opposition opposition to to him him than than the the gigantic, gigantic, mythical mythical conspiracy conspiracy by by imperialist imperialist secret secret services services and and their their Trot Trotskyist skylst hirelings. hirelings.Though Though the theparanoid paranoid strain strain in in what what Khrushchev Khrushchev later later called called Stalin's Stalins "sickly sickly suspicious" suspiciouspersonality personality does does much much to to explain explain his his obsession obsession with with conspiracy conspiracy theory, theory, there there was was an an impeccable impeccable Leninist Leninist logic logic at at the the heart heart of of that that obsession. obsession. Stalin Stalin claimed was claimed Lenin's Lenins authority authority for for his his insistence insistence that that itit was impossible impossible for for the the imperialists imperialists not overthrow not to to attempt attemptto to overthrow the the world's worlds first first and and only only worker-peasant worker-peasant state: state: We but in a system of We are are living living not not only only in in aaState, State, but in system a of States, States, and and the the existence existence of of the thelong long run the Soviet Soviet Republic Republic side side by by side side with with imperialist imperialist States States is is in in the run unthinkable. until that that end comes, unthinkable. But But until end comes, a a series series of of the the most most terrible terrible clashes clashes between between the the Soviet Soviet Republic Republic and and bourgeois bourgeois States States is is unavoidable. unavoidable. It the enemies It was was equally equally inevitable, inevitable, Stalin Stalin argued, argued, that that the enemies without without would would conspire conspire with with traitors traitors within. within. Only Only "blind blindbraggarts braggarts or or concealed concealed enemies enemies of of the the people," people, he he declared, who disagreed mati declared,would would dispute dispute this this elementary elementary logic.6 Those Thosewho disagreed thus thus auto automatically cally branded branded themselves themselves as as traitors. traitors. Despite Despite Stalin's Stalinsincreasing increasing obsession obsession during during the the 1930s 1930s with with Trotskyist Trotskyist conspiracy, conspiracy, Trotsky Trotsky never never really reallyrepresented represented any any credible credible threat threat to tothe theStalinist Stalinist regime. regime. He He spent spent his nd a his early early years years in in exile exile trying trying vainly vainly to to fi find a European Europeanbase base from from which which to to organize organize his his followers. followers. In In 1933 1933 he he left leftTurkey Turkey for for France, France, then then two two years years later later moved moved on on to to Norway, Norway, but but his his political political activity activity in in all all three three countries countries was was severely severelyrestricted restricted by by the the reluctant reluctant host host governments. governments. In In 1937, 1937, having having finally finally despaired despaired of of finding finding aaEuropean European headquarters, Trotsky left headquarters,Trotsky left for for Mexico, Mexico,where where he he remained remained until until his his assassination assassinationthree three years The years later. later. The chief chief European European organizer organizer of of the the Trotskyist Trotskyist movement movement for for most most of of the the 1 930s was 1930s was not not Trotsky Trotsky himself himself but but his his elder elder son, son, Lev Lev Sedov, Sedov, who who from from 1933 1933 was was based organized based in in Paris. Paris. lt It was was Sedov Sedovwho, who, until until his his death death in in1938, 1938, organized publication publication of of his his the Opposition father's fathers Bulletin Bulletin of Ofthe Opposition and and maintained maintained contact contact with with Trotsky's Trotskys scattered scattered supporters. supporters. Sedov's Sedovs entourage, entourage, like like his his father's, fathers, was was penetrated penetrated by by the the OGPU OGPU and and NKVD. From 1934 onwards his closest confidant and collaborator in Paris was From 1934 onwards his closest confidant and collaborator in Paris was an an NKVD Mark. Zboro:wski, NKVD agent, agent, the the Russian-born Russian-born Polish Polish Communist Communist Mark, Zborowski, known known to to Sedov Sedov as as etienne Stienne and and successively successivelycodenamed codenamed by by the the Center CenterMAKS, MAKS, MAK, MAK, TULIP TULIP Etienne" so and and KANT. KANT. Sedov Sedov trusted trusted " Etienne so completely completely that that he he gave gave him him the the key key to to his his letterbox, allowed him to collect his mail and entrusted hiIIl with Tr9tsky'S most con letterbox, allowed him tocollect his mail and entrusted him withTrotskys most confidential fidential files files and and archives archives for for safekeeping.7 safekeeping7 headquarters the Trotskyist headquarters of of both boththe Trotskyist movement movement and and the the White White Guards, NKVD Guards, Paris Paris became became for for several severalyears yearsthe the main main center center of of operations operations for for the the NKVD Administration Serebryansky, which Administration for for Special SpecialTasks, Tasks, headed headed by by "Yasha" Yasha Serebryansky which specialized specialized in illegal residency other in assassination assassination and and abduction. abduction. Serebryansky's Serebryanskys illegal residency in in Paris Paris had had other targets, rabble-rousing targets, too. too. The The most most prominent prominent was was the the mercurial mercurialJacques Jacques Doriot, Doriot, aa rabble-rousing orator orator who who during during the the early early 1930s 1930s was was considered considered a a likely likely future hture contender contender for for the the
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leadership early leadership of of the the French French Communist Communist Party.8 Party.8In In the the early months months of of1934, 1934, he he aroused aroused the ire of Moscow by calling on the Party to form an anti-fascist Popular Front the ire of Moscowby calling on theParty to form an anti-fascist Popular Front with with the officially condemned Moscow as "socialfiascists. fascists." Doriot the socialists, socialists, still still officially condemned in in Moscow as social Doriot was was summoned summoned to to Moscow Moscowto torecant recant but but refused refused to to go. go. He H e was was expelled expelled from from the the Party Party for for indiscipline indiscipline in in June June 1934, 1934, ironically ironically at at the the very very moment moment when when the the Communist Communist International, in a rapid volte-face instantly accepted by the French Communist International, in a rapid volte-face instantly accepted by the French Communist Party, Party, decided decidedin in favor favor of of a a Popular Popular Front Front policy. policy. Doriot Doriot responded responded with with a a series series of ofincreasingly increasinglybitter bitter attacks attacks on on both both Stalin's Stalins"ori orienta1" he derided ental despotism despotism and and the the French French Communist Communist leadership, leadership, whom whomhe derided as as "Stalin's slaves." The Centre, fearing the effect of Doriot's impassioned and now sub Stalins slaves.The Centre, fearing the effect of Doriots impassioned and now subversive versive oratory oratory on on the theFrench French left, left, ordered ordered Serebryansky Serebryansky to to keep keep him him under under continu continuous surveillance. In ous surveillance. In 1935, 1935, after after almost almost the the whole whole non-Communist non-Communist press press had had publicized Doriot's revelation that the French Party received secret publicizedDoriots revelation that the French Communist Communist Party receivedsecret instructions instructions and and funds funds from from Moscow, Moscow, the the Centre Centreinstructed instructed Serebryansky Serebryansky to to draw drawup up plans plans for for his his liquidation.9 liquidation. The The order order to to go go ahead ahead with with the the assassination assassination seems seems never never to to have have been been given, given,perhaps perhaps because because of ofthe the triumph triumph of ofthe the Popular Popular Front Front in inthe the1936 1936 elections elections and and Doriot's Doriots foundation foundation soon soon afterwards afterwards of of the the neofascist neofascist Parti Parti Populaire Populaire Frans:ais. FranGais. Doriot's Doriots public public vindication vindication of of the the Communist Communist charge charge that that he he was was a a fascist fascist collaborator provided the Centre with a propaganda victory which his assassination collaborator provided the Centre with a propaganda victory which his assassination would would have have spoiled spoiledrather rather than than enhanced.10 enhanced.( Among ordered Among other otherassassinations assassinations which which Serebryansky Serebryanskywas was ordered to to organize organize was wasthat that of Goering, who of the the leading leading Nazi Nazi Hermann Hermann Goering, who was was reported reported to to be be planning planning a a visit visit to to Paris. The Administration for Special Tasks ordered its Paris residency to recruit Paris. The Administration for Special Tasks ordered its Paris residency to recruit a a sniper ltrating him sniper and and flnd find a a way way of of infi infiltrating him into into the the airport, airport, probably probably Le Le Bourget, Bourget, at at which which Goering Goering was was expected expected to to landY land. Goering, Goering, however, however, failed failed to to visit visit France France and and the les seen seen by by Mitrokhin no indication the sniper sniper was was stood stood down. down. The The fi files Mitrokhin give give no indication of of the the Centre's motive in ordering an assassination which was undoubtedly authorized Centres motive in ordering an assassination which was undoubtedly authorized by by Stalin is, however, however, that Stalin himself. himself. The The probability probability is, that the the main main objective objective was was to to damage damage relations relations between between France France and and Germany Germany rather rather than than to tostrike strike a a blow blow against against Nazism. Nazism. The The assassination assassination on on French French soil soil in in 1934 1934 of of the the President President of of the the Republic Republic and and the the King King of of Yugoslavia Yugoslavia by by a a non-Communist non-Communist assassin assassin doubtless doubtless encouraged encouraged the the Centre Centre to to believe believe that that it itcould could avoid avoid responsibility responsibilityfor forthe the killing killing of of Goering Goeringif if an an opportu opportunity nity arose. arose. Despite residency, its its main Despite the the numerous numerous other other duties duties of of Serebryansky's SerebryanskysParis Paris residency, main task task remained remained the the surveillance surveillance and and destabilization destabilization of of French French Trotskyists. Trotskyists. Until Until 1937 1937 Lev Lev Sedov, tienne" Zborowski, Sedov,thanks thanks to to his his misplaced misplacedbut but total total confidence confidence in in " E Etienne Zborowski,was was such such an an indispensable indispensable source source on on the thePOLECATS POLECATS (as (as the the Trotskyists Trotskyists were were codenamed codenamed by by the 12 In the Centre) Centre) that that he he was was not not marked marked down down as as a a target target for for liquidation. liquidation.12 In the the autumn autumn of because nancial problems, of 1936 1936 Zborowski Zborowski warned warned the the Centre Centrethat, that, because of ofhis his fi financial problems,Trot Trotsky s k y was was selling selling part part of ofhis his archive archive (formerly (formerly among among the the papers papers entrusted entrusted by by Sedov Sedov to to Zborowski for safekeeping) to the Paris branch of the International Institute of Zborowski for safekeeping) to the Paris branch of the International Institute of Social Social History History based based in in Amsterdam. Amsterdam. Serebryansky Serebryansky was wasordered ordered to to set set up up a a task task force force to to recover recover it, it, codenamed codenamed the the HENRY HENRYgroup. group. He H e began began by by renting renting the the flat flat immedi imtnediately in in thethe rue ately above abovethe the institute institute rue Michelet Michelet in in order order to to keep keep it it under under surveillance. surveillance. On On

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Serebryansky's Serebryansvs instructions, instructions, Zborowski, Zborowski, then then working working as as a a service service engineer engineer at at aaParis Paris telephone exchange, exchange,was was ordered ordered to to cause cause a a fault fault on on the the Institute's Institutes telephone telephone line line in in telephone order to to give give him him aachance chance to to reconnoitre reconnoitre th the exact exact 10catiC? location of o f th the Tr()ky Trotsky papers papers and and order examine examine the the locks. locks,When When the the Institute Institute reported reported the the fault fault on on its itsline, line, however, however, one one of of Zborowski's sent Zborowskis colleagues colleagueswas was sent to to mend mend the the fault fault instead. instead. Zborowski Zborowski promptly promptly put put the action the Institute's Institutes phone phone out outof of action once once again again and and on on this this occasion occasion was was called called to to make make the repair repair himself. himself. As the Institute, having As he he left left the the Institute, having mended mended the the fault fault and and closely closely inspected inspected the the locks locks to to the the front front and and back back doors, doors, he he was was given given a a five five franc franc tip tip by by the the director, director, Boris Boris Nikolayevsky, Nikolayevsky, a a prominent prominent Menshevik Menshevik emigre CmigrC classed classed by by the the NKVD as as an an "enemy enemy of of the the people."13 people.13 Serebryansky time for the morning morning of Serebryansky fixed fured the the time for the the burglary burglary at at two two o'clock oclock on on the of November 1936, and November 7, 7,1936, and ordered ordered it it to to be be completed completed by by 5 5 a.m. a.m. at at the the latest. latest. Since Since his his agents agents were were unable unable to to find find keys keys to to fit fit the the Institute Institute locks, locks, he he decided decided to to cut cut them themout out a drill powered by an electric transformer concealed in a box filled with sawdust with with adrill powered by an electric transformer concealed in abox filled with sawdust and and cotton cotton wool wool to to deaden deaden the the sound.14 sound.14The Th,eburglars burglars broke broke in in unobserved unobserved and and left left with with Trotsky's Trotskys papers. papers. Both Both Sedov Sedov and and the the Paris Paris police police immediately immediately suspected suspected the the NKVD NKVD because because of of both both the the professionalism professionalism of of the the burglary burglary and and the the fact fact that that money money and valuables valuables in in the theInstitute Institutehad had been left left untouched. untouched. Sedov Sedov assured assured .the police that that and been the police E tienne" Zborowski, was completely case his his assistant assistant " Etienne Zborowski~was completely above above suspicion, suspicion, and and in in any any case kept the the main main archive, archive, which which had had not not been been stolen, stolen, at at his his home home address. address. Ironically, Ironically, kept Sedov Sedov suggested suggested that that the the NKVD might might have have learned learned of of the the transfer transfer of of a a part partof of the the archive archive as as the the result result of of an an indiscretion indiscretion by by the the Institute Institute director, director, Nikolayevsky.15 Nik01ayevsky.l~ The The extraordinary extraordinary importance importance attached attached by by the the Centre Centre to to the the theft theft of of the the papers papers was Order of 4e HENRY was demonstrated demonstrated by by the the award award of of the the Order of the the Red Red Ban11:er Banner to to . the group.16 group.16The The operation, operation, however, however, was wasas as pointless pointless as as it it was was professional. professional.The The papers papers stolen stolen from from the the Institute Institute (many (many of of them them press press cuttings) cuttings) were were of of no no operational operational sig significance the Trotsky nificance whatever whatever and and of of far far less less hitorical historical jmportance ,importance than than the Trotsky archive archive which ne4 up which remained remained in in Zborowski's Zborowskis hapds hands a.n and later ,.ended up at at Harvard Harvard UniversityY University.17 .d later But But by by the the mid-1930s mid-1930s Stalin Stalin had had lost lost all all sense sense of o f proportion proportion in in his his pursuit pursuit of of Trot Trotskyism skyism in in all all its its forms, forms, both both real real and and imaginary. imaginary. Trotsky Trotsky had had become become an an obsession obsession who who dominated dominated many many of of Stalin's Stalinswaking waking hours hours and and probably probably interfered interfered with with his his sleep sleep at at night. night. As As Trotsky's Trotskysbiographer, biographer, Isaac Isaac Deutscher, Deutscher, concludes: concludes: The the paramount paramount The frenzy frenzy with with which which [Stalin] [Stalin] pursued pursued the the feud, feud, making making it it the preoccupation preoccupation of of international international communism communism as as well well as as of of the the S<?yiet Soviet Uni()Il,and Union. .and . subordinating all political, political, tactical, tactical, intellectual intellectual and and other otherinterests, interests, beggars beggars subordinating to to it itall description; description; there there is is in in the thewhole whole of of history history hardly hardly another another case case in in which whichsuch such immense immense resources resources of of power power and and propaganda propaganda were were employed employed against against a a single single is individual. individual.* The The British British diplomat diplomat R. A. Sykes Sykes later later wisely wisely described described Stalin's Stalinsworld world view view as as "a acuri curious Stin.\ pparent in ous mixture mixture of of shrewdness shrewdness and and n()nsense."19 n~nsense.~ Stalins-hre shrewdness .. es s .. w: was -a .. ,.... apparent in the the Il. 31 . . way he outmaneuvered death of way that that he outmaneuvered his his rivals rivals after after the the death of Lenin, Lenin, gradually gradually acquired acquired absolute absolute power power as as General General Secretary, Secretary, and and later later out-negotiated out-negotiated Churchill Churchill and and RooRooi

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sevelt sevelt during during their their wartime wartime conferences. conferences. Historians Historians have have found found it it difficult difficult to to accept accept that that so so shrewd shrewd a a man man also also believed believed in in so so much much nonsense. nonsense. But But it it is is no no more more possible possible to understand Stdin Stalin without to understand without acknowledging acknowledging his his addiction addiction to to conspiracy conspiracy theories theories about Trotsky (and others) than it is to comprehend Hitler without grasping the about Trotsky (and others) thanit is to comprehend Hitler withoutgrasping the pas passion sion with with which which he he pursued pursued his his even even more more terrible terrible and and absurd absurd conspiracy conspiracy theories theories about about the the Jews. Jews. head head of of the the NKVD from from 1934 1934 to to 1936, 1936, was was far far chief grudge less less obsessed obsessedby by Trotsky Trotsky than than Stalin Stalin was. was. Stalin's Stalinschief grudge against against him him was was proba probably a a growing growing conviction conviction that that he hehad had been deliberately negligent negligent in in his his hunt hunt for for Trot Trotbly been deliberately skyist traitors.2o traitors.20His His nemesis nemesis arrived in September September 1936 1936 in in the form of a telegram telegram skyist arrived in the form of a from Stdin and his his protCgC, Andrei Zhdanov, Zhdanov, to to the declaring from Stalin and protege, Andrei the Central Central Committee Committee declaring that Yagoda Yagoda had had "definitely definitely proved proved himself himself incapable incapable of of unmasking unmasking the the Trotskyite Trotskyitethat Zinovyevite bloc" blocand and demanding demanding his his replacement replacement by by Nikolai Nikolai Ivanovich Ivanovich Yezhov. Yezhov. Zinovyevite NKVDfor the next two two years, Yezhov Yezhovcarried through the the largest As head of the NKVD scale peacetime peacetime political persecution and and blood-letting in European European history, history, known known scale political persecution blood-letting in to posterity posterity as as the the Great GreatTerror. Terror.21 from the the Yezhov Yezhov era, era, which which to 21 One One NKVD document document from doubtless probably slavishly slavishlyimitated-Stalins own view, view, asserted asserted doubtless reflected-and reflected-and probably imitated-Stalin's own that the scoundrel Yagoda" Yagoda had had deliberately deliberately concentrated concentrated the the attack attack on on the lower that "the scoundrel the "lower ranks of of "the the right-wing right-wing Trotskyite Trotskyite underground in order order to to divert divert attention attention from from ranks" underground" in leaders: Zinovyev, Zinovyev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Tomsky, Kamenev and Smirnov. Smirnov. Yagoda, Yagoda, its true leaders: it was claimed, had either sacked or sidelined NKVD staff who had tried to indict Leninistera for their imaginary crimes.22 save Tomsky, Tomsky, these former heroes of the Leninist crimes.22 All save committed suicide, given starring roles in the the show trials of 1 1936 to1 938, 1938, who committed suicide, were given 936 to gruesome morality plays which proclaimed a grotesque conspiracy theory uniting all gruesome morality plays which proclaimed a grotesque conspiracy theory uniting all opposition at at home and abroad abroad by by the the use of elegantly formulae such such as: as: opposition home and use of elegantly absurd absurd formulae Trotskyism is is a a variety variety of fascism fascism and and Zinovyevism Zinovyevism is isa a variety variety of ofTrotskyism. In the the "Trotskyism Trotskyism." In last of of the the great great show show trials trials Yagoda, Yagoda, despite a plea plea for for mercy mercy written written on bended last despite a "on bended knees,was was himself himself unmasked unmasked as as a a leading leading Trotskyist Trotskyist conspirator. conspirator.The The chief chief author author of of knees," the gigantic gigantic conspiracy conspiracy theory, theory, which which became undisputed orthodoxy orthodoxy within within the the became undisputed the and provided provided the the ideological ideological underpinning underpinning of of the the Great Terror, was was Stalin NKVD and Great Terror, Stalin himself.23 Stalin personally personally proofread proofread the the transcripts transcripts of of the the show show trials trials before before their their himsel[23 Stalin publication, the defendants' defendants speeches speeches to to ensure ensure that that they did not deviate publication, amending amending the they did not deviate confessions to imaginary conspiracies.24 con~piracies.~~ from their well-rehearsed confessions NKVD records of The practical organiza organizathe period proclaim with characteristic obsequiousness obsequiousness that, "The tion of work exposing exposing the the right-wing right-wing Trotskyite Trotskyite underground underground was was supervised supervised tion ofthe the work personally by by Comrade Comrade Stalin, Stalin, and and in in 1936-8 1936-8 crippling crippling blows blows were were delivered delivered to to the the personally rabble.25 rabble. "25 Crippling blows against both real and imaginary Trotskyist "rabble" rabblewere struck "Crippling blows" the Spanish Civil War outside as well as inside the Soviet Union. The beginning of the in July 1936 1936 opened up a a major new new field of operations for Serebryansky's Serebryanskyb Adminis Administration for for Special Special Tasks Tasks and and for for INO I N 0 as as a a whole. whole. The The struggle struggle of of the theSpanish repubtration Spanish repub lican government to defend itself against the nationalist rebellion led by General Francisco Franco Franco fired fired the the imagination imagination of of the the whole whole of the the European Europeanleft left as a a crusade crusade Francisco as
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against international fascism: volunteers, most most of them Communist, against international fascism: 35,000 35,000 foreign foreign volunteers, of them Communist, set out out for for Spain Spain to to join Brigades in defense of republic. In set join the theInternational International Brigades in defense of the the republic. In October 1936 1936Stalin Stalin declared declared in in an an open open letter letter to to Spanish Spanish Communists: Communists: Liberation October "Liberation of Spanish reactionaries the private private concern concern of of Spain Spain from from the the yoke yoke of of the the Spanish reactionaries is is not not the of Spaniards alone, alone, but but the the common common cause cause of of all all progressive progressive humanity. From the the out outSpaniards humanity." From set, however, Spain in fronts: against set, however, the the NKVD was was engaged engaged in in Spain in a awar war on on two two fronts: against Trot Trotskyists the republicans the International Brigades, as well skyists within within the republicans and and the International Brigades, as well as as against against Franco and and the the nationalist nationalist forces. forces. The The former former .illegal illegal resident London, Aleksandr Franco resident in in London, Aleksandr Orlov, sent to Spain as resident after dently Orlov, sent to Spain as legal legal resident after the the outbreak outbreak of of the the Civil Civil War, War, confi confidently assured theCentre Centre assured the in in October, October, "The The Trotskyist Trotskyist organization organization POUM [Partido [Partido Obrero de de Unificacion Marxista] can can be be easily easilyl iq~idated.~~ Obrero Unificacion Marxista] liquidated."26
the NKVD's NKVDs secret within Spain, Spain, the secret two-front two-front war war within Serebryansky Serebryansky conducted conducted operations operations from from abroad. abroad. Serebryansky Serebryansky organized organized training training courses in in Paris Paris for for saboteurs saboteurs from from the the International InternationalBrigades, run by by GIGI, a courses Brigades, run a French French Communist pay, FRANYA, a a female female Polish Polish Communist mechanic mechanic who who usually usually worked worked without without pay, student paid LEGRAND, on on whom further details are are student paid 1,500 1,500francs francs a a month, month,and and LEGRAND, whomno no Lrther details available. greatest sabotage sabotage success Serebryansky was was the claim by by available. The The greatest success reported reported by Serebryansky the claim the of illegals, based basedin theBaltic to have the ERNST TOLSTY group group ofillegals, in the Baltic and and Scandinavia, Scandinavia, to have sunk arms to the leading leading saboteurs a franc^.^^ One One of of the saboteurs was was a sunk seventeen seventeen ships ships carrying carrying arms to FrancoP young German Communist,Ernst Ernst Wollweber, who who twenty twenty years years later later was young German Communist, Wollweber, was to to become become head of of the the Stasi Stasi in in East East Germany2* AnNKVD inquiry head Germany.28 An after the Civil War War concon inquiry after the Civil cluded, however, however, that that some some of of the the reports reports of of sinkings sinkings were were fabrications.29 fabrication^.^^ cluded, The and saboteurs saboteurs were The main main NKVD training training grounds grounds for for guerrillas guerrillas and were within within Spain Spain itself at at training training camps camps supervised supervised by by Orlov Orlov at Bilbao and and itself at Valencia, Valencia, Barcelona, Barcelona, Bilbao Argen. Orlov Orlov later later boasted boasted of of how how his his guerrilla guerrilla platoons succeeded in Argen. platoons succeeded in blowing blowing up up power lines and bridges and in convoys far far behind behind the the nationalist nationalist power lines and bridges and in attacking attacking enemy enemy convoys lines. an SVR-sponsored biography of of Orlov larger purpose lines. As an SVR-sponsored biography Orlov acknowledges, acknowledges, his his larger purpose was control to to effect effect a a Stalinization Stalinization of of was "to to build build up up a a secret secret police police force forceunder under NKVD control Spain. The The chief chief Soviet Soviet military military adviser adviser in in republican republican Spain, Spain." Spain, General General Jan Jan Berzin, Berzin, formerly complained that Orlovand andthe the NKVD formerly head head of of Red Red Army Army intelligence, intelligence, complained that Orlov NKVD were than an an ally3 ally. 30 were treating treating republican republican Spain Spain as as a a colony colony rather rather than In the the spring spring of of 1937 1937 Orlov Orlov and Serebryansky In and Serebryansky were were ordered ordered to to move move from from the the sursur veillance the liquidation liquidation of of their their leaders. leaders. veillance and and destabilization destabilization of of Trotskyist Trotskyist groups groups to to the While Serebryansky Serebryansky began began preparing preparing the the abduction abduction of Sed~v,~ Orlov supplied the the While of Sedov,31 Orlov supplied republican government government with with forged forged documents documents designed discredit POUM republican designed to to discredit POUM as as a ((a German-Francoist June 16 16 the the head head of of POUM, Andreu Andreu Nin, German-Francoist spy spy organization." organization. On O n June Nin, and forty forty leading leading members members were were arrested, arrested, its its headquarters batand headquarters closed closed and and its its militia militia bat talions a week disappeared from from prison. prison. An An official official talions disbanded. disbanded. Less Less than than a week later later Nin Nin disappeared investigation announced that In reality, reality, he he was was abducted abducted and and murmur investigation announced that he he had had escaped. escaped. In dered squad" of supervised by by Orlov. Nin was was one one of dered by by a a ('mobile mobile squad of NKVD NKVD assassins, assassins, supervised Orlov. Nin of many Trotskyists Trotskyists in in Spain, Spain, both both real real and and imagined, imagined, who met such Orlov many who met such fates. fates. Until Until Orlov defected to to the States in in 1938, fearing that defected the United United States 1938, fearing that he he too too had had been been placed placed on on an an NKVD death death list, he lived lived in in some luxury while NKVD list, he some luxury while organizing organizing the the liquidation liquidation of of eneeneCOORDINATED WHILE O RL O V C O O R D I NAT E D

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mies mies of of the the people. people. A young young volunteer volunteer in in the the International International Brigades Brigades summoned summoned to to his presence was struck by how strongly he reeked of eau de cologne, and watched his presence was struck by how strongly he reeked of eau de cologne, and watched enviously by enviously as as he he consumed consumed a a large large cooked cooked breakfast breakfast wheeled wheeled in in on ona trolley trolley a by a a white whitecoated the famished eaten coated servant. servant. Orlov Orlov offered offered none none of of it it to to the famished volunteer, volunteer, who who had hadnot not eaten for for twenty-four twenty-four hours.32 hours.32 Though Though unusually unusually forthcoming forthcoming about about Orlov, Orlov, who, who, because because of of his his defection, defection, never never qualifi ed for qualified for the the KGB KGB Valhalla, Valhalla, the the SVR has has been been much much more more reluctant reluctant to to release release material material on on the the Spanish Spanish Civil Civil War War which which might might damage damage the the reputation reputation of of the the tradi traditional tional heroes heroes of of Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence: intelligence: among among them them Hero Hero of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union Stanislav Vaupshasov, long Stanislav Alekseyevich Alekseyevich Vaupshasov, long celebrated celebrated for for his his daring daring exploits exploits behind behind enemy two Orders Orders enemy lines lines during during the the Second Second World World War. War. With With four four Orders Orders of of Lenin, Lenin, two of chestful of the theGreat GreatPatriotic Patriotic War War and and a a chesthl of of other other medals, medals, Vaupshasov Vaupshasov was wasprobably probably the decorated intelligence the Soviet Soviet Union's Unions most most profusely profusely decorated intelligence hero. hero. As As recently recently as as 1990 1990 he he was was honored honored by by a a commemorative commemorative postage postage stamp. stamp. Vaupshasov's Vaupshasovs murderous murderous pre-war pre-war record, record, however, however, is isstill still kept kept from from public public view view by by the the SVR. SVR. In In the the mid-1920s mid-1920s he he led led a a secret in numerous secret OGPU OGPU unit unit in numerous raids raids on on Polish Polish and and Lithuanian Lithuanian border border villages, villages, dressed sentenced dressed in in Polish Polish and and Lithuanian Lithuanian army army uniforms. uniforms. In In 1929 1929 Vaupshasov Vaupshasovwas was sentenced to a colleague, to death death for formurdering murdering a colleague, but but managed managed to to have have the the sentence sentence commuted commuted to to ten ten years years in in the the gulag. gulag. He H e was was quickly quickly released released and and resumed resumed his his career career as as one one of of the the NKVD's leading experts NKVDs leading experts in in assassination. assassination. Among Among Vaupshasov's Vaupshasovs duties duties in in Spain Spain was was the the construction construction and and guarding guarding of of a a secret secret crematorium crematorium which which enabled enabled the the NKVD to to dispose their remains. dispose of of its its victims victims without without leaving leaving any any trace trace of of their remains. Many Many of of those those selected selected for for liquidation liquidation were were lured lured into into the thebuilding building containing containing the thecrematorium crematorium and and killed killed on on the the spot.33 spot.33 The The NKVD agent agent in in charge charge of of the the crematorium crematorium was was Jose JoseCastelo Castelo Pacheco Pacheco (code (codenamed and a Salamanca named JOSE, JOSE, PANSO PANS0 and TEODOR),34 TEODOR),34 a Spanish Spanish Communist Communist born bornin in Salamanca in who was deputy in 1910, 1910, who was recruited recruited by by Orlov's Orlovs deputy resident, resident, Leonid Leonid Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Eitin Eitingon, in 1936.35 In 1982, some years after Castelo's death, the KGB received a gon, in 1936.35In 1982, some years after Castelos death, the received a letter letter from he had had told from a a female female relative relative appealing appealing for for a a pension pension and and claiming claiming that that he told her her before you problems way before his his death, death, "If If you have haveany any problems and and there there is is no no other other way out, out, I mean mean only only in in extreme extreme circumstances, circumstances, then then contact contact my my Soviet Soviet comrades." comrades.Though Though Castelo's Castelos file file showed promised details showed that that he hehad had promised never never to to reveal reveal any any details of of his his work work as as a a Soviet Soviet agent, agent, there there was was an an obvious obvious risk risk that that his his relative relative had had discovered discovered his his work work in inthe the NKVD cre crematorium. to refuse matorium. The The Centre Centre therefore therefore concluded concluded that that to rehse her her request request might might have have "undesirable the consular undesirable consequences." consequences. In In January January 1983 1983 she she was was summoned summoned to to the consular department department of of the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy in in Madrid Madrid by by the the resident resident and and told told that, that, though though ex gratia she she had had no nolegal legal right right to to a a pension, pension, it it had had been been decided decided to to make make her her an an exgratia pay payment ment of of 5,000 5,000 convertible convertible roubles, roubles, then then the theequivalent equivalent of of 6,680 6,680 US dollars. dollars. No refer reference ence was was made made to to Castelo's Castelos work work for for the the NKVD.36 NKVD.36
admirable studies studies of of the the Stalin S t a h era era fail fail to to men menadmirable tion the the relentless relentless secret secret pursuit pursuit of of "enemies enemies of of the the people" peoplein in western western Europe. Europe. The The tion result, all too too frequently, frequently, is is a a sanitized, sanitized, curiously curiously bloodless bloodless interpretation interpretation of of Soviet Soviet result, foreign policy policy on on the the eve eve of of the the Second Second World World War Warwhich which fails fails to to recognize recognize the the pripriforeign
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ority given given to to assassination. assassination. Outside Outside Spain, Spain, the main theater of operations ority the main theater of operations for for the the NKVDs assassins assassins was wasFrance, where their chief targets were Lev Sedov and General NKVD's Yevgeni Karlovich Karlovich Kutepovs successor successorasas head of GuardROVS. In Yevgeni Miller, Kutepov's of the White White Guard the similar plans to liquidate liquidate both. the summer summer of of 1937 1937 Serebryansky Serebryanskydevised devised similar plans to both. Sedov Sedov and and Miller were were each each to to be be kidnapped kidnapped in in Paris, Paris, smuggled board a off the Miller smuggled on on board a boat boat waiting waiting off the Channel coast, coast, then brought to the Soviet Union for interrogation and retribution. The fi first stage in in the the abduction abduction operations operations was was the the penetration their entourages. The rst stage penetration of of their entourages. Etienne" Zborowski, Miller's Sedovs assistant " Etienne Millers deputy, deputy, General Nikolai Like Sedov's Skoblin, used Skoblin, was an NKVD agent. Probably unknown to Skoblin, Skoblin, Serebryansky Serebryansky also used illegal, Mireille Lyudvigovna Lyudvigovna Abbiate (codenamed AVIATORSHA, an illegal, AVIATORSHA, aviators "aviator's wife), to keep Miller under surveillance. surveillance. Abbiate was the daughter of a French music wife"), teacher in in St. St. Petersburg, Petersburg, born born and and brought brought up up in inRussia. teacher Russia. When When her her family family returned returned to France France in in 1920, 1920, she she had had stayed stayed in in Russia Russia and married the aviator Vasili to and married the aviator Vasili Ivanovich Ivanovich Yermolov (hence (hence her her later later codename). codename). In In 1931, traveled to Yermolov 1931, when when she she traveled to France France to to visit visit her parents, she was recruited by the NKVD. During her visit she recruited her brother, Roland Lyudvigovich Abbiate, who also became an codebrother, Roland Lyudvigovich Abbiate, who also became an illegal illegal with with the the code name LETCHIK ("pilot"). (pilot). AVIATORSHA rented rented a next to name a flat flat next to General General Miller, Miller, secretly forced forced an an entry, entry, stole stole some of his his papers hidden microphone secretly some of papers and and installed installed a a hidden microphone which enabled enabled her her to to bug bug his his apartment.37 apartment.37 O n September which On September 22, 1937, 1937, like like Kutepov Kutepov seven years yearsearlier, earlier,Miller Miller disappeared disappeared in in broad broad daylight daylight on aParis The %rete seven on a Paris street. street. The Surete later concluded that Miller Miller had had been taken to the Soviet embassy, killed killedand and his later concluded that been taken to the Soviet embassy, his body body placed in aalarge trunk which was then taken by a Ford truck to tobe loaded on aaSoviet freighter waiting waiting at at Le Le Havre. Havre. Several Several witnesses witnesses reported the trunk freighter reported seeing seeing the trunk being being however, was was still alive inside the trunk, loaded on board. Miller, however, trunk, heavily drugged. Unlike Kutepov Kutepov in in 1930, 1930, he he survived survived the the voyage voyage to to Moscow, Moscow, where he was Unlike where he was interrointerro gated and and shot. who fell fell under under immediate suspicion by Millers supporters, supporters, gated shot. Skoblin, Skoblin, who immediate suspicion by Miller's fled to to Spain.38 Spain.38Mireille Mireille Abbiate, Abbiate, whose whose role role went went undetected, was awarded the fled undetected, was awarded the Order of of the the Red Red Star, Star, then then reassigned to the the operation against Sedov.39 Sed~v.~~ Order reassigned to operation against Planning for for the the abduction abduction of of Sedov Sedov was was at at an advanced stage stage by by the Planning an advanced the time time Miller Miller disappeared. fishing boat been hired at Boulogne Boulogne to to take him on on the the first first stage stage disappeared.A fishing boat had had been hired at take him of his his journey journey to to the the Soviet Soviet Union.40 Union.40The The operation, however, was was aborted-possibly aborted-possibly of operation, however, as suspected involvement involvement in in as a a result result of of the the furor furor aroused aroused in in France France by by the the NKVD's NKVDs suspected Q.n f(!ary 8, 8, Miller's a different diffel,"pt l). Millers abduction. abduction. A few few months months later later Sedov Sedov met met a end. O n February Etienne" Zborowski Zborowski helped 1938 he he entered entered hospital hospital with with acute acute appendicitis. appendicitis. " Etienne helped to to per per1938 suade must have suade him him that, that, to toavoid avoid NKVD surveillance, surveillance, he he must have his his appendix appendix removed removed not not ata a privateclinic run by Russian emigres, CmigrCs,which was in at aaFrench hospital but at small private reality reality an an easier easier target target for for Soviet Soviet penetration. penetration. No No sooner sooner had had Zborowski Zborowski ordered ordered the the ambulance than, as later admitted, alerted the the NKVD. But, for for alleged alleged security security ambulance than, as he he later admitted, he healerted NKVD. But, reasons, he he refused to reveal reveal the the address address of the clinic to French Sedovs reasons, refused to of the clinic t() Frenh Trotskyists. Trotskyists. Sedov's operation seemed to to be making a normal recovrecov operation was was successful successful and and for for a a few few days days he he seemed be making a normal ery. Then he had had a a sudden sudden relapse relapse which which baffled baffled his his doctors._ doctors..Despite Despite repeated repeated blood blood ery. Then he transfusions, 16 at at the age of thirty-two. The the age of only only thirty-two. The transfusions, he he died died in in great great pain pain on on February February 16 responsible for for his contemporary files contain contain no no proof proof that that the the NKVD was contemporary files was responsible his death.41 death.41 It the Kamera, Kamera, which experimented It had, had, however, however, a a sophisticated sophisticated medical medical section, section, the which experimented

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with capable of of poisoning the NKVD with lethal lethal drugs drugs and and was was capable poisoning Sedov. Sedov. It It is is certain certain that that the intended to assassinate Sedov,just as it it planned planned to to kill kill Trotsky Trotsky and and his his other other leading leading intended to assassinate Sedov, just as lieutenants. What remains remains in in doubt doubtis is whether whether Sedov Sedov was wasmurdered murdered by the the NKVD in in lieutenants. What February February 1938 1938 or or whether whether he he died died of of natural natural causes causes before before he he could could be be assassinated.42 as~assinated.~~ Sedovs death death enabled enabled the the NKVD to to take take a a leading leading role role in in the the Trotskyist Trotskyist organi organiSedov's zation. Zborowski Zborowski became both publisher publisher of of the the Bulletin of o f the Opposition Opposition and and Trot Trotzation. became both sky's skys most most important important contact contact with with his his European European supporters. supporters. While While unobtrusively unobtrusively encouraging internecine internecine warfare warfare between between the the rival rival Trotskyist Trotskyist tendencies, tendencies, Zborowski Zborowski encouraging impeccably On one occasion tell Trotsky Trotsky that impeccably maintained maintained his his own own cover. cover. O n one occasion he he wrote wroteto to tell that the Bulletin was was about to publish an article TrotskysLife Life in in Danger," Danger, which which about to publish an article entitled entitled "Trotsky's the would expose the Mexico. In summer of 1938 the agents in in Mexico. In the thesummer of 1938 the would expose the activities activities of of NKVD agents defector Aleksandr Aleksandr Orlov, Orlov, then then living living in in the the United United States, States, sent sent Trotsky Trotsky an an anony anonydefector mous letter warning warning him him that that his his life life was was in in danger danger from from an an NKVD agent agent in in Paris. Paris. mous letter Orlov Orlov did did not not know know the the agent's agents surname surname but but said said that that his his first first name name was was Mark Mark (the (the E real first first name name of of Etienne Zborowski), and and gave gave a a detailed detailed description of his his real " tienne" Zborowski), description of appearance and and background. background. Trotsky Trotsky suspected suspected that that this this letter letter and andothers others like like it it were were appearance provocateurs. Zborowski Zborowski agreed. agreed. When told about one of of the the work work of of NKVD agents agentsprowocnteurs. When told about one the him, he hearty laugh."43 the accusations accusations against against him, he is is reported reported as as having having given given "a a hearty laugh.33 Following Following the the death deathof of Sedov, Sedov,the the NKVD's NKVIDs next next major major Trotskyist Trotskyist target target in in Europe Europe was the the German GermanRudolf Rudolf Klement, Klement, secretary secretary of of Trotsky's Trotskys Fourth Fourth International, International,whose whose was founding to be the year.44 1938 the the founding conference conference was was due due to be held held later later in in the year.44On July July 13, 13, 1938 NKVD abducted home. A few headless abducted Klement Klement from from his his Paris Paris home. few weeks weeks later later his his headless corpse was was washed washed ashore ashore on on the the banks banks of of the the Seine. Seine. The The founding founding conference conference of of the the corpse Fourth Fourth International International in in September September was was a a tragicomic tragicomic event, event, attended attended by by only only twenty twentyone delegates claiming claiming to to represent represent mostly mostly minuscule minuscule Trotskyist Trotskyist groups in eleven eleven one delegates groups in countries. The Russian Russian section, whose authentic members members had probably been been entirely exterminated, was represented represented by Zborowski. Zborowski. The The American Trotskyist Sylvia Sylvia exterminated, was American Trotskyist Angeloff, one of the the conference conference translators, translators, was was accompanied accompanied by by her Spanish lover, lover, Angeloff, one of her Spanish Ramon illegal posing later to Ram6n Mercader, Mercader, an an NKVD illegal posing as as a a Belgian Belgian journalist journalist who who was was later to achieve fame fame as as Trotsky's Trotskys assassin assassinin Mexico City.45 City. achieve in Mexico
B Y BY
' 1938 S SEREBRYANSKYS Special Tasks was the largest section I938 E R E B RYA N S KY S Administration for Special

intelligence, claiming to have 212 illegal officers officers operating in six sixof Soviet foreign intelligence, teen countries: the USA, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Czechoslovakia and Finland, Germany, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia China. After Trotskyists, the largest number of enemies Mter Trotskyists, "enemies of the people people" pursued abroad by by the the NKVD during during the the Great Great Terror Terror came came from from the the ranks ranks of of its its own own for forabroad service.46 eign intelligence service.46 When receiving reports from Moscow of show trials and their colleagues colleagues as agents of imperialist powers, intelligence offi offithe unmasking of their carehl attention not merely to what they said but cers stationed abroad had to pay careful their facial expressions expressionsand body language. language. Those who whofailed to respond with also to their sufficiently visible or heartfelt outrage to the conspiracies being sufficiently the non-existent conspiracies Centre-freunveiled in Moscow Moscow were likely to have adverse adverse reports sent to tothe the Centre-fre consequences. quently with fatal consequences.

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Lenins forrner formerlieutenants Afterthe the trial of Lenin's lieuteaI1t Zinovyev, p.ovyev, Kamenev Kamenev and and other other degenerates in in August August 1936, 1936, the the Centre received an an outraged outraged communication "degenerates" Centre received communication from the the Paris Paris legal legal residency residency regarding regarding the the unsatisfactory level of from unsatisfactory level of indignation indignation disdis played by by the the military military intelligence intelligence officer officer Abram Abram Mironovich Mironovich Albm Albam (codenamed played (code named BELOV): does not not appear appear to to feel feel a a deep deep hatred hatred or or a sharply critical BELOV does a sharply critical attitude attitude towards political bandits. of the the trial trial ,of of the th.e TrotTrot towards these these political bandits. During During discussions discussions of skyite-Zinovyevite bandits, he retreats retreats into into silence. BELOV was hoping that that skyite-Zinovyevite bandits, he silence. BELQV was oping the sixteen sixteen convicted would be be shown shown mercy, the convicted men men would mercy, and, and, when when he he read read about about their execution execution in in the the newspaper today, he actually sighed.47 their newspaper today, he actually sighed. 47 Albams subversive subversivesigh sighhelped helped to to convict Albam's convict not not merely merely himself himself but but also also a a number number of of his his colleagues of of imaginary imaginary crimes. crimes. His His file file lists lists thirteen his acquaintances were colleagues thirteen of of his acquaintances who who were subsequently arrested; arrested; at at least least some, probably most, shot. Albams subsequently some, probably most, were were shot. Albam's wife, wife, Frida Frida Lvovna, tried tried to to save save herself herself by by disowning disowning her arrested husband. Lvovna, her arrested husband. The "The most rnost horrible horrible realization for for an an honest Party member, she wrote wrote indignantly the NKVD, is realization honest Party member," she indignantly to to the "is the the fact that that he he was was an an enemy enemy of of the thepeople thepe~ple.~ fact people surrounded surrounded by by other other enemies enemies of of the people."48 Both at home home and Great Terror favored the the survival survival of the most Both at and abroad abroad the the Great Terror, favored . , . . of the most . . morally unfit. unfit. Those Those who who were were quickest quickest to to denounce their colleagues morally denounce their colleagues for for imaginary imaginary crimes stood the being among survivors. The The fact crimes stood the greatest greatest chance chance of of being among the the minority minorityof of survivors. fact thebeginning of GreatTerror, was one that Yakov Surits, ambassador ambassador in Berlin at the of the Great of senior diplomats well something to expertise of the the few few senior diplomats to to survive survive may may well have have owed owedsomething tohis his expertise to head off denunciation by the head of the legal res resin denunciation. Surits sought to idency in in his his embassy, embassy, B. M. Gordon, Gordon, by by denouncing first. At the the outset idency denouncing Gordon Gordon first. outset of of the Terror, Terror, Surits Surits drew drew to to the of the the the attention attention of the Centre Centre that that a a Soviet Soviet diplomat diplomat with with whom terms was former Socialist Socialist Revolutionary Rev9luti<mary who who frefre whom Gordon Gordon was was on on friendly friendly terms was a a former quently visited visited relatives relatives in in Prague Prague "where where other other SR emigres CmigrCs reside."49 After the quently After the show show trial of ofthe Trotskyite-Zinovyevite Terrorist Terrorist Center" Centerin January 1937, 1937, Surits trial the "Trotskyite-Zinovyevite in January Surits reported disturbing disturbing evidence evidence of of Gordon's Gordons Trotskyite sympathies: reported Trots1.. ),ite sympathies:
. '" ..... , .- . .

meeting in the Berlin embassy. embassy. Gordon, Gordon, B. M., On O n February February 2 2a a Party Party meeting was was held held in theBerlin the delivered a a report report on on the of the resident resident and and Communist Communist Party Party organizer, organizer, delivered the trial trial of the the Trotskyite Trotskyite Center. Center. Gordon ,of bands had a a Gordon did did not not say say a a word word about about the the fact fact that that his his rabble rabble ,of bandits had specifi c program hid its its program program from from specific program of of action; action; he he did did not notsay say why why this this scum scum hid the people; why why it it led led a a double double life; life; why why it the working working class class and and from from all all working working people; it went went deeply deeply underground. underground. He after all the enemies enemies managed managed to to cause cause He did did not not dwell dwell on on the thereasons reasons why why after all the damage damage for for so so many many years. years. He despite wrecking, H e did did not not deal deal with with the the question question why, why, despite wrecking, sabotage, sabotage, terror terrorism espionage, our made progress ism and and espionage, our industry industry and and transport transport constantly constantly made progress and and continue continue to to make make progress. progress. He the trial. trial. 50 H e did did not not touch touch on on the the international internationalsignificance significance of of the

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Surits, Surits, however, however, was was unaware unaware that that he he was was himself himself being being simultaneously simultaneously denounced denounced for for similar similar failings failings by by one one of of his his secretaries, secretaries,who who wrote wrote virtuously virtuously to to the the Centre: Centre: To ofBukharin To this this day day the the office office of of Comrade ComradeSurits Surits is is adorned adorned with with aaportrait portrait of Bukharin with with the thefollowing following inscription: inscription: "To To my my dear dear Surits, Surits, my my oid old friend friend and and comrade, comrade, with not take with love-No love-N. Bukharin." Bukharin. I deliberately deliberately do do not take it it down, down, not not because because I greatly because I want greatly enjoy enjoy looking looking at at it, it, but but because want to to avoid avoid the the cross cross looks looks which which Comrade the portrait ofYenukidze. Comrade Surits Surits gave gave me me when when I removed removed the portrait ofyenukidze. I am am waiting waiting for for him him to to remove remove it it himself, himself, since since if if Bukharin Bukharin was was indeed indeed once once his his close close friend, friend, he he must must now now be be his his enemy, enemy, as ashe he has has become become the the enemy enemy of of our our Party Partyand andof of the the whole whole working working class. class. The The portrait portrait should should immediately immediately have re. have been been thrown thrown into into the thefi fire. That, toto you. That, really, really, is is all all that that I considered considered it it my my Party Party duty dutyto toreport report you. After After the the adoption adoption of of the the Stalin Stalin Constitution Constitution [of [of 1936] 19361 which which has has granted granted us us great great rights rights and andput put us us under under great great obligations, obligations, calling calling us us to to exercise exercise discipline, discipline, hon honest est work work and and vigilance, vigilance, I could could not not remain remain silent silent about about these these facts.51 facts. all or cers, In In 1937-8, 1937-8, following following the the recall recall and and liquidation liquidation of of all or most most of of their their offi officers, many ceased to the residencies many NKVD residencies residencies ceased to function. function. Though Though the residencies in in London, London, Berlin, most, Berlin, Vienna Vienna and and Tokyo Tokyo did did not notclose, close, they they were were reduced reduced to to one oneor, or, at at the the most, two two c ers each. 52 Most of the Great Illegals were purged with the rest. Among the first offi officers each.52 Most of the Great Illegals were purged with the rest. Among thefirst NKVDs most success successfall under suspicion suspicion was the London London head of probably probably the NKVD's to fall illegal residency, residency, Teodor Maly, Maly, whose religious background and revulsion at the ful illegal use return use of terror made him an obvious obvious suspect. suspect. He accepted accepted the order to return toto Moscow Moscow in in June June 1937 1937 with with an an idealistic idealistic fatalism. fatalism. "1 I know know that that as as a a former former priest priest I haven't havent got got a a chance," chance, he he told told Aleksandr Aleksandr Orlov. Orlov. "But But 1 I have have decided decided to to go there there so so that that nobody nobody can can say: say: 'That That priest priest might might have have been been a a real real spy after after all.' all. "53 53 Once Once in in Moscow a few Moscow he he was was denounced denounced as as a a German German spy, spy, interrogated interrogated and and shot shot a few months months later. later. Moisei Akselrod, head of the illegal illegal residency in Italy Italy and controller of DUN DUNCAN, the previous CAN, the the most most productive productive source source of of intelligence intelligence on on Britain Britain during during the previous decade, decade, was was also also recalled recalled to to Moscow. Moscow. After After a a brief brief period period in in limbo, limbo, he he too too was was exe executed 54 cuted as as an an enemy enemy of of the thepeople. people.54 Amid Great Terror, Amid the theparanoia paranoia of of the the Great Terror, Arnold Arnold Deutsch's DeutschsJewish-Austrian Jewish-Austrian origins origins and After thethe and unorthodox unorthodox early early career career made made him him automatically automatically suspect suspect in in the theCentre. Centre. After recall of Maly, Maly, Akselrod and other illegals, illegals, he must have feared feared that his own turn recall would would not not be be long long in incoming. coming. In In an an effort effort to to extend extend his his visa visa he he had hadrecently recently contacted contacted a a Jewish Jewish relative relative in in Birmingham, Birmingham,Oscar Oscar Deutsch, Deutsch, president president of of a a local local synagogue synagogue and and managing director of Odeon Theatres. Arnold sometimes visited his Birmingham relatives for Friday night sabbath dinners, and Oscar promised to to provide work to relatives 55 These contacts doubtless enable him to to stay stay in Britain. Britain. doubtless added to the suspicions suspicions of enable Centre. the Centre. Remarkably, Remarkably, however, however, Deutsch Deutsch survived. survived. He H e may may well well have have owed owed his his survival survival to to a Paris-based NKVD illegal, illegal, Ignace Poretsky (alias (alias July 1937 1937 of a the defection in July Reiss, codenamed RAYMOND). Poretsky was tracked down in Switzerland by a Reiss,

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Serebryansky Service," Service, Roland Abbiate (alias Rossi, French illegal in the the "Serebryansky "Rossi," codecode Mireiue, also in the Serebryansky Service," Service, was was named LETCHIK), whose sister Mirille, the "Serebryansky simultaneously preparing the abduction of of General Miller Millerinin Paris.56 To lure Poretsky simultaneously Paris.56 J=>ore.tsky GermanCom Comto his death, Abbiate used one of his friends, Gertrude Schildbach, a German munist to Poretsky urgently munist refugee refugee who who was was persuaded persuaded to to write write to Poretsky to to say say that that she she urgently advice. Schildbach refusq,a, refused.,.arequest to give Poretsky a box of needed his advice. of chocolates chocolates recovered by the Swiss Swiss police), laced with strychnine (later recoverd police), but enticed him into into a a side-road near Lausanne where Qi!}:ys.,iing with aamachine-gun. machine-gun. At the the last last side-road near Lausanne where Ab.. Abbjaie 4wa5Gvaiting with hewas bing being led into a atrap trapand tried to grab hold of moment Poretsky realized that he of Schildbach. in one onehand hand Schildbach. His bullet-ridden body was later discovered, discovered, clutching in aa strand 57 strand of of her her greying greying hair. hair.57 The concluded that e had The NKVD damage damage assessment assessment after after Poretsky's Poretskys defection defection concluded that.h,he had probably probably betrayed betrayed Deutsch, Deutsch, with with whom whom he he had been stationed in in Paris . a a . fe few years years earlier, to Western Westernintelligence intelligence services.58 Deutschs classification earlier, services. 58 Deutsch's classification as a victim of TrotTrot skyite and Western conspiracy helped to protect him froIn from charges of of skyite of being part of conspiracy. He H e was recalled recalledto Moscow in November 1937, not,like Maly, to be 1937, not, that conspiracy. shot, shot, but because the Centre believed he had, ha,d, been pyen compromised by Poretsky and other traitors. of Deutsch did severe cataThe liquidation of Maly and recall of sver and aq.d potentially cata NKVDs British operations. strophic damage to the the NKVD's operations. All A l l contact was broken with (MAG),the cipher clerk in the theForeign Office recruited in 1935, 1935, since Captain King (MAG), assessment absurdly concluded that Maly had the NKVD damage assessment "had betrayed MAG theenemy."59 enemy.59 The files do not not what tile thedamage assessto the files noted by Mitrokhin do record wha, assess ment concluded about the Cambridge Cambridgerecruits, but, since since Maly knew all their names, there S must there were were undoubtedly undoubtedly fears fears that that they they too too had hadbeen compromised. Those fear, fears must qf surely have been oVJ1lber . o surely have been heightened heightened by by the the defection defection in in N November f WaJtt:r Walter .-Kriyitsky, J Viyitsky, the illegal resident etherland, . Though Krivitsky seems the illegal resident in the the N Netherlands. seems not to to have have known the names of any of the Cambridge includ Cambridge Five, Five, he knew some details about them, including the journalist who had been sent to . Spain with thefact that one of them was a young journalist to a a mission mission to to assassinate assassinate Franco.6o Franco.60 Mter to After Deutsch's Deutschs recall recall to Moscow, Moscow, the the three three members members of o f the the Five Five who who remained remained in England-Burgess, of direct contact with England-Burgess, Blunt Blunt and and Cairncross-were Cairncross-were out out of direct .contact with the the Cen Centre for nine months. They were so highly motivated, however, however, that they continued to work for the NKVD even as the illegal residency residency which had controlled them thm was disclis Burgess, who had had been allowed by by Deutsch and Maly Maly to toconsider himintegrating. Burgess, him: self wholly dependent dependent on from self an an NKVD officer officer rather rather than than an an agent agent wholly on instructions instructions from his He himself as his controller, controller, continued continued recruiting recruiting agents agents on his own own initiative. H e saw saw himself continuing Oxf()rd continuing and and developing developing Deutsch's Deutschs strategy strategy of of recruiting recruiting bright bright students studentsatat Oxford as as well well as as Cambridge Cambridge who who could could penetrate penetrate Whitehall. Whitehall. Burgess intended his at Oxford be Rees, a a young Burgess intended his chief chief talnt:-spotter talent-spotter at Oxfordto to be Goronwy Goronwy Rees, young Welsh ofhe Spectator. Rees Welsh Fellow Fellow of of All A l l Souls Souls and and assistant assistant eclo,r editor ,of, the Spectator. Rees had first met met Burgess him, had none the Burgess in in 1932 1932and, and, though though resisting resisting Burgess's Burgesss attempt attempt to toseduce seduce him, hadnone the less been deeply seemed to me that that there something deeply less been deeply impressed impressed by by him: him: "It It seemed to me therewas was something deeply original, something which was, as it were, his very own in everything he had hadto say.61 original, say."61

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It which persuaded It was was probably probably a a book book review review by by Rees Rees late late in in 1937 1937 which persuaded Burgess Burgess that that he he was was ready ready for for recruitment. recruitment. The The misery misery of of mass mass unemployment unemployment in in south southWales, Wales, wrote wrote Rees, Rees, was was misery misery of of aaspecial special and and peculiar peculiar kind kind .. .. .. and and to to many many people people it it implies implies a a final final condemnation the society condemnation of of the society which which has has produced produced it it .. ....If If you you tell tell men men and and women, women, already already inclined inclined by by temperament temperament and and tradition tradition to to revolutionary revolutionary opin opinions, ions, that that their their sufferings sufferings are are caused caused by by an an impersonal impersonal economic economic system, system, you you leave choice. leave them them but butone one choice. Lenin Lenin could could not not do do better. better. One the beginning 1938, sitting sitting in in Rees's One evening, evening, probably probably at at the beginning of of 1938, Reess flat flat with, with, as as S pectator review usual, a bottle of whiskey between them, Burgess told him that his usual, a bottle of whiskey between them, Burgess told him that his Spectator review showed showed that that he he had had "the the heart heart of ofthe thematter matterin inhim." him. Then, Then, according according to to Rees, Rees, he he added added with with unusual unusual solemnity, solemnity,"I I am am aa Comintern Cominternagent agent and and have have been been ever ever since since I I came In came down down from from Cambridge."62 Cambridge.62 In later later years years Rees Rees was wasto to try tryto togive give the the impression impression that he did did not not agree makes clear that he agree to to become become an an agent. agent. His His KGB KGB file file makes clear that that he he was was recruited-though recruited-though it it confirms confirms that that Burgess Burgess asked asked him him not not to to work work for for the the NKVD NKVD but help As with but "to to help the theParty."63 Party.63 As an anNKVD NKVD case case officer officer with whom whomBurgess Burgess made made contact contact later later in in the the year year reported reported to to the the Centre, Centre, he he regarded regarded Rees Rees (henceforth (henceforth codenamed codenamed FLEET FLEET or or GROSS) GROSS) as as a a key key part part of ofhis his Oxbridge Oxbridge recruitment recruitment strategy: strategy: The The kind kind of of work work which which he he would would do do with with great great moral moral satisfaction satisfaction and and with with absolute absolute confidence confidence in in its its success success and and effectiveness effectiveness is isthe the recruitment recruitment by by us us of of young people graduating from Oxford and Cambridge Universities and young people graduating from Oxford and Cambridge Universities and preparing preparing them them to to enter enter the the civil civil service. service. For For this this kind kind of of work work he he has has such such assistants Cambridge and assistants as as TONY TONY [Blunt] [Blunt] in in Cambridge and GROSS GROSS [Rees] [Rees] in in Oxford. Oxford. AD CHEN [Burgess] 64 M MADCHEN [Burgess] always alwaysreturns returns to to this this idea idea at at every every meeting meeting .. .. ..64 Though Centre Though unhappy unhappy with with Burgess's Burgesss undisciplined undisciplined recruiting recruiting methods, methods, the theCentre regarded important agent. Britain's leading regarded Rees Rees as as potentially potentially an an important agent. Three Three of of Britains leading appeasers-Lord appeasers-Lord Halifax, Halifax, the the Foreign Foreign Secretary; Secretary; Sir Sir John John Simon, Simon,then thenHome Home Secre Secretary; tary; and and Geoffrey Geoffrey Dawson, Dawson, editor editor of of The T6e Times-were Timeswere nonresident nonresident Fellows Fellows of of All Souls. The Center attached exaggerated importance to the fact that Rees met all Souls. The Center attached exaggerated importance to the fact that Rees met all three three from high uence ofRees's from time time to to time time on on high table. table. It also also overestimated overestimatedthe the infl influence of Reess friend friend Sir Sir Ernest Ernest Swinton, Swinton, a a retired retired major-general major-general who who had had been been Chichele Chichele Professor Professor of of Military Military History History since since 1925 1925 and and was was referred referredto to by by the the Centre Centreas as "General General Swinton."65 Swint~n.~ pressing y with pressing ahead ahead enthusiasticall enthusiastically with his his Oxbridge Oxbridge recruit recruitment 1938 its ment strategy, strategy,INO I N 0 was was in in turmoil. turmoil. On On February February 17, 17,1938 its head, head, Abram Abram Slutsky, Slutsky, was c e, allegedly from was found found dead dead in in his his offi office, allegedly from a a heart heartattack. attack. But But at athis his lying lying in in state statein in the the NKVD NKVD officers' officersclub, club, his his senior senior staff staff noticed noticed on on his his face face the the tell-tale tell-tale signs signs of of cyanide Yagoda, cyanide poisoning.66 poisoning.66 Yagoda, meanwhile, meanwhile, was was confessing confessing at at his his trial trial to to working working for for the the German, German,Japanese Japanese and and Polish Polish intelligence intelligence services, services, to to poisoning poisoning his his predecessor, predecessor, Menzhinsky, the Menzhinsky, and and to to attempting attempting to topoison poison his his successor, successor,Yezhov.67 Y e ~ h o vBy .~~ By the end end of ofthe the
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Slutskystwo immediate successors successors as heaq head of INO, Zelman Pasov and Mikhail Mikhail year, Slutsky's ofINO, 68 I Shpigelglas, had also also been shot as enemies of of the people. people.68 N 0 collapsed into such Shpigelglas, INO daysnot a single foreign intelligence conhsion 1938that thatfor 127 confusion during 1938 127 consecutive days Stalin.69In December Y Yezhov, wasreplaced as head of report was forwarded to Stalin.69 ezhoV as of the Pavlovich Beria; accused of treasonNKVD by Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria; a few months later he was accused of treason conspiracywith Britain, Germany, Japan and Poland.70 able conspiracy Pqland.70 As NKVD officers went in the the evening, each one must have wondered whether the kn.ock kn.ock at the door door home in the early hours would signal that his own doom was nigh. in the Most of the theINO I N 0 officers officers who were interrogated and brutally tortured during duringthe the 1930s in the thename of the vast conspiracy theories of of Stalin and his NKVD chiefs late 1930s didwas the first of of the Great GreatIllegals, did not live to tell the tale. One of the few who did Illegals, Bystroletov. In 1937 1937 Bystroletov had been sent on ona mission to Berlin to conDmitri Bystroletov. Bystroletov con Soviet agent on the the Reichswehr general staff. e later claimed that, before he tact a Soviet staff H He have given given you youone of left, he was embraced by Yezhov. Be "Be proud that we have of our best sources,Yezhov Stalin and your fatherland will not forget yoU."71 Early in sources," Yezhov told him. "Stalin 1938, however, however, Bystroletov Bystroletovwas suspended from duty and transferred to the Moscow 1938, September. During Chamber of Commerce, where he worked until his arrest in September.72 Bystroletovsinterrogation by Colonel Solovyev,Yezhov Yezhov entered the room and asked Bystroletov's Colonel Solovyev, hewas accused accusedo of.When told h he was charged with spying for four foreign pow powwhat he Yezhovreplied "Too Too few!", few!, turned on his heels and left.73 left.73 ers, Yezhov When When Bystroletov Bystroletov refused refused to to confess confess to to his his imaginary imaginary crimes, Solovyev Solovyev and and his his assistant, Pushkin, beat him with a ball-bearing on the end of an iron rope, breaking assistant, with the end of of the the other other two of his ribs and penetrating a lung. His skull was fractured by one of instruments of torture, a hammer wrapped in cotton cotton wool and bandages, and his instruments stomach muscles muscles torn by repeated kicks from his interrogators. Convinced that he would die if the beating continued, Bystroletov Bystroletov signed a confession confession dictated to him him by most INO to imaginary were by Solovyev. Solovyev.For For most I N 0 officers, officers, torture torture and and confession confession to imaginary crimes crimes were bullet bul1e in in the back of of the the followed by a short walk and a followed by a short walk to to an an execution execution chamber chamber and the back head. Bystroletov, survived to an account account of of his interrogation. Though Though head. Bystroletov,however, however, survived to write write an his interrogation. sentenced to twenty years years' imprisonment in 1939, 1939, he he was rehabilitated during the Second time he his wife, wife, Shelmatova, Shelmatova, sent sent to Second World World War. War. By By the the time he was was released, released, his to the the gulag spouse of gulag as as the the spouse of an an enemy enemy of of the the people, people, had killed killed herself by by cutting cutting her herthroat throat knife. His eldrly elderly mother poisoned herself.74 with a kitchen knife. herself.74
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of residency following the liquida of the the LqggoIl London egal gegal residency following the liquidation of tion ofMaly of Maly and and the the recall recall of ofDeutsch, the the Centre Centreplanned to hand over over the running of its in Kensington. its main main British British agents agents to to the the legal legal residency residency at at the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy in Kensington. In In April 1938 a (code named SAM), SAM), arrived to take April 1938 a new new resident, resident, Grigori Grigori Grafpen &+en (codenamed charge.75 The most experienced experienced I IN 0 officers had a dramatic dramatic charge.75 The massacre massacre of of many many of of the the most N 0 officers had a effect Deutsch, Orlov effect on on the thequality quality of of NKVD tradecraft. tradecraft. Deutsch, Orlov and and Maly Maly had had taken taken elabo elaborate before Il1c:: ing their an inexperienced rate precautions precautions to to avoid avoid surveillance surveillance before meeting their agents. agents. But But an inexperienced emissary inspect Grafpen's had so so little idea emissary from from the the Centre Centre who who came came to to inspect Grafhens residency residencyhad little idea about assumed it to operate operate in in the environs of the about tradecraft tradecraft that that he heassumed it was was safe safeto theimmediate immediate environs of the embassy. "Next to to the Embassy there there is is a park [Ken[Kenembassy. He He reported reported naively naively to to Moscow, Moscow, Next the Embassy a park
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sington sington Gardens] Gardens] which which is is convenient convenient .. .. .. for for holding holding meetings meetings with with agents, agents, as as one one can can simply the simply give give the appearance appearance of of having having gone gone out out for for a a walk walk in in this this park."76 park.76 Grafpen's Grafpens first first priority priority was was to to renew renew contact contact with with Donald DonaldMaclean, then then the the most most productive Cambridge Five productive of of the the Cambridge Five and and able able to to smuggle smuggle large large numbers numbers of of classified classified documents Foreign 10 a apparently inexperi documents out out of ofthe the Foreign Office. Office. On O n April April 10 a young young and and apparently inexperienced theEmpire Empire enced female female NKVD officer, officer, codenamed codenamed NORMA, met met Maclean Maclean in in the Cinema in Cinema in Leicester Leicester Square. Square. A few few days days later later Maclean Maclean came came to to NORMA's NORMASflat flat with with a large bundle Foreign Office which she she photographed, giving a large bundle of of Foreign Office documents documents which photographed, before before giving the film to the undeveloped undeveloped film to Grafpen Grafpen for for shipment shipment to to Moscow. Moscow. Either Either on on that that occasion occasion or or soon soon afterwards, afterwards, the the young young British British agent agent and and his his Soviet Soviet case case officer officer followed followed the the photography session by going to bed together. In defiance of her instructions, photography sessionby going to bed together. In defiance of her instructions, NORMA also bed, that NORMA also told told Maclean, Maclean, probably probably in in bed, that his his current current codename codename (which (which he he was not supposed was not supposed to to know) know) was was LYRIC.77 LYRIC.77 In 8 Maclean rst foreign In September September 193 1938 Maclean left left for for his his fi first foreign posting posting as as third third secretary secretary in in the the Paris Paris embassy, embassy, preceded preceded by by an an effusive effusive testimonial testimonial from from the the Foreign Foreign Office Office per personnel sonnel department: department: Maclean, who is Maclean, who is the the son son of of the the late late Sir Sir Donald Donald Maclean Maclean .. .. .. has has done done ex extwo years here and is one of the mainstays mainstays of the tremely well during his first first two e is a very nice individual indeed and has plenty of Western Department. Department. H He brains is, too, nice-looking brains and keenness. keenness. He H e is, nice-looking and and ought, ought,we we think, to to be a a suc success 78 cess in in Paris Paris from from the the social social as as well well as as the the work work point point of of view. view.78

As Maclean Macleanwas leaving leaving for Paris, the Munich Munichcrisis was wasreaching its humiliating clicli max the surrender of of the the Czech CzechSudetenland to Nazi Germany. On O n September ma.. x with the 30 the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, returned returned to a a hero's heros welcome in Hitlers signature which, London, brandishing the worthless piece of paper bearing Hitler's he claimed, meant not not only honor" but time." For he claimed, only "peace peace with with honor but "peace peace for for our our time. For the the Cambridge less than Cambridge Five, Five, incapable incapable of of imagining imagining that that less than a ayear year later later Stalin S t a h would would sign sign a was confirmation of justice of their a pact pact with with Hitler, Hitler,Munich Munich was further further confirmation of the the justice their cause. cause. theMunich Munich access to Foreign Office files containing During the crisis Cairncross had access the very best information imaginable" imaginable on British policy, policy, what Burgess described as "the theNKVD via Klugmann and Burgess.79 Burgess.79Cairncross's Cairncrosss which he passed to the documents on the attempted appeasement the onthe attempted appeasement of of Germany, Germany, which which reached reached its its nadir nadir with withthe Munich the provide Munich agreement, agreement, were were used usedby by the Centre Centreto to provide further further evidence evidence for for the the con conthat the thesecret aim of British foreign policy, policy, supported by the French, spiracy theory that to lure Germany into into an attack on Russia." Russia. Though the chief advocate advocate of of this was "to S t a h , it was also alsofervently espoused by IN INO. theCold Cold theory was Stalin, O. Throughout the War, Britains aim aimat Munich had hadbeen not merely to appease appease Hitler but butalso the claim that Britain's intoa a theSoviet Soviet Union remained unchallenged orthodoxy to drive him into conflict with the conamong KGB historians. As late as the mid-1990s, Yuri Modin, the post-war con This claim was neither propaganda nor troller of the Five, was still insisting that, "This the unvarnished truth, proven by the documents obtained for us disinformation but the Burgess (chiefly, (chiefly, no doubt, doubt, from Cairncross).8o Cairncross). by Burgess"

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Macleans posting to Paris duringthe Munich After Maclean's the Munich crisis, cnSlS, Cairncross was intended by the Centre source within the Centre to tosucceed succeed him as its chief source the Foreign Office. The person The London London resident, resident, Grafpen, Grafpen, bungled bungled the the transition. transition. Cairncross's Cairncrosss prickly personality encomiums from from his his colleagues colleagues ality and and lack lack of of social social graces graceshad had not not won won the the same same encomiums or the the Foreign Office personnel department as Maclean's Macleans more patrician manner. In December 81 At almost December 1938 1938 he he moved moved to to the the Treasury. Treasury. almost the the same same moment moment as Cairn Cairncross's reasons, Grafpen was crosss departure for the Treasury, though for unconnected reasons, recalled recalled to to Moscow. Moscow. Given Given the the atIl!o_phere atmos-phereof the the time, he may may actually have been unmasked as a Trotskyist on his arrival, to be sentenced to only relieved, after being "unmasked" five execution cellar in the five years yearsin in aalabor camp camp rather than thanbeing led to an anexecution theLubyanka basement.82 En route for Moscow in December 1938, 1938, Grafpen accompanied basement.82 NORMA (renamed ADA since indis<;reti()l!) to Paris where she was due since her earlier indiscretion) to to resume resume contact contact with with Maclean. ADA reported reported that that Maclean Maclean was having an affair atthe theSorbonne, Sorbonne, Melinda Marling, whom he later to with an American student at Melinda Marling, whom he was marry. heavily, had that marry. She also also discovered discovered that that Maclean, Maclean, now now drinking drinking heavily, had admitted that he had had told both his mistJ.'es.s mistress and hig.brother that he was _working working for while drunk he his_ h,r()ther that,h e . ... ' Soviet ADA remained in provided by Soviet intelligence.83 intelligen~e.~ in Paris, filming the documents provided by embassy files, Maclean from from embassy files, then then passing passing the film film to to an illegal codenamed FORD for for transmission to to the theCentre.84 Centre.84 1938 of Maclean's Macleans drunken security lapse was balanced by The news in December 1938 a spectacular spectacular success. success. In the same month Burgess reported, probably via Paris, that he he had He had been been taken taken on on by had succeeded succeeded in in joining joining the the Secret Secret Intelligence Intelligence Service. Service. H e had by SIS's D, founded earlier in in the the year year to devise dirty dirty tricks tricks SISs newest newest branch, branch, Section Section D, founded earlier to devise (delicately described asways of ranging from sabotage sabotage to psychological psychological warfare (delicately ways of "attacking enemies by of military attacking potential potential enemies by means means other other than than the the operations operations of military force") force) for however, the for use use in in a a future future war.85 war. Instead Instead of of being being elated by by the the news, however, the Centre Centre appeared almost almost paralyzed paralyzed by appeared by fear fear and and suspicion. suspicion.
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two and Maly, and the su two London London illegal illegal residents, residents, Reif Reif and Maly, and the legal legal resi resident, Grafpen, as combined with the defection defection of of Orlov, Orlov, dent, Grafpen, as imaginary imaginary enemy enemy agents, agents, combined with the put the future of of intelligence in Britain Britain in in doubt. The illegal illegal resi put the entire entire future intelligence operations operations in doubt. The residency the staff staff of the legal dency had had been been wound wound up up and, and, with with one one exception, exception, the of the legal residency residency London, Anatoli Anatoli were recalled to The were recalled to Moscow.86 MOSCOW.~ The only only remaining remaining IN I N0 0 officer officer in in London, Veniaminovich about even most important important British Veniaminovich Gorsky, Gorsky, was was poorly poorly briefed briefed about even the the most British agents. was due due to return to to London the agents. In In the the summer summer of of 1939, 1939, when when Philby Philby was to return London after after the end the Centre, orders on on end of ofthe theSpanish Spanish Civil Civil War, War, Gorsky Gorsky told told the Centre, "When When you you give give us usorders OHNCHEN, we what some orientation what to to do do with with S SOHNCHEN, we would would appreciate appreciate some orientation on on him, him, for for he is is known us only in the he known to to us only in the most most general general terms."87 An the Centre Centre conclded intelligence work in Britain "was An assessment assessment in in the concluded that that intelligence work in Britain was based acquired at the time time when when it it was was based on on doubtful doubtful sources, sources, on on an an agent agent network network acquired at the controlled by extremely dangerous. dangerous." It It concon controlled by enemies enemies of of the thepeople people and and was was therefore therefore extremely cluded to break all British agents-the Five Five cluded with with aarecommendation recommendation. break to contact contact with with . all /. British .. agents-the ' e included.88 Though contact not yet the Five Five seem ee to to have have been b en held helq at at included. Though contact was was not yet broke broken,, the InteUigence from from them was accepted, accepted, often often without arm's most of arms length length for for most of 1939. 1939. Intelligence them was without
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any it, while Centre continued any visible visible interest interest in in it, while the the Centre continued to to debate debate the the possibility possibility that that some or some or all were were agents agents provocateurs. provocateurs. ADA reported reported that that Philby Philby "frequently" frequently com complained plained to to Maclean Maclean about about the the NKVD's NKVDs lack lack of of contact contact with, with, and and interest interest in, in, him.89 him.89 Litzi who Litzi Philby Philby (MARY) (MARY) and and Edith Edith Tudor Tudor Hart Hart (EDITH), (EDITH), who were were used used by by Burgess Burgess and 8-9, grumbled and others othersas as couriers couriers to to make make contact contact with with the theNKVD in in Paris Paris in in 193 1938-9, grumbled that being paid. paid. Gorsky Gorsky reported in July that their their expenses expenses were were not not being reported to to the theCentre Centre July in 1939: 1939: MARY announced hiatus announced that, that, as as a a result result of of aafour-month four-month hiatus in in communications communications A weowe owe andM MADCHEN home [the [the with her, we her and DCHEN L65. 65. I promised to check at home L30 in advance, since since she said they were in material Centre] and gave him 30 need .. .. .. MARY continues to live in [France] [France] and for some some reason, reason, she says on our on there. there. our orders, orders, maintains maintains a a large large flat flat and and so on The Centre replied:

given orders to keep a fl flat necessary,MARY was given At one time, when it was necessary, at in Paris. That is no longer necessary. necessary. Have her get rid of of the flat and live more willnot pay. MARY should not be paid 65, L65, since since we do not not modestly, since we will oweher,for her,foranything. anything. We confirm the payment of ofL30. that 30. Tell her that feel that we owe willpay pay more. we will no more.90 however, the ideological ideological commitment of the main British To a remarkable degree, however, Centre. 1938 Burgess recruited one of his agents survived the turmoil in inthe the Centre. In 1938 Kessler, a Swiss Swiss journalist turned diplomat on the lovers, Eric Kessler, the staff of the Swiss London. Later Later codenamed OREND and SHVEYTSARETS SHVEYTSARETS ("Swiss"), (Swiss), embassy in London. source on Swiss-German Swiss-German relations.91 relations. Probably in 1939, 1939, Kessler proved proved a valuable source HungarianAndrew Andrew of Burgess recruited another foreign lover, the Hungarian Revoi, later leader of in wartime London. Codenamed TAFFY ("Toffee"), (Toffee),he the exiled Free Hungarians in source also claimed that he hehad had was described in his KGB file as a pederast; the same source had homose:x. homosexual aForeign Office official." official.Ironically, Ironically, 1942Burgess "had 'Ual relations with a in 1942 also to recruit Revoi as an MI5 MIS source.92 was also source.92 though they Lhzi Philby, Philby, still good comrades according to KGB files though Kim and Litzi both now had different partners, made a probably even more important recruitment in 1939: 1939: that of the Austrian journalist H. H. P. Smolka, whom Litzi had had known in Vienna. Soon after the Nazi Anschluss, Germanyinin 1938, Anschluss, which united Austria with Germany 1938, the name of of Peter Smollett. Code CodeSmolka became a naturalized British subject with the A B 0 by the Centre, Centre, Smollett later succeeded in becoming head of the Rus Rusnamed ABO thewartime Ministry of Information. Informati~ sian section in the 93n . ~ ~ The signature of the Nazi-Soviet Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in Moscow on August 23, 1939 was an even bigger blow to the the morale of of the NKVD's NKVDs British agents than the the 1939 inthe Centre. Exchanging toasts with Hitler's Hitlers foreign minister, Joachim von turmoil in him, "I I can guarantee, on my word of honor, that the the Soviet Ribbentrop, Stalin told him, partner.The ideological agents recruited during the the 1930s 1930s Union will not betray its partner." The ideological had been motivated, at least in part, by the desire desire to fight fascism. fascism. Most, after vary-

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ing ing degrees degrees of ofinner inner turmoil, turmoil, overcame overcame their their sense sense of of shocked shocked surprise surprise at at the theconclu conclusion sion of of the the Nazi-Soviet Nazi-Soviet Pact. Pact. Over Over the the previous previous few few years, years, they they had had become become suffi sufficiently indoctrinated, often self-indoctrinated, in Stalinist double-think to perform ciently indoctrinated, often self-indoctrinated, in Stalinist double-think to perform the the vision the intellectual intellectual somersaults somersaults required required to to sustain sustain their their commitment commitmentto to the vision of of the the Soviet progressive Soviet Union Union as as the the world's worlds first first worker-peasant worker-peasant state, state, the the hope hope of ofprogressive mankind. mankind. A minority however, minority of of the the ideological ideological agents agents in in the theWest, West, however,were were so so sickened sickened by by the the Nazi-Soviet the NKVD. The most Nazi-Soviet Pact Pact that that they they ended ended their their connection connection with with the NKVD. The most important Rees. DurDur important of of those those who who broke broke contact contact in in Britain Britain was was FLEET, FLEET, Goronwy Goronwy Rees. ing ing a a visit visit to to Moscow Moscow in in 1993, 1993,Rees's Reess daughter daughter Jenny Jenny was was informed, informed, accurately, accurately, dur during ing a a briefing briefing by by an an SVR representative representative that that Rees Rees had had refused refused to to cooperate cooperate after after the the Pact: Pact: "We We hear hear no no more more of of him him after after that." that. At the the end end of of the the briefing, briefing, Jenny Jenny Rees Rees asked something else, are not asked perceptively: perceptively: "You You know know something else, do do you, you, about about Rees Rees that that you you are not going The going to to tell tell me?"94 me?94 The SVR SVR did did indeed. indeed. The The most most important important of of the the secrets secrets that that the the SVR Burgess, by SIS officer, panicked when SVR was was unwilling unwilling to to reveal reveal was wasthat that Burgess, by now now an an SIS officer, panicked when Rees decided to sent an warning Rees decided to break break away, away, sent an urgent urgent message message to to the theCentre Centre warning that that Rees Rees might and asked might betray betray both both himself himself and and Blunt, Blunt, and asked for for Rees Rees to to be be assassinated. assassinated. The The Centre Centre refused. rehsed.Rees's Reess KGB me, file, however, however,records records that that he hedid did not not betray betray Burgess Burgess and and Blunt Blunt because because of of his his "old old friendship" friendship with with Burgess. Burgess. In In an an attempt attempt to to make make betrayal betrayal less likely, Nazi-Soviet less likely, Burgess Burgess told told Rees Rees that that he he too too had had been been disillusioned disillusioned by by the the Nazi-Soviet Pact ended illegal Maclean was Pact and and had hadended illegal work work for for the the Communist CommunistParty.95 Party.95Maclean was also alsodeeply deeply worried worried by by Rees's Reess "defection." defection.Years Years later, later, as as he he was was beginning beginning to to crack crack under under the the strain British diplomat Rees: "You strain of of his his double double life life as as British diplomat and and Soviet Soviet agent, agent, he he spat spat at at Rees: You 6 used but you used to to be be one one of of us, us, but you ratted!"9 ratted!96 The some of British agents The doubts doubts about about Moscow Moscow felt felt by by some of the the NKVD's NKVDs British agents after after the the Nazi-Soviet Nazi-Soviet Pact Pact were were more more than than matched matched by by the the Centre's Centres doubts doubts about about its its agents. agents. The the possibility The Center Center launched launched an an investigation investigation into into the possibility that that Philby Philby was was either either a a German or British agent.97 Since Philby German or a a British agent.97Since Philby had had provided provided the the original original leads leads which which led led to Maclean, and Cambridge to the the recruitment recruitment of of Burgess Burgess and and Maclean, and ultimately ultimately to to all all the the Cambridge recruits, recruits, doubts doubts about about him him reflected reflected on on the thewhole whole British British agent agent network. network. The The lowest lowest point point in in the the history history of of NKVD operations operations in in Britain Britain came came at at the the beginning beginningof of 1940 1940 when London legal residency, was was withdrawn to when Gorsky, Gorsky, the the last last member member of of the the London legal residency, withdrawn to Moscow, leaving not a single NKVD officer active in Britain. A me in the KGB Moscow, leaving not a single officer active in Britain. file in the . archives records, "The residency on the archives records, The residency was was disbanded disbanded on the instruction instruction of of Beria Beria [head [head of of the ."98 Beria's are not least in the files files examined examined by the NKVD] NKVD].98 Berias reasons reasons are not recorded, recorded, at at least in the by Mitrokhin, was Mitrokhin, but butchief among among them them was undoubtedly undoubtedly the the recurrent fear fear that that the theBritish British . agent network was deeply suspect. In February 1940 the Centre issued orders all agent network was deeply suspect. In February 1940 the Centreissued orders for for all contact Burgess was terminated at at about contact with with Philby Philby to to be be broken broken off. 99 Contact Contact with with Burgess was terminated about 100 the the same same time. time.
D H E LAT E R 1930s hunt for people" replaced DU URI IN NG T THE LATER 1930s the the hunt for "enemies enemies of of the the people replaced intelli intelligence collection as the main priority of NKVD foreign operations. The NKVD's gence collection as the main priority of NKVD foreign operations. The NKVDs most most active active foreign foreign intelligence intelligence agency agency was was Serebryansky's Serebryansws Administration Administration for for Spe Special cial Tasks, Tasks, whose whose persecution persecution ofINO of I N 0 officers officers steadily steadily diminished diminished the the flow flow of of foreign foreign

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intelligence the Center. Center. Even intelligence and and degraded degraded its its analysis analysis at at the Even the the executioners executioners abroad, abroad, however, however, were were not not immune immune from from the the Terror Terror at at home. home. Serebryansky Serebryansky himself became of his own witch-hunt. Though he heheld the Order Orderof of Lenin for his one of the victims of many victories over enemies of the people, he was recalled to Moscow many victories over enemies of the people, he was recalled to Moscow in in November November 1938 and exposed "a spy An 1938 and exposed as asa spy of of the the British British and and French French intelligence intelligence services." services. An a large number of of traitors and inquiry later concluded that his network contained "a elements.Though the allegations allegations of of espionage espionage for Britain and France plain gangster elements." were the size were absurd, absurd, the the charge charge that that Serebryansky Serebryansky had had inflated inflated both both the size of of his his illegal illegal the scale of its accomplishments in reports to to the Centre Centrewas probably network and the scale of well well founded.lol founded. Serebryansky's Serebryanskys successor successorwas wasPavel Pave1 Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, Sudoplatov, who a few months Cmigrk Ukrainian Ukrainian nationalist leader Yevkhen Konovalets Konovalets earlier had assassinated assassinated the emigre of chocolates. chocolates. In March 1939 with an ingeniously booby-trapped box of 1939 Sudoplatov became deputy head of foreign intelligence, intelligence, thus bringing "special special tasks" tasks and INO IN0 association than ever before. before.lo2 H e was personally instructed by Stalin that 102 He into closer association his chief task was to send a task force to Mexico to assassinate assassinate Leon Trotsky. Trotsky. The Trotsky, codenamed operation UTKA ("Duck" (Duck), killing of Trotsky, ), had become the chief Stalins foreign policy. policy. Even after the outbreak of of the theSecond World War War objective of Stalin's in September 1939, 1939, discovering discovering the intentions intentionsof Adolf Adolf Hitler remained a lower pri priSudoplatovs task force was was ority than arranging the liquidation of of the great heretic. Sudoplatov's of Spanish and Mexican NKVD agents recruited during the Civil War, composed of supervised of "special actions" supervised by by his his deputy, deputy, Leonid Leonid Eitingon, Eitingon,whose long long experience experience of special actions of enemies of the people Spain.03 included the liquidation of "enemies of people" in Spain.103 The The task task force force consisted consisted of of three three groups. groups. The The first first was was an an illegal illegal network network headed KO(codenamed MOTHER), by the Spanish Communist Caridad Caridad Mercader del Rio of the NKVD's NKVDs most celewho was both recruited and seduced by Eitingon, one of cele womanizers.lo4The most important agent in Caridad Mercader's Mercaders group was brated womanizers.lo4 RAYMOND),05 adoctored Canadian her son Ramon (codenamed RAYMOND),105 who traveled on a thename of of Frank Frank Jacson (an eccentric NKVD spelling of passport in the ofJackson). Like Eitingon, Ramon Mercader employed employed seduction as an operational technique, using theAmerican Trotskyist Sylvia Ageloff to penetrate Trotskys villanear his affair with the Trotsky's villa Mexico City. His opportunity came when Ageloff began work as one of of Trotskys Trotsky's secretaries 1940.Each Each toTrotsky's Trotskys villa villa in the themorn mornsecretaries early in 1940. day Mercader drove her to ing and returned returned to collect her after work. Gradually he became a well-known figure the guards and some of of Trotsky's Trotskys entourage, who, in March March 1940, allowed him with the into the the villa for the first time. Mercader's Mercaders role role at this stage was still that of of penetrapenetra thanassassin, thetask of onthe the villas defenses, occution agent rather than assassin, with the ofreporting on villa's defenses, occu pants and guards.lo6 guards.lo6 The attack on the thevilla was wasto be led by a second group of of agents drawn from vetvet erans of the the Spanish Civil War, headed by the celebrated Mexican Communist KONE),07 who was animated by an painter David Alfaro Siqueiros Siqueiros (codenamed KONE),107 exuberant ideological of art, revolution, Stalinism and exhibitionism. Both Mer Merideological mix of cader and Siqueiros Siqueiros were later to become well known for their involvement in operoper ation UTKA. KGB files, files, however, also reveal reveal the involvement of of a shadowy third

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assassins headed by one of the most remarkable of all Soviet illegals, group of assassins illegals, Iosif Iosif Romualdovich Grigulevich (then codenamed MAKS MAKS and FELIPE), who had had taken Romualdovich a leading role in liquidating Trotskyists during the the Spanish Civil War, as well as arsonists to operate behind Franco's lines."* I t is a measure training saboteurs saboteurs and arsonists lines.lo8 It measure of of though born borna a Lithuanian Jew,''' Grigulevich's skill in assuming false identities that, though Lithuanian Jew, 109 later, in passing himself off as a Costa CostaRican diplomat.'" he was to succeed, succeed, a decade decade later, diplomat.11o 1940 he recruited Siqueiros's Siqueiros's former pupil, the painter Antonio Pujol (codeEarly in 1940 (code JOSE),whom he later described described as lacking in initiative but "very loyal, loyal,excep excepnamed JOSE), Siqueiros's second-in-command tionally reliable and quite bold," bold," to act as Siqueiros's second-in-command in the the assault on Trotsky's villa.ll1 villa."' Grigulevich's other recruits included his future hture wife and assault assistant, the Mexican Communist Laura Araujo Aguilar (codenamed LUISA)Y2 LUISA).'12 assistant, A key part of the assault plan was the infiltration in April of a young AmerAmer April1940 of NewYork YorkTrotican agent, Robert Sheldon Harte (codenamed AMUR), posing as a New Trot skyist, as a volunteer guard in Trotsky's Trotsky's villa. Harte's Harte's role was was to open the main gate skyist, assault group staged its surprise attack in the of the night.l13 when the assault the middle of the night.l13 brief him on Though enthusiastic, enthusiastic, he was also alsonaive. naive. Grigulevich decided not to to brief on what would happen after he opened the villa gate. records identify identi+ Grigulevich as the real leader of Trotsky's KGB records of the assault on Trotsky's ~i1la.l'~ rolein the theattack was two-fold: to ensure that Siqueiros's assault villa.114 Grigulevich's role Siqueiros's assault group gained entrance to the villa compound, and to try to inject some element of discipline into the devices, Siqueiros Siqueiros would have led the discipline the attack. Left to to his own devices, assault with with all all guns guns blazing blazing but but probably probably have have made few few attempts to tocover cover his tracks. On 23, 1940 Siqueiros Siqueiros and group O n the the evening evening of of May May 23,1940 and aa group of of about twenty twenty followers followers put on a mixture of army and police uniforms and armed themselves themselves with pistols and revolvers. As they did so, according to one of their number, they "laughed and joked revolvers. as if ifit it were a feast day."11 day.'"155 Then, Then, with with Pujol Pujol carrying carrying the the only only machine-gun, machine-gun, Grigule Grigulevich -y. 116 vich and and the the assault assault group group set off off to to assassinate assassinate Trots1... TrotsAy116 O n arriving arriving at the villa in the early hours of of May 24, Grigulevich spoke to the On American assault group American volunteer volunteer guard, guard, Harte, Harte, who who opened opened the the gate.1I7 gate.'17 The The assault group raked raked the gun fire that the the Mexican police later counted the bedrooms bedrooms with with gun fire to to such such effect effect that Mexican police later counted seventy-three Trotsky seventy-three bullet bullet holes holes in in Trotsky's Trotsky's bedroom bedroom walL wall. Remarkably, Remarkably, however, however,Trotsky and and his his wife wife survived survivedby by throwing throwing themselves themselves beneath beneath their their bed. bed. Though an incendi incendiof their their small grandson, he too escaped by ary bomb was thrown into the bedroom of lIS Harte hiding hiding under his his bed. bed.'" Harte was was shocked shocked by by the the attack-particularly, attack-particularly, perhaps, by by the the assault assault group the attempt attempt to to kill kill Trotsky's Trotsky's grandchild. grandchild. He H e angrily angrily told told the group that, that, had had behave, he would never have havelet them them To Harte he known how they would behave, in.in. To prevent revealing revealing what what had had happened, he he was was taken taken away and and shot.1I9 shot.'" A few few months months later, Siqueiros arrested yo Grigulevich, Siqueiros was was tracked tracked down down and and arrested.120 Grigulevich, however, however, managed to to smuggle himself, Laura Araujo Aguilar out out of country without without his his smuggle himself, Pujol Pujol and and Laura Araujo Aguilar of the the country identity he ran an illegal illegal identity being being discovered discovered by by the the Mexican Mexican police. police. From From 1942 1942 to to 1944 1944 he ran an residency in Argentina Argentinawhich, according to KGB files, files, planted more than 150 150 mines in in cargoes cargoes and and ships ships bound bound for for Germany.12l Germany.12' The byby the dispersal of of Siqueiros's Siqueiros's The failure failure of of the the attack attack on on Trotsky's Trotsky's villa, villa,followed followed the dispersal the promotion promotionof Ramon Ram6n Mercader from penetration penetration agent to assasgunmen, led to the

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succeeded partly because he was patient. Five days after the raid he sin. Mercader succeeded thefirst time. Amiable as ever, ever,he gave gave Trotsky's Trotskys met Trotsky for the grandson a toy glider Over the the next three months he paid ten visits to the and taught him how to fly it. Over himand always taking care not to over overvilla, sometimes bringing small small presents with him stay his welcome. 20, he welcome. Finally, on August 20, he brought an an article he he had written and asked for Trotsky's Trotskys advice. advice.As Trotsky sat reading it at his study desk, Mercader took took an icepick from his pocket and brought it itdown with all the force he could muster on the back of Trotsky's Trotskys skull.122 skull.122 had expected Trotsky to die instantly and silently, silently, thus allowing allowing him to to Mercader had lover, Eitingon, were wait waitmake his escape to a car nearby where his mother and her lover, cry. ("I (I shall ing. But Trotsky, though mortally wounded, let out a "a terrible piercing cry." life, said Mercader afterwards.) Mercader was arrested and later hear that cry all my life," sentenced totwenty twenty years inEitingon jail. 123 Eitingon persuaded his motherto to flee withhim him Russia, promising to marry her if she did so. so. In Moscow Seiiora to Russia, Senora Mercader was by Stalin Stalk in the Kremlin and decorated with the the Order Order welcomed by Beria, Beria, received by But within within aafew years, abandoned by Eitingon and denied permission to of Lenin. But leave Russia, Russia, she was consumed with guilt at having turned her her son into an assassin assassin then leaving him to languish in a aMexican jail. 124 and then Ram6n Mercader Mercader kept kept the the Stalinist Stalinistfaith faith throughout Ramon throughout his twenty years in prison. History, he claimed, would see him as a soldier who had had served the cause of the of aatraitor. KGB fi files reveal(contrary to tomost most working-class revolution by ridding it of les reveal Mercader published accounts) that when Mercader was finally released and traveled to in 1960, 1960, he was awarded the title Hero of the the Soviet Union, along with a Moscow in generals pension and a three-room apartment, and was personally congratulated by general's a three-room apartment, and Trotsky, the liquidation of ofene eneKhrushchev. Twenty years after the assassination of Trotsky, of mies of the people abroad still remained, on a reduced scale, a significant part of 5 operations.12 KGB foreign operations.12

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nuring the later months of 1940, with Trotsky dead and the worst of the bloodD

uring the later months of 1940, with Trotsky dead and the worst of the blood letting Centre sought soughtto to rebuild letting inside inside INO I N 0 at at an an end, end, the the Centre rebuild its its foreign foreign intelligence intelligence the Great GreatTerror, all all new recruits to I N 0 had been trained individu individunetwork. Until the INO ally trainees. By ally at at secret secret apartments apartments in in Moscow Moscow and and kept kept strictly strictly apart apart from from other trainees. By 1938, however, however, so so many INO I N 0 offi officers 1938, cers had been unmasked as (imaginary) (imaginary) enemies of of the Centre Centre decided group training training was required to increase increase the flow the people that the of Soviet Unions Union's first first of new new recruits. recruits. NKVD order no. 00648 00648 of October 3 3 set up up the the Soviet school, hidden from public view in the themiddle of of aa foreign intelligence training school, wood at Balashikha, fifteen miles east of of the Moscow ringroad. Given the official title (Special Purpose School), Shkola Osobogo Naznacheniya (Special Schoo!), but better known by the SHON, it drew its recruits either from Party and Komsomol members with acronym SHON, higher education or from new university graduates in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and 1 elsewhere. elsewhere. Since Since most of the new recruits had experienced experienced only the cramped, squalid living collectivefarms and army barracks, barracks, an conditions of crowded city apartment blocks, collective attempt attempt was was made to to introduce introduce them them to togracious gracious living living so so that that they they would would feel at at ease Western"high highsociety." society.Their rooms were furnished with what what an anofficial history in Western solemnly cho solemnly describes describes as "rugs, rugs, comfortable and beautiful furniture, and tastefully chothewalls, walls, with excellent excellent bed linens and expensive expensive bedspreads."2 bedspreads.2With sen pictures on the no no experience experience of of personal personal privacy, privacy, the the trainees trainees would would have have been been disoriented disoriented by by being being accommodated ifspace space had accommodated separately separately even even if had allowed, allowed, and and so so were were housed housed two two to to a a room. The The curriculum curriculum included four four hours' hours teaching teaching a a day day on on foreign foreign languages, languages, two two hours on intelligence tradecraft, and lectures on on the CPSU, CPSU, history, history, diplomacy, diplomacy, phi philosophy, religion and painting-an painting-an eclectic eclectic mix designed both to to reinforce reinforce their ide idelosophy, ological to acquaint withWestern Western bourgeois There ological orthodoxy orthodoxy and and to acquaint them them with bourgeois culture.3 ~ulture.~ There were musical evenings. evenings. Instructors experience living the West West were also also regular regular musical Instructors with experience living in in the fashiongave the trainees crash courses in bourgeois manners, diplomatic etiquette, fashion able During its SHON taught taught annual annual able dressing dressing and and "good good taste."4 ta~te. During ~ its first first three three years, years, SHON 120 trainees-all trainees-all but four of of them male.5 male. intakes totalling about 120 The Pavel Mikhailovich The most most successful successful of of SHON's SHONs first first intake intake of of students students was was Pave1 Mikhailovich Fitin, whose early career had been spent in an agricultural publishing house. Fitin, whose early career had been spent in an agricultural publishing house. In In Feb February been recruited by internal training ruary 1938 1938 he hehad had been recruited by the the NKVD's NKVDs internal training school school to to fill fill one one

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of of the the many many vacancies vacancies caused causedby by the the liquidation liquidation of of "enemies enemies of of the the people" people within within its its ranks. In October he was transferred to SHON, where, according to an official ranks. In October he was transferred to SHON, where, according to anofficial hagiography, his "high outstanding organizational hagiography,his high intellect intellect and and outstanding organizational ability" ability made made an an immediate his immediate impression. impression. After After only only a a few few months, months,with with his training training still still incomplete, incomplete, he he was 9 he was drafted drafted into into foreign foreign intelligence. intelligence. In In May May 193 1939 he was was appointed appointed head head of of INO. INO. At At age age thirty-one, thirty-one, Fitin Fitin was was both both the the youngest youngest and and most most inexperienced inexperienced foreign foreignintel intelligence chief in his sudden prospects ligence chief in Soviet Soviet history. history. At At the the time time of of his sudden promotion promotion his his prospects must During must have have seemed seemedpoor. poor. During the thechaotic chaotic previous previous fifteen fifteen months months three threeof of his hispre predecessors proved decessors had had been been liquidated liquidated and and a a fourth fourth transferred.6 transferred.6 Fitin, Fitin, however, however,proved remarkably remarkably tenacious. tenacious. He H e remained remained head head of of INO I N 0 for for seven seven years, years,the the longest longest period period anyone ce since since the 920s, before returning to anyone had had held held that that offi office the 1 1920s, before losing losing favor favor and and returning to provincial provincial obscurity.? obscurity. Towards 1940, despatched Fitin's I N 0 officers officerswere were despatched to to London Londonon on Fitins Towards the the end endof of 1940,four four INO orders residency. The orders to to reopen reopen the the legal legal residency. The new new resident resident was was Anatoli Anatoli Veniaminovich Veniaminovich Gorsky intelligenceofficer officer to Gorsky (codenamed (codenamed VADIM), VADIM), the the last last intelligence to be be withdrawn withdrawn from from London London before before the the residency residency had had closed closed that that February.s February. Gorsky Gorsky was was a a grimly grimly effi efficient, cry from cient, humorless, humorless, orthodox orthodox Stalinist, Stalinist, a a far far cry from the the Great Great I1legals Illegals of of the the midmid1930s. at-footed" and Another 1930s. Blunt Blunt found found him him "fl flat-footed and unsympathetic.9 un~ympathetic.~ Another of of his his wartime wartime agents "a short, in his agents described described him him as as(a short, fattish fattish man man in his mid-thirties, mid-thirties, with with blond blond hair hair pushed cold eyes. eyes."lO pushed straight straight back back and and glasses glasses that that failed failed to to mask mask a a pair pair of of shrewd, shrewd, cold Like promotion Like Fitin, Fitin, Gorsky Gorsky owed owed his hisrapid rapid promotion to to the therecent recent liquidation liquidation of of most most of of his his colleagues. colleagues. Gorsky Gorsky returned returned to to London, London,however, however, far farbetter better briefed briefed than than during during his his previous previous tour tour of of duty, duty,when when he hehad had been been forced forced to to ask ask the the Centre Centre for for background background material material on on Kim 1 On Kim Philby.l Philby. O n Christmas Christmas Eve Eve 1940 1940 he he reported reported that that he he had hadrenewed renewed contact contact with with O HNCHEN. The S SOHNCHEN. The Centre Centre appeared appeared jubilant jubilant at at Gorsky's Gorskys report. report. In In the the summer summer of of 1940 Burgess had succeeded in recruiting Philby to Section D of SIS, which soon 1940 Burgess had succeeded in recruiting Philby to Section D of SIS, which soon afterwards merged into afterwards was was merged into a a new new organization, organization, the the Special Special Operations Operations Executive Executive (SOE), (SOE), instructed instructed by by Churchill Churchill to to "set set Europe Europe ablaze" ablaze through through subversive subversive warfare warfare behind Countries, behind enemy enemy lines. lines. Following Followingthe the six-week six-week defeat defeat of of France France and and the theLow Low Countries, the the Prime Prime Minister's Ministers orders orders proved proved wildly wildly optimistic. optimistic. The The Centre, Centre, however, however, warmly warmly welcomed Gorsky's report welcomed Gorskys report that that Philby Philby "was was working working as as a a political political instructor instructor at at the the training training center center of of the the British British Intelligence Intelligence Service Service preparing preparing sabotage sabotage agents agents to to be be sent however, one surprise in sent to to Europe." Europe. There There was, was, however, one major major surprise in Philby's Philbys early early reports. reports. OHNCHEN's date," 'ccording According to to SSOHNCHENs date, Gorsky Gorsky informed informed the the Centre, Centre, "[SOE] [SOE] has has not .not sent its agents to the USSR yet and is not even training them yet. The USSR is tenth sent itsagents to the yet and is not even training them yet. The USSR is tenth on on the thelist list of of countries countries to to which which agents agents are are to to be be sent." sent. Wrongly Wrongly convinced convinced that that the the Soviet Soviet Union Union remained remained a a priority priority target, target, a a skeptical skeptical desk desk officer officer in in the the Centre Centreunder underlined lined this this passage passage and and placed placed two two large large red red question question marks marks in in the the margin.I2 margin.12 Early Early in in1941, 1941, the the London Londonresidency residency renewed renewedcontact contact with with the the other other members members of of the the Five. Five. Maclean Maclean continued continued to to provide provide large largenumbers numbers of of Foreign ForeignOffice Officedocuments. documents. Unlike Unlike Philby, Philby, Burgess Burgesshad had failed failed to to secure secure a a transfer transfer from from Section Section D D of of SIS SIS to to SOE SOE and and had had returned returned to to the the BBC. BBC. Blunt, Blunt, however, however, had had succeeded succeeded in in entering entering the theSecu Security of 1940. largeamounts amounts of rity Service, Service, MIS, MI5, in in the the summer summer of 1940. As As well well as as providing providing large of

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material from MIS MI5 files, files, Blunt also ran as a sub-agent one of of his former Cambridge Long(codenamed ELLI), ELLI),who worked in military intelligence.13 intelligen~e.~ Among pupils, Leo Long Among the MIS files files was that during the early early intelligence intelligence provided provided by by Blunt Blunt from from MI5 wasevidence evidence that during the the two years before beforethe outbreak of the Second World War Warthe the NKVD had two NKVD had abandoned agents. In the summer of of 1937, height of of the one of its best-placed British agents. 1937, at the height paranoia generated by the Great Terror, the Centre had had jumped jumpedto tothe the conabsurd con Captain King, the Foreign Office cipher clerk recruited three years ear earclusion that Captain lier, had been betrayed to British intelligence by Teodor Maly, the illegal resident in lier, Blunt revealed revealed that King had gone undetected until his identification by a London. Blunt Soviet defector at the theoutbreak ofwar. war.14 Soviet 14 succeeded in occupying what the Centre considered a prime Cairncross too had succeeded Whitehall.In September 1940 1940 he he left the secposition in Whitehall. left the Treasury to become private sec Churchills ministers, Lord Hankey, Chancellor of of the Duchy retary to one of Churchill's Duchy of of Lancaster. Though not a member of the War Cabinet (initially composed of only five Lancaster. a the War Cabinet of all cabinet papers, chaired many secret commit commitsenior ministers), Hankey received all responsible for overseeing the work of services.15 By the tees and was responsible of the intelligence services.1s end so many classified documents-among documents-among end of of the the year year Cairncross Cairncross was was providing providing so them SIS reports, them War WarCabinet Cabinetminutes, minutes, SIS reports, Foreign Foreign Office Office telegrams telegrams and and General General Staff Staff assessments-that assessments-that Gorsky complained there was far too much to transmit in incipher.16 cipher.16 During 1941 1941 London London was easily easily the NKVDs NKVD's most productive legal residency. residency. According the residency residency forwarded forwarded to to Moscow Moscow 7,867 7,867 According to to the the Centre's Centres secret secretstatistics, statistics, the classified eco classified political political and and diplomatic diplomatic documents, documents, 715 715 on on military matters, matters, 127 127 on ecoaffairs and 51 intelligence. In addition it provided many other nomic affairs 51 on British intelligenceY reports based on verbal information from the Five and other agents. agents. It is difficult to conclusion that, until the Soviet Union entered the war, most of avoid the conclusion of this treasure intelligence was simply wasted. Stalins understanding of of British trove of high-grade intelligence wasted. Stalin's policy that no amount of of good policy was wasso so distorted distorted by by conspiracy conspiracy theory theory that no amount good intelligence intelligence was was likely to enlighten him. Despite the fact that Britain and Germany were at war, he continued mid-1930s-that the British continued to to believe-as believe-as he he had had done done since since the the mid-1930s-that British were plotting embroil him plotting to to embroil him with with Hitler. Hitler. His belief belief in in a a non-existent non-existent British conspiracy theexistence existence of of helped to blind him to the a real German plot to invade the Soviet Union. in resumed work in 1940 in the the Berlin Berlin embassy embassy resumed work in 1940 at at about about the the same its most most important important same time time as as that that in in London. London. The The NKVD NKVD had had lost lost touch touch with with its German (codenamed CORSICAN), an official the EcoEco German agent, agent, Arvid Arvid Harnack Harnack (codenamed CORSICAN), an official in in the nomics morning of September September 17,1940 17, 1940 contact contact nomics Ministry, Ministry, in in June June 1938. 1938. Early Early on onthe the morning of was was resumed resumed by by the the newly newly arrived deputy deputy Berlin resident, Aleksandr Mikhailovich Korotkov "Erdberg," codenamed SASHA and and DLINNY). The The fact fact that that Korotkov (alias (alias Erdberg, codenamed SASHA Korotkov and arranged arranged their their next next meeting in the Korotkov simply simply knocked knocked on on Harnack's Harnacks door door and meeting in the Soviet embassy is evidence both of the decline in tradecraft caused by the liquidation Soviet embassy is evidence both of the decline in tradecraft caused by the liquidation of most experienced the fact that the was at at this this stage of most experienced IN I N0 0 officers officers and and of of the fact that the Gestapo Gestapowas stage of omnipresent than of the the war war far far less less omnipresent than was was widely widely supposed. supposed. A fellow GermanCommunist Communistunderground, underground, Reinhold fellow member member of of the the German Reinhold Sch6n Schonbrunn, brunn, later later recalled: recalled:
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Harnack .. .. .. had little sense of of humor, and we, his colleagues, colleagues, did not feel at ease in puritan in in the the man, man, some ease in his his presence. presence. There There was was something something of of the the puritan something thing narrow narrow and and doctrinaire. doctrinaire. But But he hewas was extremely extremely devoted. devoted.

Philby, Harnack was so highly motivated that he had carried on Like Burgess and Philby, recruiting recruiting intelligence intelligence sources sources even even during during the the two two and and a a quarter quarter years years that that he he was was out out of of contact contact with with the the Centre. Centre.Korotkov reported reported that that Harnack Harnack was was in touch with with a a loose network loose network of of about about sixty sixty people, people, although although he he could could not not "personally personally vouch vouch for for every : every person" person:

CORSICANS description of the way that they camoufl camouflage CORSICAN's age their operations is that, while not all of the members of of of the circle know one another, something of a the background a chain chain exists. exists. CORSICAN CORSICAN himself himself tries tries to to remain remain in inthe background 18 although of although he he is is at at the theheart heart of the the organization. organization.ls
sources cultivated cultivated by Harnack was a lieutenant in the The most important of the sources Luftwaffe service, Harro codenamed STARSHINA Luftwaffe intelligence intelligence service, Harro Schulze-Boysen, Schulze-Boysen, codenamed STARSHINA (Senior),whose dynamic personality personalityprovided a striking contrast with that of the dour ("Senior"), Harnack. Leopold Trepper, Trepper, who knew them both, found Schulze-Boysen Schulze-Boysen "as as passion passionate ate and and hot-headed hot-headed as as Arvid A m d Harnack Harnack was was calm calm and and reflective." reflective. His His tall, tall, athletic athletic frame, frame, fair hair, blue eyes and Aryan features were far removed from the Gestapo stereotype hair, blue were far removed stereotype of Communistsubversive. subversive. On O n March 15, the Communist 1941 the Centre ordered Korotkov to make 15,1941 direct persuade him direct contact contact with with Schulze-Boysen Schulze-Boysen and and persuade him to to form form his his own own network network of of Schulze-Boysen needed neededlittle persuasion.19 persuasi~n.~ informants independent of Harnack. Schulze-Boysen experienced intelligence offi officer Even a more experienced cer than Korotkov would have found Harnack, Harnack, Schulze-Boysen Schulze-Boysen and and their their groups groups of of agents agents difficult difficult to to run. run. Both Both networks networks themselves at increased risk by combining covert opposition to the the Nazi regime put themselves espionage for the Soviet Soviet Union. Schulze-Boysen Schulze-Boysen and his glamorous wife, .wife,Libwith espionage Lib ertas, discussion groups for members of, and potential recruits to, an ertas, held evening discussion anti-Hitler underground. Libertas's anti-Hitler Libertass many many lovers lovers added added to to the thedanger danger of of discovery. discovery. As As resisters pasted anti-Nazi anti-Nazi posters on Berlin walls, Schulze-Boysen Schulze-Boysen stood guard young resisters over the ready and over them them dressed dressed in in his his Luftwaffe Luftwaffe uniform, uniform, with with his his pistol at at the and the the 0 ofE20 safety catch off. 2 The The most important intelligence intelligence provided provided by by the the Harnack and and Schulze-Boysen Schulze-Boysen thefi first half of of 1 1941 Hitlers preparations for operation BAR BARnetworks in the rst half 941 concerned Hitler's BAROSSA, the the invasion of Russia. On June 16 16 Korotkov cabled the Centre Centre that that intelligence from the two networks indicated that [all1 "[a]ll of the military training by inpreparation for its attack on the theSoviet Union is complete, and the strike Germany in be expected at any time."21 time.21Similar intelligence may be intelligence arrived from NKVD sources sources as over a hundred" hundredintel intelfar afield as China and Japan. Later KGB historians counted "over Germanattack forwarded to Stalin by Fitin ligence warnings of preparations for the German 1 and June 21 21.22 intelligence. All were between January 1 .22 Others came from military intelligence. as resistant to good intelligence from Germany as he was to good wasted. Stalin was as intelligence from Britain.

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in Soviet intelligence The Great Terror had institutionalized the paranoid strain i n Soviet assessment.Many NKVD officers officers shared, shared, if if usually to aa less grotesque degree, Stalins assessment. degree, Stalin's conspiracy theory. None the addiction to conspiracy the less, less, the main blame for the catastrophic failure to foresee the surprise attack on onJune 22 belongs to Stalin himself, himself, who confailure con tinued to act analyst. Stalin not merely ignore a tinued to act as as his his own own chief chief intelligence intelligence analyst. Stalin did did not series of accurate warnings. He H e denounced many of series of wholly accurate of those who provided them. an NKVD report from Schulze-Boysen Schulze-Boysen on June June 16 His response to an 16 was the obscene You can send your 'source' sourcefrom the German minute: "You German air force to his whore of of a a mother! Stalin."23 Stalin mother! This This is is not not a a 'source' sourcebut but a disinformer. disinformer. J. Stalin.23 Stalin also heaped abuse Sorge, who sent similar warnings from Tokyo, on the the great GRU illegal Richard Sorge, wife. where he had penetrated the German embassy and seduced the ambassadors ambassador's wife. Sorges warnings of operation BARBAROSSA were dismissed by Stalin as disinforSorge's disinfor shit who has set himself himself up with some small factories factories and brothmation from a lying "shit broth els in Japan. Japan,23 "24 less suspicious suspicious Adolf Hitler Hitler than thanof Stalin was much less of Adolf ofWinston Churchill, the evil genius who had preached an anti-Bolshevik crusade the civil war wartwenty years ear eargenius crusade in the lier and had been plotting against since. Behind many of of the against the Soviet Union ever since. camreports of impending German attack Stalin claimed claimed to detect a disinformation cam paign by Churchill designed to continue the long-standing British plot to embroil Churchills personal BARhim with Hitler. Churchill's personal warnings to Stalin of preparations for BAR BAROSSA intelligence reports sent by the BAROSSA only only heightened heightened his his suspicions. suspicions. From the intelligence residency, Stalin almost certainly untilJune 1941 theJoint Joint IntelliLondon residency, certainly knew that until 1941 the Intelli gence Committee (]IC), body responsible for assess (JIC),the the forthe main British intelligence intelligence assessHitlerwas preparing an invasion. t reported to Churchill ments, did not believe that Hitler invasion. I It as as late late as as May May 23 23 that that "the the advantages advantages .. .. .. to Germany of concluding an agreement over~helrning.~~ The assessments were wereprobably regarded by with the USSR are overwhelming."25 The JIC proof that Churchill's Churchills warnings were intended intended to deceive him. Stalins Stalin as further proof Stalin's suspicions of Churchill and of British policy in general were cleverly cleverly exploited deep suspicions exploited by the the Germans. Germans. As As part part of of the the deception deception operation which preceded BARBAROSSA, BARBAROSSA, the of an impendimpend the Abwehr, Abwehr, German German military military intelligence, intelligence, spread spread reports reports that that rumors rumors of ing German attack were part of a British disinformation campaign. campaign. By early June, reports of German troop troop movements toward the Soviet frontier explained, even by by Stalin, simply as British disinformation. were too numerous to be explained, At a in Moscow, Moscow, the the ambassador, ambassador, Count Count von von a private private lunch lunch in in the the German German embassy embassy in der Hitler had had definitely decided on on invasion. invasion. You "You will will der Schulenberg, Schulenberg, revealed revealed that that Hitler definitely decided Soviet ambassador to Ger ask me me why why I am am doing this," this, he he said to to the the astonished Soviet GerIwas raised raisedin the thespirit of Dekanozov. "I many, Vladimir Georgyevich Dekanozov. of Bismarck, Bismarck, who was response was was to to tell tell the the PolitPolit was always always an an opponent opponent of of war war with with Russia." Russia. Stalin's Stalins response Disinformation has now reached ambassadorial ambassadorial level! "26 O n June 9, or soon buro, "Disinformation On afterwards, embassy had been been sent sent afterwards, however, however, Stalin Stalin received received a a report report that that the theGerman German embassy had orders within a week and and had had begun burning orders by by telegram telegram to to prepare prepare for for evacuation evacuation within a week begun burning documents documents in in the thebasement.27 basement.27 Though Stalin remained preoccupied by a non-existent British conspiracy, conspiracy, he increasingly as well-though not one aimed increasingly began began to to suspect suspect a a German German plot plot as well-though not one which which aimed

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at surprise attack. became ever at surprise attack. As As it it became ever more more difficult difficult to to conceal German German troop troop move movements, the issue an ultimatum, ments, the Abwehr Abwehr spread spread rumors rumors that that Hitler Hitler was was preparing preparing to to issue an ultimatum, backed some display might, demanding demanding new backed by by some display of of military military might, new concessions concessions from from the the Soviet illusory threat rather than the real threat threat Soviet Union. Union. It It was was this this illusory threat of of an anultimatum, ultimatum, rather than the real invasion, which increasingly increasingly worried Stalin during the of German invasion, the few weeks and days alone. A succession days before before BARBAROSSA. BARBAROSSA. He H e was was not not alone. succession of of foreign foreign statesmen statesmen also taken in by the planted rumors of of aaGerman German ultimatum.28 and journalists were also ultimatum.28 to protect his position as head of of the the NKVD by expressing expressing mount mountBeria sought to ing who dared dared to to send send reports reports of of ing indignation indignation at at those those inside inside and and outside outside the the NKVD who preparations On 1941 he preparations for for a a German German invasion. invasion. O n June June 21, 21,1941 heordered ordered four four NKVD offi officers cers who who persisted persisted in sending sending such such reports reports to to be "ground ground into into labor labor camp camp dust." dust. He He wrote wrote to to Stalin Stalin on on the same same day day with with his his characteristic characteristic mix mix of of brutality brutality and and syco sycophancy: phancy:

recalling and punishing our ambassador to Berlin, Dekanozov, Dekanozov, I again insist on recalling who who keeps keeps bombarding bombarding me me with with "reports" reports on Hitler's Hitlers alleged alleged preparations preparations to to attack attack the the USSR. USSR.He H e has has reported reported that that this this attack attack will will start start tomorrow tomorrow .. .. .. But But Iosif Vissarionovich, Vissarionovich, have fi firmly I and my people, Iosif rmly embedded in our memory going to toattack us in 1941 1941.29 your wise conclusion: conclusion: Hitler is not going .29 theforthcoming forthcoming German was Also in jeopardy for providing intelligence on the German invasion was N 0 officer Vasili Mikhailovich Zarubin, later chief resident in the United the senior I INO States.ja Early Eariy in in 1941 1941Zarubin Zarubin to China China to tomeet meet Walter States.30 was sent to Walter Stennes, German adviser to the Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek. Stennes had once been Hitlers storm stormtroopers, developed a grudge deputy head of Hitler's troopers, the Sturmabteilung, but developed against him after being sacked 1931. In 1939 1939 Stennes was approached by the sacked in 1931. Hitler. In Febru FebruNKVD Chungking residency and agreed to supply intelligence on Hitler. 1941 Zarubin reported to the that ary 1941 theCentre Centre that a visitor from Berlin had secretly assured Stennes that "an an attack against the USSR by the Germans Germans .. .. .. was being year (the original date set by Hitler but but later postplanned for the end of May this year" post poned). Zarubin cabled on June 20: 20: "The The FRIEND [Stennes] repeats and confirms poned).31 categorically-based on absolutely reliable information-that information-that Hitler has completed categorically-based 2 Fitin outraged Beria by taking these and USSR.32 preparations for war against the USSR."3 seriously. An SVR official history concludes, concludes, probably correctly, correctly, similar warnings seriously. Only the theoutbreak of war saved P. P. M. Fitin from the firing firingsquad."33 squad.33 "Only The devastating surprise achieved by the German invasion in the early hours of Soviet intelligence system at the the June 22 was made possible both by the nature of the Soviet time and by the personal failings failings of of the the dictator who presided over it. In Whitehall patient,if if uninspired, examination of of intelligence intelligence reports through the thecommittee the patient, system eventually turned the belief that Germany overwhelming advan advansystem the belief Germany saw the "overwhelming" withRussia into recognition that Hitler Hitlerhad had tages of a negotiated settlement with decided assessment was dominated by to attack. In Moscow the whole system of intelligence assessment the fearful fearhl sycophancy encapsulated in the formula sniff sycophancy the "sniff out, suck up, survive, survive," and by a culture of conspiracy theory.

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Stalin had institutionalized both aaparanoid strain and a servile servile political correctness intelligence assessment even which lesser degree all which continued continued to to distort distort in in greater greater or or lesser all intelligence even to 1944 the Cam CamGreat Patriotic War in in 1941. 1941. From 1942 after the outbreak of the Great 1942 to 1944 the Soviet wartime agents, were to be seriously seriously bridge Five, probably the ablest group of Soviet bythe Centre Centreof being double agents controlled by British intelligence simsuspected by intelligence sim voluminous and highly classified intelligence sometimes failed to ply because their voluminous classified intelligence conform to Stalin's Stalinsconspiracy conspiracy t h e ~ r i e sThe . ~ ~ responsibility, responsibility, The however, conform theories.34 however, did not rest with intelligence assessment remained inherent Stalin alone. Some degree degree of distortion in intelligence autocratic nature of the Soviet Soviet system system throughout the Cold War. The Centre in the autocratic always shrank from telling the Kremlin what it did not want to hear. The last head of of foreign intelligence, intelligence,Leonid Shebarshin, confessed in 1992 1992 that until Gorbachev KGB foreign that until ofglasnost, topresent its reports in a afalsely pos posintroduced a measure of glasnost, the KGB had "had to itive light" light which pandered to the thepredilections predilections of itive of the political leader~hip.~ leadership.35

GreatPatriotic War, while the German Germanforces advanc advancmonths of the Great ing into into Russia were were sweeping sweeping all before them, Stalin faced the even more terrifying prospect of a two-front two-front war. Ribbentrop IClbbentrop instructed the German embassy in Japan, DOeverything to rouse the Japanese to begin war against Russia .. .. .. Our goal "Do the Japanese on the the Trans-Siberian Railway before the remains to shake hands with the winter. Opinion in Tokyo was initially divided between those who beginning of winter." northernsolution" solution(war with the theSoviet Union) and the supporters of favored the "northern of the "southern solution solution" (war States). Sorge, deeply distrusted southern (war with with Britain and and the theUnited United States). Sorge, distrusted reassurancefrom Tokyo that the theadvocates of ofthe southby Stalin, sought to provide reassurance ((south ern October 18 Sorge was arrested and ern solution" solutionwere were gaining gaining the the upper upper hand. But Buton on October 18 his his spy spy ring ring rapidly rapidly rounded rounded up. up. SIGINT in persuading be SIGINT was was more more influential influential than than Sorge Sorge in persuading Stalin Stalin that that there there would would be 1938 the combined NKVD/Fourth NKVD/Fourth Department no Japanese attack. Late in 1938 Department SIGSIG INT unit the former formerHotel Hotel unit had had been been broken broken up. up. The The NKVD section section moved moved into into the Select traffic; most, but Select on Dzerzhinsky Street, Street, where it concentrated on diplomatic traffic; not all a l, , military communications were the responsibility of of the cryptanalysts cryptanalysts of of the GRU (successor to In cryptan GRU (successor to the the Fourth FourthDepartment). Department). In February February 1941 1941 the theNKVD NKVD cryptanalysts new alysts had had been been integrated integrated into intoaa new and and enlarged enlarged Fifth (Cipher) (Cipher) Directorate, with, at its heart, aaresearch section responsible responsible for the attack attackon on foreign codes codes and ciphers. Sergei Tolstoy, Tolstoy, went on to become the The chief Japanese specialist in the section, Sergei two Orders of of Lenin. In the most decorated Soviet cryptanalyst of of the the war, war, winning winning two autumn group of American codebreakers codebreakers autumn of of 1941, 1941, a a group led led by by him him replicated replicated the the success success of a a year year earlier earlier in in breaking breaking the the main main Japanese diplomatic diplomatic cipher, cipher, codenamed codenamed by by the the Americans and since Westernhistorians as PURPLE. The teetotal Amersince known to Western Amer ican by sending out for case of of Coca ican codebreakers codebreakers had had celebrated celebrated their their success success by for a a case CocaCola. celebrate Cola. Tolstoy Tolstoy is is unlikely unlikely to to have have had had time timeto to celebrate at all. The Japanese diplomatic decrypts were of of enormous enormous importance. importance. Japan, Japan, they decrypts which which he he provided, provided, however, however, were they made Union. 36 made clear, clear, would would not not attack attack the the Soviet Soviet Union.36 The The reassurance reassurance about about Japanese Japanese intentions intentions provided provided by by SIGINT SIGINT enabled enabled Stalin Stalin to to shift shift to to the the west west half half the the divisional divisional strength strength of of the Far Far Eastern Eastern Command. Command. During During
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October divisions, together October and and November November 1941, 1941, between between eight eight and and ten ten rifle rifle divisions, together with with about thousand aircraft, the fight against Ger about a a thousand thousand tanks tanks and and aa thousand aircraft, were were flung flung into into the fight against Germany. many. These These forces, forces, together together with with other other Red Red Army Army divisions divisions which which had had been been held held in in reserve, may well wellhave havesaved saved the reserve, may the Soviet Soviet Union Union from from defeat. defeat. As Professor Professor Richard Richard Overy Overy concludes concludes in in his his study study of of the the eastern eastern front, front, "It Itwas was not not the the tough toughwinter winter con conditions ditions that that halted halted the the German Germanarmy army [in [in December December 1941] 19411but but the theremarkable remarkable revival revival of summer o f Soviet Soviet military military manpower manpower after after the the terrible terrible maulings maulings of o f the thesummer andand autumn. "37 autumn.37 As As well well as as providing providing reassurance reassurance that that Japan Japan did did not not propose propose to to attack attack the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, SIGINT SIGINT also also gave gave indications indications of of its its move move towards towards war war with with Britain Britain and and the the United United States, States, though though the the diplomatic diplomatic decrypts decrypts contained contained no no mention mention of of plans plans for for a a surprise surprise attack attack on on Pearl Pearl Harbor. Harbor. A decrypted decrypted telegram telegram from from Tokyo Tokyo to to its its Berlin Berlin embassy 1941, ten embassy (probably (probably copied copied to to the the Moscow Moscow embassy) embassy) on on November November 27, 27,1941, tendays days before before Pearl Pearl Harbor, Harbor, instructed instructed the the ambassador: ambassador: See secret See Hitler Hitler and and Ribbentrop, Ribbentrop, and and explain explain to to them themin in secret our our relations relations with with the the United the main United States States .. .. ..Explain Explain to to Hitler Hitlerthat that the main Japanese Japanese efforts efforts will will be be con concentrated centrated in in the the south south and and that that we we propose propose to to refrain refrain from from deliberate deliberate opera operations .38 tions in in the the north north[against [against the the Soviet Soviet Union] Union].38 Soviet were unable match the the success Soviet cryptanalysts, cryptanalysts, however, however, were unable to to match success of o f the the British British wartime wartime SIGINT SIGINT agency agency at at Bletchley Bletchley Park Park in in breaking breaking the the main main high-grade high-grade ciphers ciphers used so partly partly for for technological technological rea reaused by by the the German German armed armed forces. forces. They They failed failed to to do do so sons. sons. Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence was was unable unable to to construct construct the the powerful powerful electronic electronic "bombs," bombs, first break first constructed constructed at at Bletchley Bletchley Park Park in in 1940 1940to to break the the daily daily settings settings of of the the German German Enigma Enigma machine machine cipher. cipher. It was was even even further further from from being being able able to to replicate replicate COLOS COLOSSUS, 943 to SUS, the the world's worlds first first electronic electronic computer computer used used by by Bletchley Bletchley from from 1 1943 to decrypt decrypt the the Geheimschreiber Geheimschreibermessages messages (radio (radio signals signals based based on on teleprinter teleprinter impulses impulses enciphered enciphered and deciphered automatically) two years of the the war yielded yielded more automatically) which for the last two operational operational intelligence intelligence than than the the Enigma Enigmatraffic. traffic. But But there there was was a a human human as as well well as as a a technological technological explanation explanation for for the the inferiority inferiority of of Soviet Soviet to to British British SIGINT. SIGINT.The The Soviet Soviet system system would would never never have havetolerated tolerated the the remarkable remarkable infusion infusion of of unconventional unconventional youth youthful built. ful talent talent on onwhich which much much of of Bletchley's Bletchleys success successwas was built. Alan Alan Turing-the Turing-the brilliant brilliant eccentric eccentric who who buried buried his his life life savings savings (converted (converted into into silver silver ingots) ingots) in in the the Bletchley Bletchley Woods, went onon to to be Woods, forgot forgot where where he he had had hidden hiddenthem, them,but but went be chiefly chiefly responsible responsible for for the the invention invention of of COLOSSUS-was COLOSSUS-was one one of of many many British British cryptanalysts cryptanalysts who who would would surely political correctness surely have have been been incapable incapable of of conforming conforming to to the the political correctness demanded demanded by by system.39 Some British ULTRA-the ULTRA-the SIGINT SIGINT derived from decrypting the Stalinist system.39 Some enemy traffic-was, traffic-was, however, however, passed passedofficially officially a disguised disguised high-grade enemy to Moscow in a form, 40 form, and and in in an an undisguised undisguised form form by by several severalSoviet Soviet agents. agents.40
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KGB later sought to take refuge from the horrors of its Stalinist past by constructing a Leninist golden age of revolutionary purity, so so it also also sought to the Great GreatPatriotic War of of 1941-5 1941-5 as as one one of ofselfless selfless heroreinvent its record during the

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ism-best exemplified by by its its role role in in special warfare behind ism-best exemplified special operations operations and and partisan partisan warfare behind enemy Sudoplatov, head head of wartime enemy lines. lines. According According to to Pavel Pave1 Anatolyevich Anatolyevich Sudoplatov, of the the wartime Directorate for for Special Tasks and and Guerrilla Guerrilla Warfare, Warfare, "This Thischapter in in NKVD Directorate Special Tasks chapter history is is the the only only one one that thatwas was not not officially officially rewritten, rewritten, since since its its accomplish accomplishNKVD history ments stood stood on on their their own own merit merit and and did did not not contain contain Stalinist Stalinist crimes that had to be ments crimes that had to be covered up.41 In reality, reality, the the NKVD's NKVDs wartime wartime record, rest of its history, history, was covered Up."41 In record, like like the the rest of its was extensively doctored. doctored. extensively Among the thebest-publicized best-publicized examples examples of of the theNKVDs bravery behind lines Among NKVD's bravery behind enemy enemy lines were the the heroic heroic deeds deeds of of its its detachment detachment in in the theUkrainian Ukrainian Black Black Sea port of of Odessa were Sea port Odessa during the the 907 907-day occupation by by German German and Romanian forces. forces. The The detachment -day occupation and Romanian detachment during based tunnels used used to to excavate excavate based itself itself in in the the catacombs catacombs there, there, a a maze maze of underground underground tunnels sandstone for for the the construction construction of of the the elegant elegant nineteenth-century buildings which sandstone nineteenth-century buildings which still line many of Odessas streets and boulevards. With over a thousand kilometers still line many of Odessa's streets and boulevards. With over a thousand kilometers of of unmapped tunnels tunnels as as well well as as numerous numerous entrances entrances and unmapped and exits, exits, the the catacombs catacombs made made an an almost base for the twenty-fifth anniversary of ofVE almost ideal ideal base for partisan partisan warfare. warfare. In In 1969, 1969, on on the twenty-fifth anniversary VE Day, a a section section of of the the catacombs catacombs on on the outskirts of of Odessa was opened opened as the Day, the outskirts Odessa was as the Museum of Partisan Glory, Glory, which which throughout throughout the remainder of of the the Soviet Soviet era era Museum of Partisan the remainder received received over overa a million million visitors visitors a a year.42 year.42 After the theSecond Second World World War, War, however, however, the the sometimes sometimes heroic story of of the struggle After heroic story the struggle to liberate liberate Odessa Odessa from from enemy occupation was was hijacked hijacked by to enemy occupation by the the KGB to to refurbish refurbish its its dubious wartime wartime record. record. Pride Pride of of place place in in the the Museum Museumof of Partisan Glory is given to dubious Partisan Glory is given to the detachment headed headed by by Captain Captain Vladimir Vladimir Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich the exploits exploits of of the the NKVD detachment Molodtsov, of the Union and and suffered suffered Molodtsov, who who was was posthumously posthumously made made a a Hero Hero of the Soviet Soviet Union the ofof having into that a Stalinist Stalinist plaster saint. the indignity indignity having his his whole whole life life transformed transformed into thatofof a plaster saint. The traced back back to selfless devotion The origins origins ofMolodtsov's of Molodtsovs heroism heroism were were officially officiallytraced to selfless devotion in in overfdfilling his his norms norms as as a a miner miner during during the the first Five Year What a overfulfilling first Five Year Plan. Plan. "What a wonderwonder ful thing thing it itis, he was was said said to to have have declared declared in 1930,not to notice watch the time "not to notice or or watch the time ful is," he in 1930, during the theworking working day, day, not not to towait wait for for the the end the shift shiftbut butto during end of of the to seek seek to to prolong prolong it, it, to run run behind behindthe the[coal] [coal] trolley, trolley, to to be be bathed bathed in in sweat sweat and the end endof to and at at the of the the shift shift to to emerge fulfilling the emerge victorious victorious in in fulfilling the plan!"43 plan!43 The a reconstruction "reconstruction" of The Museum Museum of of Partisan Partisan Glory Glory contains contains a of the the NKVD detach detachment's depot, ments underground underground headquarters, headquarters, complete complete with with dormitories, dormitories, ammunition ammunition depot, workshops, fuel fuel store, store, kitchen kitchen and and meeting meeting room room with-inevitably-a with-inevitably-a portrait of of workshops, portrait 17 meters long link Lenin (but not of Stalin) on the walL 44 Nearby is a vertical shaft Lenin (but not of Stalin) on thewall.44Nearby is a vertical shaft 17 meters long linking the headquarters headquarters to to the surface, through through which ing the the surface, which it it received received messages messages and and food food from numerous films, magazine from its its agents agents in in Odessa. Odessa. During During the the Soviet Soviet era era numerous films, books, books, magazine and articles, many promoted by the KGB, celebrated celebrated the the heroic heroic feats and newspaper newspaper articles, many promoted by the feats of of the in holding thousands of German and and Romanian Romanian the NKVD detachment detachment in holding at at bay bay thousands of German troops in in Odessa before giving giving their their lives lives in in defense of the troops Odessa before defense of the fatherland. fatherland. Mitrokhin of the to a a colleague colleague in in Mitrokhin owed owed his his discovery discovery of ofthe the true true story story of the catacombs catacombs to the multi-volume Odessa the FCD Illegals Illegals Directorate Directorate S, S, who who borrowed borrowed the the multi-volume Odessa file file and, and, when he he returned returned it, it, told told Mitrokhin Mitrokhin he The file when he might might find find it it interesting. interesting. The file began began by by recording despatch of six NKVD officers to Odessa recording the the despatch of Molodtsov's Molodtsovs detachment detachment of of six officers to Odessa shortly before before it it fell fell to to the the Germans October 1941, with orders to with orders to establish establish an an shortly Germans in in October

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underground special underground residency residency which which would would organize organize reconnaissance, reconnaissance, sabotage sabotage and and special operations lines. In Odessa they joined by members operations behind behind the the German Germanlines. In Odessa they were were joined by thirteen thirteen members of Special Department, Department, commanded commanded by of the the local local NKVD Special by Lieutenant Lieutenant V. A. Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov. two groups groups held held a a Party/Komsomol Party/Komsomol According to to the official version version of events, the According the official of events, the two meeting on on the the evening evening of of October October 15 15 immediately immediately before before going going down down into into the the cata catameeting combs to to set set up up their their base. What actually actually took took place, place, according according to to the theKGB file, file, was wasa a combs base. What raucous dinner dinner party party and and heavy heavy drinking drinking which which ended ended in in aafight fight between between the the Moscow Moscow raucous and Odessa NKVD detachments. detachments. The next day daythe two groups groups entered entered the catacombs and Odessa The next the two the catacombs still at at daggers daggers drawn, drawn, with with Molodtsov Molodtsov and and Kuznetsov Kuznetsov each claiming overall overall comstill each claiming com mand. Over Over the next nine nine months months Muscovites Muscovites and and Odessans combined operations operations mand. the next Odessans combined against 45 against the the Germans Germans and and Romanians Romanians with with internecine internecine warfare warfare among among themselves. themselve~.~~ Molodtsovs end end may may well well have have been genuinely heroic. According to to the the official official Molodtsov's been genuinely heroic. According Soviet version, he was was captured captured by by the the enemy enemy in in July July 1942 1942 but butrefused rehsed to to beg beg for for his his Soviet version, he life, courageously courageously telling telling his his captors, We are are in in our ourown own country country and andwill will not not ask ask the the life, captors, "We enemy for mercy."46 mercy.46 The rest rest of of the the history of the the Odessa Odessa catacombs, catacombs, however, however, was was an enemy for The history of an NKVD horror disarmed his detach horror story. story. After After Molodtsov's Molodtsovs execution, execution, Kuznetsov Kuznetsov disarmed his detachone, N. F. ment and put put them them under under guard guard inside the catacombs. catacombs. All but but one, F. Abramov, Abramov, ment and inside the were executed executed on Kuznetsovs orders orders on charges of plotting against against him. him. As As condi condiwere on Kuznetsov's on charges of plotting tions in in the the catacombs catacombs deteriorated, deteriorated, the the Odessans then proceeded proceeded to to fall fall out out among among tions Odessans then themselves. became moldy; withtheir their kerosene themselves. The The dwindling dwindling food food supply supply became moldy; and, and, with kerosene almost exhausted, exhausted, the the detachment detachment was was forced forced to to live live in in semidarkness. semidarkness. O n August August 28 almost On Kuznetsov shot shot one one of of his his men, Molochny, for for the the theft theft of of a a piece piece of of bread. bread. On O n Sep SepKuznetsov men, Molochny, were executed executed for tember tember 27 two two others, others, Polschikov Polschikov and and Kovalchuk, Kovalchuk, were for stealing stealing food food and lack of sexual discipline. Fearing that he might be shot next, Abramov killed and ((lack of sexual discipline." Fearing that he might be shot next, Abramov killed Kuznetsov a a month monthlater. later. In his notebook, notebook, later later discovered in the thecatacombs catacombs and and preKuznetsov In his discovered in pre served in in the the KGB Odessa Odessa file, file, Abramov Abramov wrote: wrote: served
The former former head head of of the the Third Third Special Special Department of the the Odessa Odessa district district of of the the The Department of NKVD, State Security Security Lieutenant Lieutenant V. A. Kuznetsov, Kuznetsov, wasshot by me me with with two two was shot by NKVD, State bullets in thetemple temple in the underground underground "Mirror Mirror Factory base in in the the cat catbullets in the in the Factory" [the [the base acombs] on on October October 21, 21,1942. 1942. acombs] By this time, following several several other deaths at the hands of of the enemy, enemy, only three officers remained alive in the the catacombs: catacombs: Abramov, Glushchenko and Litvi LitviNKVD officers nov. Abramov and Glushchenko Glushchenko together killed Litvinov, Litvinov, then began to eye each the semi-darkness. other suspiciously suspiciously in the surrender: "We We are Glushchenko wrote in his diary that Abramov wanted to to surrender: beaten. There is no victory to wait for. for. He told me not to be frightened of of commit commitGermanintelligence." intelligence.On O n February 18, 18, ting treason or being shot as he has friends in German 1943, apparently suffering from hallucinations, Glushchenko wrote, "[Abramov] [Abramov] was 1943, to his papers. I took my pistol from my belt and shot him him in in bending over, attending to head. Over the next few months Glushchenko spent much of his the back of the head." time outside the catacombs in his wife's wifes Odessa flat, finally abandoning the the under underAfterthe the of Odessa by the Red Army 10, 1943. After liberation of ground base on November 10,1943.

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in Glushchenko returned in April April1945 1945 Glushchenko returned with with members members of of the the Ukrainian Ukrainian NKVD to to col collect equipment and compromising papers from the catacombs, but was fatally lect equipment and compromising papers from the catacombs, but was fatally wounded his hands.47 wounded when when a agrenade grenade he he picked picked up up exploded exploded in in his hands.47 For For almost almost twenty twenty years, years, the the Centre Centre believed believed that that no nosurvivor survivor of of the the Odessa Odessa cata catacombs combs remained remained to to cast cast doubt doubt on on the theheroic heroic myth myth it it had had constructed. constructed. In In 1963, 1963, how however, Abramov had not been by ever, the the KGB was was disconcerted disconcerted to to discover discover that that Abramov had not been killed killed by Glushchenko France. His His father, Glushchenko after after all, all, but but had hadescaped escaped and and was was living living in in France. father, who who may may also reported to also have have known known the the true true story story of of the the Odessa Odessa catacombs, catacombs, was was reported to have have emi emigrated grated to to the the United United States. States. Abramov's Abramovs supposed supposed widow, widow, Nina Nina Abramova, Abramova, who who had had been been working working in in the theKGB First First Chief ChiefDirectorate, Directorate, was was quietly quietly transferred transferred to to another another job. 48 job. The The myth myth of of the the NKVD heroes heroes of of the the Odessa Odessa catacombs catacombs was was left left undisturbed. ~ndisturbe d.~~ According According to to statistics statistics in in KGB KGB files, files, the the NKVD NKVD ran ran a a total total of of 2,222 2,222 "operational operational combat the Great Great Patriotic combat groups" groups behind behind enemy enemy lines lines during during the Patriotic War.49 War.49Mitrokhin Mitrokhin found partisan warfare. found no no realistic realistic appraisal, appraisal, however, however, of of the the effectiveness effectiveness of of partisan warfare. Con Contrary trary to to the the claims claims of of post-war post-war Soviet Soviet hagiographers, hagiographers, the the combat combat groups groups seem seem only only rarely Because rarely to to have have tied tied down down German German forces forces larger larger than than themselves.5o thernselve~.~ Because about about half half of of all all partisans partisans were were NKVD personnel personnel or or Party Party officials, officials, they they were were frequently frequently regarded regarded with with acute acute suspicion suspicion by by the the peasant peasant population population on on whom whomthey they depended depended for for local the western local support. support. The The virtual virtual collapse collapse of of partisan partisan warfare warfare in in the western Ukraine, Ukraine, for for example, the hostility inhabitantsto to the Party and example, was was due due largely largely to to the hostility of of the the inhabitants the Party and the the NKVD. Though Though partisan partisan warfare warfare became became more more effective effective after after Stalingrad, Stalingrad, there there were were important important areas-notably areas-notably Crimea Crimea and and the the steppes-where steppes-where it it never never became became a a signifi significant the eastern 51 cant factor factor in in the the fighting fightingon on the eastern front. front. NKVD's German targets NKVDs most most successful successful attacks attacks on on German targets were were mounted mounted by by an an illegal illegal residency residency in in Argentina,52 Argentina,52 headed headed by by Iosif Iosif Romualdovich Romualdovich Grigulevich of sabotage the Grigulevich (codenamed (codenamed ARTUR), ARTUR), a a veteran veteran both both of sabotage operations operations in in the Spanish attempt to 53 In Spanish Civil CivilWar War and and of of the the first first attempt toassassinate assassinateTrotsky Trotsky in in Mexico Mexico City. City.53 In September September 1941 1941 an an official official Argentinian Argentinian inquiry inquiry reached reached the the hysterical hysterical conclusion, conclusion, endorsed endorsed by by the the Chamber Chamberof of Deputies Deputies but butrejected rejected by by the the government, government, that that the theGer German man ambassador ambassador was was the the head head of of over over half half a a million million Nazi Nazi stormtroopers stormtroopers operating operating under America.54 During the under cover cover in in Latin Latin Ameri~a.~ During the months months after after Pearl Pearl Harbor, Harbor, Argentina Argentina and and Chile Chile were were the the only only Latin Latin American American states states not not to to break break off off diplomatic diplomatic relations relations with with Germany Germany and and Japan. Japan. The The rumors rumors of of Nazi Nazi plots plots among among Argentina's Argentinas quarter quarter of of a a million corps, and million German German speakers, speakers, pro-German pro-German sympathies sympathies in in its its officer officer corps, and the the pres presence ence of of an an Argentinian Argentinian military military purchasing purchasing mission mission in in Berlin Berlin until until 1944, 1944, helped helped to to persuade persuade the the Centre Centre that that Argentina Argentina was was a a major major Nazi Nazi base. base. Though Though this this belief belief was was greatly greatly exaggerated, exaggerated, it it was was shared shared by by OSS, OSS, the the US US wartime wartime foreign foreign intelligence intelligence agency, agency, which which reported reported that that Dr. Dr. Ramon RamonCastillo, Castillo, president president of of Argentina Argentina from from 1941 1941 to was 55 Such Centre by to 1943, 1943, was in in the thepay pay of ofHitler. Hitler.55 Such reports, reports, passed passed on on to tothe the Centre by its its agents agents in State Department,56 doubtless suspicions of in OSS OSS and and the the State De~artment,~ doubtless reinforced reinforced Moscow's Moscows suspicions of Nazi Nazi plots plots in in Argentina. Argentina. Mter war the merchant After the theoutbreak outbreak of ofwar theGerman German merchant navy navy was wasunable unable to to run run the the gaunt gauntlet ports. Grigulevich's let of of the the Royal Royal Navy Navy and and enter enter Argentinian Argentinian ports. Grigulevichs residency, residency,however, however,
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reported reported in in 1941 1941 that thatcopper, copper, saltpetre, saltpetre, cotton cotton and aad other other strategic strategic raw raw materials materials were were being vessels to being exported exported from from Argentina Argentina in in neutral neutral vessels to Spain, Spain, whence whence they they were were being being secretly secretly transported transported overland overland through through France France to to Germany. Germany. To To disrupt disrupt this this export export trade, trade, Grigulevich Grigulevich recruited recruited a a sabotage sabotage team team of of eight e,ight Communist Communist dockyard dockyard workers workers and (code and seamen, seamen, headed headed by by a a Polish Polish immigrant, immigrant, Feliks Feliks Klementyevich KlementyevichVerzhbitsky Verzhbitsky (codenamed named BESSER), BESSER),who who in in December December 1941 1941 obtained obtained a a job jobas as a a blacksmith blacksmith in in the the port port of of Buenos Buenos Aires. Aires. The The first first major major exploit exploit ofVerzhbitsky's of Verzhbitsky's group group was was to to burn burndown down the the German German bookshop bookshop in in Buenos Buenos Aires, Aires,which which Grigulevich Grigulevich regarded regarded as as the the main main center center of of Nazi Nazi propaganda. propaganda. Thereafter Thereafter it it concentrated concentrated on on planting planting delayed-action delayed-action incendiary incendiary devices devices on on ships ships and and in in warehouses warehouses containing containing goods goods bound bound for for Germany.57 Germanys7 Grigule Grigulevich vich also also ran ran smaller smaller sabotage sabotage and and intelligence intelligence networks networks in in Chile Chile and and Uruguay. Uruguay The The approximately ung illegal were approximatelyseventy seventy agents agents in in his his far-fl far-flung illegal residency residency were to to remain remain the the basis basis of extent of Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence operations operations in in Argentina, Argentina, Uruguay Uruguay and-to and-to a a lesser lesser extentChile early as Chile during duringthe the early years years of ofthe the Cold ColdWar War as well well as as the the Second Second World World War.58 War.58 Between 1942 and Between the the beginning beginningof of 1942 and the the summer summer of of 1944, 1944, according according to to statistics statistics in in KGB files, over 150 Grigulevich's files, over 150 successful successful incendiary incendiary attacks attacks were were mounted mounted by by Grigulevich's agents against German ed number agents against German cargoes, cargoes, and and an an unspecifi unspecified number of of Spanish, Spanish, Portuguese Portuguese and Centre and Swedish Swedish vessels vessels sunk. sunk. One, One, probably probably exaggerated, exaggerated, assessment assessment by by the the Centre claims the attacks 1944in in halting German exports claims that that the attacks succeeded succeeded early early in in 1944 halting German exports from from Buenos Buenos Aires.59 Aire~.A ' ~ more more serious serious problem problem for for Germany Germany than thanSoviet Soviet sabotage, sabotage, however, however, was change of A military was the the change of government government in in Argentina. Argentina. military coup coup in in the thesummer summer of of 1943, 1943, followed a Nazi to sever followed by by the the uncovering uncovering of of a Nazi espionage espionage network, network, led led Argentina Argentina to sever diplomatic January diplomatic relations relations with with Germany Germanyin in January 1944.60 1944.60 For For most most of of the the war war communications communications between between Grigulevich's Grigulevich's residency residency and and the the Centre Centre were were slow slowand and spasmodic, spasmodic, depending depending on on occasional occasional couriers couriers between between Buenos Buenos Aires York Aires and and the theNew New York residency.61 residency6' In In the the summer summer of of 1944, 1944, shortly shortly after after the the NKGB had had established established a a legal legal residency residency in in Uruguay, Uruguay, Grigulevich Grigulevich was was summoned summoned to toMonte Montevideo video to to give give a a detailed detailed report report on onhis his intelligence intelligence operations, operations, finances finances and and agent agent net networks Great Patriotic had become works since since the the beginning beginning of of the the Great Patriotic War. War. The The Centre Centre had become alarmed alarmed at at the thescale scale of of his his incendiary incendiary attacks attacks on on neutral neutral shipping shipping and and feared feared that that his his cover cover might might be be blown. blown. In In September September it it ordered ordered him him to to suspend suspend sabotage sabotage operations operations and and limit limit himself himself to to intelligence intelligence collection collection in in Argentina, Argentina, Brazil Brazil and and Chile.62 Chile.6' Once Once instructed instructed to to stop stopwork work by by Grigulevich, Grigulevich, Verzhbitsky Verzhbitsky began began making making grenades grenades for for the the underground but was underground Argentinian Argentinian Communist Communist Party Party but was seriously seriouslyinjured injured in in October Octoberby by an explosion explosion in in his his workshop workshop which which cost cost him him his his left left arm arm and and the the sight in one one eye. eye. an sight in Grigulevich Grigulevich reported reported that that he he behaved behaved with with great great bravery bravery during during police police investigation, investigation, sticking sticking to to a a prepared prepared cover cover story story that that a a personal personal enemy enemy had had planted planted explosives explosives on on him, hidden packet of of dried dried milk. milk. In In 1945 1945 Verzhbitsky Verzhbitsky was was smuggled smuggled out out of of him, hidden in inaa packet prison and and exfiltrated exfiltrated by by the the Argentinian Argentinian Communist across the the border border into into prison Communist Party Party across Uruguay, pension.63 Uruguay,where where he he lived lived on on aaParty Party pension.63 Remarkable they were, Remarkable though though they were, the the sabotage sabotage operations operations run run from from Buenos Buenos Aires Aires had uence on the course Great Patriotic the had no no perceptible perceptible infl influence on the course of of the the Great Patriotic War. War. Once Once the alarmism the summer alarmism of of the summer of of 1944 1944 had had died died down, down, however, however, they they greatly greatly enhanced enhanced Grigulevich's the Centre as Grigulevich's reputation reputation in in the Centre as saboteur saboteur and and assassin. assassin. His His successes successes in in

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wartime Argentina Argentina help help to to explain explain his his later later selection selection for for the most important assassiwartime the most important assassi nation mission mission of of the the Cold Cold War.64 War.64By contrast, contrast, Grigulevich's Grigulevichs chief chief saboteur, nation saboteur, VerzhVerzh wasregarded as an embarrassment because of of his disablement. His request to bitsky, was emigrate to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union in in 1946 1946 was brusquely emigrate was brusquely turned turned down. down. In In 1955, 1955, however, however, when Verzhbitsky, Verzhbitsky, by then completely blind, applied again, his application was accepted-possibly for for fear fear that that he reveal his On accepted-possibly he might might otherwise otherwise reveal his wartime wartime role.65 role.65 On arrival in the Soviet Union, Verzhbitsky was awarded an invalidity pension of of 100 100 roubles a a month, month,but but his application application for for membership membership of theSoviet Communist Party Party roubles his of the Soviet Communist was turned down.66 was turned down.66
INDIVIDUAL ACTS of heroism, heroism, the the NKVD and its security and D E SP I T TE E I N D I V I D UA L ACT S of and NKGB (as (as its security and intelligence components components were were renamed renamed in in 1943) 1943) deserve to be remembered less intelligence deserve to be remembered less for for their bravery bravery during during the theSecond Second World World War Warthan than for theforcible their for their their brutality. brutality. After After the forcible incorporation into into the the Soviet Soviet Union of eastern Poland in in September followed incorporation Union of eastern Poland September 1939, 1939, followed by the the Baltic Baltic states and Moldavia Moldavia in in the thesummer summer of 1940, the moved by states and of 1940, the NKVD quickly quickly moved in to to liquidate enemies and and cow cow the the populations s u b m i ~ s i o n On . ~ ~June On in liquidate class "class enemies" populations into into submission.67 June 25,1941, threedays days after after the the beginning beginningof of Hitlers 25, 1941, three Hitler's invasion, invasion, the the NKVD was was ordered ordered to secure secure the the rear rear of of the the Red Red Army Army by by arresting arresting deserters to deserters and and enemy enemy agents, agents, protectprotect ing communications and liquidating isolated pockets of German troops. In August ing communications and liquidating isolated pockets of German troops. In August 1941 Soviet Soviet parachutists parachutists disguised as Germans villages of the 1941 disguised as Germans landed landed among among the the villages of the Volga German Autonomous Region Region and and asked to be be hidden until the the arrival arrival of Volga German Autonomous asked to hidden until of the the Wehrmacht. When they the whole whole village village was exterminated by by Wehrmacht. When they were were given given shelter, shelter, the was exterminated the NKVD. All All other other Volga Volga Germans, Germans, however however loyal, loyal, were weredeported the deported by by the the NKVD to northern Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan, with enormous loss loss of oflife.68 to Siberia Siberia and and northern with enormous life.@ When the the Red Red Army Army took tookthe theoffensive offensive in in 1943, 1943,the the NKVD followed followed in its wake When in its wake to mop mop up resistance resistance and subversion. Beria Beria reported reported proudly at the the end end of to and subversion. proudly to to Stalin Stalin at of the the year: year:

In are responsible responsible for for security security in in the rear who are the rear In 1943, 1943, the the troops troops of of the the NKVD, who of the the Active Active Red Red Army, Army, in in the the process up the territory liberated liberated of process of of cleaning cleaning up the territory from ,549 people people for for investigation. investigation. Of Of these, these, 582,515 582,5 15 from the the enemy, enemy, arrested arrested 931 931,549 were were servicemen servicemen and and 394,034 394,034 were were civilians. civilians. Of many cases cases wrongly, spies, traitors, traitors, Of those those arrested, arrested, 80,296 80,296 were were "unmasked," unmasked, in in many wrongly,as as spies, deserters, bandits bandits and and "criminal criminal elements." elements. deserters, Stalin used used the the NKVD punish and and deport Stalin NKVDto to punish deport entire entire nations nations within within the the Soviet Soviet Union whomhe he accused among them themChechens, Chechens, Ingushi, Balkars, Union whom accused of of treachery: treachery: among Ingushi, Balkars, Karachai, Meskhetian Turks. In response response to Stalin's Karachai, Crimean Crimean Tartars, Tartars, Kalmyks Kalmyks and and Meskhetian Turks. In to Stalins instructions carried out order in in an exem instructions to to reward reward "those those who who have have carried out the thedeportation deportation order anexemplary Beria replied: plary manner," manner, Beria replied: In instructions, I submit of the the Presidium In accordance accordance with with your your instructions, submit a a draft draftdecree decree of Presidium of Supreme Soviet on decorations decorations and and medals for the most of the the Supreme Soviet of of the the USSR on medals for the most outstanding the operation involving the deportation of outstanding participants participants in in the operation involving the deportation of the the

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Chechens Chechens and and Ingushes. Ingushes. 19,000 19,000 members members of of the the NKVD, NKGB NKGB and and Smersh Smersh took took part, part,plus plus up up to to 100,000 100,000officers officers of of the theNKVD forces forces .. .. .. As As on on this this occasion, occasion, many many of of the the NKVD and and NKGB NKGB personnel personnel decorated decorated during during the the war for valor war received received their their medals medals not not for valor against against the the enemy enemy but but for for crimes crimes against against humanity.69 humanity.69 of of Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence on on the the eastern eastern front front was was patchy. patchy. Up Up to main espionage to the theend end of of 1942 1942 the themain espionage system system providing providing intelligence intelligence from from Nazi Nazi Ger Germany many and and occupied occupied Europe Europe was was a a loosely loosely coordinated coordinated GRU illegal illegal network network linked linked to to the the NKVD Harnack Harnack and and Schulze-Boysen Schulze-Boysen groups, groups, codenamed codenamed the the Rote Rote Kappelle ("Red were (Red Orchestra") Orchestra) by by the the Abwehr. Abwehr.The The "musicians" musicians were the the radio radio operators operators who who sent sent coded coded messages messages to to Moscow; Moscow; the the "conductor" conductor was was the the Polish Polish Jew Jew Leopold Leopold Trepper, Trepper, alias alias Jean Jean Gilbert, Gilbert,known known within within the the network network as as Ie le grand grand chef chef:The The Rote Rote Kappelle Kappelle had had 117 The 117 agents: agents: 48 48 in inGermany, Germany, 35 35 in in France, France, 17 17in in Belgium Belgium and and 17 17 in in Switzerland.7 Swit~erland.~The network network was was gradually gradually wound wound up up during duringthe thelater later months months of of 1942 1942 as as German German radio radio direction-finding tracked down the "musicians." Trepper himself was captured direction-finding tracked down the musicians.Trepper himself was captured as as he he sat sat in in a a dentist's dentists chair chair in in occupied occupied Paris Paris on on December December 5. 5. According According to to the the Abwehr Abwehr officer For a officer who who arrested arrested him, him, "For a second second he he was was disturbed; disturbed; then then he hesaid said in in perfect perfect Ger German, man, 'You You did did a a fine fine job.' job. " Only Only Rado's Rados GRU illegal illegal residency residency in in Switzerland, Switzerland, known known as Rote Drei Drei after as the the Rote after its its three three main main radio radio transmitters, transmitters, which which was was out out of of reach reach of of German German intelligence, intelligence, continued continued work work for for another another year year until until it it was was shut shut down down by by the the SWiSS.71 Swiss.71 Though and Rad0 Rado were ten years' in Though both both Trepper Trepper and were sentenced sentenced to to ten years imprisonment imprisonment in Moscow Moscow after after the the war, war, it it was was later later alleged alleged by by Soviet Soviet historians historians that that intelligence intelligence from from the the Rote Rote Kappelle Kappelle had had been been of of enormous enormous assistance assistance to to the theRed Red Army. Army.In In reality, reality, intel intelligence cant influence ligence did did not not begin begin to to have have a a signifi significant influence on on Soviet Soviet military military operations operations until until after after Trepper Trepper was was arrested arrested and and most most of of his his network network wound wound up. up. Military Military intelli intelligence gence failed failed to to detect detect the the sudden sudden German German turn turn south south which which captured captured Kiev Kiev in in Sep September 1941, and was taken aback by the intensity of the October assault tember 1941, and was taken aback by the intensity of theOctober assault on on Moscow. was Moscow. The The loss loss of of Kharkov Kharkov in in May May1942 1942 was due due partly partly to to the thefact fact that that the theStavka Stavka (a wartime wartime combination combination of of GHQand G H Q a n d high high command) command) was was expecting expecting another another attack attack (a on summer on the thecapital. capital.The The Wehrmacht's Wehrmachts move move south south in inthe the summer again again took took the theStavka Stavka by by surprise. the German German advance surprise. Throughout Throughout the advance to to Stalingrad Stalingrad and and the the Caucasus, Caucasus, Soviet Soviet forces forces were were constantly constantly confused confused about about where where the the next next blow blow would would fall. fall. When When the the Red Red Army Stalingrad Army encircled encircled Axis A x i s forces forces at at Stdingrad inin November November 1942, 1942, it it believed believed it it had had trapped trapped 85,000 85,000 to to 90,000 90,000 troops; troops; in in reality reality it it had had surrounded surrounded three three times times as as many.72 many.72 The good intelligence The NKVD's NKVDs main main role role at at Stalingrad Stalingrad was was less lessin in providing providing good intelligence than than in the Red 13,500 Soviet in enforcing enforcing a a ferocious ferocious discipline discipline within within the Red Army. Army. About About 13,500 Soviet sol soldiers diers were were executed executed for for "defeatism" defeatismand and other other breaches breaches of of military military discipline discipline in in the the course of of the the battle, battle, usually usually by by a a squad squad from from the the NKVD NKVDSpecial Special Detachment. Detachment. Before Before course execution, strip so their uniform so that that their uniform and and boots boots could could be be execution, most most were were ordered ordered to to strip reused. postal censorship censorship seized seized on on any any unorthodox unorthodox or or politically politically incor incorreused. The The NKVD postal lieurect comment comment in soldiers letters letters to to their families as as evidence evidence of of treachery. treachery. A lieurect in soldiers' their families
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tenant good . .. .. . Our Our anti-aircraft people shoot shoot tenant who who wrote wrote "German German aircraft aircraft are are very very good anti-aircraft people down only only very very few few of of them" them was, was, inevitably, condemned as down inevitably, condemned as a a traitor. traitor. In In the the 62nd 62nd half of October 1942, military Army alone, in the the first half 1942, the the NKVD claimed that "military secrets were divulged divulged in in 12,747 12,747 letters."73 letters.73 The great by secrets were The great victory victory at at Stalingrad, Stalingrad, sealed sealed by the surrender of Marshal Friedrich Friedrich Paulus, o generals generals the surrender of the the German German Field Field Marshal Paulus, twenty-tw twenty-two and 91,000 91,000 troops troops early early in in 1943, 1943, was was achieved achieved in in spite rather than and spite of, of, rather than because because of, of, the the contribution of of the the NKVD. contribution Stalingrad was was followed followedby by a a major major improvement improvement in thequality quality of Soviet military military Stalingrad in the of Soviet intelligence on on the the eastern eastern front, front, made made possible possible in part by by massive massive supplies intelligence in part supplies of of radio radio equipment from the the Americans and the the British.74 British.74At the end of Stavka equipment from Americans and the end of 1942 1942 the the Stavka established special-purpose equipped with with eighteen to twenty established special-purpose radio radio battalions, battalions, each each equipped eighteen to twenty radio-intercept receivers and four four direction-finding direction-finding sets. The result, result, according radio-intercept receivers and sets. The according to to a a Soviet historian given access access to to the the battalions' battalions records, aqualitative qualitative jump the Soviet historian given records, was was "a jump in in the development of of radio-electronic radio-electronic combat in the the Soviet army. Though development combat in Soviet army." Though Soviet Soviet cryptcrypt analysts lacked lacked the the state-of-the-art state-of-the-art technology which enabled Park to to analysts technology which enabled Bletchley Bletchley Park decrypt high-grade Enigma Enigma and and Geheimschreiber Geheimschreiber messages, they made major decrypt high-grade messages, they made major advances during during 1943-reluctantly 1943-reluctantly assisted by German cipher personnel personnel captured at advances assisted by German cipher captured at Stalingrad-in direction-finding, traffic analysis analysis and and the the breaking breaking of of lower-grade lower-grade Stalingrad-in direction-finding, traffic hand ciphers. In benefit ofLuftwaIe sup hand ciphers. In 1942-3 1942-3 they they also also had had the the benefit of Luftwaffe Enigma Enigma decrypts decrypts supplied by by an an agent agent inside Bletchley Park. Park. plied inside Bletchley A l l these these improvements improvements were were evident evident during during the thebattle battle of of Kursk Kursk in in the the summer of All summer of 1943 eastern 1943 when when the the Red Red Army Army defeated defeated the the last last great great German German offensive offensive on on the the eastern front. Red Army front. Intelligence Intelligence reports reports captured captured by the the Wehrmacht Wehrmacht from from the the Red Army during during the SIGINT had located the and headquarters headquarters the battle battle revealed revealed that that Soviet Soviet SIGINT had located the positions positions and I1 and and XIII XI11 Panzer Corps, and and Second Second of the the 6th, 6th, 7th 7th and and 1 11th Panzer Divisions, Divisions, II of 1th Panzer Panzer Corps, Army Army HQ H Q Aerial Aerial reconnaissance reconnaissance before before and and during during Kursk Kursk was wasalso alsoon on a alarger larger scale scale and successful than 75 and more more successhl than ever ever before. before.75 Victory at at Kursk Kursk opened the way way to to an an almost almost continuous advance by the Red Red Victory opened the continuous advance by the Army on onthe the eastern front front which which was was to to end end with with Marshal IMarshal Zhukov Zhukov accepting the sur surArmy eastern accepting the render of of Berlin Berlin in in May 1945. With With a a four-to-one four-to-one superiority superiority in men over over the the render May 1945. in men Wehrmacht, large large amounts amounts of of military military equipment from its its Western Western allies and grow growWehrmacht, equipment from allies and ing dominance dominance in in the the air, air, the the Red Red Army, Army, though suffering enormous proved ing though suffering enormous losses, losses, proved unstoppable. In In the the course of its its advance, the Red Red Army sometimes captured lists of of unstoppable. course of advance, the Army sometimes captured lists the of the Wehrmachts Wehrmacht's Enigma Enigma machines, the daily daily settings settings for for periods periods of of up up to to aamonth month of the machines, as final stages as well well as as some some of of the the machines machines and and their their operators. operators. During During the the final stages of of the the war spasmodically war these these captures captures sometimes sometimes enabled enabled Soviet Soviet cryptanalysts cryptanalysts to to decrypt decrypt spasmodically a a still still unknown unknown number number of of Enigma Enigma messages.76 messages.76 Despite the the improvements improvements after after Stalingrad, Stalingrad, however, however, the Soviet intelliDespite the quality quality of of Soviet intelli gence the eastern SIGINT-never compared compared with the gence on on the eastern front-in front-in particular particular the the SIGINT-never with the intelligence intelligence intelligence on on Germany Germany available available to to their their Western Western allies. allies. The The ULTRA intelligence provided quite simply, simply, the the best best in his provided to to British British and and American American commanders commanders was, was, quite in the thehistory of of warfare. warfare. The The Soviet Soviet Union's Unions most striking intelligence intelligence successes tory most striking successes during during the the Great Patriotic Patriotic War, achieved not against its its enemies against its its Great War, by contrast, contrast, were were achieved not against enemies but but against allies Grand Alliance: Alliance: Britain and the allies in in the the wartime wartime Grand Britain and the United United States. States.

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Britain as as a a target target for for INO I N 0 operations. operations. Even Even in in the the mid-1930s mid-1930s the the main main Soviet Soviet espi espiBritain onage networks networks in in the the United United States States were were run run by by the the Fourth Fourth Department Department (Military (Military onage Intelligence, later later renamed renamed the the GRU) GRU) rather rather than than by by the the NKVD. Fourth Fourth DepartIntelligence, Depart ment agents agents included included a a series series of of young, young, idealistic idealistic high-flyers high-flyers within within the the federal federal gov govment ernment, among among them: them:Alger Alger Hiss Hiss and and Julian Wadleigh, both of whom whomentered entered the ernment, Julian Wadleigh, both of the State Department in in 11936; HarryDexter Dexter White of the the Treasury Treasury Department; Department; and and State Department 936; Harry White of George Silverman, Silverman, a a government government statistician statistician who who probably probably recruited recruited White.1 White. Like Like George the Cambridge Cambridge Five, Five, the the Washington Washington moles moles saw sawthemselves themselves as as secret secret warriors warriors in in the the the struggle against against fascism. fascism. Wadleigh Wadleigh wrote wrote later: later: struggle When the the Communist represented the the only only world world force force effec effecWhen Communist International International represented tively resisting resisting Nazi Nazi Germany, Germany, I had had offered offered my my services services to to the the Soviet Soviet under undertively ground in inWashington Washingtonas as one one small small contribution contribution to tohelp help stem stem the the fascist ground fascist tide.2 tide.2 The main main NKVD operations operations in in the theUnited UnitedStates States during during the themid-1930s mid-1930s were were run run The by an an illegal illegal residency residency established established in in 1934 former Berlin Berlin resident, resident, Boris Boris by 1934 under under the the former Bazarov (codenamed (codenamed NORD), with withIskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov Akhmerov (YUNG), a a Bazarov Iskhak Abdulovich SovietTartar, Tartar, as as his his deputy.3 d e p ~ t yBazarov Bazarov .~ wasremembered with affection affection by by Hede MassSoviet was remembered with Hede Mass ing, an an Austrian Austrian agent agent in in his his residency, residency, as as the the warmest warmest personality personality she she had had encoun encouning, tered in in the the NKVD. NKVD.On O n the the anniversary anniversary of of the the October October Revolution Revolution in in 1935 1935 he hesent sent tered long-stemmed red roses roseswith a a note which read: her fifty long-stemmed

F or most United States For most of of the the inter-war inter-war years years the the United States had had ranked ranked some some way way behind behind

Our lives are are unnatural, but we must endure it it for [the sake of] humanity. always express express ourlittle little group love and con conThough we cannot always it, our group is bound by love ofyou with great warmth. sideration for one another. I think of
Massingas a "Muscovite Muscovite automaton," automaton,he was Though Akhmerov, by contrast, struck Massing a ~ p e a r e dUnknown .~ less robotic than he appeared.4 to Massing, Akhmerov was engaged in a passionate love affair with his assistant, Helen Lowry, the cousin of the American Communist Party Party leader, Earl Browder, and-unusually-gained and-unusually-gained permission from Centre to marry her.5 her. the Centre

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Bazarov's included three three agents agents in Department: Bazarovs and and Akhmerov's Akhmerovs recruits recruits included in the theState State Department: EFUKH, KIY and "19."6 19.6Probably the most important, as well as the only one of of the ERIKH, three who who can be clearly clearly identified, was agent 19, " 19," Laurence Duggan, who who later became chief chief of of the the Latin Latin American American Division.7 Di~ision.~ To Hede Massing, Duggan became To Hede Massing, Duggan seemed seemed an extremely extremely tense, high-strung, high-strung, intellectual young man." man. His recruitment took "an some time, time, not not least least because because Alger Alger Hiss Hiss was was simultaneously simultaneously attempting attempting to some to recruit recruit him for for the the Fourth Fourth Department. In April April 1936 Bazarov complained the Centre him Department. In 1936 Bazarov complained to to the Centre the"persistent persistent Hiss" Hiss showed no sign of abandoning the attempt.* that the attempt.8 A year later, in the midst midstof of the the Moscow show trials, told Akhmerov hewas was afraid that, the Moscow show trials, Duggan Duggan told Akhmerov that that he afraid that, if he "collaborated" collaboratedwith Soviet Soviet intelligence, intelligence, he might mightbe exposed exposedby by traiifhe a Trotskyite trai tor. By the beginning of 1938, however, Duggan was supplying Akhmerov with State tor. By the beginning of 1938, however, Duggan was supplying Akhmerov with State Department documents documents which which were were photographed photographed in the illegal illegal residency then Department in the residency and and then returned. In March Duggan Duggan reported that his close friend Sumner Welles, underunder secretary at at the the State StateDepartment Departmentfrom from 1938 1938 to to 1945, had told he was secretary 1945, had told him him he was becombecom ing too attracted to Marxism and had given him a friendly warning about his too a acquaintances. Duggan's Duggansfuture in the theState State Department, however, left-wing acquaintances.9 Department, however, seemed as bright bright as as that that of of Donald Donald Maclean Maclean in in the the Foreign Foreign Office. Office. as saw a bright bright future for Michael Straight Straight (codenamed NOMAD The Centre also saw and NIGEL), NIGEL), the the wealthy wealthy young young American American recruited shortly before his graduation graduation and recruited shortly before his 1937.lo Its optimism from Cambridge University in 1937.10 optimism sprang sprang far far more from from Straights Straight's family connections connections than than from from any any evidence as a family evidence of of his his enthusiasm enthusiasm for for a a career career as a secret secret agent. Straight's Straightsjob job hunt huntafter after his his return return to tothe the United States thetop-over top-over agent. United States began began at at the theWhite House withFranklin and Eleanor tea at the House with Eleanor Roosevelt. Roosevelt. With With some some assistance assistance State from Mrs. Roosevelt, he obtained a temporary, unpaid assignment assignment in in the the State Department early early in in 1938. 1938. Soon afterwards, he received a phone Department Soon afterwards, he received a phone call call from from Akhmerov, who who passed passed on on "greetings greetings from from your your friends friends at University Akhmerov, at Cambridge Cambridge University" and todinner dinneratat local restaurant. Akhmerov introduced introduced himself himself as as and invited invited him him to a a local restaurant. Akhmerov Michael Green, thenordered a large meal. Straight watched as he ate: "Michael Green," then He and a smile. His His English English was He was was dark dark and and stocky, stocky, with with broad broad lips lips and a ready ready smile. was good; his his manner manner was was affable and easy. easy. H e seemed good; affable and He seemed to to be be enjoying enjoying his his life life in in America. America.
Ahkmerov seemed seemed to to accept accept that that it itwould would be be some Straight had hadaccess to Ahkmerov some time time before before Straight access to important documents, documents, but but was was evidently evidently prepared prepared to wait. Before paying the important to wait. Before paying the bill, bill, he he delivered a a brieflecture brief lecture on on international international relations. relations. Straight Straight was stunnedto think delivered was too "too stunned to think clearly.Though Though Straight Straight claims claims that that he he was was "unwilling unwilling to clearly." to become become a a Soviet Soviet agent agent in in the Departmentof of State," not say so to to Akhmerov. Akhmerov. The The two men the Department State, he he plainly plainly did did not say so two men "parted meetings.ll parted as as friends" friends and and Straight Straight agreed agreed to to continue continue their their meetings. With Europe, the Centre's interest in the States With the the approach approach of of war war in in Europe, the Centres interest in the United United States steadily 8 the the NKVD defection of of the the main main Fourth Fourth steadily increased. increased. In In 193 1938 NKVD used used the the defection Department courier, courier, Whittaker Whittaker Chambers, a pretext Department Chambers, as as a pretext for for taking taking over over most most of of the the military agent network, the notable notable exception exception of of Alger Alger Hiss.12 Hiss.12 In In military intelligence intelligence agent network, with with the the United States, the expansion expansion of of NKVD NKVD operations operations was was the United States, as as elsewhere, elsewhere, however, however, the

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disrupted hunt for disrupted by by the the hunt for imaginary imaginary "enemies enemies of of the the people." people. Ivan Ivan Andreyevich Andreyevich Morozov York Morozov (codenamed (codenamed YUZ and and KIR), KIR), who who was was stationed stationed in in the theNew New York legal legal res residency by idency in in 1938-9, 1938-9, sought sought to to prove prove his his zeal zeal to to the theCentre Centre by denouncing denouncing the the Resident, Resident, Pyotr NIKOLAI), and and most most of of his his colleagues colleagues as as Pyotr Davidovich Davidovich Gutzeit Gutzeit (codenamed (codenamed NIKOLAI), secret 13 In 1938 Gutzeit and secretTrotskyists. Trotsky~sts.~~ 1938 In both both Gutzeit and Bazarov, Bazarov, the the legal legal and and illegal illegal residents, residents, were were recalled recalled and and shot.14 shot.14Morozov's Morozovs denunciation denunciation of of the the next next legal legal resident, resident, Gayk Gayk Badalovich and GENNADI),was was less lesssuccessful successful and may may have have Badalovich Ovakimyan Ovakimyan (codenamed (codenamed GENNADI), ,t S prompted 1939.l prompted Morozov's Morozovs own own recall recall in in 1939 Bazarov Bazarov was wassucceeded succeeded as as illegal illegal resident resident by by his his former former deputy, deputy, Iskhak Iskhak Akhmerov, Akhmerov, who henceforth controlled most political intelligence operations in the United who henceforth controlled most political intelligence operations intheUnited States.16 States.16Mitrokhin Mitrokhin noted noted the the codenames codenames of of eight eight rather ratherdiverse diverse individuals individuals in in whom whom the the Centre Centre seemed seemed to to place place particularly particularly high high hopes hopes on on the the eve eve of of the the Second Second World World theState StateDepartment; Department;18 War:17 War:17 Laurence Laurence Duggan Duggan (agent (agent "19," 19, later later FRANK) F M N K ) in in the Michael Straight (NIGEL), the State Department; Martha Dodd Stern Michael Straight (NIGEL), also also in in the State Department; Martha Dodd Stern (LIZA), Dodd, and (LIZA), daughter daughterof of the the former former US ambassador ambassador to to Germany, Germany, William William E. E. Dodd, and wife wife of of the the millionaire millionaire Alfred Alfred Kaufman Kaufman Stern Stern (also (also a a Soviet Soviet agent); agent); Martha's Marthas brother, brother, William Jr. William E. E. Doss, DOSS, Jr. (PRESIDENT), (PRESIDENT), who who had had run rununsuccessfully unsuccessfully for for Congress Congress as as a a Democrat and and still the Treasury Democrat still had had political political ambitions; ambitions; Harry Harry Dexter Dexter White White in in the Treasury Department (KASSIR, later Department (KASSIR, later JURIST); JURIST); an anagent agent codenamed codenamed MORIS MORIS (probably (probablyJohn John Abt) Justice Abt) in inthe the Justice Department";19 Department; Boris Boris Morros Morros (FROST), (FROST), the the Hollywood Hollywood producer producer of of Laurel Laurel and and Hardy's Hardys Flying Deuces and and other other box-office box-office hits;20 hits;2oMary Mary Wolf Wolf Price Price (code named KID and who was the (codenamed and DIR), DIR), an an undeclared undeclared Communist Communist who was secretary secretary to to the well-known columnist Walter Lippmann; and Henry Buchman (KHOSYAIN, well-known columnist WalterLippmann;and Henry Buchman (KHOSYMN, "Employer"), Employer), owner owner of of a a women's womens fashion fashion salon salon in in Baltimore.21 Baltimore.21 In In August August 1939, 1939, however, however, political political intelligence intelligence operations operations in in the theUnited UnitedStates, States, as as in in Britain, Britain, were were partially partially disrupted disrupted by by the the signing signing of of the the Nazi-Soviet Nazi-Soviet Pact. Pact. Laurence Laurence Duggan whohad had serious Duggan broke broke off off contact contact with with Akhmerov Akhmerov in in protest.22 protest.22 Others Others who serious doubts Straight. At a October in in aa restaurant doubts included included Michael Michael Straight. a meeting meeting in in October restaurant below below Washington's Station, Akhmerov him. Great "Great days are Washingtons Union UnionStation, Akhmerov tried tried to to reassure reassure him. daysare approaching!" approaching!he he declared. declared. With With the the beginning beginning of of the the Second Second World World War, War, revolution revolution would would spread spread like like wildfire wildfire across across Germany Germany and and France.23 France.23Straight Straight was was unimpressed unimpressed and attend the the next and failed failed to to attend next meeting.24 meeting2 Duggan Duggan and and Straight Straight are are unlikely unlikely to to have have been been the the only only agents agents to to break break contact, contact, at at least least temporarily, temporarily,with with the the NKVD. Further United States Further disruption disruption to to NKVD operations operations in in the the United States followed followed Akhmerov's Akhmerovs recall, Moscow recall, soon soon after after his his last last meeting meeting with with Straight, Straight,to to Moscow where where he he was was accused accused by by Beria Though, unknown rea Beria of of treasonable treasonable dealings dealings with with enemies enemies of of the the people.25 people.25 Though, for for unknown reasons, were dropped, placed in the NKVD reserve sons, the the charges charges were dropped, Akhmerov Akhmerov was was placed in the reserve and and remained was thoroughly remained under under suspicion suspicion for for the the next next two two years years while while his his record record was thoroughly checked. rst time, checked. For For the the fi first time, the the center center of of NKVD operations operations in in the the United UnitedStates States was was moved, moved, after after Akhmerov's Akhmerovs recall, recall,to to the the legal legal residency residency headed headed by by Gayk Gayk Ovakimyan, Ovakimyan, later later known known to to the the FBI as as the the "wily wily Armenian." Armenian. Ovakimyan Ovakimyan found found himself himself terribly terribly overworked, also expected expected to overworked, all all the the more more so so since since he he was was also to take take an an active active part part in in the the complex in complex preparations preparations for for Trotsky's Trotskysassassination assassination in Mexico Mexico City. City. He He would would sometimes sometimes return return home home exhausted exhausted after after meeting meeting as as many many as as ten ten agents agents in in a asingle single day.26 day.26

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Ovakimyan's Ovakimyans main main successes successes were were in in scientific scientific and and technological technological (S&T), (S&T), rather rather than I N 0 officers officers in in holding holding a a science science than political, political, intelligence. intelligence. He He was was unusual unusual among among INO doctorate (Moscow Higher Higher Technical Technical School) School) and, and, since since 1933, 1933,had had doctorate from from the the MVTU (Moscow operated operated under under cover cover as as an an engineer engineer at at Amtorg Amtorg(American-Soviet (American-Soviet Trading Trading Corpora Corporation) York tion) in in New NewYork. York. In In 1940 1940 he heenrolled enrolled as as a a graduate graduate student student at at aaNew New York chemi chemical cal institute institute to to assist assist him him in in identifying identifying potential potential agents.27 agents.27Ovakimyan Ovakimyan was was the the first first to to demonstrate demonstrate the theenormous enormous potential potential for for S&T S&T in in the the United United States. States. In In 1939 1939 alone alone NKVD operations the United United States 8,000 pages operations in in the States obtained obtained 1 18,000 pages of of technical technical docu documents, ments, 487 487 sets sets of of designs designs and and 54 54 samples samples of of new new technology.28 technology.28 Ovakimyan Ovakimyan was was probably probably also also the the first first to to suggest suggest using using an an INO I N 0 officer, officer, under under 1cover as an exchange student, to penetrate the Massachusetts Institute of Techno cover as an exchange student, to penetrate the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. named TVEN), ogy. The The first first such such "student," student, Semyon Semyon Markovich Markovich Semyonov Semyonov (code (codenamed entered entered MIT in in 1938. 1938.The The scientific scientific contacts contacts which which he he made made over over the the next next two two years, years, before before changing changing his his cover cover in in 1940 1940 to to that that of of an an Amtorg Amtorg engineer, engineer, helped helped to to lay lay the the basis for the remarkable wartime expansion of S&T collection in the United States. basis for the remarkable wartime expansion of S&T collection in the United States. One New York Semyonov's "large One of of his his colleagues colleagues in in the the New York residency residency was was struck struck by by Semyonovs large eyes eyes which, which, while while he he was was talking talking to to somebody, somebody, [revolved] [revolved]like like parabolic parabolic antennae."29 antennae.29 By April April 1941 1941 the the total totalNKVD agent agent network network in in the the United United States States numbered numbered 221, 221, of statistics as as "engineers" engineers(probably (probably a a cate cateof whom whom forty-nine forty-nine were were listed listed in in NKVD statistics gory rather broad the gory which which included included a a rather broad range range of of scientists).3o scientist^).^' In In the the same same month month the Centre residencies to Centre for for the the first first time time established established separate separate departments departments in in its its major major residencies to specialize (later known as Line Line specialize in in scientific scientific and and technological technological intelligence intelligence operations operations (later known as 1 X), X), a a certain certain sign sign of of their their increasing increasing priority.3 pri~rity.~ According history, the According to to an an SVR official official history, the sheer sheer number number of of agents agents with with whom whom Ovakimyan hehe was by the the Ovakimyan was was in in contact contact "blunted blunted his his vigilance." vigilance.In In May May 1941 1941 was caught caught by FBI in the act ofreceiving receiving documents documents from in the act of from agent agent OCTANE, OCTANE, briefly briefly imprisoned, imprisoned, freed freed on on bail bail and and allowed allowed to to leave leave the the country country in in JulyY July.32But But for for the the remarkably remarkably lax lax security of the Roosevelt administration, the damage to NKVD operations might security of the Roosevelt administration, the damage to operations might have much 1939, the have been beenvery very much worse worse than than the thearrest arrest of of Ovakimyan. Ovakimyan. On O n September September 2, 2,1939, the day Chambers had day after after the the outbreak outbreak of of war warin in Europe, Europe, Whittaker Whittaker Chambers had told told much much of of what what he Berle, Assistant he knew knew about about Soviet Soviet espionage espionagein in the theUnited UnitedStates States to to Adolf Adolf Berle, Assistant Secre Secretary on tary of of State State and and President President Roosevelt's Roosevelts adviser adviser on internal internal security. security. Immediately Immediately after afterwards, wards, Berle Berle drew drew up up a a memorandum memorandum for for the the President President which which listed listed Alger Alger Hiss, Hiss, Harry Harry Dexter Dexter White White and and the the other other leading leading Soviet Soviet agents agents for for whom whom Chambers Chambers had had acted acted as as courier. leading presidential aide, Lauchlin courier. One One of of those those on on the thelist list was was a a leading presidential aide, Lauchlin Currie Currie (mis (mistranscribed was not transcribed by by Berle Berle as as Lockwood Lockwood Curry). Curry). Roosevelt, Roosevelt, however, however, was not interested. interested. He He seems seems to to have have dismissed dismissedthe the whole whole idea idea of of espionage espionage rings rings within within his his administration administration as as absurd. absurd. Equally Equally remarkable, remarkable, Berle Berle simply simply pigeon-holed pigeon-holed his his own own report. report. He H e did did not not even even send send a a copy copy to to the the FBI until until the the Bureau Bureau requested requested it it in in 1943.33 1943.33 Japanese attack Japanese attack on on Pearl Pearl Harbor Harbor and and Hitler's Hitlers declara declaration December 1941, tion of of war war on on the the United United States States in in December 1941, Vassili Vassili Zarubin Zarubin (alias (alias Zubilin, Zubilin, codenamed codenamed MAKSIM) MAKSIM) was was appointed appointed legal legal resident resident in in New New York. York. Already Already deeply deeply suspicious of British commitment to to the the defeat suspicious of British commitment defeat of of Nazi Nazi Germany, Germany, Stalin Stalin also also had had
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doubts Zarubin before doubts about about American American resolve. resolve. He H e summoned summoned Zarubin before his his departure departure and and told him him that thathis his main main assignment assignment in in the theUnited United States was was to to watch watch out out for for attempts attempts told States by Roosevelt Roosevelt and and "US US ruling ruling circles" circles to to negotiate negotiate with with Hitler and sign sign a a separate by Hitler and separate peace. As As resident in New York, based in the Soviet consulate, Zarubin was was also peace. resident in New York, based in the Soviet consulate, Zarubin also responsible for subresidencies in Washington, San Francisco, and Latin America.34 responsible for subresidencies in Washington, San Francisco, and Latin America.34 fragmentary, the evidence suggests suggests that Stalin continued to take a direct per perThough fragmentary, sonal interest interest in in overseeing overseeing intelligence intelligence operations operations against against his his allies. allies. sonal brief official official SVR biography biography portrays portrays Zarubin's Zarubins wartime wartime record record in in New York A brief New York (and later in in Washington) Washington) as as one one of of unblemished unblemished brilliance.35 brillian~e.~ reality, In his abrasive abrasive (and later In reality, his personality caused immediate immediate uproar. personality and and foul-mouthed foul-mouthed behavior behavior caused uproar. Zarubin's Zarubins prefer preference for operations offi cers whom ence for the the operations officers whom he he brought brought with with him him (among (among them them his his wife, wife, Yelizaveta Yulyevna YulyevnaZarubina)36 Z a r ~ b i n aand )~~ his unconcealed contempt contempt for for existing existing residency residency Yelizaveta and his unconcealed staff cers whom staff led led to to open open rebellion. rebellion. Two Two of of the the operations operations offi officers whom he he insulted, insulted, Vasili Vasili Vasili the remarkable Dmitryevich Mironov and Vas iIi Georgyevich Dorogov, went to to the remarkable lengths of of reporting his crudeness, crudeness, general lack of of manners, manners, use use of of street street language language lengths reporting "his general lack and obscenities, obscenities, carelessness carelessness in in his his work, work, and and repugnant secretivenessto to the the Centre, Centre, and repugnant secretiveness" and asking asking for for his his recall recall along along with with his his almost almost equally equally unpopular unpopular wife. wife. Feuding Feuding and within the the residency residency continued continued throughout throughout the the Second Second World World War.37 War.37 within Zarubin's Zarubins recruitment recruitment strategy strategy was was simple simple and and straightforward. straightforward. He H e demanded demanded that the theleaders leaders of of the the Communist CommunistParty Party of the the United UnitedStates States (CPUSA) (CPUSA) identifY identify sup supthat of porters and and sympathizers sympathizers in in government government establishments establishments suitable suitable for for work work as as agents.38 agents.3s porters When Zarubin Zarubin arrived arrived in in New New York, York, the the CPUSA leader When leader Earl Earl Browder Browder (codenamed (codenamed RULEVOY-Helmsman) was serving serving a a prison prison sentence sentence for for using using a a false false passport passport RULEVOY -"Helmsman") was during during his his frequent frequent secret secret journeys journeys to to the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. His His first first contact contact was was there therefore with with Eugene EugeneDennis Dennis (born Francis Francis X. Waldron, Waldron, code codenamed RYAN), a a Moscow Moscowfore (born named RYAN), trained Comintern agent agent who who later later succeeded succeeded Browder Browder as as CPUSA secretary. trained Comintern CPUSA general general secretary. Dennis reported reported that that a a number numberof of Communists Communists (mostly (mostly secret secret Party members) were were Dennis Party members) the first professional professional American foreign intelligence agency, agency, the Offi Office joining the ce of the Coordinator of of Information, Information, reorganized reorganized in in June June 1942 1942 as as the the Office Office of of Strategic SerCoordinator Strategic Ser vices (OSS). ( O S ) .Shortly Shortly before before the the foundation of OSS, OSS, Browder Browder left left prison prison to to resume resume vices foundation of the Party Party leadership. leadership. He H e was, was, Dennis told Moscow, Moscow, "in in aasplendid splendid mood."39 mood.7739 the Dennis told Among the thefirst first Soviet Soviet agents agents to to penetrate penetrate OSS was was Duncan Duncan Chaplin Chaplin Lee Lee(code (codeAmong named KOCH), KOCH), who who became became personal personal assistant assistant to to its its head, head, General General "Wild Wild Bill" Bill named Donovan. Donovan had had aarelaxed relaxed attitude attitude to tothe the recruitment of of Communists. Communists. "I'd Id put put Donovan. Donovan recruitment Stalin on on the theOSS payroll," payroll, he he once once said, said, "if if I thought thought it itwould would help help us us defeat defeat Hitler." Hitler. Stalin Throughout the the Second World War War the the NKVD knew vastly more about OSS than Throughout knew about about the the NKVD.40 NKVD.40 OSS knew Browdersrecruitment leads also also included foreign Communists and fellow fellow travelers travelers Browder's rehge in the theUnited States. States. Among the themost important was the French who had taken refuge radical politician politician Pierre Cot, six six times times Minister ofAir and twice Minister of Commerce governments of the prewar Third Republic. Cot had probably been been in the short-lived governments durrecruited by the NKVD in the mid-1930s, but seems to have drifted out of touch dur thechaotic followed the purge of much of Soviet Sovietforeign foreign intelligence ing the chaotic period which followed intelligence and had condemned the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Rebuffed by General Charles and had condemned the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. Rebuffed by General Charles

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de de Gaulle, Gaulle, the the leader leader of of the the Free Free French French after after the the fall f d of of France Francein in 1940, 1940, Cot Cot spent spent the the next In reported next few few years years in in the the United United States.41 States.41 In November November Browder Browder reported to to Moscow: Moscow: "Cot Cot wants wants the the leaders leaders of ofthe the Soviet Soviet Union Union to to know know of of his his willingness willingness to to perform perform whatever whatever mission might to mission we we might choose, choose, for for which which purpose purpose he he is is even evenprepared prepared to break break faith faith with with his his own position."42Probably Probably a month or arrival in ownposition.42 a month or so so after after his hisarrival in New New York, York, Zarubin Zarubin approached approached Cot Cot and, and, with with his his habitual habitual brusqueness, brusqueness, pressed pressedCot Cot to tobegin begin active active work work as records that as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent forthwith. forthwith. Cot's Cots KGB KGB flle file records that he he was was taken taken aback aback by by the the peremptory peremptory nature nature of of Zarubin's Zarubins summons summons and and insisted insisted that that one one of of the the leaders leaders of of the the his approval.43 approval.43 On 1 Zarubin Zarubin French Communist Communist Party Party exiled exiled in in Moscow Moscow give give his O n July July 1 French reported "the signing Cot" as reported to to the theCentre Centre the signing on on of of Pierre Pierre Cot as agent agent DAEDALUS.44 DAEDALUS.4 In In 1944 1944 Cot pro Cot was was to to be be sent sent on on a a three-month three-month mission mission to to Moscow Moscow on on behalf behalf of of de deGaulle's Gaulles provisional "Liberty visionalgovernment. government.He He concluded concludedthe the report report on on his his mission: mission: Libertydeclines declinesunceas unceasingly under under capitalism capitalism and and rises rises unceasingly unceasingly under socialism."45 sociali~m.~~ ingly under Though Though the the Centre Centre was was plainly plainly impressed impressed by by the the quality quality of of Communist Communist recruits recruits talent-spotted talent-spotted by by Browder, Browder, it it cautioned cautioned Zarubin Zarubin against against over-reliance over-reliance on on them: them: We the use Communist[Party [Party members'] illegal intelligence We permit permit the use of of the the Communist members] illegal intelligence capabilities capabilities .. .. .. as as a a supplement supplement to to the the Residency's Residencys operations, operations, but but it it would would be be 46 a a mistake mistake to to turn turn these these capabilities capabilities into into the themain main basis basis of of operations. operation^.^^ At in December New At almost almost the the same same moment moment in December 1941 1941 when when Zarubin Zarubin arrived arrived in in New York as legal resident, named YUNG and Yorkas legal resident, Iskhak Iskhak Akhmerov Akhmerov (successively (successively code codenamed and ALBERT) residency,also also based New York, ALBERT) returned returned to to reestablish reestablish the the illegal illegal residency, based in in New York, which which he he had had been been ordered ordered to to abandon abandon two two years years earlier. earlier.Though Though he he had had previously previously used used Turkish Turkish and and Canadian Canadian identity identity documents, documents, on on this this occasion occasion he he carried carried a a doc doctored tored US US passport passport which which he he had had acquired acquired in in 1938.47 1938.47Unlike Unlike Zarubin, Zarubin, Akhmerov Akhmerov avoided avoided all allcontact contact with with Browder-despite Browder-despite the the fact fact that that his his wife wife and and assistant, assistant, Helen Helen Lowry (codenamed MADLEN and ADA), was Browder's niece.48 In March Lowry (codenamed MADLEN and ADA), was Browders niece.48 In March 1942 1942 the the Akhmerovs Akhmerovs moved moved from from New New York York to to Baltimore, Baltimore, a a more more convenient convenient location location from from which which to to run run agents agents based based in in Washington. Washington.There ThereAkhmerov, Akhmerov, whose whose stepfather stepfather had a local had been been a a furrier, furrier, opened opened a a fur h r and and clothes clothes business business in in partnership partnership with with a local Soviet Soviet agent, agent, KHOSYAIN, KHOSYAIN, to togive give himself himself a a cover cover occupation.49 oc~upation.~~ Michael Straight (NIGEL), whom Akhmerov Michael Straight (NIGEL), in in whom Akhmerov had had placed placed such such high high hopes hopes before before the the Second Second World World War, War, refused rehsed to toresume resume work work as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. Straight Straight had had one one last last meeting meeting with with Akhmerov Akhmerov in in Washington Washingtonearly early in in 1942, 1942,declined declined any any further further meeting, Most other meeting, shook shook hands hands and and said said goodbye.50 g~odbye.~ Most other pre-war pre-war agents, agents, however, however,were were successfully successhlly reactivated, reactivated, among among them themLaurence Laurence Duggan Duggan (FRANK)51 (FRANK)* and and Harry Harry Dex Dexter ter White White (JURIST).52 (JURIST).52Henry Henry Wallace, Wallace, vice-president vice-president during during Roosevelt's Rooseveltsthird third term term of of office office (1941 (1941 to to 1945), 1945), said said later later that that if if the the ailing ailing Roosevelt Roosevelt had had died died during during that that period period and and he he had had become become president, president, it it had had been been his his intention intention to to make make Duggan Duggan his his Secretary of State and White his Secretary of the Treasury.53 The fact that Roosevelt Secretary of State and White his Secretary of the Treasurys3 The fact that Roosevelt survived survived three three months months into into an an unprecedented unprecedented fourth fourth term term in inthe theWhite White House, House, and and replaced Harry Truman Truman as replaced Wallace Wallace with with Harry as vice-president vice-president in in January January 1945, 1945, deprived deprived Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence of of what what would would have have been been its its most most spectacular spectacular success success in in penetratpenetrat-

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ing a a major major Western Western government. government. The The NKVD succeeded succeeded none none the the less less in in penetrat penetrating ing all all the the most sensitive sections sections of of the the Roosevelt Roosevelt administration. administration. ing most sensitive Akhmerovs most productive Washington Washington network network was was a a group group of of Communists Communists Akhmerov's most productive and (suc and fellow fellow travelers travelers with with government government jobs jobs run run by by Nathan Nathan Gregory GregorySilvermaster Silvermaster (successively the Farm cessively codenamed codenamed PAL and and ROBERT), ROBERT), a a statistician statistician in inthe Farm Security Security Administration, 54 Greg "Greg" SilverSilver Administration, later later seconded seconded to to the the Board Board of of Economic Economic Warfare. Warfare.54 master retained retained the idealism of dream. A chronic chronic suf master the untarnished untarnished idealism of the the revolutionary revolutionary dream. sufferer asthma, which left him him gasping ferer from from bronchial bronchial asthma, which often often left gasping for for breath, breath, he he believed believed that, "My Mytime time is is strictly strictly limited, and when when I die die I want want to tofeel feel that that at atleast have had had that, limited, and least I have some part part in in building building a a decent decent life life for those who who come come after after me.55 some for those me."55 involved in Akhmerov believed, probably correctly, correctly, that, despite the security risks involved Silvermastersunorthodox unorthodox tradecraft, tradecraft, he he was was able ableto to obtain obtain far far more more intelligence intelligence from from Silvermaster's individually by a Soviet his increasing number of sources than if each of them was run individually Silvermaster himself disdained NKVDs bureaucratic "orthodox orthodox meth methcontroller. Silvermaster disdained the NKVD's ods. Though Though most most of of his his sources sources must must have have been been aware aware of the ultimate ultimate destination destination ods." of the of their their intelligence, intelligence, the the network network was was run run under under what what Akhmerov Akhmerov termed termed the Comof "the Com munist Party Party flag." flag. Informants Informants regarded regarded themselves themselves as as helping helping the the CPUSA, CPUSA, which which munist would in in turn turn assist assist its its Soviet Soviet comrades. comrade^.'^ would 56 To limit the security risks, risks, Akhmerov placed two twocut-outs between himself and the Silvermaster group. group. The The fi first was a a courier, courier, Elizabeth Elizabeth Bentley Bentley (codenamed (codenamed MIRNA, Silvermaster rst was then, more condescendingly, condescendingly, UMNITSA-"Good UMNITSA-Good Girl"), Girl), a a Vassar Vassar graduate graduate who who in then, more in 1938, at at the age of of thirty, had been to break with the the 1938, the age thirty, had been persuaded persuaded to break her her visible visible links links with CPUSA in in order order to to work work for for the the NKVD. Every Every fortnight fortnight Bentley Bentley collected collectedclassified classified CPUSA documents microfilmed by Silvermaster and his wife in her knitting bag. She reported himself but to another Soviet illegal in his residency, residency, Jacob Jacob Golos not to Akhmerov himself (ZWK-Sound), whom she knew knewas "Timmy." Timmy.Golos broke NKVD rules by byseduc seduc(ZVUK-"Sound"), snowstorm. According to Bentley's Bentleys enthusiastic enthusiastic ing Bentley during a New York snowstorm. description of the seduction, seduction, she felt herself "fl float ecstasythat seemed description oat away into an ecstasy seemed to end. Encouraged by Golos's Golossunprofessional unprofessional example, Benthave no beginning and no end." example, Bent have horrifi horrified ley mixed friendship and espionage in a way which would have ed the Centre. usedNKVD funds to buy carefully carefully chosen presents, ranging from Each Christmas she used chosen presents, whiskey to lingerie, for the agents in Silvermaster's Silvermasters group. group. These, she said later, later, were were the good days-the days workedtogether comrade^.'"^ "the good old days-the days when when we worked together as as good good comrades."57 Zarubins, Akhmerov's Akhmerovs illegal residency recruited non-American non-American as well as Like Zarubin's, themost important was the British journalist and wartime American agents. Among the intelligence officer Cedric Belfrage (codenamed CHARLIE), who joined joined British Security Coordination (BSC) in New York shortly after the United States entered New war. Directed by the SIS of the war.58 SIS head of station, Sir William Stephenson, for much of the Americans on behalf MI5 and the war, BSC handled intelligence liaison with the behalf of ofMI5 SOE SIS.59Belfrage volunteered his services services to Soviet intelligence. intelligence. Like a SOE as well as SIS.59 the United UnitedStates, he made his initial approach number of other American agents in the EarlBrowder, who passed him on onto to Golos.60Given the unprecedented number of of to Earl Golos.60 wartime secrets exchanged by the British and American intelligence communities, access to an unusually wide range of intelligence. intelligence. Belfrage had access

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The The rolls rolls of of microfllm microfilm forwarded forwarded by by Akhmerov's Akhmerovsillegal illegalresidency residency to to the the Centre Centre via the legal residency in New York increased almost four-fold in the space of via the legal residency in NewYork increased almost four-fold in the space of a a year, year, from 1943. from fifty-nine fifty-nine in in 1942 1942to to 211 211in in 1943. Zarubin Zarubinnone none the the less less regarded regarded Akhmerov's Akhmerovs refusal refusalto to have have direct directdealings dealingswith with the theCPUSA CPUSAleadership leadership and and his his roundabout roundabout meth methods ods of of controlling controlling the the Silvermaster Silvermaster group group as as feeble feeble and and long-winded. long-winded. Akhmerov Akhmerov himself, may well himself, Zarubin Zarubin complained, complained, had had a a "dry dry and and distrustful" distrustful manner-which manner-which may well have been true as far as his relations with Zarubin were concerned. Zarubin had a have been true as far as his relations with Zarubin were concerned. Zarubin had a much Helen much higher higher opinion opinion of ofAkhmerov's Akhmerovswife, wife, Helen Lowry, Lowry,whom whom he heregarded regarded as as more more quick-witted, quick-witted, more morebusiness-like business-like in in manner, manner,and-because and-because of ofher her American American upbring upbringing-better able to ing-better able to make make direct direct contact contact with with US US agents.61 agents.61
T TH HE E RE R E WAS WAS T TH HU US Sa abreathtaking breathtaking gulf gulfbetween between the the intelligence intelligencesupplied suppliedto to Stalin Stalin on on

the available Whereas the United UnitedStates States and andthat that availableto to Roosevelton Roosevelt.onthe the Soviet SovietUnion.62 Union.62 Whereas the the Centre Centre had had penetrated penetrated every everymajor majorbranch branch of of Roosevelt's Rooseveltsadministration, administration, OSS-like OSS-like SIS-had Big At the the Tehran TehranConference Conference of of the the BigThree Three SIS-had not not aasingle singleagent agent in in Moscow. Moscow.At in in November November 1943-the 1943-the first first time time Stalin Stalin and and Roosevelt Roosevelt had had met-vastly met-vastly superior superior intelligence intelligence gave gave Stalin Stalin a a considerable considerable negotiating negotiating advantage. advantage.Though Though there there is is no no precise precise indication indication of of what what intelligence intelligence reports reports and and documents documents were were shown shown to to Stalin Stalin before before the the summit, summit, there there can can be be no no doubt doubt that that he he was was remarkably remarkablywell well briefed. briefed. He He was was almost almost certainly certainlyinformed informed that that Roosevelt Roosevelthad had come come to to Tehran Tehrandetermined determined to to do do his his utmost utmost to toreach reach agreement agreementwith with Stalin-even Stalin-even at at the thecost cost of of offending offending Churchill. Churchill. FDR FDRgave gaveproof proof of of his his intentions intentions as as soon soon as as he he arrived. arrived.He H e declined declined Churchill's Churchillspro proposal that they should meet privately before the conference began, but accepted posal that they should meet privately before the conference began, but accepted Stalin's Stalinspressing pressing invitation invitation that-allegedly that-allegedly on on security securitygrounds-he grounds-he should should stay stay at at aa building building in in the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy compound compound rather rather than than at at the the US US legation. legation. It It seems seems not bugged, not to to have have occurred occurredto to Roosevelt Roosevelt that that the thebuilding building was, was, inevitably, inevitably, bugged, and and that that every word uttered by himself and his delegation would be recorded, transcribed every word uttered by himself and his delegation would be recorded, transcribed and and regularly regularlyreported reported to to Stalin.63 Stalir~.~~ Stalin Stalinmust must also alsohave havewelcomed welcomedthe the fact factthat that Roosevelt Rooseveltwas was bringing bringing to to Tehran Tehran his his closest closest wartime wartime adviser, adviser, Harry Harry Hopkins, Hopkins, but but leaving leaving behind behind his his Secretary Secretary of of State, State, Cordell Cordell Hull. Hull. Hopkins Hopkins had had established established a a remarkable remarkable reputation reputation in in Moscow Moscow for for tak taking the Russians into his confidence. Earlier in the year he had privately warned ing the Russians into his confidence. Earlier in theyear he had privately warned the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy in in Washington Washington that that the the FBI FBI had had bugged bugged a a secret secret meeting meeting at at which which Zarubin Zarubin (apparently (apparently identified identified by by Hopkins Hopkins only only as as a a member member of of the the embassy) embassy) had had passed teve Nelson, Communist under passed money money to to S Steve Nelson, a a leading leading member member of of the the US US Communist underground.64 sentto to Moscow New York residency on the talks ground.64Information Information sent Moscow by by the the New York residency on the talks between Roosevelt and Churchill in May 1943 had also probably come from between Roosevelt and Churchill in May 1943 hadalso probably come from Hop Hopkins.65 kin^.^* There There is is plausible plausiblebut but controversial controversialevidence evidencethat, that, in inaddition addition to to passing passing con confidences fidences to to the the Soviet Soviet ambassador, ambassador,Hopkins Hopkins sometimes sometimes used used Akhmerov Akhmerov as as a a back back channel to Moscow, much as the Kennedys later used the G RU officer Georgi Bol channel to Moscow, much as the Kennedys later used the GRU officer Georgi Bolshakov. confidential years shakov.Hopkins's Hopkinss confidential information information so so impressed impressed the the Centre Centrethat, that, years later, later, some been These some KGB KGB officers officersboasted boasted that that he hehad had been a a Soviet Soviet agent.66 agent.66 These boasts boasts were were far far from was sympathy from the the truth. truth.Hopkins Hopkins was an an American American patriot patriot with withlittle little sympathyfor for the theSoviet Soviet system. system. But But he he was was deeply deeply impressed impressed by by the the Soviet Sovietwar war effort effort and and convinced convinced that, that,

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"Since Since Russia Ru.ssiaisisthe the decisive decisive factor factor in in the thewar war she she must must be be given givenevery every assistance assistance and and every effort must be made to obtain her friendship."67 "Chip" Bohlen, who acted every effort must be made to obtain her friend~hip.~ Chip Bohlen, who acted as as American interpreter, later described Hopkins's influence on the President the American interpreter, later described Hopkinss influence on the President at at the Tehran Tehran summit summitas as "paramount."68 param~unt.~~ It It was was at at Tehran, Tehran,Churchill Churchilllater later claimed, claimed, that that he he realized realized for for the the first first time time how how small the British nation was: small the British nation was: There the great There I I sat sat with with the great Russian Russian bear bear on on one one side side of of me, me, with with paws paws out outstretched, stretched, and and on on the the other otherside side the the great great American American buffalo, buffalo, and and between between the the two sat the poor little English donkey . . . 69 two sat the poor little English donkey . . .69 Despite the closeness the British-American Despite the closeness of of the British-American wartime wartime "special special relationship" relationship and and Roosevelt's Rooseveltsfriendship friendship with with Churchill, Churchill, his his priority priority at at Tehran Tehranwas was to to reach reach agreement agreement with with Stalin. Stalin. He H e told told his his old old friend, friend, Frances Frances Perkins, Perkins, the the Secretary Secretaryof of Labor, Labor, how how Winston Winston got got red red and and scowled, scowled, and and the the more more he he did didso, so, the the more more Stalin Stalin smiled. smiled. Finally, Finally, Stalin Stalin broke broke out out into into a a deep, deep, hearty hearty guffaw, guffaw, and and for for the the first first time time in in three three days days I I saw sawlight. light. I I kept kept it it up up until until Stalin Stalin was was laughing laughing with with me, me, and and it it was was then then that that I I called called him him "Uncle UncleJoe." Joe. He H e would would have have thought thought me me fresh fresh the the day day before, before, but but that thatday day he he laughed laughed and and came came over over and and shook shook my my hand. hand. From From that that time time on on our ourrelations relationswere were personal personal .. .. ..We We talked talked like like men men and and brothers. 70 brother^.^' In Conference, In the the course course of ofthe theTehran Tehran Conference,Hopkins Hopkins sought sought out out Churchill Churchill privately privately at at the the British adamant British embassy, embassy,and and told told him him that that Stalin Stalin and and Roosevelt Rooseveltwere were adamant that that Operation Operation OVERLORD, of occupied France, OVERLORD, the the British-American British-American cross-Channel cross-Channel invasion invasion of occupied France, must must take take place placethe the following followingspring, spring,and and that that British British opposition opposition must must cease. cease.Churchill Churchill du1y dulygave gaveway. way.The The most mostimportant important political politicalconcession concessionto to Stalin Stalinwas was British-American British-American agreement agreement to to give give the the post-war post-war Soviet SovietUnion Union its its 1941 1941 frontier, frontier,thus thus allowing allowing Stalin Stalin to to recover Pact: eastern recover his his territorial territorial gains gains ill-gotten ill-gotten under under the the Nazi-Soviet Nazi-Soviet Pact: eastern Poland, Poland, the the Baltic Baltic states states and and Moldova. Moldova. The The Polish Polish government-in-exile government-in-exile in in London London was was not not consulted. consulted. Stalin Stalin returned returned to toMoscow Moscow in in high highspirits. spirits.The The United United States States and and Britain Britain seemed seemed to to have have recognized, recognized, as as a a Russian Russian diplomat diplomat put put it itprivately, privately, Russia's Russias "right right to to establish establish friendly Roosevelt's friendly governments governments in in the the neighboring neighboring countries."71 c~untries.~~ Roosevelts willingness willingness to to go go so had sofar far to to meet meet Stalin's Stalinswishes wishes at atTehran Tehran had derived derived chiefly chieflyfrom from his his deep deep sense sense of of the the West's Wests military military debt debt to to the the Soviet SovietUnion Union at at a a time time when whenthe theRed Red Army Army was was bearing bearing the the war the overwhelming overwhelming brunt brunt of of the warwith with Germany. Germany. But But there thereis is equally equallyno no doubt doubtthat that Stalin's greatly cards Stalinsnegotiating negotiating success successwas was greatly assisted assistedby by his his knowledge knowledgeof of the the cards in in Roo Roosevelt's sevelts hand.72 hand. Despite Despite the the considerable considerable success success of of the the legal legal and and illegal illegal American American residencies residencies in in penetrating the Roosevelt penetrating the Roosevelt administration, administration, however, however, they they had had failed failed totally totally in in one one important of Zarubin's Centre had important respect. respect. Part Part of Zarubins original original brief brief from from the the Centre had been been to to recruit community who recruit agents agents from from among among the the large large German-American German-American community who could could be be

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used against endhe he recruited a single single one. one. When When asked asked to to used against Germany. Germany. In In the the end recruited not not a explain this omission, omission, he he told told the the Centre most German-Americans German-Americans were Jews explain this Centre that that most were Jews and therefore Zarubin, had so engrossed engrossed in in the and therefore unsuitable.73 ~ n s u i t a b l eThe . ~ ~ Centre, Centre, T h e like like Zarubin, hadbecome become so the intelligence allies that to have have judged leniently his his failfail intelligence offensive offensive against against its its allies that it itappears appears to judged leniently ure ure against against the the enemy. enemy.
continued to expand in well as continued to expand in Britain Britain as as well as the second legal residency began began to to oper the beginning beginning of of 1942 1942 a a second legal residency operthe United United States. States. At the ate in in London London under under Ivan Ivan Andreyevich Andreyevich Chichayev Chichayev (JOHN) alongside that that of of Anaate (JOHN) alongside Ana toli Gorsky, who remained in toli Gorsky Gorsky (successively (successively HENRY and and VADIM). VADIM). Unlike Unlike Gorsky, who remained in charge presence in in London charge of of the the agent agent network, network, Chichayev Chichayev announced announced his his presence London to to the the authorities liaison with both the the British British and and authorities and and was was responsible responsible for for intelligence intelligence liaison with both allied governments-in-exile.74 governments-in-e~ile.~~ Chichayev also an agent agent network network of CmigrC offiallied Chichayev also ran ran an of emigre offi cials informed of of British British negotiations negotiations cials from from central central and and eastern eastern Europe Europe who whokept kept him him informed with the Polish Czechoslovak president, president, Edvard Bene s, with the Polish government-in-exile, government-in-exile, the the Czechoslovak Edvard Benes, King Ivan S Subas.75 King Peter Peter of of Yugoslavia Yugoslavia and and his his prime prime minister, minister, Ivan ~bis.~ The to generate generate a amount of The Cambridge Cambridge Five, Five, meanwhile, meanwhile, continued continued to a phenomenal phenomenal amount of intelligence. documents intelligence. For For 1942 1942 alone alone Maclean's Macleans documents filled filled more more than than forty-five forty-five volumes volumes in large quantities quantities of of highly highly classified classified in the theCentre Centrearchives.76 archives.76Philby Philby too too was was providing providing large flies. Section V (Counter-intelligence) files. Since Since September September 1941 1941 he he had had been been working working in in Section (Counter-intelligence) of Section V was St. Albans, Albans, rather SIS London London of SIS. Though Though Section was then then located located in in St. rather than than in in SIS headquarters advantage of of being next door door to to the headquarters at at Broadway Broadway Buildings, Buildings, it it had had the the advantage being next the registry housed SIS spent some some time time cultivating the archivist, archivist, registry which which housed SIS archives. archives. Philby Philby spent cultivating the Bill appreciation of of pink gin. As Bill Woodfield, Woodfield, with with whom whom he he shared shared a a common common appreciation pink gin. As Philby Philby later recalled, This "This friendly paid of"77 Over Over a a period period of of months, months, Philby later recalled, friendly connection connection paid Philby borrowed operational files working abroad abroad and and handed handed them borrowed the the operational files of of British British agents agents working them to to Gorsky Early in April April 1942 1942 the the Centre completed a a Gorsky in in batches batches to to be be photographed.78 p h ~ t o g r a p h e d Early . ~ ~ in Centre completed records removed removed by byPhilby Philby up the end lengthy analysis analysis of of the the SIS lengthy SIS records up to to the end of of the the previous previous O HNCHEN for sending a a lot of interesting interesting year. praising S SOHNCHEN for "systematically systematically sending lot of year. Though Though praising material," to show show that had no no agent agent material, it it was was puzzled puzzled that that this this material material appeared appeared to that SIS had network only extremely "extremely insignificant insignificant" operations operations network in in Russia Russia and and was was conducting conducting only against had two reasons for for disputing disputing these these entirely entirely against the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. Centre Centre analysts analysts had two reasons accurate First, though partly aware evidence used to concon accurate conclusions. conclusions.First, though at atleast least partly aware that that the theevidence usedto vict of working for British British intelligence intelligence was was vict some some of of their their liquidated liquidated predecessors predecessors of working for fraudulent, convinced that SIS had had been conducting major major operations operations fraudulent, they they remained remained convinced that SIS been conducting against most highly skilled agents, agents," throughout throughout the the against the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, using using "their their most highly skilled 1930s. a Moscow Moscow station-was, station-was, so so far far as as 1930s.The The reality-that reality-that SIS SIS had had not not even even possessed possessed a the The Centre Centre refused refused to to believe the Centre Centre was was concerned, concerned, literally literally unbelievable. unbelievable. The believe that that the Soviet Soviet Union Union was was a a smaller smaller priority priority for for British truth, the British intelligence intelligence (which (which was, was, in in truth, almost wholly Britain was was for for Soviet Soviet intelligence: almost wholly geared geared to to the thewar war effort) effort) than than Britain intelligence:
WARTIME EN NC CE E GAT G A TH E RI N G WART I M E I NT TE EL L I G E
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If hundred agents agents in in Europe over the the past past If the the HOTEL [SIS] [SIS] has has recruited recruited a a hundred Europe over few years, mainly by the Germans, there can be be no no few years, mainly from from countries countries occupied occupied by the Germans, there can doubt less attention.79 doubt that that our our country country gets gets no no less attention.79

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Such Such reports reports merely merely echoed echoed Stalin's Stalins own own acute acute suspicions suspicions of of his his British British allies. allies. The London residency the first Great The intelligence intelligence from from the the London residency during during the first year year of of the the Great Patriotic Patriotic War War which whichultimately ultimately had had the the greatest greatest impact impact on on both both Stalin Stalin and and the the Cen Centre 1941 Gorsky tre came came from from Cairncross. Cairncross. On O n September September 25, 25,1941 Gorsky telegraphed telegraphed Moscow: Moscow: I am am informing informing you you very very briefly briefly about about the the contents contents of of a a most most secret secret report report of of the the development the Government Government Committee Committeeon on the development of of uranium uranium atomic atomic energy energy to to produce 24, 1941 to produce explosive explosive material material which which was was submitted submitted on onSeptember September 24,1941 tothe the War War Cabinet.80 Cabinet.80
The secret secret committee committee which which produced produced the the report report was was the the Scientific Scientific Advisory Advisory ComThe Com mittee, chaired chaired by by Lord Lord Hankey, Hankey, whose whose codename codename BOSS reflects reflects the the fact fact he he was was mittee, Cairncross's The Cairncrosss employer.81 employer.81 The report report which which Cairncross Cairncross gave gave Gorsky Gorsky was was the the first first to to alert alert the the Centre Centre to toBritish British plans plans to to build build the the atomic atomic bomb.82 bomb.82 Vitally Vitally important important though though that thatreport, report, and and others others on on the the atomic atomic bomb bomb despatched despatched from London over months, proved from London over the the next next few few months, proved to to be, be, they they had had a a delayed delayed impact impact in in Moscow. Moscow. When When Cairncross's Cairncrosss first first report report arrived, arrived, Stalin Stalin and and the the Stavka Stavka were were preoccu preoccupied German advance October 1941 1941 forced pied by by the the German advance which which in in October forced them them to to evacuate evacuate the the capital. 1942 that Beria sent capital. It It was was not not until untilMarch March 1942 that Beria sent Stalin Stalin a a full hll assessment assessment of of British British atomic research. research. The The British British high high command, hereported, reported, was was now now satisfied satisfied that that the the atomic command, he theoretical problems of had been been "fundamentally theoretical problems of constructing constructing an an atomic atomic bomb bombhad fundamentally solved, and Britains best best scientists scientists and and major major companies companies were collaborating on on the the solved," and Britain's were collaborating project.83 project.83At At Beria's Berias suggestion, suggestion, detailed detailed consultations consultations with with Soviet Soviet scientists scientists followed followed over over the the next next few few months.84 months.84 In June June 1942 1942 President President Roosevelt Roosevelt ordered ordered an an all-out all-out effort, effort, codenamed codenamed the the In MANHATTAN project, build an atomic bomb. bomb. Though project, to to build an American American atomic Though it itwas was another another year year before before British British participation participation in in the the project project was was formally formally agreed, agreed, the the NKVD dis discovered covered that that Roosevelt Roosevelt and and Churchill Churchill had had discussed discussed cooperation cooperation on on the the building building of of the June 20.85 On the bomb bomb during duringtalks talks in in Washington Washington on on June 20.85 O n October October 6, following following exten extensive consultations with Centre submitted sive consultations with Soviet Soviet scientists, scientists, the theCentre submitted the the first first detailed detailed report Anglo-American plans plans to construct an report on on Anglo-American to construct an atomic atomic bomb bomb to to the theCentral CentralCom Committee mittee and and the the State StateDefence Defence Committee, Committee, both bothchaired chaired by by Stalin.86 Stalin.86By the the end endof of the the year, Stalin had begin work Soviet atomic atomic bomb.87 year, Stalin had decided decided to to begin work on on the theconstruction construction of of a a Soviet bomb.87 In that momentous the middle In taking taking that momentous decision decision in in the middle of of the the battle battle of of Stalingrad, Stalingrad, the the main turning turning point in the the war Stalin was thinking of the main point in war on on the the eastern eastern front, front, Stalin was not not thinking of the needs of since it could not be needs of the the Great GreatPatriotic Patriotic War, War, since it was was clear clearthat that the thebomb bomb could not be ready ready . in time timeto to assist in the thedefeat defeat of of Germany. Germany. Instead, Instead, he hewas was already alreadylooking looking forward forward to to in assist in a post-war post-war world in which, which, since since the the United United States States and Britain would would have have nuclear nuclear a world in and Britain weapons, the Soviet Soviet Union Union must must have have them them toO.88 too.88 weapons, the For most most of of the the Great Great Patriotic Patriotic War Moscow collected collected more more atomic atomic intelligence For War Moscow intelligence from Britain Rritain than than from from the the United United States. States. In December December 1942 1942 the the London London residency residency from received a a detailed detailed report report on on atomic atomic research research in in Britain and the the United States from from a a received Britain and United States Communist scientist codenamed Vladimir Barkovsky, Barkovsky,head head of of scientific scientific and techCommunist scientist codenamed K. "K." Vladimir and tech K "works works for us intelligence (S&T) at the residency, later reported that "K" nological intelligence

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with enthusiasm, but .. .. .. turns turns down down the the slightest slightest hint hint of of financial financial reward. With the with enthusiasm, but reward." With the help of of a a duplicate duplicate key key personally personally manufactured manufactured by by Barkovsky Barkovskyfrom wax impression help from a a wax impression provided "K," he able to classified documents documents from from colcol provided by by K, he was was able to remove remove numerous numerous classified leaguessafes safes well his as own. own.The The most view, were leagues' as as well as his most valuable, valuable, in in the the Centres Centre's view, were those those on on the construction of uranium piles. At least two other scientists, codenamed MOOR "the construction of uranium piles." At least two other scientists, codenamed and KELLY, also also provided provided intelligence intelligence on on various various aspects ALLOYS, the the and aspects of of TUBE ALLOYS, British atomic atomic project.89 project.89 British The most most important important of of the the British British atom atom spies, spies, the the Communist physicist Klaus The Communist physicist Klaus Fuchs, a a naturalized naturalized refugee refugee from from Nazi Nazi Germany, Germany, was was initially an Fuchs, initially a a GRU rather rather than than an NKVD/NKGB agent. agent. Fuchs Fuchs was was a a committed to take take part part in in NKVDINKGB committed Stalinist Stalinist who who was was later later to the Before the he had had been been an enthusiastic the construction construction of of the the first first atomic atomic bomb. bomb. Before the war war he an enthusiastic participant in in dramatized dramatized readings readings of of the the transcripts transcripts of show trials trials organized organized by by participant of the the show the Society Society for for Cultural Cultural Relations Relations with with the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, and and impressed research the impressed his his research supervisor, the the future future Nobel Nobel Laureate Laureate Sir Sir Neville Neville Mott, with the with which supervisor, Mott, with the passion passion with which he played played the the part part of of the the prosecutor prosecutor Vyshinsky, Vyshinsky, "accusing accusingthe the defendants with a a cold he defendants with cold venom have suspected from so quiet and and retiring retiring a a young young man." venom that that I would would never never have suspected from so quiet man. Late Party (KPD) (KPD) under Late in in 1941, 1941,Fuchs Fuchs asked asked the the leader leader of of the the German German Communist Communist Party underground in passing passing to to the Russians what he had had ground in in Britain, Britain, Jurgen Jurgen Kuczynski, Kuczynski, for for help help in the Russians what he learned the TUBE ALLOYS project project at at Birmingham Birmingham University. University. learned while while working working on on the Kuczynski in touch with Simon Kuczynski put put him him in touch with Simon Davidovich Davidovich Kremer, Kremer, an an officer officerat at the the GRU London his insistence insistence on on taking long rides rides in in Lon London residency, residency, who who irritated irritated Fuchs Fuchs by by his taking long London taxis, taxis, regularly regularlydoubling doubling back back in in order order to off anyone anyonetrying trying to don to throw throw off to tail tail them. them.90 In the the summer summer of of 1942 1942Fuchs Fuchs was was moved movedon another and and more congenial GRU In on to to another more congenial controller, SONYA (referred (referred to to in in KGB files files under the alternative codename FIR),91 controller, under the alternative codename FIR),91 who he he almost almost certainly certainly never never realized realized was was the the sister sister of Jurgen Kuczynski. usuwho ofJurgen Kuczynski. They They usu met near near Banbury, between Birmingham Birmingham and and Oxford, Oxford, where where SONYA ally met Banbury, midway midway between SONY A lived as as Mrs. Brewer, aJewish a Jewish refugee refugee from from Nazi Germany. SONYA remembered lived Mrs. Brewer, Nazi Germany. remembered the the material she she collected from Fuchs Fuchs as as just strings of hieroglyphics and material collected from "just strings of hieroglyphics and formula formula writwrit ten in in such such tiny tiny writing writing that that they they just like squiggles:" squiggles: ten just looked looked like

Klaus hour together together when when we met. Two Two Klaus and and I never never spent spent more more than than half half an an hour we met. minutes would been enough but, apart the pleasure the meeting, meeting, minutes would have have been enough but, apart from from the pleasure of of the it took aalittle together rather rather than part it would would arouse arouse less less suspicion suspicion if if we wetook little walk walk together thanparting live isolation can can guess guess how pre ing immediately. immediately. Nobody Nobody who who did didnot not live in in such such isolation how precious comrade were.92 were.92 cious these these meetings meetings with with another another German German comrade SONYA later to be be made honorary colonel colonel of the later became became the the only only woman woman ever ever to made an an honorary ofthe Red recognition of in the the GRU93 But though though it Red Army, Army,in in recognition of her her remarkable remarkable achievements achievementsin GRU93 But it has been publicly publicly acknowledged acknowledged that ran other besides Fuchs during her has been that she she ran other agents agents besides Fuchs during her time Britain, both RU have gone to to some some pains to conceal conceal the the time in in Britain, both the the SVR and and the the G GRU have gone pains to existence the most important important of them: Melita Melita Stedman Stedman Nonvood, Norwood, nCe nee Sernis Sernis (code(code existence of of the most of them: named shows her to have have been, in d all probabil named HOLA). HOLA).Norwood's Nonvoods file filein in the the Centre Centre shows her to been, in probability, the most most important British female female agent in KGB history history and and the the ity, both both the important British agent in longest-serving of all Soviet spies in Britain.94 longest-serving ofall Soviet spiesin Britain.94

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HOLA was was born born in in 1912 1912 to to aaLatvian Latvian father father and and British British mother, mother, joined joined the the Com Communist munist Party Party of of Great Great Britain Britain (CPGB), (CPGB), married married another another Party Party member member employed employed as as a a mathematics teacher in a secondary school, and from the age of twenty onwards mathematics teacher in a secondary school, and from the age of twenty onwards worked secretary in research department British Non-Ferrous Metals worked as as a a secretary in the the research department of of the the British Non-Ferrous Metals Association. one of Roth Association. Talent-spotted Talent-spotted in in 1935 1935 by by one of the the CPGB's CPGBs founders, founders, Andrew Andrew Rothstein, recruited two stein, she she was was recommended recommended to to the the NKVD by by the the Party Party leadership leadership and and recruited two years years later. later. Like Like the the Magnificent Magnificent Five, Five, Norwood Norwood was was a a committed committed ideological ideological agent agent inspired by Soviet Union relationship to the inspired by a a myth-image myth-image of of the the Soviet Union which which bore bore little little relationship to the brutal rule. Her Her forty-year Soviet agent, agent, however, brutal reality reality of of Stalinist Stalinist rule. forty-year career career as as a a Soviet however, nearly nearly ended She was ring operating ended almost almost as as soon soon as as it it began. began. She was involved involved with with aaspy spy ring operating inside inside the the Woolwich Arsenal, whose whose three leading members tried Woolwich Arsenal, three leading members were were arrested arrested in in January January 1938, 1938, tried and months later. detect clues and imprisoned imprisoned three three months later. MIS MI5 failed, failed, however, however, to to detect clues to to her her iden identity tity contained contained in in a a notebook notebook taken taken from from the the ringleader, ringleader, Percy Percy Glading Glading (codenamed (codenamed GOT), GOT), and and after after a a few few months months "on on ice" iceshe she was was reactivated reactivated in in May May 1938. 1938. It It is is a a sign sign of the the Centre's Centres high high opinion of Norwood Norwood that that contact contact with with her her was was maintained at a a of opinion of maintained at time time when when it it was was broken broken with with many many other other agents, agents, including including some some of of the the Five, Five, because because of of the the recall recall or or liquidation liquidation of of most most foreign foreign intelligence intelligence officers.95 officer^.^' Contact Contact with with Norwood Norwood was was suspended, suspended, however, however, after after the the temporary temporary closure closure of of the London residency early early in in 1940. When reactivated reactivated in in 1941, 1941, she she was was for for unex unexthe London residency 1940. When plained A of NKVD concon plained reasons reasons handed handed over over to to SONY SONYA of the the GRU rather rather than than to toan an troller. troller. Her Her job job at atthe theNon-Ferrous Non-Ferrous Metals Metals Association Association gave gave her her access access to to extensive extensive S&T A and S&T documents documents which which she she passed passed on on to toSONY SONYA and subsequent subsequent controllers. controllers. By the the final the TUBE final months months of of the the war war Norwood Norwood was was providing providing intelligence intelligence on onthe ALLOYS project. notes on on her assessed project. According According to to Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes her file, file, she she was wasassessed throughout throughout her her career career as as a a "committed, committed, reliable reliable and and disciplined disciplined agent, agent, striving striving to to be be of the the utmost utmost assistance."96 as~istance.~~ of By By the the beginning beginning of of 1943, 1943, aware aware of of American American plans plans to to build build the the first first atomic atomic bomb, the the Centre Centrewas was even evenmore more anxious anxious to to collect collect atomic atomic intelligence intelligence in in the the United United bomb, States than than in Britain. One One certain certain indication indication of of the the importance attached by by the the States in Britain. importance attached MANHATTAN project project was was the the dispatch dispatch of of its its head head of of Centre to monitoring monitoring the the MANHATTAN scientific and and technological technological intelligence, intelligence, Leonid Leonid Romanovich Romanovich Kvasnikov Kvasnikov (ANTON), (ANTON), scientific S&T in January 1943.97 1943.97Igor to New New York where he became deputy resident for S&T Vasiliyevich Kurchatov, the newly newly appointed scientific head of of the Soviet atomic atomic Vasiliyevich Kurchatov, the appointed scientifi c head the Soviet project, wrote wrote to to Beria on March March 7: project, Beria on 7:
My examination examination of of the the [intelligence] [intelligence] material material has has shown shown that that their theirreceipt receipt is is of of My enormous and and invaluable invaluable significance significance to to our our nation nation and and our our science. O n the the enormous science. On one hand, hand, the the material material has has demonstrated demonstrated the the seriousness seriousness and and intensity of the the one intensity of scientific research research being conducted on on uranium uranium in in Britain, and on on the scientific being conducted Britain, and the other other hand, it important guidelines hand, it has has made made it it possible possible to to obtain obtain important guidelines for for our our own own scien scientific research, research, by-passing by-passing many many extremely extremely difficult difficult phases phases in in the the development development tific of this this problem, problem, learning learning new new scientific scientific and and technical technical routes routes for for its its develop developof ment, establishing three new new areas areas for for Soviet Soviet physics, physics, and and learning learning about about the the ment, establishing three possibilities for for using not only only uranium-235 uranium-235 but but also also uranium-238.98 uranium-238.98 possibilities using not

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While new While Beria Beria was was reading reading the the report, report,a a new top-secret top-secret laboratory laboratory was was starting starting work work at at Los rst atomic Los Alamos Alamos in in New New Mexico Mexico to to build build the the fi first atomic bomb. bomb. Los Los Alamos Alamos contained contained probably probably the the most most remarkable remarkable collection collection of of youthful youthful talent talent ever ever assembled assembledin in aasingle single laboratory. laboratory. A majority majority of of the the scientists scientists who who worked worked on on the the bomb bomb were were still still in in their their twenties; twenties; the the oldest, oldest, Robert Robert Oppenheimer, Oppenheimer, the the head head of of the the laboratory, laboratory, was was thirty thirtynine. nine. Los Los Alamos Alamos eventually eventually included included twelve twelve Nobel Nobel Laureates. Laureates. In In April April 1943, 1943,a a month monthafter after the the opening openingof of Los Los Alamos, Alamos, the the New NewYork York residency residency reported MANHATTAN project. project. An An unknown unknown woman woman reported an an important important source source on on the theMANHATTAN had had turned turned up up at at the the Soviet Soviet consulate-general consulate-general and and delivered delivered a a letter lettercontaining containing clas classified sified information information on on the theatomic atomic weapons weapons program. program. A month month later later the the same same woman, woman, who who again again declined declined to to give give her her name, name, brought brought another anotherletter letter with with details details of of research research on the plutonium route to the atomic bomb. Investigations by the New York on the plutonium route to the atomic bomb. Investigations by the New York resi residency dency revealed revealed that that the thewoman woman was was an an Italian Italian nurse, nurse, whose whose first first name name was was Lucia, Lucia, the the daughter daughter of of an an anti-fascist anti-fascist Italian Italian union union leader, leader, "D." D.At At a a meeting meeting arranged arranged by by the the residency residencythrough through the theleaders leaders of of the the Friends Friends of of the the USSR Society, Society,Lucia Lucia said said that that she she was was acting acting only only as as an an intermediary. intermediary. The The letters letters came came from from her her brother-in-law, brother-in-law, an an American American scientist scientist working working on on plutonium plutonium research research for for the the Du D u Pont Pont company company in in Newport New York, Newport while while completing completing a a degree degree course course in in New York, who who had had asked asked his his wife wife Regina Regina to to pass pass his his correspondence correspondence to to the the Soviet Soviet consulate consulate via via her her sister sister Lucia. Lucia. The The scientist-apparently scientist-apparently the the first first of of the the American American atom atom spies-was spies-was recruited recruited under under the the codename codename MAR; MAR Regina Regina became became MONA and and Lucia Lucia OLIVIA.99 OLIVIA.99 In York In June June the theNew New York residency residency forwarded forwarded intelligence intelligence on on uranium uranium isotope isotope sepa separation named KVANT KVANT ration through through gaseous gaseous diffusion diffusion from from an an unidentified unidentified agent agent code codenamed ("antum" ) working (Quantum) working for for the the MANHATTAN MANHATTAN project. project. KVANT KVANT demanded demanded pay payment ment and and was was given given300 300 dollars.loo dollars. On O n July July 3, 3, after after examining examining the the latest latest atomic atomic intel intelligence ligence from from the the United UnitedStates, States, Kurchatov Kurchatovwrote wrote to to the theNKVD NKVD (probably (probably to to Beria Beria in in person): person): I I have have examined examined the the attached attached list list of of American American projects projects on on uranium. uranium. Almost Almost every every one one of of them them is is of of great great interest interest to to us us .. .. ..These These materials materials are are of ofenormous enormous interest interest and and great great value value .. .. ..The The receipt receipt of of further further information information of of this this type type is is extremely extremely desirable.lol desirable. As United States less detailed As yet, yet, however, however, atomic atomic intelligence intelligence from from the the United States was was less detailed than than that 1941-2.12Among Among those those who who supplied supplied some some of of the the fur furthat obtained obtained from from Britain Britain in in 1941-2.102 ther 1943 ther intelligence intelligence requested requested by by Kurchatov Kurchatovwas was MAR, MAR, who who in inOctober October 1943 was was trans transferred the Du Hanford, Washington State, ferred to tothe D u Pont Pont plant plant in inHanford, Washington State, which which produced produced plutonium plutonium for for the the MANHATTAN MANHATTAN project. project. He H e told told his his controller controller that that his his aim aim was was to to defeat defeat the the "criminal" criminalattempt attempt of of the the US US military military to to conceal conceal the the construction construction of of an an atomic atomic bomb bomb from from the the USSR.103 USSR.lo3Other Other sources sources of of atomic atomic intelligence intelligence included included a a "progressive progressive professor" professor in in the the radiation radiation laboratory laboratory at at Berkeley, Berkeley, California,104 California,lo4and andprobably-a the MANHATTAN probably-a scientist scientist in in the MANHATTAN project's projects metallurgical metallurgical laboratory laboratory at at IDS Chicago Chicago University. University. The The mercenary mercenary KVANT KVANT seems seems to to have have faded faded away, away, but but by by early 1944 another another agent, agent, a a Communist Communist construction construction engineer engineer codenamed codenamed FOGEL early 1944

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(later (later PERS), PERS), was was providing providing intelligence intelligence on on the the plant plant and and equipment equipment being being used used in in the however, no evidence that MANHATTAN project.106 project.lo6There There is, is, however, no reliable reliable evidence that Soviet Soviet the MANHATTAN intelligence inside Los Los Alamos.107 intelligence yet yet had had an an agent agent inside Alamos.lo7 The The penetration penetration of of the the MANHATTAN project project was was only only the the most most spectacular spectacular part part of of a a vast vast wartime wartime expansion expansion of of Soviet Soviet scientific scientific and and technological technological espionage. espionage. S&T from the United States and Britain made a major contribution to the from the United States and Britain made a major contribution to thedevelop development of Soviet radar, ment of Soviet radar, radio radio technology, technology, submarines, submarines, jet jet engines, engines, aircraft aircraft and and synthetic synthetic lOS rubber, Atomic rubber, as as well well as as nuclear nuclear weapons. weapons. Atomic intelligence intelligence was was codenamed codenamed ENOR ENORMOZ ("Enormous"), (Enormous),jet jetpropulsion propulsion VOZDUKH ('ir"), (Air),radar radar RADUGA RADUGA ("Rain (Rainbow").109 A. S. Yakovlev, the aircraft designer and Deputy Commissar of the Aviation bow).109 s.Yakovlev, the aircraft designer and Deputy Commissar of the Aviation Industry, Industry, paid paid handsome, handsome, though though private, private, tribute tribute to to the the contribution contribution of of S&T to to the the Soviet aircraft Soviet aircraft which which bore bore his his name.110 name. Political Political and and military military intelligence intelligence from from inside inside all all the the main main branches branches of of the the Roosevelt Roosevelt administration administration also also continued continued to to expand, expand, thanks thanks chiefly chiefly to to the the increasing increasing activity activity of of Akhmerov's Akhmerovs Washington Washington networks. networks. The The rolls classified documents documents sent rolls of of film film of of classified sent by by his his illegal illegal residency residency to to Moscow Moscow via via New New York increased from York increased from 211 211 in in 1943 1943 to to 600 in in 1944.111 1944. political even that political intelligence intelligence from from Britain Britain probably probably exceeded exceeded even that from coordination of from the the United United States, States, partly partly as as a a result result of of the the greater greater coordination of British British gov government and and intelligence intelligence assessment assessment through through the theWar WarCabinet Cabinet and the the Joint Joint Intelliernment and Intelli gence Committee Committee (of (of which which there there were were no no real real equivalents equivalents in in the gence theUnited United States, States, despite the the existence existence of of bodies bodies with with similar similar names). names). The The wartime wartime files files of of the the London London despite residency residency contain contain what what Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins summary summary describes describes as as "many many secrets secrets of of the the British Cabinet," correspondence British War War Cabinet, correspondence between between Churchill Churchill and and Roosevelt, Roosevelt, telegrams telegrams exchanged exchanged between between the the Foreign Foreign Office, Office, the the embassies embassies in in Moscow, Moscow, Washington, Washington, Stockholm, Ankara Ankara and andTehran, Tehran, and the minister-resident in Cairo, Cairo, and and intelligence intelligence Stockholm, and the minister-resident in reports.l3 From From the the summer of 1942 1942 to to the thesummer summer of of 1943, 1943, the the intelligence intelligence reports reports reports.ll3 summer of included ULTRA decrypts decrypts direct direct from from Bletchley Bletchley Park, Park, the the main main wartime wartime home home of of included the British British SIGINT agency, agency, where where John Cairncross spent a year year as as a a Soviet agent. the John Cairncross spent a Soviet agent. His controller, controller, Anatoli Anatoli Gorsky, Gorsky, whom, whom, like like the the rest rest of of the the Five, Five, he he knew knew as as "Henry," Henry, His gave on his his gave him him the the money money to to buy buy a a second-hand second-hand car car to to bring bring ULTRA to to London London on days Because of the the unprecedented unprecedented wartime wartime collaboration collaboration of of the the Anglo Anglodays off 113 Because of American intelligence residency was also able able to American intelligence communities, communities, the the London London residency was also to provide provide American as as well well as as British British intelligence.114 intelligence. American The problem problem for for the the professionally professionally suspicious suspicious minds minds in in the the Centre Centrewas that it it all all The was that seemed too too good to be be true. true. Taking Taking their their cue cue from from the the master master conspiracy conspiracy theorist theorist in seemed good to in the Kremlin, Kremlin, they they eventually eventually concluded concluded that whatappeared appeared to to be be the the best intelligence the that what best intelligence ever obtained obtained from from Britain Britain by by any any intelligence intelligence service service was wasat at root root a a British British plot. plot. The The ever Five, later later acknowledged acknowledged as as the the ablest ablest group group of of agents agents in in KGB history, history, were were discred discredFive, ited in in the theeyes eyes of of the the Centre Centreleadership leadership by by their their failure failure to to provide provide evidence evidence of of a a masited mas sive, non-existent non-existent British British conspiracy conspiracy against against the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union, Of the the reality reality of of that that sive, conspiracy, Stalin, and therefore his chief intelligence advisers, advisers, had no doubt. In conspiracy, October 1942 1942 Stalin Stalin wrote wrote to to the the Soviet Soviet ambassador ambassador in in Britain, Britain, Ivan Ivan Maisky: October Maisky:
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Churchillis aiming at the the All of us in Moscow have gained the impression that Churchill in order order then then to defeat of of the the USSR, in defeat to come come to to terms terms with with the theGermany Germany of of Briining at the the expense of our ourcountry.ll5 country.l5 Hitler or Bruning Always in in Stalin's Stalins mind mind when when he he brooded brooded on on Churchill's Churchills supposed supposed wartime Always wartime conspirconspir acies against against him him was was the the figure figure of Hitler's Hitlers deputy deputy Fuhrer, Rudolf Hess, whom, he he acies Fuhrer, Rudolf Hess, whom, in reserve. told Maisky, Churchill was keeping "in reserve." In May 1941 1941 Hess Hesshad had made a bizarre flight flight to to Scotland, in the the deluded deluded belief belief that arrange peace bizarre Scotland, in that he he could could arrange peace between between Britain and Germany. Germany. Both and Berlin Berlin correctly correctly concluded concluded that was Britain and Both London London and that Hess Hess was somewhat deranged. deranged. Stalin, Stalin, inevitably, inevitably, believed believedinstead that Hesss flight was was part of somewhat instead that Hess's flight part of a deeply laid British plot. His suspicions deepened after the German invasion in suspicions German June. For For at at least least the the next next two two years years he he suspected Hesswas part of British conJune. suspected that that Hess was part of a a British con spiracy to to abandon abandon its its alliance alliance with with the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and sign a a separate peace with spiracy and sign separate peace with Germany.l16 Kremlin in in October October 1944 1944 Stalin Germany.l16At At dinner dinner with with Churchill Churchill in in the the Kremlin Stalin pro proposed a toast to the British intelligence service which had inveigled Hess into composed a toast to "the British intelligence service which had inveigled Hess into com ing to England: "He He could could not not have have landed landed without being given givensignals. The ing to England:" without being signals. The intelligence service service must must have have been been behind behind it all.117Stalin's Stalins mood was intelligence it all."117 mood at at dinner dinner was jovial, but but his his conspiracy theory was was deadly deadly earnest. earnest. If his misunderstanding of Hesss jovial, conspiracy theory Ifhis misunderstanding of Hess's flight to to Britain Britain did did not not derive derive from from Centre Centre intelligence intelligence assessments, was certainly flight assessments, it it was certainly reinforced by by them. As late late as as the the early early 1990s 1990s the the same still reinforced them. As same conspiracy conspiracy theory theory was was still being publicly propounded propounded by by a a KGB spokesman being publicly claimed that that in in 1941 1941 Hess Hess spokesman who who claimed brought the the Fuhrer's Fuhrers peace peace proposals proposals with with him plan for for the the invasion "brought him and and a a plan invasion of the the Soviet Union." Union. That That myth myth is is still, still, apparently, apparently, believed by some SVR succes succesSoviet believed by some of of their their SVR sors.l1S sors.* O n October October 25,1943 theCentre Centre informed the London residency itwas On 2S, 1943 the informed the London residency that that it was now now clear, after after long long analysis analysis of of the the voluminous voluminous intelligence clear, intelligence from from the the Five, Five, that that they they were were double agents, working working on on the theinstructions instructions of andMIS. As far far back double agents, of SIS SIS and back as as their their years years at Cambridge, Cambridge, Philby, Maclean Burgess had had probably probably been been acting acting on instructions at Philby, Maclean and and Burgess on instructions from ltrate the before making contact with from British British intelligence intelligence to to infi infiltrate the student student left left before making contact with the the NKVD. Only Onlythus, thus, the the Centre Centre reasoned, reasoned, was was it it possible possible to explain why why both NKVD. to explain both SIS SIS and and MIS jobs Cambridge Cambridge graduates with a MIS were were currently currently employing employing in in highly highly sensitive sensitive jobs graduates with a Communist background. The lack of any reference to British recruitment of Soviet Communist background. The lack of any reference to British recruitment of Soviet agents by SOHNCHEN S OHNCHEN (Philby) from SIS SIS or or by agents in in the the intelligence intelligence supplied supplied either either by (Philby) from by (Blunt) from from MIS MIS was was seen as further hrther evidence evidence that bothwere TONY (Blunt) seen as that both were being being used used to to feed feed disinformation disinformation to to the the NKGB: NKGB:

O HNCHEN] and During During the the entire entire period period that that S[ S[OHNCHEN] and T[ONY] T[ONY] worked worked for for the the British services, they expose a single valuable British special special services, they did did not not help help expose a single valuable ISLANDERS either in or in in ISLANDERS [British] [British] agent agent either in the the USSR or in the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy in the ISLAND ISLAND [Britain] [Britain]. the ' There Blunt to to expose, expose, but but that There was, was, of of course, course,no no such such "valuable valuableagent" agent for for Philby Philby or or Blunt that simple did theorists in Philby's accusimple possibility possibility did not not occur occur to to the theconspiracy conspiracy theorists in the theCentre. Centre. Philbys accu-

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rate report report that that "at at the the present present time time the the HOTEL [SIS] [SIS] is is not not engaged engaged in in active active work work rate against the the Soviet Soviet Union" Union was was also, also,in in the theCentre's Centres view, view, obvious di~information.~ against obvious disinformation.119 Since Since the the Five Five were were double double agents, agents, it it followed followed that that those those they they had had recruited recruited to to the the NKVD were also plants. One example which particularly exercised the Centre was NKVD were also plants. One example which particularly exercised the Centre was the case of had achieved the case of Peter Peter Smollett Smollett (ABO), (ABO), who whoin in1941 1941 had achieved the the remarkable remarkable feat feat of of becoming becoming head head of of the the Russian Russian department department in in the thewartime wartime Ministry Ministry of of Information. Information. By Smollett was organize pro-Soviet a By 1943 1943 Smollett was using using his his position position to to organize pro-Soviet propaganda propaganda on on a prodigious scale. A vast meeting at the Albert Hall in February to celebrate the prodigious scale. vast meeting at the Albert in February to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of songs of praise by twenty-fifth anniversary of the the Red Red Army Army included included songs of praise bya a massed massed choir, choir, readings by Laurence Olivier, attended by leading politi readings by John John Gielgud Gielgud and andLaurence Olivier, and and was was attended by leading politiar was cians parties. The cians from from all all parties. The film film USSR USSR at W War was shown shown to to factory factory audiences audiences of of one one and and a a quarter quarter million. million. In In September September 1943 1943 alone, alone, the the Ministry Ministry of of Information Information orga organized venues, 35 35 factories, nized meetings meetings on on the theSoviet Soviet Union Union for for34 public public venues, factories, 100 100voluntary voluntary societies, schools and same month month societies,28 civil civil defense defense groups, groups, 9 9 schools and aaprison; prison; the the BBC in in the thesame broadcast substantial Soviet Smollett broadcast thirty thirty programs programs with with a a substantial Soviet content.120 content.12 Yet, Yet,because because Smollett had been been recruited by Philby, Philby, he he was, in the the eyes eyes of of the the Centre, Centre, necessarily necessarily a a plant. had recruited by was, in plant. His His apparently apparently spectacular spectacular success success in in organizing organizing pro-Soviet pro-Soviet propaganda propaganda on on an an unprecedented was thus cunning plot plot by British unprecedented scale scale was thus perversely perversely interpreted interpreted as as a a cunning by British intelligence intelligence to to hoodwink hoodwink the the NKVD.l2l NKVD.12 Even the the hardened hardened conspiracy conspiracy theorists theorists of of the the Centre, however, had had some some diffi diffiEven Centre, however, culty culty in in explaining explaining why why the the Five Five were were providing, providing, along along with with disinformation, disinformation, such such large resi large amounts amounts of of accurate accurate high-grade high-grade intelligence. intelligence. In In its its missive missive to to the theLondon London residency 25, the the Centre Centresuggested suggested a a number number of of possible possible answers answersto to this this baf bafdency of of October October 25, fling problem. The sheer fling problem. The sheer quantity quantity of ofForeign Foreign Office Office documents documents supplied supplied by by Maclean Maclean might indicate, it mkht indicate, it believed, believed, that, that, unlike unlike the the other otherfour, four, he he was was not not consciously consciously deceiving deceiving the others to of their their abil the NKVD, NMVD, but but was was merely merelybeing being manipulated manipulated by by the the others to the thebest best of ability. Centre also instructed to pass on ity. The The Centre also argued argued that that the the Five Five were were instructed to pass on important importantintel intelligence about about Germany Germany which which did did not not harm harm British British interests interests in in order order to to make make their their ligence disinformation about about British British policy policy more more credible.122 credible.122 disinformation The most most valuable valuable "documentary documentary material material about about the the work work of of the The the Germans Germans" in in 1943 was was the the German German decrypts decrypts supplied supplied by by Cairncross Cairncross from from Bletchley Bletchley Park. Park. A brief brief 1943 official biography biography of of Fitin Fitin published published by by the the SVR singles singles out out for for special special mention mention the the official ULTRA intelligence intelligence obtained obtained from from Britain Britain on on German Germanpreparations preparations for for the the battle battle of of Kursk when when the the Red Red Army Army halted halted Hitler's Hitlers last last major major offensive offensive on on the the eastern front.123 front.123 Kursk eastern The Luftwaffe Luftwaffe decrypts decrypts provided provided by by Cairncross Cairncross were were of of crucial crucial importance importance in in The enabling the Red Air Force to launch massive pre-emptive strikes against German airfields which destroyed over 500 enemy enemy aircraft.124 aircraft.24 airfields The Centres addiction to conspiracy theory ran ran so so deep, deep, however, however, that that it was The Centre's addiction to conspiracy theory it was capable of of regarding the agent who supplied supplied intelligence intelligence of of critical critical importance importance before before capable regarding the agent who Kursk as as part part of of an an elaborate elaborate network network of of deception. deception. It therefore therefore ordered ordered the the London London Kursk network uncontaminated uncontaminated by the Five. residency to create a new independent agent network But, though Five "undoubtedly double agents," the residency was But, thoughthe the Five were were undoubtedly double agents, the residency was ordered ordered to to maintain contact with with them. them. The The Centre Centre gave gave three three reasons for this this apparently apparently con conmaintain contact reasons for decision. First, if British intelligence intelligence realized that that their tradictory decision. their grand grand deception

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involving been discovered, search for involving the the Five Five had had been discovered, they they might might well well intensify intensify their their search for the the new to replace them. Secondly, Centre acknowledged new network network intended intended to replace them. Secondly, the the Centre acknowledged that, that, despite the none the despite the Five's Fives "unquestionable unquestionable attempts attempts to to disinform disinform us," us, they they were were none the less less providing providing "valuable valuable material material about about the the Germans Germans and and other other matters." matters. Finally, Finally, "Not Not all all the questions questions about group of of agents agents have have been been completely completely cleared cleared up." up.The Centhe about this this group The Cen tre was, was, in in other otherwords, words, seriously seriously confused confbsed about about what what exactly exactly the the Five Five were up t tre were up to.125 ~ . ~ To try try to todiscover discover the the exact exact nature nature of of the the British British intelligence intelligence conspiracy, conspiracy, the the Cen CenTo tre rst time tre sent, sent, for for the the fi first time ever, ever, a a special special eight-man eight-man surveillance surveillance team team to to the the London London residency residency to to trail trail the the Five Five and and other other supposedly supposedly bogus bogus Soviet Soviet agents agents in in the the hope hope of of discovering discovering their their contacts contacts with with their their non-existent non-existent British British controllers. controllers. The The same same team team also the Soviet some of also investigated investigated visitors visitors to to the Soviet embassy, embassy, some of whom whom were were suspected suspected of of being MIS agents provocateurs. The unsuc being agentsprouocateurs. The new new surveillance surveillance system system was was hilariously hilariously unsuccessful. conspicuously Russian Russian cessful. None None of of the theeight-man eight-man team team spoke spoke English; English; all all wore wore conspicuously clothes, ill frequently have dis clothes, were were visibly visibly ill at at ease ease in in English English surroundings surroundings and and must must frequently have dis126 concerted those they followed. concerted those they followed.126 The absurdity absurdity of of trailing trailing the the Five Five highlights highlights the the central central weakness weakness in in the the Soviet Soviet The intelligence intelligence system. system. The The Centre's Centres ability ability to to collect collect intelligence intelligence from from the the West West always always comfortably its capacity it its comfortably exceeded exceeded its capacity to to interpret interpretwhat what it collected. collected. Moscow's Moscows view viewof of its British allies was was invariably invariably clouded clouded by by variable variable amounts amounts of of conspiracy conspiracy theory. theory. The The British allies Soviet leadership was it easier easier to atomic bomb than to Soviet leadership was to to find find it to replicate replicate the the first first atomic bomb than to understand policy-making understand policy-making in in London. London.

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iven the British-American "special relationship," the Centre Given the closeness closeness of of the the British-American special relationship, theCentre inevitably some of inevitably suspected suspected that that some of the the President's Presidents advisers adviserssympathized sympathized with with Church Churchill's himself, however, ills supposed supposed anti-Soviet anti-Soviet plots.1 plots. Suspicions Suspicions of of Roosevelt Roosevelt himself, however,were were never never as those of Churchill. Nor Nor did theories about as intense intense as as those of Churchill. did the the Centre Centreform form conspiracy conspiracy theories about its its American American agents agents as as preposterous preposterous as as those those about about the the Cambridge Cambridge Five. Five. Perhaps Perhaps because because the NKVD had the OSS from had penetrated penetrated the the OSS from the the moment moment of of its its foundation, foundation, it it was was less less inclined deception inclined to to believe believe that that United United States States intelligence intelligence was was running running a a system system of of deception which compared compared with with the thesupposed use of of the the Five Five by by the the British. British. The The CPUSNs CPUSAs assis assiswhich supposed use tance the operation Trotsky, combined the enthusiasm tance in in the operation to to assassinate assassinate Trotsky, combined with with the enthusiasm with with which it it "exposed exposed and and weeded weeded out out spies spies and and traitors,"2 traitor~,~ appeared to its under underwhich appeared to make make its ground section section a a reliable reliable recruiting recruiting ground. ground. Vasili Vasili Zarubins regularcontacts contacts with with the the ground Zarubin's regular CPUSA leader, the reliability those covert covert leader, Earl Earl Browder, Browder, plainly plainly convinced convinced him him of of the reliability of of those Party members members who who agreed agreed to provide secret secretintelligence. intelligence. Party to provide By the the spring security of of its spring of of 1943, 1943, however, however, the the Centre Centre was was worried worried about about the the security its large and and expanding expanding American American agent agent network. network. Zarubin Zarubin became became increasingly increasingly incau incaularge tious both both in meetings with with Party leaders and and in arranging for the payment payment to to tious in his his meetings Party leaders in arranging for the them secret subsidies Moscow. One files noted noted by Mitrokhin them of of secret subsidies from from Moscow. One of of the the files Mitrokhin records records censoriously, the Central Zarubin crudely vio censoriously, "Without Without the theapproval approval of of the CentralCommittee, Committee, Zarubin crudely violated the the rules rules of of clandestinity." clandestinity. On O n one one occasion Browder asked asked Zarubin Zarubin to to deliver lated occasion Browder deliver Soviet to the the Communist underground organization in Chicago; Chicago; Soviet money money personally personally to Communist underground organization in the the KGB file is that he agreed. On occasion, in April the implication implication in in the file is that he agreed. O n another another occasion, in April 1943, Zarubin traveled to to California California for for a with Steve Steve Nelson, 1943, Zarubin traveled a secret secret meeting meeting with Nelson, who who ran ran a secret control commission commission to to seek informants and and spies in the a secret control seek out out informants spies in the Californian Californian branch of of the the Communist Communist Party, Party, but but failed failed to to find find Nelson's Nelsons home. Only on on aasecond branch home. Only second visit did he succeed in delivering the money. O n this occasion, however, the meeting visit did he succeed in delivering the money. On this occasion, however, the meeting was bugged bugged by by the the FBI which which had had placed placed listening listening devices devices in in Nelsons home.3 The was Nelson's home.3 The Soviet in Washington Washingtonwas was told told confidentially confidentially by none none other other than thanRoose RooseSoviet ambassador ambassador in velts adviser, adviser,Harry Harry Hopkins, Hopkins,that thata a velt's member of his embassy had been detected passpass ing California.4 ing money money to to a a Communist Communistin in Calif~rnia.~ Though Zarubin Zarubin became became somewhat somewhat more more discreet discreet after after this this "friendly friendly warning," warning, Though his cover cover had had been blown. Worse Worse was was yet yet to to come. Four months months later later Zarubin Zarubin was was his been blown. come. Four by Vasili Mironov, a a senior officer in in the the New New York York secretly denounced to the the FBI by secretly denounced to Vasili Mironov, senior officer

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residency for residency who who had had earlier earlier appealed appealed unsuccessfully unsuccessfully to to the theCentre Centre for Zarubin's Zarubins recalLs recall. , Mironov In 7, 1943 1943, Mironoviden idenIn an an extraordinary extraordinary anonymous anonymous letter letter to to Hoover Hoover on on August August 7, tified tified Zarubin Zarubin and and ten ten other other leading leading members members of of residencies residencies operating operating under under diplo diplomatic States, matic cover cover in in the theUnited United States, himself himself included, included, as as Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence officers. officers.He He also with also revealed revealedthat that Browder Browder was was closely closelyinvolved involved with Soviet Soviet espionage espionage and and identified identified the the Hollywood Hollywood producer producer Boris Boris Morros Morros (FROST) (FROST) as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. Mironov's Mironovs motives motives derived derived partly partly from from personal personal loathing loathing for for Zarubin Zarubin himself. himself. He He told told Hoover, Hoover, speaking speaking of of himself himself in in the the third thirdperson, person, that that Zarubin Zarubin and and Mironov Mironov "both bothhate hateeach each other." other. Mironov Mironov also also appears appears to to have have been been tortured tortured by by a a sense sense of of guilt guilt for for his his part part in in the the NKVD's NKVDs massacre massacre of of the the Polish Polish officer officer corps corps in in 1940. 1940. Zarubin, Zarubin, he he told told Hoover, Hoover, "interrogated interrogated and and shot shot Poles Poles in in Kozelsk, Kozelsk, Mironov Mironov in in Starobelsk." Starobelsk. (In (In reality, reality, though though Zarubin Zarubin did did interrogate interrogate some some of of the the Polish Polish officers, officers, he he does does not not appear appear to to have have been been directly signs in directlyinvolved involved in in their their execution.) execution.) But But there there are are also alsoclear clear signs in Mironov's Mironovs letter, letter, if mindset generated if not not of of mental mental illness, illness, at at least least of of the the paranoid paranoid mindset generated by by the the Terror. Terror. He He accused accused Zarubin Zarubin of of being being a aJapanese Japanese agent agent and and his his wife wife of of working working for for Germany, Germany, and and concluded that Z is concluded bizarrely: bizarrely: "If Ifyou you prove proveto to Mironov Mironov that is working working for for the the Germans Germansand and Japanese, Japanese, he he will will immediately immediately shoot shoot him him without withoutaatrial, trial, as as he he too too holds holds a a very very high high post post in in the theNKVD."6 NKVD.6 By By the the time timeMironov's Mironovs extraordinary extraordinary denunciation denunciation reached reached the the FBI, FBI, Zarubin Zarubin had had moved move probably moved from from New New York York to to Washington-a Washington-a move probably prompted prompted by by the the steady steady growth growth in in intelligence intelligence of of all all kinds kinds from from within within the the Roosevelt Roosevelt administration. administration. As As the the senior States, senior NKVD NKVD officer officer in in the theUnited United States, Zarubin Zarubin retained retained overall overall control control in in Wash Washington ington of of the the New NewYork York and and San San Francisco Francisco residencies; residencies; responsibility responsibility for for liaison liaison with with the the head head of of the the CPUSA, CPUSA, Browder, Browder, and and with with the the head head of of the the illegal illegal residency, residency,Akh Akhmerov; them the the French merov; and and direct direct control control of of some some of of his his favorite favorite agents, agents, among among them French politician politician Pierre Pierre Cot Cot and and the the British British intelligence intelligence officer officer Cedric Cedric Belfrage, Belfrage, whom whom he he took took over over from from Golos.7 Go~os.~ With With his his cover cover blown, blown, however, however, Zarubin Zarubin found found life life in in Washington Washington difficult. difficult.One One of of his most humiliating moments came at a dinner for members of the Soviet embassy his most humiliating moments came at a dinner for members of the Soviet embassy given given early earlyin in 1944 1944 by by the the governor governor of of Louisiana, Louisiana, Sam Sam Houston Houston Jones.8 Jones.8Mter After dinner, dinner, as as guests guests wandered wandered round round the the governor's governors house house in in small small groups, groups, a a lady lady who who appeared appeared to to know know that that Zarubin Zarubin was was a a senior senior NKGB NKGB officer, officer, turned turned to to him him and and said, said, "Have Have a a seat, seat, General!" General! Zarubin, Zarubin, whose whose fuse fuse and and sense sense of of humor humor were were both both somewhat somewhat short, short, took stiffly, "I took the the seat seat but but replied replied stiffly, I am am not not a a general!" general! Another Another guest, guest, who who identified identified himself himself as as an an officer officer in in military military intelligence, intelligence, complimented complimented the the lady lady on on her her inside inside knowledge. knowledge. He He then then caused caused Zarubin Zarubin further further embarrassment embarrassment by by asking asking for for his his views views on on some the 16,000Polish Polish officers, officers, some of of whose whose bodies bodies had had been been exhumed exhumed in in the the the massacre massacre of of16,000 Katyn Katyn woods. woods. Zarubin Zarubin replied replied that that German Germanallegations allegations that that the theofficers officers had had been been shot shot by (as indeed indeed they they had) had) were were a a provocation provocation intended intended to to sow sow dissension dissension by the the NKVD (as within within the the Grand GrandAlliance Alliance which which would would deceive deceiveonly only the the naive.9 naive. Zarubin Zarubin subsequently subsequently sought sought to to persuade persuade the the Centre Centre that that his his humiliating humiliating loss loss of of cover was due to his to the the fact the Americans cover was due not not to his own own indiscretion indiscretion but but to fact that that the Americans had had somehow somehow discovered discovered that that he hehad hadinterrogated interrogated imprisoned imprisoned Polish Polish officers officers in in Kozelsk. Kozelsk. The the NKGB PerThe Centre Centre was was unimpressed. unimpressed. In In a a letter letter to to the the Central CentralCommittee, Committee, the NKGB Per-

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sonnel States sonnel Directorate Directorate reported reported that that his his period period as as resident resident in in the theUnited United States had had been been marked before marked by by a a series series of of blunders.10 blunders. Mironov Mironov not notlong long before had had informed informed on on Zarubin Zarubin to being in to Hoover, Hoover, now now appears appears to to have have written written to to Stalin, Stalin, accusing accusing Zarubin Zarubin of of being in con conFBI. In In the the summer summer of of 1944, 1944, both bothZarubin Zarubin and Mironov Mironov were were recalled recalled tact with with the theFBI.ll tact and to until aa few months earlier had been been resident resident in to Moscow. Moscow. Anatoli Anatoli Gorsky, Gorsky7who who until few months earlier had in London, London, succeeded succeeded Zarubin Zarubin in in Washington.12 Washington.12 Once back back in in Moscow, Moscow, Zarubin Zarubin quickly quickly succeeded succeeded in in reestablishing reestablishing his his position position at at Once the the expense expense of of Mironov Mironov and and was was appointed appointed deputy deputy chief chief of of foreign foreign intelligence. intelligence. By the the time time he he retired retired three three years years later, later, allegedly allegedly on on grounds grounds of of ill ill health, health, he he had had suc succeeded in in taking taking much much of of the the credit credit for for the the remarkable remarkable wartime wartime intelligence intelligence obtained obtained ceeded from States, and Lenin, two two Orders Orders of of Lenin, two Orders Orders of of the the from the the United United States, and was was awarded awarded two Red Banner, Banner, one one Order Order of of the the Red Red Star, Star, and and numerous medals.13Mironov, Mironov, by by conRed numerous medals.13 con trast, sentenced soon to Moscow ve years camp, trast, was was sentenced soon after after his his return return to Moscow to to fi five years in in a a labor labor camp, probably accusations against Zarubin. In probably for for making making false false accusations against Zarubin. In 1945 1945 he he tried tried to to smuggle smuggle out of of prison prison to to the the US embassy out Moscow information about the embassy in in Moscow information about the NKVD massacre massacre of Polish Polish officers officers similar to that that which, unknown to to the the Centre, Centre, he he had had sent to the the of similar to which, unknown sent to two years years earlier. earlier. On O n this this occasion occasion Mironov Mironov was was caught caught in in the the act, act, given given a a sec secFBI two ond 14 ond trial trial and and shot. shot.14 Even after after the the recall recall of of Zarubin Zarubin and and Mironov, Mironov, feuding feuding and and denunciations denunciations contin continEven ued within within the theAmerican American residencies. residencies. As As with with Mironov's Mironovs bizarre bizarre accusations, accusations, some some of of ued the feuds feuds had had an an almost almost surreal surreal quality quality about about them. them. In In August August 1944 1944 the newly the the newly appointed resident resident in in San San Francisco, Francisco, Grigori Grigori Pavlovich Pavlovich Kasparov, Kasparov, telegraphed telegraphed to to the the appointed bitter denunciation of the resident in Mexico City, Lev Tarasov, Tarasov, who, he Centre a bitter claimed, had bungled attempts attempts to to liberate liberate Trotsky's Trotskys assassin, assassin, Ramon Ramon Mercader, Mercader, and and claimed, had bungled had adopted adopteda a grand lifestyle." lifestyle. As well well as as renting renting aahouse house with with grounds grounds and and employhad "grand employ ing two two servants in addition to the the staff staff allocated to him, him, Tarasov Tarasov was was alleged alleged to to be ing servants in addition to allocated to be spending too too much much time parrots, poultry poultry and and other birds. The The fate fate of of spending time breeding breeding parrots, other birdsY Tarasovs denounced parrots is is not not recorded. recorded. Tarasov's denounced parrots New There was dissension dissension too in in New York, where the inexperienced 28-year-old Stepan Apresyan (MAY) had hadbeen appointed resident early in 1944, 1944,despite the fact that he never previously previously been been outside outside the the Soviet Soviet Union. His appointment appointment was was that he had had never Union. His bitterly resented resented by his his much much more more experienced experienced deputy, deputy, Roland Abbiate (alias (alias "Vlad Vladbitterly Roland Abbiate imir Pravdin," Pravdin, codenamed SERGEI), whose whose previous previous assignments assignments had had included included the the imir codenamed SERGEI), Poretsky. Operating under undercover as asthe Tass bureau liquidation of the defector Ignace Poretsky. chief in New York, Abbiate had a grasp of of American conditions which greatly ex exceeded Apresyan's, Apresyans, but his career continued to be held back by the fact that, although hadbeen born in inSt. 1902, hadreturned he had St. Petersburg in 1902, his parents were French and had 1920. Abbiate had returned with them, them,living in France until his recruit recruitto France in 1920. 1932.16 ment by the OGPU as an illegal in 1932.16 As a a stop-gap stop-gap measure measure to to compensate compensate for for Apresyan's Apresyans now now visible visible incompetence, incompetence, As the Centre Centre gave gave Abbiate Abbiate virtually virtually equal equal status with Apresyan Apresyan in in the the autumn autumn of 1944 the status with of 1944 in running running the the residency. residency. Abbiate Abbiate responded responded by by telegraphing telegraphing to to Moscow Moscow a a scathing scathing in attack on on Apresyan, Apresyan, whom whom he as "incapable incapable of of dealing dealing with with the tasks attack he condemned condemned as the tasks which are set him" him or of of gaining gainingthe the respect of his staff: of staff:

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[Apresyan] is is utterly utterly without without the of dealing with people, MAY [Apresyan] the knack knack of dealing with people, frefre shgwing himself excessively excessively abrupt and inclined to nag, and too rarely quently showing finding time to chat with withthem. them. Sometimes our operational workers . .. .. . cannot urgent question from him for several days at a a time time. get an answer to an urgent several days .. .. .A experience of work abroad cannot cope on his own with the the worker who has no experience OFFICE [New York residency]. work of directing the TYRE OFFICE residency] . responsibility, Abbiate clearly implied, rested with the Centre Centre for appointThe real responsibility, appoint ing such an obviously unsuitable and unqualified resident. resident.17 The civil war between invictory for the resident and his deputy continued for just over a year before ending in 1945Apresyan was transferred to San Francisco, leaving leavingAbbiate Abbiate. In March 1945 IS NewYork. York.18 as resident in New
WH IIL WAS N G T O N and and New New York York residencies residencies were wereboth insome some turmoil in W H LE E THE THE WA SH HI IN both in turmoil in the summer summer of of 1944, 1944, sanity sanity was was returning returning to to London. The Magnificent the London. The Magnificent Five Five were were officially absolved absolved of of all suspicion suspicion of of being being double controlled by British. officially double agents agents controlled by the the British. On then headed headed by by Konstantin Konstantin O n June June 29 29 the the Centre Centreinformed informed the the London London residency, residency, then Mikhailovich Kukin Kukin (codenamed IGOR),19 that important SIS documents Mikhailovich (codenamed IGOR),19 that recent recent important documents provided by by Philby Philby had had been been largely largely corroborated corroborated by by material from "other other sources" sources provided material from (some theAmerican OSS, OSS, with whom SIS exchanged many highly clas(some probably in the clas OHNCHEN] ,s honesty sified honesty in in his his sified reports):20 reports):20"This This is is a a serious serious confirmation confirmation of of S[ S[OHNCHEN]s work with with us, us, which which obliges obliges us to review review our attitude toward the entire work us to our attitude toward him him and and the entire group. It It was was now now clear, clear, the the Centre Centre acknowledged, acknowledged, that the Five group." that intelligence intelligence from from the Five was "of ofgreat great value," value, and contact with with them them must maintained at all costs: costs: was and contact must be be maintained at all

OHNCHEN] for On . .. If If O n our our behalf behalf express express much much gratitude gratitude to to S[ S[OHNCHEN] for his his work work.. . you S[ O HNCHEN] in most tactful tactful you find find it it convenient convenient and and possible, possible, offer offer S[OHNCHEN] in the the most way bonus of pounds or him a of equal equal value. value. way a a bonus of 100 100 pounds or give give him agift gift of After a penetration been frefre six years years in in which which his his phenomenal phenomenal work work as as a penetration agent agent had had been After six quently quently undervalued, undervalued, ignored ignored or or suspected suspected by by the the Centre, Centre, Philby Philby was was almost almost pathet pathetically of his his achievements. ically grateful grateful for for the the long long overdue overdue recognition recognition of achievements. "During During this this decade of been so deeply touched decade of work," work, he he told told Moscow, Moscow, "I I have have never never been so deeply touched as as now now with with your communication [of thanks] ,"21 your gift gift and and no no less less deeply deeply excited excited by byyour your communication [of thanks].21 High among among the the intelligence intelligence which which restored restored the the Centre's Centres faith faith in in Philby Philby were his High were his "to study reports, SIS of Section IX reports, beginning beginning early early in in 1944, 1944, on on the thefounding founding by by SIS of a a new new Section I Xto study past records Soviet and on by his new new controller, past records of of Soviet and Communist Communist activity." activity.Urged Urged on by his controller, Boris Boris Krotenschield KRECHIN), Philby Krotenschield (alias (alias Krotov, Krotov,codenamed codenamed KRECHIN), Philby succeeded succeeded at at the theend end of of IX, with with aaremit for the "the collection collection the head of expanded Section Section E, the year year in in becoming becoming head of an anexpanded remit for and concerning Soviet Soviet and Communist espionage espionage and and interpretation interpretation of of information information concerning and Communist and subversion British territory. territory." As one of his his SIS colcol subversion in in all parts parts of of the the world world outside outside British one of leagues, .. . .. ensured ensured that the leagues, Robert Robert Cecil, Cecil, wrote wrote later, later, "Philby Philby at at one one stroke stroke had had . that the whole espionage would would become become known in the whole post-war post-war effort effort to to counter counter Communist Communist espionage known in the Kremlin. The history of records few, few, if if any, comparable masterstrokes."22 Kremlin. The history of espionage espionage records any,comparable masterstroke^."^^

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At At about about the the same same time time that that Philby Philby was was given given his his present, present, Cairncross Cairncross was was belat belatedly edly rewarded rewarded for for his his contribution contribution to tothe theepic epic Soviet Sovietvictory victory at at Kursk. Kursk. Krotenschield Krotenschield informed informed him him that that he he had had been been awarded awarded one one of of the the highest highest Soviet Soviet decorations, decorations, the the Order decoration Order of of the the Red Red Banner. Banner. He H e opened opened a a velvet-lined velvet-lined box, box, took took out outthe the decoration and and placed Cairncross placed it it in inCairncross's Cairncrosss hands. hands. Krotenschield Krotenschield reported reported to to the theCentre Centrethat that Cairncross was elated back was visibly visibly elated by by the the award, award, though though he hewas was told told to to hand handitit back for for safekeeping safekeeping in in Moscow.23 The Moscow.23 The award award came came too too late, late, however, however,to to achieve achieve its its full effect. effect. In In the the summer summer 943, exhausted to deliver of of 1 1943, exhausted by by the the strain strain of of his his regular regular car car journeys journeys to to London London to deliver ULTRA decrypts decrypts to to Gorsky, Gorsky, and and probably probably discouraged discouraged by by Gorsky's Gorskyslack lack of of apprecia appreciation, inin tion, Cairncross Cairncross had had left left Bletchley Bletchley Park. Park. Though Though he he succeeded succeeded in in obtaining obtaining aajob job SIS, first in Section V (Counterintelligence), then in Section I (Political Intelli SIS, first in Section (Counterintelligence), then in Section (Political Intelligence), Centre's that gence), his his importance importance in inthe the Centres eyes eyes now now ranked ranked clearly clearly below below that of of Philby.24 Philby.24 Unlike SIS colleagues. colleagues. The The head head of of Unlike Philby, Philby, Cairncross Cairncross did did not not get get on on well well with with his his SIS Section Section I, I, David David Footman, Footman, found found him him "an an odd odd person, person, with with aachip chip on on his his shoulder."25 shoulder.25 Encouraged Encouraged by by the the Centre's Centres new new appreciation appreciation of of their their talents, talents, the the other other members members of Burgess and even more of the the Five-Maclean, Five-Maclean,Burgess and Blunt-became Blunt-becameeven more productive productive than than 944 Maclean embassy, before. before. In In the the spring spring of of 1 1944 Maclean was was posted posted to to the theWashington Washington embassy,where where he he was was soon soon promoted promoted to to first first secretary. secretary. His His zeal zeal was was quickly quickly apparent. apparent. According According to to one of his colleagues, "No task was too hard for him; no hours were too long. He one of his colleagues, No task was too hard for him; no hours were too long. H e gained gained the the reputation reputation of of one one who who would would always always take take over over a a tangled tangled skein skein from from a a col colleague league who who was was sick, sick, or or going going on on leave, leave, or or simply simply less less zealous." zealous.The The most most sensitive, sensitive, and the NKGB's and in in the NKGBs view view probably probably the the most most important, important, area area of of policy policy in in which which 1945 was Anglo-American Maclean succeeded in becoming involved by early Maclean succeeded in becoming involved by early 1945 was Anglo-American col collaboration laboration in in the thebuilding building of of the the atomic atomic bomb.26 bomb.26 Burgess the NKGB by in the the Foreign Burgess increased increased his his usefulness usefulness to to the by gaining gaining a a job job in Foreign Office Claiming no no Office press press department department soon soon after after Maclean Maclean was was posted posted to to Washington. Washington. Claiming doubt doubt that that he herequired required access access to to a awide wide range range of of material material to to be be adequately adequately informed informed for for press press briefings, briefings, Burgess Burgess regularly regularly filled filled a a large large holdall holdall with with Foreign Foreign Office Office docu documents, them to to be ments, some some of of them them highly highly classified, classified, and and took took them be photographed photographed by by the the NKGB. The The holdall, holdall, however, however, was was almost almost his his undoing. undoing. At At a a meeting meeting with with Kroten Krotenschield, schield, Burgess Burgess was wasapproached approached by by a a police police patrol, patrol, who who suspected suspected that that the the bag bag con contained the two tained stolen stolen goods. goods. Once Once reassured reassured that thatthe two men men had had no no housebreaking housebreaking equipment that the hold all contained equipment and and that the holdall contained only only papers, papers, the the patrol patrol apologized apologized and and pro proceeded may subsequently used a ceeded on on its its way. way. Though Though Burgess Burgess may subsequently have have used a bag bag which which less less resembled resembled that that of of a a housebreaker, housebreaker, his his productivity productivity was was unaffected. unaffected. According According to to one one of of the the files files examined examined by by Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin, of of the the Foreign Foreign Office Office documents documents provided provided by by 389 were Burgess Burgess in in the thefirst first six six months months of of 1945, 1945,389 were classified classified "top top secret."27 secret.27 Blunt's Blunts productivity productivitywas was prodigious prodigious too. too. In In addition addition to to providing providing intelligence intelligence from from MIS, run Leo Long inthe the crucial MIS, he he continued continued to to run Leo Long in in military military intelligence, intelligence, and and in crucial months months before before D-Day D-Day gained gained access access to to Supreme Supreme Headquarters Headquarters Allied Allied Expeditionary Expeditionary Force Blunt's contribution Force (SHAEF), (SHAEF), not not far far from from MIS MIS headquarters.28 headquarters.28Part Part of of Blunts contribution to to NKGB NKGB operations operations in in London London was was to to keep keep the the residency residency informed informed of of the the nature nature and and extent revealed MI5 surveillance. surveillance.Intelligence Intelligence which which he he provided provided in in 1945 1945 revealed that that MIS MI5 extent of of MIS

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had had discovered discovered that that his his Cambridge Cambridge contemporary, contemporary,James James Klugmann, Klugmann, was was a a Commu Communist nist spy. spy. In I n 1942 1942 Klugmann Klugmann had had joined joined the theYugoslav Yugoslav section section of of SOE SOE Cairo, Cairo, where where his his intellect, Serbo-Croat gave intellect, charm charm and and fluent fluent Serbo-Croat gave him him an an influence influence entirely entirely dispropor disproportionate tionate to tohis his relatively relativelyjunior junior rank rank (which (which eventually eventually rose rose to to major). major). As well well as as brief briefing cers about ing Allied Allied offi officers about to to be be dropped dropped into into Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, he he also also briefed briefed the the NKGB on on British British policy policy and and secret secret operations. operations. In In both both sets sets of of briefings briefings he he sought sought to to advance advance the interests ofTito's those ofMihailovich's the interests ofTitos Communist Communist partisans partisans over over those ofMihailovichs royalist royalist Chet Chetniks. mis niks. For For four four months months in in 1945 1945 he he served served in in Yugoslavia Yugoslavia with with the the British British military military mission sion to to Tito's Titos forces. forces. Blunt Blunt was was able ableto to warn warn Krotenschield Krotenschield that that MI5 MIS listening listening devices devices in the the British Communist Party Party headquarters headquarters in in King King Street, Street, London, London, had hadrecorded in British Communist recorded a boasted of passing classified classified information a conversation conversation in in which which Klugmann Wugmann boasted of secretly secretly passing information to to the theYugoslav Yugoslav Communists.29 communist^.^^
W I T H T H E EXC E X CE EP PT T I O N of of the the Five, Five, potentially potentially the the most most important important Soviet Soviet spy spy in in Britain RU late .30 Britain was was the the nuclear nuclear physicist physicist Klaus Klaus Fuchs, Fuchs, recruited recruited by by the the G GRU late in in 1941 1941.30 When When Fuchs Fuchs left left for for the the United United States States late late in in 1943 1943 as as part part of of the the British British team team cho chosen to take part in the MANHATTAN project, he was-though he did not realize sen to take part in the MANHATTANproject, he was-though he did not realize it-transferred it-transferred from from GRU to to NKGB control control and and given given the the codename codename REST (later (later changed Earlier changed to to CHARLES).31 CHARLES).31 Earlier in in 1943, 1943, the the Centre Centrehad hadinstructed instructed its its residencies residencies in in Britain Britain and and the the United United States States that that "[t]he [tlhe brain brain centers centers [scientitic [scientific research research estab establishments] lishments] must must come come within within our our jurisdiction." jurisdiction. Not Not for for the the first first time, time, the the GRU was was forced 1944 forced to to give give way wayto to the the demands demands of of its its more more powerful powerful "neighbor."32 n e i g h b ~ r . In ~~ I nMelita 1944 Melita Norwood, Norwood, the the long-serving long-serving Soviet Soviet agent agent in in the the British British Non-Ferrous Non-Ferrous Metals Metals Associ Association, SONYA of given an ation, ceased ceased contact contact with with SONYA of the the GRU and and was was given an NKGB NKGB con controller.33 troller.33 In In March March 1945, 1945, after after her her employer employer won won a a contract contract from from the the TUBE ALLOYS project, project, Norwood Norwood gained gained access access to to documents documents of of atomic atomic intelligence34 intelligence3 which Centre described which the the Centre described as as "of of great great interest interest and and a a valuable valuable contribution contribution to to the the development eld." She development of of work work in in this this fi field. She was was instructed instructed to to say say nothing nothing about about her her espi espionage onage work work to to her her husband, husband, and and in in particular particular to to give give no no hint hint of of her herinvolvement involvement in in atomic Atomic atomic intelligence.35 intelligen~e.~ Atomic intelligence intelligence from from London London and and the the American American residen residencies was complementary cies was complementary as as well well as as overlapping. overlapping. According According to to Vladimir Vladimir Barkovsky, Barkovsky, head residency, "In the head of of S&T S&T at at the theLondon London residency, In the USA we we obtained obtained information information on on how how the made and what it was the bomb bombwas was made and in in Britain Britain of ofwhat it was made, made, so so that that together together [intelligence [intelligence from two countries] countries] covered covered the the whole whole problem."36 problem.36 from the the two On 1944 Fuchs O n February February 5, 5,1944 Fuchs had had his his first first meeting meeting in in New NewYork's Yorks East East Side Side with with his his NKGB GOOSE and NKGB controller, controller, Harry Harry Gold Gold (codenamed (codenamed successively successively GOOSE and ARNO), ARNO), an an industrial industrial chemist chemist born born in in Switzerland Switzerland of of Russian Russian parents.37 parents.37Fuchs Fuchs was was told told to to iden identify t i @himself himself by by carrying carrying a a tennis tennis ball ball in in his his hand hand and and to to look look for for a a man man wearing wearing one one pair pair of of gloves gloves and and carrying carrying another.38 another.38Gold, Gold, who who introduced introduced himself himself as as "Raymond," Raymond, reported York reported to to Leonid LeonidKvasnikov, Kvasnikov,head head of of S&T S&T at at the theNew New York residency residency (later (later known known as Line X), X), that "greeted him as Line that Fuchs Fuchs had had greeted him pleasantly pleasantly but but was was rather rather cautious cautious at at first."39 Fuchs Fuchs later later claimed, claimed, after after his his arrest arrest in in 1949, 1949, that that during during their theirmeetings meetings "the the attitude attitude of'Raymond' was at all times that of an inferior." Gold admitted, after his own arrest of Raymondwas at all times that of an inferior. Gold admitted,after his own arrest

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by the by the the FBI, FBI, that that he hewas was overawed overawedby by the extraordinary extraordinary intelligence intelligence which which Fuchs Fuchs pro provided vided and and had had found foundthe theidea idea of of an an atomic atomic bomb bomb "so so frightening frightening that that the theonly only thing thing I I could could do do was was shove shoveit it away away as asfar farback back in in my my mind mind as as I I could could and and simply simply not not think think on all."40 on the the matter matterat at all.7740 On 1944 the 25,1944 the New NewYork York residency residency telegraphed telegraphed the the Centre: Centre:''Almost Almosthalf half a a O n July July 25, year year of of contact contact established established with with REST REST [Fuchs] [Fuchs] has has demonstrated demonstrated the the value value of of his his work work for for us." us. It asked asked permission permission to to pay pay him him a a "reward" rewardof of 500 500 dollars. dollars. The The Centre Centre agreed, It agreed, but, but, before before the the money money could could be be handed handed over, over, Fuchs Fuchs had had disappeared.41 di~appeared.~ It was was over months before over three threemonths before Gold Gold discovered discovered that that Fuchs Fuchs had had been been posted posted to to Los Los Alamos, not renew until Fuchs east Alamos, and and he hedid did not renew contact contact with with him him until Fuchs returned returned to to the the east coast coast on on leave leave in in February February 1945.42 1945.42 During 944 Kvasnikov's given the During 1 1944 Kvasnikovs responsibilities responsibilities were were extended: extended: he he was was given the new new post post of of S&T S&T resident resident for for the the whole whole of of the the United United States-a States-a certain certain indication indication of of the the increasing Late to increasing priority priority of of atomic atomic espionage.43 espionage.43 Late in in 1944 1944 Kvasnikov Kvasnikov was wasable able to inform inform the the Centre Centre that, that,in inaddition addition to to Fuchs, Fuchs, there there were were now now two two more more prospective prospective spies spies at at Los Alamos. Los Alamos. The The first, first, David David Greenglass, Greenglass, was was recruited recruited through through aagroup group of of S&T S&T agents agents run run by by Julius Julius Rosenberg Rosenberg (codenamed (codenamed successively successivelyANTENNA ANTENNA and and LIBERAL), LIBERAL), aa26-year 26-yearold old New New York York Communist Communist with with a a degree degree in in electrical electrical engineering. engineering. Like Like Fuchs, Fuchs, the the members of the Rosenberg ring, who included his wife Ethel, had been rewarded members of the Rosenberg ring, who included his wife Ethel, had been rewarded with with cash cash bonuses bonuses in in the the summer. summer. The The ring ring was was producing producing so so many many classified classified docu documents that the the New New York ments to to be be photographed photographed in in Kvasnikov's Kvasnikovs apartment apartment that York residency residency was was running running dangerously dangerously short short of of film. film. The The residency residency reported reported that that Rosenberg Rosenberg was was receiving so much intelligence from his agents that he was finding it difficult to cope: receiving so much intelligence from his agents that hewas finding itdifficult to cope: "We We are are afraid afraid of of putting putting LIBERAL LIBERAL out out of of action action with with overwork."44 overwork.744 In Rosenberg's In November November 1944 1944 Kvasnikov Kvasnikovinformed informed the the Centre Centrethat thatEthel Ethel Rosenbergs sister, sister, Ruth had agreed Ruth Greenglass Greenglass (codenamed (codenamed WASP), WASP), had agreed to to approach approach her her husband, husband, who who worked as a machinist at Los Alamos.45 "I was young, stupid and immature," worked as a machinist at Los A l a m ~ s . ~ was young, stupid and immature, said I said David David Greenglass Greenglass (codenamed (codenamed BUMBLEBEE BUMBLEBEE and and CALIBRE) CALIBRE) later, later, "but but I I was was a a good good Communist." Communist. Stalin Stalin and and the the Soviet Soviet leadership, leadership, he he believed, believed, were were "really really geniuses, them:" geniuses, every every one one of of them: "More More power power to to the theSoviet Soviet Union Union and and abundant abundant life life for for their most certainly will their peoples!" peoples!"My My darling," darling, Greenglass Greenglass wrote wrote to to his his wife, wife, "I I most certainly will be be glad glad to to be be part part of of the the community communityproject project [espionage] [espionage] that that Julius Julius and and his his friends friends [the [the Russians] Russians] have have in in mind."46 mind.746 The The New New York York residency residency also also reported reported in in November November 1944 1944 that that the the precociously precociously brilliant brilliant nineteen-year-old nineteen-year-old Harvard Harvard physicist physicist Theodore Theodore Alvin Alvin ("Ted") (Ted) Hall, Hall, then then working at Los Alamos, had indicated his willingness to collaborate. As well as being working at LosAlamos, had indicated his willingness to collaborate. As well as being inspired inspired by by the the myth-image myth-image of of the the Soviet Soviet worker-peasant worker-peasant state, state, which which was was an an article article of of faith faith for for most most ideological ideological Soviet Soviet agents, agents, Hall Hall convinced convinced himself himself that that an an American American nuclear the peace nuclear monopoly monopoly would would threaten threaten the peace of of the the post-war post-war world. world. Passing Passing the the secrets secrets of of the the MANHATTAN MANHATTAN project project to to Moscow Moscow was was thus thus aa way way "to to help help the the world," spies, Hall world, as as well well as as the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. As the the youngest youngest of of the the atom atom spies, Hall was was given given the Though MLAD ("Young"). (Youngn). Though only only one one year year the appropriate, appropriate, if if transparent, transparent, codename codename MLAD older, student who first Hall into contact the older, the the fellow fellow Harvard Harvard student who first brought brought Hall into contact with with the

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NKGB, Saville Saville Savoy Savoy Sax, was codenamed STAR (Old).47 onto to Sax, ("Old").47 Hall himself himself went on
become probably probably the the youngest youngest major major spy spy of ofthe twentieth century. century become the twentieth

Los part of of a general surge surge in in Soviet Soviet Los Alamos Alamos was was part a more more general intelligence collection collection in the theUnited United States thelast of the asthe intelligence States during during the last two years of the war, as the NKGBs buoyed up up by by the the remorseless remorseless advance the Red Army towards towards NKGB's agents, agents, buoyed advance of of the Red Army Berlin looked forward to a a glorious glorious victory over Berlin and and the the opening opening of of a a second second front, front, looked forward to victory over fascism. The The number of rolls rolls of of microfilm microfilm sent Akhmerovs illegal illegal residency residency to to fascism. number of sent by by Akhmerov's Moscow via via New New York York grew grew from from 211 211 in in 1943 1943 to to 600 600in in1944 1944 and Moscow and 1,896 1,896 in in 1945.48 1945.48 The Centre, however, however, found it difficult to believe that espionage theUnited United States espionage in the could really really be as straightforward straightforward as as it it seemed. could be as seemed. During During 1944-5 1944-5 the the NKGB grew grew increasingly concerned concerned about the security security of of its operations and to increasingly about the its American American operations and sought sought to bring them them under under more more direct direct contro1.49 Among its its chief chief anxieties anxieties was was Elizabeth Elizabeth bring control.49Among Bentleys habit habit of of socializing socializing with with the the agents agents for for whom Bentley's whom she she acted acted as as courier. courier. When When Bentleys controller controller and and lover, lover, Jacob Jacob Golos, Golos, died died from from a Bentley's a sudden sudden heart heart attack attack on on Thanksgiving Day Day 1943, 1943, Akhmerov decided Thanksgiving Akhmerov decided to to dispense dispense with with a a cut-out cut-out and and act act as as her her new were of of a smartly dressed dressed jaunty-looking "jaunty-looking new controller. controller. Bentley's Bentleys first first impressions impressions were a smartly man manner. (Akhmerov forty man in in his his mid-thirties" mid-thirties with with an an expansive expansive manner. (Akhmerov was was actually actually fortytwo). She soon that "despite the superficial appearance of of a boule two). She soon realized, realized, however, however, that despite the superficial appearance a boulevardier, six months, months,though though Bentley Bentley vardier, he he was was a a tough tough character."5o character. For For the the next next six ' continued to toact act as as courier for the the Silvermaster Silvermaster group group in Washington,she herself continued courier for in Washington, she felt felt herself under increasing increasing pressure. pressure. under In 1944 Earl Earl Browder passed on to her heranother anothergroup group of of Washington In March March 1944 Browder passed on to Washington bureaucrats who who had had been him intelligence intelligence which which he he had hadpreviously previously passed passed bureaucrats been sending sending him on Bentley on to to Golos.51 Go~os Bentley . ~ ~ regarded regarded Victor Victor Perlo Perlo (RAIDER), (WIDER), a a government government statistician statistician who group-proba who provided provided intelligence intelligence on on aircraft aircraft production, production, as as the the leader leader of of the the group-probably bly because because he he acted acted as as spokesman spokesman during during her herfirst first meeting meeting with with them.52 them.52Akhmerov, Akhmerov, however, however, believed believedthat that the the real real organizer organizer was was Charles Charles Kramer Kramer (LOT), (LOT), a a government government economist, and and was was furious hrious that thatthe the Perlo/Kramer network network had had been been handed handed over over by economist, Perlo/Kramer Browder not not to to him him but but to to Bentley. Bentley For For over over a a year, year, he he told told the the Centre, Centre, Zarubin Zarubinand and Browder he had wanted to to make make direct direct contact contact with with the group, but but Browder Browder had had failed failed to to he had wanted the group, arrange added, "it necessary to arrange it. it. "If If we we work work with with this this group," group, Akhmerov Akhmerov added, it will will be be necessary to remove remove [Bentley] [Bentley]."53 .53 Bentley Bentley appealed appealed to to Browder Browder for for support support as as she she struggled struggled to to remain remain the the courier courier for for the Washington Washington networks. networks. "Night Night after after night, night, after after battling battling with with [Akhmerov] [Akhmerov], wrote the ," wrote Bentley bed, sometimes sometimes too Bentley later, later, "I Iwould would crawl crawl home home to to bed, too weary weary to to undress." undress. Eventu Eventually, ally, Bentley Bentley agreed agreed to to arrange arrange a a meeting meeting between between Akhmerov Akhmerov and and Silvermaster Silvermaster (PAL). (PAL). Soon Soon afterwards, afterwards, according according to to Bentley, Bentley, Akhmerov Akhmerov told told her, her, "almost almost drooling drooling with with arrogance:" to arrogance:"Earl Earl [Browder] [Browder] has hasagreed agreed to turn turn Greg Greg[Silvermaster] [Silvermaster] over over to to me me .. .. .. Go Go and "You know and ask ask him." him. "Don't Dontbe benaive," naive,Browder Browdertold told Bentley Bentley the the next next day. day. You know that that when Akhmerov when the the cards cards are aredown, down, I have have to to take take my my orders orders from from them."s4 them.54 Akhmerov reported reported to to the the Centre Centre that thatBentley Bentley had had taken taken her her removal removal from from the the Silvermaster Silvermaster group group "very very much not trust trust her. much to to heart heart .. .. .. evidently evidently supposing supposing that that we we do do not her. She She is is offended offended at at RULEVOY RULEVOY [Browder] [Browder] for for having having consented consented to to our our liaison liaison with with PAL."55 PAL.
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Bentley alsoremoved removed from the Perlo/Kramer Bentley was was also from contact contact with with the Perlo/Kramer group. group. Gorsky Gorsky tried to to placate placate her her by by inviting inviting her her to to dinner dinner at ataawaterfront waterfront restaurant restaurant in in Washing Washingtried ton. good," he said. ''Americans ton. He H e made made a a bad bad start. start. "I I hope hope the thefood food is is good, he said. Americans are are such such stu stupid people people that that even even when when it it comes to aasimple simple matter matter like like cooking cooking a a meal, they do do it it pid comes to meal, they very yes," he added, seeing seeing Bentley's change. "I very badly." badly.''Ah, Ah,yes, he added, Bentleys expression expressionchange. Ihad had forgotten forgotten for Gorsky went she for the the moment moment that thatyou, you, too, too, are are an an American." American. Gorsky went on on to to tell tell her her that that she had been awarded ("one of highest-reserved for had been awarded the the Order Order of of the the Red Red Star Star (one of the the highest-reserved for all all our best fighters) and showed showed her her a a facsimile: facsimile: "We We all our best fi ghters") and splendidly all think think you've youve done done splendidly and you." GOOD GIRL was A year was not not to to be be placated.56 pla~ated.~ year and have have a a great great future future before before you. later later she she secretly secretly began began telling telling her her story story to tothe theFBI. FBI. The Centre Centre was was also worried by by increased increased FBI surveillance surveillance of of the the New York The also worried New York Soviet consulate, which housed the Soviet consulate, which housed the legal legal residency, residency, and and by by a a warning warning from from Duncan Duncan Lee (KOCH) (KOCH) in in September September 1944 1944 that that the the OSS Security Security Division Division was was compiling compiling a a Lee list of of Communists Communists and and Communist Communist sympathizers sympathizers in in OSS.57 OSS.57 The Centre's Centres nervous nervouslist The ness was was shared shared by by some some of of its its best best agents. agents. Bentley Bentley found found Lee Lee himself"on himself on the the verge verge ness of cracking cracking up up .. .. .. so so hypercautious hypercautious that that he hehad had taken to crawling crawling around the floor of of taken to around the floor of his apartment apartment on on hands hands and and knees knees examining examining the the telephone telephone wires wires to to see see if if they they had had his been tampered tampered with."58 with.* Another Another highly highly placed placed Soviet Soviet agent, agent, the the senior senior Treasury Treasury offi offbeen cia1 Harry Dexter Dexter White White (JURIST), (JURIST), told controller that, that, though though he he was was uncon unconcial Harry told his his controller cerned cerned for for his his own own personal personal security security and and his his wife wife had had prepared prepared herself herself "for for any any self-sacrifice," damage to self-sacrifice, he he would would have have to to be be very very cautious cautious because because of of the the damage to the the "new new course" there course (the (the Soviet Soviet cause) cause) which which would would occur occur if if he he were were exposed exposed as as a a spy. spy. He H e therefore proposed proposed that that in inthe the future they they have have relatively relativelyinfrequent infrequent meetings, meetings, each each lasting fore future lasting about half half an an hour, hour, while while driving driving around around in in his his car.59 car.59 about There was was a a further furtheralarm alarm in in November November which, which, according according to to Bentley, Bentley, followed followedan an There urgent warning warningfrom from an an agent agent in in the theWhite White House, Roosevelt's Roosevelts administrative administrative assis assisurgent House, tant Lauchlin Lauchlin Currie. Currie. Currie reported that that the Americans were were on on the verge of of tant Currie reported "the Americans the verge breaking the the Soviet Soviet code."60 code.60 The alarm alarm appears appears to to have have subsided subsided when when it it was was discov discovbreaking The ered that that Currie had wrongly concluded that aa fire-damaged codebook ered Currie had wrongly concluded that fire-damaged NKGB codebook obtained by OSS from from the the Finns Finns would would enable enable Soviet Soviet communications communications (which (which went went obtained through aafurther, further, theoretically theoretically impenetrable, impenetrable, encipherment encipherment by by "one-time one-time pad") pad) to to be through be decrypted.61(Given the phenomenal success of of Anglo-American Anglo-American codebreakers codebreakers in decrypted.61 breaking the the highest highest grade grade German German and and Japanese Japanese ciphers, Curries mistake mistake is is under underbreaking ciphers, Currie's Roosevelts insistence, Donovan returned returned the NKGB codebook to the the standable.) At Roosevelt's Soviet embassy. embassy. A doubtless doubtless bemused bemused Fitin Fitin sent sent Donovan Donovan his his "sincere sincere thanks.62 Soviet thanks."62
Centres anxiety anxiety that that Soviet espionage was was about about to to be be exposed, exposed, Centre's Soviet espionage and despite all the confusion in the residencies, the NKGBs eager American and the residencies, NKGB's eager and British agents continued to provide intelligence remarkable for both its quantity and quality. The The NKGB proudly proudly calculated calculated after after the the war war that that the total of its its quality. thegrand grand total of (confidentid contacts") contacts) around the world had been wartime agents and informers ("confidential 1,240,who had had provided 41,718 items of intelligence. intelligence. Approximately 3,000 3,000 foreign 1,240, intelligence reports and documents had been judged important enough to be sent to intelligence important
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Committee. the State State Defense Committee and the Central Central Committee. Eighty-seven foreign intelligence officers were decorated for their wartime work. 63 intelligence officers Moscow made made far far better better use use of of S&T S&T than than of of its was Moscow its political political intelligence, intelligence, which which was always likely to be ignored or regarded with suspicion when it disagreed with Stalins always likely disagreed Stalin's conspiracy theories-or with with those of the the Centre, Centre,which were closely closely modeled on his. conspiracy theories-or those of which were modeled on his. S&T from from the the West, West,by by contrast, contrast, was was welcomed welcomed with open and arms by S&T with open and unsuspicious unsuspicious arms by Soviet scientists scientists and technologists. A. F. loffe, Ioffe, the director of Soviet A. F. of the USSR Academy of of Sciences Leningrad Physics and Technological Institute, wrote of S&T: Sciences of wartime S&T: The information always always turns turns out and for The information out to to be be accurate accurate and for the the most most part part very very complete .. .. .. I have have not not encountered encountered a a single single false finding. Verification of of all all complete false fi nding. Verification the formulae formulae and and experiments experiments invariably invariably confirms confirms the the data in the the data contained contained in the materials.@ materials.64 The most most valuable valuable S&T S&T concerned concerned the the atomic program. Kurchatov Kurchatov reported reported to to The atomic program. Beria for the MANBeria on on September September 29, 29, 1944 1944 that that intelligence intelligence revealed revealed the the creation creation for the MAN HATTAN project project of of "a a concentration concentration of scientific scientific and and engineering-technical engineering-technical power HATTAN power on aa scale scale never before seen in the history of of world world science, science, which which has has already on never before seen in the history already achieved the most pricelessresults.65 to NKGB calculations, achieved the most priceless results."65 According According to calculations, up up to to November on nuclear nuclear research, research, of of which which 88 88 November 1944 1944 it it had had acquired acquired 1,167 1,167 documents documents on from the the United United States States and and 79 79 from from Britain Britain were were judged particular importance.66 from judged of of particular importance. 66 The most however, were wereyet yet to come. The most important, important, however, to come. O n February February 28, 1945 the submitted to to Beria its first first comprehensive On 28, 1945 theNKGB NKGB submitted Beria its comprehensive report on atomic intelligence intelligence for for two two years-also years-also the the first from report on atomic first to to be be based based on on reports reports from inside Los Los Alamos. Alamos. Five Five months months before before the the successful successful test test of of the the fi first atomic bomb at inside rst atomic bomb at Alamogordo Mexico, was informed informed of of all the main main eleele Alamogordo in in southern southernNew New Mexico, the the Centre Centrewas all the ments in in its its construction. construction. The The information information which which Fuchs Fuchs had had passed Gold on on the the ments passed to to Gold east coast in mid-February mid-February arrived arrived too too late late to in the theCentres east coast in to be be included included in Centre's assessment. assessment. The report report passed passed to to Beria Beria was, was, almost almost certainly, certainly, based based chiefly chiefly on on intelligence The intelligence from from the nineteen-year-old nineteen-year-old Theodore TheodoreHall and technical technical sergeant sergeant David David Greenglass. Greenglass. the Hall and There can can be be little little doubt doubt that thatHall's Halls intelligence, intelligence, delivered delivered to to the theNew New York There York residency residency by important. It was probably first by his his friend, friend, Saville Saville Sax, Sax, was was the the more more important. It was probably Hall Hall who who first revealed the bomb, more detailed revealed the the implosion implosion method method of of detonating detonating the bomb, though though aa more detailed report on April report on on implosion implosion by by Fuchs Fuchs reached reached Kurchatov Kurchatov on April 6.67 6.67 In and the the New York In the the spring spring of of 1945 1945 Sax was was replaced replacedas as courier courier between between Hall Hall and NewYork residency Leontina (Lona) ("Lona") Cohen, codenamed LESLIE. Lona "Lona" had been residency by by Leontina Cohen, codenamed LESLIE. had been recruited 1941 by named LUIS), who had become a recruited in in 1941 by her her husband husband Morris Morris (code (codenamed who had become a Soviet the Spanish the International Soviet agent agent during duringthe Spanish Civil Civil War War while while serving serving in inthe International Brigades. The heroes of Soviet intelligence, were Brigades. The couple, couple, later later to to figure figure among among the the heroes of Soviet intelligence, were collectively codenamed codenamed the the DACHNIKI DACHNIKI (Vacationers), their careers collectively ("Vacationers"), but but their careers as as agents agents was reactivated were interrupted by Morriss Morris's conscription in 1942. 1942. Lona "Lona" was reactivated early in in 1945 both Los Alamos and the atomic 1945 to to act act as as a a courier courier to to both Los Alamos and the Anglo-Canadian Anglo-Canadian atomic research Chalk River, also penetrated penetrated by by Soviet Soviet research center center at at Chalk River, near near Ottawa, Ottawa, which which was was also

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agents. While Hall,Gold Gold acted Fuchs and and agents. While she she made made contact contact with with Hall, acted as as courier courier for for Fuchs Greenglass. Greenglass. Each Each of of the the three threeSoviet Soviet agents agents was was completely completely ignorant ignorant of of the the espionage espionage 68 conducted conducted by by the the other other two. two.68 It I t is is probable probable that that both both Fuchs Fuchs and and Hall Hall independently independently furnished furnished the the plans plans of of the the first Centre was able to first atomic atomic bomb, bomb, each each of of which which the the Centre was able to crosscheck crosscheck against against the the other.69 atomic other.69Fuchs Fuchs and and Hall Hall also also independently independently reported reported that that the the test test of of the the first first atomic bomb had been been fixed in the end weather bomb had fuced for for July July 10, 10, 1945,7 1945,70though though in the end weather conditions conditions caused postponed for end. caused it it to to be be postponed for six six days. days. A month month later later the the Pacific Pacific War War was was at at an an end. Following Following the the bombing bombing of of Hiroshima Hiroshima and and Nagasaki Nagasaki on on August August 6 and and 9, 9, Japan Japan sur surrendered. rendered. Lona Cohen Lona Cohen spent spent the thefinal final dramatic dramatic weeks weeks of of the the Pacific Pacific War War in in New NewMexico, Mexico, waiting to deliver missing ren waiting for for Hall Hall to deliver the the results results of of the the Alamogordo Alamogordo test. test. After After missing rendezvous dezvous in in Albuquerque Albuquerque on on three three consecutive consecutive Sundays, Sundays, Hall finally finally handed handed a a set set of of highly soon after highly classified classified papers papers to to his his courier, courier, probably probably soon after the the Japanese Japanese surrender.71 surrender.71 On Lona Cohen O n catching catching the the train train back back to to New New York, York, Lona Cohen was was horrified horrified to to see see military military police on board searching mind police on board searching passengers' passengers luggage. luggage. With With remarkable remarkable presence presence of of mind she she thrust thrust Hall's Halls documents documents inside inside a a newspaper newspaper and and gave gave it it to to a a policeman policeman to to hold hold while handed the while she she opened opened her her purse purse and and suitcase suitcase for for inspection. inspection. The The policeman policeman handed the newspaper newspaper back, back, inspected inspected her her purse purse and and suitcase, suitcase, and and Mrs. Mrs. Cohen Cohenreturned returned safely safely to to New York. New Y ~ r72k . ~ ~ Thanks chiefly chiefly to first Soviet Soviet atomic bomb, successfully Thanks to Hall and and Fuchs, Fuchs, the the first atomic bomb, successfullytested tested just an exact the Alamogordo just over over four four years years later, later, was was to to be be an exact copy copy of of the Alamogordo bomb. bomb. At the the time, however, however, the the Centre Centre found foundit it difficult to to believe that the the theft theftof of two two copies copies of of time, difficult believe that perhaps most important secret plans plans in history could perhaps the the most important secret in American American history could possibly possibly escape escape detection. fear that detection. The The sheer sheer scale scale of of its its success success made made the the NKGB fear that the thepenetration penetration of of the be uncovered the MANHATTAN project project would would soon soon be uncovered by by the the Americans. Americans. The 1945 The NKGB officer officer in in charge charge of of intelligence intelligence collected collected from from Los Los Alamos Alamos in in 1945 was codenamed an engi was Anatoli Anatoli Antonovich Antonovich Yatskov Yatskov (alias (alias "Yakovlev," Yakovlev, codenamed ALEKSEI), ALEKSEI), an engineer recruited recruited by by the the NKVD in in 1939 1939 who whosucceeded Kvasnikov as as S&T resident in neer succeeded Kvasnikov resident in the the United United States.73 States.73He H e is is nowadays nowadaysremembered remembered as as one one of of the theheroes heroes of of Russian Russian for foreign At the time, however, critical of of him. him. In In eign intelligence.74 intelligen~e.~~ the time, however, the the Centre Centre was was bitterly bitterly critical July 1945 1945 ititconcluded concluded that that his his carelessness carelessness had had probably probably compromised compromised MLAD, MLAD, and July and denounced "completely unsatisfactory [the denounced his his completely unsatisfactory work work with with the theagents agents on on ENORMOZ [the pr~ject].~~ the At very very moment moment of of Soviet Soviet intelligence's intelligences greatest greatest MANHATTAN project] ."75 At the ever triumph triumph in the acquisition acquisition of of the the plans plans of of the the first atomic ever in the the United United States, States, the first atomic bomb, the the Centre wrongly feared feared that that the whole ENORMOZ was in in bomb, Centre wrongly the whole ENORMOZ operation operation was jeopardy. jeopardy. The GRU, as well as the NKGB, had had some in the the wartime as well as the some striking striking successes successes in wartime The United States. States. Though Though Soviet Soviet military military intelligence intelligence had had been forced to to surrender surrender both both United been forced Fuchs and the majority of its more important pre-war American agents to the more Fuchs and the majority of its more important pre-war American agents to the more powerful succeeded in least one it had had succeeded in retaining retaining at at least one of ofwhom whom the the Centre Centrewas was powerful NKGB, it a conversation conversation between Akhmerov envious in 1945. 1945. Gorsky reported to the Centre a and been working past ten years.76 and ALES (Alger (Alger Hiss), Hiss), who whohad had been working for for the the GRU for for the the past ten years.76 GRU had generally generally Though Hiss Hiss was was a a senior senior diplomat, diplomat, Akhmerov Akhmerov said said that that the Though the G RU had

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appeared documents, appeared little little interested interested in in State StateDepartment Department documents, and and had had asked asked Hiss Hiss and and a a small small group group of of agents, agents, ((for for the the most most part part consisting consisting of of his his relations," relations, to to concentrate concentrate on Late however, on military military intelligence.77 intelligen~e.~~ Late in in1944, 1944, however, Hiss's Hisss role role as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent took took on on a a new new significance significance when when he he became became actively actively engaged engaged in in preparations preparations for for the the final final meeting inin February meeting of of the the wartime wartime Big Big Three Three at at Yalta Yalta in in the theCrimea Crimea February 1945. 1945. Yalta bigger This Yalta was wasto to prove prove an aneven even bigger success success for for Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence than than Tehran. Tehran. This time time both both the the British British and and the the American American delegations, delegations, housed housed respectively respectively in in the the or ornate successfully bugged. nate Vorontsov Vorontsov and and Livadia Livadia Palaces, Palaces, were were successfully bugged. The The mostly mostly female female personnel personnel used used to to record record and and transcribe transcribe their their private private conversations conversationswere were selected selectedand and transported inin great transported to to the the Crimea Crimea great secrecy. secrecy.Not Not till till they they arrived arrived at at Yalta Yalta did did they they dis discover The cover the the jobs jobs that that had had been been assigned assigned to to them.78 them.78 The NKGB NKGB sought, sought, with with some some suc success, cess,to to distract distract both both delegations delegations from from its its surveillance surveillanceof of them them by by lavish lavish and and attentive attentive hospitality, hospitality, personally personally supervised supervised by by a a massive massive NKGB NKGB general, general, Sergei Sergei Nikiforovich Nikiforovich Kruglov. thatlemon lemon went Kruglov. When When Churchill's Churchills daughter, daughter, Sarah, Sarah, casually casually mentioned mentioned that went well well with with caviar, caviar, a a lemon lemon tree tree appeared, appeared, as as ifby if by magic, magic, in in the theVorontsov Vorontsov orangery. orangery.At At the the next next Allied Allied conference, conference, in in Potsdam, Potsdam, General General Kruglov Kruglov was wasrewarded rewarded with with a aKBE, KBE, thus thus becoming becoming the the only only Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence officer officer to to receive receive an an honorary honorary knight knighthood. hood. Stalin even better Yalta than than he had Stalin was was even better informed informed about about his his allies allies at at Ydta he had been been at at Tehran. All of of the the Cambridge CambridgeFive, Five, no no longer longer suspected suspected of of being being double double agents, agents, pro proTehran. All vided run vided a a regular regular flow flow of of classified classified intelligence intelligence or or Foreign Foreign Office Office documents documents in in the the runup to the conference, though it is not possible to identify which of these documents up to the conference, though it is not possible to identifywhich of these documents were were communicated communicated to to Stalin Stalin personally. personally.Alger Alger Hiss Hiss actually actually succeeded succeeded in in becoming becoming a a member member of of the the American American delegation. delegation. The The problem problem which which occupied occupied most most of of the the time Yalta the time at at Yalta was was the future future of of Poland. Poland. Having Having already already conceded conceded Soviet Soviet dominance dominance of of Poland at Tehran, Roosevelt and Churchill made a belated attempt to secure the Poland at Tehran, Roosevelt and Churchill made a belated attempt to secure the restoration restoration of of Polish Polish parliamentary parliamentary democracy democracy and and a a guarantee guarantee of of free free elections. elections. Both Both were were outnegotiated outnegotiated by by Stalin, Stdin, assisted assisted once once again again by by a a detailed detailed knowledge knowledge of of the the cards cards in in their their hands. hands. He H e knew, knew, for for example, example, what what importance importance his his allies allies attached attached to to allow allowing some ((democratic" politicians into the puppet Polish provisional government ing some democratic politicians into the puppet Polish provisional government already already established established by by the the Russians. Russians. On O n this this point, point, after after initial initial resistance, resistance, Stalin Stdin gra graciously the ((democrats" ciously conceded, conceded, knowing knowing that that the democratscould could subsequently subsequently be be excluded. excluded. Mter After first first playing playing for for time, time, Stalin Stalin gave gave way way on on other other secondary secondary issues, issues, having having first first underlined underlined their their importance, importance, in in order order to to preserve preserve his his allies' alliesconsent consent to to the thereality reality of of a a Soviet-dominated Soviet-dominated Poland. Poland. Watching Watching Stalin Stalin in in action action at at Yalta, Yalta, the the permanent permanentunder undersecretary secretary at at the the Foreign Foreign Office, Office, Sir Sir Alexander Alexander Cadogan, Cadogan, thought thought him him in in a a different different league league as as a a negotiator negotiator to to Churchill Churchill and and Roosevelt: Roosevelt: ((He He is is a a great great man, man, and and shows shows up up very very impressively impressivelyagainst against the the background background of of the the other other two two aging aging statesmen." statesmen. Roose Roosevelt, two months months to to live, live, struck struck Cadogan, Cadogan, by by velt, in in rapidly rapidly failing failing health health and and with with only only two contrast, contrast, as as "very verywoolly woolly and and wobbly."79 wobbly.79 Roosevelt Roosevelt and and Churchi11 Churchill left left Yalta Yalta with with no no sense sense that that they they had had been been deceived deceived about intentions. Even hitherto more Rooabout Stalin's Stalins true true intentions. Even Churchill, Churchill, hitherto more skeptical skeptical than than Roo sevelt, Poor Neville sevelt, wrote wrote confidently, confidently, "Poor Neville Chamberlain Chamberlain believed believed he he could could trust trust Hitler. Hitler. He of how dont think think I'm Im wrong wrong about about Stalin."Bo Stalin.* Some Some sense sense of how H e was was wrong. wrong. But But I don't

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Moscow Moscow felt felt that that good good intelligence intelligence had had contributed contributed to toStalin's Stalins success successat at Yalta Yalta is is con conveyed by Moscow's congratulations to Hiss. Gorsky reported to the Centre in March veyed by Moscows congratulations to Hiss. Gorsky reported to the Centre in March 1945, a meeting meeting between between Akhmerov Akhmerov and andHiss: Hiss: 1945, after after a Recently ALES [Hiss] [Hiss] and and his his whole whole group group were were awarded awarded Soviet Soviet decorations. decorations. Recently ALES After person After the the Yalta Yalta conference, conference, when when he he had hadgone gone on on to to Moscow, Moscow, a a Soviet Soviet personage Com age in in a avery very responsible responsible position position (ALES (ALESgave gave to to understand understand that that it itwas was Comrade touch with rade Vyshinsky Vyshinsky [Deputy [Deputy Foreign Foreign Minister]) Minister]) allegedly allegedly got got in in touch with ALES and at the the behest passed on and at behest of of the the military military NEIGHBOURS [GRU] [GRU] passed on to to him him their so on.81 on.*l their gratitude gratitude and andso The must surely surely The NKGB's NKGBs regret regret at at failing failing to to wrest wrest Hiss Hiss from from the the NEIGHBOURS must have April when have intensified intensified in in April when he he was was appointed appointed acting acting Secretary-General Secretary-General of of the the United Nations "organizing conference" at San San Francisco.82 United Nations organizing conferenceat Francisco.82
B RI IO OU US S Red during the the BE EH H I N D T H E V I CT CTOR Red Army Army as as it it swept swept into into central central Europe Europe during fi nal months months of came detachments final of the the war war came detachments of of Smersh Smersh (short (short for for Smert Snzert Shpionam, "Death Death to toSpies!"), Spies!), a a military military counter-intelligence counter-intelligence agency agency detached detached from from the the NKVD in 1943 placed directly directly under under the control of of Stalin Stalin as as Chairman Chairman of of the the State in 1943 and and placed the control State Defense Committee and Defense Defense Commissar.83 C~mmissar.*~ Smershs main main mission was to to hunt hunt Defense Committee and Smersh's mission was for traitors traitors and and Soviet Soviet citizens citizens who who had collaborated with with the enemy. On O n Stalin's Stalins for had collaborated the enemy. instructions, it ve million instructions, it cast cast its its net net remarkably remarkably wide, wide, screening screening well well over over fi five million people. people. The s who The million million or or more more Soviet Soviet POW POWs who had had survived survived the the horrors horrors of of German German prison prison camps camps were were treated treated as as presumed presumed deserters deserters and and transported transported to to the the gulag, gulag, where where many many died. died. ally, both both the the British British and American In their anxiety to honor obligations to their ally, and American governments collaborated collaborated in in a sometimes barbarous barbarous repatriation. repatriation. So So far far as as Britain Britain governments a sometimes was concerned, the most controversial was concerned, the most controversial part part of of the the forced forced repatriation repatriation was was the the hand handover "dissident" Yugoslavs over of of Cossacks Cossacks and and dissident Yugoslavs from from south south Austria Austria to to the the Red Red Army Army and and Titos forces forces respectively in May and June June 1945. 1945. Most Most had had collaborated collaborated with with the Tito's respectively in May and the enemy, though though sometimes only to to a a nominal nominal degree. degree. On O n June June 1 1battle-hardened battle-hardened sol solenemy, sometimes only diers of of the the 8th 8th Argylls, Argylls, some some of of them them in in tears, tears, were were ordered ordered to to break break up up a a Cossack Cossack diers religious service service and and drive drive several several thousands thousands of of unarmed unarmed men, men, women women and and children children religious into cattle cattle trucks trucks with with rifle rifle butts butts and and pick handles. There There were were similar similar horrors horrors on on sucinto pick handles. suc ceeding days. Some Some of of the the Cossacks Cossacks killed killed themselves themselves and and their their families families to to save save them ceeding days. them from torture, torture, execution execution or or the the gulag. gulag. Most of the the 45,000 45,000 repatriated repatriated Cossacks Cossacks were were from Most of Soviet citizens, whom Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed at Yalta to return to the Soviet Soviet But aaminority, variously estimated at between 3,000 and 10,000 10,000were Soviet Union. But old emigres" kmigrks hadleft Russia after the civil war, war, so-called "old who had had never been citizens of the the Soviet Soviet Union, and were were not not covered covered by by the the Yalta Yalta agreement. agreement. They They too too were were of Union, and will.84 repatriated against their their will. 84 Among old emigres" Cmigrks were were a a group group of of White White generals-chief generals-chief among Among the the "old among them them Krasnov, Andrei Shkuro Shkuro and and Sultan Kelech Ghiref5-whom Pyotr Krasnov, Ghirel5-whom the NKGB and Smersh detachment detachment its predecessors predecessors had had been been pursuing pursuing for for a a quarter of a a century. century. A Smersh its quarter of

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the British was sent to Austria with orders to track them down. Its initial inquiries to the about their their whereabouts whereabouts met met with withno no response other other than thanthe the claim about response claim that that no no informainforma tion was was available. available.After After heavy heavy drinking drinking at at aadinner dinner for Anglo-Russian troops, howtion for Anglo-Russian troops, how ever, a British soldier blurted out that, that,until until recently, the generals had been at aacamp ever, thevillage of Gleisdor86 GleisdorLg6 of Smersh officers drove droveimmediately to Gleis Gleisin the A group of dorf where where they they discovered discovered that, that, though the generals had left, Shkuros mistress dorf though the generals had left, Shkuro's mistress Yelena (surname (surname unknown) unknown) was was still still there. there. Yelena was lured lured out the Yelena Yelena was out of of the the camp camp on on the pretense that she had a visitor. As she approached the Smersh car, she suddenly saw pretense that she had a visitor. As she approached the Smersh car, she suddenly saw officers inside and froze with fear. She was quickly bundled into the the car the Russian officers revealed, under no doubt brutal and revealed, brutal interrogation, that the theWhite White generals had appealed for for the the Supreme Supreme Allied Allied Commander, Commander, Field Marshal Alexander, protecappealed Field Marshal Alexander, for for protec generals had with them of tion. Yelena also also disclosed disclosed that the the generals them fourteen kilograms of gold.87What happened next is of such importance that Mitrokhins it it gold.87 Mitrokhin's note on on deserves to to be be quoted quoted as as fully as as possible: possible: deserves The Chekists Chekists [Smersh [Smersh officers] officers] raised the matter of the the generals generals again at a The raised the matter of again at a meeting with .. .. ., [a [a British] lieutenant-colonel. They They mentioned mentioned where where the meeting with British] lieutenant-colonel. the generals Chekists proposed proposed that they should approach the the question question generals were. were. The The Chekists that they should approach of "What do do you mean by that? that?" asked asked of the the generals' generals fate fate in in aabusiness-like business-like way. way. What you mean the If the the British British would would hand hand them over the Englishman. Englishman. They They explained explained to to him. him. If them over quietly at at the the same time as as the the Cossacks Cossacks were could keep quietly same time were repatriated, repatriated, they they could keep the the generals gold. the old old men with you, you, you you and will generals' gold. If "If the men remain remain with and your your colleagues colleagues will get no benefit benefit at at all. all. If you you accept accept our our alternative, you will will get get the the gold. The get no alternative, you gold." The lieutenant-colonel thought thought aawhile while and thenagreed. e talked talked with two of his lieutenant-colonel and then agreed. H He with two of his colleagues the operation. operation. On that they they were colleagues about about the the details details of of the O n the the pretext pretext that were being taken taken to to Alexander's Alexanders headquarters headquarters for the generals generals were were put being for talks, talks, the put into into cars Odenburg [Judenburg] cars without without any any of of their their belongings belongings and and driven driven to to Odenburg [Judenburg] where Chekists. From hands of Smersh they where they they were were handed handed over over to to the the Chekists. From the the hands of Smersh they were transferred to Moscow, to the Calvary of the Lubyanka.88 were transferred to Moscow, to the Calvary of the Lubyanka.88 corroboration is is available available from from any any other other source source for for the claim in in a No corroboration the claim a KGB file file that cer (and (and perhaps perhaps two had been been bribed bribed into into that a a British British army army offi officer two of of his his colleagues) colleagues) had handing over handing over the the White White generals. generals. Given Given the the failure failure on on the the ground ground to to distinguish distinguish the the minority of rest, they they might have been been surrensurren minority of non-Soviet non-Soviet Cossacks Cossacks from from the the rest, might well well have dered Smersh in ifif dered to to Smersh in any any case. case.The The generals generals would would probably probably have have survived, survived,however, however, their petitions petitions had had reached Field Marshal Alexander, who who might might well well have have granted granted their reached Field Marshal Alexander, them. But petitions mysteriously disappeared en them. But the thepetitions mysteriously disappeared en route.89 route.89 The speed and injustice injustice of of the the "repatriation" repatriation derived chiefly from from the of milThe speed and derived chiefly the desire desire of mil itary itary commanders commanders on on the the spot spot to to be be rid rid of of an an unwelcome unwelcome problem problem as as soon soon as as possi possible, ble, combined combined with with the thebelief belief that that individual individual screening screening to to determine determinewhich which Cossacks Cossacks were complex, long some cases cases were not not of of Soviet Soviet nationality nationality would would be be a a complex, long drawn drawn out, out, and and in in some impossible 21 Brigadier Corps, which was in charge of impossible task. task. On Qn May May21 Brigadier Toby Toby Low Low of5 of 5 Corps, which was in charge of the to be be regarded as Soviet Soviet citi the "repatriation," repatriation, issued issued an an order order defining defining who who were were to regarded as citizens. The collectively identified as nonnonzens. The one one White White Russian Russian group group which which could could be be collectively identified as

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Soviet, Colonel Anatol Rogozhin, Soviet, the the Schutzkorps, Schutzkorps, commanded commanded by by Colonel Anatol Rogozhin, was, was, he he instructed, not not to be repatriated. repatriated. But those to to be be "treated treated as as Soviet Soviet Nationals" Nationals instructed, to be But those included the the ''Ataman Ataman Group" Group (of (of which which General General Krasnov Krasnov was was a a leading leading member) member) included and the of Lt.-Gen. Lt.-Gen. Shkuro." Shkuro. Low Low added added that that "[i]ndividual [ilndividual cases cases [appeals] and the Units "Units of [appeals] w i l lNOT N O T be be considered considered unless unless particularly particularly pressed," pressed, and and that that "[i]n [iln all all cases cases of of doubt, doubt, will the individual will be treated as a Soviet National."9o the individual will be treated as a Soviet Nati~nal.~ When When all all allowance allowance is ismade made for for the the difficulties difficulties of of combining combining loyalty loyalty to to allies allies with with respect for for the the human human rights rights of of the the Cossacks, Cossacks, the the brutality with which which the therepatria repatriarespect brutality with tion was was conducted remains perhaps the most episode in in twentiethtion conducted remains perhaps the most ignominious ignominious episode twentieth century British military history. history. "1 I reproach reproach myself myself for for just just one one thing, thing," the the century British military 76-year-old White White general general Krasnov Krasnov later later told told the the NKGB. Why did did 1 I trust trust the the 76-year-old NKGB. "Why British?" just before before 3 3 A.M., A.M., a a time timeof of day day much much favored favored by bySoviet Soviet Secu SecuBritish? On O n May May 27, just rity, rity, General General Shkuro Shkuro was was awakened awakened by by an an unidentified unidentified British British officer, officer, who who told told him him he he was was under under arrest arrest and and took took him him to to be be held held under under close close guard guard well well away away from from the the Cossack camp. camp. Another, Another, or or perhaps perhaps the the same, same, British British officer officer later later delivered delivered an an Cossack "urgent," though bogus, invitation General Krasnov urgent, though bogus, invitation to to General Krasnov to to a a conference conference with with Field Field Marshal Alexander, Alexander, his his former former comrade-in-arms comrade-in-arms during duringthe civil war. Marshal the Russian Russian civil war. Smersh photographers photographers were were waiting waiting to to record record the the historic historic moment moment when Smersh when the the NKGBs oldest enemies enemies were were turned turned over over to to it.91 it.91For For the British British army army it it was a shame shameNKGB's oldest the was a h l moment. moment. For For Stalin, Stalin, Smersh Smersh and and the the NKGB, it it was was a famous victory. ful a famous victory.

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ing ing disaster disaster in in intelligence intelligence operations operations against against its its wartime wartime allies. allies.The The first first major major alarm alarm occurred Ottawa, where occurred in in Ottawa, where relations relations among among NKGB NKGB and and GRU personnel personnel working working under in under "legal" legalcover cover in the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy were were as as fraught fraught as as in in New NewYork. York. The The situa situation residency. On O n the the evening evening of of September September 5, 5, 1945 1945 Igor Igor tion was was worst worst in in the the GRU residency.1 Gouzenko, aG RU cipher the Soviet Ottawa, secretly Gouzenko, a GRU cipher clerk clerk at at the Soviet embassy embassy in in Ottawa, secretly stuffed stuffed more more than than a a hundred hundred classified classified documents documents under under his his shirt shirt and and attempted attempted to to defect. defect. He H e tried tried hard hard to to hold hold his his stomach stomach in in as as he he walked walked out out of of the the embassy. embassy. "Otherwise," Otherwise, his his wife wife said said later, later, "he he would would have have looked looked pregnant." pregnant. Defection Defection turned turned out outto to be be more more difficult difficult than than Gouzenko Gouzenkohad had imagined. imagined. When When he he sought sought help help at at the the offices offices of of the the Ministry Ministry of of Justice Justice and and the the Ottawa Journal, he he was was told 6 both both the the Ministry Ministryof of Justice Justice and and told to to come come back back the the next next day. day. But But on on September September 6 the the Ottawa Journal, Journal, which which failed failed to to realize realize it it was was being being offered offered the the spy spy story story of of the the decade, decade, showed showed no no more more interest interest than than on on the theprevious previous evening. evening.By By the the night night of of Sep September tember 6 6 the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassyrealized realizedthat that both both Gouzenko Gouzenko and and classified classified documents documents were While neighbor's were missing. missing. While Gouzenko Gouzenko hid hid with with his his wife wife and and child child in in aa neighborsflat, flat, NKGB men broke broke down down his his door door and and searched searched his his apartment. apartment. It was was almost almost midnight midnight before before men to the local local police policecame came to his his rescue rescue and and the the Gouzenko Gouzenkofamily family at at last last found found sanctuary.2 sanctuary.2 the As As well well as as identifying identifylng a a major major GRU spy spy ring, ring, Gouzenko Gouzenko also also provided provided fragmen fragmentary tary intelligence intelligence on on NKGB operations. operations. Some Some months months later later Lavrenti Lavrenti Beria, Beria, the the Soviet Soviet security incompetence security supremo, supremo, circulated circulated to to residencies residencies a a stinging stinging indictment indictment of ofthe the incompetence and, he heimplied, implied, the the NKGB in in Ottawa: Ottawa: of the the GRU and, of The The most most elementary elementary principles principles of of security security were were ignored, ignored, complacency complacency and and self-satisfaction unchecked. All self-satisfactionwent went unchecked. A l l this this was was the the result result of of aadecline decline in in political political vigilance sense of vigilance and and sense of responsibility responsibility for for work work entrusted entrusted by by the the Party Party and and the the government. caused great government. G[ouzenkoJ's G[ouzenko]s defection defection has has caused great damage damage to to our our country country and the American and has, has, in in particular, particular, very very greatly greatly complicated complicated our our work work in in the American countries.3 countrie~.~ The The fear fear of of being being accused accused of of further hrther breaches breaches of of security security made made the the Ottawa Ottawa residency residency unwilling unwilling to to take take any any initiative initiative in in recruiting recruiting new new agents. agents. According According to to a a later later damage damage

R Rt t the the end endof of the the Second Second World World War, War, the the Centre Centre faced faced what what it it feared feared was was impend impend-

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assessment, Canada] for assessment, Gouzenko's Gouzenkos defection defection "paralyzed paralyzed intelligence intelligence work work [in [in Canada] for sev several most negative eral years years and and continued continued to to have have a a most negative effect effect on on the the work work of of the the residency residency right Vladimir right up up to to 1960." 1960. In In the the summer summer of of 1949 1949 the the acting acting resident resident in in Ottawa, Ottawa, Vladimir Trofimovich Burdin (also known as Borodin), newly arrived from Moscow, Trofimovich Burdin (also known as Borodin), newly arrived from Moscow, wrote wrote to to the about his his colleagues' the Centre Centre to tocomplain complain about colleaguesinertia: inertia: The The residency residency not not merely merely lost lost all all its its previous previous contacts contacts in in Canadian Canadian circles circles but but did ones .. . . .. The closed in did not not even even try try to to acquire acquire new new ones The Soviet Soviet colony colony closed in on on itself itself and becoming wholly preoccupied with and shut shutitself itself off off from from the the outside outside world, world, becoming wholly preoccupied with its its own own internal internal affairs. affairs. The The Centre Centre agreed. agreed. The The residency, residency, it it concluded, concluded, had had "got got stuck stuck in in a arut."4 rut. For For the the rest rest of of Gouzenko's Gouzenkos life life the the KGB tried tried intermittently intermittently and andunsuccessfully unsuccessfullyto to track track him him down. down. In In 1975, 1975, after after a a Progressive Progressive Conservative Conservative MP, MP, Thomas Thomas Cossit, Cossit, requested requested a a review review of of Gouzenko's Gouzenkos pension, pension, the the Ottawa Ottawaresidency residency deduced deduced that that Gou Gouzenko lived lived in in his his constituency. constituency. The The residency residency also reported that that Cossit Cossit and and Gou Gouzenko also reported zenko visit the zenko had had been been seen seen together together at at an an ice ice hockey hockey match match during duringa a visit to to Canada Canadaby by the Soviet team. A KGB officer officer stationed stationed in in Ottawa, Nikolayevich Soviet national national team. Ottawa,Mikhail Mikhail Nikolayevich Khvatov, sought to hope of of discovering Gouzenko's wherewhere Khvatov, sought to cultivate cultivate Cossit Cossit in in the the hope discovering Gouzenkos abouts. He abouts. H e had had no no success success and and the the residency residency subsequently subsequently reported reported that that parliamen parliamentary Cossit were tone." Some Some years tary questions questions by by Cossit were "clearly clearlyanti-Soviet anti-Soviet in in tone. years later later the the KGB began on Cossit's private life and prepare active began to to search search for for compromising compromising material material on Cossits private life and prepare active measures He 1982 before him had had measures to to discredit discredit him. him. H e died died in in 1982 before the the campaign campaign against against him begun.5 begun. Gouzenko's Gouzenkos defection defection in in September September 1945 1945 also also caused caused alarm alarm at at NKGB NKGB residencies residencies in Britain Britain and and the United As head head of of SIS Section IX I X (Soviet (Soviet Counter Counterin the United States. States. As SIS Section intelligence) and intelligence) Philby Philby was was kept kept well well informed informed of of the the debriefing debriefing of of Gouzenko Gouzenko and reported an intensification reported "an intensification of of counter-measures" counter-measures against against Soviet Soviet espionage espionage in in Lon London. don. The The Centre Centre responded responded with with instructions instructions for for tight tight security security procedures procedures to to ensure ensure that valuable that "the the valuable agent agent network network is is protected protected from from compromise." compromise. Boris Boris Krotenschield Krotenschield (aka "Krotov"), K~o~ov), the controller controller of of the the residency's residencys most important agents, agents, was was told told to to (aka the most important hand over all all but to other officers and and to to reduce the frequency frequency of of meet meetbut Philby Philby to other case case officers reduce the hand over all when going ings ings to to once once a a month: month:"Warn Warn all our our comrades comrades to to make make a a thorough thoroughcheck check when going is observed, not to attempt under any circumout to a meeting and, if surveillance out to a meeting and, if surveillance is observed, not to attempt under any circum stances to meet the " If necessary, contact stances to evade evade the the surveillance surveillance and and meet the agent agent .. .. .. If necessary, contact with with British agents was to to be be temporarily temporarily broken broken of6 ofE6 British agents was Even greater greater alarm alarm was was caused causedby by the the attempted attempted defection defection of of an an NKGB NKGB officer officer in in Even Turkey, the 1945 Volkov Volkov wrote wrote to to the Turkey, Konstantin Konstantin Dmitryevich Dmitryevich Volkov. Volkov. On O n August August 27, 1945 Page, requesting requesting an an urgent urgent appointment. appointment. When When British vice-consul vice-consul in in Istanbul, Istanbul, C. British C. H. Page, Page person on Page failed failed to to reply, reply, Volkov Volkovturned turned up up in in person on September September 4 4 and and asked asked for for polit political asylum asylum for himself and his wife. In return for asylum and the sum of 50,000 pounds at today's pounds (about (about a a million million pounds pounds at todays values), values), he he offered offered important important files files and and information obtained obtained while while working working on on the the British British desk desk in in the the Centre. Centre. Among Among the the information most highly agents, he (doubttwo in in the the Foreign Foreign Office Office (doubtmost highly rated rated Soviet Soviet agents, he revealed, revealed, were were two

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less system," includ less Burgess Burgessand and Maclean) Maclean) and and seven seven "inside inside the the British British intelligence intelligence system, including British counter-espionage ing one one "fulfilling hlfilling the thefunction function of of head head of of a a section section of of British counter-espionage in in London" London(almost (almost certainly certainly Philby).7 Philb~).~ On O n September September 19 19 Philby Philby was was startled startled to to receive receive a a report report ofVolkov's of Volkovs meeting meeting with with Page Istanbul consulate.8 He warned Kr6ten Page by by diplomatic diplomatic bag bag from from the the Istanbul consulate. H e quickly quickly warned Krotenschield.9 issued visas visas for schield. On O n September September 21 21 the the Turkish Turkish consulate consulate in in Moscow Moscow issued for two two NKGB hatchet The next hatchet men men posing posing as as diplomatIC diplomatic couriers. couriers.The next day day Philby Philby succeeded succeeded in in gaining y to SIS, Sir Sir Stewart Stewart Menzies, Menzies, to to fl fly to Turkey Turkey to to gaining authorization authorization from from the the chief chief of of SIS, deal personally personallywith with the theVolkov Volkov case. case.Due Due to tovarious various travel traveldelays delays he did did not notarrive arrive in in deal he Istanbul Istanbul until until September September 26. 26. Two Two days days earlier earlier Volkov Volkov and and his his wife, wife, both both on on stretch stretchers sedated, had ers and and heavily heavily sedated, had been been carried carried on on board board a a Soviet Soviet aircraft aircraft bound bound for for Moscow.1o During the flight back to London Philby drafted a cynical report to Men Moscow.1oDuring theflight back to LondonPhilby drafted a cynical report to Menzies zies on on the thepossible possible reasons reasonsfor for Volkov's Volkovs detection detection by the the NKGB. As As he he wrote wrotelater, later, Doubtless bugged. Both Doubtless both both his his office office and and his his living living quarters quarters were were bugged. Both he he and and his his wife were reported reported to wife were to be be nervous. nervous. Perhaps Perhaps his his manner manner had had given given him him away; away; perhaps talked too perhaps he he had had got got drunk drunk and andtalked too much; much; perhaps perhaps even even he he had had changed changed his all his mind mind and and confessed confessed to to his his colleagues. colleagues. Of course, course, I admitted, admitted, this this was was all speculation; never be speculation; the the truth truth might might never be known. known. Another Another theory-that theory-that the the Rus Russians sians had had been been tipped tipped off off about about Volkov's Volkovs approach approach to to the theBritish-had British-had no no solid solid l1 evidence It evidence to to support supportit. it. I t was was not not worth worth including including in in my my report. report. Under had Under interrogation interrogation in in Moscow Moscow before before his his execution, execution, Volkov Volkov admitted admitted that thathe he had asked asked the the British British for for political political asylum asylum and and 50,000 50,000 pounds, pounds, and and confessed confessed that that he he had had planned 14 Soviet planned to to reveal reveal the the names names of of no no fewer fewer than than 3314 Soviet agents.12 agents.12Philby Philby had had had hadthe the narrowest Ottawa a a few earlier, Gou narrowest of of escapes. escapes. With With slightly slightly less less luck luck in in Ottawa few weeks weeks earlier, Gouzenko zenko would would not not have have been been able able to to defect. defect.With With slightly slightly more more luck luck in in Istanbul, Istanbul, Vol Volkov kov would would have have succeeded succeeded in in unmasking unmasking Philby Philby and and disrupting disrupting the the MGB's MGBs British British operations. operations. The The Gouzenko Gouzenko and and Volkov Volkov alarms alarms occurred occurred at at a a remarkably remarkably busy busy period period for for the the London 1947 by . London residency, residency, headed headed until until 1947 by Konstantin Konstantin Kukin Kukin (codenamed (codenamed IGOR) IGOR). From 1 to , 1945 the f the From September September 1 11 to October October2 2,1945 the Council Councilof of Foreign Foreign Ministers Ministers o of the five five permanent permanent members members of of the the UN Security Security Council Council (the (the United United States, States, Soviet Soviet Union, Union, Britain, rst meeting Britain, France France and and China) China) held held its its fi first meeting in in London London to todiscuss discuss peace peacetreaties treaties with problems. The with defeated defeated enemy enemy states states and and other other post-war post-war problems. The residency's residencys penetration penetration of of the the Foreign Foreign Office Office gave gave it it an an unusually unusually important important role. role. Throughout Throughout the the meeting, meeting, according according to to KGB KGB files, files, the the Soviet Soviet ambassador, ambassador, Ivan Ivan Maisky, Maisky, placed placed greater greater reliance reliance on on residency residency staff staff than than on on his his own own diplomats, diplomats, forcing forcing them them to to extend extend each each working working day day into into the the early early hours hours of of the the following following morning.13 morning.13The The Security Security Council Council meeting, meeting, however, however, was wasa a failure, failure,publicly publicly exposing exposing for for the the first first time time the the deep deep East-West East-West divi divisions which sions which by by 1947 1947 were were to to engender engender the the Cold ColdWar. War. At the Security At this this and and subsequent subsequent meetings meetings of of the Security Council, Council, Stalin's Stalins foreign foreign minis minister, ter, Vyacheslav Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Molotov, Molotov, depended depended heavily heavily on on the theintelligence intelligence supplied supplied by by the the MGB's MGBs Western Western agents. agents. Indeed, Indeed, he he tended tended to to take take it it for for granted. granted. "Why," Why,he he

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roared roared on on one one occasion, occasion, "are are there there no no documents?" documents? At the the London London conference conference which which opened in some Foreign docu opened in November November 1947, 1947, he he appears appears to to have have received received some Foreign Office Office documents even British delegation.14 ments even before before they they reached reached the the British delegation.14 The MGB's most most important important sources sources during meetings of The MGBs during the the meetings of the the Council Council of of For Foreign Ministers were Thanks to kidnapping eign Ministers from from 1945 1945 to to1949 1949 were British. British. Thanks tothe the kidnapping ofVolkov, of Volkov, four the wartime were able work as Soviet four of of the wartime Magnificent Magnificent Five Five were able to to carry carry on on work as full-time full-time Soviet agents was agents after after the the war. war. The The exception exception was was Anthony Anthony Blunt, Blunt,who who was under under such such visible visible strain object to his decision decision to to leave leave MI5. he strain that that the the Centre Centre did did not not object to his MIS. Shortly Shortly before before he returned world in November 1945 as Surveyor the Kings King's Pictures, Pictures, Blunt Blunt returned to to the theart art world in November 1945 as Surveyor of of the made one one extraordinary extraordinary outburst outburst which which at at the the time taken seriously. seriously. "Well," Well, made time was was not not taken he me great pleasure to he told told his his MI5 MIS colleague colleague Colonel Colonel "Tar" TarRobertson, Robertson, "it's its given given me great pleasure to pass the names names of the Russians!" Russians!The Centremay pass on on the of every every MI5 MI5 officer officer to to the The Centre may well well have have hoped Leo Long named ELLI), had run run as as a a sub-agent sub-agent in in hoped that that Leo Long (code (codenamed ELLI), whom whom Blunt Blunt had military intelligence during would succeed succeed him the military intelligence during the the war, war, would him in in the Security Security Service. Service. Blunt recommended Long for a senior post post in in MI5 but but the the selection selection board Blunt recommended Long for a senior board passed passed him over, over, allegedly allegedly by by a a narrow narrow margin, margin, in favor of of another another candidate. candidate. Long moved him in favor Long moved instead to to the the British where he instead British Control Control Commission Commission in in Germany, Germany, where he eventually eventually became became Deputy Director Intelligence. There There he resisted attempts attempts to Deputy Director of of Intelligence. he resisted to put put him himin in regular regular contact with with aacase officer-a recalcitrance recalcitrance which the Centre Centreattributed attributed part to the contact case officer-a which the in in part to the fact that that Blunt Blunt had hadceased ceased to his controller. the occasional occasional services fact to be be his controller. Among Among the services which which Blunt continued to to perform perform for for the the Centre two or or three three visits to Germany to Blunt continued Centre were were two visits to Germany to , seek intelligence from Long. seek intelligence from Long.ls Maclean Unlike Blunt, of the the Magnificent Five-Philby, Burgkiss and MacleanUnlike Blunt, three three of Magnificent Five-Philby, Burgis s and were peak as agents, and Cairncross still his, when were all at at their theirpeak as Soviet Soviet agents, and Cairncross still close'to closdto his, when the the Cold Cold War began. Philby remained head SIS Section Section IX until 1947, when War began. Philby remained head of of SIS until 1947, when he he was was appointed head enabled him appointed head of of station station in in Turkey, Turkey, a a position position which which enabled him to to betray betray agents agents who crossed the Russian as well well as as their their families families and and contacts contacts inside the who crossed the Russian border border as inside the Soviet Union. reputation as Soviet Union. Maclean Maclean established established a a reputation as a a high-flying high-flying young young diplomat diplomat in in Washington embassy, embassy, where he remained until 1947. 1947. In 1946 1946 Burgess, who had the Washington joined the Foreign Office Office in in 1944, to Hector joined the Foreign 1944, became became personal personal assistant assistant to HectorMcNeil, McNeil, toErnest Ernest thepost-war Labor government.16 government.16Mter After the thewar Minister of State to Bevin in the John Cairncross Cairncross returned returned to to the theTreasury, Treasury, where where the the London Londonresidency residency renewed renewed con conJohn tact with him in 1948.17 Cairncrosss main job at the Treasury over the next few years tact with him in 1948.17 Cairncross's main job at the Treasury over the next few years was to authorize authorize expenditure on defense research. According to his Treasury colcol league G. G. A. A. Robinson:
just about atomic weapons developments but also [Cairncross] thus knew not just plans for guided missiles, microbiological, microbiological, chemical, chemical, underwater and all other H e also needed to know, know, inter alia, about projected spending types of weapons. He on aeronautical and radar research and anti-submarine detection, research by other bodies into signals intelligence, eavesdropping tech techthe Post Office and other signals intelligence, niques, H e .. .. .. could legitimately ask for any further hrther details thought thought necniques, etc. He nec approval to the the spending of money.1S money.* essary to give Treasury approval

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Cairncross's Cairncrosss controller, controller, Yuri Yuri Modin, Modin, was, was, unsurprisingly, unsurprisingly, "overjoyed overjoyed by bythe the quality quality of of [his] [his] information."19 inf~rmation.~ The The new new security security procedures procedures introduced introduced in in the thewake wake of of the the Gouzenko Gouzenkoand and Volkov Volkov alarms more laborious and time alarms made made controlling controlling the the London Londonresidency's residencys agents agents far far more laborious and timeconsuming consuming than than during during or or before before the the war. war. On O n average, average, before before every every meeting meeting with with an an agent, each each case case officer officerspent spent five five hours hours moving moving on on foot footor or by by public public transport transport (espe (espeagent, cially London Underground) cially the the London Underground) between between locations locations he he had had studied studied previously previously in in order order to to engage engage in in repeated repeated checks checks that that he he was was not not under under surveillance. surveillance. Once Once at at the the meeting place, place, both required to visual meeting both the the case case officer officer and and the the agent agent were were required to establish establish visual contact and satisfy themselves contact and to to satisfy themselves that that the the other other was was not not being being watched watched before before they they approached either had back on approached each each other. other. If If either had any any doubts, doubts, they they would would fall fall back on one oneof of three three previously previously agreed agreedalternative alternative rendezvous. rendezvous.The The system system pioneered pioneered in in London Londonwas was later later introduced introduced into into other other residencies.20 residencies.2o The The London London residency residency also also pioneered pioneered the the use use of of radio radio intercept intercept units units to to identify identify and and monitor monitor surveillance surveillance of of its its operations operations by by the the police police and and MIS. MIS. In In addition addition to to the the main residency, main interception interception unit unit in inthe the residency, mobile mobile units units were were established established in in embassy embassy cars cars to to check check the the areas areas in in which which meetings meetings took took place place with with agents.21 agents. However, However, the the Centre's Centres experiment the Second experiment with with the the eight-man eight-man surveillance surveillance team team sent sent to toLondon Londonduring during the Second World World War War to tocarry carry out out checks checks on on agents agents and and visitors visitors to to the the Soviet Soviet embassy, embassy, as as well well as discover the used by by British as to to discover the surveillance surveillance methods methods used British intelligence, intelligence, was was discontin discontinued. ued. A report report in in KGB KGB archives archives records records that, that, handicapped handicapped by by its its lack lack of of fluency fluency in in English, The English, the the team team had had "no no major major successes."22 successes.22 The experiment experiment was was probably probably a a total total failure. failure. The and The London London residency's residencys attempts attempts to to enforce enforce the the strictest strictest standards standards of of secrecy secrecyand security security had had only only a a limited limited effect effect on on Guy Guy Burgess. Burgess. On O n one one occasion, occasion, while while coming coming out he out of of a a pub pub where where he he had hadestablished established visual visual contact contact with with his his case case officer, officer, he dropped dropped his his briefcase briefcase and and scattered scattered secret secret Foreign Foreign Office Office papers papers over over the the floor. floor.There There were were fre frequent quent complaints complaints that that he he turned turned up up for for meetings meetings the the worse worse for for drink drink and and with with his his clothing clothing in in disarray.23 disarray2When When George George Carey-Foster, Carey-Foster, head head of of the the embryonic embryonic security security branch encountered Burgess was branch in in the theForeign Foreign Office, Office, first first encountered Burgess in in 1947, 1947,he he was struck struck by by his his "disheveled that I disheveled and and unshaven unshaven appearance. appearance. He H e also also smelt smelt so so strongly strongly of of drink drink that enquired Yet Burgess enquired who who he he was was and and what what his his job job was." was.Yet Burgess could could still still display display fragments fragments of of the the charm charm and and brilliance brilliance of of his his Cambridge Cambridge years. years. Late Late in in 1947, 1947, probably probably to to get getrid rid of of him, him, Hector Hector McNeil McNeil recommended recommended Burgess Burgess to to the the parliamentary parliamentary under-secretary under-secretary at ce, Christopher at the the Foreign Foreign Offi Office, Christopher Mayhew, Mayhew, who who was was then then organizing organizing the the Informa Information to to counter tion Research Research Department Department (IRD) (IRD) counter Soviet Soviet "psychological psychologicalwarfare." warfare. Mayhew Mayhew made what he he later later described described as as "an an extraordinary extraordinary mistake:" mistake: "I I interviewed interviewed Burgess. Burgess. made what He H e certainly certainly showed showed a a dazzling dazzling insight insight into into Communist Communist methods methods of of subversion subversion and and I readily readily took took him him on." on. Burgess Burgess went went the the rounds rounds of of British British embassies embassies selling selling IRD's IRDs wares wares while while simultaneously simultaneously compromising compromising the the new new department department by by reporting reporting all all its its plans plans to to Yuri Yuri Ivanovich Ivanovich Modin, Modin, who who became became his his case case officer officer in in 1947 1947 and and acquired acquired a a reputation intelligence. The reputation as as one one of of the the ablest ablest agent agent controllers controllers in in Soviet Soviet intelligence. The chorus chorus of of protests protests at at Burgess's Burgesss undiplomatic undiplomatic behavior behavior led led to to his his removal removal from from the the IRD and and

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transfer the Foreign Department in inthe the autumn of transfer to to the Foreign Office Office Far Far Eastern Eastern Department autumn of 1948.24 1948.24 Though it disturbed the Centre, Burgess's frequently outrageous conduct paradoxi Though it disturbed the Centre, Burgesss frequently outrageous conduct paradoxically most of cally strengthened strengthened his his cover. cover. Even Even to to most of those those whom whom he he outraged outraged he he seemed seemed as as unlike Soviet spy unlike a a Soviet spy as as it it was was possible possible to to imagine. imagine. Modin Modin was was also alsoconcerned concerned about about Nikolai Nikolai Borisovich Borisovich Rodin Rodin (alias (alias "Korovin"), Korovin),who who succeeded 1947. Rodin Rodin considered the succeeded Kukin Kukin as as London London resident resident in in 1947. considered himself himself above above the tight security regulations other members tight security regulations on on which which he he insisted insisted for for the the other members of of the the resi residency. dency. According According to to Modin, Modin, who who loathed loathedhim himpersonally, personally, Rodin Rodin was was "known known to to go go to cars, and to clandestine clandestine meetings meetings in in one one of of the the embassy embassy cars, and sometimes sometimes was was foolhardy foolhardy enough to place direct direct calls their offices." But, in enough to place calls to to agents agents in in their offices. But, in the therigidly rigidly hierarchical hierarchical world intelligence, Modin Modin felt it. world of of Soviet Soviet intelligence, felt that that "there there was was nothing nothing I could could do do about about it. It was denounce my superior in was hardly hardly my my place place to to denounce my superior in the the service." service. As As head head of of Faculty Faculty Number One (Political the FCD Andropov inthe the early early Number One (Political Intelligence) Intelligence) in in the Andropov Institute Institute in 1980s, less inhibited. He 1980s, Modin Modin was was less inhibited. H e dismissed dismissed Rodin Rodin as as an an arrogant, arrogant, pretentious pretentious nonen tity. 25 n~nentity.~
most agents were were still still undetected at the the end most important important British British agents undetected at end of the the 1940s, 1940s, many many of of their their American counterparts had had been compromised. The The of American counterparts been compromised. Centre had had complained complained as as early early as as March March 1945 1945 that that the the membership membership of of the the Silver SilverCentre master master spy spy ring ring was was an an open open secret secret among among "many" manyWashington Washington Communists Communistsand and that that Harry Dexter Whites Soviet Soviet "connection" connection had had also also become known. It denounced denounced Harry Dexter White's become known. "not York] controlling and not only only the the falling falling off off in in the the [New [New York] Residency's Residencyswork work of of controlling and edu educating probationers probationers [agents], [agents], but but also also the the lack lack of of understanding understanding by by our our operational operational cating workers of of the the most most elementary elementary rules rules in in our our work."26 work.26 workers The defections defections later later in in 1945 1945 of of Igor Igor Gouzenko Gouzenko and and Elizabeth Elizabeth Bentley Bentley confirmed The confirmed the Centre's Centres worst worst fears. fears. In In September Edgar Hoover Hoover reported reported to to the the White House the September J. Edgar White House and Department that Gouzenko had and the theState State Department that Gouzenko had provided provided information information on on the theactivities activities of Soviet spies States, whom was of a a number numberof of Soviet spies in in the theUnited United States, one one of ofwhom was "an an assistant assistant to to the the Secretary certainly Alger On November 7 Bentley, Secretary of of State" State (almost (almost certainly Alger Hiss). Hiss). O n November Bentley, who who had had first earlier, began Soviet first contacted contacted the the FBI six sir; weeks weeks earlier, began revealing revealing what what she she knew knew of of Soviet espionage to York sent President President Truman's mil espionage to its itsNew New York field field office. office. Next Next day day Hoover Hoover sent Trumans military ed by itary aide aide a a first first list list of of fourteen fourteen of of those those identifi identified by Bentley Bentley as as supplying supplying informa informationto the Soviet espionage espionage system:" system: among amongthem Assistant Secretary Secretary of of the the tion to "the Soviet them Assistant Treasury Harry Harry Dexter Dexter White, White, OSS executive executive assistant Duncan C. and Roo RooTreasury assistant Duncan C. Lee Lee and intersevelts former former aide aide Lauchlih Lauchlin Currie.27 C ~ r r i eBentley's Bentleys .~~ defection, in in turn, turn, revived revived FBI inter sevelt's defection, est in in Whittaker Whittaker Chambers' Chambers earlier earlier evidence evidence of of pre-war pre-war Soviet Soviet espionage espionage by by Hiss, Hiss, est White and and others.28 others.28 White O n November 20 Gorsky, Gorsky, the Washington Washington resident whom Bentley knew as ('Al AI, ," On met her her for for the the last last time time in of Bickford's Bickfords cafeteria cafeteria on on 23rd and Sixth met in front front of 23rd Street Street and Sixth NewYork. York. Unaware that they were under surveillance surveillance by the FBI, Gorsky Avenue in New arranged their their next next meeting meeting for for January 20. According According to to Bentley, Bentley, he he told told her her that thatshe she arranged January the time timethe the date for their their next might soon soon be be needed needed ((back back in in undercover undercover work." work. By the might date for next rendezvous arrived, however, however, Gorsky was back in Moscow.29 Moscow.29 His hasty departure rendezvous had arrived,
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was defection.30 A few few months months later the was probably probably due due to to the the discovery discovery of of Bentley's Bentleys defe~tion.~ later the resident (alias "Pravdin"), whose wife known to to resident in in New New York, York, Roland Roland Abbiate Abbiate (alias Pravdin),whose wife was was known Bentley, A damage in the Centre concluded that Bentley, was was also also withdrawn.31 ~ithdrawn.~ damage assessment assessment in the Centre concluded that Bentley did not not know or telephone telephone number number of of her her previous previous Bentley did know the the real real name, name, address address or controller, Iskhak Iskhak Akhmerov, Akhmerov, the the illegal illegal resident resident in the United United States. States. As As a a precaucontroller, in the precau tion, Moscow.32 tion, however, however, he he and and his his wife wife were were recalled recalledto to Moscow.32 The almost almost simultaneous simultaneous recall recall of of Gorsky, Gorsky, Abbiate Abbiate and left the the MGB The and Akhmerov Akhmerov left without experienced experienced leadership leadership in in the the United UnitedStates. States, There were few senior senior officers officers without There were few at the first-hand knowledge knowledge of of North capable of at the Centre Centre with with first-hand North America America capable of succeeding succeeding them. case, as leery of sending peo them. In In any any case, as Yuri YuriModin Modin later later acknowledged, acknowledged, "We We were were leery of sending people for fear officers worked worked in ple out out of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union for fear of of defections. defections. Most Most of of our our officers in Moscow, with with the theresult result that that the thefew few men men posted posted in in foreign foreign countries had aaworkload Moscow, countries had workload so crushing that many many of of them them cracked cracked under the Akhmerov was so crushing that under the pressure."33 Akhmerov was not not replaced as 34 Gorskys Gorsky's two two successors successors as as chief chieflegal replaced as illegal illegal resident resident until until 1948. 1948.34 legal resident resident in the the United UnitedStates States both both became bywords for for incompetence incompetence in in the the Centre. Centre. Grigori Grigori in became bywords Grigoryevich Dolbin, who in 1946, had to replaced in in Grigoryevich Dolbin, who arrived arrived to to replace replace Gorsky Gorsky in 1946, had to be be replaced 1948 it was to the onset of of 1948 after after showing showing signs signs of of insanity insanity (due, (due, it was rumored rumored in in Moscow, Moscow, to the onset hereditary Sokolov, was hereditary syphilis). syphilis). His His successor, successor,Georgi Georgi Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Sokolov, wasreprimanded reprimanded by by the the Centre Centrebefore before being being recalled recalled in in 1949.35 1949.35 The most effective measure taken taken by by the after Bentleys Bentley's The most effective damage damage limitation limitation measure the MGB after defection break off contact with the wartime wartime American American agents agents whose defection was was to to break off contact with most most of of the whose identities Bentley's many leads resulted resulted in sin identities were were known known to to her. her. As As a a result, result, Bentleys many leads in not not a a single to catch of the spies gle prosecution. prosecution. The The FBI began began its its investigations investigations too too late late to catch any any of the spies named classified information, information, and it was was unable named by by Bentley Bentley in in the theact act of of passing passing on on classified and it unable to to use Centre, however, however, failed to grasp grasp the the extent extent use evidence evidence from from wiretaps wiretaps in in court. court. The The Centre, failed to of the FBI and and continued continued to to fear fear for for several several of the the legal legal obstacles obstacles which which confronted confronted the years succeed in major spy spy trial. trial. years that that it itwould would succeed in mounting mounting aamajor The strengthened by by a a major American codebreaking codebreaking success, success, The Centre's Centres fears fearswere were strengthened major American later diplomatic and commu later codenamed codenamed VENONA. For For its its high-grade high-grade diplomatic and intelligence intelligence communications 1927 aa virtually unbreakable cipher cipher system system nications the the Soviet Soviet Union Union had hadused used since since 1927 virtually unbreakable known During and and immediately after the the Sec known in in the the West Westas as the the "one-time one-time pad."36 pad.36During immediately after Second were reissued, reissued, thus thus becoming becoming ond World World War, War, however, however, some some of of the the one-time one-time pads pads were vulnerable-though and British British codebreakers vulnerable-though it it took took several several years years for for American American and codebreakers to to exploit the difficult opportunity offered to them by Soviet cryptographic careless exploit the difficult opportunity offered to them by Soviet cryptographic carelessness. Meredith Gardner, a brilliant cryptanalyst in the Secu ness. Late Late in in 1946 1946 Meredith Gardner, brilliant a cryptanalyst in the US Army Army Security [SIGINT] Agency, rity [SIGINT] Agency, began began decrypting decrypting some some of of the the wartime wartime messages messages exchanged exchanged between Centre and American residencies. the summer summer of of 1947 1947 he had between the the Centre and its its American residencies. By By the he had accumulated of massive Soviet espionage espionage in in the wartime accumulated evidence evidence from from the the decrypts decrypts of massive Soviet the wartime United FBI. From From October October special special agent agent Robert Robert United States. States. In In 1948 1948 ASA called called in in the the FBI. Lamphere began began full-time full-time work work on on VENONA, identify the the agents agents (some Lamphere VENONA, seeking seeking to to identify (some still the VENONA still active) active) whose whose codenames codenames appeared appeared in in the VENONA decrypts.37 decrypts.37Remarkably, Remarkably, however, the Central was not VENONA until late however, the Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency was not informed informed of of VENONA until late in appears not not to have been been told in 1952.38 1952.38Even Even more more remarkably, remarkably, President President Truman Truman appears to have told

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of Director of the the decrypts, decrypts, perhaps perhaps for for fear fearthat that he he might might mention mentionthem them to tothe the Director of of Cen Central one of his weekly meetings with him. tral Intelligence, Intelligence, head head of of the the CIA, at at one of his weekly meetings withhim. VENONA OSS, the VENONA showed showed in in graphic graphic detail detail how how OSS, the CIA's CIASwartime wartime predecessor, predecessor, had had been Sovietagents. agents. Both of the been heavily heavily penetrated penetrated by by Soviet Both Hoover Hoover and and the the Chairman Chairman of the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs Chiefsof of Staff, General General Omar Omar N. Bradley, Bradley, seem seemto to have have suspected-wrongly suspected-wronglythat true of Agency.39 that the thesame same was was true ofthe the Agency.39 The Centre learned 1947-five years earlier than than the The Centre learned the the VENONA secret secret in in 1947five years earlier the CIA-from The son CIA-from anan agent agent in in ASA, William William Weisband Weisband (codenamed (codenamed ZHORA).40 ZHORA).40 The son of employedas as a of Russian Russian immigrants immigrants to to the the United United States, States, Weisband Weisband was was employed a Russian Russian linguist linguist and and roamed roamed around around ASA on on the the pretext pretext oflooking of looking for for projects projectswhere where his his lin linguistic assistance. Meredith guistic skills skills could could be beof of assistance. Meredith Gardner Gardner recalls recalls Weisband Weisband looking looking over over his his shoulder shoulder at at a a critical critical moment moment in in the the project project late late in in 1946, 1946,just justas as he he was was producing producing one the December 2,1944 2, 1944 which one of of the first first important important decrypts-an decrypts-an NKGB telegram telegram of of December which revealed revealed Soviet Sovietpenetration penetration of of Los LosAlamos.41 Alamos.41 For of unpredictable For the the Centre, Centre, VENONA represented represented a a series seriesof unpredictable timebombs timebombs which few years. years. It means of which threatened threatened to to explode explode over over the the next next few I t had had no no means of knowing knowing precisely telegrams would decrypted in part, or or which precisely what what NKGB telegrams would be be decrypted in whole whole or or part, which Soviet them. Moscow's Soviet agents agents would would be be compromised compromised by by them. Moscows anxieties anxietieswere wereheightened heightened by controversy which in the summer of by the the public public controversy which broke broke out out in the United United States States in in the the summer of 1948 public 1948 over over Soviet Soviet espionage. espionage. In In July July 1948 1948 Elizabeth Elizabeth Bentley Bentley gave gave evidence evidence in in public for Committee on on Un-American achieved for the the first first time time to to the theHouse House Committee Un-American Activities Activities and and achieved instant media celebrity celebrity as "Red Spy Qyeen." evidence to the committee in instant media as the the Red Queen. In In evidence to the committee in early others as early August, August, Whittaker Whittaker Chambers Chambers identified identified Hiss, Hiss, White Whiteand and others as members members of of a a secret secret pre-war pre-war Communist Communist underground. underground. The The Centre Centre wrongly wrongly feared feared that that the thecom committee mittee hearings hearings would would be be the the prelude prelude to to a a series series of ofshow show trials trials which which would would expose exposeits its wartime wartime espionage espionage network. network.
D U R I N G TH HE E LAT E 1940s foreign intelligence intelligenceoperations operations were further LATE 1940s Soviet Soviet foreign were further con confused by a reorganization in filsed by a major major reorganization in Moscow, Moscow, prompted prompted by by the the American American National National Security Agency for "for the Security Act Act of of July July 1947 1947 which which established established a a Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency the purpose of of coordinating coordinating the the intelligence intelligence activities activities of of the the several several government government depart departpurpose ments interest Though that ments and and agencies agencies in in the the interest of ofnational national security." security.Though that coordination coordination was was never fully achieved, achieved, Molotov Molotov argued argued that that the the unified unified foreign never foreign intelligence intelligence apparatus apparatus envisaged envisaged by by the the National National Security Security Act Act would would give givethe the United UnitedStates States a a clear clear advantage advantage over the the fragmented fragmented Soviet Soviet system. system.The The solution, solution, he he argued, argued,was was to to combine combine the the for forover eign intelligence directorates directoratesof of both the MGB under a roof eign intelligence both the MGB and and the the GRU under a single single roof. Molotov's Molotovs proposal proposal had had the the further furtheradvantage, advantage, from from Stalin's Stalins viewpoint, viewpoint, of of weakening weakening the power power of of Beria, Beria, whose Viktor Semyonovich Semyonovich Abakumov, the the whose protigi, protege, Viktor Abakumov,headed headed the MGB.42 In October October 1947 1947the the foreign intelligence intelligencedirectorates directoratesof of the MGB and GRU MGB.42 In foreign the MGB and were ed foreign were combined combined to to form form a a new new unifi unified foreign intelligence intelligence agency, agency,the the Committee Committee of of Information (Komitet Informatsii or or KI).43 K I ) . 4 3 Under Under the the new, new, highly highly centralized centralized system, system, Information (Komitet Informatsii even the the operational operational plans plans for forarranging arranging meetings meetings with, with, and and investigating investigating the the reliabil reliabileven ity of, of, important important agents agents required required the the prior prior approval approval of ofthe the KI.44 KI.44 ity

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The as of The appointment appointment of ofMolotov Molotov as first first chairman chairman of of the theCommittee Committee of Information Information gave gave the the Foreign Foreign Ministry Ministry greater greater influence influence on on foreign foreign intelligence intelligence operations operations than than ever rst deputy ever before. before.The The fi first deputy chairman, chairman, responsible responsible to to Molotov Molotov for for day-to-day day-to-day oper operations, Fedotov, who had become ations, was was the the relatively relatively pliant pliant Pyotr Pyotr Vasilyevich Vasilyevich Fedotov, who had become the the MGB man MGB foreign foreign intelligence intelligence chiefin chief in the theprevious previous year.45 year.4 Like Like most most of of the theCentre Centre management, West. agement, Fedotov Fedotov had had almost almost no no experience experience of of the the West. Roland Roland Abbiate, Abbiate, the the former former resident New York resident in in New York and and probably probably the the senior senior intelligence intelligence officer officer best best acquainted acquainted with with the the West, West,was was sacked sacked on on the the formation formation of of the the KI. KI. His His file file records records that that he he was was given thatit "it was given no no explanation explanation for for his his dismissal dismissal and and that was a a terrible terrible blow blow for for him." him. Though Though the the reason reason for for the the sacking sacking is is not not recorded, recorded, it it may may well well have havebeen been related related to to his his foreign foreign Jewish Jewish ancestry, ancestry, which which is is duly duly noted noted in in his his me. file. Abbiate Abbiate was was briefly briefly rein reinstated stated after after Stalin's Stalins death, death, then then sacked sacked again again and and later later committed committed suicide.46 suicide.46 Molotov sought strengthen Foreign Molotov sought toto strengthen Foreign Ministry Ministry control control of of KI operations operations by by appointing appointing Soviet Soviet ambassadors ambassadors in in major major capitals capitals as as "chief chief legal legal residents" residents with with authority authority over over both both civilian civilian (ex-MGB) (ex-MGB) and and military military (ex-GRU) (ex-GRU) residents. residents. In In the the jaun jaundiced dicedview view of of the the later later KGB KGB defector defector Ilya Ilya Dzhirkvelov: Dzhirkvelov: This This resulted resulted in in incredible incredible confusion. confbsion. The The residents, residents, the the professional professional intelli intelligence gence officers, officers, resorted resorted to to incredible incredible subterfuges subterfuges to to avoid avoid informing informing their their ambassadors ambassadors about about their their work, work, since since the the diplomats diplomats had had only only amateurish amateurish knowl knowl47 edge edge of of intelligence intelligence work work and and its its methods methods .. .. ..47 Some Some diplomats, diplomats, however, however, became became directly directly involved involved in in intelligence intelligence operations. operations. Mter After the troubles in the Washington residency which led to the recall of two successive the troubles in the Washington residency which led to the recall of two successive residents residents in in 1948-9, 1948-9, the the Soviet Soviet ambassador, ambassador, Aleksandr Aleksandr Semyonovich Semyonovich Panyushkin, Panyushkin, took took personal personal charge charge for for a a year. year. He H e acquired acquired such such a a taste taste for for intelligence intelligence that that he helater later became became head head of of the the KGB KGB First First (foreign (foreign intelligence) intelligence) Chief Chief Directorate.48 Dire~torate.~~ In In 1949 1949 Molotov, Molotov, now now out out of of favor favor with with Stalin, Stalin, was was succeeded succeeded as as both both Foreign Foreign Minister Minister and and chairman chairman of of the the KI I U by by his his former former deputy, deputy, Andrei Andrei Vyshinsky, Vyshinsky, who who had had made brutal prosecutor the prewar made his his reputation reputation as as the the brutal prosecutor in in the prewar show show trials. trials. Vyshinsky Vyshinsky retained retained a a sycophantic sycophantic devotion devotion to to Beria Beria which which showed showed itself itself even even on on the thetelephone. telephone. According to one of his successors, Andrei Gromyko, t'As soon as he heard According to one of his successors, Andrei Gromyko, As soon as he heard Beria's Berias voice voice Vyshinsky Vyshinskyleapt leapt respectfully respectfully out out of of his his chair. chair. The The conversation conversation itself itself also also pre presented sented an an unusual unusual picture: picture: Vyshinsky Vyshinsky cringed cringed like like a a servant servant before before his his master."49 master.49 Unlike Unlike Molotov, Molotov, Vyshinsky Vyshinsky had had little little interest interest in in KI affairs, affairs, handing handing over over the the chair chairmanship after a few months to Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin. Fedotov manship after a few months to Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin. Fedotov was succeeded as was succeeded as first first deputy deputy chairman chairman in in charge charge of of day-to-day day-to-day operations operations by by the the more more brutal brutal and and decisive decisive Sergei Sergei Romanovich Romanovich Savchenko, Savchenko,like like Vyshinsky Vyshinsky a a protege protCgC of of Beria. answered to thanthe the Foreign Beria. Savchenko Savchenko seems seems to to have have answered to Beria Beria rather rather than Foreign Min Ministry.50 istry. By By the the time time Vyshinsky Vyshinsky succeeded succeeded Molotov, Molotov, much much of of the the Committee Committee of of Informa Information tion had hadunraveled. unraveled. In In the the summer summerof of 1948, 1948, after after a a prolonged prolonged dispute dispute with with Molotov, Molotov, Marshal Armed Forces, Marshal Nikolai Nikolai Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Bulganin, Bulganin, Minister Minister for for the the Armed Forces, began began

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withdrawing withdrawing military military intelligence intelligence personnel personnel from from KI control control and and returning returning them them to to the RU. Probably Beria, Abakumov GRU. Probably with with the the support support of ofBeria, Abakumov then then embarked embarked on on a a long long the G drawn remnants of KI. At drawn out out struggle struggle to to recover recover control control of of the the remnants of the the KI. At the the end end of of 1948 1948 all residency offi c ers in the EM (Russian emigre) and SK (Soviet colonies abroad) all residency officers in the (Russian tmigrt) and (Soviet colonies abroad) Lines returned Lines returned to to the theMGB. MGB. The The KI was was finally finally wound wound up up and and the the rest rest of of its its foreign foreign intelligence returned to intelligence responsibilities responsibilities returned to the theMGB late late in in 1951.51 1951.
of the the KI period period to to the the subsequent subsequent development development of of Soviet Soviet intel intelof ligence was was a a renewed renewed emphasis on illegals illegals who, who, it it was was believed, believed, would would eventually eventually ligence emphasis on establish secure and establish a a more more secure and better-concealed better-concealed foundation foundation for for foreign foreign intelligence intelligence operations than the United United States. States. The operations than the the legal legal residencies, residencies, particularly particularly in in the The Fourth Fourth (Illegals) Directorate (Illegals) Directorate of of the the KI, formed formed by by combining combining the the illegals illegals sections sections of of the the MGB and the GRU, MGB andthe GRU, hada had a total total staff staff of of eighty-seven, eighty-seven, headed headed by by Aleksandr Aleksandr Mikhailovich had made Mikhailovich Korotkov, Korotkov, who who had made his his reputation reputation during during pre-war pre-war missions missions to to assassinate enemies "enemies of people" on assassinate of the the people on foreign foreign soil. soil. In In 1949, 1949, by by which which time time military military personnel the directorate RU, forty-nine personnel in in the directorate had had returned returned to to the the G GRU, forty-nine illegals illegals were were in in trainings2 Korotkov set set up up departments departments specializing specializing in in the the selection selection of of illegals, illegals,their their training. 52 Korotkov training and and the thefabrication fabrication of of documentation to support support their their legends. By 1952 1952 the the training documentation to legends. By documentation doctored 364 identity documents, documentation department department had hadforged forged or or doctored 364 foreign foreign identity documents, including seventy-eight seventy-eight passports. Illegal support support (Line (Line N) N) officers officers were were sent sent by by the the including passports. Illegal Centre to to all all major major legal legal residencies.53 re~idencies.~ Centre The first first priority priority of of the the Fourth Fourth Directorate Directoratewas was the the creation creation of of a a new new illegal illegal resi resiThe dency in in New New York to to rebuild rebuild its its American American intelligence intelligence operations. operations. The The man man selected selected dency York as as illegal illegal resident, resident, the the first first since since Akhmerov's Akhmerovs departure departure from from the the United United States States at at the the beginning of of 1946, 1946, was was Vilyam Vilyam("Willie") (Willie) Genrikhovich Genrikhovich Fisher, Fisher, codenamed codenamed MARK, beginning probably the the only only English-born English-born Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence officer.54 officer.54Fisher's Fishersparents parents were were probably Russian revolutionaries revolutionaries of of the the Tsarist Tsarist era era who who had had emigrated emigrated in in 1901 1901 to toNewcastle NewcastleRussian on-Tyne, where where Vilyam Vilyam had had been born in 1903. In In 1921 1921 the family returned returned to to on-Tyne, been born in 1903.55 the family Moscow, where Fisher became became a a Comintern translator. During During military service in in Moscow, where Fisher Comintern translator. military service 1925-6, he he was was trained trained as as a a radio radio operator operator and, and, after after a a brief brief period period in in the the Fourth 1925-6, Fourth Department (Military Intelligence), was was recruited recruited by by I N 0 (OGPU foreign foreign intelli intelliDepartment (Military Intelligence), INO gence) 1927. He residencies in Turkey, gence) in in 1927. He served served as as a a radio radio operator operator in in residencies in Norway, Norway, Turkey, Britain and and France France until until 1936, 1936,when whenhe he was appointed appointed head head of of a a training training school school for for Britain was radio operators operators in in illegal illegal residencies. re~idencies.~ radio 56 Fisher was was fortunate fortunate not not to to be be shot shot during duringthe theGreat Great Terror. His His file file records records that, that, Fisher Terror. as well well as as being automatically suspect of his his English English background, background, he he had as being automatically suspect because because of had been referred to to in in positive positive terms by a a series series of of "enemies enemies of of the the people, and his his been "referred terms" by people," and wifes brother was accused accusedof being a Trotskyite. Though dismissed dismissed by the NKVD at wife's the the end end of of 1938, 1938, he he survived survived to to be be reemployed reemployed during during the the Great Great Patriotic Patriotic War in in a a trainingradio operators for guerrilla and intelligence operations behind German German unit training lines.57 lines. 57 Fishers training as an illegal began in 1946 the Fisher's 1946under under the personal supervision supervision of Illegals Department. Korotkov, the head of the MGB I1legals Korotkov, Department. His legend was unusually complicated. Fisher assumed one identity identityduring duringhis journey to the United United States in complicated.
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1948 and another shortly after his arrival. arrival. The first identity was that of of Andrei 1948 Yurgesovich Kayotis, Kayotis, a a Lithuanian Lithuanian born born in 1895 who had the United United Yurgesovich in 1 895 who had emigrated emigrated to to the States become an crossed the States and and become an American American citizen. citizen. In In November November 1947 1947 Kayotis Kayotis crossed the to visit relatives relatives in Europe. While he was in Denmark, the the Soviet embassy Atlantic to issued a travel document enabling him to visit Russia and retained his passport for by Fisher. Fisher. In October 1948 1948Fisher traveled to Warsaw on a a Soviet passport, then use by Kayotiss passport via Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia and Switzerland to Paris, where he traveled on Kayotis's Scythia. On O n November 6 he set sail from purchased a transatlantic ticket on the SS SS Scythia. Montreal and-still and-still using Kayotiss passportLe Havre to Quebec, Qyebec, traveled on to Montreal Kayotis's passport the United UnitedStates on November 17.58 17.* crossed into the O n November November 26 26 Fisher Fisher had had a a secret secret meeting meeting in New York York with with the the celebrated On in New celebrated Soviet illegal illegalI. Grigulevich (codenamed (codenamed MAKS), who had hadtaken in the thefirst Soviet I. R. Grigulevich MAKS), who taken part part in first attempt to to assassinate Trotsky in in Mexico Mexico City and had had led led a Latin American attempt assassinate Trotsky City and a Latin American sabosabo thethe war attacking ships and cargoes cargoes bound tage groupduring during bound for for Germanys9 Germany. 59 1,000 dollars dollars and three documents in the Grigulevich gave Fisher 1,000 the name of of Emil certificate, a draft draft card forged by the Centre and a Robert Goldfus: Goldfus: a genuine birth certificate, tax certificate certificate (also (also forged). forged). Fisher Fisher handed tax handed back back Kayotiss Kayotis's documents documents and and became became Goldfus. The The real real Goldfus, Goldfus, born born in inNew New York on August 2, 2,1902, had died theage Goldfus. York on August 1902, had died at at the age of only fourteen months. Fishers file records that his birth certificate had been of only fourteen months. Fisher's file records that his birth certificate had been theend end time when obtained by the NKVD in Spain at the of the Spanish Civil Civil War, at at aatime when it was was collecting collecting identity identity documents documents from from members InternationalBrigades it members of of the the International Brigades for for use in in illegal illegal operations, operations, but but gives gives no no other other details details of the use of its its provenance. provenance. According According to to the legend constructed by by the the Centre, Centre,Goldfus the son German house legend constructed Goldfus was was the son of of aaGerman house painter painter in in New York, York, had had spent his childhood childhood at at 120 120 East East87th 87thStreet, Street, left 1916 and New spent his left school school in in 1916 and 1926. After After further Rapids, Detroit worked in Detroit Detroit until until 1926. further periods periods in in Grand Grand Rapids, Detroit and and Chicago, the legendary had returned Chicago, the legendary Goldfus Goldfus had returned to to New New York York in in 1947. 1947. The The legend, legend, however, was wasfar far from perfect. perfect. The The Centre Centre instructed instructed Fisher however, from Fisher not not to to seek seek employment employment for fear fear that that his his employer employer would would make make inquiries inquiries which cover. Instead, for which would would blow blow his his cover. Instead, he to be be self-employed.60 As Fisher Fisher minmin he was was told told to to open open an an artist's artists studio studio and and claim claim to self-employed.60 As gled with with other otherNew New York York artists, artists, his his technique technique gradually gradually improved hebecame gled improved and and he became a a competent, if surprised friends friends in in the artistic comcom competent, if rather rather conventional, conventional, painter. painter. He H e surprised the artistic munity with withhis his admiration admiration for for the the late late nineteenth-century nineteenth-century Russian Russian painter painter Levitan, munity Levitan, realism, of whom they had never heard, but made no no mention of of Stalinist Stalinist socialist "socialist realism," with which which he he was was probably probably also also in in sympathy. sympathy. Fisher made no dislike for with Fisher made no secret secret of of his his dislike for abstract painting. painting. "You You know," know,he he told told another another artist, I think abstract artist, "I think most most contemporary contemporary art art is headed down blind aliey."61 is headed down a a blind alley.61 In Fisher was control of of a a group of In 1949, 1949, as as the the basis basis of of his his illegal illegal residency, residency,Fisher was given givencontrol groupof agents Cohen (codenamed (codenamed LUIS and and VOLUNTEER), VOLUNTEER), which which agents headed headed by by Morris Morris Cohen included his wife Lona (LESLE).62 (LESLE).62 Following Elizabeth Bentleys Bentley's defection, the Centre had broken contact contact with early in in 1946, renewed Centre had temporarily temporarily broken with the the Cohens Cohensearly 1946,but butrenewed contact with them in Paris a year later and reactivated them in the United States contact with them in Paris a year later and reactivated them in the United States in in 1948.63 The was the physicist network was the physicist 1948.63 The most most important important agent agent in in the the VOLUNTEER network Ted Hall Hall (MLAD), for whom whom Lona LonaCohen Cohen had acted as 1945 when Ted (MLAD), for had acted as courier courier in in 1945 when he he was was passing intelligence from Los Alamos.64 Early in in 1948, then working for for passing atomic atomic intelligence from Los Alamos.63Early 1948,Hall, Hall, then working

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his his PhD at at Chicago Chicago University, University, had had joined joined the the Communist CommunistParty Partytogether together with with his his wife wife Joan, Joan, apparently apparently with with the the intention intention of of abandoning abandoning work work as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent and and working working for for the the campaign campaign of of the the Progressive Progressive candidate, candidate, the the naively naively pro-Soviet pro-Soviet Henry Henry Wallace, the presidential Morris Cohen, however, Wallace, in in the presidential election.65 ele~tion.~ Morris Cohen, however, persuaded persuaded Hall Hall to to return return to to espionage. espionage. On O n August August 2, 2, 1948 1948 the the Washington Washington residency residency telegraphed telegraphed the the Centre: Centre: LUIS LUIS has has met met MLAD. MLAD. He H e has has persuaded persuaded him him to to break break contact contact with with the the Pro Progressive gressive organization organization and and concentrate concentrate on on science. science. Important Important information information obtained obtained on on MLAD's MLADs two two new new contacts. contacts. They They have have declared declared their their wish wish to to transmit data on on ENORMOZ transmit data ENORMOZ [the [the nuclear nuclear program], program], subject subject to to two two condi conditions: tions: MLAD MLAD must must be be their their only only contact contact and and their their names names must must not not be be known known to to officers officers of of ARTEMIS ARTEMIS [Soviet [Soviet intelligence].66 intelligence].66 The The VOLUNTEER network network expanded expanded to to include, include, in in addition addition to to MLAD, MLAD, three three other EN, SERB Two other agents: agents: AD ADEN, SERB and and SILVER.67 SILVER.67 Two of of these these were were undoubtedly undoubtedly the the two two nuclear nuclear physicists physicists contacted contacted by by Hall. Hall. Though Though their their identities identities remain remain unknown, unknown, the the Centre rst importance. Centre clearly clearly regarded regarded their their intelligence intelligence as as of of the the fi first importance. According According to to an an SVR history, history, "the the Volunteer Volunteer group group .. .. .. were were able able to to guarantee guarantee the the transmittal transmittal to to the the Centre Centre of of supersecret supersecret information information concerning concerning the the development development of of the the American American atomic atomic bomb."68 bomb.68 In success, Fisher awarded the groups success, Fisher was was awarded the In recognition recognition of of the the VOLUNTEER group's Order A year however, his was Order of of Red Red Banner Banner in in August August 1949.69 1949.69 year later, later, however, his illegal illegal residency residency was disrupted Cohen had disrupted by the the arrest arrest of of Julius Julius and and Ethel Ethel Rosenberg, Rosenberg, for for whom whom Lona Lona Cohen had acted were withdrawn acted as as courier. courier. Both Both the theCohens Cohens were quickly quickly withdrawn to to Mexico, Mexico,where where they they were were sheltered sheltered for for several several months months by by the the Soviet Soviet agents agents OREL OREL ("Eagle") (Eagle)and and FISH-both FISH-both members 7-before moving members of of the the Spanish Spanish Communist Communist Party Party in in exile exile7-before moving on on to toMoscow. Moscow. The years later, later, under The Cohens Cohens were were to to resurface resurface a a few few years under the the names names Peter Peter and and Helen Helen Kroger, as members of a new illegal residency in Britain.71 Hall's career as a Soviet Kroger, as members of a new illegal residency in Britain.71 Halls career as a Soviet spy was also interrupted. was also interrupted. In In March March 1951 1951 he he was was questioned questioned by by an an FBI team team which which was was convinced convinced that that he he was was guilty guilty of of espionage espionage but but lacked lacked the the evidence evidence for for a a prosecution.72 prose~ution.~ Under Under his his later later alias alias "Rudolf Rudolf Abel," Abel, Fisher Fisher was was to to become become one one of of the the best-known best-known of of all all Soviet Soviet illegals, illegals, whose whose career career was waspublicized publicized by by the the KGB as as a a prime prime example example of of the the Cold War. the success success and and sophistication sophistication of of its its operations operations in in the theWest Westduring during the Cold War. In In reality, reality, Fisher Fisher never never came came close close to to rivaling rivaling the the achievements achievements of of his his wartime wartime predeces predecessor, resident, sor, Iskhak Iskhak Akhmerov. Akhmerov. During During eight eight years years as asillegal illegal resident, he he appears appears never never to to have have identified, let let alone alone recruited, recruited, a a single single promising promising potential potential agent agent to to replace the VOL VOLidentified, replace the UNTEER network. 73 Unlike network.73 Unlike Akhmerov, Akhmerov, however, however, he he did did not not have have the the active active and and enthusiastic to to enthusiastic assistance assistanceof of a a well-organized well-organized American American Communist Communist Party Party(CPUSA) (CPUSA) act act as as talent-spotters talent-spotters and and assistants. assistants.Part Part of of the the reason reason for for Fisher's Fishers lack lack of of success success was was the the post-war post-war decline decline and and persecution persecution of of the the CPUSA.74 CPUSA.74
ST T I I M P O RTA R T AN NT T American American THE MOS

agent recruited recruited during during the theearly early Cold Cold War, War, Alek Alekagent sandr ("Sasha") (Sashd) Grigoryevich Grigoryevich Kopatzky, Kopatzky, was was a a walk-in. walk-in. Kopatzky Kopatzky had had been been born born in in sandr

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the in 1923,75 1923/5 and and had had served as a lieutenant in in the city city of of Surozh Surozh in in Bryansk Bryansk Oblast Oblast in served as a lieutenant Soviet he was by the Soviet intelligence intelligence from from August August 1941 1941 until until he was wounded wounded and and captured captured by the Germans hospital he agreed to to work work for Ger Germans in inDecember December 1943. 1943.While While in in aaGerman German hospital he agreed for German man intelligence. intelligence. During During the the last last two two months months of of the the war war he he served served as as an an intelligence intelligence officer in in General Vlasovs anti-Soviet anti-Soviet Russian Russian Army Army of Liberation which which officer General Andrei Andrei Vlasov's of Liberation fought the Red in alliance the Wehrmacht. At end of fought the Red Army Army in alliance with with the Wehrmacht. At the the end of the the war, war, Kopatzky Kopatzky was was briefly briefly imprisoned imprisoned by by the the American American authorities authorities in in the the former former concen concentration camp camp at at Dachau.76 tration dacha^.^' Despite his his service service in in the Kopatzkys anti-Soviet anti-Soviet credentials credentials seemed so Despite the NKVD, Kopatzky's seemed so well established established that that he he was was invited invited to to join join the theAmerican-supervised German intel intelwell American-supervised German ligence service service established established in in 1946 Pullach, near near Munich, General Reinhard Reinhard ligence 1946 at at Pullach, Munich, by by General Gehlen, former Wehrmacht Wehrmacht intelligence intelligence chief chief on on the eastern front.77 front.77In In 1948 Gehlen, the the former the eastern 1948 Kopatzky further further distanced distanced himself himself from from his his Soviet Soviet past past by by marrying marrying the the daughter daughter of of Kopatzky a former former SS officer, Eleonore Stirner, who who had hadbeen been briefly briefly imprisoned imprisoned for a SS officer, Eleonore Stirner, for her her activactiv ities ities in the the Hitler Hitler Youth. Eleonore later recalled that her her husband drank "drank a lot lot of vodka. He kissed kissed ladies H e was was very his shoes, shoes, did did his vodka. He ladies' hands hands .. .. .. He very punctual, punctual, shined shined his his gymnastics gymnastics in the morning, had a neat haircut, short hair all his life. And he was a very good good shot. liked to to hunt hunt and talked of of hunting hunting tigers tigers in in Siberia with his his very shot. Sasha Sasha liked and talked Siberia with father. Many Many years years later, later, after after Sasha's Sashas death, death, it it suddenly occurred to father." suddenly occurred to Eleonore, Eleonore, while while watching a televised televised adaptation adaptation of a John John Le CarrC novel, watching a of a Le Carre novel, that that her her husband husband might might have married married her toimprove improve his his cover. cover. That That realization, realization, she she says, camelike like a mounhave her to says, "came a moun tain of of bricks bricks on on me."78 By By their their wedding wedding day day Kopatzky Kopatzky was was probably probably already already plan plantain ning to torenew renew contact contact with Soviet intelligence. intelligence. ning with Soviet The SVR still still regards the Kopatzky Kopatzky case case as sensitive. It insisted as The regards the as extremely extremely sensitive. It insisted as recently as as 1997 1997 that that no no file which suggests suggests that that Kopatzky, Kopatzky, under under any any of his recently file exists exists which of his aliases, ever engaged in in "collaboration collaboration .. .. .. with with Soviet Soviet intelligence."79 intelligen~e.~~ Mitrokhin, aliases, ever engaged Mitrokhin, however, was was able able to to take take detailed detailed notes notes from from the the bulky bulky file file which which the the SVR claims claims however, does not exist.The file reveals that in 1949 Kopatzky visited the Soviet military does not exist. The file reveals that in 1949 Kopatzky visited the Soviet military mismis sion sion in in Baden-Baden, Baden-Baden, and and was was secretly secretly transported transported to to East East Berlin Berlin where where he he agreed agreed to become become a a Soviet Soviet agent.80 agent. Soon Soon afterwards, he infiltrated the anti-Soviet anti-Soviet CmigrC to afterwards, he infiltrated the emigre organization of the the Struggle Struggle for forLiberation ofthe of Russia Russia organization Union Union of Liberation of the Peoples Peoples of (SBONR), based based in in Munich, Munich,which whichhad had close links links with with the the CIA. CIA. In In 1951, 1951, doubt doubt(SBONR), close less to to his his Soviet Soviet controllers' controllers delight, delight, he he was was recruited recruited by by the the CIA station station in in West West less Berlin as as "principal principal agent."81 agent. Successively Successively codenamed codenamed ERWIN, ERWIN, HERBERT and and Berlin by the the Centre, Kopatzky received received a a monthly salary of of 500 marks marks in in RICHARD by Centre, Kopatzky monthly salary addition to to his his income income from from the the CIA. CIA. Among Among his his earliest earliest successes on Novemaddition successes was, was, on Novem 1951, to get one one of fellow CIA agents, agents, the the Estonian Vladimir Kivi Kivi ber 5, ber 5, 1951, to get of his his fellow Estonian Vladimir (wrongly described in Kopatzws file file as as an an "American American intelligence intelligence chief"), chief), drunk, drunk, (wrongly described in Kopatzky's transport him to East East Berlin and hand hand him over to to Soviet Soviet intelligence.82 intelligence.s2Though Though transport him to Berlin and him over Kopatzky at Agency headquarters, he he Kopatzky was was not not aaCIA staff staff officer officer and and never never worked worked at Agency headquarters, did enormous enormous damage damage to to Agency Agency operations operations in in Germany Germany for formore more than than a a decade.83 decade.83 did than twenty-three According to his file, no fewer than twenty-three KGB legal operational officers officers and one one illegal illegal "met met and and worked worked with with him" him-a certain indication indication of of how how highly highly the the and -a certain Centre Centre rated rated him.84 him.84

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Soviet United States States as Soviet intelligence intelligence regarded regarded the the United as its place at thebeginning beginning of Cold War War was its "main main adversary." adversary. In In second second place at the of the the Cold was the the United United Kingdom. came France.85 United States's Statess closest closest ally, ally, the the United Kingdom. In In third third position position came France.s5 Before Before the the Second Second World World War, War, France France had had been been a a major major base base for for NKVD foreign foreign operations. Her crushing crushing defeat June 1940, 1940, however, German operations. Her defeat in in June however, followed followed by by the the German occupation occupation of of northern northern France, France, the the establishment establishment of of the the collaborationist collaborationist Vichy Vichy regime in the south (later also occupied by the Germans) and Hitler's invasion regime in the south (later also occupied by the Germans)and Hitlers invasion of of the the Soviet Union in 1941 drastically scope for Soviet Union inJune June 1941 drastically reduced reduced the the scope for Soviet Soviet penetration. penetration. The The NKGB sections of NKGB did, did, however, however, establish establish a a strong strongpresence presence within within Communist Communist sections of the the French French Resistance. Resistance. There There were were two two main main groups groups of of Soviet Soviet agents agents in in wartime wartime France: France: one one in in Paris Paris of of about about fifty fifty Communists Communists and and fellow fellow travelers travelers headed headed by by LEMOINE (transliterated (transliterated into into the the Cyrillic Cyrillic alphabet alphabet as as LEMONYE), LEMONYE), and and another another of of over over twenty-five twenty-five headed headed by by HENRI, HENRI, based based on on Toulouse, Toulouse, with, with, from from 1941, 1941, aasubgroup subgroup in in Paris. Paris. According According to to KGB records, the LEMOINE group, most of whom believed they were working for records, the group, most of whom believed they were working for the than the disbanded because because of the Communist Communist Party Partyrather rather than the NKGB, "was was disbanded oftreachery." treachery. Though LUCIEN, MORIS, six members members of of the the HENRI group group (KLOD, (KLOD, LUCIEN, MONS, ROBERT ROBERT Though six and core and ZHANETTA) ZHANETTA) were were caught caught and and shot shot by by the the Germans, Germans,the the core of of the the group group sur survived.86 vived.86 At At the the end end of of the the war war Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence had had much much greater greater freedom freedom of of action action in in France in either United States France than than in either the the United States or or Britain. Britain. The The Parti Parti Communiste Communiste Fmnfais Frnnfais (PCF) the wartime (PCF) publicly publicly congratulated congratulated itself itself on on its its undeniably undeniably heroic heroic role role in in the wartime the shot), shot"), and Resistance, Resistance, proudly proudly termed termed itself itself Ie le parti parti des des fusillis fusilks ("the (the party party of of the and greatly heroes. From General de de greatly inflated inflated the the numbers numbers of of its its fallen fallen heroes. From August August 1944, 1944,when when General Gaulle Gaulle invited invited the the PCF to to join jointhe theProvisional Provisional Government, Government, there there were were Communist Communist ministers ministers for for the the first first time time in in French French history. history. According According to to an an opinion opinion poll poll in in May May 1945, 57 percent thought that defeat 1945,57 percent of of the the population population thought thatthe the defeat of of Germany Germany was was due due prin principally to the Soviet Union (20 percent gave the most credit to the United States, cipally to the Soviet Union (20 percent gave the most credit to the UnitedStates, 12 12 percent PCF, percent to to Britain). Britain). In In the the elections elections of of October October 1945 1945the the PCF, with with 26 26percent percent of of the the vote, had almost vote, emerged emerged as as the the largest largest party party in in France. France. By the the end end of of the the year year it it had almost 800,000 800,000members. members.Though Though support support for for the the PCF had had almost almost peaked, peaked, there there were were many many who hoped-or feared, particularly after de Gaulle's resignation early in 1946-that who hoped-or feared, particularly after de Gaulles resignation early in 1946-that France "people's democracy." France was was on on the the road road to to becoming becoming a a Communist-controlled Communist-controlled peoples democracy. One minister privately senior civil One socialist socialist minister privately complained, complained, "How How many many senior civil servants, servants, even even at at the top, are the very very top, are backing backing Communism Communism to to win! ,,87 The The Centre's Centres first first instructions instructions to to the the newly newly re-established re-established Paris Paris residency residencyafter after the the Liberation, dated November 18, 1944, instructed it to profi t from the "current favor Liberation, dated November 18,1944, instructed it toprofit from the current favorable the pre-war able situation" situation to to renew renew contact contact with with the pre-war agent agent network network and and recruit recruit new new agents interior ministries, intelligence agencies agencies and agents in in the theforeign foreign and and interior ministries, intelligence and political political parties parties and and organizations. organizations. Inspired Inspired by by the the success success of of scientific scientific and and technological technological intelligence intelligencegathering United States, Centre sent gathering in in Britain Britain and and the the United States, the the Centre sent further further instructions instructions on on February 1945, ordering February 20, 20,1945, ordering the the residency residency to to extend extend its its recruitment recruitment to to the thePasteur Pasteur and and

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Curie The Curie Institutes Institutes and and other other leading leading research research bodies.88 bodies.8s The appointment appointment of of the the ardent ardent Communist Communist and and Nobel Nobel Laureate Laureate Frederic FrCdCric Joliot-Curie Joliot-Curie as as the the French French government's governments Director Director of of Scientific Scientific Research Research doubdess doubtless delighted delighted the the Centre. Centre. Joliot-Curie Joliot-Curie assured assured Moscow Moscow that that "French French scientists scientists .. .. .. will will always always be be at at your your disposal disposalwithout without asking asking for for any any information information in in return."89 return.89 During During 1945 1945 the theParis Paris residency residency sent sent 1,123 1,123 reports reports to to Moscow, Moscow, based based on on intelli intelligence gence from from seventy seventy sources. sources. Its Its operational operational problems problems derived derived not not from from any any lack lack of of agents but from a shortage of controllers. Up to February 1945 the residency had agents but from a shortage of controllers. Up to February 1945 the residency had only only three three operational operational officers.9o officers. In In May May MARCEL MARCEL of of the the wartime wartime HENRI HENRI group group was was instructed instructed to to set set up up a a new new group group to to assist assist in in the thepenetration penetration of of the the post-war post-war for foreign eign and and domestic domestic intelligence intelligence agencies, agencies, the the foreign foreign ministry ministry and and the thepolitical political parties, parties, and By November and in inre-establishing re-establishing control control over over agents agents in in the theprovinces.91 provinces.l By November the the num number ber of of operational operational officers officers in in the theParis Paris residency residency had had increased increased to to seven, seven,supported supported by by six six technical technical staff, staff, but but there there was was to to be be no no further further increase increase for for several several years. years.In In addi addition tion to to recruiting recruiting new new agents, agents, the the residency residency was was ordered ordered to to check check individually individually every every agent agent recruited recruited before before the the war. war. Unsurprisingly, Unsurprisingly, its its 1945 1945 reports reports were were criticized criticized for for lack insufficient lack of of depth depthand and insufficient attention attention to tothe themost most valuable valuable agents.92 agents.92 The The next next available available statistics statistics on on the the intelligence intelligence supplied supplied by by the the Paris Paris residency residency cover 1946 to June 1947, when cover the the period period from from July July 1, 1,1946 to June 30, 30,1947, when it it supplied supplied 2,627 2,627 reports reports and 945. It and documents, documents, well well over over double double the the total total for for 1 1945. I t also also had had some some major major recruit recruiting ing successes. successes.In In 1944 1944WEST, WEST, recruited recruited by by HENRI HENRI from from the the Resistance Resistance in in the thepre previous ER (from vious year, year, joined joined the the newly newly founded founded foreign foreign intelligence intelligence agency agency the the DG DGER (from January January 1946 1946 the the Service Service de de Documentation Documentation Exterieure ExtCrieure et et de de Contre Contre Espionnage Espionnage (SDECE , working the Italian, desk. (SDECE)), working first first on on the the British, British,then then the Italian, desk. His His file file records records that that he on the theFrench, French, Italian and British he provided provided "valuable valuable information information on Italian and British intelligence intelligence services." 1945and and services.Though Though WEST WEST (later (later renamed renamed RANOL) RANOL) was was dismissed dismissed in in 1945 moved moved to to a a career career in in publishing, publishing, he he retained retained contact contact with with some some of of his his former former col colleagues. the first the files leagues. RATYEN, RATYEN, the first of of his his recruits recruits to to be be identified identified in in the files noted noted by by Mitrokhin, was dismissed from SDECE in 1946. In 1 947 WEST recruited two, Mitrokhin, was dismissed from SDECE in 1946. In 1947 WEST recruited two, more more important important SDECE SDECE officers, officers, codenamed codenamed CHOUAN CHOUAN (or (or TORMA) TORMA) and and NOR NOR (or (or NORMAN).93 NORNIAN).93 Soviet Soviet penetration penetration was was assisted assisted by by the the chronic chronic infighting infighting within withinSDECE. SDECE.In I n May May 1946 Andre Dewavrin (alias "Passy"), de Gaulle's wartime intelligence chief and 1946 AndrC Dewavrin (alias Passy),de Gaulles wartime intelligence chief and the the first first head head of of SDECE, SDECE, was was arrested arrested on on a a charge charge of of embezzlement embezzlement of of which which he he was was later Dewavrin's successor, later found found innocent.94 innocent.94For For the the next next few few years years Dewavrins successor, Henri Henri Ribiere, Ribiere, and and his his deputy, deputy, Pierre Pierre Fourcaud, Fourcaud, were were engaged engaged in in such such bitter bitter feuding feuding that that Fourcaud Fourcaud was was forced forced to to deny deny accusations accusations that that he he had had sabotaged sabotaged the the brakes brakes of of Ribiere's Ribieres car car and and caused caused a a near near fatal fatal accident. accident. On O n one one occasion, occasion, during during the the fractious fractious daily daily meeting meeting of of SDECE SDECE division division heads, heads, Ribiere Ribikre drove drove his his deputy deputy out out of of the the room room with with his his walking walking stick. SDECE stick.As As one one SDECE officer officer complained, complained, "[DJivision [Dlivision heads, heads, finding finding themselves themselveswith with confl icting orders conflicting orders from from their their director director and and his his deputy, deputy, did did not not know know what what to to do."95 do.95 In 1947, the Paris 1,147 In the the year year up up to to June June30, 30,1947, the Paris residency residency forwarded forwarded to to the theCentre Centre 1,147 documents documents on on the theFrench French intelligence intelligence services, services, 92 92 on on French French intelligence intelligence operations operations against The against the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and 50 50 on onother other intelligence intelligence agencies.96 agencies.96 The files files noted noted by by

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Mitrokhin O R worked n political Mitrokhin record record that that both both CHOUAN and and N NOR worked o on political intelligence intelligence (SDECE Section dCtudes d'etudes politiques). in the the was employed employed for for a a time time in (SDECE Section politiques). CHOUAN was American department department of Bloc affairs. American of SDECE, SDECE, but but by by 1949 1949 was was working working on on Soviet Soviet Bloc affairs. NOR 30,000 francs N O R specialized specialized in in intelligence intelligence on on ltaly.97 Italy.97WEST was was paid paid 30,000 francs a a month month by in 1957 1957 was francs to buy a Ivan by the the Paris Paris residency, residency, and and in was given given 360,000 360,000 francs to buy a flat.98 flat.98Ivan Ivanovich of his his Ivanovich Agayants, Agayants, the the Paris Paris resident resident from from 1946 1946 to to 1948, 1948,was was fond fond of of boasting boasting of success penetrating SDECE. In a lecture at theCentre Centre 1952 success in in penetrating SDECE. In a lecture at the inin 1952 he he sneeringly sneeringly described "that prostitute described French French intelligence intelligence as as that prostitute I put put in in my my pocket."99 Penetration at the the Quai Qyai d'Orsay difficult. Penetration of of the the Foreign Foreign Ministry Ministry at dOrsay proved proved more more difficult. During a union leader leader Benoit Benoit During a visit visit to to Moscow Moscow in in June June 1946, 1946, the the Communist Communist trade trade union Frachon Frachon reported reported pessimistically: pessimistically: The Ministry represent represent a closed caste caste .. .. .. well The officials officials of of the the Foreign Foreign Ministry a very very closed well known Our situation very precar known for for their theirreactionary reactionary views. views. Our situation at at the theministry ministry is is very precarious. We Party member. member. This of ious. We have have only only one oneParty This is is the the private private secretary secretary of [Georges] Bidault who knows she is is CommuCommu [Georges] Bidault [the [the Foreign Foreign Minister], Minister], who knows that that she nist-so for nist-so we we do do not not have have total total confidence confidence in in her. her. Among Among the the diplomats diplomats in in foreign postings, only is Communist. Communist. eign postings, only the the embassy embassy secretary secretary in in Prague Prague is The tienne Manac'h, The Communist Communist embassy embassy secretary secretary was was almost almost certainly certainly E Etienne Manach, who who went went -75).100 Manach, Manac'h, codenamed codenamed on become French ambassador in on to to become French ambassador in Beijing Beijing (1969 (1969-75).0 TAKSIM, had had first first made made contact contact with with Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence while while stationed stationed in in Turkey Turkey TAKSIM, in 1942. 1942. His in His KGB file him as rather than an agent, file describes describes him as a a confidential confidential contact contact rather than an agent, who to time time on "on an an ideological-political basis" until who provided provided information information from from time time to ideological-political basis until 1971. His information was was clearly clearly valued twenty-nine 1971. His information valued by by the the Centre. Centre.During During his his twenty-nine years' six case case officers, Tsim years contact contact with with the theKGB he he had had six officers,the the last last of of whom-M. whom-. S. Tsimbal-was head head of of the the FCD Fifth Fifth Department, Department,whose whose responsibilities included oper operbal-was responsibilities included ations in France.10l ations in France. The agents Ministry were The KGB's KGBs most most important important Cold ColdWar War agents in in the theForeign Foreign Ministry were cipher cipher personnel rather than diplomats. diplomats. Ultimately most valuable and longest-serving personnel rather than Ultimately the the most valuable and longest-serving agent recruited by embassy at of the war was probably 23-year-old agent recruited by the the Paris Paris embassy at the theend end of war the was probably a a 23-year-old cipher d'Orsay codenamed into the cipher officer officer in in the theQyai Quai dOrsay codenamed JOUR (transliterated (transliterated into theCyrillic Cyrillic alphabet as amount of Foreign Ministry Ministry documents documents and and cipher cipher alphabet as ZHUR). ZHUR). The Thelarge large amount of Foreign materials provided provided by by JOUR were from Paris Paris to to Moscow in what whathis file materials were despatched despatched from Moscow in his file describes as special container, container," and much of the describes as "a aspecial and enabled enabled much of the the cipher cipher traffic traffic between between the Qyai d'Orsay and In 1957 Quai dOrsay and French French embassies embassies abroad abroad to to be be decrypted. decrypted. In 1957 he hewas was secretly secretly awarded the the Order Orderof of the the Red Red Star. Star.JOUR was was still active a a quarter quarterof later, awarded still active of a a century century later, and of Peoples Peoples for his long "long and and and in in 1982 1982 was was awarded awarded the the Order Order of of the the Friendship Friendship of for his fruitful co-operation.lo2 fruitful co-operation."102 The dismissal of Communist ministers from from the the French French government May The dismissal of Communist ministers governmentin in May 1947 made further Soviet penetration penetration of official bureaucracy bureaucracy more more difficult. difficult. 1 947 made further Soviet ofthe the official The Centre Centre complained complained in in April April1948 1948that: that: the the residency no agents agents close close to The residency had had no to nrais, the Christian RassembZement du Peuple PeupZe Fra FranGais, the Christian the leadership leadership of the Gaullist Gaullist Rassemblement the of the

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Democrat MRP and and other other "reactionary" reactionary political political parties; it had had failed failed to penetrate Democrat parties; it to penetrate the section of intelligence on the Soviet Soviet section of SDECE; SDECE; intelligence on the the British British and and American American embassies embassies was progress the Commissariat Commissariat was poor; poor; and andinadequate inadequate progress had had been been made made in inpenetrating penetratingthe on Energy and and other other major scientific and technological intelintel on Atomic Atomic Energy major targets targets for for scientific and technological 1igen~e.l~ ligence.lo3 plan was was drawn drawn up up to to remedy remedy these these failings failings and and to to promote promote active active measures measures"to to A plan compromise hostile to to the and the French Communist Communist Party." Party. Once Once compromise people people hostile the USSR and the French again, Moscow Moscow was was not not fully hlly satisfied satisfied with with the results achieved. achieved. In In the the five-month five-month again, the results period September 1 1, 1949, the Paris 923 period from from September 1 to to February February 1, 1949, the Paris residency residency submitted submitted 923 reports, of of which which 20 20 percent percent were were judged judged sufficiently sufficiently important important to pass on on to reports, to pass to the the Central Committee. The "the requirement Central Committee. The Centre Centre noted, noted, however, however, that that the requirement set set by by the the leadership with with regard regard to to political political intelligence intelligence had had still still not not been adequately met." met. leadership been adequately During 31 the During the the eleven eleven months months from from February February 1 1to to December December 31 the residency residency supplied supplied 1,567 percent the reports 1,567reports. reports. Though Though 21 21 percent were were passed passedto to the the Central CentralCommittee, Committee, the reports were criticized criticized for for failing failing to to "reveal reveal the the innermost aspects of events and and for not were innermost aspects of events" for "not making circles in struggle with making it it possible possible to to identify identify the the plans plans of of ruling ruling circles in their their struggle with demo democratic cratic [pro-Soviet] [pro-Soviet] forces."lo4 forces.1o4 The decline decline in in the the number number of of reports reports to to the the Centre Centre during during 1949-about 1949-about forty forty a a The month fewer fewer than than during latter months of 1948-was 1948-was due due chiefly chiefly to to what what the month during the the latter months of the files describe describe as as a a "deterioration deterioration in in the the operational operational situation the beginning beginning of of the files situation" at at the the year, heightened surveillance year, caused causedby by heightened surveillance by by the the internal internalsecurity security service, service, the the Direction Direction de 1949 the de la la Surveillance Surveillance du du Territoire Territoire (DST), (DST), and and the the Surete. ScretC. On O n March March 12, 12,1949 the Cen Centre warned warned the the Paris Paris residency residency of of the the danger danger of of continuing meet agents agents on on the tre continuing to to meet the street or in cafes and restaurants and advised it to make much greater use of dead street or in cafCs and restaurants and advised it to make much greater use of dead letter-boxes, letter-boxes, messages messages in in invisible invisible ink ink and and radio radio communication. communication. The The residency residency was was also instructed instructed to to train train its its agents agents to to recognize recognize and and evade evade surveillance, surveillance, and and to to instruct instruct also them them on on how how to to behave behave if if questioned questioned or or arrested. arrested. A month residency re month later later the the residency reported to the Centre that, though it was impracticable to abandon completely street ported to the Centre that, thoughit was impracticable to abandon completely street meetings meetings with with agents, agents, security security had had been been much much improved. improved. Case Case officers officers were were now now for forbidden Soviet premises meet an bidden to to go go directly directly from from the the embassy embassy or or any any other other Soviet premises to to meet an agent. residency driver agent. Before Before each each meeting meeting the the officer officer was was picked picked up up by by a a residency driver at at a a pre prearranged arranged location location and and driven driven to to the the area area of of the the rendezvous, rendezvous, after after elaborate elaborate security security checks designed to detect detect surveillance. surveillance. Following Following the the meeting the case case officer officerwould would checks designed to meeting the pass on residency officer pass on any any materials materials supplied supplied by by the the agent agent to to another another residency officer in in a a "brush brush contact" contact as as they they walked walked past past each each other. other. Both Both times times and and places places of of meetings meetings with with agents were more rendezvous arranged in in churches, agents were regularly regularly changed, changed, and and more rendezvous were were arranged churches, the theOS l aters, aters, exhibitions exhibitions and and locations locations outside outside Paris. Paris. As agents was As a a further further security security precaution, precaution, the the frequency frequency of of meetings meetings with with agents was also also reduced. The The six six most valuable were were seen twice a a month, month, ten tenother other agents were were met reduced. most valuable seen twice agents met once another seven months. Less Less important once a a month monthand and another seven once once every every two two months. important agents agents were were either arose. After either put put on onice ice or or contacted contacted by by pre-arranged pre-arranged signals signals only only as as the the need need arose. After a a year procedures, the residency reported year operating operating the thenew new security security procedures, the Paris Paris residency reported that that operat operating conditions conditions had had improved. improved. On O n April April 22, 22,1950 it informed informed the the Centre Centre that that ititwas was ing 1950 it

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in as many For most in contact contact with with almost almost fifty agents-twice agents-twice as many as as a a year year before.106 before.06 For most of of the the next decade the provide better better intelligence in next decade the residency residency was was to to provide intelligence than than its its counterparts counterparts in l07 Britain and the United States. Britain and the United States.lo7
ZAT SII Nof of Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence intelligence in in the thelate late 1940s 1940s TH HE E O R G A NI I ZAT II OO NN AA LLC O N F U S OO N was was reflected reflected in in the the running runningof of its its three three most most productive productive British British agents. agents. Remarkably, Remarkably, no regular regular controller controller during during his his term term as as head head of of station station in even Kim Philby had had no even Kim Philby in Turkey from from 1947 1947 to to 1949. 1949. Except Except during during visits visits to to London, London, he he communicated communicated with with Turkey Soviet Burgess's behavior, however, Soviet intelligence intelligence via via Guy Guy Burgess. Burgess.Burgesss behavior, however, was was becoming becoming increasingly it seemed nerve was increasingly erratic. erratic. To To his his controller, controller, Yuri Yuri Modin, Modin, it seemed "that that his his nerve was "108 A trip going, he could going, and and that that he could no no longer longer take take the the strain strain of of his his double double life. life.* trip by Burgess and Tangier Goronwy Burgess to to Gibraltar Gibraltar and Tangier in in the the autumn autumnof of 1949 1949 turned turned into intowhat what Goronwy Rees called a "wild wild odyssey odyssey of of indiscretions": indiscretions: among failing to to pay pay his his hotel hotel Rees called a among them them failing bills, publicly publicly identifying identifying British British intelligence intelligence officers officers and and drunkenly drunkenly singing singing in in local local bills, bars, "Little Little boys boys are are cheap today, cheaper yesterday. Burgess Burgesswas was surprised bars, cheap today, cheaper than than yesterday." surprised not not to London.l09 Once back in Office, however, to be be sacked sacked on on his his return return to to London. Once back in the the Foreign Foreign Office, however, he resumed resumed his career as as a a dedicated agent, supplying large quantities quantities of of clas clashe his career dedicated Soviet Soviet agent, supplying large sified papers. papers. On O n December December 7, 7,1949, for example, example, he he handed handedModin Modin168 sified 1949, for 168 documents, documents, totaling Burgess with totaling 660 660 pages. pages. KGB files files also alsocredit credit Burgess with using using Anglo-American Anglo-American policy policy differences over over the the People's Peoples Republic Republic of in October toto differences of China, China, established established in October1949, 1949, cause friction friction in the "Special Special Relationship."l1O Relationship. cause in the Donald greater strain strain than posting to Cairo Donald Maclean Macleanwas was under under even even greater than Burgess. Burgess. His His posting to Cairo in October 1948 1948 as counselor and head of the age age of thirty-five in October as counselor and head of chancery chancery at at the of only only thirty-five seemed set him which lead him of the the diplomatic diplomatic serser seemed to to set him on on aapath path which would would lead him to to the thetop topof vice, or or a a position close to to it. it.But But Maclean became deeply deeply depressed depressed at vice, position close Maclean became at his his insensitive insensitive handling the Cairo The documents were accepted without handling by by the Cairo residency. residency. The documents he he supplied supplied were accepted without comment and andno no indication was was given givenby the the Centre Centreof of what what was was expected of him. comment indication expected of him. In In December 1949 1949 Maclean attached to to a a bundle bundle of of classified classified diplomatic December Maclean attached diplomatic documents documents a a note asking asking to to be be allowed allowed to to give give up up his his work work for for Soviet intelligence. The Cairo resi resinote Soviet intelligence. The Cairo dency gave gave so so little little thought thoughttoto running Maclean forwarded it his note note unread unread to to dency running Maclean thatthat it forwarded his Moscow. Incredibly, Incredibly, the the Centre Centre also also ignored ignored it. it. Not Not till till Maclean Maclean sent sent another another appeal appeal Moscow. in April April 1950, 1950, asking asking to be released released from from the the intolerable strain of his double in to be intolerable strain of his double life, life, did did he attract attract the theCentre's Centres attention. attention. It It then then read read for for the the first time the the letter letterhe he had had sent he first time sent four months months earlier.111 earlier. four While the the Centre Centrewas was deliberating, deliberating, Maclean Maclean went went berserk. One evening evening in in May, May, While berserk. One while in a drunken drunken rage, rage, he he and drinking companion companion Philip Toynbee broke while in a and his his drinking Philip Toynbee broke into into of two two female female members members of of the the US embassy, embassy, ransacked the flat flat of ransacked their their bedroom, bedroom, ripped ripped apart their then moved moved on on to destroy the the bathroom. There, Toynbee apart their underclothes, underclothes, then to destroy bathroom. There, Toynbee later recalled, recalled, "Donald Donald raises raises a a large large mirror above his his head head and and crashes later mirror above crashes it it into into the the alas, the bath bathbreaks in two bath, when to my amazement and delight, alas, two while the mirmir ror remains intact. intact." A few days later Maclean was sent back to London London where the Foreign Office gave him the thesummer off and paid for treatment by a psychiatrist who off diagnosed overwork, overwork, marital problems and and repressed homosexuality. In In the autumn, diagnosed marital problems repressed homosexuality. the autumn,

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apparently back back in in control control of of himself, himself, at at least least in in office office hours, hours, he he was was made made head head of apparently of the the the Foreign Office.112 Office.l12 American desk in the The heightened by The impact impact of of Burgess's Burgesss and and Maclean's Macleans intelligence intelligence in in Moscow Moscow was was heightened by the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Macleans deputy on the American the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. Maclean's deputy on the American . desk, desk, Robert Robert Cecil, Cecil, later later concluded concluded that that the theKremlin Kremlin must must have have found found the the documents documents provided by by Maclean Maclean "of of inestimable inestimable value value in in advising advising the and the the North North provided the Chinese Chinese and Koreans on on strategy strategy and and negotiating negotiating positions."113 positions.113 In addition addition to to supplying supplying classified Koreans In classified documents, Maclean Maclean and and Burgess Burgess also put their own anti-American anti-American gloss gloss on on them them documents, also put their own and thus thus strengthened strengthened Soviet Soviet fears fears that that the the United UnitedStates States might might escalate escalate the the Korean Korean and conflict into world war. For For perhaps the first time in in his diplomatic career, career, Maclean showed open open sympathy sympathy in in a a Foreign Foreign Office Office minute with the the crude crude Stalinist Stalinist analysis analysis showed minute with aggressive designs of American finance capital. capital. There was, he said, of the inherently aggressive designs of some point" point to tothe theargument that the theAmerican economy was now so so geared geared to to the the "some military machine machine that that all-out war might might seem preferable to to a a recession recession produced produced by by military all-out war seem preferable demobi1ization.ll4 114 demobilization. The Centre's Centres most most prized prized British British agent, agent, however, however, remained remained Kim Kim Philby, Philby, who, who, it it The was Secret Service. was hoped, hoped, would would one one day day rise rise to to become become Chief Chief of of the the Secret Service. In In the the autumn autumn of 1949 1949 he he was was appointed station commander commander in in Washington. Washington. Philby Philby was was exul exulof appointed SIS SIS station tant. new posting, posting, he he later later wrote, back into middle of of tant. His His new wrote, brought brought him him right "right back into the the middle intelligence policy-making" intelligence policy-making and and gave gave him him "a a close-up close-up view view of of the the American American intelli intelligence organizations."115 organization^.')"^ gence Before his his departure departure for for the the United States, Philby Philby was was "indoctrinated" indoctrinated into into the the Before United States, Though aware aware of of the the possibility possibility that that one one of of the the decrypts decrypts might might VENONA secret. secret. Though identify him as as a a Soviet Soviet agent, agent, he he was was doubtless to discover discover that that VENONA VENONA identify him doubtless reassured reassured to 116 provided provided comparatively comparativelylittle little information information on on NKGB NKGBactivities activities in in Britain. Britain.l16The The bulk bulk of the the Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence decrypts decrypts concerned concerned operations operations in in the the United United States. In late late of States. In September successful test September 1949, 1949, immediately immediately after after the the successhl test of of the the first first Soviet Soviet atomic atomic bomb, Philby Philby discovered discovered during during his his VENONA briefing briefing that that the atom spy spy bomb, the atom CHARLES in Los Alamos had had been identified as as Klaus Klaus Fuchs. Fuchs. The CHARLES in Los Alamos been identified The Centre Centre promptly warned warned those those of of its its American agents who who had had been with Fuchs Fuchs promptly American agents been in in contact contact with that they they might might have have to to escape escape through through Mexico.117 Mexico.l17 It did did not, not, however, however, succeed succeed in in that inApril April 1950 yearsimprisonment.11s imprisonment. warning Fuchs, who in 1950 was sentenced sentenced to fourteen years' O n his his arrival arrival in in Washington Washingtonin in October 1949, Philby quickly succeededin in gain gainOn October 1949, Philby quickly succeeded ing ing regular regular access access to to VENONA decrypts. decrypts. That That access access became became particularly particularly important important after the the arrest arrest and and imprisonment imprisonment in in the following year year of of William William Weisband, Weisband, the the after the following American VENONA secret to the American agent agent who who had had first first revealed revealed the the VENONA secret to the CentreY9 Centre. Philbys liaison liaison duties duties with with the the CIA allowed allowed him him to towarn warn the the Centre Centreof American as as Philby's of American well as British operations against the Soviet Bloc, even enabling him to provide the well as British operations against the Soviet Bloc, even enabling him to provide the geographical coordinates parachute drops drops by British and geographical coordinates of of parachute by British and American American agents.120 agents.12 When sometimes unable resist gloating over When writing writing his his memoirs memoirs later, later, Philby Philby was was sometimes unable to to resist gloating over the agents he betrayed. Referring those who the fate fate of of the the hundreds hundreds of of agents he betrayed. Referring to to those who parachuted parachuted into the the arms arms of of the the MGB, he he wrote wrote with with macabre macabre irony, irony, "I I do do not not know what hapinto know what hap I pened concerned. But pened to to the the parties parties concerned. But I can can make make an an informed informed guess."12 guess.121

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Philby's despite, rather because of, Philbys success success in in Washington Washington was was achieved achieved despite, rather than than because of, the the in Washington. Washington. The chaotic of the the Wash Washassistance given given him by the the KI/MGB assistance him by KI/MCB in The chaotic state state of ington ington residency, residency, which which led led to to the the recall recall of of two two successive successive residents residents in in 1948-9,122 1948-9,122 made made Philby Philby refuse refuse to to have have any any contact contact with with any any legal legal Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence officers officers in in the For the United United States.123 States.123 For almost almost a a year year Philby's Philbys sole sole contact contact with with the the Centre Centre was was via via messages sent to Burgess in messages sent to Burgess in London.124 London.124 In In the the summer summerof of 1950 1950 Philby Philby received received an an unexpected unexpected letter letter from from Burgess. Burgess. "I I have have a a shock shock for for you," YOU, Burgess Burgess began. began. "I I have have just just been been posted posted to to Washington." Washington. Philby Philby later Burgess up later claimed claimed in in his his memoirs memoirs that that he he had had agreed agreed to to put put Burgess up in in his his large large neo neoclassical classical house house at at 4100 4100 Nebraska Nebraska Avenue Avenue during during his his tour tour of of duty duty at at the theWashington Washington embassy to try to to keep out of "scrapes" for he was embassy to try keep him him out of the the spectacular spectacular scrapes for which which he was now now notorious.125 The continued. notorious.125 The "scrapes," scrapes,however, however, continued. In In January January 1951 1951 Burgess Burgess burst burst in in on on a a dinner dinner party party given given by by the the Philbys Philbys and and drew drew an an insulting insulting (and (and allegedly allegedly obscene) obscene) caricature caricature of of Libby Libby Harvey, Harvey, wife wife of of a a CIA officer. officer. The The Harveys Harveys stormed stormed out, out, Aileen Aileen Philby hands, repeatedly Philby retired retired to to the the kitchen kitchen and and Kim Kim sat sat with with his his head head in in his his hands, repeatedly ask asking Burgess, "How ing Burgess, How could could you? you? How How could could yoU?"126 Despite the United United States, Despite Burgess's Burgesss scrapes scrapes in in the States, he he fulfilled fulfilled an an important important role role as as courier code courier between between Philby Philby and and his his newly newly appointed appointed case case officer, officer,a a Russian Russian illegal illegal codenamed named HARRY (CARRI (GARRI in in Cyrillic Cyrillic transliteration), transliteration), who who had had arrived arrived in in New New York York a began his embassy. a few few months months before before Burgess Burgess began his posting posting at at the theWashington Washington embassy. HARRY had been born hehe had been sent had been born Valeri Valeri Mikhaylovich Mikhaylovich Makayev Makayev in in 1918. 1918.In In May May 1947 1947 had been sent to some years to Warsaw Warsaw to to establish establish his his legend legend as as a a US citizen citizen who who had had lived lived for for some years in in Poland. Centre gave Poland. As As evidence evidence of of his his bogus bogus identity identity the the Centre gave him him an an out-of-date out-of-date US passport Kovalik, born in Chicago passport issued issued in in 1930 1930 to to Ivan Ivan ("John") (John) Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Kovalik, born in Chicago to to Ukrainian The Kovalik, whose Ukrainian parents parents in in 1917.127 1917.127 The real real Kovalik, whose identity identity Makayev Makayev assumed, assumed, had been been taken taken to to Poland Poland as as a a child child by by his his parents parents in in 1930, 1930,later later settling settling in in the the Soviet had Soviet Union; he died died in in 1957 1957in inChelyabinskaya Chelyabinskaya Oblast. Oblast. Union; he After passport in in the After two two years years in in Warsaw, Warsaw, Makayev Makayev was was able able to to obtain obtain a a new new US passport the name of at the embassy. The name of Kovalik Kovalik with with the thehelp help of of a a female female clerk clerk at theAmerican American embassy. The MGB discovered in November informing the the embassy, embassy, the discovered that that in November 1948, 1948, without without informing the clerk clerk had had married a a Polish Polish citizen citizen with with whom whom she sheplanned planned to to return return to to the the United United States States after after married her tour tourof of duty. duty. Anxious to keep keep her her marriage marriage secret, secret, she she was her Anxious to was pressured pressured by the the MGB into swearing swearing under under oath was personally personally acquainted acquainted with Kovalik and and his his into oath that thatshe she was with Kovalik parents and and could could vouch vouch for for his good character. According to to Makayevs his parents his good character. According Makayev's file, file, his application "processed in an expeditious and with application for for a a new new US passport passport was was processed in an expeditious manner manner and with significant deviations deviations from from the the rules." rules.The embassy clerk received a a reward of significant The corrupt corrupt embassy clerk received reward of 750 dollars.12* 750 dollars.128 On March 5, 1950 Makayev Makayev left left Gdynia States on board the the ship O n March 5,1950 Gdynia for for the the United United States on board ship Batory. concluded that be preserved preserved B a t 0 ~129 y .The The l ~ ~ Centre Centre concluded that his his cover, cover, like like Fisher's, Fishers, could could best best be within New New Yorks cosmopolitan artistic artistic community. community. Soon after his his arrival, began within York's cosmopolitan Soon after arrival, he he began a Polish-born an affair with a Polish-born ballerina, codenamed ALICE, who owned a ballet stustu Makayevs gifts as a musician probably exceeded Fishers dio in Manhattan. Manhattan. Makayev's Fisher's as a painter. After After a brief period as a a furrier, furrier, he he succeeded in obtaining painter. a brief period working working as succeeded in obtaining a a job job teaching musical composition at New NewYork Uni~ersity.~ UniversityYo

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The hopes The Centre Centre had hadhigh high hopes of of Makayev. Makayev.He H e was was given given25,000 25,000 dollars dollars to to establish establish a a new new illegal illegalAmerican American residency residency to to run run parallel parallel with with Fisher's. Fishers. Two Two other other Soviet Soviet ille illegals were were selected selected to to work work under under him: Reino Hayhanen Hayhanen (codenamed (codenamed VIK), who had gals him: Reino who had assumed and Vitali Ivanovich Lyampin assumed a a bogus bogus Finnish Finnish identity, identity, and Vitali Ivanovich Lyampin (DIM (DIM or or DIMA), DIMA), who had had an an Austrian Austrian legend. legend. Two Two dedicated dedicated communications communications channels channels were were pre prewho pared for for the the new new residency: residency: a a postal postal route route between between agents agents MAY in in New New York York and and pared GERY in London, and a a courier courier route route using using ASKO, a a Finnish on a G ERY in London, and Finnish seaman seaman on a ship ship which traveled traveled between between Finland Finland and and New New York. York. Makayev Makayev impressed impressed the the Centre Centre by by which getting to to know know the the family family of of the senator for for Vermont, Vermont, Ralph Ralph E. Flangetting the Republican Republican senator E. Flan ders. mission, however, most impor ders. His His main main mission, however, was was to to act act as as controller controller of of Moscow's Moscows most important tant British British agent, agent, Kim Kim Philby.131 Philby.13 Burgess's in Washington Burgesssfirst first journey journey as as a a courier courier between between Philby Philby in Washingtonand and Makayev Makayev in in New The for his journeys to to New New York York took took place place in in November November 1950.132 1950.132 The main main pretext pretext for his journeys New York was wasto to visit visit his his friend friend Alan Alan Maclean Maclean (younger (younger brother brother of of Donald), Donald), private private secYork sec retary to to the theBritish British representative representative at at the theUnited United Nations, Gladwyn JebbY3 Jebb.133 Once the retary Nations, Gladwyn Once the liaison working smoothly, meet Makayev Makayev liaison established established by by Burgess Burgess was was working smoothly, Philby Philby agreed agreed to to meet himself. Burgess, Burgess, however, however, continued continued to to act act as as the the usual method of communication himself usual method communication between Philby Philby and and his his case case officer.134 0 f f i ~ e r .His His l ~ ~visits visits to Alan Maclean Maclean became became so so frequent frequent between to Alan that two men that Jebb Jebb formed formed the the mistaken mistaken impression impression that that the the two men "shared shared a a flat." flat. Conver Conversations keep track sations with with Alan Alan doubtless doubtless also also helped helped Burgess Burgess keep track of of Donald Donald Maclean's Macleans unstable unstable mental mental state.135 state.13 Some of the the most most important important intelligence intelligence which which Philby Philby supplied supplied to to Makayev Makayev Some of directly The VENONA decrypts decrypts to which he directly concerned concerned Maclean. Maclean. The to which he had had access access con contained tained a a number number of of references references to to an anagent agent codenamed codenamed HOMER operating operating in in Wash Washington at the theend end of clues to ington at of the the war, war, but but initially initially only only vague vague clues to his his identity. identity. Philby Philby quickly realized realized that that HOMER was was Maclean, Maclean, but but was was informed informed by by the the Centre that quickly Centre that "Maclean post as plans would would be be made Maclean should should stay stay in in his his post as long long as as possible" possible and and that that plans made to The until the to rescue rescue him him "before before the the net net closed closed in."136 in.136 The net net did did not not begin begin to to close close until the winter of of 1950-1 1950-1. By the the end end of of 1950 1950 the thelist suspects had had narrowed narrowed to thirty-five. winter . By list of of suspects to thirty-five. By the the beginning of April April 1951 1951it it had had shrunk shrunk to to nine.137 a telegram telegram By beginning of nine.137 A few few days days later later a decrypted identified HOMER as as Maclean. Maclean. It revealed revealed decrypted by by Meredith Meredith Gardner Gardner finally finally identified that HOMER's with her mother HOMERSwife wife was was expecting expecting a a baby baby and and living living with her mother that in inJune June1944 1944 in Maclean but but not wife of of any in New NewYork138-information York13*-information which which fitted fitted Melinda MelindaMaclean not the thewife any other suspect. other suspect. There space of least a a few few weeks in which There still still remained remained a a breathing breathingspace of at atleast weeksin which to to arrange arrange Maclean's evidence necessary necessary to to convict him of of espionage, Macleans escape. escape.The The search search for for the the evidence convict him espionage, complicated prosecution, made neces complicated by by the the decision decision not not to to use use VENONA VENONA in in any any prosecution, made necessary Maclean that sary a a period period of of surveillance surveillanceby by MI5 before before any anyarrest. arrest. The The plan plan to to warn warn Maclean that he a Soviet by the the Centre he had had been been identified identified as as a Soviet agent agent was was worked worked out out not not by Centre but but by by Philby In 1951 Burgess Philby and and BurgessY9 Burgess.139 In April April 1951 Burgess was was ordered ordered home home in in disgrace disgrace after after a a series series of of escapades escapadeshad had aroused aroused the the collective collective wrath wrath of of the the Virginia Virginia State State Police, Police, the the State British ambassador. ambassador. O n the the eve eve of of Burgess's Burgesss departure departure State Department Department and and the the British On dined together from from New New York York aboard aboard the the Queen Queen Mary, he he and and Philby Philby dined together in in a a Chinese Chinese restaurant restaurant where where the the piped piped music music inhibited inhibited eavesdropping eavesdropping and and agreed agreed that that Burgess Burgess

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would convey convey a a warning warning to to both both Maclean and the the London as soon as he he would Maclean and London residency residency as soon as reached reached Britain.140 Britain. Philby even more with Maclean's. If Philby was was even more concerned concerned with with his his own own survival survival than than with Macleans. If Maclean cracked cracked under under interrogation, interrogation, as as seemed seemed possible possible in in view view of of his his overwrought overwrought Maclean condition, Philby Philby and and the the rest of the the Five Five would would also also be at risk. risk. Mitrokhins notes condition, rest of be at Mitrokhin's notes on the KGB file record: "STANLEY [Philby] demanded HOMER's immediate on the file record: STANLEY [Philby] demanded HOMERS immediate exfiltration to to the so that that he he himself would not not be be compromised."141 compr~mised. ~~~ He exfiltration the USSR, so himself would He also assurance from Burgess that also extracted extracted an an assurance from Burgess that he he would would not not accompany accompany Maclean Maclean to Moscow, Moscow, for for that that too would compromise compromise him. him. Immediately Immediately after after his his return return to to to too would England on May 7, Burgess called called on Blunt and asked him to deliver deliver a a message message to to England on May 7, Burgess on Blunt and asked him to Modin, whom whom Blunt Bluntknew knew as as "Peter." Peter.According According to to Modin, Modin, Blunt's Blunts anxious anxious appear appearModin, ance, ance, even even before before he he spoke, spoke, indicated indicated that that something somethingwas was desperately desperately wrong. wrong. "Peter," Peter, he said, "there's serious trouble. Burgess has has just just arrived back in London. he said, theres serious trouble. Guy Guy Burgess arrived back in London. HOMERSabout about to to be be arrested arrested .. .. .. Donald's Donalds now now in in such such a a state state that that I'm Im convinced convinced HOMER's hell break break down down the the moment moment they they question question him. Two days days later later the the Centre Centre agreed agreed he'll him." Two to to Maclean's Macleans exfiltration.142 exfiltration.j2 Meanwhile Burgess Burgess had had seen seen Maclean Maclean and and was was worried worried that, that, despite despite (or (or because because Meanwhile of) of) his his nervous nervous exhaustion, exhaustion, he he might might refuse refuse to to defect. defect. He H e reported reported to to Modin Modinand and the the London resident, resident, Nikolai Nikolai Rodin, Rodin, that that Maclean Maclean could could not bring himself to leave leave his his London not bring himself to wife Melinda, Melinda, who whowas was expecting their third thirdchild child in in aafew few weeks time. When Rodin wife expecting their weeks' time. When Rodin reported reported Maclean's Macleans hesitations hesitations to to Moscow, Moscow, the the Centre Centre telegraphed, telegraphed, "HOMER HOMER must must agree Melinda Maclean, Maclean, who been aware agree to to defect." defect. Melinda who had had been aware that that her her husband husband was was a a Soviet since he him, agreed safety, Soviet spy spy ever ever since he had had asked asked her her to to marry marry him, agreed that, that, for for his his own own safety, he was clear, clear, however, however, that that Maclean he should should leave leave for for Moscow Moscow without without delay.143 delay.143It It was Maclean would 17 the would need need an an escort. escort. On O n May May 17 the Centre Centre instructed instructed the the London London residency residency that that Burgess Burgess was was to to accompany accompany him him to to Moscow. Moscow. Burgess Burgess initially initially refused refused to to go, go, recalling recalling his promise to "close to his promise to Philby Philby not not to to defect, defect, and and seemed seemed to to Modin Modinclose to hysteria." hysteria. Rodin, Rodin, however, seems to he however, seems to have have persuaded persuaded Burgess Burgess to to go by by giving giving the the impression impression that that he would not not need need to to accompany accompany Maclean Maclean all all the the way, way, and and would would in in any any case casebe befree free to to would return to to London. London. In In reality, reality, the the Centre Centre believed believed that that Burgess Burgess had had become become a a liability liability return and was was determined determined to to get get him him to to Moscow-by Moscow-by deception, deception, if if necessary-and necessary-and keep keep and him Modin later, rest him there. there. ''As As long long as as he he agreed agreed to to go with with Maclean," Maclean, wrote wrote Modin later, "the the rest mattered precious little. enough, the concluded that mattered precious little. Cynically Cynically enough, the Centre Centrehad had.. .. .. concluded that we we had had two burnt-out burnt-out agents agents on on our our hands."144 hands.144 not one one but buttwo not Though the the Foreign Foreign Secretary, Secretary, Herbert Herbert Morrison, had secretly authorized authorized the the Though Morrison, had secretly interrogation of Maclean, no date had been decided for it to begin.145 The London interrogation of Maclean, no date had been decided for it to begin.145 The London residency, however, however, mistakenly believed believed that that Maclean Maclean was was to to be be arrested arrested on on Monday, Monday, residency, mistakenly May 28, and and made made plans plans for for his his exfiltration exfiltration with with Burgess Burgess during during the the previous previous week weekMay end. It theCentre Centre that surveillance end. It reported reported to to the that surveillance of of Maclean Maclean by MIS and and Special Special 8 p.m. p.m. each each day day and and at at weekends. weekends. (It (It may may not not have have realized realized that that Branch ceased ceased at at 8 Branch there was was no no surveillance surveillance at at all all of of Maclean Maclean at at his his home home at atTatsfi Tatsfield on the theKent-Sur Kent-Surthere eld on rey border.) border.) The The residency residency also also discovered discoveredthat that the the pleasure pleasure boat boat Falaise made made week weekrey end round-trip round-trip cruises cruises from from Southampton, calling in in at at French French ports, which did did not end Southampton, calling ports, which not require was instructed himself and require passports. passports. Burgess Burgess was instructed to to buy buy tickets tickets for for himself and Maclean Maclean

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under for the the ctuis' cruise leaving at Friday, May May 25. under assumed assumed names names for e leaving at midnight midnight on on Friday, 25. That That evening Burgess Burgess arrived at Tatsfield Tatsfield in in a a hired hired car, car, had had dinner with the Macleans, evening arrived at dinner with the Macleans, off with Donald to to Southampton Southampton where they were just in in time timeto toboard then drove off at St. Malo, Malo, made the the Falaise Falaise before before it it set set sail. sail. The The next next morning morning they they left left the the boat boat at made their way way to to Rennes Rennes and and caught caught the the train train to to Paris. Paris. From From Paris Paris they they took took another anothertrain train their to Switzerland, Switzerland, where where they they were were issued false by the Soviet embassy embassy in in to issued false passports passports by the Soviet left the theplane Berne. In Zurich they bought air tickets to Stockholm via Prague, but left at Prague, Prague, where where they they were were met met by by Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence officers.146 0 f f i ~ e r s . IBy By ~ ~ the thetime at time Melinda Maclean Maclean had had reported reported that that her her husband husband had had not not returned returned home home after after the the Melinda weekend, Burgess and and Maclean Maclean were were behind the Iron IronCurtain. Curtain.I4 weekend, Burgess behind the 147 Once Once in inthe the Soviet Union, Burgess was wastold told that that he hewould would not allowedback back to to Soviet Union, Burgess not be be allowed roubles.148 Modin later comBritain but would receive an annual pension of 2,000 roubles.148 com He read a lot, walked and occaplained that his talents were wasted by the Centre: "He and occa sionally picked picked up up another another man man for for sex sex .. .. .. He H e might might have have been been very very useful usehl to to [the [the sionally KGB]; but instead he did nothing because nothing was asked of him, and it was not KGB]; but instead he did nothing because nothing was asked of him, and it was not in his his nature nature to to solicit solicit work."149 work.149 Maclean was was rather rather better better treated treated than than Burgess. Burgess. H e in Maclean He Kuibyshev, took Soviet citizenship under the the name Mark Petrovich Fraser, settled in Kuibyshev, was awarded awarded an an annual pension twice twice that that of of Burgess Burgess and and taught taught for for the the next next two two was annual pension years at the Kuibyshev Pedagogical Institute. In September 1953, in an operation years at the Kuibyshev Pedagogical Institute. In September 1953, in an operation codenamed SIRA, his his wife wife and and three three children children were were exfiltrated from Britain Britain to to join join codenamed SIRA, exfiltrated from him him in in Kuibyshev.150 Kuibyshev.lS0 itself that that the the successful successful exfutration exfiltrationof Burgess and itself of Burgess and Maclean Maclean had had "raised raised the the authority authority of of the the Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligenceservice service in in the the eyes eyes of of Soviet Soviet That, however, however,was was not Philby's Philbys view. view. At a a meeting meeting on on May May Makayev had had agents."151 That, not At 24,24, Makayev found and insistent found him him "alarmed alarmed and and concerned concerned for for his his own own security" securityand insistent that that he he would would be be put "in in jeopardy" jeopardy if if Burgess as well wellas as Maclean fled fled to Moscow.1s2 The first that Philby Philby put Burgess as Maclean to Moscow.152 The first that learned Burgess's defection briefing about later learned of of Burgesss defection with with Maclean Maclean was was during during a a briefing about five five days dayslater by officer in consternation [at wrote by the the MI5 MIS liaison liaison officer in Washington. Washington. "My My consternation [at the the news]," news], wrote Philby later, later, "was wasno no pretense." pretense. Later that day day he he drove drove into into the the Virginia Virginia countryside countryside Philby Later that and equipment with documents for and buried buried the the photographic photographic equipment with which which he he had had copied copied documents for Soviet rehearsed many Soviet intelligence intelligencein in a a forest-an forest-an action action he he had had mentally mentally rehearsed many times times since since arriving years earlier.IS3 earlier.153 Just Philby most most needed needed his his concon arriving in in Washington Washington two two years Just when when Philby troller's however, Makayev let him left trollersassistance, assistance, however, Makayev let him down. down. The The New New York York legal legalresidency residency left a and 2,000 dollars to deliver deliver to Philby. a message message and dollars in in a a dead dead letter-box letter-box for for HARRY to to Philby. Makayev failed failedto receivedthem.154 them.154 Makayev to find find them them and and Philby Philby never never received An inquiry inquiry by by the the Centre Centre into into Makayev's Makayevs conduct conduct in in New prompted by by his his An New York, York, prompted failure to to help help Philby, was highly highly critical. critical. It found found him him guilty guilty of of discipline," discipline, failure Philby, was of lack "lack of "violations of the manners"-a defect blamed on on his violationsof the Centre's Centres orders" orders and and "crude crude manners-a defect blamed his neglected Plans for Makayev to a new in the neglected childhood. childhood. Plans for Makayev to found found a new illegal illegalresidency residency in theUnited United States canceled and and he residency so he could could States were were canceled he was was transferred transferred to to Fisher's Fishers residency so that that he receive His performance, performance, however, to improve. return receive expert expert supervision. supervision. His however, failed failedto improve. While While returning lost a a hollow hollow imitation imitation Swiss Swiss coin which ing to to New New York York from from leave leave in in Moscow, Moscow, he he lost coin which contained secret operational instructions on on microfilm. inquiry at the contained secret operational instructions microfilm. After.a Mter, a hrther further inquiry at the
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Centre, was recalled recalled and Centre, Makayev Makayev was and his his career career as as an an illegal illegal terminated. terminated. Attempts Attempts to to recover (2,000 dollars dollars in in bank bank accounts accounts and and recover 9,000 9,000 dollars dollars allotted allotted to to him him in in New New York York (2,000 7,000 7,000 dollars dollars in in stocks) stocks) were wereunsuccessful unsuccesshl and and the the whole whole sum sum had had to to be be written written 0[155 The Centre calculated that since their recruitment in 1934-5, Philby, Burgess The Centre calculated that since their recruitment in 1934-5, Philby, Burgess and documents and Maclean Maclean had had supplied supplied more more than than 20,000 20,000pages pages of of "valuable" valuableclassified classified documents and and agent agent reports.156 reports.lS6As As Philby Philby had had feared, feared, however, however, the the defection defection of of Burgess Burgess and and Maclean Maclean did did severe, severe,though though not notquite quite terminal, terminal, damage damage to to the thecareers careers in in Soviet Soviet intel intelligence of the the other other members members of of the the Magnificent MagnificentFive. Five. Immediately Immediately after after the the defec defecligence of tion, tion, Blunt Blunt went went through through Burgess's Burgesss flat, flat, searching searching for for and and destroying destroying incriminating incriminating documents. documents. He H e failed, failed, however, however, to to notice notice a a series series of ofunsigned unsigned notes notes describing describing confi confidential dential discussions discussions in in Whitehall Whitehall in in1939. 1939. In In the the course course of of a a lengthy lengthy MI5 MIS investiga investigation, tion, Sir Sir John John Colville, Colville, one one of of those those mentioned mentioned in inthe thenotes, notes, was was able ableto to identifY identify the the author as Cairncross. MI5 began surveillance of Cairncross and followed him to author as Cairncross. MIS began surveillance of Cairncross and followed him to a a hurriedly hurriedly arranged arranged meeting meeting with with his his controller, controller, Modin. Modin. Just Just in in time, time, Modin Modin noticed noticed the without meeting the surveillance surveillance and and returned returned home home without meeting Cairncross. Cairncross. At At a a subsequent subsequent interrogation interrogation by by MI5, MIS, Cairncross Cairncross admitted admitted passing passing information information to to the the Russians Russians but but denied being a spy. Shortly afterwards he received "a large sum of money" at a denied being a spy. Shortly afterwards he received a large sum of money at a farewell farewell meeting meeting with with Modin, Modin,resigned resigned from from the the Treasury Treasury and and went went to tolive live abroad.1s7 abroad.lS7 Immediately Immediately after after the the defection defection of of Burgess Burgess and and Maclean, Maclean, the the Centre Centre instructed instructed Modin Modin to topress press Blunt Blunt to to follow follow them them to to Moscow. Moscow. Unwilling Unwilling to to exchange exchange the the presti prestigious, congenial surroundings of the Courtauld Institute for the bleak socialist gious, congenial surroundings of the Courtauld Institute for the bleak socialist real realism ism of of Stalin's Stalins Russia, Russia, Blunt Blunt refused. refused. "I I know know perfectly perfectly well well how how your your people people live," live, Blunt Blunt told toldhis his controller, controller,"and and I I can can assure assure you youit it would would be be very veryhard, hard, almost almost unbear unbearable, able, for for me me to to do do likewise." likewise. Modin, Modin, by by his his own own account, account, was was left left speechless. speechless. Blunt Blunt was would have no hard evidence against him. Soviet was rightly rightly confident confident that that MI5 MIS would have no hard evidence against him. Soviet intelligence intelligence had had few few further further dealings dealings with with him.ls8 him.158 As As Philby Philby had had feared, feared, the the defection defection of of his his friend friend and and former former lodger, lodger, Burgess, Burgess, placed placed him him under under immediate immediatesuspicion. suspicion. The The Director Director of of Central Central Intelligence, Intelligence, Gen General was eralWalter Walter Bedell Bedell Smith, Smith, promptly promptly informed informed SIS SIS that that he he was no no longer longer acceptable acceptable as as its liaison officer in Washington. On his return to London, Philby was officially its liaison officer in Washington. O n his return to London, Philby was officially retired was retired from from SIS. SIS. In In December December 1951 1951 he he was summoned summoned to to aa"judicial judicialinquiry" inquiry at at MI5 MIS headquarters-in later headquarters-in effect effect an an informal informal trial, trial, of of which which he he later gave gave a a misleading misleading account account in in his his memoirs. memoirs. According According to to one one of of those those present, present, "There There was was not not a a single single officer officer who sat through the proceedings who came away not totally convinced of Philby's who sat through the proceedings who came away not totally convinced of Philbys guilt." impression guilt. Contrary Contrary to to the the impression Philby Philby sought sought to tocreate create in in Moscow Moscow after after his his defec defection tion twelve twelve years yearslater, later, many many of of his his own own former former colleagues colleagues in in SIS SIS shared shared the the opinion opinion ofMI5. But thethe "judicial would of MIS. But judicialinquiry" inquiryconcluded concluded that that itit would probably probably never never be bepossible possible to the evidence to find find the evidencefor for a a successful successfulprosecution. prosecution. Within Within SIS SIS Philby Philby retained retained the the sup support of a loyal group of friends to whom he cleverly presented himself as the innocent port of a loyal group of friends to whom hecleverly presented himself as the innocent victim Soviet contact victim of of a a McCarthyite McCarthyitewitch-hunt. witch-hunt. Soviet intelligence intelligence had had no nofurther further contact with with him him until until 1954.159 19S4.159 Philby Philby seems seems never neverto to have have realized realizedthat that Burgess's Burgesss sudden sudden defection defection was was the the result result not loss of of nerve nerve but but of of a a cynical cynical deception deception by by the the Centre, Centre, and and never never for fornot of ofhis his own own loss gave Burgess for putting him in jeopardy. By the time Philby himself finally defected gave Burgessfor putting him in jeopardy. By the timePhilby himself finally defected

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to Moscow Moscow in in 1963, 1963, Burgess Burgess was was on on his his death death bed. H e asked his old old friend to bed. He asked his friend to to visit visit him at at the the KGB hospital hospital in in Pekhotnaya Pekhotnaya Street. Philby refused to gO.160 go.16oHis sense of him Street. Philby refused to His sense grievance was was increased increased by by his his own own reception reception in in Moscow. Moscow. Philby Philby had had long long believed believed grievance that shocked to that he he was was an an officer officer in in the the Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence intelligence service service and and was was shocked to discover that, that, as as a a foreign foreign agent, he would would never be awarded awarded officer Worse still, still, discover agent, he never be officer rank. rank. Worse he was was not not fully fully trusted trusted by by the the leadership leadership either either of of the theKGB KGB or or its First Chief Chief (For (Forhe its First eign Intelligence) Intelligence) Directorate. Directorate. Not Not until until the the sixtieth sixtieth anniversary anniversary celebrations celebrations of of the the eign October Revolution, Revolution, fourteen fourteen years years after after his arrival in in Moscow, Moscow, was was the the KGB's KGBs most most October his arrival celebrated celebrated Western Western agent agent at at last last allowed allowed to to enter enter its its headquarters.161 headquarters.161

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ne o f the the most most remarkable remarkable public public appearances appearancesever ever made made by by a a Soviet Soviet iliegal iliegal took took One of place on on November November 6,1951, 6, 1 951, when when Teodoro "Teodoro B. Castro* Castro" attended attended the in Paris Paris place the opening opening in of the Session of of the the United United Nations Nations General General Assembly Assembly as as an an adviser adviser to to the the of the Sixth Sixth Session Costa Rican Rican delegation. delegation. Castro Castro was, was, in in reality, reality, Iosif Iosif Romualdovich Romualdovich Grigulevich Costa Grigulevich (var (vara LithuanianJew Lithuanian Jew whose whose main main prepre iously codenamed code named MAKS, MAKS, ARTUR and and DAKS),l DAKS) , 1 a iously vious expertise expertise had had been been in in sabotage sabotage and and assassination. assassination. H He had trained trained saboteurs saboteurs vious e had during the the Spanish Spanish Civil War, taken taken a a leading leading role in the operations to to kill Trotsky in in during Civil War, role in theoperations killTrotsky Mexico and had run run a residencyin Argentinawhich the Mexico and had a wartime wartime illegal illegal residency in Argentina which specialized specialized in in the sabotage of of ships ships and and cargoes cargoes bound bound for for Germany.* Germany.2 While While in Argentina, Grigulevich Grigulevich sabotage inArgentina, had begun to Latin American legend for use after 3 had begun to develop develop an an elaborate elaborate Latin American legend for use after the the war. war.3 Late Late in in 1949, 1949, Grigulevich Grigulevich and and his his wife, wife, Laura Laura Araujo Araujo Aguilar Aguilar (a (a Mexican Mexican illegal illegal agent named LUIZA), set up Posing as agent code codenamed LUIZA), set up an an illegal illegal residency residency in in Rome. Rome. Posing as Teodoro Teodoro Castro, son of (and childless) childless) Costa Costa Rican Castro, the the illegitimate illegitimate son of a a dead dead (and Kcan notable, notable, Grigule Grigulevich business to vich established established a a small small import-export import-export business to provide provide cover cover for for his his intelligence intelligence work. In In the theautumn autumn of of 1950 1950 he hemade made the the acquaintance acquaintance of of a a visiting visiting delegation delegation from from work. Costa Costa Rica Rica which which included included the the leading leading Costa Costa Rican Rican politician politician of of his his generation, generation, Jose Jose Figueres Ferrer, head of the founding junta of the Second Republic which Figueres Ferrer, head of the founding junta of the Second Republic which had had restored restored constitutional constitutional government government and and later later President President of of the the Republic Republic in in 1953-8 1953-8 and 1970-4. 1970-4.Grigulevichs success in winning winning Figueres's Figueressconfidence must have have and Grigulevich's success in confidence must exceeded exceeded his his wildest wildest expectations. expectations.Hoodwinked Hoodwinked by Grigulevich's Grigulevichs fraudulent fraudulent account account of illegitimate birth, they were of his his illegitimate birth, Figueres Figueres told told him him they were distant distant relatives. relatives. Thereafter, Thereafter, according to to Grigulevich's Grigulevichs file, file, he became became the the friend friend and and confi confidant ofthe future pres presaccording he dant of the future ident, rm importing ident, using using the the Centre's Centres money money to to invest invest with with him himin in an an Italian Italian fi firm importing Costa Costa 4 Rican Rican coffee. coffee.4 In 1951, under his cover name In October October1951, under his cover name Teodoro Teodoro Castro, Castro, Grigulevich Grigulevich was was appointed Costa Rica's charge d'affaires in Rome. A month later he was chosen as appointed C.osta Ricas charge daffaires in Rome. month later he was chosen asan an adviser to to the Costa Rican Rican delegation delegation to to the Sixth Session Session of of the the UN General General adviser the Costa the Sixth Assembly at at its its meeting meeting in in Paris. Paris. During During the the assembly assembly he he was was introduced introduced to to the the US Assembly Secretary of of State, State, Dean Dean Acheson, Acheson, and and the the British British Foreign ForeignSecretary, Anthony Secretary Secretary, Anthony Eden-but not, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eden-but not, apparently, apparently, to tothe SovietForeign Minister, Andrei Andrei Vyshinsky.5 Vyshinsky5 Vyshinskys usual usual oratorical oratorical style style at at international international gatherings gatherings was was tedious tedious and and long longVyshinsky's winded. On O n this this occasion, occasion, however, however,he he arrived arrived with with a a caged caged dove, dove, intended intended to to reprereprewinded.

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sent imperialist aggression, proceeded to speak with sent the the innocent innocentvictims victims of of imperialist aggression, then then proceeded to speak with the the brutal sarcasm for trials brutal sarcasm for which which he he had hadbeen been infamous infamous as as prosecutor prosecutor during during the the show show trials of President Truman of the the Great Great Terror. Terror. Referring Referring to to a a speech speech by by President Truman on on arms arms limitation, limitation, thecourse of a lengthy diatribe, "I I could hardly sleep all allnight Vyshinsky declared in the last night night having having read read that that speech. speech. I could could not sleep because becauseI kept kept laughing."6 laughing.6 last not sleep theother other Vyshinskys sarcasm sarcasmwas was Costa Rican delegation. Among the targets for Vyshinsky's the Costa One of of the the motions motions debated debated by by the the General GeneralAssembly Assembly was was the the call call by bythe the Greek Greekdel delOne egation for for the the return return to to Greece Greece of of the the children children evacuated evacuated to to the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc during during egation the the Greek Greekcivil civil war. war.At Acheson's Achesons request, request, the the Costa Costa Rican Rican delegation delegation agreed agreed to to sup support the motion. chosen port the motion. Doubtless Doubtless to to his his extreme extreme embarrassment, embarrassment, Grigulevich Grigulevich was was chosen to speech to draft draft aa speech in in favor favor of ofit it to tobe be delivered deliveredby by Jorge Jorge Martinez Martinez Moreno. Moreno.He H e did did his his best to to limit limit the the offense offense to to the Soviet delegation delegation by by somewhat somewhat vacuous vacuous rhetoric rhetoric best the Soviet which emphasized the anxiety anxiety and and the the interest interest with with which which [the [the Costa CostaRican] Rican] dele delewhich emphasized "the gation had had always always considered considered any any threat threat liable liable to to endanger endanger the the peace peace of the world," world, gation of the and congratulated congratulated the the UN Special Special Committee Committee on on the theBalkans Balkans "for for its its work work of of obserand obser vation although the the Balkans Balkans remained remained a a dan danvation and and conciliation, conciliation, thanks thanks to to which which .. .. .. although ger, at at least least world world peace peace had had been been safeguarded. The Soviet Soviet delegation delegation was was ger, safeguarded." The unimpressed. Probably Probably unaware unaware of of Castro's Castros real real identity, identity, Vyshinsky Vyshinsky condemned condemned the the unimpressed. speech as as the the ramblings ramblings of of a a diplomatic diplomatic clown. clown.7 speech 7 Vyshinskys denunciation, denunciation, however, however, did did nothing damage Grigulevich's Grigulevichs diploVyshinsky's nothing to to damage diplo matic 1952 he presented his letters of as Envoy matic career. career. On O n May May 14, 14,1952 he presented his letters of credence credence as Envoy Extraor Extraordinary and and Minister Minister Plenipotentiary Plenipotentiary of Costa Rica in in Rome Rome to to the the Italian Italian president, dinary of Costa Rica president, Luigi Einaudi. Einaudi. According According to to his his file, file, Grigulevich was on on good terms with with the theAmer AmerLuigi Grigulevich was good terms ican ambassador, ambassador, Ellsworth Ellsworth Bunker, Bunker, and and his his successor, successor, Claire Claire Boothe Boothe Luce, Luce, and and suc sucican cessfully Costa Rican the Vatican, Vatican, Prince cesshlly cultivated cultivated the the Costa Rican nuncio nuncio to to the Prince Giulio Giulio Pacelli, Pacelli, a a nephew XII. Grigulevich fifteen audiences with Pope. nephew of of Pope Pope Pius Pius XI. Grigulevich had had a a total totalof of fifteen audiences with the thePope. also made made friends friends with one of Italys leading leading post-war post-war politicians, politicians, the the Christian Christian He also with one of Italy's Democrat de Gasperi Gasperi (Prime Minister, 1945-53), him a a camera camera Democrat Alcide Alcide de (Prime Minister, 1945-53), who who gave gave him inscribed In token of of our our friendship."g friendship.* inscribed "In token Grigulevichs astonishing astonishing transformation transformation from from Soviet Soviet saboteur saboteur and and assassin into a a Grigulevich's assassin into popular and and successful successful Latin Latin American American diplomat, with the the initial initial success success popular diplomat, combined combined with of of "Willie" Willie Fisher's Fishers illegal illegal residency residency in in providing providing "supersecret" supersecret nuclear nuclear intelligence intelligence from seemed to vindicate the the Centre's Cold War of from the the United United States,9 States, seemed to vindicate Centres early early Cold Warstrategy strategy of attempting of the of the post-war illegals attempting to to recreate recreate the the age age of the Great Great I1legals. Illegals. The The role role of the post-war illegals was considered to be be potentially potentially even even more more important important than illustrious was considered to than that that of of their their illustrious predecessors. the Cold into hot war, quite pospos predecessors. If If the Cold War Warturned turned into hot war, as as the the Centre Centre thought thought quite sible, Soviet Soviet embassies embassies and and the the legal legal residencies they contained contained would to be be sible, residencies they would have have to illegals to run wartime intelligence withdrawn from NATO countries, leaving the illegals operations. operations.
DES HE E EA R LY Cold sP I T E TH EARLY Cold War War success success of of Grigulevich Grigulevich and and Fisher, Fisher, the the mood mood in in the the Centre at the beginning of the 1950s was anything but triumphalist. As a result Centre at the beginning of the 1950s was anything but triumphalist. As a result of of the the VENONA the identification identification of of Soviet Soviet spies spies in in the VENONA decrypts, decrypts, following following the the earlier earlier revelations the Centre had to set revelations by by Bentley, Bentley, Chambers Chambers and and Gouzenko, Gouzenko,the Centre hadto set about about

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rebuilding rebuilding almost almost its its entire entire American American agent agent network network while while operating operating under under far far closer closer 10 It FBI surveillance surveillance than than ever ever before. before. I t could could no no longer longer count count on onsignificant significant help help from from the CommunistParty Party of United States which during duringthe the Second Second the Communist of the the United States (CPUSA), (CPUSA), which World War had assisted World War had assisted Soviet Soviet penetration penetration of of the the Roosevelt Roosevelt administration, administration, the the intelligence the MANHATTAN project.ll In 1949 Dennis, intelligence community community and and the project. In 1949 Gene Gene Dennis, the other party party leaders the CPUSA general general secretary, secretary, and and ten ten other leaders were were tried tried on on charges charges of of advocating Dennis and advocating the the forcible forcible overthrow overthrow of of the the federal federal government. government. Dennis andnine nine of of the the defendants sentenced to defendants were were sentenced to five five years yearsin in jail, jail, the the eleventh eleventh was was jailed jailed for for three three years, years, and contempt of the Supreme and all all the the defense defense attorneys attorneys were were found found in in contempt of court. court. After After the Supreme Court other leading Court upheld upheld the the sentences sentences in in 1951, 1951, more more than than aahundred hundred other leading Communists Communists were were convicted convicted on on similar similar charges. charges. For For most most of of the the decade decade the the Party Party was was forced forced into into a a largely largely underground underground existence.12 existence.12 The also greatly by the The Centre Centre was was also greatly exercised exercised by the unprecedented unprecedented publicity publicity given given to to Soviet operations in States. 1950 Klaus Soviet intelligence intelligence operations in the theUnited United States. On O n January January 24, 24,1950 Klaus Fuchs Fuchs began began confessing confessing his his wartime wartime espionage espionage at at Los Los Alamos Alamos to to his his British British interrogators. interrogators. The Hiss was sentenced to ve years' imprisonment The next next day, day, in in New NewYork, York, Alger Alger Hiss was sentenced to fi five years imprisonment for for perjury perjury in in denying denying espionage espionage charges charges before before a a Grand GrandJury. Jury. On O n February February 2 2 Fuchs Fuchs was was formally the menace of espionage burst formally charged charged in in London, London,and and the menace of Soviet Soviet atomic atomic espionage burst on on to to the week later later the the front frontpages pages of of the the American American press. press. A week the previously previously little-known little-known Wis Wisconsin consin senator, senator, Joseph Joseph R. McCarthy, McCarthy, falsely falsely claimed claimed to to have have the the names names of of 205 205 State State Department Communists who were were "shaping" shapingAmerican American foreign foreign policy. policy. Despite Despite his his Department Communists who outrageous outrageous inventions inventions and and exaggerations, exaggerations, McCarthy McCarthy rapidly rapidly won won a a mass mass following. following. H e did did so so because because he he succeeded succeeded in in striking striking a a popular To many many Americans Americans the the He popular chord. chord. To idea of "enemy within," plausibility by idea of an an enemy within, given given plausibility by the the convictions convictions of of Hiss Hiss and and Fuchs Fuchs (followed those of helped to (followed a a year year later later by by those of the the Rosenbergs), Rosenbergs), helped to explain explain why why the the United United States, despite seemed unable States, despite its its immense immense power, power, seemed unable to to prevent prevent the the onward onward march march of of world Communism and world Communism and the theemergence emergence of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union as as a a nuclear nuclear superpower. superpower. As percent of Americans with As late late as as January January 1954 1954 opinion opinion polls polls found found 50 percent of Americans with aafavorable favorable opinion of of McCarthy McCarthy and and only only 29 29 percent percent opposed opposed to to him. him. opinion President President Truman's Trumans claim claim in in 1951 1951 that that "the the greatest greatest asset asset that that the the Kremlin Kremlin has has is is Senator run, to be proved Senator McCarthy" McCarthy was, was, in in the thelong long run, be to provedright. right. McCarthy McCarthy ultimately ultimately did did more for for the the Soviet Soviet cause cause than than any any agent agent of of influence influence the the KGB ever ever had. had. His His pre premore posterous "Red Menace" made posterous self-serving self-serving crusade crusade against against the theRed Menace made liberal liberal opinion opinion around the world skeptical skeptical of of the the reality reality of of Moscows secret intelligence intelligence offensive offensive around the world Moscow's secret against the Main Main Adversary. Even Even Julius Julius and and Ethel Ethel Rosenberg, Rosenberg, executed executed one one after after the the against the Adversary. other in in the thesame same electric electric chair chair at at New NewYork's Yorks Sing SingPrison Prison in in 1953, 1953,were were widely widely other Sing Sing believed to to have have been framed. It took took some years, however, however, for for the the Centre grasp believed been framed. some years, Centre to to grasp advantages of McCarthyism. At the time time the theCentre Centrewas the enormous propaganda advantages chiefly concerned concerned by by the the increased increased diffi difficulties created by by "spy spy mania" mania, in in the the United United chiefly culties created States for its its attempts attempts to torecruit recruit and and run run new new American agents. States for American agents. McCarthyism reinforced reinforced the the Centre's Centres belief in the of expanding expanding its its McCarthyism belief in the importance importance of illegal presence on of illegal presence on the theterritory territory of the the Main MainAdversary. Adversary. While While legal legal residencies residenciesbased based in official official Soviet Soviet missions missions were were inevitably inevitably subject subject to to increasingly increasingly sophisticated sophisticated FBI in surveillance,illegal illegal residencies residenciescould could operate operate freely freely so so long long as as they they remained remained unidenunidensurveillance,

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tified. Since Since his the United United States States in in 1947 had tified. his arrival arrival in in the 1947 "Willie" Willie Fisher Fisher (MARK) (MARK) had attracted no no suspicion suspicion whatsoever-despite the fact fact that that his his agent, agent, Theodore Theodore Hall, Hall, attracted whatsoever-despite the was disclosed was interrogated interrogated by by the the FBI in in 1951 1951 after after his his identity identity was was disclosed by by the the VENONA res VENONA decryptsY decrypts.13The The Centre Centre also also took took seriously seriously the the possibility possibility that that illegal illegal residencies might might have have to to take take over over all all intelligence intelligence operations operations if if war war or or other other crises crises led led idencies to expulsion residencies. The for a a major to the the expulsion of of Soviet Soviet missions missionsand and legal legal residencies. The preparations preparations for major expansion of of the the illegal illegal residencies residencies were were enormously detailed. In 1954 the the Illegals Illegals expansion enormously detailed. In 1954 Directorate drew up upplans plans for for a a network network of of130 130 "documentation documentation agents whose sole Directorate drew agents" whose sole responsibility passports and and other to to sup responsibility was was to to obtain obtainbirth birthcertificates, certificates, passports otherdocuments documents support the the illegals' illegals legends.14 legends.14Operations Operations officers officers specializing specializing in in illegal illegal documentation documentation port were posted posted in in twenty-two twenty-two Western Western and andThird Third World World residencies, well as as in China were residencies, as as well in China and all all Soviet Soviet Bloc BlocKGB liaison liaison missions.15 missions.15 and There however, more serious the Centre was willing to There were, were,however, more serious obstacles obstacles than than the Centre waswilling to acknowledge illegal networks. acknowledge than than the the expansion expansion of of its its illegal networks. The The age age of of the the Great Great I1le Illegals-brilliant cosmopolitans such gals-brilliant cosmopolitans such as as Deutsch Deutsch and and Maly, Maly, able able to to inspire inspire others others with with their own visionary faith inthe the future of of the system-had gone, never to their own visionary faith in future the Soviet Soviet system-had gone, never to return. Soviet citizens brought up return. Turning Turning Soviet citizens brought up in in the the authoritarian, authoritarian, intellectually intellectually blink blinkered command economy into people who ered command economy of of Stalin's StalinsRussia Russia into people who could could pass pass as as Westerners Westerners and a daunting, and cope cope successfully successfully with with life life in in the the United United States States was was to to prove prove a daunting, as as well well as Recruiting high-flying as time-consuming, time-consuming, business. business. Recruiting high-flying ideologically ideologically committed committed Amer American also vastly during the War than during the 1930s 1930s ican agents agentswas was also vastly more more difficult difficult during theCold Cold War than during the or had lost of its appeal even even to or the the Second Second World World War. War. The The Soviet Soviet Union Union had lost much much of its appeal to young radical intellectuals young radical intellectuals alienated alienated by by the the materialism materialism and and injustices injustices of of American American society. self-serving campaign the society. It It was was deeply deeply ironic ironic that that when whenMcCarthy's McCarthys self-serving campaign against against the Red Menace was its height, penetration of government was Red Menace was at at its height, Soviet Soviet penetration of the theAmerican American government was at almost thirty at its its lowest lowest ebb ebb for for almost thirty years. years. The by its its own The Centre Centre was was further further hampered hampered by own cumbersome cumbersome bureaucracy, bureaucracy, compli complicated and fall of the cated during during the the final final years years of of the theStalinist Stalinist era era by by the the rise rise and fall of theCommittee Committee of intelligence.16 In In the the course course of of of Information Information (KI) (KI) as as the the overseer overseer of of Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence.16 the times, and the Cold Cold War, War, the the organization organization of of the the Illegals Illegals Directorate Directorate changed changed eight eight times, and the assigned to it was modified on fourteen different Aleksandr the role role assigned to it was modified on fourteen different occasions.17 occasions.17 Aleksandr Korotkov, first decade War, had no no Korotkov, the the head head of of the the directorate directorate during during the thefirst decade of of the theCold Cold War, had experience and little understanding of the problems faced experience oflife of life in in the theWest West and little understanding ofproblems the faced by byille illegals States. grandiose plans illegal operations operations against the gals in in the theUnited United States. Few Few of of his his grandiose plans for for illegal against the Main Adversary realized. Main Adversary were were ever ever realized. Throughout the 1950s, 1950s, the Centre struggled one more more illegal Throughout the the Centre struggled to to establish establish even even one illegal residency in in the the United UnitedStates States add to that of Fisher. Fisher. The The first first attempt attempt to to found founda a residency toto add to that of second residency residencycollapsed collapsed in ignominious failure, second in ignominious failure, the the recall recall in in 1951 1951 of of Makayev Makayev (HARRY), the intended the disappearance of 9,000 dollars dollars of (HARRY), the intended resident, resident, and and the disappearance of of KI funds. The next next attempt attempt was was more a strategy strategy which which it was later to funds. The more cautious. cautious. Using Using a it was later to repeat, decided to send a resident to to Canada, wait until he repeat, the the Centre Centredecided to send a potential potentialillegal illegal resident Canada,wait until he was established, and more difficult terrain of of the the was well well established, and only only then then move move him him on on to tothe the more difficult terrain Main Adversary. Adversary. The The first first Soviet Soviet illegal illegal to to use as a staging post Main use Canada Canada as a staging post for for the the United States States was Brik (codenamed HART), United was the the 30-year-old 30-year-old Yevgeni Yevgeni Vladimirovich VladimirovichBrik (codenamed HART),

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who who landed landedin inHalifax, Halifax, Nova Nova Scotia, Scotia, in in November November 1951 1951 with withinstructions instructions to to take take up up residence residence in in Montreal. Montreal. Brik Brik had had the thegreat great advantage advantage of of a a bilingual bilingual education. education. From From 1932 1932 to to 1937 1937he he had had been a pupil at the Anglo-American School in Moscow,18 subsequently spending been a pupil at the Anglo-American School in MOSCOW,~~ subsequently spending several in York, severalyears years in New New York,where where his his father father worked worked for for Amtorg, Amtorg, the theSoviet Soviettrade trade mis mission the sion in in the the United United States/9 s t a t e ~before before , ~ ~ returning returning to to serve serve in in the the Red Red Army Army during during the Great Great Patriotic Patriotic War. War. In In 1948 1948 Brik Brik was was instructed instructed to to cultivate cultivate Western Western pupils pupils at at his his old school in order to test his suitability for intelligence work in North America. old school in order to test his suitability for intelligence work in North America. Having Having succeeded succeeded in in that that exercise exercise to to the the Centre's Centres satisfaction, satisfaction, he he began began a a two-year two-year training training course course in in 1949, 1949, covering covering ciphers, ciphers, secret secret writing, writing, use use of of short-wave short-wave radio, radio, selection selection and and use use of of dead dead letter-boxes, letter-boxes, anti-surveillance anti-surveillance precautions precautions and and methods methods of of intelligence collection. Brik was also taught the trade of a watchmaker in order to intelligence collection. Brik was also taught the trade of a watchmaker in order to enable small enable him him to to start starta a small business business in in Canada.20 Canada.20 For of For his hisjourney journey to to Canada, Canada, Brik Brik adopted adopted the theidentity identity of a a Canadian Canadian"live live double," double, Ivan Ivan Vasilyevich Vasilyevich Gladysh Gladysh (codenamed (codenamed FRED), FRED),recruited recruited in in July July 1951 1951 specifically specifically to to provide for provide cover cover for him. him. On O n instructions instructions from from the the Centre, Centre,Gladysh Gladysh crossed crossed the the Atlantic Atlantic to Germany to Vienna, where to Britain, Britain, then then traveled traveled through through France France and and West West Germany Vienna, to where he he met met Brik. Canada and Brik. In In Vienna Vienna Gladysh Gladysh briefed briefed Brik Brik on on the the details details of of his his life life in in Canada and his his journey gave journey to to Europe, Europe,then then gave him him his his Canadian Canadian passport. passport. Brik Brik pasted pasted his his own own photo photograph of Gladyshs Gladysh's and across the graph in in the the passport passport in in place place of and set set off off across the Atlantic.21 Atlantic.21After After landing at Halifax, Brik took a train to Montreal and went to the station lavatories. landing at Halifax, Brik took a train to Montrealand went to the stationlavatories. On O n one one of of the the cubicle cubicle doors doors he he saw saw the the chalk chalk mark mark he he had had been been told told to to expect. expect. He He top of the underside went went inside, inside, removed removed the the top of the the cistern cistern and and found found taped taped to to the underside the the birth birth certificate certificate and and other other documents documents belonging belonging to to another another "live live double," double, David David Semyonovich Soboloff Semyonovich Soboloff22 Soboloff.22 Soboloff (codenamed (codenamed SOKOL) SOKOL) had had been been born born in in Toronto Toronto in atat the age in 1919 1919but but the age of of sixteen sixteen had had emigrated emigrated with with his his family family to to the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. In was Mining and In 1951 1951 he he was working working as as a a teacher teacher at at the theMagnitogorsk Magnitogorsk Mining and Metallurgical Metallurgical Institute. Institute. For For the the remainder remainder of of his his time time in in Canada Canada Brik Brik became became David David Soboloff Soboloff. In In July he obtained a passport in his name.23 July he obtained a passport in his name.23 Brik was Brik succeeded succeeded in in persuading persuading the the Centre Centre that thatthere there was no no realistic realistic possibility possibility of of establishing establishing himself himself as as a a watchmaker watchmaker in in Montreal, Montreal, and and that that he he should should open open a a one oneman Montreal, he man photographic photographic studio studio instead. instead. While While in in Montreal, he was was instructed instructed to to begin begin making making plans plans for for emigration emigration to to the the United United States.24 States.24Brik, Brik, however, however, proved proved an an even even more disastrous choice than Makayev as the potential head of an illegal American more disastrous choice than Makayev as the potential head of an illegal American residency. began residency.Without Without telling telling the the Centre, Centre, in in October October1953 1953he he began a a passionate passionate affair affair with the wife Canadian soldier In order to with the wife of of a a Canadian soldier living living in in Kingston, Kingston, Ontario.25 Ontari~.~ In order not not to break that it would be break contact contact with with her, her, Brik Brik persuaded persuaded the the Centre Centre that would it be premature premature for for him him to States. to to move move to to the theUnited United States. Before Before long long he headmitted admitted to his his lover lover that that he hewas was a a Rus Russian sian spy spy living living under under a a false false identity identity and and tried tried to to persuade persuade her her to to leave leave her her husband. husband. She She refused refused but but begged begged him him to to go go to to the the RCMP RCMP (Royal (Royal Canadian Canadian Mounted Mounted Police) Police) and a voluntary voluntary confession.26 confession.26 and make make a In RCMP In November November 1953 1953 Brik Brik gave gave in in to to his his lover's lovers pleas pleas and and telephoned telephoned the the RCMP headquarters in Ottawa. Terry Guernsey, the head of the diminutive B (Counter headquarters in Ottawa. Terry Guernsey, the head of the diminutive B (Counterintelligence) intelligence) Branch Branch of of the the RCMP RCMP Security Security Service, Service,decided decided to to run run Brik Brik (codenamed (codenamed

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GIDEON GIDEON by by B B Branch) Branch) as as a a double double agent agent in in order order to to uncover uncover as as much much as as possible possible about about Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence operations operations in in Canada. Canada.GIDEON proved proved unusually unusually difficult difficult to run, particularly when his lover broke off their affair, and his drinking ran to run,particularly when his lover broke off their affair, and his drinking ran period periodically of Old Old ically out out of of control. control. On O n one one occasion, occasion, after after consuming consuming more more than than a a bottle bottle of horror Tom he rang Tom gin, gin, he rang the the Montreal MontrealGazette Gazette and, and, to tothe the horror of of the the RCMP officer officer mon monitoring itoring his his telephone telephone calls, calls, said saidin in a a drunken drunkenslur, slur, "I'm Ima a Russian Russian spy. spy. Do Do you you want want a a story?" story? Like Like the the Ottawa Ottawa Journal which which had had turned turned away away Gouzenko Gouzenko in in September September 1945, 1945, the the Gazette failed failed to to realize realize it it was was being being offered offered the the spy spy story story exclusive exclusive of of the the decade 27 decade and and dismissed dismissed the the caller caller as as a a drunk. drunk.27 Until the summer not occur the KGB that the illegal Until the summer of of 1955 1955 it it did did not occur to to the that the illegal HART (Brik) (Brik) might might now now be be a a double double agent. agent. Once Once it it was was satisfied satisfied that that he he had had successfully successhlly established Montreal,the the Centre pro established his his bogus bogus identity identity and and cover cover profession profession in in Montreal, Centre proceeded ceeded to to the the next next stage stage in in his his development development as as an an illegal illegal resident resident whose whose main main role role would would be be as as an an agent agent controller. controller. Between Between 1951 1951 and and 1953 1953 the theOttawa Ottawalegal legal residency, residency, spurred spurred on on by by Moscow's Moscows criticism criticism of of its its inertia inertia since since the the defection defection of of Gouzenko, Gouzenko, recruited eleven agents (all apparently fairly low-level) with the assistance recruited eleven agents (all apparently fairly low-level) with the assistance of of the the Canadian Communist Party. and most Canadian Communist Party. Five Five were were Communists Communists and most supplied supplied scientific scientific and By and technological technological intelligence.28 intelligence.28 By transferring transferring some some of of the the agents agents to to an an illegal illegal con controller, troller, the the Centre Centre hoped hoped to to overcome overcome the the problems problems created created by by the the RCMP RCMP security security service's embassy. services surveillance surveillance of of the theOttawa Ottawa embassy. By realized that that Brik Brik was was under under RCMP RCMP control, control, it it had had put put him him By the the time time the the KGB realized male: LISTER, TorontoCommunist Communist of LISTER, a a Toronto of in touch touch with with five five agents. agents. Three Three were weremale: in Ukrainian LIND, an an Irish-Canadian Irish-Canadian Communist Communist employee employee of of Ukrainian origin origin born born in in 1919; 1919; LIND, the the A. A. V. V. Roe Roe aircraft aircraft company, company,also also resident resident in in Toronto; Toronto; and and POMOSHCHNIK, POMOSHCHNIK,the the Communist sales and Ottawa.29 Communist owner owner of of a a radio radio and and television television sales and service service business business in in Ottawa.29 The -105 Avro The intelligence intelligence supplied supplied by by LIND LIND included included plans plans for for the the CF CF-105 Avro .Arrow, Arrow,then then among the world.30 Brik among the the most most advanced advanced jet jet fighter fighter aircraft aircraft in inthe Brik also also knew knew the the iden identities tities of of EMMA EMMA and and MARA, two two female female agents agents used used as as "live liveletterboxes" letterboxes(LLBs) (LLBs) for for communications communicationswith with the the Centre. Centre.EMMA, EMMA,who who had had been been recruited recruited while while studying studying at at the took the the Canadian CanadianExternal External Mfairs Affairs Ministry Ministry entrance entrance exami examithe Sorbonne Sorbonne in in 1951, 1951,took nation, nation, but but was was unsuccessful. unsuccessful.In In 1954 1954 she she opened opened an an arts arts and and crafts crafts shop shop in in OlIebec. Quebec. MARA M A W was was a a French French fashion fashion designer, designer,born born in in 1939, 1939, the the co-owner co-owner of of a a furniture furniture shop shop in in Paris Paris who who was was used usedas as an an LLB LLB for for KGB communications communications from from Canada.31 Canada.31 The five of The Centre Centre later later concluded concluded that that Brik Brik had had betrayed betrayed all all five of the the agents agents with with whom whom he he had hadbeen been put put in incontact. contact. He H e was was unaware, unaware, however, however, of of the the identity identityof of Hugh Hugh Hambleton, Ottawa Hambleton, ultimately ultimately the the most most important important of of the the agents agents recruited recruited by by the the Ottawa legal residency in the early 1950s. Hambleton had been born in Ottawa in 1922 and legal residencyin the early 1950s. Hambleton had been born in Ottawa in 1922 and had had spent spent some some of of his his childhood childhood in in France, France, where where his his father father was was a a Canadian Canadian press press correspondent. War he correspondent. During During the the Second Second World World War he served served as as an an intelligence intelligence officer officer with with the the Free Free French French in in Algiers Algiers and, and, after after the the Liberation, Liberation, in in Paris, Paris, before before becoming becoming French liaison liaison officer officer with with the US army's armys 103rd 103rd Division Division in in Europe. I n 1945 1945 he French the US Europe. In he transferred Canadian army a year based in transferred to to the the Canadian army and and spent spent a year based in Strasbourg Strasbourg analyzing analyzing intelligence intelligence on on occupied occupied Germany, Germany, and and interrogating interrogating prisoners-of-war. prisoners-of-war. Unsurpris Unsurprisingly, the the post-war post-war years years seemed seemed dull dull by by comparison. comparison. "To To be be important, important, to tohave have peopeoingly,

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pIe The ple pay pay attention attention to to you," you, he he once once said, said, "that that is is what what counts counts in in life."32 life.32 The KGB gave gave him which he him the the recognition recognition which he craved. craved. Hambleton's Hambletons KGB KGB fIle file reveals revealsfor for the the first first time time that that he he emerged emerged from from the the war war as as a a committed committed Communist Communist and and was was talent-spotted talent-spotted by by the the Centre's Centres "Canadian Canadian friends." friends. Harry CanadianCommunist Communist leaders, out Party Harry Baker, Baker, one one of of the the Canadian leaders, picked picked him him out atat Party meetings later vouched his ideological Party member, meetings and and later vouched for for his ideological reliability. reliability. Another Another Party member, codenamed SVY ASHCHENIK ("Priest"), him. codenamed SWASHCHENIK (Priest), carried carried out out background background checks checks on on him. In was In 1952 1952 Hambleton Hambleton was recruited recruited as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent by by the the Ottawa Ottawa resident, resident, Vladimir Vladimir Trofimovich codename RIM EN (later Trofimovich Burdin, Burdin, and and given given the the codename RIMEN (later changed changed to to RADOV). RADOV). Two Two years years later later Hambleton Hambleton moved moved to to Paris Paris where where he he began began postgraduate postgraduate research research in in economics the economics economics at at the the Sorbonne. Sorbonne. In In 1956 1956 he hegained gained a a job jobin in the economics directorate directorate of of NATO, five NATO, whose whose headquarters headquarters were were then then on on the the outskirts outskirts of of Paris. Paris. Over Over the the next next five years Hambleton handed over what his KGB file describes as "a huge quantity of years Hambleton handed over what his file describes as a huge quantity of documents," by the documents, most most of of which which were were assessed assessed by the Centre Centre as as "valuable valuable or or extremely extremely valuable Brik was valuable in in content."33 Though Though Brik was unaware unaware of of his his existence, existence, Hambleton Hambleton was was eventually eventually betrayed betrayed twenty twenty years years later later by by another another Soviet Soviet illegal.34 illegal.34 Early probably preparations to Brik to Early in in 1955, 1955, probably as as part part of of its its preparations to transfer transfer Brik to the theUnited United States, the Centre made resident, codenamed States, the Centre made plans plans to to move move another another illegal illegal resident, codenamed ZHANGO, ZHANGO, to to Canada. Canada. ZHANGO ZHANGO was was a a 49-year-old 49-year-old Russian, Russian, Mikhail Mikhail Ivanovich Ivanovich Filonenko, who been given Filonenko, who had had been given the the genuine genuine birth birth certificate, certificate, and and had had assumed assumed the the identity, 1914 in Ohio, Kulda identity, of of Joseph Joseph Ivanovich Ivanovich Kulda. Kulda. Born Born on onJuly July 7, 7,1914 inAlliance, Alliance, Ohio, Kulda had had emigrated emigrated to to Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia with with his his parents parents in in 1922. 1922. Filonenko's Filonenkos wife, wife, Anna Anna Fyodorovna named successively the identity of Fyodorovna (code (codenamed successivelyMARTA and and YELENA), YELENA),took took the identity of Mariya Czech born bornon on October 10, in Manchuria. Manchuria.Anna Anna was Mariya Navotnaya, Navotnaya, a a Czech October 10, 1920 1920 in was Czech on her her father's side; before she had spent two two years Czech on fathers side; before marrying marrying Filonenko Filonenko she had spent years in in Czechoslovakia language Czechoslovakia perfecting perfecting her her grasp grasp of of the the language and and improving improving her her legend. legend. Pos Posing Filonenkos were their ing as as Czechoslovak Czechoslovak refugees, refugees, the the Filonenkos were initially initially unsuccessful unsuccessful in in their applications help applications for for Canadian Canadianvisas, visas, but but with withthe the help of of the the UN Refugees Refugees Commission Commission (later to Brazil the Centre Centre made (later the the UNHCR) UNHCR) gained gained entry entry to Brazil in in 1954.35 1954.35In In 1955 1955 the made plans plans to to move move Filonenko Filonenko on on to to join joinBrik Brik in in Canada, Canada,where where he he was was to to have have the the new new codename codename HECTOR. HECTOR. Brik Brik duly duly informed informed the the RCMP of of HECTOR's HECTORS planned planned arrival. 36 arrival.36 The The KGB KGB was was saved savedin in the thenick nick of of time time from from a a major major intelligence intelligence disaster, disaster, which, which, it believed, would a walk-in walk-in it believed, would have have included included the the arrest arrest and and show show trial trial of of Filonenko, Filonenko, by by a to the Ottawa Ottawa residency. to the residency. On O n July July 21, 21, 1955 1955 a a heavily heavily indebted indebted 39-year-old 39-year-old RCMP corporal, some years corporal, James James Morrison, Morrison, who who for for some years had had taken taken part part in in surveillance surveillance of of the the Ottawa Ottawa embassy, embassy, got got in in touch touch with with Burdin's Burdins successor successoras as resident, resident, Nikolai Nikolai Pavlovich Pavlovich Ostrovsky and reported Ostrovsky (codenamed (codenamed GOLUBEV), GOLUBEV), and reported that that Brik Brik had had been been "turned" turned eighteen eighteen months months earlier. earlier. He H e was was acting, acting, he he claimed, claimed, out out of of sympathy sympathy for for the the USSR and and a a desire desire to to prevent prevent a a repetition repetition of of the the Gouzenko Gouzenko affair affair which which had had done doneso so much much damage damage to to Soviet-Canadian Soviet-Canadian relations relations ten ten years years earlier. earlier. Morrison's Morrisonsrequest request for for 5,000 5,000 dollars, Ostro dollars, however, however, provides provides a a better better indication indication of of his his motivesY motives.37Unknown Unknown to to Ostrovsky, vsky, he he had had already already been been caught caught embezzling embezzling RCMP funds funds with with which which he hehoped hoped to to pay Remarkably, instead pay off off the the debts debts caused caused by by his his taste taste for for high high living. living. Remarkably, instead of of being being

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sacked, sacked, Morrison Morrison was was allowed allowed to to refund rehnd the the money money he he had had stolen. stolen. Ironically, Ironically, he he was was to to repay repay the the RCMP.38 RCMP.38 to use use money money from from the the KGB to The the intelligence The Centre Centre initially initially suspected suspected that that the intelligence from from Morrison Morrison (later (later code codenamed by FRIEND)was was an anelaborate elaborate "provocation" provocation7 by the the RCMP, RCMP, but but decided decided to to inter internamed FRIEND) rogate Brik in Moscow. Fortunately for the KGB, it had already been decided in June rogate Brik in Moscow. Fortunately for the it had already been decided in June that that Brik Brik would would travel travel to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union for for a a holiday holiday and and reunite reunite with with his his wife wife later the summer.39 Though the thought of to later in in the Though understandably understandably nervous nervous at at the thought of returning returning to Moscow, Moscow, he he appears appears to to have have been been confident confident of of his his ability ability to to continue continue to to outwit outwit the the KGB.40 KGB. Before Before leaving leaving Canada, Canada, Brik Brik was was briefed briefed by by Charles Charles Sweeny Sweeny of of the the RCMP and Leslie Mitchell, the SIS Washington, and nd out and Leslie Mitchell, the SIS liaison liaison officer officer in in Washington, and asked asked to to fi find out what what he he could could about about the the fate fate of of Burgess Burgess and and Maclean, Maclean, as as well well as as to to identify identify as as many many KGB KGB officers officers as as possible possible during during his his visit. visit. They They told told him him that that if if he he needed needed assistance assistance in SIS, since Canada had no in Moscow Moscow it it would would be be provided provided by by the the British British SIS, since Canada had no foreign foreign intelligence point with intelligence service. service. He H e was was given given details details of of one one rendezvous rendezvous point with an an SIS SIS offi officer, cer, the the location location of of two two dead dead letter-boxes letter-boxes and and signal signal sites sites to to indicate indicate when when a a DLB had had been been filled. filled. If If it itbecame became necessary necessary to to arrange arrange an an escape, escape, SIS SIS would would leave leave in in a a DLB DLB a a short-wave short-wave radio, radio, money, money, a a pistol pistol with with silencer, silencer, false falseSoviet Soviet passports passports for for himself himself and and his town his wife, wife, the the internal internaltravel travel documents documents needed needed to to go to to the the town of of Pechenga Pechenga near near the the Soviet-Norwegian 41 Soviet-Norwegian border border and and a a map map showing showing where where to to cross cross the the frontier. fr~ntier.~ The took great suspicions before departure. The Centre Centre took great care care not not to to arouse arouse Brik's Briks suspicions before his his departure. His Filonenko His first first stop, stop, arranged arranged in in June, June, was was in in Brazil, Brazil, where where he he was was due due to to meet meet Filonenko (HECTOR) meeting, but (HECTOR) on on August August 7. 7. Filonenko Filonenko was was warned warned not not to to attend attend the the meeting, but the the prearranged prearranged rendezvous rendezvous was was kept kept under under KGB KGB observation. observation. When When Brik Brik arrived arrived on on August August 7, 7, the the KGB watchers watchers reported reported that that he he had had two two companions, companions, thus thus providing providing strong circumstantial evidence he was strong circumstantial evidence that that he was now now a a double double agent. agent. Apparently Apparently unde undeterred terred by by Filonenko's Filonenkos failure failure to to meet meet him, him, Brik Brik continued continued to to Moscow Moscow via via Paris Paris and and Helsinki. Helsinki. The The residents residents in in both bothcapitals capitalswere were ordered ordered to to give give him him a a friendly friendly welcome welcome and himthe the travel toCanada. Canada. A KGB and discuss discuss with with him travel arrangements arrangements for for his his return return to strong-arm however, sent toFinland Finland strong-arm man man was, was, however, sent to inin case case Brik Brik had had any any last-minute last-minute doubts the Finnish Finnish police doubts about about going going to to Moscow. Moscow. If necessary, necessary, a a Soviet Soviet agent agent in in the police agreed 42 agreed to to arrange arrange for for his his expulsion expulsion to to the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union.42 On 1955 Brik O n August August 19, 19,1955 Brik arrived arrived at at Moscow Moscow airport airport and and was was immediately immediately arrested. he was file records records that arrested. He H e at at first first denied denied that that he was a a double double agent, agent, but but his his file that he he subsequently under "pressure" His confession subsequently broke broke under pressureand and "told told all."43 all.43 His confession confirmed confirmed every everything reported to the Ottawa Ottawa residency James Morrison thing reported to the residency by by James Morrison (FRIEND), (FRIEND), who who was was then paid paid the the 5,000 5,000 dollars dollars he he had had asked asked for. for. Morrison Morrison volunteered volunteered for for further paythen further pay ment what whatthe the Centre considered ment Centre considered "valuable" valuableinformation information about about the the organization, organization, personnel personnel and and operations operations of of the theRCMP and, and, in in particular, particular, its its security security service.44 service.44 1956, at at aa closed closed session the Military Collegium of of the the O n September September 4, 1956, On sessionof of the Military Collegium Supreme he Supreme Court, Court, Brik Brik was was sentenced sentenced to to fifteen fifteen years years in in prison. prison. The The fact fact that that he escaped what his escaped the the death death penalty penalty was was presumably presumably due due to to his his cooperation cooperation in in what his file file describes Brik was describes as as "an an operational operational game." game. Brik was not not allowed allowed to to meet meet any any member member of of the the SIS station station in in the theMoscow Moscow embassy, embassy, probably probably for for fear fear that that he he would would blurt blurt out out what what SIS had instructed had happened happened to to him, him,but but instructed to to arrange arrange a a rendezvous rendezvous which which he he did didnot notkeep. keep.

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By able to By keeping keeping the the rendezvous rendezvous site site under under surveillance, surveillance, the the KGB KGB was was able to identify identify Daphne (later British embassy embassy who turned up up Daphne (later Baroness) Baroness) Park, Park, the the member member of of the the British who turned there, as an SIS officer. DUring the "operational game" Brik was allowed to live there, as an SIS officer. During the operational game Brik was allowed to live at at home give SIS the home with withhis his family family in in order order to to try trytoto give SIS theimpression impression that that he hewas was still still at at lib liberty. erty. The The KGB KGB discovered, discovered, probably probably by by bugging bugging his his apartment, apartment, that that he he tried tried unsuc unsuccessfully cessfully to to persuade persuade his his wife wife to to flee flee abroad.4s abroad.45 Morrison Morrison continued continued for for three three years years to to work work as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. Including Including the the5,000 5,000 dollars dollars he he received received for for betraying betraying Brik, Brik, he he was was paid paid a a total total of of 14,000 14,000 dollars dollars by by the the KGB. The The Centre, Centre, however, however, became became increasingly increasingly dissatisfied dissatisfied with with the the quality quality of of the the information information he he supplied. supplied. In In September September 1955 1955 Morrison Morrison was was posted posted to to Winnipeg Winnipeg as as part unit investigating States, and part of ofa a unit investigating drug drug smuggling smuggling from from the the United United States, and lost lost much much of of his his previous previous access access to to RCMP intelligence. intelligence. His His last last meeting meeting with with a a Soviet Soviet controller controller took took place place on on December December 7, 7, 1957. 1957. Morrison Morrison asked asked for for help help in in paying paying off off a a debt debt of of 4,800 Ottawa, Rem 4,800 dollars. dollars. The The deputy deputy resident resident in in Ottawa, Rem Sergeevich Sergeevich Krasilnikov Krasilnikov (ARTUR), need to (ARTUR), however, however, paid paid him him only only 150 150 dollars dollars and and told told him him that that he hewould would need to arrange a transfer to Ottawa and get better access to RCMP intelligence ifhe wished arrange a transfer to Ottawaand get better access to intelligence if hewished to turn up to earn earn more more money. money. Morrison Morrison failed failed to to turn up to to his his next next pre-arranged pre-arranged meeting meeting with Ottawa with Krasilnikov Krasilnikov and and broke broke off off further further contact contact with with the the KGB. KGB. In In 1958 1958 the the Ottawa residency press reports reports that been dismissed residency discovered discovered from from press that Morrison Morrison had had been dismissed from from the the RCMP and and given given a a two-year two-year suspended suspended sentence sentence for for fraud.46 fraud.36 Though 1955 had Though Morrison's Morrisons warning warning in in 1955 had helped helped to to contain contain the the damage damage done done to to KGB operations operations by Brik's twenty-one months as by Briks twenty-one months as a a double double agent, agent, that that damage damage was was none less considerable. abandon its none the the less considerable. The The Centre Centre was was forced forced to to abandon its plan plan for for a a second second illegal United States Brik and and Filonenko. illegal residency residency in in the the United States based based on on Brik Filonenko. In In addition addition to to betraying betraying five five KGB agents, agents, Brik Brik had had also also identified identified to to the theRCMP a a number number of of KGB whom were withdrawn from officers in the legal officers in the Ottawa Ottawa legal residency, residency,all all of of whom were withdrawn from Canada.47 Canada.47
ANOTH ER P ANOTHER P LAN LAN BY B Y the the Centre Centre to toestablish establish a a further furtherillegal illegal residency residency in in the the United United

States the mid-1950s. States also also collapsed collapsed in in the mid-1950s. The The intended intended illegal illegal resident resident was was Vladimir Vladimir Vasilyevich Grinchenko (codenamed Vasilyevich Grinchenko (codenamed RON and and KLOD), KLOD), who who had hadtaken taken the the identity identity of Ukrainian mother. Since 1948 of Jan Jan Bechko, Bechko, the the son son of of a a Slovak Slovak father father and and a a Ukrainian mother. Since 1948 Grinchenko Grinchenko and andhis his wife, wife, Simona Simona Isaakovna Isaakovna Krimker Krimker (codenamed (codenamed MIRA), MIRA), had had been been based based in in Buenos Buenos Aires, Ares, where where in in 1951 1951 they they had had gained gained Argentinian Argentinian citizenship. citizenship. In In 1954 planned United 1954 the theCentre Centre planned to to transfer transfer them them to tothe the United States. States. At the the last last moment, moment, however, discovered that the FBI had however, it it was was discovered that the had obtained obtained Grinchenko's Grinchenkos fingerprints fingerprints while while he he was was working working as as an an agent agent on ona a Soviet Soviet ship ship visiting visiting North North America. America. Grinchenko Grinchenko was was hurriedly hurriedly redeployed redeployed to to France, France, where, where, a a few few months months later, later, his his career career as "a gross as an an illegal illegal was was ended ended by by what what his his file file describes describes as as a gross breach breach of of security." security. In In August August 1955 1955 his his Argentinian Argentinian passport, passport, French French residence residence permit, permit, student student card card and and expense expense account account were were all stolen stolen from from his his hotel hotel room room in in Paris. Paris. So So was was the the photograph photograph of, letterin in Russian Russian from, codenamed BORIS. of, and and a a letter from, another another KGB illegal illegal codenamed BORIS. Both Both Grinchenko and and BORIS BORIS were were hurriedly hurriedly recalled recalled to to Moscow.48 Moscow.48 Grinchenko Though the the Centre Centredid did not not yet yet realize realize it, it, its its one one established residency Though established American American residency was by now also also in in trouble. trouble. Unlike Unlike Makayev Makayev (HARRY), (HARRY), Brik Brik (HART) (HART) and and was by now

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Grinchenko the illegal New York, Grinchenko (KLOD), (KLOD), "Willie" Willie Fisher Fisher (MARK), (MARK), the illegal resident resident in in New York, was self-discipline His chief was a a paragon paragon of of both both self-discipline and and ideological ideological dedication.49 d e d i ~ a t i o nHis .~~ chief assistant, assistant, Reino Hayhanen, Hayhanen, however, however,was wasto to prove prove even even less lessreliable reliablethan than Brik. Brik. Reino Hayhanen Hayhanen had had taken taken the the identity identity of of a a "live live double," double, Eugene Eugene Nikolai Nikolai Maki, Maki, who who had been been born born in inthe the United States in in 1919 1919toto Finnish-American a father and and a a New New had United States a Finnish-American father York York mother, mother, and and at at the the age age of of eight eight had had emigrated emigrated with with his his parents parents to to the the Finnish Finnishspeaking Soviet Soviet Republic Republic of of Karelia. Karelia. In In 1938 1938 Maki Makihad had been been arrested arrested on on suspicion suspicion of of speaking espionage espionage but but had had been been released, released, given giventhe the codename codename DAVID and and employed employed by by the the Interior inform Interior Ministry Ministrytoto inform on on the thefamilies families of of other other Karelian Karelian victims victims of of the the Terror. Terror. In In 1949 Maki Maki surrendered his his birth birth certificate certificate to to Hayhanen, Hayhanen, who whospent spent most of of the the next next 1949 surrendered most three three years years in in Finland Finland taking taking over over Maki's Makis identity identity with with the thehelp help of of a a Finnish Finnish Com Communist, hman, who munist, Olavi Olavi A &man, who had had been been recruited recruited as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent in in 1939.50 1939. On O n October October 20, 20, 1952 1952 Hayhanen, Hayhanen, now now codenamed codenamed VIK, arrived arrived in in New New York York on on board board the the Queen Queen Mary, and and spent spent most most of of the the next next two two years years establishing establishing his his new new identity, collecting collecting his his salary salaryfrom from dead dead letter-boxes letter-boxes in in the the Bronx Bronx and and Manhattan Manhattan and and identity, periodically periodically drawing drawing attention attention to to himself himself by by heavy heavydrinking drinking and and violent violent quarrels quarrels with with his his Finnish Finnish wife wife Hannah.51 Hannah. The The Centre, Centre, doubtless doubtless unaware unaware of of Hayhanen's Hayhanensdisorderly disorderly behavior, in behavior, sent sent him him congratulations congratulations on on his his "safe safe arrival" arrival in aamicrofilm microfilm message messagehidden hidden inside inside a a hollowed-out hollowed-out nickel. nickel. Like Like Makayev Makayev a a year year or or so so earlier, earlier, Hayhanen Hayhanen mislaid mislaid the the nickel, nickel, which which in in the the summer summer of of 1953 1953 was was used, used, possibly possibly by byHayhanen Hayhanen himself, himself, to to buy buy a a newspaper newspaper from from a a Brooklyn Brooklyn newsboy. newsboy.The The newsboy newsboy accidentally accidentallydropped dropped the the nickel nickel in in a a stairway stairway and and was was amazed amazed to to see see it it break break in in two two and and a a minute minute microfilm microfilm drop drop out. out. He lm to H e handed handed both both the thecoin coin and and the the microfi microfilm to the theNew New York York police, police,who who passed passed them them on FBI. Though Though it itwas was some some years years before beforethe the number number groups groups in in the the microfilm microfilm on to to the theFBI. message decrypted, message could couldbe be decrypted, the the fact fact that that they they had had been been typed typed on on a a Cyrillic Cyrillic typewriter typewriter helped It helped to to alert alert the the Bureau Bureau to to the thepresence presence in in New New York York of of a a Soviet Soviet illegal.52 illegal.52 It is is highly highly unlikely that VIK informed the Centre that the coin and microfi l m were missing. unlikely that informed the Centre that the coin and microfilm were missing. In In the the summer summer of of 1954 1954 Hayhanen Hayhanen at at last last began began work work as as Fisher's Fishers assistant. assistant. One One of of his Nations his first first tasks tasks was wasto to deliver deliver a a report report from from a a Soviet Soviet agent agent in in the theUnited United Nations secre secretariat tariat in in New NewYork, York, a a French French economist economist codenamed codenamed ORIZO, ORIZO, to to aadead dead letter-box letter-box for for collection collection by by the the New New York York legal legal residency. residency.ORIZO's ORIZOsreport report probably probably concerned concerned two two American 53 The report, American nuclear nuclear physicists physicistswhom whom he he had had been been instructed instructed to to cultivate. c~ltivate.~ The report, RIZO asked however, 54 Doubtless however, never never arrived. arri~ed.~ Doubtless alarmed alarmed at at this this breach breach of of security, security,0 ORIZO asked to but was was ultimately ultimately persuaded persuaded to to carry carry on.55 on. to stop stop working working for for the the KGB, but Though hanen's tradecraft, Though disturbed disturbed by by the the weakness weakness of of Hay Hayhanens tradecraft, Fisher Fisher failed failed to to grasp grasp that of that he he was was an an alcoholic alcoholic fraudster fraudster who who posed posed a a serious serious threat threat to to the thefuture future of his his res resof idency. idency. During During a a visit visit to to Bear Bear Mountain Mountain Park Park in in the thespring spring of 1955, 1955, Fisher Fisher and and Hay Hayhanen 5,000 dollars dollars which which Hayhanen Hayhanen was was later later supposed supposed to to deliver deliver to to the the wife wife hanen buried buried 5,000 of of Morton Morton Sobell, Sobell,a a convicted convicted Soviet Soviet spy spy and and member member of of the the Rosenberg Rosenberg spy spy ring, ring, who who had I located located Helen Helen had been been sentenced sentenced to to thirty thirty years years in in jail. jail. Hayhanen Hayhanen later later reported, reported, "I Sobell carefully." care full^.'^ In In fact, fact, he he kept kept the the Sobell and and gave gave her her the the money money and and told told her her to to spend spenditit 5,000 56 5,000 dollars dollars for for himself himselCS6 Early police to of Early in in 1956 1956the the police were werecalled called to the thehome home of the the "Makis" Makishome home at atPeekskill Peekskill in in Hudson Hudson Valley, Valley, where where they they found found both both Hayhanen Hayhanen and and his his wife wife drunk; drunk; Hayhanen Hayhanen

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had had a a deep deep knife knife wound wound in in his his leg, leg, which which he he claimed claimed was was the the result result of of an an accident. accident. Later year Later that that year he he was was found found guilty guilty of of drunken drunken driving driving and and had had his his license license suspended. suspended. In Moscow In January January 1957 1957 Hayhanen Hayhanenwas was due due to to return returnto to Moscow on on leave. leave. Initially, Initially, he he could could not not bring bringhimself himself to to go, go, fabricating fabricating a a series series of of stories stories to to justify justify his his delay. delay. He H e first first told told Fisher that he was being tailed by three men, then claimed that the FBI had taken Fisher that he was being tailed by three men, then claimed that the FBI had taken him booked him off off the the Queen QueenMary, Mary, on on which which he he had had booked a a passage. passage.The The unsuspecting unsuspecting Fisher Fisher told told Hayhanen Hayhanen to to leave leave the the country countryas as soon soon as as possible possible to to escape escape FBI FBI surveillance surveillanceand and gave gave him him 200 200 dollars dollars for for his his travel travel expenses. expenses. On O n April April 24 24 Hayhanen Hayhanen set set sail sail aboard aboard La te for La Liber Liberti for France. France. Arriving Arriving in in Paris Paris on on May MayDay, Day, he he made made contact contact with with the theKGB KGB residency dollars residency and and was was given givenanother another 200 200 dollars to to complete complete his his journey journey to to Moscow. Moscow. Four Four days days later, later, instead instead of of returning returning to toRussia, Russia, he he entered entered the the American American embassy embassy in in Paris, Paris, announced 57 announced that that he hewas was a a KGB KGB officer officer and and began began to to tell tell his his story. st01-y.~ Though the KGB did not discover the defection until August, Though the KGB did not discover the defection until August, it it warned warned Fisher, Fisher, probably probably in in late late May May or or early early June, June, that that Hayhanen Hayhanen had had failed failed to to arrive arrive in in Moscow, Moscow, and and instructed instructed him him as as a a precaution precaution to to leave leave the the United UnitedStates, States, using using a a new new set set ofiden of identity tity documents. documents. Fisher Fisher disobeyed disobeyed his his orders orders and and stayed.58 stayed.* He H e was was arrested arrested early early on on the the morning morning of of June June 21 21 while while staying staying in in a a New NewYork York hotel hotel on on East East28th 28thStreet Streetand and flown flown to to the the Alien Alien Detention Detention Facility Facility in in McAllen, McAllen, Texas, Texas, for for questioning.59 questioning. After After a a few that he he was few days days spent spent stonewalling stonewalling his his questioners questioners Fisher Fisher finally finally admitted admitted that was a a Russian Russian who who had had been been living living under under false false identities identities in in the theUnited UnitedStates, States, and and gave gave as as his his real real name name that that of of a a deceased deceased friend friend and and KGB KGB colleague, colleague, Rudolf Rudolf Ivanovich Ivanovich Abel. Abel. The had happened The Centre, Centre, Fisher Fisher knew, knew, would would realize realize what what had happened as as soon soon as as it it saw saw the the 60 name front pages name Abel Abel on onthe the front pages of of the the American American newspapers. newspapers.60
FI S H E R' s A FISHERS AR RR RE ES ST T M MA AR RK KE ED Da a major major strategic strategic defeat defeat for for KGB KGB operations operations against against the the Main Adversary. The Centre's early Cold War strategy in the United States had been Main Adversary. The Centres early Cold Warstrategy in the United States had been based based on on the the creation creation of of an an illegal illegal network network which which would would run run major major agents agents such such as as Hall and the administration and Philby, Philby, and and evenhlally eventually penetrate penetrate the administration to to approximately approximately the the level Great Patriotic level achieved achieved during during the the Great Patriotic War. War. Fisher's Fishers failure, failure, however, however, appears appears to to have without a single illegal residency in the United States. Instead of have left left the the KGB KGB without a single illegal residency in the UnitedStates. Instead of adopting adopting a a more more realistic realistic strategy strategy with with far far more more limited limited aims, aims, the the Centre Centre persisted persisted with with its its plan plan to to revive revive the the era era of of the the Great Great I1legals Illegals and and blamed blamed its its initial initial failure failure on on a a series series of of operational operational errors. errors. The The Centre's Centres investigations investigations of of the the cases cases of of Makayev Makayev (HARRY), (HARRY), Brik Brik (HART) (HART) and flaws in first and Hayhanen Hayhanen (VIK) (WK) all all revealed revealed flaws in the theselection selection of of the the first generation generation of of Cold Cold War Hayhanen's file in the KGB signs War illegals. illegals.Hayhanens file in the KGB archives archives contains contains many many warning warning signs which which should should have have been been evident evident well well before before he he was was despatched despatched to to the the United United States States in record in 1952. 1952.In In both both the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and Finland Finland he hehad hada a record for for getting getting into intodebt debt and and borrowing borrowing money, money, as as well well as as for for unusually unusually complicated complicated sexual sexual liaisons. liaisons. Though Though already already married married in in the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, Hayhanen Hayhanen entered entered into into aabigamous bigamous marriage marriage in in Finland-without Finland-without informing informing the the Centre Centre beforehand-with beforehand-with Hannah Hannah Kurikka, Kurikka, with with whom whom he he later later lived lived in in the theUnited UnitedStates. States. The The report report on on Hayhanen Hayhanen prepared prepared for for the the leadership 1949, however, glossed over over his leadership of of the the KI K1 in in 1949, however, glossed his character character weaknesses weaknesses and and

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failings would be rectified during training. Mitrokhin insisted that his operational failings Hayhanens fi file the KGB archives: noted after reading Hayhanen's le in the archives: wanted to to keep keep VIK WK in intelligence work work no nomat matIt was was obvious obviousthat that the theKGB wanted It in intelligence ter what, what, regardless regardless of of signs signs that that he he was was in in trouble, trouble, because because they they did not want want ter did not to expose expose any anyof of their their operations, operations, because because the the training training of of a a replacement replacement would to would be difficult difficult and and time-consuming, time-consuming, and and because because they regretted wasting wasting so so much much be they regretted time and and money money on on VIK.61 VIK.61 time Hayhanens Russian Russian wife wife was was informed informed of his defection, divorced him went Hayhanen's of his defection, divorced him and and went back name, Moiseyeva. a back to to her her maiden maiden name, Moiseyeva. In In 1957 1957 the the chairman chairman of of the the KGB KGB received received a letter from from a a woman woman named named M. M. Gridina asking for for news news of letter Gridina asking of Hayhanen, Hayhanen, who, who, she she said, was the the father father of of her her 12-year-old son. The The KGB was was less frank with with Gridina Gridina said, was 12-year-old son. less frank than and than with withMoiseyeva. Moiseyeva. She She was was told told that that the theKGB had had never never employed employed Hayhanen Hayhanen and did not not know know his his whereabouts, whereabouts, but but had had heard heard rumors that he committed a a seridid rumors that he had had committed seri ous crime crime against against the the Soviet Soviet state state and and was was wanted by the the police. replied that ous wanted by police. Gridina Gridina replied that she son that been killed she would would tell tell her her son that his his father father had had been killed fighting fighting the the Germans Germans during during the Great Great Patriotic Patriotic War.62 War.62In In fact, fact, Hayhanen Hayhanen died in the the United United States At the died in States in in 1961. 1961. At the time it killed in in a car accident on the Pennsylvania the time it was was alleged alleged that that he he had hadbeen been killed a car accident on the Pennsylvania turnpike; in in reality reality he he seems seems to to have have died from cirrhosis of the the liver.63 liver.63 turnpike; died from cirrhosis of O n November November 15, 1957 the the 55-year-old 55-year-old "Rudolf Rudolf Abel was sentenced sentenced to On 15, 1957 Abel" was to thirty thirty years His American James Donovan, struck by years in in jail. jail. His American lawyer, lawyer, James Donovan, was was struck by ''Abel's'' Abels"uncanny uncanny calm as as he he listened listened to to what what was, was, in in effect, effect, a This cool professionals calm" a life life sentence: sentence: "This cool professional's self-control was was just just too for me."64 me.64''Abel's'' Abelswife, wife,Ilya, who had self-control too much much for Ilya, who had last last seen seen her her husband when when he he returned returned on on leave leave to to Moscow Moscow in of 1955, 1955, made husband in the the summer summer of made less less attempt to todisguise disguise her her feelings. feelings. She She wrote wrote bitterly to the Centre that thatit it was was not attempt bitterly to the Centre not simsim ply thirty years do not know if my my hushus ply a a question question of of waiting waiting for for twenty-five twenty-five or or thirty years but but "I I do not know if band as a in aacircus circus band will will ever everreturn." return. For For the the past past seven seven years yearsshe she had had worked worked as a harpist harpist in orchestra; however, when when she criticized the the KGB after after her was jailed, orchestra; however, she criticized her husband husband was jailed, she she was made made redundant pretext that that the no longer longer needed needed a a harpist. harpist. was redundant on on the the pretext the orchestra orchestra no The Centre Centre rejected rejected Ilya Ilya "Abel's" Abelspleas pleas for for help help in in finding another job, The finding another job, but but granted granted her pension of 51 roubles her a a pension of 51 roubles a a month.65 month.65 Atlanta Penitentiary, Penitentiary, in in Georgia, Georgia, where where "Rudolf Rudolf Abel" Abel had had been been sent sent to At Atlanta to serve serve two other other convicted e played played his sentence, sentence, he he became friends with with two his became friends convicted Soviet Soviet spies. spies. H He chess with Morton Sobell, dollars embezembez 5,000 dollars chess with Morton Sobell, whose whose wife wife had had failed failed to to receive receive the the 5,000 zled received a of small small favors from Kurt Ponger, zled by by Hayhanen.66 Hayhanen.66"Abel" Abelalso also received a number numberof favors from Kurt Ponger, an dental section been sen an Austrian-born Austrian-born American American in in the the penitentiary's penitentiarys dental section who who had had been sentenced in 1953 to a term of five to fifteen years' imprisonment for conspiracy to com tenced in 1953 to term a of five to fifteen years imprisonment forconspiracy to commit espionage espionage while while serving serving in in the army in Pongers file mit the US army in Austria. Austria. Ponger's file in in the the KGB archives Soviet agent agent since 1936, but his arrest arrest archives reveals reveals that that he he had had been been a a Soviet since 1936, but that that after after his the wrongly concluded that whose arrest arrest had the Centre Centre had had wrongly concluded that he hewas was a a double double agent agent whose had been been deliberately staged staged by by the the Americans Americans in in order order to to discredit the Soviet Union in in Ausdeliberately discredit the Soviet Union Aus trian public public opinion. opinion. "Abel" Abelhad had no nodoubt doubt that Ponger was trian that Ponger was a a genuine genuine Soviet Soviet agent agent and and

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later persuade the later tried tried to to persuade the KGB to to give give Ponger Ponger financial financial assistance assistance after after he he was was freed freed in September 1962.67 in September 1962.67 "Abel" just over Abel served served only only just over four four years years of of his his sentence. sentence, On O n February February 10, 10, 1962 1962 he he was was exchanged exchanged on on the the Glienicker Glienicker Bridge, Bridge, which which linked linked West West Berlin Berlin with with Potsdam, Potsdam, for The for the the shot-down shot-down American American U-2 U-2 pilot pilot Gary Gary Powers.68 Powers.6* The exchange exchange was was treated treated by by the the KGB as as a a major major operation, operation, codenamed codenamed LYUTENTSIA, LYUTENTSIA, coordinated coordinated by by Vladimir Vladimir Trofimovich Trofimovich Burdin, Burdin, the the former former resident resident in in Ottawa. Ottawa. An An undercover undercover KGB group was watch for group was stationed stationed in in West West Berlin Berlin to to watch for signs signs of of American American military military activity activity in bridge itself, in the the area area of of the the bridge. bridge. On the the bridge itself, hidden hidden in in the theoffices offices of of the the East East Ger German man Customs Customs Service, Service, was wasa a KGB armed armed operational operational group. group. Close Close at at hand, hand, but butalso also out out of of view view from from the the Western Westernside side of of the the bridge, bridge, was was another another armed armed group group which which had had accompanied accompanied Powers Powers from from Potsdam Potsdam for for the the exchange. exchange. At the the Soviet Soviet checkpoint, checkpoint, a a specially command of specially trained trained officer officer from from the the 105th 105thRegiment Regiment was was put put in incommand of a a detail detail of of sub machine gunners. Germans provided men submachine gunners. The The East East Germans provided a a reserve reserve unit unit of of twenty twenty men armed with with sub submachine guns and and grenades.69 grenades.69 armed machine guns The The Centre Centre congratulated congratulated itself itself on on the the fact fact that that its its absurdly absurdly large, large, concealed concealed mil military 'bel's" was more itary presence presence had had gone gone almost almost unobserved.70 unob~erved.~ Abelslawyer lawyer was more impressed impressed by by the fact fact that that the the American American guard guard who who accompanied accompanied his his client client on on to to the the bridge bridge was was the "one of men I have He must have seven inches one of the the largest largest men have ever ever seen. seen. H e must have been been six six feet feet seven inches tall tall and weighed perhaps three three hundred pounds.71After After the of Abel for and weighed perhaps hundred pounds."n the exchange exchange of 'bel" for Powers, Glienicker Bridge became famous War as Powers, the the Glienicker Bridge became famous during during the theCold Cold War as the the "Bridge Bridge of of Spies. The The KGB file file on on operation operation LYUTENTSIA LYUTENTSIA records records that that its its total total nonSpies." non military cost cost (food, (food, train train tickets, tickets, hotel hotel bills, bills, various various items items for for 'bel" Abel and and his his wife wife and and military daughter, daughter, and anda a celebration celebration dinner) dinner) came came to to 5,388 5,388 marks marks 90 90 pfennigs. pfennigs. Walter Walter Ulbricht, the Ulbricht, the East East German German leader, leader, did did not not share share the the Centre's Centres satisfaction satisfaction at at the the suc success cess of of the the operation. operation. He H e complained complained to to the the Soviet Soviet ambassador, ambassador, Pervukhin, Pervukhin, on on Feb February 15 15that that his his government government had had not not been been adequately adequately informed informed and and that that the the failure failure ruary to among Powers's showed lack lack of to include include East East German German police police among Powerss escort escort showed of respect respect for for the the sovereignty of the theGerman Democratic Republic. Ulbricht followed his his verbal verbal sovereignty of German Democratic Republic. Ulbricht followed protest with with a a diplomatic diplomatic note note citing citing other other Soviet slights.72 protest Soviet slights.72 Abelspaintings and prints prints became collectors' collectors items. The In the United States, 'bel's" Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, asked asked the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy to to find find out out whether whether Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy, Abelwould would be be willing willing to to give give the the US US government government a a portrait portrait of of his his brother, brother, Presi Presi'bel" dent Kennedy, Kennedy, which which he he had hadpainted painted in in Atlanta AtlantaPenitentiary, Penitentiary, and and allow allow it it to tobe be hung hung dent in the the White White House. House. The The Centre Centre suspected a plot. plot. The The proposal to display display "Abel's" Abels in suspected a proposal to portrait in inthe the White House was, it it believed, believed, a a provocation, provocation, though though it itwas was not not certain certain portrait White House was, what exactly exactly it it was was intended to provoke. provoke. Robert Robert Kennedy's Kennedys request was turned turned what intended to request was down.73 down. 73 Abel received received an an unpublicized unpublicized hero's heros welcome on his his return return to to Moscow, Moscow, being being 'bel" welcome on received received in in turn turn by by Vladimir Vladimir Yefimovich Yefimovich Semichastny, Semichastny, chairman chairman of of the the KGB, Alek Aleksandr sandr Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Sakharovsky, Sakharovsky,head head of of the the KGB KGB First First Chief Chief(Foreign (Foreign Intelligence) Intelligence) GRU.74At At Semichastny's Semichastnys Directorate, and and General Ivashutin, head head of of the the GRU.74 Directorate, GeneralPyotr Pyotr Ivashutin, prompting, 'bel" wrote thank him him personally prompting, Abel wrote to to Khrushchev Khrushchev to to thank personally for for the the supposed supposed . am especially especially touched touched by by the the fact fact that, that, part he hehad had taken in in securing securing his his release: release: " part taken . .. .. I am

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amidst governmental you found the time time amidst the the great great variety variety of of your your Party Party and and governmental concerns, concerns, you found the to think think about about me me as as well. to well." Though it itsuited suited the the Centre, Centre, for for the the sake sake of of its own reputation reputation in in the the Party Party hierThough its own hier archy, to to portray portray 'bel's" Abelsmission mission to to the theUnited UnitedStates as an archy, States as an operational operational triumph triumph by by a a dedicated broughtto to premature a conclusion an act act of of treachery for dedicated Chekist, Chekist, brought a premature conclusion only only by by an treachery for which well aware aware that that in in reality he had had achieved achieved which he he bore bore no no responsibility, responsibility, it it was was well reality he nothing of of real real significance. significance. He H e had had been arrested in in 1957 1957 only only because he had had disnothing been arrested because he dis obeyed country after failed to return obeyed instructions instructions to to leave leave the the country after Hayhanen Hayhanen had had failed to return toto Moscow.75 Moscow.75 The that "Abel" portrayed in the American The Centre Centre took tookadvantage advantage of of the the fact fact that Abelwas was portrayed in theAmerican media by the media as as a a master master spy spy of of heroic heroic stature. stature. That That impression impression was was strengthened strengthened by the sympathetic portrayal portrayal of of him himin in Strangers on an account account by by his his lawyer lawyer of of his his sympathetic on a B1-idge, Bridge)an trial, imprisonment imprisonment and and exchange exchange for for Powers Powers published 1964. Donovan made clear clear trial, published in in 1964. Donovan made that he he admired Rudolf Rudolf as as an an individual," individual, and and quoted quoted Allen Director of Centhat "admired Allen Dulles, Dulles, Director ofCen tral him, I "I wish or four four just tral Intelligence Intelligence from from 1953 1953 to to 1961, 1961, as as telling telling him, wish we we had had three three or just like him him in inMoscow Moscow right right now now .. .. .. H e ended ended his his book book by by printing letter Abel like " He printing aaletter 'bel" had had sent two rare, rare, sixteenth-century, sixteenth-century, vellum-bound vellum-bound Latin Latin sent him him from from Moscow, Moscow, enclosing enclosing two editions of of Commentaries Commentaries on on theJustinian theJustinian Code. Code. Please "Please accept accept them, them," Abel 'bel" wrote, wrote, as "as editions done for a of my my gratitude gratitude for for all all that that you you have have done for me."76 me.76 a mark mark of All this The myth myth of of the Rudolf Abel Abel this was was music musicto to the theCentre's Centres ears.77 ears.77 The the master master spy spy Rudolf replaced the the pedestrian reality of of Fisher's Fishers illegal illegalresidency. residency. The replaced pedestrian reality The inconvenient inconvenient lack lack of of heroic by assurance that, that, though were heroic exploits exploits to to celebrate celebrate was was glossed glossedover over by the the assurance though there there were many secret to celebrate in in public.78 The The real real "Willie" many of of them, them, they they remained remained too too secret to celebrate Willie Fisher, his return return to to Moscow, Moscow, he Fisher, however, however, became became increasingly increasingly disillusioned. disillusioned. Mter After his he was denied even a was given given a a chair chair in in a a corner corner of of the the FCD Illegals Illegals Directorate Directorate but but was was denied even a desk of did, he replied disconsolately, desk of his his own. own. When When a a friend friend asked asked him him what whathe he did, he replied disconsolately, "I'm Im a a museum museum exhibit."79 exhibit.79

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he Main Adversary the presidencies Th e KGB's KGBs chief chief successes successes against against the the Main Adversary during during the presidencies of of Dwight Eisenhower (1953-61) (1953-61) and and John John F. Kennedy Kennedy (1961-3) (1961-3) derived derived not not from from Dwight D. Eisenhower its its grand grand strategy strategy for for new new illegal illegal residencies, residencies, which which collapsed collapsed for for several several years years after after FISHER's series of most important important was FISHERS arrest, arrest, but but from from a a series of walk-ins. walk-ins. The The most was probably probably a a CIA "principal Berlin and principal agent" agent in inWest WestBerlin and Germany, Germany, Alexsandr Alexsandr ("Sasha") (Sasha) Grigorye Grigoryevich Kopatzky,alias alias "Koischwitz" (successively vich Kopatzky, Kois~hwitz~ (successively codenamed codenamed ERWIN, HERBERT HERBERT and himself for and RICHARD), RICHARD),who who had had offered offered himself for recruitment recruitment by by Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence in in in secret secret writing writing and and microphotography, microphotography, he he was was paid paid a a 1949. Trained Trained by by the the KGB in 1949.1 total East German German marks West German German and and 2,117 2,117 East marks during during the the 1950s, 1950s, as as total of of 40,000 West well well as as being being rewarded rewarded for for his his success success with with several several gold gold watches.2 watches.2 Kopatzky was was employed employed at at one oneof of the the focal focal points points of of American American intelligence intelligence oper operKopatzky ations. The The CIA's CIASWest West Berlin Berlin station station was was situated situated only only a a few few miles miles from from the the greatest greatest ations. concentration concentration of of Soviet Soviet forces forces anywhere anywhere in in the theworld. world. One One of of Kopatzky's Kopatzkys chief chief tasks tasks was to to find find East German women willing to to have have sex sex with with Soviet Soviet soldiers soldiers and and act act as as was East German women willing CIA agents. in the the station's attempt to Soviet per agents. By By taking taking an an active active part part in stations attempt to recruit recruit Soviet personnel sonnel and and encourage encourage defections, defections, he he was was able ableto to find find numerous numerous opportunities opportunities to to sab sabotage its its operations. operations. Among Among the wealth of of intelligence intelligence which which Kopatzky Kopatzky provided provided otage the wealth ahundred hundred officers and agents were the identities of more than a American intelligence officers in East East Germany; Germany; some were arrested arrested while while others others were were turned into double double agents. agents. in some were turned into He H e also also assisted assisted a a number number of of KGB operations operations to to "dangle" danglebogus bogus agents agents intended intended to to deceive the the CIA CIA station. In 1952 1952 he hehelped helped to to organize organize the the bogus bogus defection defection of of Soviet Soviet deceive station. In agent VIKTOR, VIKTOR, who who was was later later employed employed by by the the Voice Voice of of America radio station station and and agent America radio supplied what what Kopatzky's Kopatzkys file file terms terms "valuable valuable information."3 inf~rmation.~ supplied After Kopatzky Kopatzky was was briefly briefly imprisoned imprisoned for for drunken drunken driving driving in in 1954, 1954, his his name name was was Mter changed by by the the CIA to to "Igor IgorOrlov," Orlov, so so that that his his criminal criminal record record would would not not appear appear on on changed his application application for for US citizenship.4 citi~enship.~ 1957, In with his cover cover as as a (but not not Soviet) Soviet) his In 1957, with his a CIA (but agent largely largely blown blown in in Berlin, Orlov was was taken taken to to Washington Washington with with his his family family and and agent Berlin, Orlov given further further operational operational training training by by the the Agency. Agency. He H e then then returned returned to Europeto to take given to Europe take part in various Austria. In 1960 the CIA at last various CIA operations in Germany Germany and Austria.5 began to to suspect suspect that that "Orlov" Orlovwas was working working for for the the KGB. A later later damage damage assessment assessment began officers who had at the the Centre Centre concluded that the the extraordinary number of KGB officers had him-over twenty during the last decade-might decade-might have been in direct contact with him-over have

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helped helped to to place place him him under under suspicion.6 suspicion.6In In order order to to prevent prevent Orlov Orlov defecting defecting before before the the case had been been established, a new the case against against him him had established, the the CIA C.IA promised promised him him a new job job with with the Agency sacked him on his Agency in in Washington, Washington, sacked him on his arrival arrival in in January January 1961 1961 and and began began an an intensive investigation.7 in~estigation.~ Orlov made made contact contact with with his his new new Soviet Soviet controller, controller, I. P. Sev Sev1. P. intensive Orlov astyanov, theWashington Washington residency, job as truck astyanov, an an operations operations officer officer at at the residency, got got aajob as a a truck driver FBI. In driver and and heard heard nothing nothing for for several several years years from from either either the the CIA or or the the FBI. In 1964 1964 he boughtaa picture-framing he bought picture-framing gallery gallery in in Alexandria, Alexandria, Virginia, Virginia, paid paid for for in in part, part, no no doubt, doubt, by by his his earnings earnings from from the the KGB.s KGB. opened his have felt confident that case By By the the time timehe he opened his gallery, gallery, Orlov Orlov may may well well have felt confident that the thecase against confidence evaporated against him him could could never never be be proved. proved. His His confidence evaporated in in the the spring spring of of 1965 1965 when when the the FBI arrived arrived on on his his doorstep, doorstep, spent spent several several days days searching searching his his home, home, ques questioned tioned his his wife wife Eleonore Eleonore and and summoned summoned him him to to take take a a polygraph polygraph test. test. Orlov Orlov seems seems to the to have have panicked. panicked. Under Under surveillance surveillance and and unable unable to to make make covert covert contact contact with with the KGB, he went into into the the Soviet 16th Street a rear he went Soviet embassy embassy on on 16th Street through through a rear door, door, vainly vainly hoping unobserved.9 hoping to toenter enter unobserved. The The Washington Washington residency residency arranged arranged with with him himan an exfll exfiltration plan which was agreed to by Moscow. Encouraged by ('Abel's" star rating tration plan which was agreed to by Moscow. Encouraged by Abelsstar rating as as a a master him, the Centre master spy spy and and his his American American lawyer's lawyers affectionate affectionate memoir memoir of of him, the Centre intended planned a press conference intended to to turn turnthe theexfiltration exfiltration into into a apublicity publicity stunt. stunt. It I t planned a press conference in in Moscow Moscow at at which which Orlov Orlov would would be be presented presented as as a a Soviet Soviet illegal illegal who who had hadperformed performed heroic deeds behind the German lines on the eastern front during the Second heroic deeds behind the Germanlines on theeastern front duringthe Second World World War CIA. Orlov then publish publish his War and and later later penetrated penetrated the the CIA. Orlov would would then his life life story, story, which which would denigrate its would be be used used as as an an ((active active measure" measure to to glamorize glamorize the the KGB and and denigrate its Main Main 10 Adversary. Adversary. called off Orlov's The The plan, plan, however, however, had had to to be becalled off. Orlovs wifewife flatly flatly refused refused to to go go to to ll Moscow Moscow with with their their two two young young sons, sons, so so he he decided decided to to tough tough it it out out in inWashington. Washington. Though the FBI kept Though the kept the the (tOrlov" Orlov file file open, open, they they were were never never able able to to prove prove a a case case against against him. him. Their Their investigation, investigation, like like that that of of the the CIA, however, however, was was based based on on one one false false assumption. assumption. Mter After his his defection defection in in December December 1961, 1961, KGB Major Major Anatoli AnatoliGolit Golitsyn syn had had provided provided some some clues clues which which helped helped to to confirm confirm suspicions suspicions about about Orlov. Orlov. Golit Golitsyn a Soviet syn correctly correctly said said that that a Soviet spy spy whose whose real real surname surname began began with with a a K had had been been active active in in Berlin Berlin and and West West Germany, Germany, but but wrongly wrongly said said that that his his codename, codename, rather rather than than his his real real name, name, was was SASHA. SASHA. The The CIA and and FBI both both wrongly wrongly concluded concluded that that Alek Aleksandr sandr C(Sasha") (Sashd) Kopatzky, Kopatzky, alias alias((Igor Igor Orlov," Orlov,was was agent agent SASHAY SASHA.12Orlov's Orlovs KGB file file shows shows that that he he was was at at various various stages stages of of his his career career successively successively ERWIN, HERBERT HERBERT and never SASHA, remained and RICHARD, RICHARD, but but never SASHA, and and that thathe he remained a a Soviet Soviet agent agent until until aafew few years After a press article claimed that years before before his his death death in in 1982. 1982. After press a article in in 1978 1978claimed that Orlov Orlovwas was a a Soviet spy, the KGB broke off contact with RICHARD. 13 In 1992, ten years after Soviet spy, the KGB broke off contact with RICHARD.13In 1992, ten years after Orlov's still described by Orlovs death, death, the theGallery Gallery Orlov, Orlov, run run by by his his widow, widow, was was still described by a a Washing Washington ton guide guide as as ((a a hangout hangout for forespionage espionage writers."14 writers.I4 West West Berlin Berlin and and West West Germany, Germany, where where Kopatzky Kopatzky (aka (aka Orlov) Orlov) had had first first offered offered his his services in 1949, 1949,were were the the KGB's KGBs most most successful successfulrecruiting recruiting grounds grounds for for services to to the the KGB in disgruntled personnel. The military personnel. The most most important important was was probably probably Robert Robert Lee Lee disgruntled US military Johnson, GEORGE, a a disaffected disaffected army army sergeant sergeant and and part-time part-time pimp pimp in in Johnson, codenamed codenamed GEORGE, West East West Berlin.is Berlin.15In In 1953 1953 Johnson Johnson and and his his prostitute prostitute fiancee, fiancke, Hedy, Hedy, crossed crossed into into East

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Berlin Berlin and and asked asked for for political political asylum. asylum.The The KGB, KGB, however, however, persuaded persuaded Johnson Johnson to to stay stay in in the the West, West,earn earn a a second second salary salaryby by spying spying for for the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and pay pay off off his his old old scores scores against against the the US US army. army. Despite Despite his his involvement involvementin in prostitution, prostitution, alcohol alcohol abuse abuse and and gambling gambling (not (not to to mention mention espionage), espionage),Johnson Johnson succeeded succeeded in in gaining gaining employment employment as as a a guard from 1957 to 1959 at missile sites in California and Texas, where he purloined guard from 1957 to 1959 at missile sites in California and Texas, where he purloined documents, documents, photographs photographs and, and, on on one one occasion, occasion, a a sample sample of of rocket rocket fuel he1 for for the the KGB.16 KGB.16 Johnson's Johnsons most most productive productive period period as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent began began in in 1961 1961 when when he he was was stationed stationed as as a a guard guard in in the the US US Armed Armed Forces Forces Courier Courier Centre Centre at at Orly Orly Airport, Airport, near near Paris, Paris, one one of of the the main main nerve nerve centers centers in in the the classified classified military military communications communications sys system. ,600 pages tem. Over Over the thenext next two two years years he he handed handedover over 1 1,600 pages of of top top secret secret documents documents to to his his controller. controller.Among Among them themwere were ciphers ciphers and and daily daily key-tables key-tables for for the the Adonis, Adonis,KW-9 KW-9 and 1 8 cipher and HWHW-18 cipher machines; machines; the the operational operational plans plans of of the the US US armed armed forces forces com command mand in in Europe; Europe; documents documents on on the the production production of of American American nuclear nuclear weapons; weapons; lists lists and locations of targets in the Soviet Bloc; US intelligence reports on Soviet scien and locations of targets in the Soviet Bloc; US intelligence reports on Soviet scientific tific research, research, aviation aviation and and missile missile development; development; and and SIGINT SIGINT evidence evidence on on the the state state of of readiness readiness of of the the East East German GermanAir AirForce. Force. Collectively Collectively the the documents documents provided provided an an extraordinary extraordinary and and highly highly classified classified insight insight both both into intoAmerican American forces forces in in Europe Europe and and into what they they knew into what knew about about the the forces forces of of the the Warsaw Warsaw Pact.17 Pact.17 Johnson Johnson was was finally finally arrested arrested in in 1964 1964after after a a tip-off tip-off from from the the KGB KGB defector defector Yuri Yuri Nosenko.18 Nosenko.18

KGB walk-ins walk-ins during during the theEisen Eisenhower presidency were two employees of the National Security [SIGINT] Agency, hower presidency were two employees of the National Security [SIGINT] Agency, 3 1-year-old Bernon F. Mitchell Mitchell and and29-year-old 29-year-old William William H. H. Martin. Martin. On O n September September 31-year-old Bernon F. 6, 6, 1960, 1960, in in Moscow's Moscows House House of of Journalists, Journalists, Mitchell Mitchell and and Martin Martin gave gave perhaps perhaps the the most history most embarrassing embarrassingpress press conference conference in in the the history of of the the American American intelligence intelligence com community. munity. The The greatest greatest embarrassment embarrassment was was the the public public revelation revelation that that NSA had had been been decrypting decrypting the the communications communications of of some some of of the the United United States' States allies. allies. Among Among them, them, said United Arab Republic Italy, Turkey, Turkey, France, France, Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, the theUnited Arab Republic said Martin, Martin, were were "Italy, [Egypt and Syria] , Indonesia, [Egypt and Syria], Indonesia, Uruguay-that's Uruguay-thats enough enough to to give give a a general general picture, picture, I I guess."19 Though a Though the the defection defection of of the the two two NSA NSA employees employeeswas was a spectacular spectacularpublicity publicity coup, coup, Mitchell's Mitchells KGB KGB file file reveals revealsthat that it it fell fell some some way way short short of of the the Centre's Centresexpectations.20 expectations.20 Somewhat Somewhat surprisingly, surprisingly,Mitchell Mitchell had had been been recmited recruited by by NSA in in 1957 1957despite despite admit admitting up ting to to six six years years of of "sexual sexualexperimentations" experimentations up to to the theage age of of nineteen nineteen with with dogs dogs and and chickens. His gifts as a mathematician were presumably thought more important than chickens. His gifts as a mathematician were presumably thought more important than his his farmyard farmyard experiences. experiences. During During Martin's Martins positive positive vetting, vetting, acquaintances acquaintances variously variously described described him him as as irresponsible irresponsible and and an an insufferable insufferable egotist egotist but-like but-like his his friend friend Mitchell-a Mitchell-a gifted gifted mathematician. mathematician. Politically Politically naive naiveand and socially sociallyinadequate, inadequate, Mitchell Mitchell and seduced by and Martin Martin were were seduced by the the Soviet Soviet propaganda propaganda image image of of the the USSR USSR as as a a state state committed whose system could offer them committed to to the thecause cause of ofpeace peace whose progressive progressivesocial social system could offer them the the personal illment they personal fulf fulfilment they had had failed failed to to find find in in the the United United States.21 States.21 In In December December 1959, 1959, Mitchell Mitchell flew flew from from Washington Washington to to Mexico Mexico City, City, in in defiance defiance of of NSA embassy and asylum in the NSA regulations, regulations, entered entered the the Soviet Soviet embassy and asked asked for for political political asylum in the USSR, action.22 The USSR, giving giving ideological ideological reasons reasons as as the the motive motive for for his his action.22 The KGB KGB residency residency

I IN NT TH HE EU UN NI IT TE ED D STATES STATES itself itself the the most most remarkable remarkable KGB

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made strenuous strenuous attempts attempts to to persuade persuade him him to to stay stay on on inside inside NSA as as a a defector-in-place, made defector-in-place, but success. Mitchell meeting with another KGB officer officer in in but without without success. Mitchell agreed agreed to to a a secret secret meeting with another Washington but but maintained maintained his his insistence Union with Washington insistence on on emigrating emigrating to to the the Soviet Soviet Union with Martin. there, however, reveal all he knew about NSA. Martin. Once Oncethere, however, he he promised promised to to reveal allhe knew about NSA. O n June June 25, 25, 1960, 1960, at at the thebeginning beginning of of three three weeks' weeks summer leave, Mitchell and On summer leave, Mitchell and Martin boarded boarded Eastern Eastern Airlines Airlines flight flight 307 atWashington Washington National Airport, Airport, bound bound Martin 307 at National another flight for Mexico for New Orleans. There, after a brief stopover, they took another City, stayed stayed the the night night at atthe theHotel Hotel Virreyes, then then caught caught a a Cubana Cubana Airlines City, Virreyes, Airlines plane plane to to Havana.23 exfiltrated from Cuba to Soviet Union. code Havana.23In In July July they they were were exfiltrated from Cuba to the the Soviet Union, KGB codebreakers theamount amount of detailed knowledge breakers were were disappointed disappointed in in the of detailed knowledge of of NSA crypt cryptanalysis possessed possessedby by Mitchell Mitchell and and Martin. Martin. Their Theirmost important intelligence, the analysis most important intelligence, in in the Centre's reassurance they on NSA's of success Centres view, view, was wasthe the reassurance they were were able ableto to provide provide on NSAs lack lack of success in breaking breaking current current high-grade high-grade Soviet Soviet ciphers.24 ciphers.24 However, However, the KGB similarly in the KGB similarly remained unable to decrypt high-grade US cipher systems.25 remained unable to decrypt high-grade cipher systems.25 Security was was so so lax lax at at NSA's NSRs Fort Fort Meade Meade headquarters headquarters that that no no attempt attempt was made Security was made to track track Mitchell Mitchell and and Martin Martin down down until until eight eightdays days after after they they had had been been due due to toreturn to return from their their three-week vacation. Inside Inside Mitchells officers found found from three-week vacation. Mitchell's house house NSA security security officers the deliberately left for them the key key to to a a safe safe deposit deposit box, box, which which Mitchell Mitchell had had deliberately left for them to to find. find. Inside the box in in a nearby bank bank they they found found a sealed envelope bearing a Inside the box a nearby a sealed envelope bearing a request, request, signed by by both both Mitchell Mitchell and and Martin, Martin, that that its its contents be made public. The The envelope signed contents be made public. envelope contained a denunciation of the evils of capitalism contained a lengthy lengthy denunciation of the the US government government and and the evils of capitalism and Union, including claim that its emanciemanci and a a bizarre bizarre eulogy eulogy of of life life in in the the Soviet Soviet Union, including the the claim that its pated pated women women were were "more more desirable desirable as as mates."26 mates.26 By decision of the Union, dated August decision no. no. 295 295 of of the the Communist Communist Party Party of the Soviet Soviet Union, dated August 11,1960, 1960, Mitchell Mitchell and and Martin Martin were were given given political asylum and and monthly 11, political asylum monthly allowances allowances of 500 500 roubles roubles each-about the same same as as their and well well above Soviet of each-about the their NSA NSA salaries salaries and above Soviet salary scales.27 In was inin thethe Institute of Mathe mat salary scales.27 In the the autumn autumnMitchell Mitchell was given givena a job job Institute of Mathematics at at Leningrad Leningrad University; University; Martin Martin began began doctoral doctoral research research at same institute. ics at the the same institute. Both to the Both defectors defectors quickly quickly put put their their beliefs beliefs about about the the desirability desirability of of Soviet Soviet mates mates to the test. Mitchell Mitchell married married Galina Galina Vladimirovna Vladimirovna Yakovleva, Yakovleva, a a 30-year-old 30-year-old assistant test. assistant propro fessor in in the the piano music department of the the Leningrad Leningrad Conservatory. Conservatory. Martin, Martin, who who fessor piano music department of changed his his name name to to Sokolovsky, Sokolovsky, married married a a Russian woman whom he met met on on holi holichanged Russian woman whom he day on on the the Black Black Sea.28 Sea.2s day Within a a few few years years the the Centre both Mitchell and Martin Martin considerably considerably Within Centrefound found both Mitchell and more trouble trouble than than they both defectors rapidly became more they were were worth. worth. Predictably, Predictably, both defectors rapidly became disil disillusioned Union. Martin, whom the the Centre Centre regarded lusioned with with life life in in the the Soviet Soviet Union. Martin, whom regarded as as the the more impressionable impressionable of of the the two, two, was was gullible gullible enough enough to to believe believe a a tale tale concocted by more concocted by the KGB that that they they had had both both been sentenced in absentia to twenty years to twenty years' hard hard labor labor by by the been sentenced a He a bogus copy of of a closed closed session sessionof of the the US USSupreme Supreme Court. Court. H e was was eventually eventually shown shown a bogus copy the of the judgment judgment in in order order to to persuade persuade him him to to put put all all thought thought of of returning returning home home out out of his mind. Mitchell his Mitchell was more skeptical and by the 1970s appeared determined to under leave. As chairman of the KGB, Yuri Andropov gave personal leave. personal instructions instructions that under no circumstances circumstances was was either either Mitchell Mitchell or or Martin Martin to tobe allowedto to go, for of deter deterno be allowed for fear fear of ring other otherpotential potential defectors defectors from from the the West. West.In In a hrther attempt attempt to deter Martin he ring a further to deter Martin he

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was was shown shown an an article article by by Yuri Yuri Semyonov Semyonov in in Izvestia claiming claiming that that American American agents agents had had been been found found in in possession possession of of poison poison ampoules, ampoules, and and was was led led to to believe believe that that these these were were intended intended for for Mitchell Mitchell and and himsel himself. Mitchell Mitchell correctly correctly suspected suspected that that the the story story had had been been fabricated fabricated by by the the KGB. KGB. Galina Galina Mitchell Mitchell was was also also anxious anxiousto to leave, leave, but but the the KGB their KGB put put pressure pressure on on her her mother mother to topersuade persuade Galina Galina to tochange change her her mind. mind.After After their applications applications for for visas visas had had been been rebuffed rebuffed by by Australia, Australia, New New Zealand, Zealand, Sweden Sweden and and Switzerland, Switzerland, as as well well as as the the United UnitedStates, States, the the Mitchells Mitchells told told the the Soviet Soviet authorities authorities on on 1980 that March March 29, 29,1980 thatthey they had had given given up up their their attempts attempts to to emigrate.29 emigrate.29But But there there were were persistent persistent reports reports afterwards afterwards that that Mitchell Mitchell was was still still trying trying to toleave.3o leave.30
FOR F the F OR M MO S ST T O OF the Cold Cold War, War, the the Washington Washington and and New New York York legal legal residencies residencies had had little little success success in in providing providing the the intelligence intelligence from from inside inside the the federal federal government government which which had limitations were had been been so so plentiful plentiful during during the the Second Second World World War. War. Their Their limitations were clearly clearly exposed exposed during during the the two two years years before before the the most most dangerous dangerous moment moment of of the the Cold Cold War, War, the the Cuban Cuban missile missile crisis crisisof of 1962. 1962. The The vacuum vacuum left left by by the the lack lack of of KGB high-grade high-grade political political intelligence intelligence from from the the United States was partly fi l led by dangerous nonsense from elsewhere, some of which United States was partly filled by dangerous nonsense from elsewhere, some of which refl ected the 1960 the reflected the paranoid paranoid strain strain in in Soviet Soviet analysis. analysis. On O n June June 29, 29,1960 theKGB KGB chairman, chairman, Aleksandr Aleksandr Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Shelepin, Shelepin, personally personally delivered delivered to to Khrushchev Khrushchev an an alarmist alarmist assessment assessment of of American American policy, policy, based based on on aamisinformed misinformed report report from from an an unidentified unidentified NATO liaison liaison officer officer with with the the CIA: CIA:

In In the the CIA it it is is known known that that the theleadership leadership of of the the Pentagon Pentagon is is convinced convinced of of the the need the Soviet soon as need to to initiate initiate a a war war with with the Soviet Union Union "as as soon as possible" possible .. .. .. Right Right now missile bases now the the USA has has the the capability capability to to wipe wipe out out Soviet Soviet missile basesand and other other mil military targets targets with with its its bomber bomber forces. forces. But But over over the the next next little little while while the the defense defense itary forces . .. .. and opportunity will and the the opportunity will disap disapforces of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union will will grow grow. pear pear .. .. .. As As a a result result of of these these assumptions, assumptions, the the chiefs chiefs at at the the Pentagon Pentagon are are hop hoping ing to tolaunch launch a a preventive preventive war war against against the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union.
Khrushchev took took the thewarning warning seriously. seriously. Less Less than than a afortnight fortnight later he he issued issued a a public public Khrushchev later warning to to the Pentagon "not not to to forget forget that, that, as as shown shown at at the latest tests, we have warning the Pentagon the latest tests, we have rockets which which can can land land in in aapre-set pre-set square target 13,000 13,000 kilometers kilometers away."31 away.31 rockets square target Moscow followed followed the the presidential presidential elections elections of of 1960 1960 with close attention. attention. Moscow with close Khrushchev Khrushchev regarded regarded the the Republican Republican candidate, candidate, Richard Richard Nixon, Nixon, as as a a McCarthyite McCarthyite friend of of the the Pentagon Pentagon hawks, hawks, and and was was anxious anxiousthat that Kennedy Kennedy should win. The The Wash Washfriend should win. (alias "Fomin"), ington resident, resident, Aleksandr Aleksandr Semyonovich Semyonovich Feklisov Feklisov (alias Fomin), was was ordered ordered to to ington propose diplomatic diplomatic or or propaganda propaganda initiatives, initiatives, or or any any other other measures, measures, to to facilitate facilitate "propose Kennedys victory." victory. The The residency residency tried tried to to make make contact contact with with Robert Kennedy but but Kennedy's Robert Kennedy was politely politely rebuffed.32 rebuffed.32 was Khrushchevs view of Kennedy Kennedy changed changed after after the the CIA's CIASabortive abortive and and absurdly absurdly Khrushchev's view of ineptattempt to to topple topple Fidel FidelCastro by landing landing an an American-backed American-backed "Cuban Cuban inept attempt Castro by brigade at at the theBay Bay of of Pigs Pigs in in April April 1961. 1961. In the the immediate immediate aftermath aftermath of of the the Cuban Cuban brigade" In dkbicle, Kennedy despairingly asked his special counsel, Theodore Sorensen, How debacle, Kennedy despairingly asked his special counsel, Theodore Sorensen, "How

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could I have have been The young young president, president, Khrushchev Khrushchev concluded, could been so stupid?"33 The concluded, was was unable American capitalism's military-industrial comcom unable to to control control the the "dark dark forces" forces of of American capitalisms military-industrial plex.34 a summit Khrushchev belligerbelliger ~ l e xAt At .~ a~ summitmeeting meeting with with Kennedy Kennedy at at Vienna Vienna in in June, June, Khrushchev ently demanded an the three-power three-power status of Berlin Berlin and a German German peace peace ently demanded an end end to to the status of and a treaty set on on a collision course. treaty by the the end end of the the year. year. The The two two superpowers superpowers seemed seemed set a collision course. Kennedy said said afterwards afterwards to to the thejournalist journalist James James Reston: Reston: Kennedy

I think Bay of of Pigs. Pigs. I think any think [Khrushchev] [Khrushchev] did did it it because because of of the the Bay think he hethought thought anyone whowas was so so young young and inexperienced as thatmess one who and inexperienced as to to get get in in that mess could could be be taken, taken, and anyone anyone who who got got into into it it and and didn't didnt see see it through had just and it through had no no guts. guts. So he he just beat the the hell hell out out of of me. me.35 beat 35
O n July 29,1961 On 29, 1961 Shelepin sent Khrushchev the outline of of a new and aggressive aggressive global grand grand strategy strategy against against the the Main Main Adversary Adversary designed circumstances global designed to to create "create circumstances in different different areas areas of of the the world world which which would would assist the attention attentionand in assist in in diverting diverting the and forces forces of the the United United States States and and its its allies, allies, and and would would tie tie them down during thesettlement settlement of of them down during the of the question question of of a a German Germanpeace peace treaty treaty and and West West Berlins the Berlin's proposal. proposal." The The first first part part of of the plan plan was was to to use movements around secure an the use national national liberation liberation movements around the the world world to to secure an advantage in in the the East-West East-West struggle struggle and and to the advantage to activate "activate by by the the means means available available to to the armed uprisings uprisings against against pro-Western pro-Western reactionary governments. At the top of KGB armed reactionary governments." the top of the list list for for demolition demolition Shelepin Shelepin placed placed "reactionary" reactionaryregimes theMain Main Adversarys the regimes in in the Adversary's own backyard in Nicaragua where where he he proposed proposed coorcoor own backyard in Central CentralAmerica, America, beginning beginning in inNicaragua dinating a revolutionary front" front in in collaboration collaboration with dinating a "revolutionary with the the Cubans Cubans and and the the SandinSandin istas. NATO bases bases in in western Europe and and a a istas. Shelepin Shelepin also also proposed proposed destabilizing destabilizing NATO western Europe disinformation campaign campaign designed to demoralize demoralize the West by disinformation designed to the West by persuading persuading it it of of the the growing August 1, 1, with with only only minor minor amendments, amendments, growing superiority superiority of of Soviet Soviet forces. forces. On O n August Shelepin's directive.36 Elements of Shelepinsmasterplan masterplan was was approved approved as as a a Central CentralCommittee Committeed i r e ~ t i v eElements .~~ of it, especially especially the the use use of of national national liberation liberation movements the struggle with the the Main it, movements in in the struggle with Main Adversary, continued continued to to reappear reappear in in Soviet Soviet strategy next quarter quarter of Adversary, strategy for for the the next of a a century. century. During the the Kennedy Kennedy administration, administration, however, however, the During the role role of of the the KGB in in WashingWashing ton less important than that that of In May Colonel Georgi ton was was less important than of the the GRU. GRU. In May 1961 1961 GRU Colonel Georgi Bolshakov, bureau of of the the Tass Tass news Bolshakov, operating operating under under cover cover as ashead head of of the the Washington Washingtonbureau news agency, began began fortnightly fortnightly meetings meetings with with the Attorney-General, Robert agency, the Attorney-General, Robert Kennedy. Kennedy. Bolshakov succeeded succeededin in persuading persuading Robert Robert Kennedy Bolshakov Kennedy that, that, between between them, them, they they could could short-circuit the ponderous of official speak straightly and short-circuit the ponderous protocol protocol of official diplomacy, diplomacy, "speak straightly and frankly without without resorting resorting to to the the politickers! politickers stock-in-trade and frankly stock-in-trade propaganda propaganda stunts stunts" and set up up a a direct direct channel channel of of communication communication between between President President Kennedy FirstSecset Kennedy and and First Sec retary with an an experienced intelligence retary Khrushchev. Khrushchev. Forgetting Forgetting that that he he was was dealing dealing with experienced intelligence professional had been been instructed cultivate him, him,the the Presidents President's brother professional who whohad instructed to to cultivate brother became convinced grew" between between him Bolshakov: became convinced that that "an an authentic authentic friendship friendship grew him and and Bolshakov:

Any some message to the President (or (or Khrushchev Khrushchev the President Any time time that that he he had had some message to to give give to had) to Khrushchev, Khrushchev, we we went went had) or or when when the the President President had had some some message message to to give give to through about all all kinds kinds of of things.37 things.37 through Georgi Georgi Bolshakov Bolshakov .. .. .. I met met with with him himabout

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Despite Bolshakov's success, GRU intelligence Despite Bolshakovs success, intelligence assessment assessment of of American American policy policy was abysmal. In 1962 wasabysmal. In March March 1962 it it produced produced two two dangerously dangerously misinformed misinformed reports reports which planning which served served to to reinforce reinforce the the KGB's KGBs earlier earlier warning warning that that the the Pentagon Pentagon was was planning a nuclear nuclear first first strike. strike. The The GRU claimed claimed that that in in the theprevious previous June June the the United United States a States had decision to the Soviet in had made made the the decision to launch launch a a surprise surprise nuclear nuclear attack attack on on the Soviet Union Union in September September 1961, 1961, but but had had been been deterred deterred at at the the last last moment moment by Soviet Soviet nuclear nuclear tests tests which which showed showed that that the theUSSR's USSRs nuclear nuclear arsenal arsenal was was more more powerful powerful than than the thePentagon Pentagon had realized. The had realized. The woefully woefully inaccurate inaccurate Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence reports reports of of Washington's Washingtons plans for a series plans for thermonuclear thermonuclear warfare warfare coincided coincided with with a series of of real real but but farcically farcically inept inept American to topple American attempts attempts to topple or or assassinate assassinate Moscow's Moscows Cuban Cuban ally, ally, Fidel Fidel Castro Castroactions strain in actions ideally ideally calculated calculated to to exacerbate exacerbate the the paranoid paranoid strain in Soviet Soviet foreign foreign policy. policy. In March March 1962 1962 Castro Castro urged urged the the KGB to In base in to set set up up an an operations operations base in Havana Havana to to export revolution Then, export revolution across across Latin Latin America.38 America.38 Then, in in May, May, Khrushchev Khrushchev decided decided to to con construct nuclear nuclear missile missile bases bases in in Cuba-the Cuba-the most most dangerous dangerous gamble gamble of of the the Cold Cold War. War. struct H e was partly motivated motivated by by his his desire desire to to impress impress Washington Washington with Soviet nuclear nuclear He was partly with Soviet might strike. At the same might and and so so deter deter it it from from further further (non-existent) (non-existent) plans plans for for a a first first strike. the same time make time he he intended intendedto to make a a dramatic dramatic gesture gesture of of support support for for the the Cuban Cuban revolution.39 rev~lution.~~ The The Soviet Soviet gamble gamble was was taken taken in in the thebelief belief that that Washington Washington would would not not detect detect the the presence of of the the Cuban Cuban missile missile sites sites until until it it was was too too late late to to do do anything anything about about them. them. presence That That belief belief was was mistaken mistaken for for two two reasons. reasons. First, First, high-altitude high-altitude U-2 spy planes planes were were able to to photograph photograph the the construction construction of of the the missile missile bases. bases.Secondly, Secondly, American intelli intelliable American gence analysts analysts were were able able to to make make sense of the the confusing confusing U U-2 photographs because because 2 photographs gence sense of they otherimportant important intelligence they possessed possessed plans plans of of missile missile site site construction construction and and other intelligence secretly supplied supplied by by Colonel Colonel Oleg Oleg Vladimirovich Vladimirovich Penkovsky, Penkovsky, a a spy in in the the GRU run run secretly jointly British SIS SIS and jointly by the the British and the the CIA. CIA. All the the main main American American intelligence intelligence reports reports on theCuban Cuban bases the missile missile crisis crisiswere were later stamped IRONBARK, a on the bases during during the later stamped a codeword indicating that use of codeword indicating that they they had had made made use of Penkovsky's Penkovskys documents.4o documents.40 As As the theconstruction construction of of nuclear nuclear missile missile bases basesin in Cuba Cubabegan, began, Bolshakov Bolshakov continued continued to to provide provide reassurance, reassurance, probably probably as as part part of of a a deliberate deliberate deception deception strategy, strategy, that that 2 spy Khrushchev policy. When Khrushchev would would never never countenance countenance such such an an aggressive aggressive policy. When U U-2 planes planes revealed revealed the the existence existence of of the the bases bases in in mid-October, mid-October, while while they they were were still still in in the the course Cuban missile crisis, Robert course of of construction, construction, thus thus beginning beginning the the Cuban missile crisis, Robert Kennedy Kennedy turned on Bolshakov. "I I bet bet you you know know for for certain certain that you have your missiles in turned on Bolshakov. that you have your missiles in Cuba," he remonstrated. it. According Cuba, he remonstrated. Bolshakov Bolshakov denied denied it. According to to Sorensen, Sorensen, "President President Kennedy had had come come to to rely rely on on the the Bolshakov Bolshakov channel channel for direct private private information information Kennedy for direct from Khrushchev, Khrushchev, and and he he felt felt personally personally deceived. deceived. He H e was was personally personally deceived."41 deceived. from the moment moment in the Cold when the the Kremlin Kremlin most most urgently urgently needed needed good good At the in the Cold War War when was unable to provide it. During intelligence from Washington, the KGB residency was intelligence the Second World the Second World War WarSoviet Soviet agents agents had had penetrated penetrated every every major majorbranch branch of of the the Roo Roosevelt administration. administration. The The Centre Centre had had been been better better informed informed on on some some important important sevelt aspects aspects of of American American policy policy (notably (notably the the MANHATTAN MANHATTAN project) project) than than Roosevelt's Roosevelts vice-presidents or or most of his his cabinets.42 cabinets.42During During the theCuban Cuban missile crisis, by vice-presidents most members members of missile crisis, by residencys sources sources were limited to agents and contacts in contrast, the Washington residency's the the press press corps corps and and foreign foreign embassies embassies (especially (especiallythose those of of Argentina Argentina and and Nicaragua). Nicaragua).
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Some of the the intelligence intelligencewhich which Feklisov, Feklisov,the the resident, resident, sent Some of sent to to Moscow Moscow was was simply simply gosgos sip. He H e had had no no source source capable capableof of penetrating penetrating the deliberations of sip. the secret secret deliberations of EXCOMM, EXCOMM, Kennedy's who cabinet room 16 and met Kennedys closest closestadvisers advisers who assembled assembled in in the thecabinet room on on October October16 and met in daily daily session for the the next next thirteen thirteen days days until until the the crisis crisis was Aleksandr in session for wasresolved. resolved. Aleksandr Sakharovsky, the the head head of of the the FCD, FCD, wrote wrote dismissively dismissively on severalof Feklkovs Sakharovsky, on several of Feklisov's telegrams "This report report does does not not contain contain any telegrams at at the the height height of of the the missile missile crisis, crisis,This any secret secret inf~rmation.~~ information."43 The during the cri The relative relative lack lack of of influence influence of of the the KGB on on Khrushchev's Khrushchevs policy policyduring the crisis also the limitations limitations of of its its chairman. the influential sis also reflected reflected the chairman. In In December December 1961 1961 the influential Aleksandr Shelepin had been as chairman chairman by Aleksandr Shelepin had been succeeded succeeded as by his his less lessable able protCgC, protege, Vladimir about intelligence intelligence and and was was so so unattracted Vladimir Semichastny, Semichastny,who who knew knew so so little little about unattracted by post offered it only from Khrushchev. Khrushchev. by the the post offered to to him him that thathe heaccepted accepted it only under under pressure pressure from Khrushchev made clear main reason appointing Semichastny Semichastny was was to Khrushchev made clear that that his his main reason for for appointing to ensure the the political political loyalty loyalty of of the the KGB rather rather than than to tobenefit from his ensure benefit from his advice advice on on forfor eign policy. policy. There There is is no no sign sign in in any any of of the the files Mitrokhin that that Semichastny eign files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Semichastny ever followed Shelepin's example of to Khrushchev ambitious grand grand everfollowed Shelepins example of submitting submitting to Khrushchev ambitious strategies for for combating combating the the Main Main Adversary. Adversary. During crisis Semichastny strategies During the the missile missile crisis Semichastny had not aasingle single meeting meeting with Khrushchev and never invited to attend attend meetings had not with Khrushchev and was was never invited to meetings of the Presidium (an enlarged Politburo which for the previous decade had the of the Presidium (an enlarged Politburo which for the previous decade had been been the main main policy-making policy-making body). body). Nor did did Khrushchev Khrushchev ever ever ask askfor, for, or receive receive frcm, theKGB any any assessment Nor or from, the assessment of of the the likely American response to to the theplacing placing of of nuclear bases in likely American response nuclear missile missile bases in Cuba.44 Cuba.44 As As foreign foreign intelligence seems to had little little insight insight into into American American policypolicy intelligence chief, chief, Sakharovsky Sakharovskyseems to have have had making. Though Though apparently apparently a a competent making. competent bureaucrat bureaucrat in in the the Soviet Soviet mold, mold, his his firstfirst hand experience experience of of the the outside outside world world was was limited hand limited to to Romania Romania and and other other parts parts of of eastern Europe. Europe. His His melancholy melancholy expression expression was was probably, probably,as one of subordinates eastern as one of his his subordinates has written, written, "due due to to the the enormous enormous pressures pressures of the pressures was has of the the job. job."45 Among Among the pressures was the of political political correctness. correctness. The The FCD rarely rarely the need need to to conform conform to to the thehighest highest standards standards of submitted c request request of of the the Foreign Foreign Ministry, Ministry, the the Inter submitted assessments assessments save save at at the thespecifi specific International or the the Presidium. Most of of what it national Department Department of of the the Central Central Committee Committee or Presidium. Most what it termed more than than digests of information information on on parpar termed its its "analyses" analyseswere, were,in in reality, reality, little little more digests of ticular at conclusions conclusions for for fear fear that that these these ticular topics topics which which generally generally avoided avoided arriving arriving at might conflict conflict with with the the opinions opinions of of higher higher authority. during might authority. The The supreme supreme authority authority during the missile missile crisis crisis was Khrushchev himself himself rather thanthe the Presidium. To a the was Khrushchev rather than Presidium. To a remarkable remarkable degree he he both bothdetermined determined Soviet Soviet policy policy and, own degree and, like like Stalin Stalin before before him, him, acted acted as as his his own chief intelligence analyst.j6 analyst.46 chief intelligence Intelligence however, have havesome influence on policyduring the Intelligence did, did, however, some influence on Khrushchevs Khrushchev's policy during the final stages stages of of the the crisis. crisis. O n October October 25 25 he he indicated indicated to the Presidium in order final On to the Presidium that, that, in order to resolve resolve the the crisis, crisis, it it might mightultimately ultimately be basesin to be necessary necessary to to dismantle dismantle the the missile missile bases in return for for a a US guarantee guarantee not not to invade Cuba. yet return to invade Cuba. Khrushchev, Khrushchev, however, however, was was not not yet ready to to make make such such a a proposal. proposal. He H e changed changed his during the ready his mind mind during the night night of of October October 25-6 after after a a GRU report report that that US Strategic Strategic Air 25-6 Air Command Command had had been been placed placed on on nuclear alert. alert. Hitherto Hitherto he hoped to to save obtaining the nuclear he had had hoped save face face by by obtaining the removal removal of of US missile bases basesin Turkey in return return for stopping the the construction of missile of Soviet missile sites

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in Cuba. On October 26, American in Cuba. O n the the morning morningof of October 26,however, however,wrongly wrongly fearing fearing that that an anAmerican invasion be emotional plea invasion of of Cuba Cubamight might be imminent, imminent, he he dictated dictated a a rambling rambling and and emotional plea for for peace to peace to Kennedy Kennedy which which asked asked for for a a US USguarantee guarantee of of Cuban Cuban territorial territorial integrity integrity but but made mention of bases. Within made no no mention of the the Turkish Turkish missile missile bases. Within twenty-four twenty-four hours, hours, Khrushchev Khrushchev had had changed changed his his mind. mind. On O n October October 27, having having concluded concluded that that an an Amer Amer, he sent another anotherletter letter insisting the ican was not imminent after ican invasion invasion was not imminent after all all, he sent insisting that that the Turkish bases must Turkish bases must be be part part of of the the deal. 47 Shortly sent his second letter, Cuba, Shortly after after Khrushchev Khrushchev had had sent his second letter, Soviet Soviet air air defense defense in in Cuba, apparently apparently as as a a result result of of a a failure failure in in the the chain chain of of command, command, shot shot down down an an American American U -2 spy U-2 spy plane plane over over Cuba, Cuba, killing killing the the pilot. pilot. Khrushchev Khrushchev panicked. panicked. Reports Reports that that Kennedy October 28 wrongly Kennedy was was to to make make a a speech speech on on national national television television at at noon noonon on October wrongly 28 persuaded might be about to persuaded him him that that the thePresident President might be about to announce announce an an invasion invasion of of Cuba. Cuba. Khrushchev Khrushchev gave gave in in and and accepted accepted Kennedy's Kennedys terms: terms: a a unilateral unilateral withdrawal withdrawal of of "all all Soviet Cuba. To in Soviet offensive offensive arms" arms from from Cuba. To make make sure sure his his message message reached reached Kennedy Kennedy in time, he broadcast over time, he ordered ordered it it to tobe be broadcast over Radio Radio Moscow.48 Moscow.48 the down at the missile the Soviet Soviet climb climbdown at the the end endof of the missile crisis, crisis,which which led coup, was led two two years years later later to to Khrushchev's Khrushchevs overthrow overthrow in ina a Kremlin Kremlin palace palace coup, was strengthened in Centre by series of strengthened inthe the Centre by the the discovery discovery of of a a series of penetrations penetrations by, by, and and defec defections Anatoli Mikhailovich tions to, to, the the CIA. CIA. In In December December 1961 1961 a a KGB KGB officer, officer, Major Major Anatoli Mikhailovich Golitsyn, walked Golitsyn, walked into into the the American American embassy embassy in in Helsinki Helsinki and and was was exfiltrated exfiltrated to to the the United States. In September arrested GRU Colonel United States. In September 1962 1962 the theKGB arrested Colonel Oleg OlegPenkovsky, Penkovsky, who for for the the past eighteen months had been providing high-grade high-grade intelligence intelligence to to the the who past eighteen months had been providing British and Americans.49 British and A r n e r i c a n ~ . ~ ~ The The damage damage report report on on Golitsyn Golitsyn produced produced the the usual usual stereotyped stereotyped denunciation denunciation of of his Since it his motives. motives. Since it was was impossible impossible to to criticize criticize either either the the KGB or or the the Soviet Soviet system, system, it it followed followed that that the the basic basic cause cause of of all all defections defections was was the the moral moral failings failings of of the the defec defectors tors themselves-in themselves-in particular, particular, "the the virus virus of of careerism" careerism unscrupulously unscrupulously exploited exploited by by Western Western intelligence intelligence services: services:
TH HE E H U M I L IAT I O N OF HUMILIATION

The The treason treason of of Golitsyn, Golitsyn, an an ambitious ambitious and and vain vain man, man, provides provides a a typical typical exam example of of a a person person representing representing the the tribe tribe of of careerists. careerists. In In the the mid-1950s mid-1950s he he reacted reacted ple painfully to to a a demotion demotion in in his his position: position: he he could could not not tolerate tolerate having having his his mispainfully mis takes takes and and blunders blunders pointed pointed out out and and commented commented on. on. Emphasizing Emphasizing his his excep exceptional qualities, qualities, he he said said that that only only bad bad luck luck had had prevented prevented him him from from becoming becoming a a tional highly successhl officer during during the the Stalin Stalin period. period. [Late [Late in in 1961] 19611 Golithighly successful senior senior officer Golit syn made persistent attempts attempts to tolearn learn the the contents contentsof of the the evaluation evaluation written written on on syn made persistent him for for Moscow, Moscow, which which was was negative. negative. The The [Helsinki] [Helsinki] Residency believes that that him Residency believes he succeeded succeeded in in learning its essence essence and, and, knowing knowing from from the the experience of he learning its experience of others that that he could expect expect a a serious serious talk talk in in the the personnel personnel department department and others he could and a a demotion in in rank, rank, he he defected defected to to the theUnited United States.50 States. demotion
codename-in case, GOR GORgiven an insulting code name-in his case, Like all defectors, Golitsyn was given (Hunchba~k).~~ BATY ("Hunchback" ).5 1 Measures taken to discredit him included the arrest of a

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Soviet smuggler (code (codenamed MUSTAFA),who was persuaded to implicate Soviet smuggler named MUSTAFA), who was persuaded to implicate Golitsyn Golitsyn in contraband contraband operations across the the Finnish article in in the newspaper in operations across Finnish border. border. An An article the newspaper Rosszja on on September 27,1962 Golitsyns (fictitious) (fictitious) involveSovetskaya Rossiya September 27, 1962 condemned condemned Golitsyn's involve ment with ment with smugglers.52 smuggler^.'^ Despite the the Centre's Centres attempt attempt to tobelittle belittle Golitsyn, damage assessment his Despite Golitsyn, the the damage assessment after after his defection to betray betray a a wide of intelligence intelligence to defection concluded concluded that that he he had had been been able able to wide range range of to the "Lines" (departments) the CIA on on the the operations operations of of most most of of the the Lines (departments) at atthe theHelsinki Helsinki and and other residencies, residencies, as as well well as as KGB methods methods of of recruiting agents. other recruiting and andrunning running agents.53 Between January 4 and February 16, 1962 the Centre sent instructions to fifty-four Between January 4 and February 16, 1962 the Centre sent instructions to fifty-four residents on the action required to limit the damage to current operations. For the time being, being, all all meetings meetings with with important agents were were to to be and contact contact important agents be suspended suspended and time limited to to "impersonal impersonal means" means such such as as dead dead letter-b~xes.~ limited letter-boxes.54 As well well as as providing providing important important intelligence intelligence on leads to As on KGB methods methods and and leads to a a numnum ber of of Soviet Soviet agents, agents, however, however, Golitsyn Golitsyn also also confused with aa series of ber confused the the CIA with series of increasingly extravagant extravagant conspiracy conspiracy theories. theories. He the head head of increasingly He persuaded persuaded the of the the CIA counter-intelligence staff, staff, James James Angleton, Angleton, that that the the KGB was was engaged engaged in in a a gigantic gigantic counter-intelligence global deception, and that that even even the the Sino-Soviet Sino-Soviet split split was charade to to deceive global deception, and was a a charade deceive the the West. Golitsyn Golitsyn was was later later to to maintain maintain that that the the Prague Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia West. Spring in Czechoslovakia was was also 55 occur to to the defection, by by also a a KGB description. descripti~ nIt . ~did did ~ Inot not t occur the Centre Centrethat thatGolitsyn's Golitsyns defection, officers infecting a small small but troublesome minority of of CIA offi cers with his own paranoid tendencies, would ultimately ultimately do do the theAgency Agency more more harm than good. tendencies, would harm than good. In Aleksandr Nikolayevich Cherepanov of of the the KGB Second In November November 1963 1963 Aleksandr Nikolayevich Cherepanov Second Chief Directorate Directorate (internal security and and counter-intelligence), sent the the American American Chief (internal security counter-intelligence), sent embassy in in Moscow Moscow a a packet packet of of highly highly classified classified papers dealing with with the embassy papers dealing the surveilsurveil lance foreigners in Russia, together lance and and entrapment entrapment of of diplomats diplomats and and other other foreigners in Russia, together with with a a note offering offering his his services services to to the the CIA. note CIA. In the deputy head In the the ambassador's ambassadors absence, absence, the deputyhead of mission mission feared feared that that the thedocuments documents were were part part of ofa a Though the the of KGB provocation. provocation. Though head of of the the CIA station station was was allowed allowed to to photograph photograph the head the documents, documents, the the originals, originals, despite his his protests, were returned returned to to the the Russians. Russians. Cherepanov Cherepanov fl fled from Moscow Moscow despite protests, were ed from but was was arrested arrested by by KGB border border guards guards on the frontier frontier with withTurkestan Turkestanon on Decembut on the Decem ber 1 17,1963. H e admitted admitted during during interrogation interrogation that the operational secrets he he had had ber 7, 1963. He that the operational secrets revealed to to the theAmericans Americans included includedthe theuse use of of "spy spy dust special chemicals (metka), special chemicals revealed dust" (metka), applied was sentenced sentenced to to applied to to suspects' suspects shoes shoes to to facilitate facilitate tracking. tracking. Cherepanov Cherepanov was death at secret trial 1964. T The Centre's damage damage assessment assessment of of the the case case death at a a secret trial in in April April 1964. h e Centres concluded: concluded:

It betrayed Cherepanov. Cherepanov. Either Either It is is not not possible possible to to determine determine why why the the Americans Americans betrayed they they wanted they suspected suspected that that his his action action was was a a KGB provocation provocation or or they wanted to to bur burden person who who had the package to to den the theKGB with with aalengthy lengthy search search for for the the person hadsent sent the package the 56 the embassy. emba~sy.~ Though the not responsible for Cherepanov's betrayal, it it was was shortly shortly to Though theCIA was was not responsible for Cherepanovs betrayal, to make serious error. Nosenko, a a make another, another, even even more more serious error. In In February February 1964 1964 Yuri Yuri Ivanovich Ivanovich Nosenko, KGB officer the Soviet delegation in in Geneva, Geneva, who who had had officer serving serving on on the Soviet disarmament disarmament delegation

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begun June 1962, defected the United States. begun working working for for the the Agency Agency in inJune 1962, defected to tothe United States. Nosenko's Nosenkos CIA debriefers, debriefers, however, however, wrongly wrongly concluded concluded that that he hewas was a a KGB plant.57 plant.57 Unaware Unaware of of the the CIA's CIAShorrendous horrendous misjudgement, misjudgement, the the Centre Centre regarded regarded Nosenko's Nosenkos defection Its damage defection as as a a serious serious setback. setback. Its damage assessment assessment began began with with the the usual usual character character assassination, claiming that Nosenko (henceforth assassination, claiming that Nosenko (henceforth codenamed codenamed IDOL), IDOL), had had been been infected-like Golitsyn-with the infected-like Golitsyn-with the "virus virus of of careerism:" careerism: Nosenko, Nosenko, who who lusted lusted for for power, power, did did not not hide hide his his ambitions ambitions and and obtained obtained a a high high position. Headquarters will not forget position. The The leadership leadership of of Department Department 1 1 at at Headquarters will not forget Nosenko's hysterical reaction plans to Nosenkos hysterical reaction when when he he was was informed informed of of their their plans to promote promote . "The chief of direc him him from from deputy deputy chief chief to to chief chief of of section section [otdeleniye] [otdeleniye]. The chief of the the direc," he torate will replace replace the the head head of of the the department department [otdel] [utdel], he torate has has promised promised that that I will shouted shouted shamelessly. shamelessly. The The characteristics characteristics of of careerism careerism were were evident evident in in many many curious became the curious facets facets of of his his life. life. When When he he became the deputy deputychief chief of of another another depart department, Nosenko ashamed of ment, Nosenko was was ashamed of his his rank rank [KGB captain], captain], which which was was below belowthat that normally normally associated associated with with his his position. position. He H e would would return return unsigned unsigned any any docu documents and ments with with "Captain" Captainon onthem, them, and would would only only sign sign documents documents on on which which his his perceptive subordinates subordinates had had not not indicated indicated his his rank. rank. perceptive 58 Throughout Throughout the the Cold Cold War, War, the the KGB had had much much greater greater success success in in collecting collecting sci scientific and and technological technological intelligence intelligence (S&T) (S&T) on on the the Main MainAdversary Adversary than than penetrat penetratentific ing the federal given ing the federal government. government. In In 1963 1963 the the S&T department department of of the the FCD was was given enhanced status as T.59 Most Most of tasking came came from enhanced status as Directorate Directorate T.59 of its its tasking from the the Military MilitaryIndustrial Commission Commission (VPK), (VPK), which which was was responsible responsible for for overseeing overseeing weapons weapons pro proIndustrial duction,60 duction,60and and was was obsessed obsessed with with American American armaments armaments and and advanced advanced technology technologyalmost to to the theexclusion exclusion of therest rest of world. In early 1960s 1960s over of almost of the of the the world. In the the early over 90 90 percent percent of VPK requirements the American requirements concerned concerned the the Main Main Adversary.61 Adversary.61Among Among the American S&T S&T obtained by tech obtained by the the KGB during during these these years years was wasintelligence intelligence on on aircraft aircraft and and rocket rocket technology, turbojet turbojet engines (from a a source source in in General GeneralElectric), Electric), the the Phantomjet fighter, nology, engines (from Phantom jet fighter, nuclear research, computers, computers, transistors, transistors, radio radio electronics, electronics, chemical chemical engineering engineering and nuclear research, and metallurgy.62S&T S&T agents in the theUnited United States identified identified in in Mitrokin's Mitrokins notes (though metallurgy.62 agents in States notes (though with few few details details of of their their accomplishments) accomplishments) include: STANK and and BOR (or BORG), with include: STARIK (or BORG), who worked worked as as research research scientists scientists for airforce; identified by who for the the US air force; URBAN, identified by Mitrokhin as a a department department head Kellogg (probably the M. W. Kellogg Kellogg Technol TechnolMitrokhin as head at at Kellogg (probably the ogy who had BERG, a a senior senior ogy Company Company in inHouston), Houston), who had served served as as an an agent agent since since 1940;63 1940;63 BERG, engineer probably probably employed employed by by Sperry-Rand Sperry-Rand (UNIVAC);64 (UNIVAC);64 VIL, who worked for for the the engineer VIL, who worked chemical manufacturers Carbide; FELKE, Du chemical manufacturers Union Union Carbide; FELKE, an an agent agent in in D u Pont Pont de deNemours, Nemours, the chemical, chemical, biomedical biomedical and and petroleum petroleum conglomerate; conglomerate; USACH, USACH, of of the the Brookhaven the Brookhaven National Laboratory Laboratory at atUpton, Upton, New York, which which carried carried out out government research on on National New York, government research nuclear energy, energy, high-energy high-energy physics physics and and electronics; electronics; and and NORTON of which nuclear of RCA, which manufactured electronic, electronic, telecommunications telecommunications and and defense defense equipment.65 eq~ipment.~ manufactured During the War, unlike unlike the the Second Second World World War, War, the the dwindling dwindling band of During the Cold Cold War, band of and fellow travelers travelers rarely rarelyhad access American Communists and access to the S&T sought by S&T agents recruited in the United States the KGB. Most S&T States seem seem to have spied for

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money. were caught by the the mid-1960s: mid-1960s: money. Two Two such such mercenary mercenary spies spies were caught by the FBI during during the John subsidiary which which did classified work work for for John Butenko, Butenko, who who worked worked for for an an ITT subsidiary did classified Strategic Colonel William provided intelligence intelligence Strategic Air Air Command, Command, and and Colonel William Whalen, Whalen, who who provided on missiles and atomic atomic weapons.66 weapons.66In In 1 1963 on missiles and 963 the the New New York York residency residency supplied supplied 114 1 14 classified S&T pages, and unclassified documents, classified S&T documents, documents, totaling totaling 7,967 7,967 pages, and 30,131 30,131 unclassified documents, totaling of state-of-the-art state-of-the-art technology technology and and totaling 181,454 181,454 pages, pages, as as well well as as 71 71 "samples" samplesof classified documents (3,944 other items. Washington sent sent the the Centre Centre 37 classifi other items. Washington ed documents (3,944 pages) pages) and and 1,408 1,408 unclassified unclassified documents documents (34,506 (34,506 pages).67 pages).67 Some from residencies residencies outside outside the the Some of of the the best best American American S&T, S&T, however, however, came came from United States. Possibly the most important was the field United States. Possibly the most important was in in the field of of computer computer technology, technology, where the Soviet had fallen the West. West. The The experimental experimental Soviet Soviet where the Soviet Union Union had fallen far far behind behind the in 1953, 1953, was was judged a Western be a BESM-1, produced produced in judged by by a Western expert expert to to be "a respectable respectable computer for for its its time, time, with with a capability superior that of computer" a capability superior to to that of the the UNIVAC-1 UNIVAC-1 introintro duced 195 1 . The went into into production in 1959, 1959, was was duced in in 1951. The BESM-2, BESM-2, however, however, which which went production in only in 1955, and one-sixteenth one-sixteenth as as fast fast as as only a a third thirdas as fast fast as as the the IBM-7094, IBM-7094,introduced introduced in 1955,and the -7090 of on the export of advanced technoltechnol the IBM IBM-7090 of 1959. 1959. Because Because of of the the embargo embargo on the export of advanced ogy (the embargo com ogy to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union maintained maintained by by COCOM (the embargo coordinating coordinating committee Japan), the computers legally legally imported imported from from the the mittee of of NATO NATO members members and and Japan), the computers West more powerful powerful than Soviet counterparts.6R counterparts.68 During During the 1960s West were were barely barely more than their their Soviet the 1960s the attempt to to catch Western computer technology was basedlargely largely on on the attempt catch up up with with Western computer technology was based espionage. espionage. The KGB's KGBs main main source source of of computer computer S&T was, The was, almost almost certainly, certainly, IBM, which which manufactured use around around the the world world in in the the mid-1960s. mid-1960s. manufactured over over half half the the computers computers in in use Within agent identified identified in in Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's notes notes was was Within IBM, IBM, the the most most important important KGB agent ALVAR, a born in in Tsarist Tsarist Russia, Russia, whose whose motives-unlike motives-unlike a naturalized naturalized French French citizen citizen born most Americans wellhave have been been ideological. ideological. Probably Probably the the most Americans in in the theS&T S&T network-may network-may well KGBs longest-serving longest-serving Line KGB's Line X agent, agent, ALVAR had had been been recruited recruited by by the the NKVD NKVD in in 1935. at IBMs IBM's European European headquarters headquarters in in Paris, Paris, 1935. By By the the 1950s 1950s he he held held a a senior senior post post at and Red Banner Banner for for his his work work as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. and in in 1958 1958was was awarded awarded the the Order Orderof of the the Red ALVAR carried his retirement retirement in in the the late late 1970s, 1970s, when when carried on on working working for for the the KGB until until his he 300 dollars a month addition to to his his company company he was was awarded awarded a a Soviet Soviet pension pension of of 300 dollars a month in inaddition pension-a of him.69 him.69 pension-a certain certain sign sign of of the the Centre's Centres appreciation appreciation of In the the early early 1960s 1960s the the Paris Paris residency residency supplied In supplied intelligence intelligence on on American American transistransis tor files, both both improved improved the the quality quality of of Soviet tor manufacture manufacture which, which, according according to to KGB files, Soviet transistors of mass mass production by one one and and aahalf years. transistors and and brought brought forward forward the the start start of production by half years. It also systems which were later later imitated imitated by by also provided provided S&T S&T on on computer computer networking networking systems which were the Soviet defense 70 The most likely source of of the the intelligence intelligence on on both the Soviet defense ministry. ministry7 The most likely source bothtran transistor was ALVAR. ALVAR. From 1964, however, however, the sistor production production and and computer computer networks networks was From 1964, the Paris codenamed KLOD, KLOD, in in Texas Texas Instruments.71 Paris residency residency also also had had an an agent, agent, codenamed instrument^.^' Among and S&T from from IBM was a Nordic Nordic Among other other agents agents who who provided provided technology technology and was a national, codenamed KHONG. to 1966 1966 KHONG KHONG worked for a a EuroEuro national, codenamed KHONG. From From 1960 1960 to worked for pean IBM, and embargoed materials materials and and samples samples worth and purchased purchased embargoed worth pean affiliate affiliate of of IBM, 124,000 dollars, dollars, which which he he passed on to 124,000 passed on to the the KGB. KGB. In In both both 1961 1961 and and 1962 1962 he he was was questioned embassy on reasons for for his his purchases, purchases, but but appears appears to to questioned by by the the local local US embassy on the the reasons

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have have satisfied satisfied the the embassy embassy on on both both occasions. occasions. KHONG's KHONGs motives, motives, unlike unlike ALVAR's, ALVARs, seem to been mainly financial. H He 10 percent seem to have have been mainly financial. e was was initially initially paid paid 10 percent commission, commission, subsequently IBM. KHONG later 15 percent, percent, on on his his purchases purchases from from IBM. later subsequently raised raised to to 15 worked Nations in in a number of countries. The a total worked for for the theUnited United Nations a number countries. of The fact fact that that he hehad had a total of of twelve twelve controllers controllers during during his his career career as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent is is evidence evidence that that the the Centre Centre considered him source. By the ceased in considered him an an important importantsource. the time time contact contact with with him him ceased in 1982, 1982,a a year retirement, the held about 150 meetings with him.72 year after after his his retirement, the KGB had had held about 150 meetings with him.72 The The Soviet Soviet Union Union often often found found it it more more difficult difficult to to use use than than to to collect collect the the remark remarkable collected from American businesses, most of con able S&T S&T which which it it collected from American businesses, most of them them defense defense contractors. In tractors. In 1965 1965 the the Politburo Politburo criticized criticized the the fact fact that that there there was was a a time time lag lag of of two two to to three before Soviet industry began began exploiting exploiting S&T.73 S~CT.~ Even the the computer computer tech techthree years years before Soviet industry Even nology at best, did no no more more than, than, at best, stabilize stabilize the the striking striking gap gap nology stolen stolen by by the the KGB did between East East and and West.74 West.74The The gap gap was was not not to to be be explained explained by by any any lack lack of of expertise expertise between among Soviet Soviet scientists and mathematicians. mathematicians. As As one oneCanadian Canadian expert wrote wrote in in 1968, 1968, among scientists and expert Westerners who who know know Soviet Soviet computer computer scientists scientists can can testify testify to to their competence "Westerners their competence and their thorough thorough knowledge and their knowledge of of the the field."75 field.75The The continued continued backwardness backwardness of of the the Soviet computer industry, despite the expertise expertise of Soviet scientists and the the remark remarkSoviet computer industry, despite the of Soviet scientists and able S&T S&T obtained by the the KGB, reflected reflected the the cumbersome inefficiency of of the the Soviet Soviet able obtained by cumbersome inefficiency command economy, economy, in in which which technological innovation had had to to run run the the gauntlet gauntlet of of a command technological innovation a complex and unresponsive state bureaucracy. complex and unresponsive state bureaucracy. Rather than than accept accept any share of responsibility for for the failure to make efficient Rather any share of responsibility the failure to make efficient use use of much of the S&T acquired from the West, the VPK chairman, L. V. Smirnov, Smirnov, blamed the the KGB for for not not obtaining enough of it. In In a a letter letter to the KGB chairman, chairman, blamed obtaining enough of it. to the Semichastny, in in April April1965 1965, Smirnov complained over 50 percent of the toppriSemichastny, , Smirnov complained that that over percent of the top pri ority S&T S&T tasks tasks assigned to the theKGB KGB between two and four years years earlier earlier had had still not ority assigned to between two and four still not been fulfilled. hlfilled. Semichastny Semichastny replied replied that that steps steps had taken to to improve KGBs been had been been taken improve the the KGB's ability to to meet its assignments, assignments, but but criticized criticized the for underestimating curability meet its the VPK for underestimating the the cur rent difficulty difficulty of of collecting S&T from scirent collecting S&T from American American targets. targets. Since Since some some of of the the same same sci entific and technological developments were taking place in Britain, France, Japan and West West Germany, Germany, the the VPK should should pay pay greater attention to to targets in these counand greater attention targets in these coun tries.76In In the the following following year year groups groups of of Line Line X officers officers operating operating against against American tries.76 American Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Brazil, Denmark, Fin Fintargets were stationed in residencies in Argentina, land, India, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Morocco, Norway, Norway, Switzerland, Switzerland, Turkey, the land, India, Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Turkey, the United Arab Arab Republic Republic and and a anumber number of of other other Third Third World World countries.77 United countries.77 Despite Smirnov's Smirnovs criticisms, criticisms, the the KGB's KGBs performance performance in collection was, was, on Despite in S&T S&T collection on story.As Smirnov himself himself acknowledged, acknowledged, the FCD fulfilled almost balance, a success story. half of the VPK's V P K s demanding tasks against the Main Main Adversary with a few years at half spectacular successes successes of twenty years earlier, most. Measured against the spectacular earlier, however, however, when the Centre bomb-the worlds Centre had had received the plans of the atomic bomb-the world's greatest scientific secret-from two different agents and important nuclear intelligence from scientific secret-from several more, even the successes successes of the early 1960s were bound to seem somewhat several disappointing. The The decline decline was was irreversible. irreversible.Most Most of of the spies who who penetrated disappointing. the Soviet Soviet spies penetrated every major major branch of the Roosevelt administration administration had had been been ideological agents, every branch of the Roosevelt ideological agents,

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seduced Russiaas as the seduced by by the the myth-image myth-image of of Stalin's Stalins Russia the world's worlds first first worker-peasant worker-peasant state, state, pointing pointing the the way way to to a a new new Socialist Socialist society. society. During During the the early early Cold Cold War, War, even even among Most of the wartime among American American radicals, radicals, the the vision vision faded. faded. Most of the the successors successors to to the wartime ideological ideological moles moles were were mercenary mercenary walk-ins walk-ins and and corrupt corrupt employees employees of of defense defense con contractors tractors willing willing to to sell sell their their companies' companiessecrets. secrets. Though Though the the KGB could could not not bring bring itself itself to to accept accept it, it, the the golden golden age age of of the the high highflying flying American American ideological ideological agent agent had had gone, gone, never never to to return. return.

A P P P E D II X X AP EN ND

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Y A VKA (M EE N GG PP LAC EE S) IN TT H E 9 6 0' S Y A VKS AS (M ET EI T IN LAC S) IN H E1 1960s

Baltimore: on North Avenue. Baltimore: by by the the Clayton Clayton men's mens clothing clothing store store on North Avenue. Boston: hall; byby thethe State Hilton Hotel. Boston: the the music music hall; State Hilton Hotel. Chicago: Chicago: the the Chicago Chicago Institute Institute of of Fine Fine Arts Arts buildings; buildings; by by the the movie movie theater theater on on State State

Street; by the the Lake State movie theater; by the men's store on onRandolph Randolph Street; by Lake State movie theater; and and by the mens tie tie store Street. Street. Cleveland: theater. Cleveland: by by the theKhipp Khippmovie movie theater. Indianapolis: board on on Market Street. Indianapolis: by bythe thenotice notice board Market Street. Los newspaper stand "Out ofTown Papers" on Las Palm as Palmas Avenue;Avenue; by Los Angeles: Angeles: by bythe the newspaper stand Out of Town Papers on Las by the the movie theaters Viltern and Star by theby display windows the entrance entrance to to the movie theaters Viltern and Theater; Star Theater; the display windows on the furniture store MacMahon Brasses; near near the entrance on Hollywood Hollywood Boulevard, Boulevard, the furniture store MacMahon Brasses; the entrance to to the the Hotel HotelRoosevelt. Roosevelt. Newark: bythe the Newark train station, on the bench by the monument to Sergeant Newark: by Newark train station, on the bench by the monument to Sergeant Donan A. Bazilone. Bazilone. Do n a n A. the Sherman movie theater. New New Haven: Haven:by by the the Taft Taft Hotel; Hotel;by by the Sherman movie theater. New by New York York (Bronx): (Bronx):by by the the David David Marcus Marcus movie movie theater; theater; by by the the restaurant restaurantSavarin; Savarin; by the display windows of the the store store Wilmas Wilma's Party Party Center; Center;under underthe the awning the the display windows of awning ofof the Middletown Inn 1 88 Middletown Middletown Road. Road. Middletown Inn Restaurant Restaurantat at3 3188 Philadelphia: Stanton movie theaters; by the Silvanna Hotel. Philadelphia: by by the theRandolph Randolphand and Stanton movie theaters; by the Silvanna Hotel. Pordand: the main street; by the Parker movie theater. Portland: by by the the parking parking lot loton on the main street; by the Parker movie theater. Rochester: movie theater. Rochester: by bythe theRandolph Randolph movie theater. Sacramento: Tower movie theater, andthe near the advertisements Sacramento: by by the the Tower movie theater, and near advertisements at the cafeat the cafe Camilia Camilia Lodge. Lodge. St. Paul: windows of of thethe St. Paul Hotel; by the movie theater. Paul: by bythe thedisplay display windows St. Paul Hotel; byStrand the Strand movie theater. San Francisco: by the Metro Metromovie movietheater theater on Union Street; Fosters Restaurant, San Francisco: by the on Union Street; by by Fosters Restaurant, Simms (in the downtown area); the Canterbury HoteL Simms Cafe, Cafe, and andComptons ComptonsCafe Cafe (in the downtown area); the Canterbury Hotel. Seatde: the movie theater Orpheum Cinema on Fifth Avenue; by the by City Motel Seattle: by by the movie theater Orpheum Cinema on Fifth Avenue; the Cityon Motel on Qyeen Queen Anne Anne Avenue. Avenue. Syracuse: theater. Syracuse: by bythe theCates Catesmovie movie theater. Union by the A&P supermarket. Union City, City, New New Jersey: Jersey: by the supermarket. Washington booth by by thethe entrance to the Restaurant Washington area: area: the thetelephone telephone booth entrance to Hot the Shoppes Hot Shoppes Restaurant in the center center of ofHyattsville, Hyattsville, aaWashington Washington suburb; by the entrance grocery in the suburb; by the entrance to to thethe grocery store Aspen Hill Shopping Center on Georgia Avenue in Maryland, six store in inthe the Aspen Hill Shopping Center on Georgia Avenue in Maryland, six miles miles north north of ofWashington. Washington.

T E T Ulll I EE LL V VE
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P art J 3: IZZegaZs fte XbeZ Pa : III ega Is aIt er r ''A bel "

KG B Collegium, for a KGB Collegium, a a senior senior advisory advisory body body headed headed by by the the Chairman, Chairman, to tocall call for a major major improvement Main Adversary. improvement in in intelligence intelligence operations operations against against the theMain Adversary. The The chief chief method proposed to method by by which which it it proposed to achieve achieve this this improvement, improvement, however, however, was wasone one which which had been attempted the 1950s: had already already been attempted unsuccessfully unsuccessfully during during the 1950s: the the creation creation over over the the next illegal residencies which would take main burbur next few few years years of of a a network network of of illegal residencies which would take over over the the main den den of of intelligence intelligence operations operations from from the the legal legal residencies residencies in in New New York, York, Washington Washington and and San San Francisco.1 Francisco. Not six years years after after the the arrest arrest of of "Rudolf Rudolf Abel" Abel in in 1957 1957did did the the KGB succeed succeed Not until until six in theterritory territory of Main Adversary. in establishing establishing another another illegal illegal residency residency on on the of the the Main Adversary. Though or through the United Though there there were were brief brief missions missions to to or through the United States States by by a a number number of of illegals, the files illegals, the the first first to to have have taken taken up up residence residence who who is is recorded recorded in in the files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was KONOV, a a Muscovite Muscovite of of Greek Greek origin origin born born in in 1912, 1912, who who took tookthe the identity Max Kohler, (now part identity of ofGerhard Gerhard Kohler, a a Sudeten SudetenGerman Germanborn born in in Reichenberg Reichenberg (now part of veteran and of the the Czech CzechRepublic) Republic) in in 1917. 1917.KONOV was was a a war war veteran and radio radio specialist specialistwho who worked Leningrad until until his by the in worked as as head head of of a a laboratory laboratory in in Leningrad his recruitment recruitment by the KGB in April 1955. 1955. He H e spent spent the the next next four four years years in in East East Germany, Germany, working working as an engineer, engineer, April as an establishing German cover identity and both his next destination, destination, West West establishing his his German cover identity andstudying studying both his next Germany, and his specialized in Germany, and his ultimate ultimate target, target, the the United United States. States. The The KGB, which which specialized in arranged marriages marriages for for its its illegals, illegals, found found him hima a German wife and assistant arranged German wife and assistant previously previously employed who took took the the identity identity of Erna Helga Helga employed by by the the Stasi, Stasi, codenamed codenamed EMMA, EMMA, who of Erna Maria Decker, born on September 2,1928 2, 1928 near Breslau (now in Poland).2 Maria Decker, born on September near Breslau (now in Poland).2 In October October 1959, 1959,posing posing as Germanrefugees, refugees, KONOV and and EMMA crossed In as East East German crossed to the the FRG, FRG, where KONOV KONOV found found work work as a radio radio engineer. engineer. In In 1962 he began began cor corto where as a 1962 he responding with with American American radio radio and and electronics electronics companies and obtained obtained several several job job responding companies and offers. After After visiting visiting the the United tourist, he he accepted accepted employment in a offers. United States States as as a a tourist, employment in a company 1963 enabled enabled EMMA and and himself himself to obtain immigrant immigrant visas. company which which in in 1963 to obtain visas. KONOV seems seems to post-war illegal States to KONOV to have have been been the the first first post-war illegal sent sent to to the the United United States to concentrate on on scientific scientific and and technological technological intelligence intelligence (S&T). Specializing in elecconcentrate (S&T). Specializing in elec tronic measuring measuring devices, devices, he he took tookpart part in number a of international international exhibitions andtronic in a number of exhibitions and according to his several inventions. KONOVs S&T S&T was was so according to his file-made file-made several inventions. KONOV's so highly highly rated rated by the the Centre him two KGB awards. awards. O On June 20, 20, 1970, after living for by Centre that that it it won won him two KGB n June 1970, after living for

II n n 1966 1966 the the lack lack of of high-grade high-grade political political intelligence intelligence from from the the United United States States led led the the

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seven States seven years yearsin in the theUnited United States as as Gerhard Gerhard and and Erna Erna Kohler, Kohler, KONOV and and EMMA became American American citizens, citizens, swearing swearing their their oaths oaths of of allegiance allegiance in in Newark Newark Court Courtbecame house.3 house.3 By two other other KGB illegals illegals By the the time time KONOV KONOV entered entered the the United United States States in in 1963, 1963,two were already established intended by Centre for were already established in in Canada, Canada, both both intended by the the Centre for subsequent subsequent transfer Main Adversary. transfer to to the the Main Adversary.Nikolai Nikolai Nikolayevich NikolayevichBitnov Bitnov (codenamed (codenamed ALBERT) ALBERT) had 1961. had arrived arrived in in Canada Canadain in 1961.The The basis basis of of the the legend legend painstakingly painstakingly constructed constructed for for Bitnov Leopold Lambert Bitnov was was a a fabricated fabricated version version of of the the life life history history of of Leopold Lambert Delbrouck, Delbrouck, who had had been been born born in in Belgium Belgium in in 1 1899, emigrated to to Russia with his his family family at at the the who 899, emigrated Russia with age of of eight eight and and died died there there in in 1946. 1946. I n the the fictitious version of of Delbroucks age In fictitious version Delbrouck's career career constructed by by the the Centre, Centre,however, however, Delbrouck Delbrouck had had married married a a Romanian Romanian woman, woman, set set constructed up home home in in Gleiwitz Gleiwitz in in Germany (now Gliwice Gliwice in in Poland) Poland) and and then then moved moved to to up Germany (now Romania, 1 . While Romania, where where he he died died in in 193 1931. While in in Gleiwitz, Gleiwitz, the the couple couple had had supposedly supposedly had had a a son, son, Jean Jean Leopold Leopold Delbrouck, Delbrouck, whose whose identity identity Bitnov Bitnov assumed. assumed. Bitnov's Bitnovs wife, wife,Nina Nina (codenamed a "dead double," Yanina Batarovskaya, (codenamed GERA), GEM),took took over over the the identity identityof of dead a double,Yanina Batarovskaya, who who had had been been born born in in France France in in 1928 1928 and and died died in in Lithuania Lithuania in in1956.4 1956.4 Early Early in in 1956, 1956, now now age age thirty, thirty, Bitnov Bitnov moved moved with with his his wife wife to to Romania Romania to to estab establish the help lish his his legend legend with with the help of of the the Romanian Romanian intelligence intelligence service, service, the the DGSP. DGSP In In April 1957, using d by Centre, they April1957, using identity identity documents documents forge' forged by the theCentre, they succeeded succeeded in in obtaining obtaining passports passports from from the the Belgian Belgian diplomatic diplomatic mission mission in in Bucharest.5 Bucharest. Six S i x months months later, business later, they they moved moved to to Geneva Geneva so so that that Bitnov Bitnov could could enroll enroll in in aa business school school and and learn learn how From summer how to to operate operate as as a a businessman businessman in in the theWest. West. From late late 1958 1958 to tothe the summer of of 1961 1961 the the couple couple lived lived in in Liege, Likge, establishing establishing Belgian Belgian identities identities and and obtaining obtaining new new passports passports which, their residence which, unlike unlike those those issued issued in in Bucharest, Bucharest, made made no no reference reference to to their residence in in Romania likely to North America. Romania and and were were thus thus less less likely to arouse arouse suspicion suspicion in in North America. In In July July 1960, 1960, the theBitnovs Bitnovs emigrated emigrated to to Canada.6 Canada.6 The The Centre Centre probably probably intended intended that thatBitnov Bitnov should should move move on on after after a a few few years years to to the the territory Adversary. territory of of the the Main Main Adversary. Initially, Initially,however, however,he he was was ordered, ordered, like like Brik Brik (HART) (HART) a decade earlier, under business cover in a decade earlier, to to establish establish himself himself under business cover in Canada. Canada. Despite Despite his his course course in in Geneva, Geneva, however, however, Bitnov Bitnov proved proved a a hopeless hopeless businessman. businessman. First, First, he heinvested invested 2,000 2,000 dollars dollars of of KGB funds funds in in a abusiness business which which bought bought up up land land with with mineral mineral rights rights and mining companies. and sold sold them them to to mining companies. Mter After two two years years the the company company went went bankrupt. bankrupt. Then 2,000 dollars Then Bitnov Bitnov spent spent 2,000 dollars purchasing purchasing a a directorship directorship in in a acar car dealership dealership which which went went into intoliquidation liquidation only only two two months months later. later. Unwilling Unwilling to to pour pourgood good money money after after bad bad into paid into any any more more of of his his investment investment schemes, schemes, the the Centre Centre ordered ordered him him to to look look for for paid employment. benefits, Bitnov employment. After After a a period period on on unemployment unemployment benefits, Bitnov found found a apoorly poorly paid paid job job as as a a bookkeeper bookkeeper which, which, he he complained, complained, left left him him little little or or no no time timefor for intelligence intelligence work. significance as work. Having Having achieved achieved nothing nothing of of any any significance as an an illegal, illegal, he he was was recalled recalled to to Moscow given a sent into into early Moscow in in 1969.7 1969.7The The following following year, year, he he was was given a pension pension and and sent early the Centre Centre persevered retirement retirement at at the the age age of of only only forty-five.8 forty-five. The The fact fact that that the persevered with with Bitnov its Bitnov for for so so long long was was further further evidence evidence of of the the strength strengthof of its determination determination to to estab establish lish a a network network of of illegal illegal residencies residenciesin in North North America. America. Bitnov in February Bitnov was was unaware unaware that that in February 1962, 1962, only only seven seven months months after after his his own own arrival illegal, codenamed DOUGLAS, had had landed landed with with his his wife wife arrival in in Canada, Canada,another another illegal, codenamed DOUGLAS,

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and and four-year-old four-year-old son son at at Montreal Montreal airport. airport. DOUGLAS DOUGLAS was was Dalibar Dalibar Valoushek, Valoushek, a a 33-year-old the assistance KGB with with the assistance of of its its 33-year-old Czech Czech border border guard guard recruited recruited by by the the KGB Czechoslovak the StB.9 the identity identity of Sudeten German, German, Czechoslovak counterpart, counterpart, the StB.9 He H e took took the of a a Sudeten Rudolf Herrmann, who whohad had died the Soviet the Second Rudolf Albert Albert Herrmann, died in in the Soviet Union Union during during the Second World World War. War. According According to to Valoushek's Valousheks legend, legend, Herrmann Herrmann had had survived survived the the war war and and made toto escape made his his home home in in East EastGermany, Germany, then then taken taken refuge refuge in in the theWest West escape the the Com Communist SudetenGerman German whose munist regime. regime. His His wife, wife, Inga Inga (codenamed (codenamed GERDA), GERDA), a a Sudeten whose family of galore Noerke, family had had moved moved to to the theGDR, GDR, took took the theidentity identity of In Ingalore Noerke, a a dead dead double" double who who had hadbeen been killed killed during during the thewartime wartime bombing bombing of of Stettin. Stettin. At At the the end endof of 1957 1957 the the Valousheks East German German Valousheks fled fled to to the the West, West, loudly loudly proclaiming proclaiming their their hatred hatred of of the the East regime. the next their legends regime. They They spent spent the next four four years years strengthening strengthening their legends as as anti antiCommunist small communist refugees refugees while while Valoushek Valoushek learned learned how how to to run run aa small business.1o business. Once in Canada, Canada, Valoushek proved a Once in Valoushek proved a much much better better businessman businessman than than Bitnov Bitnovthough though not not quite quiteas as successful successful as as published published accounts accounts of of his his career career (which (which do do not notgive give his real identity) have suggested. Soon after his arrival in Canada he bought Harold's his real identity) have suggested. Soon after his arrival in Canada he bought Harolds Famous as "Inga Famous Delicatessen Delicatessen in in downtown downtown Toronto, Toronto, which which he he and andInga, Inga, as Rudi" Rudiand and Inga Herrmann" Herrmann made made a a popular popular rendezvous rendezvous for for statf staff from from the the nearby nearby studios studios of of the the Cana Canadian dian Broadcasting Broadcasting Company. Company. After After two two years years Valoushek Valoushek sold soldthe the delicatessen, delicatessen, got got a a job job as as a a CBC CBC sound sound engineer engineer and and took took courses courses in in fUm-making. film-making. His His first first major major assignment assignment was was on on a a film film advertising advertising campaign campaign for for the the Liberal Liberal Party. Party. By By the the midmid1960s 1960s he he had had aareputation reputation as as a a popular popular and and successful successful film-maker. film-maker. At the the 1967 1967Lib Liberal eral convention, convention, which which elected elected Pierre Pierre Trudeau Trudeau as as party party leader, leader, Trudeau Trudeau leaned leaned off off the the stage "Rudi Herrmann's" stage and and playfully playfully popped popped grapes grapes into into Rudi Herrmanns mouth.l1 mouth. Though Though Va Valoushek's Centre lousheks business businessappeared appeared prosperous, prosperous, however, however,his his KGB KGB file file reveals revealsthat that the the Centre had had to to provide provide 10,000 10,000 dollars dollars to to cover cover trading trading 10ssesY losses.12 In In 1967 1967 Valoushek Valoushek became became the the controller controller of of the theKGB's KGBs most most important importantCanadian Canadian agent, (RADOV)Y After Mter losing at NATO agent, Hugh Hugh Hambleton Hambleton (RADOV).13 losing his his job job at NATO on on security security grounds in 1961 (though without any charges being brought against him), Hamble grounds in 1961 (though without any charges being brought against him), Hambleton next ton had had spent spentthe the next three three years years taking taking aaPhD PhD at at the theLondon LondonSchool School of of Econom Economics, inin 1967 to become a ics, returning returning to toCanada Canada 1967 become to a professor professor in in the theeconomics economics department department at at Laval LaVal University University in in Qyebec. Quebec. Once Once back back in in Qyebec, Quebec, Hambleton's Hambletons contact contact with with the the KGB dwindled. He met an officer from the legal residency three times in Ottawa, KGB dwindled. H e met anofficer from the legal residency three times in Ottawa,on on each each occasion occasion talking talking to to him him in in aacar car parked parked near near the the main main post post office. office. Hambleton, Hambleton, however, to however, disliked disliked his his new new controller, controller, who who tried tried unsuccessfully unsuccessfully to to persuade persuade him him to apply ob in failed apply for for a aj job in External External Affairs. Affairs. After After an an interval interval during during which whichHambleton Hambleton failed to to turn turn up up for for meetings meetings in in Ottawa, Ottawa, Valoushek Valoushek was was sent sent to to Qyebec Quebec to torenew renew contact contact with Chateau with him. him.During During a a congenial congenial dinner dinner at atthe the Chiiteau Frontenac Frontenac overlooking overlooking the the Saint Saint Lawrence Lawrence river, river, the the two two men men established established a a mutual mutual rapport rapport and and Hambleton Hambletonagreed agreed to to resume resume his his career career as as a a Soviet Soviet agent.14 agent.14Over Over the the next next few few years, years, he he traveled traveled to to a a great great variety variety of of destinations, destinations, combining combining research research on on academic academic projects projects with with work work for for the the KGB. He in Trinidad H e remained remained in in touch touch with with Valoushek Valoushek until until 1975, 1975, meeting meeting him him in Trinidad and so and Haiti, Haiti, as as well well as as Canada Canada and and the the United United States. States. But But Hambleton's Hambletons travels travels were were so far maintain contact far flung flung that that it itrequired required a a considerable considerable number number of of KGB officers officers to to maintain contact with with him.1s him.

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1968, aa In 1968, year after becoming Canadian citizens, Valoushek Valoushek and his his family family were were transferred to to the the United United States States to to found foundaanew new illegal residency in transferred illegal residency in the the New New York York area. His first KGB contact was IVANOVA, a young Russian woman who, having area. Directorateinside the Soviet formerly worked as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Chief Directorate Union, had been allowed (perhaps even encouraged) encouraged) to marry an Union, had been allowed (perhaps even to marry an American American visitor visitor and had moved to the United States. IVANOVA gave Valoushek 15,000 dollars and had moved to the United States. gave Valoushek 15,000 dollars to to establish and had had several several further further secret with him to pass establish himself himself and secret meetings meetings with him to pass on on instructions from the Centre Centre and andletters letters from funds from his Czech relatives.16 relatives.16 With the funds IVANOVA, provided by IVAN OVA, Valoushek made a12,000 12,000 dollar downpayment ona a Hartsdale,17 joined the New secluded house fifteen miles north of of New New York, in Hartsdale,17 PressClub and andbegan work as a freelance freelance cameraman and commercial photogYork Press photog Hudson rapher. His first major assignment from the the KGB was to penetrate penetratethe the Hudson a leading New York think tank. The Centre had had been excited by a report report Institute, a from Hambleton giving information on the Institute's Institutes members and believed it to source of intelligence on American Americanglobal strategy and defense be a major potential source is policy1* policy.
I N MAY

1962, three three months months after after Valoushek's Valousheks arrival, arrival, BOGUN, another Soviet ille1962, another Soviet ille

gal, had landed in Canada. Canada. The Centre intended that, after establishing himself in BOGUN, like like DOUGLAS, DOUGLAS, should should transfer transfer to to the the Main Canada, BOGUN, the territory territory of of the Main Adversary. B BOGUN was Gennadi Gennadi Petrovich Petrovich Blyablin, 38-year-old () GUN was Blyablin, a a3 8-year-old Muscovite Muscovite who who Adversary. the-identity inSofia in 1929 1929of a German Germanfather father had taken the identity of Peter Carl Fisher, Fisher, born in and Bulgarian Bulgarian mother. mother. Like Like Valoushek, Valoushek, he he perfected perfected his legend by living in and his German German legend by living in refbgee. The Centre East Germany, then moved to the West in in 1959, 1959, posing as a refugee. allowed him him three three years years to to settle, settle, legalize legalize his his status status and and find work in in West West Germany Germany allowed find work before sending him Canada. On 9, 1961 Blyablin married his his KG B before sending him to to Canada. O n March March 9, 1961 Blyablin married KGBapproved obtained their approved partner, partner, LENA, LENA, in in Hanover. Hanover. In I n December December they they obtained their West West Ger German man passports passports before before setting setting off off for for Canada Canada five five months months later.19 later. While as a Blyablin established a While Valoushek Valoushek found found cover cover as a film-maker, film-maker, Blyablin established himself himself as as a freelance press photographer-a profession profession which provided numerous numerous opportunities opportunities freelance press photographer-a which provided and pretexts pretexts for for traveling traveling around around Canada Canada and and further further afield. afield. I n February February 1965, foland In 1965, fol lowing the the Centre's Centres instructions, instructions, Blyablin Blyablin and and his his wife wife moved movedto to the theUnited United States on lowing States on immigrant visas. visas. His His main main task task over over the the next next three three years years was wasphotographing photographing and immigrant and propro viding intelligence intelligence on on major major military, military, scientific scientific and industrial targets targets around around the the viding and industrial United States.20 States.20 United 1968, however, however, Blyablin Blyablin attracted attracted the the attention attention of the during his In 1968, the FBI during his investiinvesti gation of of major major targets targets in in the theUnited United States and had hadtoto be hurriedly recalled, gation States and be hurriedly recalled, together together i It with his his wife, wife, to to Moscow.2 Moscow.21 I t was was later later discovered discovered that his correspondence with that some some of his correspondence SKIF, had had been SKIF was was Karo with the Centre, routed via via agent agent SKIF, with the Centre, routed been intercepted. intercepted. SKIF Karo Huseinjyan, an an ethnic Armenian born born in in Cyprus Cyprus in in 1919 Huseinjyan, an an Huseinjyan, ethnic Armenian 1919 was was Karo Karo Huseinjyan, ethnic Armenian Armenian born born in in Cyprus Cyprus in in 1919 1919 who owned owned a in Beirut ethnic a jewelry jewelry shop shop in Beirut and and Centre investigation disprovided a a forwarding forwarding service service for for a a number illegals. A Centre provided number of of illegals. investigation dis closed closed that that letters letters from from Blyablin, Blyablin, dated dated April April 7 and and July July 27, 1968, 1968, sent sentvia via Husein Huseinjyan, jyan, had had been been steamed steamed open.22 open.

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A year illegal, had year before before Blyablin's Blyablins sudden sudden recall, recall, RYBAKOV, another another Soviet Soviet illegal, had arrived the United United States. States. RYBAKOV was arrived in in the was Anatoli Anatoli Ivanovich Ivanovich Rudenko, Rudenko, whose whose early early career career was was strikingly strikingly similar similar to to Blyablin's. Blyablins. Like Like Blyablin, Blyablin, Rudenko Rudenko was was a a Mus Muscovite covite born born in in 1924 1924 who who had hadassumed assumed a a bogus bogus German German identity, identity, spent spent several several years years in legend and was in East East Germany Germanyworking working on on his his legend and then then moved moved to to the the West. West.Rudenko Rudenko was given identity documents Heinz Walter Walter August in Kalisch given the the identity documents of of Heinz August Feder, Feder, born born in Kalisch on on November 1927.23 While East Germany Germany he and November 6, 6, 1927.23 While in in East he had had trained trained as as a a piano piano tuner tuner and repairer. in April April 1961, 1961, posing repairer. After After crossing crossing to to West West Germany Germany in piosing as as a a refugee refugee from from Communism, job with the world-famous Communism, he he found foundaa job with the world-famous piano piano manufacturers manufacturers Steinway Steinway in Hamburg. was told was the the United in Hamburg.Though Though Rudenko Rudenko was told that that his his ultimate ultimate destination destination was United States, in 1964 1964he he was sent sent to to work work with with a a musical musical instrument instrument company company in in London, London, States, in was probably probably in in order order to to accustom accustom him him to to an an English-speaking English-speaking environment.24 en~ironment.~~ Rudenkos period period in in London Londonalmost almost ended ended in in disaster. disaster. Once, Once, while while returning returning from from Rudenko's Brussels, where where he he had had received received his his maintenance allowance from from a a KGB operations operations Brussels, maintenance allowance officer, officer, he he was was stopped stopped at at Heathrow Heathrow and and 500 pounds pounds were were found found on on him him which which he he had failed failed to to declare. declare. Rudenko Rudenko was was fortunate fortunate to to fi find a sympathetic sympathetic customs customs officer. officer. had nd a The money, money, he he pleaded, pleaded, was was his his life life savings, savings, the the product of many many sacrifices over the the The product of sacrifices over years. H e was was allowed allowed to to keep keep the the 500 pounds and and no no action was taken taken against him. years. He 500 pounds action was against him. In 1966 1966 he hewent wentto to New York on on a a tourist tourist visa visa and and visited visited the the Manhattan Manhattan show showIn New York rooms of Steinway Steinway & Sons Sons on on West West 57th 57thStreet, Street, who who offered offered Rudenko ajob job with with a a rooms of Rudenko a salary of 80 dollars a week. With Steinways assistance, he gained a work permit and salary of 80 dollars a week. With Steinway's assistance, he gained a work permit and traveled to to the the United States on on his his German German passport in July July 1967. 1967. In In New New York York traveled United States passport in Rudenko became became piano tuner to to a a series of celebrities-among celebrities-among them them Nelson RockeRudenko piano tuner series of Nelson Rocke feller, Governor Governor of of New New York, York, unsuccessful unsuccessfulcandidate candidate for for the the Republican Republican nomination nomination feller, in 1964 1964and and future future vice-president vice-president of of the the United United States.25 Rockefeller was was regarded regarded in in in States.25 Rockefeller Moscow Moscow as as the the "patron" patron, of of Henry Henry Kissinger, Kissinger, who who in inJanuary January 1969 1969 became became President President Nixons National Security Adviser (and later Secretary of State).26 State).26 Nixon's While professor at 1960s, Kissinger had served as Nelsons Harvard during the the 1960s, Nelson's paid part-time adviser and speechwriter, speechwriter, receiving receiving a a severance severance pay paygift gift of of 50,000 dollars dollars when when he hejoined the and joined the Nixon administration. He "He has a second-rate mind but but aa first-rate intuition about people, Kissinger Kissinger once said of Rockefeller. Rockefeller. "I I have a fi first-rate but aathird-rate third-rate people," rst-rate mind but intuition about people."27 To the Centre Centre it it must have seemed that Rudenko had penetrated one of the innermost sanctums of the capitalist system, system, which the Rockefeller family had Nelsons second wife, "Happy," Happy, said of seemed to epitomize for three generations. Nelson's of all. He H e always always had." had. The six six him in the the mid-l960s, mid-1 960s, He "He believed he could have it all. Nelsons Westchester estate were one of the world's worlds most valuable square miles of Nelson's properties and contained some some of the most spectacular spectacular art treasures treasures in any private collection. Theodore White once offered to exchange exchange his Manhattan townhouse on collection. East 64th 64th Street Streetfor a single Dynasty horse from the Westchester collection.28 collection.2* single Tong Dynasty Though Rudenko's Rudenkos occasional occasional visits visits to to Westchester Westchester impressed impressed the the Centre, Centre, however, however, Though significance. they achieved nothing of significance. the houses of the great and good appears to have become almost an Penetrating the itself for Rudenko, even though his access access to some of new York's Yorks most distinend in itself

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guished pianos failed to to give give him him any any intelligence intelligence access. access. Among Among the well-known guished pianos failed the well-known musicians whose pianos he tuned tuned was was the the world's worlds most famous pianist, pianist, the the Russianmusicians whose pianos he most famous Russian whofor the past twenty years had lived on East East94th 94th Street born Vladimir Horowitz, who Street 1965, after a twelve-year hiatus bya of psychi psychinear Central Park. In 1965, hiatus caused by a mixture mixture of atric problems problems and and colitis colitis attacks, attacks, Horowitz Horowitz had had returned returned to the concert platform at at atric to the concert platform the age age of of sixty-two, sixty-two, becoming, with Lucian0 one of of the thetwo the becoming, with Luciano Pavarotti, Pavarotti, one two most most highly highly paid classical musicians musicians in the the world. paid classical world. The recital recital instrument which which he he chose chose for for his his comeback was was the the Steinway Steinway concert concert grand grand numbered numbered CD 186, comeback 1 86, which which had had to to be be tuned tuned to an an exact exact440-A 440-A with with a akey key pressure pressure of of 45 45 grams to grams instead instead of of the the usual usual 48 48 to to 52.29 52.29 Overimpressed by by Rudenko's Rudenkos access access to to the pianos of of new Overimpressed the pianos new Yorks York's celebrities, celebrities, the the Centre made made detailed detailed plans plans for for him him to to become become head residencywhose Centre head of of a a new new illegal illegal residency whose chief targets targets would would be be the the US mission to the the United Nations and think chief mission to United Nations and a a New New York York think tank, concentrating concentrating on on relatively relatively junior junior employees employees with with access to classified tank, access to classified informainforma tion-in particular, particular, single single women whose whose loneliness loneliness made made them tion-in women them sexually sexually vulnerable vulnerable and and poorly paid paid employees employeeswith with large large families familieswho who were were open open to financial inducements.3o inducement^.^' poorly to financial Just as as the the new new residency residency was was about about to to be established in in New New York, however,the the Just be established York, however, Centre noticed noticed what what Rudenko's Rudenkos fi file refers to as as irregularities Centre le refers to "irregularities" and and suspicious "suspicious behavbehav ior and lured lured him him back back to to Moscow Moscow in in Apri1 April1970 1970 for hewas were ior" and for what what he was probably probably told told were final instructions instructions before before beginning work. Exactly Exactly what what the final beginning work. the Centre Centre suspected suspected is is not not known, but, but, since Rudenko was was interrogated interrogated under torture, it itmay may well well have feared known, since Rudenko under torture, have feared he he was working working as as a a double double agent agent for for the the FBI. wasmuch was FBI. What What he he revealed revealed was much less less serious, serious, but bad bad enough enough to to end end his his career career as as an an illegal. illegal. Soon Soon after arriving in in Hamburg but after arriving Hamburg in in 1961, Rudenko Rudenko had had met met BERTA, BERTA, a a 32-year-old 32-year-old ladies whom he had 1961, ladies'hairdresser, hairdresser, whom he had suggested recruiting recruiting as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. The The Centre Centre refused refused and ordered him him to to break suggested and ordered break off all all relations relations with with her. her. During During his his interrogation interrogation in that off in 1970, 1970, Rudenko Rudenko admitted admitted that he had had secretly secretly defied defied his his instructions, married BERTA and her with him to he instructions, married and taken taken her with him to New had taken messages from from the the Centre Centre and and New York. York. Worse Worse still, still, he he had taken down down radio radio messages decoded them in presence. Her Her parents parents had decoded them in her her presence. had discovered discovered that that he he was was a a spy, spy, but but believed he he was was working working for for East East Germany. Germany. Rudenko Rudenko also believed also admitted admitted that was hav that he hewas having an an affair affair with with a a female female accountant accountant (code (codenamed Penn~ylvania.~ ing named MIRA) MIRA) in in Pennsylvania.31 As part part of of the the Centre's Centres damage damage limitation limitation exercise to write As exercise it it instructed instructed Rudenko Rudenko to write to to convince convince both both of of them them and, if neces to both bothBERTA and and MIRA letters letters designed designed to and,if necessary, left the the United States because of of the the breakdown breakdown of of his his marmar sary, the the FBI that that he hehad had left United States because riage. impossible to to live her any any longer longer riage. He H e told told BERTA that that he he had had found found it itimpossible live with with her and urged urged her her not not to towaste waste time time trying trying to totrack track him down since she would would never and him down since she never find find him. to express express his his love pain Rudenko was was allowed allowedto love for for her her and and pain him. In In the the letter letterto to MIRA, Rudenko whathis file file quaintly describes describes as permissible at their separation within what "permissible bounds bounds" and his pain pain at at the the separation separation from from her. her. But, But, he he explained explained somewhat somewhat unconvincingly, his unconvincingly, his his sudden only way to escape escape from from his his sudden departure departure from from the the United United States States had had been been the the only way to other indication of wife. Both letters were posted by the KGB in Austria, giving no other of where 32 where Rudenko Rudenko was was living. living.32
THE S SU UC CC CE ES SS SI IV VE E FAI F A IL LU UR RE ES S

of (HARRY), Brik Brik (HART), Hayhanen of Makayev Makayev (HARRY), (HART), Hayhanen (VIK), Grinchenko Grinchenko (KLOD), (ALBERT), Blyablin (KLOD), Bitnov Bitnov (ALBERT), Blyablin (BOGUN) (BOGUN) and and

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Rudenko Rudenko (RYBAKOV) (RYBAKOV) underscored underscored the the Centre's Centres difficulty difficulty in in finding finding illegals illegals capa capable ble of of fulfilling fulfilling its its expectations expectations in in North North America. America. Fisherl'bel" FisherPAbel (MARK) (MARK) was, was, in in many many ways, ways, the the exception exception who who proved proved the the rule. rule. He was was able able to to survive, survive, if if not not actually actually succeed, States experience succeed, as as an an illegal illegalresident resident in in the theUnited United States because because of of a a long long experience of of the the West back West which whichwent went back to to his his Tyneside Tyneside childhood, childhood, an an ideological ideological commitment commitment which which probably probably predated predated even even the the Bolshevik Bolshevik Revolution Revolution and and a a thirty-year thirty-year career career as as a a foreign foreign intelligence intelligence officer, officer, most most of of it it under under Stalin, Stalin, from from which which he he had hademerged emerged scarred scarred but but battle-hardened. Other Cold War illegals in the United States were psychologically battle-hardened. Other Cold Warillegals in the United States were psychologically less less well well prepared prepared for for the the stress stress of of their their double double lives. lives. All All had had to to come come to to terms terms with with aa society theMain Main society which which was was strikingly strikingly different different from from the the propaganda propaganda image image of of the Adversary Adversary with with which whichthey they had had been been indoctrinated indoctrinated in in Moscow. Moscow. Unlike Unlike KGB KGB officers officers stationed stationed in in legal legal residencies, residencies, illegals illegals did did not not work work in in a a Soviet Soviet embassy, embassy, where where they they were constantly subject to the ideological discipline imposed by the official hierarchy. were constantly subject to theideological discipline imposed by the official hierarchy. They They also also had had to to cope cope with with a a much much greater greater degree degree of of personal personal isolation, isolation, which which they they could could diminish diminish only only by by friendships friendships and and sexual sexual liaisons liaisons which which were were liable liable to to under undermine mine their their professional professional discipline. discipline. No No wonder wonder that that some some illegals, illegals, like like Rudenko, Rudenko, had had affairs which they tried to conceal from the Centre; that others, like Hayhanen, took affairs which they tried to conceal from the Centre; thatothers, like Hayhanen, took to to drink drink and and embezzlement; embezzlement; and and that thatothers, others, like like Bitnov, Bitnov, found found it itdifficult difficult to to survive survive in in an an alien alien market market economy. economy. I1legals Illegals had had also also to to face face unreasonable, unreasonable, and and ultimately ultimately impossible, impossible, expectations expectations from the Centre. Until almost the end of the Cold War, no post-war Soviet from the Centre. Until almost the end of the Cold War, no post-war Soviet leader, leader, KGB KGB chairman chairman or or foreign foreign intelligence intelligence chief chief had had either eitherany any personal personal experience experience ofliv of living strong central ing in in the the West West or or any any realistic realistic understanding understanding of of it. it. Accustomed Accustomed to to strong central direction difficult direction and and a a command command economy, economy, the the Centre Centre found founditit difficult to to fathom fathom how how the the United United States States could could achieve achieve such such high high levels levels of of economic economic production production and and technolog technological ical innovation innovation with with so so little little apparent apparent regulation. regulation. The The gap gap in in its its understanding understanding of of what conspiracy what made made the the United UnitedStates States tick tick tended tended to to be be filled filledby by conspiracytheory. theory.The The diplo diplomat, mat, and and later later defector, defector,Arkadi Arkadi Shevchenko Shevchenko noted noted of of his his Soviet Soviet colleague: colleague: Many the fantastic Many are are inclined inclined to to the fantastic notion notion that that there there must must be be a a secret secret control control center , are center somewhere somewhere in in the the United United States. States. They They themselves, themselves, after after all all, are used used to to a a system system ruled ruled by by a a small small group group working working in in secrecy secrecy in in one oneplace. place. Moreover, Moreover, the the Soviets Soviets continue continue to to chew chew on on Lenin's Lenins dogma dogma that that bourgeois bourgeois governments governments are are just just the the "servants" servantsof of monopoly monopoly capital. capital. "Is Is not not that that the the secret secret command command cen tenter?" ter?they they reason.33 reason.33 However Centre learned West,itit never However much much the the Centre learned about about the the West, never truly truly understood understood it. it. Worse did. Worse still, still, it it thought thoughtitit did.
' T E C E N T R E S FA ITH TH HE CENTRES FAITH

in in the the future future of of illegal illegal operations operations in in the the United United States States was was remarkably remarkably unaffected unaffected by by the the many many failures failures and and disappointments disappointments of of the the 1950s 1950s and and 1960s. 970s the 1960s. At At the the beginning beginning of of the the 1 1970s the Centre Centre still still had had high high hopes hopes of of KONOV and and DOUGLAS. DOUGLAS. It also also had had remarkably remarkably ambitious ambitious projects projects for for the the next next decade. decade. A plan drawn up in the late 1960s envisaged establishing and putting into plan drawn up in the late 1960s envisaged establishing and putting into operation operation

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between in the States, two two in between 1969 1969 and and 1975 1975 ten ten illegal illegal residencies residencies in the United United States, in Canada, Canada, two Brazil, Uruguay and and Venezuela. Venezuela. For For two in in Mexico, Mexico, and and one one each each in in Argentina, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Chile, Uruguay use in and other was also also planned create five five "strategic use in wartime wartime and other major major crises crises it it was planned to to create strategic communications maintain contact communications residencies" residenciesto to maintain contact with with the the Centre Centreiflegal if legal residencies residencies were United States, Canada and and two two in Latin were unable unable to to operate: operate: two two in in the the United States, one one in in Canada in Latin America.34 America.34 This visionary visionary program program was was to to prove prove hopelessly hopelessly optimistic. optimistic. The 1970s produced produced This The 1970s another crop crop of of serious serious setbacks setbacks in in illegal illegal operations operations in in the the United States-among another United States-among them the collapse of of the the illegal illegal residencies of KONOV and and DOUGLAS. them the collapse residencies of DOUGLAS. When When KONOV and allegiance as in 1970, and EMMA swore swore their their oaths oaths of of allegiance as American American citizens citizens in 1970, their married couple. In reality, their neighbors neighbors apparently apparently regarded regarded them them as as a a model model married couple. In reality, the the increasing between them begun to to affect affect their their operational effectiveness. increasing friction friction between them had had begun operational effectiveness. In 1971 1971they they flew flew to to Haiti Haiti to to be be divorced, divorced, but but informed only the the Centre and their their In informed only Centre and New York York lawyer. O n their their return return they they still still contrived contrived to to keep keep up up appearances as a New lawyer. On appearances as a married Jersey apartment. EMMA, however, married couple couple by by living living together together in in their their New New Jersey apartment. however, asked the new In October October 1972 asked the Centre Centre to to find findher hera a new partner. partner. In 1972 KONOV was was recalled recalled to Moscow, Moscow, where where he he died died three three years years later. later. EMMA was was dismissed dismissed from from the the KGB.35 KGB.35 to Valoushek's to end later in in even even Valousheks career career as as the the illegal illegal DOUGLAS DOUGLAS was was to end a a few few years years later greater His first States, greater ignominy. ignominy. His first assignment assignment in in the theUnited United States, to to penetrate penetrate the the Hudson Hudson Institute, Institute, was was wholly wholly unrealistic. unrealistic. As As Valoushek Valoushek later later complained, complained, had had he hebeen been able able to to use from Charles use his his real real identity identity and and mention mention his his postgraduate postgraduate degrees degrees from Charles University, University, Prague, he might contact with the Prague, and and Heidelberg, Heidelberg, he might have have made made contact with senior senior members members of of the Institute. But posing as cameraman without education he Institute. But posing as photographer photographer and and cameraman without higher higher education he had no worthwhile do hadno worthwhile opportunity opportunity to todo InSO.36 In 1970, 1970, unreasonably unreasonably dissatisfied dissatisfied with with Valoushek's off Valousheks progress, progress, the the Centre Centre took tookhim him off the the Hudson Hudson Institute Instituteassignment.37 a~signment.~~ The 1957, had a brilliant brilliant school The Vaklousheks' Vaklousheks elder elder son, son, Peter Peter Herrmann, Herrmann, born bornin in 1957, had a school academic opportunities to to recruit recruit within within American American academic record record and and was was expected expected to to have have opportunities universities Valoushek revealed his true universities that that his his parents parents did did not. not. In In 1972 1972 Valoushek revealed his true identity identity to to Peter, told told the the Centre so and and said Peter, Centre he he had had done done so said that that his his son son was was ready ready to to join join the the KGB. Moscow to pay Peter's university university fees. fees. In In the the Moscow accepted accepted the the offer offer and and agreed agreed to pay Peters summer of in Montreal, Peter began began summer of 1975, 1975, shortly shortly before before entering entering McGill McGillUniversity University in Montreal,Peter training as an an illegal with the codename training in in Moscow Moscow and and started started his his career career as illegal with the German German codename ERBE ("Inheritor"). he moved from McGill to Georgetown Georgetown University, University, (Inheritor). In In 1976 1976 he moved from McGill to where he was to report report on on students students whose whose fathers fathers had had government government jobs jobs where he was instructed instructed to (especially exploited), as as well as on "pro (especially if ifthey they had had character character flaws flaws which which could could be be exploited), well as on progressive" the imperialist imperialist policies policies of of the United gressive students students and and professors professors opposed opposed to to the the United States. He the Georgetown Center Center for for States. H e was was also also told told to to try try to to find find a a part-time part-time job jobin in the Georgetown Strategic International Studies, friends with and Strategic and and International Studies, make make friends with Chinese Chinesestudents students and discover discover as as much much as as possible possible about about them.38 them.38 By the the end endof of the the academic academic year, year, Peter Peter Herrmann's Herrmanns brief brief career as a By career as a teenage teenage illegal illegal was 1977 Valoushek arrested by by the and given given the the choice choice was over. over.Early Early in inMay May 1977 Valoushek was wasarrested the FBI and of being being charged charged with with espionage, espionage, together together with with his his wife and son, son, or working as of wife and or of of working as a a double espionage writer writer John Barron that that after after his his arrest arrest he he double agent. agent. He H e later later told told the the espionage John Barron worked for over Bureau disdisworked as as a a double double agent agent under under FBI control control for over two two years years until until the the Bureau

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continued the operation. "Rudi Rudi [Valoushek] [Valoushek]gave us ushis word and he kept it, it," the FBI told 23, 1979 an told Barron. Barron. "We We must must keep keep our our word word to to him." him. On O n September 23,1979 an unmarked unmarked of the Herrmann furniture van removed all the contents of "Herrmann" household in Andover Road, Hartsdale. under new Road, Hartsdale. The The Valoushek Valoushek family family left left to to start start new new lives lives elsewhere elsewhere under new iden 39 id en tities. tie^.^^ Valoushek's account of Valousheks KGB file, file, however, however, gives givesa a very very different different account of his his relations relations with with the FBI. For included deliberate the FBI. For well well over over a a year year after after his his arrest, arrest, he he included deliberate errors errors and and warn warning ing signs signs in in his his messages messages to to the the Centre Centreas as an an indication indication that that he he was was working working under under instructions FBI. The instructions from from the the FBI. The KGB failed failed to to notice notice that that anything anything was was wrong wrong until until it 1978 that it was was warned warned by by an an agent agent early early in in October October 1978 that Valoushek Valoushek had had been been turned. turned. Soon afterwards afterwards the the Centre Centre summoned summoned him him to to aameeting meeting in in Mexico Mexico City City with with the the Washington deputy resident, Yuri Konstantinovich Linkov (codenamed BUROV). BUROV). The to keep The FBI told told him him to keep the the rendezvous rendezvous in in order order to to continue continue the the double double agent agent deception. Valoushek began his meeting with Linkov by admitting that he and his since the spring spring of the previous year. He H e sus susfamily had been under Bureau control since hehad been betrayed by LUTZ LUTZEN, haddefected in West WestGermany Germany pected that he EN , who had 1969.40He H e complained that he had done done his best to warn the Centre, Centre, but butthat thatno no in 1969.40 one had paid attention to his warnings. A subsequent investigation by the counter counterintelligence intelligence department of of the the FCD Illegals Illegals Directorate Directorate uncovered uncovered an an extraordinary extraordinary tale series of deliberate errors tale of of incompetence. incompetence. A series of warnings warnings and and deliberate errors in in Valoushek's Valousheks com communications munications since since May May 1977 1977had had been been overlooked overlooked and and messages messages he he had had posted posted to to the the residencies simply been been ignored.41 residencies in in Vienna Vienna and and Mexico Mexico City City had had simply ignored.41 Immediately the KGB in Immediately after after Valoushek's Valousheks warning warning to to the in Mexico Mexico City City in in October 1978, that contact tem 1978, the the KGB warned warned Hambleton Hambleton that contact with with his his controller controller would would be be temporarily porarily broken broken for for security security reasons. Instead Instead of of being being told told that that Valoushek Valoushek had had defected, however, however, he was simply given a vague warning that "progressive" progressivepeople and surveillance. He H e was instructed to destroy all all organizations were under increased increased surveillance. compromising materials and to deny everything if he was questioned. In case of emergency, advised to escape toEast East Germany. emergency, he was advised Germany. Hambleton, however, however, sufficient of his tracks to prevent a case from remained confident that he had covered covered sufficient 1979 he sent a confident message to the the KGB in being brought against him. In June 1979 2 secret writing, saying saying that there was no cause for alarm.4 alarm.42 4,1979 officers arrived arrived at Hambleton's Hambletons QueAt 7:15 a.m. on November 4, 1979 RCMP officers C21te bec City apartment with witha a search warrant. For the next two and aahalf years there was extensive press speculation and numerous questions about Hambleton in the press speculation the Cana CananoCanadian Canadian O n March 3, 3,1980, the of the 1980, the first day of dian parliament, but no prosecution. On to force its hand handby new Trudeau administration, the FBI made an apparent attempt to conference at Bureau head headproducing Valoushek (under a pseudonym) for a press conference quarters, where he publicly identified Hambleton as one of his agents. Hambleton shrugged of his his shrugged off off the the charges. charges. Though Though appearing appearing to to revel revel in in detailed detailed descriptions descriptions of otherhocus pocus, he insisted secret contacts with Moscow by short-wave radio and other that that he he was was not not a a spy: spy: ''A A spy spy is is someone someone who who regularly regularly gets gets secret material, material, passes passes it it paid.43 Hamon, takes orders, orders, and gets paid for it. I have never been paid."43 According to Ham bletons KGB file, however, however, between September 1975 1975 and and December 1978 1978 alone he bleton's

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was In Canadian Ministry ofJustice, was paid paid 18,000 18,000 dollars.44 dollars.44 In May May 1980 1980the the Canadian Ministry of Justice, apparently convinced that there was still insufficient evidence, evidence, announced thatHambleton Hambleton would in the case gradually gradually died died down. would not not be be prosecuted. prosecuted. Thereafter Thereafter media media interest interest in the case down. Two years later, however, a visit to London, London, tried however, Hambleton was arrested during a under sentenced to to ten years in in jail. 45 under the the Official Official Secrets Secrets Act Act and and sentenced ten years Valoushek's proba Valousheks intended successor successor as as illegal illegal resident in in the the United UnitedStates was probably Klementi Alekseyevich Korsakov, Korsakov,codenamed KIM, born born in in 1948 1948in inMoscow to a mother. Korsakov's a Russian Russian father father and and a a German German mother. Korsakovs mother, who who died in in 1971, had EVA. seems to have been selected herself been a KGB illegal, illegal, codenamed EV A. Korsakov seems potentialillegal while still a child and, like his mother, was given given bogus identity as a potential was Klemens documents by the East Germans. According to his legend, Korsakov was Oskar in Dalleghof 1948. Like Oskar Kuitan, Kuitan, an an illegitimate illegitimate child child born born in Dalleghof in 1948. Like many many other Soviet illegals, illegals, he and his mother posed as East German German refugees, entering West West 1953 and moving to the the FRG a year later. In 1967, 1967, at atthe theage of Berlin in 1953 of eighteen, WestGerman German he spent spent sevKorsakov obtained a West passport. After his mothers mother's death, he sev first school, then taking an advertising course, while eral years in Vienna, fi rst at an art school, simultaneously training secretly simultaneously secretly for illegal intelligence work. In 1978, after two familiarize himself with life in the the United United States, he moved to transatlantic trips to familiarize New New York. York. however, Korsakov Once he had begun work as a KGB illegal, however, Korsakov quickly became disdis ining inin illusioned. In January 1980, 1980,while undergoing further tra training Moscow, he secretly illusioned. secretly entered the United United States embassy, embassy, identified himself as an illegal, gave gavethe identities of them Artur Pyatin, head head of of of a a number number of of other other KGB officers officers (among (among them Artur Viktorovich Viktorovich Pyatin, (illegals support) in Line N (illegals inWashington) Washington)and and was debriefed by the CIA station. Since nominally German citizen, it was to transfer transfer him Since Korsakov Korsakovwas was nominally a a West West German citizen, it was decided decided to him secretly his exfiltration. Mitrokhin's notes notes secretly to to the theembassy embassy of of the the FRG to to arrange arrange for for his exfiltration. Mitrokhins not record whether the the KGB had observed him entering entering the the American embassy, embassy, do not but but they they were were waiting waiting for for him him when when he arrived arrived at Moscow Moscow airport to to return return to to the the West. West. After After lengthy lengthy interrogation, interrogation, Korsakov Korsakov was wassent to to the the Kazanskaya Kazanskaya psychiatric hospital, where, diag hospital, where, like like a a number number of of prominent prominent Soviet dissidents, he was was falsely diagnosed nosed as as schizophrenic.46 schizophrenic.16 the strategy the beginning beginning of of the the Cold Cold War, War, the the Centre's Centres grand grand strategy for residencies running running American American agent agent networks as for a a powerful powerful chain chain of of illegal illegalresidencies networks as important as those during little to show for an an enormous enormous important as those during the theSecond Second World World War Warhad had little show to for expenditure following a a string of previprevi expenditure of of time time and and effort. effort. At At the the end end of of the the 1970s, 1970s, following string of ous failures, under the (albeit imperfect) control of of ous failures, Valoushek's Valousheksillegal illegalresidency residencywas wasunder the (albeit imperfect) control the preparing to the FBI and and Korsakov Korsakov was waspreparing to defect. defect. Particularly fact that that probably probably the most remarkable Particularly galling galling for for the the Centre Centrewas was the the fact the most remarkable penetration Main Adversary was achieved penetration of of the the Main Adversary by by an an illegal illegal during during the the Cold ColdWar Warwas achieved not the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak StB. In 1965 1965 two not by by the the KGB KGB but but by by its its junior junior partner, partner, the StB. In tvvro StB illegals, Hana Koecher, claiming to be refugees from illegals, Karl Karl and and Hana Koecher, arrived arrived in in New New York, York, claiming to be refizgees from persecution in Russian, French as as well as persecution in in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia. Fluent Fluent in Russian, English English and and French well as Czech, job as Radio Free Europe while while Czech, Karl Karl Koecher Koecher found found a a job as a a consultant consultant with with Radio Free Europe
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studying Indiana University, studying first first for for a a master's masters degree degree at at Indiana University, then then for for a a doctorate doctorate at at Columbia. Columbia. Among Among his his professors professors at at Columbia Columbia was was Zbigniew Zbigniew Brzezinski, Brzezinski, who who later later became President became President Carter's Carters National National Security Security Adviser. Adviser. All A l l the the time, time, he he posed posed as as a a vir virulent ulent anti-Communist, anti-Communist, even even objecting objecting to to the the purchase purchase of of an an apartment apartment in in his his East East Side York becauseof of Lendls Lcndl's Side building building in in New New York by bythe the tennis tennis star star Ivan Ivan Lendl-simply Lendl-simply because Czech Czech origins. origins. In In 1969, 1969, a a year year before before gaining gaining his his PhD, PhD, Karl Karl Koecher Koecher was was appointed appointed lecturer lecturer in in philosophy philosophy at at Wagner Wagner College, College, Staten Staten Island. Island. Hana, Hana, meanwhile, meanwhile, worked worked for Europe and for a a diamond diamond business business which which gave gave her her regular regular opportunities opportunities to totravel travel to to Europe and act also have been act as as courier courier for for the the StB. StB. The The Koechers Koechers may may also have been the the most most sexually sexually active illegals in the history graduating from activeillegals in the history of of Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc intelligence, intelligence, graduating from "wife wifeswapping" swapping parties parties to to group group orgies orgies at at New New York's Yorks Plato's Platos Retreat Retreat and and Hell Hell Fire Fire sex sex clubs pre-AIDS clubs which which flourished flourished in in the thesexually sexuallypermissive permissive pre-AIDS era era of of the the late late 1960s 1960s and and 1970s. 1970s. With With the the blessing blessing of of the the StB, StB, the the Koechers Koechers later later revealed revealed some some of of their their colorful colorful careers careers to to the the Washington Washington investigative investigative journalist journalist Ronald Ronald KesslerY K e ~ s l e rKarl Karl . ~ ~ Koecher's Koechers KGB KGB file, file, however, however, reveals revealsthat that he he withheld withheldimportant importantdetails. details. In In 1970 1970 he hewas was sum summoned in an anStB StB active moned back back to to Prague Prague to to take take part part in active measure measure designed designed to to unmask unmask alleged was too alleged CIA operations operations using using Czech Czech emigres. emigrCs. Koecher, Koecher, however, however, was too attached attached to to his return his swinging swinging lifestyle lifestyle to to leave leave New New York, York, refused rehsed to to return and and for for the the next next four four years years broke In succeeded US broke off off contact contact with with the theStB.48 StB.48 In 1971 1971 he he succeeded in in becoming becoming a a naturalized naturalized US citizen; citizen; his his wife wife was wasgranted granted citizenship citizenship a a year year later. later. Karl devised a the StB StB by Karl Koecher Koecher seems seems to to have have devised a plan plan to to mend mend his his fences fences with with the by penetrating job as penetrating the the CIA. CIA. In In 1973 1973 he hemoved moved to to Washington Washingtonand andobtained obtained a a job as trans translator lator in in the the Agency's Agencys Soviet Soviet division, division,with with a a top top secret secret security security clearance. clearance. His His chutz chutzpah pah was was such such that that only only three three weeks weeks later later he he demanded demandeda a better better job: job: My by no My present present position position is is by no means means one one which which would would require require a a PhD. PhD. I am am interested the agency do a interested in in intelligence intelligence work, work, and and I want want to to stay stay with with the agency and and do a good would in good piece piece of of work. work. But But I I also also think think that thatit it would only only be be fair fairto to let letme me do do itit in a I have a position position intellectually intellectually far far more more demanding demanding than than the theone one have now now .. .. ..

as a result of his complaints, complaints, Koecher was later asked to write intelligence intelligence Probably as assessments based on some some of the Russian Russian and Czech Czech material which he translated assessments and and transcribed transcribed from from tape tape recordings. recordings. Sex in Washington Washington struck struck Koecher as as even more exciting exciting than in New York. York. In Sex mid-l970s, he he later claimed claimed nostalgically, nostalgically,Washington was was "the the sex capital of the the the mid-1970s, later world. The Koechers Koechers joined the Couples, who met world." theCapitol "Capitol Couples," met for dinner at at The evenings before moving on for group sex in a hotel Exchange restaurant on Saturday evenings private house, house, as as well well as as becoming members members of a private club club of Washington or private swingers at Virginia's Virginias In Place, Place, about ten of whose members members worked for the CIA. CIA. swingers Hana, Hana, blonde, blonde, attractive attractive and and ten ten years years younger younger than than her her husband, husband, later later boasted boasted that that officials, reporters from she had had sex sex with numerous CIA personnel, Pentagon officials, she newspapers and a US Senator. Senator. The The organizer of "Capitol Capitol Couples" Couples remem rememmajor newspapers strikingly beautiful; beautiful; warm, sweet, sweet, ingratiating; incredibly orgasmic." orgasmic. bered her as "strikingly

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Karl, Karl, however, however, "was wasa a bit bit strange strange .. .. ..The The women women he he was was with with said said he he was was a a terrible terrible lover, very veryinsensitive. insensitive. His wife was waseverything he wasn't."49 lover, In CIA, Karl Karl Koecher Koecher renewed renewed contact contact with with the theStB, StB, In 1974, 1974,having having penetrated penetrated the the CIA, which consulted the became a KGB about whether to reactivate him. Henceforth Henceforthhe he the KGB KGB KGB agent agent with with the thecodename codename RINO, as as well well as as being being an an StB StB illegal. illegal.The The Koechers' Koechers adventures adventures in in Washington Washingtonsex sex clubs clubs are are unlikely unlikely to to have have provided provided the the StB and and KGB with with more more than than compromising compromising information information and and gossip gossip about about Washington Washington officials, officials, most most of of it it of of no no operational operational significance. significance.Far Far more more important important was was the the classified classified Soviet Soviet Koecher for the CIA which he forwarded to and Czech material translated by Karl Koecher the KGB. KGB. Andropov personally personallypraised his intelligence intelligence as "important important and valuable."50 ~aluable.~ 1975 Koecher Koecherleft left full-time full-time Agency Agency employment, employment, but but continued continued on on contract contract work, work, In 1975 based based in in New NewYork. York. Among Among the thesubjects subjects of of his his assessments assessmentswas was the the decision-making decision-making process 51 process in in the the Soviet Soviet leadership. leadership. In In 1975 1975 Koecher Koecher supplied supplied the the KGB's KGBs New New York York residency residency with with highly highly rated rated intel intelligence ligence on CIA CIA operations against the Soviet Soviet Union in in the theThird World. As Aswell as as arranging met arranging meetings meetings in in New NewYork, York, his his KGB case case officers officersalso also met him him in inAustria Austria and and France.52Among his most important counter-intelligence leads leads was was evidence France.52 evidence that the had recruited a Soviet diplomat. Following an apparently lengthy the CIA CIA had recruited a Soviet diplomat. Following an apparently lengthy investiga investigation, tion, the the KGB KGB identified identified the the diplomat diplomat as as Aleksandr Aleksandr Dmitryevich Dmitryevich Ogorodnik, Ogorodnik, then then working working in in the the American American department department at at the the Foreign Foreign Ministry. Ministry. Soon Soon after after his his arrest arrest in in 1977, 1977, Ogorodnik Ogorodnik agreed agreed to to write write a a full confession confession but but complained complained that that the pen pen given given him him by by his his interrogator interrogator was was too too clumsy clumsy for for him him to touse. use. As As soon soon as as he he was was given given his own own pen back, back, he removed removed a concealed concealed poison capsule, capsule, swallowed swallowed it before the his guard guard could could stop stop him himand and died died in in the the interrogation interrogation room. 53 In In the the early early 1980s 1980s the the Koechers Koechers were were themselves themselves betrayed betrayed by by a a CIA CIA agent agent in in the the StB. StB. Arrested in 1984, 1984, they returned to Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia less less than two two years years later as as part part of of a a deal deal which which allowed allowed the the imprisoned imprisoned Russian Russian dissident dissident Anatoli Anatoli Shcharansky Shcharansky to to emigrate emigrate to to Israel. Israel. According According to to a a newspaper newspaper report, report, as as they they crossed crossed the the Glienicker Glienicker Bridge Bridge from from West West Berlin Berlin to to East East Germany: Germany: With With his his moustache moustache and and fur-lined fur-lined coat, coat, Karl Karl F. F. Koecher Koecher looked looked like like nothing nothing so so much mink hat. much as as a a fox. fox. His His wife, wife, Hana, Hana, wore wore a a mink mink coat coat and and high high white white mink hat. Blonde Blonde and and sexy, sexy, with with incredibly incredibly large large blue blue eyes, eyes, she she looked looked like like a a movie movie star. star. "The KGB thinks thinks highly highly of of me," me, Karl Karl Koecher Koecher later later boasted boasted to to Ronald Ronald Kessler.54 Ke~sler.~ The KGB There There was was a a curious curious sequel sequel to to the the Koechers' Koechers espionage espionage careers careers in in the the West. West. In In 1992 1992 Hana Hana succeeded succeeded in in obtaining obtaining a a job job in in the thecommercial commercial section section at at the the British British embassy embassy in in Prague. Prague. She She was was sacked sackedtwo two years years later later after after a a Czech Czech journalist journalist revealed revealed her her back background.55 ground.
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of of the the 1980s, 1980s, despite despite all all the the setbacks setbacks of of the the previous previous thirty thirty years, years, the the Centre's Centres plans plans for for the the expansion expansion of of illegal illegal networks networks on on the the territory territoryof of the the Main Main Adversary Adversary still still remained remained remarkably remarkably ambitious-though ambitious-though not not to toquite quite the the same same degree degree as as a a decade decade earlier. earlier. Instead Instead of of the the ten tenillegal illegal residencies residencieswhich which it it had had intended intended

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to theUnited United States Centre planned to establish establish within within the States by 1975, 1975, the the Centre planned to to have have six six by by six residencies were were supposed to have three to four sources sources 1982. Between them, the the six 1982. in in each each of of a a series series of of major major penetration penetration targets: targets: the the White White House, the the State StateDepart Department, the the Pentagon and what were described as "related related institutions"-among institutions-among them the Hudson thethe Rand Corporation, Columbia University's HudsonInstitute, Institute, Rand Corporation, Columbia Universitys School of Inter Interuniversitys Center for national Relations, Georgetown University's for Strategic Studies and the the affiliates Universitys Center for Strategy and Research. Research. West German affi liates of Stanford University's The Centre also planned the "active activerecruitment" recruitment of students at atColumbia, New York and Georgetown Universities. 56 and GeorgetownUni~ersities.~ success in deploying illegals illegals against the Main Main It is clear that the KGB had some some success the 1980s. 1980s. For example, example, Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes record that in in 1983 1983 illeAdversary in the the ille gal in the theUnited United States, gal couple couple GORT and and LUIZA were were operating operating in States, but but give give no no details of their achievements.57 achievement^.'^ However, However, even the KGB's KGBs downgraded plan for six details residencies, each with agents at the the heart heart of the Reagan administration, was illegal residencies, hopelessly unrealistic. scale of the Centre's unrealistic. The scale Centres ambitious projects for illegal opera operations against the Main reflected not the MainAdversary in the thelater years of the Cold ColdWar War the 1980sbut but the triumphs of the Great GreatIllegals Illegals half half a reality of the 1980s the spell still cast by the triumphs century century before. before.

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uri Andropov became KGB chairman in 1967 extravagant expectations of the Soviet foreign policy, policy, particularly potential contribution of political intelligence to Soviet United States. In a report to KGB Party activists activists soon after his appoint appointtowards the United of ment, he declared that the KGB must be in a position to influence the outcome of crises in a a way that it had had failed to do do during the the Cuban Cuban missile crisis crisis international crises five years years earlier. earlier. He ordered the preparation within three to four months of a First First five Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate report to the Central on the Chief CentralCommittee Committee on the current current and and future hture policy policy of of the the Main Adversary Adversary and and its its allies. allies. The The principal principal weak weakness of current operations in the the United United States, Andropov complained, complained, was the lack thecaliber of the Britons Kim Philby, Philby,George Blake and John of American agents of the Vassall, Heinz Felfe. Vassall, or or the the West WestGerman German Heinz Felfe. Only Only by by recruiting recruiting such such agents, agents, he he insisted, insisted, 1 could could the the FCD gain gain access access to to really really high-grade high-grade intelligence. intelligence. Almost from the moment moment he he became became a candidate (non-voting) member of the 1967, himself as a powerful powerhl voice in Soviet Soviet foreign Politburo in 1967, Andropov established himself policy. In 1968 1968 he heemerged as the chief spokesman of of those calling for "extreme extreme mea meapolicy. suresto crush the Prague Spring.2 Spring.?During the the1970s 1970s he he the sures" became co-sponsor, with the minister, Andrei Gromyko, of the main foreign policy proposals proposals brought foreign minister, before members from before the the Politburo Politburo (of (of which which both both were were full, full, voting voting members from 1973). 1973). Dmitri Dmitri Ustinov, who became Defense Minister in 1977, 1977, sometimes added his signature to the proposals proposals worked out with with Gromyko. According to the the long-serving Soviet ambassador Washington,Anatoli Anatoli Dobrynin: ambassador in Washington, Dobrynin:

Yuri Andropov became KGB chairman in 1967with with extravagant expectations of the Y

the advantage advantage of familiarity with both both foreign policy and mili miliAndropov had the tary tary issues issues from from the the KGB's KGBs broad broad sources sources of of information information .. .. .. Gromyko Gromyko and and Ustinov Ustinov were were authorities authorities in in their their respective respective domains domains but but laid laid no no special special claim claim to to each each other's othersfields fieldsin in the theway way that that Andropov Andropov felt felt comfortable comfortable in in both.3 both.3
Under Under Andropov, Andropov, the the FCD, FCD, which which had had traditionally traditionally been been wary wary of of taking taking the the initia initiative tive in in issuing issuing intelligence intelligence assessments, assessments, for for fear fear that that they they might might contradict contradict the the opin opinions number ions of of higher higher authority, authority, reformed reformed and and expanded expanded its its analytical analytical branch.4 b r a n ~ hOn .~ a aO number n of of occasions occasionsAndropov Andropov circulated circulated slanted slanted assessments assessments to to the thePolitburo Politburo in in an anattempt attempt to influence its policy.s to influence its policy.

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Andropov Andropov became became one one of of Brezhnev's Brezhnevs most most trusted trusted advisers. advisers. In In January January 1976, 1976, for for example, personal eighteen-page example, he he sent sent the the General GeneralSecretary Secretary a a strictly strictly personal eighteen-page letter, letter, which which began began sycophantically: sycophantically: This alone. If This document, document, which which I wrote wrote myself, myself, is is intended intended for for you you alone. If you you find find something of something in initit of value valueto to the thecause, cause, I shall shall be be very veryglad, glad, and and if if not, not, then then I ask ask you you to to consider consider it it as as never never having having happened.6 happened.6 Though to criticize Though careful careful not not to criticize Brezhnev Brezhnev even even in in private private discussions discussions with with senior senior KGB officers/ wellaware aware of officer^,^ Andropov Andropov was was well of both both his his intellectual intellectual limitations limitations and and declining declining health, health, and and set set out out to toestablish establish himself himself as as heir-apparent. heir-apparent. The The General General Sec Secretary retary paid paid little little attention attention to to the the details details of of foreign foreign policy. policy. Dobrynin Dobrynin quickly quickly discov discovered that what most interested Brezhnev about foreign affairs were the pomp ered that what most interested Brezhnev about foreign affairs were the pomp and and circumstance circumstance of of ceremonial ceremonial occasions: occasions: .. .. .. the the guards guards of of honor, honor, the the grand grand receptions receptions for for foreign foreign leaders leaders in in the the Krem Kremlin, the fulsome publicity, and all the rest. He wanted his photo taken lin, the fulsome publicity, and all the rest. H e wanted his photo taken for for his his albums, albums, which which he he loved loved to to show. show. He H e much much preferred preferred a a fine fine ceremony ceremony signing signing final final documents documents rather rather than than working working on on them. them. During During one one meeting meeting with with Dobrynin, Dobrynin, Brezhnev Brezhnev disappeared disappeared upstairs upstairs and and reemerged reemerged in medals. "How in field field marshal's marshals uniform, uniform, his his chest chest clanking clanking with with medals. How do I look?" look? he he asked. asked. "Magnificent!" Magnificent! Dobrynin Dobrynin dutifully dutifully replied.s replied.* From From 1974 1974 onwards onwards a a series series of of mild mild strokes strokes caused caused by by arteriosclerosis arteriosclerosis of of the the brain brain left left Brezhnev Brezhnev a a semi-invalid. semi-invalid. At the the rear rear of of the the cavalcade cavalcade of of black black Zil Zil limousines limousines which which accompanied accompanied Brezhnev Brezhnev wher wherever he went went was a resuscitation vehicle. By the mid-1970s one of his closest closest com companions panions was was a KGB nurse, nurse, who who fed fed him him a a steady steady stream stream of of pills pills without without consulting consulting his his doctors.9 doctors.
TH HO OU UG GH H ANDR RO D both OPOV S ST TR RE EN NGT G TH E N E D both his his own own influence influence and and that thatof of the the KGB in the themaking of Soviet Soviet foreign policy, policy, his ambitious plans for dramatically improved political realized. Line Line PR (political political intelligence intelligence on on the the Main Main Adversary Adversary were were never never realized. (political intelligence) intelligence) in the theAmerican residencies failed failed to live up to his high expectations. expectations. In 1968, 1968, a a scandal scandal arose arose over over the the New New York York resident, resident, Nikolai Nikolai Panteleymonovich Panteleymonovich Kule Kulebyakin, the byakin, a a former former head head of of the the FCD FCD First First (North (North American) American) Department. Department. Mter After the Centre him, probably Centre had hadreceived received a a complaint complaint against against him, probably from from within within his his residency, residency, an an enquiry entered the vitae. Con enquiry revealed revealed that that he he had hadentered the KGB KGB with with a a bogus bogus curriculum curriculum vitae. Contrary trary to to the the claims claims in in his his CV, CV, he he had had never never completed completed his his school school education education and and had had service. Fearing that Kulebyakin might defect if he hewere confronted evaded military service. with with his his crimes crimes in in Washington, Washington, he hewas was told told he he had had been been promoted promoted to to deputy deputy direc director summoned home home to tor of the the FCD and and summoned to take take up up his his new new office. office. On O n arriving arriving in in Moscow, however, however, he was summarily dismissed dismissed from the KGB and expelled from the Moscow, Party. Communist Party.1D

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Washingtonperformed rather better better Thanks chiefly to two walk-ins, Line PR in Washington NewYork during the the mid- and late 1960s. 1960s. In September 1965 1965 Robert Lipka, a than New theWashington Washington restwenty-year-old army clerk in NSA, caused great excitement in the res himself at the the Soviet embassy on Sixteenth Street, a few blocks idency by presenting himself hewas responsible responsible for shredding highly from the White House, and announcing that he classified documents. Lipka (code-named DAN) was probably the youngest Soviet classified agent agent recruited recruited in in the the United United States States with with access access to to high-grade high-grade intelligence intelligence since since the the nineteen-year-old Ted Ted Hall Hall had had offered offered his his services services to to the the New NewYork York residency while while working Los Alamos Alamos in notes working on on the the MANHATTAN MANHATTAN project project at at Los in 1944. 1944. Lipka's Lipkas file file notes that he craft taught him hequickly mastered the intelligence trade tradecraft himby Line PRo PR. Over the the next two years he made contact with the the residency about fifty times via dead letter letterboxes, cer.ll boxes, brush brush contacts contacts and and meetings meetings with with a a case case offi officer. The The youthful youthful head head of of Line Line PR, Oleg Oleg Danilovich Danilovich Kalugin, Kalugin, spent spent "countless countlesshours" hours in in the Washington residency sifting through the mass of material his cramped office in the documents for cabling to provided by Lipka and choosing choosing the most important documents 2 Lipkas Moscow.1 Lipka's motives were purely mercenary. During the the two Moscow.12 motives were purely mercenary. two years years after after he walked into the the Washington embassy, he received a total of about 27,000 27,000 dollars, dollars, but regularly complained that he was not paid enough and threatened to break contact unless his increased. Lipka eventually did break contact in August his remuneration was increased. 1967, when he left NSA at atthe the end his military service service to study at Millersville 1967, end of his Millersville ColCol lege in Pennsylvania intelligence access made it Pennsylvania and probably concluded concluded that his loss lossof of intelligence access no contact with no longer longer worth worth his his while while maintaining maintaining contact with the the Washington Washington residency. residency.To To dis discourage the KGB from trying to renew contact, Lipka sent a final message claiming courage the from trying to renew contact, Lipka sent a final message claiming that been a that he he had had been a double double agent agent controlled controlled by by US intelligence. intelligence. In In view view of of the the impor importance tance of of the the classified classified documents documents he he had had provided, provided, however, however, the the KGB had had no no doubt doubt that that he he was was lying. lying. Attempts Attempts by by both both the the residency residency and and illegals illegals to to renew renew contact contact with with eleven years.13 Lipka continued continued intermittently, intermittently, without success, success, for forat at least least another another eleven years. Only Only a a few few months months after after Lipka Lipka ceased ceased working working as as a a Soviet Soviet agent, agent, the the Washington Washington residency SIGINT. The most important important residency recruited recruited another another walk-in walk-in with with access access to to SIGINT. The most Cold in 1985 1985 Cold War War agent agent recruited recruited in in Washington Washington before before Aldrich Aldrich Ames Ames walked walked in in in was cer John Walker, was probably probably Chief Chief Warrant WarrantOffi Officer John Anthony Anthony Walker, a a communications communications watch watch officer Submarine Forces officer on on the the staff staff of of the the Commander Commander of of Submarine Forces in in the the Atlantic Atlantic(COM (COMSUBLANT) 1967 he SUBLANT) in in Norfolk, Norfolk, Virginia. Virginia. Late Late in in 1967 he entered entered the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy and and Im a naval officer. officer.I'd announced, "I'm Id like to make some money and Ill give you you some I'll give genuine high-level genuine stuffin stuff in return." return. Despite Despite his his junior junior rank, rank, Walker Walker had had access access to to very very high-level intelligence-including settings of sample batch intelligence-including the the key key settings of US naval naval ciphers. ciphers. The The sample batch of of his his material, him to examined with amazement material, which which he he brought broughtwith with him to the the embassy, embassy, was wasexamined with amazement by Accord by Ka1ugin Kalugin and and the the Washington Washington resident, Boris Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Solomatin. AccordI to Kalugin, Kalugin, Solomatins eyes widened as he leafed through through the the Walker papers. ing to Solomatin's "eyes papers. 'I want spy who turns up want this!' this! he he cried." cried. Walker, Walker, they they later later agreed, agreed, was was the kind kind of spy once in a lifetime." lifetime. Enabling Soviet codes, claims "once Soviet codebreakers codebreakers to crack US navy codes, Kalugin, intelligence advantage" Kalugin, gave gave the the Soviet Soviet Union Union "an an enormous enormous intelligence advantage by by allowing allowing it it to movements.14 to monitor monitorAmerican American fleet fleet movements.14

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Walker, 1972 as Walker, described described in in aa fitness fitness report report from from his his commanding commanding officer officer in in 1972 as "intensely sense of pho of personal personal honor honor and and integrity," integrity, found found phointensely loyal" loyal with with "a a fine fine sense tographing top secret documents and cipher material with a a Minox Minox camera in the COMSUBLANT communications communications center center so so easy easy that that he hewas was later later to to claim, claim, "K K Mart Mart has has better better security security than than the theNavy." Navy. He H e went went on on to toform form a a spy-ring spy-ring by by recruiting recruiting a a naval naval friend, Jerry Whitworth, and his his own son and friend, Jerry Whitworth, and own son and elder elder brother.15 brother. For For Kalugin Kalugin the the great greatest surprise both the est surprise of of both the Lipka Lipka and and Walker Walker cases cases was wastheir their revelation revelation of of"how how incredi incredibly bly lax laxsecurity security still still was was at at some some of of the the United United States' States top top secret secret installations."16 installation^."^^ Mter ultra-secret Sixteenth After the the foundation foundation in in 1968 1968of of the the ultra-secret Sixteenth Department Department to to handle handle SIGINT SIGINT material material collected collected by by the the FCD, FCD, Walker Walker was was transferred transferred to to its its control control and and thus thus no no longer longer figured figured on on the the Washington Washington residency's residencys agent agent list.I? list. Solomatin, how however, that he oversight of ever, was wascareful careful to to ensure ensure that heretained retained personal personal oversight of the the running running of of what what became became the the Walker Walker family family spyring spyring throughout the the extraordinary extraordinary eighteen years years of of its existence.18 Lipka and to win existence. The The reflected reflected glory glory of of the the Lipka and Walker Walker cases cases was wasto win Solomatin Solomatin the the FCD. Kalu the Order Orderof of the the Red Red Banner Banner and, and, later, later, promotion promotion to to deputy deputy head head of of the FCD. Kalugin's became gins career career also also benefited; benefited; in in 1974 1974he he became the the FCD's FCDs youngest youngest general.19 general. Most less straightforward the Most walk-ins walk-ins were wereless straightforward than than Lipka Lipka and and Walker. Walker. During During the 1970s 1970s KGB KGB residencies, residencies, especially especially that that in in Mexico Mexico City, City, had had to to deal deal with a growing growing number of "dangles"-double agents controlled number of dangles-double agents controlled by by the the US intelligence intelligence community community who of the most successful who offered offered their their services services as as Soviet Soviet agents. agents. One One of the most successful dangles dangles was was MAREK, a master sergeant sergeant of army base base in MAREK, a master of Czech Czech descent descent at at the the Fort Fort Bliss Bliss army in Texas, Texas, who who visited visited the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy in in Mexico Mexico in in December December 1966 1966 and and offered offered informa information tion on on electronic electronic equipment equipment used used by by the the US army. army. Recruited Recruited in in June June 1968, 1968,he hehad had numerous a grand grand total total of numerous meetings meetings over over the the next next eight eight years years with with a of twenty-six twenty-six case case officers 1976, officers in in Mexico, Mexico, West West Germany, Germany, Switzerland, Switzerland, Japan Japan and and Austria. Austria. In In May May 1976, however, (PONT) that however, the the KGB learned learned from from the the former former CIA officer officer Philip Philip Agee Agee (PONT) that MAREK was dangle, run joint CINDefense Intelligence was a a US US dangle, run in in aa joint CINDefense Intelligence Agency Agency opera opera20 tion tion of of which which he he had had personal personal knowledge. knowledge.20 By By the the late late 1970s 1970s a a special special Pentagon Pentagon panel panel was was selecting selecting classified classified documents documents which which were were given given to to American American dangles, dangles, mostly mostly non-commissioned non-commissioned officers officers selected selected by strengthentheir their credibility spies. As by the the DIA to to strengthen credibility as as Soviet Soviet spies. As well well as as providing providing a a potential channel for disinformation in a conflict or crisis, crisis, large amounts of KGB time time and and energy energy were were wasted wasted in in distinguishing distinguishing dangles dangles from from genuine genuine walk-ins. walk-ins. The The most successful successful of of the real Soviet recruits, Aldrich Ames, said later that the therefusal rehsal of to release classified classifieddocuments made it impossible impossible for Soviet dangles dangles the Red Army to to to compete with with those those of of the the United United States: States: Even if a document were of no real value, no one in the Soviet military was off on releasing releasing it, knowing that it itwas going to tobe passed to the willing to sign off later, they would be called before West. They were afraid that a few months later, 21 some fortreason. treason.21 some Stalin-like tribunal and be shot for

Throughout the the Cold ColdWar War the main weakness Washington residency was Throughout the weakness of the Washington its inability to recruit agents able to provide high-level political intelligence from

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within the federal government. At the end of of the the 1960s, 1960s, however, however, it had one non nonofficer, Boris Sedov, Sedov, source to which it attached great importance. A line PR officer, agent source operating operating under undercover cover as as a a Novosti Novosti journalist, journalist, had hadsucceeded succeeded in making makingcontact contact with with Henry Henry Kissinger Kissinger while while he he was was still still a a professor professor at at Harvard Harvard University. University. According to to Kalugin, illusions about Kalugin, "We We never never had had any any illusions about trying trying to torecruit recruit Kissinger: Kissinger: he he was was sim simply a source of political intelligence." intelligence. When Kissinger became an adviser to Nixon during the 1968 election election campaign, campaign, he use Sedov Sedov to pass messages messages to during the 1968 he began began to to use to pass to Moscow that Nixons Nixon's public image as Cold War War warrior was Moscow that public image as an an unreconstructed unreconstructed Cold warrior was false wanted better relations Nixon's elec false and and that that he he wanted better relations with with the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. Mter After Nixons election victory, Brezhnev sent personal congratulations to him via Sedov together tion victory, Brezhnev sent personal congratulations to himvia Sedov together with with a note expressing hope that together they they would better US-Soviet a note expressing the the hope that together would establish establish better US-Soviet relations. the presidential presidential campaign been underway, relations. While While the campaign had had been underway, the the long-serving long-serving Soviet Dobrynin, had had tolerated secret contacts contacts with Soviet ambassador, ambassador, Anatoli Anatoli Dobrynin, tolerated Sedov's Sedovs secret with Kissinger. and Kissinger became his Kissinger. Once Nixon entered the White Houseand National National Security Security Adviser, Adviser, however, however, he he insisted insisted on on taking taking over over the the back channel to to 22 the the Kremlin Kremlin himself. himself.22 When When Kissinger Kissinger took took over over as as Secretary Secretary of of State State in in 1973, Dobrynin Dobrynin became became the the only Washington who who . was allowed to the State StateDepartment Department only ambassador ambassador in in Washington was allowed to enter the 23 The unobserved unobserved via via the the underground underground garage. garage.23 The Washington Washington residency residency complained complained to to the the Centre Centre that that Kissinger Kissinger had had forbidden forbidden his his officials officials to to meet meet members members of of the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy outside outside office office hours, hours, thus thus making making it it impossible impossible for for residency residency officers officers to to develop the State State Department Department and and "check develop contacts contacts of of their their own own within within the check Kissinger's Kissingers true intentions when Ambassador Dobrynin."24 true intentions when negotiating negotiating with with Ambassador D ~ b r y n i n . During During ~ ~ his his twenty twentythree Dobrynids three years years in in Washington Washingtonfrom from 1963 1963 to to 1986, 1986, Dobrynins access accessto to a a series series of of major major policy-makers policy-makers from from Dean Dean Rusk Rusk under under Kennedy Kennedy to to George George Shultz Shultz under underReagan Reagan was was never never equaled equaled by by the the Washington Washingtonresidency.25 re~idency.~ Line York residency had success in Line PR at at the theNew New York residency had no no success in recruiting recruiting "valuable valuable agents" agents within the US administration Nations, however, was a within the administration either. either. The The United United Nations, however, was a much much softer softer target. target. Of Of the the more more than than 300 300Soviet Soviet nationals nationals employed employed in in the theUN Secretariat, Secretariat, many many were were KGB KGB and and GRU officers, officers, agents agents and and co-optees. co-optees. KGB KGB officers officers operating operating under diplomatic cover became the trusted personal assistants to successive under diplomatic cover became the trusted personal assistants to successive UN secretaries-general: secretaries-general: Viktor Viktor Mechislavovich Mechislavovich Lesiovsky Lesiovsky to to U Thant, Thant, Lesiovsky Lesiovsky and and Valeri Valeri Viktorovich Viktorovich Krepkogorsky Krepkogorsky to to Kurt Kurt Waldheim Waldheim and and Gennadi Gennadi Mikhaylovich Mikhaylovich 26 The Yevstafeyev attempts to culti Yevstafeyevto to Javier Javier Perez Pkrez de de Cuellar. CuCllar.26 The KGB made made strenuous strenuous attempts tocultivate Waldheim in particular, arranging for the publication of flattering articles about vate Waldheim in particular, arranging for the publication of flattering articles about him in the the Soviet him in Soviet press press and and selecting selecting a a painting painting of of Samarkand Samarkand by by a a Soviet Soviet artist artist which which was was personally personally presented presented to to him him by by Lesiovsky Lesiovsky and and Krepkogorsky Krepkogorskywhen when he he vis vis27 ited ited the the USSR. USSR.27 According According to to Arkadi Arkadi Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Shevchenko, Shevchenko, the the Russian Russian under under secretary secretarygeneral 1978, Lesiovsky Lesiovsky and given general at at the the UN who who defected defected in in 1978, and Krepkogorsky Krepkogorsky were were given largely largely routine routine responsibilities responsibilities by by Waldheim, Waldheim, checking checking the the order order of of speakers speakers at at the the General at innumerable General Assembly Assembly or or representing representing him him at innumerable diplomatic diplomatic receptions, receptions, but but were ''Aus were frozen frozen out out of of sensitive sensitiveUN business business by by what what they they claimed claimed was was Waldheim's Waldheims Austrian mafia." The UN Secretariat in New York none the less became a much more trian mafia. The Secretariat in New York none the less became a much more

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successful Washington. successful recruiting recruiting ground ground than than the the federal federal government government in in Washington. Shevchenko frequently saw Lesiovsky in the delegates' lounge, "buying Shevchenko frequently saw Lesiovsky in thedelegates lounge, buying drinks drinks for for an an ambassador, ambassador, telling telling amusing amusing stories, stories, procuring procuring hard-to-get hard-to-get theater theater or or opera opera tickets, tickets, name name dropping, dropping, ingratiating ingratiating himself."28 himself.28The The Secretary-General's Secretary-Generals KGB personal personal assistants assistants spent spent much much of of their their time time cultivating cultivating and and trying tryingto torecruit recruit members members of of for foreign missions and eign missions and the the UN UN Secretariat Secretariat from from around around the the world. 29 The The Centre, Centre, however, however, frequently frequently expressed expressed disappointment disappointment with with political political intelli intelligence Nations. The gence operations operations by by the the New New York York residency residency outside outside the the United United Nations. The resi residency's 1973 when dencys work work was was seriously seriously disrupted disrupted in in 1973 when it it discovered discovered that that the the FBI had had detailed detailed information information on on the the activities activities of of some some of of its its operations operations officers, officers, as as well well as as of of three GREK, BREST BREST and and BRIZ).30 BRIZ).30A report report at at three "developmental" developmentalagents agents (codenamed (codenamed GREK, the the end end of of 1974 1974 concluded concluded that that Line Line PR's PRs performance performance had had been been unsatisfactory unsatisfactory for for some some time time past: past: For For a a number number of of years years the the Residency Residency has has not not been been able able to to create create an an agent agent net network work capable capable of of fulfilling hlfilling the the complex complex requirements requirements of of our our intelligence intelligence work, work, especially especially against against the the US We We have have not not succeeded succeeded in in achieving achieving this this goal goal in in 1974, 1974, either, either, although although there there has has been been some some progress progress in in this this line. line.There There have have been been sev several eral recruitments recruitments (SUAREZ, (SUAREZ, DIF, DIF, HERMES) HERMES) and and confidential confidential contacts contacts have have been But these been acquired. acquired. But these results results still still do do not not move move us us any any closer closerto to fulfilling fulfilling our our basic 31 basic task. task.31 None None of of the the three threenew new agents agents was was of of major major significance. significance. SUAREZ SUAREZ was was a a Colombian Colombian journalist journalist recruited recruited by by Anatoli Anatoli Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Manakov, Manakov, a a KGB officer officer operating operating under under cover cover as as Komsomolskaya Komsonzolskaya Pravda correspondent correspondent in in New NewYork. York. A few few years yearslater later SUAREZ succeeded in SUAREZ succeeded in gaining gaining US citizenship.32 ~ i t i z e n s h i pDIF . ~ ~ was was a a US businessman businessman who who provided economic assessments.33 HERMES, potentially the provided political political and and economic asses~ments .~~ HEME potentially S, the most most important Cypriot born in in important of of the the three three new new recruits, recruits, was was Ozdemir Ozdemir Ahmet Ahmet Ozgur, Ozgur,a a Cypriot born 1929. the New York able to 1929. In In 1977, 1977,the New York residency residency was wasable to arrange arrange through through Arkadi Arkadi Shevchenko to gain the UN Secretariat. When Shevchenko Shevchenko for for Ozgur Ozgur to gain a a post post at at the Secretariat. When Shevchenko defected in 1 978, however, the KGB was forced to break off all contact defected in 1978, however, the was forced to break off contact with with HER HERMES.34 MES.34 DIF, residency's DIF, the the US businessman, businessman, was was also alsoincluded included in in the theWashington Washington residencys list list of of its 1974. Line Line PR had AR, agents in in 1974. had nine nine other other agents: agents: GRIG, GRIG, MAGY MAGYAR, its Line Line PR agents MORTON, RAMZES, REM, STOIC.35 GRIG MORTON, NIK, NIK, RAMZES, REM, ROMELLA, ROMELLA, SHEF S H E F and and STOIC.35 GRIG remains AR was remains unidentified unidentified but but is is reported reported as as operating operating in in Canada.36 Canada.36MAGY MAGYAR was a a lead leading MORTON was ing peace peace activist.37 activist.37 was a a prominent prominentlawyer lawyer recruited recruited in in 1970 1970but buttaken taken off because off the the agent agent list list in in 1975 1975 because of of his his advancing advancing years. years. On O n his his retirement retirement he he put gut the the was also alsoa partner partnerinin a Washington residency residency in touch with his son, son, who was a well-known firm.38 NIK was aColombian who US-Colombian cultural law firm.38 Colombian who worked on US-Colombian exchange exchange programs.39 program^.^' RAMZES RAMZES was was an an American American professor professor with with contacts contacts in in Con Congress, REM was gress, academe, academe, the the press press and and Latin Latin America.40 Arneri~a.~ was an an Italian Italian employee employee of of the the ROMELLA was a Latin American diplomat in the UN Secre SecreUN Se~retariat.~ Secretariat.41 ROMELLA tariat, who made contact with the KGB to seek its help in renewing her contract at

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the the UN before before it it expired expired in in 1975; 1975; she she supplied supplied both both classified classified documents documents and and recruit recruitment SHEF was was a a professor professor at at McMaster McMasterUniversity, University, recruited recruited during during aavisit visit ment leads.42 leads.42SHEF to Lithuania in in 1974.43 American diplomat STOIC was was a a Latin Latin American diplomat in in the the UN Secre Secreto Lithuania 1974.43STOIC tariat.44 in New New York, Line PR agents agents had had high-level high-level tariat.44As As in York, none none of of the the Washington Washington Line access of the the federal federal government. government. access to to any any branch branch of Though Though the theNew New York York residency residencyhad had some some successes successes in in electronic electronic eavesdropping, eavesdropping, in scientific and net in active active measures measures and and in in scientific and technological technological intelligence, intelligence, its its Line Line PR network UN and a minor work mostly mostly consisted consisted of of agents agents at at the the and in inemigre emigre communities, communities, only only a minorwhom had TheThe largest ofwhom had US citizenship.45 ity of citi~enship.~ largest concentration concentration of of agents agents was was within within the the Soviet Soviet colony colony itself, itself, most most of of whom whom inhabited inhabited the the residential residential complex complex in in Riverdale. Riverdale. According 1975 the According to to KGB statistics, statistics, in in 1975 the colony colony numbered numbered 1,366 1,366 Soviet Soviet employees employees and 533 employees, cially classed as and dependents. dependents. Of O f the the 533 employees, seventy-six seventy-sixwere wereoffi officially classed as agents agents and Most, were chiefly concerned and sixteen sixteen as as "trusted trusted contacts."46 ~ o n t a c t s . Most, ~ ~ however, however,were chiefly concerned with with informing informing on on their theircolleagues colleagues to to Line LineSK (Soviet (Soviet Colony) Colony) in in the theresidency. residency. The The Cen Centre's tres assessment assessment in in 1974 1974stressed stressed the the limitations limitations of of Line Line PR's PRs New New York York agents: agents: Not Not one one of of these these agents agents has has access access to to secret secret American American information. information. The The basic basic thrust thrust of ofoperations operations with with this this network network therefore therefore consists consists of of using using it it for for the the col collection lection of of information information from from UN diplomatic diplomatic sources, sources, and and from from several several Ameri American can [non-agent] [non-agent] sources.47 sources.47 Lacking cers in Lacking any any high-level high-level agents agents in in the thefederal federal government, government, Line Line PR offi officers in New New York as diplomats York and and Washington, Washington, usually usually operating operating under under cover cover as diplomats or or journalists, journalists, devoted devoted much much of of their their time time to to collecting collecting insider insider gossip gossip from from well-placed well-placed non-agent non-agent sources As sources in in Congress Congress and and the the press press corps.48 corps.48 As head head of of Line Line PR in in Washington Washington from from 1965 1965 to to 1970, 1970, Kalugin Kalugin got got to toknow know the the columnists columnists Walter Walter Lippmann, Lippmann, Joseph Joseph Kraft Kraft ashington Post; and and Drew Drew Pearson; Pearson; Chalmers Chalmers Roberts Roberts and and Murray Murray Marder Marder of of the the W Washington Post; Joseph of the the Christian of the Joseph Harsch Harsch of Christian Science Science Monitor; Monitor; Carl Carl Rowan, Rowan, former former director director of the US US Information Information Agency; Agency; and and Henry Henry Brandon Brandon of of the the London London Times. Times. Kalugin's Kalugins role role when restaurants when he he called called at at their their offices offices or or lunched lunched with with them them in inWashington Washington restaurants was was not Instead, he not that that of of agent agent controller controller or or recruiter. recruiter. Instead, he"would would act act like like a a good good reporter," reporter, carefull y noting their assessments caremy noting their assessments of of the the current current political political situation: situation: "Rarely Rarely did did I come of come up up with with aascoop scoop for for the the Politburo, Politburo, but but the thereporting reporting of our our [PRJ [PR] section section enabled enabled Soviet sense of " During During the Soviet leaders leaders to to have have a a better better sense of American American political political realities realities .. .. .. the 1968 1968 presidential presidential election election campaign campaign some some of of Kalugin's Kalugins sources sources provided provided corrobora corroboration elected, Nixon Nixon tion for for Sedov's Sedovs reports, reports, based based on on conversations conversationswith with Kissinger, Kissinger, that, that, if if elected, would prove much less anti-Soviet than Moscow feared. One of Kalugin's would prove much less anti-Soviet than Moscow feared. One of Kalugins most most important important contacts contacts was was Senator Senator Robert Robert Kennedy Kennedy who, who, but but for for his his assassination assassination just just after 1968 after he he had had won won the the California California presidential presidential primary, primary, might might have have won won the the 1968 Democratic Democratic nomination. nomination. Before Before his his death death Kennedy Kennedy presented presented Kalugin Kalugin with with a atie-pin tie-pin showing which showing the the PT-109 PT-109 torpedo torpedoboat boat which his his brother brother had had captained captained during during the the war. war. Line PR officers in Washington also had regular meetings with such leading senators Line officers in Washingtonalso had regular meetings with such leading senators as eld, William as Mike Mike Mansfi Mansfield, William Fulbright, Fulbright, Mark Mark Hatfield, Hatfield, Charles Charles Percy, Percy, Eugene Eugene McCarthy, and Jacob boast to McCarthy, George George McGovern McGovern and Jacob Javits. Javits. The The Centre Centre liked liked to to boast to the the

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Politburo Politburo that that its its assessments assessments of of American American policy policy were werebased based on on access access to to the the Con Con49 gressional gressional elite. lite.^^ Most Most of of the the political political reporting reporting of of the the Washington Washington residency residency was was thus thus based based on on non-secret some of the Soviet diplomats non-secret sources-to sources-to the the considerable considerable annoyance annoyance of of some of the Soviet diplomats whose entertain whose far far smaller smaller foreign foreign currency currency allowances allowances gave gave them them less less freedom freedom to to entertain their their contacts contacts in in Washington Washingtonrestaurants. restaurants. Despite Despite his his insistence insistence on on keeping keeping the the back back channel channel to to himself, himself, Dobrynin Dobrynin took took aamore more benign benign view view of of the the residency's residencyswork, work, and and seemed what seemed genuinely genuinely interested interested in inwhat it it discovered discovered from from both both its its contacts contacts and and agents.50 "In too many Soviet embassies," Dobrynin complained, "normal personal agents. In too many Soviet embassies, Dobrynin complained, normal personal relations relations between between the the ambassador ambassador and and the the KGB KGB resident resident were were the the exception exception rather rather than than the therule." rule.Ambassador Ambassador and and resident resident frequently frequently became became locked locked in in bitter bitterrivalry rivalry as as each each sought sought "to toshow showwho who really really was wasthe the boss boss in in the theembassy" embassyand and to to demonstrate demonstrateto to Moscow the superiority of his own sources of information. 51 Moscow the superiority of his own sourcesof information. As 968 Solomatin well As resident resident in in Washington Washington from from 1965 1965 to to 11968 Solomatinhad hadgot goton on well with with Dobrynin. New York 1971, however, Dobrynin. When When he he became became resident resident in in New York in in 1971, however, he he quickly quickly began began to to feud feud with with Yakov Yakov Malik, Malik, the the Soviet Soviet representative representative at at the the United United Nations. Nations. Malik strongly objected to Solomatin's attempts to develop contacts whom he Malik strongly objected to Solomatins attempts to develop contacts whomhe wished wished to to cultivate cultivate himself-among himself-among them them David David Rockefeller, Rockefeller,brother brother of of Nelson Nelson and and chairman Manhattan Bank.52 Rockefeller's chairman of of Chase ChaseManhattan Bank.2 Malik Malik was was fascinated fascinated by byRockefellers 30,OOO-name 30,000-name card card file file of of his his contacts contacts around around the the world, world, cross-indexed cross-indexed by by country, country, city and business. On a visit to the chairman's sprawling seventeenth-floor offi ce at city and business. O n a visit to the chairmans sprawling seventeenth-floor office at the the the sixty-story sixty-story Chase Chase Manhattan Manhattan building, building, Malik Malik asked asked to to see see a a sample sample from from the file. the card Malik file. Rockefeller Rockefeller picked picked out outthe card for for Khrushchev.53 Khru~hchev.~ Malik also also vigorously vigorously opposed veteran opposed Solomatin's Solomatins contacts contacts with with the the veteran diplomat diplomat Averell Averell Harriman, Harriman, regarded regarded in Moscow as one of the most influential American advocates of better relations in Moscow as one of the most influential American advocates of better relations with oviet Union. 54. In with with the the S Soviet Uni~n ~ co-operation co-operation In with Dobrynin, Dobrynin, Harriman Harriman later laterreturned returned from from retirement retirement to to act act as as unofficial unofficial channel channel of of communication communication between between Brezhnev Brezhnev and during the transition period 55 and Jimmy JimmyCarter Carter during the transition period after after Carter's Carters 1976 1976 election election victory. victory Solomatin Malik's Solomatin complained complained to to the the Centre Centrethat that Maliks objections objections to to his his attempts attempts to to cul cultivate Harriman were tivate Rockefeller Rockefeller and and Harriman were ((characteristic" characteristic of of his his general general obstruction obstructionism.56 He there ism.56 H e failed, failed, however, however, to to tell tell the the Centre Centrethat that there was was not not the the slightest slightest prospect prospect of of recruiting recruiting either either Rockefeller Rockefeller or or Harriman. Harriman. In In an an attempt attempt to to improve improve the the quality quality of of agent agent recruitment recruitment in in the the United United States, States, the director of the Institute of Psychology in the Academy of Sciences, Boris the director of the Institute of Psychology in the Academy of Sciences, Boris Fyo Fyodorovich contact" of 975 toto advise dorovich Lomov, Lomov, a a ((trusted trusted contact of the the KGB, KGB, was was sent sent in in 11975 advise the the New New York York residency residency on on techniques techniques of of cultivation.57 cultivation. In In 1976 1976 the the Centre Centredevised devised an an elabo elaborate rate incentive incentive scheme scheme to to reward reward successful successhl recruiters, recruiters,with with inducements inducements ranging ranging from from medals appreciation to accelerated promotion, new apartments and medals and and letters letters of of appreciation to accelerated promotion, new apartments and cash bonuses in hard currency (which would make possible the purchase of Western cash bonuses in hard currency (which would make possible the purchase of Western consumer consumer goods goods that that could could be be shipped shipped back back to to Moscow Moscow at at the theend end of of the the officer's officerstour tour of of dUty).58 duty). As As chairman chairman of of the the KGB, KGB, Andropov Andropov seemed seemed unable unable to to grasp grasp the the difficulties difficulties of of penetrating the US administration. During the mid-1 970s he initiated a series of penetrating the US administration. During the mid-1970s he initiated a series of hopelessly hopelessly impracticable impracticable recruitment recruitment schemes. schemes. Following Following Nixon's Nixons resignation resignation in in

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August scandal, Andropov August 1974 1974 after after the the Watergate Watergatescandal, Andropov instructed instructed the the Washington Washington res residency members of idency to to establish establish contact contact with with five five members of the the former former administration: administration: Pat Pat Buchanan and William Safire, former advisers and speechwriters to Nixon; Richard Buchanan and William Safire, former advisers and speechwriters to Nixon; Richard Allen, Allen, Deputy Deputy National National Security Security Adviser Adviser during during the thefirst first year year of of Nixon's Nixons administra administration; tion; C. C. Fred Fred Bergsten, Bergsten, an an economist economist on on the the National National Security Security Council Council (NSC); (NSC); and and S. months after S. Everett Everett Gleason, Gleason, an an NSC veteran veteran who who died died three three months after Nixon's Nixons resigna resignation.59 All t i~n. ~ A l lwere were wildly wildly improbable improbable recruits. recruits. In In 1975 1975 Andropov Andropov personally personally approved approved a a series series of of equally equally improbable improbable operations operations designed designed to to penetrate penetrate the the "inner innercircles" circles of of a a series gures: among series of of well-known well-known public public fi figures: among them them George George Ball, Ball, Ramsey Ramsey Clark, Clark, Ken Kenneth Sorensen.60 Some neth Galbraith, Galbraith,Averell Averell Harriman, Harriman, Teddy Teddy Kennedy Kennedy and and Theodore Theodore Sorensen.60 Somewhat humiliatingly for the FCD, the KGB's most productive agent during the what humiliatingly for the FCD, the KGBs most productive agent during the 1976 1976 election camp election campaign campaign was was a a Democratic Democratic activist activist with with access access to to the theCarter Carter camp who who had had been been recruited recruited during during a a visit visit to to Russia Russia by by the the Second Second Chief Chief Directorate.61 Directorate.61 The The KGB's KGBs most most successful successful strategy strategy for for cultivating cultivating American American policy-makers policy-makers was wasto to use use the the prestigious prestigious academic academic cover cover of of the the Moscow Moscow Institute Institute of of the the United United States States and and Canada. Canada.The The secret secret 1968 1968 statute statute of of the the institute institute kept kept at at the the Centre Centreauthorized authorized the the KGB KGB to the Adversary pro to task task it it to to research research aspects aspectsof of the Main Main Adversary which which were were of of interest interest to to it, it,toto provide vide KGB KGB officers officers with with cover cover positions, positions, to to invite invite prominent prominent American American policy-makers policy-makers and to United and academics academicsto to Moscow Moscow and and to to undertake undertake intelligence-related intelligence-related missions missions to the the United States. States. Among Among the the KGB's KGBs cover cover positions positions at at the the institute institute was was that that of of deputy deputy director, director, occupied by Colonel Radimir Bogdanov (codenamed occupied by Colonel Radimir Bogdanov (codenamed VLADIMIROV), VLADIMIROV), sometimes sometimes described The described behind behind his his back back as as "the the scholar scholar in in epaulets."62 epaulets.62 The KGB's KGBs most most important important agent ASILI, who agent at at the the institute institute was was its its director, director, Georgi Georgi Arbatov, Arbatov, codenamed codenamed V VASILI, who built built up high-level contacts up a a large large circle circleof of high-level contacts in in the theUnited United States States and and was was regularly regularlyrequired required to According to cultivate cultivate them.63 them.63 According to to Kissinger: Kissinger: [Arbatov] especially subtle [Arbatov] was was especially subtle in in playing playing to to the the inexhaustible inexhaustible masochism masochism of of American American intellectuals intellectuals who who took took ititas as an an article article of of faith faith that that every every difficulty difficulty in in US-Soviet US-Soviet relations relations had had to tobe be caused causedby by American American stupidity stupidity or or intransigence. intransigence. He He was was endlessly endlessly ingenious ingenious in in demonstrating demonstrating how how American American rebuffs rebuffs were werefrus frustrating the Kremlin, trating the the peaceful, peaceful, sensitive sensitive leaders leaders in in the Kremlin, who who were were being being driven driven reluctantly conflicts that inherently gen reluctantly by by our our inflexibility inflexibilityinto into conflicts that offended offended their their inherently gentle tle natures.64 natures.64 Though Though Arbatov's Arbatovs access accessto to US policy-makers policy-makers raised raised KGB hopes hopes of of a a major major pen penetration of the federal government, Mitrokhin found no evidence in the files of etration of the federal government, Mitrokhin found no evidence in the files of any any significant resulted from significant recruitment recruitment which which resulted from it. it. In In the the Centre's Centres view, view, Arbatov's Arbatovs most most important important contact contact during during the the 1970s 1970s was was former former Under-Secretary Under-Secretary of of Defense Defense Cyrus Cyrus Vance, . During During a the spring spring of Vance, codenamed codenamed VIZIR ("Vizier") (Vizier). a visit visit to to Moscow Moscow in in the of 1973, 1973, Vance Vance unsurprisingly unsurprisingly agreed agreed with with Arbatov Arbatov on on the theneed need to to "increase increase the the level level of of mutual trust" in US-Soviet relations. Arbatov reported that he had told Vance mutual trust in US-Soviet relations. Arbatov reported that he had told Vancedoubtless no effect-that American press press corps doubtless to to no effect-that the the majority majority of of the the American corps in in Moscow Moscow were image of the behest were propagating propagating "a a negative negative propagandistic" propagandistic image of the the USSR USSRatat the behest of of the the Zionist In 1976 Zionist lobby lobby in in the the United UnitedStates. States. In 1976 Arbatov Arbatov was was sent sent on on another anothermission mission to to

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the the United United States. States. While While there there he he claimed claimed an an addition addition 200 200 dollars dollars for for "operational operational expenses" York expensesfrom from the the New New York residency residency for for entertaining entertaining Vance Vance and and others. others. From From such such inconsequential meetings the Centre briefly formed absurdly optimistic hopes inconsequential meetings the Centre briefly formed absurdly optimistic hopes of of penetrating the new penetrating the new American American administration administration after after Jimmy Jimmy Carter's Carters victory victory in in the the presidential his presidential election election of of November November 1976 1976 and and his appointment appointment of of Vance Vance as asSecretary Secretary of of State. Andropov personally State. On O n December December 19 19 Andropov personally approved approved operations operations against against Vance Vance which which were were probably probably intended intended to to make make him him at at least least a a "trusted trustedcontact" contact of of the the KGB. KGB. The le records The operations operations were, were, of of course, course, doomed doomed to to failure. failure. Vance's Vances fi file records that, that, once once he he entered him and entered the the Carter Carteradministration, administration, any any possibility possibility of of unofficial unofficial access access to to both both him and his the frustration Centre, Ambassador his family family dried dried Up.65 up.65 Doubtless Doubtless to tothe frustration of of the theCentre, Ambassador Dobrynin via Dobrynin continued continued to to have have a a private private entree entrke to to the the State StateDepartment Department via its its under underground during Kissinger's ground garage, garage,just just as as he he had haddone done during Kissingers term term as as Secretary secretary of of State, State, and and prided through Vance prided himself himself on on maintaining through Vance the the "confidential confidential channel" channel between between White briefly White House Houseand and Kremlin Kremlin which which the the Centre Centrehad had briefly deluded deluded itself itself into into believing believing it it could could take take over.66 over.66 The The Centre's Centres early early expectations expectations of of the the Carter Carter administration administration were were so so unrealistic unrealistic that it even devised schemes that it even devised schemes to to cultivate cultivate his his hardline hardline National National Security Security Adviser, Adviser, Zbigniew Zbigniew Brzezinski. Brzezinski. The The FCD FCD drew drew up up a a plan plan to to send send Arbatov's Arbatovs deputy, deputy, Bogdanov, Bogdanov, whom whom Brzezinski Brzezinski had had met met previously, previously, to to Washington Washington "to to strengthen strengthen their their relation relationship him some ship and and to to convey convey to to him some advantageous advantageous information." information. On O n January January 3, 3, 1977 1977 Andropov Andropov also also approved approved an an operation operation to to collect collect "compromising compromising information" information on on Brzezinski Brzezinski as as a a means means of of putting putting pressure pressure on on him. him. Unsurprisingly, Unsurprisingly, as as in in the the case case of of Vance, Vance, the the Centre's Centresearly early hopes hopes of of cultivating cultivating Brzezinski Brzezinski quickly quickly evaporated, evaporated, and and the the Centre to Centre concentrated concentrated instead instead on on devising devising "active active measures" measures to discredit discredit him.67 him.67 KGB 1977 declared KGB Decree Decree No. No. 0017 0017 of of May May 26, 26,1977 declared that that there there was was an an urgent urgent need need for for better better intelligence intelligence on on the the Carter Carteradministration. administration. The The Centre's Centres evaluations evaluations of of the the work New York in and 1978 make work of of the the Washington Washingtonand and New York residencies residencies in both both1977 1977 and 1978 make clear clear that PR's States that this this requirement requirement was was not not met. met.Line Line PRs agent agent network network in in the theUnited United States was was once once again again declared declared incapable incapable of of meeting meeting the the objectives objectives assigned assigned to to it. it. Not Not a a single single agent agent had had direct direct access access to to major major penetration penetration targets.68 targets.68 Lacking Lacking reliable, reliable, high-level high-level sources sources within within the the administration, administration, the the Centre, Centre, as as fre frequently Vladimir quently happened, happened, fell fell back back on on conspiracy conspiracytheories. theories. Early Early in in1977 1977 Vladimir Aleksan Aleksandrovich drovich Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, head head of of the the FCD FCD and and a a protege protCgC of of Andropov, Andropov, submitted submitted to to him him a Plans to to Recruit Recruit Agents Agents Among Among Soviet Soviet Citizens," Citizens, reveal reveala report reportentitled entitled "On On CIA Plans ing ing aa non-existent non-existent CIA CIA masterplan masterplan to to sabotage sabotage Soviet Soviet administration, administration, economic economic development c research: development and and scientifi scientific research:

intelligence is planning to recruit agents among Soviet Soviet .. .. ..Today American intelligence citizens, them and into administrative citizens, train trainthem and then then advance advance them theminto administrative positions positions within within Soviet Soviet politics, politics, the the economy economy and and science. science. The The CIA has has drafted drafted a a pro program to subject subject agents agents to individual individual instruction instruction in espionage espionage techniques techniques and gram also intensive intensive political and ideological ideologicalbrainwashing .. .. ..The CIA CIA intends that that also individual agents agents working in isolation isolation to carry out policies policies of sabotage sabotage and dis disindividual superiors instructions will be coordinated from a single single center tortion of superiors'

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within the US within the US intelligence intelligence system. system. The The CIA CIA believes believes that that such such deliberate deliberate action by agents will create internal political difficulties for the Soviet action agents will create internal political difficulties for the Soviet Union, Union, retard retard development development of of its its economy economy and and channel channel its its scientific scientificresearch research into into dead dead ends. ends. Andropov Andropov considered consideredthis this improbable improbable top top secret secret conspiracy conspiracytheory theory so so important important that that 1977 he members on on January January 24, 24,1977 he forwarded forwarded it it under under his his signature signature to to the theother other members of of the the Politburo Politburo and and Central Central Committee.69 C~mrnittee.~~ far far fewer fewer illusions illusions about about the the incoming incoming Reagan Reagan adminis administration about tration in in January January 1981 1981 than than it ithad haddone done about Carter Carter four four years years earlier. earlier. Any Any hope hope that the election that Reagan's Reagans anti-Soviet anti-Soviet speeches speeches during during the election had had been been mere mere campaign campaign after rhetoric rhetoric quickly quickly faded faded after after his his inauguration. inauguration. In In April April 1981, 1981, after a a trip tripto to the the United United States at the Centre's request, Arbatov sent a report on the new administration States at the Centres request, Arbatov sent a report on the new administration to to Andropov dinner in inthe the White House he had been Andropov and and Kryuchkov. Kryuchkov. At At a a dinner White House he had been able able to to observe and aa half observe Reagan Reagan for for one one and half hours hours from from a a distance distance of of only only fifteen fifteen meters. meters. Though Though Reagan Reagan seemed seemed to to be be acting acting the the role role of of president, president, he he played played the the part part with with genuine genuine emotion. emotion. Tears Tears came came to to his his eyes eyes when when the the flags flags of of the the four four armed armed services services were were brought brought into intothe theroom room and and when when he he stood stood up up and and placed placed his his hand hand on on his his heart heart as as the the national national anthem anthem was was played. played.Nancy Nancy Reagan's Reagans eyes eyes never never left left her her husband. husband. Her Her adoring adoring expression expression reminded reminded Arbatov Arbatov of of a a teenage teenage girl girl suddenly suddenly placed placed next next to to her her favorite favorite pop pop star. star.Though Though Reagan's Reagans speech speech to to the the assembled assembled journalists journalists was was "excep exceptionally tionally shallow," shallow,the the President President played played to to perfection perfection the the role role of of "father father of of the the nation," nation, a kept a great great leader leaderwho who had had kept his his humanity, humanity, a a sense sense of of humor humor and andthe the common common touch.70 Both Both the the Centre Centre and and the the Kremlin Kremlin took took a a less less benign benign view view of of Reagan. Reagan. In In a a secret secret a visibly ailing speech major speech to to aa major KGB KGB conference conference in in May May1981 1981 visibly a ailing Brezhnev Brezhnev denounced denounced Reagan's Reagans policies policies as as a a serious serious threat threat to to world world peace. peace. He He was was followed followed by by Andropov, Andropov, who who was was to to succeed succeed him him as as general general secretary secretary eighteen eighteen months months later. later.To To the the astonish astonishment ment of of most most of of the theaudience, audience,the the KGB KGB chairman chairman announced announced that, that, by by decision decision of of the the Politburo, Politburo, the the KGB KGB and and GRU GRU were were for for the the first first time time to tocollaborate collaborate in in a aglobal global intel intelligence newly devised acronym for ligence operation, operation, codenamed codenamed RYAN-a RYAN-a newly devised acronym for Raketno RaAetnoY adernoye Napadenie Yadernoye Napadenie ("Nuclear (Nuclear Missile Missile Attack"). Attack). RYAN's RYANSpurpose purpose was was to to collect collect intelligence intelligence on on the the presumed, presumed, but but non-existent, non-existent, plans plans of of the the Reagan Reagan administration administration to nion-a delusion to launch launch a a nuclear nuclear first first strike strike against against the the Soviet Soviet U Union-a delusion which which reflected reflected both the KGB's continuing failure to penetrate the policy-making of the Main both the KGBs continuing failure to penetrate the policy-making of the Main Adversary "Not Adversary and and its its recurrent recurrent tendency tendency towards towards conspiracy conspiracytheory.71 theory.71 Not since since the the end end of interna of the the Second SecondWorld World War," War,Andropov Andropov informed informed foreign foreign residencies, residencies,"has hasthe the international As tional situation situation been been as as explosive explosive as as it it is is now."72 now.72 As Brezhnev's Brezhnevs successor successorin in Novem November ber 1982, 1982, Andropov Andropov retained retained full full control control over over the the KGB; KGB; his his most most frequent frequent visitors visitors were senior KGB officers.73 Throughout his term as general secretary, were senior KGB 0ffice1-s.~~Throughouthis term as general secretary, RYAN RYAN remained remained the the FCD's F C D s first first priority. priority. For years Moscow whatits its ambassador Washington, For several several years Moscow succumbed succumbed to to what ambassador in in Washington, 74 Anatoli of Reagan's Reagans policy. policy. Anatoli Dobrynin, Dobrynin,fairly fairly described described as as a a "paranoid paranoid interpretation" interpretation of Most KGB Most residencies residencies in in Western Westerncapitals capitalswere were less lessalarmist alarmist than than Andropov Andropov and and the the KGB
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leadership. residency leadership.When When Oleg Oleg Antonovich Antonovich Gordievsky Gordievskyjoined joined the theLondon London residency in in June June 1982 he found all his colleagues in Line PR skeptical about operation RYAN. skeptical about operation RYAN. None, None, 1982 he found all his colleagues in Line however, however, were were willing willing to to risk risk their their careers careers by by challenging challenging the the Centre's Centres assessment. assessment. RYAN RYAN thus thus created created a a vicious vicious circle circle of of intelligence intelligence collection collection and and assessment. assessment. Resi Residencies dencies were, were, in in effect, effect, ordered ordered to to search search out out alarming alarming information. information. The The Centre Centre was was duly alarmed by what they supplied and demanded more.75 The Washington resi duly alarmed by what they supplied and demanded more.75The Washington resident, dent, Stanislav Stanislav Andreyevich Andreyevich Androsov, Androsov, a a protege protCgC of of Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov,was wasat at pains pains to to pro provide vide it.76 it.76 The The Centre Centre interpreted interpreted the the announcement announcement of of the the SDI SDI ("Star (Star Wars") Wars) program program in in 1983 as part of the psychological preparation of the American people for March March 1983 as part of the psychological preparation of the American people for nuclear 1983 the the terminally nuclear war. war. On O n September September 28, 28, 1983 terminally ill ill Andropov Andropov issued issued from from his his sickbed sickbed a a denunciation denunciation of of American American policy policy couched couched in in apocalyptic apocalypticlanguage language unparal unparalleled leled since since the the depths depths of of the the Cold Cold War. War. "Outrageous Outrageous military military psychosis" psychosis had had taken taken over the United States. "The Reagan administration, in its imperial ambitions, over the United States. The Reagan administration, in its imperial ambitions, goes goes so Washington has so far far that that one one begins begins to to doubt doubtwhether whether Washington has any any brakes brakes at at all all preventing preventing it point at it from from crossing crossing the the point at which which any any sober-minded sober-minded person person must must stop." stop. Alarm Alarm within the Centre Centre reached the NATO ''Able Archer within the reached a a climax climax during during the NATO exercise exercise Able Archer 83," 83, held in November 1983 to practice nuclear release procedures. For a time the KGB held in November 1983 to practice nuclear release procedures. For a time the KGB leadership leadership was was haunted haunted by by the the fear fear that that the the exercise exercise might might be be intended intended as as cover cover for for a a nuclear West were nuclear first first strike. strike. Some Some FCD FCD officers officers stationed stationed in in the the West were by by now now more more con concerned theCentre Centre than by threat of cerned by by the the alarmism alarmism in in the than by the the threat of a a Western Western surprise surprise attack. 77 attack.77 Operation 1984, helped Operation RYAN RYAN wound wound down down (though (though it it did did not not end) end) during during 1984, helped by by the the death death of of its its two two main main proponents, proponents, Andropov Andropov and and defense defense minister minister Ustinov, Ustinov, and and by both worried by reassuring reassuring signals signals from from London London and andWashington, Washington, both worried by by intelligence intelligence on on Soviet paranoia.78 The alarmist RYAN reports obediently provided by KGB residen Soviet paranoia.78 The alarmist RYAN reports obediently provided by KGB residencies cies were were merely merely an an extreme extreme example example of of Line Line PR's PRs habitual habitual tendency tendency to to tell tell Moscow Moscow what what it it wanted wanted to to hear. hear. One One political political intelligence intelligence officer officer later later admitted: admitted: In In order order to to please please our our superiors, superiors, we we sent sent in in falsified falsified and and biased biased information, information, acting acting on on the the principle principle "Blame Blame everything everything on on the the Americans, Americans, and and everything everything will will be be OK." OK.That's Thats not not intelligence, intelligence, it's its self-deception!79 ~elf-deception!~~ During During the the first first Reagan Reagan administration, administration, as as at at other other periods, periods, the the Centre Centre would would have have gained into American gained a a far far more more accurate accurate insight insight into American policy policy by by reading reading the the New York York Times Times or or Washington Washington Post Post than than by by relying relying on on the the reports reports of of its its own own residencies. residencies. One One of of the the most most striking striking signs signs of of Gorbachev's Gorbachevs"new new thinking" thinking on on foreign foreign policy policy after after he he became became general general secretary secretary in in 1985 1985was was his his early early dissatisfaction dissatisfactionwith with the the FCD's FCDs politi political cal reporting. reporting. In In December December 1985 1985 Viktor Viktor Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Chebrikov, Chebrikov, KGB KGB chairman chairman 1982, summoned a meeting of the KGB leadership to discuss a stern since since 1982, summoned a meeting of the KGB leadership to discuss a stern memo memorandum randum from from Gorbachev Gorbachev "on on the the impermissibility impermissibility of of distortions distortions of of the thefactual factual state state of of affairs affairs in in messages messages and and informational informational reports reports sent sent to to the the Central Central Committee Committeeof of the the CPSU CPSU and and other otherruling ruling bodies." bodies.The The meeting meeting sycophantically sycophanticallyagreed agreed on on the the need need to to

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avoid sycophantic sycophantic reporting and and declared the duty duty of all all Chekists both at at home homeand abroad to fulfill "the the Leninist Leninistrequirement that we need only the whole truth."80 truth.8o abroad Gorbachev Gorbachev was was far far more more impressed impressed initially initially by by the the performance performance of of FCD's FCDs Direc Directorate War thethe KGB had torate T. T.Throughout Throughout the theCold Cold War had greater greater success success in in collecting collecting scien scientifi c and tific and technological technological intelligence intelligence (S&T) (S&T) than than in inits its political political intelligence intelligence operations operations against insti against the the Main Main Adversary. Adversary. Infiltrating Infiltrating US defense defense contractors contractors and and research research institutes tutes proved proved far far easier easier than than penetrating penetrating the the heart of of the the federal federal government. government. S&T S&T also rarely suffered suffered from correctness which distorted the the reporting reporting of also rarely from the the political political correctness which distorted of Line the Centre. Centre. What Line PR in in residencies residencies and and political political intelligence intelligence assessments assessments at at the What remained remained at at least least partially partially taboo, taboo, however, however, was was the the difficulty difficulty experienced experienced by by Soviet Soviet state-run industry state-run industry in in making making full h l l use use of of the the extraordinary extraordinary S&T S&T which which it it received. received. In In 1971, 1971, for for example, example, the the defense defense and and electronics electronics industry industry ministries ministries began began a a joint jointproj project because of ect to to duplicate duplicate Westinghouse Westinghouse cathode-ray cathode-ray tubes. tubes. Two Two years years later, later, because ofproduc production tion problems problems at at the the State State Optical Optical Institute, Institute, little little progress progress had had been been made.81 made. It It was was ideologically learn the such as ideologicallyimpossible impossible to to learn the lessons lessons of offailures failures such as this, this, for for to to do doso so would would have have involved involveda a recognition recognition of of the the inferiority inferiority of of the the Soviet Soviet command command economy economy to to the the market market economies economies of of the the West. West. FCD reports reports thus thus concentrated concentrated on on the thestructural structural con contradictions tradictions of of Western Western capitalism capitalism while while glossing glossing over over the the far far more more serious serious economic economic problems problems of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc.82 Bloc.82 In In 1970 1970 the the New NewYork York and and Washington Washington residencies residencies each each ran ran nine nine Line Line X agents agents and In and five five "trusted trusted contacts."83 contacts.s3 In 1973 1973 the thenew new position position of of head head S&T S&T resident resident for for the the United York, United States States was was established established in in New New York, with with responsibility responsibility for for coordinating coordinating Line Line X operations to evade operations by by the the three three American American residencies, residencies, as as well well as as attempts attempts to evade the the embargo embargo on on the theexport export of of advanced advancedtechnology technology to to the theSoviet Soviet Union. Union. By By 1975 1975 Direc Directorate torate T had had seventy-seven seventy-seven agents agents and and forty-two forty-two trusted trusted contacts contacts working working against against American targets inside and outside the United States.84 American targets inside and outside the United States.83 Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes identify identify thirty-two thirty-two of of the the S&T S&T agents agents and and trusted trusted contacts contacts active decade. A active in in the the United UnitedStates States during during the the 1970s, 1970s, mostly mostly recruited recruited in in the the same same decade. further espionage is also probably further eight eight whose whose espionage is not not dated dated in in the thenotes notes were were also probably active active in in the the 1970s.85 1 9 7 0 ~The The . ~ ~companies companies for for which which they they worked worked included included some some of of the the leading leading 86 American IBM, McDonnell McDonnell Douglas American defense defense contractors: contractors: among among them themIBM, Douglas and and TRW. TRW.86 The The S&T S&T agent agent network network also also contained contained scientists scientists with with access access to to important important defense defenserelated related projects projects at at some some of of the the United United States' Statesbest-known best-known research research institutes: institutes: among among them the Massachusetts and the them MIKE at at the Massachusetts Institute Institute of of Technology,87 Te~hnology,~ and TROP in in the Argonne University In addition to to the civil Argonne National NationalLaboratory Laboratory at at the the University ofChicago.88 ofChicago.ss I n addition the civilian also KGB armed forces ian S&T S&T agent agent network, network, there there were were also KGB agents agents in in the the armed forces who who pro provided the latest them JOE, JOE, an vided intelligence intelligence on on the latest military military technology: technology: among among them an army army electronics electronics engineer engineer who who provided provided "valuable valuable information" information on on military military communica communications 977 was tions systems,89 system^,'^ and and NERPA, NERPA, who who in in 11977 was engaged engaged in in weapons weapons research research at at the the US army's armys Material Material Development Development and and Readiness Readiness Command Command (DARCOM).90 (DARCOM).90 Though Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins information information on on the the extent extent and and targets targets of of the the S&T S&T network network on the territory territory of Main Adversary far more previously on the of the the Main Adversary is is far more extensive extensive than than any any previously available There is, for example, no available account, account, it it is is not not comprehensive.91 comprehen~ive.~ There is, for example, no mention mention in in

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Mitrokhin's Daulton Lee, who Mitrokhins notes notes of of the the Californian Californian drug drug dealer dealer Andrew Andrew Daulton Lee, who in in 1975-6 1975-6 provided the KGB residency in Mexico City with with the the operating manual for the systems. Lees Lee's the Rhyolite Rhyolite surveillance surveillance satellite satellite and and technical data data on on other othersatellite satellite systems. source Christopher Boyce, source was was his his friend friend Christopher Boyce, an an employee employee of of Rhyolite's Rhyolites manufacturer, manufacturer, TRW Corporations secrets passed Corporations in in Redondo Redondo Beach. Beach. Among the the TRW secrets passed on on to to the the KGB was detailed information on how American spy satellites satellites monitored Soviet missile missile tests. tests. In In 1977 1977 Lee Lee and and Boyce Royce were were arrested, arrested, tried tried and and sentenced sentenced to, to, respec respectively, tively, life life and and forty forty years' years imprisonment. imprisonment. Both Both achieved achieved celebrity celebrity status status as as the the sub subjects bestselling jects of of the the bestselling book book and and film film The Falcon and the Snowman.92 Snowman.92One One of of the the KGB files noted reveals that only Boyce the files noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin reveals only a a year after after the the arrest arrest of of Lee Lee and Boyce KGB recruited recruited another, another, possibly possibly even even more important, important, spy spy in in TRW with with the the code codename ZENIT. While WhileBoyce had been only a clerk (though with with access access to classified classified documents), documents), ZENIT ZENIT was was a a scientist.93 scientist.93 of its achievements, achievements, particularly against the Main Main AdverDirectorate T was proud of Adver sary, anxious to sary, and anxious to bring them them to to the the attention attention of of the the Soviet Soviet leadership. Brezhnev Brezhnev was was informed informed in in 1972 1972 that that S&T S&T had had produced a a saving saving during during the the past year year of of over over a hundred million convertible roubles.94 Among the Brezh roubles.94 the successes successes singled out for Brezhnev's nevs attention was intelligence on the construction of of the American space shuttle and he was and preparations for for unmanned unmanned flights flights to to Mars. This, he was told, told, would solve solve a a S&T number of of current problems in the development of of Soviet space technology. S&T intelligence (doubtless unrealisunrealis intelligence on on the thepelletization pelletization of of seeds, seeds, he he was was further fbrther assured (doubtless tically), would increase increase the Soviet grain harvest by 20 to 30 tically), 30 per cent and shorten growing time.95 time.95 In 1973 acquired 1973 Directorate Directorate T reported reported that that it ithad had acquired over over 26,000 26,000 doc documents and 3,700 "samples." samples.Though only a minority of ofthis material was classified, classified, it space missions, it included included top top secret secret information information on on the the Saturn Saturn rocket, rocket, the the Apollo Apollo space missions, the the Poseidon, Poseidon, Honest Honest John, John, Redeye, Redeye, Roland, Roland, Hydra Hydra and and Viper Viper missiles, missiles, the the Boeing 747 jetjet and plagiarized in 747jumbo jumbo and computer computer technology technology subsequently subsequently plagiarized in the theconstruction construction of of the the Minsk-32 Minsk-32 computer.96 computer.96 of S&T collection figured prominently in the theChekist Chekist The triumphs of Hall of of Fame Yasenevo in 1977 opened by the FCD at Yasenevo 1977 to to mark the sixtieth anniversary anniversary of the the October Revolution. Directorate T's the previous fivefive Ts exhibit claimed that during the 140,000 S&T S&T documents and more than 20,000 year period it had had obtained over 140,000 samples.These were alleged to have produced an economic benefit of bil"samples." of over one bil advancedresearch research lion roubles for the Soviet economy and to have advanced work in a number of periods of from two of branches branches of of science science and and technology technology by by periods of from two to to six six years.97 years.97 Leonid Zaitsev, the Leonid Sergeyevich Sergeyevich Zaitsev, the dynamic dynamic and and ambitious ambitious head head of of Directorate Directorate T argued appointed in in1975, 1975, argued that that it itshould should be be allowed allowedto leave the the FCD and and become an theKGB. It would, he claimed, ofonly independent directorate within the claimed, need a budget of 1 percent per it supplied supplied to to Soviet Soviet industry industry and 1percent per annum annum of of the the value value of of the the S&T which which it and agri~ulture.~~ of the FCD, Kryuchkov, however, was agriculture.98 The The head of FCD, Kryuchkov, was determined not not to allow of his to escape escape from his control. control. allow such such a a prestigious prestigious part part of his intelligence intelligence empire empire to from his indepen Despite failing to win its freedom, Directorate T increasingly increasingly operated independently of the dently from from the the rest rest of the FCD. FCD. Its Its new new recruits recruits mostly mostly came came from from scientific scientific or or engi engitheAndropov Andropov Institute (the neering backgrounds, had their own curriculum in the Institute (the FCD

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academy) other departments. departments. In academy) and and trained trained separately separately from from those those in in other In foreign foreign resi residencies little X officers officers mixed mixedrelatively relatively little with with their their colleagues colleagues in in other otherlines.99 lines,99 dencies Line Line X The The Military-Industrial Military-Industrial Commission Commission (VPK), (VPK), which which was was mainly mainly responsible responsible for for overseeing overseeingDirectorate DirectorateT, T,showed showed greater greater interest interest in in non-American non-American targets targets than than dur dur100 The ing ing the theearly early Cold Cold War. War.lo0 The United United States States none none the the less less remained remained a a more more impor important 1 .5 percent S&T target target than than the the rest rest of of the the world world combined. combined. In In 1980 1980 6 61.5 percent of of the the tant S&T VPK's VPKs information information came came from from American American sources sources (some (some outside outside the the USA), USA), 10.5 10.5 per percent 7.5percent percent from from Britain Britain and and 3 3 per percent from from West West Germany, Germany, 8 8 percent percent from from France, France, 7.5 cent from Japan.101 In 1980 the VPK gave instructions for 3,617 "acquisition tasks," cent from Japan. In 1980 the gave instructions for 3,617 acquisition tasks, of ting 3,396 of which which 1,085 1,085 were were completed completed within within a a year, year, benefi benefiting 3,396 Soviet Soviet research research and and development Directorate development projects.102 projects.lo2 Directorate T T was was its its chief chief collection collection agency. agency. Directorate of its success meeting so Directorate T T owed owed much much of its success in in meeting so many many of of the the VPK's VPKs requirements to its numerous collaborators in the Soviet scientific community, requirements to its numerous collaborators in the Soviet scientific community, who who numbered numbered approximately approximately 90 90 agent-recruiters, agent-recruiters, 900 900 agents agents and and 350 350 trusted trusted contacts contacts during the mid1 970s. 1 03 Among these collaborators-probably during the mid-1970~.~ Among these collaborators-probably the the largest largest net network in the the history history of -were some work of of talent-spotters talent-spotters in of S&T S&T-were some of of the the Soviet Soviet Union's Unions leading theUnited United States-in leading scientists. scientists. All All Western Western scientists-particularly scientists-particularly in in the States-in fields fields related related to to Directorate Directorate T's Ts "acquisition acquisition tasks" tasks were were potential potential targets targets for for the the KGB. a targeted targeted scientist a Soviet KGB. The The first first approach approach to to a scientist usually usually came came from from a Soviet col colleague at a a personal league in in a a similar similar field, field, who who would would try try to to establish establish cooperation cooperation at personal or or institutional institutional level. level. Directorate Directorate T T would would then then seek seek to to recruit recruit the the more more naive naive or or cor corrupt trustedconcon rupt of of the the Western Western scientists scientists approached approached in in this this way way as as agents agents or or trusted tacts.104 Among thethe Directorate's tact~.~ Among Directorates agent-recruiters agent-recruiters was was the the director director of of the the Physics Physics and Institute of S), and Energy Energy Institute of the the Latvian Latvian Academy Academy of of Sciences Sciences (codenamed (codenamed VITO VITOS), T. 105 SATURN, who 1 973 recruited depart who in in 1973 recruited MIKE, MIKE, a a senior senior physicist physicist at at MI MIT. SATURN, a a department 1978 with ment head head at at McDonnell McDonnell Douglas, Douglas, was was recruited recruited in in 1978 with similar similar assistance assistance from Academy of from the theLithuanian Lithuanian Academy of Sciences.106 Sciences.lo6 The selection The KGB KGB also also took took an an active active part part in inthe the selection of of Soviet Soviet students students for for academic academic exchange theUnited United States exchange programs programs with with the States and and trained trained many many of of them them as as talent talentspotters. Students were told to seek places at universities and research institutes spotters. Students were told to seek places at universities and research institutes within within easy easy reach reach of of the the residencies residencies at at New NewYork York (Brooklyn (Brooklyn Polytechnic, Polytechnic, MIT, MIT, Rens Rensselaer universities New York selaer Polytechnic Polytechnic and and the the universitiesof of Columbia, Columbia, Cornell, Cornell, Harvard, Harvard, New York and and Princeton), (American, Princeton),Washington Washington (American, Catholic, Catholic, Georgetown, Georgetown, George George Washington Washington and and Maryland Universities) and San Francisco (the University of California at Berkeley Maryland Universities) and San Francisco (the University of California at Berkeley and and San San Francisco, Francisco, California California Institute Institute of of Technology, Technology, University University of of Southern Southern Cali California fornia and and Stanford).lo7 Stanford). Directorate greatly assisted by DirectorateT's Ts success successin in penetrating penetrating American American targets targets was was greatly assisted by poor poor security its target companies and research institutes. Appearing in 1985 security in in some some of of its target companies and research institutes. Appearing in 1985 before before a a Senate Senate committee committee investigating investigatingsecurity security among among defense defense contractors, contractors, Christo Christopher pher Boyce Boyce testified testified that that he he and and colleagues colleagues at atTRW TRW"regularly regularlypartied partied and and boozed boozed it it up up during project. housing housing the the Rhyolite Rhyolite satellite satellite project. during working working hours hours with with the the 'black black vault' vault" Bacardi Bacardi rum, rum, he he claimed, claimed, was was kept kept behind behind the the cipher cipher machines machines and and a a cipher cipherdestruction destruction device device used used as asa a blender blender to to mix mix banana banana daiquiris daiquiris and and Mai-Tais.108 Mai-Tais.* Security Security failures failures in in most most other other companies companies probably probablytook took less less exotic exotic and and alcoholic alcoholic forms. forms.

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Since Since most most major major American American companies companies operated operated abroad, abroad, they they were were vulnerable vulnerable to to penetration outside outside as inside the penetration as well well as as inside the United United States. States. In In the the mid-1970s mid-1970s seventeen seventeen major companies and major US companies and research research institutes institutes were were targeted targeted by by KGB residencies in western by the the London, London,Paris, Paris, Geneva, Geneva, Vienna Vienna and and Bonn Bonn western Europe: Europe: among among them themIBM by residencies; residencies; Texas Texas Instruments Instruments by Paris; Paris; Monsanto Monsanto by London London and and Brussels; Brussels; West Westinghouse the inghouse Electric Electric by by Brussels; Brussels; Honeywell Honeywell by Rome; Rome; ITT by by Stockholm; Stockholm; and and the National National Institutes Institutes of of Health Health by by Copenhagen.109 Copenhagen."' European European residencies residencies were wereassisted assisted by by a a number number of of walk-ins. walk-ins. In In 1974, 1974, for for example, example, a a Canadian Canadian resident resident of of Los Los Angeles Angeles (later SPRINTER) entered entered the embassy in (later given given the the codename codename SPRINTER) the Soviet Soviet embassy in Helsinki, Helsinki, announced he worked announced that that he worked for for an an electro-optical electro-optical company company which which was was developing developing laser anti-missile firearms, tanks, ships and laser anti-missile systems systems and and infra-red infra-red sights sights for for firearms, tanks, ships and aircraft, aircraft, and offered its secrets.110 Like SPRINTER, of the the KGB's S&T and offered to to sell sell its secrets.'" Like SPRINTER, most most of S&T network network in appear to mercenary spies. in the the United UnitedStates States appear to have have been been mercenary spies. SIGINT added substantially to the S&T provided added substantially to the S&T provided by agents. agents. The The SIGINT SIGINT sta stations New York tions within within the the Washington, Washington, New York and and San San Francisco Francisco residencies residencies (whose (whose oper operations discussed in ations are are discussed in chapter chapter 21) 21) succeeded succeeded in in intercepting intercepting the the telephone telephone and and fax communications a series of communications of of the the Brookhaven Brookhaven National National Laboratory Laboratoryand and series a of major major com companies. Mitrokhin's panies. Mitrokhin's notes, notes, however, however, do do not not make make it it possible possible to to assess assess the the proportion proportion of of S&T S&T provided provided by by SIGINT rather rather than than HUMINT. HUMINT. Since War S&T had been regarded as Since before before the the Second Second World World War S&T had been regarded as an an essential essential means of weapons systems means of preventing preventing Soviet Soviet military military technology technology and and weapons systems from from falling falling behind noted by Mitrokhin, over pro behind the the West's. West's. According According to to one one report report noted by Mitrokhin, over half the the pro111 jects of industry in jects of the the Soviet Soviet defense defense industry in 1979 1979 were were based based on on S&T from from the the West. West."' Andropov 1981 that Andropov claimed claimed in in 1981 that all the the tasks tasks in in military military S&T S&T set set for for the the KGB had had been based largely report, based largely on on been successfully successfully completed.1l2 completed.'12 According According to to an an official official US report, documents the early documents supplied supplied during during the early 1980s 1980s by Vladimir Vladimir Vetrov Vetrov (codenamed (codenamed FAREWELL), FAREWELL), a a French French agent agent in in FCD Directorate Directorate T: T: The by using onthe the US F-1 8 fighter fighter The Soviets Soviets estimate estimate that that by using documentation documentation on F-18 their some five their aviation aviation and and radar radar industries industries saved saved some five years years of of development development time and 35 million 1980 dollar cost of research activity and 35 million roubles roubles (the (the 1980 dollar cost of equivalent equivalent research activity would other developmental would be be $55 $55 million) million) in project project manpower manpower and other developmental costs. costs. The of these The manpower manpower portion portion of these savings savings probably probably represents represents over over a a thousand thousand man-years man-years of of scientific scientific research research effort effort and and one one of of the the most most successful successful individ individual ual exploitations exploitations ever ever of of Western Westerntechnology. technology. documentation of the F F-18 radarserved served The documentation -18 fire-control radar as the technical basis lookdodshootdown engagement engagement radars for for new new lookdownlshootdown for the latest generation of Soviet Soviet fighters. fighters.US methods methods of of component component design, design, fast-Fourier-transform fast-Fourier-transform algo algofunctions, and real-time resolution-enhancement resolution-enhancement tech techrithms, terrain mapping functions, werecited cited key elements elements incorporated incorporated into the theSoviet Soviet counterpart.1l3 counterpart.'l3 niques were as key

of a successful military projects made possible by S&T were the construction of Other successful of the Soviet clone of the the AWACS airborne radar system and the construction of the American B B1-B.'I4 Blackjack Bomber modeled on the 1-By4

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From emphasis was also put on the contribu From the the late late 1970s 1970s onwards onwards increasing increasing emphasis was also put on the contribuofS&T to the the Soviet Soviet economy. economy. Directorate T calculated calculated that the the main branches tion of of In January counterpart^.^^^ In January of civilian civilian industry industry were were ten ten years years behind behind their their Western Western counterparts.l1S 1980 Andropov instructed Directorate T to draw up S&T S&T collection 1980 collection plans designed to agriculture, metallurgy, metallurgy, power-generation, to resolve resolve current current problems problems in in Soviet Soviet agriculture, power-generation, engi engineering technologyY6 Of 5,456 "samples" compo neering and and advanced advanced technology,16 Of the the 5,456 samples (machinery, (machinery, components, 44 percent nents, microcircuits, microcircuits, etc.) acquired acquired by by Directorate Directorate T during during 1980, 1980,44 percent went went to to Scidefense industries, 28 percent to civilian industry via the State Committee for Sci ence and other other government government ence and and Technology Technology (GKNT) (GKNT) and and 28 28 percent percent to to the the KGB and agencies. agencies. In In the the same, same, possibly possibly exceptional exceptional year, year, just just over over half half the the intelligence intelligence obtained obtained by by Directorate Directorate T came came from from allied allied intelligence intelligence services, services, chief chief among among them them the StB.l17 the East East German German HVA and and the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak StB.17 theHV HVAs successes was was of IBM. According Among the A's greatest S&T successes its penetration of to to the the head head of of the the HVA, HVA, Markus Markus Wolf, Wolf, the the East East German German microelectronics microelectronics company Robotron "became so Robotron became so heavily heavily dependent dependent on on surreptitiously surreptitiously acquiring acquiring IBM's IBMs techno technological of that logical advances advances that that it itwas, was, in in effect, a sort sort of of illegal illegal subsidiary subsidiary of that company."l18 company.118 Though was Though well well behind behind the West, West,Robotron Robotron was rather rather better better than thanits Soviet equivalents equivalents in in exploiting exploiting IBM computer technology. technology. The The KGB's KGBs name-trace name-trace system system SOUD SOUD ("System (System for Operational and Institutional Data") Data)used East German German computers.l19 computers.llg S&T the 1980s. 1980s. At S&T collection collection continued continued to to expand expand during during the At a a meeting of of senior senior FCD staff two years the staff early early in 1984 1984Kryuchkov Kryuchkov reported reported that, that, "In In the the last last two the quantity quantity of material and handed over industry has has increased increased by of material and samples samples handed over to to civilian civilian branches branches of of industry by half par half as as much much again." again. This, he he claimed, claimed, had had been used "to to real real economic effect," effect, particularly ticularly in in energy energy and and food food production. production. Kryuchkov Kryuchkov characteristically characteristically failed failed to to men menthat the the sclerotic sclerotic nature of tion that of Soviet economic management made it far harder to exploit economy than armaments. exploit S&T S&T in in the the civilian civilian economy than in in the the imitation imitation of of Western Western armaments. His His obsession obsession with with operation operation RYAN RYAN also left left him him dissatisfied dissatisfied with with Directorate T's Ts intelligence of Reagans Reagan's non-existent plans intelligence on on the theweapons weapons systems systems at the theheart heart of plans for for a nuclear first strike. previously," Kryuchkov complained, we "we are experiencing an an nuclear first strike. "As As previously, Kryuchkov complained, are experiencing acute of acute shortage of of secret secret information information about about new new types types of of weapon weapon and their their means means of delivery. The FCD work plan for 1984 laid down as Directorate Ts main intellidelivery." "work plan" T's intelli gence gence priorities: priorities: military build up first military technology technology measures measures taken taken by by the the Main Main Adversary Adversary to to build up firststrike weapons: the quantitative increase in nuclear munitions and means of strike weapons: the quantitative increase in nuclear munitions and means of delivery missiles, strategic delivery (MX (MX missile missile complexes, complexes,Trident, Trident, Pershing-2, Pershing-2, cruise cruise missiles, strategic bombers); replacement of generation of bombers); replacement of one one generation of nuclear nuclear missiles missiles by byanother another (Min (Minuteman, the development of weapons uteman, Trident-2), Trident-2), the development of of qualitatively qualitatively new new types types of weapons (space devices for and pencil beam (space devices for multiple multiple use use for for military military purposes, purposes, laser laser and pencil beam weapons, non-acoustic anti-submarine defense weapons, electronic warfare weapons, non-acoustic anti-submarine defense weapons, electronic warfare weapons, weapons, etc.). etc.). The The second second priority priority was was "information information and and specimens specimens of of significant significant interest interest for for civil civilian branches ian branches of of the the USSR's USSRs economy."120

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Like that Soviet Like other other Soviet Soviet leaders, leaders, Gorbachev Gorbachev doubtless doubtless took took it it for for granted granted that Soviet military technology required S&T from the West. He was probably more interested, military technology required S&T from the West.H e was probably more interested, however, the use economy. In however, in in the use of of S&T S&T to to invigorate invigorate the the civilian civilian economy. In an an address address to to embassy on December 984, three embassy staff staff in in London London on December 15, 15, 1 1984, three months months before before he he became became general general secretary, secretary,he he singled singled out out for for praise praise the the achievements achievements of of Directorate Directorate T T and and its its Line 121 It clear that regarded X officers officersin in foreign foreign residencies. residencies.12 Itwas was already already clear that Gorbachev Gorbachev regarded Line X the the covert covert acquisition acquisition of of Western Western technology technology and and scientific scientific research research as as an an important important part economic part of of economicperestroika. perestroika. The the later 980s The dramatic dramatic improvement improvement in in East-West East-West relations relations during duringthe later 1 1980s offered offered new new opportunities opportunities for for Directorate DirectorateT, T,which which produced produced 25-40,000 25-40,000 S&T S&T"infor information mation reports" reports and and 12-13,000 12-13,000 "samples" samplesa a year. year. In In 1986 1986 it it estimated estimated their their value value at at 122 550 1989 it the billion 550million million roubles; roubles;in in 1988 1988and and 1989 it put put the figure figure at at one one billion roubles roubles a a year. year.122 In by Western In the the later later 1980s 1980s about about 150 150 Soviet Soviet weapons weapons systems systems were were believed believed by Western experts experts to to be be based based on on technology technology system system stolen stolen from from the the West.123 West.123
AS ELL A S being AS W WELL AS being impressed impressed by by the the achievements achievements of of Directorate Directorate T, T, Gorbachev Gorbachev also also seems seems to to have have revised revised his his initially initially critical critical opinion opinion of of the the political political intelligence intelligence pro provided vided by by the the FCD. FCD. During During the the early early 1980s 1980s Kryuchkov Kryuchkov had had repeatedly repeatedly berated berated his his subordinates subordinates for for their their lack lack of of success success in in recruiting recruiting important important American American agents, agents, and and demanded denounced demanded "a aradical radical improvement." improvement.As As late late as as February February 1985 1985 he he denounced "the thelow low standard" Main Adversary standard of of operations operations against against the the Main Adversary and and "the the lack lack of of appreciable appreciable results" resultsby by KGB KGB residencies residenciesin in recruiting recruiting US US citizens.124 ~iti2ens.l~~ A A walk-in walk-in to to the the Washington Washington embassy embassy two two months months later later came came as as the the answer answer to to Kryuchkov's prayers. By the time Aldrich Ames offered his services to the KGB in Kryuchkovs prayers. By the time Aldrich Ames offered his services to the KGB in April 985 he had been April 11985 he had been working working for for the the CIA CIAfor for eighteen eighteen years. years.Within Within two two months months he had betrayed them Dmitri Dmitri he had betrayed twenty twenty Western Western (mostly (mostly American) American) agents: agents: among among them Polyakov, had worked Polyakov, a a GRU GRU general general who who had worked for for the the FBI FBI and and CIA CIA for for over over twenty twenty years; Oleg Gordievsky, a British agent in the KGB who had just been appointed years; Oleg Gordievsky, a British agent in theKGB who had just been appointed res resident in London; London; Adolf an electronics had provided ident in Adolf Tolkachev, Tolkachev, an electronics expert expert who who had provided high highgrade grade intelligence intelligence on on the the Soviet Soviet avionics avionics system; system; and and at at least least eleven eleven other other KGB KGB and and GRU GRU officers officers stationed stationed in in various various parts parts of of the the world. world. A A majority majority were were shot, shot, though though Gordievsky Gordievsky made made an an epic epic escape escape from from Russia, Russia, with with SIS SIS assistance, assistance,while while under under KGB KGB surveillance. surveillance.Collectively, Collectively,they they had had represented represented probably probably the the most most successful successfulWestern Western agent of the the Soviet SovietUnion Union since since the the Bolshevik Bolshevik Revolution. Revolution. Ames's Amess main main agent penetration penetration of motive motive for for betraying betraying them them was was probably probably greed. greed. By By the the time time of of his his arrest arrest nine nine years years later, later, the the KGB KGB and and its its successor successor agency agency had had paid paid him him almost almost three three million million dollars dollars (probably more than any other agent in Russian history) and had promised (probably more than any other agent in Russian history) and had promised him him another another twO.125 As As Gorbachev Gorbachev embarked embarked on on a a new new course course in in policy policy towards towards the the United United States, States, he he was was doubtless doubtless impressed impressed by by the the fact fact that that the theKGB KGB had, had, for for the the first first time, the CIA. CIA. The The FCD FCD also also appears appears to to have have time, recruited recruited a a major major agent agent within withinthe responded on the the Main responded to to Gorbachev's Gorbachevs demand demand for for less less crudely crudely biased biased reporting reporting on Main Adversary Adversary and and its its allies. allies.According According to to Leonid LeonidVladimirovich VladimirovichShebarshin, Shebarshin, then then one oneof of Kryuchkov's FCD no no longer longer had had to topresent present its its reports reports in in aafalsely falselyposposKryuchkovsdeputies, deputies, "the the FCD

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itive though found itivelight,"126 light,126 though many many of of its its officers officers must must surely surelyhave have found ititdifficult difficult to to throw throw off off the the habits habits of of a a lifetime. lifetime. In In December December 1987 1987Gorbachev Gorbachev took took Kryuchkov Kryuchkov with with him him on on his his historic historic visit visit to to Washington to sign with President Reagan the first arms control treaty to reduce the Washington to sign with President Reagan the first arms control treaty to reduce the nuclear nuclear arsenals arsenals of of the thesuperpowers. superpowers.Never Never before before had had aahead head of of the the FCD FCD accompa accompanied nied a a Soviet Sovietleader leader on on a a visit visit to to the theWest. West. Gorbachev's Gorbachevs confidence confidence in in Kryuchkov Kryuchkovwhich reflected his which he he would would later later bitterly bitterly regret-doubtless regret-doubtless reflected his high high opinion opinion of of the the FCD's an FCDs success successboth both in ingathering gathering an unprecedented unprecedented volume volume of of S&T S&Tand and in inpenetrat penetrating ing the the CIA. CIA. During During the thevisit visit to to Washington Washington Kryuchkov Kryuchkovhad had dinner dinner at atthe theMaison Maison Blanche of Blanche restaurant, restaurant, unnoticed unnoticed by by other other diners, diners, with with the theDeputy DeputyDirector Director of Central Central Intelligence, . Gates Intelligence, Robert Robert Gates Gates(later (later DCI) DCI). Gates wrote wrote later: later: Looking first Looking back, back, it it is is embarrassing embarrassing to to realize realize that, that, at atthis this first high-level high-level CIA CIAKGB Ames-at KGB meeting, meeting, Kryuchkov Kryuchkovsmugly smuglyknew knew that that he he had had aaspy-Aldrich spy-Aldrich Ames-at the the heart heart of ofCIA, CIA, that that he heknew knew quite quite well well what what we we were weretelling telling the the President President and the Soviet he was aware of of many and others others about about the Soviet Union, Union, and and that that he was aware many of of our our human and technical collection efforts in the USSR.127 human and technical collection efforts in theUSSR.127 In In October October 1988 1988 Kryuchkov Kryuchkovachieved achieved his his ambition ambition of of becoming becoming the the first first foreign foreign intelligence intelligence chief chief to to become become chairman chairman of of the the KGB. KGB. His His valedictory valedictory address address on on leav leaving the FeD was a remarkable mixture of the old and new thinking. "Democratiza ing the FCD was a remarkable mixture of the old and new thinking. Democratization perestroika, " he tion and and glasnost glasnost are are the the motive motive force force of ofperestroiha, he declared, declared, "and and we we shall shall not not win win through through without withoutthem:" them: Unless of of the the world, world, seeing seeing it it unadorned unadorned and and free free of of Unlesswe we have havean an objective objectiveview view cliches clichCs and and stereotyped stereotyped ideas, ideas, all all claims claims about about the the effectiveness effectiveness of of our our foreign foreign policy words. policy operations operations will will be be nothing nothing but butempty empty words. The The old old suspicions suspicions and and conspiracy conspiracy theories theories about about the the United United States, States, however, however, still still lurked lurked not not far far below below the the surface surface of of Kryuchkov's Kryuchkovs address. address.Without Without mentioning mentioning oper operation was ation RYAN RYAN by by name, name, he he sought sought to to justify justify the the principles principles on on which whichit it was based: based: Many FCD's] Many of of[the [the FCDs] former former responsibilities responsibilitieshave have not not been been removed removed from from the the agenda. The principal one of these is not to overlook the immediate danger agenda. The principal one of these is not to overlook the immediate danger of of nuclear nuclear conflict conflict being being unleashed. unleashed. And he added warning about he alleged was the continuing brutality And he added a a warning about what what he alleged was the continuing brutality of of "provocation operations" by Western intelligence services; he claimed that there had provocation operations by Western intelligence services; he claimed that there had the first been been over over 900 900 such such operations operations during during the first half half of of 1988 1988 alone.128 alone.12*Kryuchkov Kryuchkov began rela began 1989 1989with with a a dramatic dramatic demonstration demonstration of of the the new new climate climate of of East-West East-West relations, United States KGB history history to to receive receive the the United States tions, becoming becoming the the first first chairman chairman in in KGB ambassador ambassador in in his his office. office.Thereafter Thereafter he he embarked embarked on on an an unprecedented unprecedented public public rela relations campaign designed to win over Western as well as Soviet opinion. "The KGB," tions campaign designed to win over Western as well as Soviet opinion. The KGB,

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he he declared, declared, "should should have have an an image image not not only only in in our our country country but but worldwide worldwide which which is is 29 consistent consistent with with the the noble noble goals goals I believe believe we weare arepursuing pursuing in in our ourwork."1 work.129 After aabrief brief power struggle, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov was succeeded succeeded as head of of the theFCD by the 53-year-old 53-year-old Leonid Leonid Shebarshin, Shebarshin, the the first first man man with with experience experience of of working working in in coun counsince the Second World tries outside the Soviet Bloc to run run foreign intelligence since 0 One of War.13 Shebarshin's main jobs at War.13@ of Shebarshins at the beginning of of the the Gorbachev era era had intelligence reports for the Party leadership. been to prepare intelligence leadership. The fact that he leap leapfrogged frogged several several more more senior senior candidates candidates for for his his new new post post is is a a certain certain indication indication that that his his briefing had impressed Gorbachev.131 Foreign intelligence cers interviewed by G0rba~hev.l~ intelligence offi officers zvestia zwestia after after Shebarshin's Shebarshins resignation resignation in in September September 1991 1991 described described him him as as "the the first first decades.132 really competent head of the FCD in decades."132 According to Shebarshin, his main to ensure the West did not cheat on arms con coninitial brief from Gorbachev was "to tr01.133 trol."133 victories of the FCD F C D against the Main Adversary which impressed The tactical victories Ts very Gorbachev failed to avert strategic defeat. Directorate T's very success success in stealing Western merely underlined underlined the economy. Western secrets secrets merely the structural structural problems problems of of the the Soviet Soviet economy. Despite Despite S&T S&T worth worth a a billion billion roubles roubles a a year year and and the the Soviet Soviet Union's Unions large large numbers numbers of of scientists and engineers, Soviet scientists and engineers, Soviet technology technology fell fell steadily steadily further further and and further further behind behind the West. Gorbachev's Gorbachevs reforms served only to weaken further the command econ economy, omy, without without establishing establishing a a market market economy economy in in its its stead. stead. There There was was a a bread bread shortage shortage even No even after after the the good good harvest harvest of of 1990Y4 1990.134 No amount amount of of either either economic economic or or political political intelligence intelligence could could stave stave off offthe the disintegration disintegration of of the the failing failing Soviet Soviet system. system. As economic problems 1990 and As the the Soviet Soviet Union's Unions economic problems multiplied multiplied during during 1990 and separatist separatist the Centre's Centres traditional suspicions suspicions of the Main Adversary movements strengthened, the revived. revived. Kryuchkov Kryuchkov did did not not place place all all the the blame blame for for Russia's Russias ills ills on on imperialist plots. plots. "The The main sources of our trouble, in the the KGB's KGBs view," view,he declared, "are are to be found inside the country." country.But he he accused the CIA and other other Western Westernintelligence services services anti-socialist and separatist forces forces as part of a "secret secret war against the of promoting "anti-socialist" Soviet state."135 According to Shebarshin, Gorbachev failed to heed the FCD's Soviet state.135 FCDs warn warnings. He and his friends lived in a a world of self-delusion .. .. .. We were hitching our ings. "He the Western train."136 train.136 Gorbachev, in the Centre's Centres view, unwilling to wagon to the With Gorbachev, publicize some of the KGB's KGBs neglected offend the Americans, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov began to publicize conspiracy the.ories. the.ories.In December 1990 1990 he denounced a (non-existent) Western plot, conspiracy akin to economic sabotage," sabotage,to "deliver deliverimpure and sometimes infected grain, as well "akin level of of radioactivity or containing harmful sub subas products with an above-average above-average level s t a n c e ~ .In ~ ~~ 1991 first Kryuchkov's Kryuchkovs deputy, deputy, Viktor Fyodorovich Fyodorovich Grushko, stances."137 February 1991 and then then the the new prime minister, Valentin Pavlov, denounced an equally imaginary rouble. The fullest public version of the plot by Western banks to undermine the rouble. Centre's theory of Union was a vast vast American-led American-led conspiracy conspiracy to to subvert subvert the the Soviet Soviet Union was Centres theory of a assessments, Nikolai Sergey Sergeyset out in in April April 1991 1991 in a a speech by the head of KGB assessments, ible for evich head of evich Leonov, Leonov, formerly formerly deputy deputy head of the the FCD, respon responsible for operations operations in in North North policy, he declared, declared, was "to to eliminate the Soviet and South America. The goal of US policy, Soviet united state." state. Gorbachev, Gorbachev, he implied, was refusing Union as a united refusing to listen:

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theleadership of country about this in time time The KGB has been informing the of the country detail. We would not want a repetition of of the tragic situation before the and detail. Great Great Patriotic Patriotic War War against against Germany, Germany, when when Soviet intelligence intelligence warned about imminent attack of Nazi Germany but but Stalin rejected this information as the imminent wrong wrong and and even even provocative. provocative.You You know know what what this mistake cost us. leadershipstraditional traditional conFurther dramatic evidence of the resurgence of of the KGB leadership's con spiracy a speech by Kryuchkov to a a spiracy theories theories about about the the Main Main Adversary Adversary came came in a closed session session of the Supreme June 17. a hitherto hithertotop top Supreme Soviet on June 17. Kryuchkov read out a secret FCD report to the the Politburo of January 1977, 1977, On "On CIA Plans to Recruit Soviet Citizens," Citizens, which denounced an imaginary CIA masterplan to Agents Among Soviet sabotage the Soviet Soviet administration, economy and scientific sabotage scientific research. This plan, actively in force.138 force.138 The CIA's CIASmost important important agent, Kryuchkov claimed, remained actively solemnly informed Gorbachev, Gorbachev, was his own closest he solemnly closest adviser, Aleksandr Yakovlev, exchange student at allegedly recruited while an exchange at Columbia University over thirty ea1-1ier.l~~ years earlier.139 As Kryuchkov seriously. Kryuchkov later later complained, complained, Gorbachev Gorbachev did didnot not take such such nonsense nonsense seriously. Nor, did many with the the first-hand first-hand experience experience of of the the West Nor, no no doubt, doubt, did many FCD officers officers with West which was now most dangerous which the the KGB Chairman Chairman lacked. lacked. Kryuchkov Kryuchkov was now Gorbachev's Gorbachevs most dangerous opponent, accepted the the collapse the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc in opponent, convinced convinced that, that, having having tamely tamely accepted collapse of of the in 1989, 1989, Gorbachev Gorbachev was was now now presiding presiding over over the the disintegration of of the the Soviet Soviet Union. In August the coup topple August 1991 1991 he hebecame became the the chief chief organizer organizer of of the coup which which attempted attempted to to topple Gorbachev Gorbachev and and preserve preserve the the Union. Union.

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philosophers,wrote Marx, "have have only interpreted the world in various ways; the he philosophers," point, however, however, is to change it."l it.l In addition to collecting intelligence and producing assessments of of it, it, the the KGB also sought to to influence of politically correct assessments influence the course of events by a variety of "active active measures" measures (aktivinyye meropriatia) meroprintia)ranging from world events special actions" actions involving involving variousdegrees of violence. violence. media manipulation to "special degrees of Inspired by exaggerated exaggerated accounts of its heroic defeat of counter-revolutionary con conspiracies between the wars and a desire to impress the political leadership, it fre frespiracies a desire quently quently overestimated overestimated its its own own effectiveness. effectiveness. the Cold ColdWar War the United active Throughout the the United States was the main target for KGB active measures as well as for intelligence collection. collection. Most were at the non-violent end of active measures measures spectrum-"influence spectrum-influence operations" operations designed to discredit the Main Main the active Adversary. A conference conference of of senior FCD officers officers in January 1984 1984 reaffirmed a prior priorAdversary. since the end of the Second World War: Our ity which had remained unchanged since "Our aggressive intentions of of American imperial imperialchief task is to help to frustrate the aggressive exposing the adversary's adversarys weak and vulnerable vulnerable ism .. .. .. We must work unweariedly at exposing points. Much of what was euphemistically described as exposure was in reality points."2 "exposure" was ServiceA, the active active measures measuresbranch of of the FCD, and disinformation fabricated by Service spread officers residencies. Line PR officers officers were supposed to spread by Line PR offi cers in foreign residencies. of their time active measures, measures, though in spend about 25 percent of time on on active in practice some do so. so. failed to do the sophistication of of the the disinformation generated by Ser SerThe wide variation in the of its personnel. About 50 per cent of of its officers officers vice A reflected the uneven quality of measures. Some of of the remaining 50 per cent were rejects were specialists specialists in active measures. departments.Few of the ablest and most ambitious FCD recruits wanted from other departments. A, it rarely offered the opportunity overseas postings and was jobs in Service Service A; opportunity of overseas end.3There were, of of course, course, exceptions. exceptions.Yuri Modin, widely regarded as a career dead end.3 theMagnificent Magnificent activemeasures measures specialist,was the last controller of the Five, became an active specialist, successful Line PR post postappointed deputy head of Service A and subsequently had a successful India before becoming head of of political intelligence ing spreading disinformation in India at Institute.4 Many Service had little, if officers, however, however, if any, expe expeat the theAndropov Andropov In~titute.~ Many Service A officers, rience of living in the the West Westand relied on crude conspiracy capiconspiracy theories about the capi command center" center in the the talist and Zionist plotters who supposedly operated a secret "command

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United chairmen of heads of of the the FCD, none none of of United States.5 state^.^ Successive Successive chairmen of the the KGB and and heads thelate 1980s 1980s had worked in foreign residencies, whom until the residencies, were influenced by the same theories.
I T W WOULD HAVE IT OULD H AV E been wholly out of character had the the Centre Centre failed to interpret Kennedys assassination assassinationby Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas on November 22, President Kennedy's 1963 conspiracy.The deputy chairman of of the KGB reported to 1963 as anything less than conspiracy. Central Committee Committeein inDecember: the Central

A reliable source ofthe the Polish friends [the Polish intelligence service], an of firms closely connected to American entrepreneur and owner of a number of circles of the South, the petroleum circles South, reported in late November that the the real instigators of this criminal deed were three leading oil magnates from the South of the USA-Richardson, USA-Kchardson, Murchison and Hunt, all owners of of major reserves in the petroleum reserves the southern southern states who have long been connected to the South.6 South.6 pro-fascist and racist organizations in the

difficult to find circumstantial evidence It was not difficult "evidence" for this simplistic conspiracy theory, particularly as regards the oil magnate and anti-Communist theory, anti-Communist buffoon H. L. Hunt. "The TheCommunists need not invade the United United States, States," Hunt once preposterpreposter alreadygreater than when the declared. "Pro-Bolshevik Pro-Bolshevik sentiment in in the theUS is already ously declared. Bolsheviks overthrew the Kerensky government and took over Russia."7 R~ssia.~ Bolsheviks Hunts son, Bunker, Bunker, was one of a group of right-wing right-wing mavericks who had paid for Hunt's News on the Kennedy's visit, a a full-page Ul-page advertisement advertisement in in the theDallas Dallas Morning Murning News theday day of Kennedys accusing the President of being a Communist accusing Communist stooge-a stooge-a charge which prompted heading into into nut country. The Dallas strip-club owner Jack Kennedy to say he was "heading nut country."g Ruby, Ruby, who who shot shotand and fatally fatally wounded wounded Oswald Oswald on November November 24, had visited the Hunt Hunt offices offices shortly shortly before before Kennedy's Kennedys assassination.9 assassination. "said in aaprivate concon The KGB reported reported that that aajournalist journalist from from the the Baltimore Sun said versation ofTexas financiers versation in in early early December December that that on onassignment assignment from a group groupofTexas financiers and millionaire Hunt, Jack Ruby, who is now under arrest, pro proindustrialists headed by millionaire posed a large sum of money to Oswald for the murder of of Kennedy. Kennedy." Oswald had subsub O sequently plot.i Khrushchev seems seems sequently been been shot shot by by Ruby Ruby to to prevent prevent him him revealing the the plot. theaim of to have been convinced by the KGB view that the of the right-wing right-wing conspirators Kennedys assassination strengthen the behind Kennedy's assassination was to intensify the Cold War War and and "strengthen reactionary and aggressive policy."l1 aggressive elements of American foreign policy. The The choice choice of of Oswald Oswald as as Kennedy's Kennedys assassin, assassin,the the KGB believed, was was intended to to divert public attention from the racist oil magnates and make the assassination assassination Communist plot.12 plot.12The Centre had had strong strongreasons of its own to wish appear to be a Communist to deflect responsibility responsibility for the assassination assassination from Oswald. It I t was deeply embarrassed in 1959 1959Oswald had defected to Russia, professing disgust with with the by the fact that in American way of life and admiration for the Soviet system. system. Initially the KGB had suspected have been sent secret mission mission by by the but eventueventu suspected that that he he might might have been sent on on a a secret the CIA, but ally concluded that unstable nuisance to see see the back of him ally concluded that he hewas was an an unstable nuisance and and were were glad glad to the back of him

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when when he he returned returned to to Texas Texas with with his his Russian Russian wife wife in in 1962. 1962. After After Oswald's Oswalds return return the the FBI at rst similarly he might might be then seems at fi first similarly suspected suspected that that he be a a Soviet Soviet agent agent but but then seems to to have have made made the the same samejaundiced jaundiced assessment assessment of of him him as as the the Centre,u Centre.13KGB KGB suspicions suspicions of of Oswald however, when he wrote Oswald revived, revived, however, when he wrote to to the the CPUSA CPUSA in in August August 1963 1963 asking asking whether it might might be fight against whether it be better better for for him him to to continue continue the the fight against "anti-progressive anti-progressive forces" rather than as forcesas as a a member member of of the the "underground" underground rather than as an an open open supporter supporter of of "Com Communist munist ideals." ideals.Jack Jack Childs Childs (codenamed (codenamed MARAT), MARAT), an a m undeclared undeclared member member of of the the CPUSA the KGB, CPUSA who who acted acted as as one one of of its its main main points points of of contact contact with with the KGB, warned warned Moscow viewed as Moscow that that Oswald's Oswalds letter letter "was was viewed as an an FBI provocation." provocation. The The fact fact that, that, unknown unknown to to the the KGB, KGB, Childs Childs was was himself himself an an FBI agent agent renders renders his his warning warning unusu unusually ally ironic.14 ironic.14 The The Warren Warren Commission, Commission, appointed appointed by by President President Lyndon Lyndon B. Johnson Johnson to to investi investigate gate Kennedy's Kennedys assassination, assassination, reported reported in in September September 1964 1964 that that it it had had found found "very very persuasive" persuasive evidence evidence that that Oswald Oswald had had acted acted alone alone and and none none of of a a conspiracy. conspiracy.Though Though the IS Service the report reportwas was flawed, flawed, its its main main conclusions conclusions are are probably probably accurate. accurate. Service A, A, which which may have been may well well have been genuinely genuinely persuaded persuaded that that Kennedy Kennedy was was the the victim victim of of a a right-wing right-wing conspiracy, Warren conspiracy, succeeded succeeded in in sponsoring sponsoring its its first first counterblast counterblast even even before before the the Warren Report Report appeared. appeared. The The publisher publisher was was Carl Carl AIdo Aldo Marzani M.arzani (codenamed (codenamed NORD), NORD), an an Italian-born American Communist and Soviet agent, probably recruited before the Italian-born American Communist and Soviet agent, probably recruited before the Second extensively used measures.16 Second World World War, War, who who was was extensively used by by the the KGB for for active active measures.16 Early the New York Marzani be Early in in1960 1960 the New York residency residency recommended recommended to to the the Centre Centrethat that Marzani be given given 6-7,000 6-7,000 dollars dollars to to enable enable his his Liberty Liberty Book Book Club Club to to continue continue publishing publishing pro proSoviet Soviet material: material: NORD is is an an extremely extremely energetic energetic person person and and is is quite quite devoted devoted to to his his task. task. Despite Despite his his financial financial difficulties, difficulties, he he is is struggling struggling to to keep keep SEVER SEVER [North, [North, the the Liberty Liberty Book Book Club Club publishing publishing company] company] afloat. afloat. SEVER, SEVER, together together with with its its commercial commercial bookselling bookselling network, network, the the Prometheus Prometheus Book Book Club, Club, has has been been in in exis existence tence for for fourteen fourteen years. years. During During this this time time it it has has published published and and distributed distributed more more than than 200 200 titles titles of of a a progressive progressive nature, nature, by by both both American American and and foreign foreign authors. authors. The The catalogue catalogue of of the the SEVER SEVER publishing publishing firm firm lists lists around around fifty f i f q titles, titles, and Prometheus Book arealso also sent to and the the Prometheus Book Club Club has has 7,000 7,000 members. members. Books Books are sent to 8,000 8,000 addresses addresses on on an an individual individual basis. basis. The The international international department department of of the the Central Central Committee Committee was was plainly plainly impressed. impressed. In In May May 1960 1960it it approved approved a a secret secret grant grant of of 15,000 15,000dollars, dollars, more more than than twice twice the the sum sum sug suggested gested by by the the New NewYork York residency.17 residency.17 Marzani's 1960 included Marzanis productions productions during during 1960 included his his own own translation translation of of a a rapturous rapturous endorsement endorsement of of the the Soviet Soviet system system by by an an Italian Italian Communist: Communist:

Socialist, of every democrat, of every modern man, to It is the duty of every Socialist, USSR .. .. ..We are today today capable capable of continuing deepen his understanding of the USSR to successes suc to transform transform the the world, world, thanks thanks to tothe the successesof of the the USSR, USSR, thanks thanks to tothe the sucall wage cesses in a a series series of of other countries, thanks to tothe thestruggles cesses . struggles which we all

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in our own lands. We can, and we will, extend the civilization in civilization that was born in 1 October 8 1917. October 1917.

1961 the CPSU Central Committee allocated another 55,000 55,000 dollars In September 1961 for the next two two years to allow Marzani to to expand his publications. H e was given a He 10,000 dollars dollars a year to cover advertising costS.19 costs.19When the young KGB offi offifurther 10,000 cer Oleg Kalugin, Kalugin, stationed in New York in the early 1960s 1960s under cover as a Radio Moscow reporter, paid his first visit to one of Marzanis Marzani's receptions, he found found his apartment "filled filled with a motley assortment of Communists, liberals, liberals, and KGB spooks-all of them watched, undoubtedly, by FBI informers in attendance."2o attendan~e.~ spooks-all 1964 was the first volume on the Among the the books published by Marzani in in 1964 the assassination to appear in the the United UnitedStates, Oswald' Oswald: Assassin or 01Fall-Guy? Fall-Guy? Kennedy assassination of the book Joesten by the German German writer Joachim Joesten. At the beginning of expresses his "heartfelt heartfelt thanks .. .. .. to Carl Marzani, Marzani, aashrewd and hard-hitting hard-hitting pub pubexpresses lisher in the the finest American tradition, who who put put his whole heart and soul in this this book; withinfive weeks weeksof receiving the manubook;" Marzani succeeded in publishing it within manu 2 1 Joesten supported Moscow's script.21 Moscows line in pinning pinning the theblame for the assassination assassination script. aconspiracy by right-wing right-wing racists, chief among them them"oil oil magnate H. Hunt: on a H. L. Hunt:"
all feared that Mr. Mr.Kennedy, Kennedy, with his test-ban test-ban treaty, his neutralization of of They all Latin-American militarists, and his quiet feelers towards Laos, his dislike of of Latin-American Castro, Castro, intended intended to to put putan an end to the the Cold ColdWar, War, cut cut back the the arms budget and bring under control the Warfare State-that State-that "military-industrial military-industrial complex" complex excoriated, and warned the nation about, in which President Eisenhower had excoriated, 22 his his farewell farewell address. address.22
According provocateur with background" According to to Joesten, Joesten, Oswald Oswald was was "an anFBI agent agentprovocateur with a aCIA background expendable, used usedas a fall guy guyand murdered to prevent him giv givwho had been judged expendable, 23 Oswald' evidence.23 Oswald Assassin Assassin or or Fall-Guy? thus established two themes which were ing evidence. to Soviet and for the to recur in Soviet and Russian Russian active activemeasures measures for the next next thirty years: years: a a plot by by Hunt Hunt CIA. At the time, however, however, fanatics; and the involvement of ofthe CIA. and other right-wing fanatics; Joesten's and further further Joestens book book was was overshadowed overshadowedby by the the publication publication of of the the Warren Warren report report and undermined by undermined by the the publicity publicity given givento to Joesten's Joestens Communist Communist background.24 ba~kground.~~ talThe KGB correctly identified the New York lawyer Mark Lane as the most tal ented of ofthe the first wave of conspiracy conspiracy theorists researching the JFK assassination. assassination. According by the According to to one onereport report made made on on him, him,probably probably by the New NewYork York residency: residency: Mark to Democratic Mark Lane Lane is is well well known known as as a a person person with with close close ties ties to Democratic Party Partycir circles cles in in the theUS. He He holds holds liberal liberal views views on on aanumber number of of current current American American polit political his own of ical problems problems and and has has undertaken undertaken to to conduct conduct his own private private investigation investigation of 25 circumstances surrounding the murder of J. Kennedy. Kennedy.25 the circumstances Joesten praised praised Lane as brilliant "brilliant and courageous" and dedicated his his own book to to Joesten Lane as and courageous and dedicated own book him: state tactics' FBI-to use [Lane's] own words-nor him: "Neither Neither the the 'police police state tactics of of the the FBI-to use [Lanes] own words-nor

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the the conspiracy conspiracy of of silence silence of of the the press press magnates, magnates, could could sway sway him him from from doggedly doggedly pur pursuing truth."26 Together student assistants suing the thetruth.26 Together with withstudent assistants and and other other volunteers, volunteers, Lane Lane founded small founded the the Citizens' Citizens Committee Committee of of Inquiry Inquiry in ina a small office office on on lower lower Fifth Fifth Avenue Avenue and and rented rented a a small small theater theater at at which, which, each each evening evening for for several several months, months, he he gave gave what what became became known known as as "The The Speech," Speech,updating updating the thedevelopment development of of his his conspiracy conspiracy theory. theory. "This writes This alternative alternative method method of of dissent dissent was was required," required, writes Lane, Lane, "because because not not aasingle single network network radio radio or or television television program program permitted permitted the thebroadcast broadcast of of a a word word of of divergence divergence from view."27 Though it dared from the the official officialview.27 Though it dared not not take take the the risk risk of of contacting contacting Lane Lane directly, directly, the the New New York York residency residency sent sent him him 1,500 1,500 dollars dollars to to help help finance finance his his research research through through the the intermediary intermediary of of a a close close friend friend whom whom Lane's Lanes KGB file file identifies identifies only only as as a a trusted trusted contact. contact. While While Lane Lane was was not not told told the the source source of of the the money, money, the the residency residency sus suspected have pected that that he hemight might have guessed guessedwhere where it it came came from; from; it it was was also alsoconcerned concerned that that the the secret secret subsidy subsidy might might be be discovered discoveredby by the the FBI.28 FBI.28 The The same same intermediary intermediary provided provided 500 500 dollars dollars to to pay pay for for a a trip trip by by Lane Lane to to Europe Europe in 1964. While in 1964. While there, there, Lane Lane asked asked to to visit visit Moscow Moscow in in order order to to discuss discuss some some of of the the material he had found. The Centre regretfully concluded that inviting him to Russia material he had found. The Centre regretfully concluded that inviting him to Russia would would reveal reveal its its hand hand in intoo too blatant blatant a away way and and his his proposed proposed trip trip was was "tactfully tactfully post postponed." poned. Trusted Trusted contacts contacts were, were, however, however, selected selected from from among among Soviet Soviet journalists journalists to to encourage encourage him him in in his his research. research. Among Among them them was was the the KGB agent agent Genrikh Genrikh Borovik, Borovik, who who later later maintained maintained regular regular contact contact with with Lane. Lane. Lane's Lanes Rush Rush to t oJudgment, Judgment, published published in government in Kennedy in 1966, 1966, alleged alleged complicity complicity at at the thehighest highest levels levels of ofgovernment inthe the Kennedy assas assassination.29 to ina at ion.^^ It I t was was top top of of that that year's years hardback hardback bestseller bestseller list list and and went wenton on to become become the the bestselling bestselling paperback paperback of of 1967, 1967, as as well well as as enjoying enjoying what what Lane Lane modestly modestly describes describes as as "enormous enormous success success around around the the world" world and and causing causing "a a dramatic dramatic change change in in public public per perception" ceptionof of the the assassination.30 assa~sination.~ During success was wasless less enormous. During the the late late 1960s 1960s and and early early 1970s, 1970s, Lane's Lanes success enormous. The The most most popular popular books books on on the the assassination assassination were were now now those those that that exposed exposed some some of of the the excesses excesses of of the the conspiracy conspiracy theorists.31 theorist^.^^ CPUSA CPUSA leaders leaders who who visited visited Moscow Moscow in in 1971, 1971, though though describing describing Rush Rush to t o Judgment Judgment as as "advantageous advantageousto to the the Communists," Communists, claimed claimed that In the mid-1970s, that Lane's Lanes main main motive motive was was his his own own self-aggrandizement.32 self-aggrandi~ement.~~ the In mid-1970s7how however, ever, the the dramatic dramatic revelations revelations of of real real conspiracy conspiracy in in the the Nixon Nixon White White House House and and of of CIA assassination assassination plots plots against against several several foreign foreign statesmen statesmen gave gave the the conspiracy conspiracy theo theoThe rists a a new new lease lease on on life.33 life.33 The KGB, predictably, predictably, was wasanxious anxiousto to lose lose no no opportunity opportunity to to promote promote active active measures measureswhich which supported supported the the increasingly increasinglypopular popular theory theory that thatthe the CIA CIA was was behind behind Kennedy's Kennedys assassination. assassination.Its Its chief chief target target was was the the former former CIA officer officer turned E. Howard Howard Hunt Hunt (sometimes (sometimes confused confusedwith with the theTexan Texan turned Watergate Watergateconspirator conspirator E. oil being in oil millionaire millionaire H. H. L. L. Hunt), Hunt), who who had had been been wrongly wrongly accused accused of ofbeing in Dallas Dallas on on the the day day of of the the assassination. assassination. centerpiece of the active active measure The centerpiece measure against Howard Hunt, codenamed ARLINGTON, to him him from a fortfort ARLINGTON7was was a a forged forged letter letter to from Oswald, Oswald, allegedly allegedly written written a night night before before the the assassination. assassination. The The letter letter used used phrases phrases and and expressions expressions taken taken from from actual actual letters letters written written by by Oswald Oswald during during his his two two years years in in the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, was was fabri fabricated cated in in aaclever clever imitation imitation of of his his handwriting. handwriting.

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Dear Mr. Mr. Hunt, I would like information concerning my position. that we discuss discuss the I am only asking for information. I am suggesting that else. matter fully before any steps are taken by me or anyone else. Thank-you. Thank-you.

Lee Harvey HarveyOswald34 O~wald~~ clearly, was wasthat Oswald wanted to meet Hunt before going ahead The implication, clearly, the assassination. assassination. with the twice checked for authenticity Third Before being used, the forgery was twice "authenticity" by the Third KGBs OTU (operational technical) photoDepartment of the KGB's technical) Directorate. In 1975 1975 photo copies of it itwere sent to tothree of the most active conspiracy buffs, together together with cov covcopies ering letters from an anonymous anonymous wellwisher who claimed that he hehad had given the FBI, Clarence Kelly, who appeared to be suppressing the Director Director of ofthe the original to the FBI, it. The Centre was doubtless disappointed that for for almost two years its forgery received no publicity. publicity. In 1977, 1977, however, however, the letter was published by Penn Jones, the received small Texas newspaper and self-published author of retired owner of a small of four books assassination.The New York Times reported that three threehandwriting handwriting about the assassination. experts Oswalds widow also identified her husbands had authenticated the letter. Oswald's husband's handwrithandwrit ing3* HouseSelect Committee on onAssassinations 1978 ing.35 Experts summoned by the House Assassinations in 1978 concluded more prudently that they were unable to reach a firm "firm conclusion conclusion" because theabsence of the theoriginal document.36 document.36 of the The Centre was somewhat put out, however, the fact that however, by by that initial press reaction reactionto y on the likelihood of the letter being addressed to the late its forgery centered centered chiefl chiefly Texan H. L. Hunt Texan oiloil millionaire mdhonaire H. Hunt (the (the central central character character in in itsits own own original original conspiracy theory), con conspiracy theory), rather rather than than the theKGB's KGBs current current intended target, the Watergate conspirator Howard Hunt. Service ServiceA believed there had been a CIA plot to disrupt its own orchestratedAmerican press campaign campaign was seeking seeking plot. The KGB reported that an "orchestrated" to to divert divert public public attention attention from from Oswald's Oswalds connections connections with with the American intelligence community H. L. Hunt instead. instead. In April 1977, 1977 soon after pub community by by concentrating concentrating on on H. after the the publication of the forged letter, letter, the KGB informed the Central lication Central Committee Committee that thatit it was measures expose the supposed role of the American spelaunching additional active measures to expose supposed role of ''American spe servicesin the Kennedy assassination.37 assa~sination.~~ cial services" By 1980 1980 Howard Hunt was complaining Itsbecome become article that, "It's an an article offaith that I had some some role in the Kennedy assa~sination.~~ assassination. "38 By the late 1970s 1970s the the KGB could fairly claim that far more Americans believed some version of its own conspiracy conspiracy theory of of the Kennedy assassination, assassination, involving a some right-wing plot and the US intelligence intelligence community, right-wing community, than still accepted the main findings measures, however, however, had findings of of the the Warren Warren Commission. Commission. Soviet Soviet active active measures, had done done less to By their cover-ups to influence influence American American opinion opinion than than the the Centre Centre believed. believed. By their initial initial cover-ups the done more more than than the KGB to to encourencour the CIA and and the the FBI had had unwittingly unwittingly probably probably done the KGB age sometimes obsessional obsessional conspiracy theorists who around the the comcom age the the sometimes conspiracy theorists who swarmed swarmed around plex Dulles, the the recently retired plex and and confusing conhsing evidence evidence on on the the assassination. assassination. Allen Allen Dulles, recently retired DCI theWarren Warren Commission, not informed informed the the commission commission D C I on on the Commission, had had deliberately deliberately not
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that that the the CIA had had plotted plotted the the assassination assassination of of Castro. Castro. On O n the the very very day day of of Kennedy's Kennedys assassination, assassination, the the Agency Agency had had supplied supplied an an agent agent with with aa murder murder weapon weapon for for use use against against Castro. Castro. J. J. Edgar Edgar Hoover Hoover too too had had held held back back important important information. information. He H e dis discovered, covered, to to his his horror, horror, that that Oswald Oswald had had not notbeen been included included on on the theFBI's FBIs security security index index of threatening letter to the of potentially potentially disloyal disloyal citizens, citizens, despite despite having having written written aathreatening letter to the Bureau Bureau after after his his return return from from Russia Russia and and subsequently subsequently making making an an appointment appointment to to see see a a KGB KGB officer officer in in Mexico Mexico City. City. After After reading reading a a report report on on "investigative investigativedeficiencies deficiencies in in the the Oswald Oswald case," case, Hoover Hoover concluded concluded that, that, if if it it became became public, public, the the report report would would destroy destroy the the FBI's FBIs reputation.39 rep~tation.~~ The The information information withheld withheld by by Dulles Dulles and and Hoover Hoover would would have have been been most most unlikely unlikely to undermine the theWarren Warren Commission's to undermine Commission7sconclusion conclusion that that Oswald Oswald had had been been a a lone lone assassin. But, when it became public in the mid-1970s, it inevitably encouraged assassin. But, when itbecame public in the mid-l970s, itinevitably encouraged the the belief belief that that there there had had been been other other cover-ups cover-ups which which pointed pointed to tothe theinvolvement involvement of of the the intelligence intelligence community. community. The The Watergate Watergate scandal, scandal, and and the the revelations revelations of of intelligence intelligence abuses abuses which which followed, followed, created created a a perfect perfect breeding breeding ground ground for for the the spread spread of of conspir conspiracy Though acy theories.4o theories.40 Though most most of of the the major major abuses abuses had had been been ordered ordered or or authorized authorized by by successive successive presidents, presidents, the the belief belief grew grew that, that, in in the the words words of of Senator Senator Frank Frank Church, Church, chairman chairman of of the the Senate Senate Select Select Committee Committee to to Study Study Governmental Governmental Operations Operationswith with Respect Respect to to Intelligence Intelligence Activities, Activities, the the CIA CIA had had been been "behaving behaving like like a a rogue rogue elephant elephant on on the therampage."41 rampage.41
S SE ERVI R V IC CE EA S SE EI IZ ZE E D eagerly eagerly on on Church's Churchs ill-chosen ill-chosen metaphor. metaphor. The The KGB's KGBs most most valu valuable asset in its active measures to able asset in its active measures to discredit discredit the the Agency Agency was was an an embittered embittered former former 2 who CIA operations (codenamed PONT),4 operations officer officer in in Latin Latin America, America, Philip Philip Agee Agee (codenamed PONT),42 who had had been been forced forced to to resign resign in in 1968 1968after after complaints complaints at at his his heavy heavy drinking, drinking, poor poor finan financial cial management management and and attempts attemptstoto proposition proposition wives wives of of American American diplomats.43 dip10rnats.~~ Though Though he he remained remained in in the theWest, West, Agee Agee became, became, in in effect, effect, the the CIA's CIASfirst first defector. defector. In In 1973 1973 he he approached approached the the KGB KGB residency residency in in Mexico Mexico City City and and offered offered what what the the head head of of for of the the FCD's FCDs Counter-intelligence Counter-intelligence Directorate, Directorate, Oleg Oleg Kalugin, Kalugin, called called "reams reams of in information The suspicious mation about about CIA CIA operations." operations.The suspicious KGB KGB resident, resident, however, however, found found Agee's Agees offer plot and and turned turned him him offer too too good good to to be be true, true, concluded concluded that that he he was was part part of of a a CIA plot away. away. According According to to Kalugin: Kalugin:

Agee Cubans, who Agee then then went went to to the the Cubans, who welcomed welcomed him him with with open open arms arms .. .. .. The The Cubans in Moscow office Cubans shared shared Agee's Agees information with us. But as I sat in my office revelations coming from Agee, I reading reports about the growing list of revelations cursed cursed our our officers officers for for turning turning away away such such a a prize.44 prize.44

January 1975 1975 Agee Agee published an uncompromisingly hostile memoir of his In January CIA entitled Inside the Company: Conzpany: CIA CL4Diary, which identified approxi approxicareer in the the CIA career 250 Agency officers officers and agents and claimed claimed that "millions millions of people people all all over over mately 250 the world had been killed killed or had hadtheir their lives destroyed destroyed by the CIA CIA and the theinstitutions institutions the lives it The file on the claims, doubtless doubtless with supports."45 The self-congratulatory KGB file the book claims, some some exaggeration, exaggeration, that that it itwas was "prepared prepared by by Service Service A, A, together together with with the the Cubans."46 Cubans.46

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Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes do do not notindicate indicate exactly exactlywhat what the theKGB KGB and and its its Cuban Cuban ally, ally, the the DGI, DGI, contributed contributed to to Agee's Agees text. text. As As Agee Agee himself himself acknowledged, acknowledged, however: however: "Representa Representatives Cuba [the DGI] tives of of the theCommunist Party Party of of Cuba [the DGI] .. .. .. gave gave important important encouragement encouragement a time time when I doubted that I would be able to find the additional information I at a needed."47 While needed.747 While Agee Agee was was writing writing his his book book in inBritain, Britain, the the KGB maintained maintained contact contact Anatolyevich Cheporov, Cheporov, London correspon corresponwith him through through its co-optee, Edgar Anatolyevich dent ovosti news Ns dent of of the the N Novosti news agency agencyand and the the Literaturnaya Gazeta.48 G a ~ e t aAt At . ~ Service Service ~ As insis insistence, all references to tence, Agee Agee removed removed all references to CIA CIA penetration penetration of of Latin Latin American American Communist Communist parties parties from from his his typescript typescript before before publication.49 p~blication.~~ Because States, Because oflegal of legal problems problems in in the theUnited United States, Inside the Company was was first first pub published called lished in in Britain, Britain, where where it it was was an an instant instant bestseller. bestseller.The The London London Evening News called it it "a a frightening fi-ightening picture picture of of corruption, corruption, pressure, pressure, assassination assassination and and conspiracy." conspiracy.The The Economist commended commended it it as as "inescapable inescapablereading." reading.Probably Probably most most valuable valuable of of all, all, from from Service ServiceNs As viewpoint, viewpoint,was was a a review review in in the theSpectator Spectator by by Miles Miles Copeland, Copeland, a a former former CIA station station chief chief in in Cairo, Cairo, who who described described Inside the the Company Company as as "as ascomplete complete an an account account of spy work as is likely to be published anywhere." With enthusiastic support of spy work as is likely to be published anywhere. With enthusiastic support from from a a number number of of journalists, journalists, Agee Agee then then set set about about unmasking unmasking the the members members of of the the CIA CIA Lon London don station, station, some some of of whom whom were were surprised surprised emerging emerging from from their their homes homes by by press presspho photographers. tographers. An An American American theater theater director director staged staged a a production production satirizing satirizing the the Agency Agency in in front front of of a a number number of of CIA officers' officershouses. houses. "For For a a while," while, claimed claimed Agee, Agee, "the the CIA in The left-wing in Britain Britain was was a a laughing laughing stock." stock.The left-wing Labor Labor MP Stan Stan Newens Newens promoted promoted a a Commons Commons bill, bill, signed signed by by thirty-two thirty-two of of his his colleagues, colleagues, calling calling for for the the CIA station station to to be rush by Agees success success in in Britain, Britain, there there was was a a rush by the the media media be expelled. expelled. Encouraged Encouraged by Agee's in other 50 otherparts of Europe to expose expose the CIA stations in their theirown capitals. capitals. The The six-month six-month delay delay between between the the publication publication of of the the British British and and American American edi editions tions of of Inside Inside the the Company, Company, and and the the associated associated legal legal difficulties, difficulties, merely merely served served to to increase United States increase media media interest interest in in the the United States and and ensure ensure its its place place high high on on the the bestseller bestseller list. classified in-house list. A review review of ofInside Inside the Company in in the theCINs CIASclassified in-house journal, journal, Studies in body Intelligence, Intelligence, acknowledged acknowledged that that it itwas was "a asevere severe body blow" blow to to the the Agency: Agency: "A A consid considerable erable number number of of CIA CIA personnel personnel must must be be diverted diverted from from their their normal normal duties duties to to under undertake take the the meticulous meticulous and and time-consuming time-consuming task task of of repairing repairing the the damage damage done done to to its its "51 Latin-American Latin-American program program .. . . I On November 1976 a order November 16, 16,1976 a deportation deportation order served served on on Agee Agee requiring requiring him him to to leave leave England turned his the delight Centre,into into England turned his case, case, much much to to the delight of of the the Centre, a a calise cause cilebre. cdibre. According According to to one one of of the the files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin: Mitrokhin:
. .

The Home Office employed firm firm and and purposeful purposeful measures measures to to force force the the Home Office The KGB employed to used to to cancel cancel their their decision decision .. .. ..The The London London. residency residency was wasused to direct direct action action by by a Executive, a number number of of members members of of the the Labor LaborParty Party Executive,union union leaders, leaders, leading leading par garliamentarians, stand liamentarians, leaders leaders of of the the National National Union Union of of Journalists Journalists to to take take a a stand 52 against ce decision. against the the Home Home Offi Office de~ision.~ On O n November November 30 30 the the first first in in a a series series of of well-publicized well-publicized meetings meetings to to protest protest against against the speakers the deportation deportation order order was was held held in in London, London,with with speakers including including Judith Judith Hart, Hart, forfor-

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mer Labor Minister Minister of of Overseas Overseas Development, the leading Labor left-winger Ian Mikardo, Mikardo, Alan Alan Sapper Sapper of of the the film film and and TV technicians technicians union union and and the the distinguished distinguished active defense defense committee53 committees3 based at the the National historian E. E. P. Thompson. An active Council Council of of Civil Civil Liberties Liberties organized organized petitions, rallies rallies and and pickets pickets of the the Home Office. Office. Commons Stan StanNewens sponsored a protest supported by over over fi fifq NIPSand In the Commons fty NIPs Secretary,Merlyn Rees. Agee addressed sympathetic led a delegation to see the Home Secretary, Blackpool, Brighton, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Coven meetings in Birmingham, Blackpool, Coventry, London, Manchester and Newcastle. At his appeal against deportation in January 1977, Agee's Agees character witnesses included Stan Newens, Judith Hart, and February 1977, former former Home Office Office minister minister Alex Alex Lyon, Lyon, former former US Attorney-General Attorney-General Ramsey Ramsey Clark, Sean MacBride, MacBride, Nobel Clark, Kissinger's Kissingers former former aide aide Morton Morton Halperin Halperin and and Sean Nobel Peace Peace anotherex-Labor Prize winner and UN High Commissioner for Namibia. Hart and another minister, 150 MPs, MPs, to to reform reform the the minister, Barbara Barbara Castle, Castle, sponsored a a motion, supported supported by by 150 appeals Campaigns of appeals procedure. According to Agee's Agees KGB file, file, "Campaigns of support for PONT were were initiated initiated in in France, France, Spain, Spain, Portugal, Portugal, Italy, Italy, Holland, Holland, Finland, Norway, Mexico Mexico and drawn-out and Venezuela." Venezuela. After After Agee's Agees appeals appeals had had failed, failed, the the final final act act in in the the long longdrawn-out protest campaign was a Commons debate on May 3. The May3. The Guardian, Guardian,which which supported supported Agee's Agees appeal, appeal, commented: commented:

that Philip When Merlyn Rees .. .. .. decided that Philip Agee and [American journalist] go, he must equally have known there would be a fuss. Mark Hosenball must go, did he herealize the endlessly endlessly stretching, deeply embarrassing nature of of that But did fuss-the evidence Peace, the press conferences, fuss-the evidence at a length to rival War and Peace, conferences, the parade of fervent witnesses?54 witne~ses?~
Though Agee was eventually forced to leave England for Holland on onJune June 3, 1977, the KGB was jubilant at deeply embarrassing nature of of [the] fuss" fuss his 1977, at the the "deeply caused. The London residency's residencys claim that it had deportation had had caused. it had been able to direct the campaign by prominent Labor Labor politicians politicians and others in support supportof of "direct" Agee was, however, however,greatly exaggerated. exaggerated. of 55 It doubtless did not occur to the vast majority of Agees supporters to suspect the involvement of of the KGB and the DGL56 DGI.56 Agee's After Agee's Agees well-publicized expulsion expulsion from Britain, the KGB KGB continued to use Mter active measures measures against the CIA. CIA. him and some of his supporters in active 57 Among the byAgee from what he he described as "an an anonymous sender was documents received by anonymous sender" Kissinger, an authentic authentic copy of a classified State State Department Department circular, circular, signed by Kissinger, CIAS"key key intelligence questions" questions for fiscal year year 1975 1975 on on eco ecowhich contained the CIA's commercial reporting. rep~rting.~ 58 KGB files identify the source of the nomic, financial and commercial A.59In the summer summerof of 1977 Pamdocument as Service A.59 1977 the the circular was published in a pam phlet entitled "What What Uncle Sam Wants to to Know about You," You, with an introduction phlet acknowledging that it it was "not not the most gripping document document in inthe the by Agee. While acknowledging world, Agee claimed that it it demonstrated demonstratedthe unfair assistance assistance secretly given givento US world," community.60 companies abroad by the American intelligence community.60 CovertAction 1978 Agee and a small group of supporters began publishing the Covert In 1978 Action Information Bulletin BuZZetin in order to promote promotewhat what a worldwide campaign to Agee called "a Information

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destabilize f its Files destabilize the the CIA through through exposure exposure o of its operations operations and and personnel."61 personnel.61 Files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin claim claim that that the theBulletin Bulletin was was founded founded "on on the the initiative initiative of of the theKGB" KGB and and that the group it (collectively codenamed RUPOR), that the group running running it (collectively codenamed RUPOR), which which held held its its first first meeting meeting in in Jamaica Jamaica early early in in 1978, 1978,was was "put put together" togetherby by FCD Directorate Directorate K (coun (counterintelligence).62 The terintelligence).62 The Bulletin Bulletin was was edited edited in in Washington Washington by by Bill Bill Schaap, Schaap, a a radical radical lawyer lawyer codenamed codenamed RUBY RUBY by by the the KGB, his his wife, wife, the the journalist journalist Ellen Ellen Ray, Ray, and and another ARSENIO. Agee Agee and and two two other other disaf disafanother journalist, journalist, Louis Louis Wolf, Wolf, codenamed codenamed ARSENIO. fected of the the CIA, fected former former members members of CIA,Jim Jim and and Elsie Elsie Wilcott Wilcott (previously (previously employed employed by by the Agency respectively, finance the Agency as, as, respectively, finance officer officer and and secretary), secretary), contributed contributed articles articles and and information.63 i n f ~ r m a t i o nThere There . ~ ~ is is no no evidence evidence in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes that that any any member member of of the the RUPOR group, the group, apart apart from from Agee, Agee, was was conscious consciousof of the role role of ofthe the DGI or or KGB. Action Information was The The first first issue issue of of the the Covert CowertAction Information Bulletin Bulletin was launched launched by by Agee Agee and and the the RUPOR group group at at a a Cuban Cuban press press conference conference on on the the eve eve of of the the Eleventh Eleventh World World Festival the Havana the Festival of of Youth Youth and and Students, Students, held held to to coincide coincide with with the Havana carnival carnival in in the summer copies of another book, ork: Dirty W Work: summer of of 1978. 1978. Agee Agee also also produced produced advance advance copies of another book, Dirty and Wolf, which contained The The CIA CL4 in in Western Western Europe, Europe, coauthored coauthored by by himself himself and Wolf, which contained the the names names and and biographical biographical details details of of 700 700 CIA personnel personnel who who were, were, or or had had been, been, sta stationed tioned in in western western Europe. Europe. "Press Press reaction," reaction, wrote wrote Agee, Agee, "was was not not disappointing. disappointing. In In the the next next few few days dayswe welearned learned by by telephone telephone from from friends friends in in the the States States and and elsewhere elsewhere that most of carried stories stories about that most of the themajor major publications publications carried about the the Bulletin Bulletin and and Dirty Work. Work. Perfect. "64 Perfect.64 The personnel from The Centre Centre assembled assembled a a task task force force of of personnel from Service Service A and and Directorate Directorate K, headed assistant to Service A, to headed by by V. N. Kosterin, Kosterin, assistant to the the chief chief of of Service to keep keep the the Covert Covert Action Action Information Infoormation Bulletin Bulletin supplied supplied with with material material designed designed to to compromise compromise the the CIA. CIA. Among the material 1979 was Among the material which which the the task task force force supplied supplied for for publication publication in in 1979 was an an eighteen-page eighteen-page CIA document document entitled entitled "Director Director of of Central Central Intelligence: Intelligence: Perspec Perspectives ." The had originally tives for for Intelligence, Intelligence, 1976-1981 1976-1981. The document document had originally been been delivered delivered anonymously the apartment apartment of Washington resident, Dmitri Ivanovich anonymously to tothe of the theWashington resident, Dmitri Ivanovich Yakushkin, time had Yakushkin, and and at atthe the time had been been wrongly wrongly assessed assessed by by both both the theresidency residency and and the the Centre Agee's high Centre as as a a "dangle" dangleby by US intelligence.65 intelligen~e.~ Agees commentary commentary on on the thedocument document highlighted recent revelations lighted the the complaint complaint by by DCI William William Colby Colby that that recent revelations of of its its operations operations were Kosterin's task were among among the the most most serious serious problems problems the the CIA had had to to face.66 face.66 Kosterins task force, force, however, however,became became increasingly increasinglyconcerned concerned about about the the difficulty difficulty of of finding finding enough enough secret secret material recommended that it look material for for the the Bulletin, Bulletin, and and recommended that it look harder harder for for open-source open-source material, crises around be material, ranging ranging from from readers' readers letters letters to to crises around the the world world which which could could be blamed the Jonestown massacre in 900 blamed on on the the CIA-among CIA-among them them the Jonestown massacre in Guyana, Guyana, when when 900 members American religious been persuaded persuaded to members of of the the American religious cult cult the the "People's PeoplesTemple" Temple had had been to commit 67 commit mass mass suicide suicide or or had had been been murdered. murdered.67 Following was the success of ork: The CIA Following what what Service Service A believed believed was the success of Dirty W Work: CL4 in ork II Western Western Europe, Europe, Agee Agee began began work work with with Wolf Wolf on onaasequel, sequel, Dirty Dirty W Work I . The The CIA C U in in A frica. Early Africa. Early in in 1979 1979 Oleg OlegMaksimovich Maksimovich Nechiporenko Nechiporenko of of Directorate Directorate K and and A. A. N. ltskov list Itskov of of Service Service A met met Agee Agee in in Cuba Cubaand and gave gave him him aa list of of CIA officers officersworking working on on the ork II was finished, the Mrican African continent.68 continent.68Shortly Shortly before before Dirty W Work IIwas finished, Agee Agee decided decided not not to to be be publicly publicly identified identified as as one one of of the the authors authors for for fear fear that that he he might might lose lose his his residence residence

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permit in Germany, role on the permit in Germany, where where he he now now lived. lived. He H e also also changed changed his his official official role on the Covert Action Information would CovertAction Information Bulletin Bulletin from from editor editor to to "editorial editorial adviser." adviser,"How How that that would save save my my residence residence in in Germany," Germany, Agee Agee later later acknowledged, acknowledged, "was was a a little little obscure obscure .. .. .. but my fear barely rational-at least this point."69 but such such was was my fear that that I I was was barely rational-at least on on this Nechiporenko DGI, that that Nechiporenko and and Itskov Itskov agreed agreed with with Pedro Pedro Pupo Pup0 Perez, Perez, the the head head of of the the DGI, to coincide the conference publication publication of of Dirty Dirty Work i7b-k II 1 1should should be be timed timed to coincide with with the conference of of ninety-two heads of non-aligned nations to be held in Havana, presided over by ninety-two heads of non-aligned nations to be held in Havana, presided over by Fidel Fidel Castro, Castro, in in September September 1979.70 1979.70 ork II By Agee's Agees own own count, count, Dirty W Work II brought brought the the total total number number of of CIA CIA officials officials exposed RUPOR team team to to about about 2,000. 2,000. For For the the KGB KGB it it had had been been a a exposed by by him him and and the the RUPOR remarkably effective active measure. The Senate Intelligence Committee reported in remarkably effective activemeasure. The Senate Intelligence Committee reported in 1980: 1980: In House and Senate In recent recent years years members members of of the the House and Senate Intelligence Intelligence Commit Committees . . . have become increasingly concerned about the systematic effort tees . . . have become increasingly concerned about the systematic effort by by a a small small group group of of Americans Americans .... .. to to disclose disclose the the names names of of covert covert intelligence intelligence agents them has agents .. ....Foremost Foremost among among them has been been Philip Philip Agee Agee .. .. ..The The destructive destructive effect effect of of these these disclosures disclosures has has been been varied varied and and wide-ranging wide-ranging .. .. .. The The professional professional effectiveness effectiveness of of officers officers who who have have been been compromised compromised is is substantially substantially and and sometimes sometimes irreparably irreparably damaged. damaged. They They must must reduce reduce or or break break contact contact with with sensitive sensitive covert covert sources sources and and continued continued contact contact must must be be coupled coupled with with increased increased defensive defensive measures measures that that are are inevitably inevitably more more costly costly and and time timeconsuming. removed from consuming. Some Some officers officers must must be be removed from their their assignments assignments and and returned from overseas at substantial cost, and years of irreplaceable area expe returned from overseas at substantial cost, and years of irreplaceable area experience rience and and language language skills skills are are lost. lost. Since impaired, of Since the the ability abilityto to reassign reassign the the compromised compromised officer officer isis impaired, the the pool pool of experienced experienced CIA CIA officers officerswho who can can serve serve abroad abroad is is being being reduced. reduced. Replacement Replacement of of officers officers thus thus compromised compromised is is difficult difficult and, and, in in some some cases, cases, impossible. impossible. Such Such disclosures disclosures also also sensitize sensitize hostile hostile security security services services to to CIA CIA presence presence and and influ influence ence foreign foreign populations, populations, making making operations operations more more difficult. difficult.
All All thirteen thirteen members members of of the the House House Intelligence Intelligence Committee Committee sponsored sponsored the the Intelli Intelli-

gence gence Identities Identities Protection Protection Bill, Bill, popularly popularly known known as as the the "Anti-Agee Anti-Agee Bill," Bill, which which eventually eventuallybecame became law law in in June June1982. 1982. Agee Agee himself himself had had been been deprived deprived of of his his Ameri American and can passport passport in in 1981 1981 and traveled traveled over over the the next next few few years years on on passports passports issued issued by, by, suc successively, cessively, Maurice Maurice Bishop's Bishops Marxist-Leninist Marxist-Leninist regime regime in in Grenada Grenada and andthe the Sandinista Sandinista government government in in Nicaragua. Nicaragua. His His influence, influence, by by now, now, was was in in sharp sharp decline. decline. As As he he com complained, plained, "My My 1983 1983 call call for for a a continent-wide continent-wide action action front front against against the the CIA's CIASpeople people in in Latin Latin America America went went nowhere. nowhere. People People had had other other preoccupations preoccupations and and priorities."71 pri~rities.~ the the FBI FBI was was inevitably inevitably a a major major target target of of KGB KGB active active measures. measures.Until Until the deathof of J. J. Edgar Edgar Hoover Hoover in in 1972, 1972, many many of of these these measures measures were were personally personally the death directed directed against against the the Bureau's Bureaus long-serving, long-serving, aging aging and and irascible irascible director. director. Service Service A employed employed three three simple simple and and sometimes sometimes crude crude techniques. techniques. The The first first was was to to portray portray
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Hoover ultra right-wing Society, Hoover as as in in league league with with extremists extremists such such as as the the ultra right-wing John John Birch Birch Society, whose founder regarded even the former Republican president Dwight D. Eisen whose founder regarded even the former Republican president Dwight Eisenadedicated conscious agent of the Communist Communist conspiracy. ServiceA had hower as "a conspiracy." Service acquired of its leaders' acquired both some of the society's societys stationery and samples samples of leaders signatures from 1965 it fabfab from its its California California headquarters headquarters to to assist assist it it in inits its forgeries. forgeries. In November 1965 ricated of the Society, ricated a a letter letter of of good good wishes wishes from from Hoover Hoover to to the the leader leader of the John John Birch Society, reminding that the the FBI funds at his disposal reminding him him that funds put at disposal would would enable the society to open open several several more more branches.72 branches.72 of active measures A second, more sophisticated form of measures concerned alleged FBI abuses of civil rights. Operation SPIRT was designed to demonstrate that the the head abuses of civil of the Passport Office in the State Department, Frances Knight, was a secret FBI was theSecretary of State. In 1967 agent whose loyalty was to Hoover rather than to the 1967 SerSer toHoover Hoover and arranged for it to to vice A forged a letter from Ms. Knight to be sent to the celebrated the Washington Post on ashington Post celebrated columnist Drew Pearson, who published it in in the W 4.73 a situation of extreme August 4.73 The fabricated letter reported that a "extreme urgency urgency" had arisen arisen as a result of press enquiries about an alleged FBI request to her for informainforma onProfessor H. Stuart Hughes, Hughes,a Harvard a Harvard tion on critic of American policy in Vietnam: I am seriously afraid that this may indicate preparations for a sustained press campaign the attitude campaign against us. We have already alreadydiscussed discussed attitudeof of the Secretary Secretary of of State State towards towards the the long-established long-established practice practice of ofthe the department departmentmaking making inquiries inquiries therequest of the FBI .. .. .. at the Forgive me if if I sound alarmist, but I am quite certain from what I have Forgive heard that a principle of vital importance is at stake which affects the whole inparticular, the effectiveness ofthe Bureau. conduct of the government and, in effectiveness of

Ms. Knight told Hoover she was unwilling to commit too much to paper and sug suggested an urgent meeting with him.74 him.74 Knight and Hoover both dismissed dismissed the letter forgery, but the as a forgery, the fact that neither denied the FBIs FBI's contacts with the the Passport Office some of of its its mud had stuck.75 that at at least least some mud had Office persuaded persuaded the the KGB that ServiceA against Hoover was to accuse him of A third line of attack deployed by Service being The truth severely repressed being a a homosexual.76 homo~exual.~~ truth The about about Hoover's Hoovers probably probably severely repressedsexual sexuality is unlikely ever to be known. Later, much-publicized claims claims that he he was a gay cross-dresser cross-dresser whose whose wardrobe wardrobe included a a red red dress and boa, which made him him look like "an an old flapper," flapper,and a black dress, very fluffy, with flounces, and lace stockings, dress, "very fluffy, flounces, stockings," a black curly wig, rest on little little more than the the discredited testiwhich he wore with a testi perjurer, Susan Rosenstiel, Rosenstiel, who claimed to have seen Hoover so mony of a convicted perjurer, so attired. that Hoover and and his deputy, Clyde Clyde Tolson, Tolson, attired. Nor Nor is is there there any any reliable reliableevidence evidence that Hoover his deputy, who shared his house, ever had a homosexual relationship. But attempts to portray him less than him as as a a heterosexual heterosexual are are also also less than convincing. convincing. Hoover had no known female liaisons. As "Deke" DeLoach, acknowledges, probprob liaisons. As his his staunchly staunchly loyal loyal number number three, three, Deke DeLoach,acknowledges, ably person he had ever loved was was his his mother: "Hoover's capacity to feel feel ably the the only only person he had ever loved mother: Hoovers capacity to deeply human beings with her her in the Old Old Congressional Congressional deeply for for other other human beings [was] [was] interred interred with in the Cemetery "77 Cemetery near near Seward Seward Square. Square.77

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The commercial success, a more prurient period, period, of The later later commercial success, admittedly admittedly in in a more prurient of fanciful fanciful stories of Hoover Hoover at of his his stories of at gay gay transvestite transvestite parties parties suggests suggests that that in in fabricating fabricating stories stories of homosexual hit upon upon a homosexual affairs affairs in in the the late late 1960s 1960s Service Service A had had hit a potentially potentially promising promising active DeLoach was depressed to active measures measures theme. theme. DeLoach was later later depressed to discover discover how how readily readily such such stories stories were were accepted accepted as as "undeniable undeniable truth:" truth: "Tell Tell us us about about Hoover Hoover and and Tolson," Tolson, people people would would say. say. "Was Was it it obvious?" obvious? "Did Did everyone everyone know know what what was was going going on?"78 As sometimes sometimes happened, happened, however, however, Service ServiceA spoiled spoiled a a plausible plausible falsehood falsehood by by sur surrounding rounding it it with with improbable improbable amounts amounts of of conspiracy conspiracy theory. theory. It It sent sent anonymous anonymous let letMan, to the editors of leading ters, intended to appear to come from the Ku Klux Klan, newspapers, accusing in the FBI newspapers, accusing Hoover Hoover of personally personally selecting selecting for for promotionin the homosexuals from whom he he expected sexual favors. Not content with with turning turning the the FBI into "a allegedly been engaged for several a den of faggots," faggots, Hoover had also also allegedly several decades and the the State Department Department with with decades in in a a larger larger gay gay conspiracy conspiracy to to staff staff the the CIA and homosexuals.The national security security of the United UnitedStates, claimed homosexuals. claimed the letters, was now seriously seriously at at risk.79 risk.79Service Service 1\s As belief belief that that major major newspapers newspapers would would take take seriously seriously non nonsense especially Klux Klan, Man, was was graphic graphic evidence evidence sense of of this thiskind, kind, especially emanating emanating from from the the Ku Ku Klux society. The letters had, pre preof the limitations in its its understanding understanding of American society. dictably, dictably, no no observable observable effect. effect. victim the victim of of the the FBI's FBIs own own active active measures measureswas was the great great civil civil Luther King. Hoover's Hooversobsessive obsessive belief that King was "a atom cat rights leader Martin Luther with degenerate sexual criticism of sexual urges" urges and his simmering resentment at King's Kings criticism to make the preposterous allegation to a agroup group 1964 the FBI led him to ofofjournalists journalists in in 1964 country. When his staff urged him to that King "King is the most notorious liar in the country." insist his outburst off the "Feel free," insist that that his outburst was was off the record, record, Hoover Hoover refused. refused. Feel free, he he told told the the journalists, "to print my journalists, to my remarks remarks as as given." given. The The active active measures measures against against King King were were organized, organized, apparently without without Hoover's Hoovers knowledge, knowledge, by by FBI Assistant Assistant Director Director C. Sullivan. Sullivan. In December 1964 1964 Sullivan sent King a tape recording of of some William C. of his adulterous sexual liaisons liaisons which the Bureau had obtained by bugging his room Washingtons Willard Hotel. Hotel. With the tape was an anonymous letter which pur purin Washington's disillusioned former supporter: ported to come from a disillusioned
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area complete complete fraud and a great liabil liabilKing, look into your heart. You know you are all of us Negroes .. .. . havebeen beenour greatest leader. even at . You could have leader. You, even ity to all earlyage, age, have dissolute, abnormal an early have turned out to be a dissolute, abnormal moral imbecile .. .. .. You all time .. .. .. your hideous abnormaltherecord for for all are finished. finished. You will find on the abnormal evilness. a l l there on the therecord.80 record. ities .. .. .. What incredible evilness. It is all meaKing was probably the only prominent American to be the target of active mea claims by the CPUSA sures by both the FBI and the KGB. By the mid-1960s the claims

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Kings entourage would be able to leadership that secret Party members members within King's guidehis policies hollow.81To the the Centre's Centres dismay, dismay, King repeat"guide" policies had proved to be hollow.81 repeat edly edly linked linked the the aims aims of of the the civil civil rights rights movement not not to the alleged worldwide worldwide strug strugto the fulfillment of o f the AIll American gle against American imperialism imperialism but to erican dream and "the the magnificent magnificent words words of of the the Constitution Constitution and and the Declaration Declaration of of Independence." Independence. H e wrote in his inspirational "Letter Letter from Birmingham Jail" Jail in 1963: He 1963:
I have of freedom Bir have no no despair despair about about the the future future .. .. .. We We will reach the goal of freedom in Bir[Alabama] and all over the nation, because the goal of of America is mingham [Alabama] freedom .. .. ..We will win our freedom because the sacred heritage of of our nation and the eternal will of God are embodied in our echoing demands.82 demands.** Having given up hope of influencing King, the Centre Centre aimed instead at replacing leader. In August 1967 1967 the the Centre Centreapproved him with a more radical and malleable leader. Service A, Yuri Modin, former controller an operational plan by the deputy head of Service of cent Five, of the the Magnifi Magnificent Five, to to discredit discredit King King and his his chief chief lieutenants by placing placing arti articles the African reprinted in American newspapers, newspapers, cles in in the African press, press, which which could could then then be be reprinted in American portraying government subsidies portraying King King as as an an "Uncle Uncle Tom" Tom who who was was secretly secretlyreceiving receiving government subsidies threatening the the Johnson administo tame the civil rights movement and prevent it threatening adminis marches under the theadmiring admiring teletration. While leading freedom marches glare of worldwide tele allegedlyin close touch with with the thePresident.83 President.83 vision, King was allegedly The same operational plan also contained a series of of active measures measures designed to on the Negro issue." issue.The Centre authorized Modin: discredit US policy "on

To organize, the use the US, the organize, through through the use of of KGB residency residency resources in in the publication leaflets and appeals publication and and distribution distribution of of brochures, brochures, pamphlets, pamphlets, leaflets and appeals theNegro question denouncing the policy of the Johnson administration on the exposing the brutal brutal terrorist methods being used by the government to and exposing suppress suppress the the Negro rights rights movement. movement. To pro To arrange, arrange, via via available available agent agent resources, resources, for leading figures figures in in the thelegal legal profession discrediting the policy of Johnson fession to to make make public public statements statements discrediting the policy of the the Johnson administration administration on on the theNegro Negro question. question. To To forge forge and and distribute distribute through through illegal illegal channels a document showing that the John JohnBirch Society, Society, in conjunction with the theMinuteman Minutemanorganization, is developing of leading figures in the developing a a plan plan for for the the physical physical elimination of leading figures in the Negro Negro movement movement in in the the US.84 US.84

Service Service A sought sought to to exploit exploit the the violent violent images of of the the long, long, hot hot summers which began 965 with black Los Los Angeles Angeles ghetto, ghetto, which which began in in August August 1 1965 withrace race riots riots in in Watts, Watts,the theblack resulted deaths, left caused damage estimated at at over resulted in in thirty-six thirty-six deaths, left 1,032 1,032 injured injured and and caused damage estimated over 40 million dollars. The hoped that violence intensified intensified King King million dollars. The Centre Centre seems seems to to have have hoped that as as violence would aside by radicals such such as Stokeley Carmichael, Carmichael, who who told told a a would be be swept swept aside by black black radicals as Stokeley meeting the summer o of 1967, "We have a meeting of of Third Third World World revolutionaries revolutionaries in in Cuba Cubain in the summer f 1967, We have a

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common common enemy. enemy. Our Our struggle struggle is is to to overthrow overthrow this this system system .. .. ..We We are are moving moving into into open the United States." to North Vietnam, open guerrilla guerrilla warfare warfare in inthe United States. Traveling Traveling on onto North Vietnam, Carmichael Hanoi, We "We are We are are revolutionaries. revolutionaries. Carmichael declared declared in in Hanoi, are not not reformists reformists .. .. ..We We We want want to to change change the the American American system."8 5 King's 4, 1968 1968 was was quickly quickly followed followed by by the the violence violence and and Kings assassination assassination on on April April 4, rioting rioting which which the the KGB KGB had had earlier earlier blamed blamed King King for for trying trying to toprevent. prevent. Within Within a a week week riots erupted in in over hundred cities, riots had had erupted over a a hundred cities, forty-six forty-six people people had had been been killed, killed, 3,500 3,500 injured injured and and 20,000 20,000 arrested. arrested. To To "Deke" Deke DeLoach, DeLoach, it it seemed seemed that, that, "The The nation nation was was teetering on brink of of anarchy. "86 Henceforth, teetering on the the brink anarchy.86 Henceforth, instead instead of of dismissing dismissing King King as as an an Uncle Uncle Tom, Tom, Service Service A portrayed portrayed him him as as a a martyr martyr of of the the black black liberation liberation movement movement and and spread spread conspiracy conspiracy theories theories alleging alleging that that his his murder murder had had been been planned planned by by white white racists racists with with the the connivance connivance of of the the authorities.87 auth~rities.~ Simultaneously Simultaneously the the Centre Centre implemented implemented a a series series of of active active measures measures designed designed to to weaken weaken the the internal internal cohesion cohesion of of the the United United States States and and undermine undermine its its international international reputation reputation by by inciting inciting race race hatred. hatred. In In 1971 1971Andropov Andropov personally personally approved approved the the fabri fabrication ew cation of of pamphlets pamphlets full full of of racist racist insults insults purporting purporting to tocome come from from the the extremist extremist J Jewish ish Defense Defense League, League, headed headed by by Meir Meir Kahane, Kahane, calling calling for for a a campaign campaign against against the the "black black mongrels" mongrelswho, who, it it was was claimed, claimed, were were attacking attacking Jews Jews and and looting looting Jewish Jewish shops. shops. Thirty of Thirty pamphlets pamphlets were were mailed mailed to to a a series series of ofmilitant militant black black groups groups in in the thehope hope of pro producing ducing "mass mass disorders disorders in in New New York." York. At the the same same time time forged forged letters letters were were sent sent to to sixty black organizations giving fictitious details of atrocities committed by the sixty black organizations giving fictitious details of atrocities committed by the League League against against blacks blacks and and calling calling for for vengeance vengeance against against Kahane Kahane and and his his chief chief lieu lieutenants. the Centre's tenants. Probably Probably to to the Centres disappointment, disappointment, Kahane Kahane was was assassinated assassinated some some years years later, later, not not by by a a black black militant militant but butby by an an Arab. Arab. On at least one occasion, the Centre ordered O n at least one occasion, the Centre ordered the the use use of of explosives explosives to to exacerbate exacerbate racial racial tensions tensions in in New New York. York. On O n July July 25, 25, 1971 1971 the the head head of of the the FCD FCD First First (North (North American) Tikhonovich Kireyev, American) Department, Department, Anatoli Anatoli Tikhonovich Kireyev, instructed instructed the the New NewYork York res residency planting of idency to to proceed proceed with with operation operation PANDORA: PANDORA: the the planting of a a delayed-action delayed-action explosive Negro section explosive package package in in "the the Negro section of of New New York." York. Kireyev's Kireyevspreferred preferred target target was was "one one of of the the Negro Negro colleges." colleges.After After the the explosion explosion the the residency residency was was ordered ordered to to make make anonymous the anonymous telephone telephone calls calls to to two two or or three three black black organizations, organizations, claiming claiming that that the explosion explosion was wasthe the work work of of the the Jewish Jewish Defense Defense League.88 League.88 The The attempt attempt to to stir stirup up racial racial tensions tensions in in the the United United States States remained remained part part of of Ser Service vice .N.s As stock-in-trade stock-in-trade for for the the remainder remainder of of the the Cold Cold War. War. Before Before the the Los Los Angeles Angeles Olympics 1984,for for example, example, Line Line PR officers officers in in the the Washington Washingtonresidency residency mailed mailed Olympics in in 1984, bogus the Olympic committees bogus communications communications from from the the Ku Ku Klux Klux Klan Klan to tothe Olympic committees of of African the racial byService Service A for African and and Asian Asian countries.89 countries.89Among Among the racial taunts taunts devised devised by for inclusion inclusion in in the the mailings mailings was was the the following: following: THE THE WHITES THE OLYMPICS-FOR OLYMPICS-FORTHE W H I T E S ONLY! ONLY! African monkeys! monkeys! awaits you youin Los Angeles! Angeles! A grand reception awaits theOlympic games games by shooting at atblack moving moving targets. targets. We are preparing for the I n Los Los Angeles Angeles our own Olympic flames flames are are ready to incinerate you. The highIn

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est award for a true American patriot would be the lynching of of an African monkey. Blacks, Welcome to the the Olympic games in Los Angeles! Blacks, Well give you a reception youll never never forget! We'll you you'll forget!

measures on the same This and other active measures same theme made front-page news in many Attorney-General William French Smith denounced the letters as countries. When Attorney-General forgeries, Moscow predictably feigned righteous indignation at Washington's Washingtons KGB forgeries, slanders. anti-Soviet slanders. 90 anti-Sovietismin the the United United States changed radof "anti-Sovietism" rad ically at the thebeginning of the 1970s. 1970s.In 1968 1968 the Kremlin had been so anxious to prepre the veteran anti-Communist anti-Communist Richard Nixon that it it had hadsecretly vent the election of the subsidize the campaign of his Democratic opponent, Hubert Humphrey. offered to subsidize Humphrey.91 office, however, dktente. More Once in office, however, Nixon rapidly emerged as the architect of of detente. Soviet-American agreements were signed in 1972-3 Soviet-American 1972-3 than in in the the entire forty years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Washington. Washington. since Nixons resignation in August 1974, 1974, under threat of Nixon's of impeachment for his involveinvolve ment in in the the Watergate scandal, scandal, caused both dismay and deep suspicion in Moscow, Moscow. Nixons attempts to conceal the use of of dirty tricks against his Seen from the Kremlin, Nixon's acknowledged, "a a fairly natural thing thing to to do. Who Who opponents were, as Dobrynin later acknowledged, if it was a breach of the Constitution?" Constitution?The conspiracy theorists in the Centre Centre cared if convinced themselves pub themselves that Nixon's Nixons dramatic fall from power was was due far less less to pubto conspiracy by the enemies dktente-in par parlic indignation over Watergate than to enemies of of detente-in ticular the "Jewish lobby," who were campaigning for unrestricted emigration by Jewish lobby, SovietJews to Israel, Israel, and the military-industrial military-industrial complex, anxiousto preSoviet complex, which was anxious pre e ~ p e n d i t u 92 re.~~ vent lower arms expenditure. The gure in the anti-Soviet Centre's view, The key key fi figure in holding holdingtogether together the anti-Soviet coalition, in in the theCentres view, was the liberal Democrat, Senator Henry Scoop "Scoop" Jackson. Kissinger too regarded the indispensable link between the liberals, Jackson as "the liberals, preoccupied with human human conservatives, who became anxious rights [in the Soviet Union], and the conservatives, an.xious about any Soviets. "Jackson," Jackson, one commentator was not negotiations with the the Soviets." commentator has written, "was whatto to think, but the type of leader who needed an impassioned aide to tell him what think, but he he one anyway: anyway: Richard Perle, an intense, razor-sharp razor-sharp scourge of Soviets who, had one of the Soviets despite despite his his cherubic cherubic smile, smile, earned earned the the sobriquet sobriquet Prince Prince of ofDarkness from the thelegions legions battle. Perle was the leader of the KGB saw as he had engaged in bureaucratic battle." ofwhat the onCapitol Capitol Hill a particularly dangerous part of the Jewish lobby: lobby: an informal group on which lobbyists and which included included both both paid Israeli Israeli lobbyists and congressional congressional staffers.93 staffer^.'^ battle in August 1972 1972 by the Soviet announcement of Jackson was propelled into battIe of of their statean exit tax tax on emigrants, theoretically designed to repay the costs of state funded effect would would have been to reduce Jewish funded education education but but whose whose main main practical practical effect have been to reduce Jewish emigration to a trickle. In October Jackson introduced an amendment to the emigration to a trickle. In October Jackson introduced an amendment to the Nixon Nixon Soviet Union from receiving most-favored nation staTrade Reform Bill barring the Soviet sta tus tus and and trade trade credits credits until until it it had had lifted lifted restrictions restrictions on on emigration. emigration. Though Though Moscow Moscow
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quickly quickly dropped dropped the the exit exit tax, tax, Jackson Jackson maintained maintained his his amendment. amendment. For For the the next next two two years years Kissinger Kissingerconducted conducted a a shuttle shuttlediplomacy diplomacy between between Moscow Moscow and and Jackson, Jackson, trying trying vainly vainly to to obtain obtain enough enough Soviet Soviet concessions concessions on on Jewish Jewish emigration emigration to to persuade persuade Jackson Jackson to back down. "For a long time," said Kissinger later, "I did not realize that Jackson to back down. For a long time, said Kissinger later, I did not realize that Jackson could could not not be be placated."94 pla~ated.~ Dobrynin Dobrynin reported reported to to Moscow Moscow that that Jackson Jackson "kept kept escalating escalating his his demands" demands in in order order to to win win the the backing backing of of the the Jewish Jewish lobby lobby for for his his attempt attempt to towin win the the Democratic Democratic nomination at 1976 the 1976 election.95 The nominationatthe ele~tion.~ TheNew New York York resident, resident, Boris Boris Solomatin, Solomatin, informed informed the the Centre Centre that thatJackson Jackson appeared appeared to to be be in in a a strong strong position position for for the the presi presidential dential primaries: primaries: Jackson's point is during his ve years Jacksons strong strong point is the the fact fact that, that, during his nearly nearly thirty-fi thirty-five years in in Congress, Congress, he he has has never never been been involved involved in in any any sort sort of of political political or or personal personal scan scandal. dal. In In the the post-Watergate post-Watergate period period the the personal personal integrity integrity of of a a presidential presidential can candidate necessary to find some didate has has had had exceptionally exceptionally great great significance. significance. It I t is is necessary to find some stains stains on on the the Senator's Senators biography biography and and use use them them to to carry carry out out an an active active measure measure which which will compromise compromise him. him. We We must must discuss discuss with with the theAmerican American friends friends [the [the CPUSA] the most CPUSA] the most effective effective ways ways and and means means of of opposing opposing Jackson's Jacksons plans plans to to become become president president of of the the USA. USA. Others Centre cynically Others in inthe the Centre cynically concluded concluded that that Jackson's Jacksons reticence reticence about about his his private private life "probably probably points to the the existence existence of compromising information which could could be life used The KGB's KGBs search search for for "compromising compromising informa informaused to to discredit discredit him him and and his his family." family.The tion" tion was was extraordinarily extraordinarily wide-ranging. wide-ranging. Despite Despite the the fact fact that that Jackson's Jacksons parents parents had had left left Norway Norway as as long long ago ago as as 1885, 1885, the the Oslo Oslo residency residency was was ordered ordered in in 1974 1974 to tomake make a a detailed investigation investigation of his Norwegian relatives. relatives. As the American residencies exam examined ne toothcomb, ined Jackson's Jacksons long long political political career career with with a a fi fine toothcomb, the the most most promising promising area area le in records seemed to to emerge emerge was was his his sexuality. sexuality. Jackson's Jacksonsfifile in the theCentre Centre records that that his his which seemed marriage marriage at at the the age age of of forty-nine forty-nine "amazed amazed many many of of his his colleagues, colleagues, who who had had consid considconfirmed bachelor. Intensive KGB research, research, however, however, found no more ered him a confi rmed bachelor." incriminating incriminating evidence evidence of of homosexuality homosexuality than than the the fact fact that that for for many many years years Jackson Jackson inWashington Washington with a friend.96 had shared an apartment in with a male childhood friend.96 Lacking Lacking any any proof proof that that Jackson Jackson had had ever ever been been a a practicing practicing homosexual, homosexual, the the Cen Centre decided to fabricate fabricate it in an active active measure measure codenamed codenamed operation POROK. POROK. In tre 1976 Service Service A forged an FBI memorandum, dated dated June 20, 20,1940, 1976 1 940, in which Hoover reported reported to to the theAssistant Assistant Secretary Secretary of of Justice Justice that that Jackson Jackson was was a a homosexual. homosexual. Photo Photocopies of the forgery were sent to the Chicago Tribune, Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, Times, the copies the Chicago Topeka Topeka Capital and Jimmy Carter's Carters campaign headquarters. Service Service A also sought to to exploit a a number of incidents during during the the1976 1976 campaign. Mter After an argument primary campaign. exploit activist at aapress press conference conference in March, March, thathe he with aagay rights activist Jackson told him that did vote. During a television appearance appearance in April, Jackson declared declared that not want want his vote. homosexuality leads leads to the destruction of the family." family. The KGB sent these state state"homosexuality ments, to show ments, together together with with bogus bogus documents documents purporting purporting to show that that Jackson Jackson and and Perle Perle were members of a gay sex club, club, to, among among others: Senator Edward Kennedy, Kennedy, who

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personally hostile to Jackson;" Jackson; the columnist Jack Anderson; and the was thought "personally magazines magazines Playboy and Penthouse. Because of Jacksons Jackson's continuing influence on the ratification of of Soviet-American Soviet-American POROK arms limitation agreements, operation PO RO K continued long after he had failed to of the aims of 1977 was gain the Democratic nomination. One of of the operation during 1977 to incite the gay press press into attacking Jackson as a closet gay who hypocritically homosexuality in public for his own political advantage. advantage. Early in May aaSerattacked homosexuality Ser New York posted a forged FBI document to the California-based vice A officer in New magazine Gay Times reporting that that Jackson had been an active homosexual while the early 1940s. 1940s. Handwritten on on the theforgery was the working as a state prosecutor in the heading Our Gay the Senate. Like the rest of "Our Gay in the US Senate." of operation POROK, POROK, the forgery discernible effect on Jacksons career. had no discernible Jackson's career. Carter administration, which took office in target within the Carter 1977, was the Polish-born National National Security Adviser, Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, previ previ1977, c~ltivation.~ As Brzezinski later acknowledged, acknowledged, ously an ill-chosen KGB target for cultivation.97 State Cyrus Vance engaged in a a prolonged intense debate he and Secretary of State "prolonged and intense" the Soviet Soviet Union. The result, according to Vance, was wasan unstable balover policy to the bal ance between the "visceral visceralanti-Sovietism" anti-Sovietism of Brzezinski and his own "attempt attempt to to regance reg ulate "When Carter spoke on superpower^.^^ When ulate dangerous dangerous competition" competition between between the the superpowers.98 affairs, complained Dobrynin, the ambassador, "we we tended to hear foreign affairs," the Soviet ambassador, echoes of the anti-Sovietism of Br~ezinski.~~ The of Service A was to diminish echoes Brzezinski."99 The aim of Service Brzezinski's if possible, to engineer his dismissal. dismissaL Brzezinskis influence relative to Vance's Vances and, if The Centre ordered its American residencies to begin a trawl for potentially damdam aging information on Brzezinski as wide-ranging wide-ranging as that which preceded operation POROK. Was POROK. Was Brzezinski Brzezinski concealing concealing Jewish Jewish origins? origins? Was Was he he having having an an affair with the actress actress Candice Bergen? Bergen? Was there any compromising material on his relations with, special assistant Karl with, among among others, others, his his deputy deputy David David Aaron, Aaron, his his special Karl Inderfurth, Ambassador Richard Gardner and emigre community?100 and the thePolish CmigrC community?100 Though muckraking in the United States appears to have proved unproductive, the Brzezin the Centre Centre was was supplied with with what what it itbelieved believed was was sensational sensational evidence evidence of of Brzezinskis secret career in the CIA by the Bulgarian intelligence service. service. Probably under ski's pressure from his interrogators, Henrich Natan Natan Shpeter, a Bulgarian economist who had confessed to working for both American and Israeli intelligence, fcr both intelligence, produced a bizarre a visit Brzezinski, then then aa professor professor at bizarre account account of of a visit to to Bulgaria Bulgaria in in 1963 1963 by by Brzezinski, at University, as a guest of the Academy of Columbia University, of Sciences. Sciences. Shpeter allegedly claimed that claimed that Brzezinski Brzezinski was was a a CIA officer officer who contacted contacted him him by using a password, password, received further instructions for received intelligence intelligence from from him him and and gave gave him him further for intelligence intelligence operations. In Brzezinski had major operations. In addition, addition, even even in in 1963, 1963, according according to to Shpeter, Shpeter, Brzezinski had a a major role role in in framing framing US policy policy towards towards the the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Shpeter's Shpeters story, story,in short, short,was strikingly similar to those expected of defendants in trials. The Centre, however, however, was was easily easilyseduced by attractive conspir conspirStalinist show trials. of an active measure code codeacy theories and used Shpeters Shpeter's bizarre tale as the basis of named named operation operation MUREN. MUREN. Service Service A drafted drafted a a bogus bogus report report on Brzezinski Brzezinski by an an
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Israeli Israeli Zionist Zionist organization organization which which included included allegedly allegedlyauthentic authentic details details of of his his involve involvement ment in inShpeter's Shpeters espionage. espionage.The The report report went went on on to to denounce denounce Brzezinski Brzezinski as as "a asecret secret anti-Semite" anti-Semite and and declared declared that that the the Zionists Zionists had had compromising compromising information information on on his his private private life lifewhich which would would seriously seriouslydiscredit discredit him. him. The US US embassy embassy in in Israel, Israel, The Centre Centre decided decided to to deliver deliver this this bizarre bizarre document document to tothe the convinced that its contents were so sensational that they would be brought to convinced that its contents were so sensational that they would be brought to carter's carters as 1978 the aswell well as as Vance's Vancesattention. attention. On O n August August 20, 20,1978 thereport report was was inserted inserted through through the the half-open a street East half-open window window of of a a car car parked parked by by an an American American diplomat diplomat on on a street in in East 101 In Jerusalem. Jerusalem. In all all probability, probability,the the US US embassy embassy dismissed dismissed the the document documentas as the the work work of a mildly deranged conspiracy theorist. Service A, however, persuaded itself that of a mildly deranged conspiracy theorist. Service A, however, persuaded itself that itit had had succeeded succeeded in in putting putting Brzezinski's Brzezinskis career career in in jeopardy. jeopardy. It It seized seized on on press press articles articles during during and andafter after the the negotiation negotiation of of the the Camp CampDavid David agreement agreement between between Egypt Egypt and and Israel Israel in in September September 1978-which 1978-which appeared appeared to to show show that that Vance Vance had had established established him himself as Carter's selfas Carters main main foreign foreign policy policy adviser-as adviser-as proof proof that that Brzezinski Brzezinski had had been been demoted. 978 the demoted. In In November November 1 1978 the deputy deputy head head of of Service Service A, A, L. L. F. F. Sotskov, Sotskov, proudly proudly reported reported to to Andropov Andropov that that operation operation MUREN MUREN had had been been successfully successfully completed. completed. Though Though the the MUREN MUREN file file fails fails to to mention mention it, it, that that judgment judgment was was doubtless doubtless revised revised the following year. The hardening of Carter's policy to the Soviet Union was evident the following year. The hardening of Carters policy to the Soviet Union was evident 1 03 even of even before before the the Soviet Soviet invasion invasion of of Afghanistan Afghanistan at at the theend end of 1979. 1979.Io3
P Cold War War inspired PR RO OB BA AB BLY LY N NO O AM A ME ER RIICAN C A N policymaker policymaker at at any any time time during during the the Cold inspired quite quite as as much much fear fear and and loathing loathing in in Moscow Moscow as as Ronald Ronald Reagan Reagan during during his his first first term term as president. Active measures against Reagan had begun during his unsuccessful as president. Active measures against Reagan had begun during his unsuccessful bid bid for for the the Republican Republican nomination nomination in in 1976. 1976.The The Centre Centre had had no no doubt doubtthat thatReagan Reagan was was far either the incumbent president, the far more more anti-Soviet anti-Soviet than thaneither the incumbent president, Gerald Gerald Ford, Ford, or orthe Democratic the cases Democratic contender, contender,Jimmy Jimmy Carter. Carter. As As in in the casesof ofJackson Jackson and and Brzezinski, Brzezinski, Ser Service remarkably vice A Awas was ordered ordered to to embark embark on on aa remarkablywide-ranging wide-ranging quest quest for for compromising compromising material. an material. The The Centre Centre ordered, ordered, inter inter alia, alia, an investigation investigation of of reports reports that that Reagan's Reagans health During health had had been been affected affected by by his his father's fathers alcoholism.104 alcoholism.lo3 During his his childhood childhood Christ Christmases, mases, Reagan Reagan later later recalled, recalled,"there there was was always alwaysa a threat threathanging hanging over over our our family. family.We We knew holidays were the most likely time for Jack [Reagan senior] to jump off knew holidays were the most likely time for Jack [Reagan senior] to jump off the the wagon."10S But wagon.105 But such such painful painful childhood childhood memories memories were were not not the the stuff stuff of of which which suc successful cessful active active measures measureswere were made. made. Apart Apart from from confirming confirming Reagan's Reagans reputation reputation as as a a Cold Cold War Warwarrior, warrior, Service ServiceA A seems seems to to have have discovered discoverednothing nothing more more damaging damaging than than alleged weak intellectual A successfully successfullyplanted planted alleged evidence evidenceof of his his "weak intellectual capabilities." capabilities.Service ServiceA anti-Reagan where anti-Reagan articles articles in in Denmark, Denmark,France France and and India,106 India,lo6 where they they found found more more fertile fertile soil States, soil than than in inthe theUnited United States, but but it itis is barely barely conceivable conceivablethat that KGB KGB active active measures measures had 976. had any any influence influence on on Reagan's Reagans failure failure to to win win the the Republican Republican nomination nomination in in 1 1976. The The Centre Centrewas was less lessinvolved involvedin in trying trying to to influence influencethe the 1980 1980 presidential presidential election election than Moscow than it ithad had been been four four years years earlier. earlier. Moscow saw sawlittle little to tochoose choose between between what what it it now now saw administration hard saw as as a a Carter Carter administration dominated dominated by by Brzezinski's Brzezinskis hard line line policies policies and and Rea Reagan's uneasy gans long-standing long-standing anti-Sovietism. anti-Sovietism. "Fed Fed up up with with Carter Carterand and uneasy about about Reagan," Reagan, wrote wrote Dobrynin, Dobrynin, "it itdecided decided to to stay stay on on the the fence." fence.After After Reagan's Reagans election, election, Moscow Moscow quickly new quicklyregretted regretted its its fence-sitting, fence-sitting, convinced convincedthat that the the new administration administration represented represented

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the most conservative, conservative, chauvinist, chauvinist, and bellicose of American politics . press"the bellicose part of . .. . . press ing after the defeat in To ing for for the the restoration restoration of of American American world world leadership leadership after the defeat in Vietnam." Vietnam.To Dobryninsdismay, dismay, the Kremlin succumbed to a paranoid interpretation of Dobrynin's "paranoid interpretation" of Reagans Reagan's policy, fearful-particularly fearhl-particularly during 1983-that 1983-that he was planning aanuclear first strike. policy, Washington Dobrynin discovered from the Washington resident, Stanislav Andreyevich Androsov, the instructions for the vast KGB-GRU KGB-GRU operation RYAN designed to Reagans non-existent preparations for the surprise attack. But RYAN detect Reagan's so secret that most Soviet Soviet ambassadors ambassadors were kept in ignorance of it.107 remained so of it.107 I t was probably the extreme extreme priority attached by the Centre Centre to discrediting the It policies of the Reagan administration which led Andropov to decree policies decree formally on April 12, 12, 1982, 1982, as one of the last acts of of his fifteen-year fifteen-year term as chairman of of the KGB, that it "line" or itwas the duty duty of all foreign intelligence officers, whatever their line l OS Ensuring that department, department, to to participate participate in in active active measures. measures.08 that Reagan did not serve Service N.s As most important objective. objective. O n February 25, a second second term thus became became Service On 1983 1983 the the Centre Centre instructed instructed its its three three American American residencies residencies to to begin ,beginplanning planningactive measures to ensure ensure Reagan's 1984. Reagans defeat in the presidential election of November 1984. acquire contacts on the the staffs staffs of possiblepresidential candiThey were ordered to acquire of all possible candi dates party dates and and in in both both party headquarters. headquarters. Residencies Residencies outside outside the United UnitedStates were were told told thepossibility of sending agents to take part in inthis operation. The Cento report on the Cen tre made clear that any candidate, of either party, would be preferable to Reagan. Residencies around the world were ordered to popularize the slogan "Reagan Reagan Means Residencies War! The Centre announced five active measures Wad" measures theses "theses" to be used to discredit Reagan's Reagans foreign foreign policy: policy: his his militarist militarist adventurism; adventurism; his personal responsibility for for accelerating the arms race; his support for repressive repressive regimes regimes around the world; his accelerating administrations attempts to crush national liberation movements; movements; and his responsi responsiadministration's allies. Active Active measures measures"theses" theses,in bility for tension with his NATO allies. in domestic policy included included Reagan's Reagans alleged alleged discrimination against against ethnic ethnic minorities; minorities; corruption corruption in in his his administration; administration; and and Reagan's Reagans subservience subservience to to the the military-industrial military-industrial complex.109 complex.109 Reagan's Reagans landslide landslide victory victory in in the the 1984 1984election was was striking striking evidence evidence of of the the limi limitations O!l university tations of of Soviet Soviet active active measures measures within within the United States. States. ven Even on university and and college (admittedly less college campuses campuses Reagan Reagan was was surprised surprised by by the the (admittedly less than unanimous) unanimous) outpouring of affection affection and support:" support: "These These students studentsinin the "outpouring the eighties seemed so difdif O from those that I'd dealt with as governor a decade earlier."l1 ferent ferent from those that Id dealt with as governor a decade earlier. Though Though Service A was it could could do popular was never never willing willing to to admit admit it, it, there there was was little little it do to to undermine undermine a a popular president. and the the president. Its Its attacks attacks on on Reagan Reagan fell fell on on much much more more fertile fertile ground ground in in Europe Europe and Third the American way was frefre Third World, World, however, however, where where his his populist appeal to to the way was quently quently ridiculed. ridiculed.
the usually more more effective out the Main Main Adversary Adversary were were usually effective outside inside the States. One One of N.s most most successful successful tactics tactics was was its side than than inside the United United States. of Service Service As its use of documents shown confidence to leaders to to use of forgeries forgeries of of US documents shown in in confidence to Third Third World World leaders alert them to supposedly hostile operations against them by the CIA and other alert them to supposedly hostile operations against them by the and other American agencies. Since Since most most of never made the United American agencies. of these these forgeries forgeries were were never made public, public, the United States authenticity. One examStates was was not not usually usually able able to to challenge challenge their their authenticity. One characteristic characteristic examACT I V E M E AS ACTIVE A SU UR E ES S AGAI A G A IN NS ST T

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pIe the fi les noted the Republic ple in in the files noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was operation operation KULBIT KULBIT in in the Republic of of Guinea Guinea in in 1975. 1975. The The operation operation was was based based on on three three French French language language leaflets leaflets attack attacking Toure, allegedly ing the thegovernment government of of President President Sekou SekouTourC, allegedly produced produced by by the the CIA station station in capital, in the theGuinean Guinean capital, Conakry, Conakry, but but in inreality reality fabricated fabricated by by Service Service A in in Moscow. Moscow. To To heighten the dramatic dramatic impact impact of Conakry heighten the of the the forgeries, forgeries, the the Soviet Soviet ambassador ambassador in in Conakry telephoned telephoned the the Minister Minister of of Security, Security, Mussa Mussa Diakite, Diakite, at at6 6 p.m. p.m. on on October October 16, 16, 1975 1975 to special emissary had to tell tell him him that thata a special emissary had arrived arrived from from Moscow Moscow with with top topsecret secret informa information tion for for the the President President of of great great importance. importance. At At 9 9 p.m. p.m. the the ambassador ambassador and and O. 0. A. Seliskov, pres Seliskov, deputy deputy head head of of FCD FCD Directorate Directorate K, were were ushered ushered by by Diakite Diakite into intothe the presence ence of of Sekou Sekou Toure. Tour& Seliskov Seliskov handed handed the thePresident President the the three threefabricated fabricated CIA leaflets, leaflets, the level the first first of of which which began began with with an an attack attack on on the thehigh high level of ofGuinean Guinean unemployment. unemployment. According According to to the theKGB KGB file file on on operation operation KULBIT, KULBIT, on on seeing seeing the the reference reference to to unem unemployment, waved ployment, Sekou Sekou Toure TourC turned turned to toDiakite, Diakite, waved the the pamphlet pamphlet in in his his face face and and angrily angrily exclaimed, exclaimed, "The The filthy filthy imperialists!" imperialists!Seliskov Seliskov then then described described various various alleged alleged plots plots by by the the CIA CIA station station to to overthrow overthrow the the President, President, making making the the plots plots appear appear all all the the more more convincing convincing by by incorporating incorporating into into them themvarious various pieces pieces of of information information which which he he knew knew were the Guinean Guinean security were already already known known to to the security service. service. Sekou Sekou Toure, Toure, by by now now "in in an an emotional state," pounded poundedthe the table emotional state, table and and declared, declared, "We We will will take take decisive decisive action action against identified. within against the the US intelligence intelligence officers officers you youhave have identified. They They will will be beexpelled expelled within twenty-four hours!" When he calmed down, the President observed, as Service twenty-four hours!When he calmed down, the President observed, as Service A had had intended, intended, that that some some of of Seliskov's Seliskovs information information coincided coincided with with intelligence intelligence already already in in the the possession possession of of his his security security service.lll service. Sekou Sekou Toure Tour6 was was profuse prohse in in his his thanks thanks for for the the KGB disinformation: disinformation: "We We highly highly appreciate Soviet comrades. not Chile, appreciate the the concern concern shown shown by by our our Soviet comrades. This This is is not Chile, and and we we are are not not going goingto to allow allow the the same same events events [the [the overthrow overthrow of of the thePresident] President] to to happen happen in in our our country." country. He H e asked asked Seliskov Seliskov how how his his top top secret secret information information on on the the machinations machinations of of the and reliable sources in the United United the CIA, CIA, supposedly supposedly obtained obtained from from "important important and reliable sources in the States," discretion," replied graciously. States, should should \:>e be handled. handled. ''At At your your own own discretion, replied Seliskov Seliskov graciously. Sekou Sekou Toure TourC asked asked him him to to convey convey his his "deepest deepest gratitude" gratitude to to the the appropriate appropriate Soviet Soviet authorities imperialist threats the authorities and and asked asked to to be be kept kept informed informed about about future future imperialist threats to to the security security of of the the Guinean Guinean Republic.l12 The The fabrication fabrication of of compromising compromising US documents documents and and imaginary imaginary CIA plots plots con continued into the Gorbachev era. In addition to the "silent forgeries" shown privately tinued into the Gorbachev era. In addition to the silent forgeriesshown privately to to Sekou Sekou Toure Tour6 and and other othergullible gullible political political leaders leaders around around the the world, world, forgeries forgerieswere were used used to to promote promote media media campaigns: campaigns: among among them, them, in in 1987, 1987, a a forged forged letter letter from from the the DCI, DCI, William William Casey, Casey, on on plans plans to to overthrow overthrow the the Indian Indian prime prime minister, minister, Rajiv Rajiv Gandhi; Gandhi; in in 1989, a a fabri fabri1988, bogus bogus instructions instructions from from Reagan Reagan to to destabilize destabilize Panama; Panama; and and in in 1989, 1988, cated cated letter letter from from the the South South African African foreign foreign minister, minister, "Pik" Pik Botha, Botha, referring referring to to a a sin sinsecret agreement with with the the United UnitedStates.ll3 States.l13 ister but non-existent secret Probably Probably the the most most successful successful anti-American anti-American active active measure measure of of the the Gorbachev Gorbachev era, era, promoted was the the promoted by by a a mixture mixture of of overt overt propaganda propaganda and and covert covert action action by by Service Service A, was AIDS virus had been been "manufactured" manufacturedby American biological biological warfare warfare story that that the theAIDS story specialists specialists at at Fort Fort Detrick Detrick in Maryland. An An East East German, German, Russian-born Russian-born physicist, physicist, Professor ProfessorJacob Jacob Segal, Segal,claimed claimed on on the thebasis basis of of "circumstantial circumstantial evidence" evidence(later (later wholly wholly

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discredited) that AIDS AIDS had been artificially Fort Detrick Detrick from two two discredited) artificially synthesized at Fort HTLV-1. natural viruses, VISNA and HTLV1. Thus fortified fortified by spurious scientific jargon, the the AIDS fabrication fabrication not not merely merely swept swept through through the the Third Third World, but but took tookin insome of the Western Western media as well. In October 1986 1986the the conservative British Sunday story. During the thefirst six months of of 1987 1987 alone, Express made it its main front-page story. coveragein over forty Third World countries. the story received major news coverage however, the AIDS fabrication was compromised At the very height of its success, success, however, new thinking by a combination of Western protests and "new thinking" in Soviet foreign policy. policy. We tell the truth and nothing but but the the truth," truth, Gorbachev proudly proclaimed at a "We conference in July 1987. 1987. Faced with official official American protests and the Moscow press conference international scientific community, the Kremrepudiation of the AIDS AIDS story by the international scientific community, Krem signs of embarrassment at a successful active measures measures lin for the first time showed signs successful active campaign. was campaign. In In August August 1987 1987 US officials officials in in Moscow Moscow were were informed informed that that the the story story was officially disowned and Soviet ofit came to an abrupt halt. officially Soviet media coverage coverage of The AIDS fabrication, fabrication, however, however, was was swiftly followed by other, equally scurrilous scurriious by other, anti-American active measures measures in the the Third World, some of of which also seduced sec secalso seduced tions was the tions of of the the Western Western media. media. Among Among the the most most successful successful was the "baby baby parts" parts story, story, alleging alleging that that rich rich Americans Americans were were butchering butchering Third Third World World children in order order to use their bodies for organ transplants transplants in the United States. States. In September the bodies for September 1988 1988 a motion in the alleged traffi trafficking European Parliament condemning condemning the alleged cking in baby "baby parts, parts," proposed by of hands in a a poorly attended session.l14 a French Communist MEP, passed on aashow of sessionY4 active Even the end of the Cold Cold War War did little to diminish the enthusiasm for active measures both Kryuchkov, 1988, and measures of of both Kryuchkov, who who became became chairman chairman of of the the KGB in in 1988, and Leonid Leonid Shebarshin, Shebarshin, who who succeeded succeeded him him as as head head of of the FCD. Shebarshin, who who had had made his reputation as resident in India 1975 to part India from 1975 to 1977 1977in in part by the success of of his active active measures measures operations, was wont to speak "nostalgically nostalgically about the old days, days, about press. "115 about disinformation-forging disinformation-forging documents, documents, creating creating sensations sensations for for the the press.115 Not continuing enthusiasm enthusiasm for for Not all KGB personnel, personnel, however, however, shared shared their their chiefs' chiefs continuing active active measures. measures. Kryuchkov Kryuchkovcomplained in in September 1990 that that some FCD officers in "underestimate the importance role in both bothMoscow Moscow and and foreign foreign residencies residencies underestimate importance and andthe the role of measures designed He "Order of of the ofmeasures designed to to promote promote influence." influence. H e issued a a formal Order the Chairman the work work of of the foreign intelligence intelligence Chairman of of the the KGB" KGB requiring requiring "refinement refinement of of the the foreign service in the the field of active active measures" measures theirimportance importance intelliservice and insisting that "their inin intelli gence gence work work is is continuing continuing to togrow:" grow: In In effect effect the the joint joint political political and and operational operational scenario and and the the interests of of the Soviet society require KGB foreign foreign intelligence service to to Soviet state state and and its its society require the the KGB intelligence service introduce measures with ingenuity, inventiveness introduce active active measures with greater greater ingenuity, inventiveness and secrecy which will enhance the level of .. .. . Work oftheir effectiveness effectiveness . Work on onactive active measures measures is considered one KGB's foreign is to to be be considered one of of the the most important functions of of the the KGBs intelligence service. intelligence service. The instructed to to prepare prepare new new The FCD FCD training training school, school, the the Andropov Andropov Institute, Institute, was was instructed "specialist courses in measures." Among Among the the most most important important "themes" for specialistcourses in active activemeasures. themes for

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active active measures measures was was to to frighten frighten off off support support by by the the West-in West-in particular particular the the United United States-for nationalist movements in the Baltic republics and other parts the States-for nationalist movements in the Baltic republics and other parts ofof the Soviet Soviet Union: Union: In In Western Western government government and and political political circles circles and and in in influential influential emigre CmigrC groups, groups, it gamble on on it is is important important .. .. .. to to strengthen strengthen the the conviction conviction that that an an adventurist adventurist gamble disintegration of ofthe the Federation and statehood statehood would lead to a a dis disthe disintegration Soviet Federation contemporary international attendant unpreruptionof of contemporary international relations with the the attendant unpre 16 dictable dictable consequences.1 consequences.l6
Amid the theactive active measures measurespromoted by the the SVR in in the themid-1990s mid-1990s there there remained remained Amid promoted by some some echoes echoes of ofits its KGB past. past. Yeltsin's Yeltsins memoir, memoir, The Viewfrom Yiewfiom the Kremlin, Kremlin, published published two specially specially selected selected in the the West West in in 1994, 1994, ends ends with an an appendix which contains two examples of of KGB documents documents in the secret secret archives archives of of the the Russian One examples in the Russian president. president. One concerns the documents on concerns the assassination assassination of of John John F. F. Kennedy. Kennedy. The The KGB documents on this this topic, topic, Yeltsins attention by the SVR (then headed headedby Yevgeni Priprobably drawn to to Yeltsin's by Yevgeni Pri makov), support the formerly A that makov), support thetheory theory formerly propagated propagated by byService Service that Oswald Oswald had had been been selected by a "a group by selected as as the the assassin assassin by group of of Texas Texas financiers financiers and and industrialists industrialists headed headed by Hunt: millionaire Hunt:"

Oswaldwas was themost most suitable figure for executing a terrorist act against Kennedy Kennedy because because his his past past allowed allowed for for the the organization organization of of a a widespread widespread propa propaganda accusing the Union, Cuba, Cuba, and and the the US Communist Communist ganda campaign campaign accusing the Soviet Soviet Union, andthe the ofinvolvement in the theassassination. assassination. But .. .. .. Ruby and party ofinvolvement real instigators Kennedys murder murder did did not not take take into into account the fact fact that that Oswald Oswald suffered suffered of Kennedy's account the from psychiatric psychiatric illness. When Ruby Ruby realized realized that that after after aa prolonged interroga interrogafrom illness. When prolonged tion was capable capable of everything, Ruby Ruby immediately tion Oswald Oswald was of confessing confessing everything, immediately liqui liqui0 ~ w a l d1.7l ~ dated Oswald.1
ofthe Cold ColdWar War power than No conspiracy conspiracy theory of era seems seems to have greater staying power death of of President John that generated generated by the death President John F. Kennedy.

F F II FF TT EE EE l nl
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Bloc after the Second CommunistSoviet Bloc Second World War. Throughout eastern Europe, Communist services, set up in the theimage of the KGB and overseen-except overseen-except in controlled security services, Yugoslavia and Albania-by Albania-by Soviet "advisers," advisers,supervised supervised the transition to so-called Yugoslavia . peoplesdemocracies." democracies.Political development in most east European states followed "people's the same basic basic pattern. the same pattern. Coalition Coalition governments governments with with significant significant numbers numbers of of non nonCommunist with the the newly other communist ministers, ministers, but but with newly founded founded security security services services and and the the other main levers levers of of power power in in Communist Communist hands, were established immediately after after Germain hands, were established immediately Ger man forces forces had had been been driven driven out. out, Following Following intervals intervals ranging ranging from from a few few months months to man to three three years, years, these these governments governments were were replaced replaced by by bogus, bogus, Communist-run Communist-run coalitions coalitions Moscow. which paved the way for Stalinist one-party states taking their lead from Moscow.1 Communistleader Walter Ulbricht Ulbrichtannounced to his inner circle on The German Communist on April 30, 30,1945: to look demo demo1945: Its "It's got to his return to Berlin from exile in Moscow on cratic, but we must have everything under our control."2 control.2Because a democratic fas:ade faGade cratic, preservedthroughout eastern Europe, the theopen use offorce of force to exclude nonhad to be preserved non communist so far as possible, to be avoided. Communist Parties from power had, so avoided. Instead, the services took the new security services the lead in intimidation intimidation behind behindthe the scenes, using what became known in Hungary salami tactics-slicing off Hungary as "salami tactics"-slicing off one layer of opposition Finally, the one-party one-party people's peoples democracies, democracies, purged of of all visible dis disafter another. Finally, elections sent, were legitimized by huge and fraudulent Communist majorities in elections service^.^ rigged by the security services.3 Soviet Bloc, Soviet Soviet advisers advisers kept the new security During the early years of the Soviet services on aa tight services tight rein. The witch-hunts and show trials designed to eliminate of Tito and Zionism Zionism from the leadership of the ruling ruling mostly imaginary supporters ofTito Communist Parties of eastern Europe were orchestrated from Moscow. One of the Liszlo Rajk, in the alleged accomplices accomplices of the Hungarian Minister of the Interior, Laszlo executedin 1949, 1949,noted how, during his non-existent Titoist plot for which Rajk was executed officers of the Hungarian security service service smiled interrogation, officers "smiled a flattering, servile them and "reacted reacted to the most witless jokes of the the smile when the Russians Russians spoke to them" [MGB] officers officers with obsequious obsequious trumpetings of immoderate laughter."4 la~ghter.~ [MGB] Even Even after after Stalin's Stalins death, death, any any Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc intelligence intelligence officer officer of of whom whom the the KGB themwas Ernst Wollweber, Wollweber, head of the disapproved became became a marked man. man. Among them

Th e KGB and its T he its predecessors had played a crucial part in inthe the creation of the

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Soviet intelliintelli East German Stasi East German Stasi from from 1953 1953 to to 1957 1957, whose long long connection connection with with Soviet , whose gence back to 1930s, specializing in marine marine gence went went back to his his years years as as an an NKVD agent agent in in the the1930s, specializing in sabotage. Wollweber, however, had Moscow's habit issuing sabotage.Wollweber, however, had come come to to dislike dislike Moscows habit of ofissuing the KGB kept him ill-informed ill-informed on its peremptory orders and resented the fact that the operations operations in in West West Germany. Germany. The The KGB also also distrusted distrusted Wollweber's Wollwebers current current mistress, mistress, Clara Vater, a German Communist Communist who, like many of her comrades, had been unjustly imprisoned imprisoned during during Stalin's Stalins Terror.5 Terror. Remarkably, it placed placed both both her her and and her her unjustly Remarkably, it daughter, inside East daughter, whom whom Wollweber Wollweber had had adopted, adopted, under under surveillance surveillance inside East Germany. Germany. Wollweber succeeded in in 1957 the sycophantically Wollweber was was succeeded 1957 by by the sycophantically pro-Soviet pro-Soviet Erich Erich Mielke, Mielke, who remained remained in in office office with with Moscow's Moscows blessing until 1989, one of of the the who blessing until 1989, becoming becoming one worlds longest serving intelligence intelligence chiefs.6 chiefs. world's the pro the three three occasions occasions when when the the Red Red Army Army intervened intervened to to restore restore proSoviet orthodoxy orthodoxy in in a a wayward wayward Communist Communist state-Hungary state-Hungary in in 1956, 1956, Czechoslova CzechoslovaSoviet kia part in kia in in 1968, 1968, Afghanistan Afghanistan in in 1979-the 1979-the KGB played played a a prominent prominent part in what what was was euphemistically When the euphemistically termed termed the the process process of of "normalization." normalization.When theHungarian Hungarian upris upriswith mass demonstrations calling for free ing began in October 1956 1956 with free elections elections and the the withdrawal withdrawal of of Soviet Soviet troops, troops, the the KGB chairman, chairman, General General Ivan Ivan Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Serov, Serov, flew flewto to Budapest Budapest to to take take personal personal charge charge of ofKGB operations. operations. At At an an emergency emergency meeting denounced their meeting of ofsecurity security and and police police officers officersin in the theinterior interior ministry, ministry, Serov Serovdenounced their The fascists fascists and imperialists are reluctance to fire on the demonstrators: demonstrators: "The are bringing thestreets of Budapest, stillcomrades comrades out their shock shock troops into the Budapest, and yet there are still in countrysarmed forces forces who hesitate to use arms!" arms!Sandor Kopacsi, Kopicsi, the Budapest your country's chief of of police, police, who who was was soon soon to to side side with with the the freedom freedom fighters, fighters, replied replied scornfully: scornfully: chief
O N EEAC A C HH O F

Evidently the comrade adviser from Moscow has not yet had time to inform himself of the situation in our our country. We need to tell him that that these are not himself fascists or other "fascists" other imperialists "imperialists" who are organizing the demonstration; they come from the universities, the handpicked sons and daughters of peasants and workers, the the fine fine flower flower of of our our country's countrys intelligentsia intelligentsia which which is is demanding demanding its its workers, 7 rights . .. .7
. .

vividlyrecalled recalledthe long, withering glare in A quarter of a century later Kopicsi Kopacsi still vividly Serovs steel-blueeyes. his direction from Serov's eyes. Shortly before Kopicsi Kopacsi escaped to the the told him, Im you hanged from the highest tree in Buda BudaWest, Serov told "I'm going to have you pest! On O n the evening of November 3, 1956 a Hungarian delegation headed by Pal Pi1 pest!" 3, 1956 wasinvited invitedto Soviet military headquarters at Tokol Maleter, the minister of defense, was discuss final details of the Red Army's Armys withdrawal from Hungarian soil. At mid midto discuss Serov, brandishing a Mauser pistol, burst into night, while toasts were being drunk, Serov, the head of a group of KGB officers and arrested Maleter M a k e r and his colthe room at the col A series of mock executions over the next few hours convinced each member leagues. leagues. over few of the Hungarian delegation that all his hiscolleagues colleagues had been shot.8 shot.8 At 4 a.m. on November 4 the Red Army began the suppression of the Hungarian uprising. Serov

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deputy, KGB General K. Grebennik, who who became military and his deputy, military commandant commandant of Budapest, stayed on to supervise supervise the "normalization."9 normali~ation.~ it untilafter the Prague Spring of that the interThough it was not until of 1968 1968 that the Red Army inter enforce Soviet Soviet ideological ideological orthodoxy, orthodoxy, Moscow showed growing anxi anxivened again to enforce 1960s at increasing ety during the the 1960s increasing Western influence within within the the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Bloc. The The reported that that the theWest West was engaged engaged in in wide-ranging subversiveactivity in the the KGB reported was wide-ranging "subversive activity in ideological sphere against the socialist countries .. . political and ideological .. . seeking to persuade Western way of of life." life.The "subversion" subversiontook the population of the superiority of the Western forms: broadcasting, propagandist publications, information distributed distributed by many forms: embassies, East-West East-West cultural and scientific scientific exchanges, letterWestern embassies, exchanges, tourism and letter Centres view, Western radio stations such as the BBC World Service writing. In the Centre's immense harm" harm by broadcasting propaganda and Radio Liberty threatened to cause cause "immense designed to weaken the fraternal ties between the Soviet Union and the socialist socialist Europe. What most worried the KGB was that the states of eastern Europe.lO "the broadcasts broadcasts people. According to statistics prob probwere popular with the intelligentsia and young people." W , over 20 per cent of of young people in ably obtained from its Hungarian ally, the AVH, Hungary listened to Western radio stations.ll stations. During 1964 1964 approximately fifty mil million postal items were exchanged between Hungarian citizens and the West, eight in 1963. 1963. also exercised exercisedby by million more than in The KGB was also the growth in east EuroEuro with subversive ideas.In pean visitors to the West, who were in danger of of returning with subversive ideas. 1964 168,000 Hungarians and 150,000 Czechoslovaks Czechoslovaks visited Western countries. 1964 Centres view, many were unsupervised during their Worse still, in the the Centre's their visits. The itsPolish ally, ally,the SB, no officers officers in KGB complained that its SB, had no in its foreign foreign residencies residencies responsible for monitoring monitoringthe the who were responsible behavior of of Polish tourists tourists and and Poles Poles studystudy 1964 34,500 Poles traveled to the West as individuals ing abroad. abroad. In 1964 individuals rather than as 12 groups.12 members of groups. statistics of ofharmll attitudes and hostile acts The KGB kept somewhat bizarre statistics "harmful attitudes" "hostile acts" in the Soviet Bloc, which it tended to lump together: such disparate phenomena as enthusiasm ideological deviation. In both 1965 enthusiasm for Western pop music with cases of ideological deviation. 1965 and 1966 Hungarian young people were were said saidto have been been guilty of 1966 of approximately 87,000 87,000 harmful attitudes" attitudesand "hostile hostile acts." acts. According to classified officialstatistics, "harmful classified official statistics, the figfig fellreassuringly, reassuringly, if surprisingly,to 68,000 in 1968 ure fell if somewhat surprisingly, 1968 and remained at about that level for the next decade. Disturbingly, however, however, about 30 per cent of of the cases cases 1 recorded ofof the Komsomol. 3 recorded concerned concernedmembers members the Communist Communist youth youth organization, organization, Komsom01.l~ The West's Wests subversive activities," activities, complained one KGB report, were harming "The "harming Socialist construction" constructionthroughout throughout the the Soviet Bloc, encouraging nationthe cause of Socialist nation alist tendencies in the the states of eastern Europe and damaging their ties with the the Soviet Union. The greatest harm was being done among the intelligentsia and young Soviet among the an unhealthy tendency" tendency among writers towards ideological people. The KGB noted "an "ideological co-existence with the West West and and aagrowing belief co-existence" belief that that literature was was no no business business of of the to set set up up independent independent non-Party non-Party the Party. Party. Students Students showed showed a a worrying worrying tendency tendency to free discussion discussion on the themodel of organizations for "free of English clubs. clubs." One undated KGB report picked out two subversive subversive texts currently attracting growing interest: The "growing interest:"

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New works New Class Classby by the the heretical heretical Yugoslav Yugoslav Communist Communist Milovan Milovan Djilas, Djilas, and and the the works of of the the late late nineteenth-century nineteenth-century German German philosopher philosopher Friedrich Friedrich Nietzsche.14 Nietzsche.14 It is is easy easyto to see see why why Djilas's Djilass devastating devastating expose expos6 of of the the Soviet Soviet system system as as a a co-optive co-optive oligarchy oligarchy run run by by a a privileged privileged Party Party nomenklatura nomenklatura should should have have been been seen seen as as so so subver subversive. sive. In In 1963 1963 the the twenty-year-old twenty-year-old Russian Russian dissident dissident Vladimir Vladimir Bukovsky Bukovsky was was sent sent to to psychiatric psychiatric hospital hospital for for possessing possessing a a copy copy of of it. it. Even Even for for KGB officers officers The The New New Class Class was was seen seen as as a a potentially potentially dangerous dangerous text. text. When When General General Oleg Oleg Kalugin Kalugin finally finally read read the the book book in in the the KGB library library in in 1981, 1981, twenty-four twenty-four years years after after its its publication publication in in the the West, himself West, he hefound found himself secretly secretly agreeing agreeing with with it.iS it. Why Why Nietzsche Nietzsche should should have have been been mentioned mentioned in in the the same same breath breath as as Djilas Djilas is is more more puzzling. puzzling. His His call call for for a a "revaluation revaluation of of all all values" values so so that that the the life life force force of of the the strongest strongest should should not not be be hampered hampered by by the the weak, Stalinism, was weak, though though bearing bearing some some relation relation to to the theactual actual practice practice of of Stalinism, was ideolog ideological the works ilas , were ical anathema. anathema. But But the works of of Nietzsche, Nietzsche, unlike unlike those those of of Dj Djilas, were scarcely scarcelylikely likely to to subvert subvert the the youth youth of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Bloc.The The author author of of the the KGB KGB report report probably probably knew knew no was no more more about about the the great great German German philosopher philosopher than than that that he he was a a well-known well-known enemy enemy of of Marxism. Marxism. The rst stirrings -1960s, however, The fi first stirrings of of reform reform in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia in in the themid mid-l960s, however, caused caused relatively The relatively little little concern concern in in the theCentre. Centre. The chief chief target target of of the the reformers, reformers, the the aging aging and and truculent Party (CPCz) was truculent Czechoslovak Czechoslovak Communist Communist Party (CPCz) leader, leader, Antonin Antonin Novotny, Novotny, was increasingly increasingly regarded regarded in in Moscow Moscow as as a a neo-Stalinist neo-Stalinist nuisance nuisance rather rather than thanas as a a bulwark bulwark against against revisionism. revisionism. In In December December 1967 1967 Brezhnev Brezhnev made made an an unscheduled unscheduled one-day one-day visit visit to to Prague Prague at at the therequest request of of Novotny, Novotny,who who was was under under pressure pressure to to relinquish relinquish the the post post of of First had hitherto hitherto combined that of First Secretary, Secretary, which which he he had combined with with that of president. president. Brezhnev Brezhnev refused the problem refused to to intervene, intervene, telling telling Novotny Novotny bluntly bluntly to to deal deal with with the problem himsel16 himself.16 Deprived Deprived of of Soviet Soviet support, support, Novotny Novotny gave gave way wayto to the the reformers. reformers. The The election election of of the the 46-year-old 46-year-old Alexander Alexander Dubcek DubEek as as the the new new First First Secretary Secretary on on January either the the Kremlin Centre. January 5, 5, 1968 1968 initially initially aroused aroused no no disquiet disquiet in in either Kremlin or or the the Centre. Dubcek hon DubEek had had spent spentmost most of of his his childhood childhood in in the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, graduating graduatingwith with honors ors from from the the Moscow Moscow Higher Higher Party PartySchool School in in 1958, 1958,and and was was condescendingly condescendingly known known within within the the KGB as as "Our Our Sasha." Sasha.When When the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak attempt attempt to to create create "Social Socialism ism with with a a human human face" face began, began, the the FCD Eleventh Eleventh (East (East European) European) Department Department at at fi rst concluded "bourgeois ele first concluded that that "Our Our Sasha" Sashawas was being being cleverly cleverly manipulated manipulated by by bourgeois elements" became ments in in the theCPCz. CPCz. Once Onceit it became clear clear that that Dubcek DubEek was was himself himself one one of of the themov moving ing forces forces behind behind the the reforms, reforms, the the Centre Centrefelt felt a a sense sense of of personal personal betrayal.17 betra~a1.l~ Dubcek DubEek believed, believed, in in retrospect, retrospect, that that Moscow Moscow took took aasecret secret decision decision to to use use the the Red Red Army to crush the the Prague Prague Spring Spring little little more more than than two two months months after after he he succeeded succeeded Army to crush Novotny: Novotny:
his predecessors, predecessors, the Soviets Soviets had been permitted to con conUnder Novotny and his trol the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak armed armed forces forces and and secret secret police police in in various various ways, ways, which which trol included included an implicit "right" rightto approve approve key appointments. It was apparently not proxies might be fired and re reuntil mid-March mid-March that that they realized that their their proxies their consent and decided to step in.iS in.* placed without their

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In remained unsure In reality reality Brezhnev Brezhnev remained unsure about about the the wisdom wisdom of of military military intervention intervention until until almost the prime minister, minister, Alexei Kosygin, almost the eve eve of of the the August August invasion. invasion. The The Soviet Soviet prime Alexei Kosygin, Brezhnevs doubts.19 doubts. Both, however, however, gradually way to the the hardshared some of Brezhnev's gradually gave gave way hard the Politburo. liners in the The intervention was Politburo meeting on on March The case case for for military military intervention was first first put put at atthe the Politburo meeting March 21 by Shelest, who who declared declared that that the 21 by the the Ukrainian Ukrainian Party Party secretary, secretary, Petr Petr Yefimovich Yefimovich Shelest, the fate of of the the whole whole "socialist socialist camp" camp was was at at stake stake in the Prague Prague Spring. it was was fate in the Spring. Though Though it "essential to seek out more actively, actively," essential to seek out the thehealthy healthy [pro-Soviet] [pro-Soviet] forces forcesin in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakiamore military measures" measures would also he argued that "military also be benecessary. necessary. Shelest was vigorously Andropov, who called for concrete measures supported by the KGB chairman, Yuri Andropov, "concrete measures" 20 Though to prepare for armed intervention. intervention.20 Though as only a as yet yet only a candidate candidate (non-voting) (non-voting) to member of the Politburo, Politburo, Andropov became an increasingly influential voice during Czechoslovak crisis, the Czechoslovak crisis, willing to challenge Kosygin and other more senior figures appeared reluctant to use force.21 force.21 who appeared As Soviet ambassador in Budapest in 1956, 1956, Andropov had played a key role in suppressing the Hungarian Revolution. His insistence that the of counter countersuppressing Hungarian Revolution. the threat threat of stage helped aninitiall initially revolution had reached a critical stage helped to persuade an y reluctant KhrushKhrush intervention.2 An admiring junior junior diplomat in the Soviet chev to agree to military intervention.22 Soviet seethrough" through the reformist embassy later recalled how Andropov had been the first to "see minister, Imre Nagy, and had had seemed prime minister, seemed completely completely in in control of of events even even as as Soviet tanks entered Budapest: so calm-even calm-even when Soviet Budapest: He "He was so when bullets were flying, flying, when everyone everyone else were else atthe the embassy felt like we were inaa besieged fortress."23 As well advocate offorce, as being an uncompromising advocate force, Andropov had demonstrated demonstrated his mastery the Red Red Army was being being mastery of of deception, deception, successfully successfully persuading persuading Nagy Nagy that that the Army was withdrawn while while simultaneously simultaneously plotting plotting his overthrow. When When the theHungarian withdrawn his overthrow. Hungarian commander-in-chief phoned the Minister's office early to re commander-in-chief phoned the Prime Prime Ministers office early on on November November 4 to report him, Ambassador ''Ambassador Andropov is with assures port the theSoviet Soviet attack, attack, Nagy Nagy told told him, Andropov is with me me and and assures theres been the Soviet government me there's been some some mistake and the government did did not order order an attack attack on MOSCOW.~~ Hungary. The Ambassador and I are trying to call Moscow."24 In Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia in 1968, 1968,as in Hungary Hungaryin in 1956, Andropovs 1956, Andropov's strategy was based on Among the main of on aa mixture mixture of of deception deception and and military military might. might. Among the main instruments instruments of the Prague Spring were KGB illegals, all all disguised as Westerners. deception during the Westerners. Their the first henceforth termed termed Their deployment deployment in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia in in the first of of what what were were henceforth PROGRESS KGBs use of illegals. PROGRESS operations marked a major innovation in the the KGB's of illegals. Hitherto been sent sent overwhelmingly to the the West Westrather rather than than the the East. Hitherto illegals illegals had had been overwhelmingly to East. Most had been sent sent on on missions missions (codenamed Most of of those those deployed deployed within within the theSoviet Soviet Bloc Bloc had been (codenamed BAYKAL) either to cultivate cultivate Western tourists or to monitor contacts BAYKAL) contacts between Soviet citizens 1966 and for example, sent citizens and and Westerners. Westerners. In In 1966 and 1967, 1967, for example,a a number number of of illegals illegalswere were sent Black Sea Searesorts resortsto mingle with the growing growing number of holito Bulgarian Black of Western holi recruit^.^' The illegal illegal Stanislav Stanislav Federovich daymakers and look for possible possiblerecruits.25 daymakers Federovich Malotenko areas of Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia posing visited tourist areas of Ukraine, Bulgaria, posing as a willingly women women agents agents agreed Western Western visitor visitor in in order order to to investigate, investigate, inter alia, alia,"how how willingly agreed to have have intimate with foreigners foreigners without to intimate relations relations with without permission permission" from from the the KGB.26 KGB.26

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the illegals, posing as Western tourists, journalists, business During the Prague Spring illegals, a country country people and students, were for the first time used in significant numbers in a of of the theSoviet Soviet Bloc Bloc for for both both intelligence intelligence collection collection and and active active measures. measures.Czechoslovak Czechoslovak believed, would be much franker in revealing counter-revolutionaries, the Centre Centre believed, their subversive subversive designs to those they believed Western sympathizers than to their their neighbors the PROGRESS PROGRESS operation neighbors in eastern eastern Europe. Even within the the FCD the operation in in Czechoslovakia was was known known only only to to aa small small circle circle of of senior senior officers. officers. Initially Initially the the Czechoslovakia PROGRESS waskept in the the office of the thehead of of Directorate S (Illegals), (Illegals), GenPROGRESS file was Gen Czechoslovakia expanded, eral Anatoli Ivanovich Lazarev, though, as operations in Czechoslovakia 27 groupwithin withinthe the privy to the the secret also widened. widened.27 the group directorate who were privy O f the first twenty illegals illegals selected Of selected by the Centre Centre for PROGRESS operations 28 at least fi Czechoslovakia during 1968, 1968,28 five SADKO, SEVIDOV, SEVIDOV, in Czechoslovakia ve (GROMOV, SADKO, and VLAS)29 VLAS)29and and probably probably another another two (GURYEV and and YEVDOKI YEVDOKIVLADIMIR and MOV)30posed posed as as West West Germans. Germans.There There were were also also three three bogus bogus Austrians Austrians (ARTYO (ARTYOMOV?O VIKTOR)31 (BELYAKOV, USKOV and MOVA, DIM and VIKTOR)31 and three bogus Britons (BELYAKOV, VALYA),32two two fictitious fictitious Swiss Swiss (ALLA33 (ALLA33 and SEp34), SEP34), one Lebanese Lebanese (YEFRAT35) (YEFRAT3) and one VALYA),32 oneMexican (ROy36).37 (R0Y36).37 March, Andropov ordered that by May 12 and one Probably in March, 12 theillegals illegals should be deployed deployed in Czechoslovakia-more Czechoslovakia-more than had had at least fifteen of the ever ever been been despatched despatched to to any any Western Western country countryin inso so short short a aperiod period of of time. time. Each Each was was enough given monthly allowance dollars as as well well as as travel travel expenses expenses and and enough given a a monthly allowance of of 300 dollars 8 rent an apartment.3 apartment.38 money to rent Andropov also expanded the KGB legal representation in Prague. In addition to office, headed by M. G. the KGB liaison office, G. Kotov, which had been operating in the the headquarters theStB StB (its (its Czechoslovak headquarters of of the Czechoslovak equivalent) equivalent) for for the the past past twenty twenty years, years, residency, headed by V. V. secretly established an undeclared KGB residency, Andropov secretly Surzhaninov, which began work in the Soviet embassy on April 26.39 26.39The deputy Surzhaninov, head of FCD Directorate S, S, G. Borzov, and another senior Line N offi officer, G. F. Borzov, cer, V. K. Umnov, were sent to the residency to co-ordinate the work of the il1egak4O The main Umnov, the co-ordinate illegals.40 residencys Line PR and of of the KGB liaison with the StB was to task both of the residency's identi5 reliable, pro-Soviet members of the CPCz to form a quisling government identify invasion. At the top topof their list the KGB put four hardline members of after a Soviet invasion. Presidium-Alois Indra, Jozef Jozef Lenart, Lenirt, Drahomir Kolder and Vasil the CPCz Presidium-Alois Bilak-and a former minister of the interior, Rudolf Rudolf Barak, Bargk, who had hadbeen dismissed Bil'ak-and 1962,officially officially for embezzlement of Party funds but in inreality for and imprisoned in 1962, using the StB StB to collect an incriminating dossier on Novotny.41 Novotnf.41 KGB officers in Prague had little difficulty in arranging meetings with Indra, Indra, Lenirt, Kolder and Bil'ak, Bilak, who were regular visitors visitors to the embassy. It was Lenart, the Soviet embassy. risky, however, however, considered too risky, to approach Barak directly after his release from prison the KGB residency used a female illegal, Galina Leonidovna early in May. Instead, the Swiss passport in the Linitskaya (codenamed ALLA), operating operating with aa Swiss the name name of vivacious Maria Werner, to make the first approach to Barak. For some years the vivacious specialized in making contact with Western Western visitors visitors to the the Soviet Soviet Union ALLA had specialized interest to tothe theKGB. Her KGB file primly complains that she was "too too who were of interest stimulated and, despite having a daughter, "not not aafamily person sexually stimulated" person" (not aacrit-

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icism which appears appears in the thefiles of male illegals). illegals).ALLA had first met Barik in1961, Barak in 1961, when succeeded in renewing contact contact with with him him when he he was was minister minister of of the the interior, interior, and and succeeded in renewing ALLAs request, Barik soon after his release from prison. At ALLA's Barak agreed to a meeting S. Ivanov of the KGB residency.42 residency.42 with B. S. Indra, of the neo-Stalinist Indra, Lenirt, Lenart, Kolder and Bilak Bil'ak were all to prove stalwarts of regime presided over "Socialism with regime which which later later presided over the the destruction destruction of of Socialism with a a human human face." face. Barik, however, however, proved proved far less useful than the Barak, the Prague residency had hoped, hoped, partly partly because ofresentment-even resentment-even by some pro-Soviet of the the CPCz CPCz leaderleader because of by some pro-Soviet members members of ship-at his brutality as minister of the the interior when he had had been in charge of ship-at of the StB. H e was not fully rehabilitated until 1975, 1975, seven seven years his release release from StB. He years after after his from prison.43 prison.43

deployed main tasks: tasks: to penetrate deployed in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia had had two two main to penetrate the springing up the allegedly allegedly counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary groups groups springing up during during the thePrague Prague Spring Spring in in order their subversive and to to implement implement aa series active order to to report report on on their subversive intentions; intentions; and series of of active to measures designed to discredit them. The main task of penetration was entrusted to YEFRAT, GURYEV, GURYEV, YEVDOKIMOV, YEVDOKIMOV, GROMOV and SADKO.44 SADK0.44Their YEFRAT, Their chief the Centre Centresaw as the main sources sources of ofsubversive subversive ideas: targets were what the ideas:
TH E KGB L L E GA L S B I ILLEGALS

the chairman, Eduard Eduard Goldst cker, and and the Union Union of of Writers Writers (in (in particular particular its its chairman, Goldst A Acker, vice-chairman, Jan celebrated vice-chairman, Jan Prochazka, Prochizka, and andthe the celebrated authors authors Pavel Pave1 Kohout Kohout and and Milan Milan Kundera); Kundera); radical journals which escaped Communist control such the Union Union radical journals which had had escaped Communist control such as as the LiterarniListy SvoBodne slovo, as well as Writers Literdrnf Listy and the Socialist Partys Party's Svobodne of Writers' the increasingly increasingly unorthodox Communist Party Partynewspaper, Rudeprdvo; the unorthodox Communist newspaper, Rudeprhvo; leading reformists in television and radio (in particular Jii-i Jifi Pelikin, Pelikan,the the director-general director-general of of Czechoslovak Czechoslovak television); television); University, especially Charles University, especially its philosophy philosophy department, department, which which took took the the lead in pressing pressing for a new law protecting academic academic freedom, and leading activists such as Lubomir Holecek HoleEek and Jifi Jii-i Maller; student activists Maller; 1, a club of former political prisoners who had been jailed under the K-23 1, notorious criminal code; code; notorious Article Article 231 231 of of the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak criminal non-Party activists, formed KAN, the club of non-Party formed in in early April April to to give those those who were not Party members members the opportunity opportunity to to participate in in public life and share in the thebuilding of "a a new political system-hitherto system-hitherto never neverrealized realized in socialism;" in history-democratic history-democratic socialism; and to recover the independent and the the Socialist Socialist and and People's Peoples Parties, Parties, struggling struggling to recover the independent existence coup in in 1948. 1948.45 existence they they had had lost lost after after the the Communist Communistcoup

One of defining moments moments of Spring, which epitomized the the new new One of the the defining of the the Prague Prague Spring, which epitomized climate political freedom official censorship, was the the May climate of of political freedom and and the the near-collapse near-collapse of of official censorship, was May Day the capital, seen on on television television throughout throughout the the country. country. InIn Day procession procession through through the capital, seen stead admiration for leadership stead of of the the usual usual tedious tedious display display of of sycophantic sycophantic admiration for the the Party Party leadership and Soviet Union, Union, there was a a and platitudinous platitudinous slogans slogans celebrating celebrating friendship friendship with with the the Soviet there was

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spontaneous spontaneous celebration celebration of of popular popular support support for for the the reform reform movement movement combined combined with with irreverent messages for Moscow such as the banners proclaiming "With the Soviet irreverent messages for Moscow such as the banners proclaiming With the Soviet Union a day Union for for ever-but ever-but not not a day longer!" longer! and and "Long Long live live the the USSR-but USSR-but at at its its own own expense!" deep emotion," "truly touched" expense! Dubcek Dubzek remembered remembered the the day day "with withdeep emotion, truly touched by support for 1 and by the the support for him him from from the the former former political political prisoners prisoners of of K-23 K-231 and the the non nonParty activists of KAN. For Moscow, however, the day was an outrageous counter Party activists of KAN. For Moscow, however, the day was an outrageous counterrevolutionary that the Czechoslovak revolutionary provocation provocation which which demonstrated demonstrated that the Czechoslovak one-party one-party state state was was in in mortal mortaldanger.46 danger.46 The The danger danger was was all all the the greater greater because, because, in in the the Centre's Centres view, view, the the StB StBwas was becom becomC ing noire in Oldrich ernik's ing increasingly increasinglyunreliable. unreliable. Probably Probably Moscow's Moscows leading leading bite bite noim in Ol&ich Cerniks government, which took power in April, was the interior minister, Josef Pavel, government, which took power in April, was the interior minister, Josef Pavel, who who was was responsible responsiblefor for the the StB. StB. Ironically, Ironically,the the KGB KGB placed placed much much of of the the blame blame for for Pavel's Pavels appointment on Lubomir S trougal, who appointment on Lubomir Strougal, who later later turned turned against against the the reformists reformists and and played in in thethe return to pro-Soviet orthodoxy. played a a prominent prominentpart part return pro-Soviet to orthodov. According According to to aareport report in trougal came ernik's office in the the KGB KGB flies, files, S Strougal came into into C Cerniks office soon soon after after his his appointment appointment as as prime bugged, prime minister minister and, and, fearing fearing that that the theoffice officewas was bugged, asked asked him him to tocome come for for a a stroll stroll by Vltava, which the center by the the river river Vltava, which runs runs through through the center of of Prague. Prague. During During their their walk walk S trougal urged ernik to Strougal urged C Cernik to give give Pavel Pavel the the interior interior ministry. ministry. Because Because Pavel Pavel had had spent spent S some trougal argued some years years in in prison prison during during the theearly early 1950s, 19.50~~ Strougal argued that that he hecould could be be relied relied upon the police StB did erik upon to to ensure ensure that thatthe police and and the theStB did not not abuse abuse their their powers. powers. C Cerik allegedly allegedly agreed agreed with with his his arguments.47 argument^.'^ In In late late April, April, soon soon after after becoming becoming Interior Interior Minister, Minister, Pavel Pavel announced announced that that both both the theministry ministry and and the the StB StBwere were henceforth henceforth to to be be under government-not Party-control, and that a series of senior officials were under government-not Party-control, and that a series of senior officials wereto to be was be sacked. sacked.Among Among them themwas was the the pro-Soviet pro-Soviet head head of of the the StB, StB,Josef Josef Houska, Houska, who who was dismissed dismissed in in June. June. Some Some weeks weeks before before he he left, left, he he handed handed the the KGB KGB photocopies photocopies of of a a series series of of StB StB personnel personnel files.48 files.4 On erik, his O n May May 10 10 Aleksei Aleksei Kosygin, Kosygin, the the Soviet Soviet prime prime minister, minister, sent sent C Cerik, his Czech Czech counterpart, counterpart, an an outraged outraged letter letter complaining, complaining, among among other other things, things, that that "agents agents and and saboteurs" saboteursdisguised disguised as as Western Western tourists tourists had had been been able able to to penetrate penetrate Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia because What because of of poor poor border border security.49 security.49 What Kosygin Kosygin predictably predictablyfailed failed to to mention, mention,how however, ever, was was that that the the most most active active agents agents and and all all the the saboteurs saboteurs with with Western Western passports passports were were KGB KGBillegals. illegals.On O n the the very veryday dayhe he sent senthis his letter, letter, GROMOV GROMOV (Vasili (VasiliAntonovich Antonovich Gordievsky) Gordievsky) and and GURYEV GURYEV (Valentin (Valentin Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Gutin), Gutin), both bothposing posing as as West West Germans, kidnap most Germans,were were attempting attempting to to kidnap two two of ofthe the most eloquent eloquent tribunes tribunes of of the the Prague Prague Spring.50 earlier GROMOVhad had recent recent experience experiencein in kidnapping. kidnapping. Only Only aamonth month earlier he he Spring. GROMOV had been decorated for an assignment in Sweden, which involved exfi l trating another had been decorated for an assignment in Sweden, which involved exfiltrating another illegal, illegal, FAUST, FAUST,who who was was considered considered by by the the Centre Centre to tohave have developed developed a a persecution persecution syndrome. syndrome. Once Once back back in in the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, FAUST FAUST had had been been sent sent to to a a psychiatric psychiatric hospital hospital for for a ayear, year, then then released released and and sacked sacked from from the the KGB.51 KGB. The The targets targets selected selected for for exfiltration exfiltration by by GROMOV GROMOVand and GURYEV GURYEV in in May May 1968 1968 C C were Professor Viclav erny and Jan Prochizka.52 Viclav erny (codenamed were Professor Vaclav cerny and Jan Pr~chizka.~ Vaclav Cernj, (codenamed TEMNY),s3 TEMNY),3one one of of Czechoslovakia's Czechoslovakiasleading leading authorities authorities on on Romance Romance literature, literature, had had been 1948 been expelled expelledfrom from his his chair chair at at Charles CharlesUniversity University after after the the Communist Communistcoup coup in in 1948 but but re-emerged re-emerged during during the thePrague Prague Spring Spring as as a a founder founder member member of of KAN KAN and and an an eloelo-

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quent academic freedom. the June June 1967 1967 Congress Congress of of the the Writers Writers quent advocate advocate of of academic freedom. At At the Union, Jan been one those who took the lead in in denouncing denouncing offioffi Union, Jan Prochizka Prochizka had had been one of of those who took the lead. cial Claiming concerned cial censorship censorship and and demanding demanding "freedom freedom of of creativity."54 ~reativity.~ Claiming to to be be concerned safety, GURYEV tried to persuade C Cerny thathe he was in serious for his safety, erny that serious personal dandan (presumably from the hardline opponents of ger (presumably of reform) and offered to find him a temporary hiding place. place. GROMOV delivered a similar message message to Prochizka. Once persuaded erny and over to to persuaded of of the the need need to to hide, hide, both both C Cerny and Prochizka Prochizka were were to to be be handed handed over Service V (the FCD special thugs from Service "special actions actions" department), who would drive them them in unchecked into into East East Germany. Germany.55 If If they in a a car car with with CD plates plates which which could could cross cross unchecked they resisted, Cerny resisted, C erny and and Prochizka were to be subdued subdued with what whatthe the operational operational file euphemistically describes as euphemistically describes as "special special substances." substances. however, was failure. After the Cerny The operation, however, was a miserable failure. the persecution C erny had suffered suffered during the previous previous twenty twenty years, could not persuade him had during the years, GURYEV could not persuade him that discovered to his dismay dismay that he he was was in in any any greater greater danger danger than than usual. usual. GROMOV discovered to his that been supplied supplied with The Centre Centre had also that Prochizka Prochizka had had been with a a bodyguard bodyguard by by Pavel. Pavel. The had also C overlooked the the language language problems problems involved involved in in the the operation. operation. Though Though Cerny was a overlooked erny was a non-Czech-speaking West good linguist, Prochizka spoke only Czech. Posing as a non-Czech-speaking itdifficult to communicate with him. him.Though he could German, GROMOV found it probably have made himself himself understood in Russian, Russian, he he would have risked risked revealing identitys6 After aa few weeks GURYEV and GROMOV abandoned their his real identity. 56 After kidnap attempts. In addition to their theirother other missions during the the Prague Spring, the illegals illegals were tasked with a series of active active measures a series measures collectively collectively codenamed KHODOKI (go("go betweens), which which were were intended intended to to justifY justify a invasion by by fabricating betweens"), a Soviet Soviet invasion fabricating evidence evidence conspiracy by Czechoslovak "rightists" rightistsand Western Western intelof a counter-revolutionary conspiracy intel service^.'^ ligence services. ligence 57 Posing as sympathetic Westerners, the the illegals tried to persuade persuade the Soviet Union and and other otherprovocative editors and journalists to publish attacks on the articles. attempted to to interest erny and K-23 1 in in accepting accepting aid articles. They They also also attempted interest C Cerny and K-231 aid from from a a West.Josef Josef fictitious underground organization allegedly supplied with arms by the West. Houska, was secretly informed of Houska, the the StB StB chief chief sacked sacked by by Pavel Pavel in in June, June, was secretly informed of operation operation KHODOKI and and agreed agreed to to co-operate co-operate with with it.* KHODOKI it.58 KHODOKI, the illegals By mid-July, as part of KHODOKI, illegals had succeeded succeeded in planting fabrifabri n July 19 reported the the cated evidence of preparations for an armed coup. O On 19 Pravda reported discovery cache" of American weapons discovery of of a a "secret secret cache of American weapons near near the the West West German German border, border, some contained in "Made in in USA, USA," which some conveniently conveniently contained in packages packages marked marked Made which had had allegedly been smuggled by "revenge and champions champions of of allegedly been smuggled into into Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia by revengeseekers seekersand the old old order." order. The The Soviet Soviet authorities, authorities, it it claimed, claimed, had had also the also obtained obtained a a copy copy of of an an secret plan" plan to overthrow the Prague regime. The American "secret The press press throughout throughout the the Prawdas story with reports that hidden hidden Western weapons Soviet Bloc followed up Pravda's were allover over Czechoslovakia. intelligence were being being discovered discovered all Czechoslovakia. Simultaneously Simultaneously bogus bogus intelligence a counter-revolutionary conspir conspirthe StB StBimplicating K-23 K-231 in a was fed to the 1 and KAN in acy acy with with Western Westernintelligence intelligence services.59 service^.'^ Soviet Politburo met to consider its next step in the crisis on the same day The Soviet first report on the the fictitious counter-revolutionary arms that Pravda produced its first

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caches. the caches. Brezhnev Brezhnev began began the the meeting meeting by by proposing proposing a a final final meeting meeting with with the Czechoslovak negotiated settlement. Czechoslovak leadership leadership to to try try to to reach reach a a negotiated settlement. Only Only if if that that failed failed should spokesman of should they they take take "extreme extreme measures." measures. Andropov Andropov emerged emerged as as the the chief chief spokesman of those those who who wanted wanted extreme extreme measures measures immediately. immediately. Bilateral Bilateral talks, talks, he he argued, argued, would would achieve would achieve little, little, while while any any delay delay would increase increase the the threat threatfrom from "the the rightists:" rightists: "They They are are fi ghting for Both we fighting for survival survival now, now, and and they're theyre fighting fighting frenziedly frenziedly .. .. .. Both we and and they they are are making making preparations, preparations, and and theirs theirs are are very very thorough. thorough. They They are are preparing preparing the the working working class, ." It class, the the workers' workersmilitia militia [for [for a a conflict] conflict]. I t was was a a bad-tempered bad-tempered meeting. meeting. Andropov Androyov became became involved involved in in a a furious furious argument argument with with Kosygin, Kosygin, whom whom he he accused accused of of "attack attacking" ing him, him,presumably presumably because because of of his his call call for for immediate immediate military military intervention. intervention. "} I am am not not attacking attacking you," you, retorted retorted Kosygin. Kosygin. "On On the the contrary, contrary, it it is is you you who who are are attacking attacking me!" The only opposition to me!The only full fullmember member of of the the Politburo Politburo who who supported supported Andropov's Andropovs opposition to a a final final meeting meeting with with the the CPCz CPCz leadership leadership was was K. T. T. Mazurov. Mazurov. However, However, the the foreign foreign minister, minister, Andrei Andrei Gromyko, Gromyko, like like Andropov Andropov a a non-voting non-voting member member of of the the Politburo Politburo and and later later his his close close ally, ally, probably probably summed summed up up the themajority majority view view when when he he declared declared that that meeting meeting Dubcek Dubcek and and his his colleagues colleagues was was no no more more than than a a necessary necessary preliminary preliminary to to invasion: we invasion: "Clearly Clearly they they will will not not accept accept our our proposals. proposals. But But then then we can can move move to to a a deci decision "60 sion about about taking taking extreme extreme measures measures .. .. ..60 As As Gromyko Gromyko had had predicted, predicted, the the meeting meeting between between the the CPCz CPCz Presidium Presidium and and the the Soviet ierni nad Soviet Politburo Politburo at at the the border border town town of of C Cierni nad Tisou Tisou from from July July 29 29 to to August August 1 1 ended ended without without agreement. agreement. After After an an StB StB investigation, investigation, Pavel Pave1 reported reported to to the the CPCz CPCz e alleged Presidium Presidium that that t te alleged counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary arms arms caches caches were were a a "provocation." provocation. Though the weapons War vintage, Though the weapons themselves themselves were were American, American, of of Second Second World World War vintage, some 1 and some of of them them were were in in Soviet-made Soviet-made packaging. packaging. Other Other intelligence intelligence linking linking K-23 K-231 and 1 The KAN to ISAN with with Western Western secret secret services services was wasalso alsodiscovered discovered to be befabricated.6 fabricated.61 The KGB illegals illegals behind behind operation operation KHODOKI, KHODOKI, however, however, went went undetected. undetected. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes on not conclusive, tothe the claim on KGB KGB files files lend lend some, some, though though not conclusive, support support to claim by by an an StB StB defector defector that that the the KGB planned planned to to murder murder the the Soviet Soviet wives wives of of a a number number of of Czecho Czechoslovak slovak citizens citizens in in August August and and blame blame their their deaths deaths on on counter-revolutionaries. counter-revolutionaries. The The plan plan was was apparently apparently discovered discovered by bythe the StB and and aborted.62 aborted.62 At the StB At a a meeting meeting of of the the CPCz CPCz Party Party committee committeeof of the StB early early in in August, August, the the head head of the StB foreign foreign intelligence, intelligence, Shuoj Shuoj Frouz Frouz (codenamed (codenamed FARKAC), FARKAC), argued argued that that the of StB KGB advisers were advisers in in the theStB StB were violating violating the the principles principles of of Czechoslovak-Soviet Czechoslovak-Soviet intel intelligence ligence liaison liaison and and should should be be recalled recalled to to Moscow. Moscow. A report report of of the the meeting, meeting, at at which which other StB officers the KGB.63 Mter the other StB officers supported supported Frouz, Frouz, was was quickly quickly relayed relayed to to the KGB.63After the Soviet the recall advisers were were Soviet invasion, invasion, those those who who had had demanded demanded the recall of of the the KGB advisers arrested-with wellhave have made arrested-with the the significant significant exception exception of of Frouz, Frouz, who who may may well made the the demand main anti-Soviet demand on on KGB instructions instructions in in order order to to identify identify the the main anti-Soviet elements elements in in the StB StBin in advance of of the the invasion.64 invasion.64 the advance As public As well well as as producing producing fabricated fabricated evidence evidence of of a a Western Westernplot plotfor for public consump consumption, tion, Andropov Andropov supplied supplied the the Politburo Politburo throughout throughout the the crisis crisis with with slanted slanted intelligence intelligence designed resolve designed to to strengthen strengthenits its resolve to to intervene. intervene. Probably Probably the the most most important important accurate accurate intelligence on on American American policy policy to to reach reach the the Centre Centre during duringthe the Prague Spring Spring came came intelligence Prague from from the the Washington Washington residency, residency, where where the the dynamic dynamic 34-year-old 34-year-old head head of of Line Line PR, PR,

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Oleg he reported Oleg Kalugin, Kalugin, gained gained access access to to what what he reported were were "absolutely absolutely reliable reliable docu documents" ments proving proving that that neither neither the the CIA nor nor any any other other agency agency was was manipulating manipulating the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak reform reform movement. movement. These These documents, documents, however, however, failed failed to to conform conform to to Andropov's Andropovs conspiracy conspiracy theory theory of of an an imperialist imperialist plot plot and and were were thus thus kept kept from from the the Politburo. amazed Politburo. On O n returning returning to toMoscow, Moscow, Kalugin Kaluginwas was amazed to to discover discover that that the theCentre Centre messages should had had ordered ordered that that "my my messages should not not be be shown shown to to anyone, anyone, and and destroyed." destroyed. Instead, on onAndropov's Andropovs orders, orders, "The The KGB whipped Instead, whipped up up the the fear fear that that Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia could could fall fall victim victim to to NATO NATO aggression aggression or or to to aaCOUp."65 coup.65 At At a a meeting meeting in in Moscow Moscow on on August August 18, 18, the the leaders leaders of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and the the other other four four "reliable" reliablemembers members of of the the Warsaw Warsaw Pact-Bulgaria, Pact-Bulgaria, East East Germany, Germany, Hun Hungary agreed on the invasion gary and and Poland-formally Poland-formally agreed on the invasion of of Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, the the biggest biggest armed Europe since end of armed action action in in Europe since the the end of the the Second Second World World War.66 War.66At At 4 p.m. p.m. on on August 20 20 a a meeting meeting of of "reliable" reliablemembers members of of the the StB StB was was briefed briefed by by Pavel's Pavels pro proAugust Soviet algovic, on Soviet deputy, deputy, Viliam Viliam S SalgoviE, on plans plans for for the the invasion invasion which which was was to to begin begin that that night Houska, night and and assigned assigned tasks tasks to to assist assist the the Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact forces. forces.Josef Josef Houska, dismissed dismissed by by Pavel Pave1two two months months earlier, earlier, returned returned to to take take charge charge of of the the StB. StB. At about about 9 9 a.m. a.m. on on the the morning morning of of August August 21, 21, with with Soviet Soviet forces forces already already in in key key positions StB veteran veteran Lieutenant Lieutenant Colonel Colonel Bohumil Bohumil Molnir, Molnir, who who had had positions in in Prague, Prague, the the StB been been given given a a specially specially engraved engraved automatic automatic pistol pistol by by the the former former KGB chairman, chairman, Ivan Ivan Serov, 956, briefed Serov, for for his his assistance assistance in in crushing crushing the the Hungarian Hungarian Revolution Revolution in in 1 1956, briefed the the group of StB officers selected by the KGB to arrest Dubeek and the reformist major group of StB officers selected by the KGB to arrest Dubtek and the reformist majority Escorted by ity on onthe theCPCz C P C z Presidium.67 Pre~idium Escorted .~~ by KGB officers, officers, the the arrest arrest group group proceeded proceeded to the Central Committee building, to Dubeek's DubEeks office office in in the Central Committee building, where where one one of of them them an announced nounced in in what whatseemed seemed to to Dubeek DubEek the the "mechanical mechanicalvoice" voice of of a a second-rate second-rate amateur amateur actor: "I I am am placing placing you you in in custody custody in in the the name name of of the the Workers' Workers and and Peasants' Peasants Gov Govactor: ernment seemed to ernment led led by by Comrade Comrade Indra." Indra.He H e added, added, after after a a pause pause in in which which he he seemed to be be remembering remembering his his lines, lines, that that Duocek DuGek and and his his colleagues colleagues would would shortly shortly be be brought brought before before a a revolutionary revolutionary tribunal, tribunal, also also headed headed by by Alois Alois Indra.68 Indra.68 Indra andthe the other leading Indra and other leading members members of of the the quisling quisling government-in-waiting government-in-waiting selected embassy ready But selected by by Moscow Moscow were were already alreadyin in the the Soviet Soviet embassy readyto to take take power.69 power.69 But at at this point point the invasion plan plan had had to to be be modified. modified. Indra Indra and and his his co-conspirators co-conspirators had had this the invasion mistakenly mistakenly assured assured Moscow Moscow that that the the invasion invasion would would be be supported supported by by a a majority majority of of the retained the CPCz CPCz leadership.70 leaders hi^.^' The The fact fact that that Dubeek Dubtek retained a a majority majority on on the thePresidium Presidium as as well well as as overwhelming overwhelming popular popular support support forced forced Moscow Moscow to to abandon abandon its its plan plan for for a a pup puppet pet regime regime and and bring bring Dubeek DubEek and and his his colleagues colleagues to to the the Kremlin, Kremlin, under under KGB escort, escort, to to be be browbeaten browbeaten into into aadegree degree of of submission. submission. Brezhnev Brezhnev stuck stuck to to the thefabricated fabricated KGB story story that that "anti-socialist" anti-socialistforces forces had had been been preparing preparing a a coup: coup: Underground light. We Underground command command posts posts and and arms arms caches caches have have now now come come to to light. We don't that dontwant want to to make make charges charges against against you you personally, personally, that you're youre guilty. guilty.You You might might not not even even have havebeen been aware aware of of it i t .. .. .. As the As the the discussion discussion proceeded proceeded over over the the next next few few days, days, however, however, the Soviet Soviet Politburo Politburo passed passed from from attempts attempts to tojustifY justify the the invasion invasion and and the thepretense pretense of of comradely comradely solidarity solidarity

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to to intimidation intimidationand and coercion. coercion. Dubcek DubEek felt felt he he had had no no option option but but to toconcede concede the the main main Soviet demands: "It could not have been otherwise. We were managing the affairs Soviet demands: It could not have been otherwise. We were managing the affairs of of an an occupied occupied country country where where the the barrel barrel of of a a Soviet Soviet gun gun was was trained trained on on our our every every move." move. On the Czechoslovak O n August August 26 26 the Czechoslovak delegation delegation signed signed a a secret secret protocol protocol accepting accepting a a "temporary" the temporary occupation occupation by by forces forcesof of the Warsaw Warsaw Pact. Pact. The The decisions decisions of of the the Extraor Extraordinary dinary Fourteenth Fourteenth Congress Congress of of the the CPCz CPCz hurriedly hurriedly convened convened on on August August 22, 22, which which had had condemned condemned the the invasion, invasion, were were annulled. annulled. Some Some of of the the leading leading reformists reformists in in the the Party, Party, government, government, radio radio and and television television who who had had most most outraged outraged Moscow Moscow were were dis dismissed.71 missed.71 The The Kremlin Kremlin intended intended the theMoscow Moscow protocol protocol only only as as the the beginning beginning of of aaprocess process of of "normalization" normalizationwhich which would would rapidly rapidly turn turn the the Prague Prague Spring Spring into into winter. winter. As As a a later later official official history history of of the the CPCz CPCz complained: complained: The The Right .. .. .. still still held held the the decisive decisive positions positions in in the the Party, Party, the the state state apparatus apparatus and and the the mass mass media media .. .. .. The The Marxist-Leninist Marxist-Leninist forces forces in in the the Party Party and and society society led April led a a difficult difficult and and complicated complicated struggle struggle from from August August 1968 1968 to to April 1969, 1969,char characterized 72 acterized by by the the gradual gradual suppression suppression of of the the Right. Right.72 Of particular inin the particular concern concern to to Andropov Andropovwas was the the continued continued strength strength of of the the "Right" Right the StB, StB, despite despite Houska's Houskas arrest arrest of of some some leading leading reformists. reformists. According According to to KGB reports reports from situation was from Prague, Prague, the the situation was most most serious serious in in foreign foreign intelligence: intelligence: In were In the the [StB] [StB] First First [foreign [foreign intelligence] intelligence] Directorate Directorate nationalist nationalist passions passions were inflamed acts of inflamed and and there there were were acts of an an anti-Soviet anti-Soviet nature: nature: removal removal of of the the Soviet Soviet flag, sent to flag, [hostile] [hostile] slogans, slogans, attacks attacks on on Soviet Soviet military military units units sent to protect protect the the old old premises First Directorate, premises of of the the First Directorate, intelligence intelligence officers officers going going underground, underground, handing handing in in their their official official passes, passes, and and stopping stopping work work in in protest protest at at the the arrival arrival of of Soviet Soviet troops. troops. The passed by The Centre Centre was was outraged outraged by a a series series of ofresolutions resolutions passed by the the plenary plenary committee committee of of the the StB StB First First Directorate Directorate Communist Communist Party: Party:

1. Communists Communists of of the the First First Directorate Directorate Communist CommunistParty PartyOrganization Organization wel1. wel come the return return of the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak delegation from Moscow and express express come their ernik, Kriegel, their joy joy that that comrades comrades Dubcek, DubEek, Smrkovsky, Smrkovslj, C Cernik, Kriegel, Svoboda Svoboda and and others will will have have the the possibility possibility of of resuming resuming their their constitutional constitutional and and Party Party others duties. duties. [In [In fact, fact, on on Soviet Soviet insistence, insistence, Kriegel Kriegel was wassacked.] sacked.] expressing their confi confidence Communists In expressing dence in them, them,the the Communists of the First First Directorate Party Party Organization Organization will will continue continue to to give give these these comrades comrades their their Directorate full support in implementing the the [reformist] [reformist] action program of the full in implementing Party. Czechoslovak Communist Party. 2. The First Directorate expresses concern 2. DirectorateCommunist Communist Party Organization expresses thecontents contents of the communiquk on the thetalks in Moscow, Moscow, which about the of the final communique

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reflects in conditions conditions of of inequality, inequality, under under reflects the the fact fact that that the the talks talks were were held held in pressure and and with with occupation occupation forces forces present pressure present in in the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak Socialist Socialist Republic. Republic. 3. express their full support 3. The Communists Communists again express support for for the the lawfully lawfully elected elected leadership Service and its return return leadership of of the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak Intelligence Intelligence Service and welcome welcome its to carry out its duties. The Communists demand demand an an urgent urgent investigation investigation of this leadership, and also the orders into all incidents in which the orders of Pave1 [sacked at Moscows of the Minister of Internal Affairs Pavel Moscow's insistence], were contravened. contravened. In In this this connection, connection, it is also also essential determine what what were it is essential to to determine role by role was wasplayed played by officers officers of of the theUSSR KGB. The Party Party Organization Organizationrecognizes recognizes the the decisions decisions of Fourteenth Con ConThe of the the Fourteenth gress places responsibility responsibility gress [annulled [annulled by by the the Moscow Moscow protocol] protocol] as as lawful lawful and and places for the crisis crisis on the the Soviet Soviet troOpS.73 troops.73 The in New PATERA, The KGB discovered discovered that that the the StB StB resident resident in New York, York, codenamed codenamed PATERA, JZi Hajek, Hijek, to was trying vainly to persuade the Czechoslovak foreign minister, minister, Jifi to address Soviet invasion, invasion, in in defiance defiance of of address the the United United Nations Nations Security Security Council Council on on the the Soviet If we did not raise the Czechoslovak question in the the Security the Moscow protocol. "If Council, PATERA insisted, "the the nation would declare traitor^."^' The StB Council," declare us to be traitors."74 resident tears, told Oleg Kalugin, Kalugin, "My resident in in Washington, Washington,his his eyes eyes brimming brimming with with tears, told Oleg My chil children my country. country. They They will will never dren will will hate hate you you for for what what you've youve done done to to my never forgive forgiveyou you for It took for healthy "healthy forces, forces," as as the the KGB KGB referred referred for what what happened."75 ha~pened.~ took It several several years yearsfor to eradicate all all trace trace of revisionism. to the the Soviet Soviet loyalists loyalistsin in the the StB, to to eradicate of revisionism. After the Soviet central to Andropov's strategy After the Soviet invasion invasion KGB illegals illegals remained remained central to Andropovs strategy for "rightist" forces.76 operations in in for penetrating penetrating and and destabilizing destabilizing rightist forces.76 PROGRESS operations Czechoslovakia Soviet Bloc Bloc intelligence intelligence services. services. On Czechoslovakia were were augmented augmented by by other other Soviet August illegals in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia durdur August 25 25 Mielke, Mielke, who who had had deployed deployed East East German German illegals ing Spring, informed he was sending a a further ing the thePrague Prague Spring, informed the the Centre Centrethat that he was sending furthercontingent contingent to their operations operations and and liaise liaise with the to Prague, Prague, together together with with Stasi Stasi officers officers to to direct direct their with the KGB In and Sakharovsky, the head of the the FCD, KGB residency.77 residency.77 In September September Andropov Andropov and Sakharovsky, the head of traveled to to Warsaw Warsaw and and agreed agreed a a plan plan for for the the SB SB (the (the Polish both agents traveled Polish KGB) to to use use both agents and illegals illegals to to penetrate the Czechoslovak counter-revolutionary and penetrate the Czechoslovak "counter-revolutionary underground, underground," 8 CmigrC groups and hostile intelligence services.7 service^.^' emigre The most valuable unwitting unwitting KGB source source among ranks of The most valuable among the the ranks of Czechoslovak Czechoslovak "counter-revolutionaries" in the the files files seen seen by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was Leo Leo Lappi Lappi counter-revolutionaries identified identified in (codenamed prisoner and and founder member of of K-23 K-23 1. 1. , (codenamed FREDDI), FREDDI), a a former former political political prisoner founder member The fact that, though though a a Czechoslovak citizen, citizen, Lappi Lappi was was an an ethnic ethnic German German made made him easier to of Czechoslovak Czechoslovak citizens citizens who who were were not not him far far easier to cultivate cultivate than than the the majority majority of fluent with Lappi was made made by pos fluent in in Western Westernlanguages. languages. The The first first contact contact with Lappi was by ALLA, postwo months his culGerman-speaking Swiss, Swiss, in October October1968.79 1968.79 After about two ing as a German-speaking cul tivation handed over another female illegal, ARTYOMOVA, who whohad had tivation was was handed over to toanother female illegal, assumed February 1969 1969 onwards, onwards, assumed the the identity identityof of an an Austrian Austrian businesswoman.8o businesswoman. From From February Lappi's case officer officer was was FYODOROV, using a a West passport in in the Lappis case FYODOROV, who, who, using West German German passport the

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name name of of Walter Walter Brade, Brade, for for the the next next decade decade became became the the leading leading illegal illegal specializing specializing in in Czechoslovak Czechoslovak operations. operations. Since Since ALLA and and ARTYOMOVA ARTYOMOVA had had reported reported that that Lappi let let rooms to foreigners, foreigners, FYODOROV made initial initial contact contact with with him him on on the the Lappi rooms to FYODOROV made 1 8 pretext looking for pretext that that he hewas was a a businessman businessman looking for accommodation accommodation in in Prague. Prague.81 Lappi no idea Lappi had had no idea that that ALLA, ARTYOMOVA ARTYOMOVA and and FYODOROV were were KGB illegals sent on assist in remnants of illegals sent onmissions missions to to assist in the thedestruction destruction of of the the last last remnants of "socialism socialism with face." persuaded were Western with aahuman human face. Instead, Instead, they theysuccessfully successhlly persuaded him him that thatthey they were Western supporters of the Prague Spring, anxious to do what they could to assist in its restorasupporters of the Prague Spring, anxious to do what they could to assist in its restora tion. Given Given the the almost almost universal universal revulsion in the at the Soviet occupation, occupation, tion. revulsion in theWest West at the Soviet Lappis misplaced trust in Swiss, Austrian and German friends was an Lappi's in his new Swiss, understandable FYODOROV. Lappi's Lappis confidence understandable mistake, mistake, cynically exploited by FYODOROV. confidence in FYODOROV was so complete that he left him in charge of his flat when was so complete that heleft him incharge of his flat when he he went wenton on K-231 H e introduced FYODOROV both to K-23 holiday to Romania. He 1 activists and to Christian Democrat, Democrat,People's Peoples and Socialist Socialist Parties, which had tried to leaders of the Christian themselves during the the Prague Spring. Lappi regularly acted as translator re-establish themselves at FYODOROVs with them. of FYODOROV's FYODOROVs reports reports on on his at FYODOROV's meetings meetings with them.Some Some of his meetings with the counter-revolutionaries were rated so so highly by the Centre that 82 the Politburo. Politburo.2 they were forwarded to the What course, report feelings of the illegals What the the KGB KGB files files do do not, not,of of course, report are are the the feelings of the illegals as as they they survivors of the the Prague Spring. Unlike the leaders betrayed the sometimes heroic heroic survivors leaders of the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and the the Soviet Soviet public, public, who who had no first-hand first-hand experience experience of of the the the had no illegals knew the West of life in world outside the Soviet Bloc, the illegals West and the reality of Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia too too well well to to have have deluded deluded themselves themselves into into believing believing that that they they were were engaged in a crusade to to defend defend socialist socialist values against Western Western imperialism. imperialism. engaged in a moral moral crusade values against S that after postings abroad There were recurrent complaints in FCD Directorate S illegals sometimes returned with an "incorrect" incorrect attitude towards life in the illegals the Soviet Union.83 Occasionally their attitudes were so incorrect that their Union.83 their careers were were cut short. 1966 the KGB liaison office the Centre Centre short. In 1966 liaison offi ce in Budapest Budapest virtuously virtuously reported reported to the a series of of politically incorrect observations made by the female illegal politically female ERNA while returning returning from leave in Moscow Moscow to her her posting in Canada. Canada. Among Among the the comments said said to to have have "shocked" shockedher her fellow fellow KGB officers officers were werethe the following: following:
I n Moscow I was afraid to express express my my views viewsfrankly on certain subjects. In subjects. After all, that I had become more than a a bit bit all, I could see that they thought that bourgeois. W h y did the Party allow a second cult of personality to develop in respect Why decisions on of Khrushchev? I cannot understand how Khrushchev could take decisions all on his own. And what important Party and state matters all what were the other other members of of the Central Central Committee Committeedoing? doing? Were the consequences of the cult consequences of S t a h not still fresh in their their minds? of Stalin pointnow oflaunching of launching so many Sputniks? Sputniks?Would Would it not What is the point it not be betbet attend to Twenty years have ter to attend to more important things on earth? Twenty have gone by since the end endof the war, but people do not nothave the material goods which they since need and deserve, deserve, and which the the humblest inhabitants of the West West have long enjoyed! enjoyed!84

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Very comments openly. openly. But But the the fact fact that Very few few illegals fiegals dared dared to to voice voice such such seditious seditious comments that increassome undoubtedly thought such thoughts cannot fail to have bred in them an increas cynicism, heightened in some cases by by their experiences Czechoslovakia. ing cynicism, experiences in Czechoslovakia. the attitude of GROMOV, GROMOV, one one of the first first fi five illegalsassigned assigned Some insight into the of the ve illegals rightist groups during the Prague Spring, is provided by the to the penetration of "rightist" recollections of his younger brother, Oleg Antonovich Gordievsky, Gordievsky, who worked from recollections 1963 to 1972 1972 in the FCD Illegals Directorate and Line N in the Copenhagen resi resi1963 and, in in Olegs Oleg's view, "had grown dency. dency. GROMOV had had been been born born in in 1933 1933 and, view, had grown up up among among war, becoming a cynical, cynical, materialistic boys brutalized by war," materialistic adult who much preferred West relative privations privations of Czechoslovakia. life in the West to to thethe relative Czechoslovakia. When Oleg was informed during Czech and and Swedish, during his his training training that that he he had had to to choose choose between between learning learning Czech Swedish, his his brother told him he would be an idiot not to to choose choose Swedish: Swedish: If "If you take Czech, Czech, youll spend the rest ofyour yourlife life inthe the pathetic you'll sitting in pathetic consular departments departments in in Prague Prague Bratislava ., .. .. [But] Swedens country.. .. . and Bratislava Sweden's a nice country . From there you can go anywhere 85 There cynicism towards towards the the Czechs Czechs in FYO Europe.85 There are are signs signs of ofa a less less blatant blatant cynicism in FYOin Europe." DOROVs reports reports to to the the Centre. Centre.He H e wrote wrote of Army in DOROV's of the the role role of of the the Red Red Army in CzechoCzecho slovakia: "The The Soviet Soviet forces forces play play of a policeman standing at at a crossroads where slovakia: the role of there heavy traffic; everyone notices him him and and this this disciplines disciplines the the traffic. traffic." The The there is isheavy traffic; everyone notices Czechoslovak population, in other otherwords, words, was was being Czechoslovak population, in being cowed cowed into into submission.86 submission.86 In Czechoslovak experiences experiences probably had In the the case case of of a a minority minority of illegals, illegals, their their Czechoslovak probably had more consequences than increased level of cynicism. cynicism. A few few years years more serious serious consequences than simply simply an an increased level of later ALLA attempted attempted to tocommit commit suicide. Though her attributes the later suicide. Though her KGB file file attributes the episode episode her her,87 it is difficult to believe that that the thebetrayal solely to the fact that her partner had left her,87 Czechoslovaks ALLA had befriended did not add to her emotional scars. of the Czechoslovaks scars. A more common reaction their experiences experiences in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia was more common reaction by by the the illegals illegals to to their was to turn to to alcohol. alcohol. Unable to stop drinking probably to drinking even even after after he he contracted contracted hepatihepati 1972at at the of only the age of tis B during a mission in south-east Asia, GROMOV died in 1972 thirty-nine.88 Both BOGUN and his wife also alcoholics. 1976 he was thirty-nine.88 alsobecame became alcoholics. In 1976 at the Burdenko military hospital, admitted admitted for for "a a full fbll course course of of anti-alcohol anti-alcohol therapy" therapy at the Burdenko military hospital, while his wife was treated for alcoholism in the psycho-neurological department of Polyclinic. The previous few the Central Central KGB Polyclinic. fewyears, years, during which BOGUN had worked and elsewhere operations in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in in worked extensively extensively on on PROGRESS operations eastern heavier psychological his earlier earlier eastern Europe, Europe, seem seem to to have have taken taken a a much much heavier psychologicaltoll toll than than his period as as an an illegal illegal in in the theUnited UnitedStates.89 States.89 period Illegals Directorate In the case of one member member of the the Illegals Directorate there there is is no no doubt doubt about the shattering impact of of the the Soviet Soviet invasion invasion of For GROMOVs the shattering impact of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia. For GROMOV's brother, "It was dreadful event, event, brother, Oleg Oleg Gordievsky, Gordievsky, then then serving serving in in Copenhagen, Copenhagen, It was that that dreadful that awful awful day, day, which which determined the course own life." life. The crushing of that determined the course of of my my own The crushing of the the Prague Spring him that that the theSoviet byits Prague Spring convinced convinced him Soviet one-party one-party state state was, was, by its very very nature, nature, destructive liberties. H He spent much of the the next next few secretly ponder destructive of of human human liberties. e spent much of fewyears years secretly pondering the decision to become become a a British British penpen ing how how to to work work for for its its overthrow overthrow before before taking taking the decision to KGB.90 etration agent agent within within the the KGB.90 etration

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retreat, retreat, in in which which no no inch inchof of territory territory was was given givenup up without without calculated calculated resistance."! resistance. It It was was a a retreat, retreat, however, however, which which was was doomed doomed to to end end in in defeat. defeat. Duocek's Dubteks position position and and that other leading that of of the the other leading reformers reformers was was steadily steadily undermined undermined by by a a combination combination of of Soviet pressure, the old guard within the CPCz and former allies who decided to Soviet pressure, the old guard within the CPCz and former allies who decided to throw with the invaders to throw in in their theirlot lot with the invaders to save save their their own own careers. careers. The The immediate immediate pretext pretext for for Dubcek's Dubteks removal removal was wasthe the World WorldIce Ice Hockey Hockey Champi Championship March 1969. onship in in Stockholm Stockholm in in March 1969. On O n March March 21, 21, Dubcek Dubtek later later recalled, recalled, "The The whole whole country country watched watched [on [on TV] TV] as as Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia played played the the Soviets; Soviets; it it was was much much more The national national rejoic rejoicmore than than ice ice hockey, hockey,of of course. course. It It was was a a replay replay of of a a lost lost war war .. .. . " The ings ings after after the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak victory victory led led the the KGB to to prepare, prepare, with with assistance assistance from from its its stooges in StB, an stooges in the the StB, an anti-Soviet anti-Soviet riot riot to to follow follow the the next next match match between between Czechoslo Czechoslovakia on March March 28. 28. Shortly Shortly before before the the match match a a team team of of police police agents agents vakia and and the the USSR on disguised stones in disguised as as city cityworkers workers unloaded unloaded a a pile pile of of paving paving stones in front frontof of the the offices offices of ofthe the Soviet ot, in Soviet airline, airline, Aerofl Aeroflot, in Wenceslas Wenceslas Square. Square. Prague Prague police police documents documents show show that that the the whole ministry whole operation operation was was directly directly supervised supervised by by a a Soviet Soviet agent agent in in the theCzech Czech ministry of of the the 2 Immediately interior. interior.2 Immediately after after the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak team team had had defeated defeated the the Soviets Soviets for for the the second a week, the celebrating second time time in in a week, StB StB plain plain clothes clothes personnel personnel mingling mingling with with the celebrating crowd stones at ce crowd began beganto to throw throw the the conveniently conveniently placed placed stones at the theAeroflot Aeroflot office. office. The The offi office furniture the pavement furniture was was dragged dragged out out on onto to the pavement and and set set alight. alight. Moscow the fabricated demand that, that,The "The Moscow now now had had the fabricated evidence evidence it it required required to to demand counter-revolution had no nooption option but counter-revolution must must be be beheaded." beheaded. Dubcek Dubtek believed believed he he had but toto resign. resign. "Otherwise Otherwise the the Soviets Soviets would would set set up up another another provocation provocation that that could could lead lead to to further On April further public public turmoil turmoil and and even even a a b100dbath."3 bl~odbath.~ April On 17 17 he he was was succeeded succeededas as First First Secretary Secretary of of the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak Party Party by by the the Slovak Slovak first first secretary, secretary, Gustav Gustiv Husak. Husik.As Dubcek Dubtek broadcast broadcast the the news news of of his his replacement, replacement, he he broke broke down down and and wept. wept. PROGRESS senior officer officer from from FCD PROGRESS operations operations in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia continued. continued. A senior Directorate Directorate S, S, Dmitri Dmitri Kirillovich Kirillovich Vetrov, Vetrov, arrived arrived in in Prague Prague to to supervise supervise and and coordi coordiillegalsas nate the work of the illegals as they penetrated the ranks of theunrepentant unrepentant reformists.4 Posing as a Swiss Swiss sympathizer with the Vinoreformists.4 the Prague Spring, Galina Vino gradova gradova CALLA) (ALLA) was was instructed instructed to to cultivate cultivate Ladis1av Ladislav Lebovic Lebovi? (codenamed (codenamed KHAN), KHAN), one of the trainers of the victorious victorious Czechoslovak Czechoslovak ice hockey team which was viewed viewed
.77

D ubcek later Dubtek later described described the the eight eight months months after after the the Soviet Soviet invasion invasion as as "an an organized organized

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with suspicion in (KRAVCHENKO), who with deep deep suspicion in the the Centre.5 Centre. The The illegal illegal Yuri YuriLinov Linov (KRAVCHENKO), who pretended to be Austrian, succeeded succeeded in gaining the confidence of the international confidence of chess of the the organizers of chess grand grand master master and and sports sports columnist columnist Ludek LudEk Pachman, Pachman, one one of organizers of the of the the Soviet Soviet invasion. invasion. As As soon as the illegal illegal broadcasts broadcasts transmitted transmitted in in the theaftermath aftermath of soon as Pachmans friends and associates Linov had identified those of Pachman's associates who were ready to continue against the Soviet occupiers," Pachman himself himself was was arrested arrested continue "the the struggle struggle against the Soviet occupiers, Pachman imprisoned.6 and imprisoned.6 DubEeks departure, the KGB liaison office in Though delighted by Dubeek's in Prague remained unenthusiastic unenthusiastic about successor, Gustiv Husik, who who had had been remained about his his successor, Gustav Husak, been imprisimpris oned trumped-up charges alleged Trotskyist and "bourgeois oned in in 1952 1952on on trumped-up charges as as an an alleged Trotskyist and bourgeois nation nationalist. "Spending Spending nine years in prison," prison, it reported, "has has left its mark on Husiks alist." Husak's psychology, in in that thathe he shows unwarranted unwarranted indulgence indulgence towards towards clear clear adversaries adversariesof of the psychology, shows the line. The KGB liaison liaison office office complained complained to Czechoslovak Communist Communist Party Party line." to the the Centre thatthere there was was "no no genuine unity7 within theCPCz Centre that genuine internal internal unity" within the CPCz leadership, leadership, which which internationalists such Bilak and Indra, who whohad was divided between between "internationalists" such as Bil'ak had supported supported S trougal, who Soviet intervention intervention in in August August 1968, 1968, and and "realists" realistsled by Strougal, had opposed opposed Soviet led by who had intervention The two sides were in a a intervention but but now now accepted accepted it it as as a a fact fact of of life. life. The two sides were engaged engaged in power and place their supporters the power struggle, struggle, seeking seeking to to gain gain key key positions positions and place their supporters within within the Party Over and internationalists internationalists had had some suc Party apparatus.7 apparatu~.~ Over the thenext next year yearboth both realists realists and some successes. In ernik as as prime prime minister. minister. Simultaneously, Simultaneously, trougal replaced cesses. In January January 1970 1970 S Strougal replaced C Cernik however, was put of an an operation to purge purge the of all all reformists reformists however, Bil'ak Bilak was put in incharge charge of operation to the CPCz CPCz of during the theintroduction introduction of of new new Party Party cards. cards. fellow hardliner, hardliner, Miloi Jake:, head during 8 A fellow Milos JakeS, head of of the the Central Central Committee's Committees Control Control and and Auditing Auditing Committee, Committee, became became his his right-hand right-hand man to the liaison office.9 man and and regularly regularly reported reported on on the the progress progress of of the the purge purge to the KGB liaison office. Seventeen Seventeen years years later later JakeS Jake: was was to to succeed succeed Husak Husik as as general general secretary secretary of of the the CPCz. CPCz. The residency in The Centre's Centres assessment assessment of of the the work work of of the the KGB liaison liaison office office and and residency in Prague during during 1970 1970concluded: concluded: Prague The revisionist and in the The bloc bloc of of revisionist and anti-socialist anti-socialist forces forces in the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak Socialist Socialist Republic centers of the the right Republic has has suffered suffereda a political political defeat; defeat; the the legal legal ideological ideological centers of rightideologists of Czechoslovak renewal have wing have been eliminated; the main ideologists been political arena expelled from and mea been removed removed from from the the political arena and and expelled from the the Party; Party; and measures have been taken to purge the state apparatus of the most active carriers of sures have been taken to purge the state apparatus of the most active carriers of However, it would not be right to tosuppose that with withthe the the right-wing danger. However, exchange cards Communist Party exchange of of Party Party cards the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak Communist Partyhas has totally totally purged purged elements. its ranks of hostile and alien elements.10 Indra, power after after the the invasion at Indra, whom whomMoscow Moscow had had originally originally intended intended to to take take power invasion at the head of reported by the head of a a "Workers' Workers and and Peasants' Peasants Government," Government, was was reported by the the liaison liaison office opportunity to press his his claims claims as as gen office to to be be "biding biding his his time," time, waiting waiting for for an an opportunity to press general eral secretary.ll secretary. His His wait wait was was to to prove prove in in vain. vain. KGB agents the CPCz CPCz continued to protest protest that agents and and Soviet Soviet sycophants sycophants within within the continued to that S trougal and Strougal and other other former former reformists reformists retained retained far far too too much much influence influence at at the the expense expense of in the the Ministry Ministry of of the of the the Soviet Soviet Union's Unions true true friends. friends. One One informant informant in the Interior, Interior,

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Jaroslav trougal was Jaroslav Zeman, Ze.man, complained complained that that S Strougal was discriminating discriminating against against the the interna internaS tionalists: "And what sort of person is trougal? In 1968 he was preparing tionalists: And what sort of person is Strougal? In 1968 he was preparing to to emi emigrate theWest West and grate to to the and had had currency currency and and documents documents ready ready for for his his escape." escape. While While turncoats trougal's patronage, the turncoats prospered prospered under under S Strougals patronage, "Officials Officialswho who cooperate cooperate with with the USSR USSR are are looked looked down down on on in in the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak Socialist Socialist Republic; Republic; they they are are kept kept in in the dark, and are not promoted or rewarded."12 the dark, and are not promoted or rewarded.12 By dismissed and 70 By January January 1971 1971 310 310 foreign foreign intelligence intelligence officers officers had had been been dismissed and 1 170 expelled expelled from from the the Party. Party. The The whole whole of of the the senior senior staff staff of of the the internal internal StB StB had had been been replaced TheThe Centre, replaced along alongwith with many many more morejunior junior officers.13 0ffi~ers.l~ Centre, however, however, was wasnot not satis satisfied. The KGB liaison office was instructed during 1971 to press the interior ministry fied. The KGB liaison office was instructed during 1971 to press the interior ministry and StB "in in a a tactfi.ll tactfill manner" manner to to carry carry out out aathorough thorough reorganization reorganization of of Czecho Czechoand the the StB slovak slovak intelligence intelligence((in inview view of of the the fact fact that that the thecentral central apparatus apparatus was was tainted tainted and and the the possibility possibility that that committed committed agents agents of of the the adversary adversary were were present present in in it." it. The The Centre Centre wished wished for for active active assistance assistance from from a a reformed reformed StB StB in in the the collection collection of of scientific scientific and and technological technologicalintelligence, intelligence,the the deployment deployment of of illegals illegals and and other other FCD FCD operations.14 0perati0ns.l~ Despite Despite continuing continuing doubts doubts about about the the reliability reliability of of some some StB StB personnel, personnel, the the KGB KGB liaison liaison office office reported reported that that the theminister minister of of the the interior, interior, Radko Radko Kaska, Kaska, displayed displayeda a sat satisfactory level of subservient cooperation: isfactory level of subservient cooperation: We We have have not not noticed noticed any any unjustified unjustified or or non-objective non-objective information information from from Kaska. Kaska. Up Up to tothe the present present he he has has informed informed us us frankly frankly and and in in detail detail about about internal internal polit political in of ical processes processes in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakiaand and about about the the situation situation within within the theMinistry Ministry of Internal Internal Affairs.15 Affairs. The The KGB KGB was was provided provided with with copies copies of of StB StB operational operational orders orders and and reports, reports, and and pro proposed posed staff staff changes changes were were submitted submitted for for its its approval.16 approval.16At Husak's Husiks instructions, instructions, Kaska Kaska began began secretly secretly collecting collecting material material on on ((leading leading right-wing right-wing personalities" personalities in in order order to to determine determine how howmany many could could be be held held to to have have broken broken state state lawsP laws. The The KGB KGB was, was, how however, any ever, embarrassed embarrassed to to be be asked asked by by Kaska Kaskain in March March 1971 1971whether whetheritithad had any ((adverse adverse information" by Assem informationon on past past contacts contacts with with the theWest West by the the chairman chairman of of the the National National Assembly, Dalibor Hanes. The Centre was concerned that, if it replied to Kaska's enquiry, bly, DaLbor Hanes. The Centre was concerned that, if it replied to Kaskas enquiry,it it would would give give the the (perfectly (perfectly accurate) accurate) impression impression that that ((the the KGB KGB is is engaged engaged in in collect collecting fraternal The head ing information information on on officials officialsof of fraternal Parties Parties in in friendly friendly countries." countries.The head of of the the KGB KGB liaison liaison office office in in Prague, Prague, Yeo Ye. G. G. Sinitsyn, Sinitsyn, was was instructed instructed to to reply reply that that it ithad had ((no no reports reports of of links links between between Hanes Hanes and and foreign foreign intelligence," intelligence,but but that, that, since since it it followed followed the the principle principle of of not not spying spying on on its its allies, allies,it it would would be be unable unable to to respond respond to to such such requests requests in ak had in future. future. Sinitsyn Sinitsyn was was privately privately informed informed by by the the Centre Centre that that Bil' Bilak had complained complained to to the the Soviet Soviet ambassador ambassador that that Hanes Hanes had had ((taken taken up up incorrect incorrect positions" positions during during the the Prague Prague Spring Spring and andthat thathis his father father had had been been responsible responsible for for ((crushing crushingworkers' workers dem demIS Soon onstrations between onstrations in in Slovakia" Slovakia7 between the the wars. wars.* Soon afterwards afterwards Hanes Hanes was was replaced replaced as as chairman chairman of of the the National NationalAssembly Assembly by by the the impeccably impeccably orthodox orthodox Indra.19 1ndra.l On O n May May 4, 4, 1971 1971 Kaska Kaska. met met Semyon Semyon Konstantinovich Konstantinovich Tsvigun, Tsvigun, KGB KGB deputy deputy chairman, Tsvigun chairman, to to report report on OR the the progress progress of"normalization."20 of normali~ation.~~ Tsvigun owed owed his his job job almost almost solely he was Brezhnev's oldest solely to to the the fact fact that that he was one one of of Brezhnevs oldest drinking drinking partners. partners. Kalugin Kalugin

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downright stupid but relatively harmless.21 found him "downright harmless."21 Tsvigun cannot have been Kaskas briefing. briefing. Over the the past two years, Kaska Kaskatold him, about wholly reassured by Kaska's 450,000 CPCz members had left or been expelled, expelled, making "making contact between the 22 With one exception, difficult.22 Party and the population more difficult." exception, the heads of of all the interior interiorministry had been replaced. In all, about 3,000 of directorates in the of its ernem the StB and other agencies had been dismissed. however, still ployees in the dismissed. There was, however, widespread feeling. Soviet widespread evidence of anti-Soviet feeling. Soviet films films and and plays plays were were systematically systematically KremlinChimes there were of the film boycotted. At the Czechoslovak premiare of film The Kremlin audience; at the second showing there were only ten. There only five people people in the audience; were numerous numerous anonymous anonymous threats, malicious rumors and acts of of sabotage sabotage on the the railways. But also successes successes to report. The settingup railways. But there were also The StB had had succeeded in in setting up to "socialism socialism with with a a human human face, in order face," in order to to smoke smoke a bogus organization dedicated . to out secret supporters of the Prague Spring. Finally, Kaska Kaska assured assured Tsvigun Tsvigun that he he the KGB liaison office and its head, Genand his ministry were in close touch with the Gen Sinit~yn.~~ eral Sinitsyn.23 In the spring of 1972 1972 Andropov had a private meeting with Kaska. His manner was assertive than that ofTsvigun of Tsvigun a year earlier. earlier. He H e insisted that opposition forces more assertive forces despite the "stabilization" stabilization were still strong, despite in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia and the the strengthening of of Partys authority, authority, and that infiltrated the Communist Communist Party's that they were being infi ltrated by Western intelligence services. intelligence services. Agent penetration of the opposition therefore remained essenessen tial.24 source to which Andropov attached tial.24 The opposition source attached most most importance probably probably remained Lappi(FREDDI). (FREDDI). Still posing as a committed West German supporter remained Leo Lappi the Prague Spring, the illegal FYODOROV had regular meetings with Lappi in of the O n January 25, 1972 1972 Fyodor Konstantinovich Mortin, who Prague and East Berlin. On had succeeded succeeded Sakharovsky as head of the FCD, FCD, sought Andropov's Andropovs permission to trick Lappi Lappi into into becoming becoming a a Soviet Soviet agent agent by by a a false trick "false flag flag" deception deception which which concealed concealed the role of the KGB. Andropov gave his approval on January 29 and FYODOROV WestGerman German BND. went ahead with the recruitment, claiming to be working for the West for the Centre's Centres interest in Lappi Lappiwas that his brother Karl was An additional reason for West German German citizen who, according according to KGB files, was "close" closeto two two prominent a West files, was prominent 25 politician^.^' FRG politicians. Despite Kaska's Kaskas personal sycophancy towards his KGB advisers advisers and the extensive purge remained dissatisfied dissatisfied with with the ideological purge which which he he had had overseen, overseen, the the Centre Centre remained the ideological purity of of the the StB. StB. In In August August 1972 1972 Andropov Andropov reported reported to to the the CPSU Compurity CPSU Central Central Com mittee striving to prevent the completion mittee that that "internal internaladversaries" adversaries in in the the StB were were striving to prevent the completion of"normalization."26 A further to the November of n~rmalization.~~ hrther KGB report report to the Central CentralCommittee Committeeinin November cited complaints complaints from from its its agents agents and and informers informers within the Czechoslovak cited within the Czechoslovak Ministry Ministry of of Internal Mfairs Affairs that that leading in the the ministry ministry continued Internal leading posts posts in continued to to be be occupied occupied by by peo"peo ple not inspire The KGB also also received numerous ple who who do do not inspire political political confidence."27 ~onfidence.~ The KGB received numerous protests of the the Prague Prague Spring Spring and and their protests from from its its informants informants that that the thedisgraced disgraced leaders leaders of their S algovic, who had assisted were being insuffi insufficiently Viliam families were ciently persecuted. persecuted. ViIi am SalgoviE, assisted the Soviet invasion in 1968 1968and and had been promoted to the the CPCz Central Committee Committee in in Soviet had 1970, complained complained that that the children of of "right-wing right-wing leaders were being allowed to to 1970, the children leaders" were being allowed theuniversities. Worse still, the children of enter the of three disgraced former members of of

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S the tefan Sadovsky and Julius the Presidium-Dubcek, Presidium-DubEek, Stefan Sidovskyand Julius Turcek-had TurEek-had been been given given "excellent excellentmarks" marksin in their theirentrance entrance examinations.28 examinations.28 S algoviC's complaint Salg~viEs complaint reflected reflected the the self-righteous self-righteous vengefulness vengefulness of of the the Soviet Soviet syco sycophants 3,500 phants rather ratherthan thanany any failure failure to to purge purge the the universities. universities.In In 1969-70 1969-70 900 900 out out of of 3,500 university university professors professors were were dismissed. dismissed. All A l l Czech Czech literary literary and and cultural cultural journals journals were were closed closed down. down. Unemployed Unemployed academics academics and and writers writers were were forced forced to to seek seek new new careers careers as as lavatory lavatory cleaners, cleaners, building building laborers laborers and and boiler-room boiler-room stokers. stokers. Soon Soon after after winning winning the the Nobel 1972, Heinrich Heinrich Boll "a Nobel Prize Prize for for Literature Literature in in 1972, Boll described described Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia as as a veritable cultural cemetery."29 veritable cultural cemetery.29
M A NY OF the period MANY OF T TH HE E reports reports received received by by the the Centre Centrethroughout throughout the period of of "normaliza normalization" tionconcerned concerned continued continued covert covert feuding feuding within within the the CPCz CPCz leadership. leadership. In In December December 1972 JakeS complained to the KGB liaison office that Husak had ordered 1972 Jake5 complained to the KGB liaison office that Husik had ordered the the tele telephones phones of of all all Presidium Presidium members members to to be be tapped. tapped. The The working working atmosphere atmosphere within within the the Central Committee was now, he the Novotny Central Committee was now, he claimed, claimed, so so poisonous poisonous that that the Novotny era era ap appeared, peared, by by comparison, comparison, a a golden golden age.30 age.30In In February February 1973 1973Jakes Jakei and and three three other other lead leading ing Soviet Soviet loyalists-Presidium loyalists-Presidium members members Karel Karel Hoffmann Hoffmann and and Antonin Antonin Kapek Kapek and and party party secretary secretary Miloslav Miloslav Hruskovic-again HruSkoviFgain protested protested to to the the KGB KGB about about what what they they claimed claimed were were "attempts attempts to tosqueeze squeeze out out internationalist internationalist Communists Communists from from important important posts.'m Among leadership Among other otherintrigues intrigues within within the theParty Party leadership reported reported by by the the KGB KGB to to Moscow 1973 was the realist Minister S trougal was Moscow during during 1973 was the the claim claim that that the realist Prime Prime Minister Strougal was seeking seeking to to ingratiate ingratiate himself himself with with Husak's Husiks internationalist internationalist deputy deputy Bil'ak Bilakby bymethods methods which which included included giving giving Bil'ak's Bilaks daughter daughter a a present present costing costing 10,000 10,000 crowns, crowns, debited debited to to the the budget budget of of the theCzechoslovak Czechoslovaktelevision television service.32 service.32 On was killed killed in O n February February 28, 28, 1973 1973 Kaska Kaska was in an an aircrash aircrash while while visiting visiting his his Polish Polish opposite number and was succeeded as Minister of Internal Affairs by Jaromir opposite number and was succeeded as Minister of Internal Affairs by Jaromir Ob Obzina, his zina,who who promptly promptly gave gave a a sycophantic sycophantic display display of of his internationalist internationalist credentials. credentials."For For the the CPSU CPSU and and for for Comrade Comrade Brezhnev," Brezhnev, he he told told the the KGB KGB liaison, liaison, he he was was "ready ready to to carry Obzina, carry out out any any assignment."33 a~signment.~~ Obzina, however, however, quickly quickly became became caught caught up up in in Husak's Husiks attempts to increase attempts to increase his his personal personal prestige prestige by by combining, combining, like like Novotny Novotnf before before the the Prague Prague Spring, Spring, the the post post of of President President of of the the Republic Republic with with that that of of General General Secretary Secretary of the 973, probably of the the CPCz. CPCz.At At the end endof of 1 1973, probably at at Husak's Husiks request, request, Obzina Obzina began began trying trying to to win win over over internationalists internationalists opposed opposed to to his his ambitions ambitions for for the thepresidency. presidency.According According to of to KGB KGB reports reports from from Prague, Prague, a a group group of Soviet Sovietloyalists loyalists headed headed by by Hoffmann, Hoffmann, Indra, Indra, JakeS the KGB Jake: and and Kapek Kapek (all (allin in close close touch touch with withboth both the KGB and and the theSoviet Soviet embassy) embassy) con continued combine The two postS.34 posts.34 The growing growing senility senility ofLud of Ludtinued to to resist resist any anyattempt attempt to to combine the the two vik vik Svoboda, Svoboda,who who had hadsucceeded succeededNovotny Novotny as as president president in in 1968, 1968, however, however, played playedinto into Husak's Husiks hands. hands. In In May May 1975 1975 he he replaced replaced the the by by now now demented demented Svoboda Svoboda as as head head of of state. prdvo celebrated by publishing state. Rude RudFpnivo celebrated the the occasion occasion by publishing five five large large photographs photographs of of Husak, Husik, each each showing showing him him in in the the company company of of one one of of the the leaders leaders of of the the five five Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact countries countries who who had hadinvaded invaded Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia in in August August 1968.35 1968.35 At At the the time time of of Husak's Husiks apotheosis, apotheosis, Dubcek DubEek was was working working as as a a mechanic mechanic with with the the Slovak Slovak Forestry ForestryCommission Commission under under constant constant surveillance surveillance and and frequent frequent harassment harassment by by the StB.36 On October 2, 1975 the Centre reported to Brezhnev that Dubcek had sent reported to Brezhnev that DubEek had sent the StB.36O n October 2,1975 the Centre

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compromising Based on compromising material material on on Husak Husak to tothe theWestern Western media. media. Based on information information sup supplied plied by by Dubcek, DubEek, the the West West German Germanand and Austrian Austrian press press had had reported reported that that during during the the war war Husak Husak had had accompanied accompanied a a group group of of Nazi Nazi journalists journalists to to the the Katyn Katyn Wood Wood near near Smolensk, exhumed the several thousand Smolensk, where where the the Germans Germans had had exhumed the bodies bodies of of several thousand Polish Polish officers atrocity blamed onthe the Germans). officers shot shot by by the the NKVD (an (an atrocity blamed by by Moscow Moscow on Germans). Dubcek twice summoned StB at atthe the Slovakian Dubtek was was twice summoned for for questioning questioning by by the the StB Slovakian interior interior ministry. outcome. ''At ministry. The The KGB was was deeply deeply dissatisfied dissatisfiedby by the the outcome. At the the interrogation," interrogation, it it informed "Dubcek conducted informed Brezhnev, Brezhnev, Dubtek conducted himself himself provocatively, provocatively, categorically categorically refusing refusing to to answer answer questions questions and and declaring declaring that that in in future future he he would would protest protest against against being being sub subjected jected to to pressure." pressure. Dubcek Dubtek refused refused to to sign sign either either a a denial denial that that he he had had provided provided the the information Husak or information on on Husik or a a protest protest at at the the use use of of his his name name by by the the Western Western press, press, and and threatened if"repressive measures" werewere taken threatened to to react react "decisively" decisively if repressive measures taken against against him. him. Husak Hushk meanwhile protest meanwhile wrote wrote to to Obzina Obzinato to protest his his innocence innocence of of the the charges charges against against him.37 him.37 Despite Despite Husak's Husiks success success in in capturing capturing the the presidency, presidency, his his power power was was more more circum circumscribed than than NovotnY's Novotnys a a decade decade earlier. earlier. His His second-in-command, second-in-command, the the international internationalscribed ist ist Bil'ak, Bilak, enjoyed enjoyed greater greater authority authority and and influence influence than than any any other other deputy deputy in in eastern eastern Europe. Europe. Having Having rejected rejected the the idea idea of of a a regime regime wholly wholly dominated dominated by by notorious notorious hard hardliners, the the Kremlin, Kremlin, with with some some misgivings, misgivings, regarded regarded the the Husak-Bil'ak Husik-Bilak combination combination liners, as of as the the best best available. available.A KGB report report from from Prague Prague at at the theend end of the the decade decade reported reported in in thinly Husak and thinly disguised disguised language language that, that, despite despite growing growing friction friction between between Hushk and Bil'ak, Bilak, neither neither was was attempting attempting to to topple topple the the other other because because they they knew knew that that Moscow Moscow would would not not allow allow it: it: Business-like being main Business-like relations relations between between the the leaders leaders of of Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia are are being maintained tained largely largely because because of of the the fact fact that that Husak Husik Bil'ak Bilak and and other other members members of of the the Presidium Presidium of of the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak Communist Communist Party Party know know that that the the top topleadership leadership , firm of of the the CPSU CPSU gave gave their their full fiill, firm and and uncompromising uncompromising support support to to Husak Hushk and and Bil'ak. For both, this is a serious restraining factor for maintaining normal work Bilak. Forboth, this is a serious restraining factor for maintaining normal working ing relations relations between betweenthe the two two of ofthem, them, and and the the situation situation in in the the Presidium Presidium of ofthe the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak Communist Communist Party Party largely largely depends depends on on their their mutual mutual relations.38 relation^.^' Despite of the leadership, the Despite its its jaundiced jaundiced view view of the political political leadership, the KGB liaison liaison office office in in Prague do Prague was was fully fully satisfied satisfied with with the the willingness willingness of of Obzina Obzina and andthe theStB StBto to do its its bid bidding. ding. Obzina, Obzina, it it reported, reported, kept kept it it "objectively objectivelyinformed" informed both both about about what what took took place place in the CPCz of each Husak in the CPCz Presidium Presidium and and about about the the activities activities of each of of its its members, members, Husik included.39 there were included.39Sinitsyn Sinitsyn reported reported in in 1977 1977that that there were "operational operational contacts" contacts between between KGB In KGB and and StB StB residencies residencies in in twenty-six twenty-six countries.40 countries.4o In 1975 1975 the the StB StBhad hadagreed agreed to to a a Soviet Soviet request request to to open open a a residency residency in in Albania, Albania, a a country country which which the the KGB found found hard hard to In In 1976, StB discovered to penetrate.41 ~enetrate.~ 1976, when when the the StB discovered that that Jozef Jozef Grohman, Grohman, editor-in editor-inchief chief of of the the state state technical technical literature literature publishing publishing house house and and the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak repre representative at UNESCO, was working for West German intelligence, Obzina invited sentative at UNESCO, was working for West German intelligence, Obzina invited the Centre to the investigation the Centre to send send KGB officers officers to to Prague Prague to to help help in in the investigation of of the the Grohman what Grohman case case at at what he he deferentially deferentially termed termed "a a higher higher professional professional level. "42 Sinit Sinitsyn syn concluded concluded his his annual annual report report from from Prague Prague in in 1977: 1977:

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Our with the Our friends friends hand hand over over to to us us all all their their cipher cipher traffic traffic with theresidencies, residencies,whether whether it telegrams it is is of of an an information information nature nature or or operational; operational; they they also also hand hand over over telegrams from Our friends from ambassadors. ambassadors. Our friends keep keep practically practically no no secrets secrets from from US.43 us.33 The which followed The crushing crushing of of the the Prague Prague Spring Spring and and the the "normalization" normalizationwhich followed marked marked point in inthe the KGBs policy towards eastern Europe. PROGRESS opera turning point KGB's Europe. The PROGRESS oper ations illegals pioneered pioneered in eastern ations by by illegals in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia were were extended extended to to the the rest rest of of eastern Europe to tomonitor the state state of of public public opinion, opinion, penetrate penetrate subversive subversive groups groups and and watch watch Europe monitor the for signs of 1 969 onon for signs of "ideological ideological sabotage" sabotage by by Western Western intelligence intelligence agencies. agencies. From From 1969 wards wards the the KGB was was also also allowed allowed to to recruit recruit agents agents and and confidential confidential contacts contacts through throughout the Soviet Soviet Bloc. addition to the KGB liaison offices in countries of out the Bloc. In In addition to the liaison offices in the the countries of the the Warsaw Centre now established, as secretresidencies residencies Warsaw Pact, Pact, the the Centre now established, as in in Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, secret operating under under diplomatic diplomatic cover cover in in Soviet Soviet embassies.44 embassies.44 operating In March March 1968, partly as as a a result result of of the the Prague Prague Spring, Spring, there there had had been been several several In 1968, partly weeks students and weeks of of confrontation confrontation between between Warsaw Warsaw students and the the police, police, during during which which the the aging Polish Polish leader Wradislaw Gomulka Gomulka had had seemed seemed in in danger danger of of losing aging leader Wladislaw losing control. control. Gomurka survived survivedin in the the short short term term only only because of his his steadfast steadfast backing for interGomulka because of backing for inter vention in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia and and the the Kremlin's Kremlins desire desire to to avoid avoid simultaneous upheavals vention simultaneous upheavals in His position, under threat in another another part part of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Bloc. His position, however, however, was was already already under threat successor, Eduard Gierek. According to reports from the KGB liaifrom his eventual successor, liai son office hardline, anti-Semitic son office in in Warsaw, Warsaw, the the hardline, anti-Semitic minister minister of of the the interior, interior, Mieczyslaw Mieczysraw Moczar, SB (the (the Polish Polish KGB), feared that his his own Moczar, who who was was responsible responsible for for the the SB feared that own posi posiunder Gierek Gierek and and began plotting to prevent his suc suction would also be threatened under cession. Compromising material passed, on cession. Compromising material on on Gierek Gierek was was passed, on Moczar's Moczars instructions, instructions, to to SB agent. Moczar also ordered the bugging of a series of Radio Free Europe via an SB leading figures 45 leading figures in in the the PUWP, the the Polish Polish Communist Communist Party. Party. Late Gomulka's position was undermined by Late in in1970 1970 Gomulkas position was fatally fatallyundermine.d by a a new new round round of of public public. protest. n December 14 protest. O On 14 workers at the the Baltic shipyards shipyards of Gdansk, Gdansk, Gdynia and daywith secu secuSzczecin struck in protest at a sudden sudden rise in food prices. Clashes Clashes next day forces left 300 strikers strikers and demonstrators dead.46 dead.46 rity forces According to KGB reports from Warsaw, the order to open fire on the the shipyard workers was given givenby byZenon Kliszko, Warsaw, Kliszko, Gomulkas closest Korczynski, Gomulka's closest supporter on the the Politburo, and General Grzegorz Korczynski, defense minister and a supporter of of Gierek.47 Gierek.47The KGB also forwarded to deputy defense Moscow the minutes of of the Polish Politburo meeting held to discuss discuss the crisis on 19.With Gomulka in ina Party clinic suffering suffering from nervous exhaustion, exhaustion, the December 19. meeting was chaired by the prime minister, minister, Jozef Cyrankiewicz,who asked the Min MinJozef Cyrankiewicz, ister of Defense, Defense, General General Wojciech Wojciech Jaruzelski, Jaruzelski, to to report report on on the thesituation. situation. ister Jaruzelskis assessment assessment sealed sealedGomulka's Gomulkasfate. fate. He H e reported that 350 tanks and 600 Jaruzelski's troop carriers had been deployed in Gdansk Gdahsk and Gdynia alone. If If unrest on a similar scale occurred occurred in Warsaw, Warsaw, he could not guarantee the security of the capital, capital, though scale special measures would be taken to protect Party and government buildings. buildings. Army special morale was n the the Baltic it was morale was seriously seriously affected. affected. O On Baltic coast coast it being met met with shouts of was being with shouts of Gestapo! Murderers!Jaruzelski Jaruzelski was followed followed "Gestapo!" and "Murderers!" by Moczar, who summarized SB

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and other other reports reports reaching reaching the the interior interior ministry. Party, he he said, has never never found found and ministry. The The Party, said, has itself so so helpless helpless in the the face of a crisis. crisis. Hitherto, even when times were hardest, Party members had felt they were fighting a righteous cause-but members fighting for "a cause"-but no longer. longer. In Party meetings, letter justifying the price price increases increases was out, some meetings, when when the the Politburo Politburo letter justifying the was read readout, some Communists room. The in family family allowances Communists were were reduced reduced to to tears tears and and left left the the room. The rise rise in allowances from 15 to 25 zlotys zlotys caused caused derision derision among among rank rank and from 15 to and file me members, members, stunned stunned by by the the leaderships incomprehension of ordinary living conditions. After leadership's Mter an agitated debate it was as first first secretary was was agreed agreed that that Gomulka Gomulka should should be be replaced replaced as secretary by by Gierek. Gierek. There There was then an acrimonious acrimonious discussion about who should tell Gomulka to to submit his resigresig nation, nally decided send Cyrankiewicz Cyrankiewicz and and the the hitherto hitherto faithful faithful nation, before before it it was was fi finally decided to to send Klis~k~.~* Kliszko.48 Gomulka's marked the rst occasion in Europe Gomulkas downfall downfall marked the fi first occasion anywhere anywherein Europe since since the the Second Second spontaneous working-class protest had brought about a change of World War when spontaneous of leader~hip.~~ The was predictably alarmed alarmedat the the extent and success of political leadership.49 The Centre of the operation to the popular popular revolt revolt and and immediately immediately embarked embarked on on a a PROGRESS PROGRESS operation to assess assess farit had been contained. contained. A group of illegals, illegals,posing once again again as visihow far as Western visi tors, in organizing tors, were were instructed instructed to to investigate investigate the the role role of of the the Catholic Catholic Church Church in organizing popprotest, its attitude towards the Gierek regime and the general mood of of the pop ulation. Among the the illegals was was the experienced experienced Gennadi Blyablin (BOGUN), disulation.so dis asa West German press photographer, photographer,who was given givena list of fi five guised as ve individuals individuals to cultivate them to "co-operate under in cultivate and and told told to to persuade persuade two two or or three three of of them to co-operate under false false flag," flag, in supplying information not to to the KGB but to toWest German the belief that they were supplying wellwishers. Probably Probably thelist was that of Father Andrzej wellwishers. the most important name on the Bardecki, personal assistant to Cardinal Archbishop Karol Wojtyla Bardecki, Wojtyla of kakbw, Krakow, whom ideological influence the Centre Centre considered the leading ideological influence on the the Polish Church. Church. The The doubtless did not foresee foresee that less than eight years later become KGB doubtless later Wojtyla would become first foresight in identifying the fi rst Polish pope, but it showed some foresight identifying him as a potential threat to to the theCommunist regime. threat Communist regime. 51
D U RI N G

1971, the illegals sent on on PROGRESS to 1971,I N addition addition to tothe illegals sent PROGRESS operations operations to

Czechoslovakia in Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and and Poland, Poland, thirteen thirteen were were deployed deployed in in Romania, Romania, nine nine in seven East Germany, Hungary and and three Bulgaria.52 Though all had had seven in in East Germany, four four in in Hungary three in in Bulgaria.52 Though all broadly also specific specific causes causes of of KGB concern concern in in each each broadly similar similar objectives, objectives, there there were were also 53 The 1971 reflected growing Soviet country. country.53 The priority priority given given to to Romania Romania in in 1971 reflected growing Soviet displea displeasure a nepotis sure at at the the foreign foreign policy policy of of its its leader, leader, Nicolae Nicolae Ceauescu, Ceaugescu, who who combined combined a nepotistic version version of of neo-Stalinism neo-Stalinism at at home home with increasing independence Warsaw tic with increasing independence from from the the Warsaw Pact condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ceauescu was was Pact abroad. abroad. After After condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Ceaugescu rewarded Nixon, the rst by an rewarded in in the the following following year year by by a a state state visit visit from from Richard Richard Nixon, the fi first by an American Europe. In 1970 Ceaugescu Ceauescu paid paid the the first American president president to to Communist Communist eastern eastern Europe. In 1970 first of showed its displeasure at at his his visit Bei of three three visits visits to to the the United UnitedStates. States. Moscow Moscow showed its displeasure visit to to Beijing on the 54 jing in in 1971 1971 by by staging staging Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact maneuvers maneuvers on the Romanian Romanian borders. border^.'^ KGB reports in a combined indignation indignation reports on on Romania Romania were were written written in a tone tone which which combined with with deep deep suspicion: suspicion:

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Exploiting Chinese Communist Communist Party Party and and of Exploiting the the anti-Soviet anti-Soviet line line of the the Chinese of the the Chinese set out Chinese government, government, the the Romanian Romanian leadership leadership has has set out on on the thepath pathof of so socalled called autonomy autonomy and and independence independence from from the the Soviet Soviet Union Union .. .. .. Nationalism Nationalism is is flourishing flourishing in in Romania. Romania. Its Its authors authors and and advocates advocates are arethe the very very same same Party Party and and government government leaders. leaders. The The Romanian Romanian Communist Communist Party Party leadership leadership does does not not openly openly reveal reveal its its ter territorial ritorial claims; claims; but but it it does does everything everything to to demonstrate demonstrate that that historically, historically, ethni ethnically other ways cally and and in inother ways Moldavia Moldavia and and the the Chernovitsy Chernovitsy Oblast Oblast belong belong to to conversation with Japanese socialists socialists Romania. The statement made by Mao in conversation USSRsillegal acquisition of Bessarabia [Moldavia] [Moldavia] has been develabout the USSR's been devel oped oped in in Romania. Romania. has twice twice published published articles articles casting casting doubt doubt The French newspaper Le Monde has on Union. I It is not not impos on the thelegality legality of of Bessarabia's Bessarabiasinclusion inclusion in in the the [Soviet] [Soviet] Union. t is impossible sible that that the the initiative initiative for for publishing publishing the the articles articles came came from from Romania.55 Romania.
illegals sent to toRomania under Western Westerndisguise disguise in 1971 1971were ordered to col colThe illegals Romalect intelligence on Romanian relations with the the United United States and China; Roma north Bukovina; Bukovina; the political and nian claims on Soviet territory in Bessarabia and north theSoviet Union; the theposition of German and Hun Huneconomic basis of opposition to the CeauFescu cult; cult; and the state of the Romanian Communist garian minorities; the Ceauescu Partys6 illegals main sources included staff of the Party Party newspaper Scintea and Party. 56 The illegals' 57& ~ the the German German language language Volk Elk und Kultur. Ku/~z
ES OPERATIONS N Yugoslavia Yugoslavia during during 1971 were prompted prompted chiefly chiefly by by the the PROGR RE SS O P E RATI O N S I IN 1971 were most internal crisis crisis since since Tito's break with Moscow in most serious serious internal Titos break with Moscow in 1948. 1948. The The dramatic dramatic resurgence tensions during of resurgence of of nationalist nationalist tensions during the theCroat CroatSpring Spring of 1971 1971 culminated culminated at at the the end of the year with Tito's Titos arrest of the Croat Communist leaders leaders and 400 Croat nationalists and in in his resumption of direct control over the Croat Croat secret police. police. The Yugoslav socialism socialism was was resolving resolving ethnic rivalries was exposed as an illu illuclaim that Yugoslav ~ i o nThe .~~ illegals were given a long list of institutions in inwhich which sion.58 illegals they were instructed strike up acquaintances:" acquaintances:the Academy of Sciences, Sciences, the Public Opinion Institute Institute to "strike officesof Kommunist, Politika Pulitika and and Borba, the theTanjug Tanjug in Belgrade, Belgrade, the editorial offices of Kommunist, Agency, the Institute for International Politics and Economics at Belgrade Univer UniverAgency, sity, Zagreb Zagreb University, University, Yugoslav Yugoslav businesses and the theUnion Union of Journalists particusity, businesses and of Journalists (in (in particu Cosic, who Tito). Some lar, the writer Dobrica Dobrica Cosit, who was believed believed to be close close to Tito). Some of the theCentre Centre courier, radio and the thepost were judged suf sufreports sent back to the by illegal courier, ficiently ficiently important important to to be be forwarded forwarded to to Brezhnev.59 Bre~hnev.~ BY FA FAR R T H E largest KGB presence presence in eastern Europe was in East East Germany. Ever War there there had hadbeen a large KGB enclave within the head headsince the Second World War quarters of the Soviet military administration in the the Berlin suburb of Karlshorst. GDR During the the period which preceded the establishment of the G D R it had had closely monitored political parties, churches, trade unions and public opinion within withinthe the Soviet zone of Germany. Though the KGB claimed after the foundation of of the GD R Soviet

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that that the the role role of of its its Karlshorst Karlshorst base base was was to to mount mount operations operations against against the the FRG FRG and and other other Western Westerncountries, countries, as as well well as as to to provide provide liaison liaisonwith with the theStasi, Stasi, it it also also continued continued to to monitor monitordevelopments developments within within East East Germany.60 Germany6 In In 1971 1971 the theintelligence intelligence personnel personnel stationed at Karlshorst, not including liaison officers, totaled 404, of whom stationed at Karlshorst, not including liaison officers, totaled 404, of whom forty fortyeight eight were were operations operations officers officersworking working under under cover. cover. Another Another forty-seven forty-seven KGB KGB oper oper1 ations ations officers officerswere werestationed stationed elsewhere elsewhere in in the the GDR.6 GDR.61 The Germany in 1969 The advent advent of ofWilly Willy Brandt's Brandts socialist-liberal socialist-liberalcoalition coalition in in West West Germany in 1969 offered offered opportunities opportunities for for detente dCtente which which Moscow Moscow was was more more anxious anxious to to pursue pursue than than Walter Walter Ulbricht, Ulbricht, the the aging aging and and inflexible inflexible neo-Stalinist neo-Stalinist leader leader of of East EastGermany. Germany. KGB KGB reports reports from from Karlshorst Karlshorst complained complained that, that, after after the the invasion invasion of of Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht Ulbricht was was posing posing as as the the wisest wisest and and most most far-sighted far-sighted statesman statesman of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc, Bloc, implying the implying (probably (probablycorrectly) correctly) that that he hehad had been been quicker quicker than than Brezhnev Brezhnev to to identify identify the subversive Ulbricht's subversive nature nature of of the the Dubcek Dubtek regime.62 regime.62 Ulbrichts refusal refusal to to abandon abandon his his com commitment "socialist" mitment to to aaunited united socialistGermany Germany made made him him unwilling unwilling to to consider consider an an agree agreement ment with with Brandt Brandtinvolving, involving, for for the the first first time, time, mutual mutualrecognition recognition by by the the FRG FRG and and the GDR.63 the GDR.63 By East German German prime By 1969, 1969, if if not not before, before, both both Willi Willi Stoph, Stoph, the the East prime minister, minister, and and Erich had overseen Erich Honecker, Honecker, who who had overseen the the building building of of the the Berlin Berlin Wall, Wall, were were fueling fueling Moscow's meetings Moscowsgrowing growing irritation irritation with with Ulbricht Ulbrichtatat meetings with with the theKGB KGB and and the the Soviet Soviet ambassador, Pyotr Andreyevich Abrasimov. Ulbricht, they reported, had described ambassador, Pyotr Andreyevich Abrasimov. Ulbricht, they reported, had described Soviet Soviet cut-price cut-price imports imports of of East East German Germanuranium uranium as as "the the plundering plundering of of the the GDR's GDRs natural natural resources." resources.When When Abrasimov Abrasimov suggested suggested that that allowance allowance needed needed to to be be made made for for Ulbricht's seventy-six in retorted that thathe he Ulbrichts age age (he (he was was seventy-six in 1969), 1969), Stoph Stoph and and Honecker Honecker retorted should have resigned when he was seventy.64 In 1971 Ulbricht was kicked upstairs should have resigned when hewas seventy.64 In 1971 Ulbrichtwas kickedupstairs to to the the newly newly created created post post of of Party Party chairman, chairman, and and succeeded succeeded as as Party Party leader leader by by Honecker. Honecker. In In the the following followingyear year the the GDR GDR and and FRG FRG formally formally recognized recognized each each other's others existence existence as as separate separate states. states. Though Party leadership, Though bickering bickering continued continued within within the the Party leadership, the the KGB's KGBs main main con concern cern was was "the the impact impact of of the the adversary's adversarys ideology ideology on on citizens citizens of of the the GDR" G D R through through Western Western broadcasts broadcasts and and visits visits by byWest West Germans. Germans.The The Centre Centre calculated calculated. in in the the midmid1970s the existing [Western] 1970s that that "500,000 500,000 citizens citizens are are hostile hostile to to the existing system system and and the the [Western] adversary time retain the GDR."65 A long-running adversarywill will for for a a long long time retain a a base base of of support support in in the GDR.65 long-running KGB operation, codenamed LUCH, monitored opinion within the East German KGB operation, codenamed LUCH, monitored opinion within the East German population Germans and population and and Party, Party, contacts contacts between between East East and and West WestGermans and alleged alleged "attempts in attempts by by the the USA USA and and the the FRG FRG to to harm harm the the building building of of socialism" socialism in the theGDR. GDR. In In 1974 1974the thesection section of of the theKarlshorst Karlshorst KGB KGB responsible responsible for for LUCH LUCH was was raised raised in in sta status to a directorate.66 tus to a directorate.66 The The majority majority of of the the Centre's Centres intelligence intelligence on on East East Germany, Germany, however, however, came came from from the the Stasi, Stasi, whose whose network network of of internal internal informers informers was was vastly vastly greater greater than than the the KGB's. KGBs. The The GDR GDR had had seven seven times times as as many many informers informers per per head head of of population population as as Nazi Nazi Ger GermanyY In 1975 65 percent percent of of all all reports reports from from Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc security security services services received received man~ In .~ 1975 ~ 65 by by the the Centre Centre came came from from the the Stasi.68 Stasi.68Some Some of of the the reports reports were, were, in in effect, effect, classified classified East German opinion 1 974, for East German opinion polls. polls. In In an an opinion opinion survey survey of of factory factory workers workers in in 1974, for example, the example, 20.6 20.6 percent percent of of those those questioned questioned "considered considered that that friendship friendship with with the

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USSR t to USSR restricted restricted the the GDR's GDRs autonomy autonomy and and brought brought more more benefi benefit to the theSoviet Soviet Union Union than than to to the the GDR." GDR.A majority, majority,when when asked asked to to explain explain the the phrase phrase "achieving achievingworking workingclass to know the class power," power, claimed claimed not not to know what what it it meant. meant. Some Some of of the the comments comments on on the phrase, however, were described in the report forwarded to the Centre as "bitter, phrase, however, were described in the report forwarded to the Centre as bitter, wounding wounding and andvicious." vicious.Among Among them themwere were "Working-class Working-class power power is is all all right right [in [inthe theory] , but ory], but what what is is it it like like in in practice?"; practice?;"This This is is just just a a slogan!"; slogan!; and and "Justice Justicefor for every every worker, for Given worker, not not just just for a a newly newly created created privileged privileged group!" group! Given the the inevitable inevitable caution caution of of those questioned in expressing politically incorrect views, the real level of dissatisfac those questioned in expressing politically incorrect views, the real levelof dissatisfaction tion was was probably probably considerably considerably higher. higher. Both Both the the size size of of the the KGB's KGBs Karlshorst Karlshorst base base and on and the the volume volume of of intelligence intelligence from from the the Stasi Stasi made made the the Centre Centre less less dependent dependent on PROG RESS operations than from PROGRESS operations by by illegals illegals for for intelligence intelligence from from East East Germany Germany than from the the rest rest of of eastern eastern Europe.69 Europe.69 concern concern in in Hungary Hungarywas was the the extent extent of ofJewish Jewish influence influence within within the the Party Hungarian KGB). Zionist and Party and and the the AVH AVH (the (the Hungarian KGB). Always Always prone prone to to Zionist and anti antiSemitic by Hungarian Hungarian reluc relucSemitic conspiracy conspiracy theories, theories, the the Centre Centre was was deeply deeply disturbed disturbed by tance 1969 to to its tance to to agree agree in in 1969 its suggestion suggestion for for holding holding "an an anti-Zionist anti-Zionist conference conference in in Budapest opposed policy Budapest of of progressive progressiveJews Jews opposed to to the the policy of of Israel" Israelor or for for assisting assistingthe the KGB KGB in in making making an an anti-Zionist anti-Zionist film film alleging alleging cooperation cooperation between between Hitler Hitler and and Hungarian Hungarian Zionists. "The Hungarian security agencies," the Centre concluded, "were Zionists. The Hungarian security agencies, the Centre concluded, were forced forced to to look look over over their their shoulder shoulder when when working working on on the the [anti-]Zionist [anti-]Zionist line, line, as as Jewish Jewish nation nationalists alists within within the the leadership leadership of of the the highest highest Party Party organs organs were were morbidly morbidly cautious cautious with with regard regard to to this this sector sector of of work." work.The The KGB KGB also also looked looked askance askance at at the the number numberof of Jews Jews within the Hungarian interior ministry, reported-two deputy withinthe Hungarian interior ministry, among among them-it them-itreported-two deputy ministers, VH First ministers, the the heads heads of of the the A AVH First and and Third Third Directorates Directorates (responsible, (responsible, respec respectively, tively,for for foreign foreign intelligence intelligence and and the the surveillance surveillance of of domestic domestic political political opposition), opposition), the the head head of of the thepolice police directorate directorate and and the the head head of of military military counter-intelligence. counter-intelligence. The The situation situation was was worst worst of of all all in in foreign foreign intelligence, intelligence, where, where, according according to to KGB KGB calcula calculations, tions, thirteen thirteen of of the the seventeen seventeen department department chiefs chiefs were were Jewish.70 Jewish. The onon PROGRESS posing The illegals illegals sent sent to toHungary Hungary PROGRESS operations operations in in 1971 1971 posing as as West Western ern visitors visitors were were sent sent primarily primarily to to investigate investigate the the extent extent of of Zionist Zionist influence. influence. They They were were instructed instructed to to report report on on attitudes attitudes to to Israel Israel and and its its trade trade and and economic economic relations relations with Zionist with Hungary, Hungary, "the the links links of of Hungarian Hungarian organizations organizations and and individuals individuals with with Zionist circles" circles and and the the situation situation in in the the Writers' Writers Union Union and and other other "creative creative unions" unions (where (where Jewish to told Jewish influence influence was was also alsobelieved believed to be be strong). strong). The The illegals illegals were werealso also told to to "iden identify ti+ anti-Semitic anti-Semitic attitudes," attitudes, presumably presumably in in the thehope hope that that they they would would discover discover popular popular opposition opposition to to the the number number of of Hungarian Hungarian Jews Jews in in high highplaces. places. According According to to an an alarmist alarmist Centre Centre assessment, assessment,"Pro-Zionist Pro-Zionist domination dominationwas was entrenched entrenched in in Party, Party, state state and and pub public lic organizations."71 organization^."^^
D 972 P SS S operations of nationalist DU UR RI IN NG G I 1972 PR RO OG GR RE ES operations were were extended extended to to areas areas of nationalist unrest unrest within the Soviet within the Soviet Union. Union. On O n October October 4, 1972 1972 KGB KGB Directive Directive No. No. 150/3-10807 150/3-10807 instructed FCD Illegals Illegals Directorate Directorate to to investigate investigate the the mood mood of of the the population population instructed the the FCD and and the the activities activitiesof of Western Western tourists tourists in in the theBaltic Baltic republics. republics. The The Centre's Centres analysis analysisof of T G B 'S M TH HE E K KGBS MA AI IN N

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the and VLAS was the reports reports received received from from ARTYOM, FYODOROV, SEVIDOV and was uniformly all four four illegals illegals noted noted inefficient inefficient uniformly depressing. depressing. Posing Posing as as Western Western visitors, visitors, all workforce ''just just sitting out the administration; an apathetic workforce out the appointed [working] [working] hours, with no profession; intolerance between ethnic groups; and no pride in their their profession;" widespread the Baltic Baltic republics republics were, were, however, "well widespread drunkenness. drunkenness. The The population population of of the however,well events in the West West and andin inthe theSoviet Union. Letters informed about about events Soviet Union." Letters were were taken taken to to Westby foreign tourists, frequently written by people anxious into mar marthe West anxious to to enter enter into convenience with Westerners to provide pretexts for riages of of convenience for emigration: emigration: Many "Many people of either sex marry ethnic Jews, although they themselves themselves are are not Jews; their only aim aim is is to to leave leave the the USSR." USSR. As frequently occurred analyses of ofinternal only occurred with analyses internal disdis sidence, scapegoats were the Jews. Because sidence, the main scapegoats Because they were conscious "conscious of of the moral support support of of Israel and the the USA and and other otherWestern Western countries, moral Israel and countries," they they were were alleged alleged the population-admitting to be even more idle than the rest of the population-admitting to to the illegals that that We work just enough enough to toavoid being sacked.72 "We being sacked."72
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Europe to have franker, and and therefore therefore Europe the the illegals illegals appear appear to have given given franker, assessments of public attitudes than the offices and more depressing, depressing, assessments the KGB liaison liaison offices and residencies, who who were were under under pressure pressure to to produce produce flattering flattering accounts local reaction residencies, accounts of of local reaction by Soviet Soviet leaders. to dreary set-piece set-piece speeches speeches by leaders. Even in Bulgaria most of of the populapopula had lost their traditional sense Russia.According to tion had sense of Slav kinship with Soviet Russia. one report: one report:
Anti-Sovietism flourishes on Bulgarian Bulgarian television. television. Though Though not not openly openly Anti-Sovietism flourishes on expressed .. .. ., it finds a fertile breeding ground. The spots,featuring expressed The so-called so-called "spots," featuring Soviet Union and and Soviet Soviet life, life, cause cause the the population population to to Soviet films films about about the the Soviet Soviet Union switch their television switch off off their television sets.73 sets.73

When mission to to Bul When the the illegal illegal TANOV was was sent sent on on a a two-month two-month PROGRESS mission Bulgaria Western journalist preparing travel travel brochures, brochures, he he was was garia in in 1974, 1974, posing posing as as a a Western journalist preparing advised win Bulgarians he talked to to by by giving giving advised by by the the Centre Centreto to win the the confidence confidence of of the the Bulgarians he talked them resentment at at thethe low standard of them presents. presents. Everywhere Everywhere he he went went he hefound found resentment low standard of liv living was being being pressurized pressurized by by the the ing and and the the well-founded well-founded conviction conviction that that Bulgaria Bulgaria was Soviet Union to and other foreign friends, as Soviet Union to squander squander resources resources on on Cuba Cuba and other profligate profligate foreign friends, as well police and security system. system. From From the the Centres Centre's viewpoint, viewpoint, the the well as as on on a a huge huge police and state state security only lining in TANOV's was that that Bulgarians Bulgarians were were too too afraid afraid of of the the only silver silver lining in TANOVs bleak bleak report report was DS, their DS, their security security service, service, to to grumble grumble public1y.74 publicly.74
P RO B AB L LY O S T depressing on the Soviet Bloc Bloc to to reach reach the the Cen Y TH E M MOST depressing intelligence intelligence on the Soviet Centre the 1970s An illegal illegal reported reported after after a a tre during during the 1970s came came from from Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia. An PROGRESS 1976: PROGRESS mission mission in in 1976:

The Russians. The Czechs cannot cannot even even The population population of of the the country country hates hates the the Russians. The Czechs make Soviet artists artists performing performing on on tour make an an objective objective judgment judgment of of the the skills skills of ofSoviet tourinin Czechoslovakia. comment: It "It may may be that the artists Czechoslovakia.The The following following is is a a typical typical comment: bethat theartists

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are but are performing performing well well professionally, professionally, but because because they they are are Russians Russians I can't cant bear bear to to watch watch them."75 them.75 Lines Lines in in plays plays which which were were capable capable of of being being interpreted interpreted as as "negative negative allusions" allusionsto to the the EulenspiegeZ, Soviet Union, Union, such such as as "Love Love for for the the enemy enemy is is not not love" love in in Gorin's Gorins Till Eulenspiegel, Soviet were to provoke of applause were liable liable to provoke storms storms of applause from from the the audience.76 audience.76 In the popular the Russian In view view of of the popular rejoicings rejoicings after after the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak defeat defeat of of the Russian team team in in the the 1969 1969 World World Ice Ice Hockey Hockey Championships Championships in in Stockholm, Stockholm, there there was was con considerable siderable anxiety anxiety before before the the 1979 1979 world world championships championships which which were were held held in in Prague. Prague. A special special commission commission headed headed by by one one of of the the leading leading internationalists internationalists on on the the CPCz CPCz Presidium, a Presidium, Antonin Antonin Kapek, Kapek, tried tried to to ensure ensure good good crowd crowd behavior behavior by by introducing introducing a variety variety of of security security measures, measures, arranging arranging for for ticket ticket allocations allocations to to Party Party organizations organizations and "educational work" and conducting conducting what what was was called called educational work among among both both players players and and specta spectators. tors. Most Most of of its its efforts efforts proved proved in in vain. vain. Throughout the the championships, which opened at the theend end of April, Brezhnev received regular regular reports reports from from both both the the KGB KGB and and the the Soviet Soviet embassy in Prague. Prague. They They received embassy in made dismal dismal reading. reading. Irrespective the Russian playing, the made Irrespective of of who whothe Russian team team was was playing, the other side Czechoslovak spectators cheered the other side and shouted anti-Soviet insults. The German teams, by contrast, all received received a warm United States, Canadian and West German Soviet defeat of of the the Czechoslovak team was reception. The KGB reported that the Soviet greeted coldly even even by byS Strougal "greeted coldly" trougal and other ministers in the government box. After match senior CPCz officials officials avoided avoidedmembers of the Soviet embassy. embassy. the match however, succeed in preventing one potentially acute embarrass embarrassThe KGB did, however, Afterthe the hadtaken ment. After Soviet match against East Germany, a Russian player who had proscribed stimulants was summoned to to aadrug drug test. Had he failed the test, as no he would have done, the the Soviet victory might have been annulled. The KGB doubt he (as a result of measures taken by the [Prague] res resreported proudly to Brezhnev that, "as idency, the player concerned was let off the drug drug test. test.77 idency," 77 KGB reports from Prague complained complained that, after the Soviet team won the world German with with no championship, the medal ceremony was conducted in English and German Russian followed, the Russians coldRussian translation. At the gala reception which followed, Russians were cold shouldered. The Soviet flag was ripped from the team. Even the CPCz newspaper shouldered. Rudiprhvo paid more more attention attention to to the the Canadian, Swedish and and Finnish Finnishteams teams than than to to Rude pravo paid Canadian, Swedish Soviet world champions.78 champions.* the Soviet The enthusiasm displayed The KGB KGB was was also alsooutraged outraged at at the thesometimes sometimes visible visible lack lack of of enthusiasm displayed representatives at tedious official celebrations the Soviet by Czechoslovak representatives celebrations in the Soviet Union. damning report the of Miroslav Vasek, head of of aa delThe Centre wrote a damning report on on the behavior ofMiroslav del theNinth Conference of of Min Minegation from the Czechoslovak ministry of culture at the Socialist Countries, held in Moscow in July July 1978. 1978. At the end end isters of Culture of the Socialist mind-numbing occasion, occasion, Vasek had had the the impertinence to leave of this doubtless mind-numbing theHotel Mir Mirboth both the souvenir conference folder and a series inhis room at the behind in the souvenir conference of probably probably unreadable unreadable volumes volumes solemnly solemnly presented presented to to him him by by the the Soviet Soviet ministry ministry of of of culture: Revolution and Art, Brezhnev: A Brief Brief Biography, Biography, Sixty Jubilee Years: Y ears: culture: Lenin: Revolution o f Culture Culture m2d in the Soviet Union Union and Facts and Figures about the Achievements of and Art in

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Protection of USSR. The The KGB report report inin of Historical and Cultural Monuments in the USSR. sisted not simply simply forgotforgot sisted that that these these valuable valuable items items had had been been deliberately deliberately "abandoned, abandoned, not ten.The Centrewas was not not prepared for this this outrage be passed passedover. over. A full report ten." The Centre prepared for outrage to to be report on on both to toAndropov and to the KGB liaison office it was sent both office in Prague.79 Prague.79 For state of of Czechoslovak Czechoslovak public public opinion opinion and For all all the the KGB's KGBs dissatisfaction dissatisfaction with with the thestate and the CPCz, the Communist one-party state in in CzechoCzecho the fractious fractious leadership leadership of of the the CPCz, the Communist one-party state slovakia the 1970s. At the the beginning beginning of of 1977 1977 slovakia was wasunder under no no visible visible threat threat at at the theend end of of the 1970s. At series of of small Charter 77, itself a series small dissident groups came together in "Charter 77," which described itself a free, informal, open community of people of different convictions, convictions,different faiths as "a free, people of professions, united by the will to strive, individually individually and collectively, collectively, for for and different professions, the respect of civil and human rights." rights. Within six months, over 750 750courageous courageous indiindi viduals had signed the Charter. All A l l endured public vilification vilificationand persecution, rangrang viduals to prison sentences ing from attacks on the. the . street to sentences and incarceration in psychiatric hospitals. One of the founders, the philosopher Jan Patocka, died after a brutal interhospitals. inter ofthe StB, the rogation by the StB. StB. The power of StB, the sense sense of of powerlessness powerlessness induced in the mass of of the the population population by by the the process of "normalization" normalizationand of Soviet Soviet mass process of and the the presence presence of anychance of recapturing the mass enthusiasm generated troops robbed Charter 77 of any years earlier earlierof socialism ahuman human face.8o by the promise promise nine years "socialism with a face"8o Soviet Bloc the KGB's KGBs east clones, urged Throughout the the Soviet east European clones, urged on by by the themoving forces forcesduring the thedecade which followed the Prague Centre, were among the Spring creation of intellectually monotone monotone and and moribund moribund society. society. Viclav Vaclav Spring in in the the creation of an an intellectually the founders of Charter Charter 77 77 (and later the first president of Havel, one of the of the postpost Czech Republic), Republic), wrote later of Communist Czech of this period: period:
remember the the first first half half of of the the 1970s 1970s Czechoslovakia timewhen when hisI remember inin Czechoslovakia as as the the time "his tory with its calen tory stopped" stopped .. .. .. History History has has been been replaced replaced by by pseudo-history, pseudo-history, with its calendar congresses, festivities festivities and and dar of of regularly regularly returning returning official official anniversaries, anniversaries, Party Party congresses, the organic mass sport meetings .. .. .. Totalitarian power has brought brought order "order" in the organic disorder? history, thereby thereby numbing numbing it it as as history. "disorder" ofof history, history. The The government, government, as as it it were, were, so many nationalized time. Hence, time time meets withthe the sad sad fate fate of so many other other nationalized away. 8 1 nationalized things: things: it it has has begun begun to to wither wither away.81

The stopped in eastern Europe Europe with of the The clock clock which which had had stopped in eastern with the the suppression suppression of the Prague Prague Spring in was election of a Polish Spring in 1968 1968 was to to start start again again ten ten years years later later with with the the election of a Polish pope. pope.

S E V E D T E E n
T E THE K GB A N D W E S T E R N AND WESTERN C UN N II S ST T P A RTI E S CO OMMU PARTIES

parties parties around around the the world world dismissed dismissed claims claims that that they they were were involved involved in in Soviet Soviet espi espionage les, however, give the onage as as crude crude McCarthyite McCarthyite slander. slander. KGB fi files, however, give the lie lie to to most most of of their their denials. From denials. From the the 1920s 1920s onwards onwards Western Western Communists Communistswere were regularly regularly asked asked for for help help in considered their in intelligence intelligence operations, operations, which which they they usually usually considered their fraternal fraternal duty duty to to pro provide. vide. Most Most leaders leaders of of even even the the largest largest Western Western parties parties equally equally considered considered it it the the fra fraternal duty of of the Communist Communist Party Partyof of the Soviet Union (CPSU) to provide, via the the Soviet (CPSU) to provide, subsidies whose the KGB, annual annual subsidies whose existence they indignantly indignantly denied. denied. Knowledge Knowledge of the KGB connection elds of of both finance was the preserve preserve of small connection in in the thefi fields both espionage espionage and and finance was the of small and secretive secretive inner within each Party leadership. leadership. and inner circles circles within each Party In the immediate aftermath of the Second most active assistance In theimmediate aftermath of the Second World World War, War, the the most active assistance in Soviet agent recruitment came from four Communist Parties which were briefly included in coalition governments: the French Parti Communiste Frans:ais Fransais (PCF), the Comunista Italian0 Italiano (PCI), (PCl), the the Austrian the Italian Italian Partito Partito Comunista Austrian Kommunistische Kommunistische Partei Partei O O ) and Osterreichs (KPO) and the the Finnish Finnish Suomen Suomen Kommunistinen Kommunistinen Puolue Puolue (SKP). (SKP). sterreichs (KP
chapter 9, the PCF assisted after the the Liberation Liberation in in a a major major penetra penetrachapter 9, the assisted after of aa tion of the French intelligence community which continued for at least a quarter of century. From From July July 1, century. 1, 1946 30, 1947 residency forwarded the 1946 to to June June 30, 1947 the the Paris Paris residency forwarded to to the Centre total 1,289 French intelligence documents. documents. 1950s the 1 By the early 1950s Centre aa total of 1,289 KGBs chief collaborator inside inside the the PCF was KGB's chief collaborator was Gaston Gaston Plissonnier Plissonnier (codenamed (codenamed LANG), a life-long Soviet loyalist who had had established himself by 1970 1970 as second secondLANG), himselfby in-command to the Party leader.2Though little known to the French public and a in-command Party leader.2 a poor public speaker with a a thick thick regional accent, accent, Plissonnier was a master in the democratic centralism" centralismby which which the the Party Party leadership leadership imposed imposed arcane procedures of "democratic its members.3 member^.^ As well as providing inside information on the the PCF, he its policies on its operation^.^ assisted the KGB in identifying potential agents and other intelligence operations.4 During the the later later 1970s 1970s Plissonnier Plissonnier also alsopassed on reports reports from from an an agent agent in in the During passed on the Algeria.5 entourage of President Boumedienne Boumedienne of Algeria.s
A S S s H OW N I N AS

T he and Western Western Communist Parties Parties Throughout the Cold War, Communist Th e KGB and

I N I ITALY, Communist ministers sat in post-war coalition governments IN TALY, AS AS in France, Communist thespring of 1947. 1947.At the end endof of 1945 PC1 had 1,760,000 1,760,000members-twice members-twice until the 1945 thethe PCI

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as Italy, photographs Stalin, affectionately affectionately known as as many many as as the the PCF. PCF. All A l l over over Italy, photographs of of Stalin, known as Ba ffine C'Walrus on factory stuck to Bafone (Walrus moustache"), moustache), were were pasted pasted on factory walls walls and and stuck to machinery. machinery. "We one of Fausto Gallo, Gallo, We were were all under under the the impression," impression, one of the the Communist Communist ministers, ministers, Fausto acknowledged, "that that the the wind was blowing our way.6 later acknowledged, way."6 Washington feared feared that that Gallo Security Council Council concluded concluded in Gallo and and his his colleagues colleagues might might be be right. right. The The National National Security in November 1947, 1947, "The The Italian Italian Government, Government, ideologically November ideologically inclined inclined towards towards Western Western democracy, by a democracy, is isweak weak and and is is being being subjected subjected to to continuous continuous attack attack by a strong strongCommu Communist operation to to aid aid the Christian nist Party." Party. The The very very first first CIA covert covert action action was was an an operation the Christian Democrats against against the the Communists Communists in inthe the1948 1948 general election election by laundering over over Democrats general by laundering 10 million million dollars dollars from funds for use in campaign.7 10 from captured captured Axis Axis funds for use in the the ~ ampaign.~ As in France, the the post-war post-war popularity popularity of of the the brief As in France, the Communist CommunistParty Partyand and the brief period of of Communist Communist participation participation in in government created the the best best opportunities opportunities period government created Soviet ever to Italy for penetration. Like Like JOUR, Soviet intelligence intelligence was was ever to enjoy enjoy in in Italy for agent agent penetration. probably probably the the most most important important of of the the post-war post-war French French recruits, recruits, DARIO, DARIO, the the longest longestserving agent, was was a serving and and probably probably the the most most valuable valuable Italian Italianagent, a foreign foreign ministry ministry employee. trained as a journalist employee. Born Born in in 1908, 1908,and and trained as a a lawyer, lawyer, DARIO DARIO worked worked as as a journalistand and state the early fascist Italy. he was state official official in in agriculture agriculture during during the early years years of of fascist Italy. In In 1932 1932 he was recruited basis" but, on instructions instructionsfrom from his recruited as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent on on an an "ideological ideological basis but, on his controller, supporter Mussolini in 1937 succeeded succeeded in in controller, pretended pretended to to be be a a supporter ofof Mussolini andand in 1937 enrolling of war enrolling in in the the Fascist Fascist Party. Party. Before Before the the outbreak outbreak of war he he obtained obtained a a job job in in the the foreign and Comintern affairs and succeeded foreign ministry, ministry, ironically ironically dealing dealing with with Soviet Soviet and Cominternaffairs and succeeded in (codenamed DARYA, ANNA and and in recruiting recruiting three three foreign foreign ministry ministry typists typists (codenamed MARTA) considered valuable "valuable" MARTA) who who regularly regularly supplied supplied him him with with what what the the Centre Centreconsidered classified documents. documents. For For almost forty years years D classified almost forty DARIO was instrumental instrumental in A N 0 was in obtaining obtaining 8 His a phenomenal amount of His remarkable aphenomenal amount of classified classified foreign foreign ministry ministry material. material.* remarkable career as a Soviet agent, however, was temporarily interrupted during during the the war. In 1942, following the discovery discovery by the Italian police of an illegal GRU 1942, GRU residency with which and imprisoned, a period period D A N 0 was was in in contact, contact, he he was was arrested arrested and imprisoned, surviving surviving a which DARIO at of camp from liberated at the theend end of the the war war in in a a German Germanconcentration concentration camp from which which he hewas was liberated 9 by by the the Red Red Army. Army. Once back in reestablished contact contact with with DARYA and Once back in Italy, Italy, DARIO D A N 0 reestablished and MARTA, MARTA, both foreign ministry ministry documents. documents. Probably Probably both of of whom whom agreed agreed once once again again to to give give him him foreign on Soviet instructions, PCI he he became Italian on Soviet instructions, instead instead of of joining joining the thePC1 became a a member member of of the the Italian Socialist Party was after he was denounced denounced Socialist Party led led by by Pietro Pietro Nenni, Nenni,but but was expelled expelledin in 1946 1946after he was as the Rome Rome res as a a former former fascist fascist and and threatened threatened with with prosecution. prosecution. At At the the request request of of the residency, idency, the the Communist Communist leader, leader, Palmiro Palmiro Togliatti, Togliatti, secretly secretly interceded interceded with with Nenni Nenniand and was given his Socialist Party membership. intervention, DARIO was given back back his Socialist Party membership. Togliattis Togliatti's intervention, however, identified as links with the DARIO was was publicly publicly identified as having having links with the however, leaked leaked out out and and DARIO Soviet foreign ministry ministry Soviet embassy. embassy. He H e succeeded, succeeded, none none the the less, less, in in recruiting recruiting two two more more foreign typists: TOPO (later renamed LEDA) , who years provided provided what what the (later renamed LEDA), whofor for fifteen fifteen years theCen Centypists: TOPO tre (later INGA), tre considered considered "valuable valuable documents," documents, and and NIKOL (later INGA), who who also also supplied supplied consistentlyvaluable" valuable information. Probably soon after her recruitment under aafalse "consistently flag and DARIO In flag (not (not identified identified in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes), notes), TOPO and D A H 0 were were married.lO married. In March recruitment, he and his his wife wife were were 1975, forty-three forty-three years years after after DARIO's DARIOs recruitment, he and March 1975,

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awarded 979 after awarded the the Order Order of of the the Red Red Star. Star. He He finally finally retired retired in in May May 11979 after one one of of the the longest longest careers careers as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent in in the the history history of of the the FCD.ll FCD.ll In In the the immediate immediate aftermath aftermath of of the the Second Second World World War War the the Rome Rome residency residency also also achieved y to achieved a a highly highly successful successful penetration penetration of of the the interior interior ministry, ministry, thanks thanks chiefl chiefly to a a Communist civil servant, codenamed DEMID, who acted as agent-recruiter. On Communist civil servant, codenamed DEMID, who acted as agent-recruiter. O n instructions theCommunist Communist Party immediately instructions from from the the residency, residency, DEMID DEMID left left the Party immediately after 1944. His after his his recruitment recruitment in in 1944. His first first major major cultivation cultivation inside inside the the ministry ministry was was QYESTOR, inin the cipher QUESTOR,whom whom he hehelped helped to to obtain obtain a ajob job the cipher department. department. By By 1955 1955 the the penetration of the Italian interior ministry, begun by DEMID, was considered penetration of the Italian interior ministry, begun by DEMID, was considered so so important important that that control control of of it it was was handed handed over over to to aanewly newly established established illegal illegal residency residency in in Rome, Rome, headed headed by by Ashot Ashot Abgarovch AbgarovchAkopyan, Akopyan, a a 40-year-old 40-year-old Armenian Armenian from from Baku Baku T. 12 codenamed codenamed YEFRA YEFRAT.12
T IR RD TAT E in TH HE E T TH HI D S STATE in which which Soviet Soviet agent agent penetration penetration was was assisted assisted by by Communist Communist participation participation in in post-war post-war coalition coalition governments governments was was Austria. Austria. Though Though placed placed under under joint joint occupation occupation until until 1955 1955by by the the Soviet SovietUnion, Union, United UnitedStates, States, Britain Britain and and France France (a (a cumbersome cumbersome arrangement arrangement likened likened by by Karl Karl Renner, Renner, the the first first post-war post-war chancellor, chancellor, to to "four Germany-was allowed to four elephants elephants in in aarowing rowing boat"), boat), Austria-unlike Austria-unlike Germany-was allowed to gov govern ern itself itself. In In Renner's Renners provisional provisional government, government, formed formed in in April April 1945, 1945, the the Commu Communists nists were were given given three three ministries, ministries, including including the the key key post post of of Minister Minister of of the the Interior Interior taken Honner. In taken by by Franz Franz Honner. In the the November November 1945 1945 elections, elections, however, however, the the Austrian Austrian do as Communist Party(KPO), (KPO ), which Communist Party which had had expected expected to to do as well well as as the the French French PCF, PCF, picked picked up up aamere mere 5 5 percent percent of of the the vote vote and and was was given givenonly only the the comparatively comparativelyunim unimO left portant portant ministry ministry of of electrification electrification in in the the new new coalition. coalition. The The KP KPO left government government altogether altogether two two years years later, later, and and its its two two half-hearted half-hearted attempts attempts to to stage stage a a coup coup d'etat detatin in 1 947 and 1950 failed to gain serious Soviet support.13 1947 and 1950 failed to gain serious Soviet support.13 Franz 945 to Franz Honner Honnerused used his his seven seven months months in in 11945 to pack pack the the Austrian Austrian federal federal police police force force (Bundespolizei) (Bundespolizei) with with Communist Communist Party Party members. members.Though Though many many were were purged purged or or sidelined sidelined by by Honner's Honners socialist socialist successor, successor, Oskar Oskar Helmer,14 Helmer,14 Soviet Soviet penetration penetration of of the Austrian police, especially its security service (Staatspolizei or Stapo), continued the Austrian police, especiallyits security service (Staatspolizei or Stapo), continued until until the the 1980s. 1980s. In In an anattempt attempt to to evade evade Helmer's Helmers purge, purge, Communists Communists in in the the police police IS The force disavow forcewere were instructed instructed to to disavowor or conceal conceal their their Party Partymembership. membership. The files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin record record the the recruitment recruitment of of a a series series of of major major KGB KGB police police agents: agents: EDUARD EDUARD in in 1945,16 1945,16VENTSEYEV VENTSEYEV in in 1946,17 1946,l PETER in in 1952,18 19.52, two two further further recruits in 1955, ZAK in 197419 and NADEZHDIN in 1978.20 There may well recruits in 1955, in 197419and NADEZHDIN in 1978.20 There may well have have been been others; others; Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins list list is is probably probably not not exhaustive. exhaustive. At At least least some some of of them them took took part S) to part in inoperations operations (one (one of of them them codenamed codenamed EDELWEIS EDELWEISS) toremove remove and and copy copy top top secret secret documents documents held held in in the the safe safe of of the the head head of of the the Stapo. Stapo. In In 1973 1973 Andropov Andropov per personally sonallyauthorized authorized the the payment payment to to one one of of its its Stapo Stapo agents agents of of a a reward reward of30,000 of 30,000 Aus Austrian trian schillings.21 schillings.21 IN RE EE E OF IN T TH HR OF the the four four countries countries of of Scandinavia-Denmark, Scandinavia-Denmark, Norway Norway and and Finland FinlandCommunist Communist ministers ministers also also served served in in post-war post-war coalitions. coalitions. By far far the the most most influential influential of Alone of the the Scandinavian Scandinavian Communist Communist parties parties was was the the Finnish Finnish SKP.22 SKP.22 Alone among among GerGer-

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manys eastern allies, allies, Finland was not forced to become part of many's of the Soviet Bloc. At however, Stalin still kept his options open. In the end end of the Second World War, however, several key key positions withinthe 1945,at Soviet insistence, insistence, the SKP wasgiven 1945, at Soviet given several the Finnish government, instructed via "special channel channel" on on their Finnish government, secretly secretly instructed via a a special theirrelations relations with with bourgeois parties," parties, and held in readiness detat. That Finland was "bourgeois readiness for a possible coup d'etat. not peoples democracy not in the end forced to become a people's democracy was probably probably due chiefly chiefly to to in 1939-40, 1939-40, when the greatly had memories of the Winter War in when the greatly outnumbered outnumbered Finns Finns had inflicted heavy casualties casualtieson the the Soviet Soviet invaders. Stalin was well well aware awarethat the the price of Bloc might another blood bath.23 Finland of Finnish Finnish incorporation incorporation in in the the Soviet Soviet Bloc might be be another blood bath.23 Finland however,deprived of 12 12 percent of its territory, forced to pay enormous repara reparawas, however, tions a non-aggression non-aggression pact pact in in 1948. tions (five (five times times those those of of Italy) Italy) and and required required to to sign sign a 1948. Communists succeeded succeeded in 1945 in inclaiming In Finland, as in Austria, the Communists in 1945 claiming the the key key FranzHonner Honner post of minister of the interior. But whereas the Austrian Communist Franz office after only seven months, his Finnish counterpart, counterpart,Yrji Leino, continued in left office years. Leino's Leinosaim, like Honner's, Honners, was "to to deprive the bourgeoisie of power for three years. of one of its most important weapons in supporting supporting reactionary policies, the police force. By the end endof 1945 1945 the thesecurity police had been purged and reconstituted as a force." force, usually known known as Valpo. As Leino later acknowledged, the new recruits new force, acknowledged, "the were naturally, naturally, as as far far as as possible, possible, Communists."24 communist^."^^ The The rapidity rapidity of the purges and the the were of the purges and inexperience of the new recruits, however, led to aagood deal of of confbsion. inexperience confusion. According Valpo in SKP hands never became to Leino, "Valpo became the kind of weapon that had been hoped for for .. .. .. They They did did not not have have the the skill skill to to use use it it to to advantage advantage in in the the right hoped right way. way." increasingly difficult to 1947 he hewas drinking heavLeino himself himself found it increasingly to cope. cope. By 1947 heav the end end of he ily and and sometimes sometimes absent from his his office office for for days days on ily absent from on end. end. At the of the the year year he given a severe dressing down by two of was summoned to Moscow, given two senior members of Finnish government the Politburo, instructed to resign from the Finnish government and told to to go for for a health cure cure in in the the Soviet Soviet Union. Though Leino totender his resignation, health Union. Though Leino rehsed refused to tender his resignation, he he was dismissed by on longer was dismissed by President President Paasikivi Paasikivi in in April April 1948 1948 on the the grounds grounds that that he he no no longer enjoyed the the confidence confidence of of Parliament. Parliament. His His dismissal brought to to an end Communist Communist enjoyed dismissal brought an end 25 Leino's g~vernment.~ Leinos memoirs, memoirs, completed completed ten ten years years participation in the theFinnish Finnish government. later, caused caused such embarrassment in Moscow that, at atthe the insistence insistence of the the Soviet Soviet ambassador in Helsinki, the whole edition was destroyed on the the eve of publication, ambassador leaving leaving only only a a few few copies copies in in private private circulation.26

power Western Communist parties which power by by1948 1948 of of all all those those Western Communistparties which had reduced, but but did did not not end, to assist assist had taken taken part part in in post-war post-war coalitions coalitions reduced, end, their theirability ability to Soviet By far far the biggest disapdisap Soviet intelligence intelligence penetration penetration of of government government bureaucracies. bureaucracies.By the biggest pointment thethe beginning ofthe War in its relations pointment experienced experienced by by the the Centre Centreatat beginning of the Cold Cold War inrelations its with however, the dramatic dramatic decline decline in in the assistance with fraternal fraternal parties parties in in the theWest, West, however, was was the theassistance offered CommunistParty Party of United States States (CPUSA). (CPUSA). From the midmidoffered by by the the Communist of the the United From the 1930s the onset the Cold Cold War, had been been a a major force in in the the 1930s to to the onset of of the War, Communism Communism had major force American labor movement, cant infl uence on on the liberal wing of the the Demo American labor movement, a a signifi significant influence the liberal wing of Democratic thousand young young radicals. radicals. DurDur cratic Party Party and and aarite rite of of passage passage for for several several hundred hundred thousand ing Party had an important important part assisting Soviet Soviet ing the theSecond Second World World War Warthe the Party had played played an partinin assisting
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penetration of administration, the penetration of the the Roosevelt Roosevelt administration, the MANHATTAN project project and and the the intelligence The onset onset a intelligence community.27 ~ornrnunity.~~ The of of the the Cold ColdWar, War, however, however, dealt dealt the the CPUSA a blow blow from from which which it it never never fully fullyrecovered. recovered. In leaders In 1949 1949 Gene GeneDennis, Dennis, the the general general secretary, secretary, and and ten ten other otherParty Party leaders were were put put on Dennis and on trial trial for for advocating advocating the the forcible forcible overthrow overthrow of of the the federal federal government. government. Dennis and nine sentenced to jail, the nine of of the thedefendants defendants were were sentenced to five five years yearsin in jail, the eleventh eleventh was was jailed jailed for for three three years years and and all the the defense defense attorneys attorneys were were found found in in contempt contempt of ofcourt. court. After After the the Supreme Court upheld upheld the 1951, more a hundred hundred other other leading Supreme Court the sentences sentences in in 1951, more than than a leading Communists Communists were were convicted convicted on on similar similar charges. charges. For Formost most of of the the 1950s 1950s the the Party Partywas was forced when forced into intoa a largely largely underground underground existence. existence. It I t was was deeply deeply ironic ironic that that when the CPUSA McCarthyism was at its height the CPUSA was among those Western parties which were least able to to give give assistance assistance to to Soviet Soviet espionage. espionage. Not Not till till the the Supreme Supreme Court were least able Court backed decision in was backed away away from from its its earlier earlier decision in 1957 1957 was the the CPUSA able able to to regroup. regroup. By By the the time the the Party Party had haddrawn drawn up up a a new new membership list in in 1958, 1958, there there were were only only 3,000 3,000 time membership list open open members members and and a amuch much smaller smaller number number of ofundeclared undeclared members members left.28 left.28 achieved during the the 1950s 1950s had it been less perse perseWhat the CPUSA might have achieved 1951-3 cuted was well well illustrated by the neighboring Canadian Party, which in 1951-3 assisted the the Ottawa Ottawa residency residency in in the the recruitment recruitmentof of Hugh Hugh Hambleton, Hambleton, probably probably the the assisted Canadianagent of the Cold Cold War, and ten ten other otheragents.29 agents.29Like most most important Canadian most Western parties, the Canadian Communist Party also provided help in docu docuother Western menting illegals-among illegals-among them Konon Trofimovich Molody (codenamed BEN), the the most celebrated celebrated of of the the Cold ColdWar Warillegal illegal residents residents in in Britain.3D Britain.30In In 1957, 1957, with withthe the help most help Party, the Ottawa Ottawa residency succeeded succeeded in obtaining a a of the Canadian Communist Party, Willie Fisher (better new passport for the illegal resident in the the United United States, "Willie" Rudolf Abel") Abel) in the the name of Robert Callan, born on on March March10, 10,1903 known as "Rudolf 1903 in William, Ontario. Ontario.''Abel,'' Abel,however, however, was wasarrested before he could adopt his new Fort William, theclerk who issued the identity. The Ottawa residency was subsequently fearful that the Abelpublished in the press after his passport might recognize the photograph of ''Abel'' 1957 as that of "Robert Robert Callan." Callan. Unsurprisingly, Unsurprisingly, the clerk, who doubt doubtarrest in June 1957 saw-and paid little attention to-many to-many photographs a day, day, seems seems not to less saw-and to have 1 noticed.31 noticed.3 assistance given by Western Communists in One of the rare cases cases in which the assistance fabricating the legend of aaSoviet illegal became public was that of Reino Hayhanen adopt the the identity identityof the Finn Finn Eugene EugeneMaki Maki (codenamed VIK), who was helped to adopt Ahman Hayby the Finnish Communist Olavi A hman (codenamed (code named VIRTANEN). When Hay AAhman theFBI in 1957, 1957, and secretly taken into hid hidhanen defected to the hman and his wife were secretly Ahman ing in in the the Soviet Union. For almost twenty years A hman pleaded to go back to Finland, but the the Finnish Finnish Communist CommunistParty Party insisted that he stay in Russia for fear that his return would expose expose it to to"anti-Communist anti-Communist propaganda." propaganda. In 1975 1975 the the Party Party leader, Ville Ahman leader, Ville Pessi (codenamed BARANOV), finally relented. A hman was allowed and awarded a KGB pension of 200 roubles month.32 back home and roubles a month.32 of Western Communist parties were also alsoasked asked various kinds A number of Western Communist to provide various illegals. In 1957 1957 aagroup of undeclared members of the French of assistance assistance to KGB illegals. Communist Party, recommended by the PCF leadership, began training as radio

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illegal residencies. Initially the new recruits found difficulty difficulty in tranoperators for illegal tran scribing scribing the the coded coded number number groups groups broadcast broadcast in in test test transmissions transmissions from from the the Centre. Centre. By the the end the year, however, some had had successfully successfblly completed completed their their training By endof of the year, however, some training course.33 course.33 The Mitrokhin The files files seen seenby by Mitrokhin give give no no sense sense that that the theCentre's Centres demands demands on on the thefrater fraternal War. nal assistance assistance of of Western Western Communist Communist parties parties declined declined in in the thecourse course of of the theCold Cold War. O n the the contrary, contrary, the the KGB's KGBs solicitations solicitations of of its its "friends" friendsappear appear to to have been greater greater On have been during the the 1970s 1970s than than in in the the previous previous decade. decade. The The increased increased deployment deployment of of experi experiduring enced enced illegals illegals in in eastern eastern Europe Europe after after the the Prague Prague Spring Spring and and the the difficulty difficultyexperienced experienced by ed and FCD in in finding finding enough enough suitably suitably qualifi qualified and well-motivated well-motivated Soviet Soviet replace replaceby the the FCD ments seek inspiration ments led led it it to to seek renewed renewed inspiration from from the the era era of of the the Great GreatIllegals, Illegals, some some of the the greatest German Richard greatest of of whom-the whom-the Austrian Austrian Arnold Arnold Deutsch Deutsch and and the the German Richard Sorge Sorge chief chief among among them-had them-had been been Communists Communists from from other other European European countries. countries. Deutsch's Deutschs career, career, however, however,still still remained remained top top secret, secret, not not least least because becausetwo two of of his his most most important important recruits,Anthony Anthony Blunt Blunt and and John John Cairncross, Cairncross, were were still still at at liberty liberty in in the theWest. West. Sorge, Sorge, recruits, by by contrast, contrast, was was the the best-publicized best-publicized member member of of the the Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence pantheon. pantheon. he he had Soviet had been been posthumously posthumously declared declared Hero Hero of ofthe the Soviet Union Union in in 1964 1964 and and further further hon honored ored by by the the first first postage postage stamps stamps ever ever issued issuedto to commemorate commemorate a a spy. spy. Sorge's Sorgesreputation reputation as chosen by as a a romantic romantic heart-throb heart-throb added added to to his his popular popular appeal. appeal. His His was was the the example example chosen by the inspire the Centre Centreto to inspire a a new new generation generation of of non-Soviet non-Soviet KGB KGB illegals.34 illegal^.^^ The The recruitment recruitment campaign campaign began began on on the the eve eve of of the the Twenty-fourth Twenty-fourth Congress Congress of of the April 1971. the the Soviet Soviet Communist Communist Party Party (CPSU) (CPSU) in in April 1971.The The FCD took took advantage advantage of ofthe presence presence in in Moscow Moscow of of a a large large number number of of leaders leaders of of fraternal fraternal parties parties in in the the West Westto to ask some of them to search out a new generation of Sorges. The files noted by ask some of them to search out a new generation of Sorges. The files noted by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin record record meetings meetings between between senior senior FCD officers officers and and six six different different Western Western Communist Communist leaders leaders to to discuss discuss the the recruitment recruitment of of illegals. illegals.There There may may well well have have been been many many more more such such approaches. approaches. Shortly Party congress Copenhagen, Shortly before before the the Party congress opened, opened, the the former former resident resident in in Copenhagen, Leonid met Leonid Sergeyevich Sergeyevich Zaitsev, Zaitsev, met KnudJespersen, Knud Jespersen, the the chairman chairman of of the the Danish DanishCom Communist Party, Party, at at the the Sovetskaya Sovetskaya Hotel, Hotel, and and asked asked him him to to find find "two two or or three" three totally totally munist reliable, reliable, dedicated dedicated Communists, Communists, loyal loyal to to the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, who who could could be be trained trained to to become male, between become "Danish Danish Richard Richard Sorges." Sorges.They They should should be be male, between twenty twenty and and forty forty years years of of age, age, and and preferably preferably undeclared undeclared rather rather than than open open Party Party members. members. If married, married, their their wives wives would would have have to to meet meet the the same same conditions. conditions. Potential Potential Danish Danish Sorges Sorges would would also also need need to to be be well well educated educated and and in in aasuitable suitable occupation-such occupation-such as as journalist, journalist, busi businessman nessman or or foreign foreign language language student. student. According According to to Zaitsev, Zaitsev, Jespersen Jespersen responded responded enthusiastically, enthusiastically,saying saying that that he hefully fblly understood understood both both the theimportance importance and and the the secrecy secrecy of of the the request, request, and and already already had had one one candidate candidate in in mind, mind, whose whose details details he he would would send send to Aleksandrovich to the the current current resident resident in in Copenhagen, Copenhagen,Anatoli Anatoli Aleksandrovich Danilov.35 Danil~v.~ Meanwhile I. P. I ? . Kisliak, Kisliak, a a former former operations operations officer officer at at the the Meanwhile at at the the Ukraina Ukraina Hotel, Hotel, 1. Athens asking Commu Athens residency, residency,was was asking Kostas Kostas Koliannis, Koliannis, first first secretary secretary of of the theGreek Greek Communist nist Party, Party, to to find find "one one or or two" two Greek Greek Richard Richard Sorges. Sorges. Like Like Zaitsev, Zaitsev, Kisliak Kisliak empha emphasized but also sized that that candidates candidates must must be be "totally totally reliable reliable ideologically," ideologically, but added added that that they they also needed At needed "charm."36 charm.36 At a a subsequent subsequent meeting meeting with with Ezekias Ezekias Papaioannou, Papaioannou, general general secsec-

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retary slightly retary of of AKEL AKEL (the (the Cyprus Cyprus Communist Communist Party), Party), Kisliak Kisliakwas was slightly less less demanding. demanding. Though Though Cypriot Cypriot candidates candidates would would require require high high moral, moral, political political and and professional professional qualities, qualities,they they need need not not necessarily necessarily be be"the the equals equals of of Richard Richard Sorge."37 S~rge.~ While Zaitsev and Kisliak were approaching the heads of the and While Zaitsev and Kisliak wereapproaching the heads of the Danish, Danish,Greek Greek and Cypriot Cypriot Parties, Parties, Anatoli Anatoli Ivanovich Ivanovich Lazarev, Lazarev, head head of of the the FCD FCD Illegals Illegals Directorate, Directorate, was French was engaged engaged in in talks talkswith with Gaston GastonPlissonnier, Plissonnier,the the second-in-command second-in-command of of the the French Communist Communist Party. Party. Plissonier Plissonier agreed agreed to to select select two two or or three three undeclared undeclared members members of of the the PCF with the potential to become French Sorges and later suggested two possible PCF with the potential to become French Sorges and later suggested two possible candidates. alsoasked asked to the names candidates. He H e was was also to supply supply the the KGB KGB with with the names of of poorly poorly paid paid (and, (and, by by implication, implication, corruptible) corruptible) staff staff in in the the French French foreign foreign ministry ministry whose whose work work included included photocopying photocopying classified classified documents.38 document^.'^ One of the FCD's approaches to leading fraternal One of the FCDs approaches to aa leading member member of of aa fraternal delegation delegation to to the the Twenty-fourth Twenty-fourth Party Party Congress Congress took took place place in in hospital. hospital. Geinrich Geinrich Fritz Fritzof of the the Austrian Austrian Communist Party (KP&) Central Committee suffered an acute Communist Party (KP6) Central Committee suffered an acute attack attack of of sciatica sciatica shortly shortly before before the the congress congress opened opened and and was was taken taken for for treatment treatment to to the the CPSU CPSU Cen Central Committee Polyclinic at Kuntsevo. While undergoing treatment in Ward 103, tral Committee Polyclinic at Kuntsevo. While undergoing treatment in Ward 103,he he was was visited visited by by Ivan Ivan Alekseyevich AlekseyevichYerofeyev, Yerofeyev, deputy deputy head head of of the the Fourth Fourth (German (Germanand and Austrian) who raised Austrian) Department, Department, who raised the the question question of of finding finding "one one or or two" two Austrian Austrian Sorges. Sorges.Fritz Fritz said said that that the the KP& KP6 chairman, chairman, Franz Franz Muhri, Muhri,refused refused to to become become involved involved in intelligence matters because of his precarious position within the Party. However, in intelligence matters because of his precarious position within the Party. However, Fritz Fritz agreed agreed to to find find suitable suitable candidates candidates himself himself and and to to keep keep N. N. V. V. Kirilenko, Kirilenko, head head of of Line Line PR PR at at the theVienna Vienna residency, residency,informed informed of of his his progress.39 progress.39 The illegal The most most cautious cautious of of the the Party Partyleaders leaders whose whose responses responses to to the the1971 1971 illegal recruit recruiting Communist Party ing drive drivewere were noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was the the general general secretary secretary of of the the Communist Party of of Canada Canada (CPC), (CPC),William William Kashtan. Kashtan. Though Though a a rigidly rigidly orthodox orthodox pro-Soviet pro-Soviet loyalist, loyalist, Kashtan Kashtan "made made much much of of the the practical practical difficulties." difficulties.The The CPC CPC had had to to be be particularly particularly carehll carefillto to avoid avoid any any suspicion suspicion of of involvement involvementwith with the theKGB, KGB, he he explained, explained,because because of of memories 945, when memories of of the the Gouzenko Gouzenkoaffair affair in in 11945, when the the Party's Partysonly only MP, MP, Fred Fred Rose, Rose, and and its its national national organizer, organizer, Sam Sam Carr, Carr, had had both both been been exposed exposed as as Soviet Soviet agents. agents. Kashtan Kashtan was was assured assuredthat that he hewas was expected expected only only to to select select reliable reliable candidates, candidates, provide provide character character references references and and suggest suggest ways ways of of making making contact contact with with them. them. The The KGB KGB would would do do the the rest the event rest and and ensure ensure that, that, even even in in the event of of "complications," complications,he he would would not not become become involved. involved. Kashtan Kashtan is is said said to to have have replied replied that that this this arrangement arrangement "suited suited him him com completely."4o pletel~.~ During During the the Twenty-fourth Twenty-fourth Party Party Congress Congress senior senior FCD FCD officers officers also alsoheld held discus discussions of Latin Latin American American Communist Communist parties. parties. The The aim aim was was sionswith with at atleast least eight eight leaders leaders of not of Latin Latin American American Sorges, Sorges, but but rather rather to to iden idennot as as yet yet to to solicit solicit a a new new generation generation of tifY ti+ potential potential agents agents in in registry registry offices officeswho who could could supply supply the the documents documents required required to to support legends.41 Within was seek so, however, howe.ver,the the Centre Centre was actively actively seeksupport illegals' illegals legends.41 Within a a year year or or so, ing Latin illegals ing Latin illegals to to operate operate in in North North America.42 America.42In In 1975 1975 Kryuchkov Kryuchkov personally personally approached Argentinian Communist Party, approached the the general general secretary secretary of of the the Argentinian Communist Party, Alvarez Alvarez Arnedo, Arnedo, to to "seek seek help help from from our our Argentinian Argentinian friends friends in in building building up up the the illegal illegal agent agent apparatus apparatus of of Soviet Soviet intelligence." intelligence.According According to to the theKGB KGB record record of of the the conversation, conversation, Arnedo During 1975 gave personal Arnedo was was "wholly wholly sympathetic."43 s~mpathetic.~ During 1975Andropov Andropov also alsogave personal

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instructions for approaches approaches to Communist Party Party leaders in Syria, Lebanon Syria, Iraq and Lebanon illegal^.^^ as part of a quest for Arab illegals.44

of a century after the collapse of of the post-war post-war coalitions coalitions which which had given Communists aabrief brief experience experience of of office in France, Italy, Austria and ScanScan dinavia, Communist ministers once again entered a Western Western government. They did dinavia, 1974,when when the so-called so as a result of the Portuguese Revolution of of April April 1974, the so-called Armed Armed Forces Movement of young, radical officers ended over forty years of civilian dictaForces dicta torship promised both and to end Portugals Portugal's colonial colonial wars wars torship and and promised both to to restore restore democracy democracy and to end A Socialist leaders, in Africa. Within Within days the Communist Communist and and Socialist leaders, Alvaro lvaro Cunhal Cunhal and and returned from exile, standing together together in front of Mario Soares, had returned of their delirious supporters carnation. Soares paid tribute to Cunhal, Cunhal, supporters jointly jointly clutching clutching the the same same red red carnation. Soares paid tribute to teacher, as a his former teacher, "a remarkable man, with a luminous, penetrating glance that bespoke inner ~trength.~ strength."45 But But Cunhal was also also a a hardline hardline Soviet Soviet loyalist loyalist who bespoke great great inner Cunhal was who 1968had been the first Western Communist Communist leader to support supportthe the crushing of in 1968 of the differences between himself and Soares Prague Spring. Thoughthe the differences Soares gradually widened, together in a series of coalition coalition governments governments until until the the widened, they they were were to to serve serve together in a series of 1975. summer of 1975. 1974 Portugal and the Soviet Soviet Union established diplomatic relations for In June 1974 the first time since since the October October Revolution. Six months months later later Cunhal Cunhal had his his first first theKGB resident in Lisbon, Svyatoslav meeting with the Svyatoslav Fyodorovich Kuznetsov (code(code the recently established named LEONID), who operated under diplomatic cover in the Soviet embassy. embassy. Though the meeting took place Soviet place in in a Portuguese Portuguese Communist Communist Party Party (PCP) safe house, both men were so fearful their conversation might be bugged that they conducted an entirely silent dialogue dialogue with pencil and paper. It was agreed that the KGB would train two reliable reliable Party members to detect eavesdropping eavesdropping equipment Cunhalalso undertook to to so that their future discussions could be by word of of mouth. Cunhal thePortuguese security service, hand over material on the service, NATO (of which Portugal had been a founder member) and other other"matters matters of of interest to the KGB.46 KGB."46 Shortly after the revolution of April 1974, 1974, a commission of of enquiry was given given access to the thefiles files of the brutal brutalsecurity access security service service of of the deposed regime (known successucces sively network of of informers informers had had almost almost rivaled rivaled and DGS), DGS), whose whose vast vast network sively as as the the PIDE and those of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Bloc.Since Since the the PCP, PCP, whose Committee had those of whose 22-member 22-member Central Central Committee had between them them spent spent308 years in in jail, had been between 308 years jail, had been the the chief chief target target of of the the PIDE/DGS, PIDE/DGS, it it was, unsurprisingly, unsurprisingly,well well represented on the thec o m m i ~ s i o nAs . ~ well ~ large was, represented on commission.47 As well as as passing passing on on large numbers of of PIDE/DGS PIDE/DGS documents (some of numbers documents (some of which which concerned concerned collaboration collaboration with with intelligence services), services), the PCP also provided the Lisbon residency with files Western intelligence from Portuguese military intelligence and the new security service service established established after the noted by by Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin, the weight of of the files files noted thetotal total weight the revolution. revolution. According According to to one oneof the theLisbon residency in the themid-1970s the classified material provided by the PCP to the 474kilograms. kilograms. In I n January 1976 1976 aa theFCD came to 474 special section was created within the Fifth Department to work on the Portuguese documents which in their microfilm version filled 68,138 frames. frames. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins summary of of the Centres Centre's report on the the material concludes: concludes: material
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Extremely Extremely important important information information was was obtained obtained about about the the structure, structure, methods methods of of work Services of of the work and and agent agent networks networks of of the the Special Special [intelligence] [intelligence] Services the USA, France, France, the the FRG and and Spain Spain on on the the territory territory of of Portugal; Portugal; on on their their cooperation cooperation with colonies; with and and the the agent agent networks networks ofPIDE/DGS of PIDE/DGS in in Portugal Portugal and and its its former former colonies; on the armed on the armed forces forces of of Portugal Portugal and and of of a a number number of of other other countries; countries; on on the the methods of the Soviet Soviet Union Union methods of work work of of the the Portuguese Portuguese Special Special Services Services against against the and other other socialist socialist countries; countries; on on the the agent agent operational in the the country country and operational situation situation in and interest to the KGB; [and] on individuals of of and at at target target establishments establishments of of interest to the KGB; [and] on individuals operational interest interest to operational to the the KGB.48 KGB.48
Service A made made use of the the documents, documents, in in both both authentic authentic and and doctored form, as the Service use of doctored form, as the basis of ofactive active measures measures designed German basis designed to to discredit discredit the the CIA, CIA, French French and and West West German intelligence intelligence services.49 services.49 In post-war elections, gained In April April 1975, 1975, at atPortugal's Portugals first first free free post-war elections, the the Communists Communists gained only under only 12.5 12.5 percent percent of of the the vote-one vote-one third third of of the the support support won won by by the the socialists socialists under Soares. Cunhal, Cunhal, however, however, shrugged shrugged off off the the setback, setback, confident confident that that real real power power would would Soares. remain with with the Forces Movement, Movement, which which had a year year remain the Armed Armed Forces had made made the the revolution revolution a The elections," elections,he told an interviewer, interviewer, "have have nothing or very little to do dowith with before. "The of revolution .. .. .. I promise you the dynamics of you there there will will be no no parliament in in PortuPortu gal. Cunhal's Cunhals prediction proved hopelessly hopelesslymistaken. His withinthe the Armed gal." His support support within Armed Forces Movement crumbled after the the failure of of a left-wing left-wing coup coup in in November, and and new the Communists Communists only only 14.5 percent of the vote, as new elections elections in in April April 1976 1976 gave gave the 14.5 percent of the vote, as the socialists Soares became prime minister and Cunhal Cunhal compared with the socialists' 35 percent. Soares oppositi~n.~~ led the PCP into opposition.50 The PCP leadership The leadership continued continued in opposition to for the in opposition to talent-spot talent-spot for the KGB.51 KGB. Dur During talks talks in in Moscow Moscow in 1977 the theFCD asked asked PATRICK, PATRICK, a a member member of of the the PCP ing in July 1977 Politburo, members suitable suitable for to operate operate Politburo, to to identify identify PCP members for training training as as illegal illegal agents agents to against NATO. against using experienced members for for NATO. PATRICK saw saw no no difficulty difficulty in in using experienced Party Party members lesshappy with using them as long-term long-term particular intelligence assignments, but was less illegals since this would require them to give up their work for the PCP. Once back illegals however, PATRICK suggested the names of five possible in Lisbon, however, possible candidates without heavy Party responsibilities" responsibilities and provided blank Portuguese passports and "without identity documents to assist in the the fabrication of of their theirlegends.52 legends.52 other identity discussions with PATRICK in July 1977, analmost While the FCD was holding discussions 1977, an the veteran chairman of of the theFinnish FinnishCommu Commuidentical approach was being made to the BAFUNOV), then nist Party (SKP), (SKP), Ville Pessi (codenamed BARANOV), thenon on holiday in the the Soviet Union. Pessi agreed to suggest the names of four or five undeclared members of the SKP or trusted fellow travellers to train as illegal agents who could be used the United UnitedStates, Norway, Denmark or the against American and NATO targets in the Countries.He H e was also alsoasked asked anotherone or two regLow Countries. to find another two potential agents in reg istry offices offices or other locations able to provide the documentation required for the documentation of illegalslegend~.~ thesame fabrication ofillegals' legends.53 At about the same time that PATRICK and BARABARA discussions in Moscow, Andropov authorized an approach in NOV were engaged in discussions

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Dublin Dublin by by the the resident, resident, Mikhail Mikhail Konstantinovich Konstantinovich Shadrin Shadrin (codenamed (codenamed KAVERlN), KAVERIN), to to a a leading leading Irish Irish Communist Communist (codenamed (codenamed GRUM), GRUM), who who cannot cannot be be identified identified for for legal legal reasons. reasons. GRUM GRUM agreed agreed that that two two undeclared undeclared members members of of the the Party Party should should be be selected illegal^.'^ selected for for training training as as the the first first Irish Irish illegals.54 The The approaches approaches to to Communist Communist Parties Parties outside outside the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc coincided coincided with with a a series the FCD, series of of exhortations exhortations from from Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, the the head head of of the FCD, to to residencies residencies to to improve improve their their Line Line N N (Illegal (Illegal support) support) performance. performance. Increasingly Increasingly close close surveillance surveillance of of legal legal residencies residencies by byWestern Western counterintelligence counterintelligence agencies agencies made made the the expansion expansion of of the illegal network of increasing importance. Kryuchkov was not satisfied, however, the illegal network of increasing importance. Kryuchkov was not satisfied, however, with with the the efforts efforts made made by by residencies residencies to to follow follow up up recruiting recruiting leads leads for for illegal illegal agents agents provided provided by by Western Western Communist CommunistParties Parties and and other other sources. sources. He H e complained complained in in aacir circular cular of of April April 1978: 1978: In N work work has has been been only only half-heartedly half-heartedly pursued pursued In a a number number of of residencies residencies Line Line N on of on the thepart part of residents; residents; the the deep deep study study of of those those who who could could be be utilized utilized for for ille illegal gal espionage, espionage,especially especiallyas as special special [illegal] [illegal]agents, agents, has has not not been been conducted conducted suf suf55 ficiently ficiently purposefully purposehlly .. . ..55
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By Latin American Eastern, By the the mid-1970s mid-1970s most most Western, Western, Latin American and and some some Middle Middle Eastern, North North African African and and Asian Asian Communist Communist Parties Parties had had been been drawn drawn into into the the quest quest for for a a new new generation generation of of illegals.56 illegal^.'^ There There is, is, however, however, no no evidence evidence that that the the almost almost global global recruiting recruiting program program conducted conducted by by the the KGB KGB and and fraternal fraternal parties parties turned turned up up another another Arnold Arnold Deutsch Deutschor or Richard Richard Sorge.57 S ~ r g e . So So ~ far far as as the the recruiting recruiting leads leads produced produced by by West Western successes ern Communist Communist leaders leaders are are concerned, concerned, Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes reveal reveal no no major major successes and and a a number number of of failures. failures. The failures included The failures included Maria, Maria, a a Portuguese Portuguese Communist Communist language language teacher teacher recom recommended mended as as a a potential potential illegal illegal agent agent by by PATRICK PATRICK of of the the PCP PCP Central Central Committee. Committee. The The Centre Centre planned planned to to recruit recruit Maria Maria as as the the assistant assistant and and wife wife of of an an illegal illegal KGB KGB offi officer, cer,Aleksandr Aleksandr Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Kunosenko Kunosenko (codenamed (codenamedYEFREMOV), YEFREMOV), who who was was being being trained trained for for work work in in Brazil. Brazil. A A meeting meeting arranged arranged between between YEFREMOV YEFREMOV and and his his pro proposed posed bride bride in in East East Germany, Germany, however, however, ended ended in in disaster. disaster. Maria Maria found found Kunosenko Kunosenko physically physicallyunattractive unattractive and and refused refused to to sleep sleepwith with him; him;her her recruitment recruitment was was discontin discontinued. ciently fluent ued. Without Without Maria's Marias assistance, assistance, Kunosenko Kunosenko failed failed to to become become suffi sufficiently fluent in in Portuguese. In 1981 plans for his posting to Brazil were cancelled and he was rede Portuguese. In 1981 plans for his posting to Brazil were cancelled and he was redeployed ployed in in Directorate Directorate S S headquarters.58 headquarters. Among the more Among the more promising promising illegal illegal agents agents discovered discovered as as a a result result of of leads leads from from Western Western Communist CommunistParties Parties were were a a French French couple, couple, LIMB LIMB and and his his wife wife DANA, DANA,who who were LIMB was was recommended recommended by by the the PCF PCF as as a a man man "devoted devoted to to were recruited recruited in in 1973. 1973. LIMB Communist ideals" but not to be used against French targets. After two years' train Communist ideals but not tobe used against French targets. After two years training, was talent-spotting ing, however, however, LIMB's LIMBs first first recorded recorded success success was talent-spotting a a French French recruit. recruit. mairie MARCEL, MARCEL,LIMB's LIMBs recruitment recruitment lead, lead,worked worked in in the the mairie of of a a Paris Paris suburb suburb and and was was recruited 975, probably recruited as as a a KGB KGB agent agent in in 11975, probably to to provide provide documentation documentation for for KGB KGB ille illegals. 975 LIMB gals. In In December December 1 1975 LIMB (then (then aged aged thirty-six) thirty-six) and and DANA DANA were were deployed deployed to to

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Belgium, Belgium, where where they they set set up up a a small small business business printing printing invitation invitation and and visiting visiting cards cards near near the the headquarters headquarters of of SACEUR SACEUR (Supreme (Supreme Allied Allied Commander Commander Europe). Europe). But But their their attempts over the next year to cultivate NATO personnel met with little or no suc attempts over the next year to cultivate personnel met with little or no success. the end end of of 1976 1976 they they had had returned returned to to France, France, settled settled in in the theBordeaux Bordeaux region region cess. By the and and abandoned abandoned their their brief brief careers careers as as KGB KGB illegal illegal agents.59 agents.59 Thirty Thirty or or forty forty years years before, before, the the recruiting recruiting drive drive for for illegal illegal agents agents would would doubtless doubtless have met with much greater success. Its apparent failure in the 1970s reflected have met with much greater success. Its apparent failure in the 1970s reflected the the inability inability of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union under under Brezhnev's Brezhnevs geriatric geriatric leadership leadership to to recapture recapture the the idealism ideahsm of of an an earlier earlier generation generation of of ideological ideological agents agents inspired inspired by by the the utopian utopian vision vision of the leading of the the world's worlds first first worker-peasant worker-peasant state. state. By By the the mid-1970s mid-1970s most most of of the leading Western Communist Parties Western Communist Parties were were tainted tainted by by what what Moscow Moscow considered considered the the "Euro Eurocommunist" communist heresy, heresy, which which advocated advocated a a parliamentary parliamentary road road to to socialism socialism within within aa 60 Within multi-party multi-party system system rather rather than than slavish slavish imitation imitation of of the the Soviet Soviet model. model.60 Within the the new new generation generation of of young young Western Western Marxists, Marxists, unconditional unconditional pro-Soviet pro-Soviet loyalists loyalists were were a a dwindling dwindling breed-if breed-if not not yet yet an an endangered endangered species. species.
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Centre Western Com Centre expected expected fraternal fraternal assistance assistance from from the the leaders leaders of ofWestern Communist munist parties, parties, so so the the parties parties themselves themselves depended depended in in varying varying degrees degrees on on subsidies subsidies from delivered by from Moscow Moscow secretly secretly delivered by the the KGB. The The subsidies, subsidies, like like involvement involvement in in intelligence closely guarded intelligence operations, operations, were were closely guarded secrets secrets within within each each Party Party leadership. leadership. When gold" When stories stories of of "Moscow MOSCOW gold occasionally occasionally leaked leaked out out during during the the Cold ColdWar, War, they they were well were dismissed dismissed as as McCarthyite McCarthyite disinformation. disinformation. The The Centre, Centre, however, however,was was well aware aware that that some some details details of of its its secret secret subsidies subsidieswere were known known to to Western Westernintelligence intelligence agencies. agencies. During the late Ottawa, Aleksandr During the late 1970s, 1970s, for for example, example, the the Soviet Soviet ambassador ambassador in in Ottawa, Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev (later NikolayevichYakovlev (later one one of of Gorbachev's Gorbachevs leading leading advisers), advisers), protested protested to to Andropov, Andropov, Gromyko Gromyko and and Boris Boris Ponomarev, Ponomarev, head head of of the the Central Central Committee's Committees Inter International national Department, Department, against against the the practice practice of of Canadian Canadian Communist Communist Party Party represen representatives-in tatives-in particular particular the the Party Party leader, leader, William William Kashtan-of Kashtan-of calling calling at at the the embassy embassy to named "US to collect collect funds funds (code (codenamed US wheat") wheat) from from the the resident, resident, Vladimir Vladimir Ivanovich Ivanovich Mechulayev. Mechulayev. The The residency residency had had already already warned warned Kashtan Kashtan that that he hewas was taking taking a a consid considerable risk. risk. By By 1980 1980 the the Centre was convinced that the the Canadian authorities were were erable Centre was convinced that Canadian authorities aware that that subsidies subsidies to to the CPC were were being being funded funded by by the the Soviet-owned Soviet-owned Ukrain Ukrainaware the CPC skaya Kniga [Ukrainian Toronto. The FCD informed informed skayaKniga [Ukrainian Book] Book] Company, Company, based based in in Toronto. The FCD Ponomarev 20: Ponomarev on on October October20:
The Canadian Special Special [intelligence] [intelligence] Services Services are carrying out a study of the The financial situation of the Communist Partyof Canada which it is proposed to financial Communist Party complete within 15-1 15-18 complete 8 months. A preliminary report prepared by the federal analysis of the channels channels and quotes data based based on the theresults results of an analysis government quotes size of the financial financial receipts receipts in the theCPC treasury in 1970. 1970.The Special Special Services Services size subsequent years, years, but these give have only fragmentary information about subsequent suppose that the methods of financing the activities activities of the CPC CPC grounds to suppose the data dataof the Special Special Services, Services, the CPC budremain as before. According to the

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get amounted to 158,850 dollars rmed reports, get in in1970 1970 amounted 158,850 to dollars (according (according to to unconfi unconfirmed reports, in in 1979 it itwas was more more than than 200,000 200,000 dollars). dollars). This This sum sum is is made made up up of of Party Party mem mem1979 dues from from CPC CPC members members (13,500 (13,500 dollars dollars or or 8.5 percent), receipts receipts from from 8.5 percent), bership dues legacies from "deceased deceased loyal members members of the Party" Party (the amount legacies amount cannot cannot be estimated), estimated), voluntary voluntary payments payments and and also also direct direct transfers transfers of of cash cash by by Soviet Soviet rep representatives resentatives and and contributions contributions to to CPC CPC funds funds from from the the income income of the the Ukrain Ukrainskaya Kniga KnigaCompany. Company. It I t is noted that the thefirst three sources sources of income skaya income provide approximately approximately 30-35 30-35 percent percent of of the the Party's Partys total total budget. budget. The The remaining remaining part part [65-70 percent] comes comes from the USSR and from Ukrainskaya Kniga. The [65-70 Special Services Services report concentrates on an analysis analysis of the mechanism supSpecial mechanism for sup plying plying funds funds along along the the last last two two channels. channels. [Canadian] [Canadian] Counter-intelligence Counter-intelligence concludes concludes that that the the USSR finances finances the the CPC CPC by by means means of of "physical physical transfer transfer of of cash by byofficials officials Soviet embassy embassy in Ottawa, Ottawa, to be put at atthe disposal disposal of cash" of the Soviet Party functionaries functionaries under under pretext pretext of of covering covering the the expenses expenses of ofParty Party activists activists on on Party Socialist countries.61 countries.61 the occasion of their journeys to Socialist
seizure by Boris Yeltsin's Yeltsins government of the archives archives of ofthe Soviet Commu CommuThe seizure nist Party Party (CPSU) (CPSU)after after the the failed failed coup coup of of August August 1991 1991 led led to to the thepublication publication for for the the nist first time of documentary evidence showing that during the 1980s alone, at a time first time of documentary evidence showing that during the 1980s alone, at a time when CPSU had when the the Soviet Soviet Union Union was was chronically chronically short short of of hard hard currency, currency, the the CPSU had dis distributed Bloc. The million dollars dollars to to fraternal fraternal parties parties outside outside the the Soviet Soviet Bloc. The tributed over over 200 million Central Department had had tried Central Committee's Committees International International Department tried to to destroy destroy the the records records of of the the payments payments shortly shortly before before the the confiscation confiscation of of its its archive, archive, but but the the metal metal paper paper clips clips which machines which held held the the documents documents together together jammed jammed the theshredding shredding machines and and saved saved some some of of them them from from destruction.62 destruction.62

subsidies subsidies for for most most of of the the Cold Cold War War seem seem to to have have gone gone to to the the French French PCF and and Italian Italian PCI, PCI, the the two two leading leading Western Western Parties, Parties, the the biggest biggest per per capita capita donations donations probably probably went went to to the the Communist Communist Party Party of of the the United United States. States. The The disproportionate disproportionate share share of of Soviet Sovietfunds funds channelled channelled to to the theCPUSA CPUSA reflected reflected Moscow's Moscows desire desire to to encourage encourage the the revival revival of of Communism Communism on on the theterritory territoryof of the the Main Main Adver Adversary the mid-1950s. sary after after the the near near disintegration disintegration of of the the Party Partyin in the mid-1950s. The The CPUSA CPUSA repaid repaid Soviet Soviet generosity generosity with with an an impeccable impeccable ideological ideological orthodoxy orthodoxy which which became became particu particularly larly valued valued in in Moscow Moscow when when the the heresy heresy of of Eurocommunism Eurocommunism later later took took hold hold of of the the major major west west European European Communist Communist Parties. Parties. member In In April April 1958 1958a veteran veteran a member of of the the CPUSA CPUSA leadership, leadership, Morris Morris Childs Childs(whose (whose aliases "D. Douglas aliases included included "Morris Morris Summers," Summers, "Ramsey Ramsey Kemp Kemp Martin" Martin and and D. Douglas Mozart") discuss financial Mozart) was was invited invited to to Moscow Moscow to to discuss financial help help for for his his ailing ailing party. party. Boris Boris Ponomarev, Central Committee Committeeinternational internationaldepartment, department, offered Ponomarev, the the head head of of the the Central offered 75,000 75,000 dollars dollars for for the the current current year year and and 200,000 200,000 dollars dollars for for 1959, 1959, initially initially channelled channelled via Canadian Communist Communist Party.63 1980 the the conduits via the the Canadian Party.63From From 1961 1961 to to 1980 conduits for for Soviet Soviet subsidies subsidies were were Childs Childs (codenamed (codenamed KHAB) KHAB) and and his his brother brother Jack Jack (alias (alias "D. D.Brooks," Brooks, codenamed codenamed MARAT), MARAT), an an undeclared undeclared Communist Communist who who had had worked worked for for Comintern Comintern
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in least once once in the the1930s. 1930s. Until Until the thelate late 1970s 1970s Morris Morris Childs Childsusually usually visited visited Moscow Moscow at at least submitthe theCPUSA budget and request for funds, receive instructions from a year to submit the the International International Department Department and and the the KGB and and take take part part in in discussions discussions on on Ameri American in the can affairs. affairs. Jack Jack acted acted as as the the main main point point of of contact contact for for the the handover handover of of money money in the United States. normal procedure procedure was send a coded message United States. The The normal was for for the the Centre Centre to tosend a coded message to to a radio operator of a CPUSA CPUSA radio operator in in New NewYork York containing containing details details of of the the next next transmission transmission of who would decode it and funds. The message would then be passed to Jack Childs, who inform brother, Gus Gus Hall Hall (leader inform his his brother, (leader of of the the CPUSA CPUSA from from 1959 1959 and and codenamed codenamed PALM), or Hall's Halls wife wife Elizabeth that the the next delivery delivery was imminent.64 1968 the the CPUSA radio operator who passed messages messages from the Centre on on From 1968 to Jack Childs was another undeclared party member of Russian descent, Albert Friedman, FORD, who radio Friedman, codenamed codenamed FORD, who worked worked as as a a salesman salesman in in aaManhattan Manhattan radio store store on East East 49th 49th Street. the alias alias Weber, Weber, Friedman Friedman had had worked worked between the wars wars on Street. Using Using the between the at school in at Comintern's Cominterns radio radio school in Moscow, Moscow, training training other otherunderground underground radio radio operators. operators. In performed In January January 1969 1969 he hetravelled travelled to to Moscow Moscow for for further further training,65 training6but but performed so so well well You know more than I do" do and invited him to to lunch.66 lunch.66 that his instructor told him, "You Though Friedman paid Party dues, his membership of the CPUSA was known only the KGB and a a small group within within the theParty Party leader~hip.~ What neither the KGB to the leadership.67 What nor CPUSA was that end of nor CPUSA leaders leaders knew, knew, however, however, was that since since the the end of the the Second Second World World War War CLIP. He H e passed every Friedman had been an FBI agent in the Party, codenamed CLIP. Centres communications on to to the theBureau.68 Bureau.6s word of the Centre's By By the the late late 1960s 1960s Soviet Soviet subsidies subsidies to to the the CPUSA amounted amounted to towell well over over a a million million dollars a year; a decade later they were more than two million. Jack Childs officers (MARAT) usually took delivery of Soviet subsidies subsidies from KGB operations officers passes at pre-arranged locations in New during brush "brush passes" New York, all all at precisely 3:05 p.m. During 1974, 1974, for example, example, money-transfer operations (then codenamed VAL VAL10 Pine Street, 10th floor DAY) took place at four locations in Lower Manhattan: 10 Street, 10th (codenamed DINO); 11 11 Broadway, 9th floor (FRED); 120 120 Wall Street, 7th floor addresseswere chosen and 81 (POST); and 81 New Street, 2nd floor (ROLAND). All four addresses because severalentrances and exits. MARAT and by the New York residency because they had several the money over to him entered and left the KGB operations officer chosen chosen to hand the the building selected selected for for their their brush brush contact through through different different doors. doors. In order to to lessen lessen the building contact In order of the the increasing bulk of the packages of money handed over in brush contacts, the denomination of the bills contained in them themwas raised raisedin 1974 1974from 20 dollars dollars to 50 100 dollars.69 dollars.69 the itwas too dangerous to pass the money dollars and 100 On the grounds that it Hall, who was under close surveillance surveillance by the FBI, the to Hall, FBI, the New York police and the Service,Jack Childs gave much of it to tohis brother Morris Morrisfor safeInternal Revenue Service, safe keeping7 keeping.70 Jack As well as acting as a conduit for Soviet subsidies, subsidies, Jack Childs also regularly regularly exchanged written messages with the the New NewYork residency either through brush con concodenames; dead drops." drops. Like brush contact sites, dead drops were all given codenames; tacts or "dead MANDI, LYUSI, OPEY, RIBA and OVERA. Messages 1974 were MANDl, those in use in 1974 Minox camera placed in a a magnetic were normally sent on undeveloped film from a Minox

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container. container. One One of of the the files files noted noted by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin records records that that between between July July 1975 1975 and and August ALDAY operations August 1976 1976 MARAT took took part part in in five five V VALDAY operations and and nine nine to to exchange exchange secret secret messages messages (five (fiveby bybrush brush contact, contact, four four by by dead dead drop). drop). In In an an emergency emergency the the resi residency dency could could arrange arrange an an urgent urgent meeting meeting with with MARAT MARAT by by ringing ringing a a designated designated tele telephone number number at at precisely preciselyfive five minutes past past noon noon and and asking asking for for Dr. Dr. Albert. Albert. On O n being being phone minutes told, would told, "There There is is no noDr. Dr. Albert Albert here" here the the residency residency officer officer would reply, reply, "Sorry, Sorry,must must have have the wrong wrong number." number. He H e would would then then meet meet MARAT at the same day day at at 3:05 3:05 p.m. p.m. the the same at a a Brooklyn location location codenamed codenamed ELLIOT, ELLIOT, at at the theentrance entrance to to the the Silver Silver Road Road pharmacy pharmacy Brooklyn on the thecorner corner of of Avenue Avenue J and and East East 16th 16th Street, Street, next next to to the the subway subway station. station. MARAT on identified himself himself by by carrying carrying a a copy copy of of Time magazine magazine and and placing placing a a Bandaid Bandaid on on his his identified left him, you have the time?" When MARAT left hand. hand. The The operations operations officer officer asked asked him, "Do DO you have the time?When MARAT replied, "It's Its 3:05 3:05 sharp," sharp, he produced a business business card from one of MARAT's MARATs former replied, employers back. 71 employers with with a a note note by by KHAB, KHAB, his his brother brother Morris, Morris, on onthe the back.71 The KGB in in contacts contacts with with both bothMARAT and and The elaborate elaborate security security employed employed by by the the KGB KHAB KHAB suffered, suffered, however, however, from from one one fatal fatal flaw. flaw. Since Since the the early early 1950s 1950s both both had had been been 2 By 1974 FBI had become FBI agents.7 agents.72 1974 the theCentre Centre had become suspicious, suspicious,particularly particularly about about KHAB (Morris the anti-Communist anti-Communist witch (Morris Childs). Childs). He H e had had not not been been imprisoned imprisoned during during the witchhunts hunts of of the the 1950s, 1950s, nor nor had had he he been been arrested arrested for for travelling travelling abroad abroad on on false false passports passports (a which the by (a fact fact of ofwhich theFBI was was believed believedto to be be aware). aware).A 1967 1967 report report by the the Senate Senate Judi Judiciary IS name name ciary Committee Committee had had referred referred to to him him under underthe thenames names Morris Morris Chilovsky Chilovsky (his (h at at birth) birth) and andMorris MorrisSummers Summers (one (one of of his his aliases) aliases) and and mentioned mentioned his his pre-war pre-war links links with with Soviet Soviet intelligence. intelligence.The The Centre Centre also also found found suspicious suspicious KHAB's KHABsdetermination determination to to accompany accompany Gus Gus Hall Hallon onall all his his trips trips to to Russia Russia and and his his "nervousness" nervousnesswhen when Moscow Moscow bypassed him and his brother and communicated directly with Hall. Hall. In March 1974 1974 bypassed Vladimir First (North (North American) American) Depart DepartVladimir Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Kazakov, Kazakov, head head of of the the FCD First ment, ment, reported reported to to Andropov Andropov and and the the Central CentralCommittee: Committee: Although trust of Although [Morris] [Morris] Childs Childs enjoys enjoys the the trust of Comrade Comrade Gus Gus Hall, Hall, his his direct direct involvement involvement in in the the financial financial affairs affairs of of the the US Communist Communist Party Party constitutes constitutes a a real . In real threat threat to to this this special special channel channel [for [for the the transmission transmission of of Soviet Soviet funds] funds]. In addition, M. Childs's Childssbehavior behavior lead lead addition, certain certain doubtful doubtfid and and suspicious suspicious elements elements in in M. one one to to believe believe that that he heis is possibly possiblybeing being used used by by US intelligence. intelligence. Kazakov be persuaded persuaded to to find find a a substitute substitute for for MARAT MAMT (Jack (Jack Kazakov also also urged urged that that Hall be Childs), Childs), whom whom he he described described as as absent-minded absent-minded and and in in poor poor health. health. At a a meeting meeting with with Hall Hall in in Moscow Moscow on on May May 8, 8, another another senior senior FCD officer, officer, B. S. S. Ivanov, time had come broth Ivanov, tried tried to to persuade persuade him him that thatthe the time had come to to retire retire both both the the Childs Childs brothers, ers, whose whose long long involvement involvement in in secret secret work work placed placed them them under under increasing increasing danger danger of of FBI surveillance. surveillance. Ivanov Ivanov suggested suggested a a number number of ofalternative alternative methods methods of of transferring transferring Soviet SA, among CPUSA, among them them opening openingaaSwiss Swiss bank bank account account or or using using a a Soviet funds funds to to the the CPU cover business in the United States. But, though Hall said he had found a "reliable cover business in the United States. But, though said he had found a reliable comrade" took no the International International DepartDepart comrade to to replace replace Jack Jack Childs, Childs, he he took no action action and and the ment, ment, which which evidently evidently did did not not take take Kazakov's Kazakovs warning warning very very seriously, seriously,did did not notinsist.73 insist.73

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In Morris and Order of In 1975 1975 Morris and Jack Jack Childs Childs were were awarded awarded the the Order of the the Red Red Banner; Banner; Morris Morris received received his his in in person person from from Brezhnev Brezhnev during during aaMoscow Moscow banquet. banquet. Back Back in in the the United 5 percent percent of of the the United States States both both brothers brothers lived lived in in some some style, style, embezzling embezzling about about 5 Soviet Soviet funds funds sent sent to to the the CPUSA CPUSA as as well well as as receiving receiving a a salary salary from from the the FBI. FBI. Morris Morris posed posed as as a a wealthy wealthy businessman businessman with with a a penthouse penthouse in in Chicago, Chicago, expensively expensively furnished furnished with with antiques, antiques, paintings paintings and and oriental oriental carpets, carpets, as as well well as as apartments apartments in in Moscow Moscow and and New Hall, who believed both New York. York. Gus GusHall, who naively naivelybelieved both brothers brothers to to be be independently independently wealthy, 74 wealthy, sometimes sometimes asked asked them them to to buy buy clothes clothes for for his his family. family.74 Among the intelligence which the Childs brothers reported Among the intelligence which the Childs brothers reported to to the the FBI for for more more than years than twenty twenty years were werethe the claims claims of of the the CPUSA CPUSA leadership leadership to to influence influence on on the theblack black civil civil rights rights movement. movement. In In 1958 1958 Jack Jack Childs Childs had had reported reported a a boast boast by James James Jackson, Jackson, Party Party secretary secretary in in charge charge of of "Negro Negro and and Southern Southern Affairs," Affairs, that that "most most secret secret and and guarded people" were "guiding" the civil rights leader Martin Luther King.75 Accord guarded people were guidingthe civil rights leader Martin LutherKing.75According to one the Soviet ing to one KGB file, file, Dobrynin, Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador, ambassador, later later asked asked Hall to to stop stop bringing Jackson, whom described as bringing Jackson, whom he hedescribed as "poorly poorlytrained trained politically," politically,to to meetings meetings with him; him; he he also also requested requested the the Soviet Soviet mission mission to to the the UN (by (by which which he he probably probably meant meant the the KGB New New York York residency) residency)to to break break off off contact contact with with Jackson.76 Ja~kson.~ There however, some the claim the CPUSA There was, was, however, some substance substance to to the claim that that the CPUSA had had pene penetrated trated King's Kings entourage. entourage. The The Childs Childs brothers brothers reported reported that that one one of of King's Kings advisers, advisers, Stanley Stanley D. D. Levison, Levison, a a New NewYork York lawyer lawyerand and entrepreneur, entrepreneur, was was a a secret secret Party Party mem member.77 ber.77Levison Levison drafted drafted sections sections of of King's Kings 1958 1958 book, book, Stride Stride Toward Toward Freedom, Freedom, and and helped helped prepare prepare his his defense defense against against trumped-up trumped-up charges charges of of perjury perjury on on his his Alabama Alabama tax tax returns returns in in 1960.78 1960.78Levison Levison also also introduced introduced into into King's Kings entourage entourage a a secret secret black black member member of of the the CPUSA, CPUSA, Hunter Hunter Pitts Pitts "Jack" JackO'Dell.79 ODell.79The The FBI, FBI, who who put put Levison Levison under under surveillance, surveillance, reported reported that that he he was was meeting meeting Viktor Viktor Lesiovsky, Lesiovsky, a a KGB officer officer 0 working working as as special special assistant assistant to to the the UN Secretary-General, Secretary-General, U Thant.8 Thant. It It was was Levi Levison's in 1963 led Robert sons alleged alleged influence influence on on King King which whichin1963 led Attorney-General Attorney-GeneralRobert Kennedy Kennedy to to authorize authorize the the bugging bugging of of King's Kings hotel hotel rooms. rooms. Though Though the the bugs bugs pro produced duced recordings recordings of of a a number number of of King's Kings sexual sexual liaisons, liaisons, in in which which President PresidentLyndon Lyndon B. Johnson prurient interest, they Johnson took took a a prurient interest, they provided provided no no evidence evidence of of Communist Communist influ influence ence on on him.81 him. At the Carter administration the beginning beginning of of the the Carter administration in in 1977, 1977, the the CPUSA CPUSA leadership leadership made uence over King's former secretary, made exaggerated exaggerated claims claims of of its its infl influence overKings former executive executivesecretary, Andrew Andrew Young Young (codenamed (codenamed LUTHER), LUTHER), newly newly appointed appointed as as US US representative representative at at the United the United Nations. Nations. According According to to Hall, Hall,"Young Young himself himself did did not not know know that that several several of of his his close close friends friends in in Atlanta Atlanta were were covert covert Communists, Communists, and and he he listened listened to to them. them. The The Party, Party, while while observing observing the the required required clandestinity, clandestinity, would would cautiously cautiously exert exert an an influence influence on Lesiovsky's cover as on Young Young in in the thenecessary necessary areas."82 areas.82 Lesiovskys cover as assistant assistant to to U Thant Thant gave gave him him a a number number of of opportunities opportunities for for discussions discussions with with Young. Young. Though Though he he claimed claimed to to have have obtained obtained "important important information" informationfrom from the the discussions, discussions, he he reported-less reported-less optimisti optimistically cally than than Hall-that, Hall-that, while while Young Young hoped hoped for for better better US-Soviet US-Soviet relations, relations, his his attitude attitude , to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union was was fundamentally fundamentally "negative."83 negati~e.~~ Though Hall tended Though Hall tended to to overstate overstate the the influence influence of of undeclared undeclared members members of of the the CPUSA within the Party, there was at least CPUSA the Democratic Democratic Party, least one to whom the the Centre Centre

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the 1970s: aDemocratic attached real importance during during the 1970s: a Democratic activist in California recruited as a KGB agent during a visit to Russia. The agent, who is not identified thereports noted by Mitrokhin, had had a a wide circle of by name in the of influential contacts theDemocratic Democratic themGovernor Governor Jerry Brown of of California, Senator in the Party: among them Jerry Alan Cranston,Senator Eugene McCarthy, Senator Edward Senator Eugene McCarthy, Senator Edward Kennedy, Senator Ribicoff, Senator J. William Fulbright and Congressman John Conyers, Abraham Ribicoff, the 1976 1976 presidential election the agent agent was able to provide inside inforJr. During the infor mation from within the the Carter Carter camp and a profile of Carter himself, which were particularly highly valued by the Centre since it had so few high-level American sources. On O n one occasion occasion he spent three three hours hours discussing the progress of sources. of the camcam ameeting with Carter, Carter, Brown and Cranston Cranston in inCarter's Carters room at the thePacific paign at a Hotel. of the Hotel. His report was forwarded to the Politburo. During the final stages of campaign the agent had what what the theKGB claimed were "direct direct and prolonged conver conversations sations" with Carter, Carter, Governor Governor Brown and Senators Cranston, Kennedy, Ribicoff Javits. attachedsuch importance to tothe report on onthese conver converand Jacob J avits. Andropov attached sations the Politburo immediately after sations that he forwarded it under his signature to the Carters election.84 ele~tion.~ Carter's
I N NOV EMB 1977 sent a a memorandum to theCentral Committee IN VE BE R R 1 977 the Centre Centre sent Central Committee complaining that, that, despite despite several several requests requests to to Hall Halltoto replace the the Childs Childsbrothers, complaining replace brothers, they they the American end of the covert were still running running the "covert channel channel of of communication communication with the US Communist Communist Party." Party. During During Jack's Jacks illness illness in in August August and Morris the and September, September, Morris CPUSAs representative at a a meeting with a a KGB officer in had replaced him as the CPUSA's New York:

the special channel operation His use use in the operation is very very risky, risky, since since [Morris] Childs Childs is is the intelligence service-as service-as is is evidenced by the US Senate Judiciary known to the Committees report for 1967, 1967, where he is referred to as a person who uses sev sevCommittee's the KGB. Because of ofthis, one cannot cannotexclude eral names names and has contact with the possibility that the the FBI has him under under covert surveillance. the possibility covert surveillance.

10 Kazakov and Ivanov raised the question of of replacing Childs O n November 10 On replacing the Childs brothers at at another anothermeeting meeting with with Hall Hallin in Moscow. Hall that he hehad had three candibrothers Moscow. Hall said said that three candi Childs-John Vogo and dates in mind as a replacement for Jack Childs-John and the the Applekhoums [? [? brothers. He H e would make his Appleholmes] brothers.85 his final final choice choice in in the the near near future and and announce decision by to Moscow Moscow reporting reporting the completion of of a a announce his his decision by a a coded coded telegram telegram to thecompletion colonialism.The number of of the draft indicated the telegram draft article on colonialism. the draft indicated in in the telegram (first, (first, second he had had selected. selected. Jack Jack Childs Child's sucsuc second or or third) third) would would indicate indicate which which candidate candidate he the Soviet consulate in Vienna so that he could cessor would then apply for a visa at the so that and aahalf to two months of special training in receive one and "special training" in Moscow. Moscow. Hall Hall also also sugsug gested use the personal chauffeur chauffeur and and bodyguard bodyguard as as an an addiaddi gested that that the theKGB use the wife wife of of his his personal tional channel of communication communication in in New New York. The tional channel of York. The residency residency could could telephone telephone her her at at itself by using the parole, This Budnikcalling "This is is Mr. Mr. Budnik calling about about the the old old work, identifying itselfby furniture. hrniture. My Myfriend friend from from Hoboken Hoboken suggested suggested contacting contacting yoU."86

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Once Once again, again, however, however, Hall Hall delayed delayed taking taking action. action. The The Childs Childs brothers brothers continued continued to decade. One to take take part part in in the the"special special channel channel operation" operation for for the the remainder remainder of of the the decade. One of the files noted by Mitrokhin records that during the eight months up to April of the files noted by Mitrokhin records that during the eight months up to April 1978 1978 Jack Jack Childs Childs conducted conducted nineteen nineteen operations: operations: three three VALDAY money money transfers, transfers, two two meetings meetings with with KGB officers, officers, five fivedead dead drops, drops, six six brush brush contacts contacts and and three three oper operations ations to to signal signal contacts.87 contacts.87By By the the spring spring of of 1980, 1980, however, however, the the FBI had had concluded concluded that that the the Childs Childs were were in in imminent imminent danger danger of of being being compromised. compromised. On O n May May 28, 28, as as a a pretext Childs told that pretext for for withdrawing withdrawing from from the the "special special channel," channel, Morris Morris Childs told Hall Hall that unidentified unidentified men men had hadbeen been calling calling on on his his neighbors neighbors making making enquiries enquiries about about him him and and he handed Hall he feared feared he he might might have have to to go into into hiding hiding to to avoid avoid arrest. arrest. He H e handed Hall 225,437 225,437 dollars dollars in in cash, cash, which, which, he he claimed, claimed,was was all allthe the money money from from Moscow Moscow in in his his possession. possession. Jack York Jack Childs, Childs, who whohad had been been in in failing failing health health for for some some time, time, died died in in a aNew New York hos hospital and Eva pital on on August August 12. 12.Morris Morris and Eva Childs Childs retired retired to to a a luxurious luxurious condominium condominium north north of special of Miami Miami with withspectacular spectacularviews views over over the the Atlantic. Atlantic. In In 1987, 1987, at ata a special ceremony ceremony at at FBI headquarters, Reagan with headquarters, Morris Morris was was presented presented by by President President Reagan with the the Presidential Presidential Medal Medal of of Freedom. Freedom. He H e and and his his brother brother Jack, Jack, who who was was awarded awarded the the same same medal medal posthumously, ever to the Soviet posthumously, thus thus became became the the only only spies spies ever to be be decorated decorated by by both both the Soviet Union Union and and the the United United States.88 States.* Throughout Throughout the thedecades decades when when the theChilds Childsbrothers brothers operated operated the the secret secret channel channel to to Moscow, the CPUSA had been wholly marginal to American politics. In four presi Moscow, the CPUSA had been wholly marginal to American politics. In four presidential dential elections elections between between 1972 1972 and and 1984 1984Gus Gus Hall never never received received more more than than 59,000 59,000 votes; votes; after after falling falling to to 35,000 35,000 in in 1984, 1984, he he decided decided to to support support the the Democrats Democrats in in 1988. 1988. After dropping well below 10,000 the mid-1970s, Party staged After dropping well below 10,000 members members in in the mid-1970s, the the Party staged a a modest modest revival revival but but in in the thelater later 1980s 1980s was was only only about about 15,000 15,000 strong.89 strong.89Hall, Hall, however, however, continued fantasy CPUSA had had a amajor major influence influence on on continued to to inhabit inhabit aa fantasy world world in in which which the the CPUSA American International American politics. politics. He H e wrote wrote to to Boris Boris Ponomarev, Ponomarev, the the head head of of the the International Department, autumn of Department, in inthe the autumn of 1981: 1981: More any More than thanat at any moment moment in inrecent recent history, history, I am am convinced convinced that that our our Party Party can can be be an an important important factor factor in in slowing slowing down, down, stopping stopping and and reversing reversing the the present present reactionary reactionary policies policies of of the the Reagan Reagan administration. administration. Tens Tens of of millions millions have have become become disillusioned. disillusioned.They They are are moving moving towards towards mass mass actions, actions, and and millions millions are are in Our Party in ideological ideological flux. flux. Our Party can can be be an an important importantand and even even a a decisive decisive factor factor in in influencing influencing and and moving moving these these masses. masses.
occasion, Hall's Halls fantasy assessments assessments of the CPUSA's CPUSAs growing influence As on this occasion, were were accompanied accompanied by by appeals appeals for for Soviet Soviet subsidies, subsidies,which which for for most most of of the the1980s 1980s ran ran at at 2 million million dollars dollars a a year. year. In I n 1987 1987 Hall Hall asked for for a a large large increase: increase: 2 asked argue that because our party works in the thedecaying heart of imperi imperiI can only argue alism whatever we do in ininfluencing events in the theUnited United alism States has an impact developments. And, because of the crisis crisis of the Reagan presidency, presidency, on world developments. now, our Party's Partys work has had and continues to have which is deep and chronic now, onthe the country. a growing impact on politics of our country.

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Therefore, the context against US imperialism imperialism and and the Therefore, in in the context of of the the struggle struggle against the policies of the the Reagan administration, our party must be seen seen as an important, and indispensable, factor. and even even indispensable, factor. The to three million dollars.90 The CPUSNs CPUSAs subsidy subsidy for for the the following following year year was was put put up to three million dollar^.'^ Morris of Soviet Soviet donations to the the Morris Childs Childs believed believed that that the the remarkable remarkable generosity generosity of donations to CPUSA (200 dollars dollars a due partly partly to to the fact that that the Kremlin CPUSA (200 a member member in in 1987) 1987) was was due the fact the Kremlin Halls claims took Gus Gus Hall's claims at least semi-seriously and and ludicrously "ludicrously overestimated overestimated the the was also due, however, to the ide influence of of the the American American party."9 party.1 The The generosity generosity was also due, however, to theideinfluence ological servility servility of of Hall Hall and and the the CPUSA leadership. leadership. According ological According to to Dorothy Dorothy Ray Ray Healey, party militant ve years: Healey, a a prominent prominentparty militant for for forty-fi forty-five years: Under picked up up the dubious distincdistinc Under Gus's Guss leadership leadership the the American American CP had had picked the dubious tion in the Communist tion of of being being the the chief chief ideological ideological sheepdog sheepdog in the international international Communist movement, barking barking on on command command when when any any of of the the other other lambs lambs threatened movement, threatened to to stray would contact contact Gus Gus and and tell tell him him what stray from from the the fold. fold. The The Soviet Soviet leaders leaders would what run aastory say they wanted wanted him him to tosay, they and then then Pravda could say, he he would would say say it, it, and could run story saying that that embattled American American Communists speaking speaking from the heartland heartland of of world thus-and-such to say about whatever issue issue was of par world imperialism imperialism had had thus-and-such to say about whatever was of particular concern concern to to the the Soviets Soviets at at the the m ~ment .~ ticular moment. 92

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c OI;ference of 1960 unani conference of eighty-five eighty-five Communist Communist parties parties held held in in Moscow Moscow in in 1960 unanimously mously reaffirmed reaffirmed loyalty loyalty to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union as as an an unshakeable unshakeable article article of of faith faith for for Communists and Communists in inboth bothEast East and West: West: The uni The Communist Communist Party Party of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union has has been, been, and and remains, remains, the the uniommunist movement, versally versally recognized recognized vanguard vanguard of of the the world world C; Communist movement, being being the the most international Communist most experienced experienced and and steeled steeled contingent contingent of of the the international Communist movement. movement. By the the end end of of the the decade, decade, however, however, the the CPSU CPSU leadership leadership was was outraged outraged to to find find its its infallibility infallibility being being called called into into question question by by the the emergence emergence of of what what was was later later termed termed "Eurocommunism." rst public Eurocommunism. The The Eurocommunist Eurocommunist heresy heresy made made its its fi first public appearance appearance after the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, when a number of Western after the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, when a number of Western par parties ties ventured ventured some, some, mostly mostly timid, timid, criticisms criticisms of of the the Soviet Soviet invasion. invasion.The The leadership leadership of of the later the PCI PC1(Partito (Partito Comunista ComunistaItaliano), Italiano), later the the dominant dominant force force in in Eurocommunism, Eurocommunism, reaffirmed reaffirmed "the the profound, profound, fraternal fraternal and and genuine genuine ties ties that that unite unite the the Italian Italian Commu Communist the Soviet nist Party Party to to the Soviet Union Union and and the the CPSU," CPSU,but but denied denied the the right right of of the the Soviet Soviet Union to intervene internal life Communist Party Party or Union to intervene militarily militarily "in in the the internal life of another another Communist or , another ,1 another country. country. "The the PCI The profound, profound, fraternal fraternal and and genuine genuine ties" ties which which bound bound the PC1 to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union even even after after Soviet Soviet tanks tanks had had entered entered Prague Prague had had a a secret secret dimension dimension of of which which very few few Italian Italian Communists Communists outside outside the the Direzione Direzione were were aware. aware.Mter After the the Colonels' Colonels very coup Athens in inApril April 1967, coup in in Athens 1967, the the PCI PC1 general general secretary, secretary, Luigi Luigi Longo, Longo, and and other other party party leaders leaders had had become become alarmed alarmed by by the the possibility possibility of of an an Italian Italian military military putsch putsch on on the the Greek Greek model. model. In In the the summer summer of of 1967, 1967, Giorgio Giorgio Amendola, Amendola, on on behalf behalf of of the the PCI PC1 Direzione, Party for Direzione, formally formally requested requested Soviet Soviet assistance assistance in in preparing preparing the the Party for survival survival after no. P50/P of after a a coup coup as as an an illegal illegal underground underground movement. movement. Politburo Politburo decision decision no. P50/P of August August 15 15 authorized authorized the the FCD FCD to to draw draw up up a a program program which which was was intended intended to togive give the the PCl unit with PC1 its its own own intelligence intelligence unit withfully fully trained trained staff staff and and a a clandestine clandestine radio radio commu commuagreed in talks in Moscow between system. Details of the program were agreed nications system. ANDREA, ANDREA, the the head head of of the the PCl's PCIs illegal illegal apparatus, apparatus, and and senior senior Central Central Committee Committee

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officials October 1967 1968 three Italian radio radio officials and and KGB officers. officers. Between Between October 1967 and andMay May 1968 three Italian operators course. Other Other Party members took took KGB training training course. Party members operators completed completed a a four-month four-month KGB courses in courses in producing producing bogus bogus identity identity documents, documents, following following a a syllabus syllabus which which devoted devoted theproduction of rubber stamps theart art ninety-six hours to the stamps and and document document seals, seals, six six to to the of embossing with synthetic resins, six to changing photographs on identity docudocu ments, six six to making handwritten entries on documents and twelve to theoretical "theoretical discussions." least until until the the discussions. These These and and other other secret secret training training programs programs continued continued at at least 1970s. The PC1 also asked asked the end of the 1970s. PCI leadership leadership also the KGB to check check its its headquarters for listening listening devices.2 devices.2 for After the theimmediate PC1 protest at the thesuppression suppression of of the the Prague Prague Spring in1968, After immediate PCI protest at Spring in 1968, open Twelfth Congress Congress in February 1969, 1969, open criticism criticism quickly quickly subsided. subsided. Before Before the the PCI PC1Twelfth in February Ponomarev, head of of the Central Central Committee's Committees International Department, both Boris Ponomarev, International Department, officers put put heavy heavy pressure pressure on on Luigi Luigi Longo and other other Party Party leaders and senior senior KGB officers and Longo and leaders Cezchoslovakia in speeches speeches to the conference. In to tone down their comments on Cezchoslovakia the conference. In reports the CPSU Central Committee, Ponomarev and the reports to to the Central Committee, Ponomarev and the KGB KGB claimed claimed the the ambiguous phrases, refercredit for the fact that, despite the retention of some "ambiguous phrases," all refer intervention and "occupation" occupationby the Soviet Union and ences to "intervention" andits its allies in the the Warsaw Pact were removed. Nor was there any call by the PC1 for withdrawal of Warsaw Pact were removed. Nor was there any call by the PCI for the the withdrawal of forces from Czechoslovakia.3 C~echoslovakia.~ with Warsaw Pact forces In In a private discussion discussion in 1970 1970 with Nikita Ryzhov, RyLhov, the Soviet ambassador, Longo particularly Soviet ambassador, "particularly emphasized that for the the Soviet a forItalian the CPSU and the Italian Communists friendship with the Soviet Union Union was was not a for necessityfor their existence."4 e~istence.~ mality but aareal necessity Soviet subsidies. subsidies. H e was at his most importunate Longo also depended heavily on Soviet He when a general election was called one year ahead of of schedule in May 1972. 1972. The original CPSU CPSU Politburo allocation for the election year was was 5,200,000 5,200,000 dollars-2 dollars-2 1971. After a further appeal it provided million more than in 1971. appeal from from Longo, Longo, it provided another another 500,000 dollars. dollars. Longo then then wrote another begging letter, to a 500,000 to which Brezhnev Brezhnev sent sent a personal reply, Gennadi Fyodorovich Borzov (alias (alias personal reply, delivered delivered by by the the Rome Rome resident, resident, Gennadi Fyodorovich Borzov Bystrov),on April April4: "Bystrov"),
Dear Comrade Longo, Longo, Dear Comrade We letter additional assistance assistance to to meet meet expenses expenses We have have received receivedyour your letter requesting requesting additional the Italian Communist Communist Party's Partys participation the electoral relating to the participation in in the electoral campaign. campaign. We well well understand understand the the difficult difficult nature nature of We of the the situation situation in in which which this this campaign need for the intense intense activity activity which which your campaign is is taking taking place, place, and and the the need for the your Party to win win the the elections elections and and resist resist the the Party must must exert exert in in this this connection connection in in order order to forces of of reaction. reaction. forces As you, you, Comrade Comrade Longo, Longo, know, know, we wehave havealready already allocated allocated an additional As an additional US Communist Party part in electoral US $500,000 $500,000 for for the the Italian Italian Communist Party to totake take part in the theelectoral campaign, thus [contribution] this this year year to to US $5,700,000. $5,700,000. campaign, thus bringing bringing the the total total [contribution] In studied all the In the the light light of of your your request, request, we we once once again again carefully carefullystudied all the possibilities open to us, and decided to give the Italian Communist Party Party possibilities

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further hrther assistance assistance to to the the amount amountof of US $500,000. $500,000. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, at at the the present time, do. present time, there there is is no no more more that that we we can can do. With greetings, With Communist Communist greetings, [Signed] L. Brezhnev Brezhnev [Signed] L. General Secretary General Secretary of of the the CPSU Central Central Committee5 Committee After toto Longo, Borzov After handing handing the theletter letter Longo, Borzov reported reported to to the the Centre: Centre: The we had The Ambassador Ambassador [Nikita [Nikita Ryzhov] Ryzhov] declared declared that that as as we had gone gone behind behind his his back he intended intended to to telegraph telegraph Comrade Brezhnev about about this. Bearing in in mind mind back he Comrade Brezhnev this. Bearing Ryzhov's things of of Ryzhovs difficult difficult character, character, and and his his extremely extremely sensitive sensitive reaction reaction to to things this this kind, kind, this this particular particular incident incident has has greatly greatly exacerbated exacerbated the the Ambassador's Ambassadors attitude towards us. The The Centre Centre ordered ordered Borzov Borzov to to do dohis his best best to to pacify pacify the the Ambassador: Ambassador: Tell Tell Ryzhov Ryzhov that that you you assumed assumed he he would would be be made made aware aware in in Moscow Moscow of of the the deci decileadership]. O n your your own own behalf, behalf, ask ask sion taken taken by by the the Instantsiya Instantsiya [CPSU sion [CPSU leadership] . On to attach Comrade Ryzhov to treat all this with proper understanding and not to exaggerated importance to what whathas happened; tell him that that our relations exaggerated relations with him will continue to be businesslike businesslike and that the fidly the Ambassador will be fully PCI].6 informed about all our contacts with our friends [the PCI].6
In October 1972, friends had handed 1972, Borzov reported that the the "friends" handed back three 100embarrassingly, turned out out to be forgeries.7 f~rgeries.~ dollar notes which had, embarrassingly, 1976 the Communist Party Party Until 197 6 the transfer of funds to the Communist was a far more straightstraight United forward business in Rome than in inthe the United States or many other parts of the embassy, it world. Since leading Italian Communists regularly called at the the Soviet Soviet embassy, the clandestine rigmarole of brush contacts and was thought unnecessary to resort to the Soviet loyalist on the the PCI PC1 Direzione, who was in dead-drops. The most dependable Soviet the KGB, simply selected a series of ofemissaries emissarieswho drove to the the regular contact with the embassy and collected the money, having first checked that their cars cars were not being followed.The KGB residency's residencys KOMETA radio-listening post simultaneously mon monfollowed. wavelengths used by byItalian police and security forces forces in order to detect detectany itored the wavelengths signs surveillance. As an additional precaution, the emissary was followed followed to and signs of surveillance. car.8 Moscow provided further financial assistance assistance from the embassy by a PC1 PCI car.8 through lucrative lucrative contracts with PCI-controlled companies in business ventures PCI -controlled Soviet oil imports to to hotel hotelconstruction in the the Soviet Soviet Union.9 Union. ranging from Soviet PCIs fears fears of a right-wing right-wing military coup were revived by the overthrow of The PCl's Allendes Unidad Popular government in Chile President Salvador Allende's Chile by the armed forces in September 1 1973. the PCI PC1 took secret delivery from the KGB forces 973. In December the of three SELENGA radio stations in order to enable Party headquarters to maintain PC1 was forced underground. Party radio techni technicontact with local branches if the PCI system. In the aftermath aftermathof a coup the cians were trained in Russia to operate the new system.

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SELENGA radios to Moscow Moscow which which would would then then be be radios would would transmit transmit messages messages to PC1 underground groups by powerful powerhl Soviet retransmitted to local PCI Soviet transmitters. transmitters.Io The renewed fear of an Italian putsch, however, however, also also drove drovethe PC1 PCI in directions which Communist Party was suc which caused caused concern concern in in Moscow Moscow that that the theWest's Wests largest largest Communist Partywas succumbing "Reflections on on Italy Italy cumbing to to ideological ideological heresy. heresy. In In a a series series of of articles articles entitled entitled Reflections Chile, Enrico Berlinguer (who had succeeded Longo as general after the Events in Chile," secretary in 1972) 1972) proposed, a phrase which became famous, a compromesso secretary proposed, in a compromesso storico storico (historic compromise") compromise) with the Socialists and the ruling Christian DemocratsY Democrats. ("historic the Socialists previousmajor Communist leader with whom the KremBerlinguer was unlike any previous Krem hadagreed to their their lin had had to deal. deal. His wife Letizia was a devout Catholic and he had children faith. Longo had done his best to to persuade persuade children being being brought brought up up in in the theCatholic Catholic faith. Longo had done his best family, Berlinguer was the best available Moscow that, despite his Catholic family, available candidate rivals, Giorgio Amendola, Gian Carlo and that his three main rivals, Carlo Pajetta and Pietro Ingrao, were unsuitable for the post of general secretary. secretary. Amendola, according to Longo, had "had a great deal of the bourgeois democrat about him and had too often revisionist errors;" errors; Pajetta, ((whose whose authority was dwindling, was too committed revisionist short-tempered promote [Party] unity;" Ingrao Ingrao was was superficial ((superficial and and short-tempered and and would would not not promote [Party] unity; speculation. Berlinguer, however, represented the given to unrealistic theoretical speculation." Berlinguer, however, leaders who had emerged since the Second World War.12 new generation of Party leaders War.12 reassured. Moscow was far from reassured. Berlinguer's compromise" was conceived chiefly as Berlinguersoriginal original proposal proposal for for a a ((historic (historiccompromise was conceived chiefly as a defense defense against against the the prospect prospect of of a a right-wing right-wing coup, Lenins dictum that a coup, justified justified by by Lenin's dictum that revolutionaries must must know know when when to toretreat. retreat. Gradually, revolutionaries Gradually, however, however, the the proposal proposal evolved evolved into a more ambitious-and, in in Moscow's Moscows view, heretical-strategy, into a more ambitious-and, view, heretical-strategy, in in which which Catholic with Communist collective action action to to Catholic traditions traditions of of solidarity solidarity would would combine combine with Communist collective produce order. During 1975 Berlinguer Berlinguer emerged emerged as as the the produce a a new new political political and and social social order. During 1975 chief spokesman of became known Eurocommunism. The The PC1 PCI joined joined with chief spokesman of what what became known as as Eurocommunism. with the issuing what what was, in effect, a Eurocommunist the Spanish Spanish PCE and and French French PCF in in issuing was, in effect, a Eurocommunist manifesto, model of of socialism and committing committing manifesto, distancing distancing themselves themselves from from the the Soviet Soviet model socialismand . themselves a parliamentary parliamentary road road to to socialism socialism within themselves to to free free elections, elections, a a free free press press and and a within a -party system. 13 a multi multi-party system.13 At a secret meeting with Ryzhov on December 12, 12, 1975, 1975, a KGB informant informant on on the leadership of of a "a cowardly cowardly rejection rejection of of the Direzione Direzione accused accused Berlinguer Berlinguer and and the the Party Partyleadership Leninism" Union. He He appealed appealed to to the the CPSU to to Leninism and and growing growing hostility hostility to to the the Soviet Soviet Union. issue a a public public criticism criticism of of the the PCI PC1line: line: "This This will wiU almost it is issue almost split split the the party, party, but but it is the the only way way to to save save the the situation." situation.The The informant informant also the PCl PC1 leadership only also claimed claimed that that the leadership was European Communist Communist Parties, Parties, due due to be was planning planning to to disrupt disrupt the the conference conference of of European to be held in in East East Berlin Berlin in in the the summer summerof of 1976, 1976, by using it its revisionheld by using it as as a a platform platform for for its revision ist ist views.14 views.14 During Berlin conference conference the the Kremlin Kremlin issued issued a a series series During the thepreparations preparations for for the the East EastBerlin of the Eurocommunists Eurocommunists not not misbehave. of thinly thinly veiled veiled public public warnings warnings to to the to to misbehave. Berlinguer, however, however, was wasnot not to to be be intimidated. theItalian Berlinguer, intimidated. During During the Italian election election campaign campaign in considered his his most most outrageous statement yet. yet. ItalItal in June, June,he hemade made what what Moscow Moscow considered outrageous statement ian was on on balance balance an an advantage: advantage: This "This ian membership membership of of NATO, NATO, Berlinguer Berlinguer declared, declared, was

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guarantees socialism that be precise,socialism socialism in guarantees us us the the kind kind of of socialism that we we want-to want-to be precise, in liberty, liberty, ofa pluralist kind." kind. The Kremlin responded with a ascathing, though secret, secret, socialism of O f far more significance significance so so far as most of the PCl PC1 Direzione was letter of protest. Of concerned, however, received concerned, however, was wasthe the fact fact that that the theParty Party received a a record record 34.5 34.5 percent percent of of the the vote 7.3 percent East Berlin 29-30 the vote (up (up 7.3 percent since since 1972). 1972). At the the East Berlin conference conference on on June June 29-30 the clash by a clash between between the the CPSU and and the the Eurocommunists Eurocommunists was was thinly thinly papered papered over over by a bland communique calling bland communiquk calling for for "internationalist internationalist solidarity." solidarity. The The speeches speeches of of Berlinguer other leading leading heretics, attention to to flaws Berlinguer and and other heretics, which which drew drew attention flaws in in "existing existing socialism only in in aacen censocialism" (in other words, the Soviet model), were published published in Pravda only 1 sored sored version. version. 5 In 1976 the theBulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, always alwaysa faithful mouth mouthIn December 1976 propapiece for the Kremlin, Kremlin, denounced denounced Eurocommunism Eurocommunism as one of the bourgeois propa 16 gandists' "main gandist~~ main lines lines of of ideological ideological subversion subversion against against proletarian proletarian internationalism." internationali~m.~6 The Kremlin's Kremlins scope scope for a direct, frontal assault on on Berlinguer, Berlinguer, however, however, was waslimited popularity. Instead, Andropov instructed Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, the head of the by his immense popularity. FCD, EurocomFCD, to prepare active measures to discredit him and other tribunes of Eurocom munism. A report prepared by the FCD for the Central Committee claimed that munism.17 plotofland of land in Sardinia, and had been involved in dubious build buildBerlinguer owned a plot of lira.ls ing contracts worth tens of billions oflira.18 Remarkably, while hoping to destabilize Berlinguer by leaking evidence evidence of his Remarkably, subsidize the PCl. PCI. The The total subsidy for alleged corruption, Moscow continued to subsidize 1976 was 6.5 million dollars.19 dollars. According to KGB files, however, operational sit sit1976 files, however, the "operational uation for the transfer of money in Rome had become more difficult. difficult. The newly uation" New York), York), concluded appointed resident, Boris Solomatin (previously stationed in New 1976 that that handing handing over money at the the embassy was was insuffi insufficiently e in 1976 ciently clandestine. clandestine. H He Guido Cappelloni (codenamed ALBERTO), ALBERTO), head of the PCl PC1 Central agreed with Guido that it would be safest for the money trans transCommittee administration department, that fers to take place early on Sunday mornings at pre-arranged locations in the Rome hadbeen carefully checked beforehand by both the theresidency and the suburbs which had PCI. friend who received the money was kept PCl. The route of the car used used by by the "friend" under careful carehl surveillance surveillance by PCl PC1 members; members; hethen then transferred the money to to aasecret Party office.20 another car which delivered delivered it to also Despite its hostility to Berlinguer and Eurocommunism, the Soviet Politburo also continued to authorize authorizeKGB training in inunderground operations of specially selected example, the PCl PC1 sent three Party members to Italian Communists. Communists. In 1979, for example, IllegalsDirectorate S. S. One was trained to act Moscow for instruction by the FCD "lllegals" disguise specialist specialist and the thethird third fabas radio and cipher instructor, another as a disguise in in thethe fab 21 documents.21 rication of false documents. conflicts of Not all the confl icts between the PC1 PCl Direzione and the Communist Communist parties of the Soviet Bloc became public. The most serious serious secret dispute in the thelate 1970s 1970s concon services cerned the covert assistance assistance given by a number of east European intelligence services the West. East Germany Germany became, thewords of of its itslast, non nonto terrorist groups in the became, in the communist, minister of an Eldorado for forterrorCommunist, of the interior, Peter-Michael Peter-Michael Diestel, "an terror i s t ~What . ~ ~ most ~ ~ concerned the leaders of the PCI, however, was was support by the ists."22 leaders of PCl, however,

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Brigades).23Their anxieties Czechoslovak StB for the Italian Brigate Rosse Rosse (Red (Red Brigades).23 Their anxieties 16,1978, reached a peak on March 16, 1978, when the Red Brigades ambushed a car carrying ChristianDemocrats, AIdo Aldo Moro, in inthe the center of Rome. Moros the president of the Christian Moro's Mor0 himself chauffeur and his police escort escort were gunned gunned down and Moro himself was bundled Mor0 was held prisoner in a into a waiting car. For the next fifty-four days, while Moro secret not to the secret hiding hiding place, place, the the nation nation agonized agonized over over whether whether or or not to negotiate negotiate with with the Brigades to save save his his life.24 life.24 Red Brigades thePCI PC1 Direzione publicly maintained that there there could be no deals with Though the terrorists, it tormented by that news to the terrorists, it was was privately privatelytormented by the the fear fear that news of ofthe the support supportgiven given to the Brigades by theStB Red Brigades StB would leak out. Speaking for the Direzione, Arturo Koucky, Colombi complained to the Czechoslovak ambassador in Rome, Rome, Vladimir Vladimir Koucky, PC1 delegation to Prague had been off when it had tried that a PCI been fobbed off tried to raise the the issue Brigades, some issue of of help to the Red Brigades, some of whom, it believed, had been invited to Czechoslovakia. O n May May 4, 4,1978 Amendola warned if Moro's Moroskidnap kidnapCzechoslovakia. On 1978 Amendola warned Koucky Koucky that, that, if pers were caught and put on trial, the assistance given them by the StB could StB "could all come out." On sided with the PCI, come out. O n this this occasion, occasion, Rhyzov, Rhyzov, the the Soviet Soviet ambassador, ambassador, sided with the PCI, telling with the telling Koucky Koucky "he he had had warned warned Czechoslovak Czechoslovak representatives representatives about about contacts contacts with the Brigades, but they would not convincedthat theStB StB Red Brigades, not listen to him. him." Rhyzov was was convinced that the residency Red Brigades. "You got got a pen residency in in Rome Rome was was still still secretly secretly in in touch touch with with the theRed Brigades. You apenBrigades], nyworth of benefit [from the Red Brigades] ," he told Koucky, but "but did a hundred damage. times more damage."25 The place in in time. time. On The Italian Italian authorities authorities failed failed to to discover discover Moro's Moroshiding hiding place O n May May 9, 9, 1978 his body left in boot of a car car in 1978 he hewas was murdered murdered by by his his kidnappers kidnappers and and his body left inthe the boot of a in the the center Rome, midway of the PCI and and those those of of the the center of of Rome, midway between between the the headquarters headquarters of the PC1 outpouring of grief Christian Democrats. In the outpouring grief and soul-searching which followed Moros assassination there was-to was-to the relief Moro's assassination relief of the the Direzione-no Direzione-no mention mention of the the Brigades. During involvement of the StB StB with the Red Brigades. During the police police hunt hunt for for terrorist terrorist however, the PC1 radio stations stations over the next few years, however, PCI leadership leadership became became increasincreas anxious that their own might be discovered. In June 1981 the PCI PC1 leadership ingly anxious 1981 the informed the Rome residency that, for for security reasons, the three radio stations installed by by the the KGB for for clandestine clandestine Party Party use eight years years earlier earlier had installed use eight had been been destroyed.26 destroyed.26 The Afghanistan end of of 1979 1979 and imposition of of marmar The Soviet Soviet invasion invasionof of Afghanistan at at the theend and the the imposition tial law law in in Poland Poland two two years years later later destroyed destroyed any any semblance of a a reconciliation between tial semblance of reconciliation between Moscow PCI Central Central Committee January 1982, 1982, Moscow and and the the PCI. PCI. At At a a meeting meeting of of the the PC1 Committeein in January KGBs main contact voted against a motion motioncondemning condemning only the KGB's Soviet interference affairs. Berlinguer declared that the the October OctoberRevolution had "exhausted exhausted its in Polish affairs. propulsive force," implying CPSU had had lost lost its its revolutionary cre propulsive force, implying in in effect effect that that the the CPSU revolutionary credentials. thewest European dentials. The Direzione called on the European left to to work work for for the the democratic "democratic renewal of the countries of the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Pravda denounced the PCIs PCl's declaradeclara renewal" Bloc. Prnvda truly blasphemous." blasphemous. There followed what the lo strappo-a strappo--a tions as "truly the Italians Italians called called 10 PC1 and CPSU. brief but highly polemical breach of relations between the PCI CPSU. Within Within the the Italian Italian Party Party leadership, leadership, the the hardliner hardliner Armando Armando Cossutta Cossutta was was a a lone lone A decade later, as the Soviet Union Moscows side in the quarreL27 q~arrel.~ voice in taking Moscow's

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was disintegrating, disintegrating, evidence evidence leaked leaked out out that that Soviet Soviet subsidies subsidies to to the the PCI PC1 had had contin continwas ued a reduced the 1980s. soon ued on on a reduced scale scale in in the 1980s. But, But, according according to to one one commentator, commentator, "It It soon became clear that that if if Soviet Soviet funds funds had had been channelled into into Italy, Italy, they they went went through through became clear been channelled the hands .. .. .. of either to shore up newspaper with of Cossutta, Cossutta, either to shore up a a failing failing newspaper with pro-Soviet pro-Soviet the hands against the sympathies (Paese sympathies (Paese Sera) Sera) or or to to help help finance finance his his own own activities activities against the PCI's PCIs lead leaders.28The The final final recorded recorded payments-700,000 payments-700,000 dollars dollars in in 1985, dollars in in ers."28 1985, 600,000 600,000 dollars 1986 630,000 dollars 1986 and and630,000 dollars in in 1987-were 1987-were used used solely solelyto to provide provide "material material support" support to to what the CPSU CPSU International Department and Gor what the International Department and the the KGB (but (but probably probably not not Gorbachev) bachev) considered considered "the the healthy healthy forces forces in in the the PCI," PCI,chief chief among among them them Cossutta Cossuttaand and 29 Paese Sera. Sera. 29

Eurocommunist most suspicious Eurocommunist of of whom whom Moscow Moscow was was most suspicious was was Santiago Santiago Carrillo, Carrillo, leader leader of of the the PCE (Partido (Partido Comunista Comunista de de Espana). EspaAa). Even Even as as a a teenage precocious leadership In 1936, teenage militant, militant, Carrillo Carrillo had had shown shown precocious leadership qualities. qualities. In 1936, at atthe the age mocked by spectacles," he age of of only only nineteen, nineteen, mocked by his his opponents opponents as as "the the chrysalis chrysalis in in spectacles, he engineered a a fusion fusion between between the the socialist socialist and and communist communist youth youth movements movements and and engineered became chairman combined organization. Spanish Civil became chairman of of the the combined organization. During During the theSpanish Civil War, War, Car Carrillo rillo became became a a close close friend friend of of the the celebrated celebrated NKVD illegal, illegal, saboteur saboteur and and assassin assassin Iosif Iosif Grigulevich, whom whom he subsequently chose chose as as his his son's sons secular secular "godfather."30 g~dfather.~ Taking Grigulevich, he subsequently Taking refuge in Moscow Moscow in 1939after after Franco's Francos victory victory in in Spain, Spain, Carrillo Carrillo proved refuge in in 1939 proved his his StalinStalin ist orthodoxy by denouncing his own father, to whom whom he he wrote with self-righteous Between a Communist there fanaticism, "Between Communist and andaatraitor traitor there can be no relations of any kind. implausibly, "If If there was any kind." He later claimed, claimed, implausibly, any fear of Stalin in the the Soviet Union, Union, I did see it. did not not see it. For For many many years years only only a a minority minorityknew knew about about the the trials trials and and the the 1 purges."3 purges.31 After becoming general secretary of of the exiled PCE in 1959, however, Carrillo Mter 1959, however, n 1968 1968 the thePCE executive executive committee gradually evolved towards Eurocommunism. I In condemned Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia; Czechoslovakia; its leading Soviet Soviet loyalists, loyalists, Gbmez,Eduardo Garcia and General Enrique Agustin Gomez, Eduardo Garda Enrique Lister, wereexpelled expelled in 1969-70.32 In July 1975 1975 the the PCI PC1 and PCE jointly issued a "solemn solemn declaration that 1969-70.32 the march towards socialism in peace and freedom expresses expresses not their conception of the a tactical attitude but buta a conviction.After Franco's Francos death in inNovember, Car Cara strategic conviction." to plan the PCE's PCEs reemergence as a legal party. rillo began to party. Late in in 1976, 1976,without without informing Moscow, he returned secretly secretly to Spain from his French headquarters. On On the Centre sent theMadrid Madridresidency, residency, telling it to to December 66the Centre sent an urgent telegram to the investigate rumors that Carrillo was in Spain and, if so, find out out whether whetherhe hehad investigate so, to find the Christian Christian Demo Demoreturned on his own initiative or after a secret agreement with the Suire~.~~ crat prime minister, Adolfo Suarez.33 In fact Carrillo had returned returned in order to try try to toforce Suarez's Suirezs hand. On O n December 10 he gave a public news conference, conference, thus compelling the Prime Minister Minister to to decide 10 wrath of the army and the the right rightby legalizing the PCE or to to risk whether to risk the wrath alienating the main democratic parties by refusing to do do so. Though Carrillo was December22, he was set at liberty a few days later and met secretly with arrested on December Suarez. The formal legalization of the PCE followed in April April 1977.34 1977.34 Suarez.
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Just the PCI Just as as in in Italy, Italy, the the KGB's KGBs principal principal point point of of contact contact with with the PC1 was was with with a a Soviet loyalist, so the Madrid residency's main source within the PCE was the most Soviet loyalist,so the Madrid residencys main source within the PCE was the most pro-Soviet pro-Soviet member member of of its its executive executivecommittee, committee, Ignacio Ignacio Gallego, Gallego,codenamed codenamed KOBO. KOBO, Until 1976 Soviet Until March March 1976 Soviet subsidies subsidies to to the the PCE PCE had had been been forwarded forwarded via via the the French French Communist 1I84 of Communist Party, Party, the the PCE PCF.By By Politburo Politburo decision decision no. no. PP-1/84 of March March 16, 16,however, however, the the KGB KGB was was instructed instructed to to make make payments payments directly directlyto to Gallego. Gallego.At At least least some some of of these these payments than the the PCE payments were were intended intended for for Gallego Gallego himself, himself, rather rather than PCE executive executive as as a a whole, 1976 the so that that he hecould could "work workon on his his contacts." contacts.On O n December December 6, 6,1976 thePolitburo Politburo whole, so approved approved a a payment payment to to Gallego Gallego of of 20,000 20,000 dollars dollars (decision (decision no. no. P37/39-0P) P37/39-0P) for for the the purchase of a flat in Madrid. Though his public criticism of Carrillo was muted, the purchase of aflat in Madrid.Though his public criticism of Carrillo was muted, the Madrid Madrid residency residency reported reported that that in in private private Gallego Gallego was was bitterly bitterly critical, critical, denouncing denouncing him him as as "a a danger danger to to the the Spanish Spanish Communist Communist Party Partyand and the the international internationalCommunist Communist movement."35 mo~ernent.~~ Early the Madrid Madrid resi Early in in 1977, 1977, through through his his wife wife LORA, L O U , Gallego Gallego passed passed on on to to the residency dency Carrillo's Carrillos draft draft of of a a joint jointdeclaration declaration to to be be issued issued at at aasummit summitmeeting meeting of of the the leaders leaders of of the the PCE, PCE, PCI PC1 and and PCF, PCF, as as well well as as the the proofs proofs of of Carrillo's Carrillos forthcoming forthcoming " and y Estado .36 The book, book, ''Eurocomunismo'' Eurocomunismoy Estado ("Eurocommunism (Eurocommunism and the the State) State).36 The Centre Centre was was scandalized documents scandalizedby by the the criticisms criticismsin in both both documents of of the the Soviet SovietUnion-though, Union-though, in in the the event, event, Berlinguer Berlinguer and and Georges Georges Marchais, Marchais, general general secretary secretary of of the the PCF, PCF, rejected rejected the the most the Gallego informed most trenchant trenchant passages passagesof of the draft draftcommunique.37 c~mrnuniquk Gallego .~~ informed the the KGB KGB that that the the left-wing left-wing daily daily Pueblo PuebZo planned planned to to send send a a correspondent correspondent to to Moscow Moscow to to interview interview Soviet Soviet dissidents. dissidents.Thus Thus forewarned, forewarned, the the Madrid Madrid embassy embassy refused refused the the correspondent correspondent a a visa.38 visa.3s With With the the restoration restoration of of parliamentary parliamentary democracy democracy for for the the first first time time since since the the Spanish Spanish Civil CivilWar, War, the the PCE PCE was was widely widely expected-not expected-not least least by by Carrillo-to Carrillo-to achieve achieve as in in Spain as dominant dominant aaposition position on on the theleft left Spain as as the the PCI PC1had had in inItaly. Italy. Its Its socialist socialistrival, rival, the PSOE, had adapted itselfless well both to underground opposition to the auto the PSOE, had adapted itself less well both tounderground opposition to the autocratic maintainingparty party organization cratic Franco Franco regime regime and and to to maintaining organization during during almost almost forty forty years a years of of exile. exile. In In the the 35-year-old 35-year-old Felipe Felipe Gonzalez, Gonzilez, however, however, the the socialists socialists had had a dynamic, dynamic, telegenic telegenic leader leader whose whose youthful youthful appeal appeal to to voters voters was was far far more more effective effective than 977 than Carrillo's. Carrillos. During During the the campaign campaign for for the the parliamentary parliamentary elections elections of of June June 1 1977 the the PCE PCE also also found found it it more more difficult difficult than than the the PSOE PSOE to to free free itself itself of of an an extremist extremist image. image. To To Moscow's Moscows satisfaction, satisfaction, Carrillo's Carrillos Eurocommunist Eurocommunist campaign campaign was was at at least least mildly in May May of mildly disrupted disrupted by by the the return return from from the the Soviet Soviet Union Union in of the the 83-year-old 83-year-old president Carrillo had had succeeded president of of the the PCE, PCE, Dolores Dolores lbarruri, Ibirruri, whom whom Carrillo succeeded as as general general La Pasionaria ("passion secretary almost twenty years earlier. Known as flower), secretary almost twenty years earlier. Known as La Pasionaria (passion flower"), Ibarruri Ibirruri had had been been the the most most charismatic charismatic orator orator of of the the Civil Civil War, War, famous famous around around the the world world for for her her cries cries of of defiance defiance in in the theface face of of fascism: fascism: "Better Better to todie die on on your your feet feet than than live wife live on on your your knees!"; knees!; "Better Better to to be be the the widow widow of of aahero herothan thanthe the wife of of aa coward!" coward! Franco's supporters spread rumors that she had once cut a priest's throat with Francos supporters spread rumors that she had once cut a priests throat with her her own Though election own teeth.39 teeth.39 Though Ibarruri's Ibirruris appearances appearances during during the the1 977 1977 election campaign campaign were were limited limited by by her her age age and and weak weak heart, heart, she she lost lost no no opportunity opportunity to to praise praise the the achieve achievements ments of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc-"countries Bloc-countries where where socialism socialism is is being being built." built. Carrillo Carrillo tried tried to impact of and of her her speeches speeches by by implying implying that that she she was was out out of of touch touch and to dilute dilute the the impact

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bound bound to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union by by the the death death of of her her only only son son while while fighting fighting for for the the Red Red Army at Stalingrad. Army at Stalingrad. At At the the parliamentary parliamentary elections elections of of June June 1977, 1977, the the first first free free elections elections in in Spain Spain for for forty-one forty-one years, years, the the electorate electorate rejected rejected the the extremes extremes of of both both left left and and right. right. The The PCE PCE won won only only 9 9 percent percent of of the the vote, vote, as as compared compared with with the the34 34 percent percent of of Suarez's SuirezsUnion Union of of the Democratic Centre and the 28 percent of the socialists. Among the new Com the Democratic Centre and the 28 percent of the socialists. Among the new Communist munist deputies deputies was was Gallego, Gallego,who who became became deputy deputy chairman chairman of of the the PCE PCE parliamen parliamentary tary group. group. Believing Believing Carrillo's Carrillos position position to to be be much much weaker weaker than than Berlinguer's, Berlinguers, the the Kremlin Kremlin tried tried to to rally rally opposition opposition to to him him in in the the PCE. PCE. Shortly Shortly after after the the election, election, the the " Moscow Moscow New New Times Times published published a a vituperative vituperative review review of of Carrillo's Carrillos "Eurocommunism Eurocomnzunisnz and and the the State. State. Carrillo, Carrillo, it it declared, declared, might might appear appear to to be be talking talking simply simply about about differ differences ences in in tactics tactics and and strategy strategy between between different different Communist Communist Parties, Parties, but but his his real real views views were "exactly those The The CPSU were exactly those of of the the imperialist imperialist adversaries adversaries of of Communism."40 Comrn~nisrn.~~ CPSU International International Department Department drafted drafted an an attack attack on onCarrillo's Carrillosrevisionism, revisionism, then then arranged arranged for its publication under the signatures of three members of the PCE. A letter for its publication under the signatures of three members of the PCE. letter con containing a similar taining a similar attack, attack, signed signed by by 200 200 Spanish Spanish Communists, Communists, was was circulated circulated as as a a leaflet.41 leaflet.41 During 978 the public During 11978 the public controversy controversybetween between the the PCE PCE and and CPSU CPSU died died down. down. In In however, Carrillo was more critical than ever. According to a report from private, private, however, Carrillo was more critical than ever. According to a report from Gallego Soviet Gallego forwarded forwarded by by the the Madrid Madridresidency, residency,he he condemned condemnedthe the Soviet Union Union in inone one off-the-record "a semi-feudal off-the-record outburst outburst as as a semi-feudal state, state, dominated dominated by by a a privileged privileged bureau bureaucracy cracy which which is is cut cut off off from from the the people," people, with with a a far far less less democratic democratic way way of of life life than than the United States.42 After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, the United States.42After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979, Carrillo wrote to Carrillo made made some some of of his his criticisms criticisms public. public. In In January January 1980 1980he he wrote to the theCPSU CPSU Central Committeeattacking attacking the invasion Central Committee the invasion as as political political adventurism adventurism and and blaming blaming Soviet Though Soviet as as well well as as American American policy policy for for the the intensification intensification of of the the Cold ColdWarY War.43 Though some some local local Party Party organizations organizations supported supported Soviet Soviet intervention, intervention, Carrillo Carrillo was was backed backed by by a a majority majority of of the thePCE PCE executive. executive. Gallego, Gallego, meanwhile, meanwhile, continued continued to toreceive receive about about 30,000 The 30,000 dollars dollars a a year year from from the the KGB.44 KGB.44 The Madrid Madrid resident, resident, Viktor Viktor Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Filippov, ar as Filippov, reported reported that that though thoughGallego Gallego stuck stuck "as as f far as possible" possibleto to the thepolitical political line line recommended recommended by by the the residency, residency, there there was was little little he hecould could do do to togalvanize galvanize open open oppo opposition without isolating the executive. view, Carrillo sitionwithout isolating himself himself on onthe executive. In In Filippov's Filippovsview, Carrillo remained remained in in firm firm control control of of his his party.45 party.45In In reality, reality, torn torn between between Eurocommunists Eurocommunists and and hardliners, hardliners, and and with with the the Catalan CatalanCommunists Communistslosing losing faith faith in in Carrillo's Carrillos leader leadership, ship, the the PCE PCE had had begun begun to to disintegrate.46 di~integrate.~~ There also divisions divisionswithin within the thesocialists socialists as as Felipe Felipe Gonzalez Gonzdez tried tried to to turn turnthe the There were were also PSO E into congress reaffirmed PSOE into aasocial social democratic democratic party. party. Mter After aaparty party congress in in May May1979 1979 reaffirmed the E, Gonzalez the Marxist Marxist nature nature of of the the PSO PSOE, Gonzdez resigned, resigned, only only to to return return in intriumph triumphfour four months months later later when when an an extraordinary extraordinary party party congress congress recognized recognized the the non-Marxist non-Marxist as as well well as as Marxist Marxist "contributions contributions which which have have helped helped to to make make socialism socialism the the great great alter alternative native for for emancipation emancipation of of our our time." time. In I n the the 1982 1982parliamentary parliamentary elections elections the the PSOE PSOE won as prime prime minister, minister, the the socialists socialists dominated dominated won a a sweeping sweeping victory. victory. With With Gonzalez Gonzdezas Spanish Spanish politics politics for for the the next next decade. decade. Support Support for for the the PCE, PCE, meanwhile, meanwhile, was was dwin dwindling 10.5percent percent dling away. away. In In 1982 1982 it it gained gained only only 3.8 3.8 percent percent of of the the vote-down vote-down from from 10.5

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1979. Carrillo was forced forcedto toresign resign secretary, to be succeeded succeededby by Gerard0 in 1979. asas general secretary, Gerardo Iglesias. According to Gonzilez, Carrillo managed to accomplish in record time Iglesias. Gonzalez, "Carrillo doin forty years of of the dictatorship. He H e has dismembered the what Franco could not do Spain. Communist Party in Spain." placedmuch of the blame for the collapse collapse of PCE support on Car CarMoscow also placed rillo personally, though its analysis analysis differed from that of Gonzilez. Gonzalez. A book by the claimed that Carrillo's Carrillos Eurocommunism and rejec rejecTass journalist Anatoli Krasikov claimed of Marxism-Leninism Marxism-Leninism had led the Party into into "sharp sharp internal strife" strife and election of elec toral disaster: "Large of activists, prominent ones ones who toral disaster: Large numbers numbers of activists, including including very very prominent who had had Francoism and fought for the democratization of the thecountry, were struggled against Francoism country, were driven out of theIn Party."47 In a secret report preserved in KGB archives, archives,Boris Boris PonoPono marev, the head of the international department, declared early 1983 that there marev, early in 1983 was no prospect of a PCE revival so so long as Carrillo or his protkgks proteges retained influint1u ence in it.48 it4 1984 Moscow supported, and probably financed, the foundation by In January 1984 10s Pueblos de Espana. Espafia. Pravda Prawda wel welGallego of a breakaway Partido Comunista de los Gallegos denunciation of Eurocommunism and his announcement that the the comed Gallego's new party would be an "integral integral part of the international Communist m~vernent.~ part" movement.49 became more than a splinter party. In 1986 rump of of The PCPE, however, never became 1986 the rump the PCE merged with two two smaller left-wing left-wingparties parties to form the Izquierda Unida (United Left).
the main Eurocommunist parties in the mid-1970s was the PCF Communiste Frans:ais), Franqais), led led by byGeorges (Parti Communiste Georges Marchais, Marchais, who had previously made a reputation Stalinist. In 1957 he reputation as as an an uncompromising uncompromising Stalinist. In 1957 he shouted shouted angrily angrily at at a a Party Party purgesand the Soviet suppression suppression militant who dared to express doubts about Stalins Stalin's purges of they of the the Hungarian Hungarian Uprising: Uprising: "Yes, Yes, [the [the Soviets] Soviets] arrested arrestedpeople, people, they imprisoned imprisoned peo people! Well, I tell you they didn't didnt arrest enough! They didnt ple! didn't imprison enough! enough! If they wouldnt have got into the situation they had been tougher and more vigilant they wouldn't find themselves now!" Frans:ois Mitterrand once once complained, find themselves in in now! Franqois Mitterrand complained, "Insult Insult is is [Mar [Marchais's] saying hello."50 chaiss]way wayof of saying hello.50 consolidated his As Marchais consolidated hispower power in the the PCF as deputy general secretary in 1970 and and general general secretary secretary two two years years later, later,the the Centre Centre grew grew increasingly increasingly suspicious suspiciousof of 1970 him. his early early Soviet Sovietloyalism, loyalism, the KGB reported to the the Central Central Committee Committee him. Despite Despite his the reported to in to Marchais," he in March March 1976 1976 that, that, according according to to its its informants informants in in "circles circles close close to Marchais, he had had been gradually from been gradually moving movingaway away from "the the principles principles of of proletarian proletarianinternationalism" internationalism for for some KGBs chief informant on Eurocommunist tendencies inside some time. The KGB's inside the wasMarchaiss second-in-command, Gaston Gaston Plissonier, Plissonier, who who had had assisted PCF was Marchais's second-in-command, assisted Soviet fellow Soviet Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence operations operations since since at at least least the the early early 1950s.51 1 9 . 5 0 ~Like Like . ~ ~ his his fellow loyalists also the Moscow's loyalists in in Italy Italy and and in in Spain, Spain, Plissonnier Plissonnier was was also the main main conduit conduit for for Moscows subsidies to the the PCF.52 secret subsidies PCE 52 In June June 1972 1972 the alliance and and agreed agreed a "common pro In th.e PCF formed formed an an electoral electoral alliance a common program left-wing radicals. gram of of government" government with with the the socialists socialists and and left-wing radicals. A few few months months later, later, according to Marchais told including PlisPlisaccording to the theKGB, Marchais told his his closest closest associates associates(doubtless (doubtless including
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sonnier) 1968 and sonnier) that that he he condemned condemned both both the the invasion invasion of of Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia in in 1968 and the the continuing also continuing persecution persecution of of dissidents dissidents within within the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. Marchais Marchais was was also deeply deeply irritated irritated by by the the Kremlin's Kremlinsapparent apparent benevolence benevolencetowards towards France's Frances Gaullist Gaullist gov governments, ernments, which, which, he he claimed, claimed, "hampered hampered the the French French Communist Communist Party's Partysrevolution revolutionary ary struggle." struggle. Since Since President President de de Gaulle Gaulle had had withdrawn withdrawn France France from from the the integrated integrated NATO command in 1 966, Moscow had seen Gaullism as potentially a NATO command in 1966,Moscow had seen Gaullism as potentially a more more disrup disruptive a left-wing tive force force in in western western Europe Europe than than a left-wing French French government, government, even even one one which which included included Communists. Communists. Marchais Marchais tried tried to to persuade persuade the the Kremlin Kremlin that that its its assessment assessment was was mistaken. mistaken. In In 1972, 1972, doubtless doubtless intending intending his his warning warning to to be be passed passed on on to toMoscow, Moscow, he secretly threatened the East German leader, Erich Honecker: he secretly threatened the East Germanleader, Erich Honecker: If If the the Socialist Socialist countries countries [the [the Soviet Soviet Bloc] Bloc] do do not not take take account account of of the the French French Communist the French Communist Party's Partys warning warning that that the French government government is is shifting shifting towards towards Atlantic proper Atlantic [pro-American] [pro-American] positions, positions, and and if if they they do do not notgive give the the Party Partythe the proper assistance assistance in in the the struggle struggle to to overthrow overthrow the the regime, regime, they they would would be be faced facedwith with a a refusal rehsal by by the the French French Communist Communist Party Partyto to support support their theirpolicy, policy, as ashappened happened at at the . the time time of of the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak events events [in [in 1968] 19681. Publicly, Publicly, the the Kremlin Kremlin appeared appeared to to pay pay little little heed. heed. Before Before the the second second round round of of the the 1974 1974 French French presidential presidential elections, elections, the the Soviet Soviet ambassador ambassador called called on on the theneo-Gaullist neo-Gaullist candidate, candidate, Valery Valkry Giscard Giscard d'Estaing, dEstaing, apparently apparently implying implying that that Moscow Moscow favored favored his his election PCF support. 53 Behind the scenes, election rather rather than than that thatof of Mitterrand, Mitterrand, who whohad had PCF support.53Behind the scenes, however, secur however,the the KGB KGB was was engaged engaged in in active active measures measuresaimed-unsuccessfully-at aimed-unsuccessfully-at securing 54 ing Giscard's Giscards defeat. defeat.54 Hu At At the the beginning beginning of of 1976 1976 Marchais Marchais privately privately rebuked rebuked the the PCF PCF newspaper, newspaper, L' LHumanift!, for failing to send a correspondent to meet the exiled Russian dissident, manit4 for failing to send a correspondent to meet the exiled Russian dissident, Leonid a Leonid Plyushch, Plyushch, on on his his arrival arrival in in Paris Paris after after being being freed freed from from incarceration incarceration in in a Soviet interpreted Marchais's Soviet mental mental hospital. hospital. The The Centre Centre interpreted Marchaiss gradual gradual move move towards towards Eurocommunism Eurocommunism less less in in terms terms of of ideological ideologicalevolution evolution than than personal personal ambition. ambition. Even Even Berlinguer Berlinguer was was reported reported by by the the KGB KGB as as criticizing criticizing Marchais Marchais for for his his narrow narrow national nationalism to the the Romanian ism and and comparing comparing him him to Romanian autocrat autocrat Nicola Nicola Ceauescu. Ceaugescu. The The Centre Centre concluded 55 concluded that that Marchais Marchais would would stop stop at at nothing nothingto tosatisfy satisfy his his personal personal vanity. vanity. The The KGB KGB reported reported to to the the Central Central Committee Committee that that it it was was not not until until the the Twenty Twentysecond second Congress Congress of of the the PCF PCF in in February February 1976 1976 that thatMarchais Marchais felt felt sufficiently sufficiently confi confiof support for his increasingly heretical views within the Party hierarchy to dent dent of support for his increasingly heretical views within the Party hierarchy to dare dare to is sonnier. 56 The The congress to express expressthem them openly, openly,despite despite the the opposition opposition of of PI Pli~sonnier.~ congress adopted adopted an an ambitious ambitious Eurocommunist Eurocommunist agenda. agenda. Marchais Marchais took took the thelead lead in in rejecting rejecting the the tradi traditional the proletariat," tional aim aim of of a a "dictatorship dictatorship of of the proletariat, in in criticizing criticizing the the "limitations limitations on on democracy" democracy in in the theSoviet Soviet Bloc Bloc and and in in committing committing the thePCF PCF to to "a a democratic democratic road road to to socialism" which would "foster the free expression of many trends of thought." To socialism which would foster the free expression of many trends of thought. To scandalized the PCF, scandalized Soviet Soviet loyalists loyalists within withinthe PCF, the the new new Eurocommunist Eurocommunist platform platform ,, seemed 57 Over seemed to to "legalize legalizecounter-revolution. counter-revolution.7 Over the thenext next eighteen eighteen months months the theCPSU CPSU Central angry Central Committee Committee sent sentthree three angry letters letters to to the the PCF PCF complaining complaining about about its its poli policies.58 the scenes cies.* Behind Behind the scenes the the KGB KGB accompanied accompanied such such irate irate correspondence correspondence with with

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measures. Among them them was operation YEVROPA, begun in 1977 1977 and active measures. operation YEVROPA, and based on on forged forged CIA documents documents which which purported purported to toreveal reveal an an American American plot plot to todestroy destroy the the unity of ofthe the PCF.The The Centre Centre hoped hoped that that YEVROPA YEVROPAwould would set set some some of of the the Central Central unity PCF. he was playing into the the Committee against Marchais, presumably by implying that he hands of the CIA.59 CIA. 59 The The KGB, however, however, had had misjudged misjudged the the strength strength of of Marchais's Marchaiss ideological ideological devia deviations. The PCF's PCFs Eurocommunist flirtation had been part of the price it had hadpaid for alliance with the socialists. socialists. The flirtation ended 1977 after it the alliance ended in the summer sUlIlmer of 1977 became Communists as the largest party on on the the became clear that, instead of confirming the Communists them being socialists. In September 1977 French left, it had led to them being overtaken by the the socialists. September 1977 the left-wing alliance collapsed collapsed amid mutual recriminations. Thereafter Marchais increasingly uncritical and the the PCF Central Committee Committee gradually returned to an increasingly Soviet In October 1978 Centre cancelled Soviet loyalism.60 loyalism.60 In October 1978the the Centre cancelled an an active active measure measure devised devised by by the Paris residency to drive a wedge between the PCF and PCI, PCI, probably because it necessary6 was no longer considered necessary.61 The tothe the Central Committee in March The KGB report report on on Marchais Marchais submitted submitted to Central Committee in March 1976 reported that he he had hadhanging hanging over him him the the exposure exposure of his his war war record.62 record.62Mar1976 reported that over Mar chais claimed in 1970 that thathe hehad had been chais had had claimed in 1970 been "requisitioned" requisitioned in in December December 1942 1942 to to work German factory Lipheim building work in in a a German factory at at Lipheim building Messerschmitt Messerschmitt fighter fighter aircraft, aircraft, but but had The had escaped escaped in in January January 1943 1943 and and returned returned to to France.63 France.63 The Centre, Centre, however, however, claimed claimed to know know "from from reliable reliable sources" sourcesthat that the the French French authorities authorities had had documents documents showing showing to that, being forced signed a that, far far from from being forced to to work work in in Germany, Germany, he he had had signed a voluntary voluntary contract contract a job Lipheim. in1976 1976 it for ajob atat Lipheim. The KGB report on Marchais was so hostile that in it may well have contemplated using his war record to discredit him, just as it hoped to use well have contemplated using his war record to discredit him, just as it hoped to use Berlinguer's allegedly shady is Berlinguersallegedly shady building building contracts contracts to to destroy destroy his his reputation.64 r e p ~ t a t i o n .It ~~ is I t however, theKGB did anything to bring to tolight light a document, which unclear, however, whether the a document, which was was published published in in 1977 1977by by Auguste Auguste Lecoeur, Lecoeur, a a former former member member of of the the PCF Politburo, Politburo, Marchais had Minute, showing showing that that Marchais had voluntarily voluntarily accepted accepted and the right-wing right-wing weekly Minute, the Messerschmitt factory. factory. Marchais claimed that the the document document work in the was forged openingof the trial and brought aalibel suit against both Lecoeur and Minute. At the opening in tears. H He lost both case and libel suit suit in September September 1977 1977 he heburst burst into into tears. e lost both that that case and another another libel Express published German docu in In March in the the following following year. year. In March 1980 1980 L' LExpress published a a wartime wartime German document appeared gone voluntarily ment which which appeared to to show show not not merely merely that that Marchais Marchais had had gone voluntarily to to work work in had stayed On in Germany Germany but butthat thathe he had stayed there there until until 1944. 1944. O n this this occasion occasion Marchais Marchais did did not maintained his improb not sue sue but but maintained his innocence, innocence, declaring declaring that that he hewas was the the victim victim of of an an improbable presidential elections: "That able plot plot by by his his rivals rivals in in the the 1981 1981 presidential elections: That is is why, why,at at the theorigin origin of of this this calumny, calumny, there there have have been been successively successively discovered discovered close close collaborators collaborators of of Giscard Giscard d'Estaing, dEstaing, of of Chirac, Chirac, and and of of Frans:ois FranGois Mitterrand."65 Mitterrand.65 The PCF entered The a mood entered the the 1980s 1980s in in a mood of of unswerving unswerving loyalty loyalty to to Moscow. Moscow. No other CommunistParty Party matched which other leader leader of of a a major major Western Western Communist matched the the zeal zeal with with which Soviet invasion Marchais defended the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Two years later greeted the and the declaration sycophanticallygreeted the outlawing outlawing of of Solidarity Solidarity and the declaration later the the PCF sycophantically triumph for the Polish Communist of a state of emergency in Poland as a "triumph" Communist Party. At the same time, steep electoral 1981 presipresithe same time, however, however, the the PCF was was in in steep electoral decline. decline. In In the the 1981

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dential election election Marchais Marchais gained gained only only 15 15 percent percent of of the the vote-easily vote-easily the the Party's Partys worst worst dential result since the In 1986 even more result since the Second Second World World War. War. In 1986 the the PCF P C F vote vote fell fell even more precipi precipitously, tously, to to 6.8 6.8 percent, percent, in in the the parliamentary parliamentary elections.66 elections.66

brought sea change CPSU's relations brought a a sea change in in the the CPSUs relations with with foreign foreign Communist most faithful Communist Parties. Parties. The The PCF and and Moscow's Moscows other other most faithful Western Western followers followers were outraged to longer appreciated. were increasingly increasingly outraged to discover discover that that their their loyalism loyalism was wasno no longer appreciated. Gorbachev himself himself appeared appeared far far more more interested interested in in imaginative imaginative heresy heresy than than in in intel intelGorbachev orthodoxy. Eurocommunism seemed to have conquered the Krem Kremlectually sclerotic sclerotic orthodoxy. lin. As head of the CPSU delegation to Berlinguer's Berlinguers funeral in June June1984, 1984, Gorbachev grief by a million and a half half was deeply impressed by the spontaneous outpouring of grief Romes Piazza San Giovanni.67 G i ~ v a n n iOne . ~ ~ of of the first signs of his mourners crowded into Rome's new thinking" thinking when he became CPSU general secretary in March March1985 1985 ((new was the fact that the the only European Communist Communist leader included in his meetings with world Chernenkos funeral was Berlinguers statesmen after Chernenko's Berlinguer's successor, successor, Alessandro Natta. visibly shocked. How could it be, he asked his colleagues colleagues in the theinter interPonomarev was visibly shocked. goodCom Comnational department, that despite the presence presence of so many leaders of ((good" hadbestowed his favor instead on the thegeneral munist Parties in Moscow, Gorbachev had bad PCI?@ secretary of the ((bad" PCI?68 fiveyears PC1 leaders, leaders, Overthe the next five years Gorbachev repeatedly conferred with PCI new thinking" thinking on praised their policies and used them as sounding boards for his ((new East-West relations.69 relation^.^^ In Spain Gorbachev showed far less social democracy and East-West 0 than in thetattered tattered PCE7 inthe the interest in the remnants of the PCE7 ruling Socialist Party. GorGor bachevs press secretary, secretary,Andrei Grachev, Grachev, once asked him which foreign politician he bachev's felt closest to. Gorbachev's Gorbachevs reply Gonzilez. According to reply was was unhesitating: Felipe Gonzalez. 1 Grachev, Gorbachev ((did did not just justappreciate (Felipe,' Felipe,he loved him."7 him.71 Grachev, f" the affronted on secret Soviet subsidies, however, however, persuaded some ofthe Dependence on Soviet subsidies, some o swallow their pride. In June 1987, 1987, Marchais hardline foreign Communist leaders to swallow sent a groveling message to Gorbachev Gorbachevconveying his deepest gratitude for meeting ((deepest gratitude" in May Mayand asking for Uemergency emergency financial aid" aid of 10 (1.65 milhim in 10 million francs (1 .65 mil dollars) to prepare for the 1988 1988presidential elections.72 elections.72 thatthe the lion dollars) Noting that PCF had agreed to already received 2 million dollars during 1987, the Politburo none the less agreed KGB.73 supply another million via the KGB.73 thehardline leader of the ever-faithful CPUSA, CPUSA, Gorbachev's Gorbachevs ((new new For Gus Hall, the thinking end. Goaded Goaded for the first time in his career into thinking" proved too much in the end. Moscow, he launched 1aunch.ed a public attack on Gorbachev's Gorbachevs open disagreement with Moscow, 1989,only for his secret Soviet subsidies subsidies to be abruptly cut off off. The impact reforms in 1989, on the CPUSA was devastating. devastating. Plunged into an immediate financial crisis, it was 1990 first to cut the the publication of the Party newspaper, the People? DaiZy People's Daily forced in 1990 World, from five to two days a week, then to turn turn it it into intoa weekly.74 weekly7 Armando Cos CosWorld, sutta spoke for many traditional Moscow loyalists in Western Communist Communist Parties he declared his disgust after the failure failure of the August 1991 1991 Moscow coup that when he the term (Communism' Communismis now a dirty word even in the the land of Lenin. Lenin.75 ((the "75
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oviet "dissidents" (Decem Soviet dissidentsmade made their their first first public public appearance appearance on on Constitution ConstitutionDay Day (December group of ber 5) 5) 1965, 1965, when when a a group of about about two two hundred hundred organized organized a a demonstration demonstration in in Pushkin support of Pushkin Square, Square, Moscow, Moscow, in in support of the the authors authors Andrei Andrei Sinyavsky Sinyavsky and and Yuli Yuli Daniel, Daniel, who who were were shortly shortly to to go go on on trial trial accused accused of of attempting attempting to to subvert subvert the the Soviet Soviet system the demonstrators system through through their their writings. writings. Some Some of of the demonstrators briefly briefly succeeded succeeded in in unfurling an Open unfurling banners banners reading reading "Respect Respect the the Constitution!" Constitution! and and "We We Demand Demand an Open Trial Trial for for Sinyavsky Sinyavskyand and Daniel!", Daniel!, before before being being frogmarched frogmarched to to the the police police station station by by plain plain clothes clothes members members of of the the KGB. KGB. Henceforth Henceforth the theterm term used used tp to describe describe democratic democratic and the Soviet and human human rights rights activists activists in in the Soviet Union Union was was the the English English word word "dissidents" dissidents as rather rather than than its its Russian Russian equivalent equivalent inakomysliashchii-probably inakomysliashchii~robably as part part of of an an official official attempt attempt to to portray portray such such people people as as stooges stooges of of the the West West rather rather than than as as the the authentic authentic voice 1 voice of of Russian Russian protest. protest. The KGB had been The KGB had been unusually unusually slow slow to to track track the the two two writers writers down. down. Sinyavsky, Sinyavsky, using begun West, ini using the the pseudonym pseudonym ''Abram AbramTertz," Tertz,had had begun publishing publishing his his work work in in the the West, initially tially in in Paris, Paris, in in 1959. 1959.His His friend friend Daniel, Daniel, employing employing the the alias alias "Nikolai NikolaiArzhak," Arzhak, had had followed analysis of "Tertz" and followed suit suit in in 1961. 1961. After After extensive extensive analysis of the the publications publications of of Tertz and ''Arzhak'' by Soviet writers and literary critics who were KGB agents and co-optees, Arzhak bySoviet writers and literary critics who were KGB agents and co-optees, opinion the Centre Centre was their real opinion in in the was divided divided on on their real identity. identity. One One school school of of thought thought claimed theintimate intimate knowledge claimed that that the knowledge of of Moscow Moscow life life displayed displayed by by both both authors authors showed andhad had smuggled showed that that they they were were living living in in the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and smuggled their their work work abroad abroad for for publication. publication. This This view view was was supported supported by by the the Paris Paris residency, residency, which which for forwarded (Sud Id yot), warded a a report report that that the the manuscript manuscript for for "Tertz's" Tertzsbook, book, The The Trial TrialBegins Begins (SudIdyot), had Centre sided had reached reached France France from from Moscow. Moscow. Other: Others within withinthe the Centre sided with with literary literary ana analysts in lysts who who argued argued that that "inaccuracies" inaccuracies in the theauthors' authorsdepiction depiction of of Moscow Moscow life life showed showed that and that they they were were living living in in the theWest, West, and cited cited other other (mistaken) (mistaken) KGB KGB reports reports that that both both "Tertz" and ''Arzhak'' were living in western Europe.2 The KGB was further confused Tertz and Arzhakwere living in western Europe.2The KGB was further confused by a aJewish Jewish pseudonym, pseudonym, thus thus giving giving rise rise to to the themistaken mistaken by the the fact fact that that Sinyavsky Sinyavskyused used belief was belief that that he he was Jewish Jewish himself himself.The The official official Soviet Soviet press press later later denounced denounced the the choice choice of of pseudonym pseudonym as as "a asqualid squalid provocation." provocation.According According to to aawriter writer in in Izvestia: Izvestia: By By publishing publishing anti-Soviet anti-Soviet tales tales under under the the name name of of Abram Abram Ter,tz T e r p in in foreign foreign pub publications, antilications, Sinyavsky Sinyavsky was was attempting attempting to to create create the the impression impression that that anti-

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Semitism Semitism exists exists in in our our country country and and that that a a writer writer with with a a name name such such as as A1;>ram Abram Tertz publishers in the West "frankly" about Tertz has has to to seek seek publishers in the West if if he he wants wants to to write write frankly about Soviet Soviet life.3 life.3 After fruitless After several several years' years fruitless surveillance surveillance of of the the wrong wrong writers, writers, a a KGB agent agent in in the the Moscow 1964 that an Moscow literary literary world, world, codenamed codenanled YEFIMOV, YEFIMOV, reported reported early early in in 1964 that an author named author named Yuli Yuli Daniel Daniel was was in in possession possession of of "anti-Soviet anti-Soviet material." material. Simultane Simultaneously that Daniel Daniel ously the the KGB in in Yalta Yalta sent sent a a report report from from another another agent agent who who claimed claimed that had imprison had the the manuscript manuscript of of "a a story story for for which which he he could could be be given given fifteen fifteen years' years imprisonment." The 1964 ment. The surveillance surveillance of of Daniel Daniel quickly quickly led led the the KGB to to Sinyavsky. Sinyavsky. In In May May 1964 the Centre began operation EPIGONI to to obtain obtain proof proof that that Sinyavsky Sinyavsky and and Daniel Daniel the Centre began operation EPIGONI of the anti-Soviet volumes published in the were the authors of the "anti-Soviet" theWest, West,to to discover where manuscripts and nd out where they they kept kept their their manuscripts and fi find out how how they they smuggled smuggled them them out out of of the the Sinyavskys employer, employer, the Gorky Institute of Soviet Soviet Union. The KGB arranged for Sinyavsky's World Literature, to send him on on a a business business trip away from Moscow. During his absence it conducted a detailed search of his flat and installed bugging devices. absence Daniels apartment proved to be more difficult. difficult. His two twoSearching and bugging Daniel's room flat with shared kitchen at 85 85Leninsky Prospekt was reported to be "constantly constantly family, a friend and a dog." dog. Eventually, Eventually, a KGB officer, officer, posing as the occupied by his family, the flat, taking wax impressions impressions of the relative of a neighbor, neighbor, succeeded in staying in the keys and and creating an opportunity opportunity for for a a detailed search.4 keys creating an detailed search.4 a year for operation EPIGONI to achieve achieve significant significant results. Though It took over a Sinyavskys fi first smugthe KGB lacked proof, it correctly concluded concluded that Sinyavsky's rst attempts to smug the West had been assisted by HClane Zamoyska, the daughter of a for forgle his work to the West had assisted by Helane Zamoyska, mer French naval attachC, attache, whom he had hadmet met while she was studying at Moscow University5 In the summer of 1965 1965 the theKGB intercepted a letter to Sinyavsky, signed University.5 Alfredabut giving no return address, address, inviting him to tomeet her at the the Hotel ''Alfreda'' Hotel Bucharest Moscow. Having discovered that ''Alfreda'' Alfredawas was Alfreda Aucouturier, Aucouturier, a friend of in Moscow. HCclane Zamoyska, Sinyavsky in the the act of handing over a Heclane Zamoyska, the KGB hoped to catch Sinyavsky Sinyavskyand Daniel were both placed under 24-hour surveillance surveillance manuscript to her. Sinyavsky group was formed to catch Madame Aucouturier red redand a special "special operational group" handed. Despite bugging a visit made by Madame Aucouturier to Sinyavskys flat and Sinyavsky's filming fi lming a later meeting between them near the Rechnoy Vokzal metro station, the group failed to detect any manuscript being handed over. It was disappointed again searched Madame Aucouturier's Aucouturiers luggage luggageat the theRusso-Polish frontier on Sep Sepwhen it searched failed to produce results. The KGB's KGBs unsuccess unsuccess8.6 A long interrogation also failed tember 8.6 ful attempts to to persuade Aucouturier to admit admit that that"Tertz's" Tertzsreal real name was Sinyavsky Sinyavsky ful evidence was wasagainst him.7 him.7 merely made her realize realize how thin their evidence Shortly after after Madame Madame Aucouturier Aucouturier was was allowed to leave leave Russia, Russia, Sinyavsky Sinyavsky and and Shortly allowed to Daniel were arrested and taken to Lefortovo prison in Moscow. Under interrogation West, but but both confessed that they had published works under pseudonyms in the West, denied that they were anti-Soviet. They alsorefused thatMadame refused toadmit admit that Madame Zamoyska Zamoyska had had smuggled smuggled their their manuscripts manuscripts out out of of Russia. Russia. According According to to surveillance surveillance

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reports . had been been suspicious suspicious of all new new reports before before their their arrest, arrest, Sinyavsky Sinyavsky and and Daniel Daniel had of all acquaintances, sensibly sensibly fearing fearing that that they they might might be acquaintances, be KGB agents. agents. In In Lefortovo Lefortovo prison, prison, however, KGB 's repertoire. repertoire. A however, Sinyavsky Sinyavskyfell fell for for one one of of the the oldest oldest deceptions deceptions in in the the KGBs stoolpigeon codenamed codenamed MIKHAILOV (probably (probably the illegal Geli Geli Fyodorovich Fyodorovich Vasi Vasistoolpigeon the illegal lyev)8 was introduced gaining his Before lyev) was introduced into into his his cell cell and and succeeded succeeded in in gaining his confidence. confidence. Before MIKHAILOVs "release" releasein November, November, Sinyavsky Sinyavsky asked asked him to MIKHAILOV's to pass on on a a series of of signs to communicate signs and and passwords passwords to to his his wife wife to to enable enable her her to communicate secretly secretly with with him him dur during of Sinyavskayas Sinyavskaya's ing prison prison visits. visits. MIKHAILOV's MIKHAILOVs information information and and surveillance surveillance of describes as "invalu invalumeetings with her her husband provided what what the the EPIGONI file describes able material relating important of these contacts contacts able material relating to to Sinyavsky's Sinyavskys contacts." contacts. The The most most important of these was Literature.9 was Andrei Andrei Remizov, Remizov, head head librarian librarian at at the theMoscow Moscow Library Library of of Foreign Foreign Literature. Remizov Remizov confessed confessed during during interrogation interrogation that, that, under under the the pseudonym pseudonym "Ivanov," Ivanov,he he Mars? and essay American ''American had had published published in in the the West West the the play play Is I s There T h r e life I@ on Mars? and the the essay Conscience, which had appeared in Encounter magazine magazine in in Pangs of the Russian Russian Conscience," 1964. He H e also admitted that, 1964.10 that,during during a visit to France, France, he he had had delivered delivered one of of Sinyavsky's seems to planned Sinyavskys manuscripts manuscripts to to Helene H d h e ZamoyskaY Zamoyska. The The KGB seems to have have planned originally to to put Remizov on on trial trial with with Sinyavsky and Daniel. originally put Remizov Sinyavsky and Daniel. When When Remizov Remizov however, the plan changed. It was became suicidal, suicidal, however, was decided decided instead instead to to use use Remizov Remizov Sinyavsky and Daniel. His own case was primarily as a prosecution witness against Sinyavsky case was treated separately separately and he was placed placedunder 24-hour suicide watch. To prevent further contact with the thewives of Sinyavsky Sinyavskyand Daniel, who who not were trying to persuade him not evidence,Remizov was sent onofficial business businessby by the Ministryof to to give evidence, sent on the Ministry of Culture to Kursk and Tula, where he remained on suicide suicide watch until the trial. Surveillance Surveillance of Daniels wife wife showed a dossier of material Daniel's showed that she was collecting a dossier of material for publication publication in in Westbefore the trial. successfully planted the West trial. The KGB successfully planted on her an an illegal illegal posing posing as as a a to the theWest Westbut but sympathetic Western businessman who delivered the the dossier dossier not not to toto the the KGBY KGB.12 Though many Soviet writers had been persecuted for unorthodox opinions withwith out due due legal legal process, process,Sinyavsky Sinyavsky and Daniel Daniel were ontrial out and were the the first first to to be be put put on trial simply simply for for what was officially one, with what they they had had written. written. The The trial trial in in February February 1966 1966 was officially a a public public one, with New York Tribune both As the both defendants defendants being being granted granted their their "full full rights." rights. As the New York Herald Herald Tribune observed, "These These rights rights included included the the right right to to be by a hand-picked audiobserved, be laughed laughed at at by a hand-picked audi only the side of the case case ence ence of of 70 persons persons .. .. .. [and] [and] the the right right to to have have only the prosecution prosecution side of the reported access to to the the open "open" trial trial because because reported in in some some detail detail to to those those who who cannot cannot claim claim access they The The stage-managed spoiled by the they have have no no passes."13 passe~.~ stage-managed proceedings proceedings were, were, however, however, spoiled by the the traditions traditions failure of of the the defendants defendants to to play play the the roles roles allotted allotted to them. Against Against all the failure to them. of Daniel rehsed refused either either to guilt or or to of Soviet Soviet show show trials, trials, Sinyavsky Sinyavsky and and Daniel to admit admit guilt to show show contrition. contrition. Despite the thesycophantic audience, audience, the prosecution was visibly visiblydisconcerted by the courageous and articulate defendants. Sinyavsky exposed the elementary conhsion confusion in courageous and articulate defendants. Sinyavsky exposed the elementary in a prosecution prosecution case which identified identified the opinions opinions of of fictional characters characters with those those of of their authors. H He to of his his flat flat before before he he was inter their authors. e was was also alsoable able to refer refer to to the the bugging bugging of was interin mid-sentence.14 mid-~entence.~ rupted in TheThe state prosecutor, undeterred either by his own mental

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confusion conhsion or or by by his his uncertain uncertain grasp grasp of of the the law,15 law, concluded concluded with with an an absurdly absurdly melo melodramatic "They pour dramatic denunciation denunciation of of the the two two authors' authors work: work They pour mud mud on on whatever whatever is is most holy, most holy, most most pure-love, pure-love, friendship, friendship, motherhood. motherhood. Their Their women women are are either either mon monsters bitches. Their debauched." But sters or or bitches. Their men men are are debauched. But the themost most serious serious crime crime committed committed by by Sinyavsky Sinyavsky and and Daniel Danielwas was that that of of ideological ideological subversion: subversion: The The social social danger danger of of their their work, work, of of what what they they have have done, done, is is particularly particularly acute acute at at this this time, time, when when ideological ideological warfare warfare is is being being stepped stepped up, up, when when the theentire entire propa propaganda ganda machine machine ofinternational of international reaction, reaction, connected connected as as it it is is with with the theintelligence intelligence services, is being brought contaminate our services, is being brought into into play play to to contaminate our youth youth with with the the poison poison of by hook of nihilism, nihilism, to to get get its its tentacles tentacles into into our our intellectual intellectual circles circles by hook or or by by 16 crook crook .. .. ..I6 Sinyavsky Sinyavskywas wassentenced sentenced to to seven seven years years in in a alabor labor camp, camp, Daniel Daniel to to five. five. The cial transcript sign of The promised promised offi official transcript of of the the trial trial never never appeared-a appeared-a sure sure sign of the the weakness of of the the prosecution prosecution case. case. An An unofficial unofficial transcript, transcript, however, however, assembled assembled by by weakness supporters of the the West. supporters of the defendants, defendants, was was published published in in the West. To To penetrate penetrate the the dissi dissidents who had come in support of Daniel, the Centre dents who had come together together in support of Sinyavsky Sinyavsky and and Daniel, the Centre selected illegals in their late late twenties, Anatoli Andreyevich Andreyevich Tonkonog selected two two illegals in their twenties, Anatoli Tonkonog (code (codenamed named TANOV) TANOV) and and his his wife wife Yelena Yelena Timofeyevna Timofeyevna Fyodorova Fyodorova (TANOVA). (TANOVA). Tonkonog reported that the sale of of the the transcripts transcripts of the trial trial of of Sinyavsky Sinyavsky and and Tonkonog reported that the sale of the Daniel had Daniel in inthe theWest West had been been organized organized by by an an entrepreneurial entrepreneurial KGB agent, agent, Nikolai Nikolai Vasilyevich Dyakonov Dyakonov (codenamed GOGOL), who who had worked for for the the Novosti Novosti Vasilyevich (codenamed GOGOL), had worked Press the United UnitedStates and other otherWestern Westerncountries. countries. According Press Agency in the States and According to one one ofTonkonog's of Tonkonogs informants, informants, Dyakonov Dyakonovwas was "a areal real wheeler-dealer" wheeler-dealer who who dealt dealt in infor foreign currency and sold Russian abstract paintings and unpublished literary literary works to to Western WesternbuyersY buyers. the KGB evidently considered that the theprosecution of Dyakonov Dyakonov would Though the long investigation it put put on on trial in January January 1968 1968 four be too embarrassing, after a long had compiled the transcript transcript and andother other documents concerning young dissidents who had documents Sinyavsky and Daniel: Aleksandr Ginzburg, Yuri Galanskov, Galanskov, Alexei the trial of Sinyavsky andGalanskov had for forsome years taken Dobrovolsky and Vera Lashkova. Lashkova. Ginzburg and leading roles in the the production production of samizdat journals. Their trial proceeded in much Sinyavsky and Daniel. The courtroom audience was, the same same manner as that of Sinyavsky once again, picked by the KGB and the the defense was prevented from calling most of of Ginzburg and Galanskov, Galanskov, again refused its witnesses. The two principal defendants, Ginzburg to the the success success of their own show trial and were sentenced to fi five to contribute to ve and respectively. Emboldened by the courage of the defen defenseven years in labor camp respectively. Daniels wife, Larisa Bogoraz, and a dants and the the interest interest of the Western media, Daniel's Pave1 Litvinov, Litvinov, issued an impassioned denunciation of ofthe theconduct conduct fellow dissident, Pavel that itit broadof the trial to foreign correspondents, with aarequest "that be published and broad 1 8 Tonkonog later reported that the possible.18 the small demon demoncast by radio as soon as possible." 1968 strationin in Red Square inAugust August 1968 against Soviet military interventionin in O n this occasion Litvinov Czechoslovakia was also also organized by Larisa Bogoraz. On

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and other dissidents tenof of them joined her when and other dissidents tried tried to to dissuade dissuade her, her, but but ten them joined her when sheshe insisted on going ahead. The KGB inevitably broke up the demonstration and insisted on going ahead. The inevitably broke up the demonstration and arrested arrested the the demonstrators.19 demonstrators.19
FA R T H E writer FAR writer who who most most concerned concerned the the Soviet Soviet authorities, authorities, Aleksandr Aleksandr 20 had Solzhenitsyn, (Spider) by by the the KGB, KGB,20 had escaped escaped arrest. arrest. Solzhenitsyn, codenamed codenamed PAUK ("Spider") Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn had had been been saved savedin in part partby by his his celebrity. celebrity.The The labor labor camp camp novel novel One Day Day in the Life Life of o f Ivan Denisovich, Denisovich, which which changed changed him him almost almost overnight overnight from from an an obscure obscure provincial a world-renowned provincial teacher teacher of of mathematics mathematics and and physics physics into into a world-renowned author, author, had had been personal been published published in in 1962 1962 with withthe the personal blessing blessing of of Khrushchev. Khrushchev. During During a asweep sweep of of Moscow dissidents dissidents shordy shortly after after the the arrest arrest of of Sinyavsky Sinyavsky and and Daniel Daniel in in September September Moscow 1965, 1965, the the KGB had had discovered discovered and and confiscated confiscated manuscripts manuscripts which which Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn had had left left for for safekeeping safekeeping at at the thehome home of of a a friend. friend. The The KGB reported reported to to the the Central CentralCom Committee mittee that that the the manuscripts manuscripts provided provided proof proof that that "Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsynindulges indulges in in politically politically damaging damaging statements statements and and disseminates disseminates slanderous slanderousfabrications." fabrications.Both Both the theKGB KGB chair chairman, man, Vladimir Vladimir Semichastny, Semichastny, and and the the Public Public Prosecutor, Prosecutor, Roman Roman Rudenko, Rudenko, were, were, how however, ever, uncertain uncertain how how to to proceed proceed against against such such a a celebrated celebrated writer, writer, and and simply simply referred referred Solzhenitsyns manuscripts manuscripts to to the theWriters' Writers Union, Union, which which did did not not supply supply the the denunci denunciSolzhenitsyn's ation ation expected expected of ofit it for for another another eighteen eighteen months. months. By By the the time time the the Central CentralCommittee Committee considered the the matter matter in in March March 1967, 1967, Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn had had sent sent his his latest latest novel, novel, Cancer considered Cancer and Archipelago, his epic study W ard, to Ward to the theWest West and had had almost almost finished finished The Gulag GdagArch$eZago, his epic study of of the the labor Central Committee, Committee,the the initiative labor camps. camps. Within Within the the Central initiative in in calling calling for for "decisive decisive measures" measures to to deal deal with with Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns "anti-Soviet anti-Soviet activities" activities came came from from Andropov, Andropov, 1 who who succeeded succeeded Semichastny Semichastny as as KGB KGB chairman chairman in in the the summer summer of of 1967.2 1967.21 For For the the remaining remaining seventeen seventeen years years of of his his life, life, Andropov Andropov remained remained the the dissidents' dissidents most most determined determined opponent opponent within within the theSoviet Soviet leadership. leadership. First-hand First-hand involvement involvement in in crushing Hungarian uprising, crushing the theHungarian uprising, reinforced reinforced by by second-hand second-hand experience experience of of the the Prague rst year of Prague Spring Spring during duringhis his fi first year as as KGB chairman, chairman, convinced convinced him him that thatone one of the the chief chief threats threats to to the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc was wasWestern-sponsored Western-sponsored ideological ideological subversion: subversion: T HUS HUS

The The enemy enemy gives gives direct direct and and indirect indirect support support to to counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary elements, elements, engages engages in in ideological ideological sabotage, sabotage,establishes establishes all sorts sorts of of anti-Socialist, anti-Socialist, anti-Soviet anti-Soviet and and other other hostile hostile organizations organizations and and seeks seeks to to fan fan the the flames flames of of nationalism. nationalism. Graphic Graphic confirmation confirmation of of this this is is provided provided by by the the events events in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia .. .. .. 22 22 In In the the wake wake of of the the Prague Prague Spring, Spring, Andropov Andropov set set up up aanew new KGB KGB Fifth Fifth Directorate Directorate to to monitor departments within monitor and and crack crack down down on on dissent dissent in in all all its its forms. forms. Specialized Specialized departments within the intellectuals, students, students, nation the directorate directorate were were responsible responsible for for the the surveillance surveillance of of intellectuals, nationalists alists from from ethnic ethnic minorities, minorities, religious religious believers believersand and Jews.23 Jews.23 Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn increasingly increasingly became became one one of of Andropov's Andropovs personal personal obsessions. obsessions. The The announcement announcement in in October October 1970 1970 that that the the great great subversive subversive had had won won the the Nobel Nobel Prize Prize for for Literature Literature prompted prompted the the KGB chairman chairman to to submit submit to to the thePolitburo Politburo a a memoran memorandum, dum, also also signed signed by by Rudenko, Rudenko, enclosing enclosing a a draft draftdecree decree to to deprive deprive Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn of of his his citizenship citizenship and and expel expel him him from from the the Soviet Soviet Union: Union:

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When When analyzing analyzing the the materials materials on on Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn and and his his works, works, one one cannot cannot fail fail to conclusion that to arrive arrive at at the the conclusion that we we are are dealing dealing with with a a political political opponent opponent of of the the Soviet system .. .. .. If continues to reside in the Soviet state state and and social social system If Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn continues to reside in the country after Nobel Prize, strengthen his and country after receiving receiving the the Nobel Prize, it it will will strengthen his position, position, and allow allow him him to to propagandize propagandize his his views views more more actively.24 actively.24 Andropov, Andropov, however, however, did did not not persuade persuade a a majority majority of of the the Politburo. Politburo. Brezhnev Brezhnev showed showed more more sympathy sympathy for for the the contrary contrary views views of of his his crony, crony, Nikolai Nikolai Shchelokov, Shchelokov, the the interior interior minister, the autumn autumn of of1971 1971 that that Solzhenitsyn needed to minister, who who argued argued in in the Solzhenitsyn needed to be be won won over, higher-ups needs needs to over, not not persecuted: persecuted: "One One of of the thehigher-ups to sit sitdown down and and talk talk with with him, him, to to remove the taste that remove the bitter bitter taste that persecution persecution has, has, no no doubt, doubt, left left in in his his mouth." mouth. Brezhnev Brezhnev underlined-apparently series of comments in a memorandum memorandum by underlined-apparently approvingly-a approvingly-a series of comments in a by Shchelokov been anathema Shchelokov which which must must have have been anathema to to Andropov: Andropov: In Solzhenitsyn question question we past mistakes In resolving resolving the the Solzhenitsyn we must must analyze analyze past mistakes made made in in dealing with with people people in in the the arts arts .. .. .. The The "Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn Problem" Problemwas was created created by by dealing literary administrators who should have known better .. .. . . In this case what needs to to be be done is not not to to execute execute our our enemies enemies publicly publicly but but smother smotherthem them with needs done is with 25 embraces. embraces.25 Henceforth man. Mter Henceforth Shchelokov, Shchelokov, so so far far as as Andropov Andropov was was concerned, concerned, was was a a marked marked man. After Brezhnevs death he he was charged by Andropov with with corruption but committed sui suiBrezhnev's cide before going on trial.26 cide before going ontrial.26 autumn of of 1971, however, however, Andropov knew better than In the autumn than to attack openly opinions But he not prepared In March March 1972 opinions approved approved by by Brezhnev. Brezhnev. But he was was not prepared to to give give up. up. In 1972 Andropov to persuade persuade the Andropov made made a a further hrther attempt attempt to the Politburo Politburo to to expel expel Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn from Union, providing was delib from the the Soviet Soviet Union, providing further further "indisputable" indisputable evidence evidence that that "he he was delibthepath path theSoviet government erately and irrevocably embarked on the of struggle with the government and will will wage wage this this struggle struggle regardless regardless of of everything." everything.Though agreeing that that Solzhen Solzhenand Though agreeing itsyn was was a true degenerate," degenerate, the the Politburo-doubtless Politburo-doubtless to to Andropov's Andropovs extreme extreme dis disitsyn "a true pleasure-was still not willing to send him into into exile.27 exile.27 pleasure-was
who most obsessed Andropov Andropov from from the the early early 1970s 1970s O TH E ER R DISSI DENT T who most obsessed Sakharov, codenamed onwards was the nuclear physicist and Academician Andrei Sakharov, ASKET (''Ascetic'') (Ascetic) by by the the KGB, "father" father of of the the Soviet Soviet H-bomb H-bomb and and three three times times Hero of of Socialist Socialist Labor. Labor. Though Though out out of of favor favor with with the scientific establishment, establishment, he he Hero the scientific retained retained an an official official dacha dacha in in Zhukovka Zhukovka as as well well as as his his flat flat in in Moscow. Moscow. Late Late in in 1970, 1970, Sakharov and and two two fellow fellow physicists, physicists, Valeri Valeri Chalidze Chalidze and Andrei Tverdokhlebov, Sakharov and Andrei Tverdokhlebov, Committeefor Human Rights and persuaded Solzhenitsyn to become a founded the Committee corresponding member.28 Sakharovs corresponding (though not not very active) active) member.28 Like Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov's international stature made it difficult for the KGB to persecute him as freely as less makesthe absurd claim that Sakharov "used used his well-known dissidents. His KGB file makes decisions of the judiciary and create a hullabaloo around authority to influence the decisions elements such as Vladimir Bukovsky, Bukovsky, put on on trial in January the trials of anti-social elements"
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1972 evidence about of himself himself and and other other dissidents dissidents to 1972 for for compiling compiling evidence about the the committal committal of to mental The complaint was that Sakharov Sakharov and and his his was that mental hospitals.29 hospitals.29 The real real burden burden of of the the KGB complaint committee modest success success in the abuse abuse committee had had some some modest in limiting, limiting, though though not not in in preventing, preventing, the of of the the legal legal process. process. In October October 1972 37-year-old illegal illegal Georgi Georgi Ivanovich In 1972 the the 37-year-old Ivanovich Kotlyar, Kotlyar, codenamed codenamed BERTRAND, BERTRFIND, succeeded succeeded in in winning winning Sakharov's Sakharovs confidence confidence and and establishing establishing what what the with him his wife wife Elena Bonner. the Centre Centre considered considered a a "trusted trustedrelationship" relationship with him and and his Elena Bonner. Kotlyar passing himself Kotlyar had had been been born born in in France France and and succeeded succeeded in in passing himself off off as as one one "Alain Alain Boucaut," a had been been working the past past Boucaut, a French French archaeologist archaeologist who who had working in in Mexico Mexico for for the decade. His success success in in maintaining maintaining his his cover cover and providing intelligence Sakharov decade. His and providing intelligence on on Sakharov Bobkov, head of and Bonner won him high praise from both Filipp Denisovich Bobkov, of the 0 Attempts were also deputy, Nikashin.3 Nika~hin.~ also made to plant Fifth Directorate, and his deputy, agents on Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn, among them the the pianist Miroka Kokornaya (transparently onconcert tours abroad. A KGB opera operacodenamed MIROKA), who regularly went on tion in in 1973 1973to to persuade Solzhenitsyn to use MIROKA as a courier to the theWest West failed.31 failed.31 1973 the theKGB at last succeeded in staging what it considered a In the summer of 1973 successhl successful show trial, during which the defendants incriminated themselves themselves in the best Stalinist tradition, and other dissidents were duly demoralized. The victims of of this traditional travesty of Soviet justice were Pyotr Yakir and Viktor Krasin, leading Chronicle of Current Current Events. Events. members of the group group which produced the samizdat Chronicle was duringthe the Great Terror, and had hadspent spent Yakir was the son of an army commander shot during Great of his arrest in June 1972, 1972, he was known by much of his life in prison. At the time of other heavily. After other dissidents dissidents to to be be close close to to breaking breaking point point and and drinking drinkingheavily. After the the trial trial of of Bukovsky, the the KGB had had overheard overheard him him saying, saying, I cant take take it it any any more. more. I couldn't couldnt Bukovsky, "I can't face another sentence strength." Before arrest, Yakir face another sentence myself-I myself-I haven't havent the the strength. Before his his arrest, Yakir circu circulated jail should dis lated a a statement statementsaying saying that that any any confession confession extracted extracted from from him him in injail should be be disregarded.32 found regarded.32Though Though exhausted exhausted by by many many years years of of persecution, persecution, Yakir Yakir somehow somehow found the resist his interrogation before finally finally break the strength strengthto to resist during during the theearly early stages stages of of his interrogation before breaking pressure. In In the chief interinter ing under under prolonged prolonged pressure. the brutally brutally triumphant triumphant words words of of his his chief the contents contentsof rogator, He "He began to assess assess his actions and the of the anti-Soviet literature which distributed fairly correctly." Yakir finally which he he had had distributed fairly objectively objectively and and politically politically correctly. Yakirwas was finally persuaded confession: persuaded to to put put his his signature signature to to a aformulaic formulaic KGB-dictated KGB-dictated confession: In In the the course course of ofthe the investigation, investigation, I have have come come to to understand understand that that I committed committed a defamatory content content a whole whole series series of of criminal criminal acts: acts: I have have signed signed letters letters with with a a defamatory which sentenced for have which asserted asserted that that in inour our country country people people are are sentenced for their their beliefs; beliefs; I have given interviews to correspondents which which contained given a a number number of of interviews to foreign foreign correspondents contained slan slanderous of similar similar con derous assertions; assertions; I kept, kept, duplicated duplicated and and distributed distributed documents documents of content; correspondents frequently passed passed tendentious tendentious information information to to foreign foreign correspondents tent; and and I frequently who used this who used this for for propaganda propaganda purposes. purposes. Having done, I sincerely repent. Not Having grasped grasped the the seriousness seriousness of of what what I have have done, sincerely repent. Not only influence only will will I not not do dothis this again again in in the thefuture, hture, but but I shall shall do do my my utmost utmost to toinfluence people of their their positions.33 positions.33 people who who are are close closeto to me me and and to to demonstrate demonstrate the the error error of

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The The breaking breaking of of Krasin Krasin under under interrogation interrogation caused caused much much greater greater surprise surprise in in dissi dissident that of [Krasin] stood dent circles circles than than that of Yakir. Yakir. According According to to his his KGB KGB file, file, " [Krasin] stood out out because Soviet because of of the theparticularly particularly hostile hostile attitude attitude to tothe the Sovietsystem system which which he he had had adopted adopted in in his his youth, youth, his his stubbornness stubbornness and and consistency consistency in in his his work, work, and and his his readiness readiness to to see see things throughto to the end, regardless things through the end, regardless of of the the obstacles." obstacles.?He He was was co-author co-author of of the the samizdat samizdat Legal Legal Instructions, Instructions, which which advised advised all all those those summoned summoned for for interrogation interrogation by by the the KGB to to refuse refuse to to answer answer questions. questions. On O n seven seven occasions occasionsbetween between 1968 1968 and and 1972 1972 when when he hehimself himself had had been been questioned questioned by by the the KGB, KGB, Krasin Krasin had had faithfully faithfully followed followed his his own own advice. advice. After After prolonged prolonged surveillance, surveillance, however, however, the the Fifth Fifth Directorate Directorate concluded concluded that that a a "polite polite and and calm" calminterrogation interrogation with with i'absolutely absolutelyno no sneering," sneering, combined combined with with a a sympathetic sympathetic stoolpigeon stoolpigeon in in his his cell, cell, would would eventually eventually wear wear down down his his resistance. resistance. Krasin Krasin was was known known to to be be willing willing to to disagree disagreewith with other otherdissidents, dissidents, and and during during 1971-2 1971-2 had had become become increasingly increasingly despondent despondent about about their their prospects. prospects.There There were, were, he he said, said, "few few defenders at the final barricades."34 defenders at the final barricade^."^^ As As expected, expected, Krasin Krasin began began his his lengthy lengthy interrogation interrogation in in defiant defiant mood. mood. When When his his interrogator, interrogator, Lieutenant-Colonel Lieutenant-Colonel Pavel Pave1 Aleksandrovsky, Aleksandrovsky, asked, asked, "Why Why do do you you refuse rehse to to say say what what you you have have been been doing doing if if you you do do not not consider consider it it criminal?" criminal? Krasin Krasin replied, replied, "I do not consider it criminal, but you do. Therefore, if I were to tell you, I would I do notconsider it criminal, but you do. Therefore, if were to tell you, would be be giving giving you you incriminating incriminating material material which which I do do not not want want to to do." do. The The first first breach breach in in Krasin's Krasins defenses defenses was was made made by by the the KGB KGB agent agent in in his his cell, cell,who who pretended pretended that that he hehad had been been arrested arrested for for dealing dealing in in foreign foreign currency currency and and appealed appealed for for Krasin's Krasins advice adviceon on how how to not to to answer to face face the the charges charges against against him. him. Instead Instead of of simply simply telling telling him him not answer ques questions, how to to frame tions, Krasin Krasin showed showed him him how frame the the best best defense defense during during his his interrogation. interrogation. Full Full of of praise praise for for Krasin's Krasins knowledge knowledge of of the the criminal criminal code, code, the the stoolpigeon stoolpigeon then then urged urged him him to to follow follow his his own own advice advice and and challenge challenge the the charges charges against against him: him: You clever. Fancy You are are very very clever. Fancy knowing knowing the the law law so so well! well! You You can can stand stand up up to to any any interrogator. trick you interrogator. It It would would be be impossible impossible to to trick you or or frighten frighten you! you! If If you you can can prove helping prove that that what whatyou you did did was was not not criminal, criminal, then then you you will willbe be helping your your friends friends who who are are still still free! free! Krasin's previous political Krasins KGB KGB cellmate cellmate claimed claimed to to have have been been converted converted from from his his previous political skepticism skepticism to to Krasin's Krasins dissident dissident opinions, opinions, and and gradually gradually persuaded persuaded him him that that by by stand standup for for those those views views during during his his interrogation interrogation he he would would be be continuing continuing his his fight fight for for ing up Russian of the Russian democracy. democracy. According According to to the the absurdly absurdly stilted stilted language language of the interrogation interrogation report, "The The agent agent also also introduced introduced the the beauty beauty of of nature nature and and the the signifi significance of art art and and report, cance of literature literature into into their their conversations. conversations. This This rekindled rekindled Krasin's Krasins love love of of life life and and made made him him forget forget his his bitter bitter disenchantment." disenchantment. Rumors Rumors fed fed to to him him that that Yakir Yakir was was now now talking talking to to his interrogator interrogator seem seem finally to have persuaded persuaded Krasin to take his cellmate's cellmates advice. advice. his The idea idea that Yakir was giving full full, detailed evidence," evidence,? declared inter, true and detailed declared his inter "The rogator "hung rogator Aleksandrovsky Aleksandrovsky dramatically, dramatically, hung over over him him like like the the sword sword of ofDamocles."35 Dam~cles.~~ Krasin's Krasins early early replies replies to to Aleksandrovsky's Aleksandrovskysquestions questions were were extremely extremely cautious. cautious. Ini Initially attempted to subvert tially he he limited limited himself himself to to refuting refuting alleged alleged evidence evidence that that he hehad had attempted subvert to Soviet power, power, refusing rehsing to to answer answer anything he he considered a leading quesor weaken Soviet

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tion. tion. He H e prepared prepared written written answers answers to to those those questions questions he he accepted, accepted, sometimes sometimes prepar preparand correcting several drafts before handing one of them to his interrogator. ing ing andcorrecting several drafts before handing oneof them tohis interrogator. This This laborious laborious procedure procedure continued continued for for two two months, months, during duringwhich which Krasin Krasin provided provided what what the the KGB KGB considered considered "only onlyworthless worthless information." information. Like Like all all good good interrogators, interrogators, how however, ever,Aleksandrovsky Aleksandrovskywas was patient. patient. "The The importance importance of of these these first first interrogations," interrogations,he he believed, "was that they enabled psychological contact to be established." believed, wasthat they enabled psychological contact to be established. The Krasin The first first sign sign of of a a breakthrough breakthrough came came on on September September 27, 27, 1972. 1972. As As usual usual Krasin insisted insisted that, that, "The Theaccusation accusation against against me me is is monstrous. monstrous. 1 I cannot cannot do do what what is is against against my 1 I cannot cannot admit admitthat that I am am guilty guilty of of something something that that1 I have have not not done doneor or my conscience. conscience. 1 repent repent of of crimes crimes which which have have not not been been committed." committed. But, But, for for the the first first time, time, he he seemed seemed "1 announced, to end. to accept acceptthat that his his career career as as a a dissident dissidentwas was at at an an end. Iwill will not," not,he he announced, "carry carry on main on with with my my work." work. Krasin Krasin added added that that he he did did not not believe believe Aleksandrovsky's Aleksandrovskys main aim aim was was to to sentence sentence him him to to another another term term in in a a labor labor camp. camp. Henceforth Henceforth the the scope scope of of the the interrogation interrogation was was broadened. broadened. Each Each day dayAleksandrovsky Aleksandrovskyallowed allowed Krasin Krasinto to choose choose the the subject subject for for discussion discussionbut but tried, tried, when when the the opportunity opportunityarose, arose, to to develop develop their their conver conversation sation in in ways ways which which showed showed the the hopelessness hopelessness of of his his position position and and of of the the dissident dissident cause. cause. While While discussing discussing the the fight fightagainst against counter-revolution counter-revolution in in the theDzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky era, era, Aleksandrovsky Aleksandrovskymentioned mentioned the the case case of of the the arch arch anti-Bolshevik anti-Bolshevik Boris Boris Savinkov, Savinkov,who who had had been been lured lured back back to to Russia Russia in in August August 1924. 1924. Krasin's Krasins KGB KGB cellmate cellmatewas was primed primed to to raise howlong long Savinkov's raise the the question question of of how Savinkovs interrogation interrogation had had lasted. lasted. The The answer, answer, which which Krasin Krasin doubtless doubtless discovered discovered from from a a book book lent lent him him by by his his interrogator, interrogator, was was that that after after only only nine nine days days Savinkov Savinkov publicly publicly renounced renounced his his "bloody bloody struggle" struggle against against the the Bolshevik Bolshevikregime regime and and declared declared that that he heunconditionally unconditionally recognized recognized the the Soviet Soviet state.36 state.36 When When Krasin Krasin asked askedhim him why why Savinkov Savinkov had had recanted, recanted, Aleksandrovsky Aleksandrovskyreplied replied that that he he had had seen seen the the hopelessness hopelessness of of his his situation, situation, realized realized that that his his struggle struggle against against Soviet Soviet power power was wasdoomed doomed to to failure failure and and understood understood that that his his actions actions were were against against the the inter interests of the Russian people. ests of the Russian people. Whenever Whenever Krasin Krasin expressed expressed interest interest in in a a subject subject during during interrogation, interrogation, Aleksan Aleksandrovsky drovskywould would try try to tofind find him him relevant relevant books books and and articles articles which which would would have have a a "posi positive tive influence" influence on on him. him. He H e was was thought thought to to be be particularly particularly impressed impressed by by the the stirring stirring account ar of account by by the the British British journalist journalist Alexander Alexander Werth Werth in in his his book book Russia Russia at at W War of the the endurance Patriotic endurance and and triumph triumph of of the the Soviet Soviet people people during during the theGreat Great Patriotic War. War. On O n one one occasion of occasion Krasin Krasin was was even evengiven givencopies copies of the the banned banned periodical periodical Posev, Posew, published published by by the the emigre 6migr6 NTS NTS (social (social democrat democrat organization), organization), which which contained contained articles articles by by himself himself and to and Yakir. Yakir. Krasin Krasin was wasseen seen to rub rub his his hands hands with with anticipation anticipation as as he he opened opened the the pages pages of of the the periodical. periodical. After After a a time, time, he he put putthe thecopies copies of of Posev Posev down down in in disgust, disgust, declaring declaring that so primitive primitive that it it was was "White White Guard Guarddrivel" drivel and and that that he hehad had never never read read "anything anything so and and bereft bereft of of ideas." ideas. From From his his reading reading of of the the file, file, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin suspected suspected that that Krasin Krasin had had been been given given fabricated fabricated copies copies of of the the periodical periodical specially specially designed designed to to arouse arouse his his indignation. indignation. Krasin's who Krasins separation separation from from his his wife, wife, Yemelkina, Yemelkina, who was was banished banished into into internal internalexile exile at used to at Yesineysk, Yesineysk,was wasalso also used to increase increase the the emotional emotional pressure pressure on on him. him. Alexandrovsky Alexandrovsky noted noted cynically, cynically, "Krasin Krasin loved loved his his wife wife greatly greatly and and was was ready ready to to do do anything anything for for her her sake." sake.On O n visiting visiting Yemelkina Yemelkina at at Yesineysk, Yesineysk, he he found found that that she she too too was was desperate desperate to to be be

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reunited reunited with with her her husband. husband. Probably Probably as as a a condition condition of of being being allowed allowed to to visit visit Krasin, Krasin, anti-Soviet literature." literature. After an Yemelkina agreed to reveal where she had hidden "anti-Soviet ,emotional 1973, Krasin Krasin gave Aleksandrovsky the the 'emotional reunion reunion with his wife in January 1973, gave Aleksandrovsky locations hiding places places containing allegedly subversive subversiveforeign foreign publica publicalocations of of four four hiding containing sixty allegedly tions 140 microfilms Fur tions and and 140 microfilms (totaling (totaling 5,000 frames) frames) of of other other "anti-Soviet anti-Soviet texts."37 texts.37Further pressure on Krasin his mother relatives ther pressure on Krasin was was exerted exerted during during visits visits from from his mother and and other otherrelatives and and friends, friends, all of of whom whom had had been been expertly expertly intimidated intimidated by by the the KGB.38 KGB.38 Even agreed to against him, however, Even after after Krasin Krasin had had agreed to plead plead guilty guilty to to the the charges charges against him, however, he refused for for almost almost two months months to to incriminate incriminate his friends. Step Step by by step step Aleksan Aleksanhe refused his friends. drovsky his resistance. First, talk about drovsky overcame overcame his resistance. First, Krasin Krasin agreed agreedto to talk about dissidents dissidents who who had had already left Moscow Moscow and and already confessed, confessed, then then about about foreign foreign correspondents correspondents who who had had left Soviet put it, "beyond the Soviet emigres CmigrCs in in the theUSA and and Israel Israel who who were, were, as as he he put it,beyond the reach reach of of the the KGB." identified people people who, said, had notcommitted committed any criminal KGB. Next Next he he identified who, he he said, had not any criminal offense but had merely read "anti-Soviet anti-Soviet literature" literature and had had been foroffense been present present when for Then, almost almost eign given the eign correspondents correspondents were weregiven the Chronicle of o f Current Events. Events. Then, overnight, remained of resistance to his overnight, what what remained of Krasin's basins resistance to informing informingon on his fellow fellow dissidents dissidents collapsed. a document over a collapsed. He H e spent spent ten ten days days writing writing by by hand hand a document of of over a hundred hundred pages pages setting out the evidence setting out the evidence against against dissidents, dissidents, identifying identifying sixty sixty of of them them and and giving giving details of previously unknown unknown to details of numerous numerous incidents incidents previously to the the Fifth FifthDirectorate-among Directorate-among theorigins of the Chronicle of afCurrent Ewents. To a triumphant triumphantAleksandrovsky Aleksandrovsky Current Events. them the it seemed seemed as as though though Krasin was"unburdening unburdening himself of a a great great weight." weight. it Krasin was himself of Aleksandrovskys prompting, Krasin then spent At Aleksandrovsky's spent two months composing an Yakirs flat in appeal to his fellow dissidents which was read aloud at a meeting in Yakir's April 1973 1973 and, and, according according to to a a KGB report, report, "made made a a strong strong impact." impact. "We We started started by by April thatthe the observed,declared Krasin, "but but ended up break breakdemanding that laws should be observed," them.We forgot the basic truth that that we are are citizens of the USSR and are bound ing them. bound to respect and dissidents named to respect and keep keep the the laws laws of of our our state." state. Fifty-seven Fifty-seven dissidents named by by Krasin Krasin suband Yakir were summoned summoned for interrogation by the Moscow KGB. Some Some were sub jected to emotional emotional confrontations confrontations with with Krasin Krasin and and Yakir, Yakir, who who appealed appealed to to them them to to jected to end the end the dissident dissident campaign. campaign. According According to to KGB records, records, forty-two forty-two capitulated. capitulated. Another Another eight eight"vacillated vacillated in in evaluating evaluating their their activities" activitiesbut but "gave gave assurances assurancesthat that they they would not not commit any anti-social acts in in future." future. Only Only seven seven remained remained completely completely would commit any anti-social acts officialcautions and put under underoperational surveillance. unrepentant; all were given official "operational surveillance." 1973 totalof 154 154 people associated with the thedissident movement were cau cauDuring 1973 a total tioned by by the the Moscow Moscow KGB, eighty eighty of of them them "for for possessing, possessing, writing and and distributing distributing tioned writing conduct. ideologically harmful material and for anti-social and politically harmful conduct." 27,1973. Solzhenitsyn The trial ofYakir and Krasin opened in Moscow on August 27, 1973. Solzhenitsyn inadvance advance as "a adismal repetition of the clumsy Stalin-Vyshinsky Stalin-Vyshinskyfarces:" farces: dismissed it in
farces, despite the primitive stagecraft, the smeared 1930s .. .. .. these farces, In the 1930s success with grease-paint, the loudness of the prompter, were still a great success thinking people among Western intellectuals . . . But if no [foreign] corre"thinking people" intellectuals . . . [foreign] corre spondents are to be admitted to to the thetrial, it means that it ithas been pitched two still. grades lower still.

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however,invited to a KGB press conference Western correspondents were, however, conference at which The Yakir paraded their in front of television cameras. 39 The Yakir and and Krasin Krasin paraded their guilt guilt and and remorse remorse in frontof television cameras.39 so remarkable that some dissidents sustransformation of Krasin seemed seemed so dissidents wrongly sus pected agent all all along.40 along.40 pected he he had had been been a a KGB agent Centre, the the show trial was regarded as a triumph. triumph. Basking in the the approval In the Centre, their superiors, the case officers of Yakir and Krasin wrote a self-congratulatory of their case officers explaining how the "the article inthe the classified in-house quarterly, KGB Sbornik, explaining detailed tactics worked out for the interrogation of the accused accused" and the the deeply "deeply thought-out cultivation within the cell by well-trained stoolpigeons had thought-out the [prison] cell" combined to "determine determine the the positive results which were obtained at the hearing of of the the case."41 case.41
S O LZ H E N I T S Y N , however, still remained remained beyond SA AK KHA H AR RO OV V AND S SOLZHENITSYN, however, still beyond the the punitive punitive arm arm wasin progress of the KGB. While the trial ofYakir and Krasin Krasin was progress they raised raised the the stakes stakes their campaign by publicly criticizing the concessions made by the United United States in their States Soviet Union in in the the name of East-West East-West detente. On O n September 17 to the Soviet 17 Sakharov addressed public appeal appeal to asking it support the Jackson-Vanik Congress, asking it to tosupport the Jackson-Vanik addressed a a public to the the US Congress, amendment opposing most-favored nation status the USSR until it ended ended restricrestric amendment opposing most-favored nation status for for the until it tions on emigration:

internal affairsof The amendment does not represent interference inthe the internal affairs of socialist of international socialist countries, countries, but but simply simply a a defense defense of international law, law, without without which which 2 trust.4z there can be no mutual trust.4 Sakharovsletter, printed in capital letters in the Washington W ashington Post, Post, was was credited credited with Sakharov's in the persuading Congress pass the amendment, despite despite the the opposition opposition of persuading Congress to to pass the amendment, of the the Nixon Nixon administration. The denounced Sakha fury. Brezhnev Brezhnev absurdly absurdly denounced SakhaThe Politburo Politburo reacted reacted with with predictable predictable fury. rovs letter as "not not just just an anti-State anti-State and anti-Soviet deed, but a rov's a Trotskyist deed. deed." he declared, declared, tolerated the behavior of They had, he of Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov for for far far too long: "We stopped them now a a full (voting) (voting) too long: We should should have have stopped them right right away." away. Andropov, Andropov, now member of the the Politburo, Politburo, sought sought to to maintain collective outrage outrage of his colleagues member of maintain the the collective of his colleagues Sakharov, he declared, by a series series of slanted intelligence reports. Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov, declared, their services services to reactionary imperialist, had stepped "stepped up the peddling of their imperialist, and particpartic ularly Zionist, Zionist, circles, circles," and were being being manipulated by, or actually colluding colluding with, Western intelligence intelligence agencies. O n February February 7, 1974 Western agencies. On Andropov submitted submitted to to the 1974 Andropov the further draft draftdecree decree to deprive deprive Solzhenitsyn of Politburo a further of his citizenship and expel him Union. Simultaneously, sent an an alarmist alarmist personal personal letter letter to him from from the the Soviet Soviet Union. Simultaneously, he he sent to Brezhnev, implying implying that that there there would would be be serious Party and Brezhnev, serious discontent discontent among among senior senior Party and Military Military figures figures unless unlessthe the decree decree was was approved: approved:

.. .. .. I think not to relations, think it itimpossible, impossible, despite despite our our desire desire not to harm harminternational international relations, to longer, because it could could to delay delay the the solution solution of of the the Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn problem problem any any longer, because it have unpleasant consequences for us inside the country. have extremely extremely unpleasant consequences for us inside the country.

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This On This time time the theKGB KGB pressure pressure on on Brezhnev Brezhnev and and his his colleagues colleagues was wassuccessful. successful. O n Feb February ruary 11 11the the Politburo Politburo formally formally approved approved "the the proposals proposals of of Comrade Comrade Andropov."43 Andr~pov.~~ Three ight to Three days days later, later, Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn was was forcibly forciblyput put on onboard board an an Aeroflot Aeroflot fl flight to Frank Frankfurt by KGB officers. As the plane took off, he crossed himself and bowed the furt by KGB officers. the plane took off, he crossed himself and bowed to to the homeland homeland he he might might never never see seeagain.44 again.44 From where From Frankfurt Frankfurt Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn moved moved on on to toZurich, Zurich, where he he rented rented a a house house in in the the city easier for city center. center. Paradoxically Paradoxically it it was was easier for the the KGB to to penetrate penetrate his his entourage entourage in in Switzerland Switzerland than than in inRussia. Russia. Abroad, Abroad, among amongstrangers, strangers, Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn found found it it far far more more difficult at home home to to distinguish difficult than than at distinguish friend friend from from foe. foe. The The KGB was was quick quick to to take take advantage advantage of of his his sympathy sympathy for for the the survivors survivors of of the the Prague Prague Spring Spring by by using using StB StB agents agents in Czech emigre in the the Czech CmigrC community community to to win win his his confidence. confidence. The The first first to to do do so so was was the the Russian-born the Russian-born StB StB officer officer Valentina Valentina Holubova.45 H o l u b o ~ a .Though Though ~~ the files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin do not not record rst meeting Mitrokhin do record her her fi first meeting with with Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn, she she seems seems to to have have arrived arrived on on his his doorstep doorstep on on his his first first day day in in Zurich, Zurich,claiming claiming to to be be from from Ryazan Ryazan (where (where he he had had been been a a schoolteacher) schoolteacher) and and bearing bearing a a bouquet bouquet of of roses roses and and lilac. lilac. She She gave gave him him a an a note notecontaining containing an old old Ryazan Ryazan proverb proverb and and said said the the lilac lilac was wasto to remind remind him him of of the the lilac Within weeks, at lilac that that bloomed bloomed in in Ryazan Ryazan each each spring.46 spring.46 Within a a few few weeks, at most, most, Holubova Holubova and and her her husband, husband, Dr. Dr. Frantisek FrantiSek Holub Holub (also (also an an StB StB agent), agent), had had succeeded succeeded in in ensconcing Valentina ensconcing themselves themselves as as Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsynsunofficial unofficial advisers advisers in in Zurich, Zurich,with with Valentina also also acting acting as as his his part-time part-time secretary secretary and and spokeswoman.47 ~pokeswoman.~~ In Solzhenitsyn In March March 1974 1974the the Holubs Holubstook took Solzhenitsyn to to see see an an exhibition exhibition of of paintings paintings by by the the artist artist Lucia Lucia Radova Radova at at a a gallery gallery in in the the village village of of Pfuffikon, Pfliffikon, not not far far from from Zurich, Zurich, owned owned by by the the Czech Czech emigre CmigrC Oskar Oskar Krause. Krause. When When Krause Krause told told him him that that he he too toohad had been been a a political political prisoner, prisoner, imprisoned imprisoned in in Czech Czechjails, jails, Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn embraced embraced him him and and burst burst into into tears. tears. The The Holubs Holubs then then introduced introduced him him to to the theyoung young Czech Czech writer writer Tomas TomaS R ezac (codenamed cer who RezBE (codenamed REPO), REPO), like like themselves themselves an an StB StB offi officer who had had penetrated penetrated the the emigre CmigrC community community posing posing as as a a dissident. dissident. Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn later later agreed agreed that that Dr. Dr. Holub Holub should should edit edit the thework work of of the the seven seven translators translators producing producing a a Czech Czechedition edition of of The The Gulag Gdag R Archipelago, while ezac would translate the long narrative poem, Prussian Nights, ArchipeZag-0, while RezaE would translate the long narrative poem, Prussian Nkhts, which which Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn had had written written in inprison prison in in 1949.48 1949.4* Solzhenitsyn a long Solzhenitsyn thus thus became became the the latest latest in in a long line line of of leading leading Soviet Soviet emigrees, CmigrCes, stretching Guard and stretching back back to to the the inter-war inter-war White White Guard and Trotskyist Trotskyist leaders, leaders, who who unwit unwittingly their most most trusted The tingly included included Soviet Soviet agents agents among among their trusted advisers.49 advisers.49 The thought thought of of R Holub ezac translating Holub and and RezhE translating the the works works of of the the great great heretic heretic was was bound bound to to give give the the Centre Centre some some pause pause for for thought. thought. But But
I t was deemed to be operationally justified for REPO REPO to translate all Solzhen SolzhenIt itsyns materials, without declining to translate various anti-Soviet texts or or itsyn's materials, various attempting to tone tone them them down, might otherwise Solzhenitsyn's attempting to down, since since he he might otherwise lose lose Solzhenitsyns confidence and the texts would in any case case be be translated by someone else. else. confidence Because of the importance of the PAUK (Solzhenitsyn) (Solzhenitsyn) case, case, REPO's REPOs instructions Because were personally drawn up up, doubtless in consultation with the KGB, KGB, by the head of , doubtless StB foreign intelligence, intelligence, Hladik, and his deputy deputy, Dovin. StB , Dovin.50

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Holubs and andR Rezit monitor SolzhenitIntelligence from the Holubs ezac allowed the KGB to monitor Solzhenit syns contacts with supporters inside the Soviet Union as well as his activities activities in the the syn's thePolitburo Poiitburo on May May2: West. Andropov reported to the 2: [Solzhenitsyn] is hatching plans to conduct subversive subversive activity against the [Solzhenitsyn] Zurich,he he USSR. Residing in in Zurich, has established, in in particular, particular, contacts contacts with with reprep resentatives in Switzerland, assistance of of resentatives of of the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak emigres CmigrCs in Switzerland, with with the the assistance whom to to arrange his writings and other other matemate whom he heintends intends arrange the the illegal illegal delivery deliveryof of his writings and rial Union. Solzhenitsyn in a dis rial of of an an anti-Soviet anti-Soviet nature nature to to the the Soviet Soviet Union. Solzhenitsyn stated stated in a disCmigrCs that that his future activities cussion withthe the Czechoslovak emigres activities would be the interests of of the theopposition subordinate primarily to the "opposition inside the USSR. USSR."

Following identify his sources by name; in in particuparticu Following usual usualpractice, practice, Andropov Andropov did did not not identifjr his sources by name; lar main CmigrCs emigres with whom Solzhenitsyn lar he he did did not not reveal reveal to to the the Politburo Politburo that that the themain with whom Solzhenitsyn had agents. O On 24 he reported that that SolzhenSolzhen had had had these these conversations conversations were were StB StB agents. n July July 24 he reported itsyn had had set set up up a a Russian Fund, using his books, itsyn "Russian Social Social Fund," using royalties royalties from from his books, to to assist "assist the the families prisoners detained detained in in Soviet on other other occasions, occasions, families of of political political prisoners Soviet camps." camps. As As on Andropov also also gave a woefully woefully distorted distorted assessment assessment of of Solzhenitsyns Andropov gave a Solzhenitsyn's influence influence in in exile. Available . exile. ''Available information, information," he informed the Politburo, " .. .. . indicates that after Solzhenitsyn's deportation abroad, interest in himin in the West is steadily on on the the Solzhenitsyns deportation abroad, interest in him the West is steadily was a a runaway runaway decline. At At that that very very moment, volume I of decline." moment, volume of The Gulag Archipelago was bestseller, print run of inthe the USA alone. 5 1 KGB assessassess bestseller, with with a aprint run of 2 2 million million paperbacks paperbacks in USA ments were distorted distorted at at two two levels. First, ments on on Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn, as as on on some some other other subjects, subjects, were levels. First, residencies in Centre what it to hear. Secondly, residencies in varying varying degrees degrees told told the the Centre what it wanted wanted to hear. Secondly, it to to hear-which hear-which in in the the summer summer of of Andropov the Politburo what he wanted Andropov told told the Politburo what wanted it 1974 the correctness of the to send into exile but 1974 emphasized emphasized the correctness of the decision decision to send Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn into exile but did include the sales figures his books. books. did not not include the phenomenal phenomenal Western Western sales figuresof of his On 1974 Andropov O n September September 19, 19,1974 Andropov approved approved a a large-scale, large-scale, "multifaceted multifacetedplan" plan (no. (no. 519-16091) his family family and and cut his links 5/9-16091) to to discredit discredit and and destabilize destabilize Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn and and his cut his links with dissidents in the the Soviet Soviet Union. Fifth Department Department officer officer with experience of of with dissidents in Union. A Fifth with experience the a series the PAUK case case was wassent sent to to Switzerland Switzerland on on long-term long-term assignment assignment to to direct direct a series of of operations against Solzhenitsyn.52 TheThe KGB sponsored a series series of hostile books books and and operations against Sol~henitsyn.~ sponsored a of hostile articles, among them under the name of of his his first wife, Natalia Natalia articles, among them a a memoir memoir published published under the name first wife, Reshetovskaya, In 1975 ezac suddenly Reshetovskaya, but but probably probably mainly mainly composed composed by by Service ServiceA. In 1975 R Rezit suddenly Prussian Nights Nights with him, and and disappeared from manuscript of disappeared from Zurich, Zurich, taking taking the the manuscript of Prussian with him, made biography intended to to destroy destroy SolzhenSolzhen made his his way way to to Moscow Moscow to to begin begin work work on on aa biography intended itsyn's realized that he had had also been itsyns reputation. reputation. Shortly Shortly afterwards, afterwards, Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn realized that he also been betrayed whom he since he he had arrived in in Zurich, betrayed by by the the Holubs, Holubs, on on whom he had had relied relied ever ever since had arrived Zurich, and them.53 Andropov gave orders orders to maintain "an and broke broke all contact contact with with them.53 Andropov gave to maintain an atmosphere atmosphere of suspicion between and the the people people around around him" by feeding feeding of distrust distrust and and suspicion between PAUK and him by Solzhenitsyn his circle Solzhenitsyn constant constant rumors rumors that that others others in in his circle were were KGB agents agents or or deceiving deceiving him variety him in ina a variety of of ways. ways. The create a a state state of of nervousness nervousness The plan plan to to destabilize destabilize Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn also also sought sought "to tocreate within his his family" family through through a a constant constant stream stream of threats against children and within of threats against his his children and the the

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sending 54 sending of of suspicious suspicious packages packages which which looked looked as as if if they they might might contain contain explosives. explosive^.^^ The Sakharovs were subjected to similar treatment. Shortly before Elena Bonner was The Sakharovs were subjected to similar treatment. Shortlybefore Elena Bonner was due due to to have have eye eye surgery, surgery, they they were were sent sent photographs photographs of of eyes eyes gouged gouged out out of of their their sock sockets 1974 they ets and and other other horrifying horrifying eye eye injuries. injuries. At At Christmas Christmas 1974 they received received dozens dozens of of envelopes envelopes containing containing photographs photographs of of car car accidents, accidents, brain brain surgery surgery and and monkeys monkeys with with All electrodes electrodes implanted implanted in intheir their brains.55 brains.55 A l l such such threats, threats, Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn told told Time Time mag magazine, -the KGB. 56 azine, "come come from from one one and and the the same same organization" organization-the KGB.56 What What is is most most striking striking about about the the KGB's KGBs campaign campaign against against Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn during during his his Swiss Swiss exile exile is is the the enormous enormous priority priority and and resources resources devoted devoted to to it. it. The The "plan plan of of agent agent operational operational measures" measuresto to be be implemented implemented during during 1975 1975 against against Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn and and the the emigree Cmigrke journal, journal, Kontinent, Kontinent, with with which which he he was was associated, associated,was was jointly jointly agreed agreed late late in in the the previous previous year year by byKryuchkov, Kryuchkov,Grigorenko Grigorenko and and Bobkov Bobkov (heads (heads of of the the First First Chief, Chief, Second Second Chief Chief and and Fifth Fifth Directorates). Directorates). It had had nineteen nineteen sections, sections, of of which which the the first first three three alone alone provided provided for for twenty twenty different different hostile hostile operations.57 operation^.^^ The The residencies residencies in in Berne, Berne, Geneva, Geneva, Karlshorst, Karlshorst, London, London, Paris, Paris, Rome Rome and and Stockholm Stockholm were were all involved involved in in implementing joint operations implementing the the"agent agent operational operational measures" measuresand and a a series series of of joint operations were were planned other Soviet plans for planned with with other Soviet Bloc Bloc intelligence intelligence agencies.58 agencies.58In In July July 1976 1976 plans for yet yet more measures, jointly more active active measures, jointly proposed proposed once once again again by by Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, Grigorenko Grigorenko and and Bobkov, Bobkov, were wereapproved approved by by Andropov.59 Andr~pov.~ The The destabilization destabilization campaign campaign had had some some success. success. Swiss Swiss newspapers newspapers reported reported that that Solzhenitsyn for, but protection. KGB Solzhenitsyn asked asked for, but did did not not receive, receive, police police protection. KGB harassment harassment in in Zurich Zurich was was probably probably at at least least partly partly responsible responsible for for his his decision decision to to move move to to the theUnited United States Since States in in 1976.60 1976.60 Since his his expulsion expulsion from from Russia Russia two two years years earlier, earlier,Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn had had lost formerly lost some some of of the theimmense immense moral moral authority authority he hehad had formerly possessed possessed as as a a persecuted persecuted dissident. dissident. Dismayed Dismayed by by what what he hesaw saw as as Western Western indifference indifference to to the theSoviet Soviet menace, menace, he he took took to to denouncing, denouncing, sometimes sometimes in in apocalyptic apocalyptic tones, tones, the the moral moral failings failings of of a a West Westhe he did did not not fully fullyunderstand. understand. After After settling settling in in Vermont, Vermont, he he became became a a virtual virtual recluse recluse on on his his fifty-acre fifty-acre estate estate behind behind an an eight-foot-high eight-foot-high chainlink chainlink fence fence topped topped with withbarbed barbed wire, wire, as as he he devoted devoted himself himself to to writing writing a a series series of of historical historical novels novels on on Russia Russia in in the the years years leading Revolution. leading up up to to the theOctober October Revolution. Solzhenitsyn's as Solzhenitsynslife life as a a recluse recluse (with (with occasional occasionalexcursions excursions to to deliver deliver the the 1978 1978Har Harvard West) vard Commencement Commencement Address Address and and other other solemn solemn pronouncements pronouncements on on East Eastand and West) may have spared may well well have spared him him further furtherKGB penetration penetration of of his his entourage entourage of of the the kind kind that that had 1975, Andropov had taken taken place place in in Zurich. Zurich. Previously, Previously, on on August August 23, 23,1975, Andropov had had approved approved a proposed heads of a draft draft directive directive (no. (no. 150/S-9195), 150/S-9195),jointly jointly proposed by by the the heads of the the First First Chief Chief and and Fifth Fifth Directorates, Directorates, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov and and Bobkov, Bobkov, establishing establishing as as the the main main priority priority in in operations operations against against emigres CmigrCs the the infiltration infiltration of of at at least least one one illegal illegal into into Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns inner circle. circle. When When Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn moved moved to to the States, L. Bolbotenko, a a inner the United United States, L. G. G. Bolbotenko, Line put operations against Line KR officer officer in in the the New NewYork York residency, residency,was was put in in charge charge of of operations against him. him. Though Though there there were were numerous numerous active active measures measures designed designed to to discredit discredit Solzhenit Solzhenitsyn and and embroil embroil him him with CmigrCs, there there is is no no evidence evidence that that any any illegal illegal sucsyn with other other emigres, suc gaininghis confidence.61 confidence.61 ceeded in gaining Solzhenitsyns Vermont fastness, fastness, the KGB seems to Despite failing to penetrate Solzhenitsyn's have reputation in have been been broadly broadly satisfied satisfied by by the the later later 1970s 1970s that thatthe the great great writer's writers reputation in the the

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West the FCD and Direc West had had declined declined dramatically. dramatically. In In the the summer summer of of 1978, 1978, the and Fifth Fifth Directorate torate jointly jointlyarranged arranged the the screening screening of of aavideo video of of Solzhenitsyn's SolzhenitsynsHarvard Harvard Address Address to to a meeting of leading KGB and Party figures. It was was an an extraordinary moment in in Soviet an audience audience gathered Soviet history. history. Never Never before, before, almost almost certainly, certainly, had had such such an gathered together to hear a lecture by a leading opponent of of the the Soviet Soviet system.62 system.62 The The Moscow notables watched, watched, probably probably intently, intently, as as Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn gave gave his his Commencement Commencement audi audinotables ence their academic academic gowns, gowns, an an uncompro ence in in Harvard HarvardYard, Yard, while while drizzle drizzle moistened moistened their uncompromising "measure measure of of bitter bitter truth." truth.He H e denounced denounced those those in in the theWest West whose mising whose silence silence and and inertia suffering imposed those who lived inertia had had made made them them "accomplices" accomplices in in the the suffering imposed on on those who lived under Communist Communist rule. rule. Corrupted and selfish selfish individualism, the under Corrupted by by materialism materialism and individualism, the West had become hundred or or even even fifty fifty years ago, it it West had become morally morally impoverished: impoverished: "Two Two hundred years ago, would be granted would have have seemed seemed quite quite impossible, impossible, in in America, America, that that an an individual individual be granted boundless freedom freedom with with no purpose, simply simply for the satisfaction satisfaction of of his boundless no purpose, for the his whims whims . .. . .. " Though many many in in Harvard Yard were were skeptical, and some were probably probably seething, seething, Though Harvard Yard skeptical, and some were they dutifully dutihlly followed followed tradition tradition and and cheered cheered Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns address.63 address.63 they address was followed followedby commentaries from FCD and The KGB screening of the address Fifth conclu Fifth Directorate Directorate officers. officers. Though Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins brief brief notes notes report report only only their their conclusions, they probably probably cited cited the the hostile hostile reception reception accorded to Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns "bitter bitter sions, they accorded to ashington Post. The Times leader leader writer truth by by The New New York Yor.4 Times and and the theW Washington Post. The writer found found truth" Mr. Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns world world view view .. .. .. far far more more dangerous than the easy-going spirit "Mr. dangerous than the easy-going spirit which denounced his his gross "gross misunderstand which he he finds finds so exasperating," exasperating,while while the the Post denounced misunderstanding that Solzhenitsyn had ing of of western western society." society.The The KGB commentators commentators were were agreed agreed that Solzhenitsyn had reactionary views alienated his American listeners by his "reactionary views and and intransigent intransigent criticism way of of life-a life-a fact fact which which could could not fail to have a on his of the US way not fail to have a negative negative effect effect on his authority in anti-Soviet anti-Soviet propaganda. propaganda." authority in in the theeyes eyes of of the the West West and andhis his continued continued use use in that no The meeting of KGB and Party Party notables agreed that no activemeasures measures were required to counter the Harvard Address.64 evidently believed, required to counter the Harvard Address.64Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn, they they evidently believed, had himsel had discredited discredited himself.

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n August 1, 1975 leadership committed committed what On August 1, 1975 the the Soviet Soviet leadership what turned turned out outto tobe be a a strate strategic war gic blunder blunder in in its its war against against the the dissidents. dissidents. As As part partof of the the Helsinki Helsinki Accords Accords on on Secu Security States, all European rity and and Co-operation Co-operation in in Europe, Europe,the theUnited United States, Canada Canada and and all European states states save series of save Albania Albania and and Andorra Andorra agreed agreed to to protect protect a a series of basic basic human human rights. rights. Though Though Andropov the Politburo Andropov warned warned against against the the consequences, consequences, a a majority majority of of the Politburo shared shared Gromyko's confident view "We are Gromykos confident view that that We are masters masters in in our our house"-that house-that the the Soviet Soviet Union would would be be free free to to interpret interpret the thehuman human rights provisions provisions of of the Helsinki Accord Accord Union rights the Helsinki as it saw fi fit. fiact, as put the Soviet t. In fact, as Zbigniew Brzezinski predicted, the accord "put Union onthe the ideological at Union on ideological defensive."l defensive. Henceforth Henceforth its its human human rights rights critics critics both both at home and abroad could justly claim that it was in breach of an international agree agreement it had freely entered into. increasingly,Andrei Sakharov. Sakharov. From the The most most influential of those those critics was, increasingly, KGB's the importance the difficulty Sakharov KGBs viewpoint, viewpoint, both both the importance and and the difficulty of of discrediting discrediting Sakharov his being awarded the the Nobel Prize in before world opinion were heightened by his being awarded Nobel Peace Peace Prize in October Oslo residency had been in its pre October 1975. 1975.The The Oslo residency had been instructed instructed to to do do all in its power power to to preconfess that it itwas powerless powerlessto influence the Nobel vent the award, but was forced to confess Peace Prize committee which, it claimed, was wholly composed of reactionaries"reactionaries" Lionaes.2 chief amongst amongst themitsits chairwoman, theLabor Labor Party deputy Aase Lionaes.2 pronounced the Peace Prize "a a great honor not not just justfor me but also also for the Sakharov pronounced movement: whole human human rights movement":
withour prisoners of of conscience-they conscience-they have sacrificed I feel I share this honor with have sacrificed precious possession, their liberty, their most precious liberty, in defending others by open and means.3 non-violent means.3 newsof the award, the first of of the "Sakharov Sakharov HearJust over a week after he received news Hear ings, held in response to an appeal launched by Sakharov and other dissidents a year ings," earlier, opened in Copenhagen Copenhagento to hear evidence evidence of Soviet human rights abusesabuses all of of them in inbreach of the Helsinki HelsinkiAccords. almost all Accords. Complex OperaO n November 22 Andropov approved a document On document entitled "Complex Opera the tional Measures to Expose the Political Background to the Award of the Nobel Peace Sakharov.The sheer range and ambitiousness of the the active measures measures proPrize to Sakharov."

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posed indicated Sakharov's Sakharovs increasing increasing prominence as a KGB target. In collaboration, where necessary, necessary, with other other KGB directorates, the FCD was instructed:

articles and speeches speeches by public and political personalities Norto inspire articles personalities in Nor Sweden, Denmark, Britain and the FRG, to develop way, Finland, Sweden, develop the theme that that the theaward of ofthe Nobel NobelPeace Prize to Sakharov was an attempt circles to slow down the process of dCtente by certain political circles detente .. .. .. speeches by representatives of to organize articles and speeches of public and political Britain, to to circles through KGB assets assets inFinland, Finland, France, Italyand and Britain, demonstrate the absurdity of of attempting attempting to award of of the Peace demonstrate the absurdity to link link the the award the Peace Prize to Sakharov to to aa decision decision relating relating to Prize to Sakharov to the the all-European all-European [Helsinki] [Helsinki] Conference .. .. .. to organize organize the the mailing mailing of of letters letters and and declarations to declarations protesting protesting about about the the award to the Nobel Committee of the the Nor award of of the the Peace Peace Prize Prize to to Sakharov Sakharov to the Nobel Committee of Norwegian Storting Storting [parliament] [parliament] and andto organs in wegian to influential influential press press organs in various various Western countries countries .. .. .. to tothe the Danish, Swedish Swedish and and to pass pass material material compromising compromising Sakharov Sakharov to Danish, Finnish press, press, hinting at at his links with reactionary organizations financed financed Westernspecial services; services; by the CIA and other Western to take steps designed to persuade persuade S. Haffner, the leading political observer the of the West German German Stern magazine to make negative comments on the Sakharov. Haffner award of the Nobel Nobel Peace Prize to Sakharov. Haffner had had already already made made criticisms in the FRG press sharp criticisms press when Sakharov was put forward for the Peace Prize Prize in in 1973; 1973; Peace dissident emigration in western Europe to pass information to the "dissident" designed to to exacerbate exacerbate relations relations between between Sakharov Sakharov and and Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn , designed . .. .. with among prominent emigres (in with the the help help of of agents agents of of influence influence among prominent Chilean ChileanCmigrks (in Algeria and Mexico), to disseminate the text of of a [bogus] [bogus] telegram of concon gratulations supposedly sent by General Pinochet Pinochet [who [who had led led the coup coup the occasion of the award of the against President Allende] to Sakharov on the occasion of Nobel Peace Peace Prize; Prize; Nobel to Chilean CmigrCs emigres in in Italy, Italy, the to inspire inspire pronouncements pronouncements by by leading leading Chilean the FRG the and France, expressing expressing the outrage of all all Chilean Chilean patriots patriots at the award of of the the Nobel Peace welcomed the the overthrow Nobel Peace Prize Prize to to Sakharov, Sakharov, who who in in 1973 1973 had hadwelcomed overthrow of the Allende government and in return for this had been awarded the title Honorary Citizen of "Honorary Citizen" by Pinochet; to statements in Arab con to inspire inspire public public statements by by public public personalities personalities in the the Arab countries, countries, conCommittees decision decision on Sakharov, demning the Nobel Committee's Sakharov, presenting this as a betweenSakharov Sakharov deal between and the Zionists, Zionists, in return for for Sakharovs Sakharov's pronouncepronounce ments on on the the question question of of Jewish Jewish emigration emigration from from the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, as the ments as the Zionists Committee when it awarded. awarded Zionists had had a a decisive decisive influence influenceon on the the Nobel Nobel Committee when it 1975. It should theSakharov the Nobel Peace Prize for 1975. should be be noted noted that that the "Sakharov HearHear ings" Sakharov by ings in in Copenhagen Copenhagen were were also also a a form form of of payment payment to to Sakharov bythe the Zion Zionists ists in in return return for for his his pro-Israel pro-Israel activity; activity;

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to available through abroad a to make make available through Novosti Novosti for for publication publication abroad a series series entitled entitled criminals "Who Who Defends Defends Sakharov?," Sakharov?, dealing dealing with with [alleged [alleged pro-Sakharov] pro-Sakharov] criminals sentenced (Leviyev), sentenced in in the the Soviet Soviet Union Union for for bribery bribery (Shtern), (Shtern), theft theft (Leviyev), instiga instigation tion of of terrorism terrorism (Bukovsky, (Bukovsky,Moroz).4 Moro~).~

The Sakharov personally-his links The main main fabrications fabrications intended intended to to discredit discredit Sakharov personally-his links with with Western support Western intelligence intelligence agencies, agencies,his his support for for the the Pinochet Pinochet regime regime and and his his plots plotswith with the Zionists-were a11 further developed in active measures over the next few years.5 the Zionists-were all hrther developed in active measures overthe next few years. The The files files examined examined by by Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin, however, however, record record few few immediate immediate successes successes for for the the operations by Andropov operations approved approved by Andropov in in November November 1975. 1975.The The best best the the Oslo Oslo residency residency could to provoke awardwas was to could do do to provoke Norwegian Norwegian opposition opposition to to Sakharov's Sakharovs award to claim claim the the Dagbladet ridiculing his wife Elena Bonner, who credit for an article submitted to credit for an article submitted to Dagbladet ridiculing his wife Elena Bonner, who in in December December 1975 1975 collected collected the the award award in in place place of of Sakharov Sakharov after after he he was was denied denied an an exit exit visa. been published] published] claimed that visa. The The article article [which [which seems seems not not to to have have been claimed that Bonner, Bonner, a a heavy constantly heavy smoker, smoker,was was constantly providing providing "free freepublicity publicityfor for the the tobacco tobacco industry" industry and and should should have have received receiveda a cigarette cigarette lighter lighter rather rather than than the theNobel Nobel Prize.6 Prize.6 In In Oslo Oslo to to see see Bonner Bonner co11ect collect the the award award on on behalf behalf of of Sakharov Sakharovwas was the the Soviet Soviet emi Cmigre Maximov, editor-in-chief grC Vladimir Vladimir Maximov, editor-in-chief of of the the journal journal Kontinent, Kontinent, which which published published news news of of dissidents dissidents throughout throughout eastern eastern Europe Europe in in Russian, Russian, English, English, French, French, German German editions. The rst issue issue in and and Italian Italian editions. The fi first in September September 1974 1974 had had opened opened with with a a ringing ringing declaration declaration by by Solzhenitsyn: Solzhenitsyn: The intelligentsia of The intelligentsia of eastern eastern Europe Europe speaks speaks with with the theunited united voice voice of of suffering suffering and and knowledge. knowledge. All All honor honor to to Kontinent Kontinent if if it it is is able able to to make make his his voice voice heard. heard. (which wi11 not be long in coming) to western Europe if its ears Woe Woe (which will not be long in coming) to western Europe if its ears fail fail to to hear.7 hear.

Kontinent established Maksimov the Kmztinent rapidly rapidly established Maksimov as as second second only only to to Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn in in the KGB's KGBs list list of ofemigrees CmigrCes enemies. enemies. Among Among the themost most ingenious ingenious of of the the many many active active mea measures sures used used to to discredit discredit him him in in 1976 1976 was was one one which which followed followed the the discovery discovery that that a a car car used used by byEduard Eduard Mihailovich Mihailovich Serdinov Serdinov (codenamed (codenamed TKACHEV), TKACHEV),an an operations operations offi officer cer in in the the New NewYork York residency, residency, had had been been bugged bugged by by the the FBI. FBI. It It was was decided decided to to stage stage a a conversation conversation in in the the car car between between Serdinov Serdinov and and a a KGB agent agent from from the the Soviet Soviet com community FBI: munity which, which, it it was was hoped, hoped, would would deceive deceivethe the FBI:
SERDINOV: By SERDINOV: By the the way, way, Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns chum chum Maksimov Maksimov is is also also becoming becoming more more

and and more more insolent. insolent. He H e is is turning turning into into an an open open enemy. enemy. do do you you mean? mean? SERDINOV: SERDINOV: That That Parisian Parisian one-from one-from the the Kontinent. Kontinent. AGENT: AGENT: Oh, Oh, don't dont pay pay any any attention attention to to him! him! I have have heard heard here here from from "certain certain people" he is people .. .. .. well, well, from from "them" them [i.e. [i.e. the the KGB] .. .. .. that that he is their their agent agent and and that he he even even underwent underwent special special training training with with them them before before he he left left the the Soviet Soviet that Union. Union.
AGENT: AGENT: Which Which Maksimov Maksimov

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Other active measures measures were weredevised devisedto reinforce the impression that Maksimov was a KGB agent.* agent.8 Whether any of them actually succeeded in deceiving deceiving the FBI or any Westernintelligence agency remains in doubt. doubt. other Western Doubtless to was able able to publicize Doubtless to the the intense intenseirritation irritationof of the the Centre, Centre, Kontinent was to publicize 1977 of of Helsinki Groups in in .Moscow, the formation during 1976 1976 and 1977 "Helsinki Watch Watch Groups" Moscow, Ukraine, Lithuania, Georgia and Armenia to monitor Soviet compliance with the to monitor the terms of the Helsinki Accords. Accords. 1976,Andropov branded At a meeting of the KGB Collegium in 1976, branded Sakharov Sakharov Pub"Pub NumberOne,"9 One,9 a he retained for the thenext nine years. The active mealic Enemy Number a title mea sures campaign against him continued to expand for several years, years, with attacks on his LISA-Vixen-by wife Elena (codenamed LISA-"Vixen" -by the KGB) forming an increasingly increasingly large measures compiled in Febrularge part of it. A list of current and impending active measures Febru ,, ; seven 1977 included thirteen "operations operations to compromise ASKET[Sakharov] ASKET[Sakharov]; ary 1977 measures to cut off ASKET and LISA from their close contacts engaged in anti"measures anti activity and to cause dissension measures to hinder the social activity dissension in their circle; circle;" eight "measures activity of ASKET and LISA;" LISA; and four "measures measures to distract ASKET and hostile activity activity. Such was the pedantic precision of of active measures measures LISA from their hostile activity." terminology that hindrance "hindrance" operations were carefully distinguished from those whose purpose was merely merely to distract. "distract." The main responsibility for directing and thirty-two operations fell upon V. N. Shadrin, the Ninth Ninth coordinating these thirty-two Shadrin, head of of the 1o It Department of the Fifth Fifth Directorate. Directorate. I t was a measure of courage and characof the courage charac ter of of Sakharov Sakharov and and Bonner Bonner that that their their sanity sanity and and determination survived the the KGBs ter determination survived KGB's best efforts to destroy them. The remarkably diverse. diverse. As As usual, they The thirteen thirteen compromise compromise operations operations were were remarkably usual, they Department evaluation forgeries: among them a bogus State involved a number of forgeries: State Department which dismissed Sakharov as a worn-out political dilettante and a fabricated letter from Radio Liberty's Libertys Russian staff denouncing his links with the the Zionists. SomeSome bizarrely, attempts were made to link what more bizarrely, link Sakharov with the the gay liberation signatures of movement. Letters bearing the forged signatures of Sakharov and a Belorussian group of homosexuals" homosexualswere sent to gay rights organizations in Britain and Scandi"group Scandi the aim of prompting them them to send letters in reply. navia, with the The Western "bourgeois bourgeois press" press and its Moscow correspondents correspondents were fed stories storiessuccess-claiming that Sakharovs apparently without much success-claiming Sakharov's family suffered from he hereditary mental illness, which affected both his children and his brother, and that he a tired, weak-willed man, himself had degenerated into "a man," unable " unable to take independent decisionsn because of his domineering wife. Instructions weregiven decisions" given for suitably correspondents to be invited to meet the Deputy DeputyProcurator-General, gullible foreign correspondents S. I. Gusev, information the nature of the the official official S. I. Gusev, who who would would provide provide "objective objective information about about the nature of warning given to ASKET about his provocative actions.7711 actions."u of the active active measures measureswere The most vicious of were directed against against Elena Elena Bonner Bonner both both reputation for integrity made him a because Sakharovs Sakharov's worldwide reputation a less vulnerable target than his less less well-known wife, and because attacks on Bonner wounded Sakharov more more deeply deeply than than those those on on himself. Sakharov himsel During During Sakharovs Sakharov's fifteen fifteen years years of of perper-

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secution, to secution, his his only only resort resort to to physical physical violence violencewas was to slap slap the the face face of of Nikolai Nikolai Yakovlev, Yakovlev, one KGB to to libel libel Bonner.12 Bonner.12The The character character assassination assassination of of one of of the the writers writers used used by by the the KGB Bonner began in earnest with an article entitled "Madame Bonner-Sakharov's Evil Bonner began in earnest with an article entitled Madame Bonner-Sakharovs Evil Genius?" Genius?planted planted in in the the New NewYork York Russian-language Russian-language newspaper newspaper Russkiy Russdiy Golas Golos (Rus (Rnssian AK, in sian Voice) E k e ) by by an an agent agent codenamed codenamed Y YAK, in July July 1976.0 1976.13 Simultaneously, Simultaneously, Bonner Bonner began purportingto to come A but but purporting come from from one one began to to receive receive letters letters prepared prepared by by Service Service A "Semyon Zlotnik," who claimed to know the secrets of her "dark past" and demanded Semyon Zlotnik, who claimed to know the secrets of her dark past and demanded money money with with menaces.14 menaces.14 The The "dark dark past" past fabricated fabricated by by the the KGB KGB over over the the next next few few years years was was an an explosive explosive mixture [Bonner] had mixture of of sex sex and and violence. violence. "In In her her dissolute dissolute youth," youth, it it was was claimed, claimed, " [Bonner] had developed an almost professional knack for seducing and subsequently sponging developed an almost professional knack for seducing and subsequently sponging off off older older men men of of considerable considerable stature." stature. During During the the war war she she had had allegedly allegedly seduced seduced the the poet sevelod Bagritsky, then bombarding poet V Vsevelod Bagritsky, then hounded houndedhis his wife wife to to her her grave grave by by bombarding her her with with obscene the KGB obscene telephone telephone calls. calls. Her Her next next victim, victim, according according to to the KGB libel, libel, was was a a well wellknown known engineer, engineer, "Moisei Moisei Zlotnik" Zlotnik ("uncle" (uncleof of the the fictitious fictitious Semyon Semyon Zlotnik), Zlotnik), who who was jailed for murdering his wife on instructions from Bonner. To escape justice, was jailed for murdering his wife on instructions from Bonner. To escape justice, Bonner a wartime Bonner was was said said to to have have become become a a nurse nurse on on a wartime hospital hospital train-only train-only to to be be sacked by the sackedwhen when her her seduction seduction of of the the elderly elderlydoctor doctor in in charge chargewas was discovered discovered by the doc doctor's ctitious post-war tors daughter. daughter.Among Among Bonner's Bonners fi fictitious post-war conquests conquests was was her her equally equally elderly, elderly, married French uncle, Leon Kleiman; the affair was said to have continued even married French uncle, Leon Kleiman; the affair wassaid to have continued even after after she to enormous she "ensnared" ensnared Sakharov.15 Sakharov. The The KGB KGB went wentto enormous pains pains to to fabricate fabricate this this account account of of Bonner's Bonners supposedly supposedly homicidal homicidal sexual sexualappetites, appetites, even even sending sending an an illegal illegal to to France France in in 1977 1977 to torecover recover some some of of the the papers papers of of Leon Leon Kleiman Kleiman (who (who had had died died five five years years earlier) earlier) to to assist assist in in the theproduction production of of Service Service N.s Als forgeries.16 forgeries.16 Unsurprisingly, in Unsurprisingly,the the KGB KGB found found considerable considerabledifficulty difficultyfor for several severalyears years in placing placing this the Western Western "bourgeois this libellous libellous fiction fiction in in the bourgeois press." press. It It eventually eventually appeared appeared as as a a "world world exclusive" exclusivein in the the Sicilian Sicilian newspaper newspaper Sette Sette Giorni, Giorni, whose whose staff-according staff-according to to the the Rome Rome residency-included residency-included a a "confidential confidential contact" contact codenamed codenamed KIRILLY KIRILL.I7On On April 1980 Sette April 12, 12,1980 Sette Giorni Giorni printed printed aasensational sensational story storyheadlined headlined "WHO WHOIS IS ELENA ELENA BONNER? of everal Murders." BONNER? The TheWife Wife of Academician Academician Sakharov Sakharov Perpetrator Perpetrator of of S Several Murders. An the editorial the elusive An unnamed unnamed member member of of the editorial staff staff was was reported reported to to have have met met the elusive "Semyon Semyon Zlotnik" Zlotnikwhile while on on holiday holiday in in Paris, Paris,and and to tohave have learned learned the the story storyfrom from him. him. Sette Giorni cited at some length a series of Service A forgeries, among them a letter Sette Giorni cited at some length a series of Service A forgeries, among them a letter from from "Moisei Moisei Zlotnik" Zlotnik to to Bonner Bonner reproaching reproaching her her for for persuading persuading him him to to murder murder his his wife: wife: "You You acted acted precisely, precisely, cold-bloodedly cold-bloodedly and and rationally rationally ......And And your your demand demand 'to to bump seemed bump her heroff' off seemed as as natural natural as as remembering remembering that that I I should should give give you youyour your favorite favorite chocolates chocolates on on your your birthday." birthday.The The article article also also cited cited an an equally equallyfraudulent fraudulent diary diary sup supposedly posedlywritten written by by Leon Leon Kleiman Kleiman describing describing his his seduction seduction by by Bonner Bonner and and denounc denouncis The ing ing her her obsession obsession with with "subjugating subjugating others" others to to her her will. will.* The Rome Rome residency residency proudly proudly sent sent fifty fifty copies copies of of the the Sette Sette Giorni Giorni article article to to the theCentre, Centre,together together with with sub subsequent or sequent readers' readers letters letters denouncing denouncing Bonner, Bonner, most most of of which which had had been been written written or prompted by the residency itself 19 When reporting on the operation to the Central prompted by the residency itself. When reporting on the operation to the Central Committee, Committee, the the KGB KGB is is unlikely unlikely to to have have mentioned mentioned that that Sette Sette Giorni Giorni was was a a little littleknown run of known provincial provincialnewspaper newspaperwith with aaprint print run of only only20,000.20 20,000.20

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To To increase increase the the pressure pressure on on Bonner, Bonner, and and through through her her on on Sakharov, Sakharov, attempts attempts were were thesupport support made to deprive her of the of family and friends. The first of the active meamea 1977 "to to cut cut off sures devised devised by the KGB early in 1977 off ASKET and LISA from their close contacts cause dissension dissension in in their circle" close contacts engaged engaged in in anti-social anti-social activity activity and and to to cause their circle listed seven different methods of harassing her daughter from her first marriage, Yankelevich, in order to force them to emigrate. The Tanya, and son-in-law, Efrem Yankelevich, harassment succeeded. O n September 5, 1977 1977 Bonner said goodbye goodbye to harassment succeeded. On September 5, Bonner said to Tanya Tanya and and Sheremetyevo airport. Efrem at Sheremetyevo to to alienate the Sakharovs' Sakharovs The Centre showed equal ingenuity in attempting attempting friends. Agents in the friends. the dissident movement were instructed to cause "cause dissension between contacts involved involved in in antianti between ASKET and and LISA on on the the one one hand hand and and their their contacts activity by by circulating disparaging comments about other dissidents suppos suppossocial activity" edly Bonner.21 edly made made by by Sakharov Sakharov and and Bonner.21 two sets sets of KGB active measures designed to hinder of The two "hinder the hostile activity of LISA also had the unstated aim of making daily life ASKET and LISR' aim of life impossible for hindrance operations were designed to create both of them. The "hindrance" "create abnormal [living] conditions in as many ways as possible. possible. Though the KGB did not not yet dare to withconditions" with Sakharovs driving license, license, no other member of his or Bonners draw Sakharov's Bonner's families families was retain-a license. An agent codenamed MORVIKOV was allowed to obtain-or obtain-or retain-a license. instructed to stir up trouble between the couple couple and Andrei Sakharovs Sakharov's children. The distraction "distraction" operations included flooding the Sakharovs Sakharovs with bogus bogus requests requests for for help help hadfallen foul of the Soviet systemor who whosimply sought their their from people people who had Soviet legal system advice The effect of of the the KGBs KGB's active mea advice on on non-existent non-existent problems.22 problems.22 The cumulative cumulative effect active meainevitable toll-particularly toll-particularly on the thehealth of sures took an inevitable of Bonner, Bonner, who was suffering suffering heart condition. There were times, she wrote later, when from a heart "when it was difficult difficult for evena hundred hundredyards, yards, when even sitting atthe the typewriter me to walk even sitting at typewriter made made me me break break out in in aa cold sweat. sweat." Simply thinking about the allegations allegations about her private life made her feel sick-or sick-or even that she was about to have a heart heart attack.23 attack.23 the to the that the the Sakharovs' Sakharovscovert covert persecution persecution was was due due partly partly to thefact fact that the did not not yet yet dare dare imprison imprison them. them. The The president of the the Soviet KGB did president of Soviet Academy Academy of of SciSci ences solemnly solemnly assured assured his his American American opposite opposite number number that that not one hair hair of of Dr. Dr. ences "not one Sakharov's Bonner wryly wryly remarked, promise Sakharovshead" headwould would be be harmed-though, harmed-though, as as Bonner remarked, the the promise since Sakharov Sakharov was almost bald.24 bald.24During 1977, 1977, however, however, there was a meant little since wave two most prominent wave of of arrests arrests of of other other well-known well-known dissidents, dissidents, among among them themthe the two most prominent members Watch Groups": rights campaigner Alek members of of the the "Helsinki Helsinki Watch Groups: the the veteran veteran civil civil rights campaigner Aleksandr Ginzburg,victim victim of of the the botched 1968 show show trial, and the Yuri Orlov, Orlov, sandr Ginzburg, botched 1968 trial, and the physicist physicist Yuri founder of the founder of the Moscow Moscow group. group. Andropov's Andropovs characteristically characteristically slanted slanted intelligence intelligence reports cam reports to to the the Politburo Politburo sought sought to to implicate implicate both both in in the the ideological ideological subversion subversion campaigns paigns allegedly allegedly run run by by Western Western intelligence intelligence agencies: agencies:
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The The enemy's enemys special special services services and and ideological ideological centers centers are are applying applying serious seriousefforts efforts to elements on on the the terri to invigorate invigorate and and extend extend the the hostile hostile activity activity of of anti-Soviet anti-Soviet elements territory Union. Especially special sertory of of the the Soviet Soviet Union. Especially notable notable is is the the effort effort of of Western Western special ser-

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vices to to organize organize an an association associationof of persons persons opposing opposing the the existing existing state state and and social social vices order in in our our country country.. .. .. The The need need has has thus thus emerged emerged to to terminate terminate the the actions actions of of order 25 Orlov, , on Orlov, Ginzburg Ginzburg and and others others once once and and for for all all, on the thebasis basis of of existing existing law law.. .. ..25 Orlov and were arrested arrested in in February February 1977. 1977. A month month later later it it was was the Orlov and Ginzburg Ginzburg were the turn of of the the leading leading Jewish Jewish human human rights rights activist activist and and "refusenik" refusenikAnatoli Anatoli Shcharansky. Shcharansky. turn For best efforts teams of For the the next next year year all all three three withstood withstood the the best efforts of of teams of KGB interrogators interrogators to cooperating in to cajole cajole and and bully bully them them into into cooperating in their theirown own show show trials. trials. On O n December December 29, 29, 1977 1977 Orlov's Orlovs chief chief investigator, investigator, Captain Captain Yakovlev, Yakovlev, made made what what amounted amounted to to a a formal formal admission of of failure. failure. Mter After Yakovlev Yakovlev showed showed him him the theofficial official charge charge sheet, Orlov took took admission sheet, Orlov notes he wholly rejected the notes of of it it but but "refused refused to to sign sign it, it, saying saying that that he wholly rejected the charge." charge. The The that day (reproduced as an appendix to this chapter) record of the interrogation on that shows Orlov, Orlov,ten ten months months after after his arrest, obviously obviously getting getting the thebetter better of shows his arrest, of his his interrogainterroga it tor. When asked whether he understood the charge against him, Orlov replied that it him, and that he had been was not clear to him, that he been shown no evidence "evidence that my actions actions had had regime. He H e put in writing writing a the intention of undermining undermining or weakening the Soviet regime." [ilthas never neverbeen explained to me precisely and unambiguouslywhat complaint that "[i]t weakening,and even 'Soviet Sovietregime.' regime. is meant by the words undermining, 'undermining,' 'weakening,' " InterInter wenton on to rogator Yakovlev offered no explanation. explanation. Orlov went to complain against the the manman of Yakovlevs interrogation: You ner ofYakovlev's "You first make an assertion ofyour own, and then ask question. Orlov whether this is a fact. This is the typical way of of putting a leading question." claimed thedocuments he had hadcirculated on behalf of the Helsinki Watch Group Group claimed that the effect. progressive forces theWest, had had a beneficial beneficial effect. They had been studied by "progressive forces in the West," whose criticismhas clearly such as the French and Italian Communist parties, "whose has clearly theUSSR." USSR.Fewer people improved certain certain aspects aspects of human human rights in the people were were being being sent sent psychiatric hospitals, and fewer children to prison camps or or being mistreated mistreated in psychiatric children from from unregistered Christian Christian sects sects were were being being taken taken away away from their parents. parents. Yakovlev, Yakovlev, as unregistered from their as usual, had no answer. Orlov made a written protest that his previous request for down.26 Yakovlev to be taken off his case had been turned down.26 The most striking feature of Orlovs trial in May 1978, apart from his own coura couraof Orlov's May 1978, apart spectacle of geous defiance, defiance, was the pathetic spectacle of fifteen prosecution witnesses witnesses insisting all the freedoms guaranteed by the Helsinki Accords. For that Soviet citizens enjoyed all yearsimprisoncampaigning for those very freedoms, Orlov was sentenced to seven years' imprison five in exile. ment, followed by five Ginzburg, who was tried two months later, knew that, as a re-offender, he was liable to a ten-year sentence. But, to his surprise: surprise: hewas They played a little game with me. The prosecution told the court that he only asking for eight years, because becauseI had helped the police in the the Shcharansky case. I t was a lie, but it itwas a good piece of of character assassination assassination for them to to case. It their propaganda and to make life hard for me in the campsY camps.27 use in their Shcharanskys the same time as Ginzburg's, Ginzburgs, had moments moments of Shcharansky's trial, held at the of farce as well as brutality. brutality. At one point point a witness named Platonov was asked, "What What can you

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tell us about the case of Shcharansky?" Shcharansky?"Nothing," Nothing, he hereplied. Im "I'm not familiar with case. But Ginzburg, Ginzburg,he he declared, verybadly. badly. I t quickly became clear the case." declared, had behaved very It Platonov turned up in the thewrong court. The trial ended, however, in aagreat that Plato nov had turned ended, however, Shcharansky. He H e declared in his closing address: moral victory for Shcharansky.

I am proud that I came to know and work with such people as as Andrei Andrei Sakharov, Yuri Yuri Orlov and Aleksandr Ginzburg, who are carrying on the best Sakharov, of all, I feel part of traditions of the Russian intelligentsia. But most of of a marmar velous historical process-the process-the process of the national revival of Soviet Jewry of of the homeland, to IsraeL Israel. and its return to the For two thousand years the Jewish people, my people, have been dispersed over the world and seemingly seemingly deprived of of returning. But still, all over of any hope of stubbornly, and apparently without reason, said to each each year Jews have have stubbornly, Next year in Jerusalem!" Jerusalem! And today, when I am further than than ever from other, "Next my dream, from my people and from my Avital [Shcharansys [Shcharansky's wife], and when ofprisons and camps wifeand many difficult years of camps lie ahead of of me, I say to my wife Next year in Jerusalem!" Jerusalem! to my people, "Next to the court, which has only to read a sentence that was prepared long And to ago-to you I have nothing to to say.28 say2* ago-to
The KGB's KGBs main main fear fear in in the the aftermath aftermathof of the the show The show trials trials of of Orlov, Orlov, Ginzburg Ginzburg and and Shcharansky was that Orlov, Orlov, like Sakharov three years earlier, earlier,would be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The KGB residency in Norway was ordered to give the highest measures campaign, personally overseen by Andropov himself, priority to an active measures designed to discredit Orlov and ensure that his candidacy failed.29 n October 27, failed.29 O On 1978 the Oslo resident, Leonid Alekseyevich Makarov (codenamed SEDOV), 1978 SEDOV), rang Suslov, the the Politburo's Politburos leading leading ideologist, ideologist, in Suslov, in the the middle middle of of the the night night to to pass pass on on the the good news that the theprize had gone instead to the Egyptian Egyptian and Israeli leaders leaders Anwar succeeded in claiming more of Sadat and Menachem Begin. Makarov succeeded of the credit than he deserved deserved for what was regarded by the KGB as a famous victory. victory. In a notably immodest telegram to the the Centre, he he reported reported that that the the residency residency had successfully successfully carried "carried out complex active measures through reliable reliable assets assets in in order order to to disrupt disrupt the anti-Soviet operation" to prize to It claimed to to have have brought brought prespres anti-Soviet operation to award award the the prize to Orlov. Orlov. I t claimed sure to to bear bear during during conversations conversations with with a a series series of Norwegian sure Norwegian political political leaders, leaders, chief chief them Knut Knut Frydenlund, the foreign minister, Reiulf Steen, chairman of among them of the Norwegian Labor Party and of the Parliamentary Foreign Policy Committee, Tor Central Federation of ofTrade Unionsand of Halvorsen, chairman of the Central Trade Unions of the Board of of Norway-USSR Friendship Society, Society, and Trygve Bratteli, a former prime ministhe Norway-USSR minis theParliamentary Labor Party PartyGroup: Group: ter and chairman of the In the the course course of of these these conversations, conversations, the the provocative In provocative nature nature and and anti-Soviet anti-Soviet bias of the the agitation around Yuri Yuri Orlov Orlov was was emphasized bias of agitation around emphasized . . .. . . It was was pointed pointed out out that the political proper responsibility that the political leadership leadership of of Norway Norway needed needed to to show show proper responsibility for the state and development development of bilateral relations relations between between our our countries. countries. The The

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conversations conversations produced produced the the desired desired response response in in influential influential circles circles of of the the Nor Norwegian wegian Labor Labor Party. Party. The The work work that thatwe we did did exerted exerted useful useful influence influence on on the thefor foreign eign policy policy leadership leadership of of Norway Norway and, and, in inour our opinion, opinion, made made it it possible possible for for the the residency's Nobel Peace residencys task task to to be be carried carried out-to out-to prevent prevent the the award award of of the the Nobel Peace Prize Prize to to Yuri Yuri Orlov Orlov and and his his Committee.3o C~mmittee.~ The The Centre Centre gave gave Makarov Makarov as as much much credit credit as as he he gave gave himself himself. Viktor Viktor Fedorovich Fedorovich Grushko, Department (whose Grushko, head head of of the the FCD FCD Third Third Department (whose responsibilities responsibilities included included Scandinavia), "the determination Scandinavia), telegraphed telegraphed congratulations congratulations on on the determination and and operational operational effectiveness effectiveness which which the the residency residency has has shown shown while while carrying carrying out out this this work."31
A OV AN D R O P O V R RE EM MA AIIN NE ED D AS A S obsessed obsessed with with ideological ideological subversion subversion during during his his final final years had been the outset. years as as KGB KGB chairman chairman as as he he had been at at the outset. The The war war against against subversion subversion extended 1979 by extended even even to to abstract abstract painting. painting. A joint joint report report in in 1979 by the the KGB Moscow Moscow Directorate and the Moscow department of the Fifth Directorate proudly reported Directorate and the Moscow department of the Fifth Directorate proudly reported that, possible to that, over over the the past past two two years, years, "it it proved proved possible to use use agents agents to to prevent prevent seven seven attempts attempts by by avant-garde avant-garde artists artists to to make make provocative provocative arrangements arrangements to to show show their their pic pictures." tures. Four Four "leaders leaders of of the the avant-garde avant-garde artists" artists had had been been recruited recruited as as agents. agents. Surveil Surveillance was an lance of of the the "creative creative intelligentsia" intelligentsia was an important important part partof of "the the task task of of the the [KGB] [KGB] agencies agencies to to protect protect the the intelligentsia intelligentsia from from the the influence influence of of bourgeois bourgeois ideology": ideology:

Creative Creative workers workers produce produce individualistic individualistic works; works; they they are are cut cut off off from from the the posi positive uence of tive infl influence of the the collective collective for for forming forming and and training training their their personality; personality; they they develop develop an an egocentric egocentric attitude attitude towards towards reality, reality, one one that that is is based basedon on strictly strictly per personal sonal perceptions, perceptions, personal personal interest, interest, arrogance, arrogance, ambition ambition and and over-estimation over-estimation of of their their importance.3 i m p ~ r t a n c2e . ~ ~ Andropov conference that thethe KGB Andropov told told a a Fifth FifthDirectorate Directorate conference in in March March1979 1979 that KGB could could not not afford afford to to ignore ignore the the activities activities of of a a single single dissident, dissident, however however obscure: obscure: Our even certain Our enemies-and enemies-and even certain comrades comrades from from Communist Communist Parties Parties in in West Western up this you say, you have ern countries-often countries-often bring bring up this question: question: "If, If, as asyou say, you have con condeveloped socialist socialist society, society,then do dovarious anti-social phenomena or or structed a developed the the negative negative activities activities of of an an insignificant insignificant handful handful of of people people really really represent represent a a threat Are threat to toit? it? Are they they really really capable capable of of shaking shaking the the foundations foundations of of socialism?" socialism? O f course course not, not, we we reply, if one one takes takes each each act act or or politically politically harmful harmful trick trick Of reply, if individually. But if one takes takes them all together, combining their content content with with individually. their purpose purpose as as regards ideological sabotage, sabotage, then then every every such act represents represents a a their regards ideological such act danger. And we cannot ignore it. it. We We simply do not not have the right to permit danger. even the political even the the smallest smallest miscalculation miscalculation here, here, for for in in the political sphere sphere any any kind kind of of ideological sabotage sabotage is directly directly or indirectly intended to create an opposition ideological which is hostile to our system-to system-to create create an underground, to encourage encourage a tran tranwhich otherextreme extreme forms of struggle, struggle, and, in inthe final analy analysition to terrorism and other sis, to create create the conditions for the overthrow of socialism. socialism. sis,

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Czechoslovakia in The experience of of Hungary in in1956 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 1968 showed showed that that behind the Soviet the main organizers of sabotage-the Soviet dissidents were "the of ideological ideological sabotage-the intelligence services services and and subversive subversive centers centers of the imperialist nations. The The struggle struggle intelligence of the imperialist nations. against decisive, uncompromising, and merciless. the Soviet against them must be decisive, merciless." Within the twelve-year ideological ideological struggle" struggle of Union the the "twelve-year of the Fifth FifthDirectorate Directorate showed that repression worked: repression

The Check Check lists have learned learned to quash undesirable undesirable and hostile hostile phenomena in in 15,580 people their initial stages. stages. This is confirmed confirmed by the the facts. Of Of the 15,580 people who suppressed last year, only 107 107 showed themselves were suppressed themselves to be be hostile a second time.33 time.33
Sakharov ceased to be untouchable. While being driven to the In 1980 1980 even Sakharov the Academy of Sciences Sciences on January 22 he was arrested, taken to the the prosecutor's prosecutors office office wereto be exiled to Gorky, Gorky, a city closed to Westerners: and told that he and his wife were You are forbidden to go beyond the city limits of Gorlsy. You'll Youll be kept under sur sur"You of Gorky. veillance, are forbidden contact foreigners veillance, and and you you are forbidden to to meet meet with with or or contact foreigners or or criminal criminal ele elements [dissidents] dissident^].^^ The KGB Fifth Directorate organized a series of workplace .34 Directorate of workplace broadcasts on local radio and television in an attempt to to meetings in Gorky as well as broadcasts ensure that that Sakharov Sakharov and and Bonner Bonner were were reduced reduced to to pariah status throughout throughout their their ensure pariah status exile. banishment to exile. To To the the KGB's KGBs embarrassment, embarrassment, however, however, Sakharov's Sakharovsbanishment to Gorky Gorky was was quickly followed by an unconnected period of social social unrest which it feared would become was car factory factory there. there. In In SepSep become known known in in the theWest. West. In In May May there there was a a strike strike at at the thecar tember and and October, October, after after a a series series of of four four murders murders in in Gorky, Gorky, rumors spread rapidly rapidly tember rumors spread officially conround the city that murders were in fact occurring daily but were being being officially con cealed. of their classes and factories cealed. In the ensuing panic schools schools suspended some some of were numerous letters to the theauthorities pleading for the the canceled night shifts. There Were Centres relief, however, however, Gorkypassed murderers to be caught. To the Centre's the mayhem in Gorky theWest.35 West.35 unnoticed in the the early 1980s 1980s the dissident movement seemed at its lowest ebb since its During the emergence in in the the 1960s. 1960s. Most Most leading leading dissidents dissidents were were in in labor labor camps camps or or exile. exile. Those emergence Those who remained at liberty were under constant KGB surveillance. surveillance. Samizdat literature trickle. During the thesecond half half of the 1980s, 1980s, was reduced to aatrickle. however, the dissidents themselves, to their great surprise, surprise, rapidly transformed from "anti anti-social elefound themselves, -social ele perestroika. The of this this transformation transformation was ments into the prophets of ofperextroika. The chief chief agent agent of was ments" Mikhail Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev. When I became became General General Secretary," Secretary,writes writes Gorbachev in his con"I con "When Gorbachev in his Memoirs, I sidered an important task Sakharov from from exile."36 The sidered it it an important task to to rescue rescue Academician Academician Sakharov The record in both both public his first first year Soviet record of of his his statements statements in public and and private private during during his year as as Soviet leader, complicated story. story. At a a Politburo on August leader, however, however, tells tells a a more more complicated Politburo meeting meeting on August 29, 1985, 1985, Gorbachev announced that received "a from a 29, Gorbachev announced that he he had had received a letter letter from a certain certain Mr. Mr. Sakharov, whose name will not be unknown to H e asks us to allow his wife Sakharov, to you. He and visit to go abroad for medical Bonner to medical treatment treatment and visit relatives.The relatives." The KGB KGB chairman, chairman, Viktor "He has lost Viktor Chebrikov, Chebrikov, reported reported that that Sakharov Sakharov was was in in poor poor health: health: He has largely largely lost

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his political figure nothing new his position position as as a a political figure and and recently recently we we have have heard heard nothing new from from him. him. months. Chebrikov So perhaps Bonnerought ought to beallowed allowed abroad for three three months." appeared the propaganda appeared to to believe believe the propaganda image image of of Bonner Bonner sedulously sedulously cultivated cultivated by by the the over the the previous previous decade: decade: "We We must must not not forget forget that that [Sakharov] [Sakharov] acts acts very very much much KGB over under Bonners influence has one one hundred over him." him. under Bonner's influence .. .. .. She She has hundred per per cent cent influence influence over "That's Thats what whatZionism Zionismdoes does for for you!" you! joked joked Gorbachev. Gorbachev. Chebrikov Chebrikov added added that, that,with with Bonner even be be willing willing to reach some Bonner away, away, Sakharov Sakharov might might even to reach some sort sort of of accommoda accommodation.37 not tell t i ~ nThough Though . ~ ~ he he did did not tell the the Politburo, Politburo, Chebrikov Chebrikov was was doubtless doubtless aware aware from from KGB surveillance surveillance reports reports that that Sakharov Sakharov had had welcomed welcomed Gorbachev's Gorbachevs election election as as gen general the comment: comment: "It We've got eral secretary secretary with with the It looks looks as as if if our our country's countrys lucky. lucky. Weve got an an intelligent leader!"38 leader!38 Yakovlev, the most influential reformer among Gorbachev's Gorbachevs advisers, advisers, Aleksandr Yakovlev, secretly asked two two officials officials of the Central Committees international information secretly Central Committee's department, Andrei Grachev and Nikolai Shishlin, to prepare a case which would persuade According to persuade the the Politburo Politburo to to end end Sakharov's Sakharovs exile. exile.According to Grachev, Grachev, both both Yakovlev Yakovlev and Gorbachev Gorbachev realized that neither nor the the normalization and realized that neither democratic democratic reform reform nor normalization of of East-West relations could proceed so so long as Sakharovs East-West Sakharov's banishment continued. thedelicacy of the problem was indicated by Yakovlev's Yakovlevs conspiratorial tone" tone as But "the the attention attention of the K.GB. he emphasized the need need to avoid attracting attracting the KGB. Grachev Grachev and of Shishlin hadto to conduct conduct an elaborate covert operation even to obtain copies copies of Sakharovs works without Chebrikov realizing what they were up to. On O n December Sakharov's 1,1986 time to tobe ripe to raise the Sakharov ques ques1, 1 986 Gorbachev finally considered the time atthe the approval to end his exile.39 exile.39 O n December 15 15 two two tion at Politburo, and gained its approval On electricians, escorted by a KGB officer, arrived arrivedat Sakharov's Sakharovs Gorky flat and installed electricians, KGB officer, Gorbachev. "You You [and a telephone. At 10 10 a.m. the next day he received a call from Gorbachev. together, Gorbachev told him. "You You have an apart apartBonner] can return to Moscow together," ment work!o ment there .. .. .. Go back back to your patriotic work!"40 Sakharovs work at the Though Gorbachev probably had in in mind Sakharov's the Academy of Sciences, by far his greatest impact was on the transition to a democratic political sys sysSciences, the tem-in changing the Soviet Union from what the theMarquis Marquis Custine, a vis vistem-in de de Custine, a French half earlier, had described as a "nation nation of itor to Tsarist Russia over a century and a half mutes. Custine had had famously prophesied: mutes."
time-sooner or later the day of discussion Nations are mute only for a time-sooner arises .. .. .. As soon as speech is restored to this silenced people, one will hear so an astonished world will think it ithas returned to the the confu confilmuch dispute that an Babel. sion of Babe1.41 discussion arrived arrived in Russia on May May 25, 1989, 1989, with the opening of The day of discussion" "The of Peoples Soviets, Soviets, the product product of the first contested the first session of the Congress of People's since 1917. 1917.Gorbachev later acknowledged acknowledged that, of of all elections since all the deputies elected unquestionably the most outstanding personality."42 pers~nality.~ to the congress, Sakharov was "unquestionably At the time, however, however, Gorbachev viewed Sakharov with a mixture of of irritation and

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Sakharov wanted the congress to abolish the one-party one-party state, curb the admiration. Sakharov ofthe KGB and establish a directly elected office of ofpresident. If power of "If only we had listened more carefully carehlly to Andrei Dmitriyevich [Sakharov]," [Sakharov], Gorbachev said later, "we was not to end end the we might might have have learned learned something." something. But But Gorbachev Gorbachev was not ready ready to the Com Communist power. He decide, Sakharov complained, munist Party's Partys monopoly monopoly of ofpower. H e could could not not decide, Sakharov complained, the leader of the nomenklatura or or the leader leader ofpereJtroika, of perestroika, " When When whether he was "the Argunzenti i Fakti published a poll showing that Sakharov was by by the popular weekly Argumenti country, Gorbachev was so enraged that he far the most popular politician in the country, he threatened to sack the editor. Tension between Sakharov and Gorbachev renewed at 1989. Gorbachev brushed aside an the next session sessionof of the congress in December 1989. with tens of of thousands of attempt by Sakharov to present him with of telegrams calling for an end to the one-party state. state. A few days later, Sakharov died suddenly of of a heart attack. At At his his lying lying in in state, state, Gorbachev Gorbachev and and the the Politburo Politburo stood stood bare-headed sevattack. bare-headed for for sev front of of the theopen coffin of of the man once described by Andropov as eral minutes in front Public Enemy Number Number One."43 One.43 "Public Sakharov's Sakharovs premature premature death death was was in in all all likelihood likelihood partly partly due due to to the the strain strain of of his his to the lack of proper medical treatment dur durand Bonners Bonner's earlier persecution, and to Gorky exile. "The The totalitarian system probably killed him, ingtheir their Gorky exile. him," said the democratic journalist journalist Vitali Korotich. Im "I'm only glad that before he died Sakharov dealt the system system a mortal mortal blow."44 In 1990 the the text of of a long longletter letter (previously availavail samizdat) able only in samizdat) calling for . democratic political change addressed by the Soviet leadership twenty years earlier was Sakharov and two other dissidents to the exhumed from the CPSU archives archives and published for the first time. Since GorGor bachev had had become general secretary, secretary, almost in the the subversive bachev become general almost every every issue issue raised raised in "subversive" 1970 had hadbeen the political agenda upon.45Simultaappeal of 1970 been placed on the agenda and acted upon.45 Simulta neously, Solzhenitsyns banned from bookshops library neously Solzhenitsyn's works, banned from bookshops and library shelves since ' 1974, had hadbecome bestsellers. 1974, the main agent for change in Gorbachevs The dissidents were not the Gorbachev's Soviet Union. As at them the at other other celebrated celebrated turning turning points points in in modern modern Russian Russian history-among history-among them the the West Westin inthe theearly eighteenth century, century, the end colturn to the end of of feudalism feudalism in in 1861, 1861, col lectivization and crash industrialization after 1929-change lectivization 1929-change came chiefly from the top. The Soviet system was transformed, and ultimately destroyed, destroyed, by by Gorbachevs Gorbachev's courageous but but misguided attempt to toreform reform the the unreformable. The dissidents, dissidents, howcourageous misguided attempt unreformable. The how ever, played played a major role in changing the political consciousness of of the Soviet ever, Soviet elite. One main task task One KGB report report of of the the mid-1970s mid-1970s quotes quotes Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn as as saying saying that that the the main a moral and ideological preparation preparation of of the Russian of the dissident movement was "a regime.46Against all the odds, the dissidents intelligentsia to oppose the Soviet regime."46 largely mission. A small small and and persecuted persecuted minority, minority, powerpower largely succeeded succeededin in fulfilling fulfilling that that mission. less save save for the strength strength and courage courage of its convictions, convictions, only feebly supported by the West, determined campaign silence them them by by the the worlds world's largest largest and and West, defeated defeated a a determined campaign to to silence most powerful powerful security and intelligence intelligence service. service. Nowhere Nowhere in most security and in the the world world during during the the final radical intelligentsia contri final third third of of the the twentieth twentieth century century did did a a radical intelligentsia make make a a greater greater contribution system. bution to to the the destruction destruction of of an an anti-democratic anti-democratic political political system.

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T H E INTERROGATION I N T E R RO G AT I O N O F Y URI O R L O V ON D E C E M B E R 2 9, 1 9 77 THE OF YURI ORLOV 29,1977

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The Orlov on December 29, 1977 According to official announcements The Interrogation Interrogation ofYuri of Yuri Orlov on December 29,1977 According to official announcements in Moscow, Fifth Fifth Directorate interrogation records of the interrogation of dissidents in Moscow, Directorate interrogation records of the interrogation of dissidents have have been destroyed. Mitrokhins Mitrokhin'scopy copy may therefore only surviving transcript of Orlov's been destroyed. may therefore be be the the only surviving transcript of Orlovs interrogation. byby thethe Fifth Directorate to the ofof thethe dossier interrogation. A copy copy was wassent sent Fifth Directorate to FCD the to to form formpart part dossier being toto discredit Orlov in in the West and prevent him receiv being used used to to prepare prepare active activemeasures measures discredit Orlov the West and prevent him receiving Prize. Mitrokhin's growing sympathy for the is reflected in ing the the Nobel NobelPeace Peace Prize. Mitrokhins growing sympathy fordissidents the dissidents is reflected in the the fact copied the the whole of this some documents dealing with their persecution, fact that thathe he copied whole ofand this andother some other documents dealing with their persecu rather his usual practice of copying extracts, making notes or writing precis. prkcis. rather than than following following his usual practice of copying extracts, making notes or writing The interrogation was was conducted conducted by byCaptain Captain Yakovlev, investigator for especially The interrogation Yakovlev, senior senior investigator for especially important cases with important cases with the the investigation investigation department department of ofthe the KGB Directorate Directorate for for Moscow Moscowand and Moscow Oblastunder under the USSR Council of Ministers, assisted by Assistant Procurator Moscow Oblast the Council of Ministers, assisted by Assistant Procurator Chistyakov City: Chistyakov of ofMoscow Moscow City:
Q UESTION: You shown the resolution dated December 29, 1977 summoning QUESTION: You have havebeen been shown the resolution dated December 29,1977 summoning you criminal case No. committing a crime specified you as as the the accused accusedin in criminal case No. 474, 474, charged chargedwith with committing a crime specified in in Section Section 1 1of of Article Article 70 70of of the the RSFSR RSFSR Criminal Criminal Code. Code. Do the charge? D o you you understand understand the the nature natureof of the charge?

No, had No, it it is is not not clear clear to to me. me.I I have have not not been been shown shown evidence evidencethat thatmy myactions actions had the regime, or or any other evidence; the intention intention of of undermining undermining or or weakening weakeningthe theSoviet Soviet regime, any other evidence; instead ofwhich, which, as it, the thecharge charge presented contains emotional phrases instead of as I see see it, presented to to meme contains emotional phrases which of the case. which obscure obscure the thenature nature of the case.
ORLOV: ORLOV: Q UESTION: QUESTION:

Do guilty ofof thethe charge? D o you you admit admit you youare are guilty charge?

ORLOV: ORLOV: No,

proof of of mymy guilt; I do in in my own No, I I do do not. not.I I do do not not see seeany any proof guilt; do not not feel feelguilty, guilty, my own

conscience. conscience.
Q UESTION: Do of preparing, duplicating and disseminating the doc QUESTION: D o you you admit admitthe thefacts facts of preparing, duplicating and disseminating the documents against you? uments specified specified in inthe thecharge charge against you? ORLOV: ORLOV:

Since these documents are qualified as slanderous fabrications, Sincethese documents are qualified as deliberately deliberatelyslanderous fabrications, uttered of undermining or or weakening the Soviet regime, I uttered with with the theintention intention of undermining weakening the Soviet regime, I refuse refuse to to answer answer your yourquestion. question.

Q UESTION: The has established established that thatyou youwere werea a direct participant the QUESTION: T h e investigation investigation has direct participant in in the preparation, ofof the documents cited in the and inand in preparation, duplication duplication and anddissemination dissemination the documents cited in charge, the charge, a cases youyou werewere their their author. The contents of these documents, as a number numberof of cases author. The contents of these documents, as the the mate materials slanderous nature, defaming the Soviet State and social rials of of the the case case show, show,are areof ofa a slanderous nature, defaming the Soviet State and social order. about that? order. What W h a t can can you you say say about that? ORLOV: ORLOV:In In

answer I should answer to tothat thatquestion, question, should like like to to say say the the same same thing thingas as I have have said said in in answer namely that I do evidence, and do do notnot feelfeel answer to to the the previous previousquestion, question, namely that do not not see seeany any evidence, and guilty conscience. guilty in in my myown own conscience.

Q UESTION: It has established that thatyou youacted acted deliberately undermine and QUESTION: has also also been been established deliberately toto undermine and weaken regime. What do do youyou have to say weaken the theSoviet Soviet regime. What have say toabout about that? that? ORLOV: ORLOV:I

Q UESTION: Do to which you QUESTION: D o you you believe believe that that the the imperialist imperialist States Statesand andtheir theiragencies, agencies, to which you addressed addressed the the majority majority of of the the documents documents which which incriminate incriminate you, you,are arenot notinterested interestedin in

I do do not not believe believe that that this this has has been been established. established.I rely rely on on my my own own inner inner convicconviction, and onon mymy thoughts. tion, on on my myexperience experience and thoughts. ,

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weakening and and undermining undermining the theSoviet Soviet regime but strengthening Is it? how we we weakening regime but in in strengthening it? I s that that how must interpret must interpretyou? you?
ORLOV: ORLOV:

I protest against such such a a manner mannerof of putting questions,when when you first make protest against putting questions, you first make anan assertion ofyour your own, then ask ask whether whether this this is is aa fact. fact. This This is is the the typical typical way way of assertion of own, and and then putting a question. The T h e very very problem problem set set out out in in your your positive positive assertion assertionderives derives putting a leading leading question. from the theinterpretation interpretation of general aspects of detente, on the contrary, of the Co from of general aspects of detente, or, on theor, contrary, of the Cold War, the interest ofthe peoples in making and, in particular, themutual mutual interest of the peoples incommon makingprogress common progress and, in particular, progress in inthe thefield field human rights or,the onother the other their mutual in interprogress of of human rights or, on hand, hand, their mutual interestinterest in inter nal the lack ofof such progress. The problem also also derives nal troubles troubles arising arisingbecause becauseof of the lack such progress. T h e problem derives from from the interpretation what international organizations one may turn to, to, andand to which the interpretation of of what international organizations one may turn to which ones one not (or, must not approach anyany international organizations?). ones onemay may not (or, perhaps, perhaps,one one must not approach international organizations?), derives from fromthe theinterpretation interpretationof of whether international obligations human rights It derives whether international obligations onon human rights may be be verified verifiedat atan aninternational international level; whether they can criticized by the internamay level; whether they can be be criticized by the interna tional public; when such criticism criticism is it becomes becomes interference interference in in tional public; when such is permissible, permissible, and and when when it internal general criticism of breaches of particular soci internal affairs; affairs; does doesin in general criticism of breaches of human human rights rights in ina a particular society structure or improve it; which humanhuman rights are organically linked with ety undermine undermineits its structure or improve it; which rights are organically linked wi the regime, regime,and and which the same applies to breaches of the rights. as the which areare not;not; and and the same applies to breaches of the rights. Besides, as Besides, is well well known, known, my been used in in the West by those progressive forces is mydocuments documentshave have been used the West by those progressive forces whose criticism criticismhas has clearly improved certain aspects of human rights in the I have have whose clearly improved certain aspects of human rights in the USSR. in inin France, Italy and probably others, and also in mind mind statements statementsby byCommunists Communists France, Italy and probably others, and criti also criticism their meetings and so rep cism from from various variousleft-wingers, left-wingers, their meetings and so forth, forth, and and also alsostatements statementsby by representatives Workers' Parties, Socialists and Social Democrats. One must in in mind resentatives of of Workers Parties, Socialists and Social Democrats. One mustbear bear mind that criticism criticism from from hostile hostile forces forcescan can be useful for the regime; example, criticism that be useful for the regime; forfor example, criticism of of capitalism the USSR USSR has undoubtedly strengthened that system prolonged capitalism by by the has undoubtedly strengthened that system andand prolonged its its existence. However, I did not appeal hostile forces, but either the international existence. However, did not appeal to to hostile forces, but either to the to international pubic pubic as as a a whole, whole, or or to to left-wingers, left-wingers,including includingCommunists, Communists,or orto tomembers membersof ofgovern governments irrespective irrespective of of regime, if was it was a question of formal international obligations. All ments regime, if it a question of formal international obligations. criticism, and external, has has led to the shifts in the field of human criticism, both bothinternal internal and external, led tofollowing the following shifts in the field of huma rights in in the theUSSR: USSR: as the the result result of ofthe the 1977 reforms, thenumber numberof of people imprisoned rights as 1977 reforms, the people imprisoned in the the camps camps is actually actually falling; falling; a clause been introduced in constitution the constitution concernin is a clause hashas been introduced in the concern ing the the unacceptability unacceptabilityof of persecution for criticism, very persecution which was one ing persecution for criticism, the the very persecution which was one of the reasons reasons why why Soviet Soviet citizens citizensappealed appealedto toWestern Western public opinion; the number of the public opinion; the number of of psychiatric been reduced; there has been a clear reduction, and possibly a psychiatric repressions repressionshas has been reduced; there has been a clear reduction, and possibly a total stop, to instances instances of of children children being being virtually virtually taken taken away away from from members members of of certain certain total stop, to religious following decisions decisions by judicial authorities, forth. For For religious communities communities following by the the judicial authorities, and and so forth. these can consider question has no no direct relevance to the these reasons, reasons,I can consider that thatyour your question has direct relevance to case. the case.

QUESTION: How Q UESTION: How

ORLOV: ORLOV: I

d oyou you explain explain your yourreluctance reluctanceto to give objective testimony subdo give objective testimony on on the the sub stance charge? stance of ofthe the charge?

testimony." InIn my view, I have have spoken I ask ask you you to to explain explain the the term term "objective objective testimony. my view, spoken about substance of the case. about the thevery very substance of the case.

QUESTION: Q UESTION: Do
ORLOV: I ORLOV:

Do you you have have anything anythingto toadd? add? I wish wish to towrite write additional comments in my hand. additional comments in my own hand.

[Written [Written comments comments by Orlov} Orlou]

In the the first first place, place, I want want to to add add that that I did did not not sign sign the the charge charge sheet, sheet,although althoughI read read it, it, in the investigator investigator who has just charge to to me me be be in part part because because I requested requested that that the who has just put put the the charge taken and I do Procuracy's rejection of my taken off off the thecase, case, and do not not accept acceptthe the Procuracys rejection of request. my request. Secondly, to explain explain further further why why I do not understand understand the thesubstance substance of of the Secondly, I want want to do not the charge. of Article of the charge. The T h e accusation accusation is is based based on on an aninterpretation interpretation of Article 70 of the RSFSR RSFSRcrimcrim-

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ina! code which whichisis not clear me: it has never explained me precisely inal code not clear to to me: it has never beenbeen explained to meto precisely and and unambiguously what meant by words the words "undermining," "weakening" and even unambiguously what isis meant by the undermining, weakening and even Soviet regime," regime,how howthe thepresence presence absence of "purpose" purpose is isto tobe be interpreted, what is "Soviet oror absence of interpreted, what is considered is is not, and so on. considered as as "defamatory" defamatory and andwhat what not, and on. have read readthrough through the record; answers written verbatim, do and not I have the record; mymy answers havehave been been written verbatim, and I do not have have any any corrections corrections or orobservations. observations. [Signed] [Signed] Yu. Yu. Orlov.47 or lo^.^^

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one operations and inter interne of the largest gaps in histories of Cold War intelligence operations signals intelligence national relations in both East East and West concerns the role of of signals intelligence (SIGINT). The role of the ULTRA intelligence generated by British and American codebreakers in hastening victory over overGermany and Japan during the Second codebreakers Second World well known. Research on post-war SIGINT, barely War is now well known. SIGINT, by contrast, has barely begun. exception of the VENONA decrypts of mostly wartime Soviet communicaWith the exception communica tions, British and American SIGINT records for for the Cold Cold War War remain completely closed. declassified files, show that SIGINT sometimes sometimes had impor closed. Other Other declassified files,however, however, show that SIGINT had an an imporin-house CIA history tant policy. An in-house history concludes concludes that that tant influence influence on on British British and and American American policy. during became "a critically important important source source of during the the Korean Korean War War SIGINT SIGINTbecame a critically of information." information. During British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Selwyn Lloyd, Lloyd, wrote wrote to to During the the 1956 1956 Suez Suez Crisis, Crisis, the the British Foreign Secretary, congratulate agency, GCH on the "vol SIGINT agency, GCHQ on thevolcongratulate the the director-general director-general of of the theBritish British SIGINT ume" and the Eastern decrypts decrypts it it had produced and to say "how ume and "excellence" excellenceof of the Middle MiddleEastern had produced and to say how valuable" decrypts had In 1992, end of of the the Cold War, PresPres valuable the the decrypts had proved proved to to be.1 be. In 1992, after after the the end ColdWar, describedSIGINT SIGINT as "a aprime factor" factor in his foreign policy.2 policy2 ident George Bush described War SIGINT operations conIn both both Britain and and the United States Cold War operations were con agency Soviet SIGINT trolled by a single agency. SIGINT was more fragmented. The The GRU had responsibility for intercepting and decrypting military communications, the KGB for responsibility diplomatic diplomatic and and other other civilian civilian traffic. traffic. An An attempt attempt early early in in the the Cold ColdWar Warto tocombine combine the was short-lived Until the the late late 1960s the SIGINT SIGINT operations operations of of the the two two agencies agencies was short-lived. Until 1960s KGB SIGINT, responsibility of SIGINT, ciphers ciphers and and communications communications were were the the primary primary responsibility of the the Eighth The The volume Soviet leadership Eighth Chief ChiefDirectorate.3 Dire~torate.~ volume of of SIGINT SIGINT supplied supplied to to the theSoviet leadership verylarge. large. 1961 was very The KGB annual report sent to to Khrushchev early in 1961 reveals that during 1960 the Eighth Chief Directorate decrypted 209,000 diplomatic sent during 1960 the Eighth Chief Directorate decrypted 209,000 diplomatic cables cables sent by representatives representatives of of fifty-one fifty-one states. states. No No fewer fewer than than 133,200 133,200 of of these were by these intercepts intercepts were forwarded no doubt, to its its international forwarded to to the the Central Central Committee Committee (chiefly, (chiefly, no doubt, to international depart department).4 By 1967 1967 the the ableto ment).4 KGB was able to decrypt 152 152 cipher cipher systems employed by a a total of 72 72 states.5 states. Though Though the the text text of of all all these these decrypts decrypts remains inaccessible in in the of remains inaccessible the archives of of the the Eighth Eighth and andSixteenth Sixteenth directorates, directorates, FCD files sources conarchives files and and other other sources con tain SIGINT operations operations and some of of the results tain important important information information on on KGB SIGINT and some the results achieved residencies abroad abroad and and th.-e Second Chief Chf Directorate achieved by by them. them. Both Both FCD residencies the Second Directorate (SCD) within within the the Soviet Soviet Union made impressive impressive contributions (SCD) Union made contributions to to these these operations. operations.

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David David Kahn, Kahn, the the leading leading Western Western historian historian of of SIGINT, SIGINT,plausibly plausibly concludes concludes that, that, on on present present evidence, evidence, bugs bugs and and agent agent penetration penetration contributed contributed more more than than cryptanaly cryptanalysis War.6 sis to to Soviet Soviet SIGINT SIGINT successes successes during during the theCold Cold War.6The The SCD SCD had had a a long long tradition tradition of For over thirty of bugging bugging Moscow Moscow embassies. embassies.For over thirty years years after after the the establishment establishment of of Soviet-American Soviet-American diplomatic diplomatic relations relations in in 1933, 1933, the theUnited UnitedStates States embassy embassy was was one one of of its its most most successful successful targets. targets. A navy navy electrician electrician who who conducted conducted the the first first electronic electronic sweep of the 1944 discovered hidden microphones. sweepof the embassy embassy in in 1944 discovered 120 120 hidden microphones. For For a a time, time, according according to to aamember member of of the the embassy embassy staff, staff, more more "kept kept turning turningup, up, in in the thelegs legs of of any any new new tables tables and and chairs chairs that that were were delivered, delivered, in in the the plaster plaster of of the the walls, walls, any any and and every everywhere."7 security by here."^ The The embassy embassy seems seems to to have have been been lulled lulled into into a a false false sense sense of of security by its its failure find more the early of the Cold War. failure to to find more bugs bugs during during the early years yearsof the Cold War. In In reality, reality, it it remained remained highly highly vulnerable vulnerable to to increasingly increasinglysophisticated sophisticated Soviet Soviet electronic electronic eavesdrop eavesdropping least ping until untilat at least the the mid-1960s. mid-1960s. In the new thorough In 1952 1952 the new American American ambassador, ambassador, George George Kennan, Kennan, ordered ordered a a thorough search search of of both both the the embassy embassy and and his his own own residence. residence. The The security security experts experts sent sent from from Washington Washington asked asked him him to to dictate dictate the the text text of of an an old old diplomatic diplomatic despatch despatch in in his his study study in in order order to to help help them them discover discover any anyvoice-activated voice-activatedlistening listening device. device. As As he he continued continued his his dictating, dictating, one one of of the the experts experts suddenly suddenly began began hacking hacking away away at at the the wall wall behind behind a a wooden wall, wooden replica replica of of the the Great Great Seal Seal of of the the United United States. States. Finding Finding nothing nothing in inthe the wall, he he then then attacked attacked the the seal seal itself itself with with a a mason's masons hammer hammer and and triumphantly triumphantly extracted extracted from Kennan's every from it it a a pencil-shaped pencil-shaped bug bug which which had had been been relaying relaying Kennans every word word (and (and no no doubt doubt those those of of previous previous ambassadors) ambassadors) to to Soviet Soviet eavesdroppers. eavesdroppers. Next Next morning morning Ken Kennan nan noted noted a a "new new grimness" grimness among among the the Soviet Soviet guards guards and and embassy embassy staff: staff: "So SOdense dense was the atmosphere of anger and hostility that one could have cut it with a knife."g was the atmosphere of anger and hostility that onecould have cut it with a knife.* In In 1953 1953 work work began began on on aanew new US US embassy embassy in in Tchaikovsky Tchaikovsky Street. Street. During During its its con construction struction American American security security personnel personnel stood stood guard guard each each day day to to prevent prevent the the installa installation oflistening oflistening devices, devices, particularly particularly on on the thetwo tion two top top floors floors which which were were to to contain contain the the CIA CIA station, station, the the ambassador's ambassadors office office and and the the cipher cipher rooms. rooms. The The day-long day-long security security vigil, vigil, however, however, served served little little purpose purpose since since the the guards guards were were withdrawn withdrawn at at night, night, thus thus allowing to bug allowing KGB KGB personnel personnel ample ample opportunity opportunity to bug the the embassy. embassy. Charles Charles "Chip" Chip Bohlen, Bohlen, who who had had succeeded succeeded Kennan Kennan as as ambassador, ambassador, later later blamed blamed the the extraordinary extraordinary decision (presum decision to to leave leave the the new new embassy embassy unguarded unguarded overnight overnight on on "carelessness" careles~ness~ (presumably in matters of ably his his own) own) and and the the desire desire "to to save save money."9 money. "Carelessness" Careles~ness~ matters in of security security was was by bynow now an an embassy embassy tradition. tradition. During discussion with During a a heated heated discussion with US ambassador ambassador Foy Foy Kohler Kohler in in 1962, 1962, Khrushchev Khrushchev clear-to the dismay dismay of the the KGB-that KGB-that he knew the ambassador ambassador had person personmade clear-to supply of steel steel tubing manufactured in the the West ally opposed the supply West for the construction gas pipelines pipelines in the theSoviet Soviet Union.10 Union. Though Kohler probably deduced that of natural gas Khrushchev seems Khrushchev knew knew the the contents contents of of some some of of his his cables cables to to Washington, Washington,he he seems not not to to have realized that the information came came from the bugging of his own embassy. have embassy. In 1964, however, however, acting on intelligence intelligence from the KGB defector Yuri Nosenko, the 1964, embassy discovered discovered over forty bugs concealed concealed in bamboo tubes built into the walls walls embassy detectors. Remarkably, Remarkably, behind the radiators in order to shield them from metal detectors.ll most most studies studies of of US-Soviet US-Soviet relations relations take take no no account account whatever whatever of of the the almost almost contincontin-

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United States Moscow uous hemorrhage of diplomatic secrets from the the United Moscow embassy embassy for for more than than thirty thirty years. years. more
F ROM TH E 1 series of of successes successes in in bugging I9 96 60 0s s onwards onwards the the KGB also also had had aaseries bugging Amer AmertheThird World, as well as the intelligence stations for ican and British embassies embassies in the which they provided diplomatic cover. The planting of listening devices devices on targets Soviet Union was the responsibility of the FCD OT (Operational Tech Techoutside the Soviet (also known as the Fourteenth Department), Department), whose offi offinical Support) Directorate (also cers in residencies hada a wide range of duties which included providing the equipment for clandestine clandestine photography of classified classified documents, short-range radio communication and the construction of apparently innocent objects (such as hairhair brushes and cans of shaving cream) which could be used to conceal film and other espionage remote espionage paraphernalia. paraphernalia. Each Each of of the the OT eavesdropping eavesdropping devices, devices, often often remoteindividually constructed in order to assist concealment in the target controlled, was individually alwayscarefully carefully werefixed futed area, which was always reconnoitered beforehand. The devices devices were in officers or by local localagents employed as cleaners, cleaners, elec elecplace either by FCD operations officers tricians, plumbers, furniture makers and telephone company technicians.12 technicians.12 One FCDs most One of the FCD's most successhl successful eavesdropping eavesdropping operations operations against against a a British British tartar thechief SIS station in the theMiddle Middle East, the get was directed at the East, which was located in the British OVRAG, "Ravine")Y Ravine).13During British embassy embassy building in Beirut Beirut (codenamed OVRAG, During the 1960s a Lebanese maid in the embassy, embassy, Elizabeth Aghasapet Ghazarian, was early 1960s talent-spotted bishop in the Armenian Armenian Orthodox Orthodox church, church, codenamed talent-spotted by by a a bishop in the codenamed OLAF, OLAF, who had'been hadbeen recruited as a Soviet Soviet agent in 1947.14 Ghazarian was herself 1947.14 In 1964 Ghazarian (Cinderella7).15 By January 1966 1966 she had successrecruited as agent ZOLUSHKA ("Cinderella").is success fully planted planted a a radio radio microphone microphone (STEREO-I) (STEREO-1) in the office office of of the fully in the the ambassador, ambassador, Sir Sir Derek Riches. Riches. On O n February February 4 ZOLUSHKA succeeded succeeded in another radio Derek in concealing concealing another radio thedesk microphone (STEREO-2), about the size of a matchbox, matchbox, behind behind the desk of the Old Old Etonian SIS SIS head of station, Peter Lunn Lunn (codenamed (codenamed PHOENIX), PHOENIX), who who worked 16 under as the embassy first secretary. secretary.16 under diplomatic cover as Lunns background and career by his former colleague The Centre was briefed on Lunn's Philby, who had hadworked in Beirut as a journalist and SIS SISagent from 1956 until Kim Philby, 1956 until his defection defection to to Moscow Moscow in in 1963, after SIS of his his 1963, soon soon after SIS obtained obtained proof proof of his treachery.17 treacheryY Lunn been captain of the the British British team at Lunn was was one one of of Britain's Britains leading leading skiers; skiers; he he had had been captain of team at 1936 authorof a series ofwell-known skiing man manthe 1936 Winter Olympics and was the author series of uals.* He H e and Philby joined SIS uals.is SIS at almost the same moment in in 1941.19 1941.19 After his C M G (the defection Philby informed the KGB that Lunn had been awarded the CMG officer save savethe for his the highest decoration then given to any SIS SIS officer the Chief) Chief) for his success success in in the planning and operation operation of a 500-meter tunnel under under East Berlin Berlin which in 1955-6 1955-6 tapped Soviet Soviet and and East East German German telephone telephone lines. lines. The The Centre Centre rather rather admired admired Lunns tapped Lunn's professionalism calm, self-assured According to to a a report report on on operation professionalism and and calm, self-assured manner. manner. According operation RUBIN in in 1967: 1967:

Peter information on Peter Lunn Lunn has has many many agents, agents, who who collect collect information on intelligence intelligence services services of East, on on the the activof socialist socialist countries countries and and their their representatives representatives in in the theMiddle Middle East, activ-

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ities intelligence service United Arab short-lived ities of of the the intelligence service of of the the United Arab Republic Republic [the [the short-lived union of union of Egypt Egypt and and Syria], Syria], on on oil oil policy policy (via (via a a fluctuating fluctuating agent agent network), network), on on relations relations between between Arab Arab countries countries and and the the USSR USSR and and carry carry out out the the cultivation cultivation of of Egyptian Egyptian intelligence intelligence officers. officers. In In his his agent agent work work Lunn Lunn shows shows caution, caution, expe experience, puts contacts. With rience, puts a a high high priority priority on on security security with with agent agent contacts. With those those agents agents who under embassy embassy cover used the who do do not not know know that that Lunn Lunn works works under coverhe he used the assumed assumed name Joseph Joseph and and met met either either at at aa clandestine rendezvous rendezvous or or at at the the flat of of his his secname clandestine flat sec retary . .. .. For Lunn, he he retary. For meetings meetings with with agents agents who who are are personally personally known known to to Lunn, used business premises premises in used his his flat flat or or business in the thecity. city. Lunn Lunn is is demanding, demanding, strives strives to to give give his agents set tasks and to they are out clearly. very eco his agents set tasks and to ensure ensure they are carried carried out clearly. He He is is very economical nomical when when paying paying rewards rewards to to his his agents, agents, he he adheres adheres strictly strictly to to the therule rule that, that, firstly, firstly, it it is is only only necessary necessary to to pay pay for for information information when when it it is is unobtainable unobtainable with without out paying paying and, and, secondly, secondly, that that payment payment is is only only for for that that information information which which can can be be used used actively. actively. Lunn's station Lunns only only major major weakness, weakness, in in the the Centre's Centres view, view, was was his his relaxed relaxed attitude attitude to to station security. security. The The KGB eavesdroppers eavesdroppers overheard overheard one one of of his his staff staff suggest suggest extra extra security security measures. been relieved measures measures. They They must must have have been relieved to to hear hear Lunn Lunn reply reply that that no nofurther further measures were were necessary. necessary. The The bugging bugging of of the the office office of of the the Beirut Beirut head head of of station, station, codenamed codenamed operation RUBIN, continued continued for for three three and and a a half half years years after after Lunn Lunn was was recalled recalled to to a a operation 20 post at SIS headquarters post at SIS headquarters in in November November 1967. 1967.20 The deputy head of the FCD, Mikhail Stepanovich Tsymbal, Tsymbal, reported to Andropov identified British agents Andropov in in 1967 1967 that thatRUBIN RUBINhad had identified over over fifty fifty British agents in in the the Mid Middle Europe: Of "Of the SIS agent dle East East and and Europe: the greatest greatest interest interest is is the the identification identification of of an an SIS agent group the highest of group consisting consisting of of a a courier courier and and two two agents agents in in the highest government government circles circles of Iraq." also alleged alleged to agent" in inEgypt Egyptwith "with access access to Iraq. SIS SIS was was also to have have "an an important important agent to Nasser, and "sub-sources" sub-sources who included the foreign minister of one Mid MidPresident Nasser," dle the army dle Eastern Eastern country countryand and the army chief-of-staff chief-of-staff of of another.21 another.21 revealed that SIS penetrated the theLebanese Commu CommuOperation RUBIN also revealed SIS had penetrated nist Party. Its most important penetration agent was a lawyer who was a member of Partys Politburo and a personal friend of its general secretary, secretary, Nicolas Nicolas Chaoui. the Party's O n September 27, 1967 the Centre informed the Soviet Politburo that, in addition On 1967 the Centre affairs of the Lebanese Communist Party, the to keeping SIS SIS well informed on the affairs lawyer had provided intelligence on contacts between the Party leadership and the Soviet ambassador, ambassador, and on Soviet Soviet involvement in the the affairs affairs of the Lebanese retiring Soviet Cairo Peace Conference. The Centre, how howand Syrian peace movements and of the Cairo ever, was wasreluctant to warn Chaoui that thatone one associates was was SIS agent, ever, of his closest associates an SIS he in turn the probably for fear that he would confront the agent, who in turn would alert SIS SIS to the penetration of its operations. 1971, a year after SIS In 1971, SIS had had discovered the bugging of its Beirut station, the Soviet Politburo gave permission for Chaoui to be briefed during a visit to Moscow. At a meeting in the the international international department departmentof the CPSU on December 25, Pavel Pave1 officer, informed Chaoui that the lawyer was was Yefimovich Nedosekin, a senior FCD officer, regarded by SIS SIS as one agents and had given it secret informa"one of its very valuable agents"

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tion about the Lebanese Communist Party Party and two of the most important Soviet World Peace Council and the the Afro-Asian Comfront organizations, the World Mro-Asian Solidarity Com that, mittee. Though doubtless somewhat shocked, Chaoui admitted admitted that, as early as 1949, he had received a report of a confidential meeting between the lawyer and a 1949, British consul; consul; he added that since 1968 1968 the thelawyer had twice been to London, London,ostenosten acknowledged that he had no intelligence sibly for treatment to a cataract. Chaoui acknowledged department capable capable of protecting Party security, security, and promised to take immediate up.22 action to set one Up.22 Among was the the discovery discovery that that Among other other unwelcome unwelcome revelations revelations of of operation operation RUBIN was SIS had planting six the GRU and and the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak SIS had succeeded succeeded in in planting six agents agents in in the the KGB, the StB. The most important appears appears to have been been SHAUN, of an anadvertising advertising StB. SHAUN, the owner of deputy, bureau in Damascus, who was discovered to be a double agent run by Lunns Lunn's deputy, BARITONE. A Centre damage assessment concluded that SHAUN had comproBARITONE. compro series of ofKGB operations operations in which he had taken part, among them the therecruit recruitmised a series ment of the Spanish Spanish cipher clerk GOMEZ (arrested after his return to Spain); Spain); the attempted recruitment recruitment of of an an unidentified of the the West West German attempted unidentified member member of German embassy embassy in in Damascus; and contacts contacts between the Soviet military attache attach6 and the chief of the Syr SyrDamascus; staff. SHAUN SHAUN had also reported to betweenthe ian general staff to SIS SIS on an an affair between the KGB resres ofa Soviet Soviet doctor. doctor. tersely informed ident in Damascus Damascus and the wife of Andropov was was tersely informed that measures havebeen been neutralize the consequences treachery.23 "measures have taken to neutralize consequences of of SHAUNs SHAUN's treachery."23 In January 1967 1967 ZOLUSHKA succeeded in placing a bug in BARITONE's BARITONES ZOLUSHKA also succeeded office in the the SIS discovered office SIS Beirut station. In addition to running SHAUN, SHAUN, he was discovered sixteen agents inside the Lebanese Communist Party to have sixteen Partyand andother other left-wing organizations. A detailed study of the SIS SIS officers organizations. officers in Lebanon, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and thebugging of of the Beirut station led the Centre Centreto draw elsewhere identified through the conclusions which, surprisingly, surprisingly, it does not seem to have fully a number of general conclusions correctly, that the the cover grasped before. The report on operation RUBIN concluded, correctly, posts occupied by SIS officers officers in British embassies were were rarely as high as counselor and never higher; most were first, second or third secretaries, secretaries, and seldom headed any of the the main main embassy embassy departments departments such as trade of such as trade and and information. information. SIS SIS personnel personnel did did not more time time outside outside the embassy, lived not keep keep to to the the daily daily diplomatic diplomatic routine, routine, spent spent more the embassy, lived in worse accommodation, drove older cars and gave fewer large receptions at their homes than British diplomats, but had higher expense allowances allowancesand arranged more meetings in restaurants and other public places. Philby had doubtless made such debriefers still tended to seek only detailed classified infor inforpoints before, but KGB debriefers mation from agents and defectors defectors and failed to use them to to add to their their general understanding of the West. By the late 1960s 1960s Philby understanding Philby was, was, unsurprisingly, unsurprisingly, deeply deeply depressed heavily, convinced that the depressed and drinking drinking heavily, the KGB had no "no idea idea" of of how to profit vast experience.24 profit from from his his vast e~perience.~~ In 1967 1967 ZOLUSHKA was rewarded for her work as a KGB agent with the the secret granting of Soviet citizenship. citizenship. For the next four years she continued to provide clasclas otherintelligence from the SISstation station sified documents and other the British British embassy embassy and and the the SIS 1971, after she had been questioned about the discovery of in Beirut. In 1971, of the radio microphones, she was hurriedly exfiltrated to to the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, settled settled in in Armenia

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and Armenian KGB and given given a a modest modest pension pension of of 120 120 roubles. roubles. In In 1978, 1978, after after the the Armenian reported the Centre Centrethat that the pension reported to to the the pension was was insufficient, insufficient, Andropov Andropov approved approved an an increase to increase to 180 180 roubles. roubles.
B E CAU HE E closeness CAUSE O F TH closeness of of Anglo-American Anglo-American intelligence intelligence cooperation, cooperation, eaves eavesdropping SIS Beirut dropping on onthe the SIS Beirut station station also also produced produced intelligence intelligence on on the theCIA. CIA. The The KGB discovered CIA/SIS to bug discovered plans plans for, for, and and was was able able to to forestall, forestall, a a joint joint C I N S I S operation operation to bug the the Beirut bureau In 1969 operation which, Beirut bureau ofNovosti.25 of No~osti.~ 1969 In the theKGB KGB residency residency began began an an operation which, it it was hoped, would 26 was hoped, would penetrate penetrate the the CIA station station (codenamed (codenamed OMUT ("Whirlpool" (Whirlpool))26 successfully as ZOLUSHKA O n KGB instructions, as successfully ZOLUSHKA had penetrated that of SIS. SIS. On one Lebanese agents, codenamed MARAT, founded one of of its its Lebanese agents, a a hotel hotelowner owner codenamed founded an an employ employment agency maids and used in in ment agency designed designed to to attract attract maids and domestic domestic servants servants who who could could be be used MainAdversary. Adversary. The most promising applicant to the theagency operations against the Main was Matrosian (codenamed Armenian fam was Mary Mary Matrosian (codenamed VERA), VERA), aaLebanese Lebanese maid maid from from an an Armenian family living living in in Syria. Syria. Until Until 1967 she had had worked worked in in the the American American ambassador's ambassadors resi resiily 1967 she dence dence in in Beirut, Beirut, but but had had taken taken refuge refuge with with her her family family in in Syria Syria after after the the outbreak outbreak of of the the Arab-Israeli Arab-Israeli Six S i x Day Day War. War. On O n her her return return to to Beirut Beirut in in 1969, 1969, MARAT's MARATs agency agency found series of American diplomatic diplomatic families. found her her domestic domestic work work with with a a series of American families. VERA was was recruited under aafalse recruited by by MARAT under false flag flag to to provide provide information information on on her her employers employers and and remove papers papers from from their their homes. homes. MARAT told remove told her her the the information information was was needed needed by by Armenian Armenian community community and and church church leaders leaders in in order order to to keep keep them them informed informed of of poten potential the security Armenian people. tial threats threats to to the security of of the the Armenian people. In In 1971 1971 MARAT handed handed her her over over to to a a controller controller from from the the Beirut Beirut residency, residency,who who posed posed as as a a fellow fellow Armenian. Armenian. With With VERAS(possibly (possibly unwitting) unwitting) help, the KGB succeeded succeeded in in bugging bugging the the apartment apartment of of VERNs help, the worked.27 the CIA officer for whom she worked.27 KGB files record a number of other KGB attempts to bug CIA stations, though none been as operation RUBIN. Among Among the most vulner none seems seems to to have have been as successful successful as asoperation themost vulnerembassies was wasthat in in Conakry, C.onakry,the capital of Guinea. One of the files able US embassies files noted brief reference to the successful bugging of an American by Mitrokhin contains a brief the successful diplomats apartment in Conakry in 1965.28 1965.28 details are available diplomat's Much fuller details available on the bugging embassy during Saharan Mrica bugging of of the the Conakry Conakryembassy during the the1970s, 1970s, when when subsub-Saharan Africa became became apriority area for both Soviet foreign policy and KGB operations.29 operation^.^^ for the first time a 1972 aaGuinean Guinean (codeIn December 1972 employee of the embassy recruited by the KGB (code successively RUM and SANCHO) SANCHO) succeeded in installing a radio-operated named successively eavesdropping eavesdropping device device in in the the office office of of the the ambassador, ambassador, Terence Terence Todman Todman (succeeded (succeeded in in 1975by William Harrop). Harrop).RUM/SANCHO was instructed that, if detected, he May 1975 diplowas to tell his interrogators that he had been paid to place the bug by a Chinese diplo mat mat whose whose visiting visiting card card he he was was given. given. The The bug bug (replaced (replaced by by an an improved improved version version in in 1974) was so so well concealed, concealed, however, however,that it went went undetected during three January 1974) Todsecurity. The KGB monitoring post which recorded Tod annual checks on embassy security. mans dictation and conversations conversations with embassy and CIA staff (operation REBUS) man's ambassadors office. office. was situated in an apartment only thirty meters from the ambassador's by Todman's Todmansengaging habit of The voice-activated bug was sometimes activated by cheerfidly to himself himself. In general, general, however, however, operation bursting into song or whistling cheerfully

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REBUS REBUS provided provided what what the the Centre Centreconsidered considered information information "of ofgreat great operational operational value" value on US policy policy to to Mrican African liberation liberation movements movements as as well well as as on on State StateDepartment Department assesson assess relations and Soviet Soviet policy Africa. The volume volume of ments ofSoviet-American Soviet-American relations policy in Mrica. intelligence intelligence was was so so large large that that two two English-speaking English-speaking operations operations officers, officers, Anatoli Anatoli Mikhaylovich Tatuzov, were seconded Mikhaylovich Zheleznoy Zheleznoy and and Yuri Yuri Yefimovich Yefimovich Tatuzov, were seconded from from the the KGB residency the residency in in Addis Addis Ababa Ababa to to process process it. it. In In July July 1975 1975 bugged bugged conversations conversations in in the ambassadors office office revealed revealedthat the the embassy embassy was wasaware awarethere had been a leak in its ambassador's communications communications with with Washington Washington and and had had asked asked the the State State Department Department for for help help in in reviewing security. Though reviewingembassy embassy security. Though strongly stronglytempted tempted to to remove remove the the bug, bug, the the Conakry Conakry decided not to to do doso so for fear of compromising compromising RUM/SANCHO. RUM/SANCHO. Accord Accordresidency decided ing to to a a KGB KGB damage damage assessment, assessment, when when the the bug bug in in the the ambassador's ambassadors office office was was dis dising covered in September, September, "suspicion suspicion fell fell entirely entirely on the Guinean [Intehgence] covered Guinean Special [Intelligence] Services." Services.RUM/SANCHO RUMISANCHOwent went undetected undetected and and remained remained on on the theembassy embassy staf30 stafL3 The The KGB's KGBs most most ambitious ambitious bugging bugging operation operation against against a a US diplomatic diplomatic mission mission during new during the the later later Cold Cold War War was was the the bugging bugging of of a a new eight-storey eight-storey Soviet-built Soviet-built embassy embassy building in in Moscow Moscow on on which which construction construction began began in in 1979. 1979. The The CIA was was warned warned in in building 1980 Eighth Chief Chief Directorate, "the 1980 by by a a defector defector from from the the Eighth Directorate, Viktor Viktor Sheymov, Sheymov, that that the going to make the building itself a giant system system of of sensors sensorsthat could pick KGB was going up up virtually virtually anything." anything. Officials Officials in in Washington, Washington, however, however, rashly rashly concluded concluded that that any any sensor installed installed by the KGB KGB could could be be detected and removed removed before before it was used. used. Five sensor years years later later they they discovered discovered they they had had made made an an expensive expensive mistake. mistake. Further Further investigation investigation revealed a a series series of of highly sophisticated sophisticated bugs bugs built built into into the the fabric of of the the building building which which revealed highly fabric according to aa member of the House House Foreign Mfairs Affairs Committee, "an an eight eightmade it, according storey the Politburo." the storey microphone microphone plugged plugged into into the Politburo. Steel-reinforcing Steel-reinforcing rods rods set set into into the concrete codenamed G concretewere were designed designed to to serve serve as asantennae. antennae. A power power source, source, codenamed BATWIN BATWING by by the the CIA, CIA, which which was was discovered discovered embedded embedded in in a a concrete. concrete wail, wall, was was estimated estimated to to be be ashington Post, to last last for for a a century. century. One One US official, official, interviewed interviewed by by the the W Washington Post, com comable to mented, "Our technical people were astounded at the level of sophistication. One mented, Our technical people wereastounded at thelevel of sophistication. One man man from from the the CIA said, said, 'These These are are the the kind kind of of things things that that are are only only on on the thedrawing drawing boards boards here.' here. " For For the the KGB KGB as as well well as as the the State State Department, Department, however, however, the the operation operation ended ended in in expensive expensive failure. failure.The The new new embassy embassybuilding building was was never neveroccupiedY occupied.31
M O S T EAV RAT ON NS S using MOST E A VE ES SD DR RO OP PP PI IN NG G O PER ATIO using bugs bugs planted planted in in foreign foreign embassies embassies or or overseas overseas targets targets were were short-term, short-term, unlikely unlikely to to last last more more than than a a few few years. years. By By the the late late 1960s operations were 1960s the the FCD's FCDs most most important important and and long-term long-term SIGINT SIGINT operations were run run by by specialized specialized posts posts within within its its residencies residencies in in foreign foreign capitals capitals which which intercepted intercepted local local telephone post appears telephone and and radio radio communications. communications. The The earliest earliest such such intercept intercept post appears to to have RADAR, it have been been that that set set up up in in the theMexico Mexico City City residency residency in in 1963. 1963.Codenamed Codenamed RADAR, it was communications was given giventhe the task task of of intercepting interceptingthe the communications of of the theUS embassy embassy and and CIA station, The station, but but had had only only limited limited success.32 success.32 The most most successful successfulof of the the residency residency posts posts cre created Main Adversary ated to to intercept intercept the the communications communications of of the the Main Adversary were were those those set set up up in inthe the United United States States itself. itself.The The first, first, codenamed codenamed POCHIN ("Start" (Start or or "Initiative"), Initiative), started started life floor life in in 1966 1966 on onthe thetop top floor of of the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy on on Sixteenth Sixteenth Street Street in inWashing Washington, House. In similar BA ton, a a few few blocks blocks from from the the White White House. In 1967 1967 a a similar post, post, codenamed codenamed PRO PROBA

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("Test" (Testor or "Trial"), Trial),was was established established by by the the New NewYork York residency. residency.There There were were eventually eventually five five POCHIN intercept intercept posts posts in in various various Soviet Soviet establishments establishments in in and and around around Wash Washington York PROBA posts posts in in the theNew New York regionY region.33 ington and andfour four PROBA By By 1970 1970 POCHIN-1 POCHIN-1 (at (at the theembassy) embassy) and and POCHIN-2 POCHIN-2 (in (in the the embassy embassy residen residential tial complex) complex) had had transformed transformed intelligence intelligence collection collection by by the the Washington Washingtonresidency.34 residency.34 According According to to Oleg OlegKalugin, Kalugin, head head of of Line Line PR: PR We able to We were were able to overhear overhear the the communications communications of of the the Pentagon, Pentagon, the the FBI, FBI, the the State other agenagen State Department, Department, the theWhite White House, House, the the local local police, police,and and a a host host of of other cies. These communications cies.These communicationsall all were were broadcast broadcast on on open, open, non-secure non-secure channels, channels,but but nevertheless over the nevertheless a a surprising surprisingamount amount of of useful useful material materialwas was relayed relayed over the airways.35 air~ays.~ Among intelligence was vet Among the the intelligencewhich which most most impressed impressed the the Centre Centre was secret secret data data on onthe the vetting of ninety the first ting of ninety candidates candidates for for posts posts in in the first Nixon Nixon administration. administration. In In 1969-70 1969-70 twenty-three to be twenty-three POCHIN intercepts intercepts were were considered considered sufficiently sufficiently important importantto be shown to leading members of the Politburo. shown to leading members of the Politburo. During the same the UN) During the same period period PROBA-1 PROBA-1 (in (in the the Soviet Soviet mission mission to tothe UN) and and PROBA-2 PROBA-2 (in (in the the large large embassy embassy "dacha" dachaat at Glen Glen Cove Cove on on Long Long Island) Island) intercepted intercepted diplomatic and received Argentina, Brazil, diplomatic traffic traffic sent sentand received by by the the UN misions missions of ofArgentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Portugal, Spain and Venezuela, as well as some US military Canada, France, Portugal, Spain and Venezuela, as well as some military cables cables and and the the communications communications of of Radio Radio Liberty Liberty and and Radio Radio Free Free Europe. Europe. According According to to the the PROBA PROBA files, files, the the intelligence intelligence from from these these intercepts intercepts was was given given"a a high high evaluation" evaluationby by both Malik. 36 both Foreign Foreign Minister Minister Gromyko Gromyko and and the the Soviet Soviet UN representative, representative, Yakov Yakov Malik.36 operations operations against against the the Main Main Adversary Adversary were were greatly greatly assisted assistedby by a a series access to series of of agents agents and and defectors--al d e f e c t o r s 4l of of them them walk-ins-with walk-ins-with access to highly highly classified classified intelligence and/or cipher systems. In intelligence on on American American cryptanalysis cryptanalysisand/or cipher systems. In 1960 1960 two two NSA employees, employees,Bernon Bernon F. F. Mitchell Mitchell and and William Wjlliam H. H.Martin, Martin, who who had had made made contact contactwith with the the KGB were exflitrated by they KGB a a year year earlier earlier in in Mexico Mexico City, City, were exfiltrated by the the FCD FCD to to Moscow, Moscow, where where they continued continued being being debriefed debriefed for for several several years.37 years.37In In 1963 1963 Staff Staff Sergeant Sergeant Jack Jack E. E. Dunlap Dunlap committed spent committed suicide suicide after after several severalyears years spent smuggling smugglingtop top secret secret documents documents out out ofNSA of NSA headquarters suicide, another headquartersat at Fort Fort Meade Meade for for the the GRU. GRU. Shortly Shortlybefore before Dunlap's Dunlaps suicide, another NSA defector, defector, Victor Victor Norris Norris Hamilton, Hamilton, arrived arrived in in Moscow. Moscow. In In 1965 1965 Robert Robert Lipka, Lipka, a a young young army documents, army clerk clerkat at NSA NSAresponsible responsible for forthe the shredding shredding of of highly highlyclassified classified documents, began began handing handing many many of ofthem them over over to to the the KGB. KGB. Lipka Lipka is is the the last last KGB KGB agent agent inside inside the the NSA identified flies Mitrokhin. identified in in the the files seen seenby by Mitrokhin. (A (A retired retired NSA employee, employee, Ronald RonaldPelton, Pelton, was, was, however, valuableintelligence intelligence to the early however, to to provide provide valuable to the the Washington Washington residency residency in in the early 1980s.) Officer John John Walker, 1980s.) Shortly Shortly after after Lipka Lipka left left NSA in in 1967, 1967, Chief Chief Warrant Warrant Officer Walker, a a communications staff the communicationswatch watch officer officer on on the the staff of of the commander commander of of submarine submarineforces forces in in the the Atlantic career as Atlantic (COMSUBLANT), (COMSUBLANT), began began an aneighteen-year eighteen-year career as a a KGB KGB agent, agent, supplying supplying detailed detailed information information on on US US naval naval ciphers.38 ciphers.38 During the late theNew New York During the late 1960s 1960s both both the York and and Washington Washington residencies residencies had had a a series of of other other striking striking SIGINT SIGINT successes. successes. Late Late in in 1969 1969 operation PRESSING, PRESSING,run run series operation New York residency, residency,succeeded succeeded in concealing concealing remote-controlled radio transby the New
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offices used by the chairman of mitters in UN offices of the Security Council. The devices, hidden in inwooden wooden boards, boards, were were fixed furedbeneath beneath bookcases bookcases and Westhidden and constructed constructed from from West ern materials materials to ern conceal their Soviet origin. Simultaneously, operation KRAB, which to conceal their Soviet origin. Simultaneously,operation which almost to be approved by the Politburo, succeeded almost certainly had to succeeded in in bugging bugging the the secsec secretary-general, U Thant (codenamed BROD). A radioradio retariat of the UN secretary-general, controlled also concealed in the the Ghanaian Ghanaian controlled eavesdropping eavesdropping device device was was also concealed in the offices offices of of the mission to the theUN. U N . 339 9 In 1969 1969 the Washington residency succeeded succeeded in in concealing concealing a In the Washington residency a remote-control remote-control radio-operated meeting room of the the Senate Senate Foreign Relations radio-operated bugging bugging device device in in the the meeting room of Foreign Relations device, once again constructed Committee. The device, constructed from from Western materials, materials, continued to information (which have to function function for for at at least least four four years. years. In In February February 1973 1973 information (which may may have inaccurate) reached the residency from press sources sourcesthat a abug had been found been inaccurate) attached the underside the Foreign Foreign Relations Committee attached to to the underside of of the the press press table table in in the Relations Committee room. The KGB was puzzled by the report since was fixed fmed since its own listening device was beneath the seat seat of of a a chair chair rather rather than than under underthe thetable table and and still still appeared to be be funcbeneath the appeared to func normally. Expecting its bug to be discovered, tioning normally. discovered,Service Service A prepared a story story ithad been placed by by the DGSE, the French foreign intelligence ser serclaiming that it surprise, however, however, the the media media lost lost interest in the the episode episode and and no no vice. To To the the KGB's surprise, vice. interest in report report of of the the bug bug beneath beneath the the chair chair appeared appeared in in the thepress.40 pres4'
E A R LY I N 1 9 6 8 the most important important penetration penetration of of British British SIGSIG EARLY 1968 the KGB achieved achieved its its most operations since sinceJohn John Cairncross Cairncross had had entered entered Bletchley Bletchley Park 1942.Corporal Corporal INT operations Park in in 1942. Geoffrey station at at Gatow in in West Geoffrey Arthur Arthur Prime, Prime, then then working working in in the theRAF SIGINT station Gatow West Berlin, a message a Soviet Soviet checkpoint Soviet Berlin, handed handed a message to to a a Russian Russian officer officer at at a checkpoint asking asking Soviet intelligence to to make make contact contact with with him. him. Prime's Prime's note note was was passed passed not the FCD but intelligence not to to the but comparatively lowly KGB Third Directorate, whose to the comparatively whose main main responsibility responsibility was was the and security security of Soviet armed forces but but which which sometimes sometimes succeeded the surveillance surveillance and of Soviet armed forces succeeded in making making (usually (usually low-level) low-level)recruits recruits among among Western Western troops in troops stationed stationed in in Germany. Germany. Anxious to steal by gaining gaining the the credit credit for for Anxious to steal a a march march over over the the more more prestigious prestigious FCD by amessage, Prime's recruitment, a Third Directorate officer left left him him a message, inviting him him to to a a rendezvous Berlin, in attached to to his his car car door. At rendezvous in in East East Berlin, in a a small small magnetic magnetic cylinder cylinder attached door. At the rendezvous, Prime Prime agreed agreed to to work work as as the meeting meeting which which followed followed and and at at subsequent subsequent rendezvous, explained that his service with to end endin in August a KGB agent agent but explained his service with the RAF was was due due to August 1968. In agreement his Third case officers he applied, applied, successfully, successfully, 1968. In agreement with with his Third Department Departmentcase officershe for GCHC2.t, the British British SIGINT agency. agency. for a a job jobprocessing processing Russian Russian intercepts intercepts at at G C H Q the sexual and social misfit who blamed many of his problems on the thecapPrime was a sexual cap italist "a misplaced misplaced idealistic italist system system and, and, as as he he later later acknowledged, acknowledged, developed developed "a idealistic view view of of Russian Communism." however,skillfblly skillfully handled handled by by his his controllers. controllers. In In Russian Communism." He He was, was, however, September GCHC2.t, spent aa week in in the KGB September 1968, 1968, before before taking taking up up his his job job in inG C H Q PPrime r i m e spent week theKGB compound suburbs being being trained trained in in radio radio transmistransmis compound at at Karlshorst Karlshorst in in the the East EastBerlin Berlin suburbs sion, photography of of documents a Minox sion, cipher cipher communications, communications, microdots, microdots, photography documents with with a Minox camera and use of Before flying to Britain, Britain, he he was was given given a a camera and the the use of dead dead letter-boxes. letter-boxes. Before flying to briefcase set of pads, secret secret writing materials and and 400 400 briefcase containing containing a a set of one-time one-time cipher cipher pads, writing materials H e continued working as a Soviet agent in G C H Q f o r almost pounds in banknotes. He GCHQfor

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nine nine years, years, spending spending most most of of his his time time transcribing transcribing and and translating translating intercepts. intercepts. Among Among the during his in the intelligence intelligence supplied supplied by by Prime Prime during his final final year year working working for for GCHQ GCHQi n 1 976-7 were details of British successes and failures in decrypting Soviet traffic. 1976-7 were details of British successes and failures in decrypting Soviet traffic. Though it Though his his GCHQcolleagues GCHQcolleagues were were struck struck by by his his morose morose appearance, appearance, they they put put it down down to to his his unhappy unhappy marriage marriage and and failure failure to to be be promoted.41 promoted. The GINT operations 960s led The expansion expansion of of KGB KGB SI SIGINT operations during during the thelate late 1 1960s led to to aareorga reorganization at the Centre. Hitherto the KGB Eighth Directorate had handled SIGINT nization at the Centre.Hitherto the KGB Eighth Directorate had handled SIGINT as 1 968 Andropov as well well as as ciphers ciphers and and communications. communications. Probably Probably in in 1968 Andropov established established a a new new Sixteenth Sixteenth Directorate,42 headed headed by by Nikolai Nikolai Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Andreev, Andreev, to to specialize specialize T. Its exclusively exclusively in in SIGIN SIGINT. Its operations operations were were among among the the most most highly highly classified classified in in the the whole of the KGB. The Sixteenth Directorate worked closely with the Sixteenth whole of the KGB. The Sixteenth Directorate worked closely with the Sixteenth Department Department of of the the FCD, FCD, founded founded at at about about the the same same time, time, which which was was given givenrespon responsibility sibility for for residency residency intercept intercept posts, posts, operations operations to to acquire acquire foreign foreign codes codes and and ciphers ciphers and attempts to and attempts to penetrate penetrate other other SIGINT SIGINT agencies.43 agencies.43On O n May May 15, 15, 1970 1970 Andropov Andropov approved approved a a plan plan for for radio-intercept radio-intercept posts posts (some (some were were already already functioning) functioning) in in fifteen fifteen residencies: New York, residencies: Washington, Washington, New York, Montreal, Montreal, Mexico, Mexico, Tokyo, Tokyo, Peking, Peking, Teheran, Teheran, Athens, Athens, Rome, Rome, Paris, Paris, Bonn, Bonn, Salzburg, Salzburg, London, London, Reykjavik Reykjavik and and Belgrade. Belgrade. During During 1 971 these 1971 these fifteen fifteen posts posts intercepted intercepted a a total total of of 62,000 62,000 diplomatic diplomatic and and military military enci enciphered phered cables cables from from 60 60 countries, countries, as as well well as as more more than than 25,000 25,000 plain plain text text messages.44 messages.44 The The most most important important intercept intercept posts, posts, operated operated by by the the Sixteenth Sixteenth Department Department with with the CHIN and the assistance assistance of of OT OT personnel, personnel, remained remained the the Washington Washingtonarea area PO POCHIN and New New York CHIN stations York PROBA PROBA stations. stations. The The most most striking striking achievement achievement of of the the PO POCHIN stations during during the the 1970s 1970s was was the the interception interception of of many many of of the the messages messages exchanged exchanged between between Washington, Washington, via via Andrews Andrews Air Air Force Force Base, Base,and and the the aircraft aircraft taking taking the the President, President, Sec Secretary retary of of State State and and other other senior senior members members of of the the administration administration on on overseas overseas trips. trips. ANTON, CHIN operational ANTON, one one of of the the PO POCHIN operational officers, officers, was wasawarded awarded the the Order Order of ofthe the Red Red Star Star for for his his success success in in intercepting intercepting US US communications communications during during Kissinger's Kissingersvisit visit to July to London Londoninin July 1974 1974 for for talks talkswith with the theBritish British Foreign Foreign Secretary Secretary (and (and future hture prime prime minister), minister), James James Callaghan.45 Callaghan.45The The Centre's Centres particular particular interest interest in in these these intercepts intercepts doubtless was to doubtless derived derived from from the the fact fact that that the themain main purpose purpose of of Kissinger's Kissingersvisit visit was to brief brief Callaghan Callaghan on on Nixon's Nixons recent recent visit visit to to Moscow-his Moscow-his last last foreign foreign trip trip before before his his resig resignation Soon nation at at the the height height of of the the Watergate Watergate scanda1.46 scandal.46 Soon afterwards afterwards the the PROBA PROBA sta stations tions succeeded succeeded in in intercepting intercepting Kissinger's Kissingers telephone telephone conversations conversationswith with Callaghan Callaghan and during the crisis and the the Turkish Turkish foreign foreign minister, minister, Professor ProfessorTuran Turan Ganes, G%nes, during the crisis caused causedby by the The the Turkish Turkish invasion invasion of of northern northern Cyprus Cyprus on on July July 21.47 21.47 The KGB KGB was was thus thus able able to to monitor way monitor the the dramatic dramatic way in in which, which,as as Kissinger Kissinger later later recalled: recalled: During we forced During the thenight night of ofJuly July 21-22, 21-22, we forced a a cease-fire cease-fire by by threatening threatening Turkey Turkey that that we we would would move move [US] [US] nuclear nuclear weapons weapons from from forward forward positions-especially positions-especially where where they they might might be be involved involvedin in aawar war with with Greece.48 Greece.* Not all the the intercepts intercepts of of Kissinger's Kissingers conversations conversations concerned concerned affairs affairs of of state. state. On O n one one Not all occasion occasion he he was was heard heard talking talking to to his his fiancee, fiancke, Nancy Nancy Maginnes, Maginnes, shortly shortly before before their their marriage 974. According marriage in in 11974. According to to Kalugin's Kalugins somewhat somewhat censorious censorious recollection: recollection:

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He his egotistical egotistical way, way, was her He apparently apparently had had just just given given a a speech speech and, and, in inhis wasasking asking her what in effect, effect, How "How did really what she she thought thought of of it. it. He H e was was saying, saying, in did I look? look? You You really thought I sounded well?" The showed Kissinger to be be a vain and and thought sounded well? The transcript transcript showed Kissinger to a vain boastful man. man. boastful
loved the intercepted conversation. Word came back from Moscow that Andropov "loved conversation." H e enjoyed boasting to some of his Politburo colleagues that the He colleagues KGB was able to eavesdrop on on the the intimate intimateconversations conversations of of the the US National National Security Security Adviser.49 Adviser.49 eavesdrop of Soviet missions sprouting on the the roofs of missions gradually alerted Western SIGINT agencies agencies to the the presence of the intercept stations within. of the within. 50 successhlly gained access Though probably unaware the KGB had successfully access to his own comcom munications, Kissinger protested to Ambassador Dobrynin on on August 15, 15, 1975 1975 at conversations by the Soviet embassy. the interception of radio and telephone conversations embassy. The reply: Centre drafted a robust reply:
EX ANTENNAE TH E C O M P L LEX E

I t is advisable advisable that, when there is a meeting with Kissinger, if he again raises It Kissinger, if Soviet ambassador should state that the the antennae set up on the the that issue, issue, the Soviet Soviet basis of of [diplo Soviet embassy's embassys roof roof are are being being used used on on the the basis of the the principle principle of [diplomatic] as to to receive receive matic] reciprocity reciprocity to to ensure ensure communications communications with with Moscow, Moscow, as as well well as general radio and television transmissions. These antennae are in no way a concon the embassy's embassys status. It should be brought to to the the attention attentionof tradiction of the of the that the US government should prevent the installation of Secretary of State that of embassy, which would equipment, including that on buildings close to the the embassy, impede the the normal operation of of the the USSR embassy's embassys radio station. impede normal operation radio station.51 wasinhibited in in pursuing his protest by the knowledge that NSA also ran Kissinger was SIGINT operations from the US embassy in in Moscow. Moscow. In 1971 1971 columnist columnist Jack Jack Washington ashington Post that the the embassy had succeeded in Anderson had revealed in the W microwave radio and telephone communications exchanged intercepting the microwave between the the large large black black ZIL limousines limousines of Politburo Politburo members as they between members as they sped sped around around Moscow.52 Kissinger seems, however, to have been genuinely alarmed by the Moscow.52 Kissinger seems, however, to have been genuinely alarmed by the elecelec countermeasures taken to frustrate SIGINT operations run from the Moscow tronic countermeasures embassy. In November 1975 1975 he he told Dobrynin that it was believed believed that the Ameri Ameriembassy. can ambassador, ambassador, Walter Walter Stoessel, had developed developed leukemia result of of prolonged can Stoessel, had leukemia as as a a result prolonged n instructions exposure to electromagnetic radiation directed against the embassy. embassy. O On from Moscow, Dobrynin replied that the electromagnetic field around the embassy he wasprivately Soviet health standards. Dobrynin claims thathe didnot not exceed Soviet privately StateDepartment Department during Carter administration that aastudy had informed by the State during thethe Carter evidence of of damage concluded that there was, was, in fact, no evidence damage to to the the health health of of embassy embassy 53 personneLS3 personnel. Kissinger's the continued of POCHIN and and Kissingers protests protests failed failed to to halt halt the continued expansion expansion of PROBA operations. from operations. Summaries Summaries and and transcripts transcripts of of POCHIN intercepts intercepts grew grew from 2,600 7,000 in these two years 800 800 reports reports based based on on 2,600 pages pages in in 1975 1975 to to 7,000 in 1976. 1976. During During these two years

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the intercepts were cabled cabled to to the the Centre Centrefrom from the the Washington Washingtonresidency. residency. Among Among the the the intercepts were communications to to and and from from Andrews Andrews Airforce Airforce Base Base intercepted during 1976 1976 were were communications intercepted during important messages Donald Rumsfeld's important messages dealing dealing with with Secretary Secretary of of Defense Defense Donald Rumsfelds visits visits to to h the Nuclear Planning January and and June, and to to US armed armed forces forces t e NATO Nuclear Planning Group Group in in January June, and headquarters Europe headquarters in inEurope in in February; February; and and on on Kissinger's Kissingers meetings meetings with with British, British, leader^.'^ 1977 POCHIN French, West German and South African leaders. 54 In 1977 POCHIN summaries and and transcripts transcripts increased increased again again to to over over 10,500 10,500 pages,55 pages,55covering covering foreign foreign visits visits by, by, among others, others, Vice-President Vice-president Walter Walter Mondale Mondaleand and Secretary of State Cyrus Cyrus Vance. Van~e.~ among Secretary of State 56 For CHIN posts For much much of of the the Carter Carter administration administration the the PO POCHIN posts also also intercepted intercepted a a sub submaterial; the KGB kept a file stantial amount of State Department material; a card fi le on all the officials mentioned mentioned in in it. it.57 officials 57 KGBs lack of high-level penetration agents in Washington Washingtonduring during the Given the KGB's the 1970s, it it seems seems likely that PO POCHIN Cen1970s, CHIN and other SIGINT SIGINT operations were the Cen tres most important source source of intelligence on the theforeign and defense policies of the tre's Ford and Carter administrations. The general effect of this intelligence was probably benign-to limit the toto conspiracy benign-to the natural predisposition of the Centre Centre conspiracy theories policy. During the 1979 1979 crisis about American policy. crisis caused by American protests at the brigade in Cuba, Cuba, for example, of presence of aa Soviet Soviet combat "combat brigade" example, POCHIN intercepts of other communications enabled the Washington Washington Pentagon telephone discussions discussions and other residency theUnited UnitedStates had no plans for military interresidency to reassure Moscow that the inter vention.* vention.58 intelligence provided by the POCHIN stations during the The most important intelligence 1970s and 1980s, however, was 1970s and early 1980s, was probably military. The intercepts provided highly classified information on the theTrident, Trident, MX, Pershing-2, Cruise and andsurface-to surface-tol\1X, systems; the F-15, F-16, F-18, B-52 and B-1 aircraft; air missile systems; aircraft; and the AWACS system. From 1973 1973 onwards the main priority of theNew early warning system. New York alsoscientifi scientific intelligence, particularly in the themil milPROBA stations was also c and technical intelligence, success during the theremainder of the decade was the inter interitary field. Its most striking success on Long Long ception of fax communications from the Brookhaven National Laboratory on companies, among them Island and aa series of of major companies, them Boeing, Fairchild, General Hughes,IBM, Dynamics, Grumman, Hughes, IBM, Lockheed and Sperry Rand. Fax intercepts on the design and development of the military projects included important material on the A-10, EF-111A A-I0, B-1, EFI I IA and F-14 aircraft; the anti-missile defense program; and the 1976 an codenamed anti-submarine defense system. system. By 1976 an intercept post, code named VESNA (Spring), theSan San Francisco residency, residency, successfully successfully intercepting fax ("Spring"), was operating in the Francisco high-tech compa compaand telephone communications of defense contractors and other high-tech theWest West C ~ a s 59 t.~ nies on the Coast. Francisco also had The KGB residencies in New New York, Washington and San Francisco radio-intercept posts (codenamed, respectively, respectively, RAKETA, MKETA, ZEFIR and RUBIN) radio-intercept which monitored FBI (codenamed FIRMA) communications in order to keep track surveillance of its operations. In New York during the the 1970s 1970s the theRAKETA post of surveillance channels.60Its monitored continuously six FBI shortwave radio communications channels.6o eavesdroppers quickly became used to Bureau jargon. According to a report in KGB eavesdroppers files: fues:

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surveillance teams communicate using FBI look-out posts and surveillance using simple simple codes, codes, slang easily deciphered slang expressions expressions and and pre-arranged pre-arranged phrases phrases which which are are easily deciphered by by the the RAKETA look-out posts posts and and a surveil RAKETA operator. operator. Conversations Conversations between between the the look-out a surveillance short dialogues the post the team lance team team consist consist of of short dialogues in in which which the post informs informs the team of of the the target's is moving in up an intersection and targets number number and and the the direction direction he he is moving in up to to an intersection and beyond. beyond. of the Daily radio intercept of the operation of the FBI dispatch center provides a a picture operational environment the FBI's conduct of operations in picture of of the the operational environment and and the FBIs conduct of operations in city. Whenever the the [KGB] residency is conducting thecity, the city. conducting an operation in the city, the RAKETA operator the operation the FBIs FBI's radio radio center; the operator monitors monitors the operation of the center; if if necessary, be given a danger danger signal signal prior prior to going necessary, an an operations operations oHicer officer can can be given a to his his going out site be conducted, conducted, [or [or told] told] to to back back off out to tothe the site where where an an operation operation is is to to be off from from if he has been detected by surveillance. surveillance.The RAKETA post an operation ifhe post makes makes of local citizens who have come to the the attention attentionof of the FBI, FBI, and they are note oflocal KONTAKT system [the FCD's FCDs computerized name-trace put on file in the the KONTAKT system] . system].

For years the deluded believing that that it was able For several several years the New NewYork York residency residency deluded itself itself into into believing itwas able the FBI.61 FBI.61In In to detect detect every every instance of street street surveillance surveillance of to instance of of KGB personnel personnel by by the 1973, however, however, it realized that it it had been taken Having discovered the FBI 1973, taken in. Having discovered that that the was officers, as well as of three "devel was aware awareof of the the activities activities of of some some of of its its operations operations officers, as well as of three developmental agents, the apparent of FBI surveillance opmental" agents, it finally grasped grasped that the apparent simplicity simplicity of surveillance techniques was actually actually a a means of diverting diverting the far more techniques was means of the residencys residency's attention attention from from far more sophisticated methods which to detect. detect. The residency's operations operations were sophisticated methods which it it had had failed failed to The residencys were temporarily disrupted disrupted as come to terms with with methods it did did temporarily as it it tried tried to to come to terms methods of surveillance surveillance it not not fully hlly understand.62 understand.62
T H E RU OS TS residencies around R UN N I N G C co ST s for for the the main main intercept intercept posts posts in in KGB residencies around the the world and New New York by far far the world in in 1979 1979 show show that that the the Washington Washington and York operations operations were were by the most The SIGINT post residency, the third most expensive.63 e~pensive.~~ The SIGINT post in in the the Havana Havana residency, the third most most expen expenposts were sive, focused chiefly on States. All other sive,was wasalso also focused chiefly on the theUnited United States. other intercept intercept posts were also also instructed communications of instructed to to give give priority, priority,when when possible, possible, to to the thecommunications of the the Main MainAdver Adversary. most important important of intercept posts posts targeted targeted on on the sary. The The most of the the KGB's KGBs foreign foreign intercept theUnited United States outside, however, located residency but large States from from outside, however, was was located not not in ina a residency but in inthe the large SIGINT base mid-1960s to navy base set set up up by by the the GRU at at Lourdes Lourdes in in Cuba Cuba in in the the mid-1960s to monitor monitor US navy communications other high-frequency On 25, 1975 1975 aa communications and and other high-frequency transmissions.64 transmission^.^^ O n April April 25, secret (no. 342-115) of a secret Soviet Soviet government government decree decree (no. 342-115) authorized authorized the the establishment establishment of a new SIGINT station station (codenamed TERMIT-P) within the Lourdes Lourdes base, new KGB KGB SIGINT (codenamed TERMIT-P) within the base, which Run by the Sixteenth Sixteenth Directorate, Directorate, which began began operations operations in in December December 1976. 1976.Run by the TERMIT-P antenna and 7-meter dish dish antenna antenna TERMIT-P had had a a fixed fured 12-meter 12-meter dish dish antenna and a a mobile mobile 7-meter mounted on a a covered it to to intercept microwave communicacommunica mounted on covered lorry, lorry, which which enabled enabled it intercept microwave tions microwave towers.65 towers.6S tions "downlinked" downlinked from from US satellites satellites or or transmitted transmitted between between microwave Other Directorate SIGINT SIGINT stations stations established in the the late Other large large GRU/Sixteenth GRUISixteenth Directorate established in late 1970s those in South Yemen at Cam Cam Ranh Bay Bay in Vietnam. The The 1970s included included those in South Yemen and and at Ranh in Vietnam.

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biggest, biggest, however, however, remained remained the the LQurdes Lourdes complex, complex, which which continued continued to to grow grow steadily steadily over over the the next next decade. decade. President President Reagan Reagan declared declared in in 1983: 1983: The 100 miles miles from from our our coast coast is is The Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence collection collection facility facility less less than than 100 the elds and the largest largest of of its its kind kind in in the the world. world. The The acres acres and and acres acres of of antennae antennae fi fields and intelligence installations and intelligence monitors monitors are are targeted targeted on on key key US military military installations and sensi sensitive activities. The tive activities. The installation, installation, in in Lourdes, Lourdes, Cuba, Cuba, is is manned manned by by 1,500 1,500 Soviet Soviet technicians, station allows technicians, and and the the satellite satellite ground ground station allows instant instant communication communication with with Moscow. Moscow. This This 28-square-mile 28-square-mile facility facility has has grown grown by by more more than than 60 percent percent in in size size during during the thepast past decade. decade. A joint joint report report by by the the Departments Departments of ofState Stateand and Defense Defense in in 1985 1985estimated estimated that that the the total total personnel personnel at at the the Lourdes Lourdes SIGINT SIGINT base base had had increased increased further further to to2,100.66 2,100.66 By By the the early early 1980s 1980s all all KGB KGB residencies residencies possessed possessed an an intercept intercept post.67 post.67Each Each post post was Centre in in November, was required required to to submit submit an an annual annual report report to to the the Centre November, giving giving details details of of encrypted encrypted and and plain plain text text material material intercepted intercepted over over the the past past year; year; the the proportion proportion of of operationally discovered communications operationally significant significant intercepts; intercepts; newly newly discovered communications channels channels of of intelligence in the intelligence value; value; characteristics characteristics of of the the "radio-intelligence radio-intelligence environment" environmentin the country country concerned; concerned; the the handling handlingand and fulfillment fulfillment by by the the intercept intercept post post of of its its SIGINT SIGINT assignments; assignments; measures measures taken taken to to protect protect the the security security and and secrecy secrecy of of its its operations; operations; 68 conclusions conclusions about about past past performance performance and and proposals proposals for for the the future. future.68 In 1980 the the Washington Washington area area POCHIN posts posts reported reported that, that, as as a a result result of of new new In 1980 security security precautions, precautions, it it had had become become much much more more difficult difficult to to intercept intercept the the communi communications residency there, cations of of the the federal federal government.69 g ~ v e r n m e n t The .~~ T residency he there, however, however, reported reported one one major success. In September 1980, after two years' planning, in major new new SIGINT SIGINT success. In September 1980, after two years planning, in an an operation operation codenamed codenamed FLAMINGO, FLAMINGO, the the residency residency succeeded succeeded in in bugging bugging the the confer conference private ence room room of of System System Planning Planning Corporation Corporation (SPC), (SPC),a a private company company in in Arlington, Arlington, Virginia, Virginia, which which did did research research for for the the Pentagon. Pentagon. Viktor Viktor Vasilyevich Vasilyevich Lozenko Lozenko (code (codenamed X (scientific named MARVlN), MARVIN), a aLine Line (scientific and and technological technological intelligence) intelligence) officer officer under under diplomatic diplomatic cover cover at at the theWashington Washingtonresidency, residency, had had noticed noticed that that the the SPC SPC conference conference room room was was also also used used for for meetings meetings of of the the Society Society for for Operational Operational Research, Research, of of which which he the end he was was a a member. member. The The day day before before he he left leftWashington Washingtonatat the end of of his his tour tour of of duty, duty, he quarter of he succeeded succeeded in in fixing fvring the the listening listening device-a device-a battery-powered battery-powered rod rod a a quarter of a a meter meter long--underneath long-underneath a a table table in in the theroom. room. The The signal signal from from the the bug bugwas was monitored monitored from from a a command command post post in in aacar car with with diplomatic diplomatic number number plates, plates, fitted fitted with with aaT-shaped T-shaped antenna windshield, antenna built built into into the the front front windshield, which which took took up up position position at at one one of of nine nine loca locations tions situated situated at at distances distances of of 300-500 300-500 meters meters from from the the SPC SPC offices. offices. the next ten ten and and a half months operation FLAMINGO provided what the For the the Centre Centre considered considered "highly highly important" important intelligence intelligence on on the thecurrent current and and future future deploy deployUS nuclear nuclear weapons weapons in Europe, Europe,on on chemical weapons, weapons, on the theUS ment of US American chemical navys chances chances of of survival survival conflict, and on the the the navy's in aa nuclear confl ict, and US position on the SALT-2 talks. cial presented talks. On O n January January 27, 27, 1981 1981 a a senior senior Pentagon Pentagon offi official presented a a classified classified report report US Current Status and at a meeting entitled "Current and Trends Trends in in the Advancement of the US Forces in the Central War. Among the issues disNuclear Forces Central European Theater of War." the issues

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cussed capabilities; the the effectiveness effectiveness of of cussed at at the the meeting meeting were: were: American American mobilization mobilization ,capabilities; laser tons of of chemical chemical weapons weapons laser guidance guidance systems; systems; plans plans for for the the destruction destruction of of 730 tons which were were now now unusable; unusable; and and the the extent extent of and requirements requirements which of US intelligence intelligence on, on, and concerning, eetings in in the the bugged conference concerning, Soviet Soviet chemical chemical weapons. weapons. Other Other m meetings bugged conference officials, discussed room, also attended by senior Pentagon officials, discussed the current status and proposed reforms reforms of of the the US armed armed forces. forces. The The operation operation came an end proposed came to to an end not not because because wasdiscovered discovered the listening device was but because its power supply gradually gradually ran out.70 of the KGB officers officers involved involvedin operation FLAMINGO FLAMINGO received the Order Order Four of Star: Lozenko, who selected selected the location and placed the bug; V. I. 1. Shokin, Shokin, of the Red Star: operation; the head of of the PO POCHIN Nikolayevich who supervised the operation; CHIN station Yuri Nikolayevich Marakhovsky, who played a leading role in collecting collecting and Marakhovsky, and processing the the intelligence intelligence SPC conference room; and Yuri Vasilyevich Gratsiansky, collected from the SPC Gratsiansky, head of of Operational-Technical Support section, responsible for the the residencys residency's Operational-Technical section, who was responsible technical of the the operation. operation. Three Three other otherresidency officers received lesser awards.71 technical side side of residency officers received lesser awards.71
sovIEt S I G I N T OPERATION OPERATIONS United States, were assisted assistedby byallied allied SOVI Et SIGINT S ,, like those of the United agencies. The concluded in in 1948 between the agencies. The UKUSA Security Security Agreement Agreement concluded 1948 between the United United States, States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Canada, Australia and New Zealand Zealand provided for the division between their their SIGINT SIGINT division of of collection collection tasks tasks and and the the sharing sharing of of the the product product between 2 The KGB, however, services.72 however,was was services.7 determined to give its its allies only limited access access to its the 1975 Andropov Andropov approved approved "Regulations Regulations on on the its cryptanalytic cryptanalytic secrets. secrets. In In January January 1975 Principles Security Agencies Social Principles and and Directions Directions of of Co-operation Co-operation with withthe theSecurity Agencies of of the the SocialOperations, drafted ist Countries in in Decryption Operations," drafted by the Sixteenth Directorate. Its two joint operations with the the "friends" (allied two guiding guiding principles principles were, were, first, first, that that joint operations with friends (allied agencies) second, that agencies) were were to to be be under under KGB KGB control; control; second, that cryptographic cryptographic information information supplied to to allied allied agencies agencies should not not disclose the level level of of the the latest achievesupplied "should disclose the latest [Soviet] [Soviet] achieve ments eld of ments in in the the fi field of cryptanalysis:" cryptanalysis: Bearing in in mind mind that that at atthe the present time time the therelated related services ofour Bearing present services of our friends friends have have acquired a certain experience experience of working on acquired on and and exploiting exploiting [SIGINT] [SIGINT] targets targets by methods of electronic [computer-based] cryptanalysis, there there is is some some by the the methods of electronic [computer-based] cryptanalysis, possibility to apply apply these these methods indepen possibility that that in in future future our our friends friends may may try try to methods independently In these these conditions, it is is essential essential to to dently against against other other targets targets as as well. well. In conditions, it strengthen co-operation the Sixteenth Sixteenth Directorate Directorate and and the the strengthen further furtherthe the co-operation between between the related view to to exclude uncontrolled operations operations related services services of of our our friends friends with with a a view exclude uncontrolled irreparable harm to the theSixteenth Directorate with withregard to which could cause irreparable the cryptanalysis. the application application of of the the methods methods of of electronic electronic cryptanalysis.

On existence of of the secret training training O n no no account account were were the the "friends" friendsto to learn learn of of the the existence the top top secret school for be given given the the impression impression that that all training training school for KGB KGB cryptanalysts; cryptanalysts; they they were were to to be took on occasion, could be be given cipher took place place at at the the Centre. Centre.Though, Though, on occasion, allied allied agencies agencies could given cipher communications from intercepted by by the the Sixteenth Sixteenth DirecDirec communications from shortwave shortwave transmissions transmissions intercepted torate, allowed access access to SIGINT from residency intercept intercept posts, posts, torate, they they were were never never allowed to SIGINT from residency satellite Union.73 satellite communications communications or or telegraph telegraph lines lines within within the the Soviet Soviet Union.73

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theSixteenth Directorate's Directorates reluctance to share most SIGINT SIGINT secrets with Despite the allies, it depended on their assistance. assistance. With the growing complexity its intelligence intelligence allies, computer-generated cipher systems, systems, Soviet Soviet cryptanalysts cryptanalysts were increasingly increasingly depen depenof computer-generated dent penetration pos dent on onthe the penetration of of foreign foreign embassies embassies to to steal steal cipher cipher materials materials and, and, when whenpossible, joint operations sible, bug bug cipher cipher machines machines and and teleprinters. teleprinters. During During 1974 1974 alone alone joint operations by by the succeeded in the FCD Sixteenth Sixteenth Department Department and and its its Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc allies allies succeeded in abstracting abstracting cipher least seven cipher material material from from at at least seven embassies embassiesin in Prague, Prague, five five in in Sofia, Sofia, two two in in Budapest Budapest two in Warsaw.74 Warsaw.74Soviet Bloc intelligence services also and two also shared some of their agents Western embassies ministries with the KGB. Among those agents in in Western embassies and and foreign foreign ministries with the Among those who who were were particularly particularly highly highly rated rated by by the the KGB Sixteenth Sixteenth Directorate Directorate was was a a Bulgar BulgarGreek ian agent codenamed EPIR, EPIR, a security official inthe the Greek foreign ministry recruited recruited by by Bulgarian Bulgarian intelligence intelligence in in 1966. 1966. Over Over the thenext next ten ten years years he he assisted assisted in in the the removal classified pages documents from removal of of over over 12,000 classified pagesof of documents from the the ministry.75 ministry7 A conference main priorities conference of of the the KGB leadership leadership in in May May 1981 1981 included included in in its its main priorities the recruitment of personnel of United States, States, Britain, Britain, the recruitment of agents agents from from the the cipher cipher personnel of the the United France, Germany and and China. China. Andropov in a a special special France, West West Germany Andropov reaffirmed reaffirmed that that priority priority in directive issued after also directive issued after he he succeeded succeeded Brezhnev Brezhnev as as general general secretary secretary in in 1982.76 1982.7hHe H e also approved the the secret secret award award of of the the Order Order of of the the Friendship Friendship of of Peoples Peoples to to the the KGB's KGBs approved JOUR in the the French foreign ministry, ministry, in recog recoglongest-serving cipher officer agent, ]OUR co-operation over the previous thirty-seven years.77 years.77 nition of his long "long and fruitful co-operation" The FCD Sixteenth Sixteenth Department, Department, headed headed by by A. V. Krasavin, Krasavin, had had plans plans to to create create The forty another forty or fifty intercept intercept posts posts in Soviet establishments around the world by the decade. It calculated calculated optimistically that the volume of intercepted com comend of the decade. five to eight eight times its present level if if the current rate munications would increase by five maintained.78 of expansion were maintained.78 Makarov, who served in the theSixteenth Directorate from 1980 According to Viktor Makarov, 1986, the European to 1986, European states whose diplomatic traffic was decrypted with varying Finland,France, Greece, Italy, Swe Swefrequency during these years included Denmark, Finland, den, Switzerland and and West WestGermany. Germany. There There was, he believes, believes, no penetration of of highden, Switzerland was, he no penetration high period.79 An grade British British cipher systems systems duringthat that period.79 An inner inner circle withinthe the Politburo-consisting, in 1980, 1980, of Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Politburo-consisting, Kirilenko, Suslov Ustinov-were sent a daily selection selection of the most important intercepts. A larger and Ustinov-were dayto the theheads of the First and and Second Chief Direcselection was forwarded each day Direc torates.80Though neither selection is yet available available for research, torates.80 research, both will one day be sources of major importance for historians of Soviet foreign policy. policy. Kissingers and Vance's Vances meetings In addition to obviously important items such as Kissinger's with foreign leaders, leaders, the intercepts selected for the inner inner circle of the Politburo also included, whenever possible, Western responses to their theirpublic pro proundoubtedly also nouncements. Vyacheslav Ivanovich Ivanovich Gurgenev (alias (alias 'rtemov"), Artemov),deputy head of the the FCD, complained publicly in 1991: 1991:

Our service has had enough trouble in the past trying to collect responses to brilliant initiative by our leaders. leaders. This kind of of work tended to every "brilliant" to corrupt people who started started out out with the of doing doingsomething something usefiL81 81 with the illusion of useful.

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Residencies prompt reports reports of of favorable favorable Residencies around around the the world world were were expected expected to to provide provide prompt responses to every major speech by the Soviet leadership. When no such responses responses Soviet leadership. occurred, they were commonly invented to avoid the risk of offending the Politoccurred, Polit buro.82 Since the Sixteenth Directorate was able, 1960s, to decrypt at buro.82 able, by the later 1960s, of finding least some of the diplomatic traffic of over seventy seventy states,83 its chances chances of some each week some suitable suitable response response among among the the thousands thousands of of decrypts decrypts produced produced each week were were residency. much greater than those of even the most active residency. controversial references to to Soviet leaders leaders were were routinely In the pre-glasnost era controversial edited edited out of translations translations of diplomatic diplomatic decrypts. decrypts. Makarov Makarov recalls seeing seeing an interinter August 1984 discussing the cepted cable from the Swedish ambassador in Moscow in August likely power struggle which would follow the demise of of the ailing Konstantin CherCher nenko. passages removed or doctored in the Russian translation was a nenko. Among the passages Gorbachevs wife, wife, Raisa Raisa Maximovna. O n another occasion disparaging reference to Gorbachev's On Makarov was ordered to remove from a diplomatic telegram he had decrypted the sentence, "Gorbachev Gorbachev is like Andropov." Andropov. Such excisions were wereknown within the the Sixsentence, Six minding the thewords."84 word^.'''^ teenth Directorate as "minding
1980s SIGINT agencies agencies in in both bothEast East and West West began began to to face 1980s and face two forfor midable of fiber global telecommunitelecommuni midable new new technological technological challenges: challenges: the the use use of fiber optics optics in in global increased availabilityof cations andthe the greatly increased of highly sophisticated encryption systems. systems. Neither the the KGB nor any other SIGINT agency agency seems seems to have devised devised a a of system of intercepting messages messages which passed along fiber-optic lines as streams of light. fiber-optic trunk system, light. In In the the late late 1980s 1980s Britain Britain installed installed a a highly highly secure secure fiber-optic trunk system, codenamed BOXER, BOXER, which linked 200 military installations. Simultaneously, Simultaneously, the development by mathematicians mathematicians at at the development of of Public Public Key Key Cryptography Cryptography by the Massachusetts Massachusetts Institute Technology and the Weizmann Institute in Israel, Israel, and subsequent subsequent refinerefine Institute of ofTechnology and the Weizmann Institute in and ments Privacy) system, system, made made ciphers ments such such as as Phil Phil Zimmermann's Zimmermanns PGP (Pretty (Pretty Good GoodPrivacy) ciphers which were were difficult, difficult, if if not not impossible, impossible, for for SIGINT agencies crack, available which agencies to to crack, available to to anyone and modem. modem.85 anyone with with a a powerful powerful desktop desktop computer computer and The Mitrokhin, which which end end in do not explain The SIGINT-related SIGINT-related files files seen seen by by Mitrokhin, in 1982, 1982, do not explain t is clear from other how the KGB sought to respond respond to these these new challenges. challenges. I It is clear other evievi dence, however, SIGINT operations operations continued continued to to expand, expand, at least in in volvol at least dence, however, that that Soviet Soviet SIGINT GRU, ume, era. Those ume, during the Gorbachev era. Those of the G RU, targeted targeted chiefly on on the armed armed forces States, NATO and were on on an scale than than the and China, China,were an even even larger larger scale the forces of ofthe the United United States, KGBs. By the end of the 1980s 1980sthe the had40 SIGINT regiments, 170 SIGKGB's. Red Army had SIG SIGINT companies. companies. Since the launch of of Kosmos 189 in 1 89 in INT battalions and over 700 SIGINT 1967, put over 130 SIGINT SIGINT satellites satellites 1967, the the GRU Space Space Intelligence Intelligence Directorate Directorate had had put over 130 Soviet surface ships orbit. More More than than 60 Soviet into orbit. ships and over 20 different types types of of aircraft aircraft were and KGB had between them them over were used used for for SIGINT SIGINT collection. collection. The The GRU and had between over 500 ground stations stations in in the theSoviet Soviet Union Union and and around around the the world. world. In all, the the GRU SIGINT ground In all, and KGB SIGINT probably employed about 350,000 intercept operators, and SIGINT network network probably employed about 350,000 intercept operators, processors, cryptanalysts and and other other technical technical specialists, specialists, a of them them military processors, cryptanalysts a majority majority of military personnel-about times as NSA and Cryptological personnel-aboutfivefive times as many many as as the the NSA and US US Service Service Cryptological 70,000personnel.86 anestimated 60,000 to 70,000 Authorities, which together had an personneL86 AccordD U R I N G TH E

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ing ing to to Vladimir Vladimir Rubakov, Rubakov, a a senior senior KGB officer officer interviewed interviewed shortly shortly before before the the reor reorganization consumed a ganization of of Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence in in 1991, 1991, SIGINT operations operations consumed a quarter quarter of of the the KGB budget.87 budget.87 In In December December 1991 1991 the the former former Eighth Eighth and and Sixteenth Sixteenth Directorates Directorates of of the the KGB were reconstituted as Government were reconstituted as an an independent independent service, service, the the Federal Federal Agency Agency for for Government Communications Russian acronym), responsible for Communications and and Information Information (FAPSI (FAPSI in in its its Russian acronym), responsible for communications Russian SIGINT SIGINT operations operations today communications security, security, ciphers ciphers and and SIGINT. SIGINT. Russian today are on on aasignificantly significantly smaller smaller scale scale than than those those of of the the former former Soviet Soviet Union. of the the are Union. One One of least consequences of of the the disintegration disintegration of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc was was the the disman dismanleast noticed noticed consequences the great majority of the 150 countling of the 150 ground stations in former Warsaw Pact coun tries.88 Some Some of of the the most most important important stations stations outside outside the the Russian Russian Federation, Federation, tries.88 however, the large SIGINT complexes however, still still survive-among survive-among them them the large SIGINT complexes near near Tallinn Tallinn in in (though the theLourdes personnel was reduced by over over Estonia and at Lourdes in Cuba (though half to to aatotal total of about about 1,000 1,000 in in 1993).89 1993).89 The residencies of the the Russian Russian for forhalf of The residencies of the SVR, the eign intelligence service, continue to contain active intercept posts. Though FAPSI operates with with somewhat somewhat reduced reduced resources, resources, faces facesharder harder targets targets and and probably probably finds finds it it operates increasingly cult to art technology, increasingly diffi difficult to match match NSRs NSA's state state of of the the art technology, Russian Russian SIGINT still has a global reach.

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1930s he had been obsessed with NKVD operations to liquidate Trotsky and his 1930s leading foreign foreign supporters. supporters. The The final final act act of of his his foreign foreign policy policy before before he died in in 1953 1953 leading he died was the leading was a a plan plan to to assassinate assassinate Josip Josip Tito, Tito, who who had hadsucceeded succeeded Trotsky Trotsky as as the leading heretic heretic of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Bloc. of heightof the Terror, Tito (born Josip Broz) had, ironically, ironically, been one At the height one of of the few leading Yugoslav Communists Communists (most (most then living in in exile exile in in Moscow) Moscow) who were few leading Yugoslav then living who were trusted by the the NKVD. O trusted by On purged Yugoslav n becoming becoming secretary secretary general general of of the the purged Yugoslav Party Party in his persecuted in in 1937, 1937, he he had had dutifully dutifully denounced denounced his persecuted and and liquidated liquidated comrades, comrades, in impeccable anti impeccable Stalinist Stalinist invective, invective, as as Trotskyists, Trotskyists, traitors, traitors, factionalists, factionalists, spies spies and and antiH e apologized personally to Stalin for his own lack of vigilance in Party elements. elements. He of vigilance choosing been unmasked an (imaginary) choosing as as his his first first wife wife a a woman woman who who had had since since been unmasked as as an (imaginary) Gestapo When Tito wartime leader an Gestapo agent. agent. When Titobecame became wartime leader of of the the Communist Communist partisans, partisans, an (Air),acted NKVD agent, Josip Kopinit, Kopinic, codenamed codenamed VAZHDUH ('ir"), acted as his radio radio link link 1 At the war, the NKGB resident, resident, Saveli Saveli Vladimirovich Bur with Moscow. Moscow. At the the end endof of the war, the with Vladimirovich Burtakov (codenamed (codenamed LIST), the head head ofTito's ofTitos Bureau of People's Peoples Protection, takov LIST), presented presented the Bureau of Protection, Alexander-Leka a portrait of of Stalin. Stalin. Apparently Apparently deeply Alexander-Leka Rankovic, RankoviC, with with a portrait deeply moved, moved, Rankovic most precious precious RankoviC (codenamed (codenamed MARKO MARK0 by by the the Centre) Centre) replied replied that that it itwas was the the most gift There no sign gift he he could could possibly possibly have havereceived.2 received.2 There was was no sign yet yet of of the the violent violent confronta confrontation tion between between Tito Tito and and Stalin Stalin which which was was to to erupt erupt only only three three years years later. later. Despite Despite his his own Yugoslav communist own subsequent subsequent loathing loathing for for Stalinism, Stalinism, the the leading leading Yugoslav communist Milovan Milovan Djilas Djilas later later acknowledged: acknowledged:

H ssassination had integral part of Stalin's During the Rssassination had been been an an integral part of Stalins foreign foreign policy. policy. During the late late

The before the war, is that that not not aasingle single Party Party leader leader was was anti-Soviet-not anti-Soviet-not before the war, The fact fact is not during, not after after .. . . .. Stalin and the the Soviet Union were our corner-stone not during, not Stalin and Soviet Union were our corner-stone and and point point of of spiritual spiritual origin origin .. .. .. 3 There alreadysigns signs by end of of the however, that that Tito Tito (codenamed (codenamed There were were already by the the end the war, war, however, OREL ("Eagle") Centre) would be less less sycophantic sycophantic to (Eagle) by by the the Centre) would be to Moscow Moscow than than most most other other leaders leaders of of the the emerging emerging Soviet Soviet Bloc. Bloc. Unlike Unlike other other Bloc Bloc members, members, the the Yugoslav Yugoslav partisans had had defeated Germans and chiefly through their own efforts partisans defeated the the Germans and Italians Italians chiefly through their own efforts

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rather sacrifices of ominously soon soon after rather than than the the sacrifices of the the Red Red Army. Army. Tito Tito declared declared ominously after VE VE Day, on anyone again." Burtakov the Day, "We We will will not not be be dependent dependent on anyone ever ever again. Burtakov reported reported to to the Centre: Centre: Side Side by by side side with with his his positive positive qualities-popularity, qualities-popularity, good good looks, looks, an an expressive expressive face, spirit and also has the lust face, spirit and willpower-OREL willpower-OREL also has the following following negative negative traits: traits: lust for power, power, lack lack of of modesty, modesty, arrogance arrogance and and insincerity. insincerity. He H e considers considers himself to for himself to be be the the absolute absolute authority, authority, prefers prefers unquestioning unquestioning obedience, obedience, dislikes dislikes an an ex exchange of and criticism change of views views and criticism of of his his orders; orders; he he is is irritable, irritable, hot-tempered hot-tempered and and curt; curt; he he loves loves to to strike strike poses. poses. Burtakov believed Tito less than Burtakov also also believed Tito was was less than frank frank about about his his dealings dealings with with Britain, Britain, "although supposed hostility although outwardly outwardly he he makes makes a a show show of of his his supposed hostility towards towards the the Allies, Allies, especially especially the the British."4 Briti~h.~ Tito Tito and and Rankovic, RankoviC, in in turn, turn, took tooka a dim dim view view of of Burtakov, Burtakov,who who became became notorious notorious for his habit of looting jewelry, crystal, china and rugs from Yugoslav mansions for his habit of looting jewelry, crystal, china and rugs from Yugoslav mansions (a (a practice posted to At practice he he was was to to repeat repeat when when posted to Romania Romania and and Czechoslovakia).5 Czecho~lovakia).~ At the the end end of 1945 1945 Burtakov Burtakov was was replaced replaced as as chief chief adviser adviser to to the the Bureau Bureau of of People's Peoples Protection Protection of (OZNA) by by Arseni Arseni Vasilyevich Vasilyevich Tishkov, Tishkov, known known to to the the Yugoslavs Yugoslavs as asTimofeyev.6 Timofeyex6 (OZNA) The post-war post-war MGB MGB had had residencies residencies in in Belgrade, Belgrade, Zagreb, Zagreb,Ljubljana Ljubljana and and Skopje, Skopje, as as The well as as four four sub-residencies sub-residencies elsewhere elsewhere in Yugoslavia/ Y~goslavia,~ whose imperious behavior caused caused well in whose imperious behavior increasing resentment resentment at at Soviet Soviet intrusion intrusion into into Yugoslav Yugoslav affairs. affairs. An An inspection inspection by by the the increasing Centre of the Centre reported reported that that MGB MGB advisers advisers "interfered interferedroughshod roughshod in in the theinternal internal affairs affairs of the Bureau of Peoples Protection, Protection, and and applied applied pressure pressure in in order order to to obtain obtain information." information. Bureau of People's Information OZNA's leaders leaders was was surreptitiously Information refused refixed by by OZNAs surreptitiously obtained obtained from from its its junior junior officers.8What What caused caused most most resentment resentment in in Belgrade, Belgrade, however, however, was MGB recruitment recruitment officers.8 was MGB of unaware that of of Yugoslav Yugoslav agents. agents. Tito Tito was wasunaware that two twoof hishis own own ministers-Andriya ministers-Andriya Hebrang, minister minister of Hebrang, finance minister-were of industry, industry, and and Streten Streten Zujovic, ZujoviC, finance minister-were among among them. however, outraged in 1945 1945 to them. He H e was, was, however, outraged at at a a Soviet Soviet attempt attempt in to seduce seduce and and recruit recruit Dusica Dusica Petrovic, PetroviC, the the female female officer officer in in charge charge of of Yugoslav Yugoslav ciphers. ciphers. When When informed informed of of the case case by by Rankovic, RankoviC,Tito Tito exploded: exploded: ' A spy spy network network is is something we will willnot not tolerate! tolerate! something we the Weve got got to tolet let them know right right away."9 away.Tishkov, Tishkov, however, however, continued continued to to demand demand from We've them know from Tito OZNA headhead Tito and and Rankovic RankoviC offices offices for for himself himself and and the the Soviet Soviet "advisers" advisersinside inside OZNA ues and quarters, quarters, with with the the right right to to be be informed informed of of all all agent agent f files and operations.10 operations. Of all a l l Tito's Titos early early signs signs of of independence, independence, the the one one which which caused alarm in Of caused most most alarm in Moscow Moscow was was probably probably his his plan plan for for a a Balkan Balkan federation-interpreted federation-interpreted by by Stalin Stalin as as a a potential challenge to to Soviet Soviet hegemony. hegemony. In In March March 1948 1948the the Soviet Union recalled its its potential challenge Soviet Union recalled advisers and and angrily angrily denounced the Yugoslav Yugoslav Party Party as as riddled riddled with with both both ideological advisers denounced the ideological heresy and and British spies. O n June June 28 Cominform Cominform (the post-war successor successor to to Com Comheresy British spies. On (the post-war intern) expelled expelled the the Yugoslavs Yugoslavs and and appealed appealed to to "healthy healthy elements" elements in in the Party to to intern) the Party overthrow the the leadership. leadership. Titos flattering secret secret codename codename OREL (Eagle) was was overthrow Tito's flattering OREL ("Eagle") hurriedly downgraded downgraded to to STERVYATNIK STERWATNIK("Carrion (Carrion Crow").l1 Crow).11Stalin, Stalin, however, however, ini inihurriedly I tially overestimated overestimated the the ease ease with with which which "Carrion Carrion Crow" Crow could could be be overthrown. overthrown. "I tially

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shall shake shake my my little little finger," finger, he he boasted boasted to to Khrushchev, more shall Khrushchev, and "and there there will will be be no no more Tito. When When that that failed, failed, "he he shook everything else else he he could could shake; without sucTito." shook everything shake;" but but without suc cess. machinery remained remained secure. secure. cess.Tito's Titoshold hold over over the the Party, Party, army army and and state state machinery In MGB began a vicious vicious In the the summer summer of of 1948 1948 the the MGB and and UDBA UDBA (OZNs (OZNAs successor) successor) began a intelligence two Soviet moles in in Titos Tito's cabinet, cabinet, were intelligence war. war. Hebrang Hebrang and and Zujovic, Zujovit, the the two Soviet moles were arrested. ofwhom the most arrested. Other Other Soviet Soviet agents agents were were discovered discoveredin in Tito's Titos bodyguard, bodyguard, ofwhom the most senior was was Major-General Major-General Momo Mom0 Jurovic JuroviC (codenamed According to senior (codenamed VAL). VAL). According to Djilas, Djilas, the out the Yugoslav Politburo Politburo with auto the UDBA UDBA discovered discovered an an MGB MGB plot plot to to wipe wipe out the Yugoslav with automatic rifl e s while they were relaxing in the billiards room at Tito's villa. The UDBA' s matic rifles while they were relaxing in thebilliards room at Titos villa. The UDBAs use of against Cominforn in horror, horror, if if not not in use of terror terror against Cominforn "traitors" traitors rivaled rivaled in inscale, scale, that that of ofthe the NKVD against Soviet Soviet "enemies a decade decade before. before. Djilas Djilas mournfidy mournfully NKVD against enemies of of the the people" people a told are treating followers just just as as he he treated treated his his eneene told Rankovic, RankoviC, "Now Now we we are treating Stalin's Stalins followers mies!"12 services simultaneously engaged in in a a mies! The The MGB MGB and and its its allied allied intelligence intelligence services simultaneously engaged purge Titoist conspirators conspirators throughout the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Bloc. Their Their purge of of mostly mostly imaginary imaginary Titoist throughout the most minister, Lis& La.szl6 Rajk, and seven seven most celebrated celebrated victims victims were were the the Hungarian Hungarianinterior interior minister, Rajk, and alleged rehearsed show show trial trial in in Budapest Budapest to to alleged accomplices accompliceswho who confessed confessed at at aacarefully carefully rehearsed taking part part in vast plot hatched by Tito Tito and and the the CIA.13 CIA.13 taking in aa vast non-existent non-existent plot hatched by The to assassinate assassinate Tito involved one The final, final, and and most most ingenious, ingenious, of of the the MGB MGB plans plans to Tito involved one of Iosif Grigulevich Grigulevich (at (at this of the the most most remarkable remarkable of of all all Soviet Soviet illegals, illegals, Iosif this time time code codenamed a leading leading part first, narrowly unsucunsuc named MAKS MAKS or or DAKS), DAKS),who who had had taken taken a part in inthe the first, narrowly cessful, City in inMay May 1940, 1940, had had run run a a Latin Latin cessful, attempt attempt on on Trotsky's Trotskys life life in in Mexico Mexico City American Second World World War, War, and and in 1951-posing American sabotage sabotage network network during during the the Second in 1951-posing asas Teodoro Costa Rican (later Minister Minister Plenipo Teodoro Castro-had Castro-had become become Costa Rican charge chargk d'affaires daffaires (later Plenipotentiary) had no no diplomatic diplomatic mission mission in in Belgrade, tentiary) in in Rome.14 Rome.14 Since Since Costa Costa Rica Rica had Belgrade, Grigulevich able to post of of non-resident non-resident envoy envoy to to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia. The The Grigulevich was was also also able to obtain obtain the the post MGB MGB reported reported to to Stalin Stalin in in February February 1953: 1953:
While in the the second second half half of the year year 1952, 1952, While fulfilling fulfilling his his diplomatic diplomatic duties duties in of the [MAKS] he was well received. received. H He access [MAKS] twice twice visited visited Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, where where he was well e had had access to was given the promise promise of of a a personal personal to the the social social group group close close to to Tito's Titos staff staff and and was giventhe audience MAKS at at the present time time makes makes it it pospos audience with with Tito. Tito.The The post post held held by by MAKS thepresent sible active measures against Tito.15 sible to to use use his his capabilities capabilities for for active measures against Tito. Grigulevich of assassin. At a secret secret meeting meeting with with senior senior Grigulevich volunteered volunteered for for the the role role of assassin. At a MGB 1953 he four possible possible ways ways to to MGB officers officers in in Vienna Vienna early early in in February February 1953 he suggested suggested four eliminate eliminate "Carrion Carrion Crow:" Crow: 1. To administer a plague from from a a silent silent spray spray concon 1. To administer a lethal lethal dose dose of of pneumonic pneumonic plague

cealed during a a personal with Tito. Tito. (Grigulevich (Grigulevich cealed in in his his clothing clothing during personal audience audience with would beforehand.) would be be inoculated inoculated with with an an antidote antidotebeforehand.) 2. the reception for Tito to be be given given during during his 2. To To obtain obtain an an invitation invitation to to the reception for Tito to his forthcoming London by Yugoslav ambassador, ambassador, with with whom whom forthcoming visit visit to to London by the the Yugoslav Grigulevich Grigulevich would would shoot shoot Tito Tito with with a a Grigulevich was was on on friendly friendly terms. terms. Grigulevich

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silenced silenced pistol, pistol, then then spray spray tear tear gas gas at at the the reception reception to to cause cause panic panic and and assist assist his escape. his escape. 3. 3. To To use use the the previous previous method method at at aadiplomatic diplomatic reception reception in in Belgrade. Belgrade. 4 4 To To present present Tito Tito with with jewelry jewelry in in a a booby-trapped booby-trapped box box which which would would release release a a lethal lethal poison poison gas gas as as soon soon as as it it was was opened. opened. Grigulevich Grigulevich was was asked asked to to submit submit more more detailed detailed proposals proposals to to the the Centre, Centre,Meanwhile, Meanwhile, the because of the MGB M G B assured assured Stalin Stalin that that there there was was no no doubt doubt that that "MAKS, MAKS, because of his his per personal sonal qualities qualities and and experience experiencein in intelligence intelligence work, work, is is capable capable of of accomplishing accomplishing a a mis mission sion of of this this kind."16 kind.16 The Central was intended The use use of of an anaccredited accredited Central American American diplomat diplomat as as Tito's Titos assassin assassin was intended to possible the to conceal conceal as as effectively effectivelyas as possible the hand hand of of the the MGB. MGB. Using Using his his Costa Costa Rican Rican alias, alias, Grigulevich Grigulevich composed composed a a farewell farewellletter letter addressed addressed to to his his Mexican Mexican wife wife to to be be made made pub public lic and and used used to to reinforce reinforce his his Latin Latin American American cover cover if ifhe he were were captured captured or or killed lulled during during the attemptY On 1, 1953 the assassination assassinationattempt.17 O n March March 1, 1953 the the MGB MGB reported reported to to Stalin Stdin that that MAK's M A K s attempt attempt to to "rub rub out" outTito Titohad, had, unfortunately, unfortunately, not not yet yet taken taken place. place. This This disap disappointing been the pointing report, report, which which Stalin Stalin read read at at about about midnight, midnight, may may well wellhave have been the last last doc document he ument he he saw saw before before he suffered suffered a a fatal fatal stroke stroke in in the the early early hours hours of of March March 2.18 2. After After Stalin's Stalins death death three three days days later, later, plans plans for for the the assassination assassination were were suspended. suspended. That That May May Grigulevich Grigulevich was was hurriedly hurriedly withdrawn withdrawn to to Moscow Moscow when when the the pre-war pre-war So Soviet viet defector defector Aleksandr Aleksandr Orlov Orlov began began publishing publishing reminiscences reminiscences of of Stalin Stalin and and the the NKVD NKVD in in Life Lye magazine. magazine. The The Centre Centre feared feared that that Orlov, Orlov, who who knew knew of of Grigulevich's Grigulevichs sabotage sabotage missions missions before before and and during during the the Spanish Spanish Civil Civil War, War, might might blow blow his his cover coverthough, though, in in the the event, event, he he did did not not do do SO.19 s ~ SO So.far far~as as the the ~ puzzled puzzled Costa Costa Rican &can foreign foreign ministry ministry and and Rome Rome diplomatic diplomatic corps corps were were concerned, concerned, Grigulevich Grigulevich and and his his wife wifesim simply ply disappeared disappeared into into thin thin air. air. A A note note on on his his KGB KGB file file in in 1980 1980 records records that that Western Western intelligence intelligence services services had, had, apparently, apparently, never never identified identified the the missing missing Teodoro Teodoro Castro Castro as as the the Soviet Soviet illegal illegal Iosif Iosif Grigulevich. Grigulevich. Back Back in in Moscow, Moscow, Grigulevich Grigulevich had had successfully successhlly completed c researcher completed a a doctoral doctoral dissertation, dissertation, become become a a senior senior scientifi scientific researcher at at the theEthno Ethnographic graphic Institute Institute of of the the Soviet Soviet Academy Academy of of Sciences Sciences in in 1958, 1958, and and thereafter thereafter made made a a new new life life for for himself himself as as a a leading leading writer writer and and academic academic authority authority on on Latin Latin America, America, ethnography ethnography and and religion, religion, becoming becoming vice-president vice-president of of the the Soviet-Cuban Soviet-Cuban and and Soviet-Venezuelan Soviet-Venezuelan Friendship Friendship Societies.20 Societies.
UNDER K KH HR RU SH H C H V, L O T S to US C H EE V , P PLOTS to assassinate assassinate Tito Tito were were replaced replaced by by attempted attempted con conciliation ciliation with with Belgrade. Belgrade. The The public public Soviet-Yugoslav Soviet-Yugoslav conflict conflict was was formally formally con concluded during during a a state state visit visit by by Khrushchev Khrushchev to to Belgrade Belgrade in in May May 1955. 1955. Assassination Assassination cluded was far far less less central central to to Khrushchev's Khrushchevs foreign foreign policy policy than than it it had had been been to to Stalin's. Stalins. It It was remained, remained, however, however, as as it it had had done done throughout throughout the the Stalin Stalin era, era, a a basic basic part part of of Soviet Soviet policy the leaders policy for for dealing dealing with with the leaders of of anti-Soviet anti-Soviet emigre CmigrC groups: groups: in in particular, particular, the the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the rival Social-Democratic Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the rival Social-Democratic National (NTS). As National Labor Labor Union Union (NTS). As Party Party secretary secretary in in the the Ukraine, Ukraine, Khrushchev Khrushchev had had ordered of, among among others, others, the the nationalist nationalist Olek Olekordered the the secret secret poisoning poisoning by by the the MGB MGB of, sander sander Shumsky Shumsky and and of of Archbishop Archbishop Romzha Romzha of of the the Uniate Uniate (Catholic) (Catholic) church.21 church.21

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The first first major major foreign foreign assassination assassination target target of post-Stalin era era was was Georgi Georgi The ofthe the post-Stalin Sergeyevich Sergeyevich Okolovich, Okolovich, one one of of the the leaders leaders of of the the NTS NTS organization organization in in West West Ger Germany. The The training training of of Okolovich's Okolovichs intended intended assassin, assassin,Nikolai Nikolai Khokhlov, Khokhlov, was was personmany. person ally overseen by by the ally overseen the MGB MGB head head of of foreign foreign intelligence, intelligence, Aleksandr Aleksandr Semyonovich Semyonovich Panyushkin. judo chamcham Panyushkin. Khokhlov's Khokhlovs instructors instructors included included Mikhail Mikhail Rubak, Rubak, a a Soviet Soviet judo pion, pion, and and Lieutenant-Colonel Lieutenant-Colonel Godlevsky, Godlevsky, winner winner of of five five national national pistol pistol tourna tournawith a silencer ments. The The execution execution weapon weapon was was an an electrically electrically operated operated gun, gun,fitted fitted with silencer a ments. and concealed concealed inside inside a a cigarette cigarette packet, packet, which which fired fired cyanide cyanide bullets bullets developed developed in in the the and Centre's however, Centres secret secret arms arms laboratory laboratory at at Khozyaistvo Khozyaistvo Zheleznovo. Zheleznovo. Khokhlov, Khokhlov,however, proved to to be be more more squeamish squeamish than than the assassins of of the the Stalin Stalin era era and and was was at at least least proved the assassins half-persuaded by by some some of of the the NTS NTS publications publications which which he read while while plotting plotting half-persuaded he read Okolovich's 18, 1954 1954 Khokhlov Khokhlov called called at at Okolovich's Okolovichs Okolovichs assassination. assassination. On O n February February 18, flat in in Frankfurt. Frankfurt. His His introduction introduction was was somewhat disconcerting. "Georgi Georgi Sergeye Sergeyeflat somewhat disconcerting. vich," vich, he he told told him, him, "I've Ive come come to to you you from from Moscow. Moscow. The The Central Central Committee Committee of of the the Communist Party of ordered your Communist Party of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union has has ordered your assassination." assassination. He H e then then informed the the startled startled Okolovich Okolovich that that he he had had decided decided not not to to murder murder him. him. Instead, Instead, informed Khokhlov Khokhlov defected defected to to an an initially initially skeptical skeptical CIA. CIA. On O n April April 20 20 he he gave gave a a sensational sensational press revealed assassination plan press conference conference at at which whichhe he revealed the the assassination plan and and displayed displayed his his exotic exotic murder murder weapon weapon to to the theworld's worlds media.22 media.22 In In April April 1955, 1955, following following a a prolonged prolonged post-mortem post-mortem at at the the Centre Centre in in the thewake wake of of Khokhlov's Khokhlovswell-publicized well-publicized defection, defection, "special special actions" actionswere were made made the the responsibility responsibility of the thereorganized reorganized FCD FCD Thirteenth Thirteenth Department, Department, which was was represented represented in in residen residenof which cies by a F. Its Its duties duties were were to to prepare prepare and and conduct conduct sabotage sabotage in in cies by a newly newly created created Line Line F. collaboration collaboration with with the theGRU; GRU; to to carry carry out out other other"special specialactions" actions involving involving the the use use of of force, ranging ranging from from kidnapping kidnapping to toassassination; assassination; and and to tosteal steal Western Western military military tech techforce, nology FCD Directorate Directorate T T on on its its foundation foundation nology (a (a responsibility responsibility later later handed handed over over to to FCD in in 1963).23 1963).23
S A B OTA GE O P E RAT I O N S R E P LAC E D assassination SABOTAGE OPERATIONS REPLACED assassination as as the the most most important important "special special actions" during and actions of of the the Thirteenth ThirteenthDepartment Department during and beyond beyond the the Khrushchev Khrushchev era. era. The The main cation of West main priority priority of of these these operations operations consisted consisted of of the the identifi identification of targets targets in in the the West and and preparations preparations for for their their destruction destruction by by Soviet Soviet sabotage sabotage and and intelligence intelligence groups groups (diversionnye yvatelnye gruppy or (diversionnye razved razvedyvatelnye gruppy or DRGs) DRGs) and and the the local local Communist Communist "resistance" resistance in in the the event event of of an an East-West East-West conflict. conflict. One One of of Line Line F's Fs earliest earliest tasks tasks followed followed the the conclusion of the four-power Austrian State Treaty, signed in Vienna in May 1955, conclusion of the four-power Austrian State Treaty, signed in Vienna in May 1955, which wartime allies. which ended ended the the post-war post-war occupation occupation by by the the.wartime allies. Before Beforethe the withdrawal withdrawal of of the the Red Red Army, Army,the the KGB KGB was was instructed instructed to to select select and and fill fill a a series series of ofsecret secret arms arms caches. caches. Among Among the themany many sites sites recorded recorded in in the thefiles files examined examined by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin were were the the villages villages of of Mayerling, Mayerling, Mollram, Mollram, Weinersdorf, Weinersdorf, Heiligenkreuz Heiligenkreuz and and Semmering; Semmering; the the Stift Stift Git Gittweig tweig monastery; monastery; and and two two ruined ruined castles, castles, Schloss SchlossStarhemberg Starhemberg and and Schloss Schloss Merken Merkenstein. stein. KGB KGB archives archives contain contain detailed detailed plans plans and and written written descriptions descriptions of of these these and and other other locations. locations. The The plan plan of of the theruins ruins of of Schloss Schloss Starhemberg, Starhemberg, for for example, example, shows shows a a 7.65 7.65 caliber caliber Walter Walter pistol, pistol, with with a a cartridge cartridge clip clip and and 21 21 rounds rounds of of ammunition, ammunition, con concealed wall .5 meters of cealed in in aacrack crack in in the theouter outer wall at at ground ground level level 1 1.5 meters to to the theleft left of an an old old pine pine

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tree; tree; and and a a 6.35 6.35 caliber caliber Walter Walter pistol, pistol, with with a acartridge cartridge clip clip and and 21 21 live live rounds, rounds, hidden hidden in the castle a in the castle courtyard courtyard 1.5 1.5 meters meters from from an an old old pear pear tree. tree. At At Schloss Schloss Merkenstein Merkenstein a 7.65 caliber Mauser Mauser pistol, pistol, with 21 rounds rounds of ammunition, was of ammunition, was 7.65 caliber with cartridge cartridge clip clip and and 21 concealed niche underneath stone to arch; a Wal concealed in in a a niche underneath a a large large stone to the theleft left of of the the gateway gateway arch; a Walter pistol, with cartridge and 25 25 rounds, was hidden crevice in the the wall.24 ter pistol, also also with cartridge clip clip and rounds, was hidden in ina a crevice in wall.24 In residency in sample check check of In May May 1964, 1964, the the KGB KGB residency in Vienna Vienna made made a a sample of the the second second Schloss cover in Schloss Merkenstein Merkenstein cache, cache, and and was was disturbed disturbed to to discover discover that that the the cover in which which the the arms arms had had been been wrapped wrapped had had rotted rottedaway. away. Four Four of of the the twenty-one twenty-one rounds rounds of of ammuni ammunition fallen deeper the crevice; tion had had disappeared disappeared and and were were assumed assumed to to have have fallen deeper into into the crevice; the the other Walter other seventeen seventeen rounds rounds had had deteriorated deteriorated and and were were no no longer longer safe safe to to use. use. The The Walter pistol, once once rust been removed, still serviceable. serviceable. The Centre prupru pistol, rust had had been removed, as as found found to to be be still The Centre dently decided to caches undisturbed.25 dently decided to leave leave the the other other caches ~ndisturbed.~ Potential Potential sabotage sabotage targets targets and and landing landing sites sites for for Soviet Soviet sabotage sabotage and and intelligence intelligence groups same meticulous as the the groups (DRGs) (DRGs) are are recorded recorded in in KGB KGB files files with with the the same meticulous detail detail as location of By 1959, if if not not earlier, most vulnerable vulnerable points location of the the secret secret arms arms caches.26 caches.26 By 1959, earlier, the the most points of pipelines, communications and major major indus of power-transmission power-transmission lines, lines, oil oil pipelines, communications systems systems and industrial being systematically systematically recon trial complexes complexes in in most, most, if if not not all, all, NATO NATO countries countries were were being reconnoitered maps. In 1959 noitered and and marked marked on on the theThirteenth ThirteenthDepartment's Departments maps. In the the summer summer of of 1959 a KGB agent a temporary job at at an an electricity in a KGB agent obtained obtained a temporary job electricity substation substation near near Worms Worms in order of plans electric power order to to assist assist the the preparation preparation of plans to to sabotage sabotage electric power lines lines crossing crossing the the Rhine.27 From to 30, delegation of energy experts, From October October 2 2 to 30, 1959 1959 aaSoviet Soviet delegation of energy experts, headed headed by deputy minister by the the deputy minister for for the the construction construction of of power power plants plants and and including including a a KGB KGB officer, States to reconnoiter sabotage targets targets in power stasta officer, used useda a visit visit to to the theUnited United States to reconnoiter sabotage in power tions tions and and electricity electricity lines. lines. Files on on suitable suitable landing landing sites sites and bases for for the DRGswhich which would would attack attack these these Files and bases the DRGs and and other othertargets targets included included detailed detailed information information on on the theterrain, terrain, landmarks, landmarks, climate climate in in different and local different seasons, seasons, prevailing prevailing winds, winds, populated populated areas areas and local customs. customs. Where Where the the D RGs were details on coast DRGs were to to land land by by sea sea rather rather than than by by air, air, there there were were further further details on the thecoastline, tides tides and and operating operating conditions conditions for for submarines submarines and and motor motor boats.28 boats.28Much Much of of the the line, information was was collected collected by by local local agents agents and and by by Soviet Soviet citizens citizens who who were were allowed allowedto to information travel also made travel to to the the West West for for family family reunions. reunions. An An attempt attempt was was also made to to recruit recruit illegal illegal agents in in the the main NATO countries countries and and Japan Japan to to assist assist the the DRGs. DRGs. According to a agents main NATO According to a Thirteenth Departmentfile: Thirteenth Department file:

People who who are are suitable suitable as as special special [illegal] [illegal] agents agents for for Line Line F F operations are 20 People operations are 20 to 45 45 years years old. old. Persons Persons from from aristocratic bourgeois-conservative circles circles are are to aristocratic and and bourgeois-conservative of no interest. Preference is given to the following professions: electricians, of no interest. Preference is given to the following professions: electricians, mechanics, toolmakers, chemists, qualified engineers, technicians and and highly highly mechanics, toolmakers, chemists, qualified engineers, technicians skilled citizens of of the theUnited States, France, France, Canada, Canada, skilledworkers-primarily workers-primarily citizens United States, Britain, West West Germany, Germany, Italy Italy and and Japan. Japan. People People who who adhere adhere strictly strictly to to church church Britain, dogma and and rules rules are are not not suitable, nor are are people a tendency towards alcodogma suitable, nor people with with a tendency towards alco holism, drug drug addiction and sexual sexual deviations. deviations. In order to to provide provide explanations holism, addiction and In order explanations for the the characteristics and routines involved in in the theoperations carried out, out, for characteristics and routines involved operations being being carried it is is desirable desirable to to select select people people who who travel travel frequently frequently around around their their own own country it country

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as well well as as to to other other countries-people who own own houses, houses, second homes, country country as countries-people who second homes, dachas, farmsteads and and plots plots of of land.29 land.29 dachas, farmsteads The Thirteenth Thirteenth Department's Departments preparations preparations for wartime sabotage sabotage operations operations The for wartime inevitably overlapped overlappedwith with those those of of the the GRU. GRU. The The resulting resulting duplication duplication of of effort effort was was inevitably made by the the traditional traditional rivalry rivalry and distrust between between the the two two agencies. On made worse worse by and distrust agencies. On April 7, 7,1960 the CPSU CPSU Central Central Committee Committee issued issued Decision Decision No. P-274-XIVI, call callApril 1960 the No. P-274-XIVI, KGB and and GRU. GRU. This This and and other other exhorta exhortaing for for closer between the the KGB ing closer co-ordination co-ordination between tions, however, tions, however, had had little little practical practical effect. effect. In In September September 1963 1963 the the Centre Centrecomplained complained of the the G GRU was making making no no serious serious attempt attempt to co-ordinate its its that the leadership of that the leadership RU was to co-ordinate 0 operations operations with with those those of of the the KGB.3 KGB.30 The KGB KGB found found it it easier to collaborate collaborate with with the intelligence agencies The easier to the intelligence agencies of of other other Soviet countries, who subordinate role, and Soviet Bloc Bloc countries, who were were usually usually willing willing to to accept accept a a subordinate role, and sought help head sought their their help in in aanumber number of of Line Line F F operations. operations. According According to to Markus MarkusWolf, Wolf, head of the the HVA HVA (Stasi (Stasi foreign foreign intelligence) intelligence) from from 1952 1952 to to 1986, the Centre of 1986, the Centre offered offered its its allies use allies lethal lethal nerve nerve toxins toxins and and poisons poisons which which were were fatal fatal on on contact contact with with the theskin skin for for use during refused all all but but a supply of during "special special actions." actions.Wolf Wolf claims claims that that he he refused a small small supply of "truth truth drugs," doctor: drugs, which which he he had had analyzed analyzed by by an an HVA HVA doctor:
He medical He came came back back shaking shaking his his head head in in horror. horror. "Use Use those those without without constant constantmedical supervision supervision and and there there is is every every chance chance that that the thefellow fellow from from whom whom you you want want the the truth truth will will be be dead dead as as a a dodo dodoin inseconds," seconds,he he said. said. In He In his his memoirs memoirs Wolf Wolf seeks seeks to to distance distance himself himself from from KGB KGB assassination assassination attempts. attempts. H e claims, the KGB claims, for for example, example, that that the KGB assassinated assassinated Aleksandr Aleksandr Trushnovich, Trushnovich, the the NTS NTS leader in in West WestBerlin, Berlin, "while while attempting attempting to to kidnap kidnap him."31 him.31KGB KGB files files tell tell a a rather rather dif difleader ferent story. In In April 1954 Heinz a Stasi operating undercover in ferent story. April 1954 Heinz GIeske, Gleske, a Stasi officer officer operating undercover in West he was and handed West Germany, Germany, lured lured Trushnovich Trushnovich to to his his home, home, where where he was kidnapped kidnapped and handed over over to to the theKGB KGB at at Karlshorst. Karlshorst. GIeske Gleske then then issued issued a a statement, statement,claiming claiming that that Trush Trushnovich the West West and novich had had become become disillusioned disillusioned with with the and had had "voluntarily" voluntarily defected defected to to East Germany. Germany. The The Centre Centre awarded awarded GIeske Gleske the the Order Order of of the the Red Red Star.32 Star.32 East Even Even with with some some assistance assistance from from its its allies, allies, the the KGB's KGBs "special special actions" actionsagainst against NTS NTS and the Khrushchev and OUN OUN leaders leaders during during the Khrushchev era era had had a a mixed mixed record record of of success-not success-not least assassins. In least because because of of the the doubts doubts of of its its assassins. In an an attempt attempt to to disguise disguise its its involvement involvement in to murder Thirteenth in an an attempt attempt to murder the the NTS NTS president, president, Vladimir Vladimir Poremsky, Poremsky, the the Thirteenth Department hired German contract Department hired the the services services of of a a German contract killer, killer, Wolfgang Wolfgang Wildprett. Wildprett. Like had second thoughts, decided Like Khokhlov, Khokhlov, however, however, Wildprett Wildprett had second thoughts, decided not not to to go go ahead ahead with police. with the the "special special action" action and and in in December December 1955 1955 informed informed the the West West German German police. In poison Khokhlov In September September 1957 1957 a aThirteenth ThirteenthDepartment Departmentattempt attemptto topoison Khokhlov himself himself with the belief with radioactive radioactive thallium thallium (chosen (chosen in in the belief that that it it would would degrade degrade and and leave leave no no trace failed. trace at at autopsy) autopsy) also also failed. These failures, failures, however, however, were followed the by successful successful assassination assassination of of two two lead leadThese were followed by the ing 1957 and NTS ideologist, ideologist, Lev Lev Rebet, Rebet, in in October October 1957 and ing Ukrainian Ukrainian emigres: CmigrCs: the the main main NTS the The the OUN OUN leader, leader, Stephen Stephen Bandera, Bandera, in in October October 1959.33 1959.33 The Thirteenth Thirteenth Department Department

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assassin both cases, assassin in in both cases, only only twenty-five twenty-five years years of of age age when when he he killed killed Rebet, Rebet, was was KGB compound compound at at Karlshorst. Karlshorst. His His Bodgan Stashinsky, Stashinsky, who who operated operated out out of of the the KGB Bodgan murder murder weapon, weapon, specially specially constructed constructed by by the the KGB KGB weapons weapons laboratory, laboratory, was was a a spray spray gun which whichfired fired a a jet jet of of poison poison gas gas from from a a crushed cyanide ampule ampule and and caused caused death gun crushed cyanide death by cardiac arrest. arrest. The Centre calculated, by cardiac The Centre calculated, correctly, correctly, that that an an unsuspecting unsuspecting pathologist pathologist was diagnose the tested his was likely likely to to diagnose the cause cause of of death death as as heart heart failure. failure. Stashinsky Stashinsky tested his weapon a wood near and fi ring at at it. weapon by by taking taking a a dog doginto into wood a near Karlshorst, Karlshorst, tying tying it it to toa a tree tree and firing it. The moments. Confident The dog dog had had immediate immediate convulsions convulsions and and died died in in a a few few moments. Confident of of the the deadliness Bandera by deadliness of of his his spray spray gun, gun, Stashinsky Stashinsky killed killed both both Rebet Rebet and and Bandera by lying lying in in wait in darkened he was wait for for them them in darkened stairways. stairways. In In December December 1959, 1959, he was summoned summoned to to Moscow. chairman Moscow. At At a a ceremony ceremony in in the the Centre, Centre, Aleksandr Aleksandr Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Shelepin, Shelepin, chairman of out an of the the KGB, KGB, read read aloud aloud a a citation citation praising praising Stashinsky Stashinsky "for for carrying carrying out an extremely extremely important government government assignment" assignment and and presented presented him him with Red important with the the Order Order of ofthe the Red Banner. Stashinsky sent on onaa course course to English Banner. Stashinsky was was told told he he would would be be sent to perfect perfect his his English before being ona a three- to to five-year five-year assignment assignment in in the theWest West carry out further further before being sent sent on threetoto carry out "special actions."34 special actions.34 Like about Like Khokhlov Khokhlov and and Wildprett, Wildprett, however, however, Stashinsky Stashinsky had had second second thoughts thoughts about his East German his career career as as an an assassin, assassin, encouraged encouraged by by his his East Germangirlfriend, girlfriend, Inge Inge Pohl, Pohl, whom whom he Berlin Wall Wall sealed sealed off off the he married married in in 1960. 1960. In In August August 1961, 1961, the the day day before before the the Berlin the escape route route from from the the East, East, the thecouple defected to to the the West. West. Stashinsky confessed to to escape couple defected Stashinsky confessed the murders murders of of Rebet and Bandera, Bandera, was was tried tried at at Karlsruhe Karlsruhe in in October October 1962 1962and the Rebet and and sensen tenced to to eight eight years' yearsimprisonment. imprisonment. The The judge judge declared declared that that the themain main culprit culprit was was the tenced the Soviet government political murder. Heads were Soviet government which which had had institutionalized institutionalized political murder. Heads were quick quick to to roll within within the theKGB. KGB. According According to to Anatoli Anatoli Golitsyn, Golitsyn, who who defected defected four four months after roll months after Stashinsky, at at least least seventeen seventeen KGB KGB officers officers were were sacked sackedor or demoted.35 demoted.35More More impor imporStashinsky, tantly, KGB leadership leadership and and the the tantly, the the Khokhlov Khokhlov and and Stashinsky Stashinsky defections defections led led both both the theKGB Politburo to to reassess reassess the the risks risks of of "wet wet affairs" affairs (assassination (assassination attempts). Fearfd of of Politburo attempts). Fearful attracting more more of of the the worldwide worldwide publicity publicity generated generated by by Khokhlov's Khokhlovspress press conference attracting conference and Stashinsky's Stashinskys trial, trial, the the Politburo Politburo abandoned abandoned assassination as a a normal normal treatment treatment and assassination as of policy policy outside outside the the Soviet Soviet Bloc, resorting to to it itonly only on on rare rare occasions occasions such such as as in the of Bloc, resorting in the elimination of President President Hafizullah Hafizullah Amin Amin of ofMghanistan Afghanistan in in December December 1979.36 1979.36 elimination of Among the the chief chief beneficiaries beneficiaries of of the the KGB's KGBs declining declining enthusiasm enthusiasm for for assassina assassinaAmong tion plots plots was was probably probably Nikita Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev. Vladimir Vladimir Semichastny, Semichastny, then then the KGB tion the KGB chairman, claims claims that that he hewas was approached approached in in 1964 1964by by Leonid Leonid Brezhnev, Brezhnev, the the ringleader ringleader chairman, of the the plot plottoto oust Khrushchev, and and asked asked to to arrange arrange his his "physical physicalelimination." elimination. Semi Semiof oust Khrushchev, chastny refused.37 reh~ed.~ H did, e however, however, agree to bug bug Khruschchev's Khruschchevs private private telephone telephone chastny He did, agree to lines. With the the KGB's KGBs assistance, the plotters plotters achieved achieved a a substantial substantial element element of of sur surlines. With assistance, the prise. When Sea in prise. When Khrushchev Khrushchev left left for for a a holiday holiday on on the the Black Black Sea in the the autumn autumnof of 1964, 1964, he was was seen seen off off by by smiling smiling colleagues. colleagues. When When he he returned returned on on October October 13, summoned he 13, summoned to attend attend an meeting of of the the Presidium, Presidium, he he was was met met at airport only only by by to an urgent urgent meeting at the the airport and a a senior senior security security officer officer from from the the KGB. KGB. "They've Theyve all allgathered gathered in in the the Semichastny and Semichastny Kremlin and are are waiting waiting for for you, Semichastny told told him. surrendered to to Kremlin and you," Semichastny him. Khrushchev Khrushchev surrendered the the inevitable inevitable without without a a struggle, struggle, agreeing agreeing to to resign resign on on the the grounds grounds of of "advanced advanced age age and poor health." and poor health. Thereafter, Thereafter, he he was was relegated relegated almost almost to to the the status status of of unperson, unperson, not not

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mentioned again in in the the press press until until Pravda published in 1970 1970 recording mentioned again published a a brief brief note note in recording his death.38 death.38 his operations the Centre showed increasing operations declined, declined, the Centre showed increasing interest during during the the 1960s 1960s and 1970s 1970s in in collaboration collaboration with with anti-imperialist guerrilla interest and "anti-imperialist" guerrilla and terrorist terrorist groups groups in in the Third World. World. I n January January 1961 1961 Khrushchev and the Third In Khrushchev publicly publicly pledged Soviet Soviet assistance assistance for for "movements movements of of national The abortive, pledged national liberation. liberation. " The abortive, CIACIA backed invasion of Cubaat at the Bay three months months later later strengthened strengthened his his backed invasion of Cuba the Bay of of Pigs Pigs three determination to to do do so. so. On O n August August 3 3 he he told told a a private private meeting determination meeting of ofWarsaw Warsaw Pact Pact leadlead ers in in Moscow, Moscow, "I I wish wish we we could could give give imperialism imperialism a nose!7739 The Centre ers a bloody bloody nose!"39 The Centre believed it it had had devised devised a a way way to to do doso so which would conceal role of believed which would conceal the the role of the the KGB. KGB. The aggressive aggressive global global grand grand strategy strategy against against the Main Adversary, devised in the The the Main Adversary, devised in the summer of of 1961 1961 by by Shelepin Shelepin and and approved approved by by Khrushchev Khrushchev an4 and the the Central summer Central ComCom mittee, envisaged knvisaged the the use use of of national national liberation liberation movements both in inoperations mittee, movements both operations against against the "armed against reactionary the United UnitedStates States and and its its allies allies and and in inpromoting promoting armed uprisings uprisings against reactionary pro-Western governments." governments. At At the the top top of of the the list list of of national liberation movements pro-Western national liberation movements cultivated National Liberation Liberation Front cultivated by by the the KGB KGB was was the the newly newly founded founded Sandinista Sandinista National Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua, Nicaragua, which which was was dedicated to following following the the example example of Cuban (FSLN) in dedicated to of the the Cuban revolution and and overthrowing overthrowing the the brutal brutal pro-American dictatorship of of the the Somoza Somoza revolution pro-American dictatorship dynasty.40The The FSLN leader, Carlos Carlos Fonseca Fonseca Amador, Amador, codenamed codenamed GIDROLOG dynasty.4o FSLN leader, GIDROLOG ("Hydrologist"), was as a "a trusted guer (Hydrologi~t~), was described described by by the the Centre Centre as trusted agent."41 agent.41Sandinista Sandinista guerKGB sabotage and intelligence group established in 1966 rillas formed formed the the basis for a a KGB sabotage and intelligence group established in 1966 rillas basis for on US border border with with support supportbases bases in in the the area area of of Ciudad Ciudad Juarez, Juarez, Tijuana Tijuana on the the Mexican Mexican US and yUbeda Ubeda (codenamed (codenamed and Ensenada. Ensenada. Its Its leader, leader, Manuel Manuel Ramon Ram6n de de Jesus Jesus Andara Andara y F operations. operations. Among Among the thechief chief sab sabPRIM), traveled traveled to to Moscow Moscow for for training training in inLine Line PRIM), F otage targets targets across across the the US US border border were were military military bases, bases, missile missile sites, sites, radar radar installa installaotage tions and and the the oil oil pipeline pipeline (code (codenamed START) which which ran ran from from EI El Paso Paso in in Texas Texas to to tions named START) Costa Mesa, Mesa, California. California. Three sites on on the the American American coast coast were were selected for DRG DRG Costa Three sites selected for landings, together together with with large-capacity large-capacity dead-drops dead-drops in in which which to to store store mines, mines, explosive, explosive, landings, detonators materials. A detonators and and other other sabotage sabotage materials. A support support group group codenamed codenamed SATURN SATURN was was given the the task task of of using using the the movements movements of of migrant migrant workers workers (braceros) (braceros) to to conceal conceal the the given transfer munitions across border. SATURN's headquarters was was a a transfer of of agents agents and and munitions across the the border. SATURNSheadquarters hotel VLADELETS (Proprietor), ("Proprietor"), hotel belonging belonging to to aaRussian-born Russian-born agent, agent, codenamed codenamed VLADELETS in Ensenada Ensenada fi fifty miles from from the the US in fty miles Baja California. US border border in in the the Baja California. VLADELET's VLADELETs two Mexico the KGB KGB as as Russian "Russian patriots, patriots," owned two sons, sons, both both born bornin in Mexico but but assessed assessed by bythe owned a place for DRGs and and their their equipment as a gas gas station station which which was was selected selected as as a a hiding hiding place for DRGs equipment as well base from in the well as as a a base from which which to to conduct conduct sabotage sabotage in the United UnitedStates.42 States.42 Canada the south, south, was intended by Canada in in the the north, north, like like Mexico Mexico in in the was intended by the the Thirteenth Thirteenth Department (reorganized Department V) V) as as a a base base for for cross-border cross-border operoper Department (reorganized in in 1965 1965as as Department ations by by DRGs DRGs against against the the Main Main Adversary. Adversary. In In 1967 frontier crossings ations 1967 aanumber number of offrontier crossings were reconnoitred: among the Lake Lake of of the the Woods International were reconnoitred: among them themareas areas near near the Woodsand and International Falls in in Minnesota, Minnesota, and and in in the the region region of of the the Glacier Park in Montana.The Falls Glacier National National Park in Montana. The KGB believed that one one of of its its targets targets in in Montana, Montana, the theFlathead Flathead dam, KGB believed that dam, generated generated the "the largest power power supply supply system system in in the the world." world. Department Department V identifi identified point (codelargest ed a a point (codeTHOUGH ITS ASSASSINATION T HOUGH I TS A S S A S S I N AT I ON

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named onthe the South named DORIS) DORIS) on South Fork Fork river river about about three three kilometers kilometers below below the the dam, dam, where on where it it could could bring bring down down a a series series of ofpylons pylons on aasteep steep mountain mountain slope slope which which would would take take a a lengthy lengthy period period to to repair. repair. It It also also planned planned a a probably probably simultaneous simultaneous operation operation in in which which DRG DRG commandos commandos would would descend descend on on the the Hungry Hungry Horse Horse dam dam at at night, night, take take control control of of it it for for aafew few hours hours and and sabotage sabotage its its sluices. sluices. The The state state with with the the largest largest number number of of targets, targets, however, however, was wasalmost almost certainly certainly New New York, York,where where DRG's DRGs based based along along the the Delaware Delaware river, river, in in the theBig Big Spring Spring Park Parknear near Har Harrisburg, risburg, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania, and and at at other other locations locations planned planned to to disrupt disrupt the thepower power supply supply of of the the entire entire state state before before taking taking refuge refuge in in the theAppalachian Appalachian mountains. mountains. In In examining examining the the target and Department V, target files files of of the the Thirteenth ThirteenthDepartment Department and Department V, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was invari invariably been reconnoitred. ably struck struck by by the the thoroughness thoroughness with with which which each each target target had had been reconnoitred. The The file on the port of New York (target GRANIT), for example, included details of file on the port of New York (target GRANIT), for example, included details of ships' shipsberths, berths, warehouses, warehouses, communications communications systems, systems, port port personnel personnel and and security security pro procedures. cedures. As As always, always, the the port's ports most most vulnerable vulnerable points points were were carefully carehlly marked.43 marked.43 As As well well as as being being a a base base of of KGB KGB "special special tasks" tasksagainst against the the United United States, States, Canada Canada was also an important target in its own right. Operation KEDR ("Cedar"), begun was also animportant target in its own right. Operation KEDR (Cedar),begun by by the twelve years the Ottawa Ottawa residency residency in in 1959, 1959, took took twelve years to to complete complete an an immensely immensely detailed detailed reconnaissance pipelines across reconnaissance of of oil oil refineries refineries and and oil oil and and gas gas pipelines across Canada Canada from from British British Columbia and Columbia to to Montreal. Montreal. Each Each target target was was photographed photographed from from several several angles angles and its its vul vulnerable identified. The nerable points points identified. The most most suitable suitable approach approach roads roads for for sabotage sabotage operations, operations, together together with with the thebest best getaway getaway routes, routes, were were carefully carefullyplotted plotted on on small-scale small-scale maps.44 maps.4 Line Line F F operations operations in in north north America America were were part part of of a a much much larger larger strategy. strategy. In In the the event event of of war war with with NATO, NATO, Moscow Moscow planned planned a a massive massive campaign campaign of of sabotage sabotage and and dis disruption envisaged ruption behind behindenemy enemy lines. lines. But But sabotage sabotage on on aamore more modest modest scale scale was wasalso also envisaged in seen by stopped short in crises crises (not (not precisely precisely defined defined in in files files seen by Mitrokhin) Mitrokhin) which which stopped short of of war. war. Within Within Europe, Europe, residencies residencies in in NATO NATO countries countries and and some some neutral neutral states states (notably (notably Austria, all expected Austria, Sweden Sweden and and Switzerland) Switzerland) were were all expected to to make make detailed detailed plans plans for for the the sabotage sabotage of of four four to to six six major major targets targets a a year.45 year.45In In 1964-6, 1964-6, for for example, example, Line Line F F in in West West Germany Germany planned planned "special special actions" actionsagainst against the the Wilhelmshaven-Wesseling Wilhelmshaven-Wesseling oil oil pipe pipeline; line; fuel fuel and and lubricant lubricant depots depots in in Wilhelmshaven Wilhelmshaven and and Unterpfaffenhoven; Unterpfaffenhoven; the the main main electrical au; electrical substations substations in in Brauweiler Brauweiler and and Rommerskirchen Rommerskirchen and and in in the thehamlet hamlet of of Fein Feinau; the the NATO NATO military military transit transit base base in in the theharbor harbor of of Bremerhaven; Bremerhaven; the the FRG FRG government government war war bunker; bunker; the the Howaldswerft Howaldswerft shipbuilding shipbuilding docks docks at at Kiel Kiel and and the the Weser Weser A AG G in in Bre Bremen; men; and and the the main main US US army army arms arms depot depot at atMisau. Misau.On O n instructions instructions from from the the Centre, Centre, the the Bonn Bonn residency residency purchased purchased uniforms uniforms and and work work clothes, clothes, used used by by Bundeswehr Bundeswehr sol soldiers, diers, railway railway personnel, personnel, forestry forestry workers, workers, gamekeepers gamekeepers and and roadworkers, roadworkers, to to be be worn worn as as disguise disguise by by DRG DRG saboteurs, saboteurs, for for whom whom landing landingsites sites were wereselected selected in in the theBlack Black For Forest the sabotage est and and Bavaria. Bavaria. Arms Arms and and radio radio equipment equipment for for use use in in the sabotage missions missions were were hidden near the The hidden in indead-drops dead-drops near the targets.46 targets.46 The standard standard DRG DRG arms arms package, package, packed packed in in a a container container designed designed for for long-term long-term storage, storage, consisted consisted of: of: equipment equipment for for blowing blowing up up railway one "Cherepakha" railway track; track; one Cherepakha (tortoise) (tortoise) mine mine with with 3 3 additional additional explosive explosive charges; charges; 4 4 "Ugolok" Ugolokdevices devices (purpose (purpose not not specified specified in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes); notes); explosives explosives designed designed to of high-voltage high-voltage power power transmission transmission pylons; pylons; 3 3 6-meter 6-meterto destroy destroy the the main main supports supports of long two-hour 47 long detonator detonatorfuses; fuses; and and 2 2 Karandash Karandash ("pencil") (pencil)detonators detonators with witha a two-hour delay. delay.47

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Each container. Radio transmitters and Each arms arms cache cache might might include include more more than than one one container. Radio transmitters and receivers were wereusually usually concealed in separate separate caches, with local local currency currency for receivers concealed in caches, sometimes sometimes with for use August 10,000 deutschmarks deutschmarks were were placed placed in in use by by the the DRGs. DRGs. In In August 1965, 1965, for for example, example, 10,000 cache near near Bonn; several attempts attempts to locate it all the TREZUBETS the TREZUBETS cache Bonn; several to locate it a a decade decade later later all failed and and the the money money was was written written off48 failed Italy was was divided divided by by the the Centre Centre into four main with two Italy into four main zones zones of of operations, operations, each each with two landing sites sites and and bases bases for for DRGs: DRGs: the the foothills foothills of Alps (with sites near Venice landing of the the Alps (with sites near Venice and in in the the Milan-Turin Milan-Turin region), region), the the remainder remainder of of the north (with theArno Arno and the north (with sites sites in in the valley and and the the Livorno-Pisa-Florence Livorno-Pisa-Florence area), area), the the south. south. Each Eachsite valley the center center and and the site for for parachute by DRGs had to to be be a a level level area buildings of parachute landings landings by DRGs had area without without buildings of approxiapproxi mately 1 1 by by 1.5-2 kilometers. In In each each zone, zone, a a large in land land mately 1 .5-2 kilometers. large arms arms cache cache was was hidden hidden in or property to an an experienced experienced agent; radio equipment or property belonging belonging to agent; radio equipment and and money money were were hidden in in dead-drops. was instructed instructed to to buy buy samples samples of of the the hidden dead-drops. The The Rome Rome residency residency was uniforms worn worn by by the the armed armed services, services, police, police, carabinieri, carabinieri, railway railway and uniforms and forestry forestry workwork ers, local near the the landing sites. For For the ers, as as well well as as typical typical clothing clothing of ofthe the local inhabitants inhabitants near landing sites. the use of RGs in the most most northerly region, the the residency residency was was asked asked to use of D DRGs in the northerly region, to acquire acquire badges Alpine units units of armed services. Line F prepared prepared files files on on power badges from from Alpine of the the armed services. Line powertransmission lines, lines, oil oil pipelines, pipelines, bridges, tunnels and a transmission bridges, tunnels and military military installations installations within within a I20-kilometer landing site. four-volume file prepared on on for 120-kilometer radius radius of of each each landing site. A A four-volume file was was prepared former it was in mer members members of of the the Italian Italian wartime wartime resistance resistance who, who, it was hoped, hoped, would would assist assist in sabotage sabotage missions.49 missions.49 Similar Similar sabotage sabotage plans plans were were made made for for all all Department Department V's Vs target target countries. countries. Each Each DRG of its as a DRG landing landing site site was was known known as as a a DOROZHKA DOROZHKA C'runway"), (runway),each each of its bases bases as a ULEY most sinister sinister remnants remnants of War, still ULEY ("beehive").5o (beehive). Among Among the the most of the the Cold Cold War, still scat scattered Israel, Turkey, tered around around north north America, America, most most of of western western and and central central Europe, Europe, Israel, Turkey, Japan and some the world, are the the caches of KGB KGB arms arms and radio Japan and some other other parts parts of of the world, are caches of and radio equipment intended intended for for use use by by the the DRGs. DRGs. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes include include precise precise details details equipment of a number countries. Some Some are are booby-trapped booby-trapped with MOL of their their locations locations in in a number of of countries. with MOLNIYA (lightning)explosive explosive devices devicesdesigned designed to to destroy destroy their their contents contents if if the the caches NIY A ("lightning") caches are opened, and Indeed, one one or or more more of caches may may are opened, and are are highly highly dangerous.51 dangerous. Indeed, of the the caches already have havecaused causedexplosions explosions mistakenly attributed attributed to to other othercauses. causes. already mistakenly
LATE IN IN

Berne exploded on by by a a water-cannon. water-cannon. Berne identified identified by by Mitrokhin,52 M i t r ~ k h i n , which which ~ exploded when when fired fired on A if any further A spokesman spokesman for for the the Federal Federal Prosecutor's Prosecutors office officeissued issueda a warning warning that that if any hrther caches they touched: Anyone ''Anyone who tried to the caches were werediscovered, discovered, they should should not not be be touched: who tried to move move the [KGB] container container would been killed."53 Belgium, radio safely [KGB] would have have been killed.53In In Belgium, radio sets sets were weresafely removed three other (codenamed ALPHA-I, ALPHA-2 and and removed from from three other KGB KGB caches caches (codenamed ALPHA-1, ALPHA-2 ALPHA-5).54 of an an unpredictable of the ALPHA-5).54 Given Given the the dangerous dangerous condition condition of unpredictable number number of the KGB's the SVR SVR now now has has no no excuse excuse for failing to to KGBs Cold Cold War War radio radio and and arms arms caches, caches, the for failing reveal their exact the countries countries in they have have reveal their exact locations locations to to the thegovernments governments of of all all the in which which they been been hidden. hidden. In KGB residencies to run run or its In addition addition to to using using Line Line F F officers officers in in KGB residencies to or supervise supervise its operations, successor also had a a small small group group of of operations, the the Thirteenth Thirteenth Department Department and and its its successor also had

1998, 1998, the the Swiss Swiss authorities authorities began began removing removing a a radio radio cache cache in in woods woods near near

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illegals, actions," who illegals, trained trained in in sabotage sabotage techniques techniques and and other other "special specialactions, who moved moved around 55 The around the the world world from from one one sabotage sabotage target target or or "wet wetjob" job to to another. another.55 The most most active active was was Igor Igor Vitalyevich Vitalyevich Voytetsky Voytetsky (codenamed (codenamed PAUL), PAUL),who who began began training training as as an an illegal illegal in the age in 1956 1956atat the age of of twenty-three. twenty-three. Voytetsky's Voytetskys father, father, Gleb Gleb Pavlovich Pavlovich Shlyandin, Shlyandin, had had committed theheight height of Great Terror committed suicide suicide at at the of the the Great Terror in in 1937. 1937. His His mother, mother, Sofya Sofya Davidovna had remarried Davidovna Rudnitskaya, Rudnitskaya, who who worked worked as as a a music music teacher, teacher, had remarried Vitali Vital1Pante Panteleymonovich leymonovich Voytetsky, Voytetsky, a a film film director director in in the the Gorky Gorky Film Film Studio. Studio. According According to to his his legend, "Emil Belgian legend, Voytetesky Voyteteskywas was Emil Evraert," Evraert, the the son son of of aa Belgian father, father, Ernst Ernst Evraert, Evraert, and and a German mother, Marta Althammer. a German mother, Hedwig Hedwig Marta Althammer. Ernst Ernst Evraert Evraert had had lived lived in in Russia Russia since Althammer" did since 1933; 1933;"Hedwig Hedwig Althammer did not not exist. exist. However, However, a a KGB KGB agent, agent, codenamed codenamed RAG, M G , who who worked worked for for the the commune commune of of Bellecour Bellecour in in the the Belgian Belgian province province of of Hain Hainault, in the the commune ault, made made a a bogus bogus entry entry in commune records records which which purported purported to to show show that that PAUL October 15, 1943 to December PAUL and and his his fictitious fictitious mother mother had had lived lived there there from from October 15,1943 to December 14, 1944. On 14,1944. Onthe the strength strength of of this this entry entry and and forged forged identity identity documents documents provided provided by by the the FCD FCD Illegals Illegals Directorate Directorate S, S, PAUL PAUL obtained obtained a a Belgian Belgian passport passport in in the the name name of of Emil 1962, then crossed the Channel to England. Emil Evraert Evraert on on November November 8 8,1962, then crossed the Channel to England. , On Dover O n January January 30, 30, 1963, 1963,in in Dover Register Register Office, Office, Voytetsky Voytetsky married married another another KGB KGB illegal, illegal, Yulia Yulia Ivanovna Ivanovna Gorankova Gorankova (codenamed (codenamed VIRGINIA), VIRGINIA), who who was was then then able able to to apply apply for for genuine genuine Belgian Belgian identity identity documents documents to to replace replace her her forged forged West West German German passport. passport. Assisted Assisted by by Gorankova, Gorankova, Voytetsky Voytetsky embarked embarked on on aafull-time full-time career career as as an an ille illegal working for the Thirteenth Department.56 His fi r st assignment was in Northern gal working for the Thirteenth D e ~ a r t m e n tHis . ~ ~first assignment was in Northern Ireland, sites for Ireland, where where he he selected selected sites for airborne airborne and and maritime maritime landings landings by by DRGs. DRGs. He He then then reconnoitred reconnoitred landing landing sites sites in in Scotland, Scotland, where where he he also also identified identified suitable suitable bases bases for for wartime wartime "resistance resistance movements" movements by by Scottish Scottish Communists, Communists, prepared prepared large large dead deaddrops oil pipelines drops for for sabotage sabotage equipment, equipment, identified identified vulnerable vulnerable sections sections of of oil pipelines and and other operations. Over other targets targets and and selected selected agents agents for for carrying carrying out out sabotage sabotage operations. Over the thenext next decade, decade, before before becoming becoming an an illegal illegal trainer trainer in in 1975, 1975, Voytetsky Voytetsky carried carried out out similar similar assignments Canada, France, assignments in in Austria, Austria, Belgium, Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Greece, Hong Hong Kong, Kong, Israel, Israel, Italy, Italy, Spain, States-probably rst ever world Spain, Turkey Turkey and and the theUnited United States-probably the the fi first ever saboteur's saboteurs world tour.57
TH HO OU UG H H THE F e D greatly FCD greatly expanded expanded its its sabotage sabotage capability capability during during the the 1960s, 1960s, it it became increasingly confused became increasingly confused about about the the traditional traditional speciality speciality of of its its "special special actions" actions department-the department-the liquidation liquidation of of "enemies enemiesof of the the people" peopleabroad. abroad.The The targets targets of of most most of of the assassination assassination plots plots during during the the 1960s 1960s and and 1970s 1970s recorded recorded in in the theKGB KGB files files seen seenby by the Mitrokhin Mitrokhin concerned concerned the the KGB's KGBs own own defectors, defectors,all all of ofwhom whom were were sentenced sentenced to to death death in absentia. Despite Despite the the risks risks of of further further bad bad pub pubfor treason treason during during secret secret trials trials held held in for licity in in the theWest West if they they were were hunted hunted down, down, the the Centre Centrewas was determined determined not not to to allow allow licity if the belief belief to to spread spread within within KGB KGB ranks that traitors traitors could escapetheir their just just deserts: deserts: the ranks that could escape

The KGB must must intensify intensify the the spirit spirit of of hatred hatred towards towards the the enemy enemy and and traitors. traitors. The KGB Significant losses are Significant harm harm is is done done by by the the comforting comforting theory theory that that losses areinevitable inevitable in in wars between between intelligence intelligence services. services. At At meetings meetings and and in in reports, reports, betrayals betrayals are wars are sometimes sometimes called called compromises. compromises. Compromises, Compromises, by by which which is is meant meant operational operational failures, are usually provoked by skillful dangles by the enemy. Equating these failures, are usually provoked by skillful dangles by the enemy. Equating these

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two two concepts concepts usually usually leads leads to to the the moral moral justification justification of of traitors, traitors, and and creates creates an an image image of of them them as as victims victims of of the the intelligence intelligence skills skills of of the the enemy. enemy. Defectors Defectors do do go unpunished. unpunished. Their Their punishment punishment is is described in such such proverbs proverbs as: as: "The The not go not described in traitor Judas Judas is is hated hated everywhere." everywhere.''A traitor deserves a A mercenary mercenary dog dog deserves a stake stake through through the heart" heartand and "A A traitor traitor is is his his own own murderer."58 murderer.* the Deep at at thethe damage Deep concern concern in in the theCentre Centre damage done done by by Anatoli Anatoli Golitsyn's Golitsynsdefection defection from from the to deter the Helsinki Helsinki residency residency in in December December 1961 1961 strengthened strengthened its its determination determination to deter future inside the Golitsyn's future defectors. defectors. Unaware Unaware of of the the confusion confusion caused caused inside the CIA CIA by by Golitsyns increasingly extravagant conspiracy his defection increasingly extravagant conspiracy theories, theories, the the KGB KGB regarded regarded his defection as as a a serious 59 His case serious setback. ~etback.~ His case prompted prompted a a major major review review by by the the Centre Centre of of its its procedures procedures for for liquidating liquidating traitors traitors outside outside the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. In In November November 1962 1962 Semichastny, Semichastny, who had succeeded earlier, approved who had succeeded Shelepin Shelepin as as KGB KGB chairman, chairman, a a year year earlier, approved a a plan plan for for "special special actions" actionsagainst against a a group groupof of "particularly particularlydangerous dangerous traitors," traitors,jointly jointly drawn drawn up up by the heads of the First and Second Chief Directorates, Aleksandr Mikhailovich by the heads of the First and Second Chief Directorates, Aleksandr Mikhailovich Sakharovsky Sakharovsky and and Oleg Oleg Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Gribanov: Gribanov: As As these these traitors, traitors, who who have have given given important important state state secrets secrets to to the the opponent opponent and and caused in USSR, have have been been sentenced sentenced to to death death in caused great great political political damage damage to to the the USSR, their their absence, absence, this this sentence sentence will will be be carried carried out out abroad. abroad. The The oldest oldest name name on on the the death deathlist list was was that that of of the the former former GRU GRU cipher cipher clerk clerk Igor Igor Gouzenko, Gouzenko, who who had had defected defected in in 1945. 1945. The The remainder remainder were were more more recent recent KGB KGB defec defectors: Rastvorov, Vladimir tors: Anatoli Anatoli Golitsyn, Golitsyn, Pyotr Pyotr Deryabin, Deryabin, Yuri YuriRastvorov, Vladimir and and Evdokia Evdokia Petrov, Hayhanen, Nikolai plan Petrov, Reino Reino Hayhanen, Nikolai Khokhlov Khokhlov and and Bogdan Bogdan Stashinsky.60 Stashinsky.60The The plan approved to to train assassins approved by by Semichastny Semichastny instructed instructed the the Thirteenth ThirteenthDepartment Department train assassins to to carry the death sentences the traitors. carry out outthe death sentences on onthe traitors. The The FCD FCD Counter-Intelligence Counter-Intelligence Department Department (later (later Directorate Directorate K) K) was wasto to track track them them down down in in their their foreign foreign refuges, refuges, in in collaboration collaboration with with the theSecond Second Chief Chief Directorate, Directorate, which which would would maintain maintain surveillance surveillance of inside the Union, monitor of the the traitors' traitors relatives relatives inside the Soviet Soviet Union, monitor their their correspondence correspondence and and carry carry out out periodic periodic searches searches of of their their homes.61 homes.61In In Golitsyn's Golitsyns case caseit it was was hoped hoped that that he he would would emerge emerge from from hiding hiding to to give give evidence evidence to to a a Congressional Congressional committee committee and and pro provide vide an an opportunity opportunity for for a a KGB KGB assassin.62 assassin.62 In the American the former In 1964 1964 reports reports appeared appeared in in the American press press that that the former illegal illegal Reino Reino Hayhanen, been killed Hayhanen, who who had had betrayed betrayed "Willie" Willie Fisher Fisher (alias (alias "Rudolf Rudolf Abel"), Abel), had had been killed in a road accident. FCD personnel were informed that the "accident" had in a road accident. FCD personnel were informed that the accident had been been arranged Department. Though hand in in arranged by by the the Thirteenth Thirteenth Department. Though KGB KGB had, had, in in reality, reality, no no hand Hayhanen's cers were Hayhanens death, death, most most foreign foreign intelligence intelligence offi officers were taken taken in in by by their their chief's chiefs disinformation.63 The truth, di~information.~~ truth, The which which the the Centre Centrecould could not not bring bringitself itself to to admit admiteven even to to its that its own own officers, officers,was was that it itrarely rarely succeeded succeeded in in tracking tracking down down any any of of those those on on the thelist list of of "particularly particularly dangerous dangerous traitors" traitors and and that, that,even even when when it it did didso, so, it it could could not not devise devise methods methods of of assassinating assassinating them them which which did did not notcarry carry unacceptable unacceptable risks. risks. During During the the 1960s, 1960s, the the names names of of several several further further defectors defectors were were added added to to the the list list of of "particularly particularlydangerous dangerous traitors" traitors to to be be liquidated liquidated abroad. abroad. The The first first was was Yuri YuriNosenko, Nosenko,

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a a KGB KGB officer officer who who had had made made secret secret contact contact with with the the CIA CIA in in June June 1962 1962 while while serv serving Soviet disarmament delegation ing on onthe the Soviet disarmament delegation in in Geneva Geneva and and who whodefected defected to to the theUnited United States in in January January 1964.64 1964.64 Unlike any any of of the the other other defectors defectors on on the the 1962 1962list list of of "par parStates Unlike ticularly not executed. ticularly dangerous dangerous traitors," traitors, Nosenko Nosenko was was imprisoned, imprisoned, though though not executed. By By a a KGB but but the Golitsyn had terrible irony, irony, however, his jailers jailers were were not not the terrible however, his the KGB the CIA. CIA. Golitsyn had claimed dis claimed that that the the KGB KGB would would send send a a series series of of bogus bogus defectors defectors in in an an attempt attempt to to discredit insisted, was credit him. him. Nosenko, Nosenko, he he insisted, was one one of of them. them. Tragically, Tragically, Nosenko's Nosenkosdebriefers, debriefers, like like Angleton, Angleton, the thechief chief of of the thecounterintelligence counterintelligence staff, staff, believed believed Golitsyn. Golitsyn. They They paid paid too too much much attention attention to to some some of of the the apparent apparent gaps gaps and and discrepancies discrepancies in in Nosenko's Nosenkos story-notably the rank. They story-notably the confusion confusion over over his his rank. They also also wrongly wrongly concluded concluded that that some some of his information was too good to be true-particularly his accurate report in the of his information was too good to be true-particularly his accurate report in the wake file in the Centre Centre showed the wake of of Kennedy's Kennedys assassination assassination that that Oswald's Oswalds file in the showed that that the KGB KGB considered considered him him mentally mentally unstable unstable and and had had declined declined to to use use him him as as an an agent, agent, despite his period in the Soviet And they despite his period in the Soviet Union. Union. And they foolishly foolishly regarded regarded as as suspicious suspicious rather rather than thanrational rational Nosenko's Nosenkos lack lack of of support support for for Golitsyn's Golitsyns conspiracy conspiracy theories. theories. Pete Pete Bagley, Bagley, chief chief of of the the counterintelligence counterintelligence branch branch of of the the CIA's CIAs Soviet Soviet Division, Division, com complained, plained, tt[Nosenko] [Nosenko] made made everything everything sound sound less less sinister sinister than than Golitsyn. Golitsyn. To To me, me, Golitsyns version version was was simply simply superior." superior. For For four four years years and and eight Nosenko Golitsyn's eight months months Nosenko was was imprisoned imprisoned by by the the CIA CIA in in miserable miserable conditions, conditions, without without reading reading material material or or human contact, contact, while while his his interrogators interrogators insisted insisted he he admit that he was a a KGB KGB plant. plant. human admit that he was Few cases cases in in American American intelligence intelligence history history have have been been so so appallingly appallingiy mishandled.65 mi~handled.~ Few The s ill-founded The KGB KGB knew knew nothing nothing of of the the CIA' CIAs ill-founded suspicions. suspicions. Ironically, Ironically, while while Nosenko was was languishing languishing in in solitary confinement in in a prison cell, the Centre Nosenko solitary confinement a prison cell, the Centre was was working for both himand and Golitsyn Golitsyn to to be be assassinated assassinated by by the the illegal working on on aaplan plan for both him illegal PAUL, PAUL, if they they visited visited the the 1967 1967 Montreal World Fair (which, (which, for for rather rather different different reasons, reasons, nei neiif Montreal World Fair ther did).66 did).66 ther The Centre's Centres continuing continuing inability inability to to track track down down its its traitors traitors was was well well illustrated illustrated by by The the Yevgeni Runge the case case of of the the illegal illegal Yevgeni Runge (codenamed (codenamed MAKS), MAKS), who who defected defected with with his his CIA in in Germany 1967. Following Following wife Ventina Valentina Rush Rush (ZINA) (ZINA) to to the the CIA wife Germany in in October October 1967. the KGB's traditional the KGBs traditional practice practice of of using using insulting insulting codenames codenames for for defectors, defectors, MAKS MAKS was renamed GNIDA CtNit"). (Nit). Like Like his his predecessors, predecessors, he he was was secretly secretly condemned condemned to to was renamed GNIDA death Enormous efforts efforts involving involving several serviceswere were absentia. Enormous several other other Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc services death in absentia. devoted to to operation operation TREZO TREZOR, the long and unsuccessful unsuccessful attempt attempt to to track down devoted R, the long and track down and liquidate liquidate Runge. Runge. More fifty of the the Runges' Runges friends friends and in the and More than than fi fty of and relatives relatives in the Soviet Union, East Eastand and West Germany were placed placedunder surveillance;every every item item of of Soviet Union, West Germany were under surveillance; their correspondence correspondence which which passed through the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc was was opened and exam examtheir passed through opened and ined; their homes homes were were bugged bugged and and secretly secretly searched. searched. The The Stasi Stasi mounted mounted a a support support ined; their operation, codenamed COBRA, to cultivate operation, codenamed COBRA, which which set set out out to cultivate Valentina Valentina Rush's Rushs sister, sister, Renata Ludwig, Ludwig, and and one of her relatives, Ernst Ernst Buchholz, Buchholz, who who lived lived in in West WestBerlin. Berlin. Renata one of her relatives, COBRA was was finally finally abandoned. abandoned. After fifteen fifteen years years of of failure, failure, operation operation COBRA Mter The KGB also sought the assistance of other Soviet Bloc intelligence services services in in The KGB also sought the assistance of other Soviet Bloc intelligence finding north America, finding an an assassin assassin capable capable of of liquidating liquidating Runge Runge in in north America, where where it it was was assumed had taken refuge. The Hungarian assumed he he had taken refuge. The Centre's Centres preferred preferred candidate candidate was was a a Hungarianborn West West German German criminal, criminal, codenamed JAGUAR, who who had hadbeen been recruited recruited by by the born codenamed JAGUAR, the

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AVH for for "special special actions against anti-Communist anti-Communist Hungarian n July July 1, 1, actions" against Hungarian CmigrCs. emigres. O On 1968 JAGUAR JAGUAR blew blew up up the the Danube house in in Munich, produced 1968 Danubeprinting printing house Munich, which which produced tmigrC publications. publications. He H e also also set set fire fire to to the the editorial oftwo CmigrC emigre editorial offices offices of two Hungarian Hungarian emigre newspapers, putting putting one one of of them out of of business. operations JAGUAR newspapers, them out business. For For these these operations received 40,000 40,000 Hungarian Hungarian forints forints and 1,000 West West German German marks received and 1,000 marks from from the the AVH. Impressed by by his his special in Munich, Munich, the the KGB decided to employ Impressed "special actions actions" in decided to employ him him for for operation TREZOR. TREZOR.JAGUAR JAGUAR was was shown shown photographs and his his wife and operation photographs of of Runge Runge and wife and agreed to to hunt hunt them themdown. down. Once Once he he had hadleft for the United States, however, he agreed left for the United States, however, he disdis appeared without trace-together, presumably, with the operational funds allocated appeared without trace-together, presumably, with the operational funds allocated to him him by by the the KGB. KGB. Following FollowingJAGUAR's JAGUARS disappearance, disappearance, the Centre asked East to the Centre asked the the East German Stasi Stasi and and the the Bulgarian Bulgarian DS whether whether they they had contacts among American German had contacts among American gangsters or or mafiosi mafiosi who who would would take take out out a a contract contract on Runge. Neither to gangsters on Runge. Neither was was able able to suggest a a suitable suitable assassin.67 assassin.67 suggest
AS attempting to to liquidate liquidate major major traitors, traitors, the the Thirteenth ThirteenthDepartment Department and AS W E L L AS AS attempting and Department V V were were also also responsible responsible for for administering administering lesser lesser punishments to other other Department punishments to defectors to merit death penalty. The The NovemNovem defectors whose whose crimes crimes were were not not considered considered to meritthe the death penalty. ber against the ber 1962 1962 plan plan for for dealing dealing with with defectors defectors also also specified specified "special special action" action against the world-famous ballet ballet dancer Rudolf Nureyev, Nureyev, who who had defected at Le Bourget airworld-famous dancer Rudolf had defected at Le Bourget air port in Paris during during a by the the Kirov Kirov Ballet Ballet in 1961.68The The KGB KGB had begun a port in Paris a tour tour by in 1961.68 had begun a campaign of intimidation intimidation immediately immediately after after Nureyev's Nureyevs defection. n the the night campaign of defection. O On night of of his first first major major performance performance with with a aWestern Western company, when when he hewas todance his company, was due due to dance the the part of of the the Blue Blue Bird in aaParis Paris production production of ofSleeping Beauty, he emotional part Bird in he received received emotional letters to him letters from from both both his his parents parents and and his his former former ballet ballet teacher, teacher, appealing appealing to him not notto to betray the the fatherland. fatherland. Having Having steeled steeled himself himself to to go go ahead, ahead, Nureyev Nureyev then then found found his his betray performance performance interrupted: interrupted:

I whistling broke out, I had had barely barely come come on on to to the thestage stage .. .. .. when when shouting shouting and and whistling broke out, almost drowning drowning Tchaikovsky's Tchaikovskys music. music. I almost on dancing dancing the Blue Bird, I went went on the Blue Bird, but but beyond commu I was was perfectly perfectly aware aware that that some some commubeyond the the haze haze of of the the footlights footlights .. .. .. I could hardly hardly hear nists were were trying trying to to sabotage sabotage the the performance. performance. I nists I could hear the the music music and I I saw saw pieces pieces of of what what looked looked like like glass glass thrown on to to the the stage stage at at me me but I and thrown on but I kept on on dancing.69 dancing.69 kept The failed. On February 21,1962, 21, 1962, amid The KGB's KGBs early early attempts attempts at atintimidation intimidation failed. O n February amid a a blaze blaze of dancing of publicity, publicity, Nureyev Nureyev made made his his Covent Covent Garden Gardendebut, debut, dancing with with Margot MargotFonteyn Fonteyn in those who and the the twenty-three Gixelle. To To those who saw saw that that unforgettable unforgettable performance performance and twenty-three in Giselle. curtain that of the greatest partnerships partnerships curtain calls calls which which followed, followed, it it was was already alreadyclear clear that one oneof the greatest 0 in been born.7 Centre was was outraged merely by by the the in the thehistory history of of dance dance had had been born.70The The Centre outraged not not merely public notorious defector by Nureyev's publication publication a public adulation adulation of of a a notorious defector but but also also by Nureyevs a few few months of memoirs to freedom freedom" in in the Though the months later later of memoirs describing describing his his "leap leap to the West. West. Though the November did not not specify the November 1962 1962 plan plan of of campaign campaign against against leading leading defectors defectors did specify the nature him, it it was from the nature of of the the "special special action" action to to be be employed employed against against him, was clear clear from the con context deal more sprinkling broken glass text that that it it would would henceforth henceforth involve involve a a good good deal more than than sprinkhg broken glass

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on on the thestage.71 stage.71Subsequent Subsequent FCD FCD directives directives discussed discussedschemes schemes (which (which were were never never suc successfully of Nureyev's 72 cessfully implemented) implemented) to tobreak break one one or orboth both of Nureyevs legs. legs.72 In one of In the the summer summer of of 1970 1970one of Nureyev's Nureyevs best-known best-known near-contemporaries, near-contemporaries, Natalia a London London season the Natalia Makarova, Makarova, defected defected from from the the Kirov Kirov Ballet Ballet during during a season at at the Royal Royal Festival FestivalHall. Hall. The The KGB KGB report report on onthe thedefection defection predictably predictably condemned condemned her her as as a In reality, a "politically politically immature immature individual, individual, with with low low moral moral qualities."73 qualitie~.~~ reality, In the the main main motive motive for for her her defection, defection, like like Nureyev's, Nureyevs, had had been been the the quest quest for for greater greater artistic artistic free freedom.74 memorandum by First and and Second d01-n.~A A joint joint memorandum by the the heads heads of of the the First Second Chief Chief Direc Directorates proposed that, torates proposed that, if if a a way way could could be be found found to to injure injure Nureyev Nureyev without without the the hand handof of the the KGB KGB being being obvious, obvious, a a similar similar "special special action" action should should be be undertaken undertaken against against Makarova. their memorandum Makarova. As As usual, usual, the the reference reference in in their memorandum to to physical physical injury injury was was expressed expressed in in euphemistic euphemistic bureaucratic bureaucratic prose: prose:

Depending on results of of special special actions actions taken taken with with respect respect to to Nureyev, Nureyev, Depending onthe the results aimed at at lessening lessening his professional skills, skills, [the KGB] should should consider consider carrying carrying aimed his professional [the KGB] out a asimilar with respect respect to to Makarova, Makarova, in in order order to to localize the negative out similar action action with localize the negative effect of of her her forthcoming forthcomingperformances performances in in Britain and the the United UnitedStates. If the the effect Britain and States. If British propaganda propaganda organs are activated activated and and information information provided provided by by her her is British organs are is used to to slander slander Soviet Soviet life, life, additional additional measures measures will will be be devised. devised.75 used 75 An approach approach was was made made by by the the Centre Centreto to the Bulgarian intelligence intelligence service service to to seek seek An the Bulgarian the possible possible assistance assistance of of one one of of their theiragents agents in in aacompany company where where Makarova Makarova was was due the due to dance. O n one one occasion Makarova was was slightly slightly hurt hurt in an accident accident behind behind the to dance. On occasion Makarova in an the stage caused bya a beam falling from from the the set. The files files seen seenby by Mitrokhin, however, however, do do stage caused by beam falling set. The Mitrokhin, not make make clear clear whether whether this this was was the the first first nearly nearly successful successful special action by by the the not "special action" KGB against a defecting defecting ballerina ballerina or or merely merely an an act act of of clumsiness clumsiness by by a a stagehand.76 stagehand.76 KGB against a Since the the defection defection of of the the reluctant reluctant assassin, assassin, Bogdan Bogdan Stashinshky, Stashinshh, in 1960, KGB KGB Since in 1960, operations against against traitors traitors living in the the West West had been totally unsuccessful. Though Though operations living in had been totally unsuccessful. enormous amounts of time time and and resources had been devotedto to tracking tracking down down defectors defectors enormous amounts of resources had been devoted and preparing preparing to to kill kill and and maim maim them, them, the the only only successfd liquidation claimed claimed by by the the and successful liquidation Centre, the assassination assassination of of Hayhanen, Hayhanen, was was entirely entirely fraudulent. fraudulent. It It is is just possible that that Centre, the just possible the KGB KGB was was responsible responsiblefor for the minor injury to to Natalia Natalia Makarova. Makarova. But But the the probabilthe the minor injury probabil ity is is that that its its pursuit pursuit of of traitors traitors during during the the decade up to to 1970 1970 ended in complete complete failure. failure. ity decade up ended in

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UC TI O N IIS IIN G H EEM OO LL NN IY A I N STR RU NS S F FO OR RD D SA AR RM M N GT T H M IYA L LIIG GH HT TNING )E XPL ED V IC [" ") EX LO OS SI V VE DE E VI CE E

Instructions for for Disarming Disarmingthe theMOLNIY MOLNIYA Explosive DeviceFCD DeviceFCD Directorate Directorate guidance to to Instructions A Explosive S guidance residencies on the correct procedure for removing radio transmitters from booby-trapped residencies on the correct procedure for removing radio transmitters from booby-trapped caches caches

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1. diggingout out the container from earth, not to strike the handle by 1. When When digging the container from the the earth, taketake care care not to strike the handle by chance. Dig Diguntil until the upper surface of the container with thecomes handle comes to light; chance. the upper surface of the container with the handle to light; remove the remo board which cover thethe container. board and and the theplywood plywood which cover container. 2. only be turned and the tilted and taken out of theout holeof after 2. The The handle handlemust must only be turned andcontainer the container tilted and taken thethe hole a explosive explosive device devicehas hasbeen beendisarmed. disarmed. 3. order to to disarm disarm the thedevice, device,one onemust musthave havea a pocket torch battery not less 3. In In order pocket torch battery ofof not less than than 3.5 3.5 volts. Attach Attachtwo two wires of 30-50 length to battery, the battery, with probes sharp probes at the (a nail nail end volts. wires of 30-50 em cm length to the with sharp at the end (a or a a needle). needle). or 4. container out out ofthe place one ofthe battery contacts on the body on 4. Without Without taking takingthe the container ofcache, the cache, place one of the battery contacts of lock fitting, assuming that the lidlid of of thethe container of the the container, container, and and the theother otheron onthe theleft left lock fitting, assuming that the container faces the the operator. operator.The T h e contact contact points points must must be be applied applied after after scratching scratching the the paintwork paintwork on on the faces the body and on on the the locklock fitting. body of ofthe thecontainer container and fitting. 5. should be be heard inside thethe container; thisthis 5. When When contact contact is is made made with with the the battery, battery,aa"click" click should heard inside container; indicates check the contact indicates that that the the explosive explosive device device has has been been disarmed. disarmed. If Ifthere there is isno no"click," click, check the contact points again again and and repeat repeatthe theoperation operationto to disarm the device. points disarm the device. 6. when the is still nono "click," it is to the container 6. If Ifwhen the operation operation is repeated repeated there thereisis still click, is forbidden forbidden it totake take the container out cache and thethe cache must be filled in. To open the container and remove the electricthe el out of ofthe the cache and cache must be filled in. To open the container and remove detonators detonators from from the the two-way two-way radio: radio: lift the lid lid of the with with the key - remove remove the the padlocks padlocksand and lift the of container the container key thewhich which is is inside inside the the container. the four screws and remove the metal which the two the two container. Unscrew Unscrew the four screws and remove the casing metal under casing under which way way radio radio is is located located in in the theALlOT ALIOT packaging; packaging; connect the the container container with with the the ALlOT - cut cut each each of of the the wires wires which which connect ALIOT packaging packaging and and remove remove the the package packagefrom fromthe thecontainer.77 container.77

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EXAM RA AD DIIO OC C AC H PT UT E X A MP PL L E OF OF B BO O O B Y-T Y - TR RA AP PP PE D R A CH EE PU I PL LA AC CE E B Y THE B BE ER RN ER R E SII D E N C Y IN P BY NE E S D E N C Y

On May 5 , 1966, the KGB residency i nBerne, Berne, Switzerland carried out a n operation to On M ay 1 15, 1966, the residency in Switzerland carried out an operation to deposit a booby-trapped booby-trapped BR-3U agent no. 62447U2329 624471/2329 in in aahiding hidingplace place deposit a agent radio radio transmitter transmitter no. codenamed was ordered toto check the area where codenamed CACHE CACHE no. no. 3. 3. In In July July 1972, 1972, the the residency residency was ordered check the area where the transmitter had had been been buried buriedand andto to devisean an operation remove Directorate S the transmitter devise operation toto remove it.it. Directorate S sent sent Berne of the route to the cache and and of its location: Berne the the following followingdescription description of the route to the cache of its location:

Cache CacheNo. No. 3

Leaving Friburg by the Avenches road. Six from Friburg, the road Leaving Friburg by the Avenches road. S i x kilometers kilometers from Friburg, the road goesgoes through of on on its own on the right-hand through the thetownship township of Belfaux. Belfaux. There Th er e is is a a farm farmstanding standing its own on the right-hand side road as About 100 meters a track on the side of ofthe the road as you you leave leaveBelfaux. Belfaux. About 100 meters beyond beyond this thisfarm, farm, a track on the right-hand side goes goes up a wood a hillock. hillock. The entrance to right-hand side up to to a wood on on a The entrance to this this track trackis is immedi immediately railway crossing. Go up toto the edge of the where there there ately opposite oppositea a railway crossing. up this this track track the edge of wood, the wood, where is chapel with the image of of a saint andand benches for sitting. is a alarge largecovered covered chapel with the image a saint benches for sitting. A path edge of the wood. Take 55 path passes passes by bythe thechapel chapelon onthe the edge of the wood. Take 55 steps steps along alongthe thepath path from chapel (as from the the left-hand left-hand side sideof ofthe the chapel (as you you face face it). it). At that that point, point, on on the the right-hand right-hand side, inscribed with the letters F C, on the left there side, there thereis is a a stone stone pillar pillar inscribed with the letters C, and and next next to toitit on the left there is is a a large large pine pine tree tree (the (the only onlyone onein inthe thesector sectorbetween betweenthe thechapel chapeland andthe thelittle littlepillar). pillar). Start again from the the edge of at right angles to the Start counting countingsteps steps again from edge of the the path. path.Proceed Proceed at right angles topath, the path,

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passing you will bebe at at passing between between the the pine pine tree tree and and the the little little pillar. pillar.After Aftertaking taking36 36steps, steps, you will the point between two leafy trees, ones in the sector. The the point between two large large leafy trees, thethe onlyonly ones in the sector. T h e distance distance between trees has been used for the between the the trees treesis is three three paces. paces.The T h e area area between betweenthe the trees has been used for cache. the cache. If If no no motor motor car caris is available, available, one one can can reach reach the the cache cache by byrail railfrom fromFriburg, Friburg,alighting alighting at on foot. The distance from up toto at Belfaux Belfauxand andproceeding proceeding on foot. T h e distance from the the Belfaux Belfauxrailway railwaystation station up the the cache cache is is about about 1,500 1,500 m. m. There inin the cache: a case, a waterproof package and a and stone. There are are three threecontainers containers the cache: a case, a waterproof package a stone. The containerhas hasan an explosive device which was made by means of the T h e case case container explosive device which was made live live by means of the MOLNIY A [Lightning] ["Lightning"] system it it was putput into the the cache. MOLNIYA systemwhen when was into cache. A board has been been put put on ontop topof of the case container order protect the handle board has the case container inin order toto protect the handle when when the the cache cache is is opened. opened. Close center of of thethe cache, a glass hasjar been buried cm below the below surface,the surface Close to tothe the center cache, a jar glass has been30 buried 30 cm and a 15 metal piping has been sruck vertically into the and above abovethe thesuitcase suitcase a cm 15 cm length length of of metal piping has been stuck vertically into the earth, end being 5-7 surface. These items were placed there there for for earth, the theupper upper end being 5-7 cm cm below belowthe the surface. These items were placed the by third parties. the special special purpose purpose of ofindicating indicatingwhether whetherthe thecache cachehad hadbeen beenopened opened by third parties. At the the same same time, time, they they can can act act as as markers markers during during the the excavation. excavation. The T h e overall overall depth depth of of the the cache cache is is 1 1m. m. The T h e case case contains contains aaBR-3U BR-3Uradio radiotransmitter. transmitter.

Mter residency reported to to the Centre that, because of the After inspecting inspecting the the area, area,the theBerne Berne residency reported the Centre that, because of the lack the site, it would be be difficult to conceal signs of excavation. It would lack of of leaf leafcover coveratat the site, it would difficult to conceal signs of excavation. would also also be difficult to to devise deviseaacover coverstory story for the presence operational officers in the of the be difficult for the presence of of operational officers in the areaarea of the cache two attention. Directorate S cache for for one oneor or two hours, hours, which which might might well wellattract attract attention. Directorate S evenrually eventually pro proposed partly because of the diffi posed to to the the leadership leadership of ofthe theFCD FCD that that the the cache cache be bewritten writtenoff, off, partly because of the difficulties partly because the fact that the shelf lifelife of the MOLNIYA culties of of excavation, excavation,and and partly because the fact that the shelf of the M O L N W A device device had make removal of the hazardous. The proposal was approved.78 had expired expiredmight might make removal of transmitter the transmitter hazardous. The proposal was approved.7 The in December December1998 1998by by Swiss police using using the the T h e cache cache was was eventually eventually emptied emptied in Swiss Federal Federal police finding from Mitrokhin's archive reproduced above. The MOLNIY A device finding instructions instructions from Mitrokhins archive reproduced above. MOLNIYA The device was, was, as and exploded when fired on by water as Directorate Directorate S S had had anticipated, anticipated, dangerously dangerouslyunstable unstable and exploded when fired on aby a water cannon.79 cannon.79(See (Seeillustrations.) illustrations.)

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EXAM PLES O CA CH HE E S PP U T IN PA LC AE C E BY ER RO O M ER R D N EXAMPLES OF F RA R AD DI O C AC S U T IN PL BY T H E M E EE SS II D EE N CCY Y

Examples Put inin Place by by the the Rome Residency(a) Description of the Route Examples of of Radio RadioCaches Caches Put Place Rome Residency(a) Description of the Route to MEZHOZERNY ("Inter-lake") of the cache t o the the MEZHOZERNY (Inter-lake) cache cacheand andlocation location of the cache

BR-3U radio radio transmitter transmitter no. no.609072/9126 60907219126 was placed in a waterO n April April 15, 15,1962, On 1962, a a was placed in a water proof MEZHOZERNY proof package packagein inthe the MEZHOZERNY cache. cache. The located Rome in a wooded T h e MEZHOZERNY cache cacheisis located 30 30 km from from Rome in a wooded area area between Lakes LakesAlbano Albanoand and Nemi, m from the dei ViaLaghi, dei Laghi, the right-hand between Nemi, 5050 m from the Via on theon right-hand side side of from Rome to to Velletri. of the the road roadwhen whentraveling traveling from Rome Velletri. Leave the Appia Antica, and 17 km later lower end of Champino air airLeave Rome Romeby by the Appia Antica, and 17 later (the (the lower end of Champino field) turn turn left left into into the the Via Via dei deiLaghi, Laghi,leading leadingto toVelletri. Velletri. Proceed for 13 km along along the the field) Proceed for 13 Via dei dei Laghi Laghiup upto to the 13 milestone and and continue continuein inthe the same direction 120 Via the 13 km milestone same direction forfor 120 m m beyond the the 13 13 km km milestone milestone and and at at that thatpoint pointa a broad path goes off to the right into beyond broad path goes off to the right into a a wood. wood.

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Go along mm up toto a fork where there are are two two paths, continue along along this this path path for for90 90 up a fork where there paths, continue along the path path to tothe the right which begins 10 m from from four four large largestones stones on the main path. the right which begins 10 m on the main path. These either side side of ofaa hillock. hillock. After After following following the theright-hand right-hand round either These two two paths paths go round path 15 m where it branches off, off, turn turn left and up the 7-8 path for for 15 m from from the thepoint point where it branches left go and up the hill hillfor for7-8 m. the andon on its slopes there holes, apparently had been m. On On t h e hill hill and its slopes there areare holes, apparently left left afterafter treestrees had been uprooted. Among all all these these holes holes there thereisis a group four which by side. uprooted. Among a group ofof four which are are sideside by side. T h e cache cache in in which which the theload loadwas was secreted a square hole which is next next to to another another The secreted is is a square hole which is large hole hole of ofirregular irregularshape shape like the figure eight. large like the figure eight. At the the hole a chamber has been in the of the forkof in the the bottom bottomof of the hole a chamber has dug been dug direction in the direction the fork in paths and and it it is is in in this this that that the thetrunk trunkwith with the two-way radio has been placed. It is paths the two-way radio has been placed. is covcov ered withearth earth and stones a depth of 55-60 cm. the After been covered wit ered with and stones to ato depth of 55-60 cm. Mter casethe hadcase beenhad covered with 25 cm a first marker waswas placed: two lengths of green were put across the 25 cm of ofearth earth a first marker placed: two lengths of wire green wire were put across the spot diagonallyand and the case was then covered another 50 of when earth,a when spot diagonally the case was then covered with with another 50 cm ofcm earth, yel a yellow placed diagonally across thethe spot; thisthis waswas then covered withwith a 55-60 low wire wire was wasalso also placed diagonally across spot; then covered a 55-60 cm On the hole there is a stone. cm layer layerof ofearth. earth. O n the the opposite opposite side sideof of the hole there islarge a large stone. T h e distance distance from fromthe the Via Laghi Ariccia-Rocca di crossroads Papa crossroads up to the The Via deidei Laghi and and Ariccia-Rocca di Papa up to the 80 broad from Rome is ,450 m. broad footpath footpath when when traveling travelingaway away from Rome is about about 1 1,450 m.

HE E C onon February 6, 1970, apparently because of ( (T TH CAC A CH HE E WAS WAS emptied emptied by by the the Rome Rome residency residency February 6,1970, apparently because of 81 concern of its its contents might be deteriorating and becoming unsafe.) concern that that the thecondition condition of contents might be deteriorating and becoming unsafe.)

(b) and Its Location Location ( S ) Description Description of o f the tde Route Route to t o the the MARINO Cache Cache and
O n September 20,1962, containers were a note noteOn September 20, 1962, two containers were placed placed on on the the MARINO cache: cache: a book packing of the two-way radio, and a capsule capsule book with with instructions instructions on on the theremoval removaland and packing of the two-way radio, and containing instructionsfor for operating the two-way radio together with schedules for containing instructions operating the two-way radio together with schedules for two-way and and one-way one-waycommunication; communication; all materials were were on onsoft soft film English. two-way all the the materials fIlm in in English. T h e MARINO cache cache consisted consisted of of a a cleft cleft at at the the foot foot of of an anancient ancient tree treewhich whichhad had The been ofof the tree. been expanded expanded into into the theroot rootsystem system the tree. The point 6 km along Laghi after leaving Rome. T h e cache cache was was located locatedat ata a point along the the Via Viadei dei Laghi after leaving Rome. Proceed along the the Rome-Albano Rome-Albanoroad, road,turn turn left into the Via dei Laghi, and continue Proceed along left into the Via dei Laghi, and continue for toto turn sharply just in face of the for 6.3 6.3 km. k m . From From the the 6 km milestone, milestone, the the road roadbegins begins turn sharply just in face of the Marino two unmetaled village tracks off to Marino hamlet. hamlet. In In the the middle middle of ofthe thebend, bend, two unmetaled village tracks go off to the the left toto the right ofof the road and the road left and and the the right right of of the the road. road.Between Betweenthe thetrack track the right the road and the road itself there is sector overgrown overgrown with withtall tallbushes. bushes. Among these bushes there is is one one itself there is a a sector Among these bushes there ancient tree25 25mm from the road. The MARINO cache at the the foot foot of ofthis this tree the ancient tree from the road. The cache is is at tree in in the root system side opposite to the road, at a at depth of 25 cm root system on onthe the side opposite to the road, a depth of 25 cm from from the thesurface. surface. Two containers containers are are wrapped wrapped in in cellophane cellophane and and placed placedin inaametal metalsweet sweet tin measurTwo tin measur 18 x of which have been stuck down with insulating tape. tape. ing 18 X 10 10 x x4 4 cm, cm, the the edges edges of which have been stuck down with insulating ing 82 T h e objects objects have have been beencovered covered with earth and a stone placed on top.82 The with earth and a stone placed on top.

83 (The by February 7, 7, 1970.) (The cache cache was wasemptied emptied by the the Rome Rome residency residencyon on February 1970.)s3

F OF safety it it is publish the the locations locations of ofany anyof ofthe the FO OR R R R EA E AS SO ON NS S O F public public safety is impossible impossible to to publish KG B radio caches which have not been cleared, since an unknown number are KGB radio and andarms arms caches which have not been cleared, since an unknown number are booby-trapped or in booby-trapped or in otherwise otherwise dangerous dangerouscondition. condition.

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T H H E E

SP PE EC C II A L ASKS S L TA
Th e A nd dr op ov ra nd dB Be ey on nd d The An ro po u E Er a an yo

n becoming chairman of the KGB in 1967, Andropov immediately announced his intention intention to to revive revive KGB KGB "special special actions" actions as as an an essential essential tool tool of of Soviet Soviet policy policy during during the FCD, he the Cold Cold War. War. The The FCD, he declared, declared, "must must take take the the offensive offensive in in order order to to paralyze paralyze the actions of the actions of our our enemies enemies and and to to get get them them involved involved in in aastruggle struggle in in conditions conditions which which are earlier dissatisfaction recent record are unfavorable unfavorable to to them."l them. Two Two years years earlier dissatisfaction with with the the recent record of of the Thirteenth Thirteenth Department, Department, which was was responsible responsible for for FCD FCD special special actions, actions, had had led led the which to to its its reorganization reorganization as as Department Department V.2 V.2 Following Following Andropov's Andropovs call callfor for a a new new "offen offensive sive to to paralyze paralyze the the actions actions of of our our enemies," enemies, the the main main priority priority of of Department Department V V became "special peacetime use became special actions actions of of a a political political nature"-the nature-the peacetime use of of sabotage sabotage and and other other forms forms of of violence violence in in the the furtherance furtherance of of Soviet Soviet po1icy.3 policy3 Line Line F F officers officers in in resi residencies dencies were were instructed instructed to to show show greater greater ingenuity ingenuity in in devising devising special special actions actions in in which which the the hand hand of of the the KGB KGB would would be be undetectable. undetectable. All A l l of of the the newly newly devised devisedsabotage sabotage pro proposals posals employed employed the the same same standardized standardized coded coded jargon. jargon. Each Each act act of of sabotage sabotage was was device a "Bouquet" (Buket), detonator aa termed a "Lily" termed a Lily (Liliya), (LiZiya),the the explosive explosive device a Bouquet (Buket),the the detonator "Little and the Little Flower" Flower (Tsvetok), (Tsuetok), the the explosion explosion of of the the device device a a "Splash" Splash (Zaplyv) (ZapZyu)and the saboteur saboteur the the "Gardener" Gardener(Sadovnik).4 (Sad~unik).~ The the beginning of The most most important important special special action action being being planned planned at atthe beginning of the the Andropov era seized power Andropov era was was in in Greece, Greece, where where a a group group of of army army colonels colonels seized power in in April April 1967, suspended suspended parliamentary parliamentary government government and and declared martial 1aw. law. The The Greek Greek 1967, declared martia1 Communist (KKE) was was driven driven underground underground and and its its leaders leaders temporarily temporarily lost lost Communist Party Party (KKE) touch touch with with Moscow. Moscow. In In July July 1967 1967 the the KGB KGB was was formally formally instructed instructed by by the the CPSU CPSU Central Committee the underground Central Committee toto renew renew contact contact with with the underground Party Party (a (a task task it it had had doubtless already begun) begun) and and to to give give it it "political political and and material material assistance."s assistance. The The doubtless already material assistance included both both financial financial subsidies, subsidies, usually usually handed handed over over to to Party Party "material assistance" included representatives in in Budapest,6 Budapest,6 and and help help in in preparing preparing for for guerrilla warfare. The The Centre Centre representatives guerrilla warfare. decreed that that Department DepartmentV's Vs main main priority priority for for 1968 1968 should should be be to to set set up up sabotage sabotage and and decreed intelligence groups groups (DRGs) (DRGs) on on Greek Greekterritory territory prepare for for an an uprising uprising against against the the intelligence toto prepare military regime.7 regime.7Department Department V V also also made made preparations preparations for for possible guerrilla opera operamilitary possible guerrilla tions in in Italy. Italy. The The leaders leaders of of the the PCI PC1 were were seriously seriously afraid afraid of of an an Italian Italian military military tions putsch on the Greek Greek model model and requested Soviet preparing the putsch on the and had had requested Soviet assistance assistance in in preparing the it would would have have to to transform transform itself into an an Party for for the the possibility possibility that, that, like like the the KKE, Party KKE, it itself into illegal underground movement. underground movement. 8 illegal

O On becoming chairman of the KGB in 1967,Andropov immediately announced his

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I n 1968, 1968, all all KGB KGB residencies residencies were weresent In sent operational operational letters letters headed headed Recommenda"Recommenda tions for for Creating Creating the the Necessary Necessary Conditions Conditions on on the the Territory Territoryof tions of a a Potential Potential AdverAdver sary for for Special Special Group Group [DRG] Operations in letter to sary [DRG] Operations in an an Emergency. Emergency." The The letter to the the MAYSKY), added: resident in in Athens, Athens,Ivan Ivan Petrovich Petrovich Kislyak Kislyak (codenamed resident (codenamed MAYSKY), added: It "It is is not not possible that that the thecourse course of of events events will will in in practice practice require local progressive possible require us us to to assist assist local progressive forces in inthe near future, future, and and we we must must therefore forces the near therefore make make preparations preparations for for this this in in advance. The The Centre Centre issued issued instructions instructions that that all all locally locally recruited advance."9 recruited DRGs DRGs operating operating in Greece Greece were were to to be be headed headed by by KGB KGB agents, agents, but that this concealed from in but that this was was to to be be concealed from other members members of of the the groupS.lO groups. In In 1968 1968 the the illegal illegal PAUL PAUL was was sent other sent to to Greece Greece with with orders to select runways (durushki) for the landing of airborne Soviet DRGs orders to select "runways" (doroshki) for the landing of airborne Soviet DRGs and and bases-beehives (ulya)-from which to to operate, as well well as as to to check check the the suitability bases-"beehives" (urya)-from which operate, as suitability of those sites identified earlier. "Runway Runway ALFA, reconnoitered by was of those sites identified earlier. ALFA," reconnoitered by PAUL, PAUL, was located in the thesouthern southern part of the the Thessalia Thessalia plain, about forty north-west located in part of plain, about forty kilometers kilometers north-west of Lamia. "Runway on the of the the Thessalia Thessalia plain, plain, of the the town town of of Lamia. Runway BETX' BETAwas was on thenorth-west north-west of four or or five five kilometers kilometers south south of of the the Kalambaka Kalambaka settlement. The wooded hilly districts districts four settlement. The wooded hilly of Belasitsa, Piri chosen as agents and of Belasitsa, Piri and and Sengal Sengal were were chosen as areas areas suitable suitable for for smuggling smuggling agents and equipment equipment across across the the Bugarian-Greek Bugarian-Greek border.ll border. In August August 1968 1968 the the Bulgarian Bulgarian DS DS confidently confidently informed informed the the Centre In Centre that that it it was was capable Greek junta juntawith withthe the assistance assistance of capable of of overthrowing overthrowing the the Greek of one one of of its its agents, agents, whom it it identified identified as as the the former former head head of of a a Greek Greek intelligence intelligence agency. The Bulgarian Bulgarian whom agency. The Central Committee Committee had had approved approved the the proposed proposed coup coup d'etat detat in in Athens Athens and and instructed instructed Central the leadership leadership of of its its intelligence intelligence service service to to coordinate coordinate plans plans for for it it with with the the KGB KGB and and the the CPSU CPSU Central Central Committee.12 Committee.12The The KGB KGB files files seen Mitrokhin do explain the seen by by Mitrokhin do not not explain why the the Bulgarian Bulgarian proposal was turned turned down. down. There There were, were, however, at least three why proposal was however, at least three probable reasons. reasons. The The Centre may well wellhave haveassessed assessed the risks risks of of failure failure more more highly highly probable Centre may the than the the Bulgarians. Bulgarians. The The Politburo, Politburo, which which at at almost the moment moment the the Bulgarian Bulgarian pro prothan almost the posal reached it was deciding on the invasion of Czechoslovakia, was doubtless disinposal reached it was deciding on the invasion of Czechoslovakia, was doubtless disin clined to to give give its its simultaneous simultaneous approval approval to to a risky coup coup attempt attempt in Greece. Further Further clined a risky in Greece. complicationswere were caused caused by the the split split in in the theGreek Greek Communist Party which, after the the complications by Communist Party which, after suppression of of the the Prague Prague Spring, divided into into the pro-Soviet KKE KKE and and the the Eurosuppression Spring, divided the pro-Soviet Euro communist KKE-es. Brillakis(code (codenamed SEMYON), who who had hitherto hitherto been been one one of of communist KKE-es. Brillakis named SEMYON), had the underground Greek Greek Party, the KGB's KGBs chief chief contacts contacts in in the the underground Party, refused refused further further meetings meetings with residency Warsaw 13 with the theAthens Athens residency in in protest protest at at the the Warsaw Pact Pact invasion invasion of ofCzechoslovakia. Czecho~lovakia.~~ Though the the KGB KGB continued continued to to channel channel large large amounts amounts of of money money into into the the KKE,14 KKE,14 Though it seems to setting up DRGs on soil. The it seems to have have made made little little progress progress in in setting up DRGs on Greek Greek soil. The main main material successfully successfullysmuggled smuggled across across the the Greek-Bulgarian Greek-Bulgarian border border was was not not sabotage sabotage material equipment equipment into into Greece Greece but but the the archives archives of of the the KKE KKE which which were were taken taken in in the the oppo opposite site direction. direction. Weighing Weighing 14 14 tons, tons, filling filling 1,598 1,598 packages packages and and four four crates, crates, guarded guarded by by thirty Greek they were were transported transported from from Bulgaria Bulgaria to to Romania Romania and and thirty GreekCommunists, Communists, they thence thence to to the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, where where they they were were deposited deposited for for safekeeping safekeeping in in the the town town of vanovo. 15 of I Ivanovo.15
A MONG D E PA RT M E N T v's most ambitious special actions actions during during AMONG DEPARTMENT vs most ambitious proposals proposals for for special 1968 distract Western opinion from from the suppression of of the the 1968 was was an an operation operation to to distract Western opinion the suppression

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Prague ), Prague Spring Spring by by sabotaging sabotaging a a major major oil oil pipeline, pipeline, codenamed codenamed ZVENO ZVENO ("Link" (Link), near the Austrian end of Bodensee Lake, which was believed by the Centre to carry near the Austrian endof Bodensee Lake, which was believed bythe Centre tocarry 10 breaching the 10 million million tons tons of of oil oil a a year year between between Italy Italy and and West West Germany. Germany. By By breaching the pipeline where pipeline at at the thepoint point where it it crossed crossed the the Rhine Rhine canal, canal, Department Department V Vcalculated calculated that that it contaminate the the main main source drinking it could could pollute pollute the the Bodensee, Bodensee, and and thus thus contaminate source of of drinking water on the West German-Austrian frontier. To carry the explosive, the water on the West German-Austrian frontier. To carry the explosive, the Vienna Vienna residency residency purchased purchased four four Western-manufactured Western-manufactured I-liter 1-liter thermos thermos flasks, flasks, as as well well as as ten ten ballpoint ballpoint pens-presumably pens-presumably to to conceal conceal the the detonators. detonators. The The scapegoats scapegoats for for the the envi environmental were to ronmental disaster disaster caused caused by by the the explosion explosion were to be be Italian Italian extremists extremists allegedly allegedly retaliating South Tyrol retaliating for for acts acts of of sabotage sabotage carried carried out out by by South Tyrol terrorists. terrorists. 0 set pattern for ZVEN ZVENO set the thepattern for most most Department Department V V peacetime peacetime special special actions: actions: immensely immensely laborious laborious and and detailed detailed preparations, preparations, followed followed by by a a reluctant reluctant decision decision not not to to go go ahead ahead because because of of the the political political risks risks involved-in involved-in particular, particular, the the possibility possibility that, that, despite all precautions taken, discov despite all the the precautions taken, the the hand hand of of the the KGB KGB might might somehow somehow be be discovered. The times, kept ered. The operation operation was was postponed postponed several several times, kept under underreview review for for a a number number of of years years and and finally finally abandoned.16 abandoned.16 Many, Many, perhaps perhaps most, most, of of the the proposed proposed special special actions actions in in Europe Europe were were intended intended to to cause example (reproduced cause dissension dissension within within NATO. NATO. A A characteristic characteristic example (reproduced at at the the end end of of this Athens residency April 1969 1969 for this chapter) chapter) was was the the proposal proposal by by the the Athens residency in in April for a a bomb bomb attack Turkish attack on onthe the Turkish consulate-general consulate-general in in Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki, which which would would be be blamed blamed on on a a Greek Greekextremist. extremist. Though Though complimenting complimenting the the Athens Athensresidency residency on on its itsinitiative, initiative, the the Centre once again risk of May 12,12, Centre once again dared dared not not take take the the risk of giving giving the the go-ahead. go-ahead. Instead, Instead, on on May 1969, it sent a temporizing reply: 1969, it sent a temporizing reply: We We approve approve the the work work carried carried out out by by the the residency residency to to collect collect material material with with the the aim operation] against AYTSO [Turkish aim of of preparing preparing a a Lily Lily [sabotage [sabotage operation] against the the Y YAYTSO [Turkish consulate-general] consulate-general] target. target. We We have have put put this this target target on on file file and and if if the the need need arises arises we we shall shall return return to to the the question question of of carrying carrying out out aaLily Lily against against it. it. We AYTSO target We ask ask you you to to keep keep the the Y YAYTSO target under under observation observation as as far far as as possi possible, ble, in in order order to to collect collect additional additional data data and andto to take take account account of of possible possible changes.17 changes.17 Probably V plan plan approved approved by by Sakharovsky, Sakharovsky, the the head head of of the the Probably the the first first Department Department V FCD, scheme to FCD, for for a a major major special special action action in in Britain Britain was was operation operation EDDING, EDDING, a a scheme to dis disrupt rupt preparations preparations for for the the investiture investiture of of the the 20-year-old 20-year-old Prince Prince Charles Charles as as Prince Prince of of Wales 1969. Security Wales on on July July 1, 1,1969. Security at at the theceremony ceremony itself itself in in Caernavon Caernavon Castle, Castle, when when the the Qyeen presented coronet, rod, Queen presented Prince Prince Charles Charles with with the the coronet, rod, ring, ring, sword sword and and mantle mantle of of his his office front of 4,000 invited television audience office in in front of 4,000 invited guests guests and and a a worldwide worldwide television audience of of 500 500 million, tight for about a a month month million, was was expected expected to to be be too too tight for a a special special action. action. Instead, Instead, about beforehand, the road beforehand, Department Department V V proposed proposed to to blow blow up up a a small small bridge bridge on on the road from from Porthmadog to Caernavon, junction of A487 and Porthmadog to Caernavon, near near the the junction of the the A487 and the the A498, A498, using using British-manufactured British-manufactured gelignite. gelignite. On O n the the eve eve of of the the explosion explosion a a letter letterwas was to to be be sent sent to to the of the Welsh Welsh Nationalist Nationalist MP MP Gwynfor Gwynfor Evans, Evans, at at the theHouse House of Commons, Commons, warning warning him him that that MI5 MIS and and Scotland Scotland Yard Yard were were planning planning a a "provocation" provocationin in order order to to discredit discredit the the Welsh Welsh Nationalists Nationalists and and provide provide a a pretext pretext for for a a major major security security clampdown clampdown in in Wales. Wales.

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When took place his colleagues colleagues were were then then expected expected to to When the the explosion explosion took place Evans Evans and and his unmask the "British organs of power power" against unmask the conspiracy conspiracy by by the the British organs of against Welsh Welsh liberties. liberties. Though backed backed by by the the FCD, FCD, however, however, operation operation EDDING was Though was postponed postponed by by higher authority-either authority-either Andropov or the Politburo (the higher Andropov or the Politburo (the file file does does not not specify specify which)-doubtless because of the the fear, fear, once once again, again, that involvement might might which)-doubtless because of that KGB KGB involvement come to light.18 light. come to
REP O RT 1969 subjected past record record of ofboth both the Thirteenth POR T in in1969 subjected the the past the Thirteenth Department and Department V criticism. Only of Department and Department V to to scathing scathing criticism. Only the the training training of sabotage sabotage and (DRGs) was judged reasonably satisfactory. Some Some special special and intelligence intelligence groups groups (DRGs) was judged reasonably satisfactory. tasks Thirteenth Department and its its suc tasks had had proved proved beyond beyond the the capacity capacity of of both both the the Thirteenth Department and successor to The report report argued that there cessor to implement; implement; others others had had become become redundant. redundant. The argued that therewas was little in making for DRGs DRGs to sabotage American American and and little point point in making elaborate elaborate preparations preparations for to sabotage NATO also targeted by the considerably more more NATO military military installations installations which which were were also targeted by the considerably cases by nuclear missile missile strike force. numerous RU spetsnaz, numerous G GRU spetsnax, and and in inmany many cases bythe the Soviet Soviet nuclear strike force. It previous years, there been only It was was noted noted that, that, during duringthe the previous three three years, there had hadbeen only one one successful successhl "special inIstanbul Istanbul special action action of of a a political political nature"-operation nature-operation PEPEL PEPEL (''Ashes'') (Ashes) in (although remains unclear).19 report, however, predictably (although what what this this was was exactly exactlyremains unclear). The The report, however, predictably failed special actions actions involving of sabsab failed to to mention mention that that the thelack lack of of special involving the the peacetime peacetime use use of otage to Andropov's to sanction otage and and other other forms forms of of violence violence was was due due chiefly chiefly to Andropovs refusal refusal to sanction the the proposals proposals put put to to him. him. Andropov's peacetime special for Andropovs reluctance reluctance to to accept accept the the risks risks of of the the peacetime special actions actions for which becoming chairman him to which he he had had called called on on becoming chairman forced forced him to rethink rethinkhis his strategy. strategy. Hav Having scope for he increasingly increasingly turned turned to KGB, he to ing reassessed reassessed the the scope for direct direct involvement involvement by by the the KGB, using Among the first opportunities their use use was using terrorist terrorist proxies. proxies. Among thefirst opportunities for for their wasa a new new wave wave of of troubles 1969 the general secretary of the the Irish troubles in in Northern NorthernIreland. Ireland. On O n November November 6, 6,1969 thegeneral secretary of Irish Communist Brigades,20 for Communist Party, Party, Michael Michael O'Riordan, ORiordan, a a veteran veteran of of the the International InternationalBrigades,20 forwarded warded a a request request for for Soviet Soviet arms arms from from the the Marxist MarxistIRA IRA leaders leaders Cathal Catha1 Goulding Goulding and and Seamus Seamus Costello. Costello. According According to to O'Riordan: ORiordan: A C ENT RE TR E

There existed more the IRA and There has has always always existed more or or less less good good relations relations between between the IRA and the anti the Irish Irish Communists. Communists. We We not not only only conduct conduct a a number number of of public public and and antiimperialist than a year a secret mechanism mechanism for imperialist activities activities together, together, but but for for more more than a year a secret for consultations between leadership of IRA and of the the consultations between the the leadership of the theIRA and the the Joint Joint Council Councilof Irish ofof Northern Ireland has existed Irish Workers' WorkersParty Party and and the the Communist CommunistParty Party Northern Ireland has existed and advice with to tactical and is is operating. operating. They They unfailingly unfailingly accept accept our our advice with regard regard to tactical methods used in civil rights and national independence methods used in the the joint joint struggle struggle for for civil rights and national independence for for Ireland.21 Ireland.21 The by for failing failing to to defend defend the the Catholic Catholic IRA had had been been widely widelycriticized criticized by its its supporters supporters for The IRA community 1969, when when seven seven people had been community during during the the Belfast Belfast troubles troubles of ofAugust August 1969, people had been killed, forced out out of killed, about about 750 750 injured injured and and 1,505 1,505 Catholic Catholic families families had had been been forced of their their homes-almost dispossessed Protestant households. One One homes-almost fivefive times times the the number number of of dispossessed Protestant households. Catholic "I Catholic priest priest reported reported that that his his parishioners parishioners were were contemptuously contemptuously calling calling the the IRA, IRA, I

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Ran Ran Away."22 Away.22In In his his message message to to Moscow, Moscow, O'Riordan ORiordan said said that that during during the the ''August August crackdown" IRA had "armed defender" nationalist crackdownthe the IRA had failed failed to to act act as as armed defenderof of the the nationalist community community because "its because its combat combat potential potential was was weakened weakenedby by the the fact fact that that it it had had previously previously concen concentrated educational activity." trated its its efforts efforts on on social social protests protests and and educational activity.He H e claimed claimed that that there there was was now real possibility now a a real possibilityof ofcivil c i d war war in in Northern Northern Ireland Ireland between between the the two two communities, communities, and seriousclashes clashes between and of of serious between British British troops troops and and the the Catholics. Catholics. Hence Hence the the IAAs IRKS appeal the Central appeal for for arms. arms. In In a a report report to to the Central Committee, Committee, Andropov Andropov insisted insisted that, that, before before going ahead ahead with was essential to veri+ verify ORiordans O'Riordan's ability ability to "to going with an an arms arms shipment, shipment, it it was essential to guarantee the necessary conspiracy in shipping the weapons and preserve the secret guarantee the necessary conspiracy in shipping the weapons and preserve the secret of of their before Andropov their source source of of supply."23 upp ply.''^^ lt It was was more more than than two two and and half half years years before Andropov was was suf sufficiently shipment. ficiently satisfied satisfiedon on both both these these points points to to go go ahead ahead with with the the arms arms shipment. While O'Riordan, the instructed to While talks talks were were continuing continuing with with ORiordan, the illegal illegal PAUL PAUL was was instructed to explore using extremist Qyebec separatists explore the the possibility possibility of of using extremist Quebec separatists in in special special actions actions against against the Given violence of the United UnitedStates.24 States.24 Given the the violence of the the terrorist terrorist methods methods employed employed by by the the FLQ FLQ Libiration du du Quebec) Qukbec) and and its its apparent apparent interest interest in in Cuban and Soviet Soviet Bloc (Front de Liberation Cuban and Bloc assistance, assistance, the the hopes hopes placed placed in in it itby by the the Centre Centrewere were by byno no means means fancifuL fanciful.In In 1969 1969 the the FLQbombed of National Defense FLQbombed both both the thehome home of the the Montreal Montrealmayor mayor and and the the National Defense Head Headquarters it failed in quarters in in Ottawa. Ottawa.During During1970 1970 failed it in its its attempts attempts to tokidnap kidnap the the American American and and Israeli succeeded Israeli consuls-general consuls-general in in Montreal, Montreal,but but succeeded in in kidnapping kidnapping British British trade trade official official J ames Cross Cross and minister Pierre Laporte. Cross Cross was released James and Qyebec Quebec labor labor minister Pierre Laporte. was eventually eventually released in promise of kidnappers, but in return return for for a a promise of safe safe conduct conduct to to Cuba Cuba for for his his kidnappers, but Laporte Laporte was was murdered-strangled by the 25 murdered-strangled by the chain chain of of the the crucifix crucifuc he he wore wore around around his his neck. neck.25 Though succeeded in the Though PAUL PAUL probably probably succeeded in making making at at least least indirect indirect contact contact with with the FL(4 Centre almost almost certainly decided that the risks FLQ, the the Centre certainly decided that the risks of of establishing establishing a a direct direct KGB-FLQconnection seek to KGB-FLQconnection were were too too great. great. The The KGB KGB did, did, however, however, seek to cover cover its its own that the the CIA involved own tracks tracks by by circulating circulating forged forged documents documents indicating indicating that CIA was was involved with On 24, 1971 the with the the FLQ FLQO n September September 24,1971 theMontreal Montreal Star Star published published a a photocopy photocopy of of a 1970: a bogus bogus CIA CIA memorandum memorandum dated dated October October20, 20,1970: Subject Subject Qyebec. Quebec. Sources Sources advise advise that that urgent urgent action action be be taken taken to to temporarily temporarily break since the Canadian government's break contact contact with with the the FLQmilitants FLQmilitants since the Canadian governments mea measures sures may may have haveundesirable undesirable consequences. consequences.

Questions followed followed in in the Canadian parliament. Prime Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau Trudeau Qyestions the Canadian parliament. Minister Pierre declared that if the CIA was operating in Canada, it was without the knowledge or declared that if the CIA was operating in Canada, it was "without the knowledge or consent of the the government."26 g~vernrnent.~~ Twenty years years later later the the forged forged memorandum memorandum was was still still consent of Twenty being quoted quoted in inCanadian Canadian publications, even even by by some some academic academic authorities.27 a ~ t h o r i t i e sFurther Further .~~ being publications, forgeries suggesting CIA involvement involvement with with Qyebec Quebecextremists extremists were were circulated on the the forgeries suggesting CIA circulated on . eve visit to eve of of the the visit to Canada Canada by by President President Nixon Nixon in in 1972.28 1972.28 the difficulty difficulty of of mounting mounting peacetime special tasks tasks the peacetime special which would would leave leave no no trace trace of of the the KGB's KGBs involvement involvement was was heightened by his his mis miswhich heightened by takenconviction that the CIA was was pursuing pursuing its its own own series series of of special special tasks tasks against against taken conviction that the CIA KGB officers officers and and other other Soviet Soviet citizens citizens living living abroad. abroad. In In a a letter letterto toBrezhnev Brezhnev of of May May KGB
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21, 1970, headed 21,1970, headed "of of special special importance," importance, Andropov Andropov gave gave three three instances instances of of actual actual or or attempted attempted "abductions" abductionsby by the the CIA: CIA: the the unsuccessful unsuccessfbl attempt attempt to to abduct abduct the the KGB KGB officer March 17, Yuri officer Georgi Georgi Petrovich Petrovich Pokrovsky Pokrovsky in in Tokyo Tokyo on on March 17, 1966; 1966; similarly, similarly, Yuri Sergeevich RU in 1970; and Sergeevich Pivovarov Pivovarovof of the the G GRU in Buenos Buenos Aires Aires on on March March29, 29,1970; and the the dis disappearance appearance without without trace trace of of a a Novosti Novosti correspondent correspondent in in Delhi, Delhi,Yuri Yuri Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Bezmenov, 1970.29 Bezmenov, on on March March9, 9, 1970.29 Andropov's Andropovs allegations allegations derived derived not not from from any any real real CIA CIA program program of of covert covert action action but but from from his his own own addiction addiction to to conspiracy conspiracytheory. theory. Pivovarov Pivovarov had had been been the the victim victim of of an an attempted attempted kidnap kidnap and and assassination assassination by by the the right-wing right-wing Argentinian Argentinian terrorist terrorist group group Mano ("Hand"), which Mano (Hand), which claimed claimed to to be be avenging avenging the the kidnapping kidnapping of of a a Paraguayan Paraguayan diplomat diplomat by by left-wing left-wing terrorists.30 terrorist^.^' Most Most other other cases cases of of alleged alleged CIA CIA special special actions actions against attempted defection. against KGB KGB officers officers were were in in reality reality cases cases of of actual actual or or attempted defection. Some Some FCD FCD officers officers realized-as realized-as Andropov Andropov did did not-that not-that "abductions" abductions were were convenient convenient fictions reality fictions used used by by residencies residencies to to conceal conceal the the shameful shamehl reality of of defection. defection. Such Such was was the the case, Anxious the case,for for example, example, in in the thedisappearance disappearance of of Bezmenov. Bezmenov. Anxious to to save save face, face, the Delhi Delhi residency residency had had reported reported that that he he had had been been abducted, abducted, and and his his son son (the (the closest closest surviving surviving relative) financial relative) was wasgiven given financial compensation.3! c ~ m p e n s a t i o nIn . ~ reality, ~ reality, I n as as Bezmenov Bezmenov later later admitted: admitted: I become I decided decided to to stay stay in in India Indiato to become a a kind kind of of hippie hippie and and get get to to now now the the coun country. try. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, I started started reading reading local local newspaper newspaper and and found found out out the the Indian Indian police police were were looking looking for for me. me. I I panicked. panicked. I tried tried to to make make a a deal deal with with smugglers smugglers to take me out of the country, but they either wanted too much money to take me out of the country, but they either wanted too much money or or didn't didnt trust trust me. me. Eventually CIA,who who exfiltrated exfiltratedhim him first first to to Greece, Greece,where where EventuallyBezmenov Bezmenovapproached approachedthe the CIA, he was debriefed, then resettled him in Canada.32 The KGB abandoned the myth he was debriefed, then resettled him in Canada.32The KGB abandoned the myth of of Bezmenov's 974, Bezmenovs abduction abduction after after he he was was seen seen visiting visiting an an exhibition exhibition in in Montreal Montreal in in 1 1974, and and ordered ordered his his bewildered bewildered son son to to return return all all the the money money they they had had paid paid to to him.33 him.33 The theCentre, Centre, however, the The conspiracy conspiracy theorists theorists in in the however, remained remained convinced convinced that that the CIA was out to abduct KGB officers, as well as to induce them "to commit treason" CIA was out to abduct KGB officers, as well as to induce them to commit treason (in until of (in other other words, words, to to defect). defect).That That belief belief survived survived until the theend end of the the Cold ColdWar. War. When When Kryuchkov Kryuchkov became became the the first first head head of of the the FCD FCD to to visit visit Washington Washington in in 1987, 1987, Robert Robert Gates, DCI, Soviet Gates, then thendeputy deputy DCI, found found it itimpossible impossible to to persuade persuade him him that thata a Soviet scientist, scientist, Vladimir Vladimir Valentinovich Valentinovich Aleksandrov, Aleksandrov,who who had had gone gone missing missing in in Spain, Spain, had had not not been been physically physically abducted abducted by by the the CIA.34 CIA.33 In 1970, Andropov In his his letter letter to to Brezhnev Brezhnev of of May May 21, 21,1970, Andropov insisted insisted that that the theCIA CIA dared dared to to engage engage in in "brazen" brazen provocations provocations towards towards the the KGB KGB only only because because of of "the the lack lack of of appropriate appropriate measures measures on on our our part." part. It It was, was, he he argued, argued, high high time time to to retaliate retaliate in in kind kind and and abduct abduct a a CIA CIA officer officer to to teach teach the the Americans Americans a a lesson. lesson. To To avoid avoid the the risk risk that that a a KGB KGB special special action action might might go go wrong wrong and and become become publicly publicly known, known, Andropov Andropov asked asked Brezhnev's Brezhnevspermission permission to to use use a a proxy. proxy. The of Sandinista Sandinista guerrillas guerrillas against against American American The precedent precedent set set by by the the previous previous use use of targets encouraged targets in in central central and and north northAmerica.35 America.35 encouraged both both Andropov Andropov and and Department Department V theMiddle Middle East and V to to consider consider the the use use of of Palestinian Palestinian terrorists terrorists as as proxies proxies in in the East and

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Europe. Europe. The The man man chiefly chiefly responsible responsible for for exporting exporting Palestinian Palestinian terrorism terrorism to to Europe Europe was Dr Wadi Haddad, deputy leader of the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front was D r Wadi Haddad, deputy leader of the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for for the the Liberation (PFLP), headed headed by Haddad Liberation of of Palestine Palestine (PFLP), by Dr Dr George George Habash. Habash. In In 1968-9 1968-9 Haddad had with a spate and had attracted attracted favorable favorable attention attention in inthe theCentre Centre with spate a of of aircraft aircraft hijackings hijackings and attacks Israeli offices capitals. In attacks on on Israeli offices and and Jewish Jewish businesses businesses in in European European capitals. In 1970 1970 he hewas was recruited Brezhnev: recruited by by the the KGB KGB as as agent agent NATSIONALIST. NATSIONALIST. Andropov Andropovreported reported to to Brezhnev: The Haddad enables enables us The nature nature of of our our relations relations with with W. W. Haddad us to to control control the the external external operations of a certain influence in a manner operations of the the PFLP PFLP to to a certain degree, degree, to to exert exert influence in a manner favorable favorable to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and also also to to carry carry out out active active measures measures in in support support of while of our our interests interests through through the the organization's organizations assets assets while observing observing the the necessary necessary conspiratorial conspiratorial secrecy.36 secrecy.36 Andropov sought Brezhnevs Brezhnev's approval use Haddad Haddad for a special special action action against Andropov sought approval to to use for a against the CIA: the CIA: It I t appears appears expedient expedient to to carry carry out out an an operation operation to to abduct abduct the the deputy deputy CIA CIA resi resident .. .. .. and dent in inLebanon Lebanon and to tohave have him him taken taken to to the theSoviet Soviet Union Union both both as as a a retal retaliatory measure and the aim obtaining reliable iatory measure and with with the aim of of possibly possibly obtaining reliable information information [from [from him] him] about about the the plans plans and and specific specific operations operations of of the the USA USA in in the the Middle Middle East. It is is planned planned to to carry carry out out the the operation operation through through a reliable agent agent of of the the East. It a reliable Beirut Beirut residency, residency, NATSIONALIST NATSIONALIST [Haddad], [Haddad], who whodirects directs the the sabotage sabotage oper operations of of the the Popular Popular Front Front for for the the Liberation Liberation of of Palestine Palestine and and is is experienced experienced ations in carrying carrying out out aggressive aggressive measures. measures. in The essence of the the operational operational plan plan is is that that [the The essence of [the CIA CIA officer] officer] would would be be abducted by by NATSIONALIST's NATSIONALISTs reliable reliable fighters fighters in in Beirut Beirut or or its its surroundings surroundings abducted and be delivered and would would be delivered illicitly illicitly to to a a place place which which we we selected selected in in the the Damascus Damascus region, Da region, where where he he would would be be handed handed over over to to our our operational operational officers. officers. From From Damascus, mascus, he he would would be be taken taken illegally illegally to to the the USSR USSR on on one one of of our our special special aircraft aircraft or board ship. ship. or on on board Bearing in in mind that the the Palestinian Palestinian guerrilla guerrilla organizations organizations have have recently recently Bearing mind that stepped up their activities in in Lebanon against American intelligence and and its stepped up their activities Lebanon against American intelligence its agents, the Lebanese Lebanese authorities authorities and and the the Americans Americans would would suspect Palestinian agents, the suspect Palestinian guerrillas of of carrying carrying out out the above operation. The ultimate ultimate purpose of the the guerrillas the above operation. The purpose of operation would be known only only to to NATSIONALIST, NATSIONALIST,on on the foreign side, and operation would be known the foreign side, and to the the KGB KGB officers officers directly directly involved involved in in planning planningthe the operation and and carrying carrying it it to operation out, out, on on the theSoviet Soviet side. side. I I request request your your authority authority to to prepare prepare and and carry carry out out the the above above operation. operation.

Brezhnev gave gave his his consent consent on on May May25, 25,1970. The Beirut Beirut residency residency then then passed on to to Brezhnev 1970. The passed on Haddad a adetailed detailed dossier dossier on on the theCIA CIA officer officer (codenamed (codenamed VlR), VIR), his his home home address address (a (a Haddad fourth-floor apartment), apartment), car car (a light blue blue Ford Ford Comet Comet with diplomatic number numberfourth-floor (a light with diplomatic plates), route route to to and and from from work work at at the theUS US embassy embassy and and personal personal habits. habits. It I t was was noted, plates), noted, VIR regularly regularly went went for for walks walks accompanied accompanied by by his his black black poodle. poodle. for example, example, that that VlR for

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Haddad "most experienced experienced and and reliable" gunmen to to Haddad agreed agreed to to select select three three of of the the most reliable gunmen kidnap VIR. VIR. As As soon as he he had had been been seized, seized, his his captors over his his mouth mouth kidnap soon as captors would would press press over and nose nose a a mask mask impregnated impregnated with with a a general general anaesthetic anaesthetic supplied by Department and supplied by Department V. V. While he would given an an injection provided by by the the While VIR VIR was was unconscious, unconscious, he would be be given injection (also (also provided KGB) which which would would leave leave him him disoriented disoriented and and unable to resist resist when when he KGB) unable to he recovered recovered consciousness. The The PFLP PFLP would would then then drive drive VIR, in fedayeen fedayeen clothes, clothes, into consciousness. VIR, dressed dressed in into Syria along along a a route route carefully carefully reconnoitered reconnoitered by by the the KGB KGB and him over over to LineF Syria and hand hand him to Line F officers Damascus residency residency in hamlet near near Zabadani. Zabadani. From From there there he was officers from from the the Damascus in a ahamlet he was to Union. 37 KGB to to the the Soviet Soviet Union.37 to be be exfiltrated exfiltrated by by the the KGB One of of Haddad's Haddads probable probable reasons for agreeing agreeing to work as One reasons for to work as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent was was to to obtain arms for agreed to to an from obtain arms for the the PFLP. PFLP. In In July July 1970 1970 Brezhnev Brezhnev agreed an initial initial request request from Andropov that that Haddad Haddad be be supplied supplied from from the the KGB Andropov KGB arsenal arsenal with with five five RPG-7 RPG-7 hand handheld anti-tank anti-tank grenade grenade launchers launchers for for terrorist terrorist operations. operations. The The head head of held of Department Department V, Nikolai Pavlovich Pavlovich Gusev, and his his assistant, assistant, Aleksei Aleksei Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Savin, then met Nikolai Gusev, and Savin, then met Haddad to discuss the the handover handover of of further further arms arms supplies supplies which which it it was was agreed agreed to to Haddad to discuss deliver rubber boat boat at a pre-arranged deliver under under cover cover to to darkness darkness in in an an inflatable inflatable rubber at a pre-arranged spot spot near Aden. Aden. Control Controlof of the the operation, operation, codenamed codenamed VOSTOK VOSTOK ("East"), (East),was was entrusted entrusted near to the the deputy deputy head head (later (later head) head) of of Department Department V, V, Aleksandr Aleksandr Ivanovich Ivanovich Lazarenko. Lazarenko. to On the arms Haddad were O n the the orders orders of of the the defense defense minister, minister, Marshal Marshal Ustinov, Ustinov, the arms for for Haddad were loaded on an an intelligence-gathering intelligence-gathering vessel of the the Pacific Pacific Fleet, Fleet, the the Kursogra KursograJ at loaded on vessel of f, at Vladivostok. With With S. S. M. M. Grankin Grankin from from Department V on on board board to to supervise supervise the the Vladivostok. Department V handover, to rendezvous with HadHad handover, the the Kursografthen Kursograf then set set sail sail for for the the gulf gulf of of Aden Aden to rendezvous with dads motor motor launch launch at at aapoint point 1234 north north and and 4512' 4512 east, 2100 hours hours local time. dad's 1234' east, at at 2100 local time. As arranged, arranged, Haddad Haddad signaled signaled his his presence presence with with a a 360-degree 360-degree red red signal signal light. light. The The As Kzmografextinguished its lights, lights, locked locked on on to to the thelaunch's launchs radio radio beacon Kursogra fextinguished its beacon and and signaled signaled its presence with two two brief brief flashes, repeated after after a a short short interval. interval. On O n receiving receiving the the its presence with flashes, repeated answering signal signal (four (four brief brief flashes) from Haddad, the Kursogra Kursograf the rubanswering flashes) from Haddad, the f launched launched the rub ber boat boat containing the arms arms supplies and gave gave the the agreed agreed signal signal Load launched containing the supplies and "Load launched" ber (three gave the then made made (three brief brief flashes) flashes) twice. twice.Haddad's Haddads launch launch gave the same same signal signal in in reply, reply, then a "dot-dash" dot-dash signal signal twice twice as as soon soon as as it it had had picked picked up up the the arms. a arms. The Haddad consisted German pistols with The arms arms supplied supplied to to Haddad consisted of of 50 50 West West German pistols (10 (10 with silencers) and 5,000 MG-ZI machine guns with with 5,000 rounds rounds of of ammunition; ammunition; 50 50 captured captured MG-21 machine guns silencers) and 10,000 rounds of 10,000 rounds of ammunition; ammunition; 5 5 British-made British-made Sterling Sterling automatics automatics with with silencers silencers and and 36,000 30,000 rounds 36,000 rounds rounds of of ammunition; ammunition; 50 50 American American AR-16 AR-16 automatics automatics with with 30,000 rounds of 15 booby-trap foreign materials; 5 of ammunition; ammunition; 15 booby-trap mines mines manufactured manufactured from from foreign materials; and and 5 radio-controlled SNOP mines, materials. The radio-controlled SNOP mines, also also assembled assembledfrom from foreign foreign materials. The two two vari varieties some of sophisticated small eties of of mine mine were were considered considered some of the the most most sophisticated small weapons weapons in in the the Soviet some of silencers given Soviet arsenal, arsenal, and, and, like like some of the the silencers given to to Haddad, Haddad,had had never never previously previously been supplied even been supplied even to to other other members members of of the the Warsaw Warsaw Pact. Pact. The The SNOP SNOP mines mines could could be detonated by distances of two kilometers kilometers in in cities cities and and fifteen fifteen be detonated by radio radio signal signal at at distances of up up to to two to to twenty twenty kilometers kilometers in in the the countryside. countryside. The The successful successfd completion completion of of operation operation VOSTOK VOSTOK was was greeted greeted in in the the Centre Centreas as a a major FCD, and major triumph. triumph. On O n the the recommendation recommendation of of the the FCD, and with with the the approval approval of of Rear Rear Admiral Special Department Department in inthe the Pacific KGB Special Pacific Fleet, Fleet, Admiral Radchenko, Radchenko, head head of of the the KGB

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VOSTOK souvenirs VOSTOK souvenirs (each (each valued valued at at 600 600 roubles) roubles) and and cash cash bonuses bonuses of of 600 600 roubles roubles were commanders who were awarded awarded to to seven seven of of the the naval naval commanders who had had taken taken part: part: Captain Captain V. V. P. P. f Captains Captains (First (First Rank) Lebedev, Lebedev, commander commander of of the the Kursogra Kursograj Rank) A. A. G. G. Shtyrov Shtyrov and and E. G. S. E. P. I? Lopatin; Lopatin; Captains Captains(Second (Second Rank) Rank) G. S. Babkov Babkov and and V. V. I. I. Avramenko; Avramenko; and and Lieu Lieutenant tenant Commanders CommandersA. A. V. V. Garnitsky Garnitsb and and A. A. S. S. Klimchuk. Klimchuk. The The Centre Centre also also sent sent aafor formal of N. D. D. Sergeyev. Sergeyev. mal letter letter of of thanks thanks to to the theChief Chief of Naval Naval Staff, Staff, Admiral Admiral of of the the Fleet FleetN. The Centre of Haddad and the the The Centre was was to to make make what what it it considered considered successful successful use use of Haddad and PFLP number of special actions actions in against Israel PFLP in in a a number of special in the the Middle Middle East, East,particularly particularly against Israel (which covered in operation VINT, VINT, the the (which will will be be covered in the the next next volume volume of of this this book). book). But But operation attempt station in attempt by by the the PFLP PFLP to to abduct abduct the the deputy deputy head head of of the the CIA CIA station inBeirut, Beirut, ended ended in VIR varied varied his his daily daily routine routine and and Haddad's Haddads gunmen gunmen found found ititimpossible impossible to to in failure. failure. VIR implement abduction. During V V devised devised implement the the original original plan plan for for his his abduction. During 1971 1971Department Department a number of One simply Haddad VIR. One simply proposed proposed that that Haddad a number of alternative alternative plans plans to to kidnap kidnap VIR. arrange to arrange VIR's V I R S assassination. assassination. All A l l failed. failed. So So did did operation operation INTIKAM, INTIKAM, an an attempt attempt to use PFLP terrorists to kill two Soviet defectors, P. S. Branzinkas and his son (code use PFLP terrorists to kill two Soviet defectors, P. S. Branzinkas and his son (codenamed in in 1970 named PIRATY, PIRATY, "Pirates"), Pirates),who who 1970 hijacked hijacked an an Aeroflot Aeroflot aircraft aircraft and and escaped escaped to to Turkey. Turkey.The The operational operational file file records records that that NATSIONALIST NATSIONALIST did did not not realize realize how how dif diffi cult the be, and ficult the assignment assignment would would be, and overestimated overestimated his his capabilities."38 ~apabilities.~ Plans to hunt down Plans to to make make larger larger use use of of the the PFLP PFLP to hunt down Soviet Soviet defectors defectors were were largely largely abandoned. abandoned. Andropov's Andropovs decision decision to to use use Haddad Haddad for for special special actions, actions, and and Brezhnev's Brezhnevs approval approval for for it, it, none none the the less less marked marked a a turning turning point point in in the the history history of of KGB KGB opera operations. other Soviet tions. Henceforth, Henceforth, other Soviet Bloc Bloc intelligence intelligence services services were were to to follow follow the the Soviet Soviet lead lead in in using, using, or or conniving conniving in in the theuse use of, of, terrorist terrorist groupS.39 groups.39
LI RAT S of the Khrushchev IK KE E TH E O PER ATIONS of the the Thirteenth Thirteenth Department Departmentduring during the Khrushchev era, era, those those of of Department Department V V were were seriously seriously compromised compromised by by defections. defections. The The most most impor important Line F the London residency, F officer officer in in the London residency, Oleg Oleg Adolfovich Adolfovich tant defector defector was was the the Line Lyalin, Lyalin, an an expert expert in in hand-to-hand hand-to-hand combat combat as as well well as as a a highly highly proficient proficient marksman marksman and been recruited and parachutist parachutist who who had had been recruited by by MIS MIS as as a a defector-in-place defector-in-place in in the the spring spring of of 1971. 1971. During During the the six six months months before before he he defected defected in in September, September, Lyalin Lyalin provided provided details Paris, details of of KGB KGB sabotage sabotage plans plans in in London, London,Washington, Washington, Paris, Bonn, Bonn, Rome Rome and and other other Western capitals. In addition to compromising preparations for a number of peace Western capitals. In addition to compromising preparations for a number of peacetime time special special actions, actions, he he revealed revealed Department Department V's Vs hair-raising hair-raising contingency contingency plans plans for for operations during periods of international crisis operations during periods of international crisis or or conflict conflict which which would would be be carried carried out out by by illegals, illegals,local local agents agents and and sabotage sabotage and and intelligence intelligence groups groups (DRGs) (DRGs) who who would would infiltrate each target infiltrate each target country.40 country.4o In In Washington, Washington, according according to to Oleg OlegKalugin, Kalugin, head head of of Line Line PR PR and and deputy deputy resident, resident, Line Line F F "did did everything everything from from plotting plotting ways ways to to poison poison the the capital's capitals water water systems systems to to drawing Projected drawing up up assassination assassination plans plans for for US US leaders."41 1eade1-s.~~ Projected sabotage sabotage in in Britain Britain included plans blow included plans to to flood flood the the London London Underground, Underground, blow up up the theearly-warning early-warning station station at the ground. Some Some of at Fylingdale, Fylingdale, North North Yorkshire, Yorkshire, and and destroy destroy V-bombers V-bombers on on the ground. of Department Department V's Vs schemes schemes were were as as bizarre bizarre as as any any of of those those devised devised by by the the CIA CIA in in its its unsuccessful attempts attempts to tokill kill Castro Castro aadecade decade earlier. earlier. One One plan plan revealed revealed by by Lyalin Lyalin was was unsuccessful for men to to scatter for KGB KGB agents agents posing posing as as messengers messengers and and delivery delivery men scatter colorless colorless poison poison

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capsules capsules along along Whitehall Whitehall corridors corridors of of power power which which would would kill kill all all those those who who crushed crushed them them underfoot. underfoot. Though Though the the British British government government released released few few details details about about Lyalin Lyalin after Attorney General General told Commons that thathe he was after his his defection, defection, the the Attorney told the the Commons was charged charged with "the the organization of of sabotage sabotage within within the theUnited United Kingdomand and "the the elimination elimination with organization Kingdom" of of individuals individualsjudged judged to tobe be enemies enemies of of the the USSR." USSR. The The Centre Centre was was caught caught completely completely off-guard off-guard by by Lyalin's Lyalins defection defection and and the thealmost almost simultaneous simultaneous action action against against the the London London residency residency taken taken by by the the British British government. government. On O n September September 24, 24, 1971 1971 the thePermanent PermanentUnder-Secretary Under-Secretary at at the the Foreign Foreign and and Com Commonwealth Office, Office, Sir Sir Denis Denis Greenhill, Greenhill, summoned summoned the the Soviet Soviet charge charge d'affairs, daffairs, Ivan Ivan monwealth Ivanovich Ivanovich Ippolitov Ippolitov (a (a KGB KGB agent), agent), and and informed informed him him that that 90 90KGB KGB and and GRU GRU offi officers to cers stationed stationed in in Britain Britain under under official official cover coverwere were to be be expelled expelled and and another another fifteen, fifteen, then then on on leave leave in in the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, would would not not be be allowed allowed to to return, return, making making a a grand grand total total of of lOS 105expulsions.42 expulsion^.^^ Many Many of of the the Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence officers officers concerned concerned had had been been known known to to MIS MISand and SIS SIS for for some some time, time, but but over over the the past past six six months months Lyalin Lyalin had had con confirmed the list.43 firmed a a number number of of probable probable identifications identifications and and added added new new names names to to the list.43 Preparations Preparations for for operation operation FOOT, FOOT, as as the the mass mass expulsion expulsionwas wascodenamed codenamed in in White Whitehall, toto the hall, had had been been under under secret secret discussion discussion throughout throughout that that time. time. In In a a joint jointmemo memo the Prime Prime Minister, Minister, Edward Edward Heath, Heath, on on July July 30, 30, the the Foreign Foreign and and Home Home Secretaries, Secretaries, Sir Sir Alec Alec Douglas Douglas Home Home and and Reginald Reginald Maudling, Maudling, argued argued that that the thesheer sheer numbers numbers of of KGB KGB and can be be expected and GRU GRU officers officers in in London London were were "more more than than the the Security Security Service Service can expected to TheThe horrendous to contain."44 ~ontain.~ horrendous nature nature of of some some of of the the Department Department V V sabotage sabotage plans plans revealed revealed by by Lyalin Lyalin added added weight weight to to the the arguments arguments for for expulsion. expulsion. Almost Almost immediately immediately after after Ippolitov's Ippolitovs return return from from the the FCO FCO on on Friday Friday September September 24, 24, the the MIS MIS surveillance surveillance team team near near the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy in in Kensington Kensington Palace Palace Gar Gardens dens reported reported that that a a KGB KGB officer officer had had been been seen seen sprinting sprinting across across the the road road from from the the residency residency opposite, opposite, no no doubt doubt summoned summoned by by telephone telephone for for an an urgent urgent briefing briefing on on the the mass In In the mass expulsion.45 exp~lsion.~ the short short term term Lyalin's Lyalins defection defection probably probably caused caused even even greater greater concern concern than than operation operation FOOT. FOOT. Over Over the the weekend weekend the the Centre Centre informed informed the the Soviet Soviet leadership that Lyalin was likely to compromise Department V operations in leadership that Lyalin was likely to compromise Department V operations in other other countries. of countries. On O n Monday Monday September September 27 27 Brezhnev Brezhnev cut cut short shorta tour a tour of eastern eastern Europe Europe for for an VIP lounge lounge at at Moscow Moscow airport. airport. Shortly Shortly an emergency emergency meeting meeting of of the the Politburo Politburo in in the theVIP afterwards afterwards most most Line Line F F officers officers were were recalled recalled from from Western Western capitals, capitals,leaving leaving Depart Department V effectively ment V effectively crippled crippled and and unable unable to to fulfill fulfill its its task task of of coordinating coordinating sabotage sabotage operations time of the London debe operations abroad abroad in intime of crisis.46 The The Centre Centre investigation investigation into intothe London deb& cle, cle,which, which, as as was wastraditional, traditional, emphasized emphasized the the alleged alleged personal personal depravity depravity of of the the defec defector, tor, claimed claimed that that Lyalin L y a h had had seduced seduced the the wives wives of of a a number number of of his his Soviet Soviet colleagues colleagues in and in London, London, and heavily heavily criticized criticized the the former former resident, resident, Yuri Yuri Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Voronin, Voronin, for for covering up Lyalin's misdeeds to avoid a scandal.47 The head of the FCD Third covering up Lyalins misdeeds to avoid a scandal.47The head of the FCD Third Department, Department, whose whose responsibilities responsibilities included included operations operations in in Britain, Britain, was was among among those those senior senior KGB KGB officers officers who who were were demoted demoted or or sacked sacked as as a a result.48 result4*
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defection defection in in 1961 1961 had had made made the the Centre Centre much much more more cautious cautious in in ordering ordering assassinations, assassinations,so so Lyalin's Lyalins defection defection a a decade decade later later dealt dealt a a further further blow blow to to its its plans sabotage. Department V found found itselfin itselfin limbo limbo pending pending a a reorganireorganiplans for forpeacetime peacetime sabotage. Department V

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zation years to seen by by Mitrokhin zation which which took took three three and and a a half half years to complete. complete. The The files files seen Mitrokhin record no new schemes for KGB "special political actions" during the few record no new schemes for KGB special political actionsduring the few years yearsimme immediately possible that are diately after after Lyalin's Lyalins "treachery." treachery.(It (It is, is, of ofcourse, course, possible that some some special specialactions actions are recorded the recorded in in files files not not seen seen by by Mitrokhin.) Mitrokhin.) One One example exampleof of the Centre's Centres declining decliningenthu enthusiasm siasm for for such such operations operations which which made made a a particular particular impression impression on on Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was its its response to the defection of another star of the Kirov Ballet, Mikhail Baryshnikov, response to the defection of another star of the Kirov Ballet, Mikhail Baryshnikov, while a tour flawless classical classicalstyle style and while on on a tour of of Canada Canada in in June June 1974. 1974. Baryshnikov's Baryshnikovs flawless and apparently had personal apparentlyeffortless effortlessgrace grace had made made him him one one ofMitrokhin's of Mitrokhins personalfavorites. favorites.Among Among the the intercepted intercepted messages messages sent sent to to Baryshnikov Baryshnikovafter after his his defection defectionwhich which found found their their way way into his KGB file, Mitrokhin noted one from a female balletomane in Leningrad which into his KGB file, Mitrokhin noted one from a female balletomane in Leningrad which bebe mymy dear told told him him that that he he "was, was,is is and and forever foreverwill will dear little little brother brother .. ....one one of of the the bright brightest, Unsurprisingly, the est, most most beautiful beautiful and and most most notable notable people people I I have have ever evermet." met. Unsurprisingly, the KGB KGB kept observation after kept Baryshnikov Baryshnikov under under close closeobservation after his his defection. defection. Its Its agents agents included included another named MORIS, MONS, who who also also reported reported on on Nureyev Nureyev and and Maka Makaanother ballet ballet dancer, dancer,code codenamed rova. the plans to rova.What What struck struckMitrokhin, Mitrokhin, however, however,was was the apparent apparent lack lack of of plans to maim maim Barysh Baryshnikov nikov similar similar to to those those which which had had been been devised, devised, though though not not apparently apparently implemented, implemented, against earlier.49 against Nureyev Nureyevand and Makarova Makarova a a few few years years earlier.49 Despite Despite the the KGB's KGBs increased increased reluctance reluctance to to take take the the risks risks involved involved in in implement implementing ing directly directly special special actions actions in in the the West, West, it it continued continued to to use-or use-or connive connive at at the the use use of-terrorist of-terrorist groups groups as as proxies proxies in in the thestruggle struggle against against the the United UnitedStates States and and its its allies. allies. The The Centre's Centres mood, mood, however, however,remained remained distinctly distinctly cautious. cautious. It It was was almost almost three three years years before before the the arms arms requested requested by by the the IRA IRA in in November November 1969 1969 through through the the intermediary intermediary of Irish Communist Communist leader, by the of the the Irish leader, Michael Michael O'Riordan, OKordan, were were finally finally delivered delivered by the KGB. KGB. Shortly Shortly after after the the request request had had been been made, made, the the IRA IRA had had split split into into two: two: the the Offi Officials cials under under Cathal Catha1 Goulding Goulding and and the the Provisionals Provisionals led led by by Sean Sean MacStioftin.50 MacStioftin. The The sympathies Officials more sympathies of of the the KGB KGB were were wholly wholly with with the theMarxist Marxist Officials rather rather than thanthe the more nationalist was to nationalist Provisionals. Provisionals. Though Though Goulding's Gouldings long-term long-term aim aimwas to create create a a non nonsectarian, sectarian, non-military, non-military, all-Ireland all-Ireland revolutionary revolutionary movement, movement, the the Officials Officials were were responsible bloodiest Troubles responsiblefor for some some of of the the bloodiest episodes episodes in in the the Troubles of of the the early early 1970s. 1970s.The The only only answer answer to to the the "forces forces of of imperialism imperialism and and exploitation," exploitation, Goulding Goulding declared declared in in 1971, lay "in the language that brings these vultures to their senses most effectively, 1971, lay in the language that brings these vultures to their senses most effectively, the the language language of of the the bomb bomb and and the the bullet." bullet.The The Official Official IRNs 1s bloodthirsty bloodthirsty attempts attempts to to upstage upstage the the Provisionals Provisionals ended ended by by alienating alienating some some of of its its own own supporters. supporters. In In Feb February bomb planted Aldershot headquarters ruary 1972 1972 a a bomb planted at at the the Aldershot headquarters of of the the Parachute Parachute Regiment Regiment killed seven people, Catholic priest killed seven people, including including a a Catholic priest and and five five women women canteen canteen workers. workers. Nationalist Nationalist anger anger at at the thekilling killing of of an an off-duty off-duty British British soldier soldier on on home homeleave leave in in Derry Derry on on May May 21 21 1ed led the the Officials' Officials army army council council to to announce announce a a ceasefire ceasefire eight eight days days later. later. Since right Since the the Officials Officials reserved reserved the the right toto take take what what they they described described as as "defensive defensive action," the effect. action,however, however, the ceasefire ceasefire had had little littleimmediate immediate effect. Though Though Goulding Goulding gradu gradually ally succeeded succeededin in scaling scaling down down "military militaryoperations," operations,local local militants militants continued continued terror terrorist ist attacks attacks during during the theremainder remainder of of 1972 1972 and and 1973.51 1973. On 1972 the Irish wrote O nJuly July 3, 3,1972 the Irish Communist Communistleader, leader,Michael Michael O'Riordan, OKordan, wrote to to remind remind the the arms the CPSU CPSU Central Central Committee Committeethat that the arms he he had had first first requested requested on on behalf behalf of of the the IRA still behalf IRA in in November November 1969 1969 had had still not not been been received. received. Since Since then, then, on on behalf of of the the OffiOffi-

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cial IRA, IRA, he he had had held held numerous numerous discussions discussions on of shipment the cial on the the means means of shipmentwith with the KGBs technical specialists: "The The fact fact that that there there has leak of KGB's "technical specialists:" has not not been been the the slightest slightest leak of information for for two two and and a a half half years years proves, proves,in in my my opinion, opinion, aahigh high level level of of responsiinformation responsi bility with with regard regard to to keeping keeping the the secret, secret, so so to speak. Andropov Andropov agreed. agreed. O n August August bility to speak." On 21 he presented presented to to the the Central CentralCommittee Committeea a Plan for the Operation Operation of of a a Shipment Shipment 21 he "Plan for the of Weapons Weapons to to the the Irish Irish Friends," Friends, co codenamed SPLASH. SPLASH SPLASH was was a a variant variant of of denamed SPLASH. of operation operation VOSTOK, VOSTOK, which which had had delivered delivered arms arms to to Haddad Haddadand and the the PFLP PFLP two two years years earlier. Once again, the the weapons and munitions-2 munitions-2 machine-guns, machine-guns, 70 70 automatic earlier. Once again, weapons and automatic rifles, 10 Walther pistols, pistols, 41,600 41,600 cartridges, cartridges, all all of of non-Soviet non-Soviet origin the rifles, 10 Walther origin to to disguise disguise the involvement of of the the KGB-were KGB-were transported transported by by a a Soviet vesinvolvement Soviet intelligence-gathering intelligence-gathering ves sel, on on this this occasion occasion the the Reduktor. Reduktor. On O n this this occasion, occasion, the the arms, arms, in wrapin waterproof waterproof wrap sel, ping, were were submerged submerged to to a a depth depth of of about about 40 40 meters meters on on the ping, the Stanton Stanton sandbank, sandbank, 90 90 kilometers from the coast of Northern Ireland, and attached to a marker buoy of the kilometers from the coast of Northern Ireland, and attached to a marker buoy of the kind used to indicate indicate the the presence of fishing nets below the surface. kind used to presence of fishing nets below the surface. KGB laboratolaborato ries carefully carefully examined examined the the arms arms shipment it left left to to ensure there was ries shipment before before it ensure that that there was no no trace of of Soviet involvement. The The Walther Walther pistols with West WestGerman German trace Soviet involvement. pistols were were lubricated lubricated with oil, it was oil, the the packaging packaging was was purchased purchased abroad abroad by by KGB KGB residencies residencies and and it was specified specifiedthat that the Finnish or A few after the the arms been the marker marker buoy buoy should should be be Finnish orJapanese. Japanese. A few hours hours after arms had had been deposited to the deposited on on the the sandbank, sandbank, they they were were retrieved retrieved by by a a fishing fishing vessel vessel belonging belonging to the Irish friends," friends, whose whose crew crew were were unaware unaware of of their their contents. "Irish 52 Operation Operation SPLASH SPLASH content^.'^ was supervised supervised on on board board the the Reduktor by by an an officer officer from from the was the 8th 8th Department Department of of Directorate successor to Department V). Soviet arms arms shipship Directorate S S (the (the successor to Department V). Several Several further further Soviet ments similar methods. 53 ments to to the the Official Official IRA IRA were were delivered delivered by by similar method^.'^ The likely use of the supplied, The KGB KGB can can have have had had few few illusions illusions about about the the likely use of the arms arms it it supplied, since the sandbank sandbank was was the the Officials Officials' most most since the the man man in in charge charge of of their their collection collection from from the hard-line Costello.54 after a a dispute Goulding, hard-line terrorist, terrorist, Seamus Seamus cost ell^.'^ Late Late in in 1974, 1974, after dispute with with Goulding, Costello founded a a new new Trotskyite Costello was was expelled expelled from from the the Officials Officials and and founded Trotskyite movement, movement, the The Officials up four four assassination assassination the Irish Irish Republican Republican Socialist Socialist Party Party (IRSP). (IRSP). The Officials set set up squads in a series of of shoot-outs shoot-outs in in the squads to to liquidate liquidate the the dissidents, dissidents, but but came came off off worse worse in aseries the spring of a a feud feud later in the with spring of of1975. 1975. They They had, had, however, however, rather rather the the better betterof later in the year year with the Provisionals. Provisionals. The The Official Official IRA IRA eventually succeeded in Costello in the eventually succeeded in murdering murdering Costello in 1977.55 arms smuggled smuggled into into Ireland Ireland by the KGB KGB 1977. The The probability probability is is that that some some of of the the arms by the were republican paramilitaries. were used used in in the the internecine internecine warfare warfare between between republican paramilitaries. As well well as as shipping shipping arms arms to to the theOfficial Official IRA, IRA, the the KGB KGB also continued to to use some As also continued use some Third and the the Sandinistas-as Third World World terrorists terrorists and and guerrillas-notably guerrillas-notably the the PFLP PFLP and Sandinistas-as KGB found found itself-somewhat itself-somewhat to proxies. In In Latin Latin America, America, the the KGB proxies. to its its irritation-being irritation-being upstaged by Cuban ally, 1970, in the Centres Centre's view, view, the the DGI DGI had had upstaged by its its Cuban ally, the the DGI. DGI. By By 1970, in the effectively group. I In DGI effectively "expropriated" expropriated the the Sandinista Sandinista ISKRA ISKRA guerrilla guerrilla group. n 1969 1969 the the DGI financed the FSLN (Sandinista) (Sandinista) leader, leader, Carlos Fonseca financed the guerrilla guerrilla operation operation to to free free the the FSLN Carlos Fonseca Amador (GIDROLOG), from jail, where where he he had been imprisoned Amador (GIDROLOG), from a a Costa CostaRican Rican jail, hadbeen imprisoned for for bank 56 Fonseca recaptured after his his jailbreak, jailbreak, but but freed freed again again and and bank robbery. robberys6 Fonseca was was recaptured shortly shortly after flown American executives flown to to Cuba Cuba after after the the Sandinista Sandinista hijack hijack of of a a plane plane carrying carrying American executives of of the United Fruit Fruit Company, released in in exchange. exchange.57 The The DGI DGI also also orga the United Company, who who were were released orga100,000 dollars nized guerrilla guerrilla training training for for the the Sandinistas in Cuba, Cuba, and and gave gave them nized Sandinistas in them 100,000 dollars

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to purchase weapons. Pineiro Losado, to purchase weapons. The The head head of of the the DGI, DGI, Manuel Manuel Piiieiro Losado, whose whose nick nickname "Redbeard" reflected FCD, name Redbeard reflected his his fiery fiery temperament, temperament, told told the the deputy deputyhead head of of the the FCD, Boris Boris Semenovich Semenovich Ivanov, Ivanov, Of Of all all the the countries countries in in Latin Latin America, America, the the most most active active work work being being carried carried out out by [arlos] by us us is is in in Nicaragua. Nicaragua. Aid Aid is is being being given given to to partisan partisan groups groups headed headed by by C C[arlos] Fonseca. go far. far. Fonseca. This This movement movement has has influence influence and and could could go At in February the conviction At a a meeting meeting with with Fonseca Fonseca in February 1971, 1971, Pineiro Piiieiro restated restated the conviction of of the the Cuban leadership most Latin Latin American armed conflict conflict was Cuban leadership that that for for most American countries countries armed was the the only path to liberation. Though Cuba remained willing to offer the Sandinistas "any only path toliberation. Though C.uba remained willing to offer the Sandinistas any kind need to their kind of of support support and and assistance," assistance, they they would would need to make make major major changes changes in in their organization they organization if if they they were were to to avoid avoid the the defeats defeats and and heavy heavy losses losses they had had suffered suffered dur during past decade. concluded that to use use the ing the the past decade. The The Centre Centre concluded that future future attempts attempts to the Sandi Sandinistas nistas for for special special actions actions against against United United States States targets targets would would have have to to be be made made in in collaboration collaboration with with the the DGI.58 DGI.* The KGB KGB did, however, retain retain a a number numberof of agents agents within within the the Sandinistas, Sandinistas, among The did, however, among them GRIN (not (not identified identified by them GRIN by Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes), notes), who who was was used used to to identify identify possible possible operations the FSLN. operations in in which which the the KGB KGB could could make make use use of of the FSLN. In In May May 1974 1974 a a Sandi Sandinista nista delegation delegation visited visited the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy in in Havana Havana and and delivered delivered a a letter letter to to the the CPSU Committee asking asking for most dramatic dramatic Sandinista Sandinista CPSU Central Central Committee for assistance. assistance. The The most attack DGI with per attack on on a a United United States States target target was was the the attempt, attempt, assisted assisted by by the the DGI with the the personal blessing blessing of of Fidel Fidel Castro, Castro, to to kidnap kidnap Turner Turner B. the American ambassonal B. Shelton, Shelton, the American ambas sador and a a close sador in in Managua Managua and close friend friend of of the the Somoza Somoza family.59 familys9 Remarkably, Remarkably, Shelton Shelton and President President Anastasio Anastasio Somoza Somoza Debayle Debayle appeared appeared together together on on the the1974 1974 twenty cor corand twenty doba note, note, the the ambassador's ambassadors head head inclined inclined deferentially deferentially towards towards the the president; president; the the doba 0 The note quickly quickly became became known known as as the the sapo ("toady").6 note (toady). The original original plan plan of of attack attack appears been for US embassy dur appears to to have have been for a a guerrilla guerrilla group group to to force force an an entry entry into intothe the US embassy during diplomatic reception.61 On 1974, however, unexpected opporoppor ing aadiplomatic reception.61O n December December 27, 27,1974, however, an an unexpected tunity a party honor of tunity arose arose during during a party in in honor of Shelton Shelton given given by by the the former former minister minister of of agriculture, (Chema) Castillo. agriculture, Jose JosC Maria Maria (Chema) Castillo. A A Sandinista Sandinista working working undercover undercover as as a a waiter reception telephoned telephoned the waiter at at the the reception the guerrilla guerrilla group group to to report reportthat thatCastillo's Castillos house house was was poorly poorly guarded, guarded, providing providing an an excellent excellent opportunity opportunity to to kidnap kidnap the the ambassador.62 ambassador.62 Shelton the reception Shelton escaped escaped kidnap kidnap by by the the skin skin of of his his teeth. teeth. He H e left left the reception minutes minutes before stormed before a a well-drilled well-drilled assault assault group group of of Sandinistas Sandinistas (ten (ten male, male, three three female) female) stormed Castillo's mansion at ambassador gone, host, Castillos mansion at 10:50 1050 p.m. p.m. Finding Finding the the ambassador gone, they they killed killed his his host, held demanded that held the the rest rest of of the the guests guests hostage hostage and and demanded that the the Archbishop Archbishop of of Managua Managua act tense negotiations, negotiations, President Somoza released act as as mediator. mediator. Mter After several several days days of of tense President Somoza released eighteen imprisoned imprisoned FSLN FSLN members, paid a a million-dollar million-dollar ransom for the the release release of of eighteen members, paid ransom for the hostages, hostages, agreed agreed to to publish publish a a 12,000-word 12,000-word denunciation denunciation of of himself himself and and US US impe impethe rialism and and provided provided a a plane plane to to fly fly the the Sandinistas Sandinistas to to Cuba.63 Cuba.63On O n the the Sandinistas' Sandinistas rialism arrival at at Havana, Havana, the the Cubans Cubans took tookpossession possession of of the the million million dollars.64 dollars.64 arrival Though FSLN had had won won an an enormous enormous propaganda propaganda victory, victory, the the period period ofbru of bruThough the theFSLN tal of tal martial martial law law which which followed followed in in Nicaragua Nicaragua led led to to the thedeath death of many many of of its its guerrillas guerrillas

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and internal internal conflict conflict among among the the Sandinistas Sandinistas over over how wage a a victorious victorious guerrilla and how to to wage guerrilla war.65 Still in in awe awe of ofthe Russian revolutionary revolutionary tradition,66 tradition,66 Fonseca Fonseca turned war. 65 Still the Russian turnedtoto Moscow for for advice. advice. On O n February February 14, 14,1975 Moscow 1975 he he asked asked the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy in in Havana Havana to to arrange a trip trip to toMoscow for himself himself and other Sandinistas that they they could arrange a Moscow for and other Sandinistas so so that could study study and learn from both Bolshevik experience experiencebefore beforethe the October October Revolution and learn from both Bolshevik Revolution and and methmeth ods of of partisan partisan warfare warfare during during the Patriotic War. War. He He also requested further further ods the Great Great Patriotic also requested financial assistanceY as~istance.~ Late in 1975, probably probably soon soon after return from Moscow,68 financial Late in 1975, after his his return from Moscow,68 Fonseca traveled traveled secretly secretly to to Nicaragua Nicaragua to to try try to to resolve resolve the the factional factional conflict within Fonseca conflict within the FLSN. FLSN. On O n November November 8, 1976 he was killed with a National the 8, 1976 he was killed in in aashoot-out shoot-out with a National Guard patrol. patrol. Mter After the the Sandinista Sandinista victory victory in was reburied Guard in 1979, 1979, Fonseca Fonseca was reburied as as a a Hero Hero of the the Revolution.69 Rev~lution.~~ of
I N F E B RUA RUARY IN RY

FCD Illegals Illegals Directorate S. As As part partof of the the reorganization the enlarged Directorate FCD Directorate S. reorganization of of the enlarged Directorate by KGB KGB order order no. no, 0046 0046 of of April April 12, 12,1976, former Department was formally by 1976, the the former Department V was formally incorporated into it by 23 operational operational officers officers at head incorporated into itas as Department Department 8 8with, with, by 1980, 1980,23 at headquarters head of of Department Department 8, 8, quarters out out of of the the total total for for the the directorate directorate of of 400.70 400.70The The head Vladimir on the decline of of KG B spespe Vladimir Grigoryevich Grigoryevich Krasovsky, Krasovsky, mournfully mournfully reflected reflected on the decline KGB cial a man of action was symbolized symbolized by by the cial actions actions in in recent recent years. years. His His self-image self-image as as a man of action was the cigarette lighter lighter mounted mounted on fragmentation hand hand grenade grenade which which he kept on on his his cigarette on a a fragmentation he kept desk. place. That's all we desk. But, But, he he complained, complained, "We We move move paper paper from from place place to to place. Thats all we do!.71 Department 8's 8s most most basic basic task-the task-the liquidation liquidation of of traitors traitors who who had fled abroadDepartment had fled abroad was almost hopeless could not not bring itself either either to to was by by now now an an almost hopeless one. one. But But the the Centre Centre could bring itself give death sentences on KGB or to to abandon the give up up the the ritual ritual of of passing passing death sentences on KGB defectors defectors or abandon the pretence one day out. pretence that that the the sentences sentences would would one day be be carried carried out. According to Oleg Kalugin, head of FCD Directorate (counterintelligence) According to Oleg Kalugin, head of Directorate K K (counterintelligence) from succeeded in only two two post-war post-war defecdefec from 1973 1973 to to 1979, 1979, the the KGB KGB succeeded in tracking tracking down down only tors, Petrov) and States tors, one one in in Australia Australia (probably (probably Vladimir Vladimir Petrov) and the the other other in inthe theUnited United States (probably whom had defected in in the 1950s. The "The hell hell with (probably Pyotr Pyotr Deryabin)-both Deryabin)-both of ofwhom had defected the1950s. with them-they're old men men now!" ". . . .. Find Find Oleg Lyalin or or Yuri Yuri them-theyre old now! Andropov'told Andropovtold Kalugin. Kalugin. . OlegLyalin Nosenko, those twO!"72 Probably Probably in in1974, 1974, Niko Nosenko, and and I I will will sanction sanction the the execution execution of of those Nikolai (codenamed LARK), a former former Soviet Soviet naval naval offi cer work lai Fyodorovich FyodorovichArtamonov Artamonov (codenamed LARK), a officer working analyst in the US under the the alias US Office Office of of Naval Naval Intelligence Intelligence under alias "Nicholas Nicholas ing as as an an analyst in the Shadrin," told he could could discover whereabouts of of NoNo Shadrin, told his his KGB KGB controller controller that that he discover the the whereabouts senko In 1975 among senko who, who, he he claimed, claimed, was was living living near near Washington.73 Wa~hington.~ 1975 In a aKGB KGB agent agent among the States found to take take the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox clergy clergy in in the the United United States found a a gangster gangster willing willing to out contract on But before he could could do so, the the gang out a a contract on Nosenko Nosenko for for 100,000 100,000 dollars. dollars. But before he do so, gangster Almost simultaneously, Artamonov was was discov ster was was arrested arrested for for other other crimes.74 crimes.74Almost simultaneously,Artamonov discovered FBI. In In December December 1975, being lured ered to to be be a a double double agent agent working working for for the the FBI. 1975, after after being lured to he was opera to Austria, Austria, ostensibly ostensibly to to meet meet a a new new controller, controller, he was bundled bundled into into a a car car by by operations tions officers officers from from the the Vienna Vienna residency residency who who intended intended to to exfiltrate exfiltrate him him to to Moscow Moscow for for questioning. questioning. The The sedative sedative injected injected into into Artamonov Artamonov to to stop stop him him struggling struggling in in the the back was delighted so powerful powerful that that it itkilled killed him. him. Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, however, however, was delighted that that back seat seat was was so at just deserts. deserts. "Which he asked asked at last last a a traitor traitor had had received received his his just Which medal medal do do you you want?" want? he

1976 the the Politburo Politburo approved approved increase the 1976 increase staffing staffing and and funding fundingfor for the

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Kalugin. Kalugin. "The The October October Revolution Revolution or or the the Combat Combat Red Red Banner?" Banner? Kalugin Kalugin chose chose the the Red Red Banner.75 Banner.7s From 1981 the theLine Line KR From 1976 1976 to to 1981 KR (counterintelligence) (counterintelligence) officer officer E. E. R. R. Ponomarev Ponomarev (codenamed the Washington Washington residency the sole (codenamed KEDROV) KEDROV) was was 'stationed stationed at at the residency with with the sole task task of of tracking tracking down down defectors defectors and and was was given given the the cover cover post post of of deputy deputy head head of of the the Consular in order a pretext the Consular Department Department in order to to give give him him a pretext for for making making enquiries enquiries in in the Departments Pono Departments of of Immigration Immigration and andNaturalization, Naturalization, as as well well as as in in lawyers' lawyersoffices. offices. Ponomarev le of a Russian-language marev also also gained gained access access to to the the fi file of purchasers purchasers at at a Russian-language bookshop bookshop and and cultivated cultivated academics academics thought thought likely likely to to come come into into contact contact with with defectors.76 defectors.76His His five five years yearsin in Washington Washingtonappear appear to to have have been been an an expensive expensive waste waste of of time time and and effort. effort. Some Some of of the the KGB's KGBs Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc allies, allies, in in particular particular the the Bulgarian Bulgarian Durzhavna Durzhavna Sig Sigurnost (DS), were much less cautious than the Centre in their pursuit of defectors. urnost (DS),were much less cautious than the Centre in theirpursuit of defectors. The The zeal zeal with with which which the the DS DS hunted hunted down down traitors traitors who who had had fled fled abroad abroad owed owed much much to to the the personal personal outrage outrage with with which which the the Bulgarian Bulgarian dictator, dictator, Todor Todor Zhivkov, Zhivkov, the the most most colorful colorhl and and grotesque grotesque of of the therulers rulers of of eastern eastern Europe, Europe, responded responded to to emigre CmigrC criticism criticism and and mockery. mockery. The The best best known known of of the the emigre CmigrC writers, writers, Georgi Georgi Markov, Markov, broadcast broadcast regular regular commentaries commentaries on on the the corruption corruption and and excesses excesses of of the the Zhivkov Zhivkov regime regime in in the the Bulgarian-language Bulgarian-language services services of ofthe the BBC BBC World World Service Service and and Radio Radio Free Free Europe, Europe, ridi ridiculing with a "a culing Zhivkov Zhivkov himself himself as as a a man man with a a distastefully distastefully mediocre mediocre sense sense of ofhumor," humor, the the bullying phrases" and bullying manner manner of of "a a village village policeman," policeman, a a penchant penchantfor for "pompous pompous phrases and the the deluded deluded conviction conviction that that he hewas was a a great great huntsman. huntsman. In In 1974 1974 Boris Boris Arsov, Arsov, another another of of the the defectors defectors who who had haddared dared to to attack attack the the excesses excesses of Aarhus,Denmark, Denmark, of the the Zhivkov Zhivkov regime, regime, suddenly suddenly disappeared disappeared from from his his flat flat in in Aarhus, where newspaper Levski. where he he had had been been publishing publishing the the Bulgarian Bulgarian emigre tmigrC newspaper Levski Two Two months months later later he he resurfaced resurfaced in in Sofia Sofia and and was was sentenced sentenced to to fifteen fifteen years' years imprisonment. imprisonment. An An official official statement statement during duringArsov's Arsovs trial trial virtually virtually admitted admitted that that he hehad had been been kidnapped kidnapped by by the the DS: DS: Arsov Arsov was was playing playing with with fire. fire. The The timely timely activity activity of of the the State State Security Security stopped stopped his justice his dangerous dangerous activity. activity. This This only only shows shows that that the the hand handof of justice is is longer longer than than the the legs legs of ofthe the traitor. traitor. In In 1975 1975 Arsov Arsov was was officially officially declared declared to to have have been been found found dead dead in in his his prison prison cell. cell. At At about the the same same time time three three Bulgarian Bulgarian exiles exiles who who had had been been helpin helpin others to to defect defectabout ,.g others n Vienna. Ivan Kolev, Kolev, Peter Peter Nezamov Nezamov and and Vesselina Vesselina Stoyova-were Stoyova-were shot shot t n Vienna. The The assas assasIvan sin, quickly quickly identified identified by by the the Austrian Austrian police, police, was was a DS DS agent agent who who had had penetrated the sin, a penetrated the CmigrC group group and and escaped escaped to to Sofia Sofia after after the the murders.77 murders.77 emigre The actions. Early The KGB KGB eventually eventually became became embroiled embroiled in in DS DS special special political political actions. Early in in 1978 Dimitar Stoyanov, of the the DS, DS, 1978 General General Dimitar Stoyanov, Bulgarian Bulgarian interior interior minister minister and and head head of appealed for appealed to to the theCentre Centre for help help in in liquidating liquidating Georgi Georgi Markov, Markov, then then living living in in London London and accused accused of of "slandering slandering Comrade Comrade Zhivkov" Zhivkov in in his his many many radio radio broadcasts. broadcasts. The The and request was was considered considered at at a a meeting meeting chaired chaired by by Andropov Andropov and and attended by request attended by Kryuchkov, Vice Admiral Mikhail Usatov (Kryuchkovs deputy) and Oleg Kalugin, Kryuchkov, Vice Admiral Mikhail Usatov (Kryuchkov's deputy) and Oleg Kalugin, head involved in head of of FCD FCD counterintelligence. counterintelligence. Though Though reluctant reluctant to to take take the the risks risks involved in

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helping helping the the Bulgarians, Bulgarians, Andropov Andropov eventually eventually accepted accepted Kryuchkov's Kryuchkovs argument argument that thatto to refuse would would be be an an unacceptable unacceptable slight slight to to Zhivkov. Zhivkov. "But," But, he heinsisted, insisted, "there there is is to to be be refuse no no direct direct participation participation on on our our part. part. Give Give the the Bulgarians Bulgarians whatever whatever they they need, need, show show them send someone Sofia to them how how to to use use it it and and send someone to to Sofia to train train their theirpeople. people. But But that's thats all." all. The poisons labo The Centre Centre made made available available to to the the DS DS the the resources resources of of its its top top secret secret poisons laboratory, (Oper ratory, the the successor successor to to the the Kamera Kamera of of the the Stalinist Stalinist era, era, attached attached to to the the OTU OTU (Operational the direct ational Technical) Technical) Directorate Directorate and and under under the direct control control of of the the KGB KGB chairman. chairman. Sergei ofFCD Sergei Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Golubev, Golubev, head head of F C D security security and and aapoisons poisons specialist, specialist,was was put put in charge charge of of liaison liaison with with the the Bulgarians. Bulgarians. The The murder murder weapon weapon eventually eventually chosen chosen was was in concealed concealed in in an an American American umbrella, umbrella, one one of of a a number number purchased purchased at at Golubev's Golubevs request request by connection if by the the Washington Washingtonresidency residency in in order order to to disguise disguise the the KGB KGB connection if the the weapon weapon was The was ever ever discovered. discovered. The tip tip was was converted converted by by OTU OTU technicians technicians into into a a silenced silenced gun gun capable capable of of firing firing a a tiny tiny pellet pellet containing containing a a lethal lethal dose dose of of ricin, ricin, a a highly highly toxic toxic poison poison made made from from castor-oil castor-oil seeds. seeds. On O n September September 7, 7, 1978, 1978, while while Markov Markov was was waiting waiting at at a a bus stop on Waterloo Bridge, he felt a sudden sting in his right thigh. Turning bus stop on Waterloo Bridge, he felt a sudden sting in his right thigh. Turning instinctively, dropped instinctively, he he saw saw a a man man behind behind him him who whohad had dropped his his umbrella. umbrella. The The stranger stranger apologized, into apologized, picked picked up up his his umbrella umbrella and and got got into a a taxi taxi waiting waiting nearby. nearby. Though Though Markov Markov felt felt no no immediate immediate ill ill effects, effects, he he became became seriously seriously ill ill next next day day and and died died in in hos hospital 1 . During pital on on September September 1 11. During the theautopsy autopsy a a tiny tiny pellet pellet was was recovered recoveredfrom from Markov's Markovs thigh, ricin, thigh, but butthe the ricin, as as Golubev Golubev had had calculated, calculated, had had decomposed. decomposed. Markov's Markovs assassina assassination tion alerted alerted another another Bulgarian Bulgarian emigre, CmigrC, Vladimir Vladimir Kostov, Kostov, to to the the significance significance of of an an ear earlier, 26. Nearly lier, unexplained unexplained attack attack he he had hadbeen been subject subject to to in in Paris Paris on on August August 26. Nearly a a month month later, later, on on September September 25, 25, a a steel steel pellet pellet of of the the kind kind that that had hadkilled killed Markov Markov was was removed, removed, still back. During Sofia soon still intact, intact, from from Kostov's Kostovs back. During a a visit visit to to Sofia soon afterwards, afterwards, Kalugin Kalugin was was presented General Stoyanov presented by by General Stoyanov with with an an expensive expensive Browning Browning hunting hunting rifle rifle in in grati gratitude 78 tude for for KGB KGB assistance assistance in in the themurder murder of of Markov. Markov.78
TH E E C D D I T I O N to Cold War CH I E F A ADDITION to Soviet Soviet special special tasks tasks capability capability during during the the later later Cold War was the the creation of the was creation of of KGB KGB special special forces forces (spetsnaz) (spetsnaz)with with the the foundation foundation of the Alpha Alpha group 1974, on group in in 1974, on Andropov's Andropovs personal personal instructions.79 instruction^.^^ Intended Intended for for foreign foreign opera operations a minority minority of cers, the all but but a of FCD FCD offi officers, the special special tions and and initially initially kept kept secret secret from from all forces forces grew grew steadily steadily in in numbers numbers during during the thelate late 1970s. 1970s.Their Their first first major major operation, operation, by by far i far the the most most important important special special action action of of the the Andropov Andropov era, era, was was the the murder murder of of Pres President seized power a blood-thirsty dent Hafizullah Hafizullah Amin Amin of of Afghanistan, Afghanistan, who who seized power in in a blood-thirsty palace palace coup though Andropov become in coup in in September September 1979.80 1979.80Cautious Cautious though Andropov had had become in ordering ordering assassinations, in this option. Amin, Amin, he he assassinations, he he convinced convinced himself himself that that in this case case he he had had no no option. believed, was contemplating the Communist regime believed,was contemplating ending ending the Communist regime in in Afghanistan Afghanistan and and turning West. turning to tothe the West. There There were were even evenreports, reports, which which Andropov Andropov appears appears to to have have taken taken seriously, As seriously,that that Amin Amin was was plotting plotting with with the theCIA.81 CIA.81 As during during the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak crisis crisis in Andropov in 1968,82 1968,82 Andropov took took the the lead lead in in insisting insisting on on the the enforcement enforcement of of the the "Brezhnev Brezhnev doctrine" asserted Moscow's member of doctrine which which asserted Moscows right right to to prevent prevent the the defection defection of of any any member of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Bloc. For For the the first first time time since since its its foundation, foundation, Department Department 8 8 of of FCD FCD Directorate Directorate S S (I1le (Illegals) line assassinate gals) moved moved into into the thefront front line of of KGB KGB operations. operations. Its Its plot plottoto assassinateAmin, Amin, operoper-

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ation ation AGAT (''Agate''), (Agate),formed formed part part of of a a larger larger invasion invasion plan.s3 plan.83By late late November, November, after the replacement after Amin Amin had had demanded demanded the replacement of of A. M. Puzanov, Puzanov, the the Soviet Soviet ambas ambassador, sador, Andropov Andropov and and defence defence minister minister Ustinov, Ustinov, the the two two leading leading hawks hawks in in the the Polit Politburo, the need need for Soviet military buro, were were agreed agreed on onthe for Soviet military intervention intervention as as well well as as the the elimination of of Amin. Amin.* Early in in December, December, Andropov a handwritten handwritten elimination 84 Early Andropov sent sent Brezhnev Brezhnev a letter, reporting reporting "alarming alarming information information [intelligence] [intelligence] about about Amin's Amins secret activities, letter, secret activities, forewarning of of a a possible possible shift shift to to the theWest," West, bringing with with it it both boththe the end end of Comforewarning bringing of Com munist rule rule and and a a catastrophic catastrophic loss loss of of Soviet Soviet infl infl~ence.~ December 8 8 Andropov Andropov munist uence.85 On On December and obtained Brezhnev's and Ustinov Ustinov jointly jointly obtained Brezhnevs approval approval for for a a draft draft invasion invasion plan.86 plan.86 While Marshal Marshal Akhromeyev Akhromeyev and and the the General General Staff Staff operations operations group group in in charge charge of of While the invasion invasion established establishedtheir their headquarters headquarters near near the the Mghan Afghan border border in in Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan, the the the head of ofDirectorate Directorate S, S, Vadim Vadim Vasilyevich Vasilyevich Kirpichenko, and the the head head of of Department Department 8, 8, head Kirpichenko, and Vladimir Krasovsky, Krasovsky, flew flew secretly secretly into Kabul Kabul to to supervise supervise the the overthrow overthrow of of Amin. Amin. Day DayVladimir into to-day of operation operation AGAT was was entrusted entrusted to to Krasovsky's Krasovskys deputy, deputy, A. 1. I. to-day control control of Lazarenko. Lazarenko. A team team from from the the KGB Seventh Seventh (Surveillance) (Surveillance) Directorate Directorate flew flew in in to tomon monitor itor Amin's Amins movements. movements. Meanwhile, Meanwhile, elaborate elaborate attempts attempts were were made made to to avoid avoid arousing arousing two radio radio sta staAmins suspicions. suspicions. His His requests requests for for military military supplies supplies were were granted granted and and two Amin's tions December 23, tions were were constructed constructed for for him. him. On O n December 23, however, however, the the KGB residency residency in in Kabul reported reported that that Amin's Amins suspicions suspicions had had been been aroused arousedboth both by by Western Western radio radio reports reports Kabul of Soviet Soviettroop troop movements movements and and the the frequent frequent fli flights into the the Soviet Soviet airbase airbase at at Bagram, Bagram, of ghts into outside p.m. (local time) on December 25.87 outside Kabul. Kabul. The The main main invasion invasion began beganat at 3 3 p.m. (localtime) on December 25.87 According According to to some some accounts accounts of of the the Soviet Soviet invasion, invasion, Amin Amin was was successfully successfullyduped duped into him with assis into believing believing that that the the Red Red Army Army was was arriving arriving to to provide provide him with "fraternal fraternal assistance against against anti-Communist anti-Communist rebels.88 rebels.88 The Kabul Kabul residency residency thought thought otherwise. otherwise. O n tance" The On December article in English December 26 26 it it reported reported to to the the Centre Centrethe thepublication publication of of an an article in the the Englishlanguage Kabul Times entitled entitled "The The Will Will of the the People People will will be bethe the Deciding DecidingFactor." Factor. of language Though the thearticle article made made no no direct direct reference reference to to the themassive massive arrival arrivalof of Soviet Soviet troops, it Though troops, it ended with the the slogan slogan "Down Down with withthe the interventionists!The concluded: ended with interventionists!" The residency residency concluded:
As the the Mghan Afghan press press is is subject subject to to strict strict censorship, censorship, the the article article could could not not have have As been published published without sanction of of Amin. Amin. The The time chosen to to print been without the the sanction time chosen print the the article was not a coincidence. coincidence. It was was printed printed in inan an English English language newspaper, article was not a language newspaper, a language language which which few few Afghans Afghans understand. understand. It was was clearly clearly intended to turn turnthe the a intended to pro-Western sections of the the population population against against the the Soviet Soviet troops troops and and to to enable enable pro-Western sections of theWest West fuss about the Soviet inter interthe mass media in the to make an immediate fuss cauvention in Afghanistan. In general the article reflects the ambiguous and cau andhis entourage towards the increased increased Soviet military tious attitude of Amin and Afghani~tan.~~ presence in Mghanistan.89 the presidential palace on December 27 was led by 700 members of The assault on the and Zenith Zenithspecial special forces, forces, dressed in Afghan uniforms and traveling the KGB Alpha and Afghanmarkings. The signal in military vehicles vehicles with Afghan signal for the attack to begin was the explosive device device concealed concealed some detonation of an explosive some days earlier beneath a tree in the central square of the capital. capital. The palace guards, however, however, put up much stiffer resis-

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expected, and over a hundred of the KGB troops were killed tance than had been expected, was taken and Amin Amin gunned gunneddown. Among the the casualties was the before the palace was casualties was GrigoriBoyarinov, Boyarinov, commandant of of the Depart Departleader of the assault group, Colonel Grigori 8 special special operations operations training training school school at at Balashikha.90 Balashikha. ment 8 ment I t was normal KGB procedure for the portraits portraitsof officers officers who fell in combat to be It theCentre Centre O n this occasion, occasion, since displayed in black frames at the as a sign of of mourning. On of operation AGAT were so so numerous, numerous, Andropov Andropov decided decided not not to to the fallen heroes of theirhundred portraits on display. display. Some of of the survivors, survivors, however, however, put their were honored Knpichenko was promoted from major-general to for their part in in the the operation. Kirpichenko lieutenant-general7 and and soon afterwards made First Deputy of the FCD. lieutenant-general, soon afterwards made First DeputyHead Head of the FCD. Lazarenko was promoted from colonel to major-general. Leonid Aleksandrovich Kozlov of of Department Department 8 was was made made a a Hero Hero of of the the Soviet Soviet Union.91 Union. The The head head of of Line Kozlov Line N (Illegals atthe the residency,Ismail Murtuza Ogly Aliev, was wasawarded N (Illegals Support) Support) at Kabul residency, the Order Orderof of the the Red Red Star, Star, as as were were an an unknown unknown number of the the members of the the number of members of the assault assault group who who had had stormed the presidential presidential palace.92 palace.92 group stormed the Immediately after after the the storming storming of of the the palace, palace, the the exiled exiled Afghan Afghan Communist Communist and and Immediately veteran KGB agent agent Babrak Babrak Karmal, Karmal, who who had had been by Moscow Moscow to to succeed veteran been chosen chosen by succeed Amin, asked asked senior KGB officers officers in in Kabul Kabul to to assure assure Comrade Comrade Andropov Andropov that, that, as as Amin, senior KGB unswervingly follow his advice. advice. He H e also called for the "severest severest president, he would unswervingly punishment of Amin's Amins former associates all those who had opposed Soviet punishment" associates and all troops. Karmal was was fulsome fulsome in in his his praise for the the heroism heroism shown shown by by the the KGB and and troops. Karmal praise for other palace: other special special forces forceswho who had had stormed stormed the the presidential presidential palace:

As As soon soon as as we we have havedecorations decorations of of our our own, own, we we would would like liketo to bestow bestow them them on onall all the troops and took part part in fighting. We the Soviet Soviet troops and Chekists Chekists [KGB [KGB officers] officers] who who took inthe the fighting. We will award awardorders orders to to these these comrades.93 comrades.93 hope that that the thegovernment government of of the the USSR will hope The book) 2 of of this this book) The long-drawn-out long-drawn-out Afghan Afghan War War (which (which will will be be covered covered in in volume volume 2 rescued most of rescued Department Department 8 8 from from the the doldrums doldrums into into which which it it had had lapsed lapsed for for most of the the 1970s. In In 1982 1982 its its special special operations operations training training school school at at Balashikha Balashikha set set up up a a "Training Training 1970s. Centre for for Afghanistan," Afghanistan, headed headed by by V. !. I. Kikot, Kikot, previously previously a a Line Line F officer officer in in Ha HaCentre vana, Cuban experience De vana, who who was was well-informed well-informed on on the the Cuban experience of of irregular irregular warfare.94 ~arfare.~ De partment partment 8 8 also also made made an an intensive intensive study study of of the the methods methodsused used both both by by the the Palestinians Palestinians against Bal against the the Israelis Israelis and and by by the the Israelis Israelis against against Palestinian Palestinian camps camps in in Lebanon.95 Leban~n.~ Bal ashikha ashikha made made a a significant, significant, though though unquantifiable, unquantifiable, contribution contribution to to the the increasing increasing use use of and of special special forces forces and methods methods of of terrorizing terrorizing the the population-among population-among them them incendiary incendiary bombs, napalm, poison gas, tiny tiny mines mines scattered scattered from from the the air, air, even booby-trapped bombs, napalm, poison gas, even booby-trapped toys which which maimed maimed children children and and so toys parents. But though Soviet so demoralized demoralized their their parents. But though Soviet forces forces and and the theterror terror campaign campaign drove drove a a quarter quarter of of the the Afghan Afghanpopulation population into into refugee refbgee camps camps in in Pakistan, Pakistan, they they failed failed to to win win the the war. war.
WITH T HE E I NT TE EN NS SI IF FI IC CAT the Cold Cold War early years of the Reagan pres TH A T I O N of ofthe War in inthe the earlyyears ofthe Reaganpresidency and fears in the Centre that the new president was planning a nuclear rst idency and fears in the Centre that the new president was planning a nuclear fi first strike, strike, Andropov Andropov became became increasingly increasingly willing, willing, both both as as KGB KGB chairman chairman and and as as BrezhBrezh-

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nev's nevs successor successor from from 1982 1982 to to 1984, 1984, to to use, use, or or connive connive in in the the use use of, of, terrorism terrorism against against United States and NATO targets. targets. With With Andropov's Andropovs knowledge (and doubtless doubtless his United States and knowledge (and his blessing), East East Germany Germany became what its its last, last, non-Communist, non-Communist, interior interior minister, minister, blessing), became what Peter-Michael Diestel, later called called "an an Eldorado for for terrorists." terrorists.Among Among East East Germanys Peter-Michael Diestel, later Eldorado Germany's favorite terrorist terrorist groups groups was was the the West West German Red Army Army Faction Faction (RAF). (RAF). Contemp Contempfavorite German Red tuous of of working-class working-classreluctance reluctance to make make a a revolution revolution and and inspired inspired by by slogans sloganssuch such as tuous to as Dontargue-destroy!," argue-destroy!, the the well-educated well-educated members of the the RAF saw saw themselves themselves as the the "Don't members of as militant vanguard inert proletariat, of militant vanguard of of the the deplorably deplorably inert proletariat, committed committed to to the the destruction destruction of the "bourgeois bourgeois power power structures" structures of of both the FRG and and NATO. Mter After a a series series of of suc sucthe both the cessful -1970s, however, cessful terrorist terrorist attacks attacks in in the the mid mid-l970s, however, a a grand grand offensive offensive planned planned by by the the in 1977 1977 failed, failed, and and four four of of its its leaders leaders committed suicide in in prison. prison. RAF in committed suicide Thanks to to the the sanctUary sanctuary offered offered by by East East Germany Germany to to its its main main surviving surviving activists activists Thanks from training, weapons, and from 1977 1977 onwards, onwards, the the RAF was was able ableto to regroup. regroup. With With training, weapons, funds funds and false launched a false identity identity documents documents provided provided by by the the Stasi, Stasi, the the Red Red Army Army Faction Faction launched a new new offensive during during the the early early 1980s. 1980s. In In August August 1981 1981 aacar car bomb bomb attack attack on on the the European European offensive headquarters injured headquarters of of the the US airforce airforce at at Ramstein Ramstein in in West WestGermany Germany injured seventeen seventeen peo people; a a month monthlater later RAF terrorists terrorists made made an an unsuccessful unsuccessfid rocket rocket attack attack in in Heidelberg Heidelberg on on ple; the the car car of of General General Frederick Frederick Kroesen. Kroesen. During During another another terrorist terrorist offensive offensive in in 1984-5, 1984-5, the the RAF attempted attempted to toblow blow up up the the NATO school school at at Oberammergau, Oberammergau, bombed bombed the the US airbase at at Frankfurt/Main, FrankfurdMain, and and attacked attacked American American soldiers soldiers at at Wiesbaden. Wiesbaden. The The Stasi Stasi airbase also also connived connived in in the the bombing bombing of of the the La La Belle Belle discotheque discotheque in in West WestBerlin, Berlin, helping helping to to transport the the explosives explosiveswhich which killed killed an an American American sergeant sergeant and and a a Turkish Turkish woman woman and and transport wounded 230 people, servicemen. Other Other Stasi Stasi contacts contacts included included wounded 230 people, including including fifty fifty US servicemen. the Provisional Provisional IRA, IRA, the the Basque Basque ETA and and Carlos Carlos the the Jackal.96 Jackal.96 the In height ofof operation In 1983, 1983, at atthe the height operation RYAN (the (the combined combined KGB/GRU KGB/GRU attempt attempt to to find find (nonexistent) (nonexistent) evidence evidence of of US and and NATO plans plans for for a a surprise surprise nuclear nuclear attack), attack), Andropov ordered ordered preparations by Department Department 8 8 for for terrorist terrorist attacks attacks on on British, British, Andropov preparations by American American and and NATO targets targets in in Europe. Europe. Plans Plans were were made made for for a a campaign campaign of of letter letter bombs to be be sent to Mrs. Mrs. Thatcher's Thatchers office office at at 10 Downing Street and to to a a series of bombs to sent to 10 Downing Street and series of prominent prominent US and and NATO representatives.97 representative^.^^ At about about the the same same time time the the KGB orga organized a a series series of of dead dead drops drops in in bars bars and and restaurants near American bases in in West nized restaurants near American bases West Germany, intended intended to toconceal conceal explosives explosives which which could could be be detonated detonated in in aa manner that Germany, manner that would included behind behind aa would give give the the impression impression of of terrorist terrorist attacks. attacks. The The dead dead drop drop sites sites included vending machine, in aaventilation ventilation cavity cavity under under aasink, sink, on on aawooden wooden beam over a a lava lavavending machine, in beam over tory and and underneath underneath a a paper-towel paper-towel dispenser. dispenser. By By the the time time the the sites were discovered discovered tory sites were 1985, however, however, operation RYAN was winding down and plans for a by the CIA in 1985, KGB terrorist terrorist campaign campaign against against NATO targets targets had had been ~helved.~ KGB been shc1ved.98 1983, while RY RYAN In August 1983, AN was still in full swing, the Centre instructed the main residencies residencies in European NATO countries to step up their search search for NATO preparations for for preparations
sabotage teams with nuclear, bacteriological bacteriological and the secret infiltration of sabotage expansion the countries of the Warsaw Pact; [and] the expansion chemical weapons into the schools and increase increase in the of the network of sabotage-training intelligence schools

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CmigrCs from the socialist countries and persons recruitment of emigres persons who know the language of these countries, and the creation of emigre CmigrC military formations and sabotage and intelligence intelligence teams.99 teams.99 sabotage

Though, as with most of the requirements for operation RYAN, there was no such intelligence to to collect, collect, the the Centre's Centres instructions instructions give give an animportant insight into into intelligence important insight Moscows contingency plans for the role of Department 88and its DRGs in an anattack Moscow's on NATO. NATO. on fall special fall of of the the Cold Cold War War brought brought a a further further decline decline in in KGB special actions. The last last major major special special action action of of the the Soviet Soviet era era was was directed directed not not against against the the actions. The traditional Main Main Adversary Adversary and and its its NATO allies, allies, but but against against the the reformers reformers within within the the traditional Soviet Union. O n December December 8,1990 Kryuchkov, who who had had become Soviet Union. On 8, 1990 Kryuchkov, become KGB chairman chairman earlier, summoned to his office in the the Lubyanka his former chief-of-staff, two years earlier, and Alexei Alexei Yegorov Yegorovof of Counter CounterVyacheslav Zhizhin, Zhizhin, now now deputy deputy chief chief of of the theFCD, and Vyacheslav intelligence.There There he heinstructed instructed them them to toprepare prepare a a report report on on the the measures measures needed needed to to intelligence. "stabilize" country following stabilizethe the country following the the declaration declaration of of a a state state of of emergency-in emergency-in other other words, the the "special" special and and other other actions actions required required to to preserve preserve one-party one-party rule rule and and a a cen cenwords, tralized tralized Soviet Soviet state. state. Over the next eight eight months Kryuchkov repeatedly repeatedly tried tried and and failed failed to to persuade persuade Over the next months Kryuchkov Gorbachev Gorbachev to to agree agree to to the the declaration declaration of of a a state state of of emergency emergency and and the the "stabilization" stabilization of the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. The The point of no no return return for for himself himself and and his his co-conspirators co-conspirators was was of point of the agreement on July 23, 1991 of the text of a new Union Treaty which would have the agreement on July 23,1991 of the text of a new Union Treaty which would have transferred many of powers of On August 4 transferred many of the the powers of central central government government to to the the republics. republics. O n August 4 Gorbachev, whom whom Kryuchkov Kryuchkov had had placed placed under surveillance some earGorbachev, under close close surveillance some months months ear lier 10, left SUBJECT 1 110, left for for his his summer summer holidays holidays in in a aluxurious luxurious dacha dacha at at Foros Foros on on lier as as SUBJECT the Crimean coast, intending intending to return to to Moscow Moscow for for the the signing signing of of the the Union the Crimean coast, to return Union Treaty on on August August 20. 20. The The day day after after Gorbachev's Gorbachevs departure, departure, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov and and his his fellow fellow Treaty plotters-chief among them the defence and and interior ministers, Dmitri Yazov and and plotters-chief among them the defence interior ministers, Dmitri Yazov Boris Pugo Pug0 (former (former head of the the Latvian Latvian KGB)-met KGB)-met at at OBJECT OBJECT ABC, a a KGB Boris head of sanatorium sanatorium equipped equipped with with swimming swimming pool, pool, saunas, saunas, masseuses masseuses and and cinema. cinema. There There they secretly secretly constituted constituted themselves themselves as as the the State State Committee Committee for for the the State State of of Emer Emerthey gency, and and met met over over the the next next fortnight fortnight to to make make preparations preparations for for a a coup coup which which would would gency, forestall the the signing of the Treaty. The The committee committee ordered the printing forestall signing of the Union Union Treaty. ordered the printing of of 300,000 pairs of hand- . 300,000 arrest arrest forms forms and and the the supply supply by by a a factory factory in in Pskov Pskov of of 250,000 250,000 pairs of handcuffs. Kryuchkov Kryuchkov called called all all KGB personnel personnel back from holiday, holiday, placed placed them them on on alert alert cuffs. back from and floors of emptied to and doubled doubled their their pay. pay. Two Two floors of cells cells in in the the Lefortovo Lefortovo prison prison were were emptied to received prisoners and committee in received important important prisoners and a a secret secret bunker bunker prepared prepared for for the the committee in the the Lubyanka case the Lubyanka in in case the going going got got rough. rough. O n August August 18 the plotters plotters made a final final attempt attempt to On 18 the made a to intimidate intimidateGorbachev Gorbachevinto into declaring declaring a a state state of ofemergency. emergency. Having Having failed, failed, they they kept kept him him incommunicado incommunicado under under house president was house arrest arrest in in Foros Foros and and announced announced next next day daythat that the thepresident was prevented prevented by by "ill ill health" health from from performing performing his his duties, duties, and and that that Vice-President Vice-president Gennadi Gennadi Yanayev Yanayev had had become become acting acting president president (in (in fact fact a a mere mere figurehead) figurehead) at at the thehead head of of an an eight-man eight-man State State
TH E DE C L I IN NE E AND

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Committee State of discovered, however, however, Committee for for the the State of Emergency. Emergency. The The plotters plotters quickly quickly discovered, that that the the old old autocratic autocratic machinery machinery of of the the one-party one-party state state was was in in too too serious serious a a state state of of disrepair them to able to Alpha group spetsnax was was disrepair for for them to be be able to turn turn back back the the clock. clock. The The Alpha group spetsnaz supposed White House, seat of supposed to to storm storm the the Moscow Moscow White House, the theseat of government government of of the the Russian Russian Federation, Federation, and and arrest arrest its its president, president, Boris Boris Yeltsin, Yeltsin, but but failed failed to to do doeither. either. Not Not one one of of the the 7,000 7,000 reformers reformers on on the the plotters' plotters detention detention list list was was arrested. arrested. The The coup coup crumbled crumbled farcically ignominiously in committed suicide. farcically and and ignominiously in only only four four days. days. Pugo Pug0 committed suicide. "Forgive Forgive me," note to ((It was me, he he wrote wrote in in aanote to his his children children and and grandchildren. grandchildren. It was all alla a mistake. mistake. I lived lived honestly, led to van, he said to honestly, all all my my life." life. As As Yazov Yazov was was being being led to a a prison prison van, he said to those those who who arrested fucked up." arrested him, him, ((Everything Everythingis is clear clear now. now. I am am such such an an old old idiot. idiot. I've Ive really really fucked up. Kryuchkov Kryuchkov lacked lacked sufficient sufficient self-knowledge self-knowledge to to reach reach a a similar similar conclusion.loo conclusion.100 The The result result of of the the final final special special action action organized organized by by the the KGB was was thus thus the the precise precise opposite of what Kryuchkov and his fellow plotters had intended, accelerating opposite of what Kryuchkov and his fellow plotters had intended, accelerating both both the the collapse collapse of of the the Communist Communist one-party one-party state state and and the the disintegration disintegration of of the the Soviet Soviet Union. ended in in unprecedented Union. The The coup coup also also ended unprecedented humiliation humiliation for for the the KGB. KGB. On O n the the evening evening of of August August 21 21 a a heavy heavy crane crane arrived arrived in in front front of of the the Lubyanka Lubyanka and, and, before before a a cheering hoisted the noose around cheering crowd, crowd, hoisted the giant giant statue statue of of Felix Felix Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky by by a a noose around his his neck, neck, toppled toppled him him from from his his pedestal pedestal and and dragged dragged him him away away to to aa field field near near the the Tretyakov statues of Soviet regime. Tretyakov gallery, gallery,which which became became a a graveyard graveyard for for statues of the the Soviet regime.

A P P P E DI IX X AP EN ND

" HE EA AT HE EN NS S R RE ES SI ID DE EN NC CY Y S SP PE EC CIIA AL LP PO O LI L IT T I CA C AL LA AC CT TI IO ON N" P PR RO OP PO OS SE ED D BY BY T H TH TO T H HE EC CE EN NT TR RE NA A P RIIL L 1 TO E IIN P R 19 96 69 9

Our no. 24/[Line]F o fof April 14, 1969 sets plan for carry Our operational operational letter letter no. 24/[Line]F April 14,1969 sets out out aadraft draft plan for carrying operation] against thethe target codenamed V AZA ["Vase"] . ing out out aaLily Lily[sabotage [sabotage operation] against target codenamed VAZA [Vase]. The codenamed YAYTSO The operation operationis is codenamed YAYTSO ["Egg"]. [Egg]. The the operation is to moral and political damage to theto the T h e aim aim and and purpose purposeof of the operation is cause to cause moral and political damage south-east ofof NATO. south-east wing wing NATO. Constant disagreementsbetween between Greece Turkey cause concern Constant disagreements Greece andand Turkey cause greatgreat concern to the to the leadership weak link in American policy in the area leadership of of the the USA and and NATO NATO and and are area a weak link in American policy in the area of of southeast southeastEurope. Europe. Carrying AZA could exacerbate relations Greece and and Carrying out out a a Lily Lily on on the the V VAZA could exacerbate relations between between Greece Turkey. Turkey. The operation would would be be carried carried out out in in the the name name of ofaa Greek Greekwho whohad hadcome comefrom from The operation Turkey and was dissatisfied with situation of of the the Greek Greekminority minoritythere there(there (therecan can Turkey and was dissatisfied with the the situation also for carrying out thethe sabotage). also be be another anothervariant variant[pretext] [pretext] for carrying out sabotage). V AZA is house in in Thessaloniki. The belong to the VAZA is aatwo-storey two-storey house Thessaloniki. T h e house house and and its itsannex annex belong to the Turkish consulate-general .. .. ..There no furniture, furniture, only onlyaatable, table,iron iron troughs and Turkish consulate-general Th er e is is no troughs and a a cooking cooking stove. stove. On upperfloor floor the house there are displays with Atat;Anrk [the Turkish O n the the upper ofof the house there are displays with Atat;Anrk [the Turkish national him. Apart from a desk there is national heroJ's herols clothes clothesand andaaphotographic photographicportrait portraitof of him. Apart from a desk there is no n o furniture. h rn itu re.

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Next to VAZA, about 15-20 away, there there is is the the two-storey the Next to the the V AZA, about 15-20m m away, two-storey building buildingof of the Turkish consulate-general. is also also used as living living accommodation conTurkish consulate-general. This Thishouse house is used as accommodationfor for con sulate officials. officials. sulate The V VAZA and the the consulate consulatehave havea a common courtyard. detailed description The AZA and common courtyard. (A(A detailed description of of the layout layoutof of the houses and courtyard is attached.) attached.) the the houses and thethe courtyard is The most device] is is in in the The most suitable suitable place place for for planting planting a a Bouquet Bouquet [explosive [explosive device] the bushes bushes growing about about one one meter meterfrom fromthe the VAZA. growing V AZA. The V VAZA is not not open open to to the the general general public. public. can be visited with the permission The AZA is ItIt can be visited with the permission of the the Turkish Turkish consulate; consulate;a a special official is assigned assigned to to watch watch over over the the VAZA and and to to of special official is accompany visitors visitorsto to the VAZA. accompany the V AZA. The V VAZA and the the consulate consulate are areguarded guarded round the clock by two two gendarmes. gendarmes. The The The AZA and round the clock by guard posts and the approaches to to V VAZA are restricted. guard posts are aremobile mobile and the approaches AZA are restricted. The The most most conveconve nient time time to approach approach the the target target is is at at nightfall. nightfall. nient Specifications Specifications of ofthe theBouquet: Bouquet: T h e size size and andweight weightof of the Bouquet must related to results the results which are desired The the Bouquet must be be related to the which are desired from on the VAZA. Evidently, no point in causing serious damage to to from the the attack attack on the Evidently, there thereisis no point in causing serious damage the V VAZA; is better toachieve achieve a moral and political effect.calculating When calculating the AZA; it it is better to a moral and political effect. When the force the f of the the Bouquet, Bouquet,one one must bear in mind the distance the Splash [explosion] to of must bear in mind thatthat the distance from from the Splash [explosion] to the consulate consulate living livingquarters quartersis is 15-20 the 15-20 m. m. In order order to toincrease increase the impact achieve the desired results, the Bouquet mu .. .. . . In the impact andand achieve the desired results, the Bouquet must be wrapped wrapped in in a a newspaper published in Turkey for Greek citizens. be newspaper published in Turkey for Greek citizens. The temperature temperaturein in Thessaloniki ranges in winter from zero below zero while to 14"C, The Thessaloniki ranges in winter from below to 14C, in whil summer it it ranges ranges from 24C upwards. Occasionally there are fogs. thick fogs. summer from 24C upwards. Occasionally there are thick The Gardener [saboteur] must bebe sent to the at at thethe The Gardener [saboteur] must sent to country the country as as a a foreign foreigntourist tourist height of season. The greatest influx of tourists occurs occurs from June to August. height of the thetourist tourist season. The greatest influx of tourists from June to Augu According to identity documents, the the Gardener's identity documents must show According tohis his identity documents, Gardener's identity documents must show him to be be aacitizen citizen of a country friendly to Greece a neutral (the USA, Britain, him to of a country friendly to Greece or a or neutral state state (the USA, Britain, West Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Canada, Canada, Libya), excluding the Scandinavian West Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Libya), excluding the Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Holland Hollandand and Belgium. countries, Denmark, Belgium. O n arriving arriving in inAthens Athensthe the Gardener can hire a motor car, visit visit historical historical sites sitesin inthe the On Gardener can hire a motor car, south of of the thecountry country and some of the islands. Simultaneously, the Gardener is south and some of the islands. Simultaneously, the Gardener is acclimaacclima tizing himself himself and andbecoming becomingfully fully accustomed the situation in the country. tizing accustomed to to the situation in the country. After collecting Bouquet from thethe residency via a After collectingthe the Bouquet from residency via a DLB [dead [dead letterbox], letterbox] , the the Gardener travels by rail. Gardener travels to toThessaloniki Thessaloniki by rail. The estimated time carrying out thethe Lily and and for the activities is T h e estimated time span spanfor for carrying out Lily forGardener's the Gardener's activities is as follows: follows:

Athens, the Gardener Gardenercan canhire hirea amotor motor car the next day, spend Athens, the car the next day, spend one or two days in Athens and its suburbs, then travel the following route by car: one or two days in Athens and its suburbs, then travel the following route by car: Athens-Patrais-Spartia-N avplion-Epidhauros-K6inthos-Athens. This take Athens-P~trais-Spgrtia-N~~lion-Epidhauros-K6inthos-Athens. This route routewill will take the oror five Gardener books into a hotel. the Gardener Gardener four four five days. days. On O n arriving arriving in in Athens, Athens,the the Gardener books into a hotel. The places a signal indicating he is ready out thethe DLB operation T h e next next day dayhe he places a signal indicating is he ready to tocarry carry out operation to to receive receive the the Bouquet. Bouquet. The T h e DLB operation operation takes takes place placenext nextday. day. After Gardener leaves byby thethe next train to Thessaloniki, After collecting collecting the theBouquet, Bouquet,the the Gardener leaves next train to Thessaloniki, having booked out from the the hotel. A train at at 1 1 :42, andand arrives having previously previously booked out from hotel. train leaves leavesAthens Athens 11:42, arrives at he travels in in a first-class compartment. at Thessaloniki Thessaloniki at at 19:29; 19:29; he travels a first-class compartment. At Thessaloniki not stay at a at hotel. In order acquaint himselfwith the sit Thessaloniki he hedoes does not stay a hotel. In to order to acquaint himself with the uation AZA he the VAZA after checking for for surveillance. uation around around the theV VAZA he walks walkspast past the VAZA after checking surveillance. As the Gardener goes off on route of his but at the finalfinal As darkness darkness falls, falls, the Gardener goes off a on a route his own ownchoice, choice, but at the stage where hehe inserts the little flower [detonator] intointo the the Bou stage goes goes into intothe theold oldfort, fort, where inserts the little flower [detonator] Bouquet. quet. From From the the northern northern gates gates of of the the fort, fort, the the Gardener Gardener goes goes down down Isail Isail Street Streetwhich which leads to AZA and comes out on on St. Paul Street. This takes 15-20 15-20 minutes. leads tothe theV VAZA and comes out St. Paul Street. This takes minutes.

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On out on on to toIsail !sailStreet, Street,the theGardener Gardener goes from the garage towards St. O n coming coming out goes from the garage towards St. Paul Street. While moving along alongthe the [V AZA] fence, Gardener causes causes the the Splash Splash Paul Street. While moving [VAZA] fence, the the Gardener [explosion]. Gardener can into the bushes which are are close to to [explosion]. The The Gardener can throw throw the theBouquet Bouquet into the bushes which close the AZA fence can drop thethe Bouquet on the inside the V AZA fence. fence. (A the V VAZA fence or orhe he can drop Bouquet on ground the ground inside the VAZA (A diagram of ofof the location of the installations is diagram of the the route routeand and the location of the installations is attached.) attached.) Ayios Mter Splash, the Gardener goes out on Dhimitrios Street and After completing completingthe the Splash, the Gardener goes out on Ayios Dhimitrios Street and moves in in the the direction direction of of the the stadium stadium (20-25 (20-25 minutes minutes walk). walk). In Inthe thestadium stadiumarea area there moves there is some bury the or BOAC airline airline bag is some waste waste ground ground where where the theGardener Gardenercan can bury the TWA or bag used the Gardener can used for for keeping keeping and and transporting transporting the the Bouquet. Bouquet.From FromThessaloniki, Thessaloniki, the Gardener can go to train or air the airthe ticket 5-10 minutes using any to Athens Athensby by train or (buying air (buying air5-10 ticket minutes before beforetakeoff, takeoff, using any surname). surname). If not permit the Gardener to put the the Bouquet together, then he If the the situation situationdoes does not permit the Gardener to put Bouquet together, then he can .. .. .. in stadium where there is some waste can get get rid rid of ofitit in the the area area of ofthe the stadium where there is some waste ground. ground.If Ifhe he attracts the attention attention the V AZA security guard,he he must say that foreign attracts the ofof the VAZA security guard, must say that he he is is a a foreign tourist going fort to to the Delta Hotel, where he intends to spend the night, but but tourist going from fromthe the fort the Delta Hotel, where he intends to spend the night, that first visit to the town and and he is not theof way toway the hote1.101 that this this is ishis his first visit to the town he is sure not of sure the hotel.'"' to the

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Par t I r: After a g nni ifi f i cce ee Pa rt : Afte r tth he eM Mag en n tt F Fi ivv

Soviet intelligence operations operations iin Britain from from the onward fall fall into three dis disS oviet intelligence n Britain the 1930s 1930s onward into three

tinct phases. First, there was a golden age, begun by the Great GreatIllegals, Illegals, during which the KGB collected if it understand it) it) than than the collected better better intelligence intelligence (even (even if it did did not not always always understand any hostile intelligence intelligence agency came a silver age during any other other hostile agency in in British British history. history. Next Next came a silver ageduring the 1950s 1950s and and 1960s, 1960s, which which included included fewer-though fewer-though still the still substantial-intelligence substantial-intelligence successes.The The third third phase, in the the 1970s 1970s and 1980s, qualifies, successes. phase, in and 1980s, qualifies, at at best, best, as as a a bronze bronze age, age, with few few major major successes successes and and some some spectacular spectacular failures. with failures. The golden golden age age of of Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence operations operations in anend end 1951 The in Britain Britain came came to to an in in 1951 with the flight of Burgess Burgess and and Maclean Maclean to Moscow and of Philby from with the fl ight of to Moscow and the the recall recall of Philby from Washington.1 however, reveal for the that Washington. The The files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin, however, reveal for the first first time time that one major ideological agent Norwood (HOLA), (HOLA), one major ideological agent recruited recruited in in the the mid-1930s, mid-l930s, Melita MelitaNorwood continued Five.2 From From March March 1945 1945 continued to to operate operate after after the the demise demise of of the the Magnificent Magnificent Five.2 onward, while while working working in in the theresearch research department department of the British onward, of the British Non-Ferrous Non-Ferrous MetMet als Association, Association, she she had had been been able able to to provide provide intelligence als intelligence on on the the TUBE ALLOYS ALLOYS project first atomic atomic bomb. project to to build build Britain's Britains first bomb. After the Second War there of the wartime rivalry rivalry After the Second World World War there was was a a recurrence recurrence of the wartime between NKGB and and GRU for for control control of of Norwood. Nonvood. Her was between Her first first post-war post-war controller controller was an NKGB/MGB NKGB/MGB officer officer at at the theLondon London residency, Nikolai Pavlovich Ostrovsky. Ostrovsky. Duran residency, Nikolai Pavlovich Dur ing the theCommittee Committee of Information Information (KI) period period in theearly Cold War, War, however, however, when when in the early Cold ing of the combined their intelligence services, services, Norwood Norwood had the MGB and and GRU combined their foreign foreign intelligence had two two controllers: Galina Galina Konstantinovna Konstantinovna Tursevich Tursevich and and Yevgeni Yevgeni Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich GRU controllers: Oleynik. 1950, following of the the atom spy Klaus Klaus Fuchs Fuchs and and Oleynik. In In April April 1950, following the the conviction conviction of atom spy the MI5 MI5 interrogation interrogation of of SONY SONYA, the wartime wartime GRU GRU controller controller of of both both Nonvood the A, the Norwood and Fuchs, Fuchs, Norwood Nonvood was was temporarily temporarily put put "on on ice" ice for fear that that she she might might have and for fear have been been compromised. compromised. Contact, Contact, however, however,was wasresumed resumed in in 1951. 1951.Within Within about about a a year, year, follow following control of of Norwood was reclaimed reclaimed ing the thedemise demise of of the the Committee Committeeof of Information, Information, control Norwood was by RU.3 by the the Centre Centre from from the the G GRU.3 In October few months months after after Norwood the first first In October 1952, 1952, a a few Norwood returned returned to to the the MGB, the British successfully tested on the theMonte Monte Bello Bello islands islands off off the the British atomic atomic bomb bomb was was successfully tested on north-west coast of chiefly for their pearl pearl divers north-west coast of Australia, Australia, hitherto hitherto known known chiefly for their divers and and ship shipwrecks. construction of of the most wrecks. Stalin Stalin had had been been far far better better briefed briefed on on the theconstruction the bomb bombthan than most British of the British ministers. ministers. Attlee Attlee never never allowed alloweddiscussion discussion of the TUBE ALLOYS project project by by

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his cabinet, later censoriously that "some of be his whole whole cabinet, later claiming claiming censoriously that some of them them were were not not fit fit to to be trusted with withsecrets secrets of of this this kind." kind. Churchill Churchill was was amazed, after winning winning the the1951 1951 electrusted amazed, after elec tion, concealed tion, to todiscover discover that that Attlee Attleehad had concealed the the 100-million-pound 100-million-pound cost cost of of the the atomic atomic minister^.^ bomb from from both both Parliament Parliament and and most most of of his his ministers.4 bomb Over Over the the next next twenty twenty years years Norwood Norwood had had seven seven different different controllers: controllers: six six officers officers of London residency of the the KGB London residency (Yevgeni (Yevgeni Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Belov, Belov, Georgi Georgi Leonidovich Leonidovich Trusevich, Nikolai Nikolayevich Tseyrov, Gennadi Trusevich, Nikolai Nikolayevich Asimov, Asimov, Vitali Vitali Yevgenovich Yevgenovich Tseyrov, Gennadi Borosovich Borosovich Myakinkov Myakinkov and and Lev LevNikolayevich Nikolayevich Sherstnev) Sherstnev) and and one one illegal illegal (BEN). (BEN). For For security met her her controllers only four security reasons reasons Norwood Norwood actually actually met controllers only four or or five five times times a a year, year, usually suburbs of of south-east south-east London London to over the usually in in the the suburbs to hand hand over the documents documents she she had had 5 been been collecting. collecting. The between the The rivalry rivalry between the Centre Centreand and the the GRU for for control control of of Norwood Norwood during during the the Second World World War War and and the the early early Cold War-decided in in both both cases cases in in the the Centre's Centres Second Cold War-decided favor-gives a a clear indication of of her her importance importance as as an an agent. to her her file, file, favor-gives clear indication agent. According According to some of the theS&T S&T which which she she supplied supplied "found found practical practical application application in in Soviet Soviet industry." industry. some of (Mitrokhin's (Mitrokhins notes, notes, alas, alas, give give no no further further details.) details.) In In 1958 1958 HOLA was was awarded awarded the the Order of of the the Red Red Banner. Two years years later later she she was was rewarded rewarded with with a alife life pension pension of of 20 Order Banner. Two pounds was twelve pounds a a month, month,payable payable with with immediate immediate effect, effect, despite despite the the fact fact that that she she was twelve years from retirement retirement at at the the Non-Ferrous Non-Ferrous Metals Metals Association. Association. Norwood, Norwood, howyears off off from how ever, agent who did not not work her retirement ever, was wasan an ideological ideological agent who did work for for money. money. After After her retirement she she refused it.6 refused further further payment, payment, saying saying she she had had enough enough to to live live on on and and did did not not need need it.6 Norwood Norwood also also acted acted as as agent-recruiter. agent-recruiter. The The only only recruit recruit identified identified in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes, however, however, is the civil civil servant notes, is the servant HUNT, whose whose cultivation Norwood began began in in cultivation Norwood 1965. In In the the fourteen fourteen years years after after HUNTS recruitment in in 1967, 1967, he he provided provided S&T 1965. HUNT's recruitment and intelligence on In and intelligence on British British arms arms sales sales (on (on which which no no further further details details are are available). available). In the late late 1970s 1970s the the London London residency gave him him 9,000 9,000 pounds to found found a a small small busi busithe residency gave pounds to ness, probably in in the the hope hope that that he hecould could use use it it to tosupply supply embargoed embargoed technology. technology. ness, probably 7

so FAR is known, known, no no Soviet Soviet agent agent recruited recruited after after the the Second Second World World War ever S O FA R AS AS is War ever penetrated the the British quite as as successfully successfully as as Philby, Philby, Blunt penetrated British intelligence intelligence community community quite Blunt Philbys dismissal from SIS 1951, and Cairncross. Within a few months of Phil by's dismissal SIS in June 1951, however, the the MGB began began the the recruitment recruitment of of another another SIS officer, officer, the the 29-year-old 29-year-old however, George Blake, Blake, ne n C Behar. Behar. Blake Blake had had been born in in Rotterdam Rotterdam of of aanaturalized naturalized British George been born British father (by (by origin origin a a Sephardic Sephardic Jew Jew from from Constantinople) Constantinople) and and a a Dutch Dutch mother mother who father who called their their son son George George in in honor honor of of King King George George V. During During the the Second Second World World War War called Blake served served successively successivelyin theDutch Dutch Resistance Resistance and and in theRoyal Navy,before before join joinBlake in the in the Royal Navy, ing SIS SIS in in 1944. was much much that that SIS SIS had had failed failed to to discover discover about about its its new new ing 1944.There There was recruit, notably the influence on him himof his older cousin, Henri Curiel, co-founder of cousin, of the Egyptian Egyptian Communist CommunistParty, Party, a a man-according man-according to to Blake-with Blake-with "immense immense charm charm the [which] made him very attractive, not only to women, but to toall and a dazzling smile [which] who met him. In In 1949 1949 Blake Blake was to South Korea, working working under who met him." was posted posted by SIS SIS to South Korea, under year later, later, shortly shortly after after the the outbreak outbreak of of the the diplomatic cover cover as asvice-consul vice-consul in Seoul. diplomatic in Seoul. A year Korean War, he was interned by the invading North Koreans.8 Koreans.*

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In a note, in Russian Russian and and In the the autumn autumn of of 1951 1951 Blake Blake handed handed his his captors captors a note, written written in addressed to to the the Soviet Soviet embassy, embassy, saying saying that he had had important importantinformation information to to comaddressed that he com municate. At Alekseyevich Dozhdalev the KGB, he municate. At a a meeting meeting with with Vasili Vasili Alekseyevich Dozhdalev of of the he identi identified himself himself as as an an SIS officer and and volunteered volunteered to work as a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. Following Following a a fied SIS officer to work as a favorable resident, Nikolai Rodin favorable assessment assessment by by Dozhdalev, Dozhdalev, the the London London resident, Nikolai Borisovich Borisovich Rodin DIO(alias "Korovin" Korovin), traveled to to Korea Korea to to complete Blakes recruitment recruitment as as agent agent DIO (alias ), traveled complete Blake's and arranged arranged to to meet meet him him in in the theNetherlands Netherlands after after the the end the Korean War. MID, and end of the Korean War. According to to Sergei Sergei Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Kondrashev, Kondrashev, who became Blake's Blakes controller controller in in According who became Britain in in October 1953, the Centre considered him him so so important important that no other Britain October 1953, the Centre considered that no other member DIOMID's identity member of of the the London Londonresidency residency was was permitted permitted to to know know either either DIOMIDs identity or the the fact fact that that he heworked or worked for for SIS.9 SIS.9 KGB files files give give Blake the credit credit for for two major successes during the the1950s. KGB Blake the two major successes during 1950s. First, First, his his intelligence-together that supplied supplied by intelligence-together with with previous previous information information from from Philby Philby and and that by Heinz Felfe,lO BND-is said said to to have pos Heinz Felfe, a a Soviet Soviet agent agent in in the theWest WestGerman German BND-is have made made possible elimination of adversary's agent in 1953-5."11 sible the the "elimination of the the adversarys agent network network in in the the GDR in 1953-5.11 In In his hehad had betrayed his memoirs, memoirs, published published in in 1990, 1990, Blake Blake claimed claimed that that he betrayed almost almost 400 Western agents agents in in the theSoviet Soviet Bloc, Bloc, but but insisted insisted that that none none had any harm-an harm-an Western had come come to to any improbable denied by, among others, others, Oleg to improbable assertion assertion swiftly swiftly denied by, among Oleg Kalugin. Kalugin. According According to Blake, some some of of those he betrayed are today today taking an active active part in the the democratic democratic Blake, those he betrayed "are taking an part in movements movements of of their their respective respective countries countries in in eastern eastern Europe." Europe. Many Many more, more, however, however, were were executed executed in in the the 1950sY 1950s.I2 Blake's Blakes second second major major achievement achievement as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent was was to to alert alert the the Centre Centre to toone one of the the most most remarkable remarkable Western Western intelligence intelligence operations operations of of the the Cold ColdWar-the War-the secret secret of construction construction of of a a 500-meter 500-meter underground underground tunnel tunnel from from West West to to East East Berlin Berlin built built to to intercept the Soviet intercept landlines landlines running running from from the Soviet military military and and intelligence intelligence headquarters headquarters in in Karlshorst. deck bus in Karlshorst. At At a a meeting meeting with with his his controller controller on on the thetop top deck of of a a London Londonbus in Jan January copy of uary 1954, 1954, Blake Blake handed handed over over a a carbon carbon copy of the the minutes minutes of of an an SIS-CIA SIS-CIA confer conference tunnel project, posted to ence on on the the tunnel project, codenamed codenamed operation operation GOLD. GOLD. Blake Blake was was posted to the the SIS Berlin became operational. SIS Berlin station station in in April April 1955, 1955, one one month month before before the the tunnel tunnel became operational. The the tunnel's The Centre, Centre, however, however, dared dared not not interfere interfere either either with with the tunnels construction construction or or with its its early early operations operations for for fear fear of of compromising compromising Blake, Blake, who who had had established with established himhim self self as as by by far far its its most most important important British British agent. agent. the time timethe the KGB staged staged an an "accidental" accidentaldiscovery discovery of of the the tunnel tunnelin in April 1956, By the KGB April 1956, operation had yielded yielded over over 50,000 50,000 reels reels of of magnetic magnetic tape tape recording recording inter interoperation GOLD had cepted communications. The cepted Soviet Soviet and and East East German German communications. The intelligence intelligence yield yield was was so so con considerable all the the siderable that that it it took took over over two two years years after after the the end end of of the the operation operation to to process process all intercepts. the FCD was able to intercepts. Though Though the was able to protect protect its its own own communications, communications, it it was was curiously the interception RU and curiously indifferent indifferent to to the interception of of those those of of the the rival rival G GRU and of of Soviet Soviet armed gen armed forces. forces. There There is is no no evidence evidence to to support support past past claims claims that that the the intelligence intelligence generated erated by by operation operation GOLD G O L D was was muddied muddied by by significant significant amounts amounts of of KGB disinfor disinforand SIS intelligence reports reports on on the theoperation operation contained contained important important new new mation. CIA and mation. SIS intelligence information information on on the the improved improved nuclear nuclear capability capability of of the the Soviet Soviet air air force force in in East East Ger Germany; eet of bombers and radar-equipped interceptors; interceptors; the doumany; its its new new fl fleet of bombers and twin-jet twin-jet radar-equipped the dou-

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bling creation bling of of Soviet Soviet bomber bomber strength strength and andthe the creation of of a a new new fighter fighter division division in in Poland; Poland; over over one one hundred hundred air air force force installations installations in in the the USSR, USSR, GDR and and Poland; Poland; the the organi organization, bases and personnel of zation, bases and personnel of the the Soviet Soviet Baltic Baltic Fleet; Fleet; and and installations installations and and person personnel of of the the Soviet Soviet atomic atomic energy energy program. program. In In the the era era before beforespy planes and and spy spy nel spy planes satellites satellites (the (the first first U-2 U-2 overflight overflight of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union did did not not occur occur until until July July 1956), 1956), this intelligence intelligence was was of of particular particular value value to to a a West West still still ignorant ignorant about about much much of of the the this capability of of the the Soviet Soviet armed armed forces.13 forces.13 capability One of the the messages messages intercepted in the the Berlin tunnel revealed revealed the the existence existence of of a a One of intercepted in Berlin tunnel Soviet British intelligence Berlin, but that Soviet agent agent working working for for British intelligence in in Berlin, but it itwas was not not until until 1961 1961 that evidence from the the Polish Polish SB defector defector Michal Michal Goleniewski the agent agent as as evidence from Goleniewski identified identified the Blake.14 was sentenced jail but served only Blake.14 Blake Blake was sentenced to to forty-two forty-two years years in in jail but served only five five before before escaping from inmates who had escaping from Wormwood Wormwood Scrubs Scrubs with with the the help help of of three three former former inmates who had befriended him, him, the bomber Sean Bourke and and the the peace peace protesters protesters Michael Michael befriended theIrish Irish bomber Sean Bourke Randle 1966 Blake loosened iron Randle and and Pat Pat Pottle. Pottle. On O n October October 22, 22,1966 Blake knocked knocked a a loosened iron bar bar out out of theground, ground, then of his his cell cell window, window, slid slid down down the the roof roof outside outside and and dropped dropped to to the then climbed by Hid climbed over over the the outer outerwall wall with with a a nylon nylon rope rope ladder ladder thrown thrown to tohim him by Bourke. Bourke. Hidden den in in the the Randle Randle family family dormobile, dormobile, Blake Blake was was driven driven to to East East Berlin, Berlin, where where a a fort fortnight joined by night later later he he was was joined by Bourke. Bourke. Once Once in inMoscow, Moscow, Blake Blakeand and Bourke Bourke rapidly rapidly fell fell out. memoirs that, Arrangements were were made for [Bourke] [Bourke] to to out. Blake Blake writes writes in in his his memoirs that, "Arrangements made for return to He not mention, mention, and not have known, that on the the return to Ireland."15 Ireland. H e does does not and may may not have known, that on instructions head of FCD, Bourke given before his instructions of of Sakharovsky, Sakharovsky, the the head of the the FCD, Bourke was was given before his departure a cause brain brain damage damage and departure a drug drug designed designed to to cause and thus thus limit limithis his potential potential useful usefulness if if he he fell fell into into the the hands hands of of British British intelligence. intelligence. Bourke's Bourkes premature premature death death in in his his ness early forties forties probably probably owed owed as as much much to to KGB KGB drugs drugs as as to to his his own own heavy heavy drinking.16 drinking.16 early
as an an agent agent inside inside SIS SIS during during the the 1950s, 1950s, the the KGB also also had had as ambitious plans to recruit leading British politicians. Among the the targets recorded in the files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was Tom Tom Driberg, Driberg, Labor Labor MP, journalist, journalist, member member of of the Labors National National Executive Executive from from 1949 1949 to to 1974 1974 and and party party chairman chairman in in 1957-8.17 1957-8.17 In In Labor's 1956, shortly shortly after after Burgess Burgess and and Maclean Maclean gave gave the the first first press press conference conference since since their 1956, their flight to to Moscow, Moscow, claiming claiming to to have have come come to to Moscow Moscow "to to work work for for the the aim aim of of better better flight understanding between the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and the the West, Driberg provided the the understanding between West," Driberg provided i s The Burgess. opportunity for his own recruitment by requesting an interview with Burgess. had become friends during the the War-brought War-brought together by common inter intertwo men had Dribergs biographer, biographer, "contempt contempt for the bour bourests which included, according to Driberg's geoisie and healthy appetites for alcohol and young men.I9 With the approval geoisie" "healthy men."19 approval of interview, doubtless informing the Centre that the KGB, Burgess agreed agreed to the the interview, Centre that Driberg was one of ofthe the most promiscuous homosexuals in British public life. life. Whenever it saw an opportunity, the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) went to great pains to compromise compromise foreign diplomats and Western politicians visiting Moscow by by using using female female or or male male "swallows" swallowsto to seduce Moscow seduce them, them, photographing photographing their their sexual liaisons into"cooperation." cooperation.A year before beforeDriberg sexual liaisons and then blackmailing them into visited Moscow, Moscow, for for example, example, John John Vassall, Vassall, a a homosexual homosexual clerk clerk in in the office of of the the visited the office
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British British naval naval attache attache at at the the British British embassy, embassy,had had been been lured lured to to a a party party organized organized by by the the SCD. SCD. Soon Soon afterward, afterward, Vassall Vassall recalled: recalled: I .. .. .. After I was was shown shown a a box box of of photographs photographs of of myself myself at at the theparty party After about about three three photographs photographs I I could could not not stomach stomach any any more. more. They They made made one one feel feel ill. ill. There There I I was, was, caught caught.by by the the camera, camera, enjoying enjoying every every sexual sexualactivity activity .. .. .. having having oral, oral, anal anal or or a a complicated complicated array array of of sexual sexual activities activitieswith with aanumber number of of different different men. men. For years, while Moscow Admiralty For the the next next seven seven years, while working working at at the the Moscow embassy embassy and and at at the the Admiralty in in London, London,Vassall Vassall handed handed over over thousands thousands of of highly highly classified classified documents documents on on British British and and NATO NATO weapons weapons development development and and naval naval policy.20 policy20 As a compulsive eveneasier easier to As a compulsive "cottager" cottager in in public public lavatories, lavatories, Driberg Driberg proved proved even to recruit SCD sexual sexual recruit than than Vassallo Vassall. Instead Instead of of being being compromised compromised by by an an elaborate elaborate SCD entrapment, entrapment, Driberg Driberg obligingly obligingly compromised compromised himsel himself. During During his his visit visit to to Moscow Moscow he he discovered, discovered, to to his his delight, delight, "a a large large underground underground urinal urinal just just behind behind the theMetropole Metropole Hotel, Hotel, open open all all night, night, frequented frequented by by hundreds hundreds of of questing questing Slav Slav homosexuals-stand homosexuals-standing rigid ing there thereinin rigid exhibitionist exhibitionist rows, rows, motionless motionless save save for for the the hasty hasty grope grope and and the theanx anxious ious or or beckoning beckoning glance glance over over the the shoulder-and shouldeFand tended tended only only by by an an old old woman woman 21 If cleaner cleaner who who never never seemed seemed to to notice notice what what was was going going on." on.21 If the the cleaner cleaner failed failed to to notice notice the the distinguished distinguished British British visitor visitor to to the the urinal, urinal, the the KGB KGB undoubtedly undoubtedly did did not. not. Among Among Driberg's Dribergs sexual sexual partners partners on on that that or or subsequent subsequent evenings evenings in in Moscow Moscow was was an an agent agent of of the the Second Second Chief Chief Directorate. Directorate. Soon Soon afterward, afterward, Driberg Driberg was was confronted confronted with with "compromising compromising material" material on on his his sexual sexual encounters encounters (probably (probably photographs photographs similar similar to to those Somewhat those shown shown to to Vassall) Vassall) and and recruited recruited as as agent agent LEPAGE.22 LEPAGE.22 Somewhat absurdly, absurdly, in in view of the use of blackmail, Driberg's file alleges that "ideological affinity," going view of the use of blackmail, Dribergs file alleges that ideological affinity, going back back to to his his teenage teenage membership membership of of the the Communist Communist Party, Party, played played a a subsidiary subsidiary part part in in his his recruitment. recruitment. For years, Driberg For the the next next twelve twelve years, Driberg was was used usedboth both as as a a source source of of inside inside information information from the Labor National Executive and to promote active measures.23 The from the Labor National Executive and to promote active The impor importance Party may tance of of his his role role within within the theLabor Labor Party may well well have have been been exaggerated exaggerated by by the the Cen Centre, 1957. Even "Even before tre, especially especially after after he he became became party party chairman chairman in in 1957. before he he held held this this post, post, whose whose nature nature often often misleads misleads foreign foreign observers," observers,writes writes the the political political commenta commentator tor Alan Alan Watkins, Watkins, "Driberg Dribergwas was assumed assumed by by several several Russian Russian politicians politicians to to be be leader leader of of the the Labor Labor Party. Party. This This was was on on account account partly partly of of his his great great episcopal episcopal manner, manner, and and 24 Driberg partly well partly of of his his ability ability to to get geton on well with with Russians." Russians.24 Driberg was, was, none none the the less, less, won wonderfully derfully placed placed to to report report to to his his controller controller on on both both the theevolution evolution of of Labor Labor policy policy and and the the Party Party leadership. the rivalries rivalries within within the leadership. His His mixture mixture of of political political information information and and 2 gossip 5 gossip was was so so highly highly rated rated by by the the KGB KGB that that it itwas was passed passed on on to tothe thePolitburo. Politburo.25 Driberg's LEPAGE was was the the publication publication in in 1956 1956of of a a Dribergs first first active active measure measure as as agent agent LEPAGE disingenuous never disingenuous study study of of Guy Guy Burgess Burgess which which concluded concluded that that he hehad had never been been a a Soviet Soviet agent. was the time timeDriberg Driberg was temporarily temporarily out out of of the the Commons, Commons,working working as as a a free freeagent. At the lance journalist, seriously short of money and being hounded by his bank manager. lance journalist, seriously short of money and being hounded by his bank manager. The him more anything else The book book on on Burgess Burgess brought brought him more money money than than anything else in in his his writing writing

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career, career, including including the the then-astounding then-astoundingsum sum of of 5,000 5,000 pounds pounds for for its its serialization serialization in in the the Daily Mail.26 Mter went back After his his initial initial meeting meeting with with Burgess Burgess in in Moscow, Moscow, Driberg Dribergwent back A P01' to inin about biography Guy Burgess: Burgess:A Porto London, London, drafted drafted about a a month month aashort short biography entitled entitled Guy trait trait with with Background, Background, then then returned returned to to Moscow Moscow to to go go through through the the proofs. proofs. "Presum Presumably," ably,he he wrote wrote later, later, "Guy Guy had hadshown shown each each chapter chapter to to his his colleagues colleagues or or superiors."27 superi~rs.~ The The proofs, proofs, in in other otherwords, words, had had been been carefully carefully vetted vetted by by the the KGB. KGB. Driberg Driberg later later described described how, how, during during their their evenings evenings together together in in Moscow, Moscow, he he had had seen Burgess "getting a bit sozzled on vodka." The KGB, however, would tolerate seen Burgess getting a bit sozzled on vodka.TheKGB, however, would tolerate no no reference reference to to Burgess's Burgesss alcoholism. alcoholism. Driberg's Dribergs biography biography thus thus quotes quotes Burgess Burgess as as saying saying that, longer drank that, despite despite his his previous previous heavy heavy drinking drinking in in the the West, West, he he no no longer drank vodka vodka in in Moscow "the Moscow except-improbably-as except-improbably-as the best best cure cure for for an an upset upset stomach:" stomach: "You You know, know, Tom, a Socialist Tom, living living in in a Socialist country country does does have have a a therapeutic therapeutic effect effect on on one." one. Driberg Driberg praised praised the the "passionate passionate sincerity" sincerity of of Burgess's Burgesss convictions convictions and and "his hiscourage courage in in doing doing what to to work what he hethought thoughtright" right work for for "better better understanding understandingbetween between the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and the West." Burgess and and the West. Burgess and Maclean, Maclean, claimed claimed Driberg, Driberg, had had been been the the victims victims of of British British media media attacks attacks as as outrageous outrageous as as "the the extreme extreme excesses excesses of of the the McCarthy McCarthywitch witch hunt" hunt in in the theUnited UnitedStates: States: That That does does not not mean mean that that I personally personally agree agree with with the the decision decision that that Burgess Burgess and and Maclean took. As a Socialist, I take the view that, on the whole, one should Maclean took. As a Socialist, I take the view that, on the whole, one should go go on such in on working working for for Socialism Socialism by by such means means as as are are available available in one's ones own own country countryin in Britain, Britain, specifically, specifically,through through the the Labor Labor Party. Party. But But this this is is a a matter matter on on which which opinions opinions differ differ .. . ..
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While While it itwas was "silly sillyfor for Western Western Socialists Socialists to to defend defend every every action action of of the the Soviet Soviet Gov Government," the achievements ernment, the achievements of of Soviet Soviet industrial industrial democracy democracy deserved deserved to to be be better better known West. meeting known in in the the West. Driberg Driberg extolled extolled the the example example of ofa a Party Party meeting he he had hadattended attended in in aaMoscow Moscow machine-tool machine-tool factory: factory: At At this this meeting meeting a a large large percentage percentage of of those those available available to to attend attendwere were present present vol voluntarily untarily to to take take an an active, active, proud proud and and responsible responsible part part in in the the running running of of their their factory; factory; and and they they seemed seemed to to feel feel that that it it was was indeed indeed theirs, theirs, as as the the workers workers at at a a factory factory in in Dagenham Dagenham or or Coventry Coventry or or Detroit Detroit can can never, never, as as things things are, are, feel feel that that the the factories factories in in which which they they work work are are theirs.28 theirs.28
The propaganda propaganda impact impact of of Driberg's Dribergsbook book was was somewhat somewhat spoiled spoiled by by the the fact fact that, that, The just as as it it was was published published in in November November 1956, 1956, Soviet Soviet tanks tanks entered entered Budapest Budapest to to crush crush just the Hungarian Uprising. His His KGB file file records, records, however, however, that that he continued to to be be the Hungarian Uprising. he continued used for for KGB KGB active active measures.29 measures.29 Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins summary summary of of the the fi file gives few few used Though le gives details, the the Centre Centre probably considered considered Driberg's Dribergs main main use use as as an an agent agent ofinfluence of influence to to details, probably support the thecampaign campaign within within the the Labor Labor Party Party for for unilateral unilateral nuclear nuclear disarmament. disarmament. At At support Scarborough party conference conference in October October 1960, 1960, the left leftproved strong enough to the Scarborough pass two two unilateralist unilateralist motions, motions, despite despite the the impassioned impassioned opposition opposition of of Hugh Hugh pass leader, who implored his supporters to "fight fight and fi fight Gaitskell, party leader, ght and fight

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again Doubtless to Driberg was made again to to save save the the party party we we love." love.Doubtless to the theCentre's Centres delight, delight, Driberg was made to draft new a member of " Committee of appointed by by the draft aa new a member of the the Committee of Twelve," Twelve, appointed the NEC to defense complained that defense policy. policy.Though Though Gaitskell Gaitskell complained that Driberg Dribergwas was behaving behaving on on the thecom committee a pro-NATO pro-NATO and and anti mittee "like like a a tired tired snake," snake, his his supporters supporters pushed pushed through through a antiunilateralist 1961 party conference, which which reversed unilateralist policy policy later later adopted adopted by by the the 1961 party conference, reversed the the vote vote at at Scarborough Scarborough a a year year earlier.30 earlier.30 It is is unlikely unlikely that, that, after after the the publication publication of of his his biography biography of Guy Burgess, It of Guy Burgess, the the KGB had any any major major subsequent subsequent influence on Driberg's Dribergs speeches speeches and articles-though it it had influence on and articles-though doubtless some of denunciation of the British British nuclear nuclear doubtless tried tried to to claim claim some of the the credit credit for for his his denunciation of the deterrent and and America's Americas role in Vietnam. Dribergs campaigns campaigns on on these these and and other deterrent role in Vietnam. Driberg's other left-wing causes sprang conviction rather dictation. His His main main useuse left-wing causes sprang from from conviction rather than than KGB dictation. fulness lay in enabling it it to Politburo that fulness to to the the Centre Centreprobably probably lay in enabling to boast boast to to the the Politburo that it ithad had an agent agent at at the the heart heartof of the the Labor Labor leadership leadership who who would probably figure figure in the next next an would probably in the Labor government. government. Labor The Centre Centre was was doubtless doubtless deeply deeply disappointed disappointed when when there was no no place place for The there was for Driberg inthe the government formed by Gaitskells successor, successor, Harold Wilson,after Driberg in government formed by Gaitskell's Harold Wilson, after the the Labor election election victory 1964. Wilson Wilson distrusted him too to think making Labor victory of of 1964. distrusted him too much much to think of of making Together Driberg formed left-wing Tribune Tribune him aminister.31 minister.31 Together with with Ian Ian Mikardo, Mikardo, Driberg formed the the left-wing him a Group, opposed many many of Wilson's policies the back back benches. benches. After Mter WilWil Group, which which opposed of Wilsons policiesfrom from the son increased majority majority in 1966, however, however, the theTribune Tribune Groups Group's protests protests son won won an an increased in1966, protest organized became less less effective. became effective.The The Daily Express Express compared compared the the impact impact of of aaprotest organized by Driberg Driberg and and Mikardo Mikardo against against a a proposed proposed wage wage freeze freeze to to that thatof of a of wet wet cod by "a piece piece of cod dropping Driberg began distance himself the KGB, dropping in in aasnowdrift."32 ~nowdrift. Driberg ~~ began to to try try to todistance himself from from the end end secret secret contacts contacts and and limit limit himself himself to to official official meetings meetings with with Soviet Soviet diplomats diplomats and and intelligence to increase intelligence officers officers under under diplomatic diplomatic cover. cover. When When the the KGB tried tried to increase pres pressure sure on on him, him, he he broke broke off off contact contact altogether altogether in in 1968.33 1968.33 Agent LEPAGE's LEPAGEs decision-in decision-in KGB jargon-to jargon-to "refuse rehse to to cooperate" cooperate may may have have Agent been related to his worsening January 1968, 1968, while on a of Cyprus Cyprus as been related to his worsening health. health. In In January while on a tour tourof as chairman of Parliamentary Labor Labor Party, had a minor heart heart attack. chairman of the the Parliamentary Party, he he had a minor attack. Though Though warned been triggered by overdoing "overdoing it it" sexually, sexually, Driberg warned that that the the attack attack might might have have been triggered by Driberg insisted on inviting inviting Cypriot Cypriot youths youths into into his his hospital Later in in the the year, year, after insisted on hospital bed. bed. Later after his his return spent several hospital with retina, return to to London, London,he he spent several further further months monthsin in hospital with aadetached detached retina, becoming eye. At the of 1970, 1970, he at the following becoming blind blind in in one one eye. the end end of he decided decided to to retire retire at the following election.34 election.34 It is uncertain ever learned from MI5 a Soviet Soviet I t is uncertain whether whether Wilson Wilson ever learned from MIS that that Driberg Driberg was was a agent. He was,however, however, informed inthe the late 1960s that defector from agent. H e was, informed in late 1960s thata a defector from the the Czechoslovak StB, J osif Frolik, Frolik, had had reported had been been in in the pay of of the Czechoslovak StB, Josif reported that that Driberg Driberg had thepay the StB.35 Frolik that the had been been warned warned off the KGB on on the grounds off by bythe the grounds StB.35 Frolik claimed claimed that the StB had that Driberg was their "their man.36 man."36 Mitrokhin's brief summary summary of of Driberg's contains that Driberg was Mitrokhins brief Dribergs file filecontains no reference reference to a Czech Czechconnection. on the the file of another another agent the no to a connection. But But his his notes notes on file of agent in in the Labor journalist Raymond Raymond Fletcher, for Ilkeston from Labor Party, Party, the the journalist Fletcher, who who served served as as MP for Ilkeston from 1964 record was involved as well the KGB. KGB. 1964 to to1983, 1983, record that that he he was involvedwith with the the StB StB as well as as the When (codenamed PETER) by the in When Fletcher Fletcher (codenamed PETER) was was recruited recruited by the London London residency residency in 1962,37 he was preparing a on Conservative Conservative defense policy, published published 1962,37 he was preparing a scathing scathing attack attack on defense policy,

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on Defense, in in the the following following year year under under the the title title 60 1660 a a Second on Defense, which which called called for for major major defense abandonment of defense cuts cuts and and the theabandonment of the the British British nuclear nuclear deterrent. deterrent. Fletcher Fletcher ridiculed most of measures designed designed to ridiculed most of the the security security measures to prevent prevent British British defense defense secrets secrets reaching Union. "Classification," con reaching the the Soviet Soviet Union. Classification, he he declared, declared, "is is more more a a device device for for concealing incompetence than cealing incompetence than for for concealing concealing information information from from a a potential potentialenemy:" enemy:
If If the the object object of of the the deterrent deterrent exercise exercise is is to to convince convince the the Soviet Soviet Union Union that that .. .. .. "unacceptable aggression is unacceptable damage" damage can can be be inflicted inflicted if if aggression is embarked embarked upon, upon, why why conceal the methods be inflicted? conceal the methods by by which which it it is is to to be inflicted? We We do donot, not, of of course. course. Such Such is is the the dismal dismal state state of of our our security security procedures procedures that that it it is is a a safe safe bet bet that that more more is is known known about about British British security security procedures procedures in in the the Kremlin Kremlin than than in in the the House Houseof of Commons.38 Commons.38
Shortly before before his his election election as as Labor Labor MP in in 1964, 1964,the the Centre learned that that Fletcher Fletcher Shortly Centre learned was also cooperating with with the StB. On O n this this occasion, occasion, instead of warning warning off off the the was also "cooperating" the StB. instead of Czechs-as happened in case of erg-the KGB seems seems to bro Czechs-as allegedly allegedly happened in the thecase of Drib Driberg-the to have have broken off off contact contact with with Fletcher. Fletcher. The The Centre Centre was was also disturbed by by a a report report from from the the ken also disturbed Polish Polish SB SB that that a aletter letter in in the the possession possession of of the the British British Communist Communist Party Party appeared appeared to to show (almost (almost certainly certainly wrongly) wrongly) that that Fletcher been "cooperating" cooperating since since 1957 1957 show Fletcherhad had been with with the the CIA.39 CIA.39 few months months before before his his death death in in 1991, 1991,Fletcher Fletcher admitted that during the 1960s A few admitted that during the 1960s he had had contacts contacts at at the theCzechoslovak Czechoslovak embassy embassy in in London Londonwhom whom was later later claimed claimed he "itit was were intelligence intelligence personnel, but that that he hehad had thought thought "I I was was safe safe because becauseI reported reported were personnel," but all my contacts contacts to to Goronwy Goronwy Roberts Roberts at at the the Foreign Office." Office. MIS, he implied, implied, thought all Foreign MI5, he thought differently. complete bunch bunch of "tried to differently. They They were, were, he he declared, declared, "a a complete of bastards" bastards who who tried to break my my nerve and nearly my spirit."40 spirit.740 If, as as Fletcher Fletcher believed, believed, MI5 did have have break nerve and nearly broke broke my If, MI5 did him under surveillance, surveillance, his his KGB file file suggests suggests that that they they had hadsome some reason reason to to do do so. so. him under The ed in The most most important important British British politician politician identifi identified in the the files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin as a a target target for for KGB recruitment was Harold Harold Wilson. Wilson.Given Given the the extent extent of of his his contacts contacts as recruitment was with Union, unusual politician years of with the theSoviet Soviet Union, unusual for for a a Western Western politician in in the theearly early years of the theCold Cold War, Wilson Wilson was was an an almost almost inevitable inevitable target. target. As President President of of the the Board Board of ofTrade and War, Trade and 1947 to 1951, 1951, Wilson had been the youngest member of the Attlee cabinet from 1947 actively involved in promoting East-West trade. trade. He H e increased increased that that involvement involvement actively involved in promoting East-West during Labor's Labors thirteen thirteen years years in in opposition opposition after after 195 1951. His Tribune pamphlet pamphlet In I n Place during 1 . His to relax relax controls on "strategic" of o f Dollars, Dollars, published published in in 1952, 1952, urged urged the the government government to controls on strategic exports to to the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc and and ignore ignore the the inevitable inevitable American American protests protests which which would would exports follow. In In May May 1953, 1953,two two months after the the death death of of Stalin, he became became the the first first major major follow. months after Stalin, he British politician to to visit Moscow since the Berlin crisis five five years years earlier. earlier.There he British politician visit Moscow since the Berlin crisis There he renewed his his acquaintance acquaintance with with Anastas Anastas Mikoyan, Mikoyan, with with whom had established established renewed whomhe he had friendly relations relations during during visits visits in in 1947, 1947, and and held held wide-ranging talks with with the the Soviet Soviet friendly wide-ranging talks foreign minister, minister, Vyacheslav Vyacheslav Molotov. Molotov. On O n his return to London,Wilson Wilson addressed a a foreign his return to London, addressed special meeting meeting of Labor Party (PLP) and special of the the Parliamentary Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP) and was was congratulated congratulated by by ona a magnificent inside report onpost-Stalin post-Stalin Russia.41 Russia.41 Wilsons Attlee on "magnificent report" on Wilson's information on British British politics politics seems to have have been been rated rated equally equally highly highly by by the the Russians. Russians. AccordAccordon seems to

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ing There is, is, however, ing to tohis his KGB file, file, it it was was passed passedon on to to the thePolitburo.42 Politburo.42 There however,no no indica indicathat any of ofWilson's Wilsons conversationswith Soviet officials officials (some, (some, inevitably, inevitably, under undertion that conversations cover KGB officers) officers) was was any any more more confidential confidential than than his his talk talk to to the the PLP PLP.. cover During his opposition Wilson series of of consultancies consultancies with During his years years in in opposition Wilson accepted accepted a a series with firms trading with the Soviet which paid paid him, on average, about 5,000 5,000 firms trading with the Soviet Union, Union, which him, on average, about pounds with which pounds a a year.43 year. According According to to his his KGB file, file, one one of of the the firms firms with which Wilson Wilson was was involved breached breached the the COCOM embargo embargo on on "strategic" strategicexports.44 exports.44Wilson's Wilsons official official involved biographer, Philip Philip Ziegler, Ziegler, accepts accepts that that this this was probably the the case: of biographer, was probably case: The "The export export of many items items was was forbidden; forbidden; inevitably inevitably a a grey grey area areagrew grew up up in inwhich which trading trading might might or or many of Wilson's Wilsons associates might not not be illegal. illegal. Some of associates strayed into that that area or even placedby the KGB on on Wilson's Wilsons political political gossip, beyond it.45 it."45 The high value placed gossip, together together the dubious nature of some of his business contacts, probably explain the Cen Cenwith the some of tres decision in 1956 1956to thecodename OLDING and open an agent develtre's to give him the "agent devel opment file" file in in the hope of of recruiting recruiting him. The file file records, however, that, that, The opment the hope him. The records, however, "The development did not not come to fruition."46 fmiti~n.~~ development did come to Allegations that that Wilson Wilson was was ever ever a a KGB agent agent derive derive not not from from credible credible evidence evidence Allegations but from from unfounded unfounded conspiracy conspiracy theories, some of of them by the the KGB offibut theories, some them elaborated elaborated by offi have known of of the the existence of agent develop developcer Anatoli Golitsyn, who may have of the "agent ment file" file and and claimed claimed after his defection in December 1961 that was a ment after his defection in December 1961 thatWilson Wilson was a Soviet mole. mole. When Gaitskell died suddenly in 1963, Golitsyn developed the bizarrely improbable theory that that he had been poisoned by by the the KGB to to enable bizarrely improbable theory he had been poisoned enable WilWil son to succeed succeed him him as as Labor leader. Sadly, Sadly,a a minority minorityof of British British and and American son to Labor leader. American intelintel ligence officers officers with aapenchant penchant conspiracy theory-among theory-among them James Angleton ligence for conspiracy MIS-were seduced by Golitsyn's Golitsyns fantasies.47 fantasies.47 of the CIA and Peter Wright of of MIS-were Wright went on to devise several conspiracy theories of his own, among them the Wright went on to devise several conspiracy theories of his own, among them the that thirty thirty MIS MI5 officers officers later conspired against Harold Harold Wilson.48 Wilson.48 claim that Far from using Wilson as an agent or confidential contact after he became prime minister in in 1964, the London London residency residency commissioned articles attacking attacking various various of minister 1964, the commissioned articles of his policies policies by by an an agent agent code codenamed in 1959, 1959,who who contributed to the the his named DAN, recruited recruited in contributed to records that published material material given him by left-wing weekly weekly Tribune. Triltzlne. DAN's DANSfile file records that he hepublished given him by left-wing the active active measures measuressec secthe KGB KGB and and wrote wrote articles articles on on "theses" thesesdevised devised by by Service Service A, the the tion at at the theCentre. Centre. Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins brief brief notes notes on on the thefile file do do not notrecord whether tion Though record whether DAN received received regular regularpayment, payment, they they do do mention mentionthat that February 1967 1967 he he was was given given DAN inin February a "reward" rewardof of 200 pounds.49 pounds.49 a The Centre during duringthe the early The most most prominent prominent British British journalist journalist targeted targeted by by the the Centre early years Cold War Warto to be the KGB files files noted noted by years of of the the Cold be identified identified in in the by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was startof of the Cold War some Edward Crankshaw. From the start the Cold War untiluntil some years years after after his his retireretire ment in in 1968, 1968, Crankshaw Britain's most most authoritative on Soviet Soviet ment Crankshaw was was Britains authoritative commentator commentator on two years with the the British affairs. During the Second Second World World War War he hehad had served for for two affairs. During the served Military the edi Military Mission Mission in in Russia. Russia. In In 1947 1947 he hewas was "half-flattered, half-flattered, half-bullied" half-bullied by by the ediObserver, David David Astor, Astor, into into returning returningtoto Moscow as the paper's papers Russian Russian and tor of of the the Observer, Moscow as the and tor European correspondent. For the next generation, he kept kept up what he he called a East European "a continual commentary on on what what I thought thought the the Russians Russians were to in in the the continual running running commentary were up up to" Observer, its its globally globally syndicated Foreign News News Service, Service, the the New York Times Sunday Observer, syndicated Foreign

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Magazine Magazine and and "lectures lectures and and broadcasts broadcasts all all over overthe the place."5o place. Crankshaw's Crankshawsvoluminous voluminous "running continuous running commentary," commentary, diffused diffused around around the the world, world, was was a a source source of of continuous annoyance people annoyance to to both both the the Kremlin Kremlin and and the the Centre. Centre. "There Thereis is only only one one group group of of people in the world actively and com in the world today," today, he he wrote wrote in in 1951, 1951, "which which is is actively and deliberately deliberately .. .. .. committed society: the Russians who mitted to to the the downfall downfall of of our our society: the group group of of Russians who form form the the govern government ment of of the the Soviet Soviet Union."51 Union. The modify The KGB tried tried various various methods methods of of bringing bringing pressure pressure on on Crankshaw Crankshawtoto modify his his views-all views-all without without success. success. Some Some of of the the methods methods used used were were attempts attempts to to exploit exploit his his sexual sexual liaisons liaisons in in Moscow. Moscow. Though Though "slight slight and and gentlemanly gentlemanly in in appearance," appearance,accord accordDictionary National Biography, "Crankshaw ing his ing to to his entry entry in inthe the Dictionary of ofNationalBiography, Crankshaw controlled controlled a a wild wild and independent nature."52 While serving with the wartime military mission, he had and independent While serving with the wartime military mission, he had E. S. Rosinevich. lived the artist lived with with the artist T. T. S. Andreyevskaya Andreyevskaya and and her her friend friend E. Rosinevich. In In 1948 1948 both 53 both were were arrested, arrested, forced forced to to confess confess to to being being British British spies spies and and sent sent to to labor labor camp. camp.53 Crankshaw intimidated,but but the fate wellhave have Crankshaw was was not not intimidated, the fate of of the the two two women women may may well inspired moving description him in others who inspired a a moving description by by him in 1948 1948of of others who suffered suffered similar similar fates: fates:
Another Another thing thing you you become become aware aware of of in in the the north, north, and andwhich whichdominated dominatedyour your ideas, labor in sit at in your ideas, is is forced forced labor in its its many many different different forms. forms. As As you you sit at breakfast breakfast in your hotel you hear the dreadful sound woman wailing, wailing, half in the hotel you hear the dreadful sound of of a a woman half hysterically, hysterically, in the street outside. looking out see thirty women and girls being street outside. And And looking out you you see thirty or or forty forty women and girls being marched along along the the frozen frozen street street by guards guards with with fixed fuced bayonets, bayonets, each each woman woman marched with aasmall small bundle. bundle. You with You do do not notknow know where where they they are are going; going; but but you you know know that that they are are being being marched away against their will, will, that that the thecall call came they marched away against their came suddenly suddenly and and roughly, behind them homes which roughly, and and that that behind them they they are are leaving leaving homes which are, are, as as it it were, were, still still warm, while while they they trudge trudge through through the thesnow snow with with nothing nothing but buttheir their b~ndles.~ warm, bundles.54
In 1959 1959 photographs photographs were were taken taken of of Crankshaw Crankshaw while while engaged engaged in in what In what Mitrokhins notes describe describe as as "sexual sexual frolics.55 If the the photographs photographs were were shown shown to to Mitrokhin's notes frolics."55 If Crankshaw, was usual in in such Crankshaw, as aswas usual such cases, cases, he he was, was, once once again, again, not not intimidated intimidatedalthough episode may have helped the Observer that although the the episode may have helped to to inspire inspire his his reminder reminder in in the that past past atrocities atrocities committed committed by the the KGB remained remained "part part of of the the present:" present: Still no no voice voice in in the the Soviet Soviet Union Union can can be be heard heard to to say say that that the the collectivization, collectivization, Still the mass mass arrests, arrests, the the deportations deportations and and killings killings were wereappalling appalling crimes, crimes, past past now, now, the but never be forgotten, and this this means in effect that for the remarkable but never to to be forgotten, and means in effect that for all all the remarkable changes the Khrushchev Khrushchev Government Government is is still still condoning condoning those those changes since since Stalin, Stalin, the crimes.56 crimes.56 1967,he gave his approval approval for an Soon after Andropov became KGB chairman in 1967, operation designed either to blackmail Crankshaw by using the photographs taken in 1959, and and perhaps perhaps on on other occasions, or or to to discredit discredit him him by by sending sending them them to 1959, other occasions, to the the Observer. The operation, however, was abandoned at the urging of the London resiObserver. was the of London resi dency, which no doubt calculated calculated correctly correctly that Crankshaw dency, Crankshaw would not give way to blackmail and and that that his his editor editor would would stand stand by by him.57 him.57 blackmail

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Though never published, Though the the photographs photographs of of Crankshaw's Crankshaws "sexual sexual frolics" frolics were were never published, similar an active similar pictures pictures were were used used in inan active measure measure codenamed codenamed operation operation PROBA designed Anthony Courtney, designed to to discredit discredit the the Conservative Conservative MP Commander Commander Anthony Courtney, who who had Centre by campaigning campaigning against against the the growing growing size size of of the the had aroused aroused the the ire ire of of the the Centre London In London residency.58 re~idency.~ In 1965 1965 the the KGB KGB produced produced a a leaflet leaflet containing containing photographs photographs of of Courtney ed woman, Courtney having having sex sex with with an an unidentifi unidentified woman, and and circulated circulated copies copies to to his his wife, wife, other to give other MPs MPs and and newspaper newspaper editors. editors. Though Though intended intended to give the the impression impression that that Courtney been taken Courtney was was having having an an adulterous adulterous affair, affair, the the photographs photographs had had in in fact fact been taken by the years earlier widower, to the SCD SCD four four years earlier during during a a trip trip by by Courtney, Courtney, then then a a widower, to a a Moscow Moscow trade trade fair. fair. While While in inMoscow Moscow Courtney Courtney had had been been seduced seduced by an an Intourist Intourist guide guide who who visited visited him him in in a a hotel hotel room room fitted fitted with with a a concealed concealed KGB camera. camera. The The ensuing ensuing scan scandal, dal, which which began began with with a a story story in in Private Private Eye, Eye, was was largely largely responsible responsible for for Courtney's Courtneys failure the 1965 1965 general 59 The KGB file failure to to hold hold his his seat seat at at the general election. ele~tion.~ The file on on operation operation PROBA also also claimed claimed the the credit credit for for the the breakdown breakdown of of Courtney's Courtneys marriage marriage and and the the failure failure of of his his business business career.60 career.60 The The KGB's KGBs main main targets targets for for sexual sexual compromise compromise operations operations throughout throughout the the Cold Cold War embassies in War were were foreign foreign embassies in Moscow. Moscow. The The files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin suggest suggest that that few, few, if escaped some degree of penetration by if any, any,embassies embassies escaped some degree penetration of by KGB swallows. swallows.The The most most suc SUCcessful cessfd seduction seduction within within the the British British embassy embassy during during the the Brezhnev Brezhnev era, era, though though itit achieved less entrapment probably that of 30-year-old achieved far far less than than the the entrapment ofJohn ofJohn Vassall, Vassall,was was probably that of a a 30-year-old married named KAREV, seduced by Russian married male male diplomat diplomat code codenamed KAREV, who who was was seduced by his his family's familys Russian maid, codenamed CH. CH. On instructions, using y deployed O n KGB instructions, using a a stratagem stratagem successfull successfully deployed maid, codenamed against foreign diplomats, pregnant and sought pretended to to be be pregnant and sought against a a number number of of foreign diplomats, CH pretended KAREV's help in arranging an abortion, for which she claimed to have received KAREVs help in arranging an abortion, for which she claimed to have received help help from cer. KAREV was gratitude by from an an embassy embassy protection protection offi officer. was persuaded persuaded to to show show his his gratitude by giving biographical information giving some some biographical information on on embassy embassypersonnel, personnel, including including the the identities identities of of SIS working under SIS officers officers working under diplomatic diplomatic cover. cover.To To compromise compromise KAREV further, further, CH then then pretended pretended that that she she was was pregnant pregnant again again and and needed needed help help in in arranging arranging another another abortion. abortion. Soon Soon afterward afterward CH was was arrested arrested on on KGB instructions instructions for for being being found found in in possession possession of of Western Western currency currency given givenher her by by KAREV. KAREV. On O n this this occasion occasion KAREV sought sought the the help help of of a KGB officer, a whom was a Soviet Soviet official, official, whom he he probably probably realized realized was officer,both both to to arrange arrange the the sec second CH dropped. ond fictitious fictitious abortion abortion and and to to have have charges chargesagainst against dropped. Since Since KAREV's KAREVstour tour of meeting with of duty duty in in Moscow Moscow was was about about to to end, end, he he was was persuaded persuaded to to agree agree to to a a meeting with a a KG B officer next posting. out of however, KAREV KGB officer during during his his next posting. Once Once out of Moscow, Moscow, however, KAREV suc succeeded at arm's arms length. length. On O n being being shown shown his his fUe, file, Philby Philby advised advised ceeded in in holding holding the the KGB at against as in the case publicly, as in the case of of Commander Commander against attempting attempting to to compromise cornpromise KAREV publicly, Courtney, the would have have been beentoo too obvious.61 obvious.61 Courtney, probably probably because because the hand hand of of the the KGB would
IN RI TA I N , AS the United United States,62 IN B BRITAIN, A S in in the States,62the the Centre's Centres strategy strategy during during much much of of the the Cold War was based on the attempt attemptto to establish residencies Cold War was based on the establish a a network network of of illegal illegal residencies which legal which would would prove prove more more difficult difficult for for MIS MIS to to monitor monitor than thanthe the legal residency residencyat at the the Soviet embassy, and which could continue to operate if the Cold War turned into hot Soviet embassy, and which could continue to operate if the Cold War turned into hot war. war. Its Its first first post-war post-war choice choice of of illegal illegal resident resident was was Konon Konon Trofimovich Trofimovich Molody Molody (codenamed (codenamed BEN), BEN), the the son son of of two two Soviet Soviet scientists, scientists, who who seems seems to to have have been been selected selected

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in in childhood childhood as as a a potential potential foreign foreign intelligence intelligence officer. officer. In In 1932, 1932, at at only only ten ten years years of of age, age, he he was was sent, sent, with with official official approval, approval, to to live live with with an an aunt auntin inCalifornia California and and attend attend secondary uent in secondary school school in in San San Francisco, Francisco,where where he he became became fl fluent in English English before before return returning Patriotic ing to to Moscow Moscow in in 1938. 1938. During During the the Great Great Patriotic War War he hejoined joined the the NKVD NKVD and, and, according according to to a a stilted stilted official official hagiography, hagiography, "made made frequent frequent sorties sorties into into the the enemy's enemys rear the war rear .. .. .. brilliantly brilliantly displaying displaying such such qualities qualities as as boldness boldness and and valor." valor. After After the war Molody took a degree in Chinese and worked as a Chinese language instructor Molody took a degree in Chinese and worked as a Chinese language instructor before before beginning beginning training training as as an an illegal illegal in in 1951.63 1951.63 lody began Like stings in Like some some of of the the illegals illegals chosen chosen for for po postings in the the United UnitedStates, States, M Molody began by by establishing establishing his his cover cover in in Canada, Canada,where where he he arrived arrived in in 1954 1954using using the the identity identity of of a a Canadian MICK, a member of the Central Committee of Canadian Communist Communist"live live double." double. MICK, a member of the Central Committeeof the Canadian Communist Communist Party, Party member the Canadian Party, had had persuaded persuaded the the Party member to to give give him him his his passport passport in in the theprevious previous year yearwhen when he hediscovered discovered that that it ithad had never never been been used used for for for foreign eign travel. travel. Though Though the thelive live double double was was told told that that his his passport passport would would be be for for Party Party use, use, MICK passed passed it it to to Vladimir Wadimir Pavlovich Pavlovich Burdin Burdin of of the the Ottawa Ottawa residency residency via via a a senior senior member ASHCHEN member of of the the Canadian-Soviet Canadian-Soviet Friendship Friendship Society Society codenamed codenamed SVY SWASHCHENNIK ("Clergyman" ).64 The the passport (Clergyman).64 The Centre Centre replaced replaced the the photograph photographon on the passport with with that that of Molody of Molody Molody and and gave gave it it to to him him for for his his journey journey to to Canada. Canada. Once Oncein inCanada, Canada, Molody obtained obtained a a new new passport passport in in the the name name of of a a "dead dead double," double, Gordon Gordon Arnold Arnold Lonsdale Lonsdale (codenamed in in 1924, emigrated (codenamed KIZH), KIZH),who who had had been been born born in in Cobalt, Cobalt,Ontario, Ontario, 1924, emigrated as as a a child A Canadian child to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union with with his his Finnish Finnish mother mother and and died died in in 1943.65 1943.65 Canadian Royal Royal Commission Commission later later concluded: concluded: Canada Canada has has acquired acquired a a dubious dubious international international reputation reputation with with regard regard to to her her passports, passports, and and there there is is evidence evidence that that hostile hostile intelligence intelligence services services have have concen concentrated trated on on the the acquisition acquisition of of Canadian Canadian documentation documentation because because of of this this relative relative ease ease of of procurement.66 procurement.66
In March March 1955, Molody traveled traveled to to London London using using his his new new identity identity as as "Gordon Gordon In 1955, Molody Lonsdale and and enrolled enrolled as as a a student student on on a a Chinese Chinese course course at at the the School School of of Oriental Oriental Lonsdale" and reasons. First, and Mrican African Studies Studies (SOAS). (SOAS). The The Centre Centre selected selected SOAS SOAS for for two two main main reasons. First, since since the the course course taken taken by by Molody Molody did did not notlead lead to to a a degree, degree, he he was was not not asked asked to to pro provide vide the the documentation documentation on onhis his previous previous education education normally normally required required of of British British uni university Chineseand and the author of versity students. students. Secondly, Secondly, as as a a qualified qualified lecturer lecturer in in Chinese the author of a a Russian-Chinese textbook, textbook, Molody Molody found foundlittle little difficulty difficulty in in coping coping with with the thecourse course Russian-Chinese establishing the KGB's KGBs first post-war requirements while spending most of his time establishing illegal illegal residency residency in in Britain. Britain. His His main main problem problem at at SOAS SOAS was was the the need need to to conceal conceal from from his tutors tutors the thefact fact that that they they had had little, little, if if anything, anything, to to teach teach him.67 him.67Molody's Molodys contact contact in in his the the legal legal London London residency residencywas was the the Line LineN (Illegal (Illegal Support) Support) officer, officer,V. V. A. A. Dmitriyev, Dmitriyev, who provided provided him him with withmoney money and and instructions instructions from from the the Centre, Centre,as as well well as as microdot microdot who letters from from his his family family in in Moscow, Moscow, delivered delivered via via dead dead letter-boxes letter-boxes and and at at face-to-face face-to-face letters meetings.68 meetings6*"When When is is Daddy Daddy coming, coming, and and why why has has he he gone gone away?" away?asked askedMolody's Molodys small son son Trofim Trofim in in one oneletter. letter. " . What a a stupid stupidjob Daddy has has got."69 job Daddy small . .. . What

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While While at at SOAS, SOAS, Molody Molody began, began, with with the the Centre's Centres approval, approval, to to establish establish a a cover cover profession as a London businessman. Using KGB funds, he set himself up as the profession as a London businessman. Using KGB hnds, he set himself up as the director of of several several companies operating juke juke boxes, boxes, vending vending machines machines and and one onedirector companies operating armed armed bandits. bandits. According According to to a a KGB KGB file, file, the the vending vending machines machines included included chewing chewinggum sites, thus gum dispensers dispensers at at no no fewer fewer than than two two hundred hundred different different sites, thus offering offering Molody Molody two frequent pretexts for journeys in the theGreater Greater London area to meet Dmitriyev, London Dmitriyev, the two other members members of of his his residency residency and and his his agents. agents. An An electronic electronic locking locking device device pro proother duced duced by by one one of of the the firms firms in in which which Molody Molody was was a a partner partner won won a a gold gold medal medal at at the the 1960 International International Inventors Inventors Exhibition Exhibition in in Brussels.7o Bru~sels.~ retirement, In Molody made made 1960 In retirement, Molody the the wildly wildly exaggerated exaggerated claim claim that that he he had hadbeen been the the KGB's KGBs first first multimillionaire multimillionaire ille illegal resident. resident. He H e boasted boasted to to aaSoviet Soviet interviewer: interviewer: gal Let Let me me remind remind you you that that all the the working working capital capital and and profits profits from from my my four four com companies year without panies (millions (millions of of pounds pounds sterling) sterling) which which were were increasing increasingyear year by by year without any property." any help help from from me, me, were were "socialist socialist property. Strange Strange but but true!71 true!71 The residency The radio radio operators operators and and technical technical support support team team in in Molody's Molodys illegal illegal residencywere were the LESLEY, the veteran veteran American American agents agents Morris Morris and and Lona Lona Cohen Cohen (LUIS (LUISand and LESLEY, collec collectively tivelyknown known as as the the DACHNIKI), DACHNIKI),who who had hadbeen been hastily hastily recalled recalled to to Moscow Moscow after after the the arrest Cohens were issued with arrest of of the the Rosenbergs.72 Rosenbergs. In In May May 1954 1954 the the Cohens were issued with passports passports in in the Zealand the name name of of Peter Peter and and Helen HelenKroger Kroger by by a a Soviet Soviet agent agent at at the theNew New Zealand consulate consulate in in Paris, Paris, Paddy Paddy Costello Costello (codenamed (codenamed LONG), LONG), who who later later became became professor professor of of Rus Russian University.73 profession was sian at at Manchester Manchester U n i ~ e r s i t y"Peter Peter . ~ ~ Kroger's" Krogerscover cover profession in in London London was that that of of antiquarian antiquarian bookseller. bookseller. Like Like BEN, LUIS and and LESLEY LESLEY were were extroverts extroverts with with an an active active social sociallife. life. One One of of their their friends friends in in the the London London book book trade trade later later recalled recalled many many convivial convivial evenings evenings at at their their house house in in Ruislip: Ruislip: Here received good Here you you received good food, food, good good wine, wine, and and the the most most wonderful wonderful hospital hospitality . .. .. Peter ity. Peter cultivated cultivated the the acquaintance acquaintance of of everyone everyone he he could, could, and and he he and and his his wife wife were were liked liked by by all. all. He H e attended attended the the Bibliomites' Bibliomitesdarts darts matches matches and and drank drank pint their annual pint for for pint. pint. He H e played played for for the the Guv'nors Guvnors versus versus the the Bibs, Bibs, in in their annual cricket cricket match, match, wielding wielding his his willow willow like like a a baseball baseball bat, bat, and and trying trying to to knock knock home home runs, runs, to to everybody's everybodys amusement.74 am~sement.~ George George Blake, Blake, who who was was to to meet meet Konon Konon Molody Molody while while both both were were imprisoned imprisoned in in Wormwood Wormwood Scrubs, Scrubs,later later eulogized eulogized him him as as "a aperfect perfect example example of of what what an an'illegal illegal res resident' ident should should be be .. .. .. a a man man who who believes believes very very strongly strongly in in an an ideal ideal and and serves serves a a great great cause."75 During his cau~e.~ During his years years in in London, London, however, however, Molody Molody became became cynical cynical about about the the prospects prospects of of recruiting recruiting a a new new generation generation of of ideological ideological spies spies like like Blake, Blake, inspired inspired by by working for a great cause. He later told a Soviet interviewer: working for a great cause. H e later told a Soviet interviewer: The The average average Englishman Englishman is is apolitical apolitical and and indifferent. indifferent. He H e really really couldn't couldnt care care less is whether thethe Common less who who is is governing governing him, him, where where the the country country is going going or or whether Common

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Market Market is is a a good good or or bad bad thing. thing. All All that that interests interests him him is is his his own own wage wage packet, packet, his his job job and and keeping keeping the the wife wife happy. happy. Molody of Cold Cold War Warrecruits recruits on on whom whom he he Molody also also took took aajaundiced jaundiced view view of of the the kind kind of believed believed the the KGB should should concentrate concentrate in in Britain: Britain: A good good agent agent is is one one whose whose vital vital statistics statistics are are the the following: following: he he works, works, for for exam example, ple, in in aamilitary military department department and andholds holds a a middle-ranking middle-ranking but but key key position position giv giving ing him himaccess access to to information; information; he he doesn't doesnt aspire aspireto to aahigher higher office, office, has hasa a chip chip on on his his shoulder shoulder about about being being a a failure failure (let's (lets say say that that ill-health ill-health prevented prevented him him fin finishing ishing studies studies at at the the general general staff staff college); college); he he drinks drinks (an (an expensive expensive habit); habit); he he has has a a weakness weakness for for the the fair fair sex sex (which (which is is also alsonot not cheap); cheap); he he is is critical critical of of his his own own government government and and loyal loyal to to the the resident's residentsgovernment. g ~ v e r n m e 76 nt.~~ The The accounts accounts of of Molody's Molodys career career released released by bythe the KGB and and SVR SVR carefully carefully conceal conceal the the fact fact that that late late in in 1958 1958 he he was was given given control control of of the the KGB's KGBs longest-serving longest-serving British British agent, Norwood (HOLA), never to agent, Melita Melita Norwood (HOLA), whose whose ideological ideological commitment commitment seems seems never to have more rst time have wavered waveredover over more than than forty fortyyears. years. Molody Molody met metNorwood Norwood for for the the fi first time on on December December 23 23 and and received received from from her her the the usual usual batch batch of of documents documents from from the the safes safes of of the the Non-Ferrous Non-Ferrous Metals Metals Association. Association. For For reasons reasons not not recorded recorded in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes, notes, however, the control however, Norwood Norwood was was returned returned only only two two months months later later to to the control of of the the legal legal London London residency.77 residency.77Perhaps Perhaps Norwood Norwood was was repelled repelled by the the signs signs of of Molody's Molodys high highliving, living, womanizing womanizing lifestyle. lifestyle. Or O r perhaps perhaps Molody Molody simply simply lacked lacked the the ability ability to to control control an an ideological ideological agent. agent. The The files files on on the the Molody Molodyresidency residency seen seen by byMitrokhin Mitrokhin suggest suggest that that it it successfully successfully ran Houghton and Gee (codenamed ran only only two two agents: agents: Harry Harry Houghton and his his mistress mistress Ethel Ethel Gee (codenamed SHAH Houghton, SHAH and and ASYA).78 ASYA).78 Houghton, a a former former NCO in in the the Royal Royal Navy, Navy, closely closelyresem resembled bled Molody's Molodysjaundiced jaundiced stereotype stereotype of of the the British British agent. agent. He H e worked worked as as a a civilian civilian clerk clerk in where, in the the Underwater UnderwaterWeapons Weapons Establishment Establishment at at Portland, Portland, where, helped helped by by Gee, Gee, who who was was employed employed as as a a filing filing clerk, clerk, he he had had easy easy access access to to top top secret secret information information on on anti antisubmarine warfare warfare and and nuclear nuclear submarines. submarines. Houghton's Houghtons later later memoirs memoirs provide provide strik striksubmarine ing him. ing evidence evidence of of how how successfully successfully his his controller controller concealed concealed his his low low opinion opinion of of him. Though Though Molody, Molody, as as his his Moscow Moscow interviews interviews make make clear, clear, regarded regarded agents agents such such as as Houghton as as mildly mildly contemptible contemptible moral moral inadequates, inadequates, Houghton Houghton was was pathetically pathetically Houghton convinced that, that, from from their their first first meeting, meeting, "[t]here [tlhere was was a a real real camaraderie camaraderie between between us." us. convinced Molody he even thathe he Molody deceived deceived Houghton Houghton so so successfully successfully that that he even persuaded persuaded him him that regarded going going to tobed bed with with any any of of his his many many girlfriends girlfriends as as "absolutely absolutelyout."79 regarded Like Blake, Blake, Houghton Houghton was was identifi identified by MI5 MIS as as a a result result of of information information from from the the Like ed by Goleniewski. Surveillance Surveillance of of Houghton Houghton led led to to the the discovery discovery of of -defector defector Michal Michal Goleniewski. Lonsdale,who who was was then then followed followed on on aavisit visit to to the the"Krogers" Krogersin in Ruislip. Ruislip. A search search of of "Lonsdale," the "Krogers' Krogers" house house uncovered uncovered a a powerful powerful high-speed high-speed radio radio transmitter transmitter used used for for the communications with with the theCentre Centreand and a a short-wave short-wave radio radio used used for for receiving receiving messages messages communications hiddenin in a from Moscow on high-frequency bands, both hidden a cavity beneath the kitchen floor; one-time one-time cipher cipher pads pads hidden hidden in in flashlights flashlights and and a a cigarette cigarette lighter; lighter; a a microdot microdot floor;

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reader concealed concealed in in a box of powder; equipment equipment for for microdot microdot construction; construction; a a reader a box offace face powder; usedfor printing high-speed morse mes mescookery jar containing magnetic iron oxide used sages on on to to tape; tape; thousands thousands of of pounds, pounds, dollars dollars and and travelers travelers checks; checks; and and seven seven pass passsages ports. At At their their trial trial in in 1961 1961 Molody Molody was sentenced sentenced to to twenty-five twenty-five years years in in prison, prison, ports.80 was the Cohens Cohens to totwenty, twenty, Houghton Houghton and and Gee Gee to tofifteen. fifteen. the Molody Molody was was freed freed in in a aspy spy exchange exchange in in 1964. 1964.His His misleading misleading memoirs, memoirs, published published a Lonsdale," with a year year later later under under his his alias alias "Gordon Gordon Lonsdale, with the the approval approval of of the the CPSU Cen Central Committee, Committee, contained contained a a variety variety of of disinformation-including disinformation-including the the pretense pretense that that tral the "Krogers" Krogers were were entirely entirely innocent. innocent. The The London London residency reported a a "negative negative the residency reported reaction" to reaction to the the memoirs memoirs by by the the British British Communist Communist Party Partyleadership, leadership, on on the thegrounds grounds that to a a formal the Soviet that they they amounted amounted to formal admission admission that that the Soviet Union Union engaged engaged in in espi espionage Cohens were for the onage against against the the West.81 West.81In In 1969 1969 the the Cohens were exchanged exchanged for the imprisoned imprisoned British lecturer lecturer Gerald Gerald Brooke. Brooke. At At a a dinner inin their honor at a at a KGB dacha dacha on on British dinner their honor November 1969, Andropov Order of November 25, 25,1969, Andropov personally personally presented presented them them with withthe the Order of the the Red Red Star. Centre present dinner included Star. Other Other top top brass brass from from the the Centre present at at the the dinner included Sakharovsky, Sakharovsky, the head of illegals directorate. were the FCD chief, chief, and and Lazarev, Lazarev, the the head of the the illegals directorate. 5,000 5,000 roubles roubles were spent Cohens on where spent furnishing furnishing a a Moscow Moscow apartment apartment for for the the Cohens on Malaya Malaya Bronnaya, Bronnaya, where 82 the same same KGB top top brass brass attended attended a a flat-warming flat-warming party in April April1970. 1970.2 the party in The Centre Centre remained anxious, however, however, to to keep keep the the Cohens away from from other other The remained anxious, Cohens away Western defectors defectors in in Moscow-partly Moscow-partly because clung to the fiction fiction that that they they were Western because it it clung to the were Polish Poland. O On , while returning to his flat flat 1971, while returning to his Polish and and had had gone gone to to live live in in Poland. n June June 7, 1971 from into George Blake, from a a shopping shopping expedition, expedition, Morris Morris Cohen Cohen accidentally accidentally bumped bumped into George Blake, whom he he had first met met several several years earlier when when they they were were both both imprisoned in whom had first years earlier imprisoned in Wormwood Scrubs. Scrubs.The The KGB file file on themeeting meeting notes notes that that both bothexpressed expressed "genuine genuine Wormwood on the joy at their reunion, reunion, exchanged exchanged telephone telephone numbers and agreed agreed to to arrange arrange another joy" at their numbers and another meeting. The Centre, Centre, however, separately instructed both Blake the Cohens to meeting. The however, separately instructed both Blake and and the Cohens to devise pretexts to to cancel cancel their their arrangement. According to to the record of devise pretexts arrangement. According the KGB record of a a bugged conversation, Cohen Cohen rang to tell was about to go bugged telephone telephone conversation, rang Blake Blake to tell him him that thathe he was about to go on holiday holiday and would, after not be able to him in in the the near near future. future. Blake Blake on and would, after all, all, not be able to meet meet him replied that that he hequite quite understood and would would himself himself be leavingfor for his his dacha dacha in in a afew replied understood and be leaving few days' two men men never an hon days time. time. The The two never met met again.83 again.83The The Cohens, Cohens, however, however, retained retained an honored place place in in the theKGB pantheon. pantheon. Lona Lona died died in 1993atat the age of of eighty, Morris two ored in 1993 the age eighty, Morris two years later age of ninety. By order of years later at at the the age of ninety. By order of President President Yeltsin, Yeltsin, Morris Morris Cohen Cohen was was posthumously awarded awarded the the title title of of Hero of the Federation.4 posthumously Hero of the Russian Russian Federation.84 Molody's ended in Moscow, his experience in Molodys career career ended less less happily. happily.Once Once back back in Moscow, his experience oflife of life in the of other former illegals, illegals, increasingly increasingly disillusioned disillusioned the West Westmade made him, him, like like a a number number of other former with system. According with the the Soviet Soviet system. According to to Blake: Blake:

He was particularly the inefficient way Soviet H e was particularly critical critical of of the inefficient and and often oftenincompetent incompetent way Soviet industrial enterprises were and international international trade trade was conducted. Being industrial enterprises were run run and was conducted. Being an good of of his his country country at at heart, made his views views an outspoken outspoken man man who whohad had the the good heart,he he made his known. Criticism kind was was not not appreciated those days days and he soon soon known. Criticism of of any any kind appreciated in in those and he fell from favor favor and relegated to a position position of of relatively relatively minor fell from and found found himself himself relegated to a minor importance.85 importance.

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Molody also also took took to to drink. drink. One One Saturday Saturday in in October October 1970 1970 he went mushrooma Molody he went on on a mushroom collecting two friends friends from from the the collecting expedition expedition near near the the town town of of Medyi Medyi with withhis his wife wife and and two air second glass the air force. force. Immediately Immediately after after his his second glass of of vodka, vodka, he he suffered suffered a a stroke, stroke, lost lost the power of speech and died a few days later in hospital at the age of only forty-eight. 86 power of speech and died a few dayslater in hospital at the age of only forty-eight.86 He H e lay lay in in state state on on a afuneral funeral bier bier in in the the KGB officers' officersclub club while while colleagues colleagues displayed displayed his collection of medals on his large large collection of medals on velvet velvet cushions cushions and and Andropov Andropov and and other other top top brass brass came writers commissioned came to to pay pay their their respects.87 respects.87Shortly Shortly before before his his death, death, aateam team of ofwriters commissioned by a by the the Centre Centrehad had completed, completed, with with Molody's Molodys assistance, assistance, a new new biography biography of of him him enti entitled the Soviet In tled Special Special Mission, some some extracts extracts of of which which were were published published in in the Soviet press. press. In 1972, approval, not to publish book 1972, however, however, it it was was decided, decided, with with Andropov's Andropovs approval, not to publish the the book abroad abroad and and to to suspend suspend publication publication in in the theSoviet Soviet Union Union for for fear fear that that it itwould would "fan fan the the flames flames of of spymania" spymania in in the theWest.88 West.S8 Mter After Molody's Molodys death, death, his his long-suffering long-suffering wife, wife, Galina Galina Ivanovna, Ivanovna,who who had hadseen seen very very little career as took drink. Over few years little of of him him during duringhis his career as an an illegal, illegal,also also took to to drink. Over the thenext next few years she times for costing she was was treated treated several several times for alcoholism. alcoholism. In In 1976 1976 a a monument monumentto toMolody Molody costing 2,000 roubles to that 2,000 roubles was waserected erected on on his his grave grave in in Moscow's Moscows Donskoy Donskoy Monastery, Monastery, next next to that of another well (alias 'bel"). In the same of another well known known illegal illegal of of the the 1950s, 1950s, William William Fisher Fisher (alias Abel). In the same year, 89 Central Committee Committee awarded awarded his his widow widow a a pension pension of of 120 120 roubles. rouble^.^' year, the the CPSU Central Mitrokhin visits to to Britain Mitrokhin saw saw frequent frequent references references in in KGB files files to to visits Britain made made by other other Soviet the twenty Soviet illegals illegals during during the twenty years years after after Molody's Molodys arrest arrest but but found found no no evidence evidence that any any full fully functioning illegal illegal KGB residency residency to to replace replace BENS was established established dur durthat y functioning BEN's was ing that thatperiod-though period-though it it is is possible possible that that such such evidence evidence exists existsin in ftles files he he did see. ing did not not see. One of of the the principal principal candidates candidates chosen chosen to to succeed succeed BEN in in London London appears appears to to have have One been the the comparatively comparatively youthful youthful Eduard Eduard Ivanovich Koslov(codenamed (codenamed YEVDOKI YEVDOKIbeen Ivanovich Koslov MOV),born born in in 1934. 1934. With With the the help help of of the the agent an official official in in a aBelgian comMOV), agent RAG, an Belgian com mune, Koslov Koslov obtained obtained identity identity documents documents in inthe name of of the the non-existent non-existent mune,90 the name Jean-Louis de Mol, Mol, which he he used used to to obtain obtain a a Belgian Belgian passport passport in in 1961. 1961. Over thenext J ean-Louis de which Over the next few years, years, he went throughan an elaborate acclimatization period period to to strengthen strengthen his his cover, cover, few he went through elaborate acclimatization studying at a a Swiss foreign language school, working as an an electronic electronic machine machine opera operastudying at Swiss foreign language school, working as tor in inZurich, Zurich, then in a Stuttgart insurance company. 1966 he he returned to to Belgium, tor then in a Stuttgart insurance company. In In 1966 returned Belgium, took up up residence residence in in Dinant Dinant and and obtained obtained a a new new passport valid until until 1970. took passport valid 1970. Before Before he he could move move on on to toBritain or the the United UnitedStates, States, however, however, Koslov Koslovaroused aroused the suspicions suspicions could Britain or the of the the Belgian Belgian security security service service and and was was hurriedly hurriedly recalled recalled to to Moscow. At the the time time of of of Moscow. At his recall, his account in the Banque de Bruxelles (no. A-04-18295) contained 39,000 his recall, his account in the Banque de Bruxelles (no. A-04-18295) contained 39,000 Belgian francs; the Centre considered it it too too dangerous dangerous to to withdraw withdraw the the money money and Belgian francs; the Centre considered and off. Unable henceforth to travel in the wrote it off theWest, West, Koslov worked instead on PROGRESS operations in in Bulgaria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and and the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, PROGRESS operations Hungary posing as as a a British, British, American American or or Belgian Belgian tourist.91 tourist. posing
A R E NT N T failure failure of of its its attempts attempts to to establish establish a a new new illegal illegal residency residency DE S P I T TE E TH HE E AP P PA and the the Cohens, Cohens,the the KGBs British operations achieved a after the arrest of Molody and KGB's series of significant successes successes during the the following following decade. decade. The Centre discovered a series of simple but effective effective method making life life easier for the the London legal residency. simple but method of of making easier for London legal residency. Under four successive successive residents-Nikolai Grigoryevich Bagrichev (1962-4y2 residents-Nikolai (1962-4),92

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ikhail Ivanovich Mikhail Ivanovich Lopatin (acting resi resiLopatin (acting Mikhail Timofeyevich Chizhov (1964-6), M dent, 1966-7)93 1966-7)93and and Yuri Yuri Nikolayevich NikolayevichVoronin Voronin (1967-71)-the size of theresidency residency dent, (1967-71)-the size of the steadily increased. increased. Between Between 1960 1960 and and 1970, and GRU personnel personnel in in London steadily 1970, KGB and London grew grew from from about about fifty fifty to to over over 120-more 120-more than than in in Washington Washingtonor or any any other other Western Western capital. The The intelligence intelligence services services of of other other Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc countries countries also also rapidly rapidly expanded expanded capital. their British British operations. The aim, aim, which which was was partially partially successful, wasto to swamp swamp the the their operations. The successful, was overstretched MIS with more intelligence officers than they could hope to keep overstretched MIS with more intelligence officers than they could hope to keep effective surveillance. s~rveillance.~~ under effective 94 When the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak StB StB officer officer Josef JosefFrolik Frolik was was posted posted to to London London in in1964, 1964, When he was was told told that that "the theBritish British service service was wasso so short short of of funds funds and and men men that that it it would would be he be relatively easy easyto to throw throw off off their their tails."95 tail^."^' MIS's MISs job job became became even even harder harder at at the thebegin beginrelatively ning ofVoronin's of Voronins term term as as resident, resident, in in 1967, 1967, when one one of of his his operations operations officers, officers, Alek Alekning when sei NikolayevichSavin Savin (codenamed theGreater Greater sei Nikolayevich (codenamed RUSLAN),96 RUSLAN),96recruited recruited a a clerk clerk in in the London Council (GLC) (GLC) motor motor licensing licensing department, department, Sirioj Sirioj Husein Abdoolcader, London Council Husein Abdoolcader, Service and Special Branch Branch who had had access to the theregistration registration numbers numbers of of all who access to all Security Security Service and Special vehicles. A series series of of sophisticated sophisticated MIS MIS mobile mobile surveillance operations was comprovehicles. surveillance operations was compro mised by bythe the ability ability of of the the London London residency residency to to identify identify the the vehicles vehicles used.97 used.97 mised The London London residency's residencys greatest greatest successes successes during during the theBrezhnev Brezhnev era era were were in in scienThe scien tific and and technological technological intelligence intelligence (S&T), (S&T), particularly particularly in in the the defense defense field. field. In In 1967 1967 tific Lopatin, the residencys main main S&T expert expert in in the one of of the the Lopatin, the residency's themid-l960s, mid-1960s, became became one founders of of a a new new FCD Directorate specializing in in this this field and serviced Line founders Directorate T, specializing field and serviced by by Line X London from X (S&T) (S&T) officers officers in in residencies residencies abroad. abroad. The The head head of of Line Line X X in in London from the the beginning of of 1968 1968 until untilhis his expulsion expulsion in in the the summer of 1971 was Lev beginning summer of 1971 was Lev Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Sherstnev, amiable engineer spoke almost English with a Sherstnev, a a tough tough but but amiable engineer who who spoke almost flawless flawless English with a Canadian accent passion Canadian accent and and had had aa passion for for Western Western hi-fi.98 hi-fi.9 addition to to the the veteran veteran Norwood, Norwood, Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes identify identify at at least least ten ten other other In addition Line X X agents agents active active in in the the late late 1960s: 1960s: MERCURY, a a chemist chemist recruited recruited in in 1958;99 19S8;99 Line SAKS, an an employee employee of of a a British British aircraft aircraft company, company, recruited in Germany, Germany, probably probably in SAKS, recruited in in lOo YUNG, an engineer 1964, "for for material material reward;" reward; an aeronautical aeronautical and and computer computer engineer 1964, recruited in in 1965;101 196S;101 a chemical chemical engineer recruited in in 1966;102 1966;Io2ACE, an recruited NAGIN, a engineer recruited an aeronautical engineer engineer recruited 1967, who supplied voluminous voluminous documentation documentation on aeronautical recruited in in 1967, who supplied on aero engines engines and and fl flight HUNT, the the civil by Norwood Norwood aero ight simulators;103 simulators;103 HUNT, civil servant servant recruited recruited by in 1967;104 1967;lo4 AKHURYAN, a nuclear physicist physicist recruited recruited in 1968; STARIK, STARIK, an in AKHURYAN, a nuclear in 1968;105 an aeroaero nautical 1968;106 DAN, an British subsub nautical design design engineer engineer recruited recruited in in 1968;Io6 an engineer engineer in in the the British sidiary in 1969 1969 "for reward;"107 and and sidiary of of an an American American company, company, recruited recruited in for material material reward;lo7 STEP, a a laboratory laboratory assistant assistant recruited recruited in 1969 for for a a monthly monthlysalary salary of of 150 STEP, in 1969 150 dollars. dollars.108 X agents agents operating operating in in the the 1970s 1970s Mitrokhins notes notes also also identify identify four further Line Mitrokhin's four further Line X who may may well well have havebeen been recruited in the the 1960s: 1960s: a a virologist, virologist, a a research research scientist scientist in in a a who recruited in pharmaceutical 9 an engineer at reactor,110 and COOPER, who pharmaceutical laboratory,I laboratory,lo9 an engineer at aanuclear nuclear reactor, and COOPER, who worked department of worked in in the thenew new products products department of a a pharmaceutical pharmaceutical company.111 company. was hampered hampered in in its its response response to to the the upsurge upsurge of of KGB KGB and and GRU S&T S G L T oper operMIS was ations ations not not merely merely by byits its own own overstretched overstretched resources resources but but also also by by the the difficulty difficulty (which (which it was, understandably, advertise) of bringing successful it was, understandably, not not anxious anxious to to advertise) of bringing successful prosecutions. prosecutions. Unless it it could could obtain obtain confessions confessions or or catch catch agents agents in in the theact act of of handing handing over over material, material, Unless

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it it was was usually usuallyimpossible impossible to to secure secure convictions. convictions.Its Its difficulties difficultieswere were exemplified exemplified by by the the trial 963 of trial in in 1 1963 of Dr. Dr. Giuseppe Giuseppe Martelli, Martelli, a a 39-year-old 39-year-old Italian Italian physicist physicist employed employed for for the previous year at the Culham Laboratories of the Atomic Energy Authority. the previous year at the Culham Laboratories of the Atomic Energy Authority. Arrested was found Arrested as as a a result result of of a a lead lead from from a a KGB defector, defector, Martelli Martelli was found in in possession possession of of a a record record of of meetings meetings with with Nikolai Nikolai Karpekov Karpekov and and other other KGB officers, officers, a a set set of of partly partly used one-time pads for cipher communications used one-time pads for cipher communications hidden hidden inside inside an an ingeniously ingeniously con constructed cigarette case, and instructions for photographing documents. But posses structed cigarette case, and instructions for photographing documents. But possession sion of of espionage espionage paraphernalia paraphernalia (unlike (unlike housebreaking housebreaking equipment) equipment) is is not not in in itself itself a a crime official classified information, crime and and Martelli Martelli had hadno no official access accessto to classified information, though though he he was was in in contact contact with with people people who who had. had. Martelli Martelli admitted admitted meeting meeting Karpekov, Karpekov, but but claimed claimed he he was was engaged engaged in in an aningenious ingenious scheme scheme to to turn turnthe thetables tables on on aablackmail blackmail attempt attempt by by the the KGB. KGB. He H e was was acquitted.112 acquitted.l2 During two During the themidmid- and and late late 1960s 1960s there there were were only only two successful successfulBritish British prosecutions prosecutions of of Soviet Soviet spies spiesin in Britain. Britain. In In 1965 1965 Frank Frank Bossard, Bossard, a a 52-year-old 52-year-old projects projects officer officerat at the the Ministry Ministry of of Aviation Aviation was was sentenced sentenced to to twenty-one twenty-one years years in in jail jail for for passing passing top top secret secret details the G RU. An details of of British British guided guided weapon weapon development development to to the GRU. An investigation investigation after after Bossard's which had had never properly Bossards arrest arrest revealed revealed a a criminal criminal record record which never been been properly investigated. investigated. Twenty Twenty years years earlier earlier he he had had served served six six months' months hard hard labor labor for for fraud. fraud. In In 1968 1968 Douglas Douglas Britten, Britten, an an RAF RAF chief chief technician, technician, was was also also sentenced sentenced to to twenty-one twenty-one years years in in jail jail for for giving giving the the KGB KGB highly highly classified classified information information from from RAF signals signals units units in in Cyprus Cyprus and and Lincolnshire. Commission inquiry disclosed Lincolnshire. A Security Security Commission inquiry after after Britten's Brittens conviction conviction disclosed Britten's Brittens history history of of financial financial problems problems and and his his record record as as an an "accomplished accomplished liar."113 liar.113 The The work work of of Line Line X X in in the theLondon Londonresidency residency was was supplemented supplemented by KGB officers officers sent under cover sent to toBritain Britain under cover either either as as members members of of trade trade and andscientific scientific delegations delegations or or as as postgraduate postgraduate students. students. Among Among the the KGB postgraduates postgraduates was was A. A. V. Sharov Sharov of of Direc Directorate torate T, T,who who began began work work for for a a PhD in in engineering engineering at at London LondonUniversity University in in Novem November 1969. On ber 1966 1966 and and was was awarded awarded his his doctorate doctorate on on October October22, 22,1969. O n KGB instructions, instructions, Sharov take Sharov returned returned to to London Londonto to take his his degree degree in in person person in in January January 1971 1971and and embark embark on Sciences which on a a lecture lecture tour tour arranged arranged by the the Academy Academy of of Sciences which was was intended intended by by the the Centre possible recruits scientific community.114 Centre to to enable enable him him to to identify identify possible recruits in in the the scientific community.ll Probably British university Probably the the most most important important Line Line PR postgraduate postgraduate at at a a British university in in the the mid-1960s studied at mid-1960s was was Gennadi Gennadi Fedorovich FedorovichTitov Titov (codenamed (codenamed SILIN), SILIN),who who studied at Uni University onon to become resident versity College, College, London. London. Titov Titovwent went become to resident in in Norway Norway in in 1971 1971 at at the the relatively hehe was relatively youthful youthful age age ofthirty-nine;115 of thirty-nine; in in 1984 1984 was promoted promoted to to the therank rank of of KGB general, ranked third general, and and by by the the time time of of the the 1991 1991 coup coup ranked third in in the the KGB hierarchy. hierarchy. KGB officers alsoused used to uncover links officers and and agents agents disguised disguised as as students students were were also to uncover links between between Western church groups and religious minorities in the Soviet Union. In September Western church groups and religious minorities in the Soviet Union. In September 1970 1970 ABRAMOV A B M O V (not (not identified identified in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokllins notes) notes) enrolled enrolled at at aaBaptist Baptist college college in in England, England, where where he he made made contacts contacts who who revealed revealed plans plans in in Sweden Sweden and and West West Ger Germany car, hidden hidden in in specially many to to smuggle smuggle religious religious literature literature into into Russia Russia by bycar, specially con constructed structed secret secret compartments.1l6 compartments.l6 Since the demise of Magnificent Five George Blake, Since the demise of the the Magnificent Five and and the the arrest arrest of of George Blake, the the Centre Centre had hadseen seen as as the the main main weakness weakness of of its its British British operations operations its its failure failure to to recruit recruit a a new committed high-flyers. new generation generation of of young, young, ideologically ideologically committed high-flyers. The The simple simple truth, truth,

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which the the Centre Centre could could not not bring bring itself itself to to accept, accept, was was that the Soviet Soviet Union Union had had lost which that the lost most of its its former former ideological ideological appeal. The aging aging apparatchiks who ruled ruled Brezhnev's Brezhnevs most of appeal. The apparatchiks who Soviet Union lacked the luster of both the the interwar myth-image myth-image of the theworld's worlds first Soviet worker-peasant state state and and the the far far more accurate wartime wartime image image of the state state which which worker-peasant more accurate of the had been chiefly responsible responsible for the defeat of of Nazism. Most young Western radicals 1960s were attracted not to toideologically ideologicallyservile Communist Parties but to of the late 1960s the libertarian libertarian movements movements of of the the New NewLeft. Left. Moscow, however, however, refused to accept that the Moscow, refused to accept that of Kim this was more than a passing phase. phase. The Centre sought to use the exploits of Philby to to inspire a new new generation of radical radical idealists to follow follow his his example. Philby inspire a generation of idealists to example. O n his defection to Moscow in 1963, 1963, Philby had been dismayed to discover that On the KGB, did did not not hold hold officer not even even to he held only agent status in the officer rank rank and and was was not to be allowed to set foot inside inside the the Lubyanka. Lubyanka. For For the the first of his Moscow be allowed to set foot first five five years years of his Moscow exile, however, however, he was kept occupied by long debriefing sessions, sessions, helping to ghost ghostexile, write the the memoirs memoirs of of Konon Konon Molody Molody (published (published under under his his alias alias "Gordon Gordon Lonsdale") Lonsdale) write and writing writing a a sprightly sprightly but but tendentious tendentious memoir memoir of of his his own own career career as a Soviet Soviet agent agent and as a inside SIS, Philby made made no no M y Silent War.117 W ar Y7 Philby SIS, published in 1968 1968 under the title of My mention of of the the disappointments disappointments of of life life in in Moscow. Moscow. Instead, Instead, he he claimed claimed that, that, As mention ''As I look over over Moscow Moscow from from my my study study window, window, I can can see see the the solid foundations of of the the look solid foundations Cambridge. Philby ,concluded future I glimpsed at Cambridge." concluded his preface with words which . to inspire others: were intended to It is is a a sobering sobering thought thought that, that, but but for for the the power power of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and the the It Communist idea, idea, the the Old Old World, World, if if not not the the whole whole world, world, would would now now be ruled Communist be ruled andHirohito. Hirohito. matterof great pride to me that I was was invited, invited, at at by Hitler and It is a matter so early early an an age, to play play my building up that power so age, to my infinitesimal infinitesimal part part in in building up that power . .. . .. When the the proposition proposition [to [to join join Soviet Soviet intelligence] intelligence] was was made made to to me, me, I did not When did not hesitate. elite force.118 hesitate. One One does does not not look look twice twice at at an an offer offer of of enrollment enrollment in in an an Clite force.* Scarcelyhad had M My War been published published than than an an American American high student, y Silent W ar been high school school student, Scarcely inspired in tourist visa ser inspired by by Philby's Philbysexample, example,arrived arrived in Moscow Moscow on on a a tourist visa and and offered offered his his services vices to to the the KGB. Though Though aged aged only only sixteen sixteen (the (the youngest youngest Western Western recruit recruit recorded recorded in per in the the files files seen seenby by Mitrokhin), Mitrokhin), he hewas was signed signed up up in in July July 1968, 1968, with withAndropov's Andropovs personal same sonal approval, approval, as as agent agent SYNOK SYNOK ("Sonny")1l9-the (S~nny)~~--the same codename codename as as that that which which had had been given been given to to Philby Philby on on his his recruitment recruitment in in 1934.120 1934.I2OSYNOK's SYNOKs file file notes notes that that he he came came from from a a well-to-do well-to-do family, family, had had an an idealistic idealistic commitment commitment to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and was was imbued with a a romantic of intelligence intelligence work. work. Mter After a a second second meeting with imbued with romantic notion notion of meeting with SYNOK October 19, 19, it it was train him him as illegal agent. SYNOK in in Mexico Mexico on on October was decided decided to to train as an an illegal agent. Over the next few months, months, however, Over the nextfew however, either either SYNOK SYNOK or or his his parents parents had had second second thoughts thoughts and and he he failed failed to to show show up up at at the thenext next pre-arranged pre-arranged rendezvous rendezvous in in London. London. I t may may be be a a sign sign of of how how few few other other bright, bright, ideologically ideologically committed committed young young West WestIt erners Philby's example erners were were inspired inspired to to follow follow Philbys example (no (no others others are are recorded recorded in in Mitrokhins notes) notes) that that the KGB continued continued intermittently intermittently to to try try to to renew renew contact contact Mitrokhin's the KGB with decade. In with SYNOK for for more more than than aa decade. In 1978 1978 aa KGB officer officer discovered discovered from from SYNOK's was SYNOKs father father that that he he was in in Mexico, Mexico, but but failed failed to to track track him him down. down. Two Two years years later, later,

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his mother mother was was tricked tricked into into revealing revealing that that he was in in San San Francisco Francisco and and giving giving his his his he was address. In December 1980 the operations cer who had met him address. In December 1980 the operations offi officer who had met him in in Mexico Mexico twelve years earlier San Francisco, toanother another twelve years earlier wrote wrote to to SYNOK in in San Francisco, inviting inviting him him to meeting EastGerman German cover meeting in in Mexico Mexico and and giving giving an an East cover address address to to which which to to reply. reply. When no reply the at long to have have given When no reply was wasreceived, received, the KGB seems, seems, at longlast, last, to given Up.l2l up.121 Though generation of of the Though a a new new generation of Philbys Philbys failed failed to to materialize, materialize, memories memories of the Mag Magnificent Five residency. Even in nificent Five continued continued to to enhance enhance the the prestige prestige of of the theLondon London residency. Even in the the Gorbachev era, operations Britain during during the and the quarter Gorbachev era, operations in in Britain the Second Second World World War War and the quarter century afterward were still a model model for at the century afterward were still held held up up as as a for young young intelligence intelligence officers officers at the FCD training training school, Andropov Institute. main faculty heads in school, the the Andropov Institute. The The three three main faculty heads in the the institute made their Modin, who institute had had all all made their reputations reputations in in the the London London residency. residency. Yuri Yuri Modin, who was controller of the Mag was in in charge charge of of political political intelligence intelligence training, training, was was a a former former controller of the Magnificent Five. Ivan Shishkin, Shishkin, head of counter-intelligence, counter-intelligence, had had run run Line LineKR in in Lon Lonnificent Five. Ivan head of don Barkovsky, who espionage training, training, had had don from from 1966 1966 to to 1970. 1970. Vladimir Vladimir Barkovsky, who ran ran S&T espionage specialized in in that that field field in in London London from from 1941 1941 to to1946.122 1946.122 specialized If the the golden golden age age of of KGB KGB operations operations in in London Londonhad had ended with with the thedemise of the the If ended demise of Magnificent Five in in 1951, 1951, the the silver silver age came to to an an even more abrupt abrupt conclusion conclusion Magnificent Five age came even more twenty years years later later with with the the defection defection of of Oleg Oleg Lyalin Lyalin and and the the mass mass expulsion expulsion of of 105 twenty 105 KGB and and GRU G R U officers.123 0 f f i ~ e r sHenceforth Henceforth .l~~ MI5 surveillancewas was no no longer longer swamped swamped by by KGB MIS surveillance the sheer sheer numbers numbers of of Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence personnel. personnel. Oleg Oleg Gordievsky Gordievsky remembers remembers the the the British operation operation FOOT as a bombshell, bombshell, an an earthquake earthquake of of an an expulsion, British as "a expulsion, without without precedent, an an event event that that shocked the Centre Centreprofoundly."124 profoundly.124 According to Oleg OlegKalu Kaluprecedent, shocked the According to gin, "our our intelligence gathering activities activities in in England Englandsuffered suffered a a blow blow from which they gin, intelligence gathering from which they recovered.12 For the remainder of the Cold War War the the KGB probably found it never recovered."125 more difficult difficult to to collect collect high-grade high-grade intelligence intelligence in in London London than thanin in almost any any other other more almost Western capital. capital. Western

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105 KGB and and GRU GRU officers officers from from London in September September 1971, 1971, the theCentre Centre knew that 105 London in knew that it disaster. The The centerpiece of its its active cam it had had suffered suffered a a public public relations relations disaster. centerpiece of active measures measurescampaign the tables paign to to turn turn the tables on on British British intelligence intelligence and and discredit discredit the the British British expulsions expulsions was however, was in no no fit fit state state to to was the the former former rising rising star star of of SIS, Kim Kim Philby. Philby. Philby, Philby, however, wasin be in public. his memoirs to be seen seen in public. Since Since the the publication publication of of his memoirs in in 1968, 1968,the theKGB seemed seemed to have no no further for him roamed round Russia on on a a series series of almost have further use use for him and and Philby Philby roamed round Russia of almost suicidal sometimes left suicidal drinking drinking bouts bouts which which sometimes left him him oblivious oblivious of of where where he he was, was, uncer uncertain slowly pulled back tain whether whether it it was was night night or or day. day. During During the the early early 1970s 1970s he he was was slowly pulled back from from alcoholic alcoholic oblivion oblivion by by Rufa, Rufa, "the the woman woman I had had been been waiting waiting for for all all my my life."l life. Though nono doubt correctly, Though the the Centre Centrejudged, judged, doubt correctly, after after operation operation FOOT that that Philby Philby was still still in in no no condition condition to to give give a a press press conference, conference, it it used a lengthy lengthy interview with was used a interview with him "slanderous allegations" him in in Izvestia Izwestiu on on October October 1, 1, 1971 1971 to to denounce denounce the the slanderous allegations in in the the "right-wing Soviet officials from London right-wing bourgeois bourgeois British British press" press that that the the Soviet officials expelled expelled from London had been been engaged engaged in in espionage. espionage. In In striking striking contrast contrast with with the the far far more more sophisticated sophisticated had tone earlier, the tone of of Philby's Philbys memoirs memoirs published published three three years years earlier, the interview interview regurgitates regurgitates a a series denunciations of British "rwing series of of stereotypical stereotypical denunciations of British ruling circles:" circles:
It showd should be be said said that that spy spy mania, mania, the the fabrication fabrication of of slanderous slanderous inventions inventions in in regard regard to to the theSoviet Soviet Union, Union, is is nothing nothing new new in in the the activities activities of of the the ruling ruling circles circles in behind such in England. England. Definite, Definite,concrete concrete political political aims aims are are always always behind such activities. activities. This of This time time also, also, the the intensive intensive anti-Soviet anti-Soviet provocation provocation and and the the large large scale scale of the officials in in London, the false false accusations accusations in in regard regard to to Soviet Soviet officials London,as as well well as as the the tim timing the activities ing of of this this action, action, reveal reveal the the premeditated premeditated character character of of the activities of of the the Conservatives Conservatives who who now now hold hold power. power. These activities directed at brakes on These activities are are directed at putting putting the the brakes on the the process process of of lessen lessening ing tension tension in in Europe. Europe. It is is no no accident accident that, that, as as was was reflected reflected in in the the English English bourgeois bourgeois press, press, gov government showed evident should say ernment circles circles showed evident displeasure displeasure at, at, and andI should say fear fear of, of, the the for foreign the of the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, which which is is directed directed towards towards normalization normalization of of the eign policy policy of international international situation. situation.

DesPite of righteous righteous indignation indignation after expulsion of espite Moscow's Moscows public public expressions expressions of after the the expulsion of

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Philby Philby can can scarcely scarcely have havecomposed composed these these turgid turgid platitudes platitudes himself himself. The The probability probability is is that for signature. signature. Philby Philby added added to to that they they were were simply simply submitted submitted to to him him by by the the KGB for them some some personal personal memories memories of of the the anti-Soviet anti-Soviet "psychological psychologicalwarfare" warfare conducted conducted them by "SIS did did by British British intelligence-though intelligence-though there there was was a a certain certain irony irony to to his his claim claim that that SIS not interrupt interrupttheir their subversive operations operations against against the the Soviet Soviet Union Union even even at at the thetime time of not subversive of the the war war against against Hitler's Hitlers Germany."2 germ an^."^ In In reality, reality, the the lack lack of of evidence evidence of of anti-Soviet anti-Soviet sub subversion SIS reports suspect version in in the the wartime wartime SIS reports provided provided by by Philby Philby had had led led the the Centre Centre to to suspect him SIS officers, him of of disinformation.3 disinformation.3The The fact fact that that Philby Philby identified identified SIS officers, real realand and alleged, alleged, who had been been stationed stationed in the Middle Middle East East since since he Beirut in who had in the he had had defected defected from from Beirut in 1963 1963 is is further further evidence evidence that that much, much, if if not not all, all, of of his his interview interview was was scripted scripted for for him him by by the the British the Centre.4 Centre.4Among Among the British intelligence intelligence officers officers in in Beirut Beirut identified identified in in his his inter interview Spedding who, became chief view was was the the young young David David Spedding who, a a quarter quarter of of a a century century later, later, became chief of of SIS.5 ~1s.~ So, So, far far from from limiting limiting the the damage damage done done by the the London London expulsions, expulsions, Philby's Philbysinter interview fiasco. Tass view turned turned into into another another public public relations relations fiasco. Tass was was promptly promptly sued sued for for libel libel by by four citizens named named in interview as Robert four prominent prominent Lebanese Lebanese citizens in the the interview as British British agents: agents: Robert Zaman; Dori Dori Chamoun, son of Abella, editor-publisher Abella, editor-publisher of of the the Beirut Beirut weekly weekly Al Zanzan; Chamoun,son of for former President President Camille Camille Chamoun; Farid Chehab, Chehab, former former Lebanese security mer Chamoun; Emir Emir Farid Lebanese security chief; chiec and and Ahmed Ahmed Isbir, Isbir, a a deputy deputy in in the the Lebanese Lebanese parliament.6 parliament.6 The The Soviet Soviet ambas ambassador in in Beirut Beirut sought sought to todistance distance his his government government from from the the law law suit suit by by declaring declaring that that sador the whole whole affair affair was was"purely purelyjournalistic" journalistic and and that that "the theSoviet Soviet Union Union as as a a state state had had no no the connection with it. H e quickly quickly backtracked, backtracked, however, however, when when the the head head of of the the Tass Tass connection with it." He bureau in in Beirut, Beirut, Nikolai Nikolai Borisovich Borisovich Filatov, Filatov, was was included included in in the the law law suit, suit, claiming claiming bureau that "a government agency" and covered by diplo that Tass Tass was was a government news news agency and that that Filatov Filatov was was covered diplomatic immunity.7 imrn~nity.~ make matters matters worse, worse, the the Communist lawyer chosen chosen by by the the matic To To make Communist lawyer embassy to SIS agent. agent.8 Before embassy to act act for for Tass Tass was was believed believed by the the Centre Centre to to be be an an SIS Before the the case came to trial trial the the Beirut withdrew Filatov Filatov and and his his family family to to Moscow.9 Moscow. case came to Beirut residency residency withdrew 1972 the the Tass TaSs Lebanese Lebanese bureau bureau chief, chief, Raymond Raymond Saadeh, Saadeh, who who was was unable unable to to In May 1972 claim diplomatic immunity, immunity, was was sentenced sentenced to to two two months' months imprisonment imprisonment and claim diplomatic and ordered each of ordered to to pay pay damages damages of of 40,000 Lebanese Lebanese pounds pounds to to each of the the plaintiffs-a plaintiffs-a sen sentence later later reduced reduced on on appeal appeal to to a fine of of 1,000 1,000 and and damages damages of of 10,000 10,000 Lebanese tence a fine Lebanese pounds pounds each each (a (a total total of of about about 6,000 6,000 pounds pounds sterling). sterling). Tass Tass was was further further humiliated humiliated by by being ordered ordered to to report against it. it. The The story story appeared appeared in in The Times Times being report the the judgment judgment against under the the headline, headline, Tass ordered to to pay pay for for libel by Mr. Mr. Kim Kim Philby."lo Philby. under "Tass ordered libel by The miserable miserable sequel sequel to to Philby's Philbys Izvestia interview interview did did little little either either to to persuade persuade The serious use for his talents or to assist in his Philby that the KGB any longer had a serious rehabilitation. When When Oleg Oleg Kalugin Kalugin met met him for the the first first time time at beginning of of rehabilitation. him for at the the beginning 1972, a month after Philbys marriage to Rufa, he found a wreck of a man: 1972, a month after Philby's marriage to Rufa, he found "a wreck of a man:"
figure caromed off the walls as The bent figure as he walked. Reeking of vodka, he mumbled something something unintelligible unintelligible to to me me in in atrocious, atrocious, slurred slurred Russian. Russian. mumbled Over the the next few years Kalugin and other Young Turks within the FCD gradually succeeded in rehabilitating Philby, Philby, using him to to devise activemeasures measures and run run semsucceeded devise active

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officers about to be posted to Britain, Ireland, Australasia and Scaninars for young officers Scan dinavia. Kryuchkov Kryuchkov and and the theFCD old old guard, guard, however, however, remained remained suspicious suspicious of ofPhilby Philby dinavia. of status continued to rankle toallow him into intoYasenevo.ll Yasenevo. Philby's Philbys lack of and rehsed refused to him.He H e liked to give Western journalists the impression that he hewas Colonel Colonelwith him. General-Philby of the KGB. reality, he remained agent TOM. or even General-Philby KGB. In reality,
I N T H E I M M E D I AT A TE E aftermath of the mass expulsions expulsions of IN of September 1971, 1971, most of of residencys agents were put on on ice. The Centre calculated that the resithe London residency's resi a reduced scale, dency would be unlikely to resume normal operations, even on a scale, until the earliestY earliest.12 mid-1974 at the The much much reduced reduced number number of of KGB and and GRU officers in London London found found them themThe officers in selves under considerably considerablytighter surveillance. surveillance. On O n September 17,1971, selves 17, 1971, Abdoolcader, the GLC motor licensing department, was arrested after a tip-off the KGB agent in the tip-off from Lyalin, Lyalin, who who had had been his case officer for two years. years. In In his wallet from been his case officer for the the previous previous two his wallet Lyalin,giving the latest registration numbers of was a postcard addressed addressed to Lyalin, of MI5 MIS sursur veillance vehicles. vehicles.Abdoolcader was jailed for three years.13 veillance years.13 Voronin, declared persona nun and known known intel110n grata and intel With the previous resident, resident, Voronin, ligence officers rehsed British visas, a junior Line KR officer, Yevgeni Ivanovich ligence officers refused visas, junior Line officer, Lazebny, who who had had the the cover cover position position of of security at the the Soviet delegation Lazebny, security officer officer at Soviet trade trade delegation and had had somehow somehow escaped expulsion, was was made acting resident. resident. During his fourteen fourteen and escaped expulsion, made acting During his months in charge, Lazebny Lazebny tried tried to to preserve preserve his cover by his office months in charge, his cover by keeping keeping his office at at the the trade delegation and visiting the embassy each day to supervise the work of the resitrade delegation and visiting the embassy each day to supervise the work of the resi dency.14 dency.14 Though out out of of his his depth depthwhen it it came came to torunning operations, Though when running intelligence intelligence operations, Lazebny insisted insisted on on elaborate elaborate and and time-consuming security precautions precautions which which fur furLazebny time-consuming security residency. No one was allowed allowedto enter enter the theresidency ther complicated the life of the residency. wearing be to conceal wearing an an overcoat overcoat for for fear fear that that it itmight might be used usedto conceal material material being being smuggled smuggled Briefcases, bags bagsand packages were also forbidden, and the shoes in or out. Briefcases, shoes of operaopera tions officers officers were wereX X-rayed for bugs bugs or or any any hidden compartments. All mail hr-rayed for hidden compartments. mail and and fur tions niture bought bought or or repaired repaired locally locally were X-rayed. embassy administrative niture werealso also X -rayed. The The embassy administrative placing a a bulk order at at a store officer, M. V. Loshkarov, officer, M. Loshkarov, was was disciplined disciplined for for placing bulk order a London Londonstore electric lamps which Lazebny feared might be bugged. Oil cans, for electric cans, batteries, even knots in in woodwork, woodwork, were were regularly regularly inspected inspected to make sure contained no knots to make sure they they contained no bugs bugs or or S secret compartments.1 compartment^.^^ secret

At the theend end of of 1972 1972 Lazebny Lazebny was was succeeded succeeded as Yakov KonAt as resident resident by by the the Latvian Latvian Yakov Kon stantinovich (alias "Bukashev"),16 who continued to insist on elaborate stantinovich Lukasevics Lukasevics (alias Buka~hev) who , ~ ~ continued to insist on elaborate security procedures. In residency received received agent agent reports that MI5 MIS had had a a security procedures. In 1971-2 1971-2 the the residency reports that source trade delegation or among among the inspec source either either among among the theofficials officials of of the the Soviet Soviet trade delegation or theinspectors of of industrial industrial equipment. equipment. Though Though a a time-consuming time-consuming hunt hunt for the traitor traitor contin contintors for the ued unti1 until 197 1976, yielded no no result. result. It was was eventually eventually concluded theagent agent reports reports ued 6, it it yielded concluded that that the MI5 to distract the residency from its operational priormight have been planted by MIS prior ities. foundation. An ities. The The residency's residencys fears fearsof of British British penetration penetration had, had,however, however, some some foundation. An extensive network network of of bugging bugging devices devices was was discovered discoveredat at the the trade trade delegation, delegation, which which extensive contained outposts outposts of residenciesY contained of both both the the KGB and and GRU residencies.17

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Following Following the the 1971 1971 expulsions, expulsions, Cuban Cuban and and east east European European intelligence intelligence services services s The KGB were help were asked asked by by the the Centre Centretoto help plug plug the the intelligence intelligence gap gap in in London.1 London.l*The KGB also also sought some degree residency by sought to to compensate compensate in in some degree for for its its diminished diminished residency by expanding expanding its its agent embassy. 1973 nine agent network network among among the thediplomats diplomats and and staff staff of of the theLondon London embassy. By By 1973 nineteen listed KGB agents, agents, among among them them teen members members of of the the embassy embassywere were listed in in Centre Centrefiles files as as KGB the the ambassador's ambassador's deputy, deputy, Ivan Ivan IppolitovY Ipp01itov.l~Some Some of of the the KGB KGB officers officers who who were were expelled to expelled from, from, or or denied denied entry entry to, to, Britain, Britain, were were redeployed redeployed to Commonwealth Commonwealth capitals capitals with British expatriate Delhi, Colombo, with substantial substantial British expatriate communities-notably communities-notably Delhi, Colombo, Dar-es Dar-esSalaam, The les seen Salaam, Lagos Lagos and and Lusaka.20 Lusaka.20 The fi files seen by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin record record few few major major recruit recruitments of British agents ments of British agents by by the the redeployed redeployed officers. officers. In In 1974, 1974, however, however, three three operations operations officers G. M. N. T. officers in in an an east east African African residency-So residency-S. S. S. Sarmanov, Sarmanov, G. M. Yermolev Yermolev and and N. T. Krestnikov-were givenawards awards for British journalist,TOM, journalist, TOM, and Krestnikov-were given for recruiting recruiting a a British and his his wife wife IRENE. IRENE. TOM TOM and and IRENE, IRENE, however, however, proved proved of of limited limited usefulness. usehlness. Early Early in in 1976 1976 TOM TOM moved moved to to Asia Asia and and was was briefly briefly used used to to report report on on other otherWestern Westernresidents. residents. He He failed, in April 1976 failed, however, however, to to gain gain access access to to any any classified classified information information and andin April 1976 Kryuchkov Kryuchkov decided decided to to break break operational operational contact contact with with him.21 him.21 of London residency of the the London residency to to resume resume something something like like normal normal operations operations after after the the 1971 1971 expulsions, expulsions, albeit albeit slowly slowly and and on on a a reduced reduced scale, scale, was was Line Line X plans most highly X (S&T). (S&T). During During 1972 1972 plans were were made made to to renew renew contact contact with with six six of of its its most highly rated Melita Norwood Norwood (HOLA) the British rated agents: agents: the the veteran veteran Melita (HOLA) in in the British Non-Ferrous Non-Ferrous Metals Association, first recruited in 1937; ACE, an aeronautical engineer; HUNT, Metals Association, first recruited in 1937; ACE, an aeronautical engineer; HUNT, a a civil civil servant servant recruited recruited by by Norwood; Norwood; YUNG, YUNG, an an aeronautics aeronautics and and computer computer engineer; engineer; NAGIN, NAGIN, a a chemical chemical engineer; engineer; and and STEP" STEP, a a laboratory laboratory assistant.22 assistant.22 Though Though Mitrokhin's notes give account of Mitrokhin's notes give only only an an incomplete incomplete account of how how the the six six agents agents were were reacti reactivated, it is clear that it was a lengthy business, probably preceded by prolonged vated, it is clear that it was a lengthy business, probably preceded by prolonged and and painstaking painstaking surveillance surveillance to to ensure ensure that that none none was was under under MIS MI5 observation. observation. Contact Contact with , and with HUNT was was not not re-established re-established until until 1975 1975, and even even then then it itwas was thought thought safer safer to to use operations officer use a a French French agent, agent, MAIRE, rather rather than than an anoperations officer from from the the London Londonres residency, idency, as as his his controller.23 ~ontroller.~~ When inin London in 1974, it was When contact contact was was renewed renewed with with Melita MelitaNorwood Norwood London in 1974, was it dis discovered covered that that she she had had retired retired two two years years earlier. earlier.Since Since she she no no longer longer had had access access to to clas classified sified material, material, regular regular contact contact was was discontinued. discontinued. HOLA, however, however, retained retained a a high high reputation agent with reputation in in the the Centre Centre as as probably probably its its longest-serving longest-serving British British agent with a a highly highly productive record which productive record which included included intelligence intelligence on on the the British British nuclear nuclear program. program. She She seems seems to to have have remained remained throughout throughout her her career career a a true true believer believer in in the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. During During a a visit visit to to Moscow Moscow with with her her husband husband in in 1979, 1979,forty-two forty-two years years after after her her origi original declined, saying nal recruitment, recruitment, she she was was offered offered a a further hrther financial financial reward reward but but declined, saying she she had had all all she she needed needed to to live live on.24 X residency fewer By By 1974 1974 Line Line X at at the theLondon London residency had had nine nine operations operations officers officers (seven (seven fewer than operation FOOT), headed by than before before operation FOOT), headed by the the deputy deputyresident, resident, Oleg Oleg Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Yakimov, contact with most of Yakirnov, and and had had successfully successfully resumed resumed contact with most of the the Line LineX X agents agents put put on most productive productive of reactivated agents on ice ice in in September September 1971.25 1971.25The The most of the the reactivated agents was, was, almost certainly, certainly, the the aeronautical aeronautical engineer engineer ACE, recruited recruited in in the thelate late 1960s.26 1 9 6 0 ~By . ~the the ~ almost
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he died in the the early 1980s, 1980s, ACEs of about 300 volumes, volumes, time he ACE's product file consisted of each each of of about about 300 pages. pages. Most Most of of these these 90,000 90,000 pages pages consisted consisted of of technical technical docu docuon new aircraft (among them them Concorde, the Super VC-10 and Lockheed mentation on L-loll), aero-engines (including Rolls-Royce, Olympus-593, RB-211 and SNEYL-1011), 505) and and fl flight simulators. ACE's ACEs material material on on the theflight flight simulators simulators for for the the Lockheed Lockheed 505) ight simulators. L-1011 foundation for a new generation of Soviet Soviet equiva equivaL-101 1 and Boeing 747 were the foundation flag company) an aerolents. ACE also recruited under false fl ag (probably that of a rival company) aero engine specialist specialist codenamed SWEDE. SWEDE. Remarkably, Remarkably, ACE was paid a monthly salary of only only 225 225 pounds, pounds, raised to 350 pounds pounds in in 1980.27 1980.27 of raised to the exclusion from Britain of known KGB and GRU officers, officers, the KGB Despite the was still still able able to to send send Line X agents and "trusted trusted contacts" contacts from from Soviet agents and Soviet universities universities to to was Line X Britain on on scientific scientific exchanges exchanges and and for for postgraduate postgraduate or or postdoctoral postdoctoral research research in in engi engiBritain neering and and the the natural natural sciences. sciences. Most Most went went either either to to universities universities and and polytechnics neering polytechnics in in the London area or or to to Oxford and Cambridge.28 Cambridge.2s "Targets Targets of of operational operational interest," interest, the London area Oxford and where it it was was hoped hoped that that KGB agents agents and and trusted trusted contacts contacts could could identify identify potential potential where recruits, included included Churchill Churchill College, College, King's Kings College, College, St. Catharines College College and and recruits, St. Catharine's Trinity Hall University; Magdalen, Queens and and Trinity Trinity Colleges at Trinity Hall at at Cambridge Cambridge University; Magdalen, Qyeen's Colleges at Oxford; King's Kings College, College, University University College, College, the the London London School School of of Economics, Economics, the Oxford; the School of of Oriental Oriental and and African African Studies Studies and and the the School School of of Slavonic Slavonic Studies Studies at at Lon LonSchool don University.29 Uni~ersity.~~ don Some of of the the Soviet Soviet scientists scientists who who came came to to conduct conduct research research in in Britain Britain were were KGB Some officers. 1975, for example, example, Dr. Hugh Huxley of the British Medical offi cers. In May 1975, Research Council's Councils molecular molecular biology biology laboratory laboratory at at Cambridge Cambridgeinvited invited Academician Academician Research Frank, director director of of the Academy of of Sciences Sciences Biophysics Institute, to send a a Frank, the USSR Academy Biophysics Institute, to send member of his his institute institute to to carry carry out out research research at at the the laboratory. laboratory. Unknown Unknown to to Huxley, Huxley, member of the the KGB. The was the invitation invitation was was misappropriated misappropriated by by the The scientist scientist sent sent to toCambridge Cambridge was Valeri Vasilyevich Vasilyevich Lednev of of Directorate Directorate T.30 T.30 the time timeLednev Lednev embarked on Valeri Lednev At about about the embarked on his British assignment, assignment, the head of of Directorate Directorate T, his British the head had been in T, Mikhail Mikhail Lopatin, Lopatin,who who had been in charge of of S&T S&T collection collection in in Britain Britain in in the the mid-1960s, mid--1960s,arrived in London London to to advise advise charge arrived in the the residency residency on on the theexpansion expansion of of Line Line X X operations.31 operation^.^' Though not not comprehensive, comprehensive, Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes suggest suggest that that there there were were fewer fewer new new Though British Line Line X X recruits recruits during during the the1970s 1970s than than in inthe the decade before before operation operation FOOT. decade FOOT. British The earliest earliest post-FOOT recruit definitely definitely identified identified by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin is is CHRISTINA, The post-FOOT recruit CHRISTINA, who the Soviet Union.32 It is who was was recruited recruited in in 1973-probably 1973-probably in in the Soviet Union.32 is unclear unclear from from Mitrokhins notes notes whether whether four four other other Line LineX X agents agents operating operating in inBritain Britain in in the the early early Mitrokhin's 1970s the mass mass expulsion and GRU officers.33 officers.33 1970s were were recruited recruited before before or or after after the expulsion of ofKGB and Because cult operating least six (probably (probably more) more) Because of of the the diffi difficult operating conditions conditions in in London, London,at at least six Line their case officers outside Britain or Line X X agents agents either either met met their case officers outside Britain or were were controlled controlled by by other other European European residencies.34 re~idencies.~~ agent recruited recruited during during the the decade after operaThe most The most important important British British S&T agent decade after opera tion John Smith (codenamed was, almost almost certainly, certainly, Michael Michael John Smith (codenamed BORG), BORG), a a tion FOOT was, Communist The Communist electronics electronics engineer.35 engineer.35 The secretary secretary of of the the Surrey Surrey Communist Communist Party Party in in the early early 1970s, 1970s, Richard Richard Geldart, Geldart, recalls recalls Smith Smith as as an an "out-and-out out-and-out Tankie"-a Tanhe-a hard hardthe line too line supporter supporter of of the the crushing crushing of of the the Prague Prague Spring Spring by by Soviet Soviet tanks: tanks: "Not Not to toput put too

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fine a point point on on it, it,he he was the the total total nerd. nerd. There There was was socializing socializing going going on, on, but but he hewas was fi ne a was Line X officer at at the residency, Viktor Viktor Alekseevich Alekseevich not part of it."36 it.36A Line not part of X officer theLondon London residency, Oshchenko OZEROV), made initial contact with Smith Smith in ina a Oshchenko (codenamed OZEROV), pub near near Smiths fl flat at IGngston-on-Thames Kingston-on-Thames after after a a trade trade union held in in May May 1975 1975 Smith's at at union meeting meeting held before British membership membership of instructions from before the the referendum referendum on on British of the the EEC. On O n instructions from Oshchenko, Communist Party, became a Oshchenko, Smith Smith left left the the Communist Party, ceased ceased trade trade union union activity, activity, became a a local tennis club regular regular reader reader of of the the Daily Telegraph, Telegraph, joined joined a local tennis club and-as and-as his his opera operational file file quaintly quaintly puts puts it-"endeavored it-endeavored to to display display his his loyalty loyalty to to the the authorities." authorities. tional In bureaucratic confusion conhsion in in MIS, caused caused by bythe the remarkable remarkable In July July 1976, 1976, helped helped by bureaucratic . coincidence the Surrey Party contained another Michael Michael John coincidence that that the Surrey Communist Communist Party contained another John Smith, he gained gained a job as test engineer the quality Smith, he a job as a a test engineer in in the quality assurance assurance department department of of Thorn-EMI Thorn-EM1 Defense Defense Electronics Electronics at at Feltham, Feltham, Middlesex. Middlesex. Within Within a a year year he he was was XN-715, fuses for working on the the top top secret project XN -715, developing and testing radar fuses Britains freefall freefall nuclear nuclear bomb.37 bomb.37 The KGB passed passed the the documents on project project XN XN-715 Britain's The documents on -715 provided by by Smith Smith to to N. V. Serebrov Serebrov and and other other nuclear nuclear weapons weapons specialists specialists at at aasecret secret provided Soviet military military research research institute institute codenamed G-4598, who who succeeded in Soviet codenamed Enterprise Enterprise G-4598, succeeded in building a a replica replica of of the theBritish British radar radar fuse. fuse. Smith's Smithsintelligence, intelligence, however, however, seemed seemed too too building good to to be be true. true. Serebrov Serebrov and and his his colleagues colleagues were werepuzzled puzzled as as to to how how Smith Smith had hadbeen been good able to to obtain obtain the the radio radio frequency frequency on on which which the the detonator detonatorwas was to to operate. operate. This This infor inforable was so sensitive sensitive that it should not have appeared even in the the mation, they believed, was top secret secret documents documents on the design design and and operation operation of of the the detonator detonator to to which which Smith Smith top on the had access. access. Armed Armed with with a a knowledge knowledge of of the the radio radio frequency, frequency, Soviet Soviet forces forces would would be be had able to to create create radio radio interference interference which which could could prevent prevent the the detonator detonator from from operating. operating. able One possibility possibility which which occurred occurred to to the the specialists specialists was was that that the the frequency frequency supplied supplied by by One Smith might m@ht be be merely merely a test test frequency frequency which which would would not not be be used used in in actual actual military military Smith operations. But they operations. But they remained remained suspicious suspicious of of the the extent extent of of the the detailed detailed highly highly classi classified information information which which Smith Smith had had been been able able to to supply.38 supply.38 fied The Centre Centre also also seems seems to to have have been been suspicious suspicious of of the the ease ease and and speed speed with with which which The a well-known well-known pro-Soviet pro-Soviet Communist Communist had had been to gain to one oneof of Britain's Britains a been able able to gain access access to most highly classified nuclear secrets secrets so so soon after going going through through the of most highly classified nuclear soon after the motions motions of leaving the the Party Partyand and switching switching from from the the Morning Star to to the the Telegraph. Its Its susDaily Telegraph. sus leaving picions that that Smith's Smiths intelligence intelligence on on the the radar radar fuse fuse might might have have been a sophisticated sophisticated picions been a deception seem to have have strengthened strengthened when whenhe he told his his controller controller in in 1978 1978that that he had deception seem to told he had lost his his security security clearance clearance and, and, for for the the time time being, being, could could no no longer longer provide provide classified classified lost information. (Though (Though Smith did not not realize realize it it at at the the time, time, MIS had had discovered discovered its its information. Smith did Thorn-EM1 of Smith's Smiths Communist past.)39 past.)39 earlier error and secretly informed Thorn-EMI To try try to to resolve resolve its its doubts doubts the the Centre devised a a series series of of tests tests to to check check Smith's Smiths To Centre devised reliability. The first test, which Smith seems to have passed, was to remove two packreliability. passed, remove pack ets of secret material from a dead letter-box in Spain. Spain. The second, second, more elaborate Smith, a psy psycheck on Smith, personally approved by Andropov and termed in KGB jargon "a non-contact polygraph," polygraph, was conducted in Vienna in cho-physiological test using a non-contact August August 1979 1979 by by Boris Boris Konstantinovich Konstantinovich Stalnov Stalnov and and two two OT (operational-technical (operational-technical support) officers. Stalnov began with a brief prepared speech, duly entered in Smith's Smiths support) officers. a brief file: file:

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am personally with the the way way things things are with our I am personally satisfied satisfied with are going going and and with our mutual mutual relations and and I am am therefore therefore extremely extremely glad to congratulate congratulate you. From today today relations glad to you. From you are are a a full hll member of our our organization. organization. This This means the organization you member of means that that the organization will take take care care of of you. you. Believe Believe me, me,you you will have have gained gained friends friends who are ready ready to will will who are to come to your your help in any any circumstances. participation and and help help to come to help in circumstances.Your Your participation to the the organization The organization will will be be duly dulyrecognized. recognized. The organization organization is is based basedon on two two princi principles: voluntary voluntaryparticipation and sincerity. sincerity. ples: The first first means means that, that, having having joined joined the the organization organization of your own own free The of your free will, will, you may it at at any any time time if if you you think it necessary, without any you may leave leave it think it necessary, without any [adverse] [adverse] consequences for for yourself, yourself, provided provided you yougive give prior notice. consequences prior notice. As for for the the second second principle, principle, sincerity, sincerity,you you must must inform inform us all details details which As us of of all which directly or or indirectly indirectly affect affect the the interests interests of of our our organization. directly organization. This This is is underunder standable as as the the security security of of both bothsides sides depends depends on on it. it. Joining the organization standable Joining the organization is also also in in a a certain certain sense sense a a formal formal act. act. In connection with with this this I am am required required to to is In connection put a number numberof of questions to to you. you. I regard as a a pure formality.You You should put a questions regard this this as pure formality. should do do the the same. same. will simplify simplify the the task task and and save save time time if you simply simply answer answer"yes" yes or no. It will if you or "no."

Smith over 120 his replies recorded. SubseSubse Smith was was then then asked asked over 120 questions questions and and his replies secretly secretly recorded. quent analysis analysis of of the therecording recording and and Smith's Smiths response responseto to each each question question persuaded persuaded the the quent Centre-doubtless had thought possible, Centre-doubtless to to its its immense immense relief-that relief-that he he was was not, not, as as it it had thoughtpossible, engaged a grand grand deception orchestrated by British intelligence. Though Smith engaged in in a deception orchestrated by British intelligence. Though Smith had had been been led led to to suppose suppose that that the the "psycho-physiological psycho-physiological test" test was was a a routine routineformality, formality, it had never before byby the KGB outside the Soviet Union. The The Centre was it had never been beenused used before the outside the Soviet Union. Centre was so pleased its success that it it decided the same to check so pleased with with its success that decided to to use use the same method method to check other other agents. Smith aathird (and apparently agents. It It none none the theless less decided decided to to give give Smith third (and apparently final) final) test test of of his his "sincerity" of film two rolls rolls of film from from a a sincerityby by instructing instructing him himto toremove remove a a container container holding holding two DLB in cer in in the the Paris Paris suburbs suburbs and and to to deliver deliver it it to to a a KGB offi officer in Lisbon.40 Lisbon.40The The KGB would doubtless have have been been able detect any Smith or would doubtless able to to detect any attempt attempt by by Smith or another another intelli intelligence gence agency agency to to open open the the container. container. From paid a From 1979 1979 onward onward Smith Smith was was paid a 300-pound 300-pound monthly monthly retainer retainer by by the the KGB. His file file also additional payments payments for for documents documents supplied supplied by him of 1,600 His also records records additional by him of 1,600 pounds, 2,000 pounds. notes do pounds, 750 750 pounds, pounds, 400 400 pounds pounds and and 2,000 pounds. Though Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not payments, they not record record the the dates dates of of these these payments, they probably probably relate relate chiefly chiefly to to Smith's Smiths two two years The excitement of working years in in Thorn-EMI Thorn-EM1 Defense Defense Electronics.41 Electronics.41The excitement of working for for the the KGB, copying highly classified documents, emptying DLBs DLBs and goingto to secret copying highly classified documents, emptying and going secret assignations officers in seems to rescued Smith Smith assignations with with his his case case officers in foreign foreign capitals capitals seems to have have rescued from nerd." A hint exotic pre from his his earlier earlier existence existence as as a a "total total nerd. hint of of the the exotic began began to to enliven enliven a a previously drab lifestyle. hegot got married, up flamenco flamenco dancing, dancing, began viouslydrab lifestyle. In In 1979 1979 he married, took took up began experimenting with with Spanish Spanish and andMexican Mexican cuisine, cuisine, and and gave gave dinner dinner parties parties at at which which experimenting guests guests were were served servedhis his homemade homemade wine.42 wine.42 so taken taken with with his his life life as as a a secret secret agent agent that thathe he made strenuous strenuous efforts efforts to to Smith was was so Smith made recover the the security security clearance clearance he he had hadlost lost in in 1978, 1978, even drafting drafting aapersonal appealtwo two recover even personal appeal years later later to to Margaret Margaret Thatcher Thatchertoto intercede on behalf. "There There is is a a cloud cloud over overme me years intercede on his his behalf

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which which I cannot cannot dispel," dispel, he he complained complained to to the the Prime Prime Minister. Minister. "I I have have been been wrongly wrongly suspected suspected and and have have lost lost my my position position most most unjustly." unjustly. Though Though Smith Smith seems seems never never to to have Thatcher, in June succeeded have posted posted his his letter letter to toMrs. Mrs. Thatcher, June in 1980 1980 he he succeeded in in putting puttinghis his case case to ever MIS officer. officer. Smith Smith began began by by denying denying that that he hehad had ever been been a a Communist, Communist, was was to an an MI5 confronted he had, had,then then apologized had confronted with with evidence evidence that that he apologized for for lying lying and and said said he he had joined joined the the Party Party only only to to find find a a girlfriend.43 girlfriend.43Amazingly, Amazingly, Smith's Smithscampaign campaign to to recover recover his setback. More his security security clearance clearance survived survived even even this this setback. More amazingly amazingly still, still, a a few few years years later later it it succeeded.44 succeeded.44 In In 1980 1980 7.5 7.5 percent percent of of all all Soviet Soviet scientific scientific and and technological technological intelligence intelligence came came from As from British British sources.45 sources.45 As well well as as providing providing what what it itclaimed claimed was was enormous enormous assistance assistance to the military to Soviet Soviet research research and and development, development, especially especially in in the military field, field, Directorate Directorate T also also prided prided itself itself on on obtaining obtainingcommercial commercial secrets secrets which which drove drove down down the the cost cost of of con contracts with Western companies. One British example of which it was particularly tracts with Western companies. One British example of which it was particularly proud the later negotiation of proud during during the later 1970s 1970s was was the the negotiation of the the contract contract for for two two large large methane methane production production plants plants with with the the companies companies Davy Davy Power Power Gas Gas and and Klickner Klickner INA Industrial The Industrial Plants.46 Plants.46 The original original price price quoted quoted by by the the British British consortium consortium was was 248 248 mil million convertible roubles, as compared with the 206 million allocated for the project lion convertible roubles, as compared with the 206 million allocated for the project by by the the Soviet Soviet Council Council of of Ministers. Ministers. An An operation operation conducted conducted in in the the Peking Peking Hotel, Hotel, Moscow, the assistance Moscow, on on March March 23, 23, 1977 1977 by by Directorate Directorate T with with the assistance of of the the Moscow Moscow KGB, probably probably based based on on a a combination combination of of eavesdropping eavesdropping and and the the secret secret photocopy photocopying ing of of company company documents, documents, obtained obtained commercial commercial intelligence intelligence which-according which-according to to a a report report by by the the Ministry Ministry of of Foreign Foreign Trade-made Trade-made it it possible possible to to negotiate negotiate a a reduction reduction of 1977 Andropov of 50.6 50.6 million million roubles roubles on on the theprice price of of the thecontract. contract. On O n October October 24, 24,1977 Andropov formally formally commended commended fifteen fifteen KGB KGB officers officers for for their their part part in inthe theoperation. operation. Ironically, Ironically, the his Soviet the British British prime prime minister, minister,James James Callaghan, Callaghan, subsequently subsequently wrote wrote to to his Soviet oppo opposite Soviet site number, number, Alexei Alexei Kosygin, Kosygin,to to thank thankthe the Soviet government government for for awarding awarding the the con contract tract to to a a British British firm.47 firm.47 KR Lines residency Lines at at the theLondon London residency appear appear to to have have had had less less success successdur during X. ing the the 1970s 1970sthan thanLine Line X. The The only only known known Soviet Soviet agent agent within within the the British British intelli intelligence gence community, community, Geoffrey Geoffrey Prime Prime of of GCH G C H Q was was run run not not by by the the residency residency but but by by Third outside The most highly Third Directorate Directorate controllers controllers who who met methim him outside Britain.48 Britain.48 The most highly placed placed Line the decade Line PR agent agent active active during duringthe decade after after operation operation FOOT identified identified in in Mitrokhins notes notes was was WILLIAM, WILLIAM, a a trade trade union union official official and and former former Communist. Communist. Mitrokhin's WILLIAM WILLIAM was was recruited recruited during during a a visit visit to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union by by Boris Boris Vasilyevich Vasilyevich Denisov, as a Denisov, a a KGB officer officer working working under under cover cover as a Soviet Soviet trade trade union union (AUCCTU) (AUCCTU) official, and the the Labor Labor Party. Party. official, and and agreed agreed to to provide provide inside inside information information on on the the TUC and After case After a a meeting meeting with with WILLIAM WILLIAM in in London London in in December December 1975, 1975, however, however, his his case officer become officer reported reported that that he hehad had become anxious anxious about about his his role role as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. Though Though reaffirming reaffirming his his desire desire to to help help his his Soviet Soviet comrades, comrades, WILLIAM WILLIAM said said that that he he was was dis distrusted by by less less progressive trade union unionofficials officials because because his Marxist Marxist views views and and wor wortrusted progressive trade ofof his ried ried that that word word of of his his Soviet Soviet connection connection would would leak leak out out and and damage damage his his chances chances of of becoming becoming leader leader of of his his union.49 union.49Lacking Lacking any any really really important important British British agents, agents, Line Line PR
THE PR AND

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tended cance of such as as WILLIAM and and tended to to exaggerate exaggerate the the signifi significance of second-rate second-rate agents agents such othersources sources of ofinside insideinformation on British politics and government policy. its other policy. The Line PR was proudest was was Harold Harold Wilson Wilson (code was proudest (codeThe political political contact contact of of which which Line OLDING), who who became became president president of of the theGreat Great Britain-USSR Association named OLDING), named Britain-USSR Association after his his resignation as prime prime minister minister in in 1976. The first Soviet after resignation as 1976. The firstsecretary secretary at at the the Soviet embassy embassy responsible responsible for forliaison liaisonwith with the the association, association, Andrei Andrei Sergeyevich Sergeyevich Parastayev, Parastayev, periodically on Wilson, discuss its its affairs affairs with with him. The fact fact that that periodically called calledon Wilson, nominally nominally to to discuss him.The Parastayev claim that had secured secured access Parastayev was wasa a KGB agent agent allowed allowed the the residency residency to to claim that it ithad access to claiming that "confidential to the the former former prime prime minister. minister. Though Though not notclaiming that Wilson Wilsonwas was a a confidential contact (let alone alone an an agent), agent), the the residency that he provided political political contact" (let residency reported reported that he freely freely provided i n f o r m a t i ~ nMitrokhin's Mitrokhins .~~ notes give give no no examples examples of information.50 notes of what what the the information information comcom prised, but if if Wilson's Wilsons observations observationsto to Parastayev Parastayev resembled resembled his hisprivate private comments to prised, but comments to some of his his British British friends friends and and acquaintances, acquaintances, they certainlyhave have attracted some of they would would certainly attracted the the attention ofthe the Centre and probably probably have have been beenpassed passed to thePolitburo. Politburo. Roy attention of Centre and to the Roy Jenkins Jenkins noted "did think there was much much future future for for the the noted in in 1978, 1978, for for example, example,that that Wilson Wilson did not not think there was [Callaghan] Government, Government, or orindeed indeed the the Labor Labor Party."51 Party.51 [Callaghan] The Service A had The Centre Centre claimed claimed that that disinformation disinformation from from Service had been been passed passed to to Wil Wilson, via Parastayev, Parastayev, with with the the intention intention that that it itshould the Labor son, probably probably via should reach reach the Labor govgov ernment.52 that the disinformation had had any any significant ernment.52It It is is highly highly unlikely, unlikely, however, however,that the disinformation significant infl uence on government. In though influence on Wilson, Wilson, let let alone alone on on the the Callaghan Callaghan government. In retirement, retirement, though remaining fi firmly anchored in in the the Labor Party, Wilson the right. remaining rmly anchored Labor Party, Wilson moved moved steadily steadily to to the right. According to his his official officialbiographer, biographer,Philip Ziegler, by dislike of According to Philip Ziegler, by 1977 1977 his his dislike of the the far far left left equaled that that of of "the the most conservative of of capitalists."53 equaled most conservative Nor did did Wilson Wilson show show great great capitalist^."'^ Nor sympathy foreign policy. policy. His that, after after the the invasion invasion of of sympathy for for Soviet Soviet foreign His KGB file file reports reports that, Afghanistan, he he canceled canceled a a visit visit to to the the his capacity capacityas Great Afghanistan, USSR in in his as president president of of the the Great Britain-USSR Britain-USSR Association.54 Associati~n.~~ By the to spend the 1970s 1970s Line Line PR in in London, London,as as in in other other residencies, residencies, was wassupposed supposedto spend 25 percent percent ofits of itstime time on on active active measures55 measuress5 and send to the theCentre 25 and send annual annual statistics statistics to Centre on on the in 1976 in 1977.56 1977.56 the number number of of its its influence influence operations. operations. These These totaled totaled 160 in 1976 and and190 190 in During they had initiated 99 discussions discussions which which During 1977 1977 Line Line PR officers officers reported reported that that they had initiated allegedly opinion-formers, and and claimed claimed allegedly "influenced" influencedpoliticians, politicians, journalists journalists and and other otheropinion-formers, to send to have have successfully successfullyprompted prompted 26 public public announcements, announcements, 20 publications, publications, the the sending of ofmore more than than 20 20letters letters and and telegrams, telegrams, 9 questions questions in in Parliament, confering Parliament, 5 press press confer meetings and and demonstrations demonstrations and and 3 television television and and radio radio broadcasts. ences, ences, 4 meetings broadcasts. In In addition, and one document produced produced by by addition, it it had had distributed distributed three three brochures brochures and one forged forged document which was was responsible responsible for foractive activemeasures measures at the theCentre. Service A, which Service at Centre.57 In order order to to gain gain credit credit from the Centre, Centre, residencies invariably tried to exaggerate exaggerate In from the residencies invariably tried to the While working working at Centre, Oleg Oleg Gordievsky Gordievsky the success success of of their their active active measures. measures.While at the the Centre, was or London resident, resident, Yakov Lukasevics, had had been been asked was told told that that in in1977 1977 or 1978 1978 the the London Yakov Lukasevics, asked by the means to infl uence British British policy. policy. by Andropov Andropov whether whether his his residency residency possessed possessed the means to influence Why yes, we can can exert exertinfluence," influence, Lukasevics replied. We have have such channels. I "Why yes, we Lukasevics replied. "We such channels." "I do do not think think you you can," can,Andropov Andropov told told him. him. "I I think you are are too too hasty that not think you hasty in in answering answering that q~estion.~ files noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin confi confirm Andropovsskepticism. skepticism. question."58 The The fi les noted rm Andropov's

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The influence in British media media to use for The KGB's KGBs attempts attempts to to recruit recruit agents agents of of influence in the the British to use for active measures seems to have met with limited success by comparison with France active measures seems to have met with limited success by comparison with France and probably the the London London res resand some some other other European European countries. countries. The The journalist journalist DAN, probably idency's idencys most most reliable reliable agent agent of of influence influence during during the the1960s,59 1 9 6 0 ~ ,broke broke ~ contact contact during during the the 1970s-probably 1970s-probably after after he he was was put put on on ice ice in in the the aftermath aftermathof of operation operation FOOT. FOOT. Sev Several attempts by eral attempts by the the residency residency to to reactivate reactivate DAN failed failed and and he he was was eventually eventually writ written some time ten off off some time in in the theearly early 1980s.60 1980~.~ Probably most ambitious scheme devised residency during by the the London Londonresidency during the the Probably the the most ambitious scheme devised by 1970s prominent agent influence was Dr. 1970s for for the the recruitment recruitment of of a a prominent agent of of influence was targeted targeted on on Dr. Mervyn Stockwood, the Bishop of Mervyn Stockwood, the socialist socialist Bishop of Southwark.61 Southwark.61In In October October 1975 1975 Stock Stockwood jointly issued by wood delivered delivered a a public public protest protest against against a a "Call Callto to the theNation," Nation, jointly issued by Arch Archbishop Coggan of bishop Donald Donald Coggan of Canterbury Canterbury and and Archbishop Archbishop Stuart Stuart Blanch Blanch of of York, York, claiming that too much need for and claiming that it itput put too much emphasis emphasis on on the the need for individual individual responsibility responsibility and too the social social injustices caused so human misery. too little little on on the injustices which which caused so much much human misery. The The most most remarkable remarkable feature feature of of Stockwood's Stockwoods protest, protest, however, however, was wasthat that he he chose chose to to make make it it in in the the pages pages of of the the Communist Communist Morning Star, Star, and and that that he heincluded included in in it it an an extraordi extraordinary nary tribute tribute to to the theSoviet Soviet Bloc: Bloc:
Those of of us us who who have have visited visitedSocialist Socialist counties in in Europe Europe know know that that if if a a Com ComThose counties munist munist government government were were to to be be established established in in Britain Britain the the West West End End would would be be cleared up up overnight, overnight, and and the the ugly ugly features features of of our our permissive permissive society society would would be be cleared changed changed within within a a matter matter of of days. days. And And heaven heaven help help the the porn porn merchants merchants and and all all engaged through the engaged in in the themaking making of of fortunes fortunes through thecommercial commercial exploitation exploitation of of sex.62 sex.62 marveling at the innocence Stockwoods Sixteen Labor MPs signed a motion "marveling innocence" of Stockwood's understanding backbenchers supported supported a understanding of of Communist Communist regimes. regimes. Another Another fifty fifty backbenchers a Guardialz, motion supporting criticisms. One told the Guardian, supportingthe the archbishops against his criticisms. The Marxists seem of the established "The seem now to have penetrated the higher echelons of The Soviet Soviet embassy, embassy, possibly possiblyon on the theinitiative initiative of of the the residency, residency, established established Church."63 The what a a KGB file file describes describes as as "close close contact" contact with withStockwood. Stockwood. what Hopes in in the the residency residency of of the the bishop's bishops potential potential for for active active measures measuresreached reached their their Hopes peak when peak when he he arranged arranged a a dinner dinner party party with with Gordon Gordon McLennan, McLennan, general general secretary secretary of of the British Communist Party, Party, as as guest guest of of honor, honor, to to which, which, apparently, apparently, at at least the British Communist least one one Soviet cial (who, cer) was Soviet offi official (who, unknown unknown to to Stockwood, Stockwood, was was a a KGB offi officer) was also also invited.64 invited.64 Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins note note on on the the dinner dinneris is tantalizingly tantalizingly brief, brief, it it seems seems to to have have been been a a Though boisterous evening. evening. Stockwood Stockwood frequently frequently drank drank heavily heavily at at dinner dinner parties to to the theextent extent boisterous parties that that his his friend friend Princess Princess Margaret Margaret sometimes sometimes feared feared for for the the furniture hrniture at at Kensington Kensington Palace.65 Over dinner Stockwood McLennan what what the Communist Party Pala~e.~ Overdinner Stockwood asked asked McLennan the Communist Party thought the Church of England. England. McLennan McLennan replied replied that was a a thought about about the Church of that the the Church Church was moral force force in in society," society,but but regretted regretted that, that, "Unlike Unlike before before and and during during the theWar, War, we we do "moral not see members of of the the clergy clergy at at progressive progressive meetings meetings and and demonstrations." demonstrations. Stock Stocknot see members wood retorted, retorted, "We We also also don't dontsee see you at demonstrations demonstrations at at the theSoviet Soviet embassy!"66 embassy!66 The wood you at The residency to have have concluded reluctantly that that the the Bishop's Bishops tendency to launch launch residency seems seems to concluded reluctantly tendency to measures. into criticisms criticisms of the Soviet Union rendered him unsuitable for active measures.

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E X AM MP L E S S O F active active measures measuresnoted notedby byMitrokhin suggest that the residency, T H E EXA residency, in reports to the theCentre, sought to infl inflate of mostly mostlymodest modestsuccesses. successes. A charits reports ate a series of char acteristic examplewas wasits its for an an article articlein the Guardian by acteristic example attempt to claim the credit for Richard Gott (codenamed RON) attacking the role of ofthe CIA in the overthrow of ofthe Marxist president of of Chile, Chile, Salvador Allende, in 1973, 1973, and denouncing the military August0 Pinochet which had seized junta of General Augusto seized power after Allendes Allende's death.67 death.6? Gott later later denied denied reports reports that that he he had had been been a agent, but but acknowledged that after Gott a KGB agent, acknowledged that after contactedby Yuri YuriMikhailovich Solonitsyn Solonitsyn(who (who later the Chilean coup he had been contacted hehe later officer) and and had "quite quite a sort of interesting session" sessionwith him on realized was a KGB officer) series of subsequent meetings Chile, as well well as as a series meetings with both Solonitsyn and Igor VicVic torovich Titov (also (also a KGB offi officer).6s the details of Gott's Gotts articles may may some sometorovich cer).68 While the interesting sessions times have have been beeninfluenced influenced by "interesting sessions" with Solonitsyn and Titov, his his support for revolutionary movements in Latin America and loathing for American revolutionary movements and American imperialism,were were so so well well established established that that he would have little encourage"imperialism" he would have required required little encourage ment from from the the KGB to to denounce denounce either either Pinochet Pinochet or the C.IA.69 ment or the CIA.69 The London London residency residency was was equally equallyprone prone to influence in theHouse The to exaggerate exaggerate its its influence in the House of Commons. It tried to take the credit, for example, for the following parliamentary of Commons. tried to take the credit, for example, for the following parliamentary question put by the Labor LaborMP James Lamond to toFred Mulley, Mulley,Secretary Secretaryof of State for Defense in in the theCallaghan Callaghan government, government, on on February February 21,1978: Defense 21, 1978:

Does my my right right honorable honorable friend friend agree agree that deploy the Does that to to deploy the neutron neutron bomb bomb in in western of nuclear nuclear war? war? Does accept that that western Europe Europe must must lower lower the the threshold threshold of Does he he accept President Brezhnev was in in earnest earnest when when he he said the Kremlin Conservative President Brezhnev was said in in the Kremlin [ Consrrwntiwe the Soviet Union would woulddevelop develop similar shouts shouts of of "Were Were you you there?"] there?] that that the Soviet Union similar weapons cost,ifif the bomb were placed in in western western weapons at at enormous enormous cost, the neutron neutronbomb wereplaced Europe? That That would would be be a a cost cost that that neither neither the Pact nor nor NATO could Europe? the Warsaw Warsaw Pact could afford serve only to increase increase the the enormous enormous arms afford and and would wouldserve only unnecessarily unnecessarily to arms expenditure of of the the world.?O world.7) expenditure There is is absolutely absolutely no no evidence evidence that that James James Lamond Lamond had had any any conscious consciouslink link with the There with the KGB. H He was, however, however, vice-president vice-president the World Peace Council Council (WPC) and KGB. e was, ofof the World Peace (WPC) and appears not to to have realized that the leading leading Soviet Soviet front organization, appears not have realized that this this was was the front organization, devoted arms race on Western devoted to to pinning all all the the blame blame for for the the nuclear nuclear arms race on Western warmonger warmongering.71 Lamonds Lamond's parliamentary reply, parliamentary question, question, which which received received a a noncommittal noncommittal reply, derived rather than than derived from from a a much much larger larger WPC campaign campaign against against the the neutron neutron bomb bomb rather from from a a brilliant brilliant initiative initiative by by the the London London residency. residency. The Centre usually usually responded responded relatively relativelyuncritically uncritically to exaggerated exaggerated claims claimsby byres resThe Centre to idencies as much idencies of of the the success success of of their their active active measures. measures. It It suited suited the the Centre Centre as much as as the the London residency residency to to be be able able to to inform inform the the Politburo Politburo that that it itwas able to to inspire inspire ques quesLondon was able tions Commons and articles tions in in the the House Houseof of Commons and articles in in the the Guardian. Despite importance of Despite Line LinePR's P R s attempts attempts to toinflate inflate the the importance of its itsactive active measures, measures,it it also also had some undoubted undoubted successes. and the the New New Statesman were among a Observer and Stntes~nmz were among a had some successes. The The Observer

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number during the early number of of British British print print media media taken taken in in during the early 1980s 1980s by by forged forged anti antiObserver American The American and and anti-South anti-SouthAfrican African documents documents fabricated fabricated by by Service Service A.72 A.72 The Observer printed security council printed a a bogus bogus memorandum memorandum from from the the Zaire Zaire security council under under the the headline, headline, "US US and and S. S. Mrica Africa in in Angola Angola Plot."73 Plot.73The The New New Statesman Statesman published published a a forged forged letter letter from from South South African African military military intelligence intelligence to to Jeane Jeane Kirkpatrick, Kirkpatrick, US ambassador ambassador to to the the UN, conveying to her conveying its its "gratitude" gratitude and and referring referring to to a a birthday birthday present present sent sent to her "as as a a Express based token As As late late as as 1986, 1986, the the conservative conservative Sunday Sunday Express based its its token of of appreciation."74 appre~iation.~~ main virus main tront front page page story story on onreports reports (also (also concocted concocted by by Service Service A) A) that that the theAIDS AIDS virus had had originally originally been been developed developed as as part part of of an an American American biological biological warfare warfare program.75 pr~gram.~ Claims Claims that that KGB active active measures measures had had succeeded succeeded in in producing producing significant significant shifts shifts in in British opinion, however, were based on little more than wishful thinking. British opinion, however, were based on littlemore than wishfbl thinking. The The KGB's KGBs shortage shortage of of major major agents agents in in the the British British media media helps helps to to explain explain why why it it chose Petersen chose a a Danish Danish rather rather than than a a British British journalist, journalist, Arne Arne Herl0v Herl~v Petersen (codenamed (codenamed KHARLEV against Margaret KHARLEVand and PALLE) PALLE) for for its its first first major major active activemeasure measure against Margaret Thatcher Thatcher after she became prime minister in 1979. Originally a confidential contact after she became prime minister in 1979. Originally a confidential contact of of the the Copenhagen invited to the mid-1970s Copenhagen residency, residency, Petersen Petersen had had been been invited to Moscow Moscow in in the mid-1970s to to "deepen Thereafter deepen the the relationship."76 relati~nship.~~ Thereafter he he was was regularly regularly used usedas as an an agent agent of of influence influence not by but not merely merely to to write write articles articles along along lines lines suggested suggested by his his case caseofficers officers but to topublish, publish, also also under Service A. under his his own own name, name, articles articles and and pamphlets pamphlets written written in in English English by by Service A. The The first first of of the the KGBlPetersen KGBRetersenco-productions co-productions attacking attackingThatcher Thatcher was was a a 1979 1979 pamphlet, pamphlet, entitled entitled Cold arriors, which Cold W Warriors, which gave gave her her pride pride of of place place as asEurope's Europesleading leading anti-Soviet anti-Soviet crusader. crusader. The The next next Petersen Petersen pamphlet pamphlet ghostwritten ghostwritten by by Service ServiceA, True True Blues, Blues, published published in in 1980, 1980, solely devoted was was solely devoted to to an an onslaught onslaught on on Thatcher. Thatcher. It made made the the mistake mistake of of attempting attempting satire-a satire-a weak weak area area of of the the KGB's KGBs usually usually heavy-handed heavy-handedactive activemeasures-and measures-and carried carried the The Service the feeble feeble subtitle subtitle "The TheThatcher Thatcher that that Couldn't Couldnt Mend Mend her her own own Roo" Roof.The Service A author grasp Mrs. author had had an an even even feebler feebler grasp of of English English geography, geography, believing believing Mrs. Thatcher's Thatchersbirth birthplace Though the place of of Grantham Grantham in inLincolnshire Lincolnshire to to be be "in in the the suburbs suburbs of of London." London.Though theCen Centre tre appears appears to to have have been been curiously curiously proud proud of of them, them, both both pamphlets pamphlets (probably (probably intended intended chiefly chiefly for for mailing mailing to to British British "opinion-formers") opinion-formers)had had negligible negligible influence.77 influence.77
unrestricted access access to to FCD FCD files, files, their their sheer sheer volume volume unrestricted that his notes on them them are bound to to contain significant gaps. gaps. The possibility possibility meant that thus remains remains that that the the KGB had had important important Cold Cold War War British sources not not identified identified thus British sources by by him. him. It is is unlikely, unlikely, however, however,that that there there were were many many of of them. them. Oleg Oleg Gordievsky Gordievsky has has confirmed that that during his posting posting to to the residency from from 1982 1982 to 1985, confirmed during his theLondon London residency to 1985, which included included two two years years as as head head of of Line Line PR and and a a few few months months as as resident residentwhich designate, Line PR and, probably, Line KR were running no British agents of major designate, probably, no imp~rtance.~ There remains remains the the possibility possibility of of British British agents agents recruited recruited and and run run by by importance.78 There residencies and and illegals illegals outside the the United United Kingdom79-a Kingd~m~~a by Mitrokhin of KGB KGB residencies list agents, contacts contacts and and "developmentals" developmentals(targets (targets under under cultivation) cultivation) includes includes a a tantaliz tantalizagents, a British British agent agent run run from from Karlshorst Karlshorst whose whose operational operational file file ing one-line one-line reference reference to to a ing in 1981 ran to fifteen volumes.* in 1981 ran to fifteen volumes.8o The most most remarkable remarkable British British agent agent identified identified by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin outside outside the the field field of of The S&T to to have have been been recruited recruited after after operation operation FOOT was was also alsorun run by by Line Line KR outside outside S&T
IT RR OO KK HH IN TH O U GH M M IT IN HAD

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the United Kingdom. Given Given the the codename codename SCOT, he was was a a bent bent London copper: the United Kingdom. SCOT, he London copper: Detective Sergeant John Symonds of the Metropolitan MetropolitanPolice, who became probably the most of all the the KGB's KGBs British agents.81The The London London residency, residency, how howthe most peripatetic peripatetic of British agents.81 ever, was wasable ableto to claim claim no no credit credit for for his his recruitment. recruitment. ever, O n November November 29, 1969, the the day day that that The Times On 29, 1969, Times published published photographs photographs of of the the footprints on moon of of Apollo Apollo 12 12 astronauts, astronauts, it it also story footprints on the the moon also carried carried a a front front page page story headlined "London Policeman Allegations. Tapes Planted Evi headlined London Policeman in in Bribe Bribe Allegations. Tapes Reveal Reveal Planted Evireporters were dence." dence. Conversations Conversations secretly secretly recorded recorded by by two two undercover undercover Times reporters were said said to sums of of to prove prove that that Symonds Symonds and and at at least least two two other other detectives detectives were were "taking taking large large sums money in in exchange exchange for for dropping dropping charges, charges, for for being being lenient lenient with with evidence in court, money evidence in court, and Symonds, then then aged aged thirty-three, thirty-three, and for for allowing allowing a a criminal criminal to to work work unhindered." unhindered. Symonds, admitted to to the the reporters reporters that that he he was was a a member he called little firm a admitted member of of what what he called a "a little firm in in a firm-corrupt detectives in in the pay of of criminals criminals such fi rm"-corrupt detectives the pay such as as south south London London gang gang boss boss Charlie Richardson.82 Richardson.82 Charlie While awaiting awaiting trial trial at at the the Old Bailey in in 1972, 1972,Symonds Symonds went went into intohiding hiding for While Old Bailey for sevsev eral months, then fled fled abroad. abroad. His His KGB file file reveals reveals that eral months, then that he he used used a a passport passport obtained obtained in the the name name of of his his girlfriend's girlfriends mentally mentally handicapped handicapped brother, brother, John John Frederick in Frederick FreeFree man, that of Freeman by mis man, and and had had his his passport passport photograph photograph authenticated authenticated as as that of Freeman by the the mistress In his his absence, absence, the two other corrupt tress of of a a member member of of the the Richardson Richardson gang. gang. In the two other corrupt to six six and imprison policemen identified identified by policemen by The Times Timeswere were sentenced sentenced to and seven seven years' years imprisonment. embassy in in Rabat, his story, story, ment. In In August August 1972 1972 Symonds Symonds entered entered the the Soviet Soviet embassy Rabat, told told his said that that his his money money was running out outand and offered his his services theKGB.83 cersaid was running offered services to to the KGB.83 To To be be cer tain that his attention, he he gave the name name of of a a Special Special tain that his story story attracted attracted the the Centre's Centres attention, gave the Branch Lyalin, and and alleged that he was probably probably Branch officer officer guarding guarding the the defector defector Oleg Oleg Lyalin, alleged that he was corruptible. Symonds also Healey, the Secretary corruptible. Symonds also made made the the dramatic dramatic claim claim that that Denis Denis Healey, the Secretary of State for bribed Chief Chief Superintendent Bill Moody Moody of of the the Met Met of State for Defense, Defense, regularly regularly bribed Superintendent Bill "to smooth over Though Moody was later convicted of of to smooth over certain certain unpleasantness."84 unpleasantne~s.~~ Though Moody was later convicted accepting huge huge bribes bribes from from the the underworld underworld and yearsimprisonaccepting and sentenced sentenced to to twelve twelve years' imprison ment, in the was wholly wholly fraudulent. fraudulent. ment, the the allegation allegation that that Healey Healey was was involved involved in the bribery bribery was The story at its improbable improbable face face value. 85 The Centre, Centre, however, however, took took Symonds's Symondss tall story atits value.85 Symonds agent. Noting Noting that was of "of attracattrac Symonds spent spent the thenext next eight eight years years as asa a KGB agent. thathe he was tive decided to use him him as as its its first first British British Romeo "Romeo spy," using tive appearance," appearance,the the Centre Centredecided to use spy,using seduction of sexual sexual seduction and and romance, romance, rather rather than than the the traditional traditional cruder cruder KGB techniques techniques of compromise blackmail, to obtain classified classified information information from from a a series series of compromise and and blackmail, to recruit recruit or or obtain of female posted to to Bulgaria in order order to to cultivate cultivate suitsuit female officials. officials. In In 1973 1973 Symonds Symonds was was posted Bulgaria in able Sea resorts Western tourists. tourists. Symondss Symonds's most most able targets targets at at Black Black Sea resorts popular popular with with Western important an official official in in an an FRG government minmin important sexual sexual conquest conquest was was the the wife wife of of an FRG government istry. the next of visits to Bonn Bonn to to continue continue the istry. Over Over the next few few years years he he paid paid a a number number of visits to the affair. girlfriend in in 1975 1975 was considered so so affair. Intelligence Intelligence from from Symonds's Symondss German German girlfriend was considered important by by the theCentre that it it was was made made the important Centre that the . subject subject of of a a personal personal report report to to Andropov.86 Andropov.86 Symonds was was used by the KGB to to attempt attempt the Symonds used by the the seduction seduction of of female female officials, officials, mostly continents. His His next assignment, after after beginbegin mostly Western Western embassy embassy staff, staff, on on four four continents. next assignment, ning his his affair affair with with the woman from from Bonn, target women ning the woman Bonn, was was to to target women at at American American and and

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British part of 1973. end of year, British missions missions in in Mrica Africa during during the thelatter latter part 1973. of At At the the end of the the year, how however, KGB file file describes describes as as "tropical tropical fever," fever, and and ever, he he fell fell ill ill in in Tanzania Tanzaniawith withwhat whathis his KGB had to travel Moscow for As soon had recovered, hadto travel to toMoscow for medical medical treatment. treatment.As soon as as he hehad recovered, Symonds the British Symonds was was ordered ordered to to cultivate cultivate a a member memberof of the British embassy embassy staff staff in in Moscow, Moscow, codenamed VERA, who who had hadbeen been observed observedgoing going for for long long solitary solitary walks walks in in her her spare spare codenamed VERA, time. Posing as Jean-Jacques Baudouin, a Canadian businessman attending the time. Posing as Jean-Jacques Baudouin, a Canadian businessman attending the 1974 1974 International in Moscow, Symonds succeeded in International Polymer Polymer Exhibition Exhibition in Moscow,Symonds succeeded in staging staging an an apparently chance encounter with VERA and strikingup up a friendship with her. apparently chance encounter with and striking a friendship with her. Though le claims Though Symonds's Symondss fi file claims that that VERA became became "attached" attachedto to him him and and gave gave him him details of her next posting as well as her home address in Britain, there is no indica details of her next posting as well as her home address in Britain, thereis no indication him any more than unimportant personal gossip about tion that that she she passed passed on on to to him any more than unimportant personal gossip about some colleagues London. The some of ofher her colleagues and and superiors superiors in in Moscow Moscowand and London. The Centre, Centre, however, however, considered a potentially source for vulnerable considered her her a potentially valuable valuable source for identifying identifjring other, other, more more vulnerable female female targets targets in in the the British Britishembassy.87 embassys7 In journey which took him In 1976, 1976,on on KGB instructions, instructions, Symonds Symonds set set out out on ona long a long journey which took him from toto south-east from Bulgaria Bulgaria through through Africa Africa and and India India south-east Asia. Asia. In In India India he hecultivated cultivated an an English English woman woman (codenamed (codenamed JILL), JILL), an an Israeli Israeli and and at at least least five five American American women. women.In In 1977, 1977,however, however, while whilein in Singapore Singapore pursuing pursuing aasecretary secretary at at a a Western Westerndiplomatic diplomatic mis mission sion who who had had been been identified identified as as a a target target for for cultivation cultivation by by the the local local KGB residency, residency, Symonds Athens and Symonds believed believed that that he he had had come come under under surveillance, surveillance,took took a a flight flightto to Athens and returned returned to to Bulgaria. Bulgaria. An An assessment assessment by by Directorate Directorate K of of Symonds's Symondss work work over over the the previous concluded that of previous five fiveyears years concluded that he hehad had shown shown no nosign sign of dishonesty dishonesty in in his his dealings dealings with "of signifi cant operational with the the KGB, had had obtained obtained material material (of significant operational interest" interestand-but and-but for for the the fact fact that that his his existing existing travel travel documents documents had had aroused aroused the the suspicion suspicion of of Western Western security security services-still services-still had had considerable considerable potential potential as as a a KGB agent. agent. At At the the request request of of Kalugin, Kalugin, the the head head of of Directorate DirectorateK, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov instructed instructed the the Illegals Illegals Directorate Directorate to to 88 give give Symonds Symonds a a new newidentity. identity.** The The identity identity chosen chosen for for Symonds Symonds was was that that of of aa"dead dead double," double, Raymond Raymond Francis Francis Everett Everett (codenamed (codenamed FORST), FORST), an an Australian Australian who who had had died died in in childhood childhood during duringthe the Second flew from Second World World War.89 War. On O n July July 23, 23, 1978 1978 Symonds Symonds flew from Moscow Moscow to to Tokyo Tokyo en en ofof Everett, a gen route route to to Australasia, Australasia, carrying carrying a a forged forged British British passport passport in in the thename name Everett, a genuine cate in the same name and in Australia uine birth birth certifi certificate in the same name and 8,000 8,000 US dollars. dollars. Once Once in Australia Symonds Symonds was was to to abandon abandon the the British British passport passport and and use use the the birth birth certificate certificate to to obtain obtain an spending an Australian Australian passport passport in in the thename name of of the the dead dead double. double. Symonds Symondsbegan beganby by spending several developing several months months in in New NewZealand Zealand developing his his legend legend so so that, that, once once in in Australia, Australia, he he could could pose pose as as an an Australian Australian who who had had spent spentsome some years years in in New NewZealand.90 Zealand. In ofof rugby In November November 1978 1978 SCOT SCOT traveled traveled to to Australia Australia with with aagroup group rugby supporters supporters and and began began to to cultivate cultivateMargaret, Margaret, the the manageress manageress of of aasmall small travel travel agency, agency, in in the thehope hope that provide the reference for that she she would would provide the necessary necessary reference for his his passport passport application. application. Symonds's of the the way way he he had had sized sized Symondss cynical cynical report report on on Margaret Margaret was was probably probably typical typical of up the previous women he had been instructed to seduce. Margaret, he claimed, up the previous women he hadbeen instructed to seduce. Margaret, he claimed, was was tall, thin, thin, plain, plain, round-shouldered, round-shouldered, had had hair hair on was bound bound to to be be tall, on her her upper upper lip lip and and was flattered pursued her flattered by by his his attentions. attentions. Symonds Symonds pursued her with with flowers, flowers, chocolates, chocolates, presents presents and and invitations invitations to to dinner. dinner. Unfortunately Unfortunately for for Symonds, Symonds, Margaret Margaret was was honest honest as as well well as as

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unattractive. referee, she she refused refused on on the grounds that that unattractive. When When he he asked asked her her to to act act as as a a referee, the grounds the least a By now now Symonds's money Symondssmoney the law law required required her herto to have have known known him him for for at at least a year. year. By had almost run out. out. Arrangements for him him to had almost run Arrangements for to receive receive more more money money via via the the Canberra Canberra residency broke brokedown down and and his his landlord landlord locked locked him outwhen when failed to residency him out hehe failed to pay pay the the rent. rent. A female female schoolteacher schoolteacher whom whom he he persuaded persuaded to put him him up up also threw him him out A to put also threw out after after a fortnight. fortnight. At At one point Symonds Symonds was was reduced reduced to to spending a Sala one point spending several several nights nights in in a Sal vation with of a a French bank in he was able vation Army Army hostel. hostel. Eventually, Eventually, with the the help help of French bank inSydney, Sydney, he was able dollars from bank account account he he had opened in in the the name name of of to withdraw 5,000 to withdraw 5,000 US US dollars from a a bank had opened Freeman alias) in Freeman (his (his first first alias) in SenegaUl Senegal. Early in in 1979, 1979, using using a a reference reference he he had had forged himself, Symonds Symonds at succeeded forged himself, at last last succeeded Early in obtaining obtaining an an Australian Australian passport in the name of double, Raymond in passport in the name ofhis his dead dead double, Raymond Everett. Soon afterward, he he caught caught a a flight flight to to Rome, from where traveled to to Everett. Soon afterward, Rome, from where he he traveled Vienna by meet his now, however, however, Symonds Symonds had become Vienna by train train to to meet his KGB KGB controller. controller. By Bynow, had become seriously confused Australian identity. seriouslyconfused byby the the complications complications of of acquiring acquiring a a new newAustralian identity. Unwilling to risk Australian passport, he he strapped strapped it it to his leg beneath Unwilling to risk using using his hisnew new Australian passport, tohis legbeneath his British passport passport he had come to Australia Australia his sock sock and and traveled traveled instead instead on on the thebogus bogus British he had come to to replace. Once the new new passport passport to to his then to replace. Once in in Vienna, Vienna, he he handed handed over over the his controller, controller, then returned returned to to Moscow Moscow via via Belgrade.92 Belgrade. After his his return return to to Moscow, Moscow,Andropov, Kryuchkov After Andropov, Kryuchkov and and Grigori Grigori Fyodorovich Fyodorovich Grigorenko (head of Chief Directorate) Directorate) jointly planfor for Grigorenko (head of the the Second Second Chief jointly approved approved a a plan Symonds to cultivate cultivate a a secretary secretary at at the theBritish embassy, posing a Cana CanaSymonds to British embassy, posing once once again again as as a dian businessman. businessman. His His target target on on this this occasion occasion was wasERICA, ERICA, a earlier tardian a friend friend of of his his earlier tar get ve years years earlier. earlier. The operation failed-partly, get VERA, VERA, whom whom he he had had first first met met fi five The operation failed-partly, perhaps, of Symonds's increasingly run-down run-down appearance. appearance. Symondss Symonds'sfile file perhaps, because because of Symondss increasingly records that "his physical appeal to to ERICA."93 records that his physical characteristics characteristics did did not not appeal EFUCA.93 The to have have been The failed fiailed cultivation cultivation of of ERICA ERICA appears appears to been Symonds's Symondss last last operation operation as from Australia, Australia, he he had had as a a Romeo Romeo agent. agent. His His file file notes notes that, that, since since his his return return from become cult to resentful of of what he claimed claimed was was the become more more and and more more diffi difficult to handle handle and andresentful what he the KGB's trust and and interest interest in in him. him. A A medical medical report report on on Symonds Symonds prepared prepared KGBs lack lack of of trust without unstable, suffering suffering from from without his his knowledge knowledge concluded concluded that that he he was was emotionally emotionally unstable, a had become inconsistentin in his a psychological psychological disorder disorder and and had become hypersensitive hypersensitive and and inconsistent his judgments. for Sofia, Sofia, intending intending to his current current judgments. In In 1980 1980 Symonds Symonds left leftMoscow Moscow for tomarry marry his girlfriend, The couple, soon fell fell out out and per girlfriend, "Nellie." Nellie.The couple, however, however, soon and Symonds Symondsrequested requested permission to Europe. Before the Centre to his his request, mission to leave leave for for western western Europe. Before the Centre had had replied replied to request, Symonds way to Vienna and and thence thence to Britain.94 In In Symonds succeeded succeeded in in making making his his own own way to Vienna to Britain.94 April 1980, accompanied surrendered himself the Central Central April 1980, accompanied by by his his solicitor, solicitor, he he surrendered himself to to the Criminal which for his his arrest for corruption years Criminal Court, Court, which had hadissued issued a a warrant warrant for arrest for corruption eight eightyears earlier. 95 earlier.95 The that he might reveal The Centre's Centres main main fear fear after after Symonds's Symondssreturn return was was that he might reveal his his career career as to dismiss dismiss his as fantasy. as a a KGB KGB agent. agent. Should Should he he do do so, so, it it was was decided decided to his revelations revelationsas fantasy. The prepare a cate stating stating that he The Bulgarian Bulgarian medical medical authorities authorities were were asked asked to to prepare a certifi certificate that he was mentally mentallyderanged.96 deranged.96 The however, was was not not needed. needed. At At his his trial, trial, in was The certificate, certificate, however, in which Detective Sergeant made no no which he he conducted conducted his his own own defense, defense, former former Detective Sergeant Symonds Syrnonds made reference to to his his Soviet Sovietconnection, connection, which which remained theprosreference remained completely completely unknown unknown to to the pros-

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ecution. Instead, claimed that ecution. Instead, he he claimed that he he had had spent spent eight eightyears years on on the the run run from from crooked crooked senior detectives had threatened to court. senior detectives who who had threatened to kill kill him him if if he he gave gave evidence evidence in in court. Symonds sentenced to on three three charges Symonds was was sentenced to two two years' years imprisonment imprisonment on charges of of corruptly corruptly obtaining obtaining a a total total of of150 150 pounds pounds from from a a London London criminal. criminal. The The prosecution prosecution offered offered no no evidence corruption. Symonds Symonds was indignant at verdict. evidence on on five five further further counts counts of of corruption. was indignant at the the verdict. "I decided to not had had a I decided to return, return, hoping hopingto to have have a a fair fair trial," trial, he he told told the the court. court. "I I have have not a fair fair trial trial and and that that is is all all I have have to to say."97 say.97 moment 1980 to moment that that Symonds Symonds returned returned to to England England in in 1980 to face face trial, trial, Lukasevics resident. The Lukasevics left left for for Moscow Moscow at at the theend end of of his his eight-year eight-year term term as as London London resident. The Centre, unimpressed concluded that he had inadequate Centre, unimpressed by by his his performance, performance, concluded that he had made made inadequate progress 1971 expulsions progress in in rebuilding rebuilding the the residency's residencys agent agent network network after after the the 1971 expulsions and and banished Lukasevics's the banished him him to to his his native native Latvia.98 Latvia.98 Lukasevicsssuccessor, successor, the heavy-drinking heavy-drinking Arkadi Arkadi Vasilyevich Guk (codenamed Oleg Gordievsky, Vasilyevich Guk (codenamed YERMAKOV), YERMAKOV), is is remembered remembered by by Oleg Gordievsky, who served served under under him, him, as as "a a huge, huge, bloated bloated lump lump of of a a man, with a a mediocre mediocre brain brain but but who man, with a cunning." He London resident a large large reserve reserve of of low low cunning. H e owed owed his his overpromotion overpromotion to to London resident largely largely to to the the British British policy policy of of refusing refusing visas visas to to known, known, and and more more able, able, Soviet Sovietintelli intelligence officers. Guks naturally suspicious mind gave rise to a number of conspiracy gence officers. Guk's naturally suspicious mind gave rise to a number of conspiracy theories: among conviction theories: among them themthe the conviction that that many many of of the the advertisement advertisement hoardings hoardings on on the the London Underground secret look-out from which which MI5 MIS kept kept watch watch London Underground concealed concealed secret look-out posts posts from for KGB officers officers and and other suspicious travelers.99 traveler^.^^ for other suspicious During During Guk's Guks first first year year as as resident, resident, a a series series of of operations operations officers officers were were sent sent home home in disgrace. disgrace. In In 1980 1980 Yuri Yuri Sergeyevich SergeyevichMyakov Myakov (codenamed (codenamed MOROZOV), MOROZOV), who who had had in been to London Londonthree three years years earlier, earlier, was recalled for an an allegedly allegedly serious been posted posted to was recalled for serious breach breach of security: security: showing showing KGB material material to to the theGRU residency without first first gaining gaining Guk's Guks of residency without approval.* In In 1981 1981 Guk also insisted insisted on on the recall of of Aleksandr Aleksandr Vladimirovich Vladimirovich approval.lOO Guk also the recall Lopukhin, an operations officer cover correspondent for Lopukhin, anoperations officer working working in in London Londonunder under cover as ascorrespondent for Komsomolskaya since 1979, he denounced denounced for KomsomoZskaya Pravda since 1979, whom whom he for unsatisfactory unsatisfactory perfor performance, mance, keeping keeping himself himself apart apart from from Soviet Soviet colleagues colleagues and and preferring preferring a a Western Western lifestyle. Also Also in in 1981 1981the the head of of Line Line N (Illegals (Illegals Support), AnatoliAlekseyevich Alekseyevich lifestyle.lol head Support), Anatoli Zamuruyev occupied a ZIMIN), who who had had occupied a cover cover position position in in the the secre secreZamuruyev (codenamed (codenamed ZIMIN), tariat of of the the Cocoa Cocoa Organization Organization since since 1977, 1977, was was declared declared to to be be mentally mentally ill ill and and sent tariat sent back to to Moscow.102 Moscow.102 back When 0 Oleg Gordievsky arrived arrived in in London London as as a a Line Line PR officer officer in in the the summer summer of of leg Gordievsky When 1982, he he found found the the residency residency a a "hotbed hotbed of of intrigue." intrigue. For For the the previous previous eight eight years years he he 1982, had been been SISs most important important penetration penetration agent agent inside inside the the KGB. His His presence presence in in had SIS's most eventually compromised compromised almost all residency residency 1983 Gordievsky Gordievsky London eventually operations. In 1983 was promoted to head head of of Line Line PR and and deputy deputy resident. O n being being appointed appointed resident residentwas promoted to resident. On designate in in January January 1985, 1985, he he was was able to fill in in most of the gaps in in his his designate able to most of the remaining remaining gaps knowledge of of the the KGB's KGBs British British operations. operations. knowledge Among passed by Among the the intelligence intelligence passed by Gordievsky Gordievsky to to MI5 was was information information on on the the attempt attempt by by one one of of its its own own officers, officers, Michael Michael Bettaney, Bettaney, a a disaffected disaffected alcoholic alcoholic in in the the counter-espionage directorate, directorate, to to volunteer volunteer as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. On O n Easter Easter Sunday Sunday counter-espionage 1983 Bettaney Bettaney put put through through Guk's Guks letter-box letter-box in in Holland Holland Park Park an an envelope envelope containing containing 1983
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the n the the previous the case case put put by by MIS MI5 for for expelling expelling three three Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence officers officers iin previous month, all three three had had been been detected. detected, Bettaney Bettaney offered offered to to month, together together with with details details of of how how all provide further information and gave instructions on how to contact him. Guk thus provide further information and gave instructions on how to contact him. Guk thus found first of found himself himself presented presented with with the the first opportunity opportunity for for a a quarter quarter of a a century century to to recruit recruit an cer. His an MIS MIS or orSIS SIS offi officer. His addiction addiction to to conspiracy conspiracytheory, theory,however, however,persuaded persuaded him him to to look The look the the gift gifthorse horse in in the themouth. mouth. The whole whole affair, affair, he he suspected, suspected,was was a a British British provo provocation. cation. The The head head of of Line Line KR, Leonid Leonid Yefremovich Yefremovich Nikitenko, Nikitenko, who who was was reluctant reluctant to to disagree disagree with with the theirascible irascible Guk, Guk, concurred. concurred. Gordievsky Gordievsky said said little little but butinformed informed SIS. SIS. In In June June and and July, July, Bettaney Bettaney stuffed stuffed two two further further packets packets of of classified classified information information from files through from Security Security Service Service files through Guk's Guks door, door, unwittingly unwittingly providing providing what what Guk Guk believed was clinching evidence of an MIS provocation. Understandably despairing believed was clinching evidence of an MIS provocation. Understandably despairing of of Guk, Guk, Bettaney Bettaney decided decided to to try try his his luck luck with with the the KGB KGB in in Vienna Vienna instead. instead. He H e was was arrested arrested on on September September 16, 16, aafew few days days before before he he planned planned to to fly fly out. out. Guk's Guks reputation reputation never never recovered. recovered.Shortly Shortly after after Bettaney Bettaney was was sentenced sentenced to to twenty-three twenty-three years' yearsimpris imprispersona non grata onment the following spring, Guk himself was declared onment the following spring, Guk himself was declared persona non grata by by the the British British authorities.103 a~th0rities.l~ Guk's as London Guks four, four, somewhat somewhat incompetent incompetent years years as London resident resident included included the the most most dangerous dangerous phase phase of of operation operation RYAN. RYAN. The The whole whole of of Line Line PR PR in in London Londonwere were skep skeptical tical about about the the Centre's Centres fear fear that that NATO NATO was was making making plans plans for for a a nuclear nuclear first first strike strike against against the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. None, None, however, however, were werewilling willing to to risk risk their their careers careers by by chal challenging lenging the the alarmist alarmist assumptions assumptions on on which which RYAN RYAN was was based. based. As As a a result, result, the the resi residency's at least 984 was dencys chief chief priority priority from from 1981 1981 until until at least the the early early months months of of 1 1984 was the the preparation preparation of of fortnightly fortnightlyreports reports on on its its search search for for non-existent non-existent evidence evidence of of NATO NATO preparations preparations for for nuclear nuclear aggression. aggression. The The Centre's Centres alarmism alarmism reached reached its its peak peak in in November during the NATO November 1983 1983 during the NATO exercise exercise ABLE ABLE ARCHER, ARCHER, which which it it feared feared might might be be used used to to begin begin the the countdown countdown to to a a first first strike. strike. In In his his annual annual review review of of the the work ,-Guk was work of of the the London London residency residency at at the the end endof of 1983 1983,-Guk was forced forced to to admit admit "short shortcomings" c American comings in in obtaining obtaining intelligence intelligence on on "specifi specific American and and NATO NATO plans plans for for the the preparation preparation of of surprise surprise nuclear nuclear missile missile attack attack against against the the USSR." USSR. During During the the early early months the months of of 1984, 1984, helped helped by by reassuring reassuring signals signals from from London London and and Washington, Washington, the mood mood in in Moscow Moscow gradually gradually lightened. lightened. In In March March Nikolai Nikolai Vladimirovich Vladimirovich Shishlin, Shishlin, a a senior foreign affairs specialist in the Central Committee (and later an adviser to senior foreign affairs specialist in the Central Committee (and later an adviser to Gorbachev), embassy Gorbachev), addressed addressed the the staff staff of of the theLondon London embassy and and KGB KGB residency residency on on cur current rent international international problems. problems. He H e made made no no mention mention of of the the threat threat of of surprise surprise nuclear nuclear attack. AN, however, attack. The The bureaucratic bureaucratic momentum momentum of of operation operation RY RYAN, however, took took some some time time to wind down. When the London residency grew lax in the early summer of 1984 to wind down. When the London residency grew lax in the early summer of 1984 about about sending sending its its pointless pointless fortnightly fortnightly reports, reports, it it received received a a reprimand reprimand from from the the Cen Centre tre telling telling it it to to adhere adhere "strictly" strictlyto to the the original original RYAN directive.104 directive.lo4 Like Like his his predecessor, predecessor, Lukasevics, Lukasevics,Guk Guk tried tried to to compensate compensate for for his his residency's residencys fail failings In to ings by by exaggerating exaggeratingthe the success success ofits of its active active measures. measures. In particular, particular, he he sought sought to take take some movement caused some of of the the credit credit for for the the resurgence resurgence of of the the British British peace peace movement caused by by the the intensification in the early 980s. Twenty the intensification of of the the Cold ColdWar War in the early 1 1980s. Twenty years years earlier, earlier, the KGB KGB had had been detract been suspicious suspicious of of the the British British peace peace movement, movement, fearing fearing that that it itmight might detract from from the the authority as resident, authority of of the the World World Peace Peace Counci1.105 Council.1osDuring During Guk's Guks years years as resident, however, however,

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most of the the peace movement spent more time time campaigning against Amerimost sections sections of peace movement spent more campaigning against Ameri can can than than against against Soviet Soviet nuclear nuclear weapons. weapons. In In July July 1982 1982 Guk Guk briefed briefed the the newly newly arrived arrived embassy counselor, counselor, Lev Parshin, about about a a mass demonstration in in London London against the embassy Lev Parshin, mass demonstration against the deployment cruise missiles. contacts joined missiles. Although Although a a few few KGB KGB agents agents and and contacts joined deployment of of US cruise the demonstration had been Campaign for the march, march, the the demonstration had been wholly wholly organized organized by by the the Campaign for Nuclear ithout any Nuclear Disarmament Disarmament (CND) (CND) without any assistance assistance from from the the residency. residency. Guk, Guk, how however, quarter ever, assured assuredParshin, Parshin, "It "It was was us, us, the the KGB residency, residency, who who brought brought aa quarter of of a a mil million people out lion people out on on to tothe thestreets!"106 ~treets!''~'~ The main main authentic authentic successes successes of of the the London Londonresidency residency during during Guk's Guk's four four years years in in The London the previous London were, were, as as during during the previous two two decades, decades, in in scientific scientific and and technological technological intelligence Between 1980 intelligence gathering. gathering. Between 1980 and and 1983 1983Gennadi GennadiFyodorovich Fyodorovich Kotov Kotov (code (codenamed DEYEV), a Line X officer working under cover in the Soviet trade delega named DEYEV), a Line officer working under cover in the Soviet trade delegation, 600 items tion, ran ran twelve twelve agents agents and and obtained obtained 600 items of of S&T information information and and samples.107 ~arnp1es.l'~ Another GRIN), who Another Line LineX officer, officer,Anatoli Anatoli Alekseyevich Alekseyevich Chernyayev Chernyayev (codenamed (codenamed GRIN), who operated 800 items items of operated under under diplomatic diplomatic cover cover from from 1979 1979 to to 1983, 1983, obtained obtained 800 of classified classified information. He H e was was expelled in 1983 round of of tit-for-tat tit-for-tat expulsions. expulsions. A information. expelled in 1983 during during a a round Centre report reportconcluded that, despite his expulsion, expulsion, Chernyayev Chernyayev might might not nothave have been been Centre concluded that, despite his lOS Its definitely identified identified by by MI5 as as a a KGB officer. officer.''* Its author, author, however, however, was was unaware unaware definitely that that Gordievsky Gordievsky had had identified identified the the entire entire KGB residency. residency. Following Guk's Guk's expulsion expulsionin thespring spring of of 1984, 1984, Nikitenko, head of Following in the Nikitenko, the the head of Line Line KR, was made made acting acting resident. resident. In In January January 1985 1985 the the Centre Centredecided decided that that he he was was to to return return was to Moscow in the the spring springand and that that the the post post of of resident resident should to Gordievsky. Gordievsky. And to Moscow in should go to And so, when Gorbachev succeeded general secretary so, when Mikhail Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded Konstantin Konstantin Chernenko Chernenko as as general secretary in residency was SIS agent in March March1985, 1985, the the London Londonresidency was at at its itsoperational operational nadir, nadir, with with an an SIS agent about assume command it. about to to assume command of of it. Only later, residency achieved its Only aamonth month later, however, however, the the Washington Washington main main residency achieved one one of of its greatest 16 Aldrich Ames, a greatest post-war post-war triumphs. triumphs. On O n April April 16 Aldrich Ames, a senior senior officer officer in in the the CIA's CIA'S Soviet division, of the Soviet embassy embassy on Sixteenth Street Street and and Soviet division, walked walked into into the the lobby lobby of the Soviet on Sixteenth handed Stanislav Andreyevich handed a a guard guard a a letter letter addressed addressed to to the the resident, resident, Stanislav Andreyevich Androsov. Androsov. Ames claims claims that that his his original original aim aim was a one-time to extract 50,000 dollars Ames was a one-time scam scam to extract 50,000 dollars from from the KGB by by revealing revealing the the names names of of three three apparent spies in in the the Soviet Soviet Union Union the apparent CIA spies whom he knew were were really really double double agents agents controlled controlled by by the later, he he whom he knew the Centre. Centre. Only Only later, insists, did he he identify identify Gordievsky Gordievsky and and over over twenty twenty other other genuine genuine Western Western agents, agents, a insists, did a majorivy of whom whom were were shot. According to to Viktor Viktor Cherkashin, head of majorit" j of shot. According Cherkashin, head of Line Line KR (counter-intelligence) in inWashington, however,Ames's of April April 16, 16, 1985 1985 (counter-intelligence) Washington, however, Ames's letter letter of included, in in addition addition to to the names of of the the double double agents, the identities identities of of two two real included, the names agents, the American agents-one agents-one of of them them aacolleague colleague of of his his in theWashington Washington residency. Both American in the residency. Both 13, were executed. executed.Though Though Ames Ames insists insists that that he hedid did not not betray betray Gordievsky Gordievsky untilJune until June13, were it is is quite quite possible possible that that he he did did so so earlier.109 earlier.''' it the Centre By mid-May1985 1985 the Centre had reached the alarming conclusion that its agent-although it remains unclear resident-designate in London London was a British agent-although O n May 17 whether it based that conclusion on intelligence from Ames. On 17 Gordievsky received summons to received a a summons to return return to to the theCentre Centrefor for consultations consultations before before formally formally taking taking up post of In Moscow Moscow he interrogated, but up the the post of resident. resident. In he was was drugged drugged and and interrogated, but no no admisadmis-

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sion of of guilt guilt extracted extracted from from him. him. O On May 3 30 givena a period sion n May 0 Gordievsky Gordievsky was was given period of of leave leave during which which the the Centre Centre placed him under doubtless in during placed him under constant constant surveillance, surveillance, doubtless in the the hope hope that he he would would be becaught caught making making contact contact with with SIS or provide other compromising compromising evi evithat SIS or provide other dence. He He was was well well aware awarethat, that, whether whether or or not evidence was wasobtained obtained against dence. not further further evidence against him, to him as as a a British agent. O On however, him, it it had had already already been beendecided decided to execute execute him British agent. n July July 20, however, Gordievsky the in the boot of of an an SIS SIS Gordievsky was was successfully successllly exflitrated exfiltrated across across the Finnish Finnish border border in theboot car-the only only escape escape in in Soviet Soviet history history by a a Western agent under under KGB surveillance. car-the Western agent surveillance. In In October intelligence personnel Gordievskywere were October thirty-one thirty-one Soviet Soviet intelligence personnel identified identified by Gordievsky expelled from from London. London. Owing Owingto tothe the lack of any anymore senior candidate, expelled lack of more senior candidate, the the inexperiinexperi enced Aleksandr Aleksandr Smagin, Smagin, formerly formerly KGB security at the embassy, was enced security officer officer at the Soviet Soviet embassy, was appointed as the the new new London London resident.110 resident."' appointed as The greatest greatest known known success success of of KGB operations operations in in Britain Britain during the Gorbachev Gorbachev The during the era was was the the reactivation reactivation of of Michael Michael Smith, Smith,probably probably the most important important British era the most British Line Line agent since since the the retirement retirement of of Norwood. Nonvood. When last saw saw Smith's Smith's file file in X agent When Mitrokhin Mitrokhin last in 1984, he he had had been been trying trying for for six years years without without success success to recover the 1984, to recover the security security clearclear ance which which had had made made him him such such a a valuable valuable agent in the theThorn-EMI Thorn-EM1 Weapons Diviance agent in Weapons Divi sion in 1976-8. 1976-8. By now, now, the the Centre was close off. The sion in Centre was close to to writing writing him him off The last last contact contact with Smith Smith noted noted on on his his file file was was in in March March 1983. 1983. In it was put him him with In 1984 1984 it was decided decided to to put "on ice" ice"for for the the next next three three years.111 years.'" In In December however, Smith Smith was "on December 1985, 1985, however, was taken taken on on as a a quality quality assurance assurance engineer engineer by by the the GEC Hirst Hirst Research Research Centre Centre at at Wembley, as Wembley, in in north-west London, where seven months later he was given limited security clearnorth-west clear ance for for defense defense contracts contracts on on a a need-to-know need-to-know basis.l12 ance basis.112 . In 1990 1990 Line Line X at at the the London London residency Smith, arranging arranging In residency renewed renewed contact contact with with Smith, meetings either either in in the the graveyard graveyard of of the the church church of St.Mary Mary at Harrow on onthe the Hill or meetings of St. at Harrow Hill or in the the nearby Roxeth recreation park at South South Harrow. Security procedures were devised devised at each site to warn Smith if it was under surveillance. surveillance. At St. St. Mary's church white chalk line on the the vicarage wall near a fire hydrant. If he was told to look for a white the line was uncrossed, uncrossed, it it was was safe safefor for him to enter enter the graveyard. e was also told the line was him to the graveyard. H He was also told to to look at the church noticeboard. indinoticeboard. A small green dot, usually on a drawing pin, indi cated on; a was a a warning warning to cated that that the the meeting meeting with with his his case case officer officer was wasstill still on; a red red dot dot was to leave Smith had an ideological leave immediately. immediately. Though Though Smith had originally originally been been an ideological agent, agent, his his motives had had become become increasingly increasingly mercenary. mercenary. At meetings between between 1990 and1992 1992 motives At meetings 1990 and hehe was given a total of over 20,000 pounds pounds for material from from GEC defense was given a total of over 20,000 for material defense projects, projects, some of of which which he he spent an expensive expensive fl flamenco guitar, a a musical musical keyboard and some spent on on an amenco guitar, keyboard and computer equipment. equipment. Smith Smith became became increasingly increasingly confident confident and and careless. careless. When computer When he he was arrested arrested in in August August 1992, 1992, the thepolice police found found documents on the the Rapier was documents on Rapier ground-toground-to air missile missile system system and and Surface Surface Acoustic Acoustic Wave Wave military military radar radar technology technology in in a a Sains Sainsair l13 bury's carrier carrier bag bag in in the the boot boot of of his his Datsun. Datsun.'l3 bury's
'

IN been a a remarkable transformation in in the I N TH E C O U R S SE E of of the the Cold ColdWar, War, there there had had been remarkable transformation the balance of between Britain and the Soviet Union. Union. When When the balance of intelligence intelligence power power between Britain and theSoviet the Cold Cold War when Moscow, War began, began, at at aatime time when Britain Britain possessed possessed no no major major intelligence intelligence assets assets in in Moscow, the KGB was was still Five (Blunt, (Blunt, admittedly, admittedly, on on a part-time the still running running the the Magnificent Magnificent Five a part-time basis) and other major inside the British nuclear nuclear project. far as asis is basis) and had had other major agents agents inside the British project. So far

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known present, there there were were no no comparable comparable British British agents agents during during the closing years years known at at present, the closing of the Cold War, though it is impossible to exclude the possibility (not, however, a of the Cold War, though it is impossible to exclude the possibility (not, however, a probability) may have have been been a a British British Ames Ames who has so so far far gone gone undeunde probability) that that there there may who has tected. SIS, by by contrast, attracted a series of of KGB officers officers either as penetration agents tected. SIS, contrast, attracted a series either as penetration agents or defectors-among them Oleg Gordievsky, Gordievsky, Vladimir Kuzichkin, Viktor Viktor or as as defectors-among them Oleg Vladimir Kuzichkin, Makarov, Mitrokhin.114 Other Other defectors ltrated by by SIS Makarov, Mikhail Mikhail Butkov Butkov and and Vasili Vasili Mitrokhin.'14 defectors exfi exfiltrated SIS included who provided extraordi included the the leading leading Russian Russian scientist scientist Vladimir Vladimir Pasechnik, Pasechnik, who provided extraordinary intelligence on the vast Soviet biological biological warfare program.1 15 There There may nary intelligence on the vast Soviet warfare program.l'' may well well have been other and defectors whose names names have yet to be revealed. revealed. O On have been other agents agents and defectors whose have yet to be n present phase of the Cold SIS had had clearly clearly the the better present evidence, evidence, during during the the final final phase of the Cold War War SIS better of of its its intelligence intelligence duel duel with with the the KGB.

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Th e Soviet Soviet intelligence offensive against West Germany during the Cold T he Cold War had

characteristics. First, the division division of Germany made the Federal three distinguishing characteristics. Republic (FRG) easier to penetrate than any other major Western state. state. So many refugees fled to the West from the misnamed German Democratic Republic (GDR)refugees fled (GDR) about three three million milhon before before the the building building of of the the Berlin Berlin Wall W d in in 1961-that 1961-that it was not about it was not difdif ficult thousands, of East German fi cult to hide hide hundreds, even even thousands, German and Soviet agents among the bogus refugees refugees were werea series series of ill illegals. Some were KGB officers of of them. Among the egals. Some Soviet spent several establishing false German identities identities in in Soviet nationality nationality who who had had spent several years years establishing false German GDR, ofwhom secure environment of the G the secure DR, many of whom moved on to operate against north American and other other targets.1 targets. Others were East East German illegal agents American and Others were German illegal agents recruited recruited and and trained by the KGB, most of whom were deployed deployedagainst against targets in the the Federal 2 Republic.2 Republic. Secondly, Moscow received Secondly, the the FRG was was the the only only Western Western state state on on which which Moscow received even even more intelligence from Stasi's foreign more high-grade high-grade intelligence from an an allied allied agency-the agency-the Stasis foreign section, section, the the Hauptverwaltung Aufk1urung Aufkl~rung (HVA)--than it it did did from from the the KGB. From From 1952 Hauptverwaltung (HVA)3-than 1952 to to 1986 the theHVA HVA was headed by Markus Markus Johannes MischaWolf, Wolf, probably 1986 was headed by Johannes "Mischa" probably the the ablest ablest of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc intelligence intelligence chiefs. chiefs. Wolf Wolf was was the the son son of of a a well-known well-known German of German had been forced to flee to Moscow after Hitlers Communist doctor and writer who had Hitler's rise to to power. power. He H e owed owed his his appointment as head head of of East Germanforeign rise appointment as East German foreign intelligence intelligence shortly before before his his thirtieth thirtieth birthday birthday to to his his devoted devoted Stalinism and hence hence the shortly Stalinism and the conficonfi dence he he inspired in the the KGB (then (then the the MGB), MGB), as as well well as as to to his his own own ability. In 1947 dence inspired in ability. In 1947 he told told his his friend friend Wolfgang Wolfgang Leonhard Leonhard that thatEast East German Communists would have have to to he German Communists would give up up the the idea of the the "separate separate German German way way to to socialism" socialismmentioned mentioned in in their give idea of their Party Party program. When Leonhard, who whoworked in the the Party Party central secretariat, secretariat, told program. When Leonhard, worked in central told him him he he Wolf replied, secretariat! was wrong, Wolf replied, There "There are higher authorities authorities than than your central central secretariat!" higherauthorities" authorities in Moscow did indeed put an an end to talk Shortly afterward, the "higher about the the "separate separate German German way."4 way.4Wolf Wolf has has never never suffered suffered from from false modesty. "As As about false modesty. even my bitter in retirement, "[the HVA] HV A] was was even my bitter foes foes would would acknowledge," acknowledge, he he boasts boasts in retirement, [the s probably the the most efficient and effective effective such such service service on on the the European Europeancontinent." continent. probably most effi cient and The third distinguishing characteristic of Soviet intelligence operations in West The third distinguishing characteristic of Soviet intelligence operations in West Germany Germany was was that, that, in inaddition addition to to receiving receiving HVA HVA reports, reports, the the KGB's KGBs own own penetration penetration of the the FRG was was powerfully powerfullyassisted assisted its East EastGerman German allies. As well establishing of byby its allies. well as as establishing

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legal residencies in Bonn, Cologne Cologne and alsoable able to run legal residencies in Bonn, and Hamburg,6 Hamburg6 the the KGB was was also to run West German German operations from its its base at Karlshorst Karlshorst in the Berlin This was was West operations from base at in the Berlin suburbs. suburbs. This the outside the using East East German illegals the largest largest Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence station station outside the USSR, using German illegals and other otheragents agents supplied by the the Stasi Stasi and and HVA. Though Though the the KGB KGB was, in principle, principle, and supplied by was, in responsible con responsible for for funding funding its its Karlshorst Karlshorst station, station, in in the the mid-1970s mid-1970s the the GDR was was contributing tributing 1.3 1.3 million million marks marks a a year year to to its its running running costs.7 costs.7 in the which are are The first first major major recruitments recruitments by by the the Karlshorst Karlshorst KGB in The the FRG which recorded files noted 1950. SERGEYEV (also (also code coderecorded in in the the files noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin occurred occurred in in 1950. named NIKA) NIKA),,a a young young West West German Communist recruited in in that year,was named German Communist recruited that year, was instructed Communist Party Party in in order order to him to instructed to to distance distance himself himself from from the the Communist to allow allow him to provide the Trotskyists in the with whom-despite polit provide intelligence intelligence on on the Trotskyists in theFRG, FRG, with whom-despite their their political insignificance-the Centre obsessed for reasons. His le ical insignificance-the Centre remained remained obsessed for ideological ideological reasons. His fi file records early in in his agent he provided the which made made records that that early his career career as as an an agent he provided the intelligence intelligence which possible Berlin by by a a spespe possible the the abduction abduction of of Weiland, Weiland, a a leading leading Trotskyist, Trotskyist, from from West West Berlin cial of the cial actions actions snatch snatch squad.8 squad. SERGEYEV SERGEYEV became became one one of the KGB's KGBs longest longest serving serving West German agents receiving a a West German agents and and by by 1963 1963 was was receiving a salary salary of of 400 400 deutschmarks deutschmarks a month. A Centre Trot month. Centre report report on on his his work work claims claims that, that, "With With his his help, help, in in 1951-74, 1951-74, Trotskyist skyist organizations organizations in in the the FRG and and western western Europe Europe were were cultivated cultivated and and compro compromised." Simultaneously, as a mised. Simultaneously, SERGEYEV SERGEYEV served served for for some some years years as a respected respected north north German Burgermeister. Burgermeister. Fearing Fearing that that he he was was under under surveillance, surveillance, the the KGB broke broke con conGerman tact with with him him in in1981, 1981, giving him him a a final final payment payment of 3,000 deutschmarks.9 deutschmarks. tact giving of 3,000 Karlshorst's Karlshorsts main main achievement achievement in in the the early early years years of of the the Federal Federal Republic Republic was was the the penetration intelligence agency, penetration of of the the semi-official semi-official West West German Germanforeign foreign intelligence agency, the the Gehlen Gehlen Org, which which from from 1956 1956 was wasofficially attached to to the Federal Chancellery Chancellery as as the the Org, officially attached the Federal Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). (BND). In In March March 1950 Karlshorst recruited recruited "for for material material Bundesnachrichtendienst 1950 Karlshorst reward" SS captain, captain, Hans Hans Clemens Clemens (codenamed reward an an unemployed unemployed former former SS (codenamed KHANNI), KHANNI), who in in the the following following year year gained gained a a job job in inthe theGehlen GehlenOrg. Org. Over the next decade decade he he who Over the next supplied what what his his file file describes as "valuable valuable information" information on on the intelligence supplied describes as the FRG intelligence community: "This made it possible to community: This made it possible to prevent prevent the the exposure exposure of of valuable valuable agents, agents, and and to to disrupt Soviet missions disrupt operations operations directed directed against against Soviet missionsin in the the FRG."lO FRG. Clemens's Clemenss greatest greatest success, however, was to SS comrade, comrade, Heinz Heinz Felfe success,however, was to recruit recruit a a former former SS Felfe (codenamed (codenamed l With KURT), inin the Gehlen Org.l the KURT), whom whom he hesuccessfully successfully recommended recommended for for a a job job the Gehlen 0rg.l With the active active assistance assistance of of Karlshorst, Karlshorst, Felfe Felfe rapidly rapidly established established himself himself as as one one of of the the most most successful successful agents agents of of the the Cold ColdWar. War. According According to to aaKGB report, report, his his intelligence, intelligence,when when combined pos combined with with that that from from the the British British spies spies George George Blake Blake and and Kim Kim Philby, Philby, made made possible during the the period sible "the the elimination elimination of of the the adversary's adversarysagent agent network network in in the theGDR" GDR during period 1953 to to 1955.12 1955.12 1953 In 1953 1953 Felfe Felfe astounded his colleagues colleagues in in the the Gehlen GehlenOrg Org by by announcing that he he In astounded his announcing that had had set set up up an an agent agent network network in in Moscow Moscow headed headed by by a a Red Red Army Army colonel. colonel. Much Much of of the the intelligence from from the the non-existent non-existent network-a network-a blend blend of of fact fact and and fi fiction fabricated by by intelligence ction fabricated the Centre-was Centre-was passed on to Konrad Adenauer, in the passed on to the theWest WestGerman German chancellor, chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, in Simultaneously, Felfe was providing Karlshorst with large numbers Bonn. Simultaneously, numbers of FRG intelligence reports. Urgent reports went by radio; the remainder were despatched in suitcases, on fi film concealed in tins of babyfood, via dead letterthe false bottoms of suitcases, lm concealed

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boxes, or or through through a Org courier, courier, Erwin working for for boxes, a Gehlen Gehlen Org Erwin Tiebel, Tiebel, who who was was also also working Karlshorst. established himself himself as as the the German German Philby, Philby, becombecom 1958 Felfe Felfe had had established Karlshorst. By 1958 ing-like Philby Philby in in SIS SIS fourteen fourteen years years earlier-head earlier-head of of Soviet Soviet counter-intelligence ing-like counter-intelligence in in the BND. Unlike Unlike Philby, Philby, however, however,his his motives motives had had more more to dowith with vanity with the to do vanity than than with ideology. H e was, he told told himself, himself, the the supreme supreme intelligence ideology. He was, he intelligence professional, professional, recognized recognized as the same time. time. Karlshorst Karlshorst was as the the rising rising star star of of the the BND yet yet outwitting outwitting it itat at the same was care careego, encouraging him to believe that his achievements achievements were eclipsing ful to boost his ego, I wanted," wanted, Felfe Felfe said saidlater, later, to rankas top class with the the even those those of of Richard Richard Sorge. Sorge. "I even "to rank as top class with officer Germany during duringthe the1950s concluded after Russians. A CIA offi Russians." cer who served in Germany Felfes arrest in 1961: 1961: Felfe's The BND damage damage report report must must have have run run into into tens of thousands of pages. The tens of thousands of pages. Not Not only were were agents agents and and addresses addresses compromised, compromised, but years of secret agent agent only but ten ten years of secret reports had had to to be be re-evaluated: re-evaluated: those those fabricated fabricated by by the other side, reports the other side, those those subtly subtly slanted, those from purely purely mythical mythical sources.13 sources.13 slanted, those from

Soon became KGB chairman chairman in in 1967, 1967, he singled out out Felfe-along Felfe-along Soon after after Andropov Andropov became he singled with Philby, Philby, Blake and Vassall-as Vassall-as the the kind with Blake and kind of of past past agent agent whose whose recruitment recruitment was, was, once keep the the Soviet Soviet leadership leadership abreast abreast of of the the once again, again, urgently urgently needed needed in in order order to to keep development of of Western Western policy.14 p01icy.l~ development a as well well as as intelligence intelligence colleccollec a major major target target for for KGB active active measures measures as tion. operations during during the the tion. The The chief chief priority priority of of both both KGB and and HVA influence influence operations 1950s West German German politicians politicians as as possible possible as as 1950s and and 1960s 1960s was was to to discredit discredit as as many many West neo-Nazis and and "revenge-seekers." revenge-seekers. Disinformation Disinformation almost always works works most neo-Nazis almost always most effeceffec tively of the was no no tively when when it it includes includes a a basis basis of of fact. fact. In In the the early early years years of the FRG, there there was shortage and influence to denounce denounce in in active active shortage of of real real ex-Nazis ex-Nazis in in positions positions of of power power and influence to measures Among the denouncers was Reuters correcorre measures campaigns. campaigns. Among the most most effective effective denouncers was the the Reuters spondent inBerlin, John Peet, Peet, who who had hadbeen recruited as the spondent in Berlin, John been recruited as an an NKVD agent agent during during the Spanish Civil War. War. I n 1950 1950 Peet Peet defected defected to to East East Berlin, Spanish Civil In Berlin, somewhat somewhat disconcerted disconcerted by by the the defection defection by by his his East East German the excessively excessively clandestine clandestine preparations preparations made made for for the German inviting him him to to coffee coffee from from an an East East case case officer. officer. All Peet Peet expected expected was was a a phone phone call call inviting Berlin West Berlin Berlin flat. flat. Instead, Instead, the professor Berlin professor professor who who frequently frequently visited visited his his West the professor rang him and, in what struck Peet curiously high-pitched declared, rang him and, in what struck Peet as as a a curiously high-pitched voice, voice, declared, "PRIMROSE hours on on Monday. PRIMROSE has has a a message message for for DAFFODIL. DAFFODIL. 1600 1600 hours Monday. I repeat, repeat, 1600 Berlin, Peet Peet announced at a press conference: conference: 1600 hours hours on on Monday." Monday. Once Once in in East EastBerlin, announced at apress
TH HE E F FRG R G WAS WAS

I simply in the the warmongering warmongering which which simply cannot cannot consent consent to to take take part part any any longer longer in threatens Union and People's Democracies, but which threatens not not only only the the Soviet Soviet Union and the the Peoples Democracies, but which is motherland, Britain, Britain, into into a powerless is also also well well on on the theway way to to converting converting my my motherland, apowerless American American colony.1s

Democratic German German Report, Report, which which From to 1975 1975 Peet fortnightly Democratic From 1952 1952 to Peet edited edited the the fortnightly spent much records (often (often supplied supplied by by Wolf) Wolf) of ofWest West spent much ofits of its time timedenouncing denouncing the the past past records

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German politicians, diplomats, industrialists, German politicians, diplomats, industrialists, lawyers, lawyers, generals generals and and police police chiefs. chiefs. Peet Peet regarded most important important aide, Hans Globke, regarded as as his his "prize prize exhibit" exhibitAdenauer's Adenauersmost aide, Hans Globke, who who had commentary on had drafted drafted the the infamous infamous official official commentary on Hitler's Hitlers 1935 1935 race race laws.16 laws.16 Peet's Peets propaganda propaganda was was powerfully powerfully reinforced reinforced by by the the KGB-arranged KGB-arranged defection defection in in July July 1954 1954 of of Otto Otto John, John, first first head head of of the the FRG security security service, service, the the Bundesamt Bundesamt fUr fur Verfassungsschutz John press conference Verfassungsschutz (BfV). (BfV). Like Like Peet Peet four four years years earlier, earlier, John gave gave a a press conference at at which alleged revival in West In December which he he denounced denounced the the alleged revival of of Nazism Nazism in West Germany. Germany. In December 1955 reappeared claiming been drugged 1955 John John reappeared in in the theWest, West, claiming that that he hehad had been drugged by by Wolfgang Wolfgang Wohlgemuth, Wohlgemuth, aadoctor doctor working working for for the the KGB. KGB. The The West West German Germansupreme supreme court court was was skeptical. According other evidence, evidence, John had been skeptical. According to to other John was was a a heavy heavy drinker drinker who who had been observed in a a "cheerful" than comatose observed crossing crossing to to the the East East in cheerful rather rather than comatose condition, condition, after after Wohlgemuth had plied him with whisky and played on his fears of a Nazi revival. Wohlgemuth had plied him withwhisky and played on his fears of a Nazirevival. In In December he was jail, but December 1959 1959 he was sentenced sentenced to to four four years years in in jail, but served served only only eighteen eighteen months. case. The months. Considerable Considerable mystery mystery still still surrounds surrounds the the John John case. The head head of of the the KGB Karlshorst theCentre Centre Karlshorst apparat, apparat, Yevgeni Yevgeni Petrovich Petrovich Pitovranov, Pitovranov, reported reported to to the inin July July 1954 had come 1954 that thatJohn John had come for for discussions discussions in in East EastBerlin Berlin because because he he "wished wished to to main maintain action tain contact contact with with us us to to discuss discuss political political problems problems and and joint joint action against against the the Nazis Nazis of of East the East, East, however, was made East Germany." Germany. John's Johns decision decision to to remain remain in in the however, was made under under KGB case: KGB pressure. pressure. According According to to one one of of the the KGB KGB officers officers involved involvedin in the theJohn John case: We We wanted wanted to to recruit recruit him, him, but but he he turned turned us us down. down. Because Because it it was was necessary necessarythat that John remain in sleeping pill John remain in East East Berlin, Berlin, we we put put a a sleeping pill in in his his coffee coffee .. .. .. Mter After sleep sleeping specialists from ing for for about about thirty thirty hours, hours, he he was was worked worked over over by by specialists from the the KGB with with psychological psychological pressure. pressure.He H e finally finally said saidthat that he hewould would cooperate cooperate with with us. us. Among was Among the thedeceptions deceptions used used to to persuade persuade John John to toremain remain in in the theEast East was a a fake fake West Western already ern news news broadcast broadcast announcing announcing that that he hehad had already defected defected to to the the GDR.17 GDR. The their disposal East Berlin The HVA and and KGB had had at at their disposal an an archive archive in in East Berlin which which held held Wehrmacht, SS and Nazi records seized by the Red Army. In two large volumes Wehrmacht, SS and Nazi records seized by the Red Army. In two large volumes of of material neo..:.Nazis, the material on on real real and and alleged alleged war war criminals criminals and and neo-Nazis, the HVA's HVAs active active measures measures department, Abteilung X, department, Abteilung X, combined combined authentic authentic archival archival documents documents and and fabricated fabricated evidence indictment ofof thethe West German political, business and evidence to to form form aadamning damning indictment West German political, business and military military elite.18 elite.* Abteilung Abteilung X X also also concocted concocted an an additional, additional, highly highly discreditable discreditable chap chapter GeWen, first of ter to to the thememoirs memoirs of of Reinhard Reinhard Gehlen, first head head of of the the BND, in in an animitation imitation of his his handwriting. 19 handwriting. The The most most celebrated celebrated West West German German target target of of the the KGB and and the the HVA was was Willy Willy Brandt, From momentBrandt Brandt became Brandt, codenamed codenamed POLYARNIK POLYARNIK ("Polar").2o (Polar).20 From the the moment became Burgermeister he was mea Burgermeister of of Berlin Berlin in in October October 1957, 1957, he was the the victim victim of of aaseries series of ofactive active measures blackmail sures operations operations designed designed first first to to discredit discredit and and then thentoto blackmail him. him. Given Given Brandt's Brandts heroic resistance to heroic record record of of resistance to Hitler, Hitler, it it was was plainly plainly unrealistic unrealistic to to include include him him in in the the KGB's KGBs list list of of neo-Nazi neo-Nazi conspirators. conspirators. Instead, Instead, by by distorting distorting his his early early career career and and war war active measures measures sought, atvarious various times, times, to to portray portray him him as as a a record, KGB KGB and and HVA active record, sought, at Gestapo SIS and Gestapo informer, informer, an an anti-German anti-German emigre, CmigrC, a a collaborator coUaborator with with SIS and the the CIA and and even even as as a a former former Soviet Soviet agent. agent.

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In Brandt (born Herbert In 1931, 1931, shortly shortly before before his his eighteenth eighteenth birthday, birthday, Willy Willy Brandt (born Herbert Frahm) Frahm) had had become become leader leader of of the theyouth youth section section of of the the Sozialistische Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei Arbeiterpartei (SAP), (SAP), a a left-wing left-wing breakaway breakaway party party from from the the socialist socialist SDP. SDP. Mter After Hitler's Hitlers rise rise to to power 933, Brandt exile, power in in 1 1933, Brandt went wentinto into exile, traveling traveling to to Norway Norway carrying carrying only only a a briefcase briefcase containing containing the the first first volume volume of of Marx's MarxsDas Das Kapital, Kapital, a a few few shirts shirts and and 100 100marks. marks. Once Once established in in Oslo Oslohe he established himself himself as as the the SAP SAP representative representative and and began began a a career career as as a ajour journalist. nalist. In In February February 1937 1937 he hetraveled traveled to to Spain, Spain, ostensibly ostensibly as as a a journalist journalist covering covering the the Civil but also International Civil War War but also to to act act as as liaison liaison between between SAP SAP members members of of the the International Brigades the neo-Trotskyist POUM Brigades and and the POUM militia. militia. Brandt Brandt quickly quickly denounced denounced the the "blind Soviet blind terror" terrorwaged waged by by the the Communists, Communists,on on Soviet instructions, instructions, against against POUM POUM and and other other left-wing left-wing heretics: heretics: The The truth truth of of the the matter matter is: is: the the Comintern Comintern is is determined determined to to destroy destroy all all forces forces that that refuse refuse to to obey obey its its orders. orders. It is is for for this this reason reason that that the the whole whole international international labor labor movement movement must must rise rise against against it. it. Brandt was, Brandt in inturn turn was, absurdly, absurdly,denounced denounced by by the the Communists Communistsas as "an an agent agent of of Franco" Franco "21 and and "a a spy spy of of the the Gestapo. Gestapo. The his as The earliest earliest reference reference to to Brandt Brandtin in his KGB KGB file file i"s is a a description description of of him him in in1936 1936 as a during the a member member of of the the Danzig Danzig Trotskyists. Trotskyists. The The other other reports reports on on Brandt Brandt during the late late 1 930s, all 1930s, all of of them them hostile, hostile, accurately accurately reflect reflect the the paranoia paranoia of of the the Great GreatTerror. Terror. There There are are fabricated fabricated claims claims that that POLYARNIK POLYARNIK had had been been tasked tasked by by the the Paris Paris Sfirete SfiretC to to infil infiltrate POUM, that he had betrayed many members of the SDP to the Gestapo and trate POUM, that he had betrayed many members of the SDP to the Gestapo and that that he hewas was involved involvedin in the themurder murder in in Spain Spain of of Mark Mark Rein, Rein, son son of of a a prominent prominent Rus Rus22 sian reality sian Menshevik, Menshevik, who who had hadin in reality been been killed killed by by the the NKVD. NKVD.22 Mter invasionof of the After Hitler's Hitlers invasion the Soviet Soviet Union Union in in June June 1941, 1941, Brandt's Brandts attitude attitude to to Moscow Moscow changed. changed. The The NKVD residency residency in in Stockholm, Stockholm, whither whither Brandt Brandt had had moved moved after after the the German German occupation occupation of of Norway, Norway, reported reported that that there there had had been been a a split split in in the the ranks now willing ranks of of "Norwegian Norwegian Trotskyists." Trotskyists." Some, Some, including including Brandt, Brandt, were were now willing to to co cooperate operate with with the the Soviet Soviet Union Union to to secure secure the the defeat defeat of of Hitler. Hitler. In In the the autumn autumn of of 1941 1941 M. Stockholm M. S. S. Okhunev Okhunev (codenamed (codenamedOLEG), OLEG),an an operations operationsofficer officerat at the the Stockholm residency, residency, called called on on Brandt Brandt but but found found him him out out and and left left his his card. card. The The following following evening evening Brandt Brandt visited visited the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassyand and spent spent three three hours hours talking talking to to Okhunev Okhunev and and the the NKVD resident, Vetrov. Brandt resident, Mikhail Mikhail Sergeyevich Sergeyevich Vetrov. Brandt said said that that he he ran ran a a news news agency agency whose whose clients ready to clientsincluded included the the American American press, press, was was ready to do do anything anything to to hasten hasten the the destruction destruction of to of Nazism Nazism and and would would be be happy happy to to send send stories stories from from "Soviet Soviet comrades" comrades to the theUnited United States their States(which (whichhad had not not yet yet entered entered the the war)-if war)-if necessary, necessary,disguising disguising their source. source.Vetrov Vetrov and and Okhunev Okhunev replied replied that that the the most most important important contribution contribution he he could could make maketo to the thewar war effort effort would would be be to to gather gather intelligence intelligence from from his his Norwegian Norwegian friends friends on on German German forces forces and and operations operations in in Norway. Norway. Brandt Brandt agreed, agreed, and and for for the the next next nine nine months months had had clandes clandestine meetings once a fortnight with officers from the Stockholm residency. tine meetings once a fortnight with officers from the Stockholm residency. On O n one one occasion occasion he he was was handed handed 500 500 kroner, kroner, probably probablyto to meet meet his his expenses, expenses,and and gave gave a a receipt. receipt. Among the intelligence was Among the intelligence supplied supplied by by Brandt Brandt from from his his Norwegian Norwegian sources sources was information the German German battleship Tirpitz, which which left left the the Norwegian Norwegian port port of of information on on the battleship Tirpitz,

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Trondheim in March March 1942 1942 to attack Arctic Brandt informed Trondheim in to attack Arctic convoys. convoys. Brandt informed the the NKVD that he he had hadpassed passed the the same information to to the the British, who tried tried and and failed failed to to sink sink that same information British, who it.23He H e also also supplied supplied the the Stockholm Stockholm residency residencywith with information information on on German Germanpressure pressure it.23 on join the the Anti-Comintern Anti-Comintern Pact on Sweden Sweden to to join Pact and and on on plans plans (never (never implemented) implemented) to to ban the In the arrest by the ban the Swedish Swedish Communist Communist Party. Party. In the summer summer of of 1942, 1942, after after the the arrest by the Swedish agents of Swedish police police of of two two Czech Czech agents of the the residency, residency, TERENTY and and VANYA,24 VANYA,24 Brandt Brandt refused refused further further secret secret rendezvous rendezvous with with NKVD officers, officers, despite despite pressure pressure from from the the residency residency to to continue continue them. them. He H e did, did, however, however, agree agreeto to come come openly openly to to the the Soviet Soviet embassy, sometimes sometimes to to meet meet intelligence intelligence officers officers operating operating under underdiplomatic diplomatic cover.25 cover.25 embassy, None of this makes POLYARNIK a Soviet agent. The Stockholm residency reported in in 1943 had also also been in touch touch with with British British and and American reported 1943 that thatBrandt Brandt had been in American intelligence officers officers in in Sweden, as well well as as with with Trotsky's Trotskys Norwegian Norwegian former former secretary, secretary, intelligence Sweden, as who remained remained deeply deeply suspect suspect as as far far as as the Centre was concerned.26Brandt's Brandts overrid overridwho the Centre was concerned.26 ing motive motive was was to to provide provide any any information information to to all all three three members members of of the the Grand ing Grand Alliance which which might might contribute defeat of of Hitler. Hitler. In In the the case case of of the Soviet Alliance contribute to to the the defeat the Soviet Union, he calculated accurately that his best channel of communication with Union, he calculated accurately that his best channel of communication with via the Stockholm residency. residency. Moscow was via The first first attempt attempt to to discredit discredit Brandt Brandt after after his his election election as Berlin Burgermeister Biirgermeister in in The as Berlin 1957 was a lengthy operation carried out jointly jointlyby the KGB and HVA in 1958-9 1957 1958-9 to use tendentious tendentious versions versions of of his his wartime wartime record record and and other other fabrications fabrications to to show show him him as as use an agent agent of of British British and and American American intelligence. intelligence. But, But, as as the the file file on on the an the operation operation acknowledges, "This This did did not produce the the desired desired result, result, and and Brandt's Brandts position as a acknowledges, not produce position as a politician was was not not undermined."27 ~ndermined. Wolf ~ ~ next next proposed proposed reviving reviving the the old old slander slander that that politician Wolf Brandt had had been a Gestapo Gestapo agent agentduring during his Norwegian Norwegian exile, exile, but but the the East East German German Brandt been a his leadership ordered ordered the the plan plan to to be be aborted aborted due due to to lack lack of of credible credible evidence.28 evidence.28 leadership In the the 1961 1961 West West German German elections elections Brandt Brandt stood stood as as the the SDP SDP candidate candidate for for the the In chancellorship.The The campaign campaign was was the the dirtiest dirtiestin in the history of the the FRG. Brandt was was chancellorship. the history of FRG. Brandt assailed by by what what he hedenounced denounced as as "a aright-wing of mud." mud.The fact that hehad had assailed right-wing barrage barrage of The fact that he spent the years in in exile exile led to accusations accusations that that he was unpatriotic, unpatriotic, while while his spent the Nazi Nazi years led to he was his background cryptobackground as a left-wing socialist gave gave rise rise to insinuations that he he was was a crypto Communist. Brandt Brandtwas was deeply deeply depressed depressed by by the the "political politicalpornography to disCommunist. pornography" used used to dis My opponents, were sometimes successful to the credit him. "My opponents," he later admitted, "were extent that they kept me from my work for days on end. end." Sensing his vulnerability, in Brandt's Brandts view, vigorous encouragement to some of the the Stasi gave secret but, in "vigorous encouragement" charges charges fabricated against him.29 him.29 the SDP succeeded in cutting cutting the the Christian ChristianDemocrat Democratmajority (thanks Though the during the the campaign), the Centre Centre decided largely to to the the building building of of the the Berlin Berlin Wall largely Wall during campaign), the decided to threaten Brandt with far more damaging evidence than had surfaced surfaced during the 16, 1962 1962 Semichastny, Semichastny, the the KGB chairman, chairman, formally formally elections. On O n November elections. November 16, FCD. approved a a blackmail blackmail operation proposed by by Sakharovsky, Sakharovsh, the head of of the the FCD. approved operation proposed the head Though there is no mention of it in the file seen by Mitrokhin, the operation was also, certainly, approved approved by Khrushchev, Khrushchev, still still smarting from the the humiliating also, almost almost certainly, smarting from humiliating outcome of of the Cuban missile missiIe crisis in the previous month.30 month.3*The operational plan was for for Brandt Brandt to to be be approached approached by by the the Izvestia Ixvestia correspondent, Polyanov, to to whom whom correspondent, Polyanov, was

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he had had given given an an interview interview earlier earlier in in the the year. year. O n this this occasion, occasion, Polyanov he On Polyanov would would be be accompanied by an an undercover undercover KGB operations officer who would tell We accompanied by operations officer who would tell Brandt, Brandt, ((We would to resume resume our confidential relations relations with you in would like like to our confidential with you in order order to to develop develop together together sensible solutions to to the the West WestBerlin question. If sensible solutions Berlin question." If Brandt Brandt refused, refused, he he was was to to be be told, told, "We We have means to cause you and therefore therefore assume assume that that have sufficient sufficient means to cause you unpleasantness, unpleasantness, and you was in in fact Sakharovsky you will will reconsider reconsider your your position." position. The The threat threat was fact largely largely bluff bluff. Sakharovsky theoriginal documents in Brandts had been annoyed to discover discover that the Brandt's wartime operoper ational file file had had been been destroyed destroyed in in 1959 1959(an (an inconceivable action had had he he actually ational inconceivable action actually been been an agent), agent), among among them them such such apparently apparently compromising compromising items receipt for an items as as his his receipt for 500 500 kroner for for the the Stockholm Stockholm residency. residency. Brandt, Brandt, however, The kroner however, would would be be unaware unaware of of this. this. The approved by Semichastny confidently asserts that that Brandt operational plan approved Brandt must believe that that ((there there are are materials materials in in our our possession possession which could compromise believe which could compromise him.31 him."31 Mitrokhin did did not not see see the the report report on on the the meeting meeting with Mitrokhin with Brandt.32 Brandt.32 It lt is is clear, clear, howhow ever, that-if that-if it it went went ahead-Brandt brushed the ever, ahead-Brandt brushed the attempted attempted KGB blackmail blackmail aside. aside. Semichastny certainly intended, intended, with with Khrushchevs Khrushchev's Semichastny and and Sakharovsky Sakharovsky had had almost almost certainly approval, to soften up Brandt before approval, to soften up Brandt before a meeting meeting with with the the Soviet Soviet leader. leader. In In January January 1963, while while on on a a visit visit to to East East Berlin, Khrushchev duly duly invited invited Brandt to a a meeting. 1963, Berlin, Khrushchev Brandt to meeting. Already convinced convinced of of the the need need to to reach reach a a modus vivendi wviwendi between between the the FRG and and GDR Already as well well as as to to settle settle the the Berlin Berlin question, question, Brandt Brandt was to accept. accept. Opposition Opposition to to as was willing willing to the ruling West West Berlin Berlin coali the proposed proposed meeting meeting from from the the Christian ChristianDemocrats Democrats in in the theruling coalition, refuse. According to Brandt: Brandt: tion, however, however, persuaded persuaded him him to to refuse. According to

Khrushchev refusal as Ambassador [Pyotr [Pyotr Khrushchev must must have have taken taken my my refusal as an an affront. affront. Ambassador Andreyevich] Abrasimov later description of the total dismay Andreyevich] Abrasimov later gave gave me me a a vivid vivid description of the total dismay that master when news was communicated to to him. him. that overcame overcame his his erstwhile erstwhile master when the the news was communicated Khrushchev, caught caught in in the the act act of of changing, changing, almost almost dropped dropped his Khrushchev, his trousers trousers with with . 33 surpnse surprise .. .. ..33

Brandt's first SDP chancellor, chancellor, from from OctoOcto Brandts four four and and a a half half years years as asWest West Germany's Germanys first ber 1969 to 1974, marked mark of and KGB intel ber 21, 21,1969 to May May 6, 6,1974, marked the the high high water water mark of the the HVA and intelligence offensive in the FRG. success was was the penetration of ligence offensive in the FRG. Wolf's Wolfs greatest greatest success the penetration of the the Chancellor's office by In 1956 1956 GuilGuil Chancellors office by Gunter Gunter Guillaume Guillaume (codenamed (codenamed HANSEN). HANSEN). In laume a caremy carefully orchestrated laume and and his his wife wife Christel, Christel, both both HVA officers, officers, had had staged staged a orchestrated ('escape" from in Frankfurt Frankfurt to to act act as as cover for escape from East East Germany, Germany, set set up up small small businesses businesses in cover for their become active, active, apparently their intelligence intelligence work work and and become apparently staunchly staunchly anti-Communist, anti-Communist, members had become of the the Frankfurt Frankfurt members of of the the SDP. SDP By By 1968 1968 Guillaume Guillaume had become chairman chairman of SDP and member of thus becoming becoming the the only SDP and an an elected elected member of the the Frankfurt Frankfurt city city council, council, thus only HVA officer hold public FRG. In In NovemNovem officer (as (asopposed opposed to to agent) agent) ever ever to to hold public office office in in the theFRG. ber became chancellor, Guillaume gained gained a a job his ber 1969, 1969, three three weeks weeks after after Brandt Brandt became chancellor, Guillaume jobin inhis office, unions and organizations. office, initially initially as as an an assistant assistant dealing dealing with with trade trade unions and political political organizations. Hardworking manner, he he was promoted in in Hardworking and and efficient, efficient, with with a ajovial jovial down-to-earth down-to-earth manner, was promoted 1972 to become the Chancellor's aide for relations with the SDP, as well as being put 1972 to become the Chancellors aide for relations with the SDP, as well as being put in arrangements. highly rated in the in charge charge of of Brandt's Brandts travel travel arrangements. His His reports reports.were were so so highly rated in theCen Centre to foreign foreign minister minister Gromyko.34 tre that that they they were were personally personallyforwarded forwarded by by Andropov Andropov to Gr~myko.~~

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The oncerned Brandt's The key key intelligence intelligence requirement requirement placed placed on on Guillaume Guillaume concerned Brandts Ost Osthe defined the politik, which which he defined as as having having "a a threefold threefold aim: aim: improved improved relations relations with with the Soviet Union, normal the east east European European states, states, and modus vivendi vivendi Soviet Union, normal relations relations with with the and a a modus between the parts of State of the Nation" to between the two two parts ofGermany." Germany, In In his his "Report Report on onthe the State of Nation the to the the Bundestag the beginning beginning of Brandt called called for togetherness" Bundestag at at the of 1970, 1970, Brandt for "cooperative cooperative togetherness between he became the first and GDR. In In the the course course of of the the year year he became the first chancel chancelbetween the the FRG and lor the Soviet Soviet Union Poland.35 lor to to visit visit East East Germany, Germany, and and signed signed treaties treaties with with the Union and and Poland.35 Through Guillaume's Guillaumes judgments," judgments, writes writes Wolf Wolf in his memoirs, memoirs, "we we were were able to "Through in his able to conclude conclude sooner sooner rather rather than than later later that that Brandt's Brandts new new Ostpolitik, Ostpolitik, while while still still riven riven with with contradictions, marked a change of foreign contradictions, marked a genuine genuine change of course course in in West WestGerman German foreign policy."36 policy.36 hed the Moscow Moscow reac reached the same same conclusion. conclusion. After After Brandt's Brandts visit visit to to East East Germany, Germany, how however, Karlshorst reported "a noticeable rise in his popularity,"37 which caused ever, Karlshorst reported a noticeable rise in his p ~ p u l a r i t y , which ~ ~ caused some some concern to to the leadership. During During his his visit, visit, as as the the crowds crowds chanted, chanted, "Willy, Willy, concern the GDR leadership. Willy!, Brandt Brandt mischievously mischievously asked asked the the East East German German prime prime minister, minister, Willi Willi Stoph, Stoph, Willy!," whether the name a "y" whether the name being being chanted chanted was was spelled spelled with with a y or or an an "i." i. Stoph Stoph remained remained stony-faced.38 st~ny-faced.~~ With the the Christian Democrats in in open open opposition opposition to to Brandt's Brandts Ostpolitik, the the With Christian Democrats Centre was was now now concerned not to to compromise compromise Brandt but to to keep keep him him in in power. power. By Centre concerned not Brandt but the spring spring of of 1972 1972 aaseries series of of defections defections from from the the SDP SDP and and its its Free Free Democrat Democrat allies allies the had reduced majority to to four. four. With With more more defections defections in in the theoffing, offing, the fate of of had reduced Brandts Brandt's majority the fate Ostpolitik balance. success, the (Chris OstpoZitik hung hung in inthe the balance. In In April April 1972, 1972, confident confident of of success, the CDU (Christian Democrat) Democrat) leader, leader, Rainer Rainer Barzel, Barzel, tabled tabled a a motion motion of of no no confidence.39 ~ o n f i d e n c eWith .~~ W the ith tian the blessing of the the Centre, Centre,Wolf Wolfmade made a a possibly possibly critical critical secret secret intervention intervention in in the the Bun Bunblessing of destag destag with with the the aim aim of of keeping keeping Brandt Brandt in inpower. power. Shortly before before the the crucial vote of of confidence, confidence, the the HVA had had recruited a corrupt corrupt Shortly crucial vote recruited a deputy, Julius Steiner, Steiner, as an agent with the codename SIMSON.40 Wolf CDU deputy, code name SIMSON.40 Wolf paid Steiner 50,000 marks marks to to vote vote for for Brandt.41 Brandt.l Barzels failed by by Steiner 50,000 Barzel's no no confidence confidence motion motion failed two votes. votes. At a a general election in in November, November, Brandt parliamentwo general election Brandt won won a a more more secure secure parliamen tary majority, majority, with with the the SDP SDP for for the the first time beating beating the the Christian ChristianDemocrats Democrats the tary first time inin the popular vote.42 The HVA continued to run run SIMSON as the new popular vote.42 The continued to as an an agent agent in in the new BunBun destag. In In February February 1973 1973 Steiner Steiner agreed agreed to to aacontract with the theHVA (euphemistically destag. contract with (euphemistically described as as the the Structural Working Group of the the GDR Council Council of described "Structural Working Group of of Ministers), Ministers"), under which which he he was was paid paid a a retainer retainer of3,000 of 3,000 marks marks a a month. month.Soon date under Soon afterward afterward (the (the date is not not recorded recorded by by Mitrokhin), Wolfreported reported to to the the Centre Centrethat thatSteiner Steiner was is Mitrokhin), Wolf was in in concon tact with with the the BfV, BN, the the West West German Germancounter-intelligence agency, and thus useless as tact counter-intelligence agency, and thus useless as agent.43In June the photograph of a bank bank an agent.43 theMunich Munich weekly Quick published a photograph marks had had been been paid paid into into Steiner's Steiners account account the the day deposit slip slip showing showing that that 50,000 deposit 50,000 marks April 1972 1972vote confidence, thus after the April vote of confidence, thus provoking a public scandal which which was was quickly dubbed "Bonn's Bonns Watergate" Watergate or or "Rhinegate." Rhinegate. Steiner Steiner acknowledged acknowledged being being quickly dubbed had worked as a double agent with recruited as an HVA agent but claimed that he had the the BfV, and said that the 50,000 marks had BN, and said that the 50,000 marks had come come from from the the SDP SDP the approval approval of of the Wienandj4-a charge denied by Wienand (who, (who, it later transpired, chief whip, Karl Wienand44-a was agent).45 A parliamentary parliamentary inquiry inquiry decided decided that that there there was was no no con conwas also also an an HVA agent).4s evidence of bribery. bribery.36 clusive evidence 46

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By the Brandt's the time timeof of Brandts victory victory in in the theNovember November 1972 1972 elections, elections, Guillaume Guillaume was was at at the peak of his career as a penetration agent, attending all meetings meetings of of the the SDP SDP party party the peak of his career as a penetration agent, attending all and and parliamentary parliamentary leadership. leadership. On O n May May 29, 29, 1973, 1973, however, however, Gunter Gunter Nollau, Nollau, head head of of the BfV, BfV, informed informed Hans-Dietrich Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Genscher, the the interior minister, that that Guillaume Guillaume the interior minister, was was under under suspicion suspicion of of espionage espionage and and had had been been placed placedunder under surveillance. surveillance. (Their (Their rec recollections ollections later later differed differed over over how how serious serious the the suspicions suspicions reported reported by by Nollau Nollau were.)47 were.)47 Shortly Shortly afterward, afterward, alerted-according alerted-according to to Wolf's Wolfs not not wholly wholly reliable reliable account-by account-by the the BNs clumsy clumsy surveillance surveillance of of Guillaume's Guillaumes wife, wife, the the HVA ordered ordered both both Gunter Gunter and and BfV's Christel a.m. on Christel Guillaume Guillaume to to suspend suspend their their intelligence intelligence work.48 work.48At 6:30 6:30 a.m. on April April 24, 24, 1974 1974 the the Guillaumes Guillaumes were were arrested arrested at at their their Bonn Bonn apartment. apartment. In In a a curious curious breach breach of of espionage espionage tradecraft, tradecraft, Guillaume Guillaume virtually virtually admitted admitted his his guilt. guilt. Dressed Dressed only only in in a a bathrobe, German] National bathrobe, he he declared declared defiantly, defiantly, "I I am am an anofficer officer of of the the[East [East German] National Peo People's ples Army!" Army!According According to to Genscher, Genscher, "It It was was basically basicallyonly only Guillaume's Guillaumes own own declara declaration tion which which convicted convicted him."49 him.49 Wolf Wolf now now argues argues that that his his success success in in penetrating penetrating Brandt's Brandts entourage entourage was was "equiva equivalent to to kicking kicking a a football football into into our our own own goal. The political political scandal by Guil Guillent goal." The scandal caused caused by laume's 1974. The laumes arrest arrest was was the the immediate immediate cause cause of of Brandt's Brandts resignation resignation on on May May6,6,1974. The HVA, Wolf Wolf concludes, concludes, "unwittingly unwittingly helped helped to to destroy destroy the the career career of of the the most most far farHVA, sighted sighted of of modern modern German German statesmen."so statesmen. Germany Germany which which had had had had the the greatest greatest influence influence on on the the KGB's those spies (a phrase invented KGBs own own methods methods were were probably probably those of of its its "Romeo Romeo spies (aphrase invented by by the the Western Western media media but but later later taken taken over over by by Wolf himself).sl himself). The The KGB had had specialized specialized in in the diplomats and Moscow since since the the sexual sexual entrapment entrapment of of Western Western diplomats and visitors visitors to to Moscow the 1930s. 1930s. The The entrapment entrapment followed followed a a straightforward straightforward sequence: sequence: the the use use of of attractive attractive female female or or sexual bait, male male swallows swallowsas as sexual bait, the the seduction seduction of of the the target, target, the the secret secret photography photography of of the the sexual sexual encounter encounter (and, (and, on on occasion, occasion, the the interruption interruption of of the the encounter encounter by by a a supposedly supposedly outraged by Wolf's tactics were both outraged "spouse" spouseor or "relative"), relative),followed followed by blackmail.s2 blackmail.52 Wolfs tactics were both more more subtle or it, subtle and and more more effective. effective.Love, Love, or a a plausible plausible semblance semblanceof of it, was was capable capableof of generat generat53 The ing over a ing more more intelligence intelligence over a longer longer period period than than brief brief sexual sexual encounters. encounter^.'^ The main main tar targets secretaries, most gets of of the the Romeo Romeo spies spies were werelonely lonelyfemale female secretaries, most in in their their thirties thirties or or forties, forties, employed employed in in West West German German ministries ministries and and intelligence intelligence agencies. agencies. Beginning the late the Beginning in in the late 1950s, 1950s, the the KGB base base in in Karlshorst Karlshorst began began imitating imitating the HVA's the KGB files seen by by Mitrokhin HVAs "secretaries secretaries offensive." offensive. Indeed, Indeed, the files seen Mitrokhin show show that that some be A agents some of of the the "secretary secretaryspies" spieslater later thought thought to to be HV HVA agents were were in in fact fact working working for for the the Bonn Bonn Foreign KGB. Karlshorst's Karlshorsts initial initial targets targets were were female female employees employees in in the Foreign the KGB. Ministry ministry's personnel Ministry identified identified by by a a KGB KGB agent agent in in the the ministrys personnel department, department, Gisela Gisela Herzog Herzog (codenamed (codenamed MARLENE), MARLENE), recruited recruited in in 1954-without, 1954-without, apparently, apparently, the the use use of of a a Romeo Romeo spy. spy.Herzog Herzog herself herself married married an an official official from from the the French French defense defense ministry ministry in rst victim in 1958 1958and and moved moved to to Paris. Paris. The The fi first victim of of the the KGB's KGBs secretaries secretaries offensive offensive was was Herzog's friend Leonore Heinz (codenamed LOLA), secretary to a foreign ministry Herzogs friend Leonore Heinz (codenamed LOLA), secretary to a foreign ministry department department head. head. Her Her seducer seducer was was Heinz Heinz Sutterlin Sutterlin (codenamed (codenamed WALTER), WALTER), a a West West German whose German from from Freiburg Freiburg recruited recruited by by the the KGB KGB in in 1957, 1957, whose first first name, name, confusingly, conhsingly, was was identical identical to to Leonore's Leonores surname. surname. When When Herzog Herzog heard heard in in 1958 1958 that that the the 30-year30-yearT HE H VA O P E RATI O N S in THE HVA OPERATIONS in West West

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old old Leonore Leonore Heinz Heinz had had succumbed succumbed to to Sutterlin's Sutterlins advances, advances,she she became became conscience consciencestricken. stricken. Probably Probably foreseeing foreseeingHeinz's Heinzs devastation devastation when when she she discovered discovered that that she she had had been deceived, Herzog wrote to the Centre, "I should like to say that you should been deceived, Herzog wrote to the Centre,I should like to say that you should not not involve involveLOLA LOLA in in co-operation co-operation with with us us through through Sutterlin. Sutterlin. She Shewould would be be very very disillu disillusioned." another occasion, sioned. "I I do do ask ask you," you, she she wrote wrote on on another occasion, ((to to please please leave leave LOLA LOLA in in peace."54 The The Centre, Centre, predictably, predictably, paid paid no no attention. attention. In 1960 Heinz Heinz Sutterlin Sutterlin and and Leonore Leonore Heinz Heinz were were married. married. Over Over the the In December December 1960 next next year year Sutterlin Sutterlin frequently frequently discussed discussed with with his his wife wife the the danger danger that that the the Cold ColdWar War might hot war. leadership might turn turninto into hot war. At At a a time timewhen when the the West WestGerman German leadership were were building building themselves themselves nuclear nuclear shelters, shelters, he he argued argued that that they they had had to to be be concerned concerned for for their their own own safety. Leonore agreed to confide in him everything she knew about East-West safety. Leonore agreed to confide in him everything she knew about East-West relations. relations. In In 1961, 1961, at atfirst first unwittingly, unwittingly, she she was was included included in in the the KGB KGB agent agent network. network. Two without mentioning the the KGB, KGB, Two years years later, later, Sutterlin Sutterlin reported reported to to the theCentre Centrethat, that, without mentioning he he had hadtold told his his wife wife he he was was passing passing on on her her information information to to an an organization organization dedicated dedicated to to preventing preventing nuclear nuclear war: war: I I told told LOLA LOLA that that there there is is one one great great organization organization in in the the world world which which regards regards the the preservation preservation of of peace peace as as its its task. task.This This organization organization requests requests one one great great favor favor from from her. her. She She must must continue continue to to work work in in the the foreign foreign ministry ministry and and report reportto tome me everything that she finds out . . . The organization thinks well of her work . everything that she finds out . . . The organization thinks well of her work ... .. She she She has has agreed agreedto to cooperate cooperate in in every everyway way she can, can, and and declared declared that that she she regards regards it it as as the the duty duty of of every every decent decent person person to to seek seek to to tie tie the the hands hands of of warmongers. warmongers. She She declined declined to to receive receive money money for for her her help. help. I I believe believe that that in inLOLA LOLA we we have havean an assistant on whom one may rely totally. assistant on whom one may rely totally. Though Though his his wife wife refused rehsed payment, payment, Sutterlin Sutterlin received received 1,000 1,000marks marks a a month. month. From LOLA had had smuggled smuggled From 1964 1964 onward, onward, Sutterlin Sutterlin handed handed film film of of documents documents LOLA out out of of the the ministry ministry to to the the East East German German illegal illegal Eugen Eugen Runge Runge (codenamed (codenamed MAKS), MAKS), who was working for the Karlshorst KGB. Runge, in turn, left the film in a dead who was working for the Karlshorst KGB. Runge, in turn, left the film in a dead letter-box letter-box which which was was emptied emptied by by the the Bonn Bonn residency. residency.After After Leonore Leonore at atlast last realized realized that that she shewas wasworking working for for the the Soviet Soviet Bloc, Bloc, Runge Runge had had a a personal personal meeting meeting with with her. her. He He found found her her unperturbed unperturbed by by her her discovery. discovery. Leonore Leonore said said that that she she trusted trusted her her husband husband absolutely, work a that had to be absolutely,and and that that her her work in in the thecause cause of of peace peace was was ajob job that had be todone. done. Sut Sutterlin motivated terlin told told Runge Runge that that Leonore Leonore was was also also motivated by by ((hatred hatredfor for the the caste caste of of haughty haughty foreign foreign ministry ministry officials" officialsand and ((derived derivedsatisfaction satisfaction from from causing causing as as much much damage damage as as she she could."55 His His comment comment supplies supplies a a missing missing element element in in traditional traditional explanations explanations of of the the success success of of the the HVA HVA and and KGB KGB secretaries secretaries offensive. offensive.Though Though most most of of the the secre secretaries began spying for love, their espionage was probably sustained, at least in taries began spying for love, their espionage was probably sustained, at least in part, part, by by the the arrogance arrogance of of some some of of their their better-educated better-educated and and better-paid better-paid male male superiors. superiors. In 967 Runge CIA,betraying betraying both both Leonore Leonore and and Heinz Heinz Sutter SutterIn 1 1967 Runge defected defected to to the the CIA, lin. lin. Runge Runge told told his his debriefers, debriefers, ((We We received received [FRG [FRG diplomatic] diplomatic] documents documents before before they they moved moved across acrossLeonore's Leonoresdesk desk and and on onto tothe thecode code room, room, and and we we read read the the reports reports brought brought by by diplomatic diplomatic couriers couriers from from abroad, abroad, mostly mostly even even before before German German Foreign Foreign Minister Minister [Gerhard] [Gerhard]Schrider Schrider got got them." them.As As her her friend friend Gisela Gisela Herzog Herzog had had feared feared nine nine

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earlier,Leonore was distraught at atthe the discovery that she had been targeted by a years earlier, confession by by Romeo spy. spy. During her police police interrogation, interrogation, she she was confronted with with a confession Romeo During her was confronted hehad married her not for love but on onorders from the KGB. Soon her husband that he afterward Leonore Leonore hanged hanged herself herself in in.her her cell. cell.56 afterward 56

other the KGBs KGB's secretaries secretaries offensive offensive other most most successful successhl seductions seductions in in the recorded in in ftles files seen seen by byMitrokhin-those Mitrokhin-those of DORIS and and ROSIE-also ROSIE-also involved a recorded of DORIS involved a false flag flagrecruitment recruitment and and the the use use of of East East German Germanillegals. illegals. The false flag, flag,however, however, diffalse The false dif fered from from that that which which had had deceived deceived LOLA. LOLA. DORIS DORIS and and ROSIE believed believed they they were were fered working working not not for for an an underground underground peace peace movement movement but but for for a a secret secret neo-Nazi neo-Nazi group. group. DORIS was was Margret Margret Hike, Hike, a a secretary secretary in in the the office office of of the the West West German German presiDORIS presi dent, the mobilization security departments. dent, where where she she worked worked successively successively in in the mobilization and and security departments. Her Romeo Romeo spy spywas theEast German illegal Hans-Jurgen Hans-Jurgen Henze Henze (codenamed Her was the East German illegal (codenamed HAGEN), who who assumed assumed the the identity identity of of Franz Franz Becker, Becker, a a West West German Germanliving the HAGEN), living in in the GDR.57 Henze discovered discovered the the 33-year-old 33-year-old Hike by chance. chance. One day in 1968, while GDR.57 Henze Hike by One day in 1968, while oking out l window of his Bonn saw struck him ldoking out of of the the window of his Bonn apartment, apartment,he he saw a a woman woman who who struck him as a a possible possible civil civilservant servant going going for for a a walk walk alone. alone. Henze Henze stood stood waiting waiting in in aatelephone telephone as kiosk passed by, change for call. kiosk along along her her route route and, and, as as Hike Hike passed by, asked asked if if she she had had change for a a phone phonecall. Somehow and, on Somehow he he also also managed managed to to strike strike up up a a conversation conversation and, ondiscovering discoveringwhere where she she worked, worked, arranged arranged another another meeting meeting with with her. her. Gradually, Gradually, according according to to Hike's Hikes opera operational greatly attached him." Henze tional file, file, "She She fell fell seriously seriously in in love love and and was was greatly attached to to him. Henze explained explained that that he he was was a a postgraduate postgraduate student student writing writing a a dissertation dissertation on on the the work work of of the could complete the president, president, but but needed needed additional additional source source material material before before he he could complete it. it. Hike the fictional less Hike supplied supplied documents documents from from work work to to help help finish finish the fictional thesis. thesis. Though Though less infatuated infatuated than than Hike, Hike, Henze Henze also also became became emotionally emotionally involved involved in in their their relationship relationship and for for several several years years "found found it it difficult difficult to to switch switch to to a business footing." footing. Finally and a business Finally in in 1971 or or 1972 (the date is unclear unclear from from the the file), hoping to toappeal to Hike's Hikes somewhat somewhat 1971 1972 (the date is file), hoping appeal to extreme right-wing right-wing views, views, he he told told her her he he belonged an organization organization of of "German German extreme belonged to to an patriots, based based in in Brazil, Brazil, who who were were committed committed to to the the cause cause of of national revival and and patriots," national revival needed inside inside information information on on the the Bonn Bonn government government to to continue continue their their work.58 work.* needed Hike agreed assist the Hike said said she she had had guessed guessed something something of of the the sort sortand and agreed to to assist the "German German patriots." then persuaded to sign patriots. Henze Henze then persuaded her her to sign a contract, contract, allegedly allegedly drawn drawn up up by by his his "boss," under boss, under which which she she agreed agreed to to provide provide information information from from the the President's Presidents office office in in return for for her her expenses expenses and and 500 500 marks marks a a month. month.Among Among the intelligence she supplied supplied return the intelligence she were Bonn ministries; were the the mobilization mobilization plans plans of of the the Chancellor's Chancellorsoffice office and and the themajor major Bonn ministries; details the government details on on the government war war bunker bunker (which (which were were reported reported to to Brezhnev); Brezhnev); despatched and elsewhere; ambassadors in in Moscow, Moscow, Washington Washington and elsewhere; the the despatched from from FRG ambassadors secret weekly weeklyreports reports to to the the President President from from the the foreign foreign ministry; ministry; a a dossier dossier on on Brezh Brezhsecret nev's nevs visit visit to to the the FRG; FRG; and and accounts accounts of of the the President's Presidents meetings meetings with with foreign foreign diplo diplomarks she she received received each each month. month. mats. Hike Hike gradually gradually became became dependent dependent on on the the500 mats. 500 marks In mother In order order to to leave leave no no trace trace of of it it in in her her own own financial financial records, records, she she gave gave it it to toher her mother to invest invest on on her her behalf, behalf, telling telling her her that that she she found found it it difficult difficult to to save save hersel59 herselES9 With to With the help help of of her her mother's mothers investments, investments, Hike Hike was was able ableto to buy buy a a new new apartment apartment (Apart (Apartthe ment House 16, ment 85, 85, House 16,am am Baitzaplen Baitzaplen 37, 37, Oberkassel).6o Oberkasse1).60
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Mter Hike signed After Hike signed her her agent agent contract, contract, she she ceased ceased to to take take the the risks risks of of smuggling smuggling classified material back back to her fl at. Instead, Henze taught taught her photograph classified material to her flat. Instead, Henze her how how to to photograph camera concealed concealed in documents documents in in the the President's Presidents office office with with a miniature miniature camera in a a tube tube of of lipstick. O On one occasion entered the just as use lipstick. n one occasion Hike's Hikes boss boss entered the room room just as she she was was about about to to use the camera, but-to notice what the camera, but-to her her immense immense relief-failed relief-failed to to notice what she she was was doing.61 doing6 She She usually lm either usually handed handed over over the the fi film either in in Cologne Cologne or or Zurich. Zurich. The The yavka (secret (secret ren rendezvous) in in Cologne Cologne was was at at 8:30 on the the first first Tuesday Tuesday of of each each month month in in Klln Kilndezvous) 8:30 p.m. p.m. on Bayenthal, at at the end of of Bayenthalgiirtel, Bayenthalgiirtel, about about fifty fifv meters from the the Bismarck Bismarck Bayenthal, the end meters from column, by by a a telephone telephone kiosk kiosk next next to to an an advertising advertising pillar. pillar. Hike Hike was was told told to to have have a a column, meeting; if she copy copy of of Der Spiegel Spiegel in in her her hand hand if if she she was was ready ready to to go go ahead ahead with with the the meeting; if she needed to meetings in needed to give give a a danger danger signal, signal, she she was was to to carry carry a a plastic plastic bag bag instead. instead. The The meetings in Zurich took tookplace place at at 55o'clock oclock on on Saturday Saturday afternoons afternoons at at Rennweg Rennweg 35, by the the window window Zurich 35, by of a a china shop.62 of china shop.62 Henze twice awarded Henze was was twice awarded the the Order Order of of the the Red Red Star Star for for his his success success in in running running Hike as as an an agent. agent. In In 1976 1976 he he returned returned to to East East Germany Germany but but continued continued to to meet meet her her Hike regularly Cologne and Zurich.63 Hike on ice 1979 during regularly in inCologne and Hike was was temporarily temporarily put puton ice in in1979 during a a security suspected of security scare scare caused causedby by the the investigation investigation of of another another secretary secretary suspected of spying spying for for the East, East,but but was reactivated reactivated a a year year later later with with the thenew new codename VERA. By 1980 1980 the the the was code name VERA. product file of of the the documents documents she she had had provided provided filled filled ten ten volumes.64 volumes.64 Though Hike Hike "product file" Though remained in in touch touch with with Henze, Henze,she she also also passed passedon on intelligence intelligence through through RENATA, RENATA, a a remained female East East German Germanillegal illegal working working for for the the KGB.65 female KGB.65Among Among the theintelligence intelligence she she sup supplied during during the the early early 1980s 1980s were were details details of of talks talks in in October October 1982 1982between between Foreign Foreign plied Minister and US Secretary Secretary of of State State George George Schultz Schultz over over Minister Hans-Dietrich Hans-Dietrich Genscher Genscher and the stationing Pershing II I1 missiles in the the FRG. She also took took part part in in two two major major the stationing of Pershing missiles in She also WTNTEX exercises, exercises, during during which whichshe she had had been able to to provide provide intelligence NATO WINTEX been able intelligence on the the FRG wartime wartime command and control control system, system, and and was was able to report report on on her on command and able to her experience of of working working inside the secret secret wartime wartime government government bunker bunker in in the theEiffel Eiffel hills hills experience inside the near Bonn. Bonn. near Hike was was arrested arrested in in 1985, and quickly quickly confessed. confessed. In In 1987 she was was sentenced to Hike 1985, and 1987 she sentenced to eight years years in in jail jail and and fined fined 33,000 33,000 marks, marks, the the total sum she she was was believed to have have eight total sum believed to received from from the the KGB (probably (probably an an underestimate). underestimate). The The judge told her received judge told her that, that, in in passing a a relatively lenient sentence, sentence, he he was was taking account that that she she had had fallen fallen passing relatively lenient taking into into account hopelessly in love" love with her her recruiter. recruiter. The British press was was curiously divided in its its "hopelessly Telegraph described described her her as as a a "dowdy dowdy secretary," secretary, opinion of Hike. Though the Daily Telegraph GlamourSpy."66 Spy.66 she impressed the Observer as a "Glamour The methods methods used used to to recruit recruit Hike Hike were were similar similar to to those those employed employed against against Hei HeiThe drun Hofer Hofer(codenamed (codenamed ROSIE), ROSIE), a a secretary secretary in in her herearly early thirties thirties in in the theFRG foreign drun foreign (BND).67While serving at the service, the Bundesnachrichtensdienst (BND).67 intelligence service, the BND Paris Paris station station during duringthe the early 1970s Hofer was was seduced ROLAND, an early 1970s Hofer seduced by by ROLAND, an East East German illegal with with a a military military bearing who, like like Henze, to be working for for a German illegal bearing who, Henze, claimed claimed to be working a of "German Germanpatriots."68 patriots.68Hofer's Hofers deception was taken one stage fur hrneo-Nazi group of 1973 at at Innsbruch Innsbruch in in Austria, ther than than that that of of Hike. O n February February 26, ther Hike. On 26, 1973 Austria, ROLAND introduced her her to to VLADIMIR, VLADIMIR, telling telling her thathe he was one of the the leaders leaders of of the the neointroduced her that was one of neo Nazi underground. underground. Next Next day day VLADIMIR met met Hofer Hofer alone, alone, telling telling her her that that he he had had Nazi

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known known Admiral Admiral Canaris, Canaris, wartime wartime head head of of the the Abwehr Abwehr (German (German military military intelli intelligence), fatherhad had served, gence), in in which which her her father served, and and discussed discussed the the intelligence intelligence which which he he wanted wanted her her to to supply. supply.Unknown Unknown to to Hofer, Hofer, VLADIMIR was, was, in in reality, reality, a a senior senior KGB illegal, Ivan Ivan Dmitryevich Dmitryevich Unrau, Unrau, an anethnic ethnic German born Russia in in 1914.69 1914.69 illegal, German born in in Russia In 1974 1974 Hofer Hoferwas was transferred transferred to to BND headquarters headquarters at at Pullach Pullach in in Bavaria, Bavaria, where where In she worked worked successively successively for for the the west west European European and and NATO liaison liaison departments, departments, and and she became engaged to a BND major.70 Following the end of her affair with ROLAND, became engaged to a BND major.7oFollowing the end of her affair with ROLAND, the East German German illegals, N (who the KGB used used two two further further East illegals, MAZO MAZON (who pretended pretended to to be be ROLANDS father) father)and and FRANK, to to maintain maintain contact contact with with her. her. Both Both pretended pretended to to ROLAND's be Hofer be members members of of the the neo-Nazi neo-Nazi underground.71 ~nderground.~ Hofer appears appears eventually eventually to to have have real realized ized that that she she had had been been recruited recruited under under false false flag flag but but to tohave have carried carried on on working working as as a a paid the paid KGB KGB agent. agent. On O n December December 21, 21, 1977, 1977, possibly possibly as as the the result result of of a a tip-off tip-off to to the BND BND from from the the French French SDECE, SDECE, she she was was arrested arrested while while driving driving across across the the Austrian Austrian border border to to meet meet her her controller. controller. Next Next day day she she confessed confessed to to being being a a KGB agent. agent. Hofer Hofer showed ance had showed little little emotion emotion until until told told that that her her BND fi fiance had broken broken off off their their engage engagement. ment. Mter After bursting bursting into into tears, tears, she she asked asked for for the the window window to to be be opened opened to to give give her her some her feet some air, air, then then suddenly suddenly leaped leaped to to her feet and and threw threw herself herself from from the the sixth sixth floor. floor. Though Though her her fall f d was was partially partially broken broken by by some some bushes, bushes, she she was was critically critically injured.72 injured.72 Apart Apart from from Hike Hike and and Hofer, Hofer, the the most most successful successful KGB recruitment recruitment made made by by an an East East German German Romeo Romeo spy spy during during the the 1970s 1970s appears appears to to have have been been that that of of Elke Elke Falk Falk (code (codenamed named LENA). LENA). Mter After Falk Falk had had advertised advertised in in a a lonely lonely hearts hearts column, column, she she was was contacted contacted by by the the illegal illegal Kurt Kurt Simon Simon (codenamed (codenamed GEORG), GEORG), who who introduced introduced himself himself as as Gerhard Gerhard Thieme. flag Simon employed Thieme. It is is unclear unclear from from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes what, what, if if any, any, false false flag Simon employed to to recruit with as recruit her. her.However, However, with his his encouragement, encouragement,Falk Falk gained gained a a job job in in 1974 1974 as a a secretary secretary in taking in the theChancellor's Chancellors office,73 office,73 taking with with her her to to work work a a miniature miniature camera camera disguised disguisedas as a a cigarette Like cigarette lighter lighter and and a a bogus bogus can canof of hairspray hairspray in in which which to to store store her her fIlms.74 films.74 Like Hike, Hike, Falk Falk was was a a member member of of the the crisis crisis management management team team during during the the WINTEX exercises. exercises.In In 1977 the Centre awarded Simon the Order of the Red Star. Later Falk was moved 1977 the Centre awarded Simon the Order of the Red Star. Later was moved to to the the control control of of two two other other illegals, illegals, one one who who used used the the alias alias "Peter Peter Muller" Muller and and a a second second who who was was codenamed codenamed ADAM.75 ADAM? Falk Falk moved moved from from the the Chancellor's Chancellorsoffice ofliceto to the the trans transport economic By port ministry ministry in in 1977, 1977,then then in in 1979 1979 to tothe the economic aid aidministry ministry two two years years later.76 later.76 1980, when Mitrokhin saw her operational fUe, it fill e d seven volumes.77 Falk was 1980, when Mitrokhin saw her operational file, it filled seven volumes.77 Falk was arrested wrongly at arrested in in 1989 1989but but wrongly described described at her her trial trial as as an an HVA rather rather than than a a KGB agent. agent. Though a Though sentenced sentenced to to six six and and a a half half years' years imprisonment, imprisonment, she she served served only only a few few months months before spyexchange. exchange. Falk was before being being released released as aspart part of of an an East--West East-West spy was alleged alleged to to have have received received a a total total of20,000 of 20,000 marks marks for for her her espionage.78 espionage.78 Romeo Romeo spies, spies, however, however,achieved achievedresults. results. Among Among the the failures failures was was one one of of the the KGB's KGBs East East German German illegals, illegals, Wilhelm Wilhelm Kahle Kahle (codenamed (codenamed WERNER), WERNER), who who assumed assumed the the identity identity of of a a West West German German living living in in the the GDR. GDR. Kahle's Kahles cover cover occupa occupations included working as a laboratory technician in Cologne and Bonn universities tions included working as a laboratory technician in Cologne and Bonn universities and and as as a a German German language language teacher teacher in in Paris. Paris. During During the theearly early 1970s 1970s he heset set out out to to cul cultivate tivate four four FRG FRG foreign foreign ministry ministry and and embassy embassy secretaries, secretaries,a a female female clerk clerk at at an anAmer American ican embassy embassy in in Europe, Europe, an an American American student student at at a a German German university university who who invited invited
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him toher her parents parents' home in the theUnited United States British secretary him to home in States and and a a British secretary at at NATO. Kahle's Kahles ten-volume ten-volume file, file, however, however, contains contains no no indication indication that that he he obtained obtained significant significant intelligence intelligence from from any any of ofthem. them. His His main main West West German Germancultivation cultivation was was BELLA, BELLA, who who worked embassies in worked at at the the FRG FRG embassies in Tehran Tehran and, and, from from 1975, 1975, in in London. London.According According to to WERNER's WERNERS file, file, his his attempts attempts to to recruit recruit BELLA during during her her tour tourof of duty duty in inLondon London showed showed "insufficient insufficient determination" determination and and were were hampered hampered by by a a number number of of operational operational errors, errors, such such as as attracting attracting the the attention attentionof of the the embassy embassy security security officer. officer. Kahle Kahle became became more more interested interested in in MONA, MONA, a a French French technical technical translator translator for for a a firm firm of of Swedish Swedish paper paper manufacturers manufacturers in in Paris, Paris, where where he he was was based based from from 1975 1975 onward. onward. His His file file records records that that he wished to Centre, how he had had "intimate intimate relations" relations with with MONA and and wished to marry marry her. her. The The Centre, however, intelligence potential potential and ever, became became understandably understandably skeptical skeptical both both of of MONA's MONAS intelligence andof of Kahle's Kahles motives motives in in pursuing pursuing her. her. The The KGB also also discovered, discovered,through through tapping tappingthe thetele telephone correspondence of phone and andintercepting intercepting the the correspondence of Kahle's Kahles mother mother in inEast EastGermany, Germany, that that he being recalled he was was fearful fearful of of being recalled to to Moscow Moscow and and anxious anxious about about the the fate fate of of his his crystal crystal and porcelain collections collections in 79 and porcelain in Paris, Paris, of of which which the the Centre Centrewas was previously previously unaware. unaware.79 In summoned back In 1978 1978 Kahle Kahle was was duly duly summoned back to to Moscow Moscow and and given given a a lie-detector lie-detector test-on valuable experience a test-on the the pretext pretext that that it it would would be be valuable experience if if he he were were subjected subjected to to a polygraph posting. As a further method of polygraph during during his his next next posting. Asafurther method of discovering discovering what what WERNER been up WERNER had had really really been up to, to, an an impeccably impeccably ideologically ideologically orthodox orthodox female female agent, agent, ANITA, tar ANITA, was was planted planted on on him-the him-the only only known known example example of of aaRomeo Romeo agent agent being being targeted report confirmed the Centre's suspicions. When she geted by by a a "Juliet." Juliet. ANITA's ANITAS report confirmed the C.entres suspicions. When she asked been recalled, a grin grin that that he he had had asked why why he he thought thought he he had had been recalled, Kahle Kahle replied replied with with a become "too become too comfortable" comfortable in in Paris, Paris, had had made made many many friends friends and and acquaintances acquaintances and and had had acquired acquired a a well-appointed, well-appointed, attractively attractively furnished furnished apartment apartment which which he he was was reluc reluctant to toleave. leave. He H e had had also also broken broken KGB regulations tant some of of his regulations by by leaving leaving some his possessions possessions with to be with MONA and and by by borrowing borrowing 3,000 3,000 francs francs from from her. her. ANITA claimed claimed to be shocked shocked by by Kahle's Kahles "ideological ideological crisis:" crisis:
would do do him himno no harm harm to to refresh refresh his his knowledge knowledge of of Marxism-Leninism, Marxism-Leninism, and and It would especially especially the the course course on on the thepolitical political economy economy of of socialism. socialism. He He was was not not imbued imbued with a a class class instinct, instinct, as as he he had had been been brought brought up up in in a a petty pettybourgeois bourgeois environ environwith ment. Life mark on "dripping ment. Life in in the the West Westhad hadleft left its its mark on him; him; as as the the saying saying goes, goes,dripping water wears wears away awaystone." stone. His beliefs could could be be those those of of the the French French Communist water His beliefs Communist Party. The The dictatorship dictatorship of of the the proletariat proletariat was was like like a a red red rag rag to to aabull bull for for him; him; he he Party. was not not convinced convinced of of its its necessity necessity and and he he had had little little faith faith in in the the advantages advantages of was of the socialist socialist planned planned economy. economy. WERNER had had only only encountered the chocolate the encountered the chocolate icing side side of of the the West. H e had had been contact with conicing West. He been in in contact with people people who who were were con tented, rich rich and and successful. successful. He H e had had not not seen seen unemployment unemployment and and poverty.80 poverty.80 tented, of ANITA's ANITAS report, Kahle appears to have been sidelined. H e was formally As a result of sidelined. He removed from illegal work in 1982.81 1982.
A PART F ROM T HE APART FROM THE

secretaryspies, spies, the KGB's KGBs most productive penetrations of of the West West secretary the1970s 1970s were probably two two recruits in the theintelligence intelligence Germany bureaucracy during the

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community. Pochota) community. One One was was awarded awardedthe the Order Orderof of the the KGB Badge Badge of of Honor Honor (Znak (2nd Pochota) for his his "fruitful fruitfulcollaboration."82 collaboration.82 The other, other,whose whose recruitment recruitment was was personally personally approved for The approved by Karlshorst base as among its most by Andropov Andropov himself, himself,was was ranked ranked by by the the KGB's KGBs Karlshorst base as among its most valu valuable ByBy the to able agents.83 agents.83 the early early 1980s, 1980s,however, however, both both sources sources seem seem to have have dried dried up. up. HVA intelligence agencies agencies were were at at least least as as impressive impressive as as HVA penetrations penetrations of of FRG intelligence those who had A those by by the the KGB. KGB. In In 1973 1973 Gabriele Gabriele Gast, Gast, who had been been recruited recruited by by an an HV HVA Romeo Romeo three three years years earlier, earlier,joined joined the the BND BND as as an an analyst analyst and and rose rose to to become become deputy deputy head head of of the theSoviet Soviet Bloc Blocdivision division in in 1987, 1987, the the most most highly highly placed placed woman woman in in the themale maledominated German foreign Gast's motivation dominated West West German foreign intelligence intelligence agency. agency. Gasts motivation was was com complex. plex. As As well well as as her her emotional emotional involvement involvement with with her her recruiter, recruiter, she she was was suspicious suspicious of of the the FRG FRG political political system system and and deeply deeply fascinated fascinated by by Markus Markus Wolf. Wolf. According According to to Wolf, Wolf, "She She needed needed to to feel feel wanted wanted by by me me and and I gave gave her her my my personal personal attention attention .. .. .. Some Sometimes times her her messages messages carried carried the the wounded wounded tone tone of of a a lover lover who who feels feels taken taken for for granted." granted. Wolf Wolf met met her her personally personally seven seven times. times. His His attentions attentions were were richly richly rewarded. rewarded. "Gaby's Gabys work work for for us," us, he he recalls, recalls, "was wasflawless. flawless.She She gave gave us us an an accurate accurate picture picture of of the the West's Wests knowledge knowledge of of and and its its judgments judgments regarding regarding the the entire entire Eastern Eastern Bloc. Bloc. This This proved proved vitally rise vitally important important to tous us in in handling handlingthe the rise of ofSolidarity Solidarity in in Poland Poland in in the theearly early 1980s." 1980s. Some Some of of the the intelligence intelligence assessments assessments by by Gast Gast which which so so impressed impressed Wolf Wolf also also landed landed on on the the desk desk of of Chancellor Chancellor Kohl Kohl and, and, almost almost certainly, certainly, on on those those of of Andropov, Andropov, Cher Chernenko nenko and and Gorbachev Gorbachev as as well. 84 In the HVA resi In 1981 1981 Klaus Klaus Kuron Kuron of of the the BN BfV offered offered his his services services by by letter letter to to the residency running dency in in Bonn. Bonn. A senior senior counter-intelligence counter-intelligence officer officer who who specialized specialized in in running "turned" passed over turned HVA agents, agents, Kuron Kuron was was bitter bitter at at having having been been passed over for for the the top top jobs jobs and culty. He and now now found found himself himself in in increasing increasing financial financial diffi difficulty. H e struck struck Wolf Wolfas as "unem unembarrassed barrassed about about his his treachery treachery .. .. .. His His was was a a paradigm paradigm of of unfulfilled unfulfilled ambitions ambitions of of a a type civilservice. service." The type that that fester fester throughout throughout any any civil The HVA skilfully skilhlly pandered pandered to to his his wounded of wounded self-esteem self-esteem as as well well as as paying paying him him aatotal total of almost almost 700,000 700,000 marks marks in in the thelast last eight years of its existence.85 eight years ofits existence.85 In In 1985 1985 Hans-Joachim Hans-Joachim Tiedge, Tiedge, the the BN's BfVs counter-intelligence counter-intelligence chief, chief, caused caused even even greater greater surprise surprise than than Kuron Kuron with with his his letter letter four four years years earlier earlier by by arriving arriving drunk drunk and and unkempt unkempt at at the the East East German Germanborder border and and demanding demanding to to defect. defect. Tiedge Tiedge was was a a heavy heavy gambler gambler as as well well as as an an alcoholic, alcoholic, who who had had come come close close to to being being charged charged with with manslaughter household manslaughter after after the the death deathof of his his wife wife in in aadrunken drunken household brawl. brawl. "If If aacase case like like mine mine had had been been presented presented to to me me for for analysis," analysis, he he told told the the HVA, HVA, "I I would would have have rec recommended The first ommended that that I be be fired fired without without delay." delay.The first prostitute prostitute summoned summoned by by Wolf Wolf to to entertain entertain Tiedge Tiedge after after his his defection defection took took one one look look at at him him and and ran ran away. away. But, But, claims claims Wolf, lled Wolf, "Tiedge Tiedge had had a a memory memory like like a a computer computer for for names names and and connections, connections, and and fi filled in aa lot of the the blanks blanks for for us-though us-though not not as as many many as as he he thought, thought,since since he he was was unaware unaware in lot of that that his his colleague colleague Kuron Kuron was was in in our our pay."86 pay.86 complex complex aspect aspect of of HVA HVA operations operations in in the the FRG FRG concerned concerned its its contacts contacts either either directly directly or or through through intermediaries intermediaries with with politicians. politicians. The The great great major majority ity of of meetings meetings between between West West German German politicians politicians and and representatives representatives of of the the GDR GDR were were part part of of a a genuine genuine attempt attempt to toestablish establish a a dialogue, dialogue, often often necessarily necessarily out out of of public public
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view, view, between between East East and and West. West. The The fact fact that that the the Stasi Stasi inevitably inevitably took took a a close close interest interest in brand those in these these encounters encounters is is not not sufficient sufficient to to brand those politicians politicians from from the the FRG who who took as A. In took part partin inthem them as collaborators collaborators with with the the HV HVA. In a a small small minority minority of of cases, cases,how however, ever, such such contacts contacts acted acted as as a a cover cover for for espionage espionage or or something something close close to to it. it. The agent is is The most most notorious notorious case case of of a a West WestGerman Germanpolitician politician acting acting as as an an HVA agent that that of of Karl Karl Wienand, Wienand, an an SDP SDP parliamentary parliamentary whip whip during during the the Brandt Brandt government government and closest colleagues Wehner, leader and one one of of the the closest colleagues of of Herbert Herbert Wehner, leader of of the the parliamentary parliamentary party. After the collapse of East Germany, evidence emerged from Stasi party. After the collapse of East Germany, evidence emerged from Stasi files files that that Wienand had been been an Berlin Wall Wienand had an HVA agent agent from from 1970 1970 until until the the Berlin Wall came came down down in in 1989. f years' 1989. In In 1996 1996 he he was was sentenced sentenced to to two two and and a a hal half years imprisonment imprisonment and and fined fined a a million Accor million marks-the marks-the total total of of the the payments payments he he had hadreceived received from from the the HVA.87 HVA.87 According person to ing to to Foreign Foreign Minister Minister Hans-Dietrich Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Genscher, Wienand Wienand was was the the only only person to enjoy trust of all three enjoy the the trust of all three members members of of the the triumvirate triumvirate which which ran ran the the SDP SDP after after Brandt's Schmidt, the the new who remained Brandts resignation: resignation: Helmut Helmut Schmidt, new chancellor, chancellor, Brandt, Brandt, who remained party party chairman, chairman, and and Wehner.88 Wehner.88Wolf Wolf claims claims that that Wienand, Wienand, whose whose motivation motivation was was "extraordinarily into extraordinarilymaterialistic," materialistic,gave gave him him "an an enviable enviable insight" insight into the thepolicies policies of, of, and and tensions SDP. That That insight insight also also seems seems to to tensions between, between, the the triumvirate triumvirate at at the the top top of of the the SDP. have have impressed impressed the the Centre. Centre. According According to to Wolf, Wolf, the the KGB itself itself made made an an attempt attempt to to "do he "succeeded do business" businesswith with Wienand, Wienand,but but he succeeded in in dissuading dissuading our our Soviet Soviet colleagues" colleagues from from doing doing SO.89 The The most most controversial controversial case case of of a a senior senior West West German German politician politician in in close close contact contact with concerns Herbert been dis with the theEast East concerns Herbert Wehner. Wehner. References References to to Wehner Wehnerwhich which have have been discovered covered in in Soviet Soviet and and GDR documents documents since since the the fall fall of of the the Berlin Berlin Wall have have led led to to much much speculation speculation as as to to whether, whether, like like his his colleague colleague Wienand, Wienand, he hewas was an an agent agent for for the the HVA or The or KGB.90 KGB.90 The Centre's Centres file file on on Wehner Wehner (codenamed (codenamed KORNELIS) KORNELIS) shows shows that that he both the the KGB and the HVA, not he was was a a "confidential confidential contact" contact of of both and the HVA, but but not a a fully fully recruited recruited agent.91 agent. Wehner's Wehners contacts contacts with with Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence went went back back to to his his years years as as a a member member of of the the KPD (German (German Communist Communist Party) Party) leadership-in-exile leadership-in-exile in in Moscow Moscow after Terror after Hitler's Hitlers rise rise to to power. power. During During the the Great Great Terror he he had had denounced denounced a a number number of of his his comrades comrades as as traitors,92 traitors,92and and was was considered considered for for recruitment recruitment as as an an NKVD agent. agent. Wehner's however, reveals reveals that he himself escaped execution. Wehners KGB file, file, however, that he himself narrowly narrowly escaped execution. One denounced Wehner, One KPD official official in in exile exile who who denounced Wehner, Heinrich Heinrich Mayer Mayer (codenamed (codenamed MOST), MOST), was was executed; executed; another, another, Erich Erich Birkenhauer Birkenhauer (BELFORT), (BELFORT), was was sentenced sentenced to to twelve twelve years yearsin in the the gulag. gulag. A third third denunciation, denunciation, by by MIRRA, MIRRA, a a female female NKVD agent agent among the German German Communists, almost among the Communists, almost led led to to Wehner's Wehners downfall. downfall. She She reported reported that he was the that Wehner's Wehners behavior behavior appeared appeared to to indicate indicate that thathe was "in in contact contact with withthe Gestapo." December 15, 1937, Wehner Gestapo. On O n December 15,1937, Wehner (then (thenknown known as as Herbert Herbert Funk) Funk) was was sum summoned moned to to NKVD headquarters headquarters for for questioning. questioning. A subsequent subsequent note note on on his his file file records records agent that he he was to to be be given giventhe the impression that he he was being being recruited recruited as as an an NKVD agent that was impression that was but purpose was preparation for but that that the the real real purpose was to to gather gather evidence evidence against against him him in in preparation for his his arrest. district com comarrest. In In 1938, 1938, the the former former secretary secretary of of the the Berlin-Brandenburg Berlin-Brandenburg KPD district mittee, mittee, Theodor Theodor Beutming, Beutming, confessed confessed to to being being a a member, member, with with Wehner, Wehner, of of a a (non (nonexistent) existent) "underground underground German German Trotskyist Trotskylst center" center in in Moscow. Moscow. On O n July July 22 22 Yezhov, Yezhov, the NKVD chief, on Beutming's the memorandum the chief, wrote wrote on Beutmings confession, confession, "Where Where is is the memorandum on on

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the memorandum sent Yezhov the arrest arrest of of Funk?" Funk?A memorandum senttoto Yezhov shortly shortly afterwards afterwards listed listed a a series series of of German German Communists Communistswho who had had identified identified Wehner, Wehner, under under NKVD NKVD interrogation, interrogation, as as a a Gestapo Gestapo agent.93 agent.93 Wehner Wehner seems seems to to have have been been saved saved from from execution execution only only by by the the winding winding down down of of the Comintern the Terror Terror and and the the disgrace, disgrace, a a few few months months later, later, ofYezhov. of Yezhov. Early Early in in1940 1940 Comintern sent sent him him to to carry carry out out "illegal illegalwork" work in in Sweden, Sweden, using using identity identity documents documents in in the thename name of of H. H. M. Kornelis. Kornelis. In In June June 1941, 1941, shortly shortly before before Hitler's Hitlers attack attack on on the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, the agent material. material. It It was was the Centre Centre once once again again considered considered Wehner Wehner as as possible possible NKVD agent decided decided not not to to recruit recruit him, him, however, however, when when it it was was discovered discoveredthat that he he had hadincluded included in in a a report reportof of the the previous previous October October an anaccurate accurate but but politically politically incorrect incorrect warning warning that that an an attack on the Soviet attack by by Nazi Nazi Germany Germany on the Soviet Union Union was, was, sooner sooner or or later, later, inevitable.94 ine~itable.~~ Wehner and-according to Wehner was was later later arrested arrested by by the the Swedish Swedish police police and-according to later later claims claims by by Markus Wolf-revealed Markus Wolf-revealed the the names names of of members members of of the the Communist Communist underground underground in in both Sweden broke away both Sweden and and Germany.95 Germany9 On O n emerging emerging from from prison prison Wehner Wehner broke away from from the the Communists Communists and and made made common common cause cause with with the the SDP. SDP. Wolf Wolf found found the the post-war post-war Wehner Wehner "a a person person of of irreconcilable irreconcilable contradictions." contradictions. Though aa social Though playing playing a a major major role role in in turning turning the theSDP SDP from from a a Marxist Marxistinto into social demo democratic cratic party, party, Wehner Wehner remained remained nostalgic nostalgic for for his his Communist Communist roots. roots. In In 1973 1973 he hehad had an an "intensely intenselyemotional" emotionalreunion reunion with with Ulbricht's Ulbrichts successor, successor, Erich Erich Honecker, Honecker, with with whom whom he he had had worked worked as as a a young young Communist Communist in in the the Saarland Saarland almost almost half half a a century century earlier. earlier. Honecker went went to enormous pains reunion, trying Honecker to enormous pains to to arrange arrange the the details details of of the the reunion, trying to to ensure lodge tasted one baked baked for ensure that that aacake cake prepared prepared for for tea tea at at aahunting hunting lodge tasted exactly exactly like like one for Wehner mother.96 After Wehner many many years years before before by by Honecker's Honeckers mother.96 After Wehner's Wehners death death in in 1990, 1990, Honecker his goal Honecker claimed claimed that, that, although although he he had had rejected rejected Communism, Communism, "his goal was was still still the the union the labor movement and the building of a socialist German republic."97 union of of the labor movement and the building of a socialist German republic.97 According Wehner began the mid-1950s According to to Wolf, Wolf, secret secret contacts contacts with with Wehner began in in the mid-1950s but but were who absurdly were initially initially regarded regarded with with great great suspicion suspicion by by Ulbricht, Ulbricht, who absurdly suspected suspected him him of of being being "a a British British spy." spy. Contact Contact became became easier easier when when Wehner Wehnerbecame became Minister Minister for for All-German All-German Affairs Affairs in in 1966 1966and and began began regular regular meetings meetings with with the the East East German German lawyer "humanitarian questions" West lawyer Wolfgang Wolfgang Vogel, Vogel, who who negotiated negotiated on on humanitarian questions, with with West German German officials. officials. Vogel Vogeltook took his his instructions instructions directly directly from from Erich ErichMielke, Mielke, the the GDR Minister reported to to him him after after each Minister of of State State Security, Security, and and reported each meeting meeting with with Wehner. Wehner. According According to to Wolf: Wolf: Mielke the reports on conversations Mielke alone alone edited edited the reports on conversations with with Wehner Wehner for for passing passing on on to to Honecker. Honecker. Since Since drafting drafting was was not not his his strong strong point, point, he heoften oftenlocked locked himself himself in in his his room room for for a a whole whole day day to to put put the theWehner Wehner reports reports into into the the proper proper form. form. Hardly anything in the GDR was more secret than these reports. Apart Hardly anything in the was more secret than these reports. Apart from from the also a the three three copies copies for for Honecker, Honecker, Mielke Mielke and and myself, myself, there there was was also a re-edited re-edited and and censored censored version version of ofthe the reports reports which which was was sent sent to to our our Soviet Soviet colleagues. colleagues. Mielke Mielke boasted boasted to to the the Centre Centre that thatWehner's Wehners regular regular briefings briefings gave gave the the Stasi Stasi a a direct direct line to the heart of the West German power structure.98 Mitrokhin's notes contain line to the heart of the West German power structure.9sMitrokhins notes contain none briefings. They none of of these these briefings. They do do include, include, however, however, one one example example from from KGB KGB files files of of

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the trust trust placed placed in in Wehner Wehner as as a a "confidential confidential contact." contact. He H e was was informed informed in in 19731973the apparently apparently before before the the news news became became public-that public-that the the editor editor of of the the weekly weekly magazine magazine Quick, Heinz Van been recruited Quick, Heinz Van Nouhuys Nouhuys (codenamed (codenamed NANT), who who had had been recruited as as an an HVA agent, BN.99 agent, was was in in fact fact a a double double agent agent working working for for the the BfV.99 Brandt later concluded that been negotiating Brandt later concluded that Wehner Wehner had hadbeen negotiating with with the the GDR behind behind his It Wehner ever he his back.10o back.loO I t is is unlikely, unlikely, however, however, that that Wehner ever consciously consciously betrayed betrayed what what he saw "he saw as as the the interests interests of of the the FRG. FRG. "From From his his youth youth onwards," onwards, Wolf Wolf argued, argued, he regarded and sometimes regarded conspiracy conspiracy as as an an instrument instrument of of power power politics politics and sometimes physical physical sur survival. he was always the the vival. From From his his first first contacts contacts with with us us .. .. .. he he no no doubt doubt felt felt that that he was always stronger party in inthe thepolitical political game."101 game.lol stronger party Though the appears to to have have left left the of Wienand Wienand entirely entirely to to the Though the KGB appears the running running of the HVA and more than dential contact," during and never never regarded regarded Wehner Wehner as as more than aa "confi confidential contact, during the had a CARDINAL, an SDP offi the 1970s 1970s it it had a hitherto hithertounknown unknown agent, agent, codenamed codenamed CARDINAL, an SDP official had been been talent-spotted agent, MAVR, a a West West German German cial who who had talent-spotted by by another another KGB agent, CARDINAL included included reports reports on on FRG film-maker. The The intelligence intelligence provided provided by by CARDINAL film-maker. politicians and and industrialists, industrialists, the the issues to be be raised raised by by Brandt Brandt during his visit visit to to politicians issues to during his Moscow in in 1973, 1973, Brandt's Brandts resignation resignation in in 1974, 1974, the thesubsequent subsequent state state of of the the SDP lead leadMoscow ership and and FRG relations relations with with China, China,Israel Israel and and Portugal. Portugal. As As well well as ership as being being rewarded rewarded with an an icon and other other gifts, gifts, CARDINAL was was paid 5,000 dollars dollars in in 1974, 1974, the thesame same with icon and paid 5,000 sum 1 ,635 deutschmarks detailed sum in in 1976 1976 and and 111,635 deutschmarks in in 1977. 1977. Then Then the the doubts doubts began. began. A detailed study of of his his intelligence the Centre Centre revealed revealed nothing nothing of of significance which had had study "intelligence" by the significance which not also also appeared appeared in in the German press-apart from from some some items not theWest West German press-apart items which which the the suspected were were disinformation. disinformation. It It was was concluded concluded that that CARDINAL and and KGB suspected had been seeking to to ingratiate ingratiate themselves themselves with with the theKGB in in the the hope hope of of gain gainMAVR had been seeking ing its assistance in in winning valuable contracts contracts in in the Soviet Union. Union. Contact with ing its assistance winning valuable the Soviet Contact with 102 both was abruptly abruptly broken broken off off.1o2 both was Mitrokhins notes notes on on KGB attempts attemptstoto penetrate penetrate the theChristian Democrats Mitrokhin's Christian Democrats (CDU) are are thinner on the H e does, does, however, however, identify two agents agents (CDU) thinner than than those those on the SDP. SDP. He identify two withinthe both recruited recruited in in1972; SHTOLPEN, a aparty adviser,lo3and and within the CDU, both 1972; SHTOLPEN, party adviser/03 RADIST, a a member of the the West West Berlin Berlin city city assembly.104 assembly.104 No details are available available on on RADIST, member of No details are the intelligence which they provided. Mitrokhin also identifies a leading member of the Free Free Democrats Democrats (FDP), who had had been been recruited recruited as as a a Soviet Soviet the (FDP), codenamed codenamed MARK, who agent in in East East Germany Germany 1946 basis of what what were were alleged allegedto be "compromis compromisagent inin 1946 on on the the basis of to be ing circumstances" circumstances arising arising from from his his wartime wartime service service in in the the Wehrmacht. Wehrmacht.A few few years years ing later MARK succeeded succeeded in in fleeing to the theWest, West, where he he rapidly rapidly embarked on a anew later fleeing to where embarked on new career as a a politician. politician. In In 1956 1956 the the KGB resumed resumed contact with him him and and remained remained in in career as contact with twenty-four years. However, However, there is no evidence during that that touch for the next twenty-four evidence that during time MARK supplied any significant intelligence. A later later Centre Centre assessment assessment con contime supplied any significant intelligence. cluded that that he hehad had passed on on information information slanted slanted in in favor favor of of the the political political interests interests of of cluded passed the East Eastto to further the FDP and had tried to use his contacts with the further his own career. In 1975 one one of MARK's MARKs parliamentary colleagues told Aleksandr Demyanovich about 1975 Zakharov, a KGB officer stationed in Karlshorst, that MARK's MARKs earlier association association Zakharov, a youthful error." error. In 1980 the Centre with Soviet intelligence had been "a the Centre finally s there was no point in in remaining in contact with him.10 him.lo5 decided that there

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Both the recycled Both the recycled newspaper newspaper stories stories provided provided by CARDINAL CARDINAL and and the the quarter quarter century century wasted wasted in in trying trying to to extract extract intelligence intelligence from from MARK provide provide further further evi evidence limitations of intelligence analysis. dence of of the the limitations of the the KGB's KGBs political political intelligence analysis. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin records records one one occasion occasion on on which which Andropov Andropov issued issued what what amounted amountedto to an an official official rebuke rebuke for October 1977, for the the poor poor quality quality ofFCD of FCD assessments assessments on on the theFRG. FRG. In In October 1977,as as part part of of the the preparations West Germany in the following preparations for for Brezhnev's Brezhnevs state state visit visit to toWest Germany inthe following year, year, Kryuchkov report on on the the likely security problems, Kryuchkov submitted submitted an an alarmist alarmist report likely security problems, claiming claiming that the FRG were that no no fewer fewer than than 250 250 terrorist terrorist and and extremist extremist groups groups in in the were capable capable of of attempting attempting the the assassination assassination of of the theSoviet Soviet leader. leader. Andropov Andropov replied replied acerbically: acerbically: Comrade Comrade [V. [V. I.] I.] Kevorkov Kevorkov [of [of the the Second Second Chief Chief Directorate], Directorate], who who has has just just returned returned from from the the FRG, FRG, gives gives a a different different account account of of the the situation. situation. You You should should 106 synchronize synchronize your your watches, watches, as as for for us us this this is is not not a a trivial trivial matter. matter.lo6 In In the the event, event, Kevorkov's Kevorkovs less less alarmist alarmist assessment assessment proved proved correct correct and and Brezhnev's Brezhnevs visit visit in passed off in May May1978 1978 passed offwithout without incident.107 incident.lo7 the the KGB's KGBs West West German German agents, agents, though though exten extensive, is, for sive, is isnot not comprehensive. comprehensive.There There is, for example, example, intriguing intriguing evidence evidence in in the thefiles files seen seen by the entourage by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin of of a a KGB agent agent in in the entourage of of Egon Egon Bahr, Bahr, one one of of Helmut Helmut Schmidt's a leading Schmidts most most trusted trusted advisers advisers and and a leading architect architect of of Ostpolitik. Ostpolitik. (There (There is is no no suggestion the agent 5, 1981 suggestion that that the agent was was Bahr Bahr himself) himself.) On O n February February 5, 1981 Andropov Andropov sent sent Brezhnev Brezhnev and and the theCPSU Central Central Committee Committeean an intelligence intelligence report report (no. (no. 259-NOV), 259-A/0V), marked which anu marked "of of special special importance," importance, which recounted recounted a a telephone telephone conversation conversation on on JJanuary Schmidt and ary 27 27 between between Schmidt and Ronald Ronald Reagan, Reagan, whose whose inauguration inauguration as as president president of of the the United States States had details of United had taken taken place place a a week week earlier, earlier, and and gave gave details of Schmidt's Schmidts subse subsequent other advisers. quent discussions discussions with with Bahr Bahr and and other advisers. To To Schmidt's Schmidts irritation, irritation, Reagan Reagan asked delay to visit to Washington, previously asked for for a a month's months delay to the the chancellor's chancellors visit toWashington, previously arranged President was arranged for for March March 3, 3, on on the thegrounds grounds that that the thePresident was not not yet yet ready ready "for for a a seri serious ous discussion discussion of of foreign foreign policy policy problems." problems. Schmidt Schmidt told told his his advisers advisers that that this this was was a a deliberate delaying tactic by the new Reagan administration "designed to enable deliberate delaying tactic by the new Reagan administration designed to enable Washington Washington to to gain gain time time to to build build up up its its armaments armaments with with the the aim aim of of overtaking overtaking the the USSR in in the themilitary military field." field. The to Bahr The KGB source source also also reported reported complaints complaints by by Schmidt Schmidt to Bahr and and others others that that Bonn was flooded with specialists sent by Washington with the aim of halting Bonn was flooded with specialists sent by Washington with the aim of halting the the growth Germany and Soviet Union. growth of of commercial commercial contacts contacts between between West West Germany and the the Soviet Union. Schmidt the Reagan to torpedo Schmidt rightly rightly believed believed that that the Reagan administration administration was was out out to torpedo the the negotiations Moscow on the construction negotiations between between Bonn Bonn and and Moscow on the construction of of pipelines pipelines to to bring bring natural natural gas gas from from Siberia Siberia to to the the FRG, FRG, which which Washington Washington feared feared would would make make West West Germany dangerously dependent on Soviet energy supplies. Moscow was doubtless Germany dangerously dependent on Soviet energy supplies. Moscow was doubtless delighted delighted by by Schmidt's Schmidts intention intention to to press press ahead ahead with with the the negotiations negotiations as as quickly quickly as as 108 f ait accompli. possible possible in in order order to to present present Reagan Reagan with with aa fait accompli.* The The reliability reliability of of the the KGB's KGBs German German source source was was authenticated authenticated in in the thereport reportsent sent to CentralCommittee Committee both by to Brezhnev Brezhnev and and the the Central both by Andropov Andropov and and by by LieutenantLieutenant' MITROK ON KH HI IN N SS I I N F O R M AT ATION O N

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General General Kevorkov, Kevorkov,then then head head of of the the Seventh Seventh Department Department of of the the KGB KGB Second Second Chief Chief Directorate involvement source Directorate (SCD).109 (SCD).09Kevorkov's Kevorkovs involvementindicates indicates that that the the sourcewas wasrecruited recruited and and controlled controlled not not by by the the FCD FCD but but by by the the SCD, SCD, perhaps perhaps after after being being compromised compromised during visit during aa visit or or posting posting to to Moscow Moscow (a (a characteristic characteristic form form of of SCD SCD blackmail)Yo blackmail).10 Despite Despite some some lack lack of of enthusiasm enthusiasm for for Schmidt, Schmidt, both both the the Soviet Soviet and and East East German German leadership leadership were were anxious anxious to to prevent prevent a a return return to to power power by by the the Christian Christian Democrats. Democrats. According According to to a a KGB KGB ftle, file,Honecker Honecker secretly secretlymade made known known to to the theSchmidt Schmidt government government in East Germany was in 1978 1978that that East Germany was willing willing to to take take action action designed designed to to improve improve the the SDP's SDPs apparently example, apparently declining declining electoral electoral prospects-for prospects-for example, by by easing easing travel travel restrictions restrictions between between the the GDR GDR and and FRG.111 FRG. There There is is no no evidence evidence of of any any response responsefrom from the the SDP. SDF? bite noire was the charismatic, right-wing Bavarian Moscow's particular Moscows particular b2te noire was the charismatic, right-wing Bavarian CSU CSU leader, leader, Franz-Josef Franz-Josef Strauss, Strauss, who who was was chosen chosen as as the the candidate candidate of of the the CDU CDU and and its its CSU CSU allies allies for for the the chancellorship chancellorship in in the the 1980 1980elections. elections.According According to to the theminutes minutes of of a a meeting meeting in in Moscow Moscow in inJuly July 1979 1979between between Andropov Andropov and and Mielke, Mielke, the the GDR GDR interior interior minister minister and and head head of of the the Stasi, Stasi,"It Itwas was acknowledged acknowledgedthat that Strauss Strausswas was a a serious seriousoppo opponent to Schmidt Schmidt at atthe the Bundestag nent to Bundestag elections elections in in 1980. 1980. It It was was therefore therefore essential essential to to compromise Among compromise Strauss Strauss and and his his supporters."112 supporters.112 Among the theKGB KGB active active measures measures agreed agreed by by Andropov Andropov and and Mielke Mielke was was operation operation COBRA-2, COBRA-2, which which used used information information gath gathered by an HVA agent, Inge Goliath, former secretary to the head of the main CDU ered by an HVA agent, Inge Goliath, former secretary to the head of the main CDU foreign foreign affairs affairs think think tank, tank, to tofabricate fabricate sinister sinister links links between between the the CDU/CSU CDU/CSU leader leadership ,587 copies ship and and right-wing right-wing elements elements in in the theintelligence intelligence agencies. agencies. A A total total of of1 1,587 copies of of a cers had a booklet booklet alleging alleging that that BND BND offi officers had conspired conspired with with the the opposition opposition against against the the Schmidt other Schmidt government government were were circulated circulated to to politicians, politicians, trade trade union union leaders leaders and and other opinion-formers in the FRG. According to the KGB file on COBRA-2, some of opinion-formers in theFRG. According to theKGB file on COBRA-2, some of the the disinformation the booklet theWest West German press disinformation in in the booklet reappeared reappeared in in the German press and and caused caused Schmidt Schmidt to toorder order a ajudicial judicial enquiryY3 enquiry.13 The The KGB, KGB, which which had had a a recurrent recurrent tendency tendency to to exaggerate exaggerate the the success success of of its its active active measures in reports to the Politburo, claimed that COBRA-2 had caused great alarm measures in reports to the Politburo, claimed that COBRA-2 had caused great alarm in in ensuring in the theCDU/CSU CDU/CSU leadership leadership and and had had "a a positive positive influence" influencein ensuring an an SDP SDP vic victory tory at at the the 1980 1980 Bundestag Bundestag elections.114 elections.14Though, Though, in in reality, reality, Strauss's Straussselection election defeat defeat probably little-if anything-to probably owed owed little-if anything-to Soviet Soviet and and East East German German active active measures, measures, it it undoubtedly came as a considerable relief to the Centre. When the SDP finally fell undoubtedly came as a considerable relief to the Centre.When the SDP finally fell from 983, the from power power in in 11983, thenew new government government was was headed headed not not by by Strauss Strauss but but by by the the less less flamboyant flamboyantHelmut Helmut Kohl. Kohl. The The main main aim aim of of KGB KGB active active measures measuresduring during the theearly early 1980s 1980swas was the the attempt attempttoto exploit large German peace exploitthe the opposition opposition of of the the large and and militant militant West West German peace movement movement to to the the deployment of US medium-range missiles in the FRG. Among the most eloquent deployment of US medium-range missiles in the FRG. Among the most eloquent opponents Biirgermeister of of Saarbrucken, Saarbrucken, Oskar Oskar opponents of of the the deployment deployment was was the the Burgermeister Lafontaine, Lafontaine, later later an an unsuccessful unsuccesshl SDP SDPcandidate candidate for for the the chancellorship chancellorship (and (and in in 1998 1998 briefly briefly a a controversial controversial finance finance minister minister in in the the government government of of Gerhard Gerhard Schdder). Schrider). It It would have been wholly out of character had the Centre, which only a few years ear would have been wholly out of character had the Centre, which only a few years earlier Cyrus lier had had formed formed absurdly absurdlyunrealistic unrealisticplans plans to to recruit recruit Harold Harold Wilson Wilsonand and Cyrus Vance, Vance, not operations not also also targeted targeted Lafontaine. Lafontaine. In In 1981 1981the the operations officer, officer,L. L. S. S. Bratus, Bratus, was was sent sent to to cultivate in cultivatehim him and-predictably-failed and-predictably-failed in the the attempt.115 attempt. The The KGB KGB seems, seems, none none the the

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less, to to have have tried tried to to take take a a largely largely undeserved undeserved share less, share of of the the credit credit for for the the decision decision by by an SDP SDP congress congress eight months after after its its 1983 1983 election election defeat defeat to oppose the stationing an eight months to oppose the stationing docuof US medium-range missiles missiles on German soil. A CPSU Central Committee docu ment in in 1984 1984 claimed complacently, complacently, "Many Many arguments that had previously been pre presented by by us usto to the therepresentatives representatives of of the theSDP have now been taken taken over over by bythem.l6 sented SDP have now been them."116 As in in other other NATO countries, countries, the the chief chief priority priority of of intelligence intelligence collection collection in the As in the during the theearly early 1980s 1980s was was operation attempt to to discover discover FRG during operation RYAN-the RY AN-the fruitless fruitless attempt non-existent Western Western preparations preparations for for a a nuclear first strike strike against against the the Soviet Soviet Union. non-existent nuclear first Union. Markus Wolf Wolf and, and, no no doubt, some KGB officers officers in in Karlshorst and West GermanresMarkus doubt, some Karlshorst and West German res idencies regarded regarded the the whole whole operation operation as as utterly utterly misconceived. idencies misconceived. None, None, however, however, dared dared to challenge challenge the the paranoid paranoid mindset of the the Centre. to mindset of Centre. Wolf Wolffound found his his Soviet Soviet contacts contacts obsessedwith with RY RYAN and the the threat threat of of a a NATO NATO nuclear nuclear first "obsessed" AN and first strike: strike:

The plans for such a The HVA was was ordered ordered to to uncover uncover any any Western Western plans for such a surprise surprise attack, attack, and we we formed formed a a special special staff staff and and situation situation center, and center, as as well well as as emergency emergency comcom mand centers, to personnel had had to to undergo and mand centers, to do do this. this. The The personnel undergo military military training training and participate in in alarm alarm drills. drills. Like Like most most intelligence intelligence people, found these war participate people, I found these war games a a burdensome burdensome waste of time, time, but these orders were no no more open to disgames waste of but these orders were more open to dis cussion than than other other orders orders from from above.117 above. cussion
Because S&T S&T collection collectionwas was less lessdistorted distorted by by misconceptions of the Westthan than politBecause misconceptions of the West polit ical intelligence, intelligence, its its quality quality was was probably probably higher. higher. Kryuchkov Kryuchkov wrote wrote in ical in a a directive directive to to residencies residencies in in July July 1977: 1977: Work against against West West Germany Germanyis is assuming assuming an increasingly greater at Work an increasingly greater importance importance at the present present time time in in connection connection with with the the growth growth of the economic of the of the economic potential potential of the FRG and and the the increase increase in in its its influence influence in thesolution important interna internathe in the solution of of important tional tional issues. issues. The Federal Federal Republic of Germany Germany is is both both economically The Republic of economically and and militarilymilitarily the the leading West European capitalist capitalist country. is the the main main strategic strategic bridgehead bridgehead of of leading West European country.It It is NATO, where where a a significant concentration of military strength NATO, significant concentration of the the adversarys adversary's military strength can can be observed: the total total numerical strength of the forces be observed: the numerical strength of the forces of of the the Western Western allies allies (including the Bundeswehr) reaches almost a million in the country. This situa(including the Bundeswehr) reaches almost a million in the country. This situa distinguishes the FRG from the other otherEuropean capitalist states statesand makes tion distinguishes it the the most component of of the the military military bloc. Within the it most important important component bloc. Within the FRG, military military scientific in the fields of atomic energy, aviation, rocket scientific research research studies studies in the fields of atomic energy, aviation, rocket concon struction, intensively pursued.18 pursued.118 struction, electronics, electronics, chemistry chemistry and and biology biology are arebeing being intensively

As though ranked far behind the As Kryuchkov's Kryuchkovs directive directive indicates, indicates, West West Germany, Germany, though ranked far behind the United States, chief European target for for Line (S&T) operations. operations. United States, had had become become the the chief European target Line X (S&T) In Commission In 1980, 1980, 61.5 61.5 percent percent of of the the S&T S&T received received by by the the Military Military Industrial Industrial Commission (VPK) came in the States), 10.5 10.5 percent from came from from American American sources sources (not (not all all in theUnited United States), percent from the 7.5 percent from Britain and 3 3 percent from Japan. the FRG, 8 8 percent percent from from France, France, 7.5 percent from Britain and percent from Japan. Just in 1980 (possibly an an Just over over half half the the intelligence intelligence acquired acquired by by FCD Directorate Directorate T in 1980 (possibly

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exceptional exceptionalyear) year) came came from from allied allied intelligence intelligence services, services, the the HVA and and <;=zechoslovak Czechoslovak StB StB chief chief among among them.119 them. Among FRG was was Germany's Germanyslargest largest electron electronAmong Directorate Directorate T's Ts chief chief targets targets in in the theFRG ics company, Siemens, KGB illegal illegal icscompany, Siemens, whose whose scientists scientists and and engineers engineers included included the the KGB in East Germany, and at least two other Soviet agents: RlCHARD, t20 recruited recruited in East Germany, and at least two other Soviet agents: HELMUT12l and HELMUT121 and KARL.122 K A R L . 1 2 2 HELMUT HELMUT was was unaware unaware that that he hewas was a a KGB KGB agent agent and and believed believed that that he hewas was working working for for the the HVA.123 HVA.123 As As in in the the case case of of other other Western Westerncompanies, companies, it it proved proved easier easier to to collect collect S&T S&T from from Siemens than to exploit it in the Soviet Union, particularly in the civilian economy. Siemens than to exploit it in the Soviet Union, particularly in the civilian economy. The The Centre's Centres paranoid paranoid tendencies tendencies made made it it increasingly increasinglyfearful fearful that that the theSiemens Siemens com computers puters it it purloined purloined had had been been bugged bugged or or otherwise otherwise tampered tampered with. with. The The FCD's FCDs Fif Fifteenth teenth Department Department (Registry (Registry and and Archives) Archives) planned planned to to use use a a Siemens Siemens computer computer to to store store the the information information on on its its card card files files on on three three million million people. people. Because Because of of the the Cen Centre's the computer tres fear fear that that the computer contained contained some some hidden hidden bug bug which which Soviet Soviet experts experts had had failed failed to to detect, detect, however, however, it it remained remained unused unused in in a a storeroom storeroom for for five five years.124 years.124Less Less advanced advanced East East German Germancomputers computers were were eventually eventuallyused used instead.125 instead.12 As As well well as as benefiting benefiting from from the the HVA's HVRs extensive extensive S&T S&T operations operations in in the the FRG, FRG, the the X agents spanned almost the whole of West German high technol KGB's own Line KGBs own Line X agents spanned almost the whole of West German high technology. ogy. In In addition addition to to those those in in Siemens, Siemens, Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes identify identify twenty-nine twenty-nine other other agents agents of of varying varying importance, importance, some some of of them them working working for for such such major major firms firms as as Bayer, Bayer, Dynamit Dynamit Nobel, Nobel, Messerschmitt Messerschmitt and and Thyssen.l26 Thyssen.126 The great majority of these espionage The great majority of these espionage cases cases never never came came to to court. court. One One of of the the few few which which did did was was that that of of Manfred Manfred Rotsch Rotsch (EMIL), (EMIL), who who was was betrayed betrayed by by a a French French agent agent l27 As in in Directorate Directorate T. T.127 As head head of of the the planning planning department department in in the the FRG's FRGs largest largest arms arms manufacturer, (MBB), manufacturer, Messerschmitt-Bilkow-Blohm Messerschmitt-Bilkow-Blohm (MBB), Rotsch Rotsch betrayed betrayed many many of of the jointly with the secrets secrets of of NATO's NATOs new new fighter fighter bomber, bomber, the the Tornado Tornado(built (built by by MMB MMB jointly with British Milananti-tank anti-tank missile British and and Italian Italian manufacturers), manufacturers), the the Milan missile and and the the Hot Hot and and Roland Roland surface-to-air surface-to-air missiles.128 missiles.12*Rotsch Rotsch was was a a highly highly professional professional well-trained well-trained spy, spy, communicating communicating with with his his controllers controllers by by microdot microdot messages.129 messages.12 His His cover cover too too was was impeccable. pparently conventional impeccable. While While living living an an a. a.pparently conventional family family life life of of almost almost tedious tedious tranquility tranquility in in a a Munich Munich suburb, suburb, he he joined joined the the conservative conservative Christian Christian Social Social Union Union and elections.13o Mitrokhin's and stood stood as as a a CSU CSU candidate candidate in in Bavarian Bavarian local local e1e~tions.l~~ Mitrokhinsbrief brief note note on on EMIL EMIL indicates indicates that that he he had hadalready already been been recruited recruited by by the the KGB KGB before before he he left left East East Germany, 954.131 Rotsch have been Germany, ostensibly ostensibly as as a a refugee, rehgee, in in 1 1954.131 Rotsch thus thus may may well well have been the the longest-serving KGB agent planted in the FRG with East German assistance. longest-serving KGB agent planted inthe FRG withEastGerman assistance. Arrested 1984, he he was was sentenced sentenced in in 1986 1986 to to eight eight and and a a half years' years imprisonment imprisonment Arrested in in 1984, but but exchanged exchanged a a year year later later for for an an East East Berlin Berlin doctor doctor serving serving a a long long prison prison term term of of solitary luxury lakeside solitary confinement. confinement. Though Though housed housed with with his his wife wife in in aa luxury East East German German lakeside villa, villa, Rotsch Rotsch had had grown grown attached attached to to his his life life in in the theWest. West. Within Within a a few few months, months, both both returned to their house near Munich and a frosty welcome from their scandalized returned to their house near Munich and a frosty welcome from their scandalized neighbors.132 neighbors.132
STA SI VA offices STAS IA AN ND D H HVA offices were werefull hll of of busts busts of of Lenin Lenin and and Dzerzhinsky, Dzerzhinsky, commemora commemorative tive plaques plaques embellished embellished with with the the sword sword and and shield shield of of the the Cheka Cheka and and other other trinkets trinkets

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presented Soviet intelligence intelligence officers at which which presented at at convivial convivial gatherings gatherings of of GDR and and Soviet officers at operational successes against against the the FRG such such as Rotschs operational successes as the the East East German German Manfred Manfred Rotsch's agent were were celebrated and toasts were drunk thirty as a celebrated and toasts were drunk to to the the future. future. thirty years years as a KGB agent After the the fall fall of of the the Berlin Wall in in November however, the After Berlin Wall November 1989, 1989, however, the near near 40-year 40-year colcol and KGB, the the most characteristically laboration between between HVA and laboration most successful successful (though (though characteristically rather one-sided) one-sided) intelligence intelligence alliance alliance in in the Soviet Bloc, rather the Soviet Bloc, ended ended in in East EastGerman German charges of of betrayal betrayal by by Moscow. Moscow.Most Most appeals appeals for help to to the theCentre Centre after charges for help after the the collapse collapse of the the G D R by by former former HVA officers officers and and agents agents who who feared prosecution in theWest West of GDR feared prosecution in the were met met by by an an embarrassed embarrassed silence silence from from the the KGB. O n October Wolfwrote were On October 22,1990 22, 1990 Wolf wrote to to Gorbachev: Gorbachev:
We were were your your friends. friends. We We wear wear a a lot lot of of your decorations on We your decorations on our our breasts. breasts. We We were said said to have made made a a great great contribution contribution to Now,in in our were to have to your your security. security. Now, our hour hour of need, assume that that you you will will not not deny deny us us your your help. of need, I assume help. toinsist on an an amnesty Gorbachev, however, however, did did precisely precisely that. that. Wolf Wolfappealed appealed to Gorbachev, to him him to insist on amnesty service before beforeagreeing to German Germanreunificafor the Stasi Stasi and its foreign intelligence service reunifica It was, Wolf bitterly, bitterly, "the the Soviets of tion. Gorbachev refused. "It was," says Wolf Soviets' ultimate ultimate betrayal betrayal of their East German friends, whose whose work work for over four four decades had strengthened strengthened their East German friends, for over decades had Soviet influence in Europe."133 Soviet influence in

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S E V E n
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Ag en tP Pe ne et ra io on an nd dA c t i v e Mea su urres Age nt en tr at ti n a Active Meas es

or much, For much, probably probably most, most, of of the the Cold Cold War, War, the the Paris Paris residency residency ran ran more more agents agentsusually any other Europe. Its usually about about fifty fifty plus-than plus-than any other KGB station station in in western western Europe. Its most most remarkable remarkable achievement achievement during during the the Fourth FourthRepublic Republic (1946-58) (1946-58) was was the the penetration penetration of of the the French French intelligence intelligence community, community, especially especially SDECE, SDECE, the the foreign foreign intelligence intelligence agency. agency. An An incomplete incomplete list list in in KGB files files of of the the residency's residencys particularly particularly "valuable valuable agents" 1953 included cials in the SDECE named NOSENKO, agents in in 1953 included four four offi officials in the SDECE (code (codenamed NOSENKO, SHIROKOV, RAVIN) and SHIROKOV, KORABLEV KORABLEVand andDUB DUBRAVIN) and one one each each in in the the domestic domestic secu security rity service service DST (GORYACHEV), (GORYACHEV), the the Renseignements Renseignements Generaux GCnCraux (GIZ), (GIZ), the the for foreign the defense the naval eign ministry ministry (IZVEKOV), (IZVEKOV), the defense ministry ministry (LAVROV), (LAVROV), the naval ministry ministry (PIZHO), New Zealand (PIZHO),the the New Zealand embassy embassy (LONG) (LONG) and and the the press press (ZHIGALOV).l (ZHIGALOV). In In 1954 1954 30 30per per cent cent of of all all reports reports to to the the Centre Centrefrom from the the Paris Paris residency residency were were based based on on information information from from its its agents agents in in the the French French intelligence intelligence community.2 community. The had been The basis basis for for Soviet Soviet penetration penetration of of France France during during the the Cold ColdWar War had been laid laid at at the both to to the the leading played by by the the end end of of the the Second Second World World War. War. Thanks Thanks both leading role role played the Communist Communist Party Party in inthe theFrench French Resistance Resistance and and the the presence presence of of Communist Communist minis ministers ters in in government government until until 1947, 1947,the thefew few years years after after the the Liberation Liberation had had been been a a golden golden age Though the age for for agent agent recruitment.3 re~ruitment.~ Though the British British and and American American intelligence intelligence communi communities ties were were probably probably unaware unaware of of the the identities identities of of most most Soviet Soviet agents agents in in France, France, they they were were acutely acutely conscious conscious of of the the weakness weakness of of post-war post-war French French security security and-for and-for that that reason-cautious reason-cautious about about exchanging exchanging classified classified information information with with the the SDECE and and the the DST. 1948 assessment assessment by by the the British British Joint Joint Intelligence Intelligence Committee Committee OIC), (JIC), infused infused DST. A 1948 by by a a somewhat somewhat absurd absurd sense sense of of ethnic ethnic superiority, superiority,blamed blamed the the success success of of Soviet Soviet pen penetration etration on on "inherent inherentdefects defects in in the the French French character" character as as well well as as "the the wide wide appeal appeal of of Communism Communism in in France." France. Soviet Soviet intelligence, intelligence, the the JIC concluded, concluded, was was able ableto to exploit: exploit:
(a) (a) natural garrulous garrulous tendency tendency in in the French character character which which makes makes the the A natural the French temptation temptation to to pass pass on on "hot" hot information, information, albeit albeit in in strictest strictest confidence," confidence, almost irresistible. irresistible. almost

(b) (b)

A lack lack of of "security security consciousness" consciousnesswhich which leads leads to to carelessness carelessness and and insuf insufficient precautions precautions to to guard guard classified classified documents. documents. ficient

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(c) (c)

A certain decline in moral standards in France, which, together with extremely sell extremely low rates of pay, must contribute to the the temptation temptationto to "sell" information .. .. ..4 information 4

The confidence in superiority of Gallic secusecu The JIC's JICs supreme supreme confidence in the theinherent inherent superiority of British British over over Gallic rity was, was, presumably, at least least slightly slightly deflated deflated three three years years later later by the defection defection of rity presumably, at by the of Burgess suspicion which Burgess and and Maclean, Maclean, Philby's Philbys recall recallfrom from Washington Washington and and the the suspicion which fell fell on Blunt Blunt and and Cairncross. Cairncross. on After the thecompromise compromise of of the the British British Magnificent Magnificent Five 1951,France After Five in in 1951, France became became for for the remainder of the the decade decade the the KGB's KGBs most productive source source of the remainder of most productive of intelligence intelligence on on Western policy policy to to the theSoviet Soviet Bloc.s Bloc. The The KGB defectors Vladimir and Western defectors Vladimir and Evdokia Evdokia Petrov Petrov reported in in1954 that theCentre found intelligence intelligence work reported 1954 that the Centre "found work particularly particularly easy easy in in France .. .. .. The The French French operational operational section section was littered with with what whatlooked looked like like photoFrance was littered photo stat copies copies of of original original French French documents."6 docurnent~.~ Paris residency important stat TheThe Paris residency obtained obtained important intelligence on on Western negotiating positions positions before before both Berlin Conference intelligence Western negotiating both the the Berlin Conference 1954,the the Soviet, American, British and French foreign minisearly in 1954, first between Soviet, minis ters since since 1949, 1949, and and the the Geneva Geneva four-power four-power summit summit in in July the first meeting ters July 1955, 1955, the first meeting of of heads of of government government since since the the meeting meeting of Three at at Potsdam Potsdam ten heads of the the Big Big Three ten years years before.7 to diplomatic ciphers ciphers provided provided by cipher clerk clerk in in the b e f ~ r eThanks Thanks .~ to the the diplomatic by JOUR, a a cipher the Quai d'Orsay dOrsay recruited recruited in in 1945, 1945, the the Centre Centrealso also seems seems to to have have had had access Qyai access to to plentiplenti French SI SIGINT. In 1957 1957 JOUR was was awarded awarded the the Order Order of of the It was was GINT. In the Red Red Star.* Star.s lt ful French probably largely largely thanks thanks to to JOUR that that during during the theCuban Cuban missile crisis,the the KGB was was probably missile crisis, able traffic between the able to to supply supply the the Kremlin Kremlin with with verbatim verbatim copies copies of of diplomatic diplomatic traffic between the Quai d'Orsay dOrsay and and its its embassies embassies in in Moscow Washington. Qyai Moscow and and Washington.9 During the the early early Cold Cold War, War, the the Paris Paris residency residency also most During also appears appears to to have have been been the the most successful promoter promoter of of active active measures measures designed designed to influence Western successful to influence Western opinion opinion and and opinion-formers. Between 1947 and 1955 the residency sponsored a series of bogus opinion-formers. Between 1947 and 1955 the residency sponsored a series of bogus memoirs and and other other propagandist propagandist works, works, among among them them:Jai lapotence (I Chose the : J'ai choisi la potence (I memoirs Gallows)by by General General Andrei Andrei Vlasov, Vlasov, who who had had fought foughtwith withthe the Germans the eastGallows) Germans onon the east ern front; front; the the equally equally fraudulent fraudulent Ma M a carriiire carriare 6 0 lttat-major l'etat-major sovietipe sovietique (My (M y Career in ern by "Ivan Ivan Krylov;" Krylov; and and bogus bogus correspondence correspondence between between the Soviet High Command) Command) by Stalin and and Tito, Tito, published published in in the theweekly weekly magazine magazine Carrefour, Carrefoour, in which Tito Stalin in which Tito confessed confessed to being being a a Trotskyist. Trotskyist. The The main main author author of of the the forgeries Grigori Besedovsky, to forgeries was was Grigori Besedovsky, a a forfor mer Soviet Soviet diplomat diplomat who who had settled in in Paris. Paris. Some Some of Besedovskys fabrications, mer had settled of Besedovsky's fabrications, which also also included included two two books books about about Stalin Stdin by by a non-existent nephew, which a non-existent nephew, were were sophissophis ticated enough enough to to deceive deceive even evensuch such a a celebrated celebrated Soviet Soviet scholar scholar as as E. H. Carr, Carr, who who in in ticated 1955 contributed contributeda foreword foreword a to Notesfor aJournal, a Journal, fraudulently fraudulently attributed attributed to tothe the forfor 1955 to commissar Maksim Litvinov. The resident in Paris from 1946 1946 to to 1948, 1948, mer foreign commissar Ivan had launched the Besedovsky Besedovsky frauds, frauds, was later Ivan Ivanovich Ivanovich Agayants, Agayants, who whohad launched the was later FCDs first specialized disinformation section, appointed appointed head of the FCD's section, Department D 10 (subsequently Service A), (subsequently Service A), founded founded in in 1959. 1959. The residency also was, in in effect, its own The post-war post-war Paris Paris residency also had had what what was, effect, its own weekly weekly news newspaper, focusing focusing on oninternational relations: La Tribune des Nations (codenamed (codenamed paper, international relations: E ECOLE). 1946 Ulmann with COLE). Founded in 1946 by Andre Ulmann with thethe help of of Soviet subsidies, subsidies,ll the

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Tribune's Tribunes subscribers subscribers included included both both French French government government departments departments and and foreign foreign embassies. Publicly, Ulmann disclaimed any connection with the French Communist embassies. Publicly, Ulmann disclaimed any connection with theFrench Communist Party Party (PCF). (PCF).According According to to his his friend friend Pierre Pierre DaDe Daix:
There a There was was nothing nothing Stalinist Stalinist about about him. him. He H e did did not not even even seem seemlike like a Communist. Communist. He was a progressive intellectual, but without any of the utopian H e was a progressive intellectual, but without any of the utopian or or idealistic idealistic nonsense nonsense associated associatedwith with this this expression. expression.His His feet feet were were firmly firmly on on the theground.12 ground.12 Ulmann's Ulmanns KGB file, file, however, however, reveals revealsthat that he he was was a a secret secret member member of of the the PCF. PCF. Rec Recommended been recruited ommended by by the the Party Party leadership leadership to to the the Paris Paris residency, residency, he he had had been recruited as as agent agent DURANT DURANT in in 1946. 1946. From From 1948 1948 onwards onwards Ulmann Ulmann also also worked worked as as an an agent agent of of the the codename and provided provided the Polish Polish intelligence intelligence service, service, which which gave gave him him the codename YULI and monthly monthly subsidies subsidies of of 200,000 200,000 francs francs to to help help finance finance the the publication publication of of La Tribune Tribune des des Ulmann received Nations. N a t i o d13 3Between Between 1946 1946 and and his his death death in in1970, 1970, Ulmann received a a total totalof3,552,100 of 3,552,100 francs francs from from the the Paris Paris residency, residency, as as well well as as an an (unidentified) (unidentified) Soviet Soviet decoration decoration for for his his work B.14 To was work for for the the KG KGB.14 To at at least least some some Paris Paris journalists, journalists, however, however, Ulmann's Ulmannscover cover was somewhat somewhat transparent. transparent. The The historian historian of of the the PCF, PCF, Annie Annie Kriegel, Kriegel, herself herself a a former former miiitante, "a secret militante, recalls recalls hearing hearing Ulmann Ulmann being being described described by by one one of of her her friends friends as as a secret agent agent disguised disguised as as a a secret secret agent."15 agent. Despite Despite the the Paris Paris residency's residencys successes successesduring during the the 1950s, 1950s, the the Centre Centrewas was dissatis dissatisfied fied with with the the number number of of its its new new recruits. recruits. It It took took Moscow Moscow some some years years to to accept accept that, that, following end of following the the end of Communist Communist participation participation in in government government in in 1947, 1947, the the pace pace of of subsequent subsequent agent agent recruitment recruitment was was bound bound to tobe be slower. slower.In In a a despatch despatch to to the theParis Paris res residency theCentre Centre insisted it step idency on on February February 3, 3, 1954, 1954, the insisted that that it step up up its its campaign campaign to to acquire acquire new new agents agents in in the the foreign foreign ministry, ministry, the the cabinet cabinet secretariat, secretariat, the the SDECE, SDECE, the the DST, DST, the the general general staff's staffs Deuxiame Deuxiame Bureau, Bureau, the the armed armed forces forces and and NATO. NATO. "The The resi residency," dency,it it complained, complained, "is is living living on on its its old old capital capital and and is is not not taking taking energetic energetic measures measures to of to acquire acquire new, new, valuable valuablesources sources of information."16 inf~rmation.~ In the Paris In 1955 1955 the Paris residency residency recruited recruited a a major major new new agent agent inside inside NATO, NATO, code codenamed named GERMAIN, GERMAIN, who who was was controlled controlled by by an an (unidentified) (unidentified) illegal illegal despatched despatched from from the Centre. Centre. GERMAIN, GERMAIN, like like JOUR, was was later later awarded awarded the the Order Order of of the the Red Red Star. Star. the His His wife wife NINA trained trained as as a a KGB radio radio operator operator and and was was given giventhe the medal medal "For For com com17 In a residency bat services." services.17 In 1956 1956 a residency agent, agent, DROZDOV, DROZDOV, reported reported that that one one of of his his bat wife's wifes friends, friends, ROZA, ROZA,who who worked worked at at SDECE SDECE headquarters, headquarters, had had become become pregnant pregnant after a a one-night one-night stand stand with with "a a chance chance acquaintance." acquaintance. On O n instructions instructions from from the the resi resiafter dency, nancial help dency, DROZDOV DROZDOV gave gave ROZA fi financial help after after the the birth birthof of her her daughter daughter in in the the following year year in in the the hope hope of of laying laying the the basis basis for for an an eventual eventual recruitment. recruitment. ROZA's ROZAs following cultivation, however, however, proceeded proceeded slowly. slowly. By By1961 1961 the the residency had had concluded concluded that that she she cultivation, residency would would rebuff rebuff any any direct direct attempt attempt to to turn turn her her into into a a KGB agent, agent, and and decided decided instead instead on aafalse false flag flag recruitment. recruitment. DROZDOV DROZDOV successfully successfullypersuaded persuaded her her to to provide provide regu reguon lar intelligence reports to assist a fictitious progressive organization of which lar intelligence reports to assist a fictitious "progressive organization" of which he he claimed claimed to to be be a a member.1s member.18Other Other French French recruits recruits during during the the early early years years of of the the Fifth Fifth Republic, Republic, established established in in January January 1959 1959 under under the the presidency presidency of of General General Charles Charles de de

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Gaulle, included two cipher cipher clerks clerks (LARIONOV9 and SIDOROy2), SIDOROV0), two two Paris Paris Gaulle, included two (LARIONOV19 and DACHNIK22) and two two young young scientists (ADM23 police officers police officers (FRENE2 (FRENE21 and and DACHNIK22) and scientists (ADAM23 and SASHA24). SASHA14). In In 1964, 1964, like like his his fellow fellow cipher earlier, and cipher clerk clerk JOUR JOUR seven sevenyears years earlier, SIDOROV Order of Red Sta?a Sta?5-a further further indication SIDOROV was was awarded awarded the the Order of the the Red indication of of the the success of of KGB SIGINT operations operations in in decrypting French diplomatic diplomatic traffi traffic. success decrypting French c. The French French embassy embassy in in Moscow Moscow was was also also a a major the early The major KGB target. target. During During the early 1960s the ambassador, Maurice Dejean, attache, Colonel 1960s both both the ambassador, Maurice Dejean, and and the the air air attache, Colonel Louis Louis Guibaud, were were seduced seduced by by KGB swallows swallows after after elaborate elaborate "honeytrap" honeytrap operations operations Guibaud, directed Second Chief directed by by the the head head of of the the Second Chief Directorate, Directorate, Oleg Oleg Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Gribanov, Gribanov, with of Khrushchev. up by by a with the the personal personal approval approval of Khrushchev. Dejean Dejean was was beaten beaten up a KGB officer officer posing had seduced posing as as the the enraged enraged husband husband of of the the swallow, swallow, a a Moscow Moscow ballerina ballerina who who had seduced him. photographs of him. Guibaud Guibaudwas was confronted confronted with with the the usual usual compromising compromising photographs of his his sex sexual Both seductions, failed as intelligence operations. ual liaison. liaison. Both seductions, however, however,failed as intelligence operations. In In 1962 1962 Guibaud himself with with his his service The following following year, defector Guibaudshot shot himself servicerevolver. revolver. The year, a a defector revealed Gribanov's plan compromise Dejean, recalled to revealed Gribanovs plan to to compromise Dejean, who who was was recalled to Paris Paris before before serious KGB blackmail blackmail had had begun. De Gaulle Gaulle welcomed welcomed the the ambassador home with with serious KGB begun. De ambassador horne the The files noted the now now celebrated celebrated reproof, reproof, ''Alars, Mors, Dejean, Dejean, on on couche!"26 couche!)26 The KGB KGB files noted by by Mitrokhin French diplomat in Moscow was was suc Mitrokhin reveal reveal for for the the first first time time that that aathird third French diplomat in Moscow successfully member of embassy staff, cessfully targeted targeted by by Gribanov. Gribanov. A female female member of the the embassy staff, codenamed codenamed LOUISA, was was seduced seduced by by a a male maleswallow, confronted with with photographs photographs of her LOUISA, swallow, confronted of her seduction and and persuaded persuaded to to work work as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. Once Once back back in in Paris Paris in the early seduction in the early 27 1960s, contact with 1960s, however, however, she she broke broke off off contact with the the KGB. KGB.17 The most French recruitment recruitment in in Moscow Moscow recorded recorded in in the the files files seen seen by by The most successful successful French Mitrokhin was was that that of of the the businessman businessman Franaois Franiois Saar-Demichel (codenamed NN) NN) Mitrokhin Saar-Demichel (codenamed in the the 1960s.28 1 9 6 0 ~ .After ~ * fighting fightingin in the Resistance, had served served briefly in in After the Resistance, Saar-Demichel Saar-Demichel had briefly in the DGER and before leaving begin a business business the DGER and its its successor, successor,the the SDECE, SDECE, before leaving in in 1947 1947toto begin a career. In In 1954 1954 he he won won an an exclusive, exclusive, and and lucrative, contract to to import import Soviet Soviet wood wood career. lucrative, contract pulp to Moscow, pulp for for French French paper paper manufacture. manufacture. A year year later, later, during during a a visit visit to Moscow, he he was was recruited recruited by by the the SCD as as a a KGB agent. agent. Acting Acting on oninstructions instructions from from the the Centre, Centre, Saar SaarDemichel used his Resistance Resistance connections connections to to make make contact with some of de de Gaulles Demichel used his contact with some of Gaulle's leading and contributed to the Gaullist cause cause leading supporters supporters and contributed almost almost 15 15 million million francs francs to the Gaullist during nal years Republic.29 during the the fi final years of of the the Fourth Fourth Rep~b1ic.l~ After President of of the After the the change change of of regime regime and and de de Gaulle's Gaulles election election as as President the Republic, Republic, Saar-Demichel succeeded in an entree entree to to the the elysee and supplied supplied regular regular Saar-Demichel succeeded in gaining gaining an elyske and reports on with Soviet Soviet leaders leaders during during business business trips trips to Moscow. AccordAccord reports on his his meetings meetings with to Moscow. ing to prime minister of the ing to Constantin Constantin Melnik, Melnik, security security adviser adviser to to the the first first prime minister of the Fifth Fifth Republic, Michel Michel Debre, any other other political political movement, Gaullism was Republic, Debre, More "More than than any movement, Gaullism was swarming with agents agents of of infl influence the obliging never succeeded succeeded swarming with uence of of the obliging KGB, whom whom we we never in keeping keeping away The most important of of them them may been in away from from de de Gaulle." Gaulle.The most important may well well have have been Saar-Demichel. His reports were were designed designed by the Centre Saar-DemicheL His reports by the Centre to to reinforce reinforce de de Gaulles Gaulle's belief that Soviet leaders were were guided by Communist Communist ideology by traditional belief that Soviet leaders guided not not by ideology but but by traditional Russian interests, and and to to persuade were genuinely genuinely anxious Russian interests, persuade him him that that they they were anxious for for an an understanding with with France: understanding France:

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My Soviet interlocutors less use My Soviet interlocutors [nowadays] [nowadays] make make much much less use of of Marxist-Leninist Marxist-Leninist phraseology phraseology .. .. .. They They are are very very open open to to dialogue dialogue and and make make a a clear clear distinction distinction between discussions based based on between propaganda propaganda statements statements and and discussions on precise precise facts facts .. .. .. The The dead dead weight weight of of ideology ideology is is fading fading away, away, particularly particularly among among the thenew new generation. generation. Faced Faced with with this this transformation transformation of of public public opinion, opinion, the the leadership leadership is is making making no no attempt a attempt to toput put a stop stopto toit.30 it.30 During his also provided During his visits visits to to Moscow, Moscow, Saar-Demichel Saar-Demichel also provided the the Centre Centre with with regular regular reports on Gaulle's foreign signature of the coop reports on de de Gaulles foreign policy. policy. He H e claimed claimed that that after after the the signature of the cooperation been eration treaty treaty between between France France and and West West Germany Germany in inJanuary January 1963, 1963, which which had had been badly badly received received in in Moscow, Moscow, de de Gaulle Gaulle had had said said privately, privately, "We We extended extended our our hand hand to to the Germans so they were the Germans so that that we we could could at at least least be be sure sure they were not not holding holding a a knife knife in in theirs."31 theirs.31
collecting intelligence, the Paris Paris residency to be be energetically energetically collecting intelligence, the residency continued continued to engaged in in active annual report report for for 1961, 1961, the residency proudly proudly engaged active measures. measures. In In its its annual the residency reported that been responsible 230 articles 1 books books reported that it ithad had been responsible for for inspiring inspiring 230 articles in in the the press, press, 1 11 and pamphlets, pamphlets, 32 32 parliamentary questions and and statements, statements, 9 9 public public meetings and and parliamentary questions meetings and the circulation circulation of of 14,000 14,000 copies copies of of 10 and flysheets.32 fly sheet^.^^ In In addition addition to to Andre AndrC the 10 posters posters and Ulmann (DURANT), editor of of La L a Tribune des Nations,33 Nations,33 the the residency's residencys agents agents of of Ulmann (DURANT), editor influence influence included included at at least least two two socialist socialist politicians, politicians, GILBERT GILBERT and and DROM.34 DROM.34 GILBERT (later (later GILES), GILES), who who was was reported reported to to be be close to the the future future president, president, GILBERT "close" to Franaois was under the the code Franiois Mitterrand, Mitterrand, was recruited recruited by by the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak StB StB in in1955 1955 under codename ROTER. KGB contacts contacts with with GILBERT GILBERT began began a a year year later.35 later.35 was first first name DROM was cultivated 1961 and and paid monthly cultivated by by the the KGB in in 1959, 1959, recruited recruited as as an an agent agent in in 1961 paid a a monthly retainer ,500 francs retainer of of 1 1,500 francs for for the the next next twelve twelveyears.36 years.36 The Paris Paris residency's residencys most most ambitious ambitious active active measure measure during during de de Gaulle's Gaulles decade decade as as The President of of the the Fifth FifthRepublic Republic was was to to fund fund aanew new news news agency, agency, the the Centre Centre d'Infor dInforPresident mation Scientifique, Scientifique, E Economique et Politique, Politique, founded founded in in 1961 by Pierre-Charles Pierre-Charles mation conomique et 1961 by PathC, a a newly newly recruited recruited KGB agent agent codenamed codenamed PECHERIN PECHERIN (later (later MASON). MASON). The The Pathe, journalist journalist son son of of the the millionaire millionaire film film magnate magnate who who had had founded founded Pathe PathC newsreels, newsreels, he he had first first come come to to the the residency's residencys attention attention two two years years earlier earlier after after publishing publishing a naively had a naively pro-Soviet Essai sur Ie ZephinomAne souiitique: phenomiine sovietique: pro-Soviet
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illnesses. The victory of the The cruelties cruelties of Stalinism were only childhood illnesses. Soviet is that that of ofa correct a vision of the themarch march of of history. history. The The USSR, USSR, this Soviet Union Union is correct vision of this laboratory of new new ideas for the the most most advanced advanced development development of of society, society, will laboratory of ideas for will overtake the the gigantism gigantism of of the the United United States. States. overtake 1961 to 1967 Path6 6,000 francs a month month to publish a weekly From 1961 1967 the the KGB paid Pathe (codenamed OBZOR) from his center, soldby subscription newsletter (codenamed center, which was sold subscription but opinion-formersin politics, business, business, diplomacy.37 sent free of charge to opinion-formers'in journalism and diplomacy.37 The main purpose of the active measures measuresimplemented by Pathe PathC and the Paris res residencys other agents of influence during the idency's the early Fifth Republic was to damage

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Franco-American relations, relations, encourage encourage a a Franco-Soviet Franco-Soviet rapprochement and and distance distance Franco-American all three fronts. His France Saar-Demichel reported progress on France from from NATO.38 NATO.38Saar-Demichel reported progress on all three fronts. His finest hour agent came to negotiate sale of of the the finest hour as as a a KGB agent came during during aavisit visit to to Moscow Moscow to negotiate the the sale French SECAM SECAM color color system system to to Soviet Soviet television television in in March March 1965, 1965,when when he he told told his his French controller De controller that that de de Gaulle Gaulle wished wished to to visit visit the the Soviet Soviet Union Union in in the the following following year. year. De Gaulle, claimed, attached importance to Gaulle, he he claimed, attached no no importance to Franco-Soviet Franco-Soviet ideological ideological differences differences and had had told told him: him: and

Russia was, is, is, and Russia was, and would would continue continue to to be be a a great great power power in in Europe. Europe. The The out outstanding standing qualities qualities of of the the Russian Russian people peopleremained remained the the same same whatever whatever the the ideol ideology Communist government, Communist ogy of of the theCommunist government, but butatat thethe present present time timeCommunist ideology ideology acted acted as as a a bond bond which which held held together together this this vast vast multinational multinational federation. federation. However, However, it it was was not not ideology ideology but but reasons reasons of of state state which which played played the the main main role. role. As for the reunification of Germany, to which the Soviet Union was resolutely opposed, de de Gaulle Gaulle wished to postpone postpone it it as as long long as as possible: possible: "The The later, later, the the better." better. opposed, wished to doubtless exultant exultant Centre Centre passed on Saar-Demichel's Saar-Demichels message message to to the Central A doubtless passed on the Central Committee.39 Committee.39 It I t remains remains unclear unclear whether, whether, as as the the KGB believed, believed, the the elysee $lysCe had had asked asked Saar SaarDemichel sound out Demichel to to sound out Moscow Moscow on on the the question question of of a a state state visit-or visit-or whether, whether, know knowing himsel The ing de de Gaulle's Gaulles wishes, wishes,he he took took the the initiative initiative himself. The Centre, Centre, however, however, claimed claimed much much of of the the credit credit for for de de Gaulle's Gaulles decision decision to to distance distance France France from from NATO and and improve Union.40 In improve relations relations with with the theSoviet Soviet Union.40 In March March 1966 1966France France withdrew withdrew from from the the integrated integrated NATO command. command. Three Three months months later later de de Gaulle Gaulle made made a a triumphal triumphal state state visit Union. The influence on visit to to the theSoviet Soviet Union. The KGB had, had, in inreality, reality, little little influence on either either decision. decision. Ever his proposal Ever since since the the United United States States and and Britain Britain had had rejected rejected his proposal early early in in the the Fifth Fifth Republic in a three-power directorate Republic to to join join with withFrance France in a three-power directorate at at the the head head of of NATO, NATO, de de Gaulle had been it. His His attempt Gaulle had been increasingly increasingly inclined inclined to to distance distance himself himself from from it. attemptto to use use the the Soviet Soviet Union Union as as a a counterweight counterweight to to American American influence influence in in Europe Europewent wentback back to to his wartime wartime years years as leader of of the the Free Free French, French, when when Roosevelt Roosevelt and and Churchill had his as leader Churchill had failed to to treat treat him him as as an an equal. equal. ''Ab, Ah,Monsieur Monsieur Ie le SecrCtaire GCnCral,he he told told Brezh BrezhSecretaire General," failed nev are to you to us resist nev during during his his visit visit to to Moscow, Moscow, "how how happy happy we we are to have have you to help help us resist American pressure-just pressure-just asas we to have have the the United United States States to help us us resist resist American weare are pleased pleased to to help pressure private boasts of the the Cen pressure from from the the Soviet Soviet Union!" Union! But But if-contrary if-contrary to to the the private boasts of Centre-KGB played tre-KGB active active measures measures did did not not determine determine de de Gaulle's Gaulles foreign foreign policy, policy, they they played at least a minor role conviction that Union was a traditradi at least a minor role in in reinforcing reinforcing his his conviction that the the Soviet Soviet Union was a tional great power power with with an an increasingly thin Communist His report to the tional great increasingly thin Communist veneer. veneer. His report to the French visit to concurred with the views expressed by by French cabinet cabinet on on his his state state visit to Russia Russia concurred with the views expressed Saar-Demichel. Saar-Demichel. The The Soviet Soviet Union, Union, de de Gaulle Gaulle declared, declared, was was "evolving evolvingfrom from ideology ideology to technocracy: to technocracy: I did me, "I or a did not not talk talk to to anyone anyone who who told told me, I am am a a Communist Communist militant militant or a party party leader" aside their statements, they they are conduct leader .. .. .. If If one one leaves leaves aside their propaganda propaganda statements, are conducting ing a apeaceful peaceful [foreign] [foreign] policy.41 policy.41

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KGB active have had active measures measures may may have had a a somewhat somewhat greater, greater, though though doubtless doubtless not not decisive, decisive, influence influence on on the the evolution evolution of of French French public public opinion. opinion. According According to to opinion opinion polls polls after after de de Gaulle's Gaulles state state visit, visit, 35 percent percent of of French French people people held held a a favorable favorable opin opinion ion of of the the Soviet Soviet Union Union (as (as compared compared with with 25 25 percent percent two two years years earlier) earlier) while while only only 13 percent percent were Those with with favorable United States States fell, 13 were hostile. hostile. Those favorable opinions opinions of of the the United fell, partly as a consequence of the Vietnam War, from 52 percent in 1964 to only 22 per partly as a consequence of the Vietnam War, from 52 percent in 1964 to only percent cent at at the thebeginning beginning of of 1967.42 1967.4 Mter residency saw After the the apparent apparent successes successes of of the the previous previous few few years, years, the the Paris Paris residency saw lit little purpose in continuing to fund Pathe's tle purpose in continuing to fund PathCs Centre Centre d'Information dInformation Scientifique, Scientifique, E conomique et Economique et Politique, Politique, on on which which it it had had spent spent436,000 436,000 francs francs since since 1961. 1961. The The cen center ter closed closed and and its itsnewsletter newsletter ceased ceased publication. publication. Pathe Path6 continued, continued, however, however, to to work work as as an an agent agent of of influence, influence, writing writing regular regular articles articles in in national national newspapers newspapers under under the the pseu pseudonym 1967 to donym "Charles Charles Morand." Morand. From From January January 1967 to June June 1979, 1979,he hereceived received a a total total of of 218,400 In 1969 Path6 Pathe 218,400 francs francs in in salary, salary, plus plus68,423 68,423 francs francs for for expenses expenses and and bonuses.43 bonuses.43 In 1969 was one of pour l'Indepen was one of the the organizers organizers of of the the Gauliist-dominated Gaullist-dominated Mouvement Mouvement pour 1IndCpendance Centre regarded dance de de l'Europe, IEurope, which which the the Centre regarded as as a a potentially potentially valuable valuable means means of of destabilizing 44 destabilizing NATO. NATO.44
KGB ET T RAT O N OF the the K GB PENE R A T II O N the French French intelligence intelligence community community continued continued during during the 1960s. Mitrokhins that at atleast four French French intelligence intelligence officers officers and and one one 1960s. Mitrokhin's notes notes record record that least four former head head of of department department in in the the Sfi SfiretC were active agents during during former rete GCnCrale Generale were active KGB agents the period 1963-6, resignation in the period 1963-6, but but give give few few details.45 detail^.^' In In the the years years after after de de Gaulle's Gaulles resignation in 1969, the the quality, quality, though though not quantity, of of the the KGB's KGBs French French recruits recruits seems seems to to 1969, notthe the quantity, have have declined. declined. The The total total number number of of agents agents run run by by the the Paris Paris residency residency rose rosefrom from 48 48 in in 1971 to to55 55 in in 1974; 1974; in in 1974 1974the theresidency residency also also had had 17 confidential contacts.46 contacts.46How How1971 17 confidential ever, the the files files seen by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin contain contain no no indication that the the 1974 1974 agents included included ever, seen by indication that agents any senior civil servants servants or or intelligence intelligence officers. officers. The The KGB had had also also lost lost the the services services any senior civil of DROM, one of of its its two two leading leading agents agents within within the the Socialist Socialist Party. Party. In In 1973 1973 he he was was of DROM, one given "substantial substantial funds" hnds to to pay pay off off his his debts. debts. Shortly Shortly afterwards, afterwards, however, however, DROM given was was reported reported to to be be in in contact contact with with the the DST.47 DST.47 The The best best indication indication of of the the main main strengths strengths of of the the KGB's KGBs French French agent agent network network in in the mid mid-1970s is a a list list of of thirteen thirteen "valuable valuable agents" agents of of the the Paris Paris residency residency who, who, with with the -1970s is Andropovs personal personal approval, were given substantial New New Year Year gifts gifts in in 1973, 1974 Andropov's approval, were given substantial 1973, 1974 and 1975. 1975. In In each each of of these these three three years years JOUR was was given a bonus of 4,000 francs; and given a bonus of 4,000 francs; E, B ANDR ROK and ANDRE, BROK and FYODOR received received 3,000 3,000 francs; francs; ARGUS, DRAGUN, DRAGUN, DZHELIB and and LAURENT 2,000 francs; NANT and and REM 1,500 1,500francs; francs; BUKINDZHELIB 2,000 francs; IST, MARS MARS and and TUR 1 1,000 francs.48 Two reservations reservations need need to to be be registered registered about about 1ST, ,000 francs.48 Two this list. list. First, First, it it does does not not include include the the residency's residencys most most important important S&T S&T agent, agent, ALAN, this who who was was paid paid on on aadifferent different bonus bonus system.49 system.49(The (The same same may may apply applyto to some some other other Line Line agents.) Secondly, Secondly, three three of of the the agents agents who who received received the the New Year bonuses bonuses were were . X agents.) New Year foreign officials officials stationed in Paris who provided intelligence chiefly on non-French non-French DZHELIB was a staff member of an Asian embassy, embassy, who provided ciphers matters. DZHELIB classified documents;50 document^;^^ REM was a Canadian Canadian in inthe theParis headquarters of and other classified UNESCO, who who acted acted as as an an agent-recruiter;51 agent-re~ruiter;~ BUKINIST worked worked in in aaMiddle Middle EastEast-

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ern ern embassy.52 embassy.52 The The eleven eleven French French recruits recruits selected selected for for New New Year Year gifts gifts in in 1973-5 1973-5 do, do, however, give givean an important insight insight into the Centre's Centres and and Paris Paris residencys perception however, important into the residency's perception of their theirmain main French French assets. assets. of The most most highly highly rated rated French French agent agent in in the themid mid-1970s was also alsothe the longest-serving: The -1970s was longest-serving: the cipher cipher clerk clerk in in the the Foreign Foreign Ministry Ministry (codenamed ELITA) recruited recruited thirty thirty JOUR, the (codenamed ELITA) years earlier, earlier, who was was singled singledout out for for the the largest largest bonus. bonus. During During the theperiod 1968-73 he years who period 1968-73 he provided intelligence intelligence on on the the cipher cipher machines machines in in the the French French embassy in Moscow Moscow and provided embassy in and at (SIGINT) Directorate at NATO headquarters headquarters which which enabled enabled the the Sixteenth Sixteenth (SIGINT) D irectorate to to decrypt a a probably substantial amount of diplomatic diplomatic traffic. traffic. In 1973JOUR was was posted posted decrypt probably substantial amount of In 1973 to to a a French French embassy embassy abroad, abroad, where where contact contact with with him him was was maintained maintained through through dead dead letter-b~xes.~ Intelligence provided provided by probably assisted assisted the the bugging bugging of of the the letter-boxes.53 Intelligence by JOUR probably new teleprinters teleprinters installed installed in in the theMoscow Moscow embassy embassy between between October October 1976 and Februnew 1976 and Febru ary 1977. 1977. All All, remarkably,were were left unguarded hours during , remarkably, left unguarded for for forty-eight forty-eight hours during their their jourjour ary ney ney by by rail rail to to Moscow. Moscow. The The bugs bugs secretly secretlyfitted fitted to to the the teleprinters teleprinters during during this this period period transmitted transmitted to to the theKGB KGB the the unenciphered unenciphered text text of of all all incoming incoming and and outgoing outgoing embassy embassy telegrams for for over over six The head head of of the the bugging bugging operation, operation, Igor Igor Vasilovich telegrams sixyears.54 years.54 The Vasilovich Maslow, Maslow, was was awarded awarded the the Order Order of of Lenin Lenin and and later later promoted promoted to to head head the the Sixteenth Sixteenth (SIGINT) Directorate.55 Directorate. (SIGINT) Until 1983, 1983, thanks to Until thanks to JOUR and far better on and Maslov, Maslov, the the Centre Centrehad had far better information information on French policy policy to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union than than that that of of any any of allies. JOUR French of Frances France's NATO allies. simultaneously simultaneously continued continued to to talent-spot talent-spot other other Foreign Foreign Ministry Ministry cipher cipher and and secretar secretarL(identified only as a member of the min1978-9 he cultivated "L" ial personnel. personnel. In 1978-9 min istry "support support staff"), staff),obtained obtained his his private private address, address, carried carried out out a a background background check check on istry on his home home and and facilitated facilitated his his recruitment recruitment by by a a residency residency operations operations officer.56 officer.56During his During the less than personnel at the period period 1978-82 1978-82 no no less than six six cipher cipher personnel at the theQyai Quaid'Orsay dOrsay were were under under active active KGB cultivation.57 c~ltivation.~ majority of of the the most most highly highly rated rated French French agents agents in in the themid-1970s mid-1970s (six (six of ofthe the ten ten A majority E ,ss BROK, s9 ARGUS,60 ANDRE: BROK,59 ARGUS: who who received received New New Year Year bonuses bonuses in in 1973-5: 1973-5: ANDR NANT,61MARS62 MARS6*and and TUR63) TUR63)were were journalists journalists or or involved involved with with the press: a a clear NANT,61 the press: clear indication that, whatever whatever the the real real effectiveness of KGB disinformation disinformation campaigns campaigns indication that, effectiveness of against Centre regarded measures as of the against French French targets, targets, the the Centre regarded active activemeasures as one one of the main main strengths of of the Paris residency. O f the the three most valuable valuable French French agents, agents, strengths the Paris residency. Of threeother other most FYODOR held a foreign and provided held a a major major position position in in a foreign policy policy institute institute and provided docu documents the USA, USA, NATO and a NATO and China;64 China;64LAURENT was was a a scientist scientist in in a ments on on the aeronautical and was a aeronautical research research institute;65 in~titute;~ and DRAGUN was a businessman businessman and and agent agentrecruiter.66 and DRAGUN DRAGUN were were probably probably Line Line X (S&T) (S&T) agents. agents. Pathe Path6 recruiter.66LAURENT and (MASON), uence in the 1960s, had declined declined in (MASON), one one of of the the leading leading agents agents of of infl influence in the 1960s, had in importance and and did did not figure on the list of of most valuable agents agents in 1973-5. His His importance not fi gure on the list most valuable in 1973-5. career, however, however, was to revive revive during during the the second second half half of of the the decade. decade. career, was to The Centre's Centres probably probably exaggerated confidence in in the theagents agents of of influence influence run run by by the the The exaggerated confidence Line of of the the Paris Paris residency residency led led it it to to undertake an ambitious of active active mea meaPR Line undertake an ambitious series series of E, a sures the 1970s. journalist, files, ANDR ANDRE, a senior senior journalist, sures throughout throughout the 1970s. According According to to KGB files, "had had access access to to President President Georges Georges Pompidou," Pompidou, who who had had succeeded succeeded de de Gaulle Gaulle in in 1969, 1969, of his his senior senior ministers, ministers, including including Pierre Pierre Messmer, Messmer, who who became became prime prime and to to some some of and

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minister from minister in in 1972, 1972, and and Foreign Foreign Minister Minister Maurice Maurice Schumann.67 S ~ h u r n a n nReports Reports .~~ from the the Paris Paris E was residency claimed that pass to infor residency claimed that ANDR ANDRE was used usedto to pass to Pompidou's Pompidous office office 'slanted .slanted information" calculated In this, mation calculated to to increase increase the the President's Presidents suspicion suspicion of of the the United United States.68 States.68 In this, as in in most most infl influence operations, it it is is difficult difficult to to estimate estimate the the level level of Given as uence operations, of success. success. Given E 's access ANDR access to highest levels ANDs's to the the highest levels of of the the Pompidou Pompidou administration, administration, it it is is difficult difficult to believe that simply ignored. credit, however, to believe that he he was was simply ignored. It is is equally equally difficult difficult to to credit, however, that that he he had best-a marginal had more more than-at than-at best-a marginal influence influence on on French French foreign foreign policy. policy. The The Centre's Centres reports the Central Committee tended tended to reports to to the Central Committee to claim claim more more credit credit than than it it probably probably deserved for provoking, provoking, or or worsening, tension within within the the Atlantic Atlantic Alliance. Alliance. deserved for worsening, tension The The limitations limitations of of KGB active active measures measures in in influencing influencing French French policy policy were wereclearly clearly M A N C H E ("English (English Channel") Channel) operation, operation, illustrated by by the the failure failure of of .the illustrated the LA MANCHE designed designed to to sow sow distrust distrust between between Pompidou Pompidou and and the the British British prime prime minister, minister, Edward Edward Heath, Gaulle's veto on British Heath, to to persuade persuade the the President President to to maintain maintain de de Gaulles veto on British entry entry into into the the European European Community.69 Community.69 Though the thejournalist journalist ARGUS ARGUS appears appears to to have have had had no nodirect direct access access to to Pompidou, Pompidou, Though E with he was was in in even even closer closer contact than than ANDR ANDRE with Messmer. Messmer. According According to to reports reports from from he contact the Paris Paris residency he had had regular regular discuss,ions with the the the residency he discussions with the Prime PrimeMinister Ministerduring during the campaign aftercampaign for the March March 1973 1973 general general election election and continued continued to advise him after wards. The main aim of of the the KGB KGB disinformation disinformation channeled channeled through through ARGUS ARGUS was was to to wards. The main aim damage the electoral electoral prospects prospects of of the the Gaullist-led Gaullist-led ruling ruling coalition coalition by by sowing sowing distrust distrust damage the between the the Gaullists Gaullists and and their their allies. allies. ARGUS falsely falsely alleged allegedto to Messmer Messmer that that Michel Michel between Poniatowski, Independent Republicans, Poniatowski, general general secretary secretary of of the the Independent Republicans, and and the the Reformist Reformist Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber Servan-Schreiber had had secretly secretly agreed agreed to to cooperate cooperate in in undermining undermining the the Jean-Jacques position of of Gaullist Gaullist candidates. candidates. On O n KGB instructions, instructions, ARGUS also also planted planted similar similar position disinformation in in the Other active active measures measures devised devised by by Service to damage damage disinformation the press. press. Other Service A to Atlanticist(pro-American) candidates included included planting planting false false reports reports that that the the cam''Atlanticist'' (pro-American) candidates cam paigns of of Servan-Schreiber Servan-Schreiber and and the the Christian Christian Democrat Democratleader, leader, Jean Jean Lecanuet, were paigns Lecanuet, were being financed by American American money. money. In In Servan-Schreiber's Servan-Schreibers constituency constituency of of Meurthe Meurthebeing fi nanced by et-Moselle, posted to neo-Nazi et-Moselle, letters letters were were posted to local local notables notables purporting purporting to to come come from from a a neo-Nazi group in in the FRG which which called on all all those with German flowing in in their group the FRG called on those "with German blood blood flowing their veins to to vote vote for for Servan-Schreiber.70 Ser~an-Schreiber.~ While such operations operations may may well wellhave have impressed veins" While such impressed the Centre, Centre,it it is diffi difficult to believe believe that that they they had had a a significant significant influence influence on on French French vot votthe is cult to ers. Though Though the the vote vote of of the the left left increased increased at at the general election, election, the the Gaullist-Ied Gaullist-led ers. the general coalition retained retained a a comfortable comfortable majority majority of of seats. coalition seats. Having greatly greatly exaggerated exaggerated its its success success in in 1973, 1973, the the Centre Centrewas was also alsoconfident confident of of its its Having ability to to influence influence the the outcome outcome of of the the May May1974 1974 presidential election. election. It informed in.formedthe the ability presidential the Franiois Mitterrand, Central Committee Committeethat that the Socialist leader, leader, Franaois Mitterrand, standing as the of victory,71 victory,71 candidate of all the main left-wing parties, parties, had aareal chance of and mounted activemeasures measures ValCry Gis Gisa major active campaign against his chief right-wing opponent, Valery card -"Mole"). In card d'Estaing dEstaing (codenamed (codenamed KROT KROT-Mole). In one one week week during during the thecampaign, campaign, ten ten carried out out fifty-six fifty-six allegedly allegedly significantoper operofficers of of the Paris Paris residency residency Line Line PR carried officers the "significant ational measures.72 measures."72 leading part part in inthe the active measures measures against against Giscard Giscard was was taken taken by by one one of the the res resA leading active idencys most most highly highly rated rated and and longest-serving longest-serving agents, agents, BROK, then idency's then aawell-connected well-connected

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journalist. Originally Originally recruited recruited as as an an ideological ideological agent agent in in 1946, 1946, BROK had had begun working supplement his his income income as as a a journalist journalist and and working for for money money within within a a few few years years to to supplement to apartment. In In the francs a a to purchase purchase a a Paris Paris apartment. the mid-1970s mid-1970s he he was was paid paid over over 100,000 100,000 francs year.73 least ten so highly highly year.73As well well as as having having a a total total of of at at least ten case case officers,74 officer^,'^ BROK was was so regarded meetings regarded that that he hehad had meetings with with five heads of of the the FCD Fifth Fifth Department, Department,whose whose responsibilities included operations in France.75 elec responsibilities France.75During the 1974 presidential election a tion campaign, campaign, BROK was was provided, provided, on Andropov's Andropovs personal personal instructions, with with a fabricated supposedly secret fabricated copy copy of of supposedly secret campaign campaign advice advice given given to Giscard d'Estaing dEstaing by the Jacques Chaban-Delmas, the Americans Americans on on ways ways to to defeat Mitterrand and and Jacques Chaban-Delmas, Giscard's Giscards unsuccessful right-wing vote during the of the elecelec unsuccesshl Gaullist rival rival for for the the right-wing the first first round of tion. The forged document was then shown to Chaban-Delmas and others, doubtdoubt less to try tryto to make collaboration between him and and Giscard more difficult at the the second round, second round, when when Giscard was was the the sole sole candidate candidate of the the right.76 right.76 The only other operation to discredit Giscard d'Estaing presiden dEstaing during the the1974 1974 presidential election which is described in detail in Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's notes was a somewhat bizarre measurewhich reflected the obsession of of the KGB's KGBs many conspiracy active measure conspiracy theorists with Zionist intrigues. intrigues. In In France, the Centre Centre with Zionist France, as as in in the the United United States States and and elsewhere, elsewhere, the believed scenes, manipulating believed that that a a powerful powerful Jewish Jewish lobby lobby was at work behind the scenes, manipulating much process.77 The much of of the the political political process.77 The KGB KGB decided decided to to exploit exploit the murder murder of of a a female female relative of dEstaing in October 1973 1973 to to mount an extraordinary operation of Giscard d'Estaing designed to embroil him with the Jewish lobby. Service Service A concocted designed concocted a forged docudocu ment supposedly supposedly distributed by a (non-existent) French pro-Israeli group, claiming Giscards part in the prosecution of that she had been killed by Zionists in revenge for Giscard's prosecution of Jewish financiers while serving as finance minister some years earlier. The Centre was Jewish financiers while serving as finance minister some years earlier. The Centre was unaccountably proud In the second round the unaccountably proud of of the the whole whole absurd absurd operation.78 operation.78In the second round of of the presidential election, election, Giscard defeated Mitterrand by less less than 2 percent of of the the vote. There measures had influence on the There is is no no evidence evidence that that KGB active active measures had the slightest slightest influence on the result. result.
I HE E M I D-I970S Le Monde the IN N TH MID-1970s Monde (codenamed (codenamed VESTNIK-"Messenger"-by VESTNIK-Messenger-by the

KGB)79 became became embroiled embroiled in KGB)79 in a acontroversy controversy over over its its alleged alleged left-wing, left-wing, anti-American anti-American bias. The con bias. The most most distinguished distinguished of of its its leading leading conservative conservative critics, critics, Raymond Raymond Aron, Aron, contrasted trasted Le Monde's Mondes readiness readiness to to mention mentionUS bombing bombing raids raids on on North North Vietnam Vietnam in in the the same its reluctance in serious, same breath breath as as Nazi Nazi wartime wartime atrocities atrocities with with its reluctance to to engage engage in serious, detailed Solzhenitsyn, whose detailed criticism criticism of of Soviet Soviet abuses abuses of of human human rights.80 rights.80 Solzhenitsyn, whose Gulag Gulag Archipelago Archipelago provided provided the the best-documented best-documented evidence evidence of of those those abuses, abuses, received receivedpartic partica speech ularly ularly unfair unfair treatment. treatment. In In July July 1975 1975 Le Monde Monde used used a a distorted distorted account account of of a speech by by Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn in in the the United UnitedStates States to to smear smear him him as as a a Nazi Nazi sympathizer: sympathizer: Alexander the West West joined theUSSR USSR Alexander Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn regrets regrets that that the joined forces forces with with the against the last against Nazi Nazi Germany Germanyduring during the last world world war. war. He not alone. like [the [the leading He is is not alone. Westerners Westerners of of a a previous previous generation generation like leading French the same ideas, and [the French collaborator] collaborator] Pierre Pierre Laval Lava1 had had the same ideas, and people people like like [the French liberators.81 French fascists] fascists] Doriot Doriot and andDeat DCat welcomed welcomed the the Nazis Nazis as as liberators.81

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Two months months later, later, Le Monde reported-also reported-also inaccurately-that Solzhenitsyn had had Two inaccurately-that Solzhenitsyn accepted an an invitation invitation to to visit visit Chile Chile from from the the brutal brutal military military dictatorship dictatorship of of General General accepted Pinochet.82 is no no proof that either was planted the KGB. Pinochet.82There There is proof that either of of these these smears smears was planted by by the Both, however, however, were were entirely entirely in in line line with with disinformation disinformation which which the the KGB was was seeking seeking Both, to plant plant on on the Western press.83 press.83In In 1976 1976 a a former former member member of of Le Monde's Mondes editorial editorial to the Western staff, Michel Michel Legris, a detailed detailed analysis analysis of of what what he he claimed was its its equally equally staff, Legris, published published a claimed was biased reporting reporting in favor of of the the Portuguese Portuguese Communists, Communists, the Khmer biased in favor theCambodian Cambodian Khmer Rouge Rouge and and the the Palestinian Palestinian PLO.84 PL0.84 The The extent extent of of bias bias in in Le Monde Monde reporting reporting during during the the 1970s 1970s still still remains remains contro controversial, condemn American 85 versial, as as do do claims claims that that it itwas was far far readier readier to to condemn American than than Soviet Soviet policy. p01icy.~ KGB files, provide files, however, however, provide some some support support for for the the charges charges of of pro-Soviet pro-Soviet bias bias made made by by Le Monde's Mondes critics. critics. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins brief brief notes notes on on KGB contacts contacts with with Le Monde identify identify two senior journalists used, in cases doubtless two senior journalists and and several several contributors contributors who who were were used, in most most cases doubtless unwittingly, unwittingly, to to disseminate disseminate KGB disinformation.86 disinformation.86During During the the1970s 1970s and and early early 1980s 1980s the Monde articles articles on, on, inter inter alia, US the Paris Paris residency residency claimed claimed to to have have influenced influenced Le Monde policy in in Iran, Iran, Latin Latin America, America, the the US bicentennial, bicentennial, the the dangers dangers of of American American influ influpolicy ence in threat of supranational Europe, Europe, US plans plans for for the the neutron neutronbomb, bomb, ence in Europe, Europe,the the threat of a a supranational causes of of East-West East-West tension tension and and the the war war in in Afghanistan.87 Afghani~tan.~ July In 1981 1981 Andropov Andropov causes In July received leadership of him a message message from from the the leadership of the the French French Communist Communist Party, Party, urging urging him received a to sent to named journalist on to arrange arrange for for an an invitation invitation to to visit visit Afghanistan Afghanistan to to be be sent toa named a journalist on Le Monde, whose Some years whose reporting, reporting, it it claimed, claimed, would would be be "sympathetic."88 sympathetic. Some years earlier earlier the the same been generous same journalist journalist had had been generous in in his his praise praise of of Colonel Colonel Muhammar Muhammar ddafi. Qaddafi. Le Monde's Mondes susceptibility susceptibility to to KGB disinformation disinformation probably probably derived derived chiefly chiefly from from naivety naivety about Soviet intelligence revela about Soviet intelligence operations. operations. In In the the aftermath aftermath of of Watergate Watergate and and the the revelashowed itself-like tions of abuses by the tions of abuses the US intelligence intelligence community, community, Le Monde showed itself-like some some other aware of other sections sections of of the the media-acutely media-acutely aware of the the sins, sins, real real and and imagined, imagined, of of the the CIA but program but curiously curiously blind blind to to the theextensive extensive active activemeasures measures program of of the the KGB.89 KGB.89 agency, Agence Unlike Unlike Le Monde, the the main main news news agency, Agence France-Presse, France-Presse, attracted attracted little little public controversy. was, however, penetrated both in abroad. public controversy. It I t was, however,successfully successfully penetrated both inParis Paris and and abroad. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes identify identify six six agents90 agents and and two two confidential confidential contacts91 contactsg1in in the the agency agency was recruited recruited under false recruited between between 1956 1956 and and 1980. 1980. The The most most senior, senior, LAN, was recruited under false flag which flag by by the the businessman businessman DRAGUN in in 1969 1969 and and paid paid 1,500 1,500 francs francs a a month, month, which he came from Italian company company Olivetti, anxious to he was was told told came from the the Italian Olivetti, supposedly supposedly anxious to have have inside 92 inside information information on on French French government government policy. policy.92 Perhaps the the most ambitious active active measure measure begun begun by by the the KGB during during the the presi presiPerhaps most ambitious dency of of Giscard Giscard d'Estaing dEstaing was was the the launching launching of of the the fortnightly fortnightlynewsletter newsletter Synthesis Synthesis dency (code named CACTUS) its agent agent of (codenamed CACTUS) by by its of influence influence Pierre-Charles Pierre-Charles Pathe Path6 (MASON). (MASON). Synthesis, ostensibly ostensibly left-wing left-wing Gaullist Gaullist in in tone, tone, appeared appeared in June The first first issue issue of of Synthesis, The in June 1976 and andwas was sent free of of charge charge to to 500 opinion-f~rmers,~~ among them them 70 70 percent percent 1976 sent free 500 opinion-formers,93 among journalist^.^' The sev sevof the the Chamber Chamberof Deputies, 47 47percent of the Senate and 41 journalists.94 of enty issues over the the next next three three years, years, at at a cost to to the of 252,000 252,000 enty issues published published over a cost the KGB of francs,95 covered a a series series of of well-worn well-worn Service Service A themes. themes. France France was was portrayed portrayed as as the the francs,95 covered victim of of an an "underhanded" underhanded American American economic economic war war in in which which the of pay payvictim the US balance balance of ments deficit deficit allowed allowed Washington Washington to to act act as as a a parasite parasite on on the the wealth wealth of of other states. ments other states.

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Giscard Giscard d'Estaing dEstaing was was portrayed portrayed as as an an ''Atlanticist'' Atlanticistwho who was was failing failing to to protect protect French French police interests against American exploitation. The United States was a a sinister "police democracy which which employed employed systematic systematic violence violence against against its its black black minority minority and and all all democracy" others who stood in its way. The assassination of President Kennedy was an essenothers who stood in its way. The assassination of President Kennedy was "an essen democracy. By contrast, Pol Pot's Pots massacres tial aspect of American democracy." massacres were were either played down down or or explained explained away awayand and the the Vietnamese Vietnamese boat boat people people dismissed as middle middleplayed dismissed as emigrants.96 class emigrants.96 Pathis downfall downfall began began in in 1978 when the the DST started started tailing his case case officer officer at at Pathe's 1978 when tailing his the (alias "Kuznetsov"), son the Paris Paris residency, residency, Igor Igor Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Sakharovsky Sakharovsky (alias Kuznet~ov~), son of of a a former head head of of the After Sakharovsky Sakharovsky reported reported his his suspicions suspicions that that he was former the FCD. FCD. After he was being followed to to his his superiors, his meetings meetings with with Path6 were temporarily suspended. being followed superiors, his Pathe were temporarily suspended. When watchers to When they they resumed resumed two two months months later, later, Sakharovsky Sakharovsky inadvertently inadvertently led led his his watchers to Path6. On O n July July 5, 5,1979 the radio-intercept radio-intercept post in the theParis Paris residency, residency,while while listening listening Pathe. 1979 the post in into a a frequency frequency used used by by a a DST surveillance surveillance team, team, heard its leader leader announce, into heard its announce, The "The actors are are in in place. place. Let's Lets start start the the show!" show! Immediately Immediately afterwards Path6 was arrested actors afterwards Pathe was arrested in the theact act of of receiving receivingmoney and documents from Sakharovsky.97 Sakhar~vsky.~~ May In 1980Pathe Path6 in money and documents from In May 1980 became the of influence influence ever court. was became the only only Soviet Soviet agent agent of ever convicted convicted in in aaWestern Western court. He H e was sentenced to to five five years imprisonment but was released in 1981. During his his trial trial sentenced years' imprisonment but was released in 1981. During Path6 articles written Pathe admitted to to having received small small sums sums of money money for for articles writtenon on Moscows behalf. behalf. His His KGB KGB file file reveals revealsthat, that, in inreality, reality, by bythe the time timeof of his his arrest arrest he had Moscow's he had received a a total totalof of 974,823 974,823 francs salary and expenses.98 received francs in in salary and expenses.98 At almost almost the the same same time time as as the the Synthesis active active measure measure came came to to an an ignominious ignominious At end, des Nations, end, the the Paris Paris residency residency took took the the decision decision to to cease cease funding funding La Tribune des founded by by its its agent Ulmann (DURANT) (DURANT) in in 1946. 1946. Since Since Ulmanns in founded agent Andre Andre Ulmann Ulmann's death death in 1970, hrther subsidies to to the the Tribune, Tribune, totaling 1,527,500 francs francs by by 1978, totaling 1,527,500 1978, had had 1970, further KGB subsidies been channeled channeled through through agent a former former associate associate of Ulmann. In In the the midmidbeen agent NANT, a of Ulmann. 1970s NANT was was considered considered one one of of the the residency's residencys dozen dozen most most valuable valuable agents, agents, pro1970s pro viding intelligence intelligence obtained obtained from from his his contacts contacts in in official official circles circlesas as well well as as carrying viding carrying out out active measures. According to his file, from 1970 to 1978 he supplied 119 intelliactive measures. 1970 1978 he 119 intelli gence reports, reports, published 78 articles articles on on topics topics devised devised by byService Service and helped helped to to cul culgence published 78 A and began to tivate 12 12 potential In the the late late 1970s, 1970s, however, however, the the KGB began tivate potential agents. agents. In to suspect suspect him him dishonesty, theDST. DST. Contact with broof "dishonesty" and of being in contact with the Contact with NANT was bro ken off off in in 1980. 1980. Thus Thus ended the longest longest and and most most expensive expensive active active measures measuresopera operaken ended the tion ever ever run run by by the the Paris Paris residency. residency.The The KGB fi files on DURANT, DURANT, NANT and tion les on and three three agents closely associated with them-VERONIQUE, JACQUELINE agents closely associated with them-VERONIQ UE, JACQ UELINE and and NANCY-t'i11 totaling over NANCY-filI 26 26 volumes, volumes, totaling over 8,000 8,000 pages.99 pages.99 Each year year the the Paris Paris residency, like other other KGB KGB stations stations abroad, abroad, sent sent the Each residency, like the Centre Centre somewhat crude statistics on its active measures. Those for 1979 totaled 188 articles somewhat crude statistics on its active measures. Those for 1979 totaled 188 articles in the the press the demise of Synthesis), Synthesis), 67 67 influence "influence conversations;" conversations;19 19 operaopera in press (despite (despite the demise of tions to to convey convey disinformation disinformation by by word word of of mouth; mouth; 77operations operations involving involving forged forged doctions doc uments; the organization organization of of 2 public public meetings; at public public gatherings; gatherings; 2 uments; the meetings; 4 speeches speeches at books; and 4 4 leaflets.loo leaflets. In In 1980, 1980, largely largely as as a a result result of of the the breach breach with with NANT, NANT, the the books; and number of of press press articles articles for for which which the the Paris Paris residency the credit credit fell fell to to 99. 99. number residency claimed claimed the Influence conversations," conversations,however, however, increased increased to to 79 79 and and operations operations to to convey convey disindisin"Influence

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formation formation verbally verbally to to 59. 59. The The residency residency also also reported reported two two active active measures measures involving involving forged forged documents, documents, and and claimed claimed the the credit credit for for organizing organizing two two public public meetings, meetings, inspir inspirWI ing ing sixteen sixteen conference conference speeches speeches and and arranging arranging one one leaflet leaflet distribution. distribution. If If Paris Paris residency residency reports reports are are to to be be taken taken literally, literally, the the "influence influence conversations" conversations achieved achieved some some striking striking successes. successes. Several Several leading leading French French politicians politicians from from across across the the political political spectrum spectrum as as well well as as a a few few well-known well-known academics, academics,whom whom it it would would be be unfair unfair to threat posed to name, name, are are said said to to have have adopted adopted views views on on the the threat posed by by American American defense defense policy, the future of East-West relations and the menace to French national policy, the future of East-West relations and the menace to French national sover sovereignty been eignty from from a a "supranational supranational Europe." Europe. Some Some of of these these individuals individuals may may well wellhave have been imprudent in their their contacts imprudent in contacts with with individuals individuals from from the the Soviet Soviet embassy embassy whom whom they they might might reasonably reasonablyhave have suspected suspectedwere were KGB KGB officers. officers.It I t seems seems probable, probable,however, however, that that in many instances the Paris residency merely claimed the credit for policy statements in many instances the Paris residency merely claimed the credit for policy statements which which were were relatively relatively favorable favorableto to Soviet Soviet positions positions but but which which it it had, had, in in reality, reality, done done little to influence. the residency's was the little to influence. Among Among the residencys more more absurd absurd claims claims was the boast boast that that KGB KGB active active measures measures "compelled" compelledtwo two of of de de Gaulle's Gaulles former former prime prime ministers, ministers, Michel Michel Debre DebrC and and Maurice Maurice Couve Couve de de Murville, Murville, the the latter latter the the current current head head of of the the Foreign Foreign Mfairs theNational National Assembly, Affairs Commission Commission in in the Assembly, to to "defend defend France's Frances independence independence from from the the United United States"-a States-a policy policy to to which which both both were were already already committed. committed. Though Though the of the KGB KGB also also claimed claimed to to have have brought brought influence influence to to bear bear on on close close advisers advisers of the the Pres President, Giscard d'Estaing, the Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, the Foreign Minister, ident, Giscard dEstaing, the Prime Minister, Raymond Barre, the Foreign Minister, Jean Mitterrand, this Jean Franaois-Poncet, Franiois-Poncet, and and the the Socialist Socialist leader, leader, Franaois Franiois Mitterrand, this supposed supposed "influence" influencehad had no nodiscernible discernible effect effect on on their theirpolicies.lo2 policies.lo2 KGB the 1981 less clear-cut KGB policy policy during during the 1981 presidential presidential election election campaign campaign was was less clear-cut than during the election seven years earlier. At the end of the 1970s the left-wing than during the election seven years earlier. At the end of the 1970s the left-wing alliance allianceincluding including both both Socialists Socialistsand and Communists, C,ommunists,which which had had supported supported Mitterrand Mitterrand in first in 1974, 1974,had had broken broken down, down, and and on onthe the first round round of of the the election election he he had hadto to face face oppo opposition sition from from the the PCF PCF leader, leader, Georges Georges Marchais, Marchais, as as well well as as from from candidates candidates of of the the right. 1981 reflected right. Though Though KGB KGB active active measures measures in in 1981 reflected greater greater hostility hostility to to Giscard Giscard d'Estaing toto Mitterrand, they dEstaing and and the the candidates candidates of of the the right rightthan than Mitterrand, they were were no no longer, longer, as as in in 1974, 1974,guided guided by by the the simple simple strategy strategy of of securing securing a a Mitterrand Mitterrandvictory. victory. (It (It was was clear clear from from the the outset outset that that Marchais, Marchais, who who won won only only 15 15percent percent of of the thevote, vote, had had no no chance chance of of winning winningthe theelection.) election.) The The individual individual active active measures measures recorded recorded in in the the files files noted noted by Mitrokhin suggest that bringing pressure on all the leading candidates was by Mitrokhin suggest that bringing pressure on all the leading candidates was con considered sidered a a more more important important objective objective than than ensuring ensuring the the victory victory of of any any one one of of them. them. As As in in 1974, 1974, however, however, the the Centre Centreseriously seriouslyexaggerated exaggerated its its ability ability to to influence influence the the course course of of events. events. In In May May 1980, 1980, Giscard Giscard d'Estaing dEstaing had had become become the the first first Western Western leader leader to to hold hold talks talks with with Brezhnev Brezhnev since since the the Soviet Soviet invasion invasion of of Afghanistan, Afghanistan, thus thus helping helping to to rescue rescue the the Soviet West. SovietUnion Union from from its its pariah pariah status status in in the the West. In In preparing preparing for for the the meeting, meeting, Brezh Brezhnev's their continuing continuing access nevs advisers advisers must must have have been been greatly greatly assisted assisted in in their access to to all all the the diplomatic diplomatic traffic traffic exchanged exchanged between between Paris Paris and and the the French French embassy embassy in in Moscow. Moscow. On On Giscard's Giscards return return to to Paris, Paris, he he announced, announced, perhaps perhaps somewhat somewhat naively, naively, that that the the Soviet Soviet I Union of o3 Though Union had hadagreed agreed to to withdraw withdraw one one of its its divisions divisionsfrom from Mghanistan. Afghanistan.lo3 Though Gis Giscard's cards attitude attitude to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union subsequently subsequently appeared appeared to to harden, harden, the the Paris Paris resiresi-

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dency meaures designed designed to persuade him would dency embarked embarked on on active active measures to persuade him that thathe he would increase increase chances of reelection by presenting himself as "the the advocate advocate of of dialogue with his chances domination. Disinformation Disinformation was sent to a [eastern Europe] against American domination." member of Giscard's Giscards staff staff which which it it was was hoped would convince convince him most member of hoped would him that that the the most damaging scandal scandal of of his his presidency, presidency, that that of of the the diamonds diamonds given by "Emperor" Emperor damaging given him him by Jean Bedel of the African Republic, Republic, had had been by the the Jean Bedel Bokassa Bokassa of the Central Central African been engineered engineered by CIA.lo4 The residency residency also also claimed the credit credit for attacks by unofficial CIA.104 The claimed the for inciting "inciting" attacks by the the unofficial Gaullist candidate, candidate, Michel Michel Debre, alleged departures from Gaullist Gaullist principles Gaullist Debre, on on alleged "departures from principles" and pro-American pro-American tendencies tendencies on on the the part part of the official official Gaullist Gaullist candidate, Jacques and of the candidate, Jacques Chirac. Other Other active active measures included schemes schemes "to to expose pro-Atlantic and and pro proChirac. measures included expose pro-Atlantic Israeli elements" elements in in the thepolicies policies of of Mitt Mitterrand and one oneof his future future prime prime ministers, ministers, Israeli errand and of his Michel Rocard.lo5 Michel Rocard.105 an opinion poll during the the campaign, 53 53 percent ofJewish electors According to an electors intended to vote vote for for Mitterrand Mitterrand as compared with only 23 percent percent for intended to as compared with only for Giscard Giscard dEsd'Es taing.lo6 The KGB was was predictably predictably suspicious suspicious of ofMitt Mitterrands popularity with with Jewish Jewish taing.106 The errand's popularity voters. As in in1974 1974 the active measures measuresdevised devised Service the KGBs voters. As the active byby Service A reflected reflected the KGB's antianti Zionist conspiracy conspiracy theories, theories, in in particular particular its its belief in the thepower power of of the theFrench French Jewish Zionist belief in Jewish lobby. The The most absurd of residencys operations operations during during the the election probalobby. most absurd of the the residency's election was was proba bly its its attempt compromise the the Zionists" Zionists by by passing passing bogus bogus information information to to the bly attempt to to "compromise the French authorities authorities purporting purporting to to show that they they were were planning extremist measures French show that planning "extremist measures" iy that to disrupt disruptthe the campaigns of of Giscard Giscard d'Estaing dEstaing and Debr6.l It I t is is highly unlikely that to campaigns and Debre.107 highly unlike measurehad any significant influence either on the themain canthis or any other active measure can the outcome of the presidential election. didates or on the Mitterrands success success in in May May 1981 1981 was was followed followed by bya a landslide landslide Socialist Socialist victory victory in in Mitterrand's the legislative legislative elections elections a a month month later. later. Though Though the the career career of of the veteran Socialist Socialist the the veteran Party agent agent GILES, recruited a a quarter quarter of of a a century century earlier, earlier, was wasby by then almost over, over, Party GILES, recruited then almost he touch with he remained remained in in touch with his his case case officer, officer, Valentin ValentinAntonovich Antonovich Sidak Sidak (codenamed (codenamed RYZHOV), who who was was stationed stationed in in Paris Paris from from 1978 1978 to to 1983 1983 under under diplomatic diplomatic cover cover RYZHOV), as second second secretary at the the Soviet Soviet embassy. embassy. He H e continued to provide provide Sidak what as secretary at continued to Sidak with with what the Centre considered inside inside information information from from the of F[ran<;ois] F[ranqois] the Centre considered "the close close entourage entourage of Mitterrand.lo8 Mitterrand."lo8 Path6 in 1979 1979 and and the off contact in The arrest of Pathe the decision to break off contact with NANT in active measures influence the the 1980 caused caused a a major major change change of of strategy strategy in in KGB active 1980 measures to to influence French press press after after Mitterrand's Mitterrands election election as as president in May unusually French president in May1981. 198 1 .An An unusually frank correctly-that frank enquiry enquiry by by the the FCD Fifth Fifth Department Department concluded-probably concluded-probably correctly-that Synthsis, La Tribune Tribune des des Nations and and other periodicals funded funded by by the the KGB had had Synthesis, other periodicals had had practically no no influence influence on on public public opinion." opinion. In future the the Paris Paris residency residency was was "practically In future instructed the cheaper more productive task of acquiring instructed to to concentrate concentrate on on the cheaper and and more productive task of acquiring agents in established established newspapers newspapers and and magazines.109 magazines.lo9The The value value of of some of its its existing agents in some of existing media agents, agents, however, into media however, was wascalled called into question-among question-among them them BROK, probably probably the the KGB's recruit. During During the been one one of of KGBs longest-serving longest-serving journalist journalist recruit. the 1970s 1970s BROK had had been the best-paid best-paid and and most highly regarded regarded French French agents. agents. A subsequent subsequent review of his the most highly review of his work he was in his contacts with work concluded, concluded, however, however, that that he was "insincere, insincere, untruthful untruthful in his contacts with operational officers, officers, exaggerating exaggerating his his information information and and operational operational possibilities, possibilities, operational

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infl ating the f his inflating the value value o of his information, information, and and developing developing mercenary mercenary tendencies, tendencies, lack lack of of discipline 35-year discipline and and failure failure to to carry carry out out assignments." assignments.In In 1981 1981BROK's BROKs 35-year service serviceas as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent was was abruptly abruptly terminated.110 terminated. The The Centre Centre continued continued to to seek seek new new agents agents among among French French journalists, journalists, but but concluded concluded that, that, in in a a television television age, age,the the Western Westernpress press lacked possessed lacked the the influence influence on on public public opinion opinion which which it ithad had possessed twenty twenty years years earlier.lll earlier. of the 1 980s, partly ofthe 1980s partly as as a a result result of of the the KGB's KGBs declining declining confidence confidence in its Paris agents of influence, the Centre probably regarded S&T as the in its Paris agents of influence, the Centre probably regarded S&T as the most most suc successful cessful part part of of its its French French operations. operations. By By the the mid-1970s mid-1970s (if (if not not sooner), sooner), the the Paris Paris resi residency dency had had twice twice as as many many Line Line X X officers officersand and agents agents (over (over twenty twenty of of each) each) as as any any other other residency the European ll2 Line X operations operations continued continued to to expand expand residency in in the European Community. Community.2 Line X during the late 1 970s and-probably-the early 1980s. S&T documents sent during the late 1970s and-probably-the early 1980s. S&T documents sent to to the the Centre 829 inin 1974, 675 in Centre (835 (835 in in 1973, 1973,829 1974,675 in 1975) 1975)rose rose to to a a record record 1,021 1,021in in the thefirst first half half cers served of of 1977.113 1977.13A total total of of 36 36 Line Line X X offi officers served in in Paris Paris for for all all or or part part of of the the period period 1 974 to 980, if EC countryY4 country.14 By By 1 1980, if not not 1974 to 1979, 1979, far far more more once once again again than than in in any any other other EC before, France had become the KGB's third most productive source of S&T, providing before, France had become the KGBs third most productive source ofS&T7 providing 8 8 percent percent of of all all S&T S&Treceived received by bythe the Soviet Soviet Military Military Industrial Industrial Commission Commission (VPK)Ys (VPK).l The ed The most most important important and and best-paid best-paid French French S&T S&Tagent agent during during the the1970s 1970s identifi identified in les noted in the thefi files noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin was was ALAN ALAN (also (also codenamed codenamed FLINT FLINT and and TELON), TELON), an an employee employee of of a a defense defense contractor contractor (codenamed (codenamed AVANTGARDE). AVANTGARDE).ALAN ALAN was was a a walk-in. the Paris walk-in. In In 1972 1972 he hewent wentto to the Paris embassy, embassy, explained explained that that he he was was earning earning 7,000 7,000 francs francs a a month, month, needed needed extra extra money money to to buy buy a a house house (possibly (possibly a a second second home) home) in in the the 150,000-200,000 rm's secrets. 150,000-200,000 francs francsprice price range range and and was was willing willing to to sell sellhis his fi firms secrets. Over Over the the next next six six years years he he provided provided technical technical documentation documentation and and parts parts of of missile missile guidance guidance sys systems, ying targets tems, laser laser weapons, weapons, detection detection systems systems for for high-speed high-speed low-fl low-flying targets and and infrared infrared night-vision other uses. records night-vision equipment equipment for for tanks, tanks, helicopters helicopters and and other uses. ALAN's ALANs file file records ] ."116 that that his his S&T S&T "fully fully met met the the requirements requirements of of the the highest highest authorities authorities [Politburo poli it bur^]."^'^ In In December December 1974 1974 his his controller, controller, Boris Boris Federovich Federovich Kesarev, Kesarev, a a Line Line X X officer officer at at the the Paris residency, was recommended for the Order of the Red Star in a citation signed Paris residency, wasrecommended for the Order of the Red Star ina citation signed personally personally by by AndropovY7 Andropov.l7 ALAN ALAN was was paid paid over over 200,000 200,000 francs francs a a year,118 year,* but but was was dismissed 978 on suspicion dismissed by by his his firm firm in in 11978 on suspicion of of passing passing its its secrets secrets to to a a Western Western intelli intelligence gence service. service.The The KGB KGB appears appears to to have have escaped escaped suspicion.1l9 suspi~ion.~~ Apart Apart from from ALAN's ALANs intelligence, intelligence,the the French French S&T S&T most most highly highly rated rated by by the the Cen Centre tre probably probablyconcerned concerned France's FrancesAriane Ariane rocket rocket and and its its fuel, fuel, Clyogane.120 Cryogdne. From From 1974 1974to to 1 979 a 1979 a French French engineer, engineer, Pierre Pierre Bourdiol, Bourdiol, recruited recruited by by the the KGB KGB in in 1970, 1970, was was employed employed on on the theAriane Ariane project project by by SNIAS, SNIAS, the thepredecessor predecessor of of the the state-owned state-owned aero aero]21 Probably space space group group Aerospatiale. Aerospatiale.121 Probably in in 1979 1979 or or 1980, 1980, agent agent KARL, KARL, a a specialist specialist in in electromagnetism, succeeded in obtaining further intelligence on Ariane from an electromagnetism, succeeded in obtaining further intelligence on Ariane from an unidentified unidentified subsource. subsource. KARL KARL was was paid paid a a salary salary of of about about 150,000 150,000 francs francs a a year year and and received In received bonuses bonuses of of over over 30,000 30,000francs francs in in 1979 1979and and 1980.122 1980.122 In 1982 1982 KARL KARL recruited recruited NIKE, agent, who who worked worked in in one one of of the the laboratories laboratories of of NIKE, another another highly highly rated rated Line Line X agent, the CentreNational National de Recherches the Centre de Recherches Scientifiques. Scientifiques. NIKE NIKE was was . enlisted enlisted under under false false flag, flag, believing believing he he was was in in the the pay pay of of a a foreign foreign firm. firm. His His file file records records that that his his informa informaT. tion 123 T.123 tion "satisfied satisfiedpriority priority requirements" requirementsof of Directorate Directorate
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Just as as Line Line X operations in France France reached reached their their apogee apogee in in the the early early 1980s, 1980s, they they Just operations in were compromised compromised by by a a French French agent agent inside Directorate T, Vladimir were inside Directorate Vladimir Ippolitovich Ippolitovich Vetrov (codenamed (codenamed FAREWELL), FAREWELL), who who had had been at the Paris residency residency Vetrov been stationed stationed at the Paris from 1965 1965 to to 1970. 1970. Vetrov Vetrov was was an an ardent ardent Francophile, Francophile, deeply deeply disillusioned with the the from disillusioned with Soviet system, system, and and resentful resenthl at athis his treatment treatment by by Directorate Directorate T which which had had transferred transferred Soviet him from from operations operations to to analysis. analysis. In In the the spring springof of 1981 1981 he he sent a message, a French French him sent a message, via via a businessman returning returning from from Moscow, Moscow, to to the theDST headquarters headquarters in in Paris, Paris, offering offering his his businessman services services as as a a spy. spy. Over Over the the next next year year Vetrov Vetrovsupplied supplied over over 4,000 documents documents on on Soviet Soviet collection and and analysis. analysis. The The FAREWELL operation operation came came to to an S&T collection an abrupt abrupt end end after a a brutally brutally bizarre bizarre episode episode in in a Moscow park park in in February 1982 whose whose explana explanaafter a Moscow February 1982 tion still still remains unclear. While While driI1!cing--and drinking-and probably probably quarreling--with quarreling-with a a KGB tion remains unclear. secretary with with whom whom he hewas was having having an an affair, affair, Vetrov Vetrovwas wasapproached by a colsecretary approached by a KGB col league. been discovered, league. Startled, Startled, and and perhaps perhaps fearing fearing that that his his double double life life had had been discovered, he he stabbed his his colleague colleague to to death. death. When When his his lover lover tried tried to to run run away, away, Vetrov Vetrovstabbed stabbed her her stabbed too, probably probably to to prevent prevent her her revealing revealing what what had had happened, happened, but but she she survived survived to to give give too, evidence against against him. him. Though Vetrov began began a a twelve-year twelve-year sentence sentence for for murder murder at evidence Though Vetrov at Irkurksk prison prison in in the theautumn autumn of 1981, 1981, it it was was several severalmonths months before before the the KGB began began Irkurksk of to suspect suspect that that he hewas was also alsoguilty guilty of espionage. espionage. Vetrov Vetrov wrote wrote his his own own death death sentence sentence to with a a confession confession which which concluded, concluded, "My My only only regret regret is is that that I was was not not able able to to cause cause with more more damage damage to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and render render more more service service to to France."124 France.12 Vetrovs documents documents added added enormously enormously to to Western Western intelligence intelligence services' services knowl knowlVetrov's edge of of Soviet Soviet S&T S&T operationsYs operations.12 In In July July 1981, 1981, two two months after he he became became presi presiedge months after dent, Franiois personally informed informed Ronald Ronald Reagan Reagan of of the the documents documents dent, FranaoisMitterrand Mitterrand personally being received received from from FAREWELL. FAREWELL. Soon afterwards, Marcel Marcel Chalet, Chalet, the the head head of of the the being Soon afterwards, visited Washington Washington to tobrief brief Vice-President Vice-president George George Bush, a former former Director Director of of DST, visited Bush, a Central Intelligence, in in greater greater detail. The first first public public disclosure disclosure of of Vetrov's Vetrovs material material Central Intelligence, detail. The followed the the discovery discovery early early in in 1983 bugs in in the teleprinters of of the the French French followed 1983that that bugs the teleprinters embassy been relaying embassy in in Moscow Moscow had had been relaying incoming incoming and and outgoing outgoing telegrams telegrams to to the theKGB KGB for the the previous previous seven seven years. years. Mitterrand Mitterrand responded responded by by ordering ordering the the expulsion expulsion from from for France 1983 of France on on April April 5, 5,1983 of forty-seven forty-seven Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence officers-the officers-the largest largest such such exodus earlier. Many exodus since since operation operation FOOT in in Britain Britain twelve twelve years years earlier. Many of of those those expelled, expelled, in Line X officers, been identified identified by in particular particular the the Line officers, had had been by Vetrov. Vetrov. When When the the Soviet Soviet ambassador, Vorontsev, arrived at d'Orsay ambassador, Yuli Yuli Vorontsev, arrived at the theQ9.ai Quai dOrsay to to deliver deliver an an official official protest, protest, Foreign Foreign Minister Minister Claude Claude Cheysson Cheysson reduced reduced him him to to silence silence by by producing producing one one of of the the KGB documents operations supplied Vetrov.126 documents on on S&T S&T operations supplied by by Vetrov.12j
T HO OU UG GH H TH HE E K KGB as many TH G B residency residency in in Rome Rome ran ran less less than than half half as many agents agents as as its its councounterpart in Paris the mid-1970s to about terpart in Paris Gust (just over over twenty twenty in in the mid-1970s as as compared compared to about fifty fifty in in France),127 countries was broadly similar. France),12the the pattern pattern of of agent agent recruitment recruitment in in the the two two countries was broadly similar. Immediately Soviet intelligence intelligence succeeded, the Immediately after after the the Second Second World World War War Soviet succeeded, with with the assistance of the Communist Communist Party leadership, in in penetrating penetrating a number of assistance of the Party leadership, a number of major major ministries best ministries in in both both Italy Italy and and France. France. By By the the 1970s, 1970s, however, however, a a majority majority of of the the bestpaid paid Line Line PR agents agents run run by by the the Rome Rome and and Paris Paris residencies residencies were were journalists journalists rather rather than than civil civil servants. servants.

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As CommunistParty Party and As in in France, France, the the post-war post-war popularity popularity of of the the Communist and the the brief brief period of Communist Communist participation participation in in government government created created the the best best opportunities opportunities period of Soviet 128 Like JOUR, Soviet intelligence intelligence was was ever ever to to enjoy enjoy in in Italy Italy for for agent agent penetration. penetration.12* Like JOUR, probably probably the the most most important important of of the the post-war post-war French French recruits, recruits, DARlO, DARIO, the the longest longestserving serving and and probably probably the the most most valuable valuable Italian Italian agent, agent, worked worked in in the theforeign foreign ministry, ministry, where where he he had had recruited recruited his his first first three three female female agents agents before before the the Second Second World World War. War. On to the the ministry O n his his return return to ministry after after the the war, war, he he recruited recruited two two more more female female typists: typists: TOPO married, TOP0 (later (later renamed renamed LEDA), LEDA), whom whomhe he married, and and NIKOL NIKOL (later (later INGA).129 1NGA).lz9 For a phe For most most of of the the next next three three decades decades DARlO DARIOwas was instrumental instrumental in inobtaining obtaining phea nomenal 1950s he nomenal amount amount of of classified classified foreign foreign ministry ministry material.130 material.13 During During the themidmid-1950s he succeeded succeeded in in recruiting recruiting three three further further female female agents: agents: VENETSIANKA, VENETSIANKA,who who was was on on the Italian OVOD,on on whom whomMitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes provide provide the staff staff of of the the Italian embassy embassyin in Paris; Paris; OVOD, no no further furtherinformation; information; and and SUZA, SUZA,who who worked worked for for the the diplomatic diplomatic adviser adviser to to Presi President dent Giovanni Giovanni Gronchi Gronchi and and gained gained access access to to a awide wide variety variety of of ambassadors' ambassadorsreports reports and During early and other otherclassified classified foreign foreign ministry ministry documents.131 documents.131 During the the early 1960s 1960s DARlO's DARIOs

wife wife LEDA LEDA met met her her case case officer officer from from the the Rome Rome residency residency once once a a week week in in cinemas cinemas and the city. over a and other other locations locations in in the city. As As she she shook shook hands hands with with him, him, she she passed passed over a microfilm ed foreign microfilm of of the theclassifi classified foreign ministry ministry documents documents she she had had photographed photographed during during the the previous previous week.132 week.132 In In 1968 1968 the the Centre Centredecided decided to to put put DARIO DARIO "on on ice," ice, and and awarded awarded him him a a pension pension for Four for life life of of 180 180hard hard currency currency roubles roubles a a month. month. Four years years later, later, however, however,it it reactivated reactivated him order foreign typ him in in order to to cultivate cultivate a a female female cipher cipher officer officer in in aa foreign embassy embassy and and another another typist at the the Italian ist at Italian foreign foreign ministry, ministry, who who appears appears to to have have been been given given the the codename codename MARA.133 In In March March 1975, 1975,forty-three forty-three years years after after DARIO's DARIOs recruitment, recruitment, he he and and his his wife wife were wereawarded awarded the the Order Orderof of the the Red Red Star. Star. He H e subsequently subsequently collected collected his his pension pension at at regular regular intervals intervals by by traveling traveling abroad abroad either either to to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union or or to to some some other other country. 134 country.34 Mter Rome penetrated After the theSecond Second World World War Warthe the Rome residency residency also alsosuccessfully successfully penetrated the the interior who interior ministry, ministry,thanks thanks chiefly chieflyto to DEMID, DEMID,a a ministry ministry official official recruited recruited in in 1945 1945 who acted DEMID's first acted as as agent-recruiterYs agent-re~ruiter.~ DEMIDs first major major cultivation cultivation inside inside the the ministry ministry was was a a cipher UESTOR, who cipher clerk clerk codenamed codenamed Q QUESTOR, who agreed agreed to to supply supply information information on on the thecon contents UESTOR, tents of of the the classified classified telegrams telegrams which which he he enciphered enciphered and and deciphered. deciphered. Q QUESTOR, however, for that DEMID however,believed believed for several severalyears years that his his information information was was being being passed passed by by DEMID not not to toSoviet Soviet intelligence intelligence but but to tothe the PCI, PCI, and and refused refused to to hand hand over over the the ciphers ciphers them themselves. in 1953 1953 the the Rome selves. Late Late in Rome residency residency decided decided to to force force the the pace pace and and instructed instructed DEMID UESTOR 100,000 DEMID to to offer offer Q QUESTOR 100,000lire lire for for the the loan loan "for for a a few few hours" hours of of the the code code and cipher books used by the ministry. Q UESTOR accepted. On March 3, 1954 and cipher books used by the ministry. QUESTOR accepted. O n March 3, 1954 DEMID was PCI DEMID finally finally told told him him that thathe he was working working not not for forthe the PC1but but for for the the KGB, KGB, and and obtained UESTOR was obtained a a receipt receipt from from him him for for the the 100,000 100,000 lire. lire. Soon Soon afterwards afterwards Q QUESTOR was handed handed over over to to the thecontrol control of of STEPAN, STEPAN, an an operations operations officer officer at at the theRome Rome residency, residency, to whom he supplied a phenomenal range of official ciphers to which he succeeded to whom he supplied a phenomenal range of official ciphers to which he succeeded in in gaining gaining access. access. Among Among them them were were those those of of the the prefectures, prefectures, the the finance finance ministry, ministry, central carabinieri, Italian Italian diplomatic diplomatic missions missions central and and regional regional headquarters headquarters of of the the carabinieri, abroad, the military-run abroad, the the Italian Italian general general staff staff and and the military-run foreign foreign intelligence intelligence service, service,

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IKAR, IKAR, however, however, became became increasingly increasingly anxious anxious at at the theKGB's hold hold over over him-finally him-finally handing his controller work as a Soviet handing his controller a a rather rather pathetic pathetic letter, letter, promising promising to to continue continue work as a Soviet agent he had agent but but appealing appealing for for the the undertaking undertaking he had signed signed to to be be destroyed: destroyed: Beneath Beneath your your cloak, cloak, you you are are holding holding a a dagger dagger at at the the ready. ready. The The day day that that you you trapped me by using methods which I regard as unworthy of your highly trapped me by using methods which regard as unworthy of your highly respected tried to attitude to respected nation, nation, I tried to convey convey to to you you that that my my attitude to you you was was friendly. friendly. Ignoring of mine, me to to various Ignoring these these feelings feelings of mine, you you have havesubjected subjected me various tests. tests. Despite Despite that, you you still still doubt doubt my my loyalty loyalty and and my my good good intentions. intentions, You You continue continue to to hold hold a a that, gun to my head, while uttering words of friendship and appreciation towards gun to my head, while uttering words of friendship and appreciation towards me. If these feelings of ofyours yours correspond with with reality reality and are not a mere mere fiction, fiction, me. If these feelings correspond and are not a then give give me me some some proof-that proof-that is is to to say, say, the the question question of of destroying destroying the the docu docuthen ment concerning concerning the the circumstances circumstances in in which which I was was caught caught must must be be resolved ment resolved between If you you do do not notdo do this, this, I shall shall no no longer longer be be able ableto to regard regard you you as aswor worbetween us. us. If thy of of my my friendship friendship and and of of my my friendly friendly esteem. esteem. thy beg you you to to understand understand that that I need need your your respect. respect. Therefore, if if you you think think that that I beg Therefore, am acting acting under the threat threat of of the the materials materials relating relating to the the circumstances circumstances in I am under the in some means means of testing my my loy which which I I was was caught, caught, you you judge judge me me wrongly. wrongly. Find Find some of testing loyalty threats. I believe you continue alty without without threats. believe that that I shall shall not not be be found found wanting. wanting. If If you continue to doubt doubt my my sincerity, sincerity, I shall shall not not be be able to work work while while I remain anxious, or or to able to remain anxious, continue to to respect respect you. you. continue lKAR to look IKAR was was given givena a copy copy of of his his signed signed undertaking, undertaking, carefully carefully fabricated fabricated to look like like the the original, The original, and and destroyed destroyed it it with with evident evident relief relief in in the the presence presence of of his his controller. controller. The original, Russian translation original, however, however, remained remained in in IKAR's IKAR's file, file, together together with with a a Russian translation which which was was later later transcribed transcribed by by Mitrokhin.140 Mitrokhin.l4O Another member of embassy staff, also Another member of the the Italian Italian embassy staff, codenamed codenamed PLATON, PLATON, was was also successfully blackmailed successfully blackmailed into into becoming becoming a a KGB agent agent after after falling falling victim victim to to the the same same SCD him by SCD honeytrap. honeytrap. The The swallow swallow (codenamed (codenamed R) R) planted planted on on him by the the SCD moved moved into pregnant. PLATON paid her into his his Moscow Moscow flat, flat, then then pretended pretended that that she she was was pregnant. paid for for her to criminal act under Italian Italian law), threatened with to have have a a (fictitious) (fictitious) abortion abortion (a (a criminal act under law), was was threatened with exposure time Mitrokhin Mitrokhin saw exposure and and agreed agreed to to become become a a KGB agent. agent. By By the the time saw PLA PLATON's had left been drawn Georgi TON'Sfile file in in 1976, ,1976,he he had left Moscow Moscow and and a a plan plan had had been drawn up up for for Georgi Pavlovich stationed in Rome, to Pavlovich Antonov, Antonov, an an Italian-speaking Italian-speaking FCD officer officer formerly formerly stationed in Rome, to renew contact himin in Belgium.141 continued as a KGB renew contact with with him Be1gium.l4' Whether Whether PLATON PLATON continued as a KGB agent after agent after 1976 1976 remains remains unknm"n. unknown. One One senior senior married married Italian Italian diplomat diplomat in in Moscow Moscow was was the the victim victim of oftwo two honeytraps. honeytraps. When affair When first first targeted, targeted, ENERO (also (also codenamed codenamed INSPECTOR) INSPECTOR) was was having having an an affair with with a a secretary secretary at at the the French French embassy. embassy. The The SCD SCD concluded concluded that that he he had had an an insatiable insatiable "appetite women," selected "appetite for for women," selected a a swallow, swallow, agent agent SUKHOVA, SUKHOVA, as as his his maid maid and and secretly secretly photographed them During a ENERO was was seduced seducedby by photographed them making making love. love. During a visit visit to to Tashkent, Tashkent, ENERO another KGB swallow, Diana Georgiyevna and photographs were swallow, Diana Georgiyevna Kazachenko, Kazachenko, and further further photographs were another taken Russian friend friend of of ENERO ENERO (who, (who, unknown unknown to to ENERO, ENERO, taken of of their their lovemaking. lovemaking. A Russian was the KGB of phophoofficer) then then told told him him that that the KGB had had come come into into possession possession of was a a KGB officer)

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SIFAR (Servizio UESTOR also (Servizio Informazioni Informazioni Forze Forze Armate). Armate). Q QUESTOR also obtained obtained interior interior ministry under ministry lists lists of of Italian Italian Communists, Communists, foreign foreign nationals nationals and and others'who others-who were were under surveillance surveillance by the the Police Police security security service service (Pubblica (Pubblica Sicurezza).136 Si~urezza).~~ The The Centre Centre considered considered its its penetration penetration of of the the Italian Italian interior interior ministry ministry to to be be so important important that that in in 1955 1955 it ithanded handed over over control control of of it it to toa a newly newly established established illegal illegal resi residency dency in in Rome, Rome, headed headed by YEFRAT YEFMT ("Euphrates"). (Euphrates).YEFRAT YEFMT was was Ashot Ashot Abgarovich Abgarovich Akopyan, Baku who Akopyan, a a 40-year-old 40-year-old Armenian Armenian from from Baku who had had assumed assumed the the identity identity of of a a live live double, Like double, Oganes Oganes Saradzhyan, Saradzhyan, a a Lebanese Lebanese Armenian Armenian living living in in the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. Like many illegals, his file-in file-in Arabic, many illegals, he he was was a a gifted gifted linguist, linguist, fluent-according fluent-according to to his Arabic, Armenian, Bulgarian, Romanian and Kira Vik Armenian, Bulgarian, French, French, Italian, Italian, Romanian and Turkish. Turkish. His His wife, wife, Kira Viktorovna Chertenko, an anethnic ethnic Russian Russian from Baku, was also an torovna Chertenko, from Baku, was also an illegal, illegal, codenamed codenamed TANYA. A began in Romania in 1948, TANYA. YEFRAT and and TANY TANYA began their their careers careers as as illegals illegals in Romania in 1948, obtained obtained Italian Italian visas visas by bybribery bribery and and moved moved to to Rome Rome where where they they acquired acquired passports passports in in the original the name name of of Saradzhyan Saradzhyan from from the the Lebanese Lebanese embassy. embassy.YEFRAT's YEFRATs original mission mission was was to prepare the establishment establishment of a a new new illegal illegal residency residencyin in Iran, Iran,but but 1952 and he his his to prepare the inin 1952 he and wife were were directed directed to to Egypt Egypt instead. instead. In In 1954 1954 they they were were recalled to Rome Rome where where wife recalled to YEFRAT was was given given19,500 19,500 dollars dollars to to purchase a business business to to provide provide cover coverfor an illeYEFRAT purchase a for an ille gal not, however, Italian firm gal residency. residency. He H e was was not, however, a a successful successful businessman; businessman; an an Italian firm with with which he he was was involved involvedwent went bankrupt.137 bankrupt.137 which YEFRAT's was given control MID, Q UESTOR and YEFRATs residency residency was given control of of DE DEMID, QUESTOR and a a third third agent agent in the the interior interior ministry, ministry, CENSOR, CENSOR, who who had had probably probably been been recruited recruited by by DEMID. DEMID. in CENSORS greatest greatest coup coup was was to to abstract abstract top top secret secret documents documents from from the the safe safe of the the CENSOR's director the security service in the ministry.138 YEFRAT also succeeded director general general of of the security service in the ministry.138 YEFRAT also succeededin in renewing contact contact with with a a former former agent, agent, OMAR, OMAR, who who had had been been sacked sacked from from the the inte interenewing in 1948 1948and had obtained a job in inwhat what Mitrokhins rior ministry cipher department in Mitrokhin's notes describe as as "a a service service attached to the the American American embassy." embassy. For For unexplained reanotes describe attached to unexplained rea sons, however, the quantity of high-grade intelligence intelligence produced by the agents the sons, agents in the the later 1950s. 1950s. When exhortations by the Centre interior ministry declined during the YEFRAT and Lazarev, the head of the Illegals and a personal meeting between YEFRAT the Illegals Directorate S, failed failed to to produce was recalled recalled and his his illegal illegal residency residency Directorate S, produce results, results, YEFRAT was and closed. Control of of his his agents agents was was handed handed back back to to the thelegal legal Rome Rome residency.139 residency.139 closed. Control
ITALIAN A S SY S Y in Moscow, like that of France, was a major KGB target. TH HE E I TA L I A N E M B BA Whereas Second Chief Directorate operations operations against French diplomats culminated embarrassing public scandal, achievedspectac spectacin an embarrassing scandal, those against the Italian embassy embassy achieved norular, unpublicized success. success. The weapons used against Italian diplomats were the nor of the SCD: SCD: a combination of sexual sexualcompromise compromise and blackmail. mal stock-in-trade of waslKAR IKAR ("Icarus"), (Icarus),one of of the service service attaches attach& in the theItalian The SCDs SCD's first victim was swallow,who then claimed to seduced in the the late 1950s 1950s by a KGB swallow, embassy who was seduced be pregnant and pretended to have an abortion. IKAR lKAR was confronted by an SCD officer, posing as the swallows enraged husband and signed a document agreeing agreeing to officer, swallow's become a KGB agent in return for the supposed scandal being hushed up. In addition IKAR also gave gavehis SCD to providing classified classified information, lKAR SCD controller the combinacombina tion number of his safe and a copy of the cipher he used to communicate with Rome.

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tographs tographs of of him him in in bed bed with with SUKHOVA, SUKHOVA, taken taken by by a a criminal criminal gang gang who who were were about about to to stand with stand trial, trial, charged charged with taking taking compromising compromising photographs photographs which which they they intended intended to to use use for for blackmail blackmail and and extortion. extortion. Almost Almost simultaneously, simultaneously, ENERO ENERO was was informed informed that that Kazachenkds relatives had rape and Kazachenkos relatives had lodged lodged an an official official complaint, complaint, accusing accusing him him of of rape and claiming Kazachenko pregnant. claimed, was was claiming that that he he had had made made Kazachenko pregnant. Kazachenko, Kazachenko, it it was was claimed, now complications arising now an an invalid invalid as as a a result result of ofmedical medical complications arising from from the the abortion. abortion. An An SCD SCDoperations operations officer, officer, 1. I. 1. I. Kuznetsov, Kuznetsov, told told ENERO that that the the Soviet Soviet author authorities hush both both matters ities were were prepared prepared to to hush matters up up if if he he agreed agreed to to "help" help them. them. Though Though ENERO ENERO protested protested that that Kuznetsov's Kuznetsovs proposal proposal was was straightforward straightforward blackmail, blackmail, he he quickly quickly gave gave way way to to it. it. According According to to his his file, file, the the intelligence intelligence he he provided provided included included information the embassy illegally smuggling information that that the embassy was was illegally smuggling into into Moscow Moscow by by diplomatic diplomatic bag bag roubles roubles purchased purchased abroad abroad at at a afraction fraction of of the the official official exchange exchange rate. rate. Before Before leav leaving ing Moscow Moscow in in the theearly early 1970s, 1970s, ENERO agreed agreed to to continue continue work work as as a a KGB KGB agent agent on on his his return return to to Italy Italy and and was was given given an an initial initial payment payment of of 500 500 US dollars. dollars. Soon Soon after afterwards wards Kusnetsov Kusnetsov visited visitedhim him in inRome Rome to to introduce introduce his his new new case case officer officerfrom from the the local local residency. residency. A year year later, later, however, however, the the residency residency reported reported that that ENERO was was avoiding avoiding meetings residency meetings with with his his controller controller and and had had changed changed his his private private address. address,In In 1979 1979 aa residency officer now retired officer resumed resumed contact contact but, but, since since ENERO ENERO was was now retired and and in in poor poor health, health, he he was was removed removed from from the the agent agent network.142 network.142 The in its The SCD's SCDs greatest greatest triumph triumphin its operations operations against against the the Italian Italian embassy embassy in in Moscow Moscow was was the the recruitment recruitment of of a a senior senior diplomat, diplomat, successively successivelycodenamed codenamed ARTUR and and ARLEKINO ARLEKINO ("Harlequin"). (Harlequin). ARTUR was was first first recruited recruited by by the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak StB in the 1960s, which threatened to expose both his affair with a prostitute StB in the1960s, which threatened to expose both his affairwith a prostitute and and his his currency currency speculation speculation unless unless he he agreed agreed to to cooperate. cooperate. When When he he was was posted posted to to Moscow Moscow some control someyears years later, later, control of of him him was was transferred transferred by by the the Czechs Czechs to to the theSCD. SCD. ARTUR's ARTURs file file records recordsthat that he he was was rewarded rewarded with with "valuable valuablepresents" presentsand and all-expenses-paid all-expenses-paid hunt hunting ing expeditions expeditions in in the the Moscow Moscow area. area. Mter After his his return return to to Italy, Italy, ARTUR continued continued to to work years after work for for the the KGB KGB until until 1983, 1983, several several years after his his retirement, retirement, when when his his much muchreduced reduced access access to to classified classified information information led led to to his his removal removal from from the the agent agent network.143 net~0rk.l~ A number number of of other other Italian Italian embassies embassies around around the the world world also also contained contained KGB KGB agents: them DENIS, the Middle East agents: among amongthem DENIS, a a cipher cipher clerk clerk stationed stationed in inthe Middle East and and recruited VITTORIO, a a former former member member of of the the PCI PC1 recruited recruited in in Latin Latin recruited in in 1961;144 1961;14VITTORIO, America and America in in 1970/45 1970;145 and PLEMYANNIK PLEMYANNIK ("Nephew"), (Nephew), a a cipher cipher clerk clerk in in the the Middle Middle East As East recruited recruited with with the the help help of of Bulgarian Bulgarian intelligence intelligence in in 1977.146 1977.146 As well well as as provid providing ing large large numbers numbers of of documents, documents, the the KGB's KGBs agents agents inside inside the the Italian Italian foreign foreign ministry ministry and and embassies embassies abroad abroad must must also also have havemade made a a major major contribution contribution to to the thesuccess success of of the the Sixteenth continued at Sixteenth Directorate Directorate in in decrypting decrypting Italian Italian diplomatic diplomatic telegrams, telegrams, which which continued at least Mitrokhin's least until until the the mid-1980s.147 mid-1980~.~ Mitrokhins notes notes provide provide very very few few details details on on the the con content tent of of the the remarkable remarkable number number of of diplomatic diplomatic documents documents which which reached reached the the Centre Centre and content of and nothing nothing on on the the content of the the decrypts. decrypts. The The implications implications of of the the KGB KGB files files on on Italy Italy and and France France to to which which he he had hadaccess access are, are, none none the the less, less, very very great. great. So So great great was was the the Centre's Centres access access to to classified classified French French and and Italian Italian diplomatic diplomatic traffic traffic that, that, at at numerous numerous points Cold War, points during during the the Cold War, both both France France and and Italy Italy were were conducting, conducting, so so far far as as the the Soviet Soviet Union Union was was concerned, concerned, something something akin akin to to open open diplomacy. diplomacy.

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France, x operations operations in in Italy Italy were were on on about about half half the the scale scale of of those those in in France,

they successes. In they included included some some striking striking successes. In 1970 1970 the the co-owners co-owners of of a a small small high-tech high-tech company, METIL ("Methyl") (Methyl) and and BUTIL ("Butyl"), (Butyl),jointly jointly supplied supplied the the KGB with company, with hIll technical documentation production of on the the production of butyl butyl rubber, rubber, which which was was used used in in fidl technical documentation on the construction construction of of the theSoviet Soviet Sumgait Sumgait rubber rubber factory factory and and led led to to the the redesign redesign of of pro prothe duction lines lines at at the Nizhnekama Combine Combine and and the the Kuybyshev Kuybyshev Synthetic Synthetic Rubber Rubber duction the Nizhnekama Works. produced a 16 million Works. Directorate Directorate T calculated calculated that that their their S&T had had produced a saving saving of of I 6 million and BUTIL were were paid 50,000 dollars. dollars. I n the the mid-1970s mid-1970s BUTIL roubles. METIL and roubles. paid 50,000 In provided other other highly highly rated rated intelligence, intelligence, some some from from American American sources, sources, on on chemical chemical provided 148 and petrochemical petrochemical processes. processes.14* and In 1970 1970the Rome residency had had nine Line X officers officers who ran about aboutten In the Rome residency nine Line who ran ten agents,149 composed chiefly chiefly of of businessmen businessmen but but including including an an important important minority minorityof of agents,149 composed academics.150 There was was some expansion of of S&T operations operations during during the thelater 1970s academics.150 There some expansion later 1970s both in Rome and and in in Milan, Milan, where where a a senior senior Line Line X officer, officer, Anatoli Anatoli Vasilyevich Vasilyevich both in Rome151 Kuznetsov (codenamed KOLIN), KOLIN), was was posted posted in in 1978 1978under under consular cover.152 cover.152 ProbKuznetsov (codenamed consular Prob ably the the most most important importantLine Line agent at atthe theend end of of the the1970s 1970s and and beginning beginning of of the ably X agent the 1980s was was UCHITEL ("Teacher"), (Teacher),who whotaught taughtatat major university university and and was was con con1980s aa major trolled by by Kuznetsov.153 Ku~netsov.~~ Using his his wide wide range range of of academic academic and and business business contacts, contacts, trolled Using provided S&T S&T from from a a total eight major companies companies and and research research UCHITEL provided totalof of eight major institutes in in Italy, Italy, West West Germany, Germany, France France and Belgium, and out other other KGB institutes and Belgium, and carried carried out assignments and FRG. FRG. UCHITEL's valuable intelligence assignments in in the theUSA and UCHITELsmost most valuable intelligence seems seems to to have concerned concerned military military aircraft, aircraft, helicopters, helicopters, aero-engine aero-engine construction construction and airborne have and airborne guidance guidance systems. systems. Among Among the the intelligence intelligence he he supplied supplied was was information information on on NATO's NATOs newest aircraft, the the Tornado, by Britain, Britain, the and newest combat combat aircraft, Tornado, jointly jointly developed developed by the FRG and Italy.154 Doubtless unknown unknown to toUCHITEL, at at least one of of his his university university colleagues, colleagues, Italy.154 Doubtless least one a nuclear codenamed MARIO, a nuclear physicist physicist codenamed also a Another acaaca MARIO, was was also a KGB agent.155 agent. Another demic, KARS, who operated as a Line agent in in both and the the United UnitedStates, States, demic, KARS, who operated as a Line X agent both Italy and also appears appears to to have have been been based based at at the the same same university.156 ~niversity.~~ also Though Soviet Soviet scientists scientists working working as as KGB agents agents or or co-optees co-optees used used a a variety of Though variety of methods to to lurv lure their their Western Western colleagues colleagues into into secret secret collaboration, collaboration, they they commonly commonly methods promised both money and privileged access accessto Soviet Soviet research in their theirfields. probfields. A prob ably 12, 1976, 1976, concluded concluded by by ably typical typical example example was was the the agreement, agreement, dated dated September September 12, Professor Georgi Georgi Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Aleksandrov Aleksandrov (agent (agent AYUN) A W N ) of of the the Lenin Lenin Polytech PolytechProfessor Kdinin (LPI) nic Institute Imeni Imeni Kalinin (LPI) with KULON, a senior member of an Italian research institute:
theexchange exchange of scientific scientific and technical informa informaIn view of the importance of the othercountries, tion and the timeliness of obtaining information on research in other theone one hand, in person the of its pro-rector pro-rector for scientific scientific contacts with LPI on the hand, in the Serebryannikov,and [the Italian research institute] on foreign countries, V. A. Serebryannikov, the other hand, hand, in inthe theperson of of the the scientific scientific adviser to its its director, director, Professor [KULON], have agreed agreed as follows: follows: [KULON],

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(1) (1) Professor Professor [KULON] [KULON] agrees agrees to to use use his his own own and and LPI's LPIs facilities facilities to to assist assist LPI obtaining scientific LPI in in obtaining scientific and and technical technical information information on on basic basic problems problems of of electronics of an applied applied nature. This scientific scientific and technical information electronics should be in the theform of reports and articles articles which have not been published in journals, journals, or or of of materials materials put put out outby by firms firms on on the the results results of of studies studies by by firms firms and and scientific scientific institute institute laboratories laboratories in in the the United UnitedStates, States, the the FRG, FRG, France, France, the the UK . If and Japan Japan [Directorate [Directorate T's Ts five five main main targets] targets]. If the the information information is is of of a a confi confidential dential nature, nature, it it will will be be transmitted transmitted to to LPI's LPIs pro-rector pro-rector or his representative representative at personal meetings, which personal meetings, which may may be beheld held in in one oneof of three three countries countries as as agreed. agreed. The The pro-rector's request will separate list. list. LPI will pro-rectors request will be be made made in in the the form form of of a a separate will pay pay in in any any currency currency for for acquisitions acquisitions .. .. .. (2) (2) For For its its part part LPI LPI undertakes undertakes to to assist assist Professor Professor [KULON] [KULON] to to publish publish in in closed closed specialized specialized Soviet Sovietjournals journals and and to to arrange arrange for for invitations invitations for for him him to to the the USSR in in order order to to learn learn about about other other institutions institutions in in the the USSR and and to to carry carry out out joint stations and joint studies, studies, and and for for familiarization familiarization with with major major hydroelectric hydroelectric stations and power power transmission transmission lines. lines.
Most contacts took Most meetings meetings between between KULON and and his his KGB 'contacts took place place in in Switzer SwitzerlandY7 Though land.157 Though KULON seems seems to to have have remained remained a a confidential confidential contact, contact, similar similar approaches sometimes led approaches to to other other Western Westernscientists scientists sometimes led to to their their recruitment recruitment as as agents. agents. S&T S&T operations operations in in Italy Italy suffered suffered a a serious serious setback setback on on August August 5, 5, 1981 1981 with with the the unpublicized probably the unpublicized expulsion expulsionof of probably the most most senior senior Line Line X officer, officer,Anatoli Anatoli Kuznetsov, Kuznetsov, which which caused caused inevitable inevitableKGB KGB anxiety anxiety as as to to whether whether UCHITEL UCHITEL and and his his other other agents agents had arrived had been been detected detected by by Italian Italian counterintelligence. counterintelligence.An An investigation investigation at at the theCentre Centre arrived at for at three three possible possible explanations explanations for the the expulsion: expulsion: that that some some of of Kuznetsov's KuznetsovsLine Line X oper oper1970 to ations ations dating dating from from his his period period at at the the Paris Paris residency residency from from 1970 to 1975 1975 had had come come to to light; light; or or that that his his work work as as security security officer officer for for the the Soviet Soviet colony colonyin in northern northern Italy, Italy, which which he he combined combinedwith with his his Line Line X work, work, had had blown blown his his cover cover as as consul consul in in Milan; Milan; or or that that his his ISS frequent It frequent trips trips from from Milan Milan to to Turin Turin had had aroused aroused suspicion. suspicion.1s8 It does does not not seem seem to to have have occurred until occurred to to the theCentre Centre until its its investigation investigation of of the the FAREWELL FAREWELL case case in in 1982 1982 that that the the leak downfall might leak which which led led to to Kuznetsov's Kuznetsov7s downfall might have have come comefrom from within within Directorate Directorate T. T.
I970 8 a 1970s a majority majority of of the the most most highly highly rated rated Line Line PR agents agents run run by by both both the the Rome Rome and and Paris Paris residencies residencies were were journalists. journalists. One One of of the the files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin contains contains a a list list of of the the thirteen thirteenmost most highly highly paid paid political political intelligence intelligence agents agents run run by by the the best-paid, each Rome the beginning Rome residency residency at at the beginning of of 1977.159 1977.ls9 Of Of the the six six best-paid, each of of whom whom received received 240 240 hard hard currency currency roubles roubles a a month, month, at atleast least three three were were journalists: journalists: FRANK, FRANK, recruited recruited in in 1966, 1966, who who held held a a senior senior position position on on a a major major newspaper;160 newspaper;16 POD PODVIZHNY VIZHNY ("Agile"), (Agile),also also a a well-known well-known journalist;161 journalist;161and and STAZHER STAZHER ("Trainee"), (Trainee), worked who who had hadbeen been recruited recruited in in 1969 1969and and worked in in the theRome Rome bureau bureau of of a a news news agency.162 agency.162 The three agents The other other three agents paid paid 240 240 roubles roubles a a month month by by the the Rome Rome residency residency were were DARIO, the Foreign DARIO, the the veteran veteran agent-recruiter agent-recruiter in in the Foreign Ministry; Ministry; NEMETS NEMETS ("Ger (German" ), a man), a well-known well-known left-wing left-wing politician; politician; and and ORLANDO, ORLANDO,who who cannot cannot be be clearly clearly 63 identified identified from from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes.1 notes.163
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The residency at beginning of The next next best-paid best-paid agents agents of of the the Rome Rome residency at the the beginning of 1977 1977 were were s i x who who received received 170 170 roubles roubles a a month. No information information is is available availableon on the the occupation six month. No occupation of six, ACERO; ACERO; Mitrokhin's indicate that of one one of of the thesix, Mitrokhins notes notes reveal reveal his his identity identity and andindicate that he he 164 Of the was probably probably recruited not later later than than 1969, 1969,but butgive give no no further further details. details.16 the five five was recruited not whose occupations whose occupations are are identified, identified, three-FIDELIO, three-FIDELIO, RENATO RENATO and and MAVR-were MAVR-were journalists. RENATO, RENATO, recruited recruited in in 1974, 1974, was editor of of a a periodical.165 periodical.16 FIDELIO, FIDELIO, journalists. was editor who became an MAVR, who became an agent agent in in 1975, 1975,was was director director of of a a press press agency.166 agency.166 MAVR, a a left-wing left-wing journalist Rome daily journalist on on a a leading leading Rome daily recruited recruited some some years years earlier earlier than than RENATO RENATO or or FIDELIO, FIDELIO, also also acted acted as as agent-recruiter. agent-recruiter. Among Among his his recruits recruits was was ARALDO, ARALDO, a a civil civil servant who, according to political establishment servant who, according to MAVR MAVR, regarded regarded the the whole whole Italian Italian political establishment as ed as a a "den den of of thieves" thieves and and was was happy happy to to earn earn a a share share of of the the spoils spoils by by selling selling classifi classified 167 documents. document^.'^^ The residency were The other other two two agents agents paid paid 170 170 roubles roubles a a month month by by the the Rome Rome residency were LORETO, a disillusioned) Maoist Maoist militant LORETO, a (probably (probably disillusioned) militant who whoprovided provided information information on on China's the European left,168 Chinas contacts contacts with with its its supporters supporters in inthe European left,16s and and METSENAT METSENAT ("Patronage"), assessed as as purely (Patronage), a a corrupt corrupt civil civil servant servant whose whose motives motives were were assessed purely merce mercenary.169 final 1977 list of the Rome residency's residencys most nary.169 The fi nal codename on the January 1977 valuable 150 roubles valuable agents agents is is that that ofTURIST, ofTURIST, a a newspaper newspaper publisher publisher who who was was paid paid 150 roubles a month.170 month.17*In In all, all, at at least least seven seven of of the the residency's residencys thirteen thirteen best-paid best-paid recruits, recruits, who who a each received between 150 150 and and 240 240 roubles roubles a a month, were journalists. journalists. As As in in Paris, Paris, each received between month, were where a a majority majority of of the the KGB's KGBs most highly rated rated Line Line PR agents agents were were also also journalwhere most highly journal ists, the the Centre's Centres probably probably exaggerated exaggerated confidence in their their potential as agents agents of of ists, confidence in potential as influence led led it it to to undertake undertake an an ambitious ambitious series series of of active active measures measures throughout throughout the the influence 1970s. 1970s. Centre report reporton on the Rome residency residency in in August August 1977 1977 concluded concluded that that it ithad had "an an A Centre the Rome effective and and reliable reliable agent agent network" network with with sources in the ministry, cabinet cabinet effective soutces in the foreign foreign ministry, office, defense defense ministry ministry and and the the main main political political parties. parties. Each Each month residency office, month the the residency obtained between between 40 40 and and 50 intelligence intelligence reports reports from from its its agents. agents. It was, was, however, obtained however, criticized for for its its comparative comparative lack of success success against against American, American, NATO and and European European criticized lack of Community targets. targets. The The Centre's Centres greatest greatest praise praise was was reserved for the the residency's residencys Community reserved for influence operations: [Its] agents coped successfully with active measures, including influence operations: "[Its] agents coped successfully with active measures, including those on on a a large large scale." scale. During During 1977 1977 operation operation CRESCENDO, CRESCENDO, which which used forged those used forged documents to to discredit discredit the the human rights policy of the the Carter administration, and and documents human rights policy of Carter administration, operation BONZA, BONZA, targeted targeted against the Chinese, were singled out for for particular particular operation against the Chinese, were singled out 171 praise.171 praise. The Rome Rome residency's residencys annual annual statistics for its its active active measures in 1977 1977were were as as fol folThe statistics for measures in lows: lows:
articles published published in in the the bourgeois bourgeois press: 43 articles press: 43 materials distributed: distributed: 1 1 materials letters drafted: drafted: 2 2 letters oral information information disseminated: disseminated: 1 1 oral conversations of of int1uence: influence: 13 13 conversations

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interviews secured: 1 interviews secured: 1 television appearances: appearances: 2 2 television exhibitions mounted: 1 1 exhibitions mounted: parliamentary questions inspired: parliamentary questions inspired: 2 appeals inspired: inspired: 2172 2172 appeals Such Such statistics, statistics, of of course, course, mean mean relatively relatively little little unless unless it it can can be bedemonstrated demonstrated that thatthe the active measures to which they active they refer had a a significant influence on Italian opinion. opinion. Nowhere in in the thefiles files examined examinedby byMitrokhin, Mitrokhin, however, however, is isthere there any any sign sign of ofa a serious, serious, Nowhere critical assessment of what active measures in Italy (or in most other countries) had critical assessment of what active measures in Italy (or in most other countries) had actually actually achieved. achieved. Instead, Instead, any any sign signthat that Western Western opinion opinionwas was hostile hostile to to any any aspect aspectof of oror sympathetic Americanpolicy policy sympathetic to the the Soviet Union was liable to be seized seized on uncritically as as evidence evidence of of a a successful successful KGB operation. operation. Just Just as as it it suited suited the the residen residenuncritically cies so it cies to to exaggerate exaggerate the the success success of of their their active active measures, measures, so it also also suited suited the the Centre Centre to to report these these successes to the thePolitburo. Politburo. report successes to
AT L EAST HA LF LEAST ALF

the Rome residency's the Rome residencys best-paid best-paid Line Line PR Italian Italian agents agents in in January January 1977 were either taken off the payroll or or retired retired over over the the next next five fiveyears.173 years.73 The 1977 were either taken off the KGB payroll The first abuses of first to to go was was TURIST. TURIST.Apparently Apparently disillusioned disillusioned by by the the evidence evidence of ofSoviet Soviet abuses of human various pretexts human rights, rights, TURIST TURIST made made various pretexts for for declining declining to to co-operate co-operate during during 1977 and and by the the end endof of the year had had broken broken contact. to his his case officer,he 1977 by the year contact. According According to case officer, he "did understand and andinterpret interpret the situation of the did not not correctly correctly understand the situation of of believers believers and and of the Church itself itself in in the theUSSR, or or that thatof of dissidents." dissidents. In In other other words, had been Church words, TURIST had been alienated alienated by by the the persecution persecution of of Soviet Soviet religious religious and and political political dissidents. dissidents. An An examina examination whether he had ever a fully com tion ofTURIST's ofTURISTsfile file led led Mitrokhin Mitrokhin to todoubt doubt whether he had ever been been a fully committed mitted KGB agent.174 agent.17 In In 1978 1978 FIDELIO FIDEL10 was was also also removed removed from from the the agent agent network network after after it it was was discov discovered that that he hewas was in in regular regular touch touch with-and with-and doubtless receiving money ered doubtless receiving moneyfrom-Hunfrom-Hun garian had also made contact with the and Polish garian intelligence, intelligence, and and had also made contact with the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak and Polish services.175 followed by by METSENAT in the following services.175In In 1979 1979 DARIO retired, retired, followed in the following year.176 TO and TURIST-were becoming year.76 Simultaneously, Simultaneously, RENA RENATO and FRANK-like FRANK-like TURIST-were becoming disillusioned. RENATO RENATO was was put put on ice in in 1980, initially for for a a four-year four-year period;l77 period;177 disillusioned. on ice 1980, initially there is is no evidence as to to whether with him was subsequently resumed. there no evidence as whethercontact contact with him was subsequently resumed. plained that FRANK's cer co FRANKScase case offi officer complained that he he was was too too easily easily "influenced influenced by by anti-Soviet anti-Soviet propaganda following followingthe the Soviet Soviet invasion invasionof of Afghanistan Afghanistan December 1979 and t propaganda" in in December 1979 and the suppression of of Solidarity Solidarity in in Poland Poland two two years years later. later. FRANK was also reported reported to to be suppression was also be associated those arrested arrested for He associated with with one oneof of those for involvement involvement with with the the Red Red Brigades. Brigades.H e was was removed removed from from the the agent agent network network in in 1982.178 1982.178 years earlier been one one of The disillusion disillusion of of FRANK, who who a a few few years earlier had had been of the the KGB's KGBs The most highly Italian agents, epitomized epitomized the problems faced Service tried most highlypaid paid Italian agents, the problems facedby by Service A as as it it tried to uence operations no KGB report dared to devise devise new new infl influence operations in in the the early early 1980s. 1980s. Though Though no report dared say so, active image of say so, active measures measures could couldnot not possibly possibly repair repair the the damage damage done done to tothe theimage of the the Soviet Union by Soviet Union by the the invasion invasion of of Mghanistan Afghanistan and and the the suppression suppression of ofSolidarity. Solidarity.

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1980s 1980s in in Italy Italy and and France, France, as as in in western western Europe Europe as as a a whole, whole, were were those those which which exploited exploited popular popular currents currents of of anti-Americanism anti-Americanism and and the the fear fear of of nuclear nuclear war. war. Though Though the the first first step step in in the the renewed renewed nuclear nuclear arms arms race race had had been been the the Soviet Soviet decision decision in in 1978 1978 to to begin begin the the deployment deployment of of SS20s SS2Os (a (a new new generation generation of of intermediate-range intermediate-range ballistic ballistic missiles), missiles),Western Western peace peace movements movements were were far far more more critical critical of of the the subsequent subsequent decision decision by by NATO NATO to to station station Pershing Pershing II I1 and and cruise cruise missiles missiles in in Europe Europe from from 1983. 1983.As As Mit Mitterrand peace terrand once once drily drily observed, observed, "The The missiles missiles are arein in the the East, East,but butthe the peace protests protests are are in the West." the constant in the West. It I t is is reasonable reasonable to to assume, assume, but but difficult difficult to to prove, prove, that that the constant stream measures, encour stream of of Soviet Soviet peace peace propaganda, propaganda, reinforced reinforced by by KGB KGB active active measures, encouraged-even did not cause-the aged-even if if it it did not cause-the overconcentration overconcentration by by most most Western Western peace peace activists activists on on the thenuclear nuclear menace menace posed posed by by Reagan Reagan and and his his NATO NATO allies alliesrather rather than thanon on that oviet Union. 984, Kryuchkov that from from the the S Soviet Union. In In February February 1 1984, Kryuchkov reported reported to to a a conference conference of of senior senior FCD FCD officers, officers,when when reviewing reviewing active activemeasures measures over over the the previous previous two two years: years: Considerable Considerable work work has has been been done done to to provide provide support support for for unofficial unofficial organiza organizations anumber number of their tions [such [such as as peace peace movements] movements] in in a of countries countries abroad abroad in in their struggle struggle against against implementation implementation of of the the American American administration's administrations militarist militarist plans. 179 plans.179 The public The Centre's Centres confidence confidence that that ititnow now possessed possessed a a nerve-hold nerve-hold on on Western Western public opin opinion ion was was reflected reflected in in the thefirst first three three priorities priorities which which it it laid laid down down for for active active measures measuresin in 1984, 1984, the theyear year before before Gorbachev Gorbachev became became Soviet Soviet leader: leader: counteracting counteracting attempts attempts by by the the USA USA and and NATO NATO to to destroy destroy the the existing existing mil military itary strategic strategic equilibrium equilibrium and and to to acquire acquire military military superiority superiority over over the the USSR; USSR compromising compromising the the aggressive aggressive efforts efforts of of imperialist imperialist groups groups and and their their plans plans for for preparing preparing a a nuclear nuclear missile missile war war . .

... deepening deepening disagreements disagreements inside inside NATO NATO .. .. ..

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exposing exposingbefore before the the international internationalcommunity community the the plans plans made made by by the the USA USA to to launch launch a a war, war, its its refusal refusal to to negotiate negotiate in in good good faith faith with with the the USSR USSR on on limit limiting ing armaments; armaments; stimulating stimulating further further development development of o f the the anti-war anti-war and and anti antimissile missile movements movements in in the the West, West, involving involving in in them them influential influential political political and and
ISO movements movements to to take take more more decisive decisive and and coordinated coordinated action. action.lgO

public public figures figures and and broad broad strata strata of of the the population, population, and and encouraging encouraging these these

KGB measures in successful during the KGB active active measures in western western Europe Europe were were much much less less successful during the

glasnost within the Gorbachev East-West Gorbachev era era as as a a result result both both of of East-West detente detente and and of ofglasnostwithin the Soviet Soviet
Union. visibly concerned Western Union. By By 1987 1987 Gorbachev Gorbachev and and his his advisers advisers were were visibly concerned that that Western exposure the exposure of of KGB KGB disinformation disinformation might might take take the the gloss gloss off off the new new Soviet Sovietimage image in in the the West. virus West. The The claim claim that that the theAIDS AIDS virus had had been been "manufactured" manufacturedby by American American biolog biological active measures ical warfare warfare specialists-one specialists-one of of the the most most successful successfid active measures of of the the midmid1980s-was Moscow, though it continued 1980s-was officially officially disowned disowned by by Moscow, though it continued to to circulate circulate for for several in Third World media. severalyears years in the the Third World and and the the more more gullible gullible sections sections of of the the Western Western media.

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During During the the later later 1980s 1980s Soviet Soviet front front organizations organizations were were increasingly increasingly exposed exposed as as frauds. The The most most important important of the World Peace Council, Council, lost of its its frauds. ofthem, them, the World Peace lost most most of remaining credibility credibility in in 1989 1989 when when it it admitted admitted that that 90 percent percent of of its remaining its income income came came from the the Soviet Soviet U Union. from nion.181 In September September 1990 1990 Kryuchkov Kryuchkov acknowledged acknowledged in in an an "Order Order of of the the Chairman of In Chairman of the KGB" KGB that that there there had had been been a a serious serious decline decline in in the the .effectiveness of active active mea meathe effectiveness of sures-and in in the the FCD's FCDs faith faith in in them: them: sures-and
There are are very very limited limited opportunities opportunities for for residencies' residencies access accessto the mass mass media media There to the West,the the in the countries of the West, progress of of acquiring acquiring new operational sites is progressing slowly, slowly, and and there there is is an an absence absence of of the the necessary necessary cooperation cooperation with with progressing the other other sections sections of of the the Soviet and other ministries and agencies. the Soviet KGB and other Soviet Soviet ministries and agencies. old guard, guard, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov refused refused to to accept accept that that the theend end Like other other members members of of the the KGB old Like of the the Cold ColdWar Warimplied implied any any decline decline in in the the importance importance of of active active measures measures either either in in of western Europe Europe or or e1sewhere.182 elsewhere.182 That view view still still appears appears to to be be well-represented well-represented in in the the western That senior ranks ranks of of the the SVR today. today. senior

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T hough paying Though paying lip-service lip-service to to freedom freedom of of religion, religion, the the Soviet Soviet state state was was the the first first to to
attempt attempt to to eradicate eradicate the the concept concept of of God. God. Marx Marxhad had famously famously denounced denounced religion religion as as "the the opium opium of of the the people," people, but but also also spoke spoke with with some some compassion compassion of of its its role role as as "the the sigh sigh of of the theoppressed oppressed creature, creature, the the heart heart of ofaaheartless heartless world." world. Lenin's Lenins denunciation denunciation of uncompromisingly venomous: of religion, religion,however, however,was was uncompromisingly venomous: Every idea Every religious religious idea, idea, every every idea ideaof of God, God, every every flirting flirtingwith withthe the idea of of God, God, is is unutterable unutterable vileness, vileness, .. .. ..vileness vileness of of the the most most dangerous dangerous kind, kind, "contagion" contagion of of the the most mostabominable abominable kind. kind. Millions Millions of offilthy filthy deeds, deeds, acts acts of of violence violence and and phys physical ical contagions contagions are are far far less less dangerous dangerous than than the the subtle, subtle, spiritual spiritual idea idea of of a a God God 1 decked smartest "ideological" decked out out in inthe the smartest ideologicalcostumes. costumes. During 930s most few returned. During the the1 1930s most priests priests were were condemned condemned to toa gulag a gulag from fromwhich which few returned. Most their religious removed or onion Most churches, churches, with with their religious symbols symbols removed or defaced defaced but but their their onion domes domes usually usually left left more more or or less less intact, intact, were were turned turned into into barns, barns, cinemas cinemas and and garages, garages, or over to other secular of brutal or given given over to other secular purposes. purposes. After After two two decades decades of brutal persecution persecution which only which had hadleft left only a a few few hundred hundred churches churches open open for for worship, worship, the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church Church was was unexpectedly unexpectedly revived revivedas as a a public public institution institution by by Stalin's Stalins need need for for its its sup support during the Great Patriotic War. In 1943, after a gap of seventeen years, port during the Great Patriotic War. In 1943, after a gap of seventeen years, the the Moscow administrative center, formally reestab Moscow Patriarchate, Patriarchate, the the Church's Churchsadministrative center, was wasformally reestablished.2 the remainder the decade, Christians reclaimed lished.2 During During the remainder of of the decade, Orthodox Orthodox Christians reclaimed and and lovingly thousand churches.3 lovingly restored restoredseveral several thousand of oftheir their ch~rches.~ The The Church, Church, however, however, paid paid a a heavy heavy price price for for its its restoration. restoration. The The Council Council for for the the Mfairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (later the Council for Religious Affairs) Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church (later the Council for Religious Affairs) worked worked in in close close cooperation cooperation with with the the NKVD NKVD and and its its successors successors to to ensure ensure the the sub subservience Both Patriarch servience of of Church Church to toState.4 State.4 Both Patriarch Aleksi Aleksi I I and and Metropolitan Metropolitan Nikolai Nikolai of of Krutitsky Krutitsky and and Kolomna, Kolomna, second second in in the the Orthodox Orthodoxhierarchy, hierarchy,joined joined the the World WorldPeace Peace Council, Council, the the Soviet Soviet front front organization organization founded founded in in 1949, 1949, and andwere were highly highly valued valued by by the : the KGB KGB as as agents agents of of influence.5 influence. Aleksi Aleksi declared declared in in 1955 1955: The totally The Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church Church supports supportsthe the totally peaceful peaceful foreign foreign policy policy of of our our government, government,not not because because the the Church Church allegedly allegedlylacks lacks freedom, freedom, but but because because

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Soviet policy policy is is just just and and corresponds corresponds to to the the Christian Christianideals ideals which which tp.e the Church Church Soviet preaches.6 preaches.6 The Orthodox Orthodox Church Church also also took took a a prominent prominentpart partin in the founding of another another front front The the founding of organization, the the Christian Peace Conference Conference (CPC), (CPC), established established in in 1958 its organization, Christian Peace 1958 with with its headquarters in in Prague, Prague, in in a further attempt attempt to to mobilize mobilize worldwide worldwide Christian Christian sup supheadquarters a further of the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. At the the second second conference conference of of the the port for for the the "peace peace policies" policies of port CPC in 1960 1960 delegates delegates from from the the rest of the the world, mostly innocent innocent of of its its orchestra orchestraCPC in rest of world, mostly tion by by Moscow, Moscow, outnumbered outnumbered those those from from the the Soviet Soviet Bloc.7 Bloc.7 tion In 1961, 1961, with with the the KGB's KGBs blessing, blessing, the the Orthodox Orthodox Church Churchjoined joined the the World World Coun CounIn cil of of Churches Churches (WCC). (WCC). At At that very moment moment Khrushchev Khrushchev was was in in the the midst midst of of a a fero ferocil that very cious anti-religious anti-religious campaign campaign which which closed closed down down many many of of the the reopened reopened churches, churches, cious monasteries and and seminaries seminaries and and disbanded disbanded half half the the Orthodox Orthodoxparishes. parishes. The The KGB KGB was was monasteries simultaneously seeking seeking to to strengthen strengthen its its grip grip on onthe churches which remained. simultaneously the churches which remained. According to to aasecret secret KGB KGB directive directiveof of 1961: According 1961: individuals are studying in the two ecclesiastical ecclesiastical academies academies of of the Up to 600 individuals Moscow Patriarchate Patriarchate and and the five ecclesiastical seminaries. These must be be Moscow the five ecclesiastical seminaries. These must exploited in in the theinterests interests of of the the KGB. KGB. We We must must infiltrate infiltrate our our people among the the exploited people among students of these ecclesiastical training establishments so that they will subsestudents ecclesiastical so subse quently influence influence the the state state of of affairs affairs within within the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church Church and and quently exert influence influence on on the the believers. believers.* 8 exert

The Chief Directorate, General Oleg The head head of of the the Second Second Chief Directorate, General Oleg Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Gribanov, Gribanov, reported two years reported in in 1962 1962 that that over over the the previous previous two years the the KGB had had infiltrated infiltrated "reliable reliable agents into into the theleading positions of of the the Moscow Patriarchate, the the Catholic Catholicdioceses, dioceses, agents" leading positions Moscow Patriarchate, the Armenian Gregorian he predicted, the Armenian Gregorian Church Church and and other other religious religious groups. groups. These, These, he predicted, would make make it it possible possible to to remove remove remaining remaining "reactionary reactionary Church Church and and sectarian sectarian would authorities from from their their posts.9 posts. authorities" Since Since the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox delegates delegates to to the theWCC were were carefully carefully selected selectedby by the the and the theCouncil for Religious Affairs, it it is is scarcely scarcely surprising surprising that that they they KGB and Council for Religious Affairs, denied-often indignantly-all reports reports of of their their Church Church by by the the denied-often indignantly-all of the the persecution persecution of Soviet state. state. According According to report of Soviet to a aKGB report of August August 1969: 1969: Agents ATOSLAV, ADAMANT, SWATOSLAV, ADAMANT, MAGISTER, MAGISTER, ROSHCHIN ROSHCHIN Agents ALTAR, SVY and toEngland England and ZEMNOGORSKY ZEMNOGORSKY went went to to to take take part part in in the the work work of of the the WCC central central committee. managed to hostile activities committee. Agents Agents managed to avert avert hostile activities [public [public criticism 10 criticism of of Soviet Soviet religious religious persecution] persecution] .. .. ..lo The The most most important important of of the the agents agents at at the the WCC central central committee committee meeting meeting in in Can Canterbury terbury was was the the leader leader of of the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox delegation, delegation, Metropolitan Metropolitan Nikodim Nikodim (agent the Church Church hierarchy in (agent ADAMANT),l1 ADAMANT),ll whose whose meteoric meteoric rise rise through through the hierarchy was was in itself age itself unmistakable unmistakable evidence evidence of of KGB KGB approval. approval. In In 1960, 1960, at atthe the age of of only only thirty-one, thirty-one, Nikodim Nikodim had had become become the the youngest youngest bishop bishop in in Christendom. Christendom. A year year later later he he was was put put

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in department, and 1964 was in charge charge of of the the Moscow Moscow Patriarchate's Patriarchatesforeign foreign relations relations department, andinin 1964 was appointed Nikodim appointed Metropolitan Metropolitan of ofLeningrad. Leningrad. Nikodim took took the thelead lead in in ensuring ensuring that that there there was the WCC central message to was no no reference reference in in the central committee's committees message to member member churches churches either the invasion persecution in the Soviet either to to the invasion of of Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia or or to to religious religious persecution in the Soviet Bloc. According Bloc. According to to a a report report in in the the Church Times: Times: Agreement not without without drama drama .. .. . . The Agreement on on the the text text of of the the message message was was not The main main critic [August 21] when came critic on on the theThursday Thursday [August 211 when the the fifth fifthdraft draft came up up for for discussion discussion was the the Metropolitan Metropolitan of of Leningrad, Leningrad, Archbishop Archbishop Ni[k]odim. was Ni[k]odim . .. .. .. The Russian leader . .. .. If The Russian leader then then dropped dropped a a bombshell[:] bombshell[:] " . If certain certain amend amendments we shall ments are are not not taken taken into into account account which which are are essential essential to to us, us, we shall have have to to reject reject this this letter letter in in holy holy synod synod and and not not send send it itto to our our Churches. Churches. I am am sorry sorry to to speak in speak in such such sharp sharp terms." terms. .. .. .. On Friday morning O n Friday morning [after [after redrafting] redrafting] there there was was more more sweetness sweetness and and light, andwith with the Russian Russian leader ed, the nal draft went light, and the leader obviously obviously mollifi mollified, the fi final draft went through rapidly. rapidly. through
The main main initiative initiative agreed agreed by the WCC central central committee committee was was a a call call to member The by the to member churches to to become become "as as fully hlly engaged engaged as as possible possible in in the the struggle struggle to to eradicate eradicate racism racism churches in whatever whatever form form it it appears."12 appears.12While While welcoming welcoming the the campaign campaign against against racism, racism, the the in Church Times deplored deplored the the failure failure of of the the WCC to to address address "grave grave breaches breaches of of human human Church rights" oppressed: "Czechoslovakia rights or or to to offer offer help help to to the theoppressed: Czechoslovakia springs springs to to mind mind as as an an obvi obvious ous instance."13 instance.13 The KGB reported reported that, that, at atthe the Canterbury conference, conference, its its agents agents had had also also succeeded succeeded The Canterbury "in post." Agent in placing placing agent agent KUZNETSOV in in a a high high WCC post. Agent KUZNETSOV KUZNETSOV was was Alexei Sergeyevich laysecretary secretary of of the the Moscow Moscow Patriarchate's Patriarchates foreign foreignrela relaAlexei Sergeyevich Buyevsky, Buyevsky, lay tions department department headed headed by by Nikodim. Nikodim. Since Sincejoining joining the the department department in in 1946, 1946, Buyevsky tions Buyevsky Orthodox delegations had had accompanied accompanied all all the the major major Russian RussianOrthodox delegations abroad abroadand and had had met met the the most important visitors from Throughout the and most important visitors from foreign foreign churches churchesto to Moscow. Moscow. Throughout the 1970s 1970s and 1980s he he played played an an active activerole role in the thework work of of the the WCC central committee, helping to 1980s in central committee, helping to affars.14 draft policy statements on international affairs.14 In Churc6 Times that, that, of of the the 130 130 members members of of In 1973 1973 the theBishop Bishop of of Bristol Bristol told told the the Church central committee, committee, 42 42 percent percent were were Westerners, Westerners, 28 28 percent percent Eastern Eastern the WCC central the Orthodox (mainly (mainly Russian), and 30 percent from from the the Third Third World World (mainly (mainly Africa). Africa). Orthodox Russian), and 30 percent The Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox and and Third Third World World majority majority saw saw Westerners Westerners "primarily primarily as as the the The representatives of of 'colonialism' colonialism with with all the the emotional emotional overtones overtones which which that that con conrepresentatives tains. KGB agents agents on on the the WCC were were remarkably remarkably successful successfid in in dissuading dissuading it from tains."15 it from paying serious serious attention attention to toreligious religious persecution persecution in in the theSoviet Soviet Bloc Bloc and and in in persuading persuading paying it to to concentrate concentrate instead instead on on the the sins sins of of the the imperialist imperialist West. West. The The Reverend Reverend Richard Richard it Holloway of the the Scottish Scottish Episcopal Episcopal Church Church told told the the Nairobi Nairobi Assembly Assembly of of the the WCC Holloway of 1975: in 1975: USSR I have observed there is an unwritten rule operating that says that the USSR must never be castigated in public. Nevertheless it is well known that the the

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of human rights violations. violations. To mention this fact USSR is in the the forefront of appears to be unsporting. I think this tradition should end. The USSR should confessional along with the rest of us from white take its place in the public confessional neo-imperidism.l6 neo-imperialism.16 As late late as as 1989, 1989, the the Centre Centre claimed that, following following the the secret secret implementation of "a a As claimed that, implementation of leadership, "the the WCC executive executive and central committee plan approved approved by the KGB leadership," adopted public public statements statements (eight) (eight) and and messages messages (three) (three) which which corresponded corresponded to to the adopted the political direction direction of of Socialist Socialist [Communist] [Communist] countries."17 countries.17 political Members of of the the Orthodox Orthodox hierarchy hierarchy sent sent on on missions missions to to foreign foreign church church leaders, leaders, Members doubtless with with KGB approval, approval, invariably invariably insisted insisted that that believers believers in in the the Soviet Soviet Union Union doubtless religion. In January 1975 1975 Metropolitan Metropolitan Yuvenali of Krutitsky and enjoyed freedom of religion. Yuvenali Kolomna, who who had had succeeded his cousin cousin Metropolitan Metropolitan Nikodim Nikodim as as the the globetrotting globetrotting Kolomna, succeeded his chairman of the the Patriarchate's Patriarchates foreign foreign relations relations department,18 department, traveled traveled to to Britain for chairman of Britain for the enthronement enthronement of of the the new new Archbishop Archbishop of of Canterbury, Canterbury, Dr. Dr. Donald Donald Coggan. Coggan. In In an an the interview on on the theBBC World World Service, Yuvenalicondemned condemned the the tendency tendency of of "certain certain interview Service, Yuvenali circles in Britain, including some circles" some in the Church Church of England, to give a biased and one-sided view view of of the the Orthodox In a a private private meeting meeting with with Dr. one-sided Orthodox Church Churchin in Russia. Russia. In Dr. Coggan, he he attacked attacked the the Church Times for for its its "offensive" offensivestories religious persecu persecustories on on religious Coggan, tion in inRussia Russia and and denounced denounced Keston Keston College, College, the the world's worlds leading leading research research center on tion center on religion in in Communist countries, directed directed by by the the Anglican Anglican priest priest Michael Michael Bour Bourreligion Communist countries, deaux, as as "anti-Soviet." anti-Soviet.Though courteous, Dr. Dr. Coggan Coggan was was more more robust robust than than most of deaux, Though courteous, most of the Western council members members of of the the WCC. WCC. Yuvenali Yuvenali appeared appeared incredulous incredulous as as the the the Western council Archbishop independence of Archbishop patiently patiently defended defended the the independence of the the Church Chzlrch Times and and the the fair fairmindedness of Keston Keston College. College. During During a a visit visit to to the theSoviet Soviet Union Union two two years years later later Dr. mindedness of Dr. Coggan hosts by Moscow Coggan annoyed annoyed his his hosts by departing departing from from the the prepared prepared itinerary itinerary to to visit visit Moscow synagogues and and the the congregation congregation of of the theimprisoned imprisoned Baptist minister, Georgi Georgi Vins, synagogues Baptist minister, Vins, in in Kiev, where where he he led led the the singing singing of of the the hymn hymn He Who Would Valiant Valiant Be."19 Be.19 Kiev, "He Who Would Among KGB agents agents in in the the Patriarchate's Patriarchates foreign foreign relations relations department department who who were were Among regularly used as agents of influence influence in in meetings meetings with with Western was the the regularly used as agents of Western churches churches was monk Pustoutov, who who was was recruited in 1970, aged twenty-six, twenty-six, with with the monk Iosif Iosif Pustoutov, recruited in 1970, aged the codecode name YESAULENKO. YESAULENKO. Over Over the thenext next few few years years YESAULENKO YESAULENKO was was sent sent on on mis misname sions was sions to to the theNetherlands, Netherlands, West West Germany, Germany, Italy Italy and and France. France. In In 1976 1976 he he was appointed appointed representative of of the the Moscow Moscow Patriarchate Patriarchate of of the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church Church at at the the representative Prague headquarters headquarters of of the the Christian Christian Peace Peace Conference. Conference. In In order order to to raise raise his his stand standPrague inthe the community, his case case officer officerat the thePrague residency, residency,Yevgeni Yevgeni Vasiing in religious community, Vasi lyevich Medvedev, arranged for for him him to to be be regularly regularly invited invited to embassy receptions receptions lyevich Medvedev, arranged to embassy given ambassador.20 given by by the the Soviet Soviet ambassador.20 It I t would would be be both both simplistic simplistic and and unjust unjust to to see see all all the the KGB's KGBs agents agents and and co-optees co-optees in the theOrthodox Orthodox Church and the WCC simply as cynical careerists with no real reli reliChurch careerists gious faith-though faith-though that that may may have have been true of ofa a minority. Most Orthodox gious been true minority. Most Russian Russian Orthodox priests probably believed believed they they had had no no option option but but to to accept accept some of the the demands of priests probably some of demands of of the the 1970s, Father Dmitri Dmitri state security. security. One One of of the the best-known best-known dissident dissident priests priests of state 1970s, Father Dudko, Dudko, later later declared: declared:

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One hundred percent of the the clergy clergy were were forced forced to to cooperate cooperate to to some extent One hundred percent of some extent with the the KGB and and pass on some sort of of information-otherwise information-otherwise they they would would with pass on some sort have been deprived have been deprived of of the the possibility possibility to to work work in in a aparish. parish. minority, however, however, did did successfully successfully resist resist all the pressure pressure placed on them by the the A minority, all the placed on them by KGB. In Union, the In December December 1991, 1991, shortly shortly before before the the dissolution dissolution of of the the Soviet Soviet Union, thelast last deputy deputy chairman chairman of of the the KGB, Anatoli Anatoli Oleinikov, Oleinikov, told told an an interviewer interviewer that, that, of of the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox priests priests approached approached by by the the KGB, 15 15 to to 20 percent percent had had refused refused to to work it.21 The work for for it.21 The courageous courageous minority minority who who resisted resisted all all KGB pressure pressure were were inevitably inevitably denied most compromised denied advancement. advancement. The The section section of of the the Orthodox Orthodox Church Churchmost compromised by by its its association its hierarchy. association with with the the KGB was was its hierarchy. It be wrong, by the the hierarchy It would would be wrong, however, however, to to interpret interpret the thedeference deference shown shown by hierarchy to to the KGB simply the simply in terms of moral inadequacy in terms of the the moral inadequacy of of individual individual bishops. bishops. The The Church Church was strongly strongly influenced by a a centuries-old centuries-old tradition tradition of of Orthodox Orthodox spirituality spirituality which which was influenced by emphasized submission emphasized submission to to both both God God and and Caesar. Caesar. Before Before the the Revolution, Revolution, obedience obedience to the theTsar Tsar had had been been regarded regarded almost almost as as a a religious religious obligation. obligation. The The Orthodox Orthodox Church Church to had had traditionally traditionally functioned functioned as as a a department department of of state stateas as well well as as a a guide guide to to salvation. salvation. Metropolitan Nikodim Nikodim of of Leningrad, Leningrad, who whoheaded headed the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox delegation delegation Metropolitan to the the WCC until until his his sudden death during during aavisit visit to to the the Vatican Vatican in in 1978, 1978, impressed impressed to sudden death many Christians by theOrthodox Orthodox liturgy many Western Western Christians by his his deep deep devotion devotion to to the liturgy and and the the apparent intensity intensity of of his his prayer prayer during during church church services.22 services.22 Nikodims admirers apparent Nikodim's admirers included Pope John John Paul Paul I, who who was was with with him him when whenNikodim Nikodim died died of of a a heart heart attack attack included Pope and said said afterwards afterwards that that he he had hadpronounced pronounced during during their their meeting the most and meeting "the most beautibeauti Churchthat that heard.23 ful words about the Church I ever heard."23 Yet Nikodim was not merely supine in his his submission submission to to the the Soviet Soviet powers-that-be powers-that-be but but also also a a KGB agent.24 agent.24So So was was his his in private secretary secretary and and confi confidant, Nikolai Lvovich Lvovich Tserpitsky, Tserpitsky, who who was was recruited recruited in in private dant, Nikolai 1971 with withthe the codename codename VLADIMIR.25 VLADIMIR.25 1971 A report 1974 distinguished report by by the the Council Council for for Religious Religious Affairs Affairs in in 1974 distinguished three three cate categories of Orthodox bishop. The first category gories of Orthodox bishop. The first category affirm both in inwords words and and deed not only only loyalty loyalty but but also also patriotism towards the the affi rm both deed not patriotism towards socialist society; society; strictly strictly observe the laws laws on on cults, and educate the parish clergy socialist observe the cults, and educate the parish clergy believers in the and believers the same same spirit; spirit; realistically understand that our state is not interested in in proclaiming proclaiming the the role role of of religion religion and and the the church church in in society; society; and, and, interested activeness in extending the influ influrealizing this, do not display any particular activeness amongthe the ence of Orthodoxy among population. Among the had succeeded the bishops in this category were Patriarch Pimen, who who had succeeded 1971, andMetropolitan Metropolitan who in in1990 1990 Aleksi I in 1971 , and Aleksi of Tallinn and Estonia, who was fulsome in their theirpublic praise of to succeed Pimen as Patriarch Aleksi II.26 11.26 Both were fulsome Soviet leaders. leaders. Pimen even claimed to detect "lofty lofty spiritual qualities Andropov, Soviet qualities" in Andropov, the chief persecutor of religious dissent during his patriarchate. O n Andropov's Andropovs death On Pimen declared that he would always always "remember remember with heartfelt gratitude" gratitude his benevolent understanding understanding of the needs of of our Church."27 Chur~h.~ "benevolent

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Like Like Patriarch Patriarch Aleksi Aleksi I, I, Pimen Pimen was was used used by by the the KGB to to front front Soviet Soviet "peace" peacepro propaganda, paganda, paying paying gushing gushing and and sycophantic sycophantic tribute tribute to to Brezhnev's Brezhnevs "titanic titanic work work in in the the cause cause of of international international peace."28 peace.28In In February February 1976 1976 he, he, Metropolitan Metropolitan Aleksi Aleksi and and the the other theHoly Holy Synod specialawards awards from other metropolitans metropolitans on on the Synod received received special from the the Soviet Soviet Peace Fund Fund "for for manifold manifold and and fruitful fruithl activities activities of of the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church Church in in Peace the struggle struggle for for peace, peace, security security and and friendship."29 friend~hip.~~ month later later the the Patriarch Patriarch was was the A month given given a a similar similar award award by by the the World World Peace Peace Council Council to to mark mark its its twenty-fifth twenty-fifth anniver anniversary.30 In June behind the the ~ary.~ June In 1977, 1977, Pimen Pimen hosted hosted a a conference conference at at Zagorsk, Zagorsk, organized organized behind scenes Lasting Peace, scenes by by the the KGB, KGB, entitled entitled "Religious ReligiousWorkers Workers for for Lasting Peace, Disarmament Disarmament and and Just Just Relations Relations among among Nations," Nations, which which attracted attracted 663 663 delegates delegates from from 107 107 countries, countries, representing all all the the major major world world religions.31 religions.31 The conference conferenceapproved approved a a call call by byPimen Pimen representing The to to declare declare the the years years up up to to 2,000 2,000 "a a period period of of struggle struggle for for peace"-thus, peace-thus, in in the the KGB's KGBs view, the Vatican view, preempting preempting the the danger danger that thatthe Vatican might might take take the the lead lead in in a similar similar 2 A month appeal.3 month later later Pimen Pimen was was awarded awarded the the Order Order of of the the Red Red Banner Banner "for for his his appeal.32 great great patriotic patriotic activities activities in in defense defense of of peace."33 The The second second category category of of bishops bishops identified identified by by the the Council Council of of Religious Religious Affairs Affairs in in ( 1974 1974 consisted consisted of of those those who, who, though though loya loyal to to the the state state and and "correct" correct in in their their obser observance the role vance of of the the laws laws on on religious religious observance, observance,wished wished to to "heighten heighten the role of of the the Church Church in in personal, personal, family family and and public public life life .. .. .. and and select select for for priestly priestly office office young young people people who who are are zealous zealousadherents adherents of of Orthodox Orthodox piety." piety. Despite Despite his his use use as as an an agent agent of of influence influence in in the World Council of Churches and elsewhere, Metropolitan Nikodim was included the World Council of Churches and elsewhere, Metropolitan Nikodimwas included in because of in this this second second category category rather rather than than the thefirst-probably first-probably because of what what was was consid considered ered his his excessive excessivezeal zeal in in encouraging encouraging religious religious devotion. devotion. The The third third category category ofbish of bishops ops (just (just under under a a third third of of the the total) total) consisted consisted of of those those "who who at at different different times times have have made made attempts attempts to toevade evade the the laws laws on on cults," cults,though though without without the theconspicuous conspicuous defiance defiance which which would would have have required required their their removal removal from from office. 34 The to The first first sign sign of of dissidence dissidencewithin within the theOrthodox OrthodoxChurch Church to gain gain worldwide worldwide pub publicity was an the Fifth Fifth Assembly licity during during the the Brezhnev Brezhnev era era was an appeal appeal to to the Assembly of of the the World World Council Council of of Churches Churches at atNairobi Nairobi in in November November 1975 1975 by by the the banned banned priest priest Father Father Gleb Gleb Yakunin Yakunin and and the the layman layman Lev Lev Regelson, Regelson, who who appealed appealed for for support support for for the the victims victims of of religious religious persecution persecution in in the the Soviet Soviet Union-a Union-a hitherto hitherto taboo taboo subject subject at at WCC meet meetings.35 Swiss i n g ~A .~ ~ delegate Swiss delegate was was applauded applauded when when he he proposed proposed that that aaresolution resolution on on "Dis Disarmament, armament, the theHelsinki Helsinki Agreement Agreement and and Religious Religious Liberty" Liberty include include the the statement: statement:
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The The WCC WCC is is concerned concerned about about restrictions restrictions to to religious religious liberty, liberty, particularly particularly in in the the USSR. USSR.The The Assembly Assembly respectfully respecthlly requests requests the the government government of of the the USSR USSRto to implement other freedoms] implement effectively effectively principle principle no. no. 7 7 [religious [religious and and other freedoms] of of the the Helsinki Agreement. Helsinki Agreement. Metropolitan Metropolitan Yuvenali Yuvenali complained complained that that this this proposal proposal offended offended Christian Christian charity. charity. A KGB KGB agent agent on on the the drafting draftingcommittee, committee, Alexei Alexei Buyevsky Buyevsky(KUZNETSOV), (KUZNETSOV), working working "in in the the spirit spirit of of brotherly brotherly love, love, mutual mutual understanding understanding and and the the spirit spirit of of fellowship," fellowship, helped helped produce produce a a formula formula which which avoided avoided any any specific specific reference referenceto to the the Soviet Soviet Union Union but [d] that but "recognize recognize[d] that churches churches in in different different parts parts of of Europe Europe are are living living and and working working

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under under very very different different conditions conditions and and traditions." traditions. The The WCC's WCCs general general secretary, secretary, the the West West Indian Indian Methodist Methodist Dr. Dr. Philip Philip Potter, Potter, was was asked asked to to prepare prepare a a report report on onreligious religious interpreted liberty countries which Accords. The Times interpreted liberty in in all all countries which had had signed signed the the Helsinki HelsinkiAccords. the sidestep by the WCC resolution resolution as as "a a sidestep by churches churches on on Soviet Soviet curbs."36 There the denunciation There were were no no such such prevarications prevarications in in the denunciation of of Western Western racism racism and and imperialism. the assembly, imperialism. One One of of the the keynote keynote speakers speakers at at the assembly, Dr. Dr. Robert Robert McAffie McAffie Brown of of the Theological Seminary, Seminary, New York, confessed confessed that, that, as as a a white, white, Brown the Union Union Theological New York, male embodied the sins of "racism, sexism, sexism, classism and male middle-class middle-class American, American, he he embodied the sins of racism, classism and imperialism." "linguistic imperialism," speak imperialism. In In an an attempt attempt to to avoid avoid linguistic imperialism, he he then then began began speaking in in Spanish, Spanish, thus thus forcing forcing most of his his audience audience to to reach reach for for their their headsets so that that ing most of headsets so they address translated back into English. The they could could hear hear his his address translated back into imperialist imperialist English. The WCC's WCCs refusal to consider racism, such Asians in rehsal to consider non-white non-white racism, such as as the the expulsion expulsion of of Ugandan Ugandan Asians in 1972, 1972,led led to to protests protests and and a a walk-out walk-out by by some some British British delegates-prompting delegates-prompting the the com comment Potter that, that, Wherever "Wherever the the British the world ment by by Dr. Dr. Potter British have have gone gone in in the world they they have have established end of lobbying by established a a racist racist system."37 At the the end of the the conference, conference, lobbying by the the Soviet Sovietfront Christian Peace Conference Conference helped helped to to ensure ensure the the election election of of Metropolitan Metropolitan front Christian Peace i x presidents.38 pre~idents.~~ Nikodim (agent (agent ADAMANT) ADAMANT) as as one one of of the the WCC's WCCs s Nikodim six Had Had Andropov Andropov and and the the KGB leadership leadership kept kept any any sense sense of of proportion proportion about about the the threat of of "ideological ideological subversion" subversionposed posed by by the the few few brave brave dissidents dissidents within within a a gener generthreat ally would been quite by the ally subservient subservient Orthodox Orthodox Church, Church,they they would have have been quite satisfied satisfied by the out outto the come of of the the Nairobi Nairobi Assembly. Assembly. In In fact, fact, mild mild though though the the WCC response come response to the appeal from Regelson was, was, it caused outrage appeal from Yakunin Yakunin and and Regelson it caused outrage at at the the Centre.39 Centre.39Despite Despite complaints that he was complaints by by Dr. Dr. Potter's Potters critics critics in in the theWest West that he was "openly openly anti-Western anti-Western and and anti-~apitalist,~ claimed that, that, in inreality, reality, he he had had"anti-Soviet anti-Soviet leanings" leanings and and anti-capitalist,"40 the the KGB claimed was "known known for for his his provocative provocative statements statements about the absence of freedom freedom of of con conwas about the absence of science in in the theUSSR."41 USSR.41 Though he he had hadbeen been given given a a carefully carefully staged-managed staged-managed tour tour science Though of Soviet Soviet religious religious institutions institutions two two months before the the Nairobi Assembly, Potter Potter had had of months before Nairobi Assembly, failed to to defend defend them them against against Yakunin's Yakunins and and Regelson's Regelsons outrageously outrageously accurate accurate criti critifailed cisms. Metropolitan Metropolitan Filaret Filaret of of Kiev Kiev and and Gallich Gallich told told a a Novosti Novosti correspondent correspondent after after cisms. the assembly: the assembly:
We deplore deplore the the prejudiced prejudiced conviction conviction held held by the WCC leadership leadership about about our our We by the state and and the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church. Church. general secretary secretary Mr. Mr. Potter, Potter, by by state WCC general the way, way, was was my my guest guest last last September September and and saw saw for for himself himself that that churches churches and and the monasteries were open. While here here he he attended attendeddivine divine services services and and said that he he monasteries were open. While said that was always filled with joy when visiting this peace-loving country, in the midst was always filled with joy when visiting this peace-loving country, in the midst of such such prayerful prayerfd and and happy happy surroundings. surroundings. It It seemed seemed strange and surprising surprising to to of strange and us that that at assembly he he said nothing about his visit to the the Soviet us at the the assembly said nothing about his visit to Soviet Union, Union, including the the Ukraine.42 Ukraine.42 including T h e Centre organized a flood ofletters of letters to the theungrateful Dr. Potter from Russian The clergy, Baptists and other other Soviet Christians, protesting at his alleged hosOrthodox clergy, hos toorchestrate public criticism of Potter by "promi promitility towards them. It also sought to figuresin Britain, Syria and Lebanon, Lebanon, as well as in the the Soviet Union. nent religious figures"

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Further KGB active active measures the publication publication in in Moscow of an an EnglishFurther measures included included the Moscow of English Socialism, and the production of of a TV documentary, documentary, language book, Religion Under Socialism, o f Religion in the USSR, USSR, both involving involving a probably English-speaking agent Freedom of codenamed "K" K (not identified in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes). Attempts were also made to "compromise" through KGB agents agents compromisePotter Potter personally personally in in various various ways ways and-probably and-probably through in the the WCC-to WCC-to suggest suggest his his replacement as general general secretary. secretary. Archbishop Archbishop Kiprian Kiprian in replacement as (agent SIMONOV) from the the Moscow Moscow Church Church of ofthe the Consolation of of All A U Who W h o SorSor (agent SIMONOV) from Consolation row, gave gavean an interview interview denouncing denouncing "fabrications fabrications concerning concerning the the so-called so-called persecution persecution row, of believers believers in in the theUSSR."43 USSR.33 of The absurdity absurdity of of the KGBs overreaction overreaction to to the the temporary temporary embarrassment embarrassment of the The the KGB's of the Nairobi Assembly Assembly and and Dr. Dr. Potter's Potters handling handling of of it it was was well wellillustrated illustrated by by his his report report to to Nairobi the WCC central central committee committee in in August August 1976 1976 on onprogress progress to to religious religious liberty those the liberty in in those countries which which had had signed signed the the Helsinki Helsinki Accords. Accords. His His lengthy lengthy address address said said nothing nothing countries about religious religious persecution persecution in in the Soviet Bloc, Bloc, despite despite extensive, extensive, well-documented well-documented about the Soviet evidence of it submitted submitted by by Keston Keston College College and and others. others. Dr. Dr. Potter Potterdid, did, however, insist evidence ofit however, insist that it is essential essential for for churches churches in in Europe and north north America America to to be be aware the that "it is Europe and aware of of the problems created created and and maintained maintained by by European European and and American American domination domination of of other other problems regions of of the the world."44 w~rld.~ regions of public public defiance defiance within within the the Orthodox Orthodox Church Church during duringthe the The most serious act of Brezhnev was, in the Centre's in December December1976 1976 of of the Brezhnev era era was, in the Centres view, view, the the foundation foundation in the Christian Committee for the the pefence Defence of of Believers Rights in in the by Father Christian Committee for Belieyers' Rights the USSR by Father Gleb Yakunin, Yakunin, Hierodeacon Hierodeacon Varsonofy Varsonofy (Khaibulin) and a a layman, layman, Viktor Viktor Kapi KapiGleb (Khaibulin) and tanchuk. The The declared declared aim aim of ofthe the committ committee, which worked worked in in consultation consultation with with the the tanchuk. e e, which Helsinki Monitoring Monitoring Group, was to to help help believers believers of all denominations "exercise exercise Helsinki Group, was of all denominations their rights rights in in accordance with their conviction^."^^ "Yakunin Yakunin and and his his associates," associates, their accordance with their convictions."45 reported the the Centre, Centre,"are are in in practice practice engaging engaging in in a astruggle struggle with with the the existing existing order order in in reported the USSR .. .. .. proclaiming proclaiming a a national national religious religious revival revival in in Russia Russia as the as an an alternative alternative to to Marxist-Leninist ideology: Marxist-Leninist ideology": among religious religious The committee committee has has an an extensive extensive ntwork network of of correspondents correspondents among The the situation situation of of fanatics; they they are are the the main main suppliers suppliers of of information information about about the fanatics; believers in the the USSR to to places abroad. believers in places abroad. In order order to to cause cause a a schism in the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church Church and and to set set up up a a In schism in new Church Church organization organization taking taking up up anti-Soviet anti-Soviet positions, positions, the the Christian Christian Com Comnew mittee has has launched launched a a campaign campaign to to compromise compromise clergy clergy loyal loyal to to the the Soviet Soviet state state mittee as unfit unfit to to defend defend the the interests interests of of the the believers.46 believer^.^^ as

By By 1980-to 1980-to the the consternation consternation of of the the KGB-eleven KGB-eleven volumes volumes of of documents documents totaling totaling 1 ,189 pages Russian text, obtained by Christian Committee, Committee, had had been been pub1,189 pages of of Russian text, obtained by the the Christian pub- . lished in lished in the theWest.47 West.47 The by The KGB eventually eventually demolished demolished the the Christian ChristianCommitee Committee by its its traditional traditional tech techniques Directorate niques of of destabilization, destabilization, agent agent penetration penetration and and persecution. persecution. The The Fifth Fifth Directorate concluded the most most vulnerable concluded that that the vulnerable of of the the committee's committees founders founders was was Hierodeacon Hierodeacon Varsanofy. Varsanof) With With the the assistanc{! assistance ()f of GALl(lN GALKIN (an (an unidentified unidentified agent agent in in the the Orthodox Orthodox

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Church), early a church in Church), Varsanofy Varsanofywas wasassigned assigned early in in 1978 1978toto church a in Vladimir Vladimir region region whose whose incumbent, VOLZHSKY, was was a a long-standing long-standing KGB agent. agent. Finding Finding it it difficult difficult to to incumbent, VOLZHSKY, stay stay in in touch touch with with Yakunin Yakunin and and Kapitanchuk, Kapitanchuk, Varsanofy Varsanof) resigned resigned from from the the Christian Christian Committee. Committee. According According to to Varsanofy's Varsanofys file, file,VOLZHSKY VOLZHSKY introduced introduced him him to to a a sym sympathetic persuaded him KGB agent, agent, codenamed codenamed BULKIN), BULKIN), who who persuaded him pathetic psychiatrist psychiatrist (also (also a a KGB that membership of that he he was was suffering suffering from from a a nervous nervous illness illness and and should should give give up up membership of the the Christian Christian Committee Committee in in order order to to reduce reduce the the stress stress he he was was under under and and prevent prevent his his ill illness worse. The claimed the credit for inducing Varsonofy "to ness from from getting getting worse. The KGB claimed the credit for inducing Varsonofy to abandon abandon political political activity activity and and concentrate concentrate on on research research work work in in the the field field of of theology, theology, using Oblast archives." the archives, using materials materials from from the the Oblast archives. While While he he was was working working in in the archives, another another KGB KGB agent, agent, codenamed codenamed SPlRANSKY, SPIRANSKY, succeeded succeeded in in winning winninghis his confidence confidence and and allegedly allegedly "deflected deflectedVarsanofy Varsanofy from from his his obsession obsession of of becoming becoming the the spokesman spokesman of of believers believers in in the the Soviet Soviet Union": Union: Finally Finally he he was was persuaded persuaded to to send send a a letter letterto to Patriarch Patriarch Pimen Pimen of ofAll A l l Russia Russia and and to the Russian Church apologizing to senior senior personalities personalities in in the Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church apologizing for for the the hurt caused.48 hurt that that he hehad had caused.48 On 28, 1978 the secretly O n September September 28,1978 theCentre Centre secretly promulgated promulgated KGB order order no. no. 00122 00122 on StrengthenAgent Agent Operational Work Struggle with on "Measures Measures to to Strengthen Operational Work in in thethe Struggle with the the Subversive Centres and Hostile Elements Subversive Activity Activity of of Foreign Foreign Clerical ClericalCentres and Hostile Elements amongamong Church lengthy document which reflected the Church People People and and Sectarians": Sectarians: a alengthy document which reflected both both the KGB's KGBs addiction addiction to to conspiracy conspiracy theory theory and and its its obsession obsession with with "ideological ideological subver subversion" sion of of all all kinds. kinds. It also also paid paid unwitting, unwitting, if if irritated, irritated, tribute tribute to to the the courage courage of of the the persecuted believers and the vitality of their faith. Mitrokhin's notes on order persecuted believers and the vitality of their faith. Mitrokhins notes on order no. no. 00122 00122 include include the the following: following: .
I

Under the pretense pretense of the rights Under the of concern concern for for the the freedom freedom of of belief belief and and the rights of of believers imperialist believers in in the theUSSR, USSR, imperialist intelligence intelligence services services and and foreign foreign anti-Soviet anti-Soviet centers centers were were organizing organizing ideological ideological sabotage, sabotage, aimed aimed at at undermining underminingthe themoral moral . and undermining the and political political unity unity of of Soviet Soviet society society and and undermining the basis basis of of the the Socialist Socialist system; system; they they sought sought to to discredit discredit the the Soviet Soviet state state and and social social order, order, incite incite reli religious organizations organizations towards towards confrontations confrontations with with the state and and stimulate stimulate the the gious the state emergence emergence of of an an anti-Soviet anti-Soviet underground underground among among sectarians. sectarians.With With encourage encouragement ment from from abroad, abroad, hostile hostile elements elements had had launched launched active active organizational organizational and and provocational activity activity aimed aimed at at forming forming illegal groups groups and and organizations organizations within within provocational illegal the the sectarian sectarian milieu, milieu, setting setting up up printing printing presses presses and and establishing establishing contacts contacts with with foreign foreign clerical clerical centers. centers.
Following the the directives directives of of the the May May 1975 1975 conference of of leading leading officials officials of of KGB Following conference agencies [dealing [dealing with with religious religious affairs], affairs],it it had hadbeen been possible possible to to carry carry out out measures measures to to agencies expose strengthen operational positions in international religious organizations, to expose and compromise compromise their their leaders, leaders, officials officials and and emissaries emissariesof of clerical clerical centers. Experienced and centers. Experienced agents had been theleading circles circles of some some sectarian sectarian forand reliable agents been infiltrated into the

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mations and terminate the the subversive mations and measures measures to to identify, identify, prevent prevent and and terminate subversive activity activity of of hostile the clerical hostile elements elements among amongthe clerical anti-Soviet anti-Soviet underground underground had had become become more more effective, further strengthening strengthening of positions of religious fi gures effective, the the further of the the positions of progressive progressive religious figures had been ensured, and had been ensured, as as well well as as their their active active participation participation in in the the struggle struggle for for peace peace and other political political measures. other measures. Operational Operational work, work, however, however, still still did did not not meet meet present present requirements requirements of of the the present present time. number time. The The operational operational situation situation in in aa number of of sectors sectors of of KGB agency agency work work remained remained tense. The peo tense. The work work of of disrupting disrupting and and detaching detaching believers, believers, especially especiallyamong among young young people, from from the the influence influence of of hostile hostile elements elements was was being being carried carried out out feebly. feebly. Agent posiple, Agent posi tions in inthe leading ranks ranks of of the the dissident dissident Baptists, Baptists, the theCatholic and U Uniate tions the leading Catholic and niate priesthood, the Pentecostalists, the Adventists Adventists and and the the Jehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses, Witnesses, and and priesthood, the Pentecostalists, the among the theirregular irregular Moslem Moslem clerics, clerics, were wereweak. weak. among The USSR KGB Collegium Collegium decided decided as as follows: follows: The

1. To raise raise the the level level of ofagent agent operational operational work work designed to struggle struggle against against the the 1. To designed to
subversive activity conducted under the subversiveactivity conducted under the cover cover of of religion religion by by imperialist imperialist intelligence services, services, clerical clerical centers centers abroad abroad and and hostile hostile elements elements within within the the intelligence country. task was good time, prevent and put an country.The The basic basic task was to to identify identify in in good time, prevent and put anend end to the thesubversive subversive designs designs of of the the adversary adversary to to stimulate stimulate anti-Soviet anti-Soviet activity activity in in to the the the sectarian sectarian environment, environment, creating creating religious religious formations formations hostile hostile to tothe Socialist believers into sphere of Socialist system systemand and drawing drawing believers into their their sphere of influence. influence. The FCD, FCD,the the SCD and and the the Fifth Fifth Directorate Directorateof of the the KGB were were to to identify identifl 2. The the the foreign foreign anti-Soviet anti-Soviet clerical clerical organizations organizations which, which, evidence evidence showed, showed, were were being by the the adversary's adversarys special special services services and and were were to to submit submit proposals proposals being used used by for identifying identifjring and and cutting cutting off off subversive channels, identifying identifying and and inter interfor subversive channels, cepting communication communication channels channels with with hostile hostile elements elements in in the sectarian cepting the sectarian milieu milieu .. .. .. 3. agencies were to take steps to put put 3 . The Fifth Directorate and the local KGB agencies an end end to to hostile hostile activity activity designed designed to to undermine undermine loyalty loyalty to to the the Soviet Soviet state state an and the the social social order order by by the the largest largest religious religious organization organization in in the USSR, and the USSR, namely the the Orthodox OrthodoxChurch; Church; they were were to to prevent prevent the the penetration penetration of of indinamely they indi viduals with hostile hostile attitudes attitudes in inthe leading ranks ranks of theChurch; in in vi duals with the leading of the Church; 1978-80, they they were were to to take take steps steps to to strengthen operational positions positions 1978-80, strengthenthe the operational [;.e. the the number number and and quality quality of of agents] agents] within within the thestructure structure of the Orthodox [i.e. the Orthodox Church (in provinces, Eparchies, Eparchies, parishes, parishes, monasteries monasteries and Church (inMetropolitan Metropolitan provinces, and educational establishments), and and to to compromise compromise and and remove remove reactionary reactionary educational establishments), and anti-Soviet anti-Soviet elements 49 and elements . .. ..49
.

The The Christian Christian Committee Committee for for the the Defence Defence of of Believers' BelieversRights Rights sought sought to to protect protect itself more than itself against against KGB penetration penetration in in part part by by remaining remaining small, small, never never having having more than 50 In it was joined by by Father four four members members at at any any one one time. time. In May May 1979, 1979, however, however, it was joined Father Vasili Vasili Fonchenkov, been recruited Fifth Fonchenkov, unaware unaware that that nine nine years years earlier earlier he he had had been recruited by by the the Fifth Directorate as agent DRUG ("Friend"). According to his file, "He was involved Directorate as agent DRUG (Friend). According to his file, He was involved in in the specific individuals Orthodox Church], carried the cultivation cultivation of of specific individuals [in [in the the Orthodox Church], carried out out his his

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assignments assignments conscientiously conscientiously and and showed showed initiative." initiative. Since Since 1972 1972 Fonchenkov Fonchenkov had had been a lecturer at the Zagorsk theological academy as well as holding a position been a lecturer at the Zagorsk theological academy as well as holding a position in in the Moscow the foreign foreign relations relations department department of ofthe the Moscow Patriarchate. Patriarchate. In In 1976-7 1976-7 he he had hadbeen been the incumbent of ofthe the church St. Sergi East Berlin the incumbent church of of St. Sergi in in East Berlin and and editor editor of of Stimme Stimme der der Orthodoxie the journal journal of the Patriarchate's Orthodoxie ( fVoice i i c e of Orthodoxy), Orthodoq), the of the Patriarchates central central European European exarchate.51 helped recommend exarchate. His His contacts contacts with with foreign foreign churches churches may may well wellhave have helped to to recommend agent agent DRUG to to his his unwitting unwitting colleagues colleagues on on the the Christian ChristianCommittee. Committee. The The KGB campaign campaign against against public public dissent dissent in in the the Orthodox Orthodox Church Church reached reached its its peak of leading leading dissidents-chief dissidents-chief among among them them peak in in 1979-80, 1979-80, with with a a wave wave of of arrests arrests of Father Gleb Gleb Yakunin-who Yakunin-who were were later later imprisoned imprisoned or orpersuaded persuaded to to recant. recant. Probably Probably Father to protect protect his his cover, cover, Fonchenkov Fonchenkov was was summoned summoned for for interrogation interrogation by by the the KGB and to and issued a astatement saying that thathe was threatened threatenedwith wasnever issued statement saying he was with arrest, arrest, but but was never charged. 52 During a ~harged.~ During a visit visit to to West West Germany Germany in in March March 1980 1980 Archbishop Archbishop Pitirim Pitirim of of Volokolamsk (agent (agent ABBAT)53 ABBAT)3 bizarrely bizarrely declared declared that that there there had had been been "no no wave wave of of Volokolamsk arrest^."'^ The The first first major major success of the theKGB KGB campaign campaign was was to to persuade the charisarrests."54 success of persuade the charis matic Moscow Moscow priest Father Dmitri Dmitri Dudko, Dudko,whose whose offenses offenses included included calling calling for for the the matic priest Father public recantation recantation on canonization of ofOrthodox Orthodox martyrs of of the the Soviet Soviet era, era, to to make make a public canonization martyrs on Soviet television television in in June June1980. 1980. Dudkos resistance had been a particularly particularly Soviet Dudko's resistance had been broken broken by by a skillful KGB interrogator, interrogator, Vladimir Vladimir Sergeyevich Sergeyevich Sorokin, Sorokin, whom whom he to skillful hehad had come come to regard as as "my my own own brother. H e said that he he had had hoped hoped that that parts parts of of his his conregard brother." He said later later that con the sabre-rattling sabre-rattling of the the Carter Carter administra administrafession, such as his condemnation of of "the tion, tion " would be recognized as words placed in his mouth by the KGB. His ' reputation, however, however, never never fully fully recovered.55 recovered. reputation, There was was no no prospect prospect of of aarecantation recantation by by Yakunin. Yakunin. Only Only his his wife was allowed allowedto to There wife was attend his trial. theWestern Western press, were were trial. The rest of his family and friends, along with the one correspondent described as burly refused admittance, while what one "burly young men in suits, selected selected by the KGB, filed into the courtroom. Probably to protect ill-fitting suits," his cover, cover, Fonchenkov Fonchenkov was was among among those those who who were were turned Those called give his turned aways6 away. 56 Those called to to give several KGB agents OrthodoxChurch, Church, evidence against Yakunin included several agents inside the Orthodox amongthem them Iosif Pustoutov(YESAULENKO), (YESAULENKO), former representative of the Moscow Patriarchate at the thePrague headquarters of the Christian Christian Peace Conference, of the Christian Commitwho testified to the harmful international consequences consequences of Commit tees work. Yakunin accepted his sentence of five years' years imprisonment, followed by tee's years thewords, "I I thank God Godfor this test He H e has sent me. I five years' internal exile, with the consider it a great honor, and, as a Christian, Christian,accept it gladly."The glad1yThe British Council of of Churches sent sentan an appeal to Brezhnev, urging the court court to reconsider reconsider its opinion. to gain the support support of the World WorldCouncil Council Attempts to of Churches for a similar appeal with no noresponse.57 re~ponse.~ met with Vancouver Assembly in 1983 1983ensured that the the A change in WCC rules before its Vancouver KGB suffered suffered no repetition of the embarrassment caused by the discussion of the Yakunin and and Regelson Regelson letter letter at at the the previous previous assembly assembly seven sevenand and a a half half years years earlier. earlier. Yakunin Under the the new regulations, probably prompted by the KGB agents on the WCC council:

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Appeals from from groups groups or or individuals individuals for for World World Coun.cil Council of of,Churches intervenAppeals Churches interven: delegates or tion cannot be acted on by the assembly without the support of of delegates member churches, churches, but but will will be be followed followed up up by by the the WCC general general secretary. secretary. member An open open letter from Vladimir Vladimir Rusak, Rusak, a a Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox deacon deacon who who had hadbeen been dis disAn letter from missed for for writing writing an an unauthorized unauthorized history history of of the the Church Churchafter after the the October OctoberRevolu Revolumissed tion, to delegates delegates at at Vancouver Vancouver to to "stop stop treating treating the the propagandistic propagandistic claims claims tion, appealed appealed to of Soviet delegates as the only source of information on religion in the Soviet Union. of Soviet delegates as the only source of information" on religion in the Soviet Union. He also also urged urged the the assembly assembly to to hold hold a a frank frank debate debate on on religious freedom. The The mere mere He religious freedom. discussion of of the the Yakunin-Regelson Yakunin-Regelson letter letter at at Nairobi Nairobi had had yielded some definite definite discussion "yielded some resultsby by embarrassing embarrassing the the authorities authorities into into the the"hurried hurried publication of of some some copies results" publication" copies of Bible. The received another on behalf impris of the the Bible. The assembly assembly also also received another letter letter on behalf of of thirty-five thirty-five imprisoned Soviet Christians Christians and and 20,000 20,000 persecuted persecuted Pentecostalists wished to to emi emiPentecostalists who who wished oned Soviet grate grate to to the the West. West. Unsurprisingly, Unsurprisingly, neither neither letter letter received received support support from from Soviet Soviet delegates and and neither neither was was discussed discussed at at the the assembly. assembly. delegates The embarrassment embarrassment of of the the Afghan Afghan War War was was also also successfully Despite The successfully contained. contained. Despite the of condemnation of of Soviet Soviet aggression aggression and and the the the desire desire of of a a minority minority of delegates delegates for for "a a condemnation unconditional final compromise unconditional withdrawal withdrawal of of Soviet Soviet troops," troops, the the final compromise resolution resolution called called for Soviet withdrawal "in the context of settlement between between for a a Soviet withdrawal only only in thecontext of an an overall overall political political settlement Afghanistan and and the the USSR" USSR (conveniently (conveniently ignoring ignoring the the fact fact that that the the Kabul Afghanistan Kabul regime regime had been installed by by the the Soviet Soviet invaders) invaders) and end to to the the supply supply of of arms arms to to the the had been installed and an "an end opposition outside" (in words, the the denial of arms opposition groups groups from from outside (in other other words, denial of arms to to those thoseresisting resisting the Soviet Soviet invasion). invasion). These These were were precisely the conditions conditions which which the Soviet Union Union the precisely the the Soviet itself laid laid down down for for the thewithdrawal withdrawal of of its its troops. troops. Unsurprisingly, Unsurprisingly, the the Russian Russian Ortho Orthoitself dox The Vancouver dox delegation delegation praised praised the the final final resolution resolution as as "balanced balanced and and reaistiL" realistic.The Vancouver Assembly had had no no such such inhibitions inhibitions in in condemning condemningthe the West. Western capitalism Assembly West. Western capitalism was was duly denounced denounced as as the the main main source source of of injustice injustice in in the the world, world, responsible responsible for for the the evils evils duly of "cultural of sexism, sexism,racism, racism, cultural captivity, captivity, colonialism, colonialism, and and neo-colonialism."58 neo-colonialism.58 The view,of of the Assembly, probably The success, success, in in Moscow's Moscows view, the Vancouver Vancouver Assembly, probably helps helps to to explain why why the the Centre Centre established established as as one one of of the thepriorities priorities for for KGB active explain active measures measures for 1984: for 1984:

Exerting . .. . . clerical Exerting influence influence in in our our favor favor on on the the activity activity of of. clerical organizations organizations on on the 59 the questions questions of of war war and and peace, peace, and and other otherkey key contemporary contemporary problems. pr~blerns.~ Looking Oleg Kalugin Kalugin concludes concludes that, that, like like "the the Looking back back on on his his career career in in the the KGB, Oleg stranglehold stranglehold over over the the Church Churchinside inside the the Soviet Soviet Union," Union, the thepenetration penetration and and exploita exploitation most sordid tion of of the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church Church abroad abroad was was "one one of of the the most sordid and and little little known chapters in history of came to known chapters in the the history of our our organization."60 organization.60Mitrokhin Mitrokhin came to the the same same conclusion, conclusion, commenting commenting at at one one point point in inhis his notes notes that that the the ,files ,files contained contained "a a whirl whirlpool of used its among Russian Russian Orthodox the pool of filth."61 filth.61The The KGB used its agents agents among Orthodox clergy clergy in in the West not merely to spy on emigre communities but also to identify possible agent West not merely to spy on emigre communities but also to identify possible agent recruits.62 the Russian Russian Orthodox Church in in north north America recruits.62Though Though the Orthodox Church America was was split, split, the the

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faction faction which which remained remained loyal loyal to to the theMoscow Moscow Patriarchate Patriarchate was, was, according according to to Kalugin, Kalugin, "riddled Among the agents the files riddled with with KGB KGB agents."63 agents.63 Among the agents identified identified in in the files noted noted by by Mitrokhin America Mitrokhin was was a a cleric cleric codenamed codenamed PETROV, PETROV, who whowas was sent sent to tonorth north America in in the the 1970s. officers in north America 1970s. His His case case officers in north America contacted contacted him him by by using using the the passwords passwords "Pyotr Directorate con Pyotr Mikhailovich," Mikhailovich, the the first first name name and and patronymic patronymic of of his his Fifth Fifth Directorate controller 64 troller in in Moscow. Moscow.64 \ The le on The fi file on Arkadi Arkadi Rodyoriovich Rodyohovich Tyshchuk Tyshchuk (VORONOV), (VORONOV), a a priest priest who who was was posted posted to to the theNikolsky Nikolsky Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox cathedral cathedral in in New NewYork York from from 1977 1977 to to1982, 1982, contains contains evidence evidence of of a a hostility hostility to to the the United United States States which which may may also also have have helped helped to to motivate network. The motivate other other Orthodox Orthodoxpriests priests in in the the KGB's KGBs north north American American network. The United United States, States, VORONOV told told his his KGB KGB case case officer, officer,suffered sufferedfrom from the the sin sin of of pride-"and pride-and pride pride comes comes before before a a fall:" fall: When When a a country country declares declares itself itself to to be be the the most most powerful powerhl and and the the richest, richest, and and that that its its government government is is the the smartest smartest and and possesses possesses the the best best weapons-that weapons-that isis not not maturity, maturity, it it is is bragging, bragging, and and is is the the reason reason for for the the downfall downfall of of all all the the powerful powerful nations nations of of the the past. past.
VORONOV usually usually met met his his controller controller from from the the New New York York residency residency either either at at the the VORONOV Soviet Soviet mission mission to to the the United United Nations, Nations, where where he he went went to to collect collect his his correspondence correspondence Lermanta'll, which from from Russia, Russia, or or on on board board the the ship ship Mikhail MikhaiZLermontozl, which regularly regularly came came into into port port at at New NewYork. York. More More difficult difficult to to explain explain than than his his hostility hostility to to the theUnited UnitedStates States was was his his apparent apparent admiration admiration for for the the KGB which, which, according according to to his his file, file, he he bizarrely bizarrely described described as true Russian as a a "good good shepherd" shepherd and and a a " true Russian spiritual spiritual guardian guardian and and shepherd."65 ~hepherd.~~ Russian Orthodox Orthodox priests priests in in the the West West were were also also used used by by FCD Directorate Directorate S S to to Russian collect collect material material for for use use in in devising devising the the well-documented well-documented legends legends of of KGB illegals. illegals. In In the the early early 1970s, 1970s, for for example, example, two two KGB agents agents in in the theMoscow Moscow Patriarchate Patriarchate were were sent sent to to carry carry out out detailed detailed research research on on parish parish registers registers in in Canada. Canada. Ivan Ivan Grigoryevich Grigoryevich Bor Borcha cha (codenamed (codenamed FYODOR), FYODOR), who who worked worked as as a a priest priest in in prairie prairie parishes parishes of of Ukrainian Ukrainian and and Romanian Romanian communities, communities, studied studied registers registers in in Alberta Alberta and and Saskatchewan. Saskatchewan. Viktor Viktor Sergeyevich Sergeyevich Petlyuchenko Petlyuchenko (PATRIOT), (PATRIOT),who who was was assigned assigned to to Orthodox Orthodox parishes parishes in in Edmonton, carried carried out out further filrther research research in in Alberta. 66 Edmonton,

The at part The Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church, Church,both both at home home and and abroad, abroad, took took aaprominent prominent part in the the Rodina Rodina ("Motherland") (Motherland) Society Society founded founded as as a a front front organization organization by by the the KGB KGB in 1975 to promote "cultural cultural relations relations with compatriots abroad," abroad, and thus in December 1975 provide provide new new opportunities opportunities for for agent agent recruitment recruitment among among emigre emigre communities. communities. Its Its vice-president, P. P. 1. I. Vasilyev, Vasilyev, was was a a senior senior member member of of the the FCD's FCDs Nineteenth Nineteenth (Soviet (Soviet vice-president, emigre) Metropolitan emigre) Department Department and and headed headed a a secret secret Rodina Rodina intelligence intelligence section.67 ~ection.~ Metropolitan Aleksi of ofTallinn and Estonia Estonia (agent (agent DROZDOV),68 DROZDOV),68the the hture Patriarch Aleksi Aleksi II, 11, Aleksi Tallinn and future Patriarch who all who was was made made a a Rodina Rodina council council member, member, told told its its opening opening conference, conference, "We We are are all united by by our our love love for for our our Socialist Socialist motherland." motherland.Through its exarchates, exarchates,dioceses dioceses and and united Through its parishes in in Europe, Europe, America, America, Asia Asia and and Africa, Africa, the the Orthodox Orthodox Church Church "continued continued to to parishes maintain spiritual spiritual ties ties with with our our compatriots" compatriots and and was was "doing doing its its best best to to keep keep these these maintain unaware contacts alive alive and active."69 active.69 contacts Metropolitan Aleksi is unlikely to have been unaware

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that that these these contacts contacts were were exploited exploited by by the the KGB. According According to to a a KGB document document of of 1988, chairman to to award award an an honorary honorary cita cita1988,''An An order order was was drafted drafted by by the the USSR KGB chairman tion tion to to agent agent DROZDOV" DROZDOV for for unspecified unspecified services services to to state state security.70 ~ecurity.~ satisfied satisfiedby by the the extent extent of of its its stranglehold stranglehold over over the the Orthodox Orthodox Church, the KGB was concerned by those Church, the was far far more more concerned by the the "subversive" subversive activities activities of of those Christians no direct Christians over over whom whom it it had had no direct control. control. The The largest largest of of the the underground underground churches GreekCatholic Catholic (or Church of churches was was the the Greek (or Uniate) Uniate) Church of Ukraine Ukraine (nowadays (nowadays the the Ukrainian whose Ukrainian Catholic Catholic Church), Church), whose liturgy liturgy and and structure structure followed followed the the "Eastern EasternRite" %te but Rome. Fearful but which which accepted accepted the the authority authority of ofRome. Fearful at at the the end end of of the the Second Second World World War Uniate Church would nationalism, Stalin War that thatthe the Uniate Church would provide provide a a focus focus for for Ukrainian Ukrainian nationalism, Stalin set to terrorize into submission a mock set out out to terrorize it it into submission to to Moscow. Moscow. In In . 1946 1946 a mock synod synod in in Lviv Lviv cathedral, with the the assistance of Uniate Uniate cathedral, staged staged by by the the MGB with assistance of of a a small small number number of stooges blessing of announced the stooges and and the the blessing of the the Orthodox Orthodox hierarchy, hierarchy, announced the "reunion" reunionof of the the Greek the Russian Church. Greek GrekCatholic Catholic Archbishop Greek Catholics Catholics with with the Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church. Archbishop (later (later Cardinal) Cardinal) losyf Josyf Slipyj Slipyjwrote wrote later: later:
TH HO OU UG GH H NEVER F U L LY FULLY

Our Our priests priests were were given giventhe the choice choice of of either either joining joining the the"church church of of the the Regime" Regime and and thereby thereby renouncing renouncing Catholic Catholic unity, unity, or or enduring enduring for for at at least least ten ten years years the the harsh fate of deportation and all the penalties associated with it. The over harsh fate of deportation and all the penalties associated with it. The overwhelming priests chose Soviet Union's prisons and of the the Soviet Unions prisons and whelming majority majority of of priests chose the the way way of concentration concentration camps. camps. Almost Almost overnight, overnight, the the four four million million Uniate Uniate Christians Christians became became the the world's worlds largest largest ille illegal gal church. church. All A l l but but two two of of its its ten ten bishops, bishops, along along with with many many thousands thousands of of priests priests and and believers, believers, died died for for their their faith faith in in the the Siberian Siberian gulag.71 g~lag.~ In was expelled expelled to In 1963 1963 Slipyj Slipyj was to Rome, Rome, leaving leaving Bishop Bishop (later (later Archbishop) Archbishop) Vasyl Vasyl Velychkovsky Velychkovsky as aseffective effectiveleader leader of of the the underground underground church. church. The The KGB immediately immediately deployed A and deployed five five agents-TIKHOV, agents-TIKHOV, SIDORENKO, SIDORENKO, ROMANENKO, ROMANENKO, SOV SOVA and PODOLENIN of attempts PODOLENIN (none (none identified identified in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes)-in notes)-in a a series series of attempts to to discredit persecuted Uniate discredit Velychkovsky Velychkovsky among among the the persecuted Uniate faithful. faithfid. TIKHOV, TIKHOV,evidently evidently a a member member of of the the underground underground church, church, periodically periodically sent sent to to Slipyj Slipyj in in the theVatican Vatican letters letters containing containing disinformation disinformation about about Velychkovsky Velychkovsky fabricated fabricated by by the the Centre. Centre. According According to files, Slipyj sent his to KGB files, Slipyjsent his own own emissaries emissaries to to the the Ukraine Ukraine to to check check the the truth truth of of the the allegations them confirmed allegations against against his his successor, successor, but but agents agents who who were were planted planted on on them confirmed TIKHOV's TIKHOVs fabrications.72 fabrication^.^^ KGB reports, reports, however, however, probably probably overstated overstated the the success success of of their There their active active measures. measures. There is is no no convincing convincing evidence evidence of of a a breach breach between between Slipyj Slipyj and and Ve1ychkovsky. Velychkovsky. In In July July 1967 1967 a a conference conference of of senior senior officials officials of of Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc intelligence intelligence agencies agencies met met in in Budapest Budapest to to discuss discuss "work work against against the the Vatican; Vatican; measures measuresto to discredit discredit the the Vat Vatican and its and measures ican and its backers; backers; and measures to to exacerbate exacerbate differences differences within within the the Vatican Vatican and and between the Vatican and capitalist countries."73 Two senior KGB officers, Agayants between the Vatican and capitalist Two senior KGB officers, Agayants and Khamazyuk, addressed and Khamazyuk, addressed the the conference conference on on "The TheHostile Hostile Activity Activity of of the the Vatican Vatican and of and of of the the Catholic Catholic and and Uniate Uniate Clergy Clergy on on the theTerritory Territory of the the USSR and and the the ExpeExpe-

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rience rience of of the the [KGB] [KGB] Agencies Agencies in in Countering Countering this this Activity." Activity.A third, third, Kulikov, Kulikov, spoke spoke on on "Some Some aspects aspects of of agent agent operational operational work work against against Vatican Vatican institutions." institutions. On O n the the proposal proposal of of the the KGB KGB delegation, delegation, all all but but the the Romanian Romanian representatives representatives agreed agreed on on the the need need to to intensify intensify "work work against against the the Vatican Vatican in in close close relation relation with with the the work work against against the the Main Main Adversary." Adversary.Andropov, Andropov, who who regarded regarded the the Uniates Uniates as as the the spearhead spearhead of of the the Vatican's the Soviet the Central Vaticans ideological ideological sabotage sabotage offensive offensive in in the Soviet Union, Union, wrote wrote to to the Central Committee, Committee, emphasizing emphasizing the the importance importanceof of the the conference's conferencesconclusions.74 concl~sions.~~ Andropov's Andropovs obsession obsessionwith with ideological ideological subversion subversionby by the the Holy Holy See See was was doubtless doubtless reinforced by the claim in a 1968 intelligence report that the Vatican's Secretariat reinforced by the claim in a 1968intelligence report that the Vaticans Secretariat of of State devised unity of the State had had devised a a masterplan masterplan to to shatter shatterthe the unity of Soviet Soviet the Union Union and and had had given given the the Deputy Deputy Secretary Secretary of of State, State, Cardinal CardinalGiovanni Giovanni Benelli, Benelli, the the task task of of implementing implementing it.75 it.75A A Centre Centre assessment assessment of of 1969 1969 repeated repeated the the claim claim that that the the Vatican Vatican was was out out "to to shatter the Soviet Union from within with the help of ideological sabotage": shatter the Soviet Union from within with thehelp of ideological sabotage: Church Church people people were were disseminating disseminating Church Church propaganda propaganda literature, literature, praising praising the the Western whipping Western way way of oflife, life, whipping up upnationalist nationalist feelings feelings among among the thepopulation population of of Soviet Republics and sowing distrust among Soviet people towards Soviet and Soviet Republics and sowing distrust among Soviet people towards Soviet and Party 76 Party agencies. agencies.76 A A professional professional antireligioznik antireligioxnik from from the the Ukraine, Ukraine, speaking speaking at at an an official official conference conference in in 1969, 1969, paid paid unwitting unwitting tribute tributeto to the thecontinued continued vitality vitality of of the the persecuted persecuted Uniates: Uniates: Nurturing work Nurturing hopes hopes for forthe the restoration restorationof of the,Uniate the Uniate Church, Church,its its apologists apologistsare are working repu ing on on the the clergy clergywho who reunited reunited with with Orthodoxy, Orthodoxy,trying trying to to persuade persuade them them to to repudiate and a diate the the "Muscovites" Muscovites and to to adopt adopt openly openly or orsecretly secretly a Uniate, Uniate, pro-Vatican pro-Vatican line. line. In some regions of the Ukraine, illegal schools were organized to train new Uni In some regions ofthe Ukraine, illegal schools were organized to train new Uniate y l opened ate priests. priests. In In a a series series of of localities, localities, the the Uniates Uniates have have willful willfdly opened previously previously closed .... ..77 77 closedchurches churchesand and have have been beenconducting conducting [unauthorized] [unauthorized] religious religiousservices services On 1969 Andropov O n April April 4, 4,1969 Andropov approved approved further further "measures measures to to intensify intensify the the struggle struggle against the territory territory of against subversive subversive activity activity by by the the Vatican Vatican and and the the Uniates Uniates on on the of the the USSR USSR in in 1969-70," 1969-70, to to be be implemented implemented jointly jointly by by the the FCD, FCD, the the Fifth Fifth (Dissidents (Dissidents and and Ideological Ideological Subversion) Subversion) Directorate Directorate and and local local KGBs. KGBs. The The FCD FCD was was instructed, instructed, somewhat agent somewhat ambitiously, ambitiously, to to attempt attemptthe the agent penetration penetration of of all all major major sections sections of of the the Vatican bureaucracy, the Jesuit order, the Russicum and other pontifical colleges Vatican bureaucracy, the Jesuit order, the Russicum and other pontifical colleges training training priests priests for for Eastern Eastern churches, churches, as as well well as as to to make make operational operational contact contact with with three three Roman Roman clerics-codenamed clerics-codenamed APOSTOL, APOSTOL, RASS RASS and and SLUGA-who SLUGA-who had had been been born born in in the the Soviet Soviet Union.78 Union.78Among Among the the few few successes successes in in this this ambitious ambitious program program by by the which Centre fi les was the end endof of1969 1969 which Mitrokhin Mitrokhin found foundin in Centre files wasthe the penetration penetration of of pon pontifical the tifical colleges colleges by by KGB KGB agents agents from from the the legally legally established established Catholic Catholic Church Church in in the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, particularly particularly the the Baltic Baltic republics. republics. PETROV PETROV and and ROGULIN, ROGULIN, both both agents agents of of the the Fifth FifthDirectorate, Directorate, had had arrived arrived in in Rome Rome in in January January 1968 1968 to to begin begin three three years' yearsstudy study at at the theRussicum; Russicum; in in 1969 1969they they went went on onan an intelligence-gathering intelligence-gathering mission mission to During to "Catholic Catholiccenters" centersin in France France and and Belgium.79 Belgium.79 During 1969, 1969, two two KGB KGB agents agents from from

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Lithuania, ANTANAS and and VIDMANTAS, VIDMANTAS,were were studying studying at at the theGregorian Gregorian Univer UniverLithuania, sity. Two Two other other Lithuanian Lithuanian agents, (a bishop) and ZHIBUTE, ZHIBUTE, took sity.80 agents, DAKTARAS (a bishop) and took part in inthe the working commission commission for for the the reform reform of the Canon CanonLaw Law Codex, held at at the the part working of the Codex, held Vatican from from May May 21 to June June 1 11, 1969. DAKTARAS DAKTARAS told officer that, at a a Vatican 21 to 1 , 1969. told his his case case officer that, at papal audience audience on on June June 7, 7, Paul Paul VI had had told told him, I remember my prayers prayers and and him, "I remember you you in in my papal hope that that God Godwill will help help the the clergy clergy and and believers believers [in [in Lith~ania].~ hope Lithuania] ."81 With the the assistance of the the Hungarian Hungarian AVH, A m , the the KGB also also succeeded succeeded in in cultivat cultivatWith assistance of ing a amember member of of the the Vatican's Vaticans Congregation Congregation for for the the Eastern Eastern Church, Church,Uniate UniateBishop Bishop ing Dudas, who Dudis, who was was resident resident in in Hungary. Hungary. A Fifth Fifth Directorate Directorate female female agent, agent, POTOCHINA, who who had had probably probably infiltrated infiltrated the the underground underground church church in in Ukraine, POTOCHINA, Ukraine, traveled regularly regularly to to Hungary Hungary on onthe thepretext pretext of of visiting visiting a a relative relative and-according and-according to to traveled her file-succeeded file-succeeded in in winning confidence.s2Dudis doubtless never never susher winning Dudass Dudas's confidence.82 Dudas doubtless sus pected that that she she was was a a KGB agent, pected agent, sent sent to to obtain obtain intelligence intelligence on on the the Vatican's Vaticans secret secret contacts contacts with with the theUkrainian Ukrainian Uniates. Uniates. The operations operations against against the the Vatican Vatican approved approved by by Andropov Andropov in in April also The April1969 1969 also included included a a series series of of active active measures. measures.The The KGB was was instructed instructed to to find find ways ways of of creat creating niates and ing distrust distrust between between emigre emigre clerics clerics in in Rome Rome and and U Uniates and other other Catholics Catholics in in the the Soviet Union. The leading leading KGB agents agents in in the the Russian Orthodox Church Church who who were Soviet Union. The Russian Orthodox were Vatican-DROZDOV (Metropolitan Aleksi), ADAMANT in contact with the the Vatican-DROZDOV (Metropolitan Nikodim), Nikodim), SVYATOSLAV SVYATOSLAV and NESTEROV (both (both unidentified) unidentified)(Metropolitan and NESTEROV were instructed instructed "to to cause cause dissension between Vatican Vatican organizations organizations such such as as the the Con Conwere dissension between gregation for for the theEastern Church, the the Secretariat Secretariat for for Christian ChristianUnity and the the gregation Eastern Church, Unity and Commission for for Justice Justice and and Peace." Peace. In In order order to to put putpressure pressure on on the theVatican Vatican "to to cease cease Commission its subversive subversive activity, also instructed instructed to to tell tell his his contacts contacts in in the its activity," ADAMANT was also the Roman Curia that the Soviet government was contemplating establishing Roman Curia that the Soviet government was contemplating establishing autonomous the Baltic the Soviet autonomous Catholic Catholic churches churches in in the Baltic republics republics and and elsewhere elsewhere in in the Soviet Union which which would would be be independent independent of ofRome. The Lithuanian Lithuanian bishop bishop DAKTARAS DAKTARAS Union Rome. The passed on the same heattended attended passed on the same message message when when he a a bishop's bishops conference conference in in Rome Rome in in October 1969.83 1969.83There There is is no no evidence evidence that that any any of of the the active active measures had a disOctober measures had a dis cernible cernible effect effect on on Vatican Vatican policy. policy. As well well as as giving giving higher priority to to operations operations against the Vatican, Vatican, Andropov As higher priority against the Andropov also also stepped up up the the persecution persecution of of the the Ukrainian Ukrainian Uniates. Uniates. In 1969 the thehead of the the under understepped In 1969 head of ground Bishop Velychkovsky, was arrested sentenced to three years' ground church, church, Bishop Velychkovsky,was arrested and and sentenced to three years imprisonment. The KGB reported reported that that his his arrest arrest "greatly greatly helped helped to to achieve achieve a a psy psyimprisonment. The chological SERAFIM," another chological breakthrough breakthrough in in the the mind mind of of SERAFIM, another leading leading figure figure in in the the Uniate Uniate underground, underground, who who was was recruited recruited as as a a KGB KGB agent. agent. According According to to Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes on his his file: notes on file:

SERAFIM explained in whom, when SERAFIM explained in detail detail by by whom, when and and in in what what circumstances circumstances he he was was tasked tasked to to direct direct monks monks illegally; illegally; he he reported reported incidents incidents of of criminal criminal organi organizational zational activity activity by by Bishop Bishop Velychkovsky Velychkovsky and and his his close close contacts; contacts; he he reported reported on on the the situation situation among among underground underground orders orders of of monks monks .. .. .. and and he he drew drew up up a alist list of of Uniate Uniate priests priests operating operating illegally. illegally. SERAFIM's SERAFIMs answers answers were were recorded recorded covertly covertly on tape. on tape.

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Though Though SERAFIM SERAFIM agreed agreed to to "cooperate cooperate secretly" secretlywith with the the KGB, KGB, he he refused refused to to sign sign the required the written writtenundertaking undertaking required of of most most informers. informers. His His controller controller did did not not insist, insist, on on the the grounds grounds that that it itwould would represent represent too too great great "a a psychological psychological trial trial for for a a man man of of reli religion" next gionand and leave leave him him in infear fear of of "divine divine punishment punishment in inthe the next world." world. Another Another agent, agent, terrified of "being cast into Hell," had once begged the controller, on bended knee, terrified of being cast into Hell, had once begged the controller, on bended knee, to to return 84g . ~ ~ return his his signed signed undertaking. ~ndertakin In In 1971 1971 the theKGB also also succeeded succeededin in recruiting recruiting in in Lviv Lviv one one of of the the leading leading members members of of an an underground underground order order of of Uniate Uniate monks, monks, codenamed codenamed IRENEY, IRENEY, who who served served as as one one of of the the main main points points of of contact contact with with the the Catholic Catholic Church Church in inPoland. Poland.The The Fifth Fifth Depart Department to crack. ment regarded regarded IRENEY IRENEY as as a a tough tough nut nut to crack. If If confronted confronted directly directly with with his his "illegal illegalactivity," activity,he he would would probably probably be be strong strong enough enough to to withstand withstand the the usual usual uncom uncompromising promising interrogation. interrogation. If If given given too too many many details details of of his his activities, activities, he he would would be be able ableto to identifY identify members members of of the the underground underground church church who who had had informed informed on on him. him. The The KGB KGB decided surveillance operation decided to to begin begin by by mounting mounting a a major major surveillance operation on on IRENEY's IRENEYs sister sister and A. After and "conspiratorial" conspiratorialcollaborator, collaborator, MARIY MARIYA. After MARIYA's MARIYAs sudden sudden death, death, with with lRENEY judged was IRENEY in in deep deep depression, depression,his his case case officer officer judged that that the thetime time was ripe ripe for for "a a com complex plex recruitment recruitment operation." operation. IRENEY was was brought brought in in for for interrogation interrogation and and given given extensive extensive details details of of his his ministry ministry in in the theunderground underground church, church, carefully carefully designed designed to to give give the the misleading misleading impression impression that that MARIYA MARPYA had had been been informing informing on on him him for for many many years. years. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhinsnotes notes give give the the following followingsummary summary of of the the interrogator's interrogators self-congratulatory self-congratulatory report: report: The The monk monk lost lost the the power power of of speech; speech; he he was was totally totally stunned stunned by by this this astonishing astonishing thought. eyes, trembling thought. His His wild wild eyes, trembling hands, hands, and and the the perspiration perspiration which which covered covered his his face face betrayed betrayed his his strong strong spiritual spiritual turmoil turmoil .. .. ..Judging Judging that that denials denials were were use useless, [IRENEY] described the membership of the illegal leadership of the less, [IRENEY] described the membership of the illegal leadership of the monastic named Uniate monastic order order in in Ukraine; Ukraine; he he named Uniate authorities authorities and and monks monks who who had had come through come to to Lvov Lvov [Lviv] [Lviv] through the thetourist tourist channel; channel; and and he he spoke spoke of of his his own own jour journey ney to to Poland Poland in in 1971 1971 and and of of the the meetings meetings that that he he had had held held there. there. A month month later, later, [IRENEY] [IRENEY] was was recruited recruited .. .. .. but but refused refused to to give give a a signed signed undertaking. undertaking.
so convinced convinced that that his his sister sister had had been been a a KGB KGB agent agent that, that, when when IRENEY remained remained so IRENEY passing the passing information information to to his his controller, controller, he he frequently frequentlyadded added the comment, comment, "No No doubt doubt my sister sister told told you you this." this. According According to to his his KGB file, file, he he never never ceased ceased to to marvel marvel at at my sister had succeeded succeeded in keeping her KGB connection a secret the way in which which sister from him. him.* from 85 In In 1972, 1972, like like Slipyj Slipyj nine nine years years earlier, earlier, Bishop Bishop Velychkovsky Velychkovsky was was deported deported to to the the Vatican. A year year later later the the KGB KGB managed managed to to gain gain access access to to Slipyj. Slipyj. Cardinal Felici Vatican. Cardinal Felici invited to to the the Vatican Vatican a a leading leading Uniate Uniate cleric cleric from from Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia,unaware unaware that that he he invited was a a KGB KGB agent codenamed PROFESSOR. PROFESSOR.Originally recruited by the Czechoslo Czechoslowas StB, PROFESSOR had been used by the KGB in 1971 1971 to to go on a supposedly supposedly vak StB, pastoralvisitation visitation of the the Redemptorist Redemptorist Order Order in inUkraine Ukraine in in order order to to provide provide intel intel"pastoral" ligence on on the theactivities activities of of the the underground underground church church and and its its links links with with Rome. Rome. In In Sep Sepligence tember the Vatican. to tember 1973 1973 he he met met Slipyj Slipyj in in the Vatican. Plans Plans were were made made for for PROFESSOR PROFESSOR to

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meet the leadership in meet the Uniate Uniateleadership in Lviv, Lviv, but but Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes do do not notrecord record whether whether this this meeting went ahead.86 ahead.86 meeting went In In February February 1975 1975 aaconference conference of of Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc intelligence intelligence services services considered considered the the coordination of of operations operations against, against, and and agent agent penetration penetration in, in, the theVatican.87 Vatican.87 The Pol Polcoordination The ish Czechoslovak StB StB and and Hungarian Hungarian AVH all reported that that they they had had "signifi signifiish SB, Czechoslovak all reported cant agent agent positions in the the Vatican." Vatican. Mitrokhins notes record record no no such such claim by the the cant positions in Mitrokhin's notes claim by the similar conference conference in 1967, 1967,however, however, a hugely ambitious and unreal unrealKGB. As at the istic program program for for agent agent penetration penetration was was drawn drawn up, up, which which included included plans plans to to cultivate istic cultivate the Uniate leadership and no fewer fewer than than seven cardinals (Casaroli, (Casaroli, Willebrands, Willebrands, the Uniate leadership and no seven cardinals Kinig, Samora, Samora, Benelli, Benelli, Poggi Poggi and and Pignedoli), Pignedoli), as well as as an an elaborate elaborate series series of active Kinig, as well of active measures to to influence influence and and discredit discredit the the Catholic Catholic Church.88 Church.88 measures Among the the individual individual targets targets for for character character assassination assassination was was Velychkovskys sucAmong Velychkovsky's suc cessor as as head head of of the the underground underground Uniate Uniate Church, Church, Bishop Bishop (later (later Metropolitan Metropolitan Arch Archcessor bishop) Volodymyr Volodymyr Sternyuk. Sternyuk. Agent Agent NATASHA disinformation about about bishop) NATASHA spread spread disinformation Sternyuks alleged sexual immorality and the same stories were passed by other agents Sternyuk's alleged sexual immorality and the same stories were passed by other agents to the theVatican. Vatican. As As a a result, result, according according to to KGB reports, he lost support of signifto reports, "he lost the the support of aasignif icant part part of of the the Uniates."89 Uniate~. ~reality, reality, ~ I n despite despite a a new new and and vicious vicious round round of of religious religious pericant In per secution in in the early 1980s, 1980s, the the KGB lost lost its its war war against the Uniates. In 1987 secution the early against the Uniates. In 1987 Sternyuk emerged emerged from from the the underground underground at at the theage of eighty-one with the thestatus of a a Sternyuk age of eighty-one with status of national hero, hero, openly openly acknowledged acknowledged by by Rome Rome as as head head of national of the the Catholic Catholic Church Church in in Ukraine-to the the dismay dismay of ofboth both the the KGB and and most of the the Orthodox Orthodox hierarchy. hierarchy. Met MetUkraine-to most of ropolitan Filaret Filaret of of Kiev Kiev and and Galich Galich insisted as late late as as October 1989, ((The The Uniates ropolitan insisted as October 1989, Uniates will never neverbe be legalized in our our country." country.They legalizedby by the end of of the the year.90 year. will legalized in They were were legalized the end
AF T ER T H E U N I A AT most concerned TE T E S and and other other Catholics, Catholics, the the KGB KGB was was most concerned during during its its war Union by war against against religious religious '(ideological ideological subversion" subversion in in the the Soviet Soviet Union by the the activities activities of of the the unregistered unregistered Protestant Protestant churches churches and and sects, sects, which-like which-like the the Uniates-were Uniates-were out outside estimated the side direct direct state state control. control. In In the the late late 1950s 1950s the the KGB ,estimated the mer.nbership membership of of what what it it termed termed ((illegal illegal sectarian sectarian formations"-chief formations-chief among among them them the the Reform Reform Bap Baptists, tists, Pentecostalists, Pentecostalists, Jehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses Witnesses and and Reformed Reformed Adventists-at Adventists-at about about 100,000.91 100,000.9~ The throughout the the Brezhnev continued, on The fact fact that that throughout Brezhnev era era the the KGB continued, on Andropov's Andropovs instructions, spend so represented no con instructions, to to spend so much much time time and and effort effort on on groups groups who who represented no conceivable further ceivable threat threat to to the theSoviet Soviet system systemisis further evidence evidence of of its its obsession obsession with with even even the the most harmless harmless forms forms of of dissent. dissent. Andropov the keynote keynote of of his his address to an an all allmost Andropov made made the address to union KGB conference conference in in 1975 1975 the the claim that anti-$oviet anti-Soviet elements elements were were <:: conspiring union KGB claim that onspiring against against the the state state ((under under cover cover of of religion." religion. The The first first essential essential in in unmasking unmasking and and defeating defeating the the conspiracies conspiracies was was agent agent penetration: penetration:

This This is is difficult, difficult, since since false false perceptions perceptions of of the the attitude attitude of of the the state state towards towards reli religion gion which which still still prevail prevail in in their their milieu milieu have haveleft left a a definite definite mark mark on on the thepsychol psychology believers. Among sectarians there ogy of of the the believers. Among sectarians there is is a a prejudice prejudice that that any any assistance assistance to is a a great great sin-treason. sin-treason. There There is is no no trust trust to the the authorities, authorities, including including the the KGB, is in in the the humanism humanism of of the the Cheka. Cheka.

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Andropov's Andropovs complaint complaint that that believers believers failed failed to to trust trust the the"humanism" humanismof of the theKGB KGB pro provides vides further further evidence evidence of of his his limited limited sense sense of ofthe the absurd. absurd.To To illustrate illustrate the the difficulties difficulties of of agent agent penetration penetration among among the the ungrateful ungrateful sectarians, sectarians, he he gave gave the the example example of of "one one candidate reed himself candidate for for recruitment, recruitment, who who had had almost almost f freed himself from from errors errors with with regard regard to to the rom an the Cheka, Cheka,and and carried carried out out particular particular assignments assignments f from an operational operational officer:" officer: . . . One ficer One day, day, however, however, he he declared declared that that meetings meetings with with his his operational operational of officer

...

were God had were sinful. sinful.He H e explained explained that that the theLord Lord God had appeared appeared to to him him in ina a dream, dream, had had handcuffed handcuffed him him and and asked: asked: "Whose Whose servant servant art art thou?" thou?Greatly Greatly shaken shaken by by this dream, the it as this dream, the potential potential recruit recruit interpreted interpreted it as a a warning warning from from God God and and stopped stopped meeting meeting the the Chekist.92 Cheki~t.~~ Mitrokhin cannot have Mitrokhin cannot have been been the the only only KGB KGB officer officer who, who, as as he he listened listened to to such such speeches the classified speeches or or read read articles articles on on operations operations against against believers believers in in the classified in-house in-house journal journal KGB KGB Sbornik, Sbornik, secretly secretlyadmired admired their their courage courage and and their their faith. faith. No No hint hint of of that that admiration, admiration, however, however, appeared appeared in in KGB KGB reports. reports. By By the the 1960s 1960s the the KGB KGB leadership leadership had had reluctantly reluctantly concluded concluded that that no no amount amount of of persecution ofof persecutionwould would wipe wipe out out the thesectarians sectariansaltogether. altogether.A A conference conferencein in March March1959 1959 senior senior KGB KGB officers officers leading leading "the the struggle struggle against against Jehovists Jehovists [Jehovah's [Jehovahs Witnesses]" Witnesses] concluded the correct concluded that that the correct strategy strategy was was "to to continue continue measures measures of of repression repression with with measures The KGB measures of of disruption."93 di~ruption.~~ KGB The set set out out to to divide, divide, demoralize demoralize and and discredit discredit the the sectarians, sectarians,as as well well as as to to arrest arrest their their most most influential influential leaders leaders on on trumped-up trumped-up charges. charges. In 966 Pastors In 1 1966 Pastors Georgi Georgi Vins Vins and and Gennadi GennadiKryuchkov, Kryuchkov,the the leaders leaders of of the theReform Reform Baptists, Baptists, probably probably the the largest largest sectarian sectarian group, group, were werejailed jailed for for three three years. years. After After their their release, release, both both went went underground underground to to continue continue their their ministry. ministry.In In 1974 1974Vins Vins was was caught caught and and rearrested. rearrested. Despite Despite a a major major international international campaign campaign on on his his behalf, behalf, he he was was sen sentenced tenced to to a a further further ten tenyears' yearsimprisonment, imprisonment, but but was was released released in in a a "spy spyexchange" exchangein in 1 979 and 1979 and expelled expelled to to the the United United States. States. Pastor Pastor Kryuchkov Kryuchkov remained remained at at liberty liberty until until 1989, 1989,when when he he dramatically dramatically reappeared reappeared in in public public at at an an emotional emotional Reform Reform Baptist Baptist congress. congress. His His success successin in continuing continuinga a secret secret ministry ministry for for almost almost twenty twenty years years without without being being caught caught by by the the KGB KGB remains remains one one of of the the most most astonishing astonishing achievements achievements in in the the history history of of the theSoviet Sovietreligious religious underground.94 underground. Remarkably, the more Witnesses, Remarkably,however, however, the KGB KGB was waseven even more concerned concerned by byJehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses, viewed viewed with with indifference indifference or or suspicion suspicionby by most most governments governments around around the the world, world, than than by by the the Reform Reform Baptists, Baptists, whose whose heroic heroic endurance endurance of of persecution persecution attracted attracted interna international the Second Oleg tional sympathy. sympathy. The The head head of of the Second Chief Chief Directorate, Directorate, General General Oleg Mikhailovich 962, "The most Mikhailovich Gribanov, Gribanov,reported reported in in 1 1962, The most hostile hostile of of the the sectarians sectarians are are the the Jehovists."95 Since United States no no other Chris Jehovi~ts.~ Sincetheir their emergence emergence in in the the United States in in the the1870s, 1870s, other Christian end of tian sect sect has has spent spent so so much much of of its its energies energies on on prophesying prophesying the the end of the the world. world. Though Though many many of of its its detailed detailed prophecies prophecies have have been been discredited discredited and and the the Apocalypse Apocalypse has has been been repeatedly repeatedly postponed, postponed, the the basic basic millennarian millennarian message message of of Jehovah's Jehovahs Wit Witnesses nesses has has never never varied: varied:"The The end end is is near. near. Christ Christ will will reveal revealhimself himself shortly shortly to to bring bring destruction destruction upon upon the the nations nations and and all all who who oppose oppose is is messianic messianic kingdom."96 kingdom.96

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twentieth century Jehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses have been persecuted In the course of the twentieth the death death camps by many authoritarian regimes. Thousands suffered martyrdom in the agency, however, however, has been quite as of the Nazi Third Reich. No major intelligence agency, Jehovist conspiracy. Jehovist obsession of concerned as the KGB by the ''J ehovist conspiracy." The J ehovist obsession of senior officers was, was, perhaps, the supreme example example of their lack of of any sense sense of of pro proKGB officers portion when whendealing dealing with with even even the the most most insignificant insignificant forms forms of of dissent. portion dissent. Until the the Second Second World World War Warthere there had been no inthe the Soviet Until had been no Jehovahs Jehovah's Witnesses Witnesses in Soviet Union. The incorporation of eastern Poland, Lithuania and Moldavia in 1939-40, however, turned thousands of citizens.97 Many were however, of Witnesses into unwilling Soviet citizens.97 deported to toSiberia, Siberia, accused sect.98 In 1968 the accused of being an "an American sect."98 1968 the KGB put the total number number of of Jehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses Witnesses at at about about 20,000.99 20,000.99The The fact that the the Witnesses Witnesses total fact that had originated originated in in the the United UnitedStates and still still had their world world headquarters headquarters in had States and had their in BrookBrook Centres many conspiracy theorists. lyn was regarded as deeply suspicious by the Centre's theorists.loo analysts, as they denounced the Witnesses for The almost surreal surreal outrage of KGB analysts, for describing Soviet state state (like (like states states in in general) general) as as the the work of the the Devil, would not describing the the Soviet work of Devil, would not be out out of of place in Bulgakov's Bulgakovs The Master and Margarita: be place in

The sect the Jehovah's The sect of of the Jehovahs Witnesses Witnesses or or Students Students of of the the Bible Bible is is a a foreign foreign inven invention. It is is dangerous dangerous because it is is actively engaged in in drawing drawing new new members tion. because it actively engaged members into the the sect sect. The sectarians sectarians call call Communists and the the Komsomols Komsomols "sons sons of into . .. .. The Communists and of the the Devi1." Devil. They demonstrate demonstrate that that the the Soviet Soviet state state is is founded founded by by Satan. Therefore one one They Satan. Therefore must not not implement implement Soviet Soviet laws, laws, or or take take part part in in elections, and they they urge urge peo peomust elections, and ple ehovists extend ple to to refuse refuse to to serve serve in in the the Soviet Soviet army. army. J Jehovists extend assistance assistance of of all kind kind to their their co-religionists co-religionists who who are are in in the the [labor] [labor] camps camps or or in in internal exile, supto internal exile, sup plying plying them them with with money, money, food food and and clothing.lol clothing.
The Soviet Soviet press, press, meanwhile, meanwhile, accused accused the the Witnesses' Witnesses Brooklyn Brooklyn headquarters headquarters of of orga orgaThe nizing countries of nizing an an aggressive aggressive crusade crusade against against the the countries of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc.102 Bloc.102 The Centre Centre was was disturbed disturbed by by reports reports that, that, even even in in labor labor camps, camps, "the the Jehovah Jehovah lead leadThe ers contin ers and and authorities authorities did did not not reject reject their their hostile hostile beliefs beliefs and and in in camp campconditions conditions continued their Jehovah on ued to to carry carry out out their Jehovah work." work. A conference conference of of KGB officers officers working working on operations Kishinev operations against against Jehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses Witnesses met metatat Kishinev in in November November 1967 1967 to to discuss discuss new measures measures "to to prevent prevent the the sectarians' sectarianshostile hostile work" work and and "ideological ideological subversion:" subversion: new

The in every positions among The agencies agencies were were to to strengthen strengthen in every way way their their agent agent positions among Jehovah's withinthe the country; Jehovahs Witnesses Witnesses within country; they they were were to to collect collect and and build build up up information information about about young young members members of of the the sect sect and and about about the the Jehovah Jehovah authori authorities recruitment, compromise ties for for operational operational purposes, purposes, recruitment, compromise and and for for open open counter countermeasures . The it was measures .. .. . The conference conference recognized recognized that that it was essential essential to to select select and and promote positions in promote to to leading leading positions in the the sect, sect, with with the the help help of of agents, agents, people people who who were were barely barely literate, literate, who who lacked lacked initiative initiative and and were were unlikely unlikely to to stimulate stimulate the the activity activity of of subordinate subordinate units.103 units.lo3

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The seriousness seriousness with with which which the the conference conference discussed discussed the the Jehovist Jehovist menace menace was, was, once once The again, almost surreal. The allegedly dangerous conspiracy which the Centre devoted again, almost surreal. The allegedly dangerous conspiracy which the Centre devoted so many many resources to combating to little little more more than than the the attempt attempt by by small so resources to combating amounted amounted to small groups to to worship worship together together in in private, private, mostly mostly in in each each others' others homes, homes, and and their their refusal groups refusal to perform perform military military service. service. Yet Yet the the conspiracy was judged so dangerous that the thecon conto conspiracy was judged so dangerous that ference agreed agreed on on the the need need for for agent agent penetration penetration of of the Brooklyn headquarters headquarters and and ference the Brooklyn its west west European European branches.lo4 branches.lo4It It was was also alsofeared feared that that Brooklyn Brooklyn might might correctly correctly idenits iden tify Witnesses who who had had gone tify some some Jehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses gone long long periods periods without without arrest arrest as as KGB agents. The The conference conference therefore therefore agreed agreed on on the the need need to to "create create a a reliable reliable reserved reserved of agents. !Os understudy agents" for use if existing agents understudy agents for use if the the existing agents were were unmasked. unmasked.lo5 As well well as as grossly grossly exaggerating exaggerating the the menace of the the Jehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses Witnesses and and other other As menace of contained self-congratulatory sectarians, the sectarians, the KGB Sbomik Sbornik also also contained self-congratulatory accounts accounts of of the the active active measures such case case study in the measures used used to to destabilize destabilize them. them. One One such study in themid-1970s mid-1970s concerned concerned the the leader leader of of the the Jehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses Witnesses in inKhmelnitskaya Khmelnitskaya Oblast, Oblast, codenamed codenamed PAVEL, PAVEL, whose "criminal criminal activities activities consisted consisted of of drawing drawing new new members members into into the thesect, sect, conduct conductwhose ing illegal illegal gatherings, gatherings, inducing inducing young young believers believers to to refuse refuse to to serve serve in in the the army, army, hold holding ing and and disseminating disseminating religious religious literature." literature. The The KGB concocted concocted "well-documented well-documented ing defamatory used in defamatory materials" materials which which were wereused in aa press press campaign campaign against against him. him. Even Even PAVELs children from his his first marriage were were persuaded persuaded to to sign sign a a newspaper newspaper article PAVEL's children from first marriage article about him. Finally evening meeting about him. Finally an an evening meeting was was arranged arranged by by the the KGB in in Shepetovka, Shepetovka, attended by by local Jehovahs Witnesses, Witnesses, as as well well as as representatives representatives of of the the Party, Party, provinattended local Jehovah's provin cial administration, administration, collective collective farms farms and and newspapers, newspapers, at at which which PAVEL was was subjected subjected cial to aaseries series of of doubtless doubtless well-rehearsed well-rehearsed denunciations denunciations of of his his alleged alleged indolence, indolence, cruelty, cruelty, to egoism and and dissolute dissolute behavior. behavior. The The KGB report report on on the the meeting meeting noted noted with with satisfac satisfacegoism tion that that the theevening evening ended ended in in PAVEL's PAVELs utter utter humiliation humiliation and and the the "unrestrained unrestrained sobtion sob 6 bing of of his his second wife.lo6 bing" second wife.lo

Like astonishing capacity Like the the other other sectarians, sectarians, Jehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses Witnesses showed showed an an astonishing capacity to to survive persecution. persecution. During the Gorbachev era, the the KGB's KGBs campaign campaign against against them them survive During the Gorbachev era, gradually disintegrated. disintegrated. In In October doubtless to to the the outrage outrage of of many many KGB gradually October 1989, 1989, doubtless officers, the the head head of of the the European European department department of of the the Brooklyn Brooklyn Centre, Centre, Willi Willi Pohl, officers, Pohl, arrived in Moscow Moscow as as the the guest guest of of the the Council of Religious Affairs to to visit arrived in Council of Religious Affairs visit Soviet Soviet lo7 Witness communities and and discuss discuss their their future. future.lo7 Witness communities
NG GT THE LATER 1980s the the Moscow Moscow Patriarchate Patriarchate seemed seemed to to be trying neither DURI IN H E LAT E R 1980s be trying neither to to fall behind behind nor to overtake overtake the the speed speed at at which the offi official programs of of glasnost and and fall nor to which the cial programs developing. In 1991, 1991, a succeeding Pimen as Patriarch, perestroika were developing. a year after succeeding finally dissociated himself and the Russian Aleksi 11, II, fi nally dissociated Russian Orthodox Church Church from the declaration of of loyalty" loyalty to to the the Soviet Soviet system system issued by Metropolitan Metropolitan Sergi Sergi in in 1927. 1927. "declaration issued by a quarter of a century earlier, the Council Council When an interviewer reminded him that, a the state, for Religious Affairs had classed him as one of those bishops most loyal to the the Patriarch asked for forgiveness forgiveness and understanding of his attitude at at the thetime. As 1991, I1 the Soviet Soviet Union began to disintegrate inthe the final monthsof of 1991, Aleksi II !08 Russia has suffered suffered a severe severe illness illnessin the the form of Communism." Communism.108 declared that "Russia

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The Russian Orthodox continued to past his The Russian Orthodox Church, Church,however, however, continued to be be haunted haunted by by its its past history in 1991, Russian tory of ofKGB penetration. penetration. After After the the failure failure of of the the August Augustcoup coup in 1991, the the Russian government's on Freedom Conscience, which Gleb of Conscience, which included included Father Father Gleb government's Committee Committee on Freedom of Yakunin, to Yakunin, was was given givenaccess access to a a section section of of the the KGB archives archives which which showed showed that that some some agents. After After Yakunin Yakunin published members of of the the Orthodox Orthodoxhierarchy hierarchy had had been members been KGB agents. published a documents, the of a selection selection of of the the documents, the archives archives were wereclosed closedonce once more; more; he he was was accused accused of having States pros having betrayed betrayed state state secrets secrets to to the theUnited United States and and threatened threatened with with a a private private pros1 09 Father in January 1994: ecution. ecution.lo9 Father Gleb Glebremained remained defiant. defiant. He H e wrote wrote to to the thePatriarch Patriarch in January 1994:
If the is not not cleansed cleansed of of the the taint taint of of the the spy spy and and informer, informer, it it cannot cannot If the Church Church is be reborn. reborn. Unfortunately, Unfortunately, only only one one archbishop-Archbishop archbishop-Archbishop Khrizostom Khrizostom of of be Lithuania-has had had the the courage courage publicly to acknowledge acknowledge that that in Lithuania-has publicly to inthe the past past he he worked as as an an agent, agent, and and has has revealed revealedhis his codename: codename: RESTAVRATOR. RESTAVRAT'OR. No other other worked Church hierarch hierarch has has followed followedhis hisexample, example, however. Church however. The most prominent prominent agents agents of of the past include include DROZDOV-the DROZDOV-the only only one one The most the past of the churchmen officially honored an award of the churchmen to to be be officially honored with with an award by by the the KGB of of the the in 1988, 1988,for for oustanding oustanding intelligence intelligence services-ADAMANT, services-ADAMANT, OSTROV OSTROVUSSR, in SKY, these or SKY, MIKHAILOV, TOPAZ TOPAZ and and ABBAT. ABBAT. It I t is is obvious obviousthat that none none of of these or the less less exalted agents are are preparing preparing to to repent. repent. On O n the the contrary, contrary, they they deliver deliver the exalted agents themselves pastoral maxims on the the allegedly allegedly neutral neutral character of informing informing themselves of pastoral maxims on character of on the Church, and articles have appeared in the Church press justifying the on the Church, and articles have appeared in the Church press justifying the role of of the the informer informer as as essential for the the survival survival of the Church an antirole essential for of the Churchin in an anti religious religious state. state. discovered in in the the archives archives of the the KGB belong belong to to the the top top The codenames The codenames I discovered hierarchs of of the the Moscow Moscow Patriarchate.1 Patriarchate.'"10 hierarchs

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I1 was was unprecedented in the history of of the the Russian Orthodox The letter letter to to Aleksi Aleksi II The unprecedented in the history Russian Orthodox Church-for, been aware, most Church-for, as as the the Patriarch Patriarch must must surely surely have have been aware, DROZDOV, DROZDOV, the the most important of of the the KGB agents agents discovered discovered by byFather Father Gleb Glebin in the KGB archives, archives, was wasin important the in fact fact himself himself.

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ern Europe Europe in wake of of the the Second Second World World War were successfully contained. ern inthe the wake War were successfully contained. Opponents of of the the regimes regimes usually usually felt felt too too powerless powerless to to organize organize any any visible visible opposi opposiOpponents tion to them. O n the rare occasions when the survival of the one-party state seemed tion to them. On the rare occasions when the survival of the one-party state seemed question-in Hungary in 1956 1956 and and Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia in 1968-it 1968-it was swiftly and in question-in brutally shored up with with an an overwhelming overwhelming show show of of force. force. The The Polish Polish challenge challenge to to the the brutally shored up Soviet however, eventually eventually succeeded succeeded where the Hungarian HungarianUprising and the Soviet system, system, however, failed. Though contained for a decade, it was never Prague Spring failed. never mastered and eventually began the disintegration disintegration of of the the Soviet Bloc. eventually began the Soviet Bloc. way-not, asas in Hungary Hungary The Polish crisis began in aawholly novel and unforeseen way-not, and Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, with the the emergence emergence of of revisionist governments, but with with the the election of October 16, of October 16, 1978 1978 of of Cardinal Karol Wojtya, Wojtyla, Archbishop of of Krakbw, Krakow, as II. No Soviet Soviet leader was tempted any longer to repeat Stalins Stalin's scornscorn Pope John Paul 11. ful question at the end of ful of the Second World War, How "How many divisions divisions has the Pope?The undermining of of the empire built by Stalin after Yalta was was begun not by Pope?" the military military might might of West but but by Polish Pope, the of the the West by the the moral moral authority authority of of the the first first Polish Pope, which rapidly eclipsed that of the PUWP (the Polish Communist Party). of Boris Aristov, the Soviet ambassador in Warsaw, reported to the Politburo that the the Polish authorities regarded the new Pope as "a avirulent anti-Communist. anti-Communist."l The CenCen tre agreed. Since 1971 1971 Wojtylra Wojtyla had been the target of of PROGRESS operations designed to monitor monitorhis allegedly subversive subversive role in undermining underminingthe the authority of role authority of the Polish one-party one-party state. state.2 The day after Wojtylas Wojtyla's election, the head of of the KGB mismis sion in Warsaw, Vadim Pavlov, Pavlov, sent Moscow an assessment of of him by the SB, the KGBs KGB's Polish equivalent: equivalent: Wojtya Wojtyla holds extreme anti-Communist anti-Communist views. Without openly opposing the Socialist system, system, he has criticized the way in which the state agencies of of the Polish Peoples People's Republic have functioned, making the following accusations: - that the basic human rights rights of that the of Polish citizens are restricted; - that there is unacceptable exploitation of of the workers, whom the "the Catholic Church must protect against the workers government; protect workers' government";

For forty years years all all challenges challenges to to the the Communist Communistone-party one-party states states established in east eastF or forty established in

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- that are that the theactivities activities of of the the Catholic CatholicChurch Church are restricted restricted and and Catholics Catholics treated treated as as second-class second-class citizens; citizens; - that that an an extensive extensive campaign campaign is is being being conducted conducted to to convert convert society society to to atheism atheism and impose an people; and impose an alien alien ideology ideology on on the the people; - that Church is that the theCatholic Catholic Church is denied denied its its proper proper cultural cultural role, role, thereby thereby depriving depriving Polish Polish culture culture of of its its national national treasures. treasures.
In Wojtyla's Wojtylas view, view, the the concept concept of of the the one-party one-party state state "meant meant depriving depriving the the people In people of of its its sovereignty." sovereignty."Collectivization," Collectivization,he he believed, believed, "led led to to the thedestruction destruction of of the theindi individual and and of of his his personality." personality. The The fact fact that that he dared to to say say what what most most Polish vidual he dared Polish Catholics thought KGB and Catholics thought seemed seemed to to both boththe the and the the SB evidence evidence of of his his commitment commitment to ideological ideological subversion. subversion. to The SB report report forwarded forwarded to to the the Centre Centrereveals reveals that that as as early early as as 1973-4 1973-4 the Polish The the Polish Procurator-general had had considered prosecuting Wojtyla Wojtyla for for his his sermons. Three of of his his Procurator-general considered prosecuting sermons. Three homilies-in Warsaw Warsaw on on May May5, 5,1973, in the the Krakow Krak6w steelmaking steelmaking suburb suburb of Nowa homilies-in 1973, in of Nowa Huta on and in in Krakow Krak6w on on November November 24, 24, 1974-were 1974-were judged judged in Huta onMay May12, 12,1973 1973 and in breach of of article article 194 194 of the the Criminal Criminal Code, Code, which which provided provided for for terms terms of imprisonbreach of imprison ment toten ten years services. ment of of from from one one to years for for seditious seditious statements statements during during religious religious services. According to to an an SB SB informant, declared during during one one of of his his sermons, sermons, According informant, Wojtyla Wojtyla had had declared The Church Church has has the the right rightto to criticize all manifestations manifestations and and aspects aspects of the activity of "The criticize of the activity of the people."3 Wojtyla, however, was the authorities authorities if if they they are are unacceptable unacceptable to to the the p e~ple. Wojtyla, ~ however, was pro protected eminence. Though the DB (predecessor of SB) had interned the the tected by by his his eminence. Though the UB (predecessor of the the SB) had interned Polish primate, Cardinal Stefan Stefan Wyszynski, for three years in in the the1950s, 1950s, by by the the 1970s 1970s Polish primate, Cardinal Wyszynski, for three years the Gierek Gierekregime regime no longer dared dared to to arrest arrest a cardinal.The The SB thus thus lapsed lapsed into into a tone the no longer a cardinal. a tone of largely largely impotent impotent outrage outrage as as it it denounced denounced Wojtyla's Wojtylas "moral moral support support to to the initiaof the initia tives of ofanti-socialist anti-socialist elements. tives elements." In June June 1976 1976 Gierek Gierekrepeated repeated the the mistake mistake which which had had led led to to Gomulka's Gomulkas downfall In downfall six years earlier and ordered sudden increase in food food prices. prices. Mter a wave of protest protest six years earlier and ordered a a sudden increase in After a wave of strikes and and riots, riots, the the price price rises rises were were withdrawn. O n September 30 Wojtyla Wojtylaset up a strikes withdrawn. On September 30 set up a fund to to assist the families families of of those those in in the the Krakow Krak6w archdiocese had been fund assist the archdiocese who who had been imprisimpris oned protests police.4 oned for for taking taking part part in inthe the protests or or injured injured in in clashes clashes with with the theriot riot p ~ l i c eHe . ~ also also He took an an active active interest in the the formation formation after after the the strike strike wave wave of of KOR, the Workers took interest in the Workers Defence Committee, Committee, which which sought sought to to create create an an alliance alliance of of workers workers and and dissident dissident Defence intellectuals. According According to to SB surveillance surveillance reports, reports, during duringthe autumn of 1976 1976 intellectuals. the autumn of Wojtyla had hada a series series of ofmeetings meetings with with KOR's KORs founders founders in in the theapartment apartment of the writer Wojtyla of the writer Bohdan Cywinski,later later a a prominent prominent Solidarity Solidarity activist.5 activist. The also reported he Bohdan Cywinski, The SB SB also reported that that he met individually individually KOR militants militants from from a a great great variety variety of of backgrounds: backgrounds: among among them them met the acek Kuron, the wartime Jozef LipLip the dissident dissident Communist Communist J Jacek Kur6n, the wartime resistance resistance fighter fighter Jan Jan J6zef ski, Jerzy ski, the the ex-Maoist ex-Maoist Antoni Antoni Macierewicz Macierewicz and and the thewriter writer Jerzy Andrzejewski.6 Andrzejewski6 Wojtyla Wojtyla rarely rarely read readnewspapers, newspapers, listened listened to to the thenews news on on the theradio radio or or watched watched it it on on television. television. Every Every fortnight, fortnight, however, however, Father Father Andrzej Andrzej Bardecki, Bardecki, the the Church's Churchs liaison liaison was regu officer weekly officer with with the the Catholic Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny (to (to which whichWojtyla Wojtyla was a a regular at him lar contributor), contributor), came came to to his his study study in in the thearchbishop's archbishops palace palace at Krakow Krak6w and and gave gave him

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a operations by a news news briefing.7 briefing7 Bardecki Bardecki had had been been a a target target of of PROGRESS PROGRESS operations by KGB ille illegals ever since German press gals ever since BOGUN, posing posing as as a a West West German press photographer, photographer, had had first first made himin in 1971.8 another illegal, made contact contact with with him 1971. In In 1977 1977 another illegal, Ivan Ivan Ivanovich Ivanovich Bunyk, Bunyk, codenamed codenamed FILOSOV FILOSOV ("Philosopher"), (Philosopher), who who had had been been instructed instructed by by the the Centre Centre to to develop had a develop sources sources inside inside the the Polish Polish Church, Church, had a series series of of meetings meetings with with Bardecki. Bardecki. Bunyk Bunyk had had been been born born in in France France but but had had emigrated emigrated as as a a teenager teenager with with his his Ukrainian Ukrainian family In returned family to to the theSoviet Soviet Union Union in in1 947. 1947. In 1970 1970 he hehad had returned to to France France as as a a KGB KGB ille illegal, gal, trained trained as as a a journalist journalist and and set set himself himself up up as as a a freelance freelance writer writer and and poet. poet. On O n his his first first meeting meeting with with Bardecki Bardecki in in 1977, 1977,FILOSOV FILOSOV probably probably presented presented him him with withone one or or more had published the aid more of of the the books books he he had published in in France France with with the aid of of KGB subsidies. subsidies. Though the files do not include Though the files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin do not include FILOSOV's FILOSOVs reports reports from from Poland, Poland, there there is is little little doubt doubt that that his his main main priority priority in in cultivating cultivating Bardecki Bardecki was was to to seek seek out out information information on on Wojtyla.9 Wo-jtyla. SB with a SB surveillance surveillancereports reports during during 1977 1977showed showed Wojtyla Wojtyla aligning aligning himself himselfwith a vari variety ety of of protest protest movements. movements. On O n March March 23 23 he he received received the the student studentorganizers organizers of of a a peti petition tion of of protest protest to to the the authorities authorities and and gave gave them them his his support.10 support. Increasingly Increasingly he he invoked invoked the example of St. Stanislaw, the martyred bishop of ancient Krakow whose the example of St. Stanislaw, the martyred bishop of ancient Krakow whose silver silver sarcophagus sarcophagus formed formed part part of of the the high high altar altar in in the the cathedral, cathedral, as as a a symbol symbol of of resistance resistance to to an an unjust unjust state: state: St. patron saint the St. Stanislaw Stanislaw has has become become the the patron saint of of moral moral and and social social order order in in the country country .. .. .. He H e dared dared to to tell tell the the King King himself himself that that he he was was bound bound to to respect respect the the law law of of God God .. .. .. He H e was was also also the the defender defender of of the the freedom freedom that that is is the the inalienable inalienable right right of of every every man, man, so so that that the the violation violation of of that that freedom freedom by by the the state state is is at at the the 11 same same time time a a violation violation of of the themoral moral and and social social order. order. It is is easy easy to to imagine imagine the the rage rage in in the the Centre Centre as as Wojtyla Wojtyla continued continued with with impunity impunity to to defend defend the the rights rights of of the the individual individual against against violation violation by by the the Polish Polish state. state. Arnong the the greatest greatest triumphs triumphs ofWojtyla's of Wojtylasyears years at Krakow Krakow was was the consecration consecration on on Among at the May 1977 of great May 15, 15,1977 of the the great new new church church at at Nowa Nowa Huta, Huta, constructed constructed after after many many years years of of opposition opposition from from a a regime regime which which had had sought sought to to exclude exclude a a visible visible Catholic Catholic presence presence it intended from what what it intended as as a a model model "Socialist Socialist City."12 In In his his sermon sermon to to a a congregation congregation of of from over over 20,000, 20,000,Wojtyla Wojtyla gave gave his his blessing blessing to to those those protesting protesting against against the the death deathof of a a KOR activist, official denials-to have activist, Stanislaw Stanislaw Pyjas, Pyjas, who who was was widely widely believed-despite believed-despite official denials-to have been wound its been murdered murdered by by the the SB.13 SB.I3That That evening evening a a long long procession procession of of mourners mourners wound its way way through through the the streets streets of of Krakow Krakow to to Wawel Wawel Castle, Castle, where where a a Committee Committee of of Student Student Solidarity Solidaritywas was formed. formed. Similar Similar committees committees followed followed in in other othercities, cities, all all independent independent of of 14 the of Polish Polish Students. Students.14 the officially officially sponsored sponsored Socialist Socialist Union Union of As church 1978 and church bells bells rang rang out out across across Poland Poland on on October October 16, 16,1978 and the the streets streets filled filled with crowds to with excited excited crowds to celebrate celebrate Wojtyla's Wojtylas election election as as pope, pope, the the PUWP PUWP Politburo Politburo reacted with with private private shock shock and and alarm. alarm. Publicly, Publicly, the the Politburo Politburo reluctantly reluctantly felt felt com comreacted pelled the mood sent a pelled to to associate associate itself itself with with the mood of of popular popular rejoicing rejoicing and and sent a lengthy lengthy telegram telegram of of congratulations congratulations to to the the Vatican, Vatican, expressing expressing hypocritical hypocritical joy joy that that for for the the first time time "a (a son son of of the the Polish Polish nation nation .. .. .. sits sits on on the thepapal papal throne." throne.What What particularly particularly first

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disturbed the the KGB, however, however, was wasthe the evidence evidence that that among among many many PUWP members, disturbed members, even even some some senior senior officials, officials, the the joy joy was was genuine.15 genuine. As As well well as as sending sending official official reports reports on Polish Polish popular popular rejoicing, rejoicing, KGB officers officers in also unofficially unofficiallyrelayed relayed to their on in Warsaw Warsaw also to their colleagues Centre some some of jokes circulating colleagues at at the the Centre of the the political political jokes circulating immediately immediately after after John Paul Paul II's 11s election. The white white smoke smoke from from the the Vatican Vatican chimney, chimney, traditionally traditionally used used John election. The to to signal signal the the election election of of a a pope, pope, was was said said to to have have been been followed followed on on this this occasion occasion by by red another satirical red smoke; smoke; Wojtyla Wojtyla had had burned burned his his Party Party card. card. According According to toanother satirical account, pope had interior minister, account, the the new new pope had secretly secretly visited visited the the Polish Polish interior minister, who who was was responsible for for the the SB, and announced announced after after the the election, election, "Comrade Comrade minister! minister! Your Your SB, and responsible important instructions instructions have have been been carried carried out!"16 outll6 important Two days days after after the the election, election, Aristov, Aristov, the the Soviet Soviet ambassador, ambassador, reported reported to to Moscow Moscow Two in more more senous serious vem: vein: m
. . .

Peoples Republic considers considers that the The leadership of the Polish People's the danger of Wojtylas move moveto to the theVatican Vatican is isthat that it itwill will now now clearly clearlybe be more difficult difficult to use Wojtyla's more to use the Vatican Vatican as as a a moderating moderating influence influence on on the the Polish Polish episcopate episcopate in in its its relations relations the with the thestate. state. The The Catholic Catholic Church Churchwill will now now make make even even greater conwith greater efforts efforts to to con solidate its its position position and and increase increase its its role role in the social social and political life life of solidate in the and political of the the country. country. At the same time, time, our consider that Wojtylas departure from the At the same our friends friends consider that Wojtyla's departure from the country also positive side, side, since since the reactionary part part of of the episcopate country also has has its its positive the reactionary the episcopate has been been deprived deprived of of its its leader-one leader-one who who had an excellent excellent chance chance of of becoming has had an becoming Primate of of the the Polish Polish Catholic Catholic Church. Church. Primate Aristov criticized criticized the the Polish Polish Politburo Politburo for for compromising compromising its ability to to resist the Aristov its ability resist the Churchs future future demands by its its past weakness in in permitting of Church's demands by past weakness permitting the theconstruction construction of new churches, churches, the the ordination of more more priests and larger larger print-runs new ordination of priests and print-runs for forCatholic Catholic p~b1ications.l~ publications. 17 At the time of Wojtylas election, election, Poland was probably probably the the worlds Catholic At the time ofWojtyla's Poland was world's most most Catholic country. The The KGB KGB estimated estimated that that 90 percent of of the were Catholic.ls country. 90 percent the population population were Catholic. IS With 569 ordinations With 569 ordinations in in 1978, 1978, Poland Poland had had the the highest highest ratio ratio of of priestly priestly vocations vocations to to population anywhere anywhere on population on earth. In total, total, there there were 193 Polish Polish priests and 5,325 earth. In were 19, 19,193 priests and 5,325 students in inseminaries.19 seminaries. Somewhat Somewhat alarmist alarmist KGB KGB assessments assessments put put the thefigures figures higher higher students stilpO religious practice continued over years. Accord stilL2 A steady steady rise rise in in religious practice continued over the the next next few few years. According committee, "This ing to to a a secret secret study study circulated circulated to to the the PUWP central central committee, This phenomenon phenomenon emerged emerged particularly particularly acutely acutely among among the theintelligentsia, intelligentsia, especially especially among among persons persons with with higher education. In 1978 25 25percent percent of of those with higher were reported reported higher education." In 1978 those with higher education education were to home; by risen to percent. to engage engage in in private private prayer prayer at at home; by 1983 1983 the thefigure figure had had risen to over over 50 percent. The increase to The central central committee committee study study plausibly plausibly attributed attributed the the increase to the the "social-political social-political crisis and and the the influence influence of of the the Polish Polish Pope.21 Pope.21Even Even many Party officials felt in in crisis" many Polish Polish Party officials felt awe of Wojtyla's intense, mystical spirituality. he awe of Wojtylras intense, mystical spirituality. They They reported reported to to Moscow Moscow that that he often in prayer. private chapel, chapel, aides often spent spent six six to to eight eight hours hours a a day day in prayer. On O n entering entering his his private aides would him lying the marble would sometimes sometimes find find him lying motionless motionless on on the marble floor, floor, his his arms arms out outstretched stretched in in the the shape shape of of a a crosS.22 cross.23

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The KGB privately privately denounced denounced some some of of John John Paul Paul II's 11s fi first acts in in the the Vatican Vatican as as The rst acts anti-Soviet gestures." gestures. Among Among them them was was his his order order on on the the day day after after his his election election that that "anti-Soviet the red red zuchetto--cardinal's zuchetto-cardinals skullcap-which skullcap-which he he had worn at at the papal conclave conclave the had worn the papal should be be taken taken to to Lithuania Lithuaniaby by two two priests from the the Krakow Krak6w archdiocese archdiocese and and placed should priests from placed on the altar of the church of the Virgin of Mercy in Vilnius.23 What most concerned on the altar of the church of the Virgin of Mercy in Vilnius.23 What most concerned the Centre Centreduring during earlyweeks weeks of of the the new new pontificate, pontificate, however, however,was was the Pope's Popes evi evithe thethe early the dent determination determination to to give give the the Vatican Vatican a a major major voice voice in in world world affairs. affairs. Though Though John John dent Paul II's IIs concerns concerns ranged ranged widely widely over over the the problems problems of of peacekeeping peacekeeping and and human human rights rights Paul around the the globe, his first was the the situation in Poland Poland and and eastern eastern Europe.24 Europe.24 around globe, his first priority priority was situation in The Centre Centre was was particularly particularly suspicious suspicious of of the the Pope's Popes appointment appointment of of the the Lithuanian LithuanianThe born Andris as one one of of his his chief chief advisers advisers on on the Vaticans relations relations with with the born Andris Backis Backis as the Vatican's the Soviet Bloc. Backiss father father had had served served as as pre-war pre-war ambassador ambassador of of independent independent Soviet Bloc. Backis's Lithuania in inParis, Paris, and and Backis Backis himself himself was was believed believedto to follow follow in in the thesame same "bourgeois" bourgeois Lithuania tradition. His His appointment appointment was, was, in in the theCentre's Centres view, view, another another "anti-Soviet anti-Soviet gesture."25 gesture.25 tradition. O n November November 5 the the Pope Pope made made his his first first official official visit visit outside the the Vatican Vatican to to Assisi, the On outside Assisi, the city of of St. Francis, patron patron saint saint of of Italy. Italy. A voice voice from from the the crowd crowd urged urged him him to to remem rememcity St. Francis, ber eastern eastern Europe: Europe: "Don't Dont forget forget the the Church of Silence! not a a Church Church of of ber Church of Silence!" Its "It's not Silence any any more," more, replied replied John John Paul Paul II, 11,((because because it it speaks speaks with with my my voice."26 voice.26 Silence Among the illegals sent sent on operations to to Poland Poland after after Wojtyia's Wojtyas Among the illegals on PROGRESS PROGRESS operations election was Oleg the election was Oleg Petrovich Petrovich Buryen Buryen (codenamed (codenamed DEREVLYOV), DEREVLYOV), who whoposed posed as as the representative of of a a firm of Canadian Canadian publishers. publishers. DEREVLYOV DEREVLYOV claimed claimed to to be be colrepresentative firm of col lecting material material about about Polish Polish missionaries missionaries in in the the Far Far East East and and used this as as a a pretext pretext lecting used this for contacting contacting a a number number of of prominent Church figures, figures, most of whom whom recommended recommended for prominent Church most of him to to others. others. If If arrested arrested by by the the police police or or SB, he was was told told to to stick stick firmly firmly to to his his cover cover him SB, he story and insist insist that that he he was was a a Canadian Canadian citizen. citizen. In of real real emergency, emergency,however, however, story and In case case of he was was instructed instructed to to ask ask to to see Colonel Jan Jan Slovikowski Slovikowski of of the the SB, who to he see Colonel who appears appears to have acted acted as as a a point of contact contact for for KGB agents agents who who found found themselves themselves in difficulty have point of in difficulty with the the Polish Polish authorities. authorities. Among DEREVLYOVs most most prized was one one with Among DEREVLYOV's prized contacts contacts was of the the Pope's Popes closest closest friends, friends, Father Father Jozef J6zef Tischner, Tischner, a a fellow fellow philosopher philosopher who who had had of helped him him found found the the Papal Papal Theological Theological Academy Academy in in Krakow.27 Krakb~.~ Tischner was a a fre frehelped Tischner was quent visitor visitor to to Rome Rome and and one one of of those those chosen chosen by by John John Paul Paul II I1 to to revive revive his his spirits spirits quent when he he felt felt trapped trapped in in the the Vatican.28 Vatican.2* when One One of of John John Paul Paul II's 11s chief chief ambitions ambitions during during the thefirst first year year of of his his pontificate pontificate was was to to 1979, horrified horrified that that the thePUWP Politburo Politburo was was prepared prepared to to return to to Poland. Poland. Early Early in in 1979, return contemplate try to to dissuade contemplate a a papal papal visit, visit, Brezhnev Brezhnev rang rang Gierek Gierekto to try dissuade him. him. ((How How could could I not Gierek replied, countrymen not receive receive a a Polish Polish pope," pope, Gierek replied, ((when when the the majority majority of of my my countrymen Absurdly, Brezhnev urged him to to persuade the Pope to have a diplo diploare Catholics? Catholics?" Absurdly, illness: ((Tell Tell the Pope-he Pope-he is is a wise man-that matic illness: man-that he could announce publicly that he he cannot cannot come come because he has has been taken ill." ill. When When Gierek Gierek failed failed to to see see the the that because he been taken merit of of this this odd odd suggestion, Brezhnev told told him him angrily, angrily, "Gomuika Gomulka was was a a better merit suggestion, Brezhnev better in Poland, Poland, and and wouldnt receive receive [Pope] [Pope] Pa Pa$ VI in Communist [than [than you] because because he wouldn't hnev saying, nothing ended with nothing awful awful happened!" happened!The The conversation conversation ended with Brez BrezKnev saying, ((Well, Well, do do what point what you you want, want, so so long long as as you you and and your your Party Party don't dont regret regret it it later"-at later-at which which point Brezhnev put put the the phone phone down.29 Brezhnev down.29

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On 1979 more on road, on O n June June 2, 2,1979 more than than a a million million Poles Polesconverged converged on the theairport airport road, on War Warsaw's the Old the rubble the Second Second saws Victory Victory Square Square and and in in the Old City, City, rebuilt rebuilt from from the rubble after after the World his emotional World War, War, to to welcome welcome John John Paul Paul II I1 on on his emotional return return to to his his homeland. homeland. Over Over the next next nine nine days days at at least least ten ten million million people came to to see see and and hear him; most of the the the people came hear him; most of remaining twenty-five million witnessed his his triumphal triumphal progress through Poland Poland on on remaining twenty-five million witnessed progress through television. At the the end end of of his his visit, visit, as the the Pope farewell to to his his home city of of Krakow, Krakbw, television. as Pope bade bade farewell home city where, he he said, said, "every every stone stone and brick is is dear dear to to me," me, men unconwhere, and brick men and and women women wept wept uncon trollably the Commu trollably in in the thestreets. streets. The The contrast contrast between between the the political political bankruptcy bankruptcy of of the Communist regime regime and and the the moral moral authority authority of of the the Catholic CatholicChurch Church was plain plain for for all all to to see. nist was see. The papal papal visit, visit, the the Centre reported to to the Politburo, had had lived lived up up to its worst worst The Centre reported the Politburo, to its expectation^.^' Many Many Polish Polish Party Party members, the Popes expectations.30 members, faced faced with with the Pope's ideological "ideological subsub versionof of the Communistregime, regime, felt felt that that the theideological ideological battle battle had version" the Communist had been been lost. lost. DurDur ing the visit the the KGB mission mission in in Warsaw Warsaw had had even even thought thought it possible that that KOR ing the visit it possible militants and anti-Communist anti-Communistworkers workers in in Krakow Krakbw might might try tryto to seize seize power powerfrom the militants and from the Party. Emergency Emergency preparations were were also made made to evacuate the Soviet Soviet trade trade mission mission in Katowice, Katowice, which which was was headed headed by by a a KGB officer, officer, to to Czechoslovakia.31 Czecho~lovakia.~~ The in The Centre Centre believed that that John Paul II I1 had had set out to challenge the the foundations the whole believed John Paul set out to challenge foundations of of the whole Soviet Bloc. One emphasized that that he he had hadrepeatedly repeatedly called himself not not Soviet Bloc. One KGB report report emphasized called himself just the the"Polish Polish Pope" Pope but, but, even even more frequently, the the Slav his homilies just more frequently, "Slav Pope.32 Pope."32 In In his homilies he he had one by of the the peoples of eastern had recalled recalled one by one one the the baptism baptism of peoples of eastern Europe: Europe: Poles, Poles, Croats, Croats, Slovenes, Bulgarians, Bulgarians, Moravians, Moravians, Slovaks, Slovaks, Czechs, Czechs, Serbs, Russians and Lithuanians: Slovenes, Serbs, Russians and Lithuanians:
Pope John John Paul Paul II, 11,a a Slav, Slav, a a son son of the Polish Polish nation, Pope of the nation, feels feels how how deeply deeply rooted rooted he he is in in the the soil soil of of history history .. .. .. He H e comes comes here here to the whole whole Church, is to speak speak before before the Church, before Europe Europe and and the the world, world, about about those those oft-forgotten oft-forgotten nations and peoples.33 peoples.33 before nations and

A Politburo Vatican had had embarked embarked on Politburo document document concluded concluded that that the theVatican on an an"ideologi ideological John Paul II, papal papal polpol cal struggle struggle against against Socialist Socialist countries." countries. Since Since the the election election of of John Paul 11, icy of the the Soviet in Ukraine, icy towards towards Catholic Catholic regions regions of Soviet Union-especially Union-especially in Ukraine, Lithuania, Lithuania, Latvia become more "more aggressive," aiding and Latvia and and Byelorussia-had Byelorussia-had become aggressive, aiding and abetting abetting "disloyal disloyal priests." On November 13 the Central Committee Committee secretariat secretariat approved six-point priests. O n November the Central approved a a six-point "Decision Vatican in Socialist Decision to to Work Work Against Against the the Policies Policies of of the the Vatican in Relation Relation with with Socialist States," chair States,prepared prepared by by a a subcommittee subcommittee which which included included Andropov Andropov and and the the deputy deputy chairman to organize propaganda man of of the the KGB, Viktor Viktor Chebrikov. Chebrikov. The The KGB was was instructed instructed to organize propaganda campaigns campaigns in in the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc"to to show show that that Vatican Vatican policies policiesgo go against against the the life life of of the the Catholic Church" Church and and to to embark embark on on active active measures measuresin in the theWest West demonstrate that Catholic "toto demonstrate that the leadership of II, is Church."34 the leadership of the the new new Pope, Pope, John John Paul Paul 11, is dangerous dangerous to to the the Catholic Catholic One operations was agent netnet One of of the the chief chief priorities priorities of of SB SB foreign foreign operations was to to build build up up an an agent work On June 16, 1980 the work among among the thePoles Poles in in Rome Rome and and the theVatican. Vatican. O n June 16,1980 the KGB mission mission in in Warsaw Warsaw reported reported to to the the Centre: Centre: Our SB] have their have serious serious operational operational positions positions [i.e. [Le. agents] agents] at at their Our friends friends [the [the SB] disposal to the disposal in in the theVatican, Vatican, and and these these enable enable them them to to have have direct direct access access to thePope Pope and to the Roman andto the Roman congregation. congregation. Apart Apart from from experienced experienced agents, agents, towards towards

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whom audience whom John JohnPaul Paul II I1 is is personally personally well well disposed disposed and and who who can can obtain obtain an an audience with him the leaders with him at at any any time, time, our our friends friends have have agent agent assets assets among among the leaders of of Catholic students who who are circles and Catholic students are in in constant constant contact contact with with Vatican Vatican circles and have have possibilities Radio Vatican possibilities in in Radio Vatican and and the the Pope's Popes secretariat. secretariat. The responded by proposing proposing a a series series of of KGB/SB "joint joint long-term long-term opera operaThe Centre Centre responded tions" with the following aims: tions with the following aims:

To To influence influence the the Pope Pope towards towards active active support support for for the the idea idea of of international international detente , peaceful co-existence and detente [as [as defined defined by by Moscow] Moscow], peacefulco-existence and cooperation cooperation between states, and to exert a favorable influence on Vatican policy between states, and to exert a favorable influence on Vatican policy on on par particular problems; ticular international international problems; To To intensif)r intensify disagreements disagreements between between the the Vatican Vatican and and the the USA, Israel Israel and and other other countries; countries; To To intensif)r intensify internal internal disagreements disagreements within within the the Vatican; Vatican; To study, devise and disruptthe the Vatican's study, devise and carry carry out out operations operations to to disrupt Vaticans plans plans to to strengthen religious Socialist countries; strengthen the the Churches Churchesand and religious teaching teaching in in Socialist countries; To exploit exploit KGB assets assets in in the the Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church, Church, the the Georgian Georgian and and the the Armenian-Gregorian Armenian-Gregorian Churches; Churches; to to devise devise and and carry carry out out active active measures measures to to counteract counteract the the expansion expansion of of contacts contacts between between these these Churches Churches and and the the Vatican; Vatican; To To identif)r identify the the channels channels through through which which the the Polish Polish Church Church increases increases its its influence and the Soviet influence and invigorates invigorates the the work work of of the the Church Church in in the Soviet Union. Union.

Because the Catholic Catholic Because of of the the Polish Polish Politburo's Politburos anxiety anxiety to to avoid avoid confrontation confrontation with with the Church, operations Church, however, however, the the Centre Centrehad had low low expectations expectations of of what what joint jointKGB/SB operations were were likely likely to to achieve: achieve: In SB] remain the In our our view, view, so so long long as as our our friends friends [the [the SB] remain fearful fearful of of damaging damaging the development between the Vatican development of of relations relations between the Polish Polish People's Peoples Republic Republic and and the the Vatican and not display great initiative imple and between between state state and and Church, Church, they they will will not display great initiative in in implementing the measures which which we we propose. Officers in in our our Centre Centre and in the menting the measures propose. Officers and in the [Warsaw need to some tact and flexibility in order order [Warsaw KGB] mission mission will will need to display display some tact and flexibility in to find ways of of solving solving the task before before them.35 them.35 to find ways the task
Moscows fears fearsthat that the thePolish Politburo lacked lacked the the nerve nerve to to confront confront the the challenge Moscow's Polish Politburo challenge its authority were heightened by its apparent capitulation to working-class disconto to its authority were heightened by its apparent capitulation to working-class discon tent. of 1980 wave which 1980sparked sparked off offa a strike strike wave which tent. Sudden Sudden rises rises in in food food prices prices in in the the summer summer of of gave birth birth to to the the Solidarity Solidarity trade trade union movement under under the the charismatic charismatic leadership leadership of gave union movement a hitherto hitherto unknown unknown 37-year-old 37-year-old electrician electrician from from Gdansk, Gdansk, Lech Walqsa. The The interior a Lech Walttsa. interior ministry informed informed the the KGB mission mission in in Warsaw Warsaw that that it it had had established operations ministry established an an operations center, headed headed by by Stachura, Stachura, the the deputy deputy minister, minister, to to direct direct police police and and SB SB operations operations center, To judge judge from from a a against the the strikers, strikers, monitor monitor the the situation situation and and produce produce daily daily reports. reports. To against

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report with report forwarded forwarded to to Moscow, Moscow, the the Center Centerwas was remarkably remarkablypleased pleased with its its own own perfor performance: "The The operational operational staff staff displayed displayeda a high high degree degree of of conscientiousness conscientiousnessand and disci discimance: pline, pline, and and an an understanding understanding of of their their duties; duties; combat-readiness combat-readiness was was introduced; introduced;leave leave was was canceled; canceled; and and round-the-clock round-the-clock work work was was introduced." introduced.While While not not claiming claiming "complete complete success,the the operations operations center center claimed claimed to to have have limited limited the the scale scale of of the strike strike movement movement success," the by protesters by "eliminating" eliminatingtheir their printing printing presses presses and and breaking breaking links linksbetween between protesters in in differ different to ent parts parts of of the the country. country. In In addition, addition, ''Attempts Attemptsby by anti-Socialist anti-Socialist forces forces to establish establish con contacts with with the the artistic, artistic, scientific scientific and and cultural cultural intelligentsia, intelligentsia, in in order order to to enlist enlist their their tacts support demands of support for for the the demands of the the strikers, strikers,were were cut cut short."36 The The reality, reality, however, however,was wassomewhat somewhat different. different. The The strikers strikers succeeded succeeded in in creating creating inter-factory committees to coordinate the inter-factory strike strike committees to coordinate the protest protest and and dissident dissident intellectuals intellectuals played nal judgment played an an important important part part in inadvising advising them. them. The The fi final judgment of of the the KGB mission mission in in Warsaw Warsaw was was in in stark stark contrast contrast to to the the efforts efforts by by the the Interior Interior Ministry Ministry to todefend defend its its performance. performance. The The SB, SB, it it reported, reported, "did did not not recognize recognize the the extent extent of of the the danger danger in in time time or hidden discontent or the the hidden discontent of of the the working working class." class. And And when when the the strike strike movement movement began, began, both both the the SB SB and and the the police police were were unable unable to to control control it: it: The The blame blame lay lay chiefly chieflywith with the the leadership leadership of of the the Interior Interior Ministry, Ministry, and and in in par particular ticularwith with Minister MinisterKowalczyk Kowalczyk and and his his deputy deputy Stachura Stachura .. .. .. When When the the strikes strikes intensified in the coastal intensified in the coastal region, region, Kowalczyk Kowalczyk simply simply lost lost his his head head .. .. .. In In the the opinion of and Stachura with opinion of the the KGB mission, mission, it it is is time time to toreplace replace Kowalczyk Kowalczyk and Stachura with other officers.37 other officers.37

On the deputy deputy prime prime O n August August 24 24 Aristov Aristov sent sent Moscow Moscow the the alarming alarming news news that that the minister, minister, Mieczyslaw MieczyslawJagielski, Jagielski, was wasnegotiating negotiating with with Wahtsa Walqsa and and the the strike strike leaders.38 1eade1-s.~~ Next Next day, day, the the Soviet Soviet Politburo Politburo set set up up a a commission commission headed headed by by Suslov, Suslov,its its chief chief ideol ideologist, atthe the ogist, to to monitor monitor the the Polish Polish crisis crisis and and propose propose remedies.39 remedies.39On O n August August 27, 27, at Pope's document that that explicitly Popes instigation, instigation, the the Polish Polish bishops bishops approved approved a a document explicitly claimed claimed "the to independence the right right to independence both both of of organizations organizations representing representing the the workers workers and and of of organizations Confident now organizations of of self-government." self-government. Confident of of the the Pope's Popes backing, backing, Wa:htsa Waqsawas was now convinced convinced that that the the government government had had little little choice choice but but to togive give in.40 in.4o The members of The Polish Polish government government privately privately agreed. agreed. On O n August August 27 27 the the leading leading members of the persuade partial the Polish Polish Politburo Politburo met met Aristov Aristov to to try trytoto persuade him him that thatthe the partial disintegration disintegration of people had of the the PUWP and and the the hostility hostility to to it itof of much much of of the the Polish Polish people had created created "a a new new situation:" situation: We We must must take take a a step step back back in in order order not not to to fall fall into into the the abyss, abyss, and and agree agree on on the the creation of other political creation of self-governing self-governing trade trade unions. unions. We We have have no no other political means means of of normalizing the use force. normalizing the situation, situation, and and it it is is impossible impossible to to use force.By By staging staging a a [tacti [tactical] cal] retreat, retreat, we we can can regroup regroup Party Party forces forces and and prepare prepare for for offensive offensive action. action. The motions The Poles Poles went went through throughthe the motions of of seeking seeking "the the opinion opinion of of Comrade Comrade Brezhnev," Brezhnev, recognizing unions free recognizing that that trade trade unions free from from Party Party control control were were "not not simply simply a a Polish Polish issue issue

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1 In real but but an an issue issue which which affects affects the the interests interests of of the the entire entire Socialist Socialist community."4 comm~nity.~ realIn

ity, ity, however, however, all all alternatives alternatives to to the the legalization legalization of of Solidarity Solidarity had had already already been been ruled ruled

out. 1 , which of free 31, which accepted accepted "the the formation formation of free out. The The Gdansk Gdarisk Agreement Agreement of of August August 3 trade trade unions unions as as a a genuine genuine representation representation of of the the working working class," class, made made a a series series of of unprecedented strike unprecedented political political concessions, concessions,ranging ranging from from the the right rightto to strike to to an an agreement agreement to to broadcast broadcast Mass Mass every every Sunday Sunday over over the the state state radio. radio. Wahcsa Walqsa signed signed the the agreement agreement in in front front of of the the television television cameras cameras with with an an outsize, outsize, garishly garishly colored colored pen, pen, which which he he drew drew with souvenir of visit, it with a a flourish flourish from from his his top top pocket. pocket. Produced Produced as as a a souvenir of the the papal papal visit, it had had on on it it a a portrait portraitof of John John Paul Paul 11.42 II.42

T H II R R T T Y Y TH
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II nn the the view view of of both both the theKGB and and the the Soviet Soviet Politburo, Politburo, the the Gdansk Gdarisk Agreement Agreement rep rep-

resented resented the the greatest greatest potential potential threat threat to to the the "Socialist Socialist Commonwealth" Commonwealth (the (the official official designation Bloc) since designation of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc) since the the Prague Prague Spring Spring of of 1968. 1968. On O n September September 3, 1980 Politburo 1980 the the Politburo agreed agreed a a series series of of "theses theses for for discussion discussion with with representatives representatives of of the the euphemism for demands that Polish leadership"-a 1eadershipa euphemism for demands that the thePoles Poles recover recoverthe the ground ground lost lost Polish to to Solidarity: Solidarity: The signifies the anti ] agreement, agreement, in in essence, essence, signifies the legalization legalization of of the the antiThe [Gdansk [Gdansk ] Socialist The problem problem now now is is how how to to prepare prepare a a counter-attack counter-attack Socialist opposition opposition .. .. .. The and been lost lost among class and and reclaim reclaim the the positions positions that that have have been among the theworking working class and the the people .. .. .. It is people is necessary necessaryto to give give overriding overriding significance significance to to the theconsolidation consolidation of of the society.1 the leading leading role role of of the the Party Partyin in society.

The The principal principal scapegoat scapegoat for for the the success success of of Solidarity Solidarity was was Edward Edward Gierek, Gierek, the the Polish Polish first secretary, bitterly criticized by the Soviet ambassador, Aristov, among others, first secretary, bitterly criticized by the Soviet ambassador,Aristov, among others, for for the the Lenin Lenin shipyard the loss loss of of Party Party contro1.2 control.2The The strikers strikers at at the shipyard had had greeted greeted Gierek's Giereks television television appearances appearances with with derisive derisive catcalls. catcalls. Ordinary Ordinary Poles Poles summed summed up up their their feel feelings ings in in one one of of the the political politicaljokes jokes with with which which they they privately privately mocked mocked their their Communist Communist leaders: leaders: What What is is the the difference difference between between Gierek Gierek and and Gomulka Gomulka [who [who had had been forced been forced to to resign resign as as first first secretary secretary in in 1970]? 1970]? ANSWER: None, only Gierek doesn't ANSWER: None, only Gierek doesnt realize realize it it yet!3 yet!3
Q UESTION: QUESTION:

On tough, heavily O n September September 5 Gierek Gierek was was succeeded succeeded by by Stanislaw Stanislaw Kania, Kania, the the tough, heavily built built and and heavy-drinking heavy-drinking Party Party secretary secretary responsible responsible for for national national security. security.The The KGB in onthe the changeover doing the the rounds in in Warsaw Warsaw reported reported a a satirical satirical comment comment on changeover doing rounds in Poland-"Better Kania than (better, in other words, up with an Poland-BetterKania than Vanya!" Vanya! (better, in other words, to to put put up with an unpopular It also unpopular Polish Polish Communist Communist than than have have to to face face a a Soviet Soviet invasion).4 inva~ion).~ also It reported reported that that on on September September 6 6 Admiral Admiral L. L. Janczyszyn, Janczyszyn, the the commander-in-chief commander-in-chief of of the the Polish Polish navy, intervention would not in in navy, had had warned warned two two Soviet Soviet admirals admirals that that military military intervention would end end not "normalization," 1968,but but outside troops normalization, as as in in Prague Prague in in 1968, in in catastrophe. catastrophe. "If If outside troops are are

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brought into Poland," "there would brought into Poland, he he told told them, them, there would be be a a river river of of blood. blood. You You must must understand Czechs!"5 understand that that you're youre dealing dealing with with Poles-not Poles-not Czechs! On O n September September 18 18 Pavlov, Pavlov, the the head head of of the the KGB KGB mission mission in in Warsaw, Warsaw, complained complained to to the Kania the Centre Centrethat thatthe the Kania regime regime was was already alreadyrepeating repeating the the mistakes mistakes of of its its predeces predecessors-looking sors-looking for for compromise compromise with with the the opposition opposition rather rather than than taking taking a a firm firm stand stand against them. The Party rank and file remained demoralized.6 "The counteragainst them. The Partyrank and file remained demoralized.6 The counter- revolution revolution in in Poland Poland is is in in full full flood!" flood!Brezhnev Brezhnev dramatically dramatically announced announced to to the thePolit Politburo buro on on October October29: 29: Walsa Walpa is is traveling traveling from from one one end end of of the the country country to to another, another, to to town town after after town, town, and they honor him with tributes everywhere. Polish leaders keep their mouths and they honor him with tributes everywhere. Polish leaders keep their mouths shut television is shut and and so so does does the the press. press. Not Not even even television is standing standing up up to to these these anti antiSocialist Socialistelements elements .. .. .. Perhaps Perhaps it it really really is is necessary necessary to to introduce introduce martial martial law. law. Brezhnev's Brezhnevs assessment assessment was, was, predictably, predictably,strongly strongly supported supported by by Andropov. Andropov. It It was was also also backed backed by by Mikhail Mikhail Gorbachev, Gorbachev, who who had had joined joined the the Politburo Politburo in in the the previous previous year. year. "We We should should speak speak openly openly and and firmly firmly with with our our Polish Polish friends," friends, he he declared. declared. "Up Up to to now now they they haven't havent taken taken the the necessary necessary steps. steps. They're Theyre in in a a sort sort of of defensive defensive position, position, and and they they can't cant hold hold it it for for long-they long-they might might end end up up being being overthrown overthrown themselves."7 them~elves.~ The The Politburo Politburo was was concerned concerned not not merely merely by by the the situation situation in in Poland Poland itself itself but but also also by in by the the contagious contagious effect effect of of Solidarity's Solidarityssuccess success in some some parts parts of of the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. The The PROG RESS operation to Andropov October included PROGRESS operation reports reports submitted submitted to Andropov in in October included one one from on a a mission the from the the illegal illegal SOBOLEV, SOBOLEV, who who has has been been sent sent on mission to to Rubtsovsk Rubtsovsk in in the Altay Altay Kray Kray region region of of Russia, Russia, far far from from the the Polish Polish border. border. His His report report made made depressing depressing reading: reading: The The situation situation in in the thetown town of of Rubtsovsk Rubtsovsk is is unstable. unstable. The The population population has has many many grounds grounds to to be be dissatisfied dissatisfiedwith with the thesituation situation in in the thetown, town, antisocial antisocialelements elements are are visibly visibly engaged engaged in in provocative provocative action, action, and and there there could could be be uncontrolled uncontrolled disor disorders also ready ready to ders .. .. ..Believers Believers [practicing [practicing Christians] Christians] are are also to speak speak up, up, and and the the population . population approves approves the the strikes strikes in in Poland Poland. .. ....The is food The basic basic cause cause of of dissatisfaction dissatisfaction is food supplies, supplies, especially especially the the lack lack of of meat services. The meat in in the the shops, shops,poor poorliving living conditions conditions and and disgraceful disgracefulpublic public services. The top top people through people are aresupplied supplied through special special channels, channels,and and for for this this there there are are special specialstores stores of of foodstuffs foodstuffsand and consumer consumer goods. goods.Theft Theft is is rampant, rampant, and and the the biggest biggest thieves thievesare are officials officials of ofthe the Party Party city city committee committee and and the the Soviet Soviet executive executivecommittee. committee.There There is from alcoholism. is drunkenness drunkenness everywhere, everywhere,and and many many people peoplesuffer suffer from alcoholism. The The Polish Polish events events have have a a negative negative influence influence and and effect effect on on the thelocal local popula population, tion, suggesting suggesting that that it it is is possible possible to to improve improve living living and and economic economic conditions conditions on 8 on the thePolish Polish model. modeL8 Among Among the the most most successful successful illegals illegals selected selected for for PROGRESS PROGRESS operations operations in in Poland Poland itself itself was was FILOSOV, FILOSOV, still still posing posing as as a a French French writer writer and and poet. poet. According According to to his his KGB KGB file, file, he he made made "numerous numerous contacts contacts within within Solidarity." Solidarity.Perhaps Perhaps his his most most important important concon-

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tact was was Tadeusz Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Mazowiecki, editor-in-chief editor-in-chief of of the the Solidarity Solidarity weekly, weekly, Tygodnik tact SoZidarncXc, to to whom whom he he was was introduced introduced in in November November by by Father Father Andrzej Andrzej Bardecki.9 Bardecki. Solidarnofc, Nine years years later later Mazowiecki Mazowiecki was was to to become become prime prime minister minister of of the the fi first Solidarity-led Nine rst Solidarity-led government. government. in November, November, Andropov summoned the new, hardline Polish interior min minEarly in Mirosaw Milewski, for talks in Moscow. Milewski reported that lists ister, General Miroslaw had been prepared of of more more than than 1,200 of the the "most most counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary individu individuhad been prepared 1,200 of als, who who would would be be arrested arrested immediately immediately if if martial martial law law were weredeclared. declared. Andropov Andropov then then als," launched into into an an alarmist alarmist monologue monologue designed designed to to persuade persuade Milewski Milewski that that martial martial law law launched could be avoided: avoided: could not not be Walpa in peace, Even if you left Wyszynski [the Polish primate] and Walsa Wyszynski you in Wysz);nski and and Walsa Walqsa would would not not leave leave you in peace peace until until either either they they had had achieved their their aim, aim, or or they they had had been been actively actively crushed crushed by by the the Party and the the achieved Party and responsible part part of of the the workers. If you you wait wait passively passively .. .. .. the the situation responsible workers. If situation slips slips out out of your your control. saw how how this this happened happened in in Hungary Hungary [in 19561. theold old of control. I saw [in 1956] . There, There, the leadership normalize itself, itself, and when, at leadership waited waited for for everything everything to to normalize and when, at last, last, it it was was decided one could relied upon. decided to to act, act, it it turned turned out out that that no no one could be be relied upon. There There is is every every reason to to fear fear that that the the same may happen happen in in Poland Poland also, if the the most active and reason same may also, if most active and decisive measures measuresare arenot not now now taken. taken. decisive This is is a a struggle struggle for for power. power. IfWalsa If Walpaand and his his fascist fascist confederates confederates came came to to This power, they they would would start start to to put putCommunists Communistsinin prison, to to shoot shoot them themand and subpower, prison, sub ject them to to every every kind kind of of persecution. persecution. In In such such an an event, event, Party Party activists, activists, Chekject them Chek ists [the [the SB] and military military leaders leaders would would be be most threat. ists SB] and most under under threat. You say say that that some of your your comrades take on on the the responsibility of of tak takYou some of comrades cannot cannot take responsibility ing any any aggressive aggressive measures the counter-revolutionaries. counter-revolutionaries. But But why why are are ing measures against against the they doing nothing, this could could lead lead to victory of they not not afraid afraid of of doing nothing, since since this to the the victory of reac reaction? One One must must show show the the Communists, Communists,and and in in the thefirst first place place the the Party Partyactivists, activists, tion? the Chekists Chekists [the [the SB] and and the themilitary military comrades comrades that that it itis is not not just justa a question of of the question defending socialist socialist achievements achievements in in Poland, Poland, but but a a question question of of protecting protecting their their defending own lives, lives, that that of of their their families, families, who who would would be be subjected subjected to to terror terror by by the the reac reacown tion, if, if, God God forbid, forbid, this this came came to to pass. pass. tion, Sometimes our our Polish Polish comrade comrade say say that that they they cannot cannot rely rely on on the theParty. Party. I can Sometimes cannot not believe believe this. this. Out Out of of three three million million Party Party members, members, one one can can find find 100,000 100,000 who who would would be be ready ready to to sacrifice sacrifice themselves. themselves.Wyszynski Wyszynski and and Walsa WaFsahave have roped roped in the the free free trade trade unions unions and and are are securing securing more more and and more more new new positions in var varin positions in ious spheres in Poland. There are are already already the the first first signs signs that that the counterious spheres in Poland. There the counter revolutionary revolutionary infection infection is is affecting affecting the the army. army. Comrade that we be ready Comrade Brezhnev Brezhnev says says that we must must be ready for for struggle struggle both both by by peace peaceful means. ful means means and and by by non-peaceful non-peaceful means.

When When Andropov Andropov had had finished finished his his tirade, tirade, Milewski Milewski asked asked him, him, "You You have have convinced convinced me, comrades back back in me, but but how how am am I to to convince convince our our comrades in Warsaw?" Warsaw? Andropov's Andropovs reply reply is is not not recorded.10 recorded.

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On O n December December 5 an an extraordinary extraordinary meeting meeting of of Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact leaders leaders assembled assembled in in Moscow Moscow to to discuss discuss the the Polish Polish crisis. crisis. Kania Kania heard heard one one speaker speaker after after another another castigate castigate the weakness of policies and crackdown and the weakness of his his policies and demand demandan animmediate immediate crackdown on on Solidarity Solidarity and the intervene. Eighteen the Church. Church. Otherwise, Otherwise,he he was was told, told, Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact forces forces would would intervene. Eighteen divisions were already already on on the thePolish Polish borders borders and and Kania Kania was was shown shown plans plans for for the the occudivisions were occu pation of Polish Polish cities cities and and towns. towns. The The meeting was followed followed by bya a private private discussion pation of meeting was discussion between Kania Kania and and Brezhnev. Brezhnev. Military Military intervention, intervention, Kania Kania insisted, insisted, would would be be a a disbetween dis aster don't march aster for for the the Soviet Soviet Union Union as as well well as as for for Poland. Poland. "OK, OK, we we dont march into into Poland Poland now," Brezhnev replied, "but if situation gets will come."l1 now, Brezhnev replied, but if the the situation gets any any worse worsewe we will come.1 Brezhnev's already at Brezhnevs threat threat was was probably probably a bluff bluff. With With Soviet Soviet forces forces already at war war in in Afghanistan and and the the probability probability that that military military intervention intervention in in Poland Poland would would result result in in Afghanistan a bloodbath, bloodbath, Western Western economic economic sanctions sanctions and and a a global global public public relations relations disaster, disaster, the the a Kremlins strategy strategy was was to to pressure the Poles Poles into into using martial law law to to end end Solidarity's Solidaritys Kremlin's pressure the using martial challenge to to the the Communist Communist one-party one-party state. state. Ultimately Ultimately the the most most effective effective way way of of challenge exercising was to exercising pressure pressure was to threaten threateninvasion invasion by bythe the Red Red Army. Army. Memories Memories of of Hungary Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in in 1968 and Afghanistan Afghanistan in in 1979 very few few in in in 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968 and 1979 meant meant that that very either Poland Poland or or the the West West failed failed to to take take the the threat threat seriously seriously in in 1980. 1980. either It took took over over a year year of of almost almost continuous continuous pressure, pressure, however, however, before the Polish Polish Polit PolitIt before the buro, to buro, after after a a series series of of personnel personnel changes, changes, finally finally agreed agreed to declare declare martial martial law. law. The The KGB mission Milewski was mission in in Warsaw Warsaw reported reported in in December December 1980 1980 that, that,although although Milewski was ready readyto to go ahead with the the "repression repression of of hostile people, most of the the Politburo Politburo was was not: not: go ahead with hostile people," most of
the Soviet Soviet Union Our friends consider Kania an honest Communist loyal to the CPSU, but but none none the the less less one one cannot cannot exclude exclude the the possibility possibility of of a a substantial substantial and CPSU, and difference between between his his point point of of view and and ours, especially on on the thequestion of tak takdifference view ours, especially question of decisive measures ing decisive measures .. .. .. Lately Comrade Comrade Kania has tended not to adopt immediately recommendations by Soviet Soviet representatives, representatives, displaying displaying doubts doubts immediately recommendations by and not not sharing sharing all all of of our our assessments assessments of of the the situation situation in in the the People's Peoples Republic Republic and of Poland. Poland.12 12 of

The KGB was also deeply concerned at what it believed was the growing Western 1,300 intelligence presence presence in Poland. According to data supplied by the SB, SB, of the 1 ,300 1981 about 150 150 were members or foreign journalists in Poland at the beginning of 1981 agents of of intelligence intelligence agencies. agencies. NATO NATO intelligence intelligence agencies, agencies, it it was was claimed, claimed, "were were agents Solidarity.13 acquiring firm agent positions within Solidarity."13 thePUWP continued to lose ground to Solidarity. Solidarity. On O n January For much of 1981 1981 the 15 Walesa was received receivedby by I1 in the theVatican. Vatican. "The The son," son, he announced rev rev15 Wa:l:sa John Paul II theworld's worlds television cameras, cameras, has come father.Increasingly, Increasingly,the erently to the "has come to see see the father." Walesa now appeared leaders of the Polish nation.14 nation.14In his con conPope and Wa:l:sa appeared as the real leaders theKGB, Milewski seemed to despair of defeating the challenge challenge from versations with the Walpas Solidarity without Soviet military intervention. As the news came came in of Wa:l:sa's I am beginning to think thinkthat that order will meeting with the thePope, Milewski told Aristov, Aristov, "I come only only when a reliable security guarantee guarantee in in the the form form of of allied allied come when Poland Poland has has a reliable security ambassador that the thePUWP had lost touch troops .. .. .. "15 Kania admitted to the Soviet ambassador

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with but a statement of of fact, fact, of of the the with the the Polish Polish people: people:"This This is is not not a a Solidarity Solidarity slogan slogan but a statement bitter truth." truth.The only forces forces on on which which he he could could rely relywere were the army bitter The only the army and and the the SB.16 SB. 16
I T H M A R TIA the Kremlin Kremlin to with the the W WITH T I A L LAW as as the the only only solution solution favored favored by by the to deal deal with Solidarity crisis, importance. O On Febru- Solidarity crisis, the the role role of of the the Polish Polish army army became became of ofcrucial crucial importance. n Febru-. 9, probably the minister of defense, General General Wojciech Wojciech ary ary 9, probably as as a a result result of of Soviet Soviet pressure, pressure, the minister of defense, Jaruzelski became Polish Slim, erect, wearing dark dark glasses Jaruzelski became Polish prime prime minister. minister. Slim, erect, habitually habitually wearing glasses and enigmatic figure for most most Poles. Poles. But But and an an inscrutable inscrutable expression, expression,Jaruzelski Jaruzelski was was an an enigmatic figure for he image both to he had had refused refused to he had had a a relatively relatively favorable favorablepublic public image due due both to the the fact fact that that he to of the armed forces forces as as the use use troops troops against against the the workers workers in in 1970 1970 and and to to the thereputation reputation of the armed the most to Brezhnev, Brezhnev, however, Jaruzelski had most trusted trusted state state institution. institution. In In KGB reports reports to however,Jaruzelski had long been described Union."17 O On long been described as as "a asincere sincere friend friend of of the the Soviet Soviet Union. n his his instructions, instructions, the the chief (later interior minister in in chief of of military military intelligence, intelligence, General General Czesfaw Czeslaw Kiszczak Kiszczak (later interior minister charge SB), had Warsaw every every charge of of the the SB), had for for some some time time been been meeting meeting the the KGB mission mission in in Warsaw two latest intelligence reports on on the crisis from military two or or three three days days to to provide provide the the latest intelligence reports the crisis from military sources.18 Minister, J aruzelski retained portfolio. sources. As As Prime Prime Minister, Jaruzelski retained the the defense defense portfolio. by recurrent Soviet The period period up up to to December December 1981 The 1981 was was to to be be characterized characterized by recurrent Soviet complaints to placate placate the the Soviet Soviet leadership. leadership. complaints of of Polish Polish inaction inaction and and Polish Polish attempts attempts to During that period assailed by recurrent as to to whether whether During that period the the Kremlin Kremlin was was assailed by recurrent doubts doubts as J aruzelski really possessed the resolve required to enforce martial law. In the end it it Jaruzelski really possessed the resolve required to enforce martial law. In the end concluded that available. Soviet Soviet doubts doubts about about Kania, Kania, how concluded that no no better better candidate candidate was was available. however, ever, were wereto to prove prove much much more more serious. serious. On aruzelski were to the Kremlin to to be be dressed dressed O n March March 4 Kania Kania and and J Jaruzelski were summoned summoned to the Kremlin down Politburo. When, the Soviet Soviet leaders down by by Brezhnev Brezhnev and and other other members members of of the the Politburo. When, the leaders demanded, impose martial And how was it it that, that, demanded, would would the the Polish Polish comrades comrades impose martial law? law? And how was alone the Socialist found it it so so difficult to control control the the alone among among the Socialist countries, countries, Poland Poland found difficult to Church?19 member of of the Politburo, Church? The The dressing-down dressing-down had had little little effect. effect. A member the Polish Polish Politburo, Mieczyslaw Kania had had told told him, him, shortly shortly after after his his Mieczyslaw Moczar, Moczar, informed informed the the KGB that that Kania return "In spite from Moscow, don't want want to use force force return to to Warsaw, Warsaw, In spite of of the the pressure pressure from Moscow, I dont to use against history as as the the butcher butcher of of the the Pol against the the opposition. opposition. I don't dont want want to to go go down down in in history Polish Polish informants, Kania said said that that ish people." people. According According to to another another of of the the KGB's KGBs Polish informants, Kania neither for a a confrontation confrontation with with SolidaritySolidarity neither the the Party Partynor nor the the government government was was ready readyfor "and I'll never ask the Russians and Ill never ask the Russians for for military military assistance."2o assistance.20 "We in Poland," Brezhnev told We have have huge huge worries worries about about the the outcome outcome of of events events in Poland, Brezhnev told the the Politburo listen and agree with rec Politburo on on April April 2. "Worst Worst of of all all is is that that our our friends friends listen and agree with our our recommendations, but counter-revolution is is ommendations, but in in practice practice they they don't dont do do anything. anything. And And a a counter-revolution taking fronts!" Ustinov, the defense minister, declared that if taking the the offensive offensive on on all all fronts! Ustinov, the defense minister, declared that if Socialism was wasto to survive survive in in Poland, bloodshed is is unavoidable. Solidarity,reported Socialism Poland, "bloodshed unavoidable." "Solidarity," reported Andropov, "is now position after the other. other." The only solution Andropov, is now starting starting to to grab grab one one position after the The only solution was was renewed renewed pressure pressure on on the the Poles Poles to to declare declare martial martial law: law:

We means a limited movement We have have to to tell tell them them that thatmartial martial law law means a curfew, curfew, limited movement in in the the city streets, strengthening security SB] in city streets, strengthening state state security [the [the SB] in Party Partyinstitutions, institutions, factories, factories, etc. aruzelski in etc. The The pressure pressure from from the the leaders leaders of of Solidarity Solidarity has has left left J Jaruzelski in terribly terribly

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bad lately to more bad shape, shape,while while lately Kania Kania has hasbegun begun to drink drink more and and more. more. This This is is a a very very out thatthat Polish sad sad phenomenon. phenomenon. I I want want to topoint point out Polish events eventsare are having having an an influence influence on Here, too, too, we'll well have have to to take take tough tough on the thewestern western areas areas of ofour our country countrytoo too.. .. .. Here, internal internal measures. measures. Next and Ustinov Next day day Kania Kaniaand and Jaruzelski Jaruzelski were were summoned summoned to to meet meet Andropov Andropov and Ustinov in in the the Soviet equivalent of a Pullman Pullman railway coach at the border border city Soviet equivalent of a railway coach at the city of of Brest-Litovsk. Brest-Litovsk. After After caviar caviar and and a a sumptuous sumptuousbuffet, buffet, they they were were seated seated at at aagreen-baize-covered green-baize-covered table table and and subjected subjected to to six six hours hours of of recriminations, recriminations, demands demands for for the the declaration declaration of of martial martial law responded by by law and and threats threats of of Soviet Soviet military military intervention. intervention. Kania Kania and and Jaruzelski Jaruzelski responded pleading 7, four four days days after after the the meeting meeting at at Brest-Litovsk, Brest-Litovsk, pleading for for more more time.21 time.21On O n April April 7, Mieczyslaw Mieczyslaw Moczar Moczar had had another anotherconversation conversation with with Kania Kania which which he he reported reportedto tothe the KGB. KGB. Kania Kania clearly clearly believed believed that that the the threat threat of of military military intervention intervention was was in in deadly deadly earnest. told earnest. "There There would would be bea a tragedy tragedy on on aahuge huge scale scaleif if Soviet Soviet forces forcesintervene," intervene,he he told Moczar. Poles Moczar. "It Itwould would take take two two generations generationsof of Poles to to remedy remedy the the consequences."22 consequences.22 The The Soviet Soviet Politburo Politburo believed believed that that such such a a threat threat of ofmilitary military intervention intervention was was the the main main restraining restraining influence influence on on Polish Polish "anti-Socialist anti-Socialist forces." forces. On O n April April 23 23 it it approved approved a Poland a report reporton on Poland which which concluded: concluded: Solidarity been transformed transformed into an organized Solidarity has has been into an organized political political force, force, which which has has the the capacity capacity to to paralyze paralyze the the activity activity of of the the Party Party and and state state organs organs and and take take de de If the f acto power facto power into into its its own own hands. hands. If the opposition opposition has has not not yet yet done done this, this, that that is is primarily because of troops would and primarilybecause of its its fear fear that that Soviet Soviettroops would be be introduced introducedand because it can achieve its because of of its its hopes hopes that that it can achieve its aims aims without without bloodshed bloodshed and and by by means means of of aacreeping creeping counter-revolution. counter-revolution. The agreed,as "as a deterrentto to counter-revolution," the The Politburo Politburo agreed, a deterrent counter-revolution, to to "exploit exploit to to the utmost the fears internal reactionaries international imperialism the utmost the fears of of internal reactionaries and and international imperialism that that the Soviet Soviet Union Union might mightsend send its its troops troops into into Poland." Poland. It It also also decided decidedto to maintain maintain"support support for and Jaruzelski, despite their for Comrades Comrades Kania Kania and Jaruzelski, who, who, despite their well-known well-known waffling, waffling, are are in in favor pressure favor of of defending defendingSocialism." Socialism.They They must, must, however, however, be be put put under under"constant constant pressure to more significant to pursue pursue more significant and and decisive decisive actions actions to to overcome overcome the the crisis crisis and and preserve preserve Poland Poland as as a a Socialist Socialist country country friendly friendly to to the the Soviet Soviet Union."23 Union.23 O n May May 13 On audience in 13John John Paul Paul II I1 gave gave his his usual usual Wednesday Wednesdaygeneral general audience in St. St. Peter's Peters Square. As he Square. he was was waving wavingto to the the crowds crowds from from his his open-topped open-topped "Popemobile," Popemobile, he he was was twenty feet by a a Turkish Turkish would-be would-be assassin, assassin, Mehmet Mehmet Ali Mi shot from from a a distance distance of twenty shot feet by Agca. the Agca. The The bullet bullet passed passed a a few few millimeters millimetersfrom from the Pope's Popes central central aorta; aorta; had had it it hit hithis his aorta, the thePope Pope would wouldhave have died instantly.John John Paul PaulII I1believed believed that that his his life life had had been been aorta, died instantly. saved Portugal, saved by bya a miracle miracle performed performed by bythe the Virgin Virgin of of Fatima Fatimainin Portugal, whose whosefeast feast day day it it was. On O n the the first first anniversary anniversary of of the the assassination assassination attempt, attempt, he he made made a a pilgrimage pilgrimage to to was. Fatima to to place place Agcas bullet on on her her altar.24 altar.24If If the the Pope Pope had had died, died, the the KGB would would Fatima Agca's bullet doubtless have have been been overjoyed. overjoyed.But But there there is is no no evidence evidencein in any any of of the thefiles files examined examined doubtless by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin that that itit was involved involved in in the theattempt attempt on his life.25 life.25 by was on his

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In after the pressure on In the the weeks weeks after the assassination assassination attempt, attempt, the the strongest strongest pressure on Kania Kania and and Jaruzelski from Marshal Jaruzelski to to declare declare martial martiallaw law came came from Marshal Viktor Viktor Kulikov, Kulikov, the the short-tempered short-tempered commander-in-chief Kulikov accused Jaruzelski of cowardice. commander-in-chief of of Warsaw WarsawPact Pactforces. forces. Kulikov accused Jaruzelski of cowardice. "You Youyourself, yourself,Comrade Comrade Jaruzelski," Jaruzelski, he hetold told him, him, "are are afraid afraid of of taking taking decisive decisive action." action. time martial law, Kulikov's Though Though insisting insisting that that the the time was was not not ripe ripe for for martial law,Jaruzelski Jaruzelski accepted accepted Kulikovs insults-according remarkable meekness and insults-according to to a a KGB report report to to the the Politburo-with Politburo-with remarkable meekness and even offered to remained deeply suspicious ofof the even offered to resign resign as as prime prime minister.26 minister.26Kulikov Kulikov remained deeply suspicious the motives motives of ofboth both Kania Kania andJaruzelski, and Jaruzelski, reporting reporting to to the thePolitburo, Politburo, "It Itlooks looks as as though though the the leadership dishonest political leadership of ofthe the PUWP and and the the government government is is conducting conducting a a dishonest political game game and and is is facilitating facilitating the the accession accession to to power power of ofthose those backing backing Solidarity."27 S~lidarity.~ The come to The Centre Centre informed informed the the Warsaw Warsaw KGB mission mission that that the the time time had had come to find find both prime minister: both a a new new first first secretary secretary and and a a new new prime minister:
Kania and and J Jaruzelski are no no longer longer capable capable of of leading leading Party Party and and government government Kania aruzelski are effectively. effectively.They They cannot cannot organize organize the the defeat defeat of of the the opposition, opposition, and and have have been been compromised compromised by by cooperating cooperating for for many many years years with with Gierek. Gierek. There There is is no no doubt doubt essential for that that they they do do not not even even have have the the fighting fighting qualities qualities which which are are essential for politi political cal leaders leaders capable capable of of taking taking decisive decisive measures. measures.

The the Polish The Centre's Centres preferred preferred candidates candidates on on the Polish Politburo Politburo to to succeed succeed Kania Kania and and Jaruzelski Both, it Jaruzelski were were the the hardliners hardliners Tadeusz Tadeusz Grabski Grabski and and Stefan Stefan Olszowski. Olszowski. Both, it reported, "are imbued with a firm Marxist-Leninist outlook, and are prepared to act reported, are imbued with a firm Marxist-Leninist outlook, and are prepared to act decisively decisively and and consistently consistently in in defense defense of of Socialist Socialistinterests interests and and of of friendship friendship with with the the Soviet Soviet Union."28 Union.28On On May May 30 30 Aristov Aristov and and Pavlov Pavlov sent sent a a joint joint telegram telegram to to Brezhnev Brezhnev and consistent capitulation and the the Politburo, Politburo, accusing accusing Kania Kania and and Jaruzelski Jaruzelski of of consistent capitulation to to "revi revisionist elements": sionist elements: The dismissing The present present situation situation requires requires urgent urgent consideration consideration of of the the necessity necessity of of dismissing [Kania] [Kania] from"his fromhis post post as as first first secretary secretary of of the the central central committee committee and and replacing replacing him capable of of ensuring of the him with with a a comrade comrade capable ensuring the the survival survival of the Party's Partys Marxist MarxistLeninist Leninist nature nature and and of of the the Socialist Socialist character character of of the the Polish Polish state state .. .. ..An An analysis analysis of post of of the the mood mood of of Party Party activists activists shows showsthat that the the most most suitable suitable candidate candidate for for post of first the first secretary secretary of of the PUWP central central committee committee is is Comrade Comrade T. T. Grabski.29 Having Having discovered discovered that that the theKGB was was plotting plotting against against him, him, Kania Kania lapsed lapsedinto into a a tone tone of of almost almostwhimpering whimpering self-pity. self-pity. When When Pavlov Pavlov phoned phoned him him on onJune June 7 7 to to ask ask if ifhe he pro proposed to demanding posed to ring ring Comrade Comrade Brezhnev Brezhnev to to reply reply to to another another letter letter from from Moscow Moscow demanding tough replied, "There tough action action against against Solidarity, Solidarity,Kania Kania replied, There is is probably probably now now no no point point in in my my telephoning already been been decided decided without ." telephoning as as everything everything has has already without me me [being [being consulted] consulted]. Later Later that that night night Kania Kania rang rang Pavlov Pavlov back backat at home home in in order order to to appeal appeal for for sympathy: sympathy: At At this this very very moment moment your your people people [the [the KGB] KGB] are are saying saying that that it it is is necessary necessary to to speak Kania and speak up up at at the the Plenum Plenum [of [of the the PUWP PUVVP central central committee] committee] against against Kania and

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Jaruzelski . You neverhave have had, Jaruzelski .. .. . You do do not not have, have, and and you you never had, more more trustworthy trustworthy friends than me aruzelski .. .. .. I am amazed at friends than me and and J Jaruzelski am amazed at the the method methodyou you have have cho chosen sen for for dealing dealing with with me. me. I do do not notdeserve deserve this this .. .. .. There There is is no no need need to to mobilize mobilize the members of Committee against me. It is the members of the theCentral Central Committee against me. is clear clearthat that I shall shall be be on on the the side side of of the the CPSU .. .. .. It is is very very bitter bitter sensation sensation for for me me to to realize realize that that I have have lost your trust. I feel you such a way lost your trust. feel hurt hurt that that you have havechosen chosen such a roundabout roundabout way to to mobi mobilize cult to lize opinion opinion for for an an attack attack on on me me at at the the Plenum. Plenum. I therefore therefore find find it it diffi difficult to speak speak to to Comrade Comrade Brezhnev. Brezhnev. What What can can I say say to to him?30 him?30 When aruzelski for When Kulikov Kulikov asked askedJ Jaruzelski for his his reaction reaction to to the thelatest latest philippic philippic from from Moscow, Moscow, he replied, me into into the ground. Im I'm a he replied, "They They are are hammering hammering me the ground. a fool fool for for accepting accepting this this post [of prime minister] ,"31 post [of prime mini~ter].~ During June June a a group group of of nine nine Polish Polish generals generals approached approached the the KGB with with a a plan plan to to During remove J aruzelski because order martial replace him remove Jaruzelski because of of his his unwillingness unwillingness to to order martial law law and and replace him with with a a new new defense defense minister minister (presumably (presumably one one of of the the plotters), plotters), who who would would arrest arrest the the rest points and counter rest of of the the government, government, take take control control of of strategic strategic points and seize seize up up to to 3,000 3,000 counterrevolutionaries deported to the Soviet Bloc. An revolutionaries who who would would be be deported to elsewhere elsewhere in in the Soviet Bloc. An action action group led led by by the the defense defense minister, minister, containing no members of either either the the previous previous gov govgroup containing no members of ernment or Bloc for ernment or the the Politburo, Politburo, would would then then appeal appeal to to the the rest rest of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc for "mili military assistance assistance to to protect protect Socialism Socialism in in the Polish People's Peoples Republic."32 Republic.32Moscow's Moscows tary the Polish response to to the for a a military is not recorded in noted by by response the plan plan for military coup coup is not recorded in the the files files noted Mitrokhin. Given Given its its desire to avoid avoid "military military assistance" assistanceand and preserve a semblance semblance of Mitrokhin. desire to preserve a of legality, however, however,it it cannot cannot have have been been attracted attracted by by it. it. legality, Jaruzelski's Jaruzelskis main main concern concern seems seems to to have have been been less less his his own own personal personal position position than than to prevent prevent the the disaster disaster of of Soviet Soviet military military intervention. intervention. On O n June June 22 he he held held a a meeting meeting to with with the the minister minister of of the the interior, interior, General General Milewski, Milewski, whom whom he he knew knew was was trusted trusted by by the Kremlin. Kremlin. How, How, asked asked Jaruzelski, Jaruzelski, could could he he "regain regain the the trust of our our Soviet Soviet com comthe trust of rades?Milewski Milewski replied replied that, that, though though Soviet Soviet confidence confidence in in the the Polish Polish leadership leadership had had rades?" been severely damaged, damaged, it it had hadnot not been entirely destroyed: destroyed: "If If there there had had been none at at been severely been entirely been none all , they all, they would would have have stopped stopped talking talking to to us." us. Jaruzelski Jaruzelski complained complained that, that, so so far far as as he he was concerned, they had had indeed indeed stopped stopped talking. talking. Previously, Previously,Kulikov Kulikov had phoned phonedhim him was concerned, they had almost every every day day and and had frequently come come to to see see him. him. Recently Recently he he had broken all all almost had frequently had broken contact. Soviet Soviet representatives representatives in in Warsaw Warsaw were were instructed instructed to to tell tell J Jaruzelski their contact. aruzelski that that their confidence in him had indeed shaken and and that that it would disappear altogether confidence in him had indeed been been shaken it would disappear altogether unless he mended mended his his ways.33 ways.33 unless he Centre files files record record that that in in the weeks before before the opening opening of of the the Ninth NinthPUWP Con ConCentre the weeks the gress gress on on July July 14, 14, the the Soviet Soviet embassy, embassy,the the KGB KGB mission mission and and Soviet Soviet military military representa representatives "worked worked among among the delegates to to identify identifjr Party Party members members who who followed followed the the tives the delegates Marxist-Leninist line, to establish personal contact with them, them, and and through through them them to to Marxist-Leninist line, to establish personal contact with influence the course Congress.34 influence course of the Congress."34 The Suslov Suslov Commission, set up by the PolitPolit buro a a year year earlier earlierto to monitor monitor the the Polish crisis, gave gave instructions that that the thethreat threat of mil milburo Polish crisis, instructions of othermembers of the Warsaw Pact must be "a a constant factor itary intervention by the other all Polish political O n the eve of the congress, congress, the Centre political forces."35 On Centre inthe the minds of all a straightforward instructed Pavlov, the head of the KGB mission in Warsaw, to have "a

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conversation with S. Kania and Jaruzelski on their weak Party and government work, conversation and remind them of their earlier earlier statements of of readiness to cede cede their Party and govgov necessaryin the the interest of of saving systemin Poland and ernment jobs if necessary saving the Socialist system Socialist cooperation in Europe." Europe. The choice of of Kanias successor,in the the unity of Socialist Kania's successor, Centresview, lay layamong three leading hardliners: hardliners: Tadeusz Grabski, Stefan Olszowski Olszowski Centre's and Andrzej Andrzej Zabinski. Zabinski. All A l l other other representatives representatives of healthy forces the P I of "healthy forces" in in the PUWP and lacked the the necessary necessary authority authority to to become become first first secretary. secretary,The KGB also also drew up a lacked The KGB drew up a list list suitable for election thePolitburo and a hit hitlist of removed of those suitable election to the of moderates moderates to be removed from the the government government and and Party Party posts. posts. Top Top of hitlist was the the deputy minisfrom of the the hit list was deputy prime prime minis ter, Mieczyslaw Mieczysf-aw Rakowski, who had had threatened threatened to to inform inform the the leaders leaders of the Italian and ter, Rakowski, who of the Italian and French Communist Communist Parties Parties about about Soviet Soviet interference in the internal affairs affairs of the French interference in the internal of the PUWP.. The The Centre Centre concluded concluded that, that, in in view view of] of Jaruzelskis authority in in the the PUWP aruzelski's continuing continuing "authority country and and especially especiallyin in the thearmy," army,it it would would be beunwise unwise simply to dismiss country simply to dismiss him. him. Rather, Rather, it was was hoped hoped to to kick kick him him upstairs to the theless less powerful powerful post of president and it upstairs to post of president and harness harness his his personal prestige in support support of of a a hardline government.6 personal prestige in hardline government.36 far as as Moscow Moscow was was concerned, concerned, however, however, the the Ninth Ninth PUWP Congress Congress failed to So far failed to according to to plan. plan. Faced Faced with with a a blatant blatant Soviet Soviet attempt attempt to to unseat unseat Kania, Kania, the go according the concon gress rallied rallied round him. But, But, taking seriously seriously the threat threat of Soviet invasion, invasion, the congress con of the the chief supporters of of the the Soviet Soviet gress also also retained retained among among the the leadership leadership some some of gress chief supporters campaign of of intimidation. intimidation. And Andthough though it gave gave loud loud applause applause to to Rakowski's Rakowskis speech, campaign it speech, it it dared Politburo. main conse dared not not antagonize antagonize the the Kremlin Kremlin by by electing electing him him to to the the Politburo. The The main consequence a near quence of of the the contradictory contradictory outcome outcome of of the the congress congress was wasa near paralysis paralysis of of govern government. Women Women and children marched through Polish Polish cities to ment. and children marched through cities banging banging empty empty pans pans to protest Solidarity, industrial workers elected protest against against food food shortages. shortages. Encouraged Encouraged by by Solidarity, industrial workers elected factory councils councils which which claimed claimed the the right right to tochoose choose their their managers.37 managers.37 factory The worsening worsening crisis crisis of of central central government government seems to have have convinced The seems to convinced Jaruzelski Jaruzelski that martial martial law law would would soon inevitable. Detailed Detailed plans plans were were agreed with that soon become become inevitable. agreed with Kulikov early early in in August. a meeting meeting with with J Jaruzelski senior Polish on Kulikov August. At a aruzelski and and senior Polish generals generals on August 12, 12, Kulikov Kulikov demanded demanded "firmness firmness and and still still more more firIl"lIless."38 firmness.738 O n August August On August 21 21 the new new hardline hardline interior interior minister, minister, General General Czesf-aw head of milthe Czeslaw Kszczak, Kiszczak, formerly formerly head of mil itary intelligence, intelligence, visited visited Moscow Moscow to to report reportpersonally personally to to Andropov Andropov on on secret itary secret prepaprepa rations by by the the SB SB and and police police for for the theintroduction of martial martial law. rations introduction of law. Hitherto, Hitherto,he he acknowledged, were an an egg acknowledged, "The The Polish Polish leadership leadership has has handled handled Solidarity Solidarity as as if if it it were egg which toto this."39 which it it was was afraid afraid to to break. break. We We must must put put a a stop stop this.7739 Kiszczak and and the the SB SB no no longer longer saw saw Walsa Waf-pa as as the the main main problem. During the the preKiszczak problem. During pre vious become somewhat as he strug vious six six months months Walsa's Waf-pasleadership leadership had had become somewhat lackluster lackluster as he struggled ultimately had choose between between gled to to recover recover a a clear clear sense senseof of direction. direction. Solidarity Solidarity ultimately had to to choose strategic options: options: either either it it had had to to become become a a truly truly revolutionary body capable two strategic revolutionary body capable of of overthrowing state, or or it it had accommodate itself to to the overthrowing the the Communist Communist one-party one-party state, hadto to accommodate itself the system and and be withwinning winning few a concessions. concessions. Walpa found himself unable system be content content with a few Walsa found himself unable to a general general strike in March to opt opt clearly clearly for for either either option. option.He H e had had backed backed away away from from a strike in March when most most other other leading leading figures figures in in Solidarity Solidarity believed believed the the time timehad had come for for a a show showwhen come down, Zbigniew Zbigniew Bujak, Bujak, chairman chairman of of Solidarity Solidarity in in the theWarsaw Warsaw region, region, concluded concluded that that down. Walsa Walqsa had had made made a a fatal fatal mistake: mistake:

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General you take General strikes strikes are are like like swords-once swords-once you take them them out out of of the the scabbard scabbard and and fail fail to to use use them, them, they they are are no no more more use use than than useless useless hunks hunks of of iron. iron. Walsa Walpa in in effect effect demobilized demobilized the the union union .. .. .. It deprived deprived us us of of our our basic basic weapon weapon and and thus thus became authorities counted counted on this became the the source source of of our our subsequent subsequent defeat. defeat. The The authorities on this when prepared the operation of when they they prepared the martial martial law law operation of December December 13.40 13.40
Kiszczak told told Andropov Andropov that, that, though Walpsa might might use useaggressive language to to Kiszczak though Walsa aggressive language appeal to to Solidarity Solidarity "extremists," extremists, his his thinking thinking was was relatively moderate. The The main main appeal relatively moderate. danger "He is danger now now came came from from Bujak, Bujak, who who was was both both "nti-Socialist anti-Socialist and and anti-Soviet:" anti-Soviet: He is cleverer cleverer than than Walsa Walpa and and is is closely closely linked linked with with [the [the KOR leaders] leaders] Kur6n Kur6n and and Mich Michnik. The The task task of of the the [SB] agencies is isto to discredit discredit him. nik. [SB] agencies him."

time," s time, Kiszczak Kiszczak told told Andropov, Andropov, "the the Roman Roman Catholic Catholic Church Church does a threat threat to tothe the PUWP.Milewski Milewski had had devoted devoted "immense immense efforts" efforts does not not represent represent a PUWP." to the the agent agent penetration penetration of of the the Church, Church, and and the the SB was was now now well-informed well-informed about about to its mood mood and Out of of seventy seventy bishops, good contacts contacts are are maintained maintained its andintentions: intentions: "Out bishops, good with fifty. fifty. This This makes makes it it possible possible to to bring bring influence influence to to bear bear on on the the Catholic Catholic Church Church with and to to prevent prevent undesirable moves.41 The recent death of of the the 80-year-old and undesirable moves."41 The recent death 80-year-old Primate, Primate, Cardinal Cardinal Wyszynski, Wyszynski, a a friend friend of of Solidarity Solidarity and and for for over over a a generation generation a a courageous courageous defender come as immense relief (and doubt defender of of religious religious freedom, freedom, had had come as an an immense relief to to the the SB SB (and doubtless to to the the KGB): less
The new new Primate, Primate, [Cardinal [Cardinal Jozef] Jbzef] Glemp, Glemp,is is not not as as anti-Soviet anti-Soviet as as his his prede predeThe cessor. Wyszynski Wyszynski enjoyed enjoyed immense immense authority; authority; his his word word was was law. H e was was the the cessor. law. He object of of a a personality personality cult cult and and his his cult cult exceeded exceeded anything anything imaginable. imaginable. Glemp Glemp object is a a different different kind kind of of man man and and there there are are undoubtedly undoubtedly possibilities possibilities of of exerting exerting is influence on him. influence however, remained in Church-state Church-state relations. The first was the Pope, Two problems, however, who-according to Kiszczak-was Kiszczak-was cleverly exploiting the situation in Poland to who-according advance anti-Communist policies policies in in eastern eastern Europe. Europe. The The second second problem problem was was the the advance his his anti-Communist moral authority of of the the Polish Church. The people looked on the the Church, Church, not notthe the standard-bearer of morality." morality. "In In the immediate future, Party, as the "standard-bearer future," Kiszczak to change the attitude admitted, the "the Party Party will not be able to attitude towards the Catholic Church. Church." Andropov seems to have hectored Kiszczak rather less than most other Polish leaders hadmet met fewyears. years. But he heended their meeting in somber leaders he had over the previous few mood: challenge the people's peoples power The class enemy has repeatedly tried to challenge power in the the Socialist countries . . . But the Polish crisis is the most long drawn out, and Socialist ... crisis and dangerous. The adversary's adversarys creeping counter-revolution has perhaps the most dangerous. Socialism.42 long been preparing for the struggle with Socialism.42

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Solidarity's sessions from from September September 5 to to 10 Solidaritys first first national national congress congress (held (held in in two two sessions 10 and from from September September 26 to toOctober provided further further evidence evidence of of "creeping creeping and October 7) provided to the working people of eastern counter-revolution. Its Its appeal appeal on on September September 8 "to counter-revolution." the working people of eastern difficult Europe .. .. ..who have entered the diffi cult road to struggle for a free trade union as a brazen attempt attempt to to interfere in the the inter intermovement was was denounced denounced by by the the SB as movement" "a brazen interfere in affairs of ofSocialist Socialist c~untries.~~ nal affairs countries."43 nowseemed seemed satisfied that J Jaruzelski was prepared prepared for for"decisive decisive measures to satisfi ed that aruzelski was measures" to Pavlov now the threat from Solidarity." solidarity.. O n September 29 he reported to the Centre Centre that he end "the On that he had advised Jaruzelski theline to follow at the the plenary meeting of Central Com Com"advised" Jaruzelski on the of the Central 18.MThe first ofKania, Kania, mittee on October 18.44 The fi rst priority was to get rid of who, Pavlov reported, apolicy policy conciliation towards Solidarity. Having failed to secure continued to pursue "a ofof conciliation" towards Solidarity. Kanias dismissal the congress, Moscow was determined to succeed at the the Kania's dismissal at the July Party congress, beenparticularly October Central Committee plenum. The Centre must have been particularly outraged by Pavlov's Pavlovsaccount Kanias policy policygiven by his supporter, account of a secret secret briefing briefing on Kania's supporter, Deputy Barcikowski, Prime Minister Kazimierz Barcikowski, on October 2,1981. 2, 1981. According to Barcikowski, disenchantedwith the Soviet model modelof Kania was "disenchanted of Socialism: Socialism":
The Soviet Soviet system system of ofSocialism Socialism had failed failed the theUSSR was had the test. test. The The fact fact that that the was The systematically buying buying grain grain in in the the West West was systematically was an an indication indication of of serious serious errors errors in in the management management of of agriculture agriculture .. .. .. The The power power of Soviet regime regime was the of the the Soviet was mainmain tained of coercion. coercion. However, However, in in the tained only only through through the the army army and and other other agencies agencies of the last two two or three years, the situation had begun to change to the the Soviet Unions Union's disadvantage. China was signifi significantly disadvantage. cantly strengthening its military power; its milmil itary and and economic economic contacts contacts with with the the USA were were a threat to to the theUSSR, itary a serious serious threat and pinned pinned down down a a large large number number of of troops troops on the far In the and on the far eastern eastern borders. borders. In the the situation in Afghanistan had sharply deteriorated. It was last few months, the impossible to win this conflict politically without the the now clear that itit would be impossible use of ofmass mass repressive measures similar to bythe use repressive measures similar to those those used used by the Americans Americans in in VietViet nam. If at at the the present time the the USSR still had advantage over nam. If present time had some some strategic strategic advantage over three or or four four years years it it would USA, within within three would lose lose it, it, as as the the Soviet Soviet economy economy the USA, would no no longer longer be be able ableto to meet meet the the additional additional expense ofdeveloping developing and would expense of and propro ducing new new types types of of armaments. armaments. ducing The imposition imposition of of the the Soviet Soviet model model of of socialism socialism had, believed, bureaucratized The had, Kania Kania believed, "bureaucratized the PUWP and and distorted distorted Leninist Leninist principles: principles: the PUWP"

He do everything everything to to protect protect the the positive pOSItive H e regarded regarded it it as as his his main main task task to todo processes taking place Poland, including the Solidarity Solidarity movement, movement, in in order order processes taking place in in Poland, including the to create create a a basis for genuine genuine Socialism Socialism which, which, with to basis for with certain certain variations, variations, could could also also find find a a place place in in other other Socialist Socialist countries.45 c~untries.~ Even never made a devastating devastating indictindict Even Dubtek Dubtek during during the the Prague Prague Spring Spring had had never made such such a ment of of the the Soviet Soviet system. system. ment

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Pavlov's Pavlovs detailed detailed reports reports on on Kania Kania indicate indicate either either that that his his home home had had been been bugged bugged or immediate family. or that that there there was was an an informer informer in in his his immediate family. He H e informed informed the the Centre Centre that that on 5, Kania "Kania came home in on October October 5, came home in a a very very agitated agitated state state and and told told a a narrow narrow circle circle of of his family family that that the the Russian Russian comrades comrades are are again again plotting plotting to toremove remove him him from from the the post his post of of First First Secretary." Secretary. Kania Kania claimed claimed not not to to understand understand why why his his Soviet Soviet "friends" friendsdid did not not tell tell him him frankly frankly that that he he must must resign. resign. If If they they did did so, so, he he would would go go "without without causing causing a a fuss." hss. According According to to the the KGB, Kania's Kanias wife wife was wasdeeply deeply disturbed disturbed by by his his state state of of mind mind and and anxious anxious for for him him to to resign resign so so that that he he could could recover recover his his health health and and cease cease to to be be "a a persecuted persecuted politician." politician. But But Pavlov Pavlov did did not not believe believe that that Kania Kania really really intended intended to to go quietly. H e reported reported on on October October 7 that that Kania Kania had had instructed Kiszczak to to take take action action quietly. He instructed Kiszczak against a a number number of of Party Party members members who, who, he he believed believed (no (no doubt doubtcorrectly), correctly), were were plotagainst plot ting against against him.46 Kiszczak, however, however,sided with Jaruzelski Jaruzelski and and the the plotters. ting him.46 Kiszczak, sided with plotters. Kanias fate fate was wassealed at a a stormy stormy confrontation confrontation with with Jaruze1ski, Jaruzelski, Kiszczak, Kiszczak, Kania's sealed at Milewski (now (now secretary secretary of of the the PUWP central central committee) committee) and and two two other other Polish Polish gen genMilewski erals. aruze1ski told erals. J Jaruzelski told him him that, that, unless unless he he agreed agreed to to preparations preparations for for martial martial law, law, they they would go ahead ahead behind his back-and back-and decisive (but unspecified) unspecified) action action would would be be would behind his "decisive" (but taken against against him him personally.47 per~onally.~~ the On morningof of October 18,just just before before the the open opentaken On the morning October 18, ing of of the the plenary plenary meeting meeting of of the thecentral central committee, committee, Aristov Aristov informed informed Kania Kania that that it it ing was the the "unanimous unanimous view" view in in Moscow Moscow that that he heshould should be be replaced replaced as as first first secretary secretary by by was J a r ~ z e l s k i The . ~ ~ central T h e committee committee duly duly did did Moscow's Moscows bidding, bidding, and and Kania gave way way Jaruze1ski.48 central Kania gave reports, Kania after his dismissal that that he he without a struggle. According According to KGB reports, Kania said said after his dismissal was still still haunted haunted by by memories memories of of the the shooting shootingof of strikers in 1970. 1970.Ifhe If he had hadremained remained was strikers in first secretary, secretary, he he would would never never have have been been able able to to give give the the order order to to open open fire fire again.49 again.49 first Next day, day, October October 19, 19, Brezhnev Brezhnev telephoned telephoned Jaruzelski Jaruzelski to to congratulate congratulate him him on on his his Next appointment as first first secretary, secretary,while while keeping keeping his his existing existing posts as prime prime minister and appointment as posts as minister and Hello, Wojciech," Wojciech, Brezhnev began. "Hello, Hello, my dear, deeply defense minister. "Hello, esteemed Leonid Ilyich! Jaruzelski replied. H e maintained the same same sycophantic sycophantic esteemed Leonid Ilyich!" Jaruze1ski replied. He maintained the tone throughout throughout the theconversation: conversation: tone

all for the Thank you very much, dear Leonid Ilyich, for the greeting and above all confidence confidence you have in me. I want to tell you frankly that I had some inner do so only because I knew misgivings about accepting this post and agreed to do If this had not not that you support me and that you were in favor of this decision. decision. If been so, I would would never never have have agreed agreed to to it. it. been so,
Jaruzelski added that, later in the theday, day, he would be meeting Aristov to discuss the sit sitJaruze1ski be asking for your suggestions on some questions which uation in detail and would "be he, no doubt, doubt,will convey convey you. Lying effortlessly, effortlessly, Brezhnev told J Jaruzelski the to you." aruze1ski that the CPSU Politburo had realized long ago that he Prehe was the right right man for the job.50 Pre dictably, he made no mention of the fact that in in the thecourse course of the summer summer the theKGB dictably, Jaruzelski end,however, however, the Polit Polithad recommended sacking J aruze1ski as well as Kania. In the end, authoritytoto buro had reluctantly concluded that only Jaruzelski possessed the authority declare law.51 martial law. 51

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Soviet continued. On Soviet doubts doubts about about Jaruzelski, Jaruzelski, however, however, continued. O n November November 4 Jaruzelski Jaruzelski began talks talks with with Walsa Walpa and and Archbishop Archbishop Glemp Glemp at atwhich which he he proposed began proposed their their participartici Front pation in aaFront of National Accord which, while it would have no decision-making dialogue between the state, Church and unions. unions.52 powers, would keep open dialogue 52 Though damp down any suspicion suspicion by Pavlov and Aristov were in favor of tactics designed to damp Walpsa and Glemp that thatmartial law was imminent, they feared that Jaruzelski Walsa Jaruzelski would end by making real concessions. concessions. O n November 13 sent aajoint jointtelegram to the the On 13 they sent Jaruzelskis indecisiveness Politburo condemning Jaruzelski's indecisiveness and his attempttoto conciliate conciliate Walpsa, and urging that he he be pressed pressed yet again to declare martial law without h rWalsa, fur ther delay. delays3 O n november november 21 the Politburo Politburo approved approved the the text text of ther 53 On 21 the of a a personal personal message message from Brezhnev Brezhnev to to J Jaruzelski, berating him inaction: from aruzelski, berating him for for his his inaction: The sway in many large The anti-Socialist anti-Socialist forces forces are are not not only only gaining gaining sway in many large industrial industrial enterprises, their influence among ever ever wider wider enterprises, but but are are also also continuing continuing to tospread spread their influence among segments of of the the population. population. Worse Worse still, the leaders leaders of segments still, the of Solidarity Solidarity and and the the counter-revolutionaries are are still still appearing appearing before audiences and counter-revolutionaries before various various audiences and makmak ing openly openly inflammatory inflammatory speeches speeches aimed aimed at at stirring stirring up nationalist passions and ing up nationalist passions and directed Socialism. The The direct consequence of of directed against against the the PUWP and and against against Socialism. direct consequence this . this is is the the dangerous dangerous growth growth of of anti-Sovietism anti-Sovietism in in Poland Poland. The leaders leaders of of the the anti-Socialist anti-Socialist forces forces .. . are placing placing great great store .. . are store by by the the .. .. .. The will be entering the army who have been worked fact that a new group of recruits fact that anew group of recruits w l ibe entering the army who have beenworked on Solidarity. Doesn't this failure to to take take harsh harsh measures measures on by by Solidarity. Doesnt this suggest suggest to to you you that that aafailure l icost youvaluable valuable time?54 against the the counter-revolutionaries counter-revolutionaries right right away away w will cost you time?54 against J aruzelski seems seems finally Soviet pressure pressure at beginning of of Jaruzelski finally to to have have given given way way to to Soviet at the the beginning December. Politburo on December 5 that, that, after after on December December. He H e told told a a meeting meeting of of the the PUWP Politburo thirty-six years years of of the the "people's peoplespower" power in in Poland, Poland, there there sadly sadly seemed thirty-six seemed no no alternative alternative to using police "police methods" against the class. The Politburo unanimously unanimously to using methods against the working working class. The Politburo accepted 55 The main details of its its implementation implementation accepted the the need need to to declare declare martial martial law. law. The main details of were supervision who briefed briefed Pavlov Pavlov on on Decem were worked worked out out under underthe the supervision of of Kiszczak/6 Kis~czak,~ who December other interior ber 7. 7. One One hundred hundred and and fifty-seven fifty-seven SB SB and and other interior ministry ministry personnel personnel had had been up to five to preparations had been sent sent around around the the provinces provinces in in groups groups of of up to five to ensure ensure that that preparations had been other extremists. "extremists." Pavlov Pavlov been made made to to isolate isolate and and arrest arrest Solidarity Solidarity leaders leaders and and other reported Centre that SB had had agents alllevels levels Solidarity," and and reported to to the the Centre that thethe SB agents "at at all of of Solidarity, intended step into shoes of of the the arrested intended that, that,where where possible, possible, these these agents agents should should step into the theshoes arrested activists. be to prevent activists. Their Their main main task task after after the the declaration declaration of of martial martial law law would would be to prevent workers streets. 57 Suspect members of of the workers from from going going on on strike strike or or taking taking to to the the streets.57 Suspect members the gov government and Party leadership were placed under close SB surveillance. Kania's ernment and Party leadership were placed under close SB surveillance. Kanias for former that the him wherever mer supporter, supporter, Barcikowski, Barcikowski, told told his his friends friends that the SB followed followed him wherever he he went all his his telephone telephone callS.58 calls.5* went and and recorded recorded all On night of the O n the thenight of December December 8-9 8-9 Jaruzelski Jaruzelski briefed briefed Marshal Marshal Kulikov Kulikov on onthe timetable personnel had been selected to 80,000 personnel had been selected to timetable for for martial martial law. law. Approximately Approximately 80,000 arrest 6,000 activists on the night night of December 11-12 1 1-12 or or 12-13. 6,000 Solidarity Solidarity activists on the of either either December 12-13. arrest

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Troops would begin begin moving mving from from their Troops would their barracks barracks at at 6 a.m. a.m. on on the the morning morning after after the the arrests. plans appeared not. "During our arrests.Though Though the theplans appearedresolute, resolute, however, however, Jaruzelski Jaruzelski did did not. During our discussions~ Kulikov reported, reported, "W. W.Jaruzelskis indecisiveness and and wavering wavering and and his discussions," Kulikov Jaruzelski's indecisiveness his apprehension about about the the successful successful implementation implementation of ofthe the plan to impose impose martial martial law law apprehension plan to were palpable." The aruzelski complained, complained, had little authority authority left. were palpable. The PUWP, J Jaruzelski had little left. Six to to seven hundred was seven hundred thousand thousand of of its its members members were were associated associated with with Solidarity, Solidarity, and and it it was compromised by numerous instances of theft, theft, bribery briberyand and other abuses of of the the peo peocompromised by numerous instances of other abuses ples trust. trust. For For martial martial law law to to succeed, succeed, it it might be necessary for him him to ple's might be necessary for to appeal appeal for for assistance from from Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact forces-though he asked asked for for East East German German troops troops not assistance forces-though he not to used. "I have no need for concern on that score," to be be used. I can can assure assure you you that that you you have no need for concern on that score, Kulikov told told him. him. "The The question question of of assisting assisting you you in in the theevent event that that your your own ownresources resources Kulikov become exhausted is is being being addressed addressed at at General General Staff Staff level."59 become exhausted O n December December 9 Milewski On Milewski brought brought Pavlov Pavlov further further evidence evidence ofJaruzelski's of Jaruzelskis anxious anxious state Jaruzelski martial law. state of ofmind. mind. Jaruzelski had had still still not not set set a a date datefor for the the introduction introductionof of martial law. If If the Church Church opposed opposed martial martial law, law, Jaruzelski Jaruzelski had had told told him, him, Glemp Glempwould would turn turn into into "a a the second Khomeini."60 Khomeini.60 Next day day the the CPSU Politburo Politburo met metin in emergency session sessionto to dis dissecond Next emergency cuss the the Polish Polish crisis. crisis. It It began began by byhearing hearing aa report from Nikolai NikolaiBaibakov Baibakov of Gosplan, Gosplan, cuss report from of just returned from a a visit visit to to Warsaw Warsaw to to discuss discuss Polands for economic economic assisjust returned from Poland's appeal appeal for assis tance. aruzelski, Baibakov ter tance. J Jaruzelski, Baibakov reported, reported, had hadbecome become an an "extremely extremely neurotic" neuroticwreck, wreck, terrifled members who rified that that Glemp Glemp would would declare declare a a holy holy war. war. Though Though all the the Politburo Politburo members who spoke spoke after after Baibakov Baibakov made madescathing scathing criticisms criticisms ofJaruzelski, of Jaruzelski, none none suggested suggestedtrying trying to to replace him. It was was plainly too late late for for that. There was was general general agreement, agreement, too, replace him. plainly too that. There too, that that Soviet forces forces must not intervene. intervene. Andropov Andropov declared declared bluntly: bluntly: Soviet must not
Kulikov actually actually did did speak about the theintroduction introduction troops, then I If Comrade Comrade Kulikov speak about ofof troops, then believe he he did incorrectly. We We can't cant risk risk such such a a step. step. We We don't dont intend believe did this this incorrectly. intend to to introduce troops troops into Poland. That That is is the the proper proper position, position, and and we we must must adhere adhere introduce into Poland. to the end. I don't Poland, even if to it ituntil until the end. dont know know how how things thingswill will turn turn out outin in Poland, but but even if Poland falls under the control of Solidarity, thats the way it will be.61 Poland falls under the control of Solidarity, that's the way it will beY rehsing to allow Warsaw Warsaw that, by refusing Jaruzelski complained to Milewski and and others that, Pact military military intervention if Polish Polish security security forces forces proved proved unable unable to to cope, the Soviet Soviet Pact intervention if cope, the let him himdown: Politburo had let

They pressedus us to take firmand and decisive action, andthe the Soviet leaders leaders assistance and support support needed. But now, when we promised to provide all the assistance firm decision to to take action and we would like to discuss it with have made a firm leaders, we cannot get get aaconcrete answer answer from the Soviet comrades. comrades. the Soviet leaders, Jaruzelski was gloomy gloomy about the prospects for martial law law without Soviet military the offensive," offensive,he told Milewski, but support. Were about to go on the support. "We're "but Im I'm afraid that well be branded as conspirators and hanged." hanged. Milewski rang Andropov Andropov to to later on we'll report what whatJ Jaruzelski had said.62 aruzelski said.62

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the very aruzelski's nerve Until Until the very last last moment moment Moscow Moscow continued continued to to fear fear that that J Jaruzelskis nerve would crack. crack. On O n December December 1 11 Aristov, Kulikov Kulikov and and Pavlov Pavlov jointly jointly reported reported to to the the would 1 Aristov, Politburo Politburo that that all the the preparations preparations for for "operation operation X" X (the (the enforcement enforcement of of martial martial law) law) had had been been completed. completed. But: But: In doubt, we can't Jaruzelskis inclination inclination toward toward vacillation vacillation and and doubt, we cant In view view of of W. Jaruzelski's exclude under pressure exclude the the possibility possibility that, that, under pressure from from the the episcopate episcopate and and other other forces, forces, he he may may refuse refuseto to take take the the final final decision decision and and will will pursue pursue the the line line of of mak making light of ing concessions concessions and and agreements. agreements. In In the the light of the the current current situation, situation, such such a a step prove fatal the PUWP and . the future step could couldprove fatal for forthe and for forthe future of of Socialism Socialism in in Poland.63 Poland.63 On aruzelski telephoned 12J Jaruzelski telephoned Brezhnev Brezhnev and and Suslov, Suslov,asked askedfor for and and O n Saturday Saturday December December 12 received their approval for operation X to begin that evening.64 The KGB mission received their approval for operation to begin that evening.64 The mission in in Warsaw, was still Warsaw, however, however, was still not not convinced convinced that that Jaruzelski Jaruzelski would would go go ahead. ahead. He H e contin continued ued to to agonize agonize over over whether whether the theloss loss oflife of life which which might might be be necessary necessary to to prevent prevent Sol Solidarity turning Poland if idarity turning Poland into into "a a bourgeois bourgeois state" state could could possibly possibly be be justified. justified. And And if martial law failed, he was convinced that all those responsible for declaring it would martial law failed, he was convinced that all those responsible for declaring it would be Jaruzelski, "there be "physically physicallyeliminated." eliminated. "If If we we fail," fail, said said Jaruzelski, there will will be be nothing nothing left left for for me me to to do do but but to to put put a a bullet bullet in in my my head."65 head.65Pavlov Pavlov also also reported reported that that if if Jaruzelski's Jaruzelskis nerve nerve failed, failed, Olszowski Olszowski was was prepared prepared to to stage stage a a coup-provided coup-provided he he had had the the backing backing of Olszowski's plan immediate arrest of Moscow. Moscow. Olszowskis plan of of action action included included the the immediate arrest of of Solidarity Solidarity leaders; in leaders; the the prohibition prohibition of of strikes strikes and and protests; protests; the the confiscation confiscation of of food food supplies supplies in the close "economic the Soviet the enforce the countryside; countryside; close economic cooperation" cooperation with with the Soviet Union; Union; the enforcement ment of of martial martial law law throughout throughout the thecountry; country; and and the thesealing sealing of of Polish Polish borders.66 borders.66 To Kiszczak, who To Pavlov's Pavlovs relief, relief, Kiszczak, who was was in in charge charge of of implementing implementing operation operation X, appeared appeared much much more more resolute resolute than than Jaruzelski. Jaruzelski. In In the the course course of of Saturday Saturday December December 12 12 he :30 p.m., he provided provided the the KGB KGB with with the the detailed detailed timetable timetable ofthe of the operation. operation. At At 11 11:30 p.m., tele telephone the country embassies phone communications communications throughout throughout the country would would be be shut shut down; down; all all embassies would would lose lose their their landline landline connections; connections; communications communications abroad abroad would would cease; cease; and and the the borders closed. Foreign reporters borders would wouldbe be closed. Foreign reporters without without permanent permanent accreditation accreditation would would be be expelled. expelled.The The arrests arrests would would begin begin at at midnight. midnight. Four Four thousand thousand two two hundred hundred would would be be detained detained overnight overnight and and another another 4,500 4,500 placed placed in in "protective protective custody" custody on on Sunday Sunday December 13.Walsa Walpsa would would be be asked askedto to enter enter talks talks with with the thegovernment government and and arrested arrested December 13. if if he he refused. refused. In In a a broadcast broadcast at at 6 6 a.m. a.m. Jaruzelski Jaruzelski would would declare declare martial martial law law and and announce announce the the creation creation of of a a "Military Military Council Council for for National National Salvation." Salvation.In In order order to to keep keep people people at at home home and and off off the the streets streets on on Sunday, Sunday, church church services services would-unusually-be would-unusually-be televised. December 14 14 would televised. If If necessary, necessary,Monday Monday December would be be declared declareda a public public holiday. holiday. The The security if they resistance. But, security forces forces had had orders orders to to open open fire fire if they encountered encountered serious serious resistance. But, Kiszczak Kiszczakwarned, warned, there there was was no no guarantee guarantee of of success: success: If If the the operation operation that that we we have haveundertaken undertaken fails, fails, if if we we have haveto to pay pay with with our our lives, lives, then then the the Soviet Soviet Union Union will will have have to to be be ready ready to to face face a a hostile hostile state state on on its its westwest-

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ern nationalism and ern border, border, whose whose leaders leaders will will promote promote nationalism and anti-Sovietism. anti-Sovietism. From From the imperialist states the outset outset they they will will receive receive energetic energetic assistance assistance from from the the imperialist states to to an an extent to sever Poland's extent sufficient sufficient for for them them to sever all all ties ties with with Socialist Socialist countries. countries. Polands Socialist Socialist development development would would be be put put into into reverse reverse for for a a long longperiod.67 period.67
In the the event, event, the the enforcement enforcement of of martial martial law law went went more more smoothly smoothly than than Jaruzelski Jaruzelski In had dared dared to to hope. hope. Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, who who had had arrived arrived from from Moscow to observe observe operation operation had Moscow to at first first hand, hand, must must also also have have been been pleasantly pleasantly surprised. Solidarity was was caught caught off offX at surprised. Solidarity guard, with with most most of of its itsleading leading activists activists asleep asleepin in bed bed when when the the security security forces forces arrived arrived guard, to arrest arrest them. ZbigniewBujak, Bujak, the the most most senior senior Solidarity Solidarity leader to escape escape arrest to them. Zbigniew leader to arrest and and go underground, said later, authorities were sizeable opera underground, said later, "The The authorities were clearly clearly planning planning a a sizeable operation against against the the union. union. But But we we never thought it would be be as as serious serious as as this." this. There There tion never thought it would had been so much much talk talk about about the the growing growing powerlessness powerlessness of of the the Polish Polish government government had been so that Solidarity Solidarity had had begun begun to to believe believe its its own own rhetoric. rhetoric. Poles Poles awoke awoke on on Sunday Sunday morn mornthat ing to to Ind find an an army army checkpoint checkpoint at at every every crossroads crossroads and and declarations declarations of of martial martial law law ing posted to to every street corner. corner. Jaruzelski's Jaruzelskis 6 a.m. a.m. broadcast broadcast was was repeated repeated throughout throughout posted every street the day, day, interspersed interspersed with with Chopin Chopin polonaises polonaises and and patriotic patriotic music. music. Television Televisionviewers viewers the saw Jaruzelski, dressed in in army army uniform, uniform, sitting sitting at at a a desk in front front of of a a large large Polish Polish saw Jaruzelski, dressed desk in flag. "Citizens Citizens and lady citizens of the the Polish Polish People's Peoples Republic!" Republic! he he began. began. "I I speak speak flag. citizens of government! Our Our motherland motherland is is on on the the verge verge of of an an to you you as a soldier soldier and and head head of government! to as a aby~s!~ Many interpreted interpreted his his speech as a a warning warning that that only only martial martial law law could could save save abyss!"68 Many speech as Poland from from a a Soviet Soviet invasion. invasion. Poland In the the early early hours hours of of the the morning morning Walsa Walpa had had been been taken taken by by military military escort, escort, In accompanied by the minister of labor, Stanislaw Ciosek, to a a villa on the the outskirts of accompanied Warsaw. Walsa Walesa later later recalled recalled that that he he was was addressed addressed as as "Mr. Mr. Chairman," Chairman, there there were were Warsaw. apologies being put put and razor was apologies for for the the inconvenience inconvenience to to which which he he was was being and the the razor was removed removed from the the villa's villas marble marble bathroom bathroom in in case he was was tempted to commit suicide.@Later Later in in from case he tempted to commit suicide.69 the day day Ciosek reported to to the the PUWP Politburo Politburo that that Walsa Walpa was was in in a a state state of the Ciosek reported of shock, shock, had said said that that his his role role as aschairman chairman of of Solidarity Solidaritywas was at at an an end end and and that that the theunion would had union would also alleged to be willing to cooperate with the gov govreorganized. He was also have to be reorganized. on the good news to to the KGB mission.70 mission.70Milewski exul exulernment. Kiszczak passed on ,71 In tantly told told Pavlov Pavlov and and Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, "Walsa Walgsacannot hide his his terror!, terror!771 In reality, reality, though though tantly cannot hide suddenness of of the declaration stunned by the suddenness declaration of martial law, Walgsa Walsa is unlikely to have panicked. He H e had had been arrested over over a before and and his his wife wife Danuta was panicked. been arrested a dozen dozen times times before Danuta was accustomed to to the the routine of packing a holdall for him him to to take take to to prison.72 accustomed routine of packing a holdall for prison.72 While Walsa Walqsa was wasbeing being installed installed in in the the government government villa, villa, Glemp Glemp was being vis visWhile was being ited by by Kazimierz Kazimierz Barcikowski, Barcikowski, secretary secretary of the the Polish Polish Central Central Committee Committee and presited and pres ofthe the Joint Stateand the Episcopate, and Jerzy Kuberski, ident of Joint Commission for the State Minister of Religious Affairs, to be informed of of the impending impending declaration of marmar tial law. Since Since no telephones were operating, they had arrived unannounced at 3 a.m. at the archbishop's archbishops palace, palace, where a patrolman rang the doorbell repeatedly until at last a light went on inside, Glemp was woken and a nun nun came came to let them in. The "The thing, said Barcikowski, was t h e a t r i ~ a l . Contrary ~~ to Jaruzelskis whole thing," "was a bit bit theatrical."73 to Jaruzelski's alarmist forecasts, Glemp Glemp showed showed no no inclination to declare declare a a holy holy war war and and no no desire desire alarmist forecasts, inclination to

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to become become "a a Polish Polish Khomeini." Khomeini. Milewski Milewski informed Kryuchkov and and Pavlov Pavlov that that to informed Kryuchkov calmly, with "a a certain degree of of understanding." understanding. Though the Glemp had reacted calmly, declaration of of martial martial law law did did not not surprise surprise him, hehad hadnot not expected to occur occur until declaration him, he expected it it to until after the the Christmas Christmas holidays.74 after holidays. 74 The immediate concern of the authorities had been the homily that Glemp was due to to give give on on Sunday Sunday afternoon afternoon at at the of Mary Mary Mother Mother of in due the Jesuit Jesuit church church of of God God in Warsaws Old City.75 City.75 Glemps sermon Warsaw's They need not have worried. The keynote of Glemp's was caution. caution. "Opposition Opposition to to the the decisions decisions of of the the authorities authorities under under martial law, he he was martial law," warned, "could could cause cause violent violent reprisals, reprisals, including including bloodshed, because the the authorities authorities warned, bloodshed, because forces at their of greater value than have the armed forces their disposal disposal .. .. .. There is nothing of life."The The Primate's Primates words," words,writes historian Timothy Garton Garton Ash, "were werebit bithuman life." that moment, moment,preparing to risk terly resented by many Christian Poles who were, at that lives for what they considered greater values." values.Jaruzelski, by contrast, felt an their own lives enormous sense Glemps television, sense of ofrelief. relief Glemp's homily was broadcast repeatedly on television, in the theParty Party put up on the the walls of barracks.76 printed in newspaper and put of army barracks.76 O n the the first first day day of of martial martial law, law, Brezhnev Brezhnev rang rang Jaruzelski to congratulate congratulate him onthe the On Jaruzelski to him on X.77Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, Pavlov Pavlovand Kulikov jointly telegraphed from beginning of operation X.77 Warsaw that that the the first first stages stages of of the the operation operation had had been been successfully But Warsaw successfully completed. completed. "But the most most dangerous dangerous days," days,they they believed, believed, "will will Monday, Tuesday, and and Wednesday Wednesday of of the bebe Monday, Tuesday, the coming week [December 14-16] when Solidarity activists who are still at large the coming week [December 14-16] when Solidarity activists who are still at large student^."^' During next two two will try to to spread spread disorder among workers and students."78 "During the the next weeks,Jaruzelski Jaruzelski told told Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, "a a great deal depend on on the the market situation. weeks," great deal will will depend market situation." Solidarity would be well-stocked The best antidote to Solidarity well-stockedshelves shelves in Polish shops for Christmas. e appealed appealed to to Moscow Moscow to to send send shoes, shoes,children's childrens toys and other other consumer Christmas. H He toys and consumer possible: ''Any Any nowwill will cost theexpen expengoods as quickly as possible: material aid now cost much less than the diture required required by by the the Polish Polish situation situation if if the the unthinkable unthinkable began began to to happen happen here."79 here.79 diture The worst worst violence violence after after the the declaration declaration of of martial martial law law took took place a coal The place at at a coal mine mine near Katowice, Katowice, where where more more than than 2,000 miners began began a a sit-in. O n Tuesday Tuesday December near 2,000 miners sit-in. On December 15 helicopters dropped dropped tear tear gas gas into into the mines, while police 15 helicopters the mines, while ZOMO paramilitary paramilitary police from the the ministry ministry of of the the interior, interior, supported supported by forty tanks, tanks, began began firing firing rubber rubber bul bulfrom by forty lets at at the theminers. miners. The The security security forces forces then then attacked attacked the the doctors doctors arid and ambulance drivlets ambulance driv ers who who came to tend the wounded.80 Seven Seven miners miners were were killed ers came to tend the wounded.80 killed and and thirty-nine thirty-nine injured; forty-one forty-one ZOMO policemen policemen were were also also injured, injured, though though none none were were killed. injured; killed. Overall, however, however, casual casualties were much much lower lower than had expected. expected. Overall, ties were than the the SB and and KGB had The crushing opposition The mere mere threat threat of of Soviet Soviet intervention intervention had had proved proved as as effective effective in in crushing opposition Czechoslovakia thirteen years earlier. as the actual Soviet intervention in in Czechoslovakia earlier. By the years end end organized organized opposition opposition to to martial martial law law had had virtually virtually disappeared. on year's disappeared. Graffiti Graffiti on of Polish cities proclaimed optimistically, optimistically,"Winter Winter Is Yours. Spring Will be the walls of Ours! But Spring Springdid not truly return until 1989 1989with with the formation of a SolidarityOurs!" the Solidarity led state. led government government and and the the disintegration disintegration of of the the Communist Communist one-party one-party state. the SB, Jaruzelski gave gave the the main main credit credit for for the the success success of of operation operation X to Jaruzelski to the SB, ZOMO and 31 and other other interior interior ministry ministry personnel. personnel. At a a meeting meeting in in the the ministry ministry on on December December 31 he praised the the SB's SBs dedication dedication to to Socialism Socialism and and the thehigh highmoral moral and and political political qualities qualities h e praised officers. "You You were the defenders of of its operational officers. of Socialism in Poland, Poland," Jaruzel-

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ski them. "The ski told told them. The Polish Polish army army contributed contributed to to the the success, success, but but the the main main work work was was done by principal role done by the the Interior Interior Ministry." Ministry. The The SB's SBs principal role now now was was deep deep penetration penetration of of the opposition movement to to provide provide the the intelligence intelligence necessary necessary "to to neutralize neutralize the the the opposition movement adversary adversary by by the the swiftest swiftest possible possible means." means. In In answer answer to to a a question question about about the the "mild mildness" of sentences passed passed on the strike ness of the the sentences on the strike organizers organizers at at Katowice Katowice and and elsewhere, elsewhere, Jaruzelski said said that, that, though though he was personally personally in in favor favor of of more more severe severe punishment, punishment, Jaruzelski he was public opinion opinion had had to to be be taken taken into into account: account: "If If we we were wereto to impose impose excessively excessively severe severe public sentences, people would sentences, say say ten ten to to twelve twelve years' yearsimprisonment, imprisonment, people would say say that that we we were were tak taking So we content with moderate sentences." ing our ourrevenge revenge on on Solidarity. Solidarity. So we have haveto to be be content withmoderate sentences.As As usual, an account of usual, an account of the the meeting meeting was was forwarded forwarded to to the the Centre Centre by by the the KGB mission mission in in Warsaw.81 Warsaw.s1 According the KGB, during the According to to self-congratulatory self-congratulatory SB statistics statistics supplied supplied to to the during the year martial law, year after after the the declaration declaration of of martial law, 701 701 underground underground opposition opposition groups groups were were associated with the the now-illegal Solidarity; Solidarity; 10,131 10,131 individuals individuals identified, 430 of them associated were printing presses were interned; interned; over over 400 400 demonstrations demonstrations dispersed; dispersed; 370 370 illegal illegal printing presses and and 1,200 items of printing equipment 1.2 1,200 equipment confiscated; confiscated; the distribution of over 1 .2 million leaflets total leaflets prevented; prevented; and and 12 12 underground underground Solidarity Solidarity radio radio stations stations closed closed down. down. A total of 250,000 250,000 members of the the security security forces forces were were allegedly allegedly deployed deployed on on these these operaof members of opera tions, among them them 90,000 90,000 members of police police reserve reserve units, over 30,000 30,000 soldiers soldiers and and tions, among members of units, over 10,000 The 10,000 members members of of the the volunteer volunteer police police reserve.82 reserve.82 The figures figures for for the the deployment deployment of of security been substantially security forces, forces, however, however, are are suspiciously suspiciouslyhigh high and and may may well well have have been substantially inflated in order order to to impress Moscow. J Jaruzelski commended all all those who had hadtaken inflated in impress Moscow. aruzelski commended those who taken inthe the Socialism. part in enforcement of martial law as intrepid defenders of Polish Socialism. The SB's SBs biggest biggest problem problem was was Walsa, Walpa, whose whose worldwide worldwide celebrity made it it impos imposThe celebrity made sible either either to subject him him to show trial trial or or to to treat treat him him with casual brutality brutality sible to subject to a a show with the the casual meted out less well-known well-known Solidarity (Even Walsa's wife Danuta Danuta and and meted out to to less Solidarity activists. activists. (Even Walrpas wife their small were subjected subjected to to humiliating humiliating strip strip searches.) searches.) As the the initial initial their small daughters daughters were shock of of internment internmentwore off, off, however, however,Walsa's Walpas old combative combative spirit returned and he refused first tactic refused to to negotiate negotiate with with the the authorities. authorities. The The SB's SBs first tactic was was to to try try to to persuade persuade Walsa Walpa to tofollow follow the the more more accommodating accommodating policy policy of of Cardinal Cardinal Glemp Glemp by by giving giving the the Primates spokesman, spokesman, Father Father Alojsy Alojsy Orszulik, Orszulik, regular regular access to him.83 him.83Orszulik Orszulik was was Primate's access to initially accompanied accompanied by by an an interior ministry official official later later identified identified as as Colonel Colonel initially interior ministry SB church church department, department, who who three three years years later later Adam Pietruszka, deputy head of the SB Popiehszko. was to be implicated in the murder of the Solidarity priest Father Jerzy Popieluszko. Walesa did did not nottake take to to Orszulik. Orszulik. When When urged urged to to give give up up his his resistance resistance to to negotiating Walsa negotiating with the the Military MilitaryCouncil Council for National Salvation, Walsa Walesa shouted, Theyllcome to with for National Salvation, shouted, "They'll come to me on their knees! Polish Catholics did not normally shout at their priests and me on their knees!" Polish Catholics did not normally shout at their priests and Orszulik seems seems to to have have been been shocked. shocked. According According to to Walsa, Walpsa, he he "disapproved disapproved of of my my Orszulik humility, and it it too us some time to to get getused to each other."s4 other.s4 lack of Christian humility, Walpas clashes clashes with with Orszulik Orszulik had had the the advantage, advantage, so so far far as as the the SB SB was was concerned, concerned, Walsa's 1982Kiszczak reported to the theKGB, with evident sat satof alienating Glemp. In January 1982 isfaction and and possibly possibly some some exaggeration, exaggeration, that that Glemp Glemp was was "completely completely disenchanted isfaction disenchanted Walcsa, and believed that the the leaders of of Solidarity "have have learned nothing from with Walsa," position^."^^ The SB also informed the events and refuse to budge from their previous positions."85

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Orszuliks visits visitseventually eventuallyhad a "favorable favorable effect" effect on Walpa.s6 alp KGB that Orszulik's Wah;sa.86 As W Walsa all his conditions for negotiating with the later acknowledged, he dropped one by one later acknowledged, he dropped one by one his conditions for negotiating with the authorities, "finally finallyaligning aligning himself himself with with the thechurch's churchs position."s7 po~ition.~ authorities, The SB also also tried tried less less subtle subtle methods methods of of influencing influencing and and discrediting discreditingWalsa. Walpsa. While While The working as as a a shipyard shipyard electrician electrician in in the the early early 1970s, 1970s, Walsa Walpa had had been in contact contact with working been in with the SB. Among the SB files discovered in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Comthe Among the files discovered in the early 1990s after the collapse of the Com munist regime regimewas one code codenamed BOLEK, whose whose full full contents contents have haveyet be munist was one named BOLEK, yet to to be revealed con revealed and and whose whose authenticity authenticity remains remains to to be be established, established,but but which which is is known known to to contain alleged alleged details details ofWalsa's of Walesas role informer. According to some reports, after after tain role as as an an SB SB informer. According to some reports, seeing a copy of the file in 1992, 1992, Waltsa, Walpa, by then President of the Polish Republic, signabegan to draft a public statement in which he acknowledged that he had put his signa ture to to "three three or or four" four SB SB interrogation interrogation protocols, asked for for understanding understanding of of the ture protocols, but but asked the difficult position of those those pressured pressured by by the the SB to to act as informers informers in in the the 1970s. 1970s. In In the the difficult position of act as end, it is is claimed, Walesa had had second thoughts and and scrapped the statement.88 statement. end, it claimed, Walsa second thoughts scrapped the The KGB KGB files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin do do not not disclose disclose the the exact of Walsa's Walpas The exact extent extent of cooperation the SB in the 1970s. reveal that that the the SB in the 1970s. But But they they do do reveal SB sought sought to to cooperation with with the Walesa after his internment by intimidate Walsa by reminding "reminding him him that they had had paid paid him him money and and received received information information from from him. If Walesa did did indeed indeed act act at onestage stage of money him." IfWalsa at one of his career as a a paid informant of of the it is is easy easy to to imagine the pressure exerted on his career as paid informant the SB, it imagine the pressure exerted on services. him to do so, so, as on the millions millions of other informers to Soviet Bloc security services. Kiszczak told told the the KGB that that Walsa Walesa had been confronted confronted by by one one of of his alleged for forKiszczak had been his alleged mer SB SB case case officers officersand and a a conversation conversation between them tape-recorded.89 tape-re~orded.~ mer between them Since network of of willing and unwilling unwilling Since the the SB SB did did not not wish wish to to advertise advertise its its vast vast network willing and informers, it it made only limited of Walpas past past contact contact with with it it in informers, made only limited use use ofWalsa's in active active measures measures intended to to discredit discredit him. him. Instead, Instead, it it resorted resorted to to a a series of fabrications fabrications designed designed to to intended series of portray Walsa Walpa as as a a greedy, greedy, foul-mouthed foul-mouthed embezzler.90 ernbe~zler.~ add authentic authentic detail to its its portray To To add detail to forgeries, it it stole stole a a tape-recording made by by his his brother brother Stanislaw Stanisiaw during during Walsa's Walpas forgeries, tape-recording made celebrations on September 29.91 29. O n November 1 11, Polbirthday celebrations On 1 , the anniversary anniversary of Pol ish independence, independence, Walsa Walpa was was freed freed from from internment. internment. Moscow was outraged that the the ish Moscow was outraged that news was was broadcast in Poland Poland at at the the same same time time as as the the announcement announcement of of Brezhnevs news broadcast in Brezhnev's death the previous day.n day.92Kiszczak JSiszczak sought sought to reassure Pavlov that, despite Walqsas death the previous to reassure Pavlov that, despite Walsa's release, measures were were still in hand hand to to compromise 93 J aruzelski told release, active active measures still in compromise Walsa. Wal~sa.~ Jaruzelski told Aristov that that the thematerial material being assembled to to discredit Walpa included pornographic Aristov beiI1g assembled discredit Walsa included pornographic photographs (presumably (presumably of of Walsa Walesa with with a mistress) and and would would expose expose him him as as a photographs a mistress) "a scheming, grubby grubby individual individual with with gigantic gigantic ambitions." ambitions. Walsa, Walpa, Jaruzelski Jaruzelski claimed, claimed, scheming, had already already lost lost half half the the popular popular authority authority he he had had possessed possessed before before his his internment. internment. had Though he remained a potential threat, he he no longer had his Solidarity base and would be be unable unable to to rebuild rebuild his his previous previous alliance alliancewith with the the church. church.94 would 94 Moscow was far farfrom reassured. Since the unexpectedly successful successful introduction of of martial law, many of its previous doubts about Jaruzelski had resurfaced. A KGB martial law, many of its previous doubts about Jaruzelski had resurfaced. agent in J Jaruzelskis entourage described described him as the offspring of of rich Polish agent in aruzelski's entourage him as "the offspring rich Polish landowners with little little sympathy sympathy for for working working people: people: "His His tendency tendency is is pro-Western pro-Western landowners" with and he he surrounds surrounds himself himself with with generals generals who who are are descendants descendants of of Polish Polish landowners landowners and and are are anti-Soviet anti-Soviet in in inclination." inclination. The The agent agent (presumably (presumably something something of of an an antiand anti-

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Semite) Semite) also also reported reported that that Jaruzelski Jaruzelski was was in in contact contact with with "a a representative representative of of Polish Polish Zionism": "One should himself is not a contrast, Zionism: One should examine examine whether whether he he himself is not a Zionist." Zionist. By contrast, J aruzelski "virtually ambassador.95 Jaruzelski virtually ignored" ignored the theadvice advice of of the the Soviet Soviet amba~sador.~ The both the KGB mission mission and the Soviet 1982 The reports reports of of both the and the Soviet embassy embassy during during 1982 repeatedly repeatedly condemned condemned Jaruzelski's Jaruzelskis tolerance tolerance of of men men with with revisionist revisionist tendencies tendencies in in the them Mieczysfaw the Polish Polish leadership, leadership, chief chief among among them Mieczysaw Rakowski, Rakowski, whose whose allegedly allegedly defeatist aroused deep deep suspicion defeatist attitude attitude to to anti-Socialist anti-Socialist forces forces aroused suspicion in in Moscow. Moscow. Rakowski told the the Council inin June, Rakowski was was reported reported to to have have told Council of ofMinisters Ministers June, "The The PUWP is Martial law law made made it it possible possible to to overcome overcome the the peak peak of but is sick. sick. Martial of the the opposition, opposition, but there is no noticeable change for the better in the attitude of broad layers of the popthere is no noticeable change for the better in the attitude of broad layers of the pop ulation." The strength Catholic Church meant thatthat a policy ulation.The strength of ofthe the Catholic Church meant policy a of of confrontation confrontation would be be mere mere "adventurism."96 ad~enturism.~~ report by by Rakowski Rakowski on on June June 22 22 concluded concluded that that would A report there teachers" in was there were were "100,000 100,000 hostile hostile teachers in Polish Polish schools, schools, but but that thatitit was impossible impossible to to sack them Jaruzelski was alleged alleged to to have have told Milewski, "I I know Rakowski sack them all. 97 J aruzelski was told Milewski, know that that Rakowski is a a swine, swine, but but I still still need need him." him. In In a a telegram to Brezhnev Brezhnev on on June 29, however, however, is telegram to June 29, Aristov argued that keeping Rakowski and other otherlike-minded like-minded individuals in the Polish leadership was was not simply a a tactical tactical move, a strategic strategic line for Jaruzelski, Jaruzelski, Polish leadership "not simply move, but but a line for who shares shares their their position position on on a a number numberof of problems: "It It is is therefore therefore very very important important who problems": at the the present stage to to continue continue to to exert exert influence influence on on Comrade ComradeW. J ar~zelslu.~~ at present stage Jaruzelski."98 Pavlov and and Aristov Aristov continued continued to to press press for for more more arrests arrests and and trials trials of counterPavlov of counter revolutionaries. At At a a meeting meeting with with Kiszczak Kiszczak on on July July 7, Pavlov Pavlov denounced the policy policy revolutionaries. denounced the of the the interior interior ministry ministry and and the the SB SB as as "weak weak and and indecisive." indecisive. Kiszczak Kiszczak replied replied that that of there were were 40,000 Solidarity activists, activists, and and it it was was impossible to prosecute prosecute them them a ll.99 there 40,000 Solidarity impossible to all.99 Four days later Aristov brought Jaruzelski a personal message from Brezhnev and repeated the the Soviet Soviet demand demand for for more more prosecutions. prosecutions. J Jaruzelski argued that that to repeated aruzelski argued totry try Walresa would would be be impossible because of of the the international international as as well well as as Polish Polish outcry outcry it it Walsa impossible because would produce, produce, and and that that a a trial trial of of leading leading opposition opposition figures figures which which excluded excluded Walsa Wapa would would lack lack credibility.loo credibi1ity.l The The Polish Polish decision decision in in December December to to suspend suspend (though (though not would not yet formally end) martial law caused predictable dismay in Moscow. When pressed by by Aristov Aristov to to keep keep it it in in force, force, however, however,Jaruzelski Jaruzelski delivered delivered something something of of aa lecture, lecture, which was duly reported to Moscow:
if we were were living in a bunker; we want to We cannot continue martial law as if Glemps latest statements are such that pursue a dialogue with the people .. .. .. Glemp's beprinted in in Trybuna Ludu [the Party Partynewspaper]. He appeals they could even be course, playing a game with the for calm, restraint and realism .. .. .. We are, of course, Church;our ouraim is to neutralize its harmful harmfbl influence on the thepopula populaCatholic Church; the Church Churchand and aims are arestill different. However, However, at this tion. The aims of the my aims stage we must exploit our common interest in stabilizing the situation in order strengthen Socialism and the the positions of the Party.IOI Party.lol to strengthen Jaruzelskis attitude to toMoscow had become visibly less less since operation Jaruzelski's deferential since occasion, X a year earlier. The KGB mission mission reported that he had declared on one occasion, The Soviet comrades are mistaken if they think that thatthe the "The Polish section of the CPSU

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Central Committee will make Polish policy as in the days of of Gierek. This will not 102 Jaruzelski was, initially, happen. [Those] days are are over." over."1o2 initially,favorably favorably impressed by the of aa lesshectoring style in the theSoviet leadership after Brezhnev's death. He He signs of new, less told Kiszczak after a meeting in Moscow with Andropov, Brezhnev's successor, in 1982: December 1982:
of the This was a genuine conversation on an equal footing between the leaders of amonologue as was wasthe case two Parties and countries, countries, not a case earlier with BrezhBrezh conversation lasting three hours, Andropov said that all Socialist nev. In a conversation Socialist countries must take account of of the specific conditions of of Poland. The Polish problems were not the the concern of one country alone; alone; it was a world problem. Andropov did, however, however, express expressconcern about the continued Andropov ontinued presence of Rakowski and fellow moderate, moderate, Barcikowski, Barcikowski, in in the the Polish Polish leadership. leadership. Jaruzelski Jaruzelski asked asked and his his fellow Andropov to trust his judgment on how long to keep them in office. The fact that so well informed about the Polish situation, Jaruzelski believed, Andropov appeared so was due chiefly to reports from the the KGB mission in Warsaw.103 Warsaw.'03 was due chiefly to reports from mission in The mission remained remained deeply deeply suspicious suspicious of of revisionist revisionist tendencies tendencies in in the thePol PolThe KGB mission ish leadership. It It telegraphed the Centre Centre at at the end of of 1982: 1982: ish leadership. telegraphed the the end Rakowski continues continues to to influence influence J Jaruzelski. They meet meet constantly constantly to to exchange exchange Rakowski aruzelski. They views, not not only only at at work, work, but but also also at at home, and Rakowski Rakowski was was the the first first person person views, home, and Jaruzelski met immediately immediately after after his his return return from from Moscow.104 Moscow.1o4 J aruzelski met distrust ofJaruzelski of Jaruzelski continued continued to to grow grow during during 1983. 1983. The The Warsaw Warsaw mission mission KGB distrust reported that that he given a a dangerously dangerously defeatist defeatist address address to central reported he had had given to the the PUWP central committee on January January 12: 12: committee on
,

Gierek's slogans slogans about about the the moral moral and and ideological ideological unity unity of of the the Poles, Poles, the the devel develGierek's opment of Socialism-all Socialism-all this this is is a a fantasy fantasy and and dreamworld. dreamworld. We We have have a a multi multiopment of party development of party system. system. There There is is an an uneven uneven rate rate of of development of capitalism, capitalism, but but there there is also also such such a a thing thingas as the the uneven uneven rate rate of of development development of of Socialism Socialism . In [the is . .. .. In [the current] current] situation situation tactics tactics must must prevail prevail over overstrategy. strategy. Even Lenin, Lenin, at moments of of his his career, had engaged in tactical retreats. Even at various various moments career, had engaged in tactical retreats. lOS Poland, Jaruzelski Jaruzelski claimed, claimed, must must do do the same."' Pavlov believed that Jaruzelski Jaruzelski Pavlov believed that Poland, the same. intended to he would was greatly intended to retreat retreat much much too too far. far. The The danger danger that that he would do do so so was greatly increased Polish regime's regime's capitulation visit by increased by by the the Polish capitulation to to Church Churchpressure pressure for for a a second second visit by John Paul According to John Paul II I1 in in June. June. According to Pavlov: Pavlov:

The and right-wing within the the PUWP and and the country at at The episcopate, episcopate, and right-wing forces forces within the country large, seek him with with the the might might of large, seek to to influence influence Jaruzelski Jaruzelski and and intimidate intimidate him of the the Church. There There are signs that the right right wing Church are Church. are many many signs that the wing and and the the Church are suc suc1 06 ceeding ceeding in in this. this.lo6

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Among Among other other worryIng worrying signs signs of of Jaruzelski's Jaruzelskis susceptibility susceptibility to to right-wing right-wing pressure pressure was his his willingness willingness to to allow allow family family farms farms and and the the private private ownership ownership of of land land to to be be was enshrined enshrined in in the thePolish Polish constitution.IO? constitution.lo7The The Soviet Soviet embassy embassy condemned condemned a a report reportpre presented sented to to the thePUWP Politburo Politburo on on February February 1 1on on "The The Causes Causes and and Consequences Consequences of of Social Crises Crises in in the theHistory History of the the Polish Polish People's Peoples Republic" Republic as as the the product product of"bour of bourSocial of geois geois methodology": methodology: [The the Polish [The report] report] reduces reduces the the essence essence of of the the class class struggle struggle in in the Polish People's Peoples Republic to to confl conflicts between the the authorities authorities and and society, society, thereby thereby deliberately deliberately Republic icts between excluding the the possibility possibility of of analyzing analyzing the the actions of anti-Socialist anti-Socialist forces, forces, and and excluding actions of their connections connections with with the the West's Wests ideological sabotage centers. centers. There There is is not not a a their ideological sabotage word about about the the USSR's USSRs help help in in restoring restoring and and developing developing Poland's Polands economy. economy. word
After extensive extensive lobbying lobbying by the Soviet Soviet embassy, embassy, which which had had received received an advance After by the an advance copy, the the report report was was rejected rejected and and it it was was agreed agreed that that a a revised revised version version should precopy, should be be pre pared, emphasizing emphasizing Poland's Polands supposed supposed achievements achievements in in Socialist Socialist construction construction under under pared, wp' I08 Aristov the leadership leadership of of the the Pu PUWP.los Aristov continued, continued, however, however, to to complain complain that that ideothe "ideo logical work remains a most neglected sector of the PUWPs activity, and that the logical work remains a most neglected sector of the PUWP's activity," and that the leadership was was failing failing to to master the revisionist revisionist right-wing opportunist bias PUWP leadership master "the right-wing opportunist bias in the Party. The The press revisionism and and Eurocommunism, Eurocommunism, in the Party." press was was deeply deeply tainted tainted by revisionism while Polish Polish translations translations of of Soviet Soviet textbooks textbooks were were openly openly disparaged: disparaged: while

Currency the idea the Soviet Currency has has been been given given to to the idea that that the Soviet model model is is unsuitable unsuitable for for Poland; the the PUWP is is incapable incapable of of solving solvingcontradictions in the theinterests of the the Poland; contradictions in interests of whole needs to whole of of society, society, and and a a "third thirdpath" path needs to be be worked worked out. out. There There is is increasing increasing criticism of of real realSocialism.109 Sociali~rn.~~ criticism
the time time for John Paul IIs afficial mood in As the II's return to Poland approached, approached, the official increasingly nervous. On O n April 5, 1983 Pavlov both Warsaw and Moscow became increasingly 5, 1983 Chebrikov, the KGB chairman, a request from Kiszczak for forwarded to Viktor Chebrikov, material and technical assistance Popes visit": visit: 150 "material assistance in connection with the Pope's 150 rifles of the kind used for firing rubber bullets, 20 armed personnel carriers, 300 cars for surveillance equipment, transporting plain clothes personnel and surveillance equipment, 200 army tents and supplies. According to Pavlov, Kiszczak was wasclose close declarvarious medical supplies.110 to panic, declar hecould no longer "rely rely on anyone." anyone. SB sources sources in the theVatican reported that, ing that he I1 were usually though statements drafted for John Paul II usually moderate, he tended to improvise and get carried away. Kiszczak feared that he depart from prepared texts, texts, improvise carried away. the same would do the same in Poland. SBs only ground for optimism was the decline in the the Pope's Popes health since since the The SB's assassination attempt in the previous year. At the present time, said Kiszczak, we assassination in the ''At time," said Kiszczak, "we possibility that God will recall him to his bosom as soon as can only dream of the possibility possible. Kiszczak seized eagerly on any evidence Popes possible." seized eagerly evidence which suggested suggested that the Pope's to days were numbered. According to one improbable SB SB report, which he passed on to I1was suffering from leukemia but used cosmetics cosmetics to to conceal his the KGB, John Paul II

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I1 condition. 1 Two condition. Two years years earlier earlier the the KGB KGB had had received received an an equally equally inaccurate inaccurate report report

from from the the Hungarian HungarianAVH AVH which which claimed claimed that that the thePope Pope was was suffering suffering from from cancer cancer of of the the spinal spinal column.112 column.l12About About a a fortnight fortnight after after Kiszczak's Kiszczaks appeal appeal for for help help from from the the KGB, the Polish KGB, Aristov Aristov reported reported further further evidence evidence that that the Polish authorities authorities were were wilting wilting under at first under papal papal pressure. pressure. Having Having at first refused refused to to allow allow large large open-air open-air masses masses at at Krakow the Krak6w and and Katowice, Katowice, they they had had given given way way and and agreed agreed to to both-thus both-thus running running the unacceptable unacceptable risk risk "of ofinflaming inflaming religious religious fanaticism fanaticism among among the theworking working class."113 class.113 On June 16, 983, the the underground O n the the eve eve of of the the Pope's Popes arrival arrival on on June 16, 1 1983, underground Warsaw Warsaw weekly weekly Tygodnik TygodnikMazowsze Maxowsze expressed expressed the the hope hope that that his his visit visit would would "enable enablepeople people to to break 979 visit break through through the the barrier barrier of of despair, despair,just just as as his his 1 1979 visit broke broke through through the the barrier barrier of of fear." fear. In In his his first first words words after after his his emotional emotional homecoming homecoming at at Warsaw Warsaw airport, airport, John John Paul Paul II I1reached reached out out to tothose those imprisoned imprisoned and and persecuted persecuted by by the the regime: regime: I I ask ask those those who who suffer suffer to to be be particularly particularly close close to to me. me. I I ask ask this this in in the thewords words of of Christ: Christ: "I Iwas was sick, sick,and and you you visited visited me. me. I I was was in in prison prison and and you you came came to to me." me. I I myself myself cannot cannot visit visit all all those those in in prison prison always always do. 114 At At every every stage stage during during the thenext next nine nine days, days,as as during duringJohn JohnPaul Paul II's IIs first first visit visit four four years years earlier, earlier, the the gulf gulf between between his his immense immense moral moral authority authority and and the the discredited discredited one-party one-party state state was was plain plain for for all all to to see. see. Even Even Jaruzelski Jaruzelski sensed sensed it it during during his his first first meeting meeting with with the surroundings the Pope Pope in in the theornate ornate surroundings of of Belweder Belweder presidential presidential palace. palace. Though Though a a non nonbeliever, believer,Jaruzelski Jaruzelski later later admitted admitted that, that,"My Mylegs legs were were trembling trembling and and my my knees knees were were knocking fected me knocking together together . . . The The Pope, Pope, this this figure figure in in white, white, it it all all af affected me emotionally. emotionally. 5 . . "11 Beyond all reason . Beyond all reason .115

[g aspsfrom the kaspsjom the crowdj, crowd, all all those those who who are are

suffering. suffering. But But I I ask ask them them to to be be close close to to me me in in spirit spirit to to help help me, me, just just as as they they

... ..

For Poles , the was equally For millions millions of of Poles, the visit visit was equally unforgettable. unforgettable. Many Many walked walked across across Poland their journeys. 11,often often sleeping sleeping by by the the roadside roadside during during their journeys. Poland to to see see John John Paul Paul II, Wherever than Wherever the thePope Pope stopped, stopped, there there were were rarely rarelyless less than half half a a million million people people waiting waiting the most for for him.116 him.l16"We We have have to to deal deal with with the most famous famous Pole Pole in in the the world," world, grumbled grumbled Kiszczak, here Though Kiszczak, "and, and,unfortunately, unfortunately,we we have haveto to do doitit here in in Poland!"117 Poland!l17 Though the thePope Pope could could not not meet meet the the leaders leaders of of the the illegal illegal Solidarity Solidarity underground underground during during his his visit, visit, he he had had sent sent an an emissary, emissary,Father Father Adam Adam Boniecki, Boniecki, to to see see them them before before he he arrived arrived and and con conus At vey vey his his gratitude gratitude and and admiration admiration to to them. them.18 At first first the the authorities authorities refused refused to to allow allow

Walsa final and Walpa to to meet meet the the Pope; Pope; then, then, on onthe the final day day of ofhis his visit, visit, they they gave gave way way and Walsa Walpa was Tatra mountains. was flown flownto to a a meeting meeting in in the the Tatra mountains. An An underground underground cartoon cartoon of of the the time time showed showed SB SB agents agents disguised disguised as as sheep sheep and and goats goats clutching clutching boom boom microphones microphones as as they they tried tried to to listen listen in in to tothe theconversation.1l9 conver~ation.~~ The ormal ending The f formal ending of of martial martial law law a a month month after after the the Pope's Popes visit visit did did little little to tomend mend the the regime's regimestattered tattered reputation. reputation. Nor Nor did did Rakowski's Rakowskisvisit visit to to address address Gdansk Gdansk shipyard shipyard workers anniversary workers on on the thethird third anniversary of of the theAugust August 1980 1980 accords. accords. Having Having arrived arrived to to pro proclaim claim Solidarity Solidarity dead dead and and Walsa Walqsa a a has-been, has-been, he he found foundhimself himself upstaged upstaged by by Solidar Solidarity ity hecklers. hecklers. Walsa, Walqsa,in in an an admittedly admittedly stumbling stumbling statement, statement,had hadthe theworkers workers on on his his side side when when he he accused accused Rakowski Rakowskiand and his his colleagues colleagues of of using using the the 1980 1980 strikes strikes to to lever lever

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Gierek Gierek out out of ofpower power and and advance advance their their own own careers. careers. It It was was probably probably this this debacle debacle at at Gdansk Gdansk which which finally finallypersuaded persuaded the the regime regime to to broadcast broadcast the the libelous libelous video video ofWalsa of Walpa concocted of concocted by by the the SB SB at at the theend end of the the,previous previous year. year.Film Film footage footage taken taken by by a a hidden hidden SB SB camera camera ofWalsa of Walpa eating eating aabirthday birthday meal meal with with his his brother brother Stanislaw Stanislaw was was used used as as the the basis basis of of aa bogus bogus "documentary" documentary entitled entitled

Money, Money, which which purported purported to to expose expose

Walsa's Walpsas greed greed and and corruption. corruption. The The dialogue dialogue was was constructed constructed by by splicing splicing together together some some of of Walsa's Wallpas public public statements, statements, misleading misleading extracts extracts from from the the stolen stolen tape taperecording recording of of his his birthday birthday celebrations celebrations and and words words spoken spoken by by a a Warsaw Warsaw actor actor imitating imitating Walsa's Walpas voice.120 voice.12 The The Polish Polish files files seen seen by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin end end just just too too early early to to clarify clarify who who exactly exactly was was involved involved in in the thedecision decision to to go go ahead ahead with with an an active active measure measurebegun begun over over a a year year earlier. earlier. Kiszczak blame Kiszczak later later tried tried to to put putthe the blame on on his his SB SB subordinate, subordinate, Adam Adam Pietruszka, Pietruszka, but but he he must lm must certainly certainlyhave have been been among among those those who who authorized authorized the the use use of of the the video. video. The The fi film dialogue the West: dialogueincluded included a a fabricated fabricated exchange exchange about about Walsa's Walpas supposed supposed fortune fortune in in the West:
LECH LECH

WALfSA: know W A ~ S AYou You : know all all in in all all it it is is over over a a million million dollars dollars . . . Somebody Somebody has has

. ..

to put into the country, to draw draw it it all all and and put it it somewhere. somewhere. It It can't cant be be brought brought into the country, though. though.
STANISl.AW no, STANISLAW WALfSA: W A ~ S ANo, No, : no, no! no!
LECH LECH

WALfSA: W A ~ S ASo So : I thought thought about about it it and andthey they came came here here and and this this priest priest had had an an

idea bank, idea that that they they would would open open an an account account in in that that bank, the the papal papal one. one. They They give give 15 15 percent , open percent there there .. . . Somebody Somebody has has to to arrange arrange it it all all, open accounts accounts in in the theVatican. Vatican.

..

I I can't cant touch touch it it though though or or I'd Id get get smashed smashed in in the the mug. mug. So So you you could could . . .

...

Part Part of of the the purpose purpose of of the the SB SB active active measure measure was was to to sabotage sabotage Walsa's Walp.as prospect prospect of of winning winning the the Nobel Nobel Peace Peace Prize. Prize. The The actor actor impersonating impersonating Walsa Walpa explains explains that that the the prize of money, Idget get it itif if it it weren't werent for for the the Church! Church! prize is is worth worth aalot lot of money, then then complains, complains, "I'd But is his But the theChurch Church is starting starting to tointerfere." interfere."Yeah," Yeah,says says his brother, brother, "because becausethey've theyveput put up up the the Pope Pope again."121 again.121 On O n October October 5, 5, however, however,came came the the news news that that Walsa Walpa had had indeed indeed been been awarded awarded the the Nobel Nobel Peace Peace Prize. Prize. To To counter counter the the SB's SBs attempt attempt to to portray portray him him as as a a corrupt corrupt fortune fortunehunter, was scheme hunter, Walsa Walpa announced announced that that he he was giving giving his his prize prize money money to to a a Church Church scheme to to help Though help private private farmers farmers modernize modernize and and mechanize mechanize the the countryside.122 countryside.122 Though now now ter terminally minally ill, ill, Andropov Andropov could could barely barely contain contain his his fury. fury. From From his his sickbed sickbed he he despatched despatched a aruzelski: a furious furious letter letter to to J Jaruzelski: The The Church Church is is reawakening reawakening the the cult cult of of Walsa, Walpsa, giving giving him him inspiration inspiration and and encouraging encouraging him him in in his his actions. actions. This This means means that that the the Church Churchis is creating creating a a new new kind the Party. kind of of confrontation confrontation with with the Party. In In this this situation, situation, the the most most important important thing thing is is not not to tomake make concessions concessions . . .

...

Jaruzelski Jaruzelski appeared appeared unmoved. unmoved. A A month month later later he he wrote wrote a a remarkable remarkable letter letter to to John John Paul I1 saying saying that that he he still still often often thought thought of of their their conversations conversations during during his his visit visit to to Paul II

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Poland understandable differences assessment, they Poland because, because, "regardless regardless of of understandable differences in in assessment, they were were full concern for motherland and the the well-being well-being of of man.123 man."123 hll of of heartfelt heartfelt concern for the the fate fate of of our our motherland and 's death, In April April 1984, 1984,two two months months after after Andropov Andropovs death, Jaruzelski was summoned summoned to to In Jaruzelski was explain himself himself at at another secret meeting meeting in railway coach coach at border city explain another secret in a a railway at the the border city of of Brest-Litovsk, this this time time with with foreign foreign minister minister Gromyko Gromyko and Brest-Litovsk, and defense defense minister minister UstiUsti nov. Gromyko Gromyko gave gave a a grim grim account account of of the the meeting meeting to the Politburo April26: nov. to the Politburo on on April 26: Concerning the attitude of Church, [Jaruzelski] [Jaruzelski] described the Concerningthe attitude of the the Polish Polish Church, described the Church without whom impossible. H He did not not say say a a word word Church as as an an ally, without whom progress progress is isimpossible. e did about a determined determined struggle struggle against against the the intrigues Church. about a intrigues of of the the Church.
Andropovs successor, successor,Konstantin Konstantin Chernenko, that the the Church Churchwas Andropov's Chernenko, declared declared that was leading leading a counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary offensive offensive in in Poland, Poland, inspiring a "inspiring and and uniting uniting the the enemies enemies of of Communismand those dissatisfied dissatisfied by by the the present present system." system. The Communism and those The comments comments of of Mikhail Gorbachev, Gorbachev, who who was was to to succeed succeed Chernenko Chernenko eleven Mikhail eleven months months later, later, were were curicuri ously prophetic. prophetic. "It It seems to me, he said, ously seems to me," he said, that "that we we dont don't yet yet understand understand the the true true intentions of Jaruzelski. Perhaps Perhaps he he wishes to have have a intentions ofJaruzelski. wishes to a pluralistic pluralistic system system of of government government in Poland."124 Poland.123 As in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia during during and and after after the the Prague every stage stage of As Prague Spring, Spring, every of the the PolPol ish crisis was monitored by by illegals on PROGRESS PROGRESS operations. ish crisis was monitored illegals on operations. In In Poland, Poland, as as in in Czechoslovakia, there there are are indications indications that that at at least the illegals Czechoslovakia, least a a few few of of the illegals became became symsym pathetic to the thereformers. reformers.The The evidence isclearest thecase pathetic to evidence is clearest in in the case of of Valentin Valentin Viktorovich Viktorovich Barannik (codenamed (codenamed ORLOV) ORLOV) and and his his wife, wife, Svetlana Barannik Svetlana Mikhaylovna Mikhaylovna (codenamed (codenamed ORLOVA), who, from from 1978 1978 onwards, were sent ona a series assignments in ORLOV A), who, onwards, were sent on series of of assignments in Poland Poland using false West West German German passports. passports. In the summer using false In the summer of of 1982, 1982, ORLOV despatched despatched to to the of the of the the Polish Polish one-party one-party state: state: the center center a a devastating devastating critique critique of the nature nature of

The to the fact that Yes men men are The absence absence of of a a legal legal opposition opposition leads leads to the fact that only only Yes are suc successful. of the the leadership not discussed, discussed, cessful. Views Views which which are are contrary contrary to to those those of leadership are are not but but suppressed suppressed and and eliminated. eliminated. The in a struggle, individuindividu The whole whole of of the the ruling ruling stratum stratum is is engaged engaged in a hidden hiddenstruggle, ally and even higher a prestigious prestigious appointment appointment and and other other and in in groups, groups, for for an an even higher post, post, a advantages. Thus, the Party is not not in position to to lead lead the the country advantages.Thus, the Party bureaucracy bureaucracy is ina a position country while its problems problems and and needs. needs. while taking taking a a comprehensive comprehensive account account of of all its Without and free society is Without creativity creativity and free enterprise, enterprise, a a society is not not viable, viable, and and it it becomes becomes 125 the the victim victim of of bureaucracy. bureaucracy.125 The record the Centres Centre's doubtless doubtless outraged response. The files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin do donot not record the outraged response. There illegals who agreed privately privately with with There is is little little doubt, doubt, however, however,that that there there were were other other illegals who agreed RLOV dared dared to what what 0 ORLOV to say say openly. openly.
A S E A R LY A S AS EARLY AS

1980 the Soviet been forced forced into into the recogni 1980 the Soviet Politburo Politburo had had been the reluctant reluctant recognition only Polish counter-revolution counter-revolution was fear of of tion that thatthe the only effective effective defense defense against against a a Polish was the the fear

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Soviet however,was was a based on Soviet military military intervention. intervention. That That fear, fear, however, a dwindling dwindling asset asset based on memories Polit memories of of Budapest Budapest in in 1956, 1956, Prague Prague in in 1968 1968 and and Kabul Kabul in in 1979. 1979. Once Oncethe thePolitburo secretly secretly turned the idea of invading invading Warsaw Warsaw in in 1980, 1980, its its policy was based buro turned against against the idea of policy was based on on aabluff bluff which which could could not not be be sustained sustained indefinitely. indefinitely. Gorbachevs rise riseto to power power in in 1985 1985hastened hastened the the moment momentwhen when the bluffwould be Gorbachev's the bluff would be called. called. In In some some of of his his first first meetings meetings as as general general secretary secretary with with east east European European leaders, leaders, he warned warned that that they they could could no no longer longer expect expect the the Red Red Army Army to to come come to to their their rescue rescue if if he they fell fell out out with with their theirfellow fellow citizens. citizens. Gorbachev Gorbachev conveyed conveyed the the same same message message more more they formally at at aameeting meeting of of Comecon Comecon leaders leaders in in Moscow Moscow in in November November 1986.126 1986.126 Though formally Though the east European regimes were, predictably, predictably, unwilling unwilling to to share share the the secret with their the east European regimes were, secret with their subjects, it. It did not occur to subjects, it it was was only only a a matter matter of of time time before before they they discovered discovered it. It did not occur to Gorbachev, be of Gorbachev, however, however, that that he hemight might be opening opening the theway way to to the theend end of the the Communist Communist era in in eastern eastern Europe. Europe. He H e expected expected the the hardliners, hardliners, when when they they could could hold hold out out no era no longer, longer, to to be be succeeded succeeded by by a a generation generation of of little little Gorbachevs Gorbachevs anxious anxious to to emulate emulate the the reforms being being introduced introduced in in Moscow. Moscow. Few Few peacetime peacetime miscalculations miscalculations have have had had such such reforms momentous consequences. consequences. Once Once a new crisis crisis arose within the Soviet Bloc Blocand it momentous a new arose within the Soviet ' and it became clear clear that that the the Red Red Army Army would would stay stay in in its its barracks, barracks, the the "Socialist Socialist Commonbecame Common wealth was wasdoomed. doomed. wealth" The end end game game began began in in Poland. Poland. By By the the beginning beginning of of 1989, 1989, with withthe theeconomy economy in in The dire straits straits and and the the return return of of labor labor unrest, unrest, the the Polish Polish Politburo Politburo was was discussing discussing new new dire austerity measures measures which which threatened threatened to to produce produce an an explosion explosion of of discontent discontent reminisausterity reminis cent of of that that in in 1980. 1980. J Jaruzelski refused to to consider consider a a return returnto to martial law, law, convinced convinced cent aruzelski refused martial that it would lead lead to to much much greater greater loss loss of of life life than than in 1981. The The only only option, that it would in 1981. option, he he believed, was wasto to hold hold discussions with the the still-illegal still-illegal Solidarity Solidarity in in return return for for its its help help believed, discussions with Jaruzelski Kiszczak, in preserving the peace. peace. Though J aruzelski had the support support of Czeslaw Kiszczak, interior in charge charge of of the the SB interior minister minister in hardliners of 1 , he SB and and one one of of the the :leading leading hardliners of 198 1981, he was able to push his proposal through the Politburo only only by by threatening threatening to resign. was able to push his proposal through the Politburo to resign. Solidaritys relegalization relegalization and to general Two months of tortuous negotiations led to Solidarity's elections in in June Juneunder under rules which, which, though though calculated calculated to to produce produce a a large large Communist elections rules Communist majority, would would give give Solidarity Solidarity a a place place in in parliament. parliament. To To the the stupefaction stupefaction of of both both majority, itself and and its its opponents, however, Solidarity Solidarity won won a a sweeping sweeping victory. victory. A few few months months itself opponents, however, earlier the the government government spokesman, Jerzy Urban, Urban, had had dismissed dismissed Solidarity Solidarity as as a a nonearlier spokesman, Jerzy "non existent organization" organization and and Wa:lsa Walgsa as as a a "private private citizen" citizen of of no no political political significance. significance. existent theCommunist Communist justa lost a After the defeat he told the outgoing government, This "This is not just election, gentlemen. gentlemen. It's Its the the end end of of an an age."127 age.127 election, The end end came came more more quickly quickly than than anyone anyone thought thought possible. possible. Any Any remaining remaining doubts The doubts Moscows willingness willingness to tolerate the removal of the Communist Communistold guard disabout Moscow's dis appeared during during Gorbachev's Gorbachevs visit visitto to East East Berlin Berlin in in September September to attend the thefortieth fortieth appeared to attend German Democratic Republic." Republic. H e told birthday celebrations celebrations of the now-doomed "German He a phrase quickly made public by the Soviet Honecker in a Soviet delegation, In "In politics politics life punishes severely severely those those who who fall fall behind. himself fell fell from from power power six weeks punishes behind." Honecker Honecker himself weeks later. Even Even when when it it became clear that that the the whole whole Communist Communist order, order, and and not not merely merely later. became clear the old guard, was at risk in eastern Europe, Gorbachev did not draw back. He sent of the his close adviser adviser Aleksandr Yakovlev Yakovlev to the the capitals of the disintegrating Socialist Socialist

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Commonwealth "to to make make the the point point over over and and over over again: again: We not going to inter interCommonwealth We are are not going to fere.Yakovlev Yakovlev said said later: later: fere." Please, we told told them, them, make make your your own own calculations, calculations, but but make make sure Please, we sure you you underunder stand that that our our troops troops will will not not be be used, used, even even though they are stand though they are there. there. They They will will remain in in their barracks and will not anywhere, under under any any circumstances. circumstances.128 128 remain their barracks and will not go anywhere, After delirious delirious East East German German crowds crowds surged surged through through the the Berlin Berlin Wall Wall on on November November 9 After it took took only only the the last last seven seven weeks weeks of the the year year for for the the remaining topit of remaining one-party one-party states states to to top ple like like a a house house of of cards. cards. ple The Centre Centre accepted accepted the the collapse collapse of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc with with far equanimity than than The far less less equanimity Gorbachev. in Gorbachev.Though Though the the KGB devised devised active activemeasures measures in aadesperate desperate attempt attempt to to stave stave off it was was refused permission to to implement implement off the the downfall downfall of of the the Communist Communist regimes, regimes, it refusedpermission them. According According to to the the head head of of the the FCD, FCD, Leonid Leonid Shebarshin, the leaders eastern them. Shebarshin, the leaders of of eastern Europe were were told told to to fend fend for for themselves. themselves. "But," But, he he complains, they were educated Europe complains, "they were educated only to to be be friends friends of of the the Soviet Soviet Union; Union; they they were were never never prepared prepared to to stand stand on on their only their thewolves."129 w01ves.~~~ own feet. They were just just thrown to the

C CL L U E OE N EA - P TT YA T SE TAT E CO ON NC US S I IO ON N :: F FR RO OM M T TH HE ON -P RA TR Y S T O T EP U PT U IT I N DC EY N C Y TO TH HE N P R EPSRI E DS E IN

The us ss te e llige The R Roole l e of of R Ru s ii a an n In Int l l i g en n ccee

Most Most academic academic historians historians have have been been slow slowto to recognize recognize the the role role of of intelligence intelligence com communities in the international relations and political history of the twentieth century. munities in the international relations and political history of the twentieth century. One One striking striking example example concerns concerns the the history history of of signals signals intelligence intelligence (SIGINT). (SIGINT). From From 1 945 onwards, 1945 onwards, almost almost all all histories histories of of the the Second Second World World War Warmentioned mentioned the the Ameri American can success success in in breaking breaking the the main main Japanese Japanese diplomatic diplomatic cipher cipher over over a a year year before before the the attack on Pearl Harbor. British success in breaking German ciphers during the First attack on Pearl Harbor. British success in breaking German ciphers during the First World War was also common WorldWar wasalso common knowledge; knowledge; indeed indeed one one well-publicized well-publicized German German decrypt has decrypt produced produced by by British British codebreakers-the codebreakers-the Zimmermann Zimmermann telegram-had telegram-had hastened 9 1 7. But, the revelation tened the the US US declaration declaration of ofwar war on on Germany Germany in in1 1917. But, until until the revelation of of the the ULTRA secret in 1973, it occurred to almost no historian (save for former intelli ULTRA secret in 1973, it occurred to almost no historian (save for former intelligence gence officers officers who who were were forbidden forbidden to to mention mention it) it) that that there there might might have have been been major major SIGINT against Germany SIGINT successes successes against Germany as as well well as as Japan. Japan. Even Even after after the the disclosure disclosure of of ULTRA's ULTRASimportant important role role in in British British and and American American wartime wartime operations operations in in the thewest, west, it it took another fifteen years before any historian raised the rather obvious question of took another fifteen years before any historian raised the rather obvious question of whether whether there there was was a a Russian Russian ULTRA ULTRA on on the theeastern eastern front.1 front. At At the the end end of ofthe the twentieth twentieth century, century, many many of of the the historians historians who who now now acknowledge acknowledge the SIGINT in in the the Second Second World World War War still still ignore ignore it it completely completely in in the significance significance of of SIGINT their studies of the Cold War. This sudden disappearance of SIGINT from the his their studies of the Cold War. This sudden disappearance of SIGINT from the historical torical landscape landscape immediately immediately after after VJ VJ Day Day has has produced produced a a series series of of eccentric eccentric anom anomalies alies even evenin in some some of of the the leading leading studies studies of of policymakers policymakers and and international international relations. relations. Thus, example, Sir Martin massive and Thus, for forexample, Sir Martin Gilbert's Gilbertsmassive and mostly mostly authoritative authoritative multi multivolume of for SIGINT volume official officialbiography biography of Churchill Churchillacknowledges acknowledges his hispassion passion for SIGINT as as war war leader but includes not a single reference to his continuing interest in it as peacetime leader but includes not a single reference to his continuing interest in it as peacetime prime prime minister minister from from 1951 1951to to 1955. 1955. There SIGINT in in biographies biographies of of Stalin. Stalin. While While there there are are some some There is is even even less less about about SIGINT excellent any excellent histories historiesof of the the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, it itis is difficult difficultto to think thinkof of any which which devotes devotes as as much much as as a a sentence sentence to to the the enormous enormous volume volume of of SIGINT SIGINTgenerated generated by by the the KGB KGB and and GRU. policy, the barely mentioned. GRU. In In many many studies studies of of Soviet Soviet foreign foreign policy, the KGB KGB is is barely mentioned. The The bibliography academic history Russian foreign foreign relations relations from bibliography of of the the most most recent recent academic history of of Russian from 1 9 1 7 to (published 998), praised subject 1917 to 1991 1991 (published in in 11998), praised by by a a British British authority authority on on the the subject as as "eas easily policy," contains-apart from a ily the the best best general generalhistory history of of Soviet Soviet foreign foreign policy, contains-apart from a biography biography of 120 titles.2 titles.2 of Beria-nbt Beria-nbt a a single single work work on on Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligenceamong among more more than than 120

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Though aberrations by historians the overover Though such such aberrations by leading leading historians are are due due partly partly to tothe classification of of SIGINT), derive at at classification of intelligence intelligence archives archives (worst (worst in in the the case case of SIGINT) , they they derive root from from what what psychologists psychologists call call"cgnitive cognitive dissonance-the difficulty difficultyall all us have have root dissonance"-the ofof us in grasping grasping new disturb our existing view of the the wor1d.j in new concepts concepts which which disturb our existing view of world.3 For For many many twentieth-century historians, historians, political politicalscientists scientistsand international relations specialists, twentieth-century and international relations specialists, secret intelligence intelligence has such a a concept. concept. It is, of of course, as secret has been been just just such It is, course, naive naive to to assume, assume, as some "spy spy writers have done, that that the the most secret secret sources sources necessarily provide the most some writers" have done, most necessarily provide the most important information. information. But But it it is is also toto suppose that research research on on twentieth twentiethimportant alsonaive naive suppose that century international international relations relations and and authoritarian authoritarian regimes regimes (to take only only two twoexamples) examples) century (to take can afford affordto to neglect neglect the the role role of ofintelligence intelligence agencies. As a new century dawns the can agencies. As a new century dawns the tratra ditional disregardfor for intelligence in is serious, serious, if ifnot not yet terminal,decline. decline. A ditional academic academic disregard intelligence is in yet terminal, new generation generation of of scholars scholars has has begun begun to to emerge, less disoriented disoriented than than most most of new emerge, less of their their A vast predecessors by bythe the role role of ofintelligence intelligence and its use (or (orabuse) abuse) by policymakers.4 predecessors and its use by policymakers.4 A vast research agenda agenda awaits awaitsthem. them. research Research on on the the Soviet Soviet era era has has already already undermined undermined the the common assumption of a Research common assumption of a basic symmetry between the role of intelligence in East and West. The Cheka and its basic symmetry between the role of intelligence in East and West. The Cheka and its successors were central to the the functioning hnctioning of of the the Soviet system system in ways that that intelligence successors were central to Soviet in ways intelligence communities never were wereto to the the government government of of Western The great great nineteenth nineteenthcommunities never Western states. states. The century dissident dissident Aleksandr Aleksandr Herzen, Herzen, perhaps perhaps the the fi first real Russian Russian socialist, socialist,said saidthat that century rst real what he he feared feared for forthe the twentieth twentieth century century was was "Genghis Genghis Khan Khan with with a trawhat a telegraph-a telegraph"-a tra ditional despot despot with with at at his his command command all all the the power power of of the the modern modern state. With Stalins ditional state. With Stalin's Russia, Herzen's Herzens nightmare nightmarebecame becamereality. reality. But the power of the state was, was,as Russia, But the power of the Stalinist Stalinist state as George Orwell realized, in in large large part a secret secret power. power.The of George Orwell realized, part a The construction construction and and survival survival of the world's worlds first first one-party one-party state state in in Russia and its near abroad" abroaddepended dependedon on the the Russia and its "near the crecre ation after after the the October October Revolution Revolution of ofan an unprecedented system of ofsurveillance surveillance able to ation unprecedented system able to monitor and and suppress suppress all all forms forms of Eighty-Four Orwell monitor of dissent. dissent. In In Nineteen Eighty-Four Orwell depicts depicts a a state built built on on almost almost total total surveillance: surveillance: state

There was was .. .. .. no no way way of of knowing knowing whether whether you you were There were being being watched watched at at any any given moment. moment. How How often, often, or or on onwhat what system, the the Thought ThoughtPolice plugged in given system, Police plugged in on individual wire was guesswork. It even conceivable that that they on any anyindividual wire wasguesswork. I t was waseven conceivable they watched everybody everybody all all the the time. But at at any any rate rate they they could watched time. But could plug plug in in your your wire wire whenever they wanted to.5 whenever they wanted Millions in in Stalin's Stalins Russia Russiafelt feltalmost almostas as closely watched as as Winston Winston Smith Smithinin NineMillions closely watched Nine "Because of of the informers," writes teen Eighty-Four. Because teen Eighty-Four. the ubiquity ubiquity of of NKVD NKVD informers, writes historian historian . many people people had had no no one whom they theytrusted Geoffrey Hosking, Hosking, " Geoffrey . .. .. many one whom trusted completely.6 completely."6 The state were were laid Lenin, the the Chekds Cheka's most most The foundations foundations of of Stalin's Stalinssurveillance surveillance state laidby by Lenin, ardent dismissed protests protests at at its ardent supporter supporter within within the the Bolshevik Bolshevik leadership, leadership,who who dismissed its bru brutality as as wimpish wimpish "wailing." wailing.With With Lenin's Lenins personal personal encouragement, the Cheka Chekagradtality encouragement, the grad ually permeated permeated every every aspect of life life under Soviet regime.7 regime.7 When, ually aspect of under the the Soviet When, for for example, example, Lenin sought to stamp out celebration of the Russian Christmas, it was to the Lenin sought to stamp out celebration of the Russian Christmas, it was to the Cheka Cheka that on December to be be on that he he turned. turned. ''All All Chekists," Chekists, he he instructed instructed on December 25, 1919, "have have to on the up because of ofNikold 'Nikola'[St. [St. the alert alert to to shoot shoot anyone anyone who who doesn't doesnt turn turn up toto work work because

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Nicholas's ."g Stalin the Nicholass Day] D~Y].~ Stalin used used the the Cheka's Chekassuccessors, successors, the OGPU OGPU and and the the NKVD, NKVD,to to carry carry through through the the greatest greatest peacetime peacetime persecution persecution in in European European history, history, whose whosevictims victims included included a a majority majority of of the the Party Party leadership, leadership, of of the the high high command command and and even even of of the the commissars commissars of of state state security security responsible responsible for forimplementing implementing the the Great Great Terror. Terror. Among Among Western unable to persecution was was Western observers observers of of the the Terror, Terror, unable to comprehend comprehend that that such such persecution possible in an apparently civilized society, there were some textbook cases of cogni possible in an apparently civilized society, there were some textbook cases of cognitive dissonance. The tive dissonance. The American American ambassador, ambassador, Joseph Joseph Davies, Davies, informed informed Washington Washington that that the theshow show trials trials had had provided provided "proof proofbeyond beyondreasonable reasonabledoubt doubt to to justifY justify the the ver verdict treason." The regarded as dict of of guilty guilty of of treason. The historian historian Sir Sir Bernard Bernard Pares, Pares, widely widely regarded as the the 1962, leading British expert of his generation on all things Russian, wrote as late as leading British expert of his generation on all things Russian, wrote as late as 1962, "Nearly trials] the Nearlyall all [those [those condemned condemned at at the the trials] admitted admitted having having conspired conspiredagainst against the life life of of Stalin Stalin and and others, others, and and on on this this point point it it is is not not necessary necessary to to doubt doubt them."9 them. After After the the Second Second World World War War the the NKVD NKVD and and its its successor, successor, the the MGB, MGB, played played a a central role in the creation of the new Soviet empire in eastern and central Europe. central role in the creation of the new Soviet empire in eastern and central Europe. Their was to Their role, role, according accordingto to a a sanctimonious sanctimonious Soviet Soviet official officialhistory, history, was to "help help the the peo people ple of of liberated liberated countries countries in in establishing establishing and and strengthening strengthening a a free free domestic domestic form form of of government"lO-in governmentlo-in other other words, words, to to construct construct a a series series of of obedient obedient one-party one-party states states along along the the Soviet Soviet Union's Unionswestern western borders. borders. Throughot Throughout the theSoviet Soviet Bloc, Bloc,security securityand and intelligence created in intelligence services, services,newly newly created in the the image image of of the the MGB, MGB,played played a a crucial crucial part part in in the the establishment establishment of of Stalinist Stalinist regimes. regimes. Informers Informers in in the the German GermanDemocratic Democratic Repub Republic seven times lic were were seven times more more numerous numerous even even than than in in Nazi Nazi Germany. Germany. As As in in East East Ger Germany, new not Stalinists many, many many of of the the leaders leaders of of the the new one-party one-party states states were were not merely merely loyal loyal Stalinists but but also also former former Soviet Soviet agents. agents. Though Though post-Stalinist post-Stalinist enemies enemies of of the the people people were weredowngraded downgraded by by the the KGB KGB to to the the category repression, the category of of dissidents dissidents and and subjected subjected to to less less homicidal homicidal methods methods of of repression, the campaign campaign against against them them remained remained uncompromising. uncompromising. In In order order to to understand understand the the work workings of the Soviet state, much more detailed research is needed on the KGB's meth ings of the Soviet state, much more detailed research is needed on the KGBs methods of social control. ods of social control. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes on on documents documents from from internal internal KGB KGB directorates les illustrate directorates which which found found their their way way into into FCD FCD fi files illustrate the the enormous enormous wealth wealth of of highly highly classified classifiedmaterial materialon on the thefunctioning functioning of of the the Soviet Soviet system systemwhich which still still remains remains hidden Russian security service, the hidden in in the the archives archives of oftoday's todays Russian security service, the FSB. FSB. Among was Among the theKGB's KGBs innovations innovations during during the the Cold ColdWar War was the the punitive punitive use use of ofpsy psychiatry KGB recruited recruited a a series series of of psychiatrists psychiatristsat at chiatry against against ideological ideological subversion. subversion.The The KGB the and the Serbsky SerbskyInstitute Institute for for Forensic ForensicPsychiatry Psychiatry and other other institutes institutes who who were were instructed instructed to schizophrenia," thus to diagnose diagnose political political dissidents dissidents as as cases cases of of"paranoiac paranoiac schizophrenia, thus condemn condemning them to indefi n ite incarceration in mental hospitals where they could be ing them toindefinite incarceration in mental hospitals where they could bedrugged drugged and measures" implemented and tranquilized. tranquilized. One One "plan plan of of agent agent operational operationalmeasures implemented late late in in 1975 1975 involved involved the the use use of of four four agents agents (KRAYEVSKY, (KRAYEVSKY,PETROV, PETROV, PROFESSOR PROFESSOR and and V AYKIN) and six co-optees co-optees (BEA, (BEA, LDR, LDR, MGV, MGV, MZN, MZN, NRA and and SAB) SAB) in in the the psy psyVAYKIN) and six chiatric profession.ll There almost certainly, many more. Remarkably, chiatric profession. There were, were, almost certainly, many more. Remarkably, most most incarcerated dissidents retained retained their after treatment incarcerated dissidents their sanity, sanity, even even after treatment by by KGB KGB psychia psychia977-8 by byAleksandr Aleksandr Aleksan trists. oftwenty-seven twenty-sevenof of them in 1 trists. An An examination examination of them in 1977-8 Aleksandrovich a concluded drovich Voloshanovich, Voloshanovich, a doctor doctor at at the the Dolgoprudnaya Dolgoprudnaya psychiatric psychiatric hospital, hospital, concluded that psychological disorder.12 In that none none was was suffering suffering from fromany any psychological disorder.l2 In 1983 1983 Soviet Soviet psychiatrists psychiatrists

Co n c l u s i o n : From Fr o m th n e - Pa r ty S t a t e to e Pu n Pr de ny cy Conclusion: the e O One.-Party Stcrte t o th tht? P n t iin Pr e seis die nc

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resigned resigned from from the the World World Psychiatric Psychiatric Association, Association, just just in in time time to to avoid avoid expulsion expulsion for for systematic their systematic abuse abuseof of their patients. patients. The The KGB's KGBs most most widely widely used used methods methods of of social social control control were were the the simpler, simpler, though though immensely and immensely labor-intensive, labor-intensive, techniques techniques of of ubiquitous ubiquitous surveillance surveillance and intimidation. intimidation. Andropov's fi rst-hand experience Andropov,~ first-hand experience as as ambassador ambassador in in Budapest Budapest in in 1956, 1956, reinforced reinforced by by the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak crisis crisis during during his his first first year year as as KGB chairman, chairman, convinced convinced him him that that the subversion. KGB could could not not afford afford to to overlook overlook a a single single instance instance of of ideological ideological subversion. the KGB "Every Every such such act," act, he he insisted, insisted, "represents represents a a danger."13 danger. None None was was too too trivial trivial to to attract attract the ofof thethe KGB. the attention attention KGB.The The effort effort and and resources resources employed employedto to track track down down each each and and every to criticizing the every author author of ofan an anonymous anonymous letter letter or or seditious seditious graffi graffito criticizing the Soviet Soviet system system frequently frequently exceeded exceededthose those devoted devoted in in the theWest West to to a a major major murder murder enquiry. enquiry. Among the many such authors cele Among the many successful successful operations operations against against such authors which which were were celeKGB Sbornik was the hunt for a subversive brated in the classified in-house journal brated in the classified in-house journal Sbornik was the hunt for a subversive codenamed in July codenamed KHUDOZHNIK (''Artist''), (Artist), who who in July 1971 1971 began began sending sending anony anonymous mous letters letters attacking attacking Marxism-Leninism Marxism-Leninism and and various various Party Party functionaries functionaries to to CPSU and in ballpoint and Komsomol Komsomol committees. committees. The The letters letters were were written written in ballpoint pen pen and and signed signed "Central Committee of the Freedom Party." Forensic examination revealed barely Central Committee of the Freedom Party. Forensic examination revealed barely detectable traces on drawings-hence the detectable traces on the the back back of of some some of of the the letters letters of of pencil pencil drawings-hence the codename codename KHUDOZHNIK and and the the hypothesis hypothesis that that he he had had studied studied at at art art school. school. Detailed Detailed study study of of the the contents contents of of the the letters letters also also revealed revealedthat that he he regularly regularly read readKom Konzand listened to foreign radio stations. The fact that some of somolskaya Pravda Prauda and listened to foreign radio stations. The fact that some of the the letters letters were were sent sent to to military military Komsomols Komsomolsled ledto to an an immense immense trawl trawl through through the the records records of people dismissed dismissed from of people from military military training training establishments establishments and and the the files files of of reserve reserve officers. officers. The The search search for for KHUDOZHNIK KHUDOZHNIK was was concentrated concentrated in in Moscow, Moscow, Yaroslavl, Yaroslavl, Rostov Rostov and and Gavrilov-Yam, Gavrilov-Yam, where where his hisletters letters were were posted. posted. In In all all four four places places the the postal postal censorship censorship service service (Sluzhba (Sluzhba PK) PK) searched searched for for many many months months for for handwriting handwriting similar similar to to KHUDOZHNIK's; KHUDOZHNIKs; numerous numerous KGB KGB agents agents and and co-optees co-optees were were also also shown shown sam samples le. An ples of ofthe the writing writing and and given given KHUDOZHNIK's KHUDOZHNIKs supposed supposed psychological psychologicalprofi profile. An enormous exercise was enormous research research exercise was undertaken undertaken to to identify identifjr and and scrutinize scrutinize official official forms forms which lled in. which KHUDOZHNIK KHUDOZHNIK might might have have fi filled in. Eventually, Eventually, after after a a hunt hunt lasting lasting almost almost three his writing application to the Rostov Housing three years, years, his writing was was found found on on an an application to the Rostov City City Housing Commission. Commission. In In 1974 1974 KHUDOZHNIK KHUDOZHNIKwas was unmasked unmasked as as the the chairman chairman of of a a Rostov Rostov street robov. After street committee committee named named Ko Korobov. After a a brief brief period period under under surveillance, surveillance, he he was was arrested, tried and imprisoned.14 As in many similar cases, the triumphalist KGB arrested, tried and imprisoned. As in many similar cases, the triumphalist KGB report report on on the thelengthy lengthy operation operation to to track track down down KHUDOZHNIK KHUDOZHNIK showed showed no no sense sense of of the hunt for an author "libels the absurdity absurdity of of devoting devoting such such huge huge resources resources to to the the hunt for an author of of libels against none against Soviet Sovietreality" reality none of of which which ever ever became becamepublic. public. other KGB were regularly reminded articles in KGB officers officerswere regularly reminded by byarticles in KGB Sbornik Sbornik and and other exhortations exhortations that that even even Western Western popular popular music music was was inherently inherently subversive. subversive.Provincial Provincial KGBs KGBs went went to to enormous enormous pains pains to to discover discover the the extent extent oflocal of local interest interest in in such such music, music, and and were were usually usually disturbed disturbed by by what what they they discovered. discovered. The The KGB in in Dnepropetrovsk Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, as a a party party apparatchik, apparatchik, calculated calculated after after Oblast, where where Brezhnev Brezhnev had had begun begun his his career career as a correspondence in a presumably presumably lengthy lengthy examination examination of of young young people's peoples private private correspondence in the the mid-1 970s, that age group 80 percent percent of of the the 15-20-year-old 15-20-year-old age group "systematically systematically mid-1970s, that almost almost 80

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listened to broadcasts from popular music, music, and listened to broadcasts from Western Western radio radio stations," stations, especially especially popular and showed other unhealthy signs of interest in Western pop stars such as trying to obtain showed other unhealthy signs of interest in Western pop stars suchas trying to obtain their their photographs. photographs. The The almost almost surreal surreal nature nature of of the the report report on on musical musical subversion subversion in in Dnepropetrovsk Dnepropetrovsk Oblast Oblast is is a a reminder reminder of of how how the the hunt huntfor for ideological ideological dissidence dissidencefre frequently all sense senseof of the the holy war quently destroyed destroyed all the absurd absurd among among those those committed committed to to the holy war against against it: it: Even Even listening listening to to musical musical programs programs gave gave young young people people a a distorted distorted idea idea of of Soviet reality, and treasonable nature. with Soviet reality, and led led to to incidents incidents of of a a treasonable nature. Infatuation Infatuation with trendy Western musical groups trendy Western popular popular music, music, musical groups and and performers performers falling falling under under their influence influence leads leads to to the the possibility possibility of these young young people people embarking embarking on on a a their of these hostile path. Such interests of hostile path. Such infatuation infatuation has has a a negative negative influence influence on on the theinterests of soci society, ety, inflames inflames vain vain ambitions ambitions and and unjustified unjustified demands, demands, and and can can encourage encourage the the emergence [not officially approved] groups emergence of of informal informal [not officially approved] groups with with a a treasonable treasonable tendency.Is tendency.
Michael Jackson Jackson and and Pink Pink Floyd, Floyd, amongst amongst others, others, were were thus thus identified identified as as potential potential Michael threats to to the the Soviet Soviet system, The fact Fact that that the one-party states states felt so threats system. The the Communist Communist one-party felt so threatened by by Western Western pop popstars stars confirmed confirmed their their status status as as symbols symbolsof of youthful rebel rebelthreatened youthful lion. Even in in Albania, Albania, after after the the collapse collapse in in 1992 1992 of ofthe the last last and and most most isolated isolated Com Comlion. Even munist regime regime in inEurope (isolatedeven from Moscow), Moscow), the the elegant eleganttree-lined munist Europe (isolated even from tree-lined Bulevard Bulevard in in the the center center of of Tirana Tirana was was full full of ofyoung young people people wearing wearing Michael Michael Jackson Jackson (or "Miel MielJ Jaksen) T-shirts. The The decapitated decapitated statue statue of of Stalin Stalin was was inscribed, inscribed, in in large large (or aksen") T-shirts. red characters, characters, with with the the words words "Pink Pink Floyd."16 Floyd.,16 red citizensand Westerners were regarded regardedby by All points of contact between Soviet citizens the Centre as potential potential causes causes of of ideological ideological contagion. contagion. Foreign Foreign residencies residencies had had Line Centre as Line SK officers whose officers whose chief duty was to prevent such contamination in the the local Soviet Soviet colony, which invariably contained large numbers of KGB agents and co-optees. In colony, the mid-1970s mid-1970s 15 15 percent percent of of Soviet Soviet employees in New New York York were recruited the employees in werefully fully recruited I 7 It agents. I t has has long long been known that that Soviet Soviet groups groups traveling traveling abroad abroad were were always agents. been known always carefully shepherded shepherded by by KGB officers. officers. What usually been been appreciated, appreciated, howcarefully What has has not not usually how ever, is isthe the large proportion of of agents agents and co-optees in in each (frequently over over15 15 ever, large proportion and co-optees each group group (frequently percent) percent) who who monitored monitored the the behavior behavior of oftheir their fellow fellow travelers. travelers. When the theSoviet Soviet State State When Academic Symphony Symphony Orchestra Orchestra gave gave concerts concerts in in the Italy and and Austria Austria in in Academic the FRG, Italy October and November 1974, 1974, for forexample, two KGB officers, officers, Pavel Pave1Vasilyevich October and November example, two Vasilyevich Sobolev and and Pyotr Pyotr Trubagard, Trubagard, posed posed as as members members of of the the orchestra orchestra staff. staff. The The 122 122 Sobolev members of of the the orchestra orchestra also also included included no no less less than than eight eight agents agents and and eleven eleven comembers co optees. In In the the course course of of the thetour tour compromising materials" materials were wereobtained obtained on on thirty thirtyoptees. "compromising abuse, "speculation" speculation five members of the orchestra, including evidence of alcohol "alcohol abuse," (probably mostly mostlyinvolving involvingattempts attempts to to purchase purchase Western Western consumer consumer goods), goods), and-in and-in (probably the case of the Jewishmusicians-friendly correspondence with individuals individuals in in the case of the Jewish musicians-"friendly" correspondence with compromisinginformation was obtained on the themusicians' musicians families, families, Israel. Further "compromising" such as the fact thatthe the wifeof of one of the violinists (identified by name in Mitrokhins notes) France? The Mitrokhin's notes) exchanged birthday greetings with acquaintances in France.Is

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also traveled to the West in October Moscow Chamber Orchestra also October 1974 1974 under the thirtymembers supervision of Mikhail MikhailAleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Sizov Sizov of the KGB. Of the supervision of of the the thirty members of of the orchestra, three were agents and fi five co-optees. The compromising information ve co-optees. "compromising information" theother twenty-two which most concerned the gathered by the eight informers on the was evidence evidence that that some of them them corresponded corresponded with with foreign foreign acquaintances.19 acquaintance^.^' KGB was some of I t was chiefl chiefly because of the theimmense time and effort expended in the war on all It y because fronts against ideological subversion that the the KGB was many times larger than any service. One example of the overwhelming concen concenWestern intelligence or security service. KGBs cases of ofideological ideological subversion is provided by clas clastration by provincial KG Bs on cases subversion is provided by the sified 1970 by the KGB directorate directorate for Leningrad and Leningrad Oblast. Oblast. sifi ed report for 1970 for Leningrad and Leningrad Not a a single single case case had had been been discovered discovered of of either either espionage contrast, Not espionage or or terrorism. terrorism. By By contrast, 502 people people were prophylactic briefings (warnings) over over their their involvement 502 weregiven given "prophylactic briefings" (warnings) involvement politically harmful incidents"; incidents; forty-one wereprosecuted in "politically prosecuted for committingor or involving ideological ideologicalsub subattempting to commit state crimes (most almost certainly involving version); thirty-four thirty-four Soviet Soviet citizens citizens were were caught caught trying trying to the frontier. frontier. Extensive Extensive version); to cross cross the incidents. work was carried out in institutes institutes of higher education education to "to prevent hostile incidents." The postal censorship censorship service service intercepted about 25,000 documents with ideologi"ideologi cally harmful harmful contents"; contents; a a further further 19,000 19,000documents documents were were confi confiscated at the cally scated at the frontier. frontier. One hundred hundred and and nine nine individuals individuals (as with ninety-nine in 1969) were One (ascompared compared with ninety-nine in 1969) were identified as as distributing distributing subversive subversive leaflets leaflets and and sending sending anonymous identified anonymous letters; letters; twentytwenty seven the culprits culpritswere tracked down. The KGBs huge agent network was sevenof of the were tracked down. The KGB's huge agent network was grown by another 17.3 17.3 percent percent over over the year.On O n the reported to have grown the previous previous year. the debit debit side the the KGB surveillance surveillance service servicewas wasreported reported to to have have crashed crashed twenty-seven twenty-seven.cars cars in side in the course ofits operations.20 Oleg Kalugin, who became deputy head of the its operations.20 1980, privately dismissed an elaborately Leningrad KGB in 1980, dismissed its work as "an elaboratelychoreochoreo graphed farce," farce, in in which which it it tried tried desperately desperately to to discover discover enough enough ideological ideological subver subvergraphed 1 sion to justify its existence.2 existence.* sion to justify its As head head of of the the KGB from from 1967 1967 to to 1982, 1982, Andropov Andropov sought sought to to keep As keep ideological ideological subversion at at the forefront of of the leadershipb preoccupations. asas trivial (by(by subversion the forefront the leadership's preoccupations.Issues Issues trivial Western standards) standards) as as the the activities activities of of a a small group of Western small group of Jehovahs Jehovah's Witnesses Witnesses in in the the depths ofSiberia Siberia or or the theunauthorized unauthorized publication publication in in Paris ofa by a Soviet depths of Paris of a short short story story by a Soviet author liable to Andropov's desk desk but on occasion, occasion, the author were were liable to reach reach not not merely merely Andropovs but also, also, on the Politburo. resonance with the rest of Politburo. Though Though even even the the leading leading dissidents dissidents had had little little resonance with the rest of the many hours of the Soviet Soviet population, population, at at least least until until the theGorbachev Gorbachev era, era, they they occupied occupied many hours of discussions. Early in 1977 1977a total of ofthirty-two measures operations Politburo discussions. thirty-two active measures against "Public Enemy Enemy Number against Andrei Andrei Sakharov, Sakharov, denounced denounced by Andropov Andropov as as Public Number One," One, were either in progress or about to commence both within the Soviet Union were either in progress or about to commence both within the Soviet Union and and abroad.22 abroad.22 No group group of of Soviet Soviet dissidents dissidents during during the the Cold Cold War could long avoid being No War could long avoid being penepene KGBs several several million trated by one or more of the KGB's million agents and co-optees. Their capacity to to make make a a public public protest protest was was limited limited to to the theability ability to to circulate circulate secretly secretlysamiz samizcapacity dat pamphlets pamphlets or or unfurl unfurl banners banners briefly briefly in in Red Red Square they were were torn torn down down by by dat Square before before they the yearsof of the Soviet system, system,the dissidents were were plain clothes KGB men. men. Until the final years a public support support or syma tiny tiny minority minority within within the the Soviet Soviet population population with with very very little little public or sym-

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pathy. pathy. Therein Therein lay lay much much of of their their heroism, heroism, as as they they battled battled courageously courageously against against what what must have must have seemed seemed impossible impossible odds. odds. The The KGB helped helped to to make make the the notion notion of of serious seriouspolitical politicalchange change appear appear an an impos impossible sible dream. dream. It It simply simply did did not not occur occur to to the the vast vast majority majority of of the the Russian Russian people people that that there grumbles about there was was any any alternative alternative to to the the Soviet Soviet system. system. Despite Despite grumbles about the the standard standard of the status of living, living, their their almost almost unquestioning unquestioning acceptance acceptance of of the status quo quo had had a a profound profound effect attitudes in foreign effect on on attitudes in the the West, West, and and thus thus on onWestern Western foreign policy. policy. During During the theCold Cold War, con War, most most vVestern Western observers observers reluctantly reluctantly assumed assumedthat that the theSoviet Soviet system systemwould would continue tinue indefinitely. indefinitely. Hence Hence the the general general sense sense of of shock shock as as well well as as of of surprise surprise when when the the Communist order Communist order in in eastern eastern Europe Europe crumbled crumbled so so swiftly swiftly in in the thefinal final months months of of1989, 1989, followed followed two two years years later later by by the the almost almost equally equally rapid rapid disintegration disintegration of of the the Soviet Soviet one oneparty party state. state. Henry Henry Kissinger Kissinger claimed claimed in in 1992, 1992, "I I knew knew no no one one .. .. .. who who had had predicted predicted the the evolution evolution in in the the Soviet Soviet Union."23 Union.23
A S W E L L A S underestimating AS underestimating the the centrality centrality of of the the KGB's KGBs system system of of social socialcontrol control to to the the functioning functioning of of the the Soviet Soviet system, system, Western Western observers observers have have often often underestimated underestimated the chiefs. 24 Beria, the power power and and influence influence of of its its security security and and intelligence intelligence chiefs.24 Beria,who who became became head head of of the the NKVD at at the the end end of of the the Terror, Terror, emerged emerged as as the the second second most most powerful powerful man in the Soviet Union-"my Union-my Himmler," Himmler, as as Stalin Stalin once once described described him. him. In 1945he he man in the Soviet In 1945 was in charge charge of of the construction of the first first Soviet Soviet atomic atomic bomb. bomb. After After Stalin's Stalins was put put in the construction of the death in in 1953, 1953, Beria became the the first first Soviet Soviet security securitychief to make make a a bid bid for for supreme supreme death Beria became chief to power. Fear Fearof of his ambitions, however, however, united united the the rest rest of ofthe the Soviet Soviet leadership leadershipagainst against power. his ambitions, him and and led led to to his his execution execution at at the the end end of of the the year. year. him It was was frequently frequently assumed assumed thereafter thereafter that that no no KGB chief It chief would bebe given would ever everagain again given the rest of Soviet leadership leadership to bidfor for the opportunity opportunity by by the the rest of the the Soviet to make make a a successful successful bid power. That That assumption provedcorrect in the the case caseof Shelepin, the the power. assumption proved correct in of Aleksandr Aleksandr Shelepin, dynamic and relatively relatively youthful youthful chairman of the theKGB from from 1958 1958 to to1961, 1961, who made dynamic and chairman of who made little secret to become become general secretary, but but was was effectively little secret of ofhis hisdesire desire to general secretary, effectivelysidelined sidelined after after Khrushchev's Khrushchevs overthrow overthrow by by Brezhnev Brezhnev and and the the other other leading leading plotters. plotters. Yuri Andropov Andropov played played a a much much subtler subtler game game than than Beria Beria or or Shelepin Shelepin in in planning planning his his Yuri ownrise to power power during during the the 1970s. 1970s. As As Brezhnev Brezhnev became becameprogressively feebler, own rise to progressively feebler, Andropov gradually apparent, succeeding Andropov gradually established established himself himself as as heir heir apparent, succeeding him him as as general general secretary in in 1982. 1982. There There is, however,not not a a single single reference referenceto to Andropov Andropov either either in in the the secretary is, however, 2,000 of Henry memoirs of the period period 1969-77, in Cyrus 2,000 pages pagesof Henry Kissinger's Kissingers memoirs of the 1969-77, or or in Cyrus Vances memoirs memoirs on on his his term term as as secretary secretary of of state, in succession succession to to Kissinger, Kissinger, from Vance's state, in from 1977 Kryuchkov was was similarly similarly underrated chairman a 1977 to to 1980.25 1980.25Vladimir Vladirnir Kryuchkov underrated as as KGB chairman a decade later.Most Western observers observers were weretaken taken by by surprise surprise when when he he emerged emerged as as the the decade later. Most Western ringleader of of the the abortive abortive coup coup of of August August 1991 1991 which which sought sought to to topple topple Gorbachev Gorbachev ringleader however, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov overreached overreached himself himself. and install a hardline regime. Like Beria, however, Though the the KGB had had hitherto hitherto been been an bulwark ofof the the Communist Communist Though anindispensable indispensable bulwark one-party to shore one-party state, state, Kryuchkov's Kryuchkovs mistimed mistimed attempt attempt to shore it it up up merely merely hastened hastened its its collapse.26 collapse.26 Yevgeni rst head Yevgeni Primakov, Primakov,fi first head of of the theFCD's FCDs successor, successor, the the SVR, also also attracted attracted sur surprisingly little little attention attentionfrom from most most Western Western commentators. prisingly commentators. A much-praised much-praised AmeriAmeri-

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can study of Yeltsins Yeltsin's Russia, Russia,published the eve of of Primakovs Primakov's appointment as published on - -the prime minister in September 1998, 1998, contained not a single reference reference to him. him.2i By the spring of1999, though 1999, though disclaimingany any ambition to succeedYeltsin, Yeltsin, Primakov topped opinion polls of of potential candidates in the following year's years presidential elec elections. Having Having apparently apparently concluded concluded that that Primakov Primakov had had become become too powerful, Yeltsin Yeltsin tions. too powerful, sacked him in May 1999. 1999. sacked
successors were werecentral to the the conduct of foreign policy policy its successors of Soviet foreign therunning of ofthe one-party state. as well as to the state. Kim Kim Philby proudly proudly told told a KGB leclec ture audience in 1980, 1980, Our service operating Unions fi first ture audience in "Our service operating abroad abroad is is the the Soviet Soviet Union's rst line line by of defense."28 The failure by many Western historians to identify the KGB as a major foreignpolicy policy thefact that many many Soviet Soviet policy policyaims aims did did arm of Soviet foreign is due partly to the not t Western Surveys of not fi fit Westernconcepts concepts of of international international relations. relations. Surveys of Stalin's Stalins foreign foreign policy policy invariably mention the the negotiations on collective security securityagainst against Nazi Germany, which were conducted by Litvinov Litvinov and Soviet diplomats, diplomats, but ignore entirely entirely which were conducted and Soviet but usually usually ignore the less less conventional operations against against the the White WhiteGuards Paris,the the conventional operations Guards in in Paris, the plan to to assasassas sinate General Franco early in the Spanish Civil War, the liquidation of of the leading in the thelate 1930s 1930s and the plot to kill killTito Trotskyists in western Europe in Tito in 1953-all 1953-all of which which were were entrusted entrusted to to the foreignintelligence service.29 Even after Stalins of the foreign intelligence service.29 Even after Stalin's death, foreign policy policy was not cast a Western was not cast in in a Western mold. mold. death, much of Soviet foreign INO, the the interwar interwar foreign foreignintelligence agency, made its its initial initial reputation by intelligence agency, made reputation by defeating a a series seriesof counter-revolutionary conspiracies anti-Bolshevik defeating of counter-revolutionary conspiracies involving involving anti-Bolshevik emigres imperialist intelligence intelligence agencies. Though Though the the evidence nowavailable available Cmigrks and and imperialist agencies. evidence now indicates none of (in reality, conspiracies had indicates that that none of these these (in reality, rather rather trivial) trivial) conspiracies had the the slightest slightest prospect of success, they bulked large in the imagination of the Soviet leadership. of success, large Similarly, INO's INOs liquidation liquidation of of leading leading White White Guards Guards and Trotskyists outside outside the the Similarly, and Trotskyists Soviet Union Union was, was, from from Stalin's Stalins perspective, a major majorvictory. At the the outbreak outbreak of of Soviet perspective, a victory. At the Second Second World World War, War, Stalin Stalin was was more more concerned by Trotsky Trotsky than than by by Hitler. the concerned by Hitler. During the 1930s Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence intelligence collection, thanks chiefly to the During the 1930s collection, thanks chiefly to the Great Illegals, Illegals, led led the the world. The recruitment recruitment of the Magnificent Magnificent Five Five and other Great world. The of the and other high-flying ideological agents agents opened opened up the prospect of penetrating the very very high-fl ying ideological up the prospect of penetrating the capitals. The of British British and heard of imperialist power in in Western Western capitals. The large large number number of and heard of imperialist other diplomatic diplomatic documents documents obtained obtained by by I N 0 had had an an important-though important-though still still lit litother INO tle researched-influence researched-influence on on the the making making of of Soviet Soviet foreign foreign policy. policy. Throughout Throughout the the tle Stalin the Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence contest contest with withboth both Britain, the chief Stalin era, era, the Britain, the chief pre-war tar pre-war tarUnited States, States,the theMain Main get, and the United Adversary of of the Cold War, was remarkably one-sided. wars; the one-sided. SIS SIS had had no no Moscow Moscow station station between between the the wars; the United United States States pos possessed no no espionage espionage agency agency at at all all until until 11941. INOs main pre-war defeats defeats were were self selfsessed 941 . INO's main inflicted: massacre of its who fell inflicted: chief chief among among them themthe the massacre of of many many of its best best officers officers who fell victim victim to paranoia of to the the paranoia of the the Great GreatTerror. Terror. Soviet intelligence intelligence penetration penetration of of the the West West reached reached its its apogee apogee during during the the Second Second Soviet World Never before had allies'secrets. secrets. At World War. War. Never before had any any state state learned learned so so many many of of its its allies At Tehran and Yalta Stalin Stalin was probably better better informed informed on the cards cards in the hands hands of of Tehran and Yalta was probably on the in the the Stalin the other othernegotiators negotiators than than any any statesman statesman at at any any previous previousconference. conference. Stalin knew knew the the
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contents British and American documents contents of of many many highly highlyclassified classified British and American documents which which Churchill C.hurchil1 and most of and Roosevelt Roosevelt kept kept even even from from most of their their cabiriets. cabinets. ULTRA, ULTRFI, though though revealed revealed to to ,{ British British ministers, Stalin. So So was only only SL six ministers, was was known known to to Stalin. was the the MANHATTAN MANHATTAN project, project, which carefully concealed from until he which was wascarefully concealed from Vice-President Vice-president Harry Harry Truman Truman until he suc succeeded was for the the ceeded Roosevelt Rooseveltin in April April 1945. 1945.(Truman (Truman was then then also also informed informed of of ULTRA for first peculiar irony Potsdam con first time.)30 time.)3oThere There is is a a peculiar irony about about Truman's Trumans decision decision at at the the Potsdam conference to reveal ference in in July July 1945 1945 to reveal to to Stalin Stalin that that "we we had had a a new new weapon weapon of of unusual unusual seemed unimpressed unimpressed by might, destructive power. "31 Stalin destructive power. Stalin seemed by the the news-as news-as well well he he might, since he since he had had known known about about plans plans to to build build the the American American atomic atomic bomb bomb for for fifteen fifteen times times as as long long as as Truman. Truman. Stalin also much most American policy Stalin was was also much better better informed informed than than most American and and British British policymakers against the makers about about the the first first major majorAmerican-British American-British intelligence intelligencesuccess success against the Soviet Soviet Union during Cold War, Union duringthe the Cold War, the the VENONA decrypts, decrypts, which which revealed revealed the the codenames codenames and the identities agents.Remarkably, Remarkably, Truman and clues clues to to the identities of of several several hundred hundred Soviet Soviet agents. Truman seems never seems never to to have have been been intormed informed of of VENONA at at all. all. Nor, Nor, almost almost certainly, certainly, were were more than a small minority of the Attlee cabinet in Britain. Because of internal rival more than a small minority of the Attlee cabinet in Britain. Because of internal rivalries within within the not told until late in ries the US intelligence intelligence community, community, even even the the CIA was was not told until late in 1952. of VENONA by early in 1947 from 1952. The The Centre, Centre, however, however, had had learned learned of byearly in1947 from William the US SIGINT agency, William Weisband, Weisband, an an agent agent in in the agency, ASA. Thus, Thus, amazingly, amazingly, Stalin the greatest secretof of the the early War Stalin discovered discovered the greatest American American intelligence intelligence secret early Cold Cold War over tIve the president or the over fiveyears yearsbefore beforeeither either the president or theCIA.32 CIA.32 The allies during The Centre's Centres extraordinary extraordinary successes successes in in penetrating penetrating its its allies during the the Second Second World remained in in place after victory, World War, War, and and the the fact fact that that some some of of its itsagents agents remained place after victory, raised raised exaggerated of what Soviet intelligence could achieve Cold exaggerated expectations expectations of what Soviet intelligence could achieve during during the the Cold War against against the the Main Main Adversary Adversary and and its its NATO allies. allies. KGB post-war strategy was was War post-war strategy based recreate the of Great on an an attempt attempt to to recreate the pre-war pre-war era eraof Great I1legals, Illegals, establish establisha a large large net netbased on work of of illegal and recruit recruit a a new new generation generation of high-flying ideological work illegal residencies residencies and of high-flying ideological agents. Alongside Alongside the the legal legal residencies residenciesin in Washington, Washington, New NewYork and San SanFrancisco, Francisco, agents. York and the Centre Centre planned planned as as late late as as the the early early 1980s 1980s to to set set up up six illegal residencies, residencies,each each runthe six illegal run ning administration. Its Its plans plans proved provedhopelessly hopelessly ning agents agents at at the the heart heart of of the the Reagan Reagan administration. optimistic.3. optimistic.1 Despite successes, the grand strategy Despite some some striking striking tactical tactical successes, the KGB's KGBs post-war post-war grand strategy for for penetrating failed. At least until until the penetrating the the corridors corridors of of power in in its its Main Main Adversary Adversary failed. At least the early chief source on American foreign early 1960s, 1960s, its itschief source of ofintelligence intelligence on American foreign policy policywas wasprobably probably the penetration penetration of of the the embassy in in Moscow. Moscow. By By the the beginning beginning of the Cold Warthe the the US embassy of the Cold War previously previously seductive seductive myth-image myth-image of of Stalin's Stalins Russia Russia as as the the world's worlds first first truly truly socialist socialist worker-peasant worker-peasant state, state, which which had had inspired inspired the the Magnificent Magnificent Five Five and and their their American American counterparts, was was fading fading fast. fast. Most Most of of the the idealistic idealistic student student revolutionaries revolutionaries ofthe late counterparts, of the late 1960s, unlike unlike their their pre-war pre-war predecessors, predecessors, turned turned for to the theold 1960s, for inspiration inspiration not not to old ComCom to munist parties parties but but to toa new left left which which seemed seemed deeply deeplysuspect suspect to the theincreasingly increasingly geri gerimunist a new atric leadership leadership of Brezhnevs Soviet SovietUnion. Union. atric of Brezhnev's thepost-war post-war Communist Parties in the United United States and The marginalization of the Great Britain Britain deprived deprived Soviet intelligence of what what had previously been been a a major Great Soviet intelligence of had previously major recruits and talent-spotters. Its most fertile Western recruiting grounds in source of recruits

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the immediate aftermath France and the immediate aftermath of of the the Second Second World World War War were were France and Italy, Italy, the the two two west European European countries countries with the most most powerful powerful Communist Communist Parties, Parties, both both of of which which west with the took part part in in post-war post-war coalition coalition governments. governments. The The longest-serving longest-serving and and probably probably most most took productive French and Italian agents identified in the files noted by Mitrokhin, JOUR and foreignministries ministries during these and DARIO, DARIO, both both entered entered their their respective respective foreign during these years.3" years.34 the 1950s 1950s the the KGB was was probably obtaining more more high-grade high-grade diplomatic diplomatic and and By the probably obtaining political intelligence from members in in continental continental Europe Europe than than political intelligence from the the main main NATO members from the the United United States and Britain. Britain. As As well well as as generating large numbers of diplo diplofrom States and generating large numbers of matic documents, the penetration penetration of of the the French, French, Italian Italian and and other other Western Western foreign foreign matic documents, the ministries and and Moscow Moscow embassies embassies provided provided crucial crucial assistance assistance to to KGB codebreakers. ministries codebreakers. For of diplomatic For most, most, if if not not all, all, of of the the Cold Cold War War the thetotal total number number of diplomatic decrypts decrypts which which the Centre Centre considered considered sufficiently significant to to forward forward to to the the Central CentralCommittee Committee the sufficiently significant probably never never dropped dropped below below 100,000 a year.35 year.35During During the theCold Cold War War as as a a whole, whole, as as probably 100,000 a a the East to a result result of of the the partition partition of of Germany Germanyand and the flow flow of of refugees refbgees from from East to West, West, the the FRG was most vulnerable was the the major major NATO member member most vulnerable to to agent agent penetration-though penetration-though the those of East German the KGB's KGB's successes successes were were exceeded exceeded by those of its its East German ally. ally. The The success success of of the the Chancellor West the HVA agent, agent, Ganter Ginter Guillaume, Guillaume, in in becoming becoming aide aide to to the Chancellor of of West Germany at a crucial crucial moment moment in in East-West East-West relations, just as as Willy Willy Brandt Brandt was was Germany at a relations, just beginning his his Ostpolitik, was was one one of ofthe the greatest greatest intelligence intelligence coups coups of of the the Cold Cold War. War. beginning Though the Centre volume of of high-grade high-grade intelligence intelligence Though the Centre acquired acquired a a considerable considerable volume from countries, it never satisfied satisfiedby by what from NATO countries, it was was never what it it achieved. achieved. In In Europe, Europe, as as in in north America, America, it it refused refused to to abandon abandon its its early early Cold Cold War War ambition ambition to to create create a a new new north generation generation of of Great Great Illegals. Illegals. During During the the 1970s 1970s it it sought sought and and obtained obtained promises promises of of assistance from Communist leaders around around the the world world in in finding finding further hrther Richard Richard assistance from Communist leaders Sorges. The The files files seen Mitrokhin suggest, however, that that few, few, if if any Sorges. seen by by Mitrokhin suggest, however, any Sorges Sorges were were discovered. By the members in discovered. the mid-1970s mid-1970s the the brightest brightest of of the the young young Party Party members in the the few few west to be west European European countries countries where where Communism Communism remained remained a a powerful powerful force forcetended tended to be Eurocommunist heretics rather than blindly obedient pro-Soviet loyalists ready Eurocommunist heretics rather than blindly obedient pro-Soviet loyalists ready to to sacrifice sacrifice their their lives lives in in the the service service of of the the Fatherland Fatherland of of the the Toilers. Toilers. Even Even some some Soviet Soviet illegals ideological commitment illegals had had difficulty difficulty in in preserving preserving their their ideological commitment when when confronted confronted with War progressed, best with the the reality reality of of life life in in the the West. West. As As the the Cold Cold War progressed, the the KGB's KGB's best agents became mercenary mercenary(like (like Aldrich Ames) rather agents increasingly increasingly became Aldrich Ames) rather than than ideological ideological (like (like Kim Kim Philby). Philby). Residencies, under leadership, which Residencies, however, however,remained remained under pressure pressure from from the the Centre Centre leadership, which had first-hand experience political had almost almost no no first-hand experience of of life life in in the the West, West, to to cultivate cultivate major major political figures. Hence schemes, all approved byby figures. Hence the the hopelessly hopelessly unrealistic unrealistic KGB schemes, alldoubtless doubtless approved the leadership, to Wilson, Willy the political political leadership, to recruit recruit Harold Harold Wilson, Willy Brandt, Brandt, Oskar Oskar Lafontaine, Lafontaine, Cyrus Cyrus Vance, Vance, Zbigniew Zbigniew Brzezinski Brzezinski and and other other senior senior Western Western statesmen. statesmen. Kryuchkov Kryuchkov responded to to these these and and other otherfailures failures not not with witha a more realistic recruitment recruitment policy responded more realistic policy but but with more form-filling. with greater greater bureaucracy, bureaucracy, demanding demanding ever ever longer longer reports reports and and more form-filling. Res Residents idents must must have have groaned groaned inwardly inwardly in in April April 1985 1985when when they they received received from from the the Cen Centre a a newly newly devised questionnaire which which Kryuchkov Kryuchkov instructed instructed them them to use as the tre devised questionnaire to use as the basis for for reports on politicians politicians and and other other"prominent "prominent figures figures in in the theWest" West" being beingconconbasis reports on

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sidered as contained fifty-six sidered as possible possible "targets targets for for cultivation." cultivation. It It contained fifty-six questions, questions, many many of of them complex and 14 in them highly highly complex and minutely minutely detailed. detailed. QIestion Question 14 in section section 4 4 of of the the ques questionnaire, tionnaire, for for example, example, demanded demanded information information on: on: Life hobbies,enjoyments, enjoyments, tastes; books-what Life style: style: hobbies, tastes; books-what writers writers does does he he prefer; prefer; theater, likes; collecting; theater, music, music, painting, painting, and and what what he he particularly particularly likes; collecting; attitude attitude to to sport chess, football, sport (riding, (riding, hunting, hunting, fishing, fishing, swimming, swimming, chess, football, games, games, motoring, motoring, sailing, won; sailing, etc.), etc.),prizes prizes won; hiking; hiking; with with what whatkind kind of of environment environment and and what whatkind kind of kind of prefer, and and of people people does does he he prefer prefer to to associate; associate; what what kind of cuisine cuisine does does he he prefer, so so on. on. The fty-five other detailed demands reports on The fi fifty-five other questions questions contained contained similarly similarly detailed demands for for reports on topics diverse topics as asdiverse as as "compromising compromising information information on on subject" subject and and "subject's subject*sattitude attitude towards A full any "promi towards American American foreign foreign po1icy."36 poli~y.~ full answer answerto to the thequestionnaire questionnaire on on any prominent nent figure figure in in the the West" West*would wouldhave haverequired requiredmonths months of of investigations investigations by by residency residency operations officers. operations officers.
weakness in in the the field field of intelligence was not, as as it it weakness ofpolitical political intelligence was not, supposed, in intelligence intelligence collection but rather rather in in its its ability to interpret interpret what what it it col colsupposed, in collection but ability to lected. Centre forwarded day to the lected. Under Under both both Stalin Stalin and and Khrushchev, Khrushchev, the the Centre forwarded each each day to the Kremlin intelligence reports Krendin a a selection selection of of foreign foreign intelligence reports received received from from residencies residencies and and other other sources, sources, but but usually usually shrank shrank from from offering offering more more than than perfunctory perfunctory interpretation interpretation of the the reports reports for for fear fear of of contradicting contradicting the the views views of of the the po1itica1 political 1eadership. 1eader~hip.j~ of 37 Both Both Stalin ed chief chiefintelligence intelligence analysts. Stalin and and Khrushchev Khrushchev acted acted as as their their own, own, ill-qualifi ill-qualified analysts. Brezhnev, by by contrast, spent little little time time interpreting interpreting intelligence intelligence or other infor inforBrezhnev, contrast, spent or any any other mation, thus thus giving giving Andropov Andropov greater greater scope scope than than any any of of his his predecessors predecessors to to submit submit mation, intelligence assessments. assessments. intelligence Intelligence assessment assessment was worst in in the the Stalin Stalin era. era. Stalin Stalin himself himself bears a large large Intelligence was worst bears a measure of of personal personalresponsibility responsibility for the failure failure to to heed repeated intelligence intelligence warnmeasure for the heed repeated warn ings of the the 1941 1941 German German invasion. invasion. The The institutionalized institutionalized paranoia paranoia of ofthe the Stalinist Stalinist sys sysings of tem led led to to a a series ofother other failures failures of of assessment-among assessment-among them them the thedeluded deluded belief beliefin tem series of in the middle of the the war war that that the the Magnificent Five, some of the the Centre's Centres most gifted the middle of Magnificent Five, some of most gifted and productive productive agents, agents, were were part of an an elaborate British deception. deception. Though intelliand part of elaborate British Though intelli gence analysis after again descended to genceanalysis after Stalin's Stalins death death never neveragain descended to quite quite such such paranoid paranoid depths, at atmoments moments crisisin the Cold War War the KGB tended to substitute conspirdepths, of crisis conspir acy theory theory for for balanced assessment. Within a a year year of becoming KGB chairman, chairman, acy balanced assessment. Within of becoming Andropov assessments to the Politburo Andropov was was submitting submitting distorted distorted intelligence intelligence assessments to the Politburo designed to to strengthen resolve to to crush crush the the Prague Prague Spring by armed armed force. force. His His designed strengthen its its resolve Spring by obsession obsession with with Western Western attempts attemptsto to promote promote ideological ideological sabotage sabotage in in the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc made him him unwilling unwilling to to consider consider any which suggested suggested otherwise. otherwise. In In 1968 1968 made any evidence evidence which the Centre Centredestroyed destroyed classified classifiedUS documents documents obtained obtained by by the the Washington Washington residency residency the which showed showed that that neither neither the the CIA nor nor any any other other American American agency agency was was manipulat manipulatwhich thePrague Spring.38 Spring.38 ing the reformers of the
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1960s and the early 1980s 1980s the Centre believed that the the United In both the early 1960s States was was planning planning a a nuclear nuclear first strike against against the the Soviet Soviet Union. Though some States first strike Union. Though some officers in Western Westernresidencies, far farbetter acquainted with the West than Soviet FCD officers leaders and and KGB chairmen, chairmen, privately privately dismissed dismissed such as absurd absurd alarmism, they leaders such fears fears as alarmism, they Centres judgment openly. The East German German foreign intel inteldid not dare dispute the Centre's chief,Markus Wolf, who resented the waste of time timecaused by byKGB demands ligence chief, non-existent plans for for HVA assistance in discovering non-existent for an American first strike, strike, were no also knew better than to complain to Moscow. These "These orders, orders," he claims, claims, "were above.39 more open to discussion than other orders from above."39 The distortion of Soviet intelligence analysis analysis derived, at root, from the nature of of of all all opposing views. views. The Soviet Union the one-party state and its inherent distrust of difficultthan its Western rivals to understand, and therefore to use, thus found it more difficult the Soviet really under the political political intelligence intelligenceit it collected. collected.Though Though the the Soviet leadership leadershipnever never really understood the the West West until until the the closing closing years yearsof of the the Cold Cold War, it would have have been beenoutraged outraged stood War, it would to have have its its misunderstandings misunderstandings challenged challenged by by intelligence intelligence reports. reports. Heterodox Heterodox opinions opinions to within the the Soviet Soviet system systemalways always ran ran the the risk risk of of being being condemned condemned as as subversive. subversive.Those Those within intelligence officers who dared dared to to express express them them openly openly during during the late 1930s 1930s were were intelligence officers who the late likely to to have have their their life life expectancy expectancydramatically dramaticallyreduced. reduced. Even during the the post-Stalin post-Stalin likely Even during was like of Mitrokhin, era, when their survival was no longer threatened, their careers, careers, like that ofMitrokhin, were almost certain to suffer. Closed or semi-closed societies have an inbuilt advanwere almost certain to suffer. Closed or semi-closed societies have an inbuilt advan tage open societies human sources, West tage over over open societies in in intelligence intelligence collection collectionfrom fromhuman sources, because because Westinvariably have havemuch lower levels levels of security and surveillance surveillance than their ern capitals invariably oritarian regimes. counterparts Communist and counterparts in in Communist and other other auth authoritarian regimes. Equally, Equally, however, however,one oneparty states states have havean an inherent inherent disadvantage disadvantage when when it itcomes to intelligence intelligence analysis, analysis, since party comes to since analysts usually usuallyfear fear to tell tell the the Party Party hierarch hierarch what what it it does does not not want wantto hear. analysts to to hear. Though careful careful to to avoid avoid offending offending the the sensibilities sensibilities of of the political leadership, Though the political leadership, I N0 0 report-writers report-writers during during the the 1930s 1930s knew knew that that they they were were on on safe ground if they prosafe ground if they pro IN duced evidence evidenceof of British British anti-Soviet anti-Soviet conspiracies. conspiracies. During During the theCold Cold War, War, their their FCD duced successors similarly knew that that they they were were taking taking no no risks risks if they used used the the United successors similarly knew if they United States as as a a scapegoat. scapegoat. One One Line Line PR officer, officer,interviewed intervieweda a few few weeks weeks after after the the abortive abortive States 1991 coup, coup, told told Izvestia that that he he and and his his colleagues had spent spent much much of of their their careers careers colleagues had 1991 acting on on the theprinciple principle "Blame Blame everything everything on on the theAmericans, Americans, and and everything everything will will be be acting OK."4 The intelligence reports received by the Soviet leadership thus tended to rein OK.4o The intelligence reports received bythe Soviet leadershipthus tended to reinforce, rather rather than than to tocorrect, correct, their their misconceptions misconceptions of of the the outside outside world. world. force, There There is is no no more more convincing convincing evidence evidenceof of Gorbachev's Gorbachevs "new newthinking" thinking towards towards the the West during duringhis his first firstyear year as general general secretary secretarythan than his his denunciation of the the traditional traditional West as denunciation of bias of of the the FCD's FCDs political reporting. The The fact fact that that the Centre had had to to issue stern bias political reporting. the Centre issue stern instructions of the factual instructions at at the the end end of of 1985 1985 "on on the the impermissibility impermissibility of of distortions distortions of the factual state reports sent sent to Central Committee state of of affairs affairs in in messages messages and and informational informational reports to the theCentral Committee of the the CPSU and and other other ruling ruling bodies" bodies is is a a damning damning indictment indictment of of the the KGB's KGBs sub subof servience standards by previous Soviet leaders. servience to to the the standards of of political political correctness correctnessexpected expected by previous Soviet leaders. For all all their their distortions, distortions, however, however, intelligence intelligence reports reports are are sometimes crucial to to an an For sometimes crucial understanding of Soviet Sovietforeign policy. Khrushchevs policy towards the United understanding of foreign policy. Khrushchev's policy towards the United

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States, in in particular particular the the horrendously horrendously dangerous dangerous gamble gamble of of the the Cuban missile bases, States, Cuban missile bases, was heavily heavily influenced influenced by by erroneous erroneous reports reports of of American preparations for for a a nuclear nuclear was American preparations first strike. strike. The The growing the 1970s and and his his policymaking policymaking 1970s first growing authority authority of of Andropov Andropovin in the troika with Gromyko Ustinov is is evidence of the the influence influence of of the the Centres Centre's intelli troika with Gromyko and and Ustinov evidenceof intelligence assessments assessments during during the the Brezhnev Brezhnev era. era. The The increasingly increasingly apocalyptic apocalyptic language language gence used by Andropov as as Brezhnevs Brezhnev's successor, culminating in in denunciations denunciations of of the the out"out used byAndropov successor, culminating rageous militarist psychosis" allegedly allegedly imposed imposed on on the American people people by the ReaRea rageous militarist psychosis theAmerican by the gan administration, administration, reflected, reflected, as as in in the the early early 1960s, 1960s, alarmist alarmist Centre Centre assessments assessments of of gan the (non-existent) threat of an American first strike. the (non-existent) threat ofan American first strike. Despite Gorbachevs Gorbachev's early denunciation of of KGB assessments, assessments, he he came came to to rely on Despite early denunciation rely on foreign intelligence in reorienting reorienting Soviet to the States. Hence Hence foreign intelligence in Soviet foreign foreign policy policy to the United United States. his unprecedented decision to to take the head head of of the the FCD with on his his fi rst visit to his unprecedented decision take the with him him on first visitto Washington in 1987 and his disastrous subsequent appointment of Kryuchkov as Washington in 1987 and his disastrous subsequent appointment of Kryuchkov as chairman of of the the KGB. Kryuchkov's head of of the the FCD, FCD, Shebarshin, Shebarshin, insists insists chairman Kryuchkovs successor successorasas head that intelligence reports by now free from from past, politically correct correct disdis that foreign foreign intelligence reports were were by now free past, politically tortions. to crumble in 1990-91, some of of the the tortions. As As the the Soviet Soviet system system began began to crumble in 1990-91, however, however, some old, anti-American anti-American conspiracy began to The United United States States and and its its old, conspiracy theories theories began to resurface. resurface. The allies were and other senior KGB officers officers of allies were variously variously accused accusedby byKryuchkov Kryuchkovand other senior of infect infecting Soviet grain grain imports, imports, seeking seeking to rouble, plotting plotting the ing Soviet to undermine undermine the the rouble, the disintegra disintegration of the Soviet sabotage the the economy, administration tion of the Soviet Union Union and andtraining training agents agents to to sabotage economy, administration and scientifi c research.41 and scientific research.41 found easier to scientific and found it it far far easier to digest digest scientific and technological technological than than political intelligence. While While Western Western politics were inherently inherently subversive subversive of of the the one onepolitical intelligence. politics were party party state, state, most most Western Western science science was wasnot. not. "The The achievements achievements of of foreign foreign technology" technology had fi first been identifi identified as a a Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence target target by by Dzerzhinsky in 1925.42 1925.42 By had rst been ed as Dzerzhinsky in By the as the Second Second World World War War S&T, S&T, particularly particularly in in the the military military sphere, sphere, was wasseen seen as crucially crucially important. Nothing Nothing did more more than than intelligence intelligence on on BritishAmerican BritishAmerican plans to build build the the important. did plans to first atomic bomb to bring to Stalin and the necessity of of S&T S&T in in first atomic bomb to bring home home to Stalin and the Centre Centre the the necessity ensuring ensuring that that Soviet Soviet military military technology technologydid did not not fall fall behind behind the the West. West. As As in in the the case case of the rocketry and of nuclear nuclear weapons, weapons, the early early development developmentof of Soviet Soviet radar, radar, rocketry and jet jet propulsion propulsion technology. Stalin, Stalin, indeed, was heavily heavily dependent dependent on the imitation of Western technology. indeed, had greater confidence confidencein in Western Western scientists scientists than than in in his his own. own.He H e did did not not trust trust Soviet Soviet tech techgreater nological innovation innovation unless unlessand and until until it it was was confirmed confirmed by byWestern Western experience.43 e~perience.~~ nological The enormous enormous flow flow of of Western Western(especially (especially American) American) S&T S&T throughout throughout the the Cold Cold The War helps helps to to explain explain one one of the central central paradoxes paradoxes of of a a Soviet Soviet state state which which was was War of the famously described as missiles": its famously described as "Upper Upper Volta Volta with with missiles: its ability ability to to remain remain a a military military superpower while while its itsinfant infant mortality mortality and and other other indices indices of of social social deprivation deprivation were were at at superpower Third World World levels. levels.The The fact fact that that the thegap gap between between Soviet Soviet weapons weaponssystems systems and those those Third and of the the West West was was far far smaller smaller than than in in any any other other area area of of economic economic production production was was due due of not merely merely to to their their enormous enormous priority priority within within the the Soviet Sovietsystem but also also to to the not system but the remarkable collection in West. remarkable success successof of S&T S&T collection in the the West. For For most most of of the the Cold Cold War, War, Amer American business business proved much easier easier to to penetrate penetrate than than the federal government. government. Long Long ican proved much the federal KGB finally finally acquired acquired a a major major spy spyin in the theCIA with with the the walk walk in in of ofAldrich Aldrich before the the KGB before
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Ames Ames in in 1985, 1985, itit was was running running a a series series of ofother other mercenary mercenary agents agentsin in American American defense defense contractors. Soviet agent penetration penetration was was accompanied accompanied by by interception interception of the fax fax contractors. Soviet agent of the communications communications of of some some of ofthe the United United States' States largest largestcompanies.44 ~ o m p a n i e sDuring During . ~ ~ the theearly early 1980s probably probably 70 70 percent percent of of all allcurrent current Warsaw Warsaw Pact Pact weapons weapons systems systemswere were based on based on 1980s Western 45 To an astonishing both depended Western technology. techn010gy.~~ an To astonishingdegree, degree, both sides sides in in the the Cold ColdWar War depended on on American American know-how. know-how. Andropov at least initially,Gorbachev, Gorbachev, saw greater of S&T Andropov and, and, at least initially, saw greater use use of S&T in in non nonspheres as military spheres as one one of of the the keys keys to to the the rejuvenation rejuvenation of of the the Soviet Soviet economy economy as as a a military c and secrets, whole. The The real real economic economic benefit benefit of of Western Western scientifi scientific and technological technological secrets, whole. though put put by by Directorate Directorate T at at billions billions of of dollars, dollars,was, was,however, however, severely limited by by though severely limited the structural structural failings failings of of the the command command economy. economy. The The ideological ideological blinkers the the blinkersof of the Soviet Soviet system systemwere werematched matched by by its its economic economic rigidity rigidity and and resistance resistance to to innovation innovation by by comparison the great comparison with with the the market market economies economiesof of the West. West. Hence Hence the the great economic economic para paradox of of the the 1980s: 1980s: that that despite despite possessing possessing large large numbers numbers of of well-qualified well-qualified scientists dox scientists and steadily further and engineers engineers and and a a huge huge volume volume of of S&T, S&T, Soviet Soviet technology technology fell fell steadily further behind rise to behind its its Western Western rivals. rivals. Before BeforeGorbachev's Gorbachevs rise to power, power, the the extent extent of of that that decline decline was correct FCD reports was concealed concealedfrom from the the Soviet Soviet leadership. leadership.Politically Politically correct reports dwelt dwelt over overwhelmingly capitalist West whelmingly on on the theeconomic economic problems problems of of the the capitalist West rather rather than than on onthose those of of the the "Socialist" SocialistEast. East. In In a a biennial biennial report report on on foreign foreign intelligence intelligenceoperations operations completed completed in in February February 1984, 1984, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov emphasized emphasized "the the deepening deepening economic economic and and social social crisis crisis in of the crisis in in the the capitalist capitalist world," world, but but made made no no mention mention of the far far more more serious serious crisis in the the Soviet Bloc.46 Bloc.36 Even Gorbachev, Gorbachev, in in his his speech speechto to the the Twenty-Seventh Party Party Congress Congress Soviet Even Twenty-Seventh in in 1986 1986 calling calling for for "new new thinking" thinking in in Soviet Soviet foreign foreign policy, policy,claimed claimedthat that the the crisis crisis of of capitalism capitalism was was continuing continuing to to worsen.47 worsen.47 Until years of Until the the closing closing years of the the Cold Cold War, War, there there was was an an extraordinary extraordinary contrast contrast between access to the secrets of state-of-the-art between the the Kremlin's Kremlins privileged privileged access to the secrets of state-of-the-art Western Western technology technology and and its its failure failure to to grasp grasp the the nature nature and and extent extent of of its its own own economic economic mis mismanagement. Soviet leader leader who access to management. Gorbachev Gorbachev was was the the first first post-war post-war Soviet who gained gained access to moderately on performance Abel moderately accurate accuratestatistics statistics on the the performance of of the the Soviet Soviet economy. economy. Abel Agan Aganperestroika, calcu begyan, begyan, his his most most influential influential economic economic adviser adviser in in the the early early years years of ofpemtroika, calcu1985 there The revelation lated lated that that between between 1981 1981 and and 1985 there had had been been "a a zero zero growth growth rate." rate.The revelation of Soviet economic relative to the of the the extent extent of of Soviet economic stagnation stagnation and and long-term long-term decline decline relative to the West had had a a much much more more profound profound effect effect on on Gorbachev's Gorbachevs policy policythan than the the successes of West successes of S&T S&T collection collection against against Western Western targets targets which which had had previously previously so so impressed impressed him. him. By the the end end of of the the decade, decade, he he had had moved moved from from trying trying to to rejuvenate rejuvenate the the command command econ economy to accepting the market as the main economic regulator.48 omy to accepting the market as the main economic regulator. The ending Russian Russian S&T The conclusion conclusion of of the the Cold Cold War, War, so so far far from from ending S&T operations operations in in the the West, West, created created new newLine Line X opportunities opportunities through through the the expansion expansion of ofEast-West East-Westsci scientific entific exchanges exchanges and and business business joint joint ventures, ventures, which which the the SVR was was eager eager to to exploit. exploit. The the early agent Michael Michael The reactivation reactivation in in the early 1990s 1990s of of the the leading leading British British Line Line X agent S P L T collection collection Smith was was one one sign sign among among many many of of the the continued continued priority priority given given to to S&T Smith in in the theYeltsin Yeltsin era.49 era.49For Forthe the SVR, SVR, as as for for the the FCD, FCD, the the main main Line Line X target target remained remained the of US security checks, in to build security checks, in an an attempt attempt to build the United United States. States. The The relaxation relaxation of bridges bridges to to Moscow Moscowand andBeijing, Beijing, led led in in 1994 1994 to toa a dramatic dramatic increase increase in in the the number number of of

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Russian and scientists allowed Los Alamos Sandia nuclear Russian and Chinese Chinese scientists allowed to to visit visit the the Los Alamos and and Sandia nuclear howlaboratories, as aswell asas other other institutes institutes conducting conducting classified Line X, how laboratories, well classified research. research. Line ever, than during during the Cold War. ever, has has found found less less enthusiasm enthusiasm for for its its product product than the Cold War. The The col collapse of the Russian command command economy lapseof the Russian economy left left the the military-industrial military-industrial complex complexpreviously the chief -in disarray. previously the chief customer customer for for S&T S&T-in disarray. During During (and (and perhaps perhaps even even before) seem to before) the the Yeltsin Yeltsin presidency, presidency, Russian Russian S&T S&T operations operations seem to have have been been upstaged upstaged by those those of of the the Chinese. Chinese. A congressional congressional enquiry enquiry concluded concluded in in 1999 that, over over the the by 1999 that, two China had two previous previous decades, decades, China had obtained obtained detailed detailed intelligence intelligence on on every every warhead warhead in in the US USnuclear nuclear arsenal. arsenal. There is is little little doubt doubt that that the the phenomenal phenomenal achievements achievements of of the 50 There Chinese Chinese S&T S&T collection collection were were inspired, inspired, at at least least in in part, part, by by the the Soviet Soviet Union's Unions earlier earlier success success in in copying copying the the first first American American atomic atomic bomb bomb and and in inbasing basing the the majority majority of of its its Cold weapons systems Cold War Warweapons systems on on Western Western technology. technology. not to to judge the success purely not judge the success of of KGB foreign foreign operations operations by by purely Western had, ultimately, priority than intel Western standards. standards.The The Centre Centrehad, ultimately, an an even even higher higher priority thanintelligence collection in in the the West. West. The The Cheka Cheka had had been founded six six weeks weeks after after the the ligence collection been founded Bolshevik seizure seizure of of power power "for for a a revolutionary settlementofof accounts with Bolshevik revolutionary settlement accounts with counter-revolutionaries. In In that thatprimary primary role-to role-to defend defend the the Bolshevik Bolshevik one-party one-party counter-revolutionaries." state against dissent dissent in in all all its its forms-the forms-the Cheka Cheka and and its its successors successors were were strikingly strikingly state against successful. successful. From the the 1920s 1920s onwards onwards the the war war against against "counter-revolution" counter-revolution was waswaged wagedabroad abroad From FCDs role in combating ideological subversion as well as at home. The FCD's subversion has has given given rise, in Yeltsin's Yeltsins Russia, to a a curious curious official officialamnesia. amnesia. Like Kryuchkov Kryuchkov and and some other rise, in Russia, to Like some other former senior senior FCD officers, former maintains that officers, the the SVR SVR maintains that the the FCD was was not not involved involved in in the persecution persecution of of dissidents dissidents and and the the abuse abuse of of human human rights. In In reality, reality, it it was was centrally centrally the rights. involved. Within Within the theSoviet Soviet Bloc Blocthe the war war against against ideological ideologicalsubversion subversion was increasinvolved. was increas ingly coordinated coordinated between between the the internal internal KGB and and its its foreign foreign intelligence intelligence arm. ingly arm. In the immediate of the In the immediate aftermath aftermath of the suppression suppression of of the the Hungarian Hungarian Uprising Uprising by by 1956, and and again after the destruction of the Prague Spring in 1968, 1968, Soviet tanks in 1956, many Western Western observers observers doubted doubted whether the genie genie of of freedom freedom could could be be quickly quickly many whether the returned to to its its bottle. bottle. In fact, thanks thanks largely largely to to the and its and returned In fact, the KGB and itsHungarian Hungarian and Czechoslovak allies, one-party states states were in both Budapest and and Prague Czechoslovak allies, one-party wererestored restored in both Budapest Prague with remarkable remarkable speed speedand and success. success. From From 1968 1968 onwards the state state of opinion in with onwards the of public public opinion in the Soviet Soviet Bloc monitored by by experienced experienced illegals posing as Western the Bloc was was carefully carefully monitored illegals posing as Western tourists and and business who sought and pretended pretended to to sympathize sympathize with, with, tourists business people, people, who soughtout, out, and critics of the Communist regimes. In reporting on the theresults of these "PROGRESS PROGRESS operations, the FCD was franker than it would have dared to be in analyzing, for operations," citizens Brezhnevs increasing example, satirical satirical comments comments by Soviet Soviet citizens on Brezhnev's increasingphysical physical decrepitude. KGBs waragainst ideological subversion waswas Throughout the the Cold War War the KGB's against ideological subversion energetically waged in foreign capitals as well as on Soviet soil. Residencies in the as well as Soviet West had standing instructions to collect as much material as possible to assist the persecution of of dissidents, dissidents, both both at athome and abroad: abroad: persecution home and
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In order order to to take take active activemeasures measures against the dissidents, dissidents, it itisis important to to know know of of In against the important disagreements icts within disagreements among among them, them, differences differences of ofviews views and and confl conflicts within the the dissi dissident milieu, milieu, reasons they have arisen, and possible possible ways ways of of exacerbating dent reasons why why they have arisen, and exacerbating them; and and particulars particularsdiscrediting discrediting the dissidents dissidents personally personally (alcoholism, immoral them; the (alcoholism, immoral behavior,professional professional decline so forth, forth, as as well wellas as indications oflinks of links with with the the behavior, decline andand so indications W CIA, estern special and CIA, Western special [intelligence] [intelligence]services services and ideological ideological centers).51 center^).^'

Residencies Residencies were were also also required required to to target target many many of of the the dissidents' dissidents main main supporters supporters in the West. the KGB's London neurologist in the West. Among Among the KGBs targets targets in in Britain Britain was was the the London neurologist Harold psychiatric Harold Merskey Merskey, who had had campaigned campaigned on on behalf behalf of of the the victims victims of of Soviet Soviet psychiatric , who abuse. 1976 the residency abuse. On O n September September 20, 20,1976 theLondon London residency posted posted a a letter letter to to Merskey, Merskey, pur purporting come from of an porting to tocome from an an anonymous anonymous wellwisher, wellwisher, warning warning him himof an imminent imminent attempt attempt by by unidentified unidentified assailants assailants to to cause cause him him grievous grievous bodily bodilyharm. harm. Merskey, Merskey, it it was was hoped, hoped, would would become become preoccupied preoccupiedwith with his his own own personal personal safety safetyand and spend spend less less time time supporting supporting the the incarcerated incarcerated dissidentsY dissident^.^^ So, opera So, far far from frombeing beinga a mere mere adjunct adjunct to to more more conventional conventionalforeign foreignintelligence intelligence operations, tions, the the FCD's FCDs war war against against the the dissidents dissidents was was one one of of its its chief chief priorities. priorities. Among Among its its most was dis most important important operations operations in in 1978, 1978,for for example, example, was the the attempt attempt to to ensure ensure that that the the dissident sident Yuri Yuri Orlov Orlov did did not not receive receive the the Nobel Nobel Peace Peace Prize-as Prize-as Sakharov Sakharov had had done done three three years The prize years earlier. earlier. The fact fact that that the the prize went went instead instead to to Anwar Anwar Sadat Sadat and and Menachem Menachem Begin Begin was was claimed claimed by bythe the Centre Centreas as a a m<1:ior major triumph-though, triumph-though, in in reality, reality, it it probably probably owed owedlit little to to KGB KGB active active measures. Suslov, the Politburo's Politburos leading of ideological ideological tle measures. Suslov, the leadingguardian guardian of orthodoxy, phone call orthodoxy,was was woken woken in in the the middle middle of ofthe the night night by by a a phone call from fromthe the Oslo Oslo resident resident to There to be be told told the the good good news.53 news.53 There are are few fewbetter better indications indications of ofthe the importance importance attached attached to in than to a a piece piece of ofinformation information in any any political politicalsystem system than the thedecision decision to to wake wake a a minister. minister. Residencies Residencies also also followed followed with with anxious anxious attention attention the the emergence emergence in in some some leading leading Western Communist parties of the Eurocommunist heresy which challenged the Western Communist parties of the Eurocommunist heresy which challenged the tra traditional ditional infallibility infallibility of of the the Moscow Moscow line, line, and and thus thus qualified qualified as as a a novel novel form form of of ideo ideological subversion. Among the more activemeasures measures devised in the later logical subversion. Among the more unusual unusual active devised in the later 1970s 1970s were were those those designed designed to to discredit discredit Eurocommunist Eurocommunist party party leaders.54 1eade1-s.~~ One One of of the the FCD's FCDs chief chief priorities priorities until until the the closing closing years years of of the the Cold Cold War Warwas was to to dissidents and achieving foreign foreignrecognitionrecognition seek seek to to prevent prevent all all Soviet Soviet dissidents and defectors defectors achieving even elds entirely entirelydivorced divorced from as understood the West) . even in in fi fields from politics politics (at (at least least as understood in in the West). Enormous the Enormous time time and and effort effort was was devoted devotedby by the Centre Centre to to devising devising ways waysto to damage damage the the careers careers of of Rudolf Rudolf Nureyev, Nureyev, Natalia Natalia Makarova Makarova and and other other defectors defectors from from Soviet Soviet bal ballet. 55 By the (code named VOYAZHER, let.55 the time time the the great great cellist cellist Mstislav Mstislav Rostropovich Rostropovich (codenamed VOYAZHER, "Traveller") for the in 1974, 1974, the Traveller) left left for the West West in the KGB had had ceased ceased to to plan plan operations operations to to cause cause physical physicalinjury injury to to emigres 6migrCs in in the the performing performing arts, arts, but but seems seems to to have have redoubled redoubled active active measure measure campaigns campaigns intended intended to to give give them them bad bad reviews reviews in in the the Western Western media. media. In 1976, after Rostropovich and his wife, the singer Galina Vishnevskaya, were In 1976, afterRostropovich and hiswife, the singer Galina Vishnevskaya,were deprived intelligence ser deprived of of Soviet Soviet citizenship, citizenship, the the Centre Centreappealed appealed to to all all Soviet SovietBloc Bloc intelligence services nding agents vices for forhelp help in in fi finding agents to to penetrate penetrate their their entourage. entourage. It It was was outraged outraged by by Ros Rostropovich's tropovichs appointment appointment in in 1977 1977 as as director director of of the the National National Symphony Symphony Orchestra Orchestra in in

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Washington-a to Russia Washington-a post post he he was was to to retain retain until until his his return return to Russia seventeen seventeen years years later-but encouraged encouraged by by an an untypically review of of his his work work with with the the orches orcheslater-but untypically critical critical review ashington Post in tra Washilzgton in May May1978. 1978. The The Centre Centre circulated circulated the the review review to to Western Western tra in in the the W residencies as residencies as an an example example of of the the kind kind of of criticism criticism they they were were to to encourage, encourage, and and demanded that failure to demanded that they they inspire inspire articles articles attacking attacking Rostropovich's Rostropovichsalleged allegedvanity, vanity, failure to live live up up to to Western Western expectations, expectations, and-especially and-especially ironic ironic in in view view of of KGB active active mea measures media.56 sures against against him-his him-his supposed supposed attempts attempts to to manipulate manipulate the the Western Western media.56 Dissident chess were also the Dissident chess players players were also the targets targets of of major major KGB KGB operations operations designed designed to to prevent prevent them them winning winning matches matches against against the the ideologically ideologically orthodox. orthodox. During During the the 1978 1978 world chess chess championship championship in in the Philippines between between the the Soviet Soviet world world champion, champion, world the Philippines Anatoli Karpov, Karpov, and and the the defector defector Viktor Viktor Korchnoi, Korchnoi, the the Centre Centre assembled assembled a a team team of of Anatoli eighteen FCD operations officers to to try try to to ensure Korchnois defeat.57 defeat.57KGB active active eighteen operations officers ensure Korchnoi's measures may may well wellhave have determined the the outcome outcome of of a a close close and and controversial controversial cham chammeasures determined pionship. After After draws draws in in the thefirst first seven seven matches, matches, during during which which Korchnoi Korchnoi had had the thebet betpionship. ter of of the the play, play, Karpov Karpov refused refused to to shake shake hands hands with with his his opponent opponent at at the the start start of of the the ter eighth. Korchnoi, who who was was known known to to play play poorly poorly when when angry, angry, lost the eighth. A furious furious Korchnoi, lost the game. After twelve twelve games the scores werelevel, level, with Korchnoi again appearing appearing game. After games the scores were with Korchnoi once once again in better better form. form. During the next next five five games, however, Korchnoi Korchnoi was was thrown thrown off off his his in During the games, however, stride by by the the presence in the front of the the audience audience of a a Russian Russian hypnotist, hypnotist, Dr. Dr. stride presence in the front of Vladimir Zukhar, Zukhar, who who stared stared intently intently at him throughout throughout the play. After After seventeen seventeen Vladimir at him the play. games, Korchnoi was was three three points points down. down. By By the the end end of of the the match, match, he he had had pulled pulled back games, Korchnoi back two of of his his defeats defeats but but lost lost the the championship championship by by a a single single point.* book remains remains to to two point. 58 A book KGBs involvement in Soviet chess.59 be written about the KGB's Soviet chess.59
POTENTIALLY troublesome "ideological ideologicalsubversion" subversionwith which the the KGB P O T E N T I A L LY T H HE E M O S T troublesome with which theCold Cold War came religion-especially Chrishad to contend during the War came from organized religion-especially Chris Bolsheviks had hoped and expected. expected. tianity, which failed to wither awayas as the Bolsheviks allowedto exist within the Communist Communistone-party Though no other political party was allowed rulers felt bound to proclaim a hypocritical hypocritical respect for freedom of relistate, Soviet rulers of reli gion. the attempt attempt eradicate religious religious practice gion. By the end of the Second World War the toto eradicate practice way decline and had given way to subtler forms of persecution designed designed to ensure ensure its steady decline faithhl. Within Within the Russian Orthodox church the KGB to discriminate discriminate against the faithful. was able to rely on an obedient hierarchy permeated by its agents. agents. The Centre's Centres main problems came from other Christian churches and a courageous minority of Ortho Orthoproblems religious persecution. dox priests who demanded an end to religious persecution. For freedom of of religion to make progress within the the Soviet Soviet Union, however, persecuted Christians required church-in particular from the World Council of strong support from the worldwide church-in Churches. They did not receive receive it. KGB agents agents in the WCC W C C were remarkably sucsuc to concentrate on the the sins of the imperialist West rather than cessful in persuading it to religious Bloc. In 1975 1975 agent ADAMANT (Metropolitan religious persecution in the Soviet Bloc. electedas one of the WCC's WCCssix presidents.60 Nikodim) was elected six presidents.6o The importance attached by the KGB to controlling religious dissent and denying Soviet Christians support support from the West West was fully justified by events in persecuted Soviet penetration never succeeded succeeded in bringing the Catholic Church Poland, where SB penetration Catholic Church

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under political political control. control. By By the the early early 1970s 1970s the identified Karol under the KGB had had already already identified Karol Wojtyla, Archbishop of Krakow, Krakbw, as as a a potentially potentially dangerous to Wojtyla, Archbishop of dangerous opponent, opponent, unwilling unwilling to theSB wanted to compromise on either religious freedom or human rights. Though the arrest it dared not risk the outcry would result arrest him, him, it dared not risk the outcry which which would result in in both both Poland Poland and and the the West. Wojtyla's Wojtyla7selection election as Pope John Paul II I1 in 1978 dealt the Polish Communist regime, and and ultimately ultimately the the cohesion cohesion of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc, Bloc,a blow from which they they never regime, a blow from which never recovered. During his triumphant tour of of Poland Poland in recovered. During his triumphant tour in 1979, 1979, the the contrast contrast between between the the ofthe thefirst Polish discredited Communist regime and the immense moral authority of Pope was wasplain plainfor for all to see.61 see.61 Pope all to The new new freedoms freedomsof of the theGorbachev Gorbachev era era similarly went far to justifying the KGB's The similarly went far to justifying the KGB's earlier fears fears of of the the potential damage to to the the Soviet Soviet regime regime if if political politicaldissidents dissidentswere were earlier potential damage allowed to to proceed proceed with with their their "ideological "ideological subversion." subversion."In than three threeyears allowed In 1989, 1989, less less than years after Sakharov Sakharov was was freed from internal exile and allowed to after freed from internal exile and allowed to return return to to Moscow, Moscow, he he as-in Gorbachev'swords-"unquestionably establishedhimself, himself, as-in words-"unquestionably the outstanding personality" in in the Congress of of People's People's Deputies. all the the main main dissident personality" the Congress Deputies. Almost Almost all dissident demands of of the the early early 1970s 1970s were were now now fi firmly placed on thepolitical political agenda. agenda. demands rmly placed on the Only when when the the vast vast apparatus apparatus of of KGB social social control control began to be be dismantled did Only began to dismantled did the full full extent extent of of its its importance to to the thesurvival survival of Union become clear.The the importance of the the Soviet Soviet Union become clear. The manifesto of of the the leaders ofthe August 1991 1991 coup, coup,led byKryuchkov, manifesto leaders of the August led by Kryuchkov, which which attempted to to overthrow overthrow Gorbachev, Gorbachev, implicitly that the relaxation of attempted implicitly acknowledged acknowledged that the relaxation of ideologicalsubversion subversionhad shaken the foundations of the the KGB campaign against ideological one-party state: one-party state: Authority at at all all levels levels has has lost lost the the confidence confidence of of the Authority the population population . .. . .. Malicious Malicious mockery of of all all the the institutions institutions of of state state is is being The country country has mockery being implanted. implanted. The has in in effect effect become becomeungovernable.62 ungovernable.62

What to turn back the "If What the theplotters plotters failed failed to to realize realize was wasthat that it itwas was too too late late to turnback the clock. clock. "If wrote Gorbachev the the coup coup d'etat d'i'tat had had happened happened a a year year and and a a half half or or two two years years earlier," earlier," wrote Gorbachev afterwards, But now now society was completely completely afterwards, "it "it might, might, presumably, presumably, have have succeeded. succeeded. But society was changed."63 intimidatory changed."63Crucial Crucial to to the thechange change of of mood mood was was declining declining respect respect for for the the intimidatory power been able able to to strangle Moscow demon power of of the the KGB, which which had had hitherto hitherto been strangle any any Moscow demonstration years earlier never have assembled, stration at at birth. birth.Large Large crowds, crowds, which which a a few few years earliercould could never have assembled, gathered House to to protect gathered outside outside Yeltsin's Yeltsin's headquarters headquarters in in the the Moscow Moscow White White House protect it it from cheering enthusiastically as the the giant giant from attack, attack, and and later later circled circled the the Lubyanka, Lubyanka, cheering enthusiastically as statue statue of of Feliks Feliks Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky was was toppled toppled from from its its plinth. plinth. all observers observers At the the Soviet took almost almost all the time time the the speed speed of ofthe the collapse collapse of ofthe Soviet system systemtook by remarkable, however, is sudden death death of of the the by surprise. surprise.What What now now seems seemsmost most remarkable, however, is less lessthe the sudden Communist ve years. Communist regime regime at at the the end end of of 1991 1991 than than its its survival survival for for almost almost seventy-fi seventy-five years. Without Lenin and and DzerzhinDzerzhin Without the thesystem system of ofsurveillance surveillanceand and repression repression pioneered pioneeredby by Lenin sky, sky, without without the the KGB's KGB's immense immense Cold Cold War War campaign campaign against against ideological ideological subversion, subversion, the been much briefer. The KGB had had indeed indeed proved to be be the Communist Communistera era would wouldhave have been much briefer. The provedto "the Its most achievement was to "the sword swordand and the the shield" shield" of ofthe the Soviet Soviet system. system. Its most enduring enduring achievement was to sustain the longest-lasting one-party state of the twentieth century. sustain the longest-lasting one-party state of the twentieth century.

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of of the the one-party one-party state state went went most most of of the the KGB's KGBs vast vast system of social control. though the of the system of social control. But But though the power power of the internal internal KGB directorates directorates (reorganized successively as as a ministry, a service and (reorganized successively a security security ministry, a counter-intelligence counter-intelligence service and a a security influence of suc security service) service) dramatically dramatically declined, declined, the the influence of the the newly newly independent independent successor FCD, the neshnei Razvedki, cessor to to the the FCD, the Sluzhba Sluzhba V Vneshnei Razvedki, quickly quickly recovered. recovered. Indeed, Indeed, the the SVR soon soon became became more more publicly assertive than than the theFCD had had ever ever been. been. In In 1993, 1993, its its publicly assertive head, Yevgeni published a report attacking attacking NATO expansion expansion as as a a threat threat to to head, Yevgeni Primakov, Primakov, published a report so at at a a time time when the Russian Russian foreign ministry was was Russian security-and he did did so Russian security-and he when the foreign ministry taking a a much much softer softer and and more more conciliatory conciliatory line. line.On O n the the eve eve of ofPresident President Yeltsin's Yeltsins visit visit taking to Washington Washington in in September 1994, Primakov Primakov once once again again upstaged upstaged the the foreign foreign minto September 1994, min istry by by publishing publishing a a warning warning to to the the West Westnot notto to oppose the economic and political political istry oppose the economic and reintegration of of Russia Russiawith with other other states states which which had had formerly formerly been part of ofthe the Soviet reintegration been part Soviet Union. Primakovs deputy, deputy,Vyacheslav VyacheslavTrubnikov, assertedthe the SVR's SVRs right right to to a a pub pubUnion. Primakov's Trubnikov, asserted licvoice, even if it it disagreed disagreed with with the the foreign foreignministrys: .. .. .. We We want wantto be lic voice, even if ministry's: " to be heard view heard .. .. .. We We express express our our point point of of view as as we we deem deem necessary."64 nece~sary.~~ and foreign foreign ministry ministry during during Yeltsin's Yeltsinsfirst first five five years years as as The rivalry rivalry between between SVR and The president ended ended in in decisive decisive victory victoryfor for the the SVR with with Primakov's Primakovs appointment appointment as as for forpresident eign minister minister to to replace replace the the pro-Western pro-Western Andrei Andrei Kozyrev Kozyrev in in December December 1996. 1996. Prob Probeign ably to to the dismay of of many many Russian diplomats, Primakov Primakov took took with to the ably the dismay Russian diplomats, withhim him to the foreign minister and foreign ministry ministry a a number number of of SVR officers. officers. Both Both as as foreign foreign minister and later later as as prime minister, minister, Primakov Primakov remained in close touch with with his his former former deputy, deputy, Trubnikov, Trubnikov, prime remained in close touch who succeeded succeeded him as head head of the SVR.65 SVR.65 who him as of the also more moreassertive assertivebehind the scenes scenes than the theFCD dared to be. The The SVR is also FCD regularly for example, in regularly swore swore slavish slavish obedience obedience to to the the Party Party leadership-as, leadership-as, for example, in work plan" plan for 1984: 1984: the typically ponderous preamble to its "work
W I T H TH E D I S I N T TE EG GR RAT IO ON N WITH ATI

The work of of residencies abroad abroad must be planned and organized in 1984 1984 in in strict accord accord with with the the decisions decisionsof the Twenty-sixth Twenty-sixth Party Party Congress, Congress, the the strict of the November (1982) and and June June (1983) (1983) plenary plenary sessions sessions of of the the CPSU Central Central November (1982) Committee, and the program program directives directives and and fundamental fundamental conclusions conclusionsconCommittee, and the con tained in in the the speeches speeches of of the the Secretary Secretary General of the the CPSU Central Central Com Comtained General of Andropov, as as well well as as the the requirements requirements of of the the May mittee, Comrade Comrade Yu. Yu. V. Andropov, mittee, May [FCD].66 (1981) All-Union All-Union Conference of the leadership of the [FCD] .66
Todays SVR has abandoned such bureaucratic sycophancy. Today's sycophancy. It reports direct to the president and sends him daily digests of foreign intelligence intelligence somewhat akin to the President? Daily Daily Brifproduced Briefproduced by the CIA in the United States. Unlike the CIA, CIA, President's however, the SVR lists policy however, policy options and does not hesitate to recommend those prefers.67 which it prefers.67 Yeltsin bothered to read during the final years How many SVR reports the ailing Yeltsin paperof his presidency presidency is is uncertain. By the mid-l990s, mid- 1990s, when presented with his paper work, he was already said to be frequently telling his long-suffering chief of staff, already said his long-suffering

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Viktor Ilyushin, Ilyushin, not not to to bother bother him him with with "all all that that shit."68 hit."^* Like before him, Viktor Like Primakov Primakov before him, 1998 he helped to shape however, Trubnikov had direct personal access to Yeltsin. In 1998 afterRussian policy during the dispute over UN weapons inspection in Iraq. Soon after theMoscow talks on Kosovo wards he was present at the Kosovo between Yeltsin and Slobodan Mil~SeviC.~~ Milosevic.69 Unnoticed by the media, Trubnikov also accompanied accompanied Primakov on a hrther discussions with MiloSeviC. visit to Belgrade in March 1999 for further Milosevic. Trough the SVR is not a supporter of Saddam Hussein or MiloSeviC, Milosevic, it does not wish either to be defeated by by the the West. West. defeated mid-l990s, internalsecurity service service(then the theFSK, now the FSB) had By the mid1990s, the internal recovered some of its former influence, though only a fraction of its itsprevious authorrecovered author ity. Sergei Sergei Stepashin, who became its chief chief in 1994, was one ofYeltsins closest advis advisity. ofYeltsin's closest ers. A centrist politician with reformist credentials, credentials, he had declared in 1991, The "The must be be liquidated." liquidated. Once Once head head of of the that his KGB must the FSK, however, however, he he complained complained that his service had had been been "castrated" castrated and and was was demanding greater powers. service demanding greater powers. His His influence influence was was clearly evident in the the crisis late summer clearly evident in crisis over over Chechnya. Chechnya. In In the the late summer of of 1994 1994 Stepashin Stepashin persuaded Yeltsin Yeltsin that an an attack attack on on Grozny, Grozny, the capital, would wouldoverthrow overthrow its persuaded that the Chechen Chechen capital, its rebellious president, Dzhokhar Dudayev, Dudayev, almost almost overnight overnight and and bring bringChechnya Chechnya back rebellious president, Dzhokhar back under direct direct control control from from Moscow. Moscow. The The attack was to to be be mounted under attack was mounted by by Dudayevs Dudayev's Chechen opponents, opponents, armed armed and financed by by the the FSK. When the Chechen Chechen and financed When most most of of the Chechen opposition pulled pulled out out of of the operation at at the thelast moment in inNovember, however,the opposition the operation last moment November, however, the FSK went using Russian Russian troops instead-with (as (as Stepashin Stepashin later acknowlwent ahead ahead using troops instead-with later acknowl edged) consequences. Dudayev repulsed the initial attack and and paraded paraded edged) disastrous disastrous consequences. Dudayev repulsed the initial attack Russiansoldiers soldiers before worlds television televisioncameras. cameras. captured Russian before the world's Though Grozny later fell to to Russian Russian forces, forces,the the Chechens Chechensmounted mounted a determined resistance resistance from counfell a determined from the the coun tryside in in a a brutal brutal war war which, which, over over the the next next two two years, cost25,000 lives. Yeltsin's Yeltsins reptryside years, cost 25,000 lives. rep utation never never recovered. recovered.Stepashin was sacked sacked in June1995 1995 an attempt attempt to to appease appease utation Stepashin was in June inin an critics of of the the war war in in the the Duma, Duma, but remained close close to to Yeltsin brought back critics but remained Yeltsin and and was was brought back the government two two years later, later, first first as minister of ofjustice, then in March 1998 1998 into the justice, then as minister minister of of the the interior. interior. In In May May 1999 Yeltsin chose to succeed as 1999 Yeltsin chose him him to succeed Primakov Primakov as as prime minister. prime minister.7o Yeltsin caused caused further further incredulity incredulity by by declaring declaring that that Putin Putin would would be the next next Ye1tsin be the President. The The incredulity incredulity swiftly swiftlydisappeared, disappeared, however, when Putin launched launched a a bruPresident. however, when Putin bru tal,%ll-scale attack on on the breakaway republic which achieved achieved far tal, full-scale attack the breakaway republic of of Chechnya Chechnya which far greater short-term short-term success success than than Yeltsin's Yeltsinsoffensive offensivefive five years earlier. Putins popularity greater years earlier. Putin's popularity in the theopinion polls soared soaredin in only only three three months monthsfrom O n New Years in opinion polls from 2 to to 70 percent. percent. On New Year's Eve, Yeltsin his final surprise on on Kremlin-watchers Kremlin-watchers by Eve, Yeltsin sprang sprang his final surprise by stepping stepping down down from from the his announcing that that Putin the presidency presidency before beforethe the end endof of his term term and and announcing Putinwas was succeeding succeeding leadhim as acting president. The striking contrast between the infirm and alcoholic lead ership nal years years in the tough leadership style style of Yeltsin's Yeltsins fi final in office office and and the tough no-nonsense no-nonsense leadership ership of successfully cultivated cultivatedby by Putin during his first first months in in the Kremlin himvicsuccessfully KremliI1 won him vic tory 2000. tory at at the the presidential presidential elections elections in in March March 2000.

roles under THE THESVR AND AND FSB ARE ARE GUARANTEED GUARANTEED powerful powerful roles under the the Putin Putin presidency. presidency. Neither to the War. Both, Both, indeed, indeed, now have well-established, Neither foresees foresees a a return return to the Cold Cold War. now have well-established,

T HE E TH

S OR RD D SW WO

A ND D AN

T HE E TH

S H II E EL L D D SH

564

though liaison arrangements though little-advertised, little-advertised, liaison arrangements with with the the main main Western Western intelligence intelligence and FSB none the less less expect a continuing agencies. The The SVR and agencies. none the expect a continuing conflict conflict of of interest interest with the West. with the West. so. The The collapse collapse of of the the Soviet Soviet system system has hasrevealed revealeda a They have have good good reason reason to to do do so. They much older older East-West East-West faultline which has has more more to to do dowith with events events in in the thefourth fourth cenmuch faultline which cen tury AD than than in in the the twentieth twentieth century. century. It It follows follows the the line line not not of of the the Cold Cold War War Iron Iron tury Curtain but but of of the division between Orthodox and and Catholic Christianity which which Curtain the division between Orthodox Catholic Christianity began with with the the establishment establishment of of Constantinople Constantinople as as the the New Rome in in 330 and and was was began New Rome made by the the schism schism between the Orthodox and Catholic Catholic churches made permanent by between the Orthodox and churches in in 1054.Though Though the the Orthodox East was invaded invaded by by Islam and the the unity unityof of Catholic 1054. Orthodox East was Islam and thethe Catholic West West fractured fractured by by the the Protestant Protestant Reformation, Reformation, the the cultural cultural divide divide between between East East and and West persisted. "From From the the time time of of the the Crusades," Crusades, writes writes the the historian historian Norman Norman West Davies, "the the Orthodox Orthodox looked on on the theWest West as as a a source source of ofsubjugation subjugation worse worse than than the the Davies, looked infidel.71It It is is precisely preciselybecause because the faultline faultline is is so so deeply deeply entrenched entrenched that that it itis is so so dif difinfidel."71 the ficult to to overcome.72 overcome.72Those east European states joining joining NATO at at the the end end of of the the ficult Those east European states twentieth century, century, those likely to to do doso so early early in in the the twenty-fkst and the the most probatwentieth those likely twenty-first and most proba ble future hture entrants entrants into European Union areall on the western side side of of the the ble intothe the European Union are all on the western divide.73 There is is still still no no very very promising candidate candidate in in Orthodox OrthodoxEurope. Europe. divide.73 There To most most Russians, the welcome welcome given given by by Western Western statesmen statesmen in in the the late late 1980s 1980s to to To Russians, the Gorbachevs ambition ambition of of establishing establishing Russia's Russias place inthe common European European Gorbachev's place in the "common home home" now seems hollow, now seems hollow,if if not not hypocritical. hypocritical. ''A A Russia Russia shut shut out out and anddisconnected," disconnected, argued historian historian Jonathan Jonathan Haslam, Haslam, "will will inevitably inevitably be betroublesome." troublesome.74 Despite Rus Rusargued 74 Despite Russia-NATO Joint Council and sian membership of the Council of of Europe, the Russia-NATO other Western Western attempts attemptsto to bridge bridge the the East-West East-West divide, the enlargement enlargement of of NATO other divide, the and the planned expansion expansion of European Union Union confirm confirm Russia's Russias relegation relegation to to the the and the planned of the the European margins of of Europe. Europe. The The SVR, unsurprisingly, is isresolutely resolutely opposed to both. both. oppomargins SVR, unsurprisingly, opposed to ItsIts oppo sition is is strengthened strengthened by by resentment resentment at at Russia's Russias national national decline. decline. In In the the space space of of a a few few sition months in the revolutions revolutions in eastern Europe Europe destroyed destroyed the the Soviet Soviet Bloc. Two months in 1989 1989 the in eastern Bloc. Two years later later Russia Russia lost, lost, even evenmore moresuddenly, suddenly, almost half half the the territory territory previously previously ruled ruled years almost from Moscow and found found itself smallerthan than in in the the reign reign of of Catherine Catherinethe the Great. The from Moscow and itself smaller Great. The signs that some-perhaps many-SVR officers share share the the belief of the current signs are are that some-perhaps many-SVR officers belief of the current leader of the theRussian Communist Party, Party, Gennadi Gennadi Zyuganov, Zyuganov, in in a a long-term Western leader of Russian Communist long-term Western to prevent a revival of Russian power. power. plan first to destroy the Soviet state and then to Russias historic historic mission, mission, they they believe, believe, is isto to bar bar the the way way to to American American global global hegemony hegemony Russia's value^.'^ ofWestern Western and the triumph of values.75 far too short shorta a period for for Russia to adjust to the thedis disThe Yeltsin presidency was far appearance appearance of of the the Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc and and the the break-up break-up of of the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. Like Like post postwar Britain, Britain, post-Communist post-Communist Russia Russia has, has, in in Dean Dean Acheson's Achesons famous famous phrase, phrase, "lost lost war role. But, whereas for Britain the loss of empire an empire and not yet found a role." recovery, in Russia it has been came at a time of political stability and economic recovery, accompanied by by economic economic collapse collapse and and political political disintegration. disintegration. Russia Russia is is in in the accompanied the unusual position present of of having having a a national national anthem but little prospect of of unusual positionatat present anthem but little prospect agreeing on on words words to to go go with with it-one it-one sign sign among among many of its its current crisis of agreeing many of current crisis of identity.76 national identity.76

Co 11 e ll! s i 0 17 : Pr o m t h e

0 fl e - Pa r ty

S ta te t o t h e P u t i fl P re s i de n cy

5 65

In the thesearch search for for its its own own identity identity at at the the beginning In beginning of of the the twenty-first twenty-first century, century, the the back to to a a heroic, reinvented version version of Soviet past. past. On December 20, SVR looks looks back heroic, reinvented of its its Soviet December 20, 1995 it it celebrated celebrated the the seventy-fifth seventy-fifth anniversary the founding the Cheka's Chekas for for1995 anniversary of of the founding of of the eign fth birthday, and marked marked the eign department department as as its its own own seventy-fi seventy-fifth birthday, and the occasion occasion by by pub publishing an an uncritical the "large large number number of by lishing uncriticaleulogy eulogyof of the of glorious glorious deeds deeds" performed performed by Soviet intelligence officers officers "who an outstanding outstanding contribution contribution to Soviet foreign foreign intelligence who have have made made an to guaranteeing the the security security of of our our Homeland. The SVR copes copes with with the guaranteeing Homeland." The the unfortunate unfortunate fact that that some of its its past past heroes perpetrated or fact some of heroes perpetrated or collaborated collaborated in in the the atrocities atrocities of of the the Great Terror Terror by by denying, denying,absurdly, absurdly, that they they played played any anypart inthem. them. In the verGreat that part in In the SVR ver sion of the theTerror, Terror, the the sole sole involvement involvement of of foreign intelligence was sion of foreign intelligence was to to produce produce marmar tyrs who who "perished perished in in the the torture torture chambers chambers of and Beria. the tyrs ofYezhov Yezhov and Beria."77 As As head head of of the SVR, Primakov Primakov became editor-in-chief) of of a a multi-volume multi-volume history history of of Soviet Sovietforeign foreign SVR, became "editor-in-chief" intelligence designed to to demonstrate demonstrate that that Soviet foreign intelligence intelligencehonorably intelligence designed Soviet foreign "honorably and and unselfishly to Motherland Motherland and and people."78 Though unselfishly did did its its patriotic patriotic duty duty to people.77S Though Primakov's Primakovs history has yet yetto to reach reach the the Cold Cold War Warera, it is is already alreadyclear clear that there beno history has era, it that there will will be no place place in any account account of of FCD involvement persecution of of dissidents dissidents and and the the in it it for for any involvement in in the the persecution abuse of human rights. abuse ofhuman rights. In 1996 1996 the the SVR issued a CD-ROM in in both both Russian and English, English, with with the the title title In issued a Russian and Foreign Intelligence: InteZZigence: VChK VCbK [ChekaJ-KGB-SVR, [ Chrkal-KGB-SVR,which give "for forthe Russian Foreign which claims claims to to give the first time time .. .. .. a a professional professional view viewon on the thehistory and development development of of one of the first history and one of the most most powerful secret secret services services in in the the world." world.The The aim aim throughout its multimedia multimedia celebrapowerful throughout its celebra tion past successes, successes, such such as as the cent Five tion of of past the recruitment recruitment of of the the Magnifi Magnificent Five and and atomic atomic espionage, is to emphasize emphasize the the direct direct links links between Soviet foreign espionage, is to between Soviet foreign intelligence intelligence and and todays SVR. The The cover cover of of the the CD-ROM depicts the statue statue of of Dzerzhins1.. Dzerzhinsky which today's depicts the ,), which the SVR and and FSB now now hope to see its former the the hope to see re-erected re-erected on on its former pedestal pedestal outside outside the Lubyanka. Nothing better illustrates the continuity between the Soviet and Russian Lubyanka. Nothing better illustrates the continuity between the Soviet and Russian foreign the SVR to past. foreign intelligence intelligence services servicesthan than the the attempt attempt by by the to reclaim reclaim its its KGB past.

AP PP P E E N D II X X A A A ND

GB C H HA AI IR RM ME EN N,, 1917-91 1 9 1 7- 9 1 KG

Feliks Edmundovich Edmundovich Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky Feliks (ChekalGPU/OGPU) (Cheka/GPU/OGPU) Vyacheslav Rudolfovich Rudolfovich Menzhinsky Menzhinsky Vyacheslav (OGPU) (OGPU) Genrikh Grigoryevich Grigoryevich Yagoda Yagoda Genrikh (NKVD) (NKVD) Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov Yezhov Nikolai Ivanovich (NKVD) (NKVD) Lavrenti Pavlovich Pavlovich Beria Beria Lavrenti (NKVD) (NKVD) Vsevelod Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Merkulov Merkulov Vsevelod (NKGB) (NKGB) Lavrenti Pavlovich Pavlovich Beria Beria Lavrenti (NKVD) ( NKW) Vsevelod Nikolayevich Merkulov Vsevelod NikolayevichMerkulov (NKGB/MGB) (NKGBIMGB) Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov Abakumov Viktor Semyonovich (MGB) (MGB) Semyon Denisovich Denisovich Ignatyev Ignatyev Semyon (MGB) (MGB) Lavrenti Lavrenti Pavlovich Pavlovich Beria Beria (MGB) (MGB) Sergei Sergei Nikiforovich Nikiforovich Kruglov Kruglov (MGB) (MGB) Ivan Ivan Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Serov Serov (KGB) (KGB) Aleksandr Aleksandr Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Shelepin Shelepin (KGB) (KGB) Vladimir Vladimir Yefimovich Yefimovich Semichastny Semichastny (KGB) (KGB) Yuri Yuri Vladimirovich Vladimirovich Andropov Andropov (KGB) (KGB) Vitali Vitali Vasilyevich Vasilyevich Fedorchuk Fedorchuk (KGB) (KGB) Viktor Viktor Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Chebrikov Chebrikov (KGB) (KGB) Vladimir Vladimir Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov Kryuchkov (KGB) (KGB) Vadim Vadim Viktorovich Viktorovich Bakatin Bakatin (KGB) (KGB)

1917-26 1917-26

1926-34 1926-34 1934-6 1934-6

193 6-8 1936-8

193 8-41 1938-41

1941 1941 (February-July) (February-July)

1941-3 1941-3 1943-6 1943-6 1946-51 1946-51

1951-3 1951-3 1953 (March-June) (March-June) 1953 1953-4 1953-4 1954-8 1954-8 1958-61 1958-61 1961-7 1961-7 1967-82 1967-82 1982 (May-December) (May-December) 1982 1982-8 1982-8 1988-91 1988-91 1991 (August-December) (August-December) 1991

AP EN ND A P P P E D II X X

B B
1920-99 1 9 20-99

HE A DS OF F FO ORE EI IG N I H S OF IN NT TE EL LL LI G GE EN C CE E,,

Yakov Kristoforovich Kristoforovich Davryan Davryan (Davydov) (Davydov) Yakov (C.heka) (Cheka) Solomon Solomon Grigoryevich Grigoryevich Mogilevsky Mogilevsky (Cheka) (Cheka) Mikhail Abramovich Abramovich Trilisser Trilisser Mikhail (Cheka/GPU/OGPU) (ChekalGPU/OGPU) Artur Khristyanovich Artuzov (OGPU/NKVD) (OGPU/NKVD) Abram Abramovich Abramovich Slutsky Slutsky Abram (NKVD) (NKVD) Zelman I. I. Pasov Pasov Zelman (NKVD) (NKVD) Sergei Mikhailovich Shpigelglas (NKVD) (NKW Vladimir Georgiyevich Georgiyevich Dekanozov Dekanozov Vladimir (NKVD) (NKVD) Pave1 Mikhailovich Fitin Pavel (NKVD/NKGB/NKVD/MGB) (NKVD/NKGB/NKVD/MGB) Pyotr Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Kubatkin Kubatkin Pyotr (MGB) (MGB) Pyotr Vasilyevich Vasilyevich Fedotov Pyotr Fedotov (Deputy Chairman, KI, 1947-9) (Deputy Chairman, 1947-9) Sergei Romanovich Savchenko Sergei Romanovich Savchenko (Deputy Chairman, Chairman, KI, KJ., 1949-51) 1949-51) (Deputy Yevgeni Petrovich Pitovranov Pitovranov Yevgeni Petrovich (MGB) (MGB) tepanovich Ryasnoy Ryasnoy Vasili Vas iii S Stepanovich (MGB) (MGB) Aleksandr Aleksandr Semyonovich Semyonovich Panyushkin Panyushkin (MGB/KGB) (MGB/KGB) Aleksandr Mikhailovich Aleksandr l\1ikhailovich Sakharovslcy Sakharovs1.. ), (KGB) (KGB) Fyodor Fyodor Konstantinovich Konstantinovich Mortin Mortin (KGB) (KGB) Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov Kryuchkov (KGB) (KGB) Leonid Leonid Vladimirovich Vladimirovich Shebarshin Shebarshin (KGB) (KGB) Yevgeni Maksimovich Primakov Yevgeni Maksimovich Primakov (SVR) (SVR) Vyacheslav IvanovichTrubnikov Vyacheslav Ivanovich Trubnikov (SVR) (SVR)

1920-1 1920-1 1921 1921 1921-30 1921-30 1930-6 1930-6 1936-8 1936-8 1938 1938 193 8 1938 1938-9 1938-9 1939-46 1939-46 1946 (June-September) (June-September) 1946 1946-9 1946-9 1949-52 1949-52 1952-3 1952-3 1953 (March-June) (March-June) 1953 1953-6 1953-6 1956-71 1956-71 1971-4 1971-4 1974-88 1974-88 1988-91 1988-91 1991-6 1991-6 19961996-

APPENDIX C

T H E O R G A N I Z A T I O N O F T H E KGB
General Secretary Central Committee, CPSU Collegium Special Inspectorate Politburo

Central Committee, State and Law Department Party KGB Committee Secretariat

KGB Chairman and Deputies

Planning Directorate

Directorate

Supply Directorate

CHIEF DIRECTORATES

1
First (Foreign Intelligence) Second (Internal Security and Counterintelligence DIRECTORATES
- Fourth (Transport)

Third Chief Director (Military Counterintelligence)

Troops Border Eighth (Communications and Cryptography)

DEPARTMENTSAND SERVICES KGB Protection Service (formerly Ninth Directorate, Government Guards) Investigation Department

- Tenth Department
(Archives)

Protection of the Constitution (formerly fifth Directorate, Ideology and Dissidents) Operational Technical (OTU)

- Sixth (Economic
Counterintelligence and Industrial Security)

- Government
Communications Service

- Seventh KGB
(Surveillance)

Higher School

- Sixth Department
(Interception and Inspection of Correspondence)

Sixteenth (Communications Interception and SIGINT)

- Fifteenth

- Twelfth
Department (Eavesdropping)

(Security of Government Installations)

- Military Construction

Source: Desmond B a l l and Robert Windren, Soviet Signals Intelligence (Sigint): Organisation and Management, InteZZzgence and National Security, vol. 4 (1989), no. 4; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story $Its Foreign Operationspom Lenin t o Gorbachev, paperback edition (London: Sceptre, 1991); and Mitrokhin.

APPENDIX D

T H E O R G A N I Z A T I O N O F T H E KGB F I R S T C H I E F D I R E C T O R A T E (FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE)

CHIEF and DEPUTIES Secretariat Pa9 Committee Intelligence Institute Administrative and Support Elements Operational Library Dutymen Diplomatic Pouch Section

Finance

Couriers

Administrative

n
Directorate R (Operational Planning and Analysis)

DIRECTORATES AND SERVICES

(Counter-

TnI C 1
I
Directorate S (Illegals) Directorate T

Directorate (Intelligence information: Analysis and

I

Directorate RT (Operations within and from the

(Disinformation; Technical
I

Service A of the Eighth Chief Directorate at the FCD (Code Section)

Departments 1. US, Canada

9.Anglophone Africa
10. Francophone Africa

1
I

1 2 . Latin America

Countries
4. East Germany, West 15. Registry and Archives

5. Benelux Countries, France, Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania
6. China, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, North Korea

16. SlGlNT Interception and Operations Against Foreign Code Clerks

17. India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan,

Nepal, Bangladesh, Burma

7. Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines

8. Non-Arab countries of the

--

18. Arab Countries of the Near East, plus Eqypt

19. Emigration

near east, Including Afghanistan, Iran Israel, Turkey

(Targetingand Recruitment)

20. Liaison with developing

countries

Source: Desmond B a l l and Robert Windren, Soviet Signals Intelligence (Sigint): Organisation and Management, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 4 (1989), no. 4; Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of Its Foreign Operationsj?om Lenin t o Gorbachev, paperback edition (London: Sceptre,1991); and Mitrokhin.

APPENDIX E

T H E O R G A N I Z A T I O N O F A KGB R E S I D E N C Y

KGBSupport Resident
Operatinal Staff

staff

(i

PR Line KR Line Line X Line N (Political, Economic (Counter- (Scientific and (Illegal and Military Strategic Intelligence Technological Support) Intelligence, Active and Security) Intelligence) Measures)

Line E M (Emigres)

Line SK (Soviet Colony)

Special Reservists

I
Reports Writer

Embassy Security Officer

Driver Operator (Sigint)

OT Officer (Operational Technical support)

RP Line Line 1 Cipher Clerk Officer (Computers) Radio

Secretary/ Typist

Accountant

I
Impulse station (Monitoring radio communications of surveillance teams)

Vasili Mitrokhh fishing in East Germany; a photograph presented to him by the Stasi.

I ,

.-

Mitrokhin during his KGB career: (left) on a hunting expedition; (right) returning from fishing.

Mitrokhin working on papers from his archive.

Dear VmiliNikitich, The collective5employees wish you a very happy 60th birthday. You devoted 40years ofyour I @ to the state security service andfor 35years you were a member ofourglorious Communist Party. In the glorious ranks ofthe Soviet Chekists and in advancing its work, you devoted all ofyour strength, knowledge and energy to serving our Socialist Motherland In the discharge ofyour responsibilities you received Government decorations and were an inspiration to the head ofand the Committeefor State Security. Dear VasiliNikitich, today, on the day of yourjubilee,please accept our heaqelt good wishes ofhealth, happiness and also of success in your work in t h e j h r efor the sake of our motherland

KGB certificate given to Mitrokhin on his 60th birthday.

.qfKWClOM MOXET KUTb nHWb YE,UeI C XOnOPHC4 TOIKXIOCI. rOPRLillM CEPPUEM

U WCTNMII PVKAMII-

Certificate signed by Vladimir Kryuchkov (below sword and shield emblem on the right), head of foreign intelligence, commending Mitrokhin for his work. In 1988 Kryuchkov (below) became chairman of the KGB; three years later he led the unsuccessful coup against Gorbachev.

Mitrokhin's KGB pension book, recording his retirement in 1984.

Checkmafe How the FBI Broke Spy Case That Baffled Agency for 30 Years

Robert Lipka (codenamed DAN); a leading Cold W a r Soviet agent in the United States arrested after Mitrokhh supplied the FBI with extracts from his KGB file. On being sentenced to 18 years' imprisonment in 1997, almost 30 years after his work as an agent ended, Lipka ruefully commented, 'I feel like Rip Van Spy'. Lipka's arrest, as reported by the Wall StreetJournal, 21/11/96, republished by permission (above right).

A Tip and a Risky Gamble

On Meaning of 'Roeck' Cracked KGB Scheme

'You Mean to Kill H i m ? '

I
2

I
THE I l l E G A L S

. ,-.-... . .

Moisei Akselrod (right), who operated in Italy in the mid-l930s, posing as an Austrian businessman. The classified British diplomatic documents which he obtained from a source inside the British embassy in Rome were so highly rated by the Centre that in 1935 over 100 of them were passed on to Stalin. Two years later, however, Akselrod became an innocent victim of the Stalinist Great Terror, was denounced as a traitor and executed. Dr. Arnold Deutsch (main photo below), the principal recruiter and early controller of the Magnificent Five, five young Cambridge graduates (clockwise from top: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt and John Cairncross) recruited in the mid1930s. As well as having an even more brilliant academic record than any of the Five, Deutsch w a s also a collaboratorof the leading sexologistWilhelm Reich.

Iosif Grigulevich (portrayed in 1974,at the age of 61). Grigulevichwas a master of impersonation. After the Second World War, he passed himself off as the Costa Rican Teodoro Castro, became a friend of the president and was appointed Costa Kcan envoy to Rome. As well as specializing in sabotage and assassination, Grigulevich also made a career as an academic authority and writer on Latin America.

Morris and Lona Cohen, the KGBs leading American illegal agents. In 1954 Paddy Costello, a Soviet agent in the New Zealand legation in Paris, supplied them with New Zealand passports (above) in the names of Peter and Helen Kroger, which they used to move to London to join the illegal residency of Konon Molody. In 1995 Moms Cohen was posthumously made Hero of the Russian Federation by President Yeltsin.

I
Konon Molody (BEN), KGB illegal resident in Britain from 1955 to 1961,with one of his many girlfriends in London. He did not, however, hit it off with the KGB's most important and long-serving female British agent, HOLA. After only two months H O L A was moved to another controller.
'

Gentlemen's lavatory at the Classics Cinema, Baker Street, London, used by Molody as a dead letter-box. Notes and radio spare parts were hidden in a condom inside the cistern.

Vasili Gordievsky. In 1968,with a false West German passport, Gordievsky was one of a number of illegals posing as Western supporters of the Prague Spring who were sent to Czechoslovakia to cultivate and compromise the reformers. This was the first of numerous PROGRESS operations in which illegals were used to monitor dissidence and disaffection in the Soviet Bloc.

Vasili's brother, Oleg Gordievsky (above), disgusted by the suppression of the Prague Spring, later became an SIS agent inside the KGB.

-u

g '

a 8

The Czechoslovakillegals Karl and Hana Koecher who worked for the KGB as well as for the StB in the 1970s and early 1980s.Karl Koecher seems to have been the first illegal to find employment with the CIA. The KGB chairman and hture Soviet leader, Yuri Andropov, personallypraised his intelligence as "important and valuable." The Koechers were habitud of Washington and New York sex clubs where they had sex with personnel from the CIA, Pentagon and other parts of the federal government. The photograph was taken after their return to Prague in 1986.

in a little f i r m in a f i r m . . . anywhere in London I can get on the phone to someone I know I can trust, that talks the same as me . . .' -Detectivesergeant John Symonds, of Camberwell CID
6 I'm

- 0 W r

7"s W Y I I

IITUmDAl N O I I Y m I I

rn

Wm

.
i
I
C

In 1969 a front-page story in The Times (London) charged Detective SergeantJohn Symonds and other corrupt Met officers with being in the pay of the London underworld. In 1972,while awaiting trial, Symonds fled abroad and spent the next eight years working as a KGB agent in four continents under false Australian, British and Canadian identities. In 1980 he broke contact with the KGB, returned to Britain and was sentenced to two years in jail for corruption. Interviewed in The Times (London) i t s but in 1994 (headline below), he said that he had roamed the world living off his w concealed his KGB connection.

Confessions of a bent copper

Mitrokhin succeeded in copying files giving the exact locations and other details of some of the caches located in almost every Western country, most
intended for use by illegals. Some, probably many, were booby-trapped.

Mitrokhin's copy of the instructions for defusing the Molniya ("lighming")explosive devices (above) attached to many of the caches (see chapter 22, appendix 1 ) .

Directions (i) to a booby-trapped radio cache, located near the Swiss town of Befaw (see chapter 22, appendix 2). The first major landmark referred to in the directions is a chapel (ii) on the edge of a wood. The next marker, 50 paces along the path to the left of the chapel is a stone block (ii), masked FC [Fbret Cantonale]. T h e site in which the cache was buried in 1966 is another 36 paces away, between two large trees (iv), one reduced to a stump since the instructions were drawn up. The Swiss federal police excavated the cache in December 1998, using Mitrokhin's notes, and discovered a metal container and waterproof packet (v) buried one metre deep beneath a large stone.

Inside the booby-trapped container (bottom), were a radio transmitter, radio receiver and cipher machine (top); the waterproof packet contained a radio antenna and other accessories (bottom right of top picture). The Molniya device attached to the container was discovered to be in a dangerous condition, and was exploded after Swiss police examination. Though not revealing the location of the cache, the police issued a warning that attempting to remove or open any similar caches was likely to cause death or serious injury. Most of the booby-trapped caches hidden in unknown quantities throughout the West must now also be in a dangerous condition.

The trial in 1966 of the dissident writers, Andrei Sinyavsky (bearded) and Y u l i Daniel, accused of publishing allegedly anti-Soviet works in the West. Though many Soviet writers had been imprisoned or executed in the Stalin era, Sinyavskyand Daniel were the first to be subjected to a show trial. Jeered by a courtroom audience chosen by the KGB, they were accused of pouring mud on whatever is most holy.

0 Camera Press

f I
L

Elena Bonner receives the 1975 Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of her husband, Andrei Sakharov, watched by the president of the Peace Prize Committee, Aase Lionaes. One of the priorities of KGB foreign operations was to prevent other dissidents receiving Nobel Peace Prizes.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, delivering his celebrated Commencement address at Harvard University in 1978, four years after he was expelled from Russia. The Centre arranged a secret viewing of a video of the speech by a Moscow audience of KGB and Party notables.

KGB envelope in which Mitrokhin kept his notes and copies of documents from Andrei Sakharovs file, now officially said to have been destroyed.

Sakharov, denounced by Andropov as Public Enemy Number One, with Bonner in internal exile at Gorky in the early 1980s.Both were objects of an extraordinarynumber of KGB active measures (some involving forged documents), designed . to demoralize them and destroy their reputations in the West. The KGBs campaigns of libels against Bonner were particularly vicious-partly because they wounded Sakharov more deeply than those against himself.

NOT N O T ES S

Chapter One The Mitrokhin Archive 1. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 1996; Reuter Reuter reports, 10, 1996. 1. Gazeta, December December 10, 10,1996; reports, December December 10,1996.
2. Unless Unless otherwise otherwise indicated, indicated, the the account account ofMitrokhin's of Mitrokhins career career is is based based on his own own recollections. 2. on his recollections. Because Because
ound. The The SVR is is of is reluctant reluctant to of his bc of concern concern for for his his relatives relatives in in Russia, Russia, he he is to reveal reveal details details of his family family background. still KGB defectors, defectors, whatever their motives. motives. Most, even if-like if-like Oleg still ferociously ferociouslyhostile hostile to to KGB whatever their Most, even Oleg Gordievsky Gordievskythey conviction, they betrayed betrayed not not Russia Russia but but the the now now discredited discredited Soviet Soviet one-party one-party state state through through ideological ideological conviction,

kgr

remain under under sentence sentence of of death. death. Though Thoughtheir their relatives relatives no face the the overt overt persecution the Soviet remain no longer longer face persecution of of the Soviet
era, identified. era, many many understandably understandably prefer prefer not not to to have have them them identified.

3. For personal Mitrokhin does does not not wish wish to to make make public of this this foreign where 3. For personal reasons, reasons, Mitrokhin public the the location location of foreign posting, posting, where
he operated under he operated under an an alias. alias.

Fal! of of the Soviet Soviet 4. see Moskalenko, 4. On O n the the fall f d of of Beria, Beria, see Moskalenko, "Beria's Berias Arrest"; Arrest; Volkogonov, Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall Empire, pp. 185-93; 185-93; Knight, Knight, Beria, 9. Empire, pp. Beria, ch. ch. 9. 5. The FCD Archives, known in in 1956 as the the Operational 5. The Archives, known 1956 as Operational Records Records Department Department (Otdel Operativnogo Operativnogo Ucheta), the Twelfth Urheta),were were subsequently subsequently renamed renamed the Twelfth (later (later the the Fifteenth) Fifteenth)Department. Department. 6. the Soviet Empire, p. 6. Volkogonov, Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall of ofthe Empire, p. 194. 194. chs. 1 1 ,12; Levi, 9. 7. 7. Fleishman, Fleishman, Boris Pasternak, Pasternak, chs. 11,12; Levi, Boris Pasternak, Pasternak, chs. chs. 8, 8,9. 8. 64-5. 8. Knight, Knight, The KGB, KGB,pp. pp. 64-5. 9. 9. k-9,183. k-9,183. 10. Andropov, p. p. 56. 56. 10. Medvedev, Medvedev,Andropov, 11. Andrew 483-4; Arbatov, Dobbs, Down With 11. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 434-5, 434-5,483-4; Arbatov, The System, p. 266; 266; Dobbs, WithBig Brothel; Brothel; p. p. 13. 13. 12. 1. 12. k-25, k-25,l. 13. f the dissidents' contacts and imagined) and thethe expulsion 13. k-1,191. k-1,191. Because Because o of the dissidents contacts (both (both real real and imagined) with with the theWest West and expulsion of FCD archives material on secu of some some of of their their leaders, leaders, FCD archives included included material on them them from from both both the the Second Second (internal (internal security) Chief Chief Directorate the Fifth founded by by Andropov Andropov to to spcialize specialize in rity) Directorate and and the Fifth Directorate, Directorate, founded in operations operations by by domestic subversion. domestic ideological ideological subversion. 14. Mitrokhin later of similar plans to to end dancing of another from the the 14. Mitrokhin later found found evidence evidence of similar plans endthe the dancing career career of another defector defector from Kirov Makarova. Kirov Ballet, Ballet, Natalia Natalia Makarova. 15. the FCD archive 1970 is part 1 . 15. The The approximate approximate size size of of the archive c. 1970 is given given in in vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 2, 2, part 1. 16. FCD Directorate t the o consult consult one one o f the ues transferred o Yasenevo, Yasenevo, 16.When When FCD Directorate S a at the Lubyanka Lubyanka asked asked t to of the f files transferred t to Mitrokhin return. Mitrokhin was was also also responsible responsible for for supervising supervising its its return. 17. k-16,506. 17. k-16,506. 18. Blake, No Other Choice, Choice,p. p. 265. 265. 18. Blake, 19. notes kept them the bottom of a bas 19. While White working working on on the the notes at at the the dacha, dacha, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin kept them hidden hiddenatat the bottom a laundry laundry of basket, He not the first to to bury a secret secret archive archive in in a ket, then then buried buried them them in in the the milk-churn milk-churn before before he he left. left. H e was was not the first bury a a milk-churn. the Warsaw Warsaw Ghetto Ghetto in in 1942-3 buried three milk-churn. In In the 1942-3 Emanuel Emanuel Ringelblum Ringelblum buried three churns, churns, rediscovered rediscovered after Second World War, which which contained contained a a priceless priceless collection collection of of underground underground newspapers, newspapers, reports reports after the the Second World War, on resistance networks, Jews who escaped from from the death camps. One of of the the on resistance networks, and and the the testimony testimony of of Jews who had had escaped the death camps. One milk-churns Holocaust Memorial Memorial Museum Washington. milk-churns is is among among the the exhibits exhibits at at the the United United States States Holocaust Museumin in Washington. 20. four sections: 20. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins archive archive is is in in four sections: (i) k-series: handwritten filed inin handwritten material materialjled large envelopes envelopes (ii) t-series: handwritten handwritten notebooks volumes:typed typed material, bycountry, country, sometimes with commentary by by Mitrokhin (iii) volumes: material, mostly arranged by sometimes (iv)j-ag.-series: miscellaneoushandwritten handwritten notes (iv) frag. -series: miscellaneous
Endnote ref references to Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins archive archive follow follow this this classification. Endnote erences to classification. 21. Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns letter letter of of complaint to Andropov Andropov and and Andropov's Andropovs mendacious mendacious report on it itto to the Coun21. complaint to report on the Coun
158-60. See See also cil in Scammell (ed.), The Sohhenitsyn cil of ofMinisters Ministers are are published published in Scammell (ed.), Solzhenitsyn Files, Files,pp. pp. 158-60. also Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn,

The Oak andthe and the Calf, pp. 497-8; ScammeU, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, Sohhenitsyn, pp. 739-43. Calf; pp. 322-3, 322-3,497-8; pp. 739-43. UnknownLenin, Lenin, pp. 48-50. The Unknown pp. 48-50. 23. Solzhenitsyn, the Calf, p. 1 .. 23. Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and andthe Ca& p. 1 24. Shentalinsky, Shentalinsky, The KGB's KGB? Literary Archive, Archive, pp. pp. 80-1. In the OGPU O G P U had 80-1. I n 1926 1926 the had confiscated confiscated Bulgakovs Bulgakov's 24. allegedly subversive subversivediary. diary. Though Bulgakov succeeded in itback a few few years years later, later,he he himself himself suballegedly Though Bulgakov succeeded in getting getting it back a sub22. Pipes Pipes (ed.), (ed.), 22.

No t

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57 2

sequently provide arrest. Happily, Happily, a in the KGB sequently burnt burnt it itfor for fear fear that that ititmight might provide evidence evidence for for his his arrest. a copy copy survives survivesin the KGB archives. archives. 25. "Some members of the Moscow Moscow 25. Some aspects aspects of of the the political political and and moral-psychological moral-psychological situation situation among among members of the Theatre Drama and and Comedy Comedy on the Taganka." submitted to Theatre of of Drama on the Taganka. Report Report submitted to Andropov Andropov in in July July 1978 1978 (k-25, (k-25, appendix). appendix).

The Oak 004 and the Calf, C a s pp. pp. 2-4. 2-4. 27. See See below, 27. below, chapter chapter 19. 19. 28. 28.The The Mghan Afghan War War will will be be covered covered in in volume volume 2. 2. 29.A characteristic characteristic example example was was a a plan plan (document (document no. no. 150IS-9195) 150/S-9195)for for agent agent infi infiltration into Russian Russian 29. ltration into
26. 26.Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn, emigre emigre communities communities to to monitor monitor and and destabilize destabilize dissidents dissidents abroad, abroad, signed signed jointly jointly by by Kryuchkov Kryuchkov and and

Bobkov (head (head of of the the Fifth FifthDirectorate), Directorate), submitted submitted to to Andropov Andropov on on August August 19,1975, and approved approved by by him him Bobkov 19, 1975, and a few few days days later; later; vol. vol. 6, 6,ch. ch. 8, 8,part part 6. 6.Kryuchkov Kryuchkov now now improbably improbably maintains maintains that that he he had nothing to do do with with a "had nothing to the struggle struggle against dissent (Remnick, (Remnick, Resurrection, Resurrection, p. p. 322). 322). the against dissent"

30.vol. vol. 10, 10,ch. ch. 3, 3,para. para. 23. 30. 23.
31. vol. 4; k-2,323; k-5,169. k-5,169. 31. vol. 6, 6,app. app. 2, 2,parts parts 3, 3,4; k-2,323;

Since he he does does not not wish wish to to reveal reveal some some details details of of his his departure departure from from the the Soviet Soviet Union Union to to the the present 32.Since 32. present Russian security security service, service, Mitrokhin Mitrokhin is is unwilling unwilling to to identifY identifjr the the Baltic Baltic republic republic in in which which he contacted SIS. SIS. Russian he contacted
33. 33.Kessler, Kessler, The FBL FBI,p. p. 433. 433.Despite Despite its its limitations, limitations, the the story story confirms confirms Kessler's Kesslers well-deserved well-deserved reputation reputation

for scoops. scoops. for

34. f, "FBI ashington Post (August 18, 1993). 1993). 34.Michael Michael Isikof Isikoff, FBI Probing Probing Soviet Soviet Spy Spy Effort, Effort, Book Book Says," Says, W Washington (August 18,

Fun and and Games Games with withthe theKGB," KGB, Time (August (August 30, 30,1993). 35."Fun 1993). 35. 36. The British British media media also also assumed assumed that that the the KGB KGB defector defector had had gone gone to to the the United United States. States. See, for exam exam36. The See, for ple, "Top Top US US Of Officials For KGB,' KGB, '' The Times Times (August (August 19, 19,1993); 1993); KGB Recruited Recruited 'Hundreds' Hundreds of of "KGB ple, ficials Spied 'Spied For pendent (August 19, 1993). American Spies," Inde American Spies, Iudepende?2t (August 19,1993). 37.The The first first exposure exposure of of Hernu's Hernus alleged alleged role roleas as a a Soviet Soviet Bloc Bloc agent agent was was the the article article by by JtrGme Dupuis and and 37. Jerome Dupuis Jean-Marie Pontaut, Pontaut, Charles Hernu etait ttaitun un agent agent de de l'Est," IEst, L'E: LExpress 31,1996). >:press (October (October 3 1 , 1996). Jean-Marie "Charles Hernu 38."Le Le contre-espionnage contre-espionnage f franqais est convaincu convaincu que que Charles Charles Hernu Hernu a a ete t t t un un agent agent de de l'Est," YEst, Le Monde 38. ranc;ais est (October 31, 31, 1996). 1996).For For British British versions versions of of the the Hernu Hernustory, story, see, see, inter alia, alia, the the reports reports in in the the Daily DaiZy T =le(October ele Guardian, Independent Independent and T6e Times on October October 31, 31, 1996, 1996,and in the and The Times on and in the Sunday Times and and Sunday graph, Guardian, Telegraph November 3, 3,1996. on November 1996. T elegraph on Since Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes, notes, though though voluminous, voluminous, are are not not comprehensive, comprehensive, the the absence absence of of any any identifiable identifiable 39.Since 39. reference to to Hernu Hernu is is not not proof proof of of his his innocence, especially as as his his initial initial contacts contacts were, were, allegedly, allegedly,with with Bul Bulreference innocence, especially
garian innocent of against him. him. garian and and Romanian Romanian intelligence. intelligence. Hernu's Hernus family family insist insist that that he heis is innocent of the the charges charges against

40.Focus (December (December 1996, March 1997). 1997).Focus's Focuss report report in in December December 1996 1996 provoked provoked the the vigorous vigorous SVR SVR 40. 1996, March
denunciation quoted quoted at at the the beginning beginning of of this this chapter. chapter. denunciation

41. Andreas Weber, Weber, Die Grot geschluckt: Die Die Lageplane Lageplane zu zu den denKGB-Waf KGB-Waffenund Spreng-stoffdepots 4 1. Andreas "Die 'Grot' geschluckt: fen- und Spreng-stoffdepots 42.t-7,65. t-7,65. 42.
in Osterreich Ojsterreich sind sind iiberaus uberaus prazise," prazise, Projil Pr@l (May (May 26, 1997). 26, 1997). in
43 . See 43. See below, below, chapter chapter 22. 22.

44.Focus (June (June 15, 15,1998). Other errors errors in in the theFocus story story included included the the claim claim that that the thedefector defector had had "worked worked 44. 1998). Other
at KGB KGB headquarters headquarters until until the the early early 1990s." 1990s. at

45.Focus (June (June 15, 15,1998). Roger Boyes, Boyes, "Defector Defector Says Says Willy Willy Brandt Brandtwas was KGB KGB Agent," Agent, 1998). Roger 45. 16,1998). 1998). 16,

Times (June (June The Times

46.ITARlTass ITAWTass interview interview with with Yuri Yuri Kobaladze, Kobaladze, June June 19, 19,1998. 1998. Butkovs memoirs, memoirs, so so far far available only in in 46. Butkov's available only
Norwegian, contain contain much much of of interest interest (including (including KGB KGB documents) documents) on on his his career career in in the theFCD to Norwegian, FCD from from 1984 1984 to

1991,but but include include no no reference reference to to Brandt. Brandt. In In 1998, 1998, while living living in in Britain, Britain, Butkov Butkov was was jailed jailed for for three three years years 1991, while
for his his involvement involvement in in a a confidence confidence trick trick which which persuaded persuaded companies companies in to pay pay 1.5 1.5 for in Russia Russia and and Ukraine Ukraine to pounds to to enrol enrol employees employees in in a bogus business business school school in in Calif California. Suburbia is is KGB KGB pounds a bogus ornia. Conman "Conman from from Suburbia
47. 47.k-26,88. k-26,88.

Defector, Sunday Times (April (April 26, 1998). 26, 1998). Defector,"

See below, below, chapter chapter 26. 26. 48.See 48.

49. 11, parts 28, 41. 49.vol. vol. 6, 6,ch. ch. 11, parts 26, 26,28,41.

50.Scott Scott Shane Shane and and Sandy Sandy Banisky, Banisky, "Lipka Lipka Was Was Wary Wary of of FBI's FBIs Spy Spy Trap," Trap, Baltimore BaZtintore Sun (February (February 25, 25, 50. 1996);William William C. C. Carley, Carley, "How How the theFBI FBIBroke Broke Spy Spy Case Case that that Baffled Baffled Agency Agency for for 30 30 Years," Years, W WaZZStreet 1996); all Street Jozrrnul (November (November 21, 21,1996). 1996). Journal 51. Julia C. C. Martinez, Martinez, "Accused Accused Spy Spy Admits Admits Guilt," Guilt,Philadelphia Philadekhia Inquirer (May (May 24, 24,1997). 1997). 51. Julia 52.Joseph Joseph A. A. Slobodzian, Slobodzian,"18-Year 18-Year Sentence Sentence for for Ex-Soviet Ex-Soviet Spy," Spy, PhiZadekhia Inquirer Inquirer(September (September 25, 25,1997). Philadelphia 1997). 52.

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5 73

53. The Digest Press. Press. 53. The first first edition edition was was published published in in New NewYork York by byReader's Readers Digest 54. 54. 54. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part part 54. 55. vol. 1, part 55. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, part 28. 28. 56. 56. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part part 4. 4. 57. covering the the period 1974 to 1985, were later 57. Some Some of of the the KGB KGB documents documents obtained obtained by by Gordievsky, Gordievsky,all all covering period 1974 to1985, were later

More Instructionsj-om Instructions from the Centre. Centre. 58. attributable inf ormation. Since retired six six years years before before the the publication publication of of the the history history 58. Un Unattributable information. Since Mitrokhin Mitrokhin had hadretired by Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, he he had hadno no access access to to KGB KGB files on it. by files on it. 59. Order 5, 1990. 59. Order of of the the Chairman Chairmanof of the the KGB, KGB, no. no. 10710V, 107/0V, September September 5,1990. 60. order of of KGB material shortly shortly 60. Costello Costello later later told told Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky Gordievsky that that he he received received the the first first order KGB material after the the press press conference conference to to launch launch their their book, book, at at which which he engagingly boisterous after he made made an an engagingly boisterous appearance appearance to to denounce their identification of John Cairncross as the the Fifth Fifth Man as by British denounce their identification ofJohn Cairncross as Man as a a plot plot by British intelligence. intelligence. He He subsub sequently changed changed his his mind mind after after seeing seeing material material from from Cairncrosss sequently Cairncross's KGB KGB file file which which confirmed confirmed that that ideniden tification. tification. 61. Costello, Costello, Ten Days Daysto t o Destiny. 61. 62. Costello pp. vi-vii. untimely death death in in 1996 1996 has been variously variously 62. Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. vi-vii. Costello's Costellos untimely has been attributed theorists to British or or Russian Russian intelligence. intelligence. While While Costello Costello was was attributed by by conspiracy conspiracytheorists to the themachinations machinations of of British somewhat that either either he or any of the Western somewhat naive naive in in his his attitude attitude to to the the SVR, SVR, there there is is no no suggestion suggestion that he or any of theother other Western authors (some of histories authorized authorized by by the the SVR authors (some of them them distinguished distinguished scholars) scholars) of of the the collaborative collaborative histories SVR have have been been Russian agents. agents. Russian 63. The of publication: publication: Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly 63. The collaborative collaborative volumes volumes so so far far published published are, are, in in order order of IZlusions; Murphy, Murphy, Kondrashev Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin; Berlin;Fursenko Naftali, One Illusions; and Bailey, Fursenko and and Naftali, "One Hell ofa ofa GamGam ble;West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The CrownJewels; CrownJeweZs; and and Weinstein Weinstein and HauntedWood and Vassiliev, Vassiliev, The Haunted W ood Further Further publicapublica ble"; tion details details are are given given in in the thebibliography. bibliography. tion Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly IlluIllu 64. Extracts from from the the Philby Philby file appear in in Costello, Costello, Ten Days to 64. Extracts file appear to Destiny; Costello sions; Borovik, Borovik, The Philby Files; Files;West West and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels. Jewels. and Tsarev, sions; 65. See See below, chapter 9. 9. 65. below, chapter 66. Murphy, Murphy, Kondrashev Kondrashev and and Bailey, Bailey, Battleground Berlin, Berlin, p. 248. The The authors the SVRs 66. p. 248. authors rightly rightly describe describe the SVR's claim "obviously disingenuous." The SVRs SVR's selection selection of of docudocu claim that that it it has has no no file file on on Kopatzky/Orlov Kopatzky/Orlov as as obviously disingenuous. The ments for the the most of the thecollaborative collaborative histories histories (on (on espionage in the theUSA USA in theStalin ments for most recent recent of espionage in in the Stalin era) era) shows shows some similar similar signs signs of of archival on embarrassing embarrassing episodes. episodes. It It claims, for example, example, that that available some archival amnesia amnesia on claims, for "available records do not not indicate indicate the the fate fate of of Vasili Vasili Mironov, Mironov, a a senior senior officer theNew New York records" do officer in in the York residency residency recalled recalled to to Moscow in 1944 (Weinstein and and Vassiliev, Vassiliev, The Haunted W W o o d ,p. ood, p. 275). 275). In In reality, reality, his his fate fate is is precisely precisely Moscow in 1944 (Weinstein recorded sent to labor camp, camp, then then shot after attempting attempting to recorded in in SVR SVR meso files. Mter After his his recall, recall, Mironov Mironov was was first first sent tolabor shotafter to smuggle massacre to the in Moscow. Moscow. smuggle details details of of the theNKVD NKVD massacre of of Polish Polish officers officers to theUS embassy embassy in 67. See See below, chapter 9. 9. 67. below, chapter 68. editor, Tatyana Tatyana Samolis, is spokeswoman spokeswoman for for the 68. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany Eterany Vneshnei VneshneiRaz'vedki Razvedki Rossii. The The editor, Samolis, is the SVR. One One striking striking example example of of this this volume's volumes reverential reverential attitude towards the the pious myths created SVR. attitude towards pious myths created by by the the KGB is is its its highly highly sanitized sanitized account account of of the the frequently frequently unsavory Hero of Soviet Union KGB unsavory career career of of Hero of the the Soviet Union Stanislav Stanislav Alekseyevich Alekseyevich Vaupshashov. Vaupshashov. 69. Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Rossiyskoi Vneshnei volumes were were published published between between 69. Primakov Primakov et al., Ocherki VneshneiRazvedki. Three Three volumes 1995 and classified articles in the the KGB KGB in-house in-house journal journal KGB 1995 and 1997. 1997. They They are are based, based, in in part, part, on onformerly formerly classified articles in Sbornik, of which Sbornik, some some of which were were noted noted by by Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin. 70. Thoughthe the former head of the the SVR, SVR,Yevgeni Yevgeni Primakov Primakov (who (whoin in 1998 became Russian min70. Though former head of 1998 became Russian prime prime min Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, ister), ister), was was given given the the honorary honorary title titleof of "editor-in-chief" editor-in-chief of of Ocherki his role can have been much more more than than nominal. nominal. As As literary editor, Zamoysky Zamoysky is his role can scarcely scarcely have been much "literary editor," is likely likely to to have 1980s he he regularly regularly expounded expounded his his belief belief in in a a have played played a a much much more more significant significant role. role. During During the the 1980s global Masonic-Zionist Masonic-Zionist plot trips to to foreign foreign residencies. residencies. Oleg heard him him global plot during during briefing briefing trips Oleg Gordievsky Gordievsky heard deliver residency in in January Zamoysky deliver a a lecture lecture on on this this subject subject during during his his visit visit to to the the London Londonresidency January 1985; 1985;Zamoysky was Directorate of was then then deputy deputy head head of of the the FCD F C D Directorate of Intelligence Intelligence Information. Information.Andrew Andrewand andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. 42. p. 42. 71. "Freemasons," the upper upper echelons ofgovernment West 71. Freemasons,Zamoysky Zamoysky claimed, claimed, "have have always always controlled controlled the echelons of government in in Western bourgeois society . . . . . The The true true center center of ern countries countries .. .. .. Masonry Masonry in in fact fact runs, runs, 'remotely remotely controls' controls bourgeois society. of the the world Masonic movement in the the most most Masonic 'Masonic' country country of of all, all, the the United United States. States . . . . . world Masonic movement is is to to be be found found in Ronald Reagan Reagan has has been been characterized characterized as as an an 'outstanding' outstanding Mason." Mason. Zamoyskys explanation of the Cold Cold Ronald Zamoysky's explanation of the War War was was startling startling in in its its simplicity: simplicity:

from the Centre Centre and and published published in in Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instructions Instructionsj-om

N o tt e e s N o s

57 4

The first first ever ever atomic atomic attack attack on on people, people, the the use use of of atomic atomic weapons weapons for for blackmail blackmail and and the theescalation escalation The
of of the the arms arms race race were were sanctioned sanctioned by by the the 33-degree 33-degree Mason Mason Harry HarryTruman. Truman.

The first first ever ever call callfor for the the Cold ColdWar War was sounded sounded by by Mason Mason Winston Winston Churchill (with Truman's Trumans The was Churchill (with
blessing). blessing).

The onslaught onslaught on on the the economic economic independence independence of of Western Western Europe Europe (disguised (disguised as as the the Marshall Marshall The Plan) was was directed directed by by the the 33-degree 33-degree Mason Mason George George Marshall. Marshall. Plan)
Truman Truman and and West West European European Freemasons Freemasons orchestrated orchestrated the the formation formation of of NATO. NATO. Don't owe to that cohort cohortthe the instigation West and Dont we we owe to that instigation of of hostility hostility between between the the West and the the Soviet Soviet

Union.. . .. ? Union

(Behind the Facade of emple, pp. 141.) of the Masonic T Temple, pp. 6-7, 6-7,141.) An part of theories into An important important part of the the explanation explanation for for the the survival survival of of some some old old KGB KGB conspiracy conspiracy theories into today's todays SVR continuity of SVR is is the the continuity of personnel. personnel. 72. concludes 72. The The third third and and latest latest volume volume of of the the SVR SVRofficial official history, history,which which ends ends in in 1941, 1941, concludes that that Soviet Soviet for foreign "honorably and unselfishly did and eign intelligence intelligence honorably and unselfishly did its its patriotic patriotic duty duty to toMotherland Motherland and people." people. Primakov Primakov et al, Ocherki vol. 3, 3, conclusion. aZ., Ocherki Istorii Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, Razvedki, vol. conclusion. 73. That is is why why the the SVR SVR selected as as the the first first subject subject for for a a collaborative collaborativehistory history between between one one of its own own con con73. That selected of its sultants sultants and and a a Western Western historian historian a a biography biography of of Aleksandr Aleksandr Orlov, Orlov, a a senior senior foreign foreign intelligence intelligence officer officer who, who, despite from despite being being forced forced to to flee flee to to the theWest West from Stalin's StalinsTerror, Terror, allegedly allegedly kept kept "faith faith with with Lenin's Lenins revolution" revolution and used his his superior training to intelligence agencies agencies for and used superior intelligence intelligence training to take take in in Western Western intelligence for many many years. years. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions. Illusions. 74. See below, 74. See below, ch. ch. 5. 5. 75. 16, 19, 20, 29, 30. 75. See See below, below, chs. chs. 15, 15,16,19,20,29,30. 76. 76. See See below, below, ch. ch. 18. 18. 77. On O n the the destruction destruction of of KGB KGB files, files, see see Knight, Knight, S Spies Cloaks, p. p. 194. 194. 77. pies Without Cloaks,

Cbapter Two Two From Lenin's Lenini Cheka Cbeku to t o Stalin's Stulini OGPU Chapter 1. Andrew 1. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 56-63. 56-63. 2. Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 52-3. 52-3. 2. Gordievsky, 3. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 3, 3, part part 3, 3, n. 2; 2; k-9,218. k-9,218. 3. 4. Leggett, Leggett, The Cheka, Cheka, p. p. 17. 17. 4. 5. 5. k-9,67. k-9,67. 6. Pipes, Pipes, Russia under underthe Bolshevik Regime, Regime, 1919-1924, 1919-1924, pp. pp. 92-3. 92-3. 6. 7. 7. k-9,67,204. k-9,67,204. L Lenin i VChK, 8. al. (eds.), (eds.), v. I T 1 VChK no. no. 48. 48. 8. Tsvigun Tsvigun et al 1. 9. 9. Ostryakov, Ostryakov, Voyennye Voyennye Chekisty, Chekisty, ch. ch. 1. 10. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 69-75. 69-75. On O n the the evidence evidence for for Lenin's Lenins involvement, involvement, see see Brook Brook10. Shepherd, Shepherd, Iron Maze, p. p. 103. 103. 11. Brook-Shepherd, 11. Brook-Shepherd, Iron Maze, p. p. 107. 107. KGB, p. 12. Gordievsky, 12. Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsb, p. 79. 79. 13. Before Before his his execution, execution, Kannegiser Kannegiser was was twice interrogated personally personally by by Dzerzhinsky. Dzerzhinsky. Though Though he he had had 13. twice interrogated formerly been been an an active active member member of of the the Workers' Workers Popular Popular Socialist Party, he he claimed-perhaps claimed-perhaps to to protect protect formerly Socialist Party, other supporters supporters of of the the Party-that, Party-that, as a matter matter of of principle," principle, he he was was not not currently a member member of of any party. other "as a currently a any party. Kannegiser said hehad had carried out out the theassassination assassination entirely on his his own own to to avenge avenge those those shot on UritKannegiser said that that he carried entirely on shot on Urit skys orders as "enemies enemies of of Soviet power. According According to to his his father, father, one one of of those those shot had been a friend friend of sky's orders as Soviet power." shot had been a of Kannegiser. The The family family maid, Ilinaya, claimed claimed that Kannegiser "was was linked suspicious people Kannegiser. maid, llinaya, that Kannegiser linked with with some some suspicious people who often often came came to to see see him, him, and and that he himself himself would would disappear disappear from from his house at night, returning only who that he his house at night, returning only during the theday." day. Rozenberg, Rozenberg, another another witness witness interrogated by the the Cheka, Cheka,claimed claimed that that Kannegiser Kannegiser had had told told during him of of his his plan plan to to overthrow overthrow the the Bolshevik Bolshevik regime. regime. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin noted, after reading reading the the Cheka Cheka interrogahim noted, after interroga tion records, that the theconflicts conflicts in in evidence evidence had had not not been resolved. resolved. vol. vol. 10, ch. 4. tion records, that 10, ch. 14. The record record of Kaplans interrogation interrogation was was published published in in 1923; 1923; Pipes, Revolution, p. p. 807. 807. 14. The of Kaplan's Pipes, The Russian Revolution, 15. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 75-8 75-81. 15. 1. 54. 1 6 . Pipes 16. Pipes (ed.), (ed.), The Unknown Lenin, pp. pp. 48, 48,54. 17. Though Though the the KGB fi files examined by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin do donot not record Filippov's Filippovs fate fate after after his his arrest arrest by by the the Pet17. KGB les examined record Pet rograd Cheka, hewas was never never heard heard of of again. again. k-9,67,204. k-967,204. rograd Cheka, he 237. 18. Andrew 18. Andrewand and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, p. p. 237.

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575

19. Leggett, 417 n. 21. pp. 325-7. 325-7. 19. Leggett, The Cheka, Cheka, p. p. 417 21. Conquest, Conquest, The Great Ten-or, Terror, pp. 20. 5. Buikis memoirs of of his his early 20. vol. vol. 7, 7,ch. ch. 1, 1 ,para. para. 5. Buikis subsequently subsequentlywrote wrote two two brief brief memoirs early experiences experiences in in the theCheka Cheka

in Rozvadovskaya Rozvadovskaya et al. (eds.), (eds.), Rytsar Revoliutsii, Revoliutsii, and and Lyalin Lyalin et al. (eds.), (eds.), Osoboie Zadanie. in
21. See, for 1. 21. See, for example, example, Ostryakov, Ostryakov, Voyennye Voyennye Chekisty, Chekisty, ch. ch. 1. 22. f the cial document o hereditary hereditary nobility nobility" (suppressed (suppressed 22. For For the the text text o of the offi official document certifying certifying Ulyanov's Ulyanovs "rights rights t to

19. during during the the Soviet Soviet era), era), see see Pipes Pipes (ed.), (ed.), The Unknown UnknownLenin, Lenin,p. p. 19. 138-9. 23. 23. Pipes Pipes (ed.), (ed.), The Unknown UnknownLenin, Lenin,pp. pp. 3-5, 34,138-9. 1-12. 24. 24. Radzinsky, Radzinsky, Stalin, Stalin, pp. pp. 1 11-12. 25. 25. vol. vol. 1, 1,app. app. 3. 3. C Cf Radzinsky, Radzinsky, Stalin, Stalin, pp. pp. 12-14. 12-14. 26. 26. Radzinsky, Radzinsky,

Stalin, determination about of the S t a h , pp. pp. 77-9. 77-9. It I t is is possible possible that that Stalin's Stalins determination about changing changing the the day day of the

month as as well well as as the the year year of of his his birth birth in in official official records records may may have have reflected that Okhrana Okhrana records records month reflected the the fear fear that contained some some reference reference which which had had been been overlooked overlooked to to an agent, otherwise otherwise identified contained an agent, identified only only by by codename, codename, who had had his his date date of of birth. birth. who 27. On On June June 1 11,1919 theCentral Central Committee of the the Russian Russian Communist Communist Party Partystated: stated: "[We] [We] have have noted 27. 1 , 1919 the Committee of noted
Comrade ing the in the the Comrade Dzerzhinsky's Dzerzhinskys announcement announcement concer conceryiing the necessity necessity of of leaving leaving illegal illegal political political workers workers in areas . . . It proposed that: An Illegals Illegals Operations Operations Department Department be be created created in in areas occupied occupied by by the the enemy enemy. It is is proposed that: (a) (a) An the 1, n. 1). the organizational organizational office office .. . . " (vol. (vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 1, 1). 28. 28. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 1 1and and 2 9 . k-27,305. 29. k-27,305.

. .

..

n. 1; 1;vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 1 1. .

30. Leggett, Leggett, The Cheka, Chekn, appendix appendix C. C. 30. 31. There is is little little doubt doubt that that The State and and Revolution Revolution represented innermost convictions. it represented Lenins Lenin's innermost convictions. Had Had it 3 1 . There been otherwise, otherwise, he he would would scarcely scarcely have have chosen chosen to to publish publish it it in in February February 1918, 1918, at ata a time Cheka been time when when the the Cheka
was already in Lenin's opponents to point point to to the the contradictions contradictions was already in existence existence and and it it was was only only too too easy easy for for Lenins opponents to

between his his words words and and his his deeds. Its publication publication at at such such a theregimes between deeds. Its a difficult difficult time time was was an an act act of of faith faith that that the regime's
diffi culties were to see see the the fulfillment fulfillment of of his his revolutionary revolutionary dream. dream. difficulties were only only temporary temporary and and that that he hewould would live live to

32. Report Report f from the Cheka Cheka of of the the town town and and district district of of Morshansk inthe thefirst of the Cheka weekly, 32. rom the Morshansk in first issue issue of the Cheka weekly, dated September 1918 (k-9,212) . dated September 22, 22,1918 (k-9,212). 33. Mitrokhin ollowing report an inspection inspection by Cheka headquarters of Cheka Cheka 33. Mitrokhin noted noted the the f following report (k-9,210) (k-9,210) of of an by Cheka headquarters of operations in in Dmitrov Dmitrov in in1918: 1918: operations Kurenkov, aged aged18, 18, operates operates as as the the chairman chairman of of the the Dmitrov Dmitrovtown Kurenkov, town Cheka Cheka of of Moscow Moscow province. province. All All his colleagues colleagues are are young young people, people, but but young young people people who who are and who work his are competent, competent, battle-tested battle-tested and who work with energy. energy. with However, the Cheka was was carried carriedout manner. Searches Searcheswere were carried However, the work work of of the the Cheka out in in a a primitive primitive manner. carried out out without elected elected observers observersand and without without representatives representatives of without of housing housing committees committees being being present. present. ConfisConfis cated f food stuffs werenot not handed handed over over to to the the food food department, department, and inventories were not drawn drawn up. cated ood stuf fs were and inventories were not up. 34. Melgounov, The Red T Terror Russia. Figes, Figes, A People's People? Tragedy, pp. 34. Melgounov, error in Russia. pp. 646-9. 646-9. The The files files for for the the period period noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin (mostly on foreign foreign intelligence) intelligence) make make only the noted (mostly on only indirect indirect references ref erences to to the the atrocities atrocities of of the civil civil war. war. 35. 1921; text V. I L. Lenin i VChK VChK, pp. pp. 534f. 534f. 35. Speech Speech by by Lenin, Lenin, December December 23, 23,1921; text in in Tsvigun Tsvigun et al., K 36. a1; p. p. 424. 424. The The Dzerzhinsky Dzerzhinsky Archive Archive is is Fond Fond 76 in the 36. Brovkin, Brovkin, Behind the the Front Lines of of the Civil W Wa?; 76 in the All-Russian Documents of Modern History Moscow. All-Russian Center Center for for the the Preservation Preservation and and Study Studyof of Documents of Modern Historyin in Moscow. 37. p. 239. 37. Volkogonov, Volkogonov, Lenin, p. 239. 38. Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 69. 69. 38. Tsvigun Tsvigun et e t al (eds.), (eds.), v. KL I .Lenin i VChK, VChK no. no. 198. 198. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, 39. 39, Pipes Pipes (ed.), (ed.), The Ul1kl1oum UnknoumLenin, Lenin,pp. pp. 127-9. 127-9. . 40. 1, part 1, n. 1 40. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1, part 1, 1. 4 1 . Pipes, Regime, pp. 41. Pipes, Russia under under the theBolshevik Bolshevik Regime, pp. 416-19. 416-19. 42. and Gordievsky, 99-100; Samolis (ed.), Eterany Veterany Vneshnei Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. pp. 42. Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. pp.99-100; Samolis (ed.), 142-3; 142-3; West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The CrownJewels, CrownJewels,p. p. 5. 5. 390. Andrew Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 91-4. 43. 43. Tsvigun Tsvigun et et al al (eds.), (eds.), Lenin i VChK, VChK no. no. 390. Andrew and andGordievsky, 91-4. 44. West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The CrownJewels, 44. CrownJewels, p. p. 5. 5. L Lenin i VChK, 45. 45. Tsvigun Tsvigun et al. nl. (eds.), (eds.), v. ?TI. VChK no. no. 437. 437. the Civil ar, pp. Cheka, pp. pp. 3368,464-6. 334-8, 464-6. 46. 46. Brovkin, Brovkin, Behind Behind the theFront Lines of ofthe CivilW War, pp. 334-56. 334-56. Leggett, Leggett, The Cheka, 47. 47. k-9,87. k-9,87. 48. The The fi first of fi five foreign intelligence intelligence priorities priorities set set out out in in INO I N 0 instructions 48. rst of ve foreign instructions of of November November 28,1922 28, 1922 was was The exposure on the the territory territory of of each of counter-revolutionary counter-revolutionary groups both active "The exposure on each state state of groups who who are are waging waging both active

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76 57

and passive passive activity activity against against the the interests interests of of the the RSFSR and also also against against the the international international revolutionary revolutionary and RSFSR and
movement." ch. 1 . movement. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. 1. 49. t difficult o determine 49. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins handwritten handwritten note note (k-9,87) (k-9,87) makes makes i it difficult t to determine whether whether the the date date was was June June 16 16 or or 26. him, it 26. Since Since Zavarny Zavarny crossed crossed into into Romania Romania on on June June 15 15 to to negotiate negotiate details details ofTutyunnik's ofTutyunniks return return with with him, it seems seems highly highly unlikely, unlikely, particularly particularly in in view view of of earlier earlier delays, delays, that that this this could could have havetaken taken place place as as early early as as June June 16. Because of the the me kept in in the special 16. Because CASE CASE 39 39 was was run run by by the the internal internal departments departments of theOGPU, OGPU, the file was was kept the special archival was, how archival collections collections of of the the Second Second Chief Chief Directorate, Directorate, to to which which Mitrokhin Mitrokhin did did not not have have access. access.He He was, however, note a ed history history of which was on, and quoted, the file. ever, able able to to note a classifi classified of the the operation operation which was based based on, and quoted, the CASE CASE39 39 file. MOREZ MOND), specialized vol. M O R E 2 and and MOND), specialized in in operations operations against against Ukrainian Ukrainian emigres kmigrks (vol. (vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, paras. paras. 1-2; 1-2; vol. 50. k-9,87. During the the 1930s 1930s an illegal residency by I. 1. M. Kaminsky 50. k-9,87. During an illegal residency in in Germany, Germany, headed headed by Kaminsky (codenamed (codenamed

6, ch. 5, part part1). 1). The Administration Administration for for Special SpecialTasks Tasks also also carried carried out out the theassassination assassination of of several several leading 6, ch. 5, The leading

asks, chs. chs. 1 , 2). Ukrainian Ukrainian nationalists nationalists (Sudoplatovs, (Sudoplatovs, Special T Tasks, 1,2).
. Though TREST and 52. 52. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 1, 1, n. n. 1 1. Though Mitrokhin Mitrokhin read read a a number number of of classified classified studies studies of of the the TREST and SINDlKA T operations, les on them. Since Since the operations were SINDIKAT operations, he he did did not not have have access access to to the the fi files on them. the operations were run run by by the the internal les-like that internal departments departmentsof of the the OGPU, OGPU,their their fi files-like that for for CASE CASE 39-were 39-were kept kept in in the thespecial special archival archival collections Chief Directorate. collections (spetsfondi) (spetsfondi)of of the the Second Second Chief Directorate. 1 1-12. Costello 33-4. 53. Andrew 53. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 1 111-12. Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusio1ZS, Illusions,pp. pp. 33-4. 51. vol. 51. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part part 6. 6.

Veterany Eterany Vneshnei 147-9. VneshneiRazvedki Rossii, pp. pp. 138-40, 138-40,147-9. 12-13. 55. Andrew 55. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 1 112-13. 56. 199. 56. k-4, k-4,199. 57. 57. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, IZZusions, p. p. 35. 35. 58. 14. 58. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 1 114. 59. 59. The The complex complex use use of of multiple multiple aliases aliases for for the the same same individual individual in in the the 37-volume 37-volume TREST TREST file, file, together together with confused a cers and with the thebaffling baffling mixture mixture of of fact fact and and invention invention recorded recorded in in it, it, confused a number number of of the theKGB KGB offi officers and historians historians who who studied studied it it over over the the years. years. 60. 15-17. 60. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 1 115-17. 61. Costello Illusions,pp. pp. 35-41 35-41 (based (based on on partial partial access access to to the theKGB KGB TREST TREST file); file); and and 61. Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, al, photograph 258) of photograph (following (following p. p. 258) of Reilly's Redlys corpse corpse on on display display in in the the Lubyanka Lubyanka sickbay. sickbay. C Cf. Primakov Primakov et al., Ocherki Syroyezhkin Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. vol. 2, 2, pp. pp. 121f 121ff. The The brief brief SVR SVR biography biography of of Syroyezhkin identifies him as arrests of of the the subversive White Guard Guard organization identifies him as "especially especially prominent prominent in in the the arrests subversive White organization of of B B.. Savinkov" Savinkov and and "an an active active participant participant in in operation operation TREST TREST during during which which the the British British agent agent S. S. Reilly Reilly was was detained and and arrested in September September 1925." 1925. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany Veterany Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki RazveakiRossii, p. p. 139. 139. detained arrested in 62. 1 8-21; Costello Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, 62. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 1 118-21; Costello and andTsarev, Illusions,pp. pp. 40-2. 40-2. 63. vol. 7, ch. 1. Italian-Soviet 63. vol.7, ch. 14, 14, item item 1. Italian-Soviet diplomatic diplomatic relations, relations, broken broken after after the the Revolution, Revolution, were were not not resumed rst legal Soviet diplo resumed unti1 until 1924, 1924,when when the the fi first legal residency residency was was founded founded within within the thenewly newly established established Soviet diplomatic mission. The residency residency officer officer credited credited by by KGB KGB mes files with with Constantini's Constantinis recruitment recruitment was was Sheftel, Sheftel, matic mission. The codenamed 1997-8 codenamed DOCTOR. DOCTOR. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes give give no no further further details details on on him. him.In In 1997-8 the the SVR gave gave privi privileged access access to to selected selected parts parts of of Constantini's Constantinis file file to to the authors of of two two histories histories of of Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence leged the authors operations: Primakov Primakov et al., Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, Razaedki, vol. vol. 3, ch. 13; 13; and and West West and andTsarev, operations: 3, ch. Tsarev, The CrownJewels, ch. 5. 5. Primakov reveal Constantini's real name; Tsarev mistakenly CrownJewels, ch. Primakov et e t al al. do do not notreveal Constantinis real name; West West and and Tsarev mistakenly refer to to him him as as Costantini. Costantini. refer 64. 1937 inquiry 64. KGB KGB files files radically radically revise revise previous previous interpretations interpretations of of leaks leaks from from the the Rome Rome embassy. embassy. A 1937 inquiry conducted by by Valentine Valentine Vivian, Vivian, head head of of SIS counter-intelligence, considered considered only only leakage leakage of of classified classified conducted SIS counter-intelligence, documents also gone documents to to Italian Italian intelligence. intelligence. Though Though it itwas was later later discovered discovered that that some some information information had had also gone to to the OGPUINKVD, OGPULNKVD,the the Foreign Office Office seems never to to have have realized realized that that the the original original penetration was by by the Foreign seems never penetration was the the OGPu. OGPU. 65. vol. . 65. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item1 1. 66. Primakov Primakov e et al., Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, vol. vol. 3, ch. 13. 13. 66. t al, 3, ch. 67. for For 67. West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The Crown CrownJewels, pp. pp. 94-9. 94-9. Though Though Litvinov Litvinov did did not not become become Commissar Commissar for Foreign Affairs Affairs unti1 until 1930, 1930, Izvestia later he had had been defacto of our our foreign foreign policy policy from later noted noted that that he been "de f acto head head of from eign 1928. Haslam, Haslam, Soviet Foreign Policy, PoZicy, 1930-33, 1930-33, p. p. 10. 10. 1928." uffer, As tu vu Crkmet? Cremet? 68. 68. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 126. 126. On On the the Cremet CrCmet spyring, spyring,see see Faligot Faligot and and Ka Kauffer,As-tu 69. Andrew 69. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 126-7. 126-7. 70. Professor Professor Matsokin Matsokin was was succeeded succeeded at at a a date date not not recorded recorded in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes by by another another Japanese Japanese 70. specialist, specialist, Kim Kim Roman, Roman, an an ethnic ethnic Korean Korean from from Nikolsk-Ussuriysk Nikolsk-Ussuriysk (k-9,73). (k-9,73). Neither Neither is is mentioned mentioned in in the the
-

54. 1. On 54. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part part 1. O n the the previous previous careers careers of of Syroyezhkin Syroyezhkin and and Fyodorov, Fyodorov, see see Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.),

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account of of the the Tanaka Tanaka memorandum memorandum episode episode In in Primakov Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Vneshnei account Razvedki, vol. vol. 2, 2, ch. ch. 32. 32. Razvedki, 71. 71. k-9,73. k-9,73. 72. 72. k-9,119. k-9,119. The The official official SVR SVR history history does does not not refer refer to to ANO. ANO. 73. see Klehr, Klehr, Haynes Haynes and and Firsov, Firsov, The Secret 73. k-9,73. k-9,73. On On the the publication publication of of the the Tanaka Tanaka memorandum, memorandum, see pp. 52-3. 52-3. The version of the memorandum memorandum has has been been regarded regarded World of American Communism, ofAmerican Communism, pp. The published published version of the by some scholars, this period period in in intercepting communications by some scholars, unaware unaware of of the the OGPU's OGPUssuccess success at at this intercepting Japanese Japanese communications in The KGB record record of of its its interception, interception, however, however, in Harbin Harbin and and Seoul, Seoul, as as a a forgery forgery fabricated fabricated by by the the OGPu. OGPU. The KGB describes it as genuine. genuine. It I t is is possible, possible, though though Mitrokhin Mitrokhin discovered no evidence evidence of thepublished describes it as discovered no of this, this, that that the published version version was was doctored doctored to to improve improve its its propaganda propaganda value. value. 74. Primakov Primakov et al., ai., Ocherki Ocherki Istorii Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, vol. vol. 2, 2, p. 257. 74. p. 257. 2, pp. pp. 233-5. 233-5. 75. 1927, in Degras (ed.), Documents on Soviet Foreign Policy, 75. Article Article by by Stalin Stalin of of July July 23, 23,1927, in Degras (ed.), Policy,vol. vol. 2, The former allies, nation The article article also also reflected reflected alarm alarm at at the themassacres massacres of of Chinese Chinese Communists Communists by by their their former allies, the the nationalist alist Kuomintang. Kuomintang. 76. 1. There Ilk-Weinstein residency residency in in West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The 76. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, item item 1. There is is interesting interesting detail detail on on the the Ilk-Weinstein ch. The authors had access access to to all all the the files files seen Mitrokhin, Crown}ewels, Crown Jewels, ch. 3. 3.The authors do do not, not, however, however, appear appear to to have have had seenby by Mitrokhin, and (sic--presumably a literal retransliteration f rom the the and conclude conclude that that the theresidency residency ofIlk of Ilk and and "Wanshtein" Wanshtein (sic-presumably a literal retransliteration from Cyrillic) was was extremely effective and pay pay tribute tribute to to "Ilk's Ilksgreat someCyrillic) "extremely effective" and great organizational organizational skill.This skill." This judgment judgment is is some what quality of of the the residencys residency's abundant abundant British intel what at at variance variance with with the the authors' authors acknowledgement acknowledgementthat that the the quality British intelligence they cite cite on on Ilks Ilk's attempts attempts to to excuse excuse the the quality quality of of the the ligence "left left much much to to be be desired"; desired; the the documents documents which which they intelligenceprobably probably deserve deservea a less less charitable charitable interpretation. Ilk and conspicuous by their intelligence interpretation. Both Both Ilk and Weinstein Weinstein are are conspicuous by their absence heroes published published by by the the SVR in 1995 on on the the absence from fromthe the biographies biographies of of seventy-five seventy-fiveforeign foreign intelligence intelligenceheroes in 1995 seventy-fifth the ounding of foreign department. department. Since Since the the "Great Illegals" of of the the seventy-fifth anniversary anniversaryof of the f founding of the the Cheka's Chekas foreign Great Illegals inter-war period period are are included, included, the the SVR SVR evidently evidently accepts acceptsthat that Ilk Ilkand Weinstein inter-war and Wei' nstein were were not not among among them. them. y Life, 2, pp. pp. 392-4; Volkogonov, Trotsky, 305f 77. 77. Trotsky, Trotsky, M My L@, pp. pp. 539ff; 539fC Deutscher, Deutscher, Trotsky, Trotsky, vol. vol. 2, 392-4; Volkogonov, Trotsky, pp. pp. 305ff. 78. A his memoirs, memoirs, delivered eight or or nine nine 78. A "special special courier," courier,whom whom he he refused refused to to identify identify in in his delivered an an additional additional eight secret batches batches of of correspondence correspondence from from Moscow Moscow which, which, he he claimed, kept him of everything secret claimed, kept him informed informed of "everything that that was informants by by the the same same secret secret channel channel (Trot(Trot was going going on" on in in the the capital. capital. Trotsky Trotsky replied replied to to his his Moscow Moscow informants sky, y Life, as a a member member of of the the carters carters' coco sky, M My L@, p. p. 556). 556). The The KGB KGB archives archives identify identify the the "special special courier" courier as operative reight between station in OGPU operative which which transported transported f freight between Alma-Ata Alma-Ata and and the the nearest nearest railway railway station in Frunze. Frunze. OGPU surveillance teams teams reported reported that that the the carter carter would would meet meet Trotsky's Trotsys wife wife or Alma-Ata marsurveillance or elder elder son son in in the the Alma-Ata mar ket messages which at Frunze by the the ket place, place, unobtrusively unobtrusively slip slip into into their their shopping shopping baskets baskets messages which had had arrived arrived at Frunze by Trans-Siberian ch. 3, 1. Trans-Siberian Express Express and and collect collect the the replies. replies. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. 3, part part 1. head of of OGPU OGPU on on Dzerzhinskys Dzerzhinsky's death death in 1927. 79. 79. Volkogonov, Volkogonov, Trotsky, Trotsky, p. p. 312. 312. Menzhinsky Menzhinsky became became head in 1927. 80. . 80. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 3, 3, part part 1 1. 81. 81. Deutscher, Deutscher, Trotsky, Trotsky, vol. vol. 3, 3, pp. pp. 1-3. 1-3. 82. 82. k-4,198. k-4,198. '}', KGB, p. p. 170. In this this instance, instance, the pub 83. 83. Ostryakov, Ostryakov, Voyennye Vyennye Chekisty, Chekisq, ch. ch. 2. 2. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsl. GordievsAy, 170. In the published archival record record (vol. 6, ch. ch. 3, 3, part part lished KGB KGB version version of of events events (summarized (summarized by by Ostryakov) Ostryakov) agrees agrees with with its its archival (vol. 6, (Trotsky, 1). Volkogonov more than than having Trotsky" (Trotsky, 1). Volkogonov suggests suggests that that Blyumkin Blyumkin "was wasguilty guilty of of nothing nothing more having visited visited Trotsky but overlooks was trying "trying to to estabestab p. 329), 329), but overlooks the the fact fact that that Trotsky Trotsky himself1ater himself later acknowledged acknowledged that that Blyumkin Blyumkin was lish in the Article signed "G. Gourov" lish a a connection connection between between Trotsky Trotsky and and his his co-thinkers co-thinkers in the USSR." USSR. Article signed G. Gourov [Trot [Trot1932; Vereeken, in the Trotskyist 13. sky] sky] in in La Voix V i x Communiste, Communiste, October October 30, 30,1932; Vereeken, The GPU GPUin TrotskyistMovement, Movement, p. p. 13. 84. Gorskaya's career Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, 84. There There is is a a sanitized sanitized version version of of Gorskayas career in in Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany Eterany Vneshnei pp. pp. 53-5. 53-5. 207-8, 219-21, 238-40. Poretsky, pp. 146-7. 85. 85.Agabekov, Agabekov, OGPu, OGPQ pp. pp. 202-3, 202-3,207-8,219-21,238-40. Poretsky, Our Own People, pp. 146-7. Orlov, Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes, pp. pp. 200-3. There are are minor minor discrepancies discrepancies between between these these memoirs, Stalins Crimes, 200-3. There memoirs, based All on Blyumkins Blyumkin's meeting based on on the theauthors' authorsvarying varying personal personal knowledge knowledge of of the the affair. affair. A l l agree, agree, however, however,on meeting with Trotsky, Trotsky, Gorskaya's Gorskayas involvement involvement and and Blyumkin's Blyumkins execution. execution. The The records records noted noted by Mitrokhin contain with by Mitrokhin contain no they mention mention only only Blyumkins Blyumkin's attempt attempt no details details of of Blyumkin's Blyumkins recall recall to to Moscow Moscow or or of of his his interrogation; interrogation; they to Trotskyites in in MOSCOW Moscow" and and his his subsequent subsequent execuexecu to set set up up "a a line line of of communication communication for for Trotsky Trotsky with with the theTrotskyites tion. 3, part . tion. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 3, part 1 1. 8 6 . Andrew 86. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 165-6. 165-6. 87. k-4,198,206. 87. k-4,198,206, 88. T asks, pp. 58. On in 1926, Administration for Tasks SpecialTasks, pp. 32, 32,58. O n its its foundation foundation in 1926,the the Administration for Special SpecialTasks 88. Sudoplatovs, Sudoplatovs, Special had been intended chiefly to prepare for execute sabotage sabotage operations operations behind enemy lines lines in in time time of of had been intended chiefly to prepare for and and execute behind enemy war. On see chapters chapters 22-3. war. O n post-war post-war "special special tasks," tasks, see 22-3.

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89. 89. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Illzrsions, p. p. 439, 439, n. n. 37. 37. 90. k-4,198,206; k-4,198,206; the the Kutepov Kutepov operation operation is is referred referred to to in in these these fi files as "the the liquidation liquidation of of G." G. 90. les as
91. 91. k-4,199. k-4,199. 92. 92. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 166-8. 166-8.

1. vol. 7, ch. 9. 9. 1 . vol. 7, ch.

Chapter Three Three

The Great Illegals Ilegals

2. 2. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 3. four 3. In In 1930 1930there there was was no no legal legal residency residency in in the theUnited UnitedStates States and and oniy only one one illegal illegal residency, residency, staffed staffed by by four OGPU this stage OGPU officers officers and and four four illegal illegal agents. agents. Much Much of of the the Centre's Centres interest interest in in the the USA USAat at this stage lay lay in in the the

possibilities for for operations operations against against Germany Germany and and Japan Japan offered offered by by its its large large communities of expatriate expatriate Gerpossibilities communities of Ger mans and and Japanese. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part part1 .1. mans Japanese. vol. 4.. vol. 7, ch. 9. 9. The The aim aim i in 1930, never never completely completely fulfilled, was to establish several illegal residencies in 4 vol. 7 , ch. n 1930, fulfilled, was to establish several illegal residencies in
every 1930s contained every major major target target country. country. By By contrast, contrast, no no country country in inthe the 1930s contained more more than than one onelegal legal residency. residency. 5. vol. ch. 9, para. 4. 5. vol. 7, 7, ch. 9, para. 4. 6.. vol. 9. 6 vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. py. Though 7. The The most most recent recent and and best-documented best-documented biography biography of of Sorge Sorge is is Whymant, Whymant, Stalin's Stalin? S Spy. Though a a Fourth Fourth 7. Department (later GRU) GRU) illegal, Sorge was still being being cited cited by Department (later illegal, Sorge was still by the the KGB KGB in in talks talks with with Western Western Commu Commuas representing representing the the kind kind of of illegal illegal it it wished wished to to recruit. recruit. nist leaders leaders during during the the1970s nist 1970s as 8. Andrewand and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 46-50. 46-50. See See the the forthcoming forthcomingstudy study ofTsarist of Tsarist diplomacy diplomacy by by Barbara Barbara 8. Andrew Emerson, the the first first historian historian to to gain gain full full access access to to the the dossiers secrets secretsof of decrypts decrypts in in the thearchives archives of of the the Tsarist Tsarist Emerson, foreign ministry. ministry. foreign 9. See 9. See above, above, chapter chapter 2. 2. 10. As 10. As with with many many other other inter-war inter-war operations, operations, the the record record of of Bystroletov's Bystroletovs foreign foreign intelligence intelligence missions missions is is incomplete. The The main main documents documents seen seen by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin were were a a post-war post-war memoir memoir written written by by Bystroletov, incomplete. Bystroletov, some contemporary contemporary correspondence correspondence on on his operations exchanged exchanged between between the Centerand residencies, and and some his operations the Center and residencies, the 26-volume file on one one of of his his leading leading agents, agents, Ernest Holloway Oldham (ARNO). Though ThoughBystrolethe 26-volume fi le on Ernest Holloway Oldham (ARNO). Bystrole tovs memoir is colorfully colorfully written, written, some-but some-but not not all-of all-of the the main main events events recorded recorded in in it it can can be be corrobotov's memoir is corrobo rated rom other sources. The access to writing of rated f from other sources. The SVR SVR has has given given partial partial access to its its records records on on Bystroletov Bystroletovfor for the the writing of two books books co-authored co-authored by by the the former former KGB KGB officer officer Oleg Oleg Tsarev Tsarev (now (now an an SVR SVR consultant) two consultant) and and Western Western historians: Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Dead4 Illusions; and and West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The The Crown Jewels. historians: Costello 11. Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Vetera72y VntshneiRazvedki Rossii, pp. account of of Bystroletov's Bystroletovs career career in the 1 1 . Samolis Vetemny Vneshnei pp. 19-21. 19-21. The The account in the 1997 of his 1997 SVR SVRofficial official history history also also omits omits much much that that is is of of importance importance about about it, it, including including the the identities identities of his main British British agents. agents. Primakov Primakov et al, al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Vntshnei Razvedki, ch. ch. 22. 22. main 12. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 16. The fi file noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin identifies identifies LAROCHE, in Cyrillic Cyrillic transliteration, 12. vol. 16. The le noted LAROCHE, in transliteration, as as Eliana Eliana Aucouturier, Aucouturier, born born 1898. 1898. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany Vettray Vneshnei Vneshnei Razvedki Razvedki Rossii, says says simply simply that that Bystroletov "successfully successfully cultivated cultivated a a secretary secretary at at the the French French embassy embassy who who had had access to secret secret corresponBystroletov access to correspon dence the secretary's name or code dence and and ciphers ciphers of of the the French French foreign foreign ministry" ministry (p. (p. 19), 19), but but does does not not give give the secretarys name or codename, or or refer refer to to her her seduction. seduction. name, 13. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. 13. 9. 14. 1995 and 14. The The accounts accounts of of Bystroletov's Bystroletovs career career published published by by the the SVR SVR in in 1995 and 1997, 1997, as as well well as as the the material material supplied by by the the SVR SVR for for two two books books co-authored by the the former former KGB KGB officer officer Oleg Oleg Tsarev Tsarev and and Western Western hissupplied co-authored by his torians, do do not Bystroletov was was not not an an OGPU/NKVD officer. Mitrokhin discovered, discovered, on on torians, not mention mention that that Bystroletov OGPUINKVD offi cer. Mitrokhin examining Bystroletov's Bystroletovs records, records, that that he he was simply simply an an agent agent (vol. (vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 38). 38). Even Even when when fully M y reha rehaexamining was bilitated in in 1956, 1956, after after spending spending sixteen sixteen years years in in prison prison from from 1938 1938 to to 1954 1954 as as an an innocent innocent victim victim of bilitated of the the Stalinist terror, terror, Bystroletov Bystroletov was was denied denied a a KGB KGB pension on the thegrounds grounds that that he hehad had never never held held officer officer rank. rank. Stalinist pension on Since the SVR SVRnow now portrays portrays him him as as one one of of the the main main pre-war pre-war heroes heroes of of Soviet Soviet foreign foreign intelligence, intelligence, it it is eviSince the is evi dently embarrassed embarrassed to to admit admit his his lowly lowly status. status. dently 15. Though Though based in Berlin, Bazarovs residency against a a number number of of countries, ncludinr 15. based in Berlin, Bazarov's residency operated operated against countries, i including- from 1929-Britain. Other illegals in in the the residency included Teodor Teodor Maly Maly and and D. D. A. A. Poslendy, Poslendy, vol. vol. 7, 7, f rom 1929-Britain. Other illegals residency included ch. 1 1. ch. . 16. vol. 7 7,, ch. ch. 9, 9, paras. paras. 24-30. 24-30. D De Ry later later also also came came t to the attention attentiono of the French French Deuxieme Deuxikme Bureau Bureau as as 1 6 . vol. e Ry o the f the Lur~ trajquant codes with with access access to to Italian Italian ciphers ciphers (Paillole, (Paillole,Notre espion chez cAez Hitler, p. p. 223). "un tm fiquant de codes" 223). 17. vol. vol. 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 26. 26. Though Though not not present present at at this this first first encounter encounter with with ROSSI, ROSSI, Bystroletov Bystroletov was was given given 17. details of it it by by the the Paris Paris residency residency in in order order to to help help track him down. down. details of track him 18. In In Bystroletov's Bystroletovs account (vol. 7, ch. 9, 9, para. the official official who who spoke spoke to to the the walk-in walk-in at at the the Paris Paris 18. account (vol. 7, ch. para. 26), 26), the embassy is identified only senior comrade." Other fragmentary accounts of same episode episode indicate embassy is identified only as as "a a senior comrade. Other fragmentary accounts of the the same indicate

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that comrade and Volovich: Revelations ofa ofa Soviet that the the comrade was was Vladimir Vladimir Voynovich, Voynovich, aka akaYanovich Yanovich and Volovich: Bessedovsky, Bessedovsky, pp. 247-8; 247-8; Corson and Crowley, Crowley, The TheNew KGB, pp. Illusions, Corson and pp. 433-5; 433-5; Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Diplomat, pp. p. 198. 198. p. 19. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 27. 27. The The photographer photographer of of the theciphers ciphers was identified as Voynovichswife wifeby by the 19. was identified as Voynovich's the defecdefec tor Grigori Besedovsky, then a senior senior diplomat diplomat in in the the Soviet embassy. Bessedovsky, Bessedovsky,Revelations, Revelations, p. tor Grigori Besedovsky, then a Soviet embassy. p. 247. 247. 20. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. 9. Corson Corson and and Crowley, Crowley, The New KGB, pp. pp. 140ff confuses the deRy Ry and and Oldham 140ff confuses the de Oldham cases, cases, and and 20. claims authors, who who had had no access to to KGB KGB fi les, do do not claims that that Oldham Oldham too too was was successfully successfully defrauded. defrauded. The The authors, no access files, not identify de de Ry Ry by by name name or or codename codename and and refer refer to to Oldham Oldham as Andrew and (KGB, pp. pp. identity as Scott. "Scott." Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, (KGB, 195-6) identify Oldham Oldhambut follow Corson Corson and and Crowley Crowley in suggesting that 195-6) identity but follow in suggesting thathe he was was defrauded defrauded by by Voynovich. Surprisingly, Surprisingly,Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, despite to KGB documents, make no mention Voynovich. despite their their access access to KGB documents, make no mention of of de Ry Ry and and claim claim inaccurately in their their paragraph on Oldham Oldhamthat that was Voynode inaccurately in paragraph on he he "was thrown thrown out out on on his his ear ear" by by Voyno vich, who who "evidently evidentlysuspected suspected a a British British provocation provocation plot" plot (Deadly Illusions, Illusions,p. vich, p. 198). 198). were published in Russian, French and German in in 2 1. Besedovsky's 21. Besedovskys memoirs, memoirs, Na Nu Putiakh k Termidoru, Termidoru, were published in Russian, French and German 1930; an an abridged abridged English English translation translation (in (in which which the the authors name is is transliterated as Bessedovslay) 1930; author's name transliterated as "Bessedovslay") appeared in in 1931. 1931. His His insulting insulting references references to to Stalin the hypothesis appeared Stalin make make the hypothesis that that he he was was a a bogus bogus defector defector planted on on the West untenable. untenable. There There is, is, however, that in a sometimes planted the West however, some some indication indication that in the the course course of of a sometimes bizarre life life in in exile, exile, Besedovsky Besedovsky did did co-operate co-operate to to some some degree with Soviet Soviet intelligence bizarre degree with intelligence after after the the Second Second World War. War. World 22. 22. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. 9. 23. The The corrupt corrupt Italian Italian diplomat diplomat was was successively successivelycode codenamed PATRON, CARTRIDGE and 23. named PA TRON, CARTRIDGE and PATTERN PA TTERN by Soviet Soviet intelligence; intelligence; vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. by 9. 24. vol. ch. 9. 9. 24. vol. 7, 7, ch. 25. vol. ch. 9. 9. 25. vol. 7, 7, ch. 26. The only only real real post with which which the the non-existent non-existent position position of theForeign Office 26. The post with of head head of of intelligence intelligence at at the Foreign Offi ce might conceivably conceivably have have been been confused was that that of of head head of of political SIS and andliaison might confused was political intelligence intelligence in in SIS liaison officer officer with fice. The post from 1921 to early in in the Second World World War, War, however, however, with the the Foreign Foreign Of Office. The holder holder of of that that post from 1921 toearly the Second was Major Major Malcolm Woollcombe. was Malcolm Woollcombe. 27. 9. 27. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. 28. Mitrokhin found found no no note note in in the thefi file querying the the story. 28. Mitrokhin le querying story. 29. vol. ch. 9. 9. 29. vol. 7, 7, ch. 30. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, paras. paras. 30-1. 30-1. French French intelligence both Lemoines 30. vol. intelligence records records provide provide corroboration corroboration of of both Lemoine's friendfriend ship with with de de Ry Ry and and their their common common interest interest in in obtaining obtaining foreign Paillole, Notre espion ship foreign diplomatic diplomatic ciphers; ciphers; Paillole, chez Hitler, Hitler, p. p. 223. 223. 31. On Lemoine's Lemoines career career with with the theDeuxieme Deuxikme Bureau Bureau and and recruitment recruitment of 31. On of Schmidt, Schmidt, see see Paillole, Paillole, Notrr Notre espion chez Hitler, Hider, p. p. 223. 223. 32. French French cryptanalysts cryptanalysts were were unable unable to to exploit exploit the the intelligence intelligence on on Enigma by Schmidt. The 32. Enigma provided provided by Schmidt. The first steps in in the thebreaking breaking of of Enigma Enigma were were made made by by Polish Polish military military cryptanalysts with whom whom the theDeux Deuxfi rst steps cryptanalysts with ieme the Poles passed on on to ikme Bureau Bureau shared shared Schmidt's Schmidts cipher cipher material. material. The The results results achieved achieved by by the Poles were were passed to the the British chs. 2,3; 2, 3; Andrew, Andrew, Secret Service, pp. pp. British on on the the eve eve of of the the Second Second World World War, War, Garlinski, Garlinski, Intercept, Intercept, chs. 628-32. 628-32. 33. vol. his codename, JOSEPH, appears appears in Bystroletov's 33. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 30. 30. Neither Neither Lemoine's Lemoines name name nor nor his codename, JOSEPH, in Bystroletovs 1995 SVR hagiography, hagiography, which, which, however, however, confirms that In 1995 confirms that "In the the period period between between 1930 1930 and and 1936, 1936, whilst whilst working with with another agent, Bystroletov Bystroletov .. ., .. established established operational with a working another agent, operational contact contact with a member member of of French French military intelligence. intelligence. He H e received received from from him him Austrian Austrian cipher later Italian military cipher material material and and later Italian and and Turkish Turkish cipher cipher material and even even secret secret documents from Hitler's Hiders Germany. (Samolis (ed.), Vneshnei Razvrdki Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki material and documents from Germany." (Samolis (ed.), Veterany p. 20.) 20.) It It is is clear from this censored censored account that Bystroletovs Rossii, p. clear f rom this account that Bystroletov's fellow fellow illegal illegal Ignace Ignace Reiss Reiss (alias (alias Ignace Poretsky), Poretsky), with with whom whom he he shared shared the the running runningofJOSEPH, of JOSEPH, remains remains an unperson in SVRhistoriogIgnace an unperson in SVR historiog raphy only as as "another agent." There There is is no no mention mention of of raphy because because of of his his later later defection; defection; he he is is referred referred to to only another agent. JOSEPH in and Tsarev, JOSEPH in the theaccount account of of Bystroletov's Bystroletovs career career in in West Westand Tsarev, The Crown Jewels. Jewrls. 34. 34. The noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin identifies identifies OREL OREL only only as as Lemoines The file file noted Lemoine's boss boss in in the the Deuxikme Deuxieme Bureau; Bureau; the the Center may not have identity (vol. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 30). 30). Reiss Reiss was was known known to to Lemoine Center may not have known known his his real real identity (vol. 7, 7, ch. Lemoine and and Bertrand as Deuxieme Bureau Bureau photograph, almost certainly certainly taken taken without without Reiss's Bertrand as "Walter Walter Scott." Scott. A A Deuxi6me photograph, almost Reisss knowledge, Lemoine and and Bertrand Bertrand at at Rotterdam Rotterdam in in 1935 (Paillole, Notre knowledge, shows shows him him at at a a meeting meeting with with Lemoine 1935 (Paillole, espion p. 161). espion chez chezHitler, illustration illustration facing facing p. 161). 35. 35. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. 9. 36. Paillole, Paillole, Notrt! Notrc. espion chez Hitler, p. p. 132. 132. Which Which side side provided what is 36. provided what is generally generally unclear. unclear. Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's notes, however, record record that that OREL OREL (Bertrand) (Bertrand) handed Reiss a new Italian in November November 1933. notes, however, handed Reiss a new Italian cipher cipher in 1933.

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37. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 18. 18. The The decision decision to to award award Bystroletov Bystroletov his his inscribed inscribed rifle is recorded recorded in in KGB KGB files files as as 37. rifle is
order September 17,1932. 17, 1932. order no. no. 1042 1042 of of September

38. The The date date of of Oldhams resignation resignation is is given givenin in his his "Statement Statement of of Services" Servicesin the 1933 1933 Ofice Foreign O ffice List. 38. Oldham's in the 39. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. 9. 39. ch. 9.
40. 11, para. 40. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 11, para. 56. 56. 41 . vol. 41. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. 9. 42. 42.

Foreign ffice List, 1934. Foreipz O Ofice 1934. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 196. 196.

43. 43. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. 9.

44. See See below, below, chapter chapter 3. 3. 44. 45. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. 9. 4 5. vol. 46. Foreign 4 6. Foreign Ofice List, 1934. 1934. Oake's Oakes "Statement Statement o of Services underlined underlined his his humble humble position. position. Whereas Whereas O ffice List, f Services" such statements statements for for established staff gave gave full full name, name, date date of of birth birth and and a a career career summary, summary, those those for for "tempo temposuch established staff
rary Foreign rary clerks" clerkssuch such as as Oake Oake gave gave only only surname, surname, initials initials and and date dateof of entry entry into intothe the Foreign Office. Office. 47. 47. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 20. 20.

49. Cornelissen, Cornelissen, De 49.

Foreign O Ofice List,1934. Foreign ffice List, 1934. Overtoom, pp. pp. 156-7. 156-7. GPOe op de Overtoom, 50. 50. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 22. 22. King King may may or or may may not not have have believed believed Pieck's Piecksstory story that that the themoney money he he received received for for his rom a inside information on international international relations; his documents documents came came f from a Dutch Dutch banker banker anxious anxious for for inside information on relations; Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 197. 197. 51. West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The T h e Crown CrownJewels, p. p. 94. 94. 51. West 52. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item1 1; k-4,200. 52. ; k-4,200. 53. Agabekov, 204, 237-40. 53. Agabekov, OGPu, OGPU, pp. pp. 151-2, 151-2,204,237-40. 54. 14, item 1; k-4,200. passport in name of k-4,200. Akselrod Akselrod had had previously previously used used an an Austrian Austrian passport in the the name of 54. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, item 1; "Friedrich Friedrich Keil" Keil (Agabekov, (Agabekov, OGPu, OGPU, pp. pp. 240-2) 240-2) and and may may well well have have used used the the same same false false identity identity in inItaly. Italy. Significantly, of Akselrod's of Poale Significantly, the the SVR SVR version version of Akselrods early early career career omits omits all all mention mention of of his his membership membership of Poale Zion. The tradition that that Soviet intelligence heroes heroes were untainted by Zionism appears be Zion. The KGB KGB tradition Soviet intelligence were untainted by Zionism appears to to be Vneshnei Raz'vedki, 3, preserved by preserved by SVR SVR historians. historians. Primakov Primakov et e t al., nl., Ocherki Istorii RossiyskoiVneshnei Razvedki, vol. vol. 3, pp. pp. 158-9. 158-9. text of 55. 55. Primakov Primakov et al., a]., Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, ch. ch. 13. 13.The The original original text of the the For Foreign Office Hitler, Litvinov, eign Office records records of of the the talks talks with with Hitler, Litvinov, Beck, Beck, Benes Benes and and Mussolini Mussolini are are published published in in Medli Medlicott et al. al. (eds.), (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy 191 1919-1939, 2nd series, series, vol. vol. 12, pp. 703-46, 703-46, 771-91, 9-1939, 2nd 12, pp. 771-91, cott 803-10, 812-17; vol. record of 803-10,812-17; vol. 13, 13, pp. pp. 477-84; 477-84; vol. vol. 14, 14, pp. pp. 329-33. 329-33. The The version version of of the the record of Simon's Simons and and Eden's Edens talks talks with with Hitler Hitler given given to to Stalin Stalin consisted consisted of of translated translated extracts extracts rather rather than than the thefull full Foreign Foreign Office Office docu document. The same probably Stalin of Beck, Benes ment. The same probably applies applies to to the therecords records given given to to Stalin of Eden's Edens talks talks with with Litvinov, Litvinov, Beck, Benes and Mussolini, Mussolini, which which are are not not yet yet accessible. accessible. and 56. Constantini 56. Constantini may may well well not not have have been been the the only only source source for for the the document. document. The The Foreign Foreign Office Office record record of of Simon's was by both Constantini. Simons and and Eden's Edens talks talks with with Hitler, Hitler, also also in in March March 1935, 1935, was provided provided by both King King and and Constantini. 57. Eden's 30, 1935, 1935, following 57. Edens meeting meeting with with Stalin Stalin took took place place in in the the Kremlin Kremlin on on March March 30, following his his talks talks with with Litvinov a copy Litvinov during during the theprevious previous two two days. days. His His telegram telegram on on the thetalks talks to to the theForeign Foreign Office Office records records that that a copy al. (eds.), 2nd was was sent sent to to the the Rome Rome embassy. embassy. Medlicott Medlicott et etal. (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Policy, Policy,1919-1939, 1919-1939,2nd series, vol. 12, pp. 766-9. 766-9. series, vol. 12, pp. 58. Medlicott 58. Medlicott et al nl. (eds.), (eds.), Documents on British Foreign Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, 1919-1939, 2nd 2nd series, series, vol. vol. 12, 12, p. p. 820. 820. 63. 59. 59. On O n Eden's Edens policy policy on on the the Soviet Soviet Union Union and and collective collective security, security, see seeCarlton, Carlton, Anthony Eden, p. p. 63. 60. 60. See See below, below, chapter chapter 3. 3. 61. The report report by by a a committee committee headed headed by by Sir Sir John John Maffey Maffey concluded concluded that that British British interests interests in in and around 6 1 . The and around Ethiopia were not not sufficient sufficient to to justify to Italian Italian conquest. to publish publish it it in in Ethiopia were justify opposition opposition to conquest. Mussolinis Mussolini's decision decision to February 1936, 1936, at ata a time time when when the the British British government government was was considering considering oil oil sanctions sanctions against against Italy, Italy, caused caused February predictable embarrassment in the Foreign Office. Office. Dilks, Dilks, "Flashes Flashes of of Intelligence, Andrew, predictable embarrassment in the Foreign Intelligence," pp. pp. 107-8. 107-8. Andrew, Secret pp. 567-8. There is the Maffey Maffey report Secrst Service, Service, pp. 567-8. There is no no mention mention of of the the Italian Italian publication publication of of the report in in the the two two accounts on authorized selected material his file: West and accounts of of Constantini's Constantinis career career based based on authorized access access to to selected material from from his file: West and 13. Tsarev, Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, Jewels?ch. ch. 5; 5; Primakov Primakov et al., Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, ch. ch. 13. 62. his job the British 62. According According to to Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes on on KGB KGB files, files, Francesco Francesco Constantini Constantini lost lost his job at at the British embassy in in 1936 1936(vol. (vol. 7, 7,ch. ch. 14, 14, item item 1). The current current SVR SVR version version of of his his career career claims that Constantini Constantiniwas was embassy 1). The claims that sacked in in 193 1931. (West and andTsarev, sacked 1 . (West Tsarev, The CrownJewels, CrownJewels, ch. ch. 5; 5; Primakov Primakov et al., Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Rossiyskoi Vnesh Vneshnei Razvedki, Rnzvedki, vol. vol. 3, ch. 13.) 13.) In In Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes Constantinis codename codename appears as DUDLEN-prob DUDLEN-prob3, ch. notes Constantini's appears as ably an an error error of of transcription transcription for for DUDLEY. DUDLEY. ably 63. Andrew, Secret Secret Service, Service,pp. pp. 568-9. 568-9. 63. Andrew, 48. 48.

N o te es s N

/ 1

581 8I 5

64. (Valentine [Valentine Vivian], Vivian], "Report Report on on Measures Measures to to Enhance Enhance the Security of of Documents, in H. H. M. M. 64. the Security Documents, etc., etc., in Embassy, Rome Rome (February (February 20, 20, 1937), 1937), PRO PRO FO FO 85012 850/2 Y775. Y775. This This report, report, though though not not its its authorship, authorship, was was Embassy, first revealed revealed in in Dilks, Dilks, "Flashes Flashes of of Intelligence," Intelligence, pp. pp. 107ff. 107ff. On O n Vivian's Vivians investigation investigation in in Rome Rome and and his his first authorship of of this this report, report, see see Andrew, Andrew, Secret Secret Service, Service, pp. pp. 568-71, 568-71,771 authorship 771 65. Andrew, Andrew, Secret Secret Service, Service, pp. pp. 571-2. 571-2. 65. 66. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Lord (who, as Gladwyn Jebb, had served at the 66. Lord Gladwyn (who, Rome embassy embassy in in the theyears years up up to to the theEthiopian Ethiopian war), broadcast on Rome war), broadcast on 67. Andrew, Andrew, Secret Secret Service, Service, p. p. 572. 572. 67. 68. The The exact exact nature nature of of the the Centre's Centresconfused confused suspicions suspicions about about Francesco Francesco Constantini Constantini at at the the height heightof ofthe 68. the Great Terror in 1937 1937are are unclear. unclear.Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins one-sentence summary of the suspicions suspicions recorded in DUN DUNCANSfile file reads reads as as f follows: He was was in in contact contact with with the OVRA [Italian intelligence], intelligence], was was engaged engaged in in CAN's ollows: "He OVRA [Italian extortion, and and the the documents documents were were probably probably supplied supplied by by the the Special Special [intelligence] [intelligence] Services" Services(vol. 7,ch. 14, extortion, (vol. 7, ch. 14,
CrownJewels, Jewels, ch. ch. 5; 5; Primakov Primakov et al., a/., Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Istorii Rossiyskoi Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Vneshnei The Crown Razvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, ch. ch. 13). 13). Razvedki, 69. "Mrs. Mrs. Petrov's Petrovs Statement Statement Concerning Her Her Past Past Intelligence Intelligence Work" Work (May (May 15, 15, 1954), 1954), CRS CRS 69. Concerning A6283/XR1/14, Petrov papers, Australian Archives, Archives, Canberra. A6283/xR1/14, 70. As As chairman chairman of of the the Petrograd Petrograd Cheka, Cheka, Boky Boky reported reported on on October October 15, 15, 1918 1918 that that 800 800 individuals individuals had had 70. been shot and 6,229 6,229 arrested. arrested. k-9,218. ofFear, pp. 129-3 129-31. 71. Petrovs, Empire of Fear, pp. 1. 71 . Petrovs, 72. vol. 7 7, 1,para. 13. 13. 72. , ch. 1, 73. An An official official Soviet Soviet collection collection of of intelligence intelligence documents documents for for the period 1938 to 1941 73. 1938 to 1 941 includes a limited and far far f from comprehensive selection selection of of (mainly (mainly German, Italian, Japanese and and Turkish) intercepts; and rom comprehensive Stepashin (eds.), Organy Organy Gosudarstvennoi GosudarstvennoiBezopastnosti Bezopastnosti Sbornik Stepashin et al. (eds.), SSSR v velkoi Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine: Voine: Sbomik vols. 1 1and and 2. 2. Dokumentov, vols. 74. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 237-42. 237-42. 74. 75. British British interwar interwar codebreakers codebreakers were were able able to to break break all all French French diplomatic (Andrew, 75. diplomatic ciphers ciphers until until 1935 1935 (Andrew, Secret Service, p. p. 375). 375). Given the classified classified French French diplomatic diplomatic cipher supplied to Secret Given the cipher material material supplied to Bystroletov Bystroletov by by LAROCHE, it itis is barely barely conceivable conceivablethat that Bokys traffic. LAROCHE, Boky's unit unit was was entirely entirely defeated defeated by by French French diplomatic diplomatic traffic. 76. (ed.), Documents 76. Degras Degras (ed.), Documents on Soviet SovietForeign ForeignPolicy, Policy, vol. vol. 3, 3, p. p. 224. 224. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 194-5. unusual, such such public public allusions allusions to codebreaking were were not unknown between the wars. In the the 194-5. Though unusual, unknown between 1920s, two British British f foreign secretaries and and several several other British success 1920s, two oreign secretaries other ministers ministers had had referred referred publicly publicly to to British success in in breaking Soviet Andrew, Secret Service, Service, chs. breaking Soviet codes. codes. Andrew, chs. 9,lO. 9, 10. 77. Andrew, Andrew, Secret Service, Service, pp. pp. 471, 471,573. 573. 77. 78. Orlov, A Handbook of arfare, p. p. 10. 10. Costello Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Ill usions, p. p. 78. Orlov, o f Intelligence Intelligence and and Guerrilla GuerrillaW Warfare, and Tsarev, Illusions, 90. Fursenko Fursenko and and Naftali, Naftali, "Soviet Soviet Intelligence and the CubanMissile Missile Crisis," Crisis, p. 90. Intelligence and the Cuban p. 66. 66. 79. Primakov al., Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 3, 79. Primakov et al, Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedkt vol. 3, pp. pp. 6,161,245. 6, 161, 245. 80. The The Foreign Foreign Office Office record record of of the the meeting, held on March 25-6, printed in al. 80. meeting, held on March 25-6, 1935, 1935, is is printed in Medlicott Medlicott et al (eds.), o l i 1919-1939, ~ 703-45. In thecourse course of (eds.), Documents Domments on British Foreign P Policy 1919-1939, 2nd 2nd series, series, vol. vol. 12, 12, pp. pp. 703-45. In the of the the meeting Hitler suggested an Anglo-German naval agreement with a 100:35 ratio in favor of of the Royal Navy. This formed Londonon 18,1935. Navy. f ormed the basis of of an agreement concluded in London on June 18, 1935. 81. The abbreviated the talks 81. The abbreviated Russian Russian translation translation of of the the Foreign Foreign Office Office record record of of the talks is is published published as as an an appenappen dix al, Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Istorii Ross+skoi Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, pp. pp. 461-7. 461-7. An An editorial editorial note note dix to to Primakov Primakov et al., (appendix, n. 111) path to the Azsch/uss. 1 1 1 ) asserts that, by his statement on on Austria, Simon opened "opened the path Anschluss. " 82. al., Ocherki Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 6. 82. Primakov Primakov et al., Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei vol. 3, 3, p. p. 6. 83. al., Ocherki Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei vol. 3, p. p. 155. 155. 83. Primakov Primakov et al,

102. n. 102.

Timewatch, BBC2 (July 10, 10, 1984). 1984). Timewatch, BBC2 (July

item 1. 1. C Cf.West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, item

1. 1 . Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 214. 214. Primakov Primakov et et aL, a/., Ocherki Ocherki Istorii IstoriiRossiyskoi RossiyskoiVneshnei Kneshnei Razvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, p. p. 19. 19. 2. Deutsch, 1923-7; 2. Nationale "Nationale fiir fur ordentliche ordentliche Horer Horer der der philosophischen philosophischen Fakultat: Fakultat": entries entries for for Arnold Arnold Deutsch, 1 923-7; Rigorosenakt Arnold Deutsch, cv by by Deutsch; Deutsch; records records of ofDeutschs Deutsch's 1928 1928 PhD PhD "Rigorosenakt des des Arnold Deutsch," 1928, 1928, no. no. 9929, 9929, with with cv examination. Archives examination. Archives of of University University of of Vienna. Vienna. 3. vol. 7, chs. 9,lO. 9, 10. 4. and Gordievsky, 4. Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 214-15. 214-15. 5. Sharaf, Sharaf; Fury on Earth. der Schriften der series Schr@n the series in the 6. Wilhelm Reich, Sexualerregung und Sexualbefi-ienigung,iedipng, publication in first publication the first Sexualbefriedigung, the "Copyright 1929 note Copyright the note carries the Sozialistischen Gesellscha Gesellschaft fir 1929 Sexuaiforschung in Wien, carries und Sexuavorschung Sexualberatung und Jt ilr Sexualberatung J

Chapter Chaptel' Four Four The Magnificent Five

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When by by Munster-Verlag Munster-Verlag (Dr. (Dr. Arnold Arnold Deutsch), Deutsch), Wien Wien II." 11. When he he later later wrote wrote a a classified classified memoir memoir for for NKVD NKVD

sex-pol sex-pol movement movement and and Reich, Reich, who who by by then then was was engaged engaged in in a a somewhat somewhat bizarre bizarre program program of of research research on on

fi les, Deutsch files, Deutsch seems seems to to have have considered considered it it imprudent imprudentto tomention mention his his previous previous close close association associationwith with the the human There Reich human sexual sexual behavior. behavior. There is is no no mention mention of of Reich either either in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes on on the the Deutsch Deutschfile file or or in in

West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The The c,'own CrownJewels. Jewels. The The 1997 1997 SVR SVR official official history history also also makes makes no no mention mention of of Deutsch's Deutschs involvement involvement with with Reich Reich or or the the sex-pol sex-pol movement movement in in its its hagiographic hagiographic chapter chapter on on him; him; Primakov Primakov et e t al., nl., . Ocherki Rossiyskoi OcherkiIstorii Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VntshneiRazvedki, Razvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, ch. ch. 1 1. tationsarchiv tationsarchiv des des Osterreichischen Osterreichischen Widerstandes, Widerstandes, Vienna. Vienna. Fyodor named JACK. Fyodor Yakovlevich Yakovlevich Karin, Karin, code codenamed JACK. f March 7 , 1934, ref Z.g.p.!34, Dokumen 7. 7. Viennese Viennese police police reports reports on on Deutsch Deutscho of March 25 25and and April April227,1934, ref. Z1.38. Z1.38.Z.g.p./34, Dokumen8. 8. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 10; 10; ch. ch. 10, 10, para. para. 1. 1.The The illegal illegal resident resident under under whom whom Deutsch Deutsch served served in in France France was was 9. Icate of 9. Deutsch's Deutschs address address and and profession profession as as "university universitylecturer" lecturer are are given given on on the the birth birthcertif certificate of his his daugh daugh10. University 10.vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9,para. para. 10. 10.London London UniversityArchives Archives contain contain no no record record of of Deutsch Deutsch as as either either research research stu student lecturer, dent or or lecturer,probably probably because because he he was was involved involved only only on on a a part-time part-time basis. basis. vol. 7, 1 1 . Andrew and Gordievsky, 11. Andrew and Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 214-15. 214-15. vol. 7, ch. ch. 9. 9. 12. 12.vol. vol. 7, 7,ch. ch. 10, 10,para. para. 24. 24. recruitment recruitment strategy. strategy. 14. 14.A Asimilar similar stroke stroke of of chance chance explains explainswhy why Cambridge Cambridge produced produced more more British British codebreakers codebreakers than than Oxford Oxford in Sir ormer professor in both both world world wars. wars. The The Director Director of of Naval Naval Education Education in in1914, 1914, Sir Alfred Alfred Ewing, Ewing, was was a af former professor of ormer college, of engineering engineering at at Cambridge. Cambridge. He He recruited recruited three three Fellows Fellows of of his his f former college, King's, Kings, who who themselves themselves served served in in the the wartime wartime SIGINT SIGINT agency agency at at Bletchley Bletchley Park-a Park-a far far higher higher proportion proportion than than those those recruited recruited became became recruiters recruiters a a quarter quarter of of a a century century later. later. In In the the Second SecondWorld World War, War, one one third third of of the the King's Kingsfellowship fellowship 13. para. files was 13.vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, para. 1. 1.The The files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin make make clear clearthat that Deutsch Deutsch was the the first first to to devise devise this this

the the two two works works by by authors authors given given some some access access to to it it by by the the SVR: SVR: Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Deadly Illusions, Illusiom, and and

ter, 1936. Further information ter, Ninette Ninette Elizabeth, Elizabeth, born born on on May May 21, 21,1936. Further information from from residents residents of of Lawn Lawn Road Road Flats. Flats.

from from any any other other Oxbridge Oxbridge college. college.

usions, 15. 15.vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10,para. para. 2. 2. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 209-13. 209-13. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev,Deadly DeadlyIll Illusions,
pp. pp. 125-30. 125-30. . 16. 16. Page, Page,Leitch Leitch and and Knightley, Knightley,Philby, Philby, ch. ch. 5; 5; Knightley, Knightley,Philby, Philby, ch. ch. 3 3.

usions, fail o identify 1 7 . vol. , ch. , para. 1 ; ch. 0 , para. . Costello 17, vol. 7 7, ch. 9 9, para. 1 11; ch. 1 10, para. 2 2. Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Deadly Ill Illusions, fail tto identify EDITH EDITH as as
an an agent agent recruited recruited by by Deutsch. Deutsch. 1 8 . vol. 1 . C 18. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 1 11. Cf. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev,Deadly Dead4 Illusions, Illusions,pp. pp. 133-7. 133-7. p. 19. 19. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly DeadlyIllusions, Illusions, p. 136. 136. 20. 20. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10. 10. 21. 21. The The text text of of the the report report on on Deutsch's Deutschs first first meeting meeting with with Philby, Philby,sent sent to to the the Center Centerby by the the London London ille illegal gal resident, resident, Ignati Ignati Reif, Reif, is is published published in in Borovik, Borovik, The The Philby Philby Files, pp. pp. 38-40. 38-40. C Cf. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev,

Deadly DeadZyIllusions, Illusions,p. p. 137. 137. 22. 22. Borovik, Borovik, The ThePhilby Philby Files, Files,p. p. 29. 29.
torical ollowed by rst in torical Tripos, Tripos, f followed by an an upper upper second second in in part partII I1 Economics. Economics. Burgess Burgess gained gained a a fi first in part partI I History History their their examinations examinations for for medical medical reasons). reasons). 24. 24. Cairncross, Cairncross, When WhenPolygamy PoZygamywas was Made Made a a Sin. Sin. 25. a postscript to 25. Cairncross Cairncross quotes quotes Greene's Greenesletter letter to to him him in in postscript a to his his book book La La Fontaine FontaineFables Fablesand Othe1' OtherPoems. Poems. 26. 26. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9 9 confirms confirms the the names names of of the theillegal illegal residents residents identified identified (with (with photographs) photographs) in in Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions. IZlmions. Tsarev,Deadly 28. 28. This This claim claim appears appears in in Orlov's Orlovsfile; file; vol. vol. 5, 5, ch. ch. 7. 7. In In reality, reality, Orlov Orlov did did not not meet meet Philby Philby until until Deutsch Deutsch introduced Paris few Tsarev, introduced him him in in Paris in in 1937, 1937,a a few months months before before Orlov's Orlovs defection; defection;West West and and Tsarev, The The CrownJew CrownJew27. p. 27. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly DeadlyIllusions, Illusions, p. 132 132 and and passim. passim. 23. his third in part I His 23. The The exception exceptionwas was Philby, Philby,whose whose lack lackof of attention attention to to his studies studies earned earned him him aa third in part I of of the the Hisbut but was was ill ill during during part part II I1 and and awarded awarded an an aegrotat aegrotat (the (the unclassed unclassed honors honors awarded awarded to to those those unable unable to to sit sit

els, 10. els, p. p. 1 110.

ch. containing rom KGB 29. 29. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev,Deadly DeadlyIllusions, Illusions, ch. 15. 15.Though Though containing valuable valuable material material f from KGB archives archives on on the the recruitment recruitment of of British British agents agents in in the the19305, 1930s,this this SVR-sponsored SVR-sponsored volume volume not not merely merely inflates inflates Orlov's Orlovs importance misleading rom the importance but but is is also also misleadingin in some some other other respects. respects.It I t omits omits James James Klugmann Klugmann (agent (agent MER) MER) f from the membership. membership. It It also also wrongly wrongly identifies identifies the the agent agent who who provided provided the the first first intelligence intelligence on on the the plan plan to to build build list list of of early early Cambridge Cambridge recruits, recruits, and and even even implies implies that that he he was was not not recruited recruited because because of of his his open open Party Party

an an atomic atomic bomb bomb in in 1941 1941as as Maclean Maclean rather rather than thanCairncross. Cairncross. (Since (Since Cairncross, Cairncross, alone alone of of the the Five, Five,was was still still alive 993, the intention may the material to alive at at the the time time of ofpublication publication in in 1 1993, the intention may have havebeen been to to limit limit the material on on him him to aspects aspects

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583

of that the atomic intelligence intelligence supplied supplied of his his career career already already admitted admitted by by him. him. The The SVR SVR now now acknowledges acknowledges that the atomic by 1941 came not Maclean.) Maclean.) Among Among other examples of of mismis by the the London London residency residency in in 1941 came from from Cairncross, Cairncross, not other examples

leading mystification mystification is is the the claim claim that that agent agent ABO A B 0 was was a a Cambridge contemporary of the Magnificent leading of the "Magnificent
Five," In reality, reality, A ABO was Peter Smollett, who who graduated graduated Five, who who had had never never been been identified identified as as a a Soviet Soviet spy. spy. In B 0 was Peter Smollett,

from Vienna, Vienna, not not Cambridge, University; his his career career as from Cambridge, University; as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent had had already already been been discussed discussed in in
Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 334-9. 334-9.

Illusions. In a a 30. of, in and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly IZ/z~sions. This is is acknowledged, acknowledged, though though somewhat somewhat lost lost sight sight of, in Costello Costello and 30. This
number of of respects respects the the detailed detailed evidence evidence advanced advanced by by this this volume is at at odds odds with with its overstatement of number volume is its overstatement of Orlov's 1997 SVR SVR official official history upgrades Deutschs Deutsch's role Orlovs importance importance by by comparison comparison with with Deutsch. Deutsch. The The 1997 history upgrades role Ocherki IstoriiRossiyskoi Vneshnei Ocherki Istorii Vneshnei Razvedki, 1. C pp. 103ff. 103f Razvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, ch. ch. 1. Cf. West Westand and Tsarev, Tsarev, The CrownJewels, CrownJeweZs, pp. West and and Tsarev Tsarev ( (The JeweZs, pp. pp. 103ff) 103ff) give give greater greater emphasis to Deutsch's Deutschs role role by by companion 31. The Crown Jewels, 3 1 . West with Orlov's Orlovs than than Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Dangerous with Dangerous IZZzIsions. Illusions. Their Their analysis, analysis, however, however, does does not not take take account account of Vienna University University Archives, Archives, the the Dokumentation of the the published published material material on on Deutsch Deutsch derived derived from from the the Vienna Dokumentationsarchiv des des Osterreichischen Osterreichischen Widerstandes, Widerstandes, the the work work of Deutsch and the the sarchiv of Wilhelm Reich published by Deutsch information obtained obtained by by Oleg Oleg Gordievsky Gordievsky during during his his career in the KGB (see Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky, information Gordievsky, ch. 5). 5). KGB, ch. There is is a a considerable considerable overlap overlap between between the the KGB KGB documents on Deutsch noted noted by by Mitrokhin and There those cited cited in in West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The Thc Crown Jewels. JeweZs. Each Each set contains material set of of documents, documents, however, however, contains material those missing from from the the other. other. West West and and Tsarev Tsarev do do not, not, for for example, have seen Deutschs example, appear to have Deutsch's important memorandum on on the the recruitment recruitment of of student student Communists. Communists. However, However, Mitrokhin not note note the the inter intermemorandum Mitrokhin did did not esting documents documents on on Deutsch Deutsch following following his his recall recall to to Moscow late in 1937 which are are cited by West and and esting Tsarev. Tsarev. 32. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 32. vol. 10, para. para. 8. 8. 33. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsb, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 223-6. 223-6. 33. Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Dead4 Illusions, Ihsions,pp. pp. 186-8. 186-8. 34. Costello 34. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 206-8. 206-8. 35. 35. Andrew 36. Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, IZZusions, p. p. 224. 224. 36. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Ill IZZusions, p. 225. 225. 37. Costello usions, p. 37. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 216-19. 216-19. 38. 38. Andrew 39. notes confirm given by Costello In this, this, as as in in other other instances instances in in this this chapter, chapter, Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes confirm the the codename codename given by Costello 39. In and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions. IZZmions. and 40. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10. 10. 40. 41. 14. Boyle, The Climate Climateof of Treason, Treason, p. p. 1 114. 41. Boyle, 42. Accidents, pp. fter Long Silence, pp. pp. 944,142. 94-5, 142. Rees, A Chapter Chapter of ofAccidents, pp. 122-3; 122-3; Straight, Straight,A After Long SiZence, 42. Rees, 43. 159. Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, IZZusions, pp. pp. 144-5, 144-5, 159. 43. Costello vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, paras. paras. 8, 8,9. 44. vol. 44. 9. foreigners to to achieve achieve offi cer rank cen 45. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 24-6. 24-6. The The only only foreigners officer rank were were some some cen45. Andrew tral European European interwar interwar illegals, illegals, such such as as Deutsch, Deutsch, who whowere were used agent controllers tral used as as agent controllers and and recruiters. recruiters. 46. Philby, y Silent ar, p. Emphasis added. added. 46. Philby, M My SiZent W Waar, p. 13. 13. Emphasis 47. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, para. 24. 24. 47. 10, para. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, app., app., para. para. 2. 2. On O n the the misleading misleading references references to DeodZy 48. vol. 48. to Klugmann Klugmann in in Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly IZZusions, see see above, above, note note 29. 29. Illusions, Blunt, "From From Bloomsbury Bloomsbury to to Marxism." Marxism. 49. Blunt, 49. 50. Boyle, Boyle, The Climate Climate ofT of Treason, p. 72. 72. reason, p. 50. 51. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, app., app., para. para. 2. 2. 51. 52. on material available by the SVR SVR is is in in West The first first reference reference to to Klugmann's Klugmanns recruitment recruitment based based on material made made available by the West 52. The and 206, 294. and Tsarev, Tsarev, The CrownJewels, CrownJeweZs, pp. pp. 206,294. 53. 7. See below, below, chapter chapter 1 17. 53. See 54. and had had joined OGPU only only in in Deutsch, who who was was a a decade decade younger younger than than both both Orlov Orlov and and Maly Malyand joined the the OGPU 54. Deutsch, 1932, was of resident. 1932, was evidently evidently considered considered too too junior juniorfor for the the post post of resident. 55. Though some some of of his his agents agents believed believed Maly Maly had had been been a Catholic Catholic priest, his operational operational file shows that that 55. Though fue shows he or the the army. army. West and Tsarev, Tsarev, The Crown Crown Jewels, JeweZs, he had had only only deacon's deacons orders orders when when he he volunteered volunteered f for West and pp. 13-14. pp. 1 113-14. OvertooJJJ, ch. ch. 11. II. 56. 56. Poretsky, Poretsh, Our Ozu Own People, PeopZe, pp. pp. 214-15; 214-15; Cornelissen, Cornelissen, De GPOe op de Overtoom, 57. 229-30. Costello Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 199ff. 199f Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 211-13, 211-13,229-30. Costello and and Tsarev, IZhsions,pp. 57. Andrew 58. 7, ch. vol. 7, ch. 10, 10, app., app., item item 3. 3. 58. vol. to that that of of the who started the the 'Cambridge Cambridge Five' Five ''; ;Primakov et aZ., to "the man who al.,

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e s s e

584

59. vol. 10, app., app., item 6. 59. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, item 6. fter Long Silence, 101-3,120-1. 120--1. The 60. Straight, 60. Straight,A After Silence, pp. pp. 101-3, The NKVD NKVD officer officer who who met met Straight Straightdid did not not identify identify himself, himself, but but Straight's Straights description description of of him him as as stocky stocky and and dark-haired dark-haired identifies identifies him him as as Deutsch Deutsch rather ratherthan than the the tall tall Maly, Maly, whose whose height height earned earned him him the thenickname nickname "der derLange." Lange. 6 1 . Details the archives University, Trinity 61. Details of of Cairncross's Cairncrosss academic academic career career are are in in the archives of of Glasgow Glasgow University, Trinity College, College, Cambridge, Cambridge, and and Cambridge Cambridge University. University. 62. Trinity Magazine, Magazine,Easter Easter Term 1935and and Easter Term 1936. Term 1935 Easter Term 1936. 62. 63. 63. Cairncross, Cairncross, The Enigma EnigmaSpy. Spy, p. p. 42. 42. 64. 64. Colville, Colville, The Fringes of o f Power, Power, p. p. 30 30 n. 65. 1. 65. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, item item1. 66. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, item item23. 23. 66. usions, p. p. 67. 67. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Ill Illusions, p. 214. 214. West West and andTsarev, Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, Jewels, p. 207. 207. 68. 68. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, para. para. 23. 23. Cairncross's account 69. 69. Cairncross, Cairncross, The Enigma Enigma Spy, pp. pp. 61-2. 61-2. Cairncrosss account of of the the sequence sequence of of his his initiation initiation into into the the NKVD in successive meetings meetings with Klugmann and Deutsch agrees records both in successive with Burgess, Burgess, Klugmann and Deutsch agrees with with KGB KGB records both as as noted by cited in Tsarev, noted by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin and and in in the thedocuments documents cited in West West and and Tsarev, The Crown Jewels. The Enigma EnigmaSpy is, is, none none the the less, less, a a textbook textbook case case of of psychological psychologicaldenial. denial. At At almost almost every every stage stage of of his his career career as as a a Soviet Soviet agent agent (save Bletchley Park he claims he provided (save for for a a heroic heroic year year at at Bletchley Park in in 1942-3, 1942-3, when when he claims that that the theintelligence intelligence he provided on on the the eastern front instrumental in "changing War Two"), Cairncross seeks to diminish eastern front was was instrumental in changing the the course course of of World World War Two), Cairncross seeks to diminish or Soviet agent, or deny deny the the significance significance of of his his role. role. His His version version of of his his career career as as a a Soviet agent, save save for for the the year year at at Bletch Bletchley Park, Park, is is comprehensively comprehensively contradicted contradicted by by the the evidence evidence of of the the KGB KGB files. files. ley 70. p. 70. West West and andTsarev, Tsarev, The CrowllJewels, Crown Jewels, p. 208. 208. 71. 1937, PRO W7016. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, 71. Minute Minute by by Cairncross, Cairncross, March March 23, 23,1937, PROF0371121287 F0371121287 W7016. Andrew Gordievsky, and pp. pp. 230--1. 230-1. 72. material from 72. There There are are very very few few references references to to such such documents documents either either in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes or or in in the the material from KGB KGB archives archives made made available available by by the the SVR SVRfor for West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The CrownJewels. Crown Jewels. 73. 73. Though Though there there is is no no positive positive evidence evidence that that this this document document was was provided provided by by Cairncross Cairncross or or Maclean, Maclean, other other sources Center had sources can can be be excluded. excluded. The The Center had recently recently broken broken contact contact with with the the two two other other agents agents who who provided provided it it with ce documents, his with Foreign Foreign Offi Office documents, Francesco Francesco Constantini Constantini and and Captain Captain John John King. King. Since Since Halifax's Halifaxs record recordof of his meeting with with Hitler Hider was was not not apparently apparently sent sent as as a a telegram, telegram, the the NKVD NKVDcopy copy of ofit it cannot cannot have have been beenobtained obtained meeting by by SIGINT. SIGINT. The The text text of of Halifax's Halifaxs record, record,together together with with details details of of its its despatch despatch to to the the Foreign Foreign Office, Office, is is pub pub2nd series, 19, pp. lished lished in in Medlicott Medlicott et al, al., Documents Documentson British F01-eign Foreign Policy, Policy, 1919-1939, 1919-1939,2nd series, vol. vol.19, pp. 540--8. 540-8. 74. Roberts, Roberts, "The TheHoly Fox," Fox, p. p. 70. 70. 74. 75. Primakov Primakov et al, nl., Ocherki Istorii Istorii Rossiyskoi Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Vneshnei vol. 3, pp. 6, 6,162. Razvedki, vol. 3, pp. 162. 75. 9-1939, 2nd series, 8; Roberts, 76. 76. Medlicott Medlicott et al, al., Documents Doczments on British British Foreign Policy, Policy,191 1919-1939,2nd series,vol. vol. 19, 19, pp. pp. 540-540-8; Roberts, TheHoly HoZy Fox," Fox, pp. pp. 70--5; 70-5; Parker, Parker, Chamberlain Chamberlain andAppeasement, andAppeasement,pp. pp. 98-100. 98-100. "The 77. 232-3. 77. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 216, 216,232-3. 233. Borovik, 78. 78. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, p. p. 233. Borovik, The Philby Philby Files, Files,p. p. 80. 80. 79. 79. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, para. para. 4. 4. 80. 80. Borovik, Borovik, The Philby Files, Files, pp. pp. 90-2. 90-2. 8 1 . Andrew 81. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, p. p. 234. 234.

1. o f a Revolutionmy, Revolutionary, 1901-1941, p. 259. 1. Serge, Serge, Memoirs of 1901-1941, p. 259. 2. For For the the text text of of the the "Ryutin Ryutin platform," platform, see seeIzvestia ( (1989), no. 6; 6; Ogonek ( (1989), no. 15. 2. 1989), no. 1989), no. 15. 3. Volkogonov, Stalin, Stalin, p. p. 212. 3 . Volkogonov, 212. 4. 4. k-4,198. k-4,198. 5. Volkogonov, Volkogonov, Trotsky, Trotsky, p. p. 343. 343. 6. 6. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, ch. ch. 4. 4. 7. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 171-2; Volkogonov, Trotsky, pp. pp. 334-6. Remarkably, a 1997 1997 SVR SVR 7. 171-2; Volkogonov, Trotsky, 334-6. Remarkably, a official history makes makes a a partial partial attempt attempt to tojustify justify the the anti-Trotskyist anti-Trotskptwitch-hunt: witch-hunt: offi cial history [Trotskyst] criticism, though apparently aimed at Stalin personally, was essentially essentially defamatory of of [Trotskyist] Trotskyists, a phenomenon phenomenon developed everything Soviet. Soviet. Largely thanks to the the Trotskyists, developed abroad which became known known as as anti-Sovietism, anti-Sovietism, which which for for many years years hurt hurt the theUSSR's USSRs domestic domestic and foreign foreign pol polbecame thattime, as well well as asthe international international workers' workers and communists' communists movement . . . The icy pursued at that Trotskylsts were were a a fruitful fruitful agent agent base base for for the the [Western] [Western] intelligence intelligence services. Trotskyists

Chapter Five

Terror Terror

...

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e s e s

58 85 5

Primakov Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, p. p. 90. 90. Primakov et al., al., Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei

facques Doriot, pp. pp. major change not not merely shirt but suit as as well. Brunet, Jacques major speech speech he he was was forced forced to to change merely his his shirt buthis his suit well. Brunet,
208-9. 208-9.

8. k-4,198,206. k-4,198,206. Doriot's Doriots emotionally emotionally charged charged oratory oratory caused caused him him to to perspire 8. perspire so so profusely profusely that that after after every every

9. k-4,198,206. k-4,198,206. A recent recent biography biography of of Eugen Eugen Fried, Fried, the the secret secret Comintern Comintern representative theleadership 9. representative in in the leadership
of the French Communist Party, reveals that Comintern instructions that the the campaign campaign against against of the French Communist Party, reveals that Comintern instructions were were that Doriot phases: "maneuverer, Without access to KGB KGB files, files, the the Doriot should should go go through through three three phases: maneuverer,isoler, isoler, liquider." liquider. Without access to authors assassination was authors assume-reasonably assume-reasonably but but wrongly-that wrongly-that only only "political," political,rather rather than than "physical," physical, assassination was intended. intended. Kriegel Kriegel and and Courtois, Courtois, Eugen Fried, Friea, p. p. 228. 228. 10. move to to fascism, fascism, see see Brunet, Brunet, Jacques Doriot, chs. 10. On O n Doriot's Doriots break break with with the the Communist Communist Party Party and and move chs. 9. 9-12; 9-12; Burrin, Burrin, La Derive Deiive Fasciste, Fasciste, chs. chs. 5, 5,9. 11. k-4,198,206. 11. k-4,198,206.

12. There Thereare are a a number number of of examples examples in in the the VENONA VENONA decrypts of the use of the KHORKI: (Polecat) 12. of the of the KHORKI ("Polecat")
codename codename for for the the Trotskyists. Trotskyists.

13. k-4,206. The codename codename of of the the task task force force appears appears in in vol. app. 3, 15. 13. k-4,206. The vol. 7, 7, app. 3, n. 15.
14. 14. k-4,206. k-4,206. 15. Deutscher, 348-9. 15. Deutscher, Trotsky, Trotsky,vol. vol. 3, 3, pp. pp. 348-9. 16. vol. 16. vol. 7, 7, appendix appendix 3, 3, n. n. 15. 15. 17. Deutscher, Deutscher, Trotsky, Trotsky, vol. vol. 3, 3, p. p. 349. 349. 17. 18. Deutscher, 18. Deutscher, Trotsky, Trotsky,vol. vol. 3, 3, pp. pp. 125-6. 125-6. 19. 1952, PRO FO 371/100826 NS 1023/29/G. 1023129/G. 19. Minute Minuteby by R. A. A. Sykes, Sykes, October October 23, 23,1952, PRO F O 371/100826 20. 20. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 21. Among Among the the growing growing number number of of studies studies of of the the Terror, Terror, the account remains remains that that by by Robert 21. the classic classic account Robert ConCon quest, The The Great Terror.A Evor:AReassessment. Reassessment. There There is, is, however, however,vigorous vigorous controversy over the numbers numbers of of the the Tercontroversy over the Ter quest, ror's victims. In security ministry ministry rehabilitation rehabilitation team, rorsvictims. In 1995 1995 Colonel Colonel Grashoven, Crashoven, head head of of the the Russian Russiansecurity team, estimated that in in the period 1935-45 1935-45 18 million 18 mill ion were arrested arrested and 7 million shot. Olga Shatunovskaya, a member of of Khrushchev's Khrushchevsrehabilitation rehabilitation commission, commission,gave gave the the figure of of those those repressed (imprisoned or shot) shot) member "repressed" (imprisoned f rom 1935 as in the of Anastas Mikoyan). Mikoyan). Dmitri from 1935 to to1941 1941 as 19.8 19.8 million million (a (a statistic statistic also also found found in thepapers papers ofAnastas Dmitri Volko Volkogonov arrived at at a a total total of21.5 of 21.5 million million (of (ofwhom whom a a third third were for the own go nov arrived were shot) shot) for the period period 1929-53. 1929-53. Conquests Conquest's own revised estimates estimates are are of of a a similar similar order order of of magnitude magnitude (Conquest, Gulag, p. revised (Conquest, Playing "Playing Down the the Gulag," p. 8). Recent Recent studies records suggest considerably lower, but figures. Stephen Stephen studies based based on on incomplete incomplete official officialrecords suggest considerably lower, but still still large largefigures. Wheatcroft, one one of of the the leading leading analysts analysts of of the the official official fi figures, believes it "unlikely unlikelythat there were more more than Wheatcroft, gures, believes it a million executions executions between between 1921 1921 and and 1953. 1953.The The labor labor camps and and colonies never never accounted for more more than a 2.5 million million prisoners." prisoners.What What is is striking striking even even in in the the offi official recordsisis the enormous rise in executions during during 2.5 cial records the GreatTerror: GreatTerror: 353,074 353,074 in in 1937 1937 and 328,618 328,618 in in 1938, 1938, as as compared the and compared with with a a total total ofunder of under 10,000 10,000 for for the the five five year period 1932-6 1932-6 (Wheatcroft, (Wheatcroft, "The The Scale and Nature of year Scale and of German and Soviet Repression Repression and Mass Killings, Controversy over over the the level level of of incompleteness incompleteness in the official official records records (which (which do Killi ngs, 1930-45). 1930-45"). Controversy in the do not, not, of of course, include from famine) famine) w will doubdess continue. course, include deaths deaths in in the the camps camps or or the the millions millions who who died died from l idoubtless continue. 22. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 22. 23. 23. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 149-61 149-61.. 24. . 24. Radzinsky, Radzinsky, Stalin, p p.. 371 371. 25. vol. 25. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 26. 26. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Illusions, p. p. 281. 281. 27. 27. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 1, 1,n. 1; 1;vol. vol. 7, app. app. 3, 3, n. n. 15. 15. ollweber. 28. 28. On O n Wollweber, Wollweber, see see Flocken Flocken and and Scholz, Scholz, Ernst W WoZZweber. 29. 29. k-4,206. k-4,206. 30. Costello usions, p. 267. 30. Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Ill Illusions, p. 267. 31. See below, below, chapter chapter 5. 5. 3 1 . See 32. 32. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, IZZusions, chs. chs. 10, 1 0 ,11. ll. 33. vol. vol. 5, 5, ch. ch. 7. 7. All these these episodes episodes are are conspicuous conspicuous by by their from the SVR hagiography: 33. their absence absence from the official official SVR hagiography: Samolis Razvedki Rossii, pp. Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany VeteranyVneshnei Vneshnei pp. 21-4. 21-4. 34. Castelo's Castelos personal personal file, file, archive archiveno. no.68312, registration no. 66160, once once in the files the FCD 34. 68312, registration no. 66160, in the f iles of of the FCD Fifteenth Fifteenth Department First to the Department of FCD FeD Directorate Directorate Department of ofthe the First Chief Chief Directorate Directorate was was transferred transferred to theEighth Eighth Department of S. 5, ch. S. vol. vol. 5, ch. 7. 7. 35. Mter After the thedefection of Orlov in inJuly 1938, 1938, Eitingon Eitingonsucceeded succeeded him as resident. 36. vol. 5, 5, ch. ch. 7. 7. 36. vol. 37. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. 37.

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38. 38. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 177-8. 177-8. 39. 2. 39. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2. 40. 198. 40. k-4, k-4,198.

s s

5 86 586

41 . There 41. There is, is, however, however, one one later later reference reference to to him himbeing being "killed"; killed;vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. Volkogonov, 42. and Gordievsky, 42. Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 179-80. 179-80. Volkogonov,

Trotsky, 359-60. Costello Trotsky, pp. pp. 359-60. Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Dangerous Illusions, pp. 282-4. Dangerous Illusions,pp. 282-4. 405-10. Costello Tsarev, Deadly Ill usions, pp. 1 9-21. 43. Deutscher, 43. Deutscher, Trotsky, Trotsky, vol. vol. 3, 3, pp. pp. 405-10. Costello and andTsarev, IZhsions, pp. 3 319-21. 44. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 44. 45. 419-20. Sylvia Ageloff 45. Deutscher, Deutscher, Trotsky, Trotsky, vol. vol. 3, 3, pp. pp. 407-8, 407-8, 419-20. Sylvia Ageloff later later described described how, how, at at an an apparently apparently "accidental meeting, meeting," the dashing" Mercader, posing posing as Belgian journalist, her accidental the "handsome handsome and and dashingMercader, as a a Belgian journalist, had had "swept swepther off o f Step, p. p. 242. 242. off her her feet feet with with his his charm, charm, gallantry gallantry and and generosity." generosity.Hook, Hook, Out of 46. k-4,198,206. k-4,198,206. 46. 47. n. 47. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2,2, n. 4. 4. 48. le does wife's arrest, 48. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2, 2, n. n. 4. 4. Albam's Albams fi file does not not record record his his wifes arrest, so so her her denunciation denunciation of of him him may may have Acquaintance with evidence which the mil have saved savedher. her.Acquaintance with Albam Albam was was also also among among the the evidence which led led to to the the arrest arrest of of the military itary intelligence intelligence officers officers who who had had recruited recruited him him some some years years earlier: earlier: S. P. l? Uritsky Uritsky and and Aleksandr Aleksandr Karin. Karin. At At the their arrest respectively, head head and head of military intelligence. the time time of of their arrest in in 1937 1937 they they were, were, respectively, and assistant assistant head of military intelligence. Both Both were were shot. shot. 49. 49. k-9,75. k-9,75. 50. 50. k-9,76. k-9,76. 51. k-9,83. the last 51. k-9,83. Bukharin Bukharin was was tried tried and and sentenced sentenced to to death deathinin the last of of the the great great show show trials trials in in February February 1938. 1938. 52. 52. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part part 1. 1. 53. when he 53. Orlov, Orlov, The Secret Hist01Y History of o f Stalin's StaZinS Crime, Crime, pp. pp. 235-7. 235-7. Though Though he he had had only only deacon's deacons orders orders when he gave gave up priest. up the the monastic monastic life, life, Maly Maly was was regarded regarded within within the the NKVD as as a a former former priest. Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, 3, p. 166. 54. 14, item 1. Cf. 54. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, item1. Cf. Primakov Primakov et al, al., Ocherki Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshzei Razuedki, vol. vol. 3, p. 166. 55. Oscar Deutsch, Deutsch, David 55. Information Information from from the the son son of of the the late late Oscar David Deutsch, Deutsch, who who recalls recalls meeting meeting Arnold Arnold Deutsch Deutsch at at sabbath sabbath dinners dinners in in Birmingham. Birmingham. 56. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2. 2. 57. The 57. The two two most most detailed detailed accounts accounts of of the the assassination assassination of of Poretsky, Poretsky, which which disagree disagree on on some some points points of of 1-3, chs. ehs. 9, 10; Krivitsky, detail, detail, are: are: Poretsky, Poretsky, Our Own People, People, pp. pp. 1-3, 9,lO; Krivitsky, I I was Stalin's StaZinS Agent, ch. ch. 8. 8. 58. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9. 9. 58. 59. 59. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 22. 22. 233. 60. 60. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, p. p. 233. 61. Rees,A Chapter of r&4ccidents, pp. 110-11. 61. Rees, A Chapter Accidents, pp. 11 0-1 1 . 6 2 . Rees, y, pp. 62. Rees, Lookingfor Lookingfor Mr. M KNobod Nobody, pp. 87-90. 87-90. 63. vol. 63. vol. 7, 7, eh. ch. 10, 10, app., app., item item 7. 7. 64. p. 64. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Ill~sio~zs, p. 245. 245. Blunt Blunt had had left left Cambridge Cambridge for for the the Warburg Warburg Institute Institutein in London, London, but butreturned returned for for meetings meetings of of the the Apostles Apostles and and other otheroccasions. occasions. 65. The files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin suggest suggest that that the the intelligence intelligence supplied supplied by by Rees of slender slender impor impor65. The Rees was was of tance-items such such as as information information on on the the correspondence correspondence of of the the Czech Czech newspaper newspaper editor editor Hubert Hubert Ripka Ripka tance-items (later a member of (later a member of the the Czechoslovak Czechoslovak government-in-exile government-in-exile in in London) London)and and the the unsurprising unsurprising news news that that the the former British secret secret agent Sir Paul Dukes was ch. 10, 7. former British agent Sir Paul Dukes was still still in in touch touch with with SIS. SIS. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. 10, app., app., item item 7. 66. version has Slutsky was 66. 0rlov, Orlov, The Secret Secrtt History of o f Stalin's StaZinS Crime, Crime, pp. pp. 237-8. 237-8. An An alternative alternative version has it it that that Slutsky was smothered ch. 9, para. 37. died from smothered in in his his office; office; vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. 9, para. 37. The The pretense pretense was was maintained maintained that that he hehad had died from natural natural causes in enemies of people being foreign postings to retribu causes in order order not not to to alarm alarm other other enemies of the the people being recalled recalled from from foreign postings to retribution in inMoscow. Moscow. tion 67. p. 156. 67. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 156. 68. 68. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 37. 37. 69. Primakov Prima.kov et al, nl., Ocherki OcherkiIstorii IstoriiRossiyskoi Rossiyskoi Vkeshnei Rnzvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, p. p. 17. Vneshnei Razvedki, 17. 69. 70. 70. Radzinsky, Radzinsky, Stalin, p. p. 417. 417. 71. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 36. 36. 71. 72. p. 72. Dates Dates of of dismissal dismissal and and arrest arrest from from KGB KGB file file cited cited by by Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Dendly Illusions, Illusions, p. 459, 459, n. n. 63. 63. 73. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 36. 36. 73 . vol. 74. 74. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 37. 37. 75. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, IZZUS~O~ZS, p. 207. 207. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes mention mention SAM but but do do not not record record the the 75. p. month of of his his arrival arrival in in London. London. 76. 76. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 2. 2.

s.

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e s e s

587

77. 77. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Illusions,pp. pp. 208-10. 208-10. 78. 1 , 1938), papers PHPP 2/21, 2/21 , Churchill Churchill College College 78. Foreign Foreign Office Office to to Sir Sir Eric Eric Phipps Phipps (March (March 1 11, 1938), Phipps Phipps papers

Archives Center, Center, Cambridge. Cambridge. Archives

79. p. 69) in his 79. West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The CrownJewels, Crown Jewels, p. 209. 209.bCairncross claimed in his memoirs memoirs (The (TheEnigma Spy, p. p. 69) <::: irnross claimed . dea n that, after after Deutsch's Deutschs recall recall to to Moscow, Moscow, he he "pro pro&Ied n; &rth<r data data until untilafter the the Germans Germansinvaded invaded RusRus that,

sia-one of of numerous numerous f falsehoods comprehensively demolished demolished by his KGB KGB file which which Cairncross must sian-one alsehoods comprehensively have supposed supposed would would never never be be revealed. revealed. have
80. Modin, Modin, M y Five Cambridge 80. My CambridgeFriends, Friends,pp. pp. 79-80. 79-80. 8 1 . vol. 10, para. 81. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, para. 23. 23. 82. Tsarev, 82. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, para. para. 23. 23. West West and andTsarev,

lUfth'i#

The Crown Jewels, p. 210. 210. Jewels,p.

83. 7, ch. Maclean departed departed with with the rest of of the British 83. vol. vol. 7, ch. 10, 10, para. para. 15. 15. ADA ADA remained remained in in Paris Paris until until Maclean the rest the British embassy just before victorious German army. army. embassy in in the thesummer summer of of 1940, 1940, just before the the arrival arrival of of the the victorious German

84. vol. 10, paras. paras. 15, 15,20. Costello and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Illusions,pp. 216-17. 216-17. 84. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 20. Cf. C Costello
85. pp. C vol. vol. 7, 7, 85. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 301-2. 301-2. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Illusions, pp. 239-40. 239-40. Cf.

ch. 10, 10, para. para. 8. ch. 8. 86. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 1, 1,para. para. 16. 16. 86. 87. Borovik, Borovik, The Philby PhiIby Files, Files, p. p. 1 135. 35. 87.
88. , para. 88. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 1 1, para. 15. 15.

89. Borovik, Borovik, 89.

The Philby Pbilby Files, Files,p. p. 131. 131.

90. Borovik, Borovik, The Philby Files, Files, pp. pp. 132-3. 132-3. 90. 91. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, app., app., item item 8. 8. C Cf.Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Illusions,pp. pp. 241-2. 241-2. 91. vol. 92. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, app., app., item item 9. 9. C Cf.Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Illusions,p. p. 242. 92. 242. 93. vol. 7, 7,ch. ch. 10, 10, app., app., item item 4. 4. On O n Smollett's Smollettswartime wartime career, career, see seeAndrew Andrew and Gordievsky, 334-7. Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 334-7. 93. vol. 94. Rees, Rees, Lookingfor Lookingfor Mr. Mr. Nobod Nobody, pp. 273-7. 94. y, pp. 273-7. 95. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, item 7. 7. 95. vol. 10, app., app., item
96. Accidents, p. 96. Rees, Rees,A Chapter Cbapterof ofAccidents, p. 191. 191.

97. Borovik, Borovik, 97.

Files, pp. pp. 140-1. The Philby Files, 140-1.

98. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 1, 1, para. para. 16. 16. 98. 99, Borovik, Borovik, The Philby Files, Files, p. p. 149. 149. 99.
100. when with Burgess, for 100. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin notes notes that that "In In1940, 1940, when there there was was no no contact contact with Burgess, he he handed handed over over material material for ,, the CPGB through through MARY MARY [Litzi [Litzi Philby] Philby] and EDITH EDITH [Tudor Hart] Hart]; ch. 10, app., ; vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. app., item item 4. 4. He He the CPGB appears of 1940 appears to to have have had had little little success. success. During During a a visit visit to to the the United United States States in in the the summer summer of 1940 he he sought sought Straight's been out of touch touch with our friends Straights help help in in re-establishing re-establishing contact, contact, telling telling him, him, "I've Ive been out of with our friends for for several several fter Long Silence, months" months (Straight, (Straight, A After Silence, pp. pp. 142-3). 142-3). 101. Sudoplatos,SpecialT SpecialTasks, pp. 58-9. 58-9.Though sentenced to death, Serebryanksy escaped execution. He 101. Sudoplatos, asks, pp. Though sentenced to death, Serebryanksy escaped execution. He was was reinstated by by the the NKVD NKVDafter after the the beginning beginning of of the the Great GreatPatriotic given the job of reinstated Patriotic War War and and given the job of recruiting recruiting GerGer man POWs. He He was was re-arrested re-arrested in in 1953 1953 as as an an alleged alleged co-conspirator co-conspirator with Beria and died in prison in 1956. 102. Sudoplatos, Sudoplatos, Special T Tasks, pp. 21-8, 21-8,68. Sudoplatov himself narrowly escaped the winter winter of of 102. asks, pp. 68. Sudoplatov himself narrowly escaped arrest arrest in in the 1938-9. Special Tasks Tasks occurred occurred only only in in 1941. 1941. 1938-9. His His formal formal appointment appointment as as head head of of the the Administration Administration of of Special O n the the complicated complicated administrative administrative history history of of "special special tasks" tasks during during the theSecond Second World World War, War, see SudoplaOn Sudopla ton, Special T Tasks, pp. 126-9. 126-9. tovs, asks, pp. 103. Sudoplatovs, Special T Tasks, pp. 65-9. 65-9. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, pp. 181-3. The somewhat con conasks, pp. Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 181-3. The 103. Sudoplatovs, bizarrely suggests "the possibility the fused fused account account of of the the assassination assassination in in Volkogonov, Volkogonov, Trotsky, Trotsky, bizarrely suggests the possibility that that the American special special services services were werefollowing, following, and and perhaps perhaps in (p. 454). the American in some some sense sense influencing, influencing, events events" (p. 454). On On the gaps in in the the KGB KGB files fileson on operation operation UTKA, UTKA, see see Primakov Primakov et al., RossiyskoiVneshnei Vnesbnei Razvedki, al, Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi gaps vol. , ch. vol. 3 3, ch. 8. 8. 104. an Assassin, p. . Though Eitingon's "deserved reputation as a 104. Levine, Levine, The Mind Mind of ofan p. 221 221. Though acknowledging acknowledging Eitingons deserved reputation as a man of of many many affairs affairs with with women, Sudoplatov argues argues unconvincingly relationship with man women," Sudoplatov unconvincingly that that his his close "close" relationship with Caridad Mercader did not involve since this would have have been been a a breach breach of of regulations; regulations; Special S pecial T asks, p. p. Caridad Mercader did not involve sex, sex,since this would Tasks, 70, 70, n. n. 2. 2. 105. O n the the codenames codenames of of Caridad Caridad and Ram6n Mercader, see 105. On Ramon Mercader, see Primakov et al., Ocherki Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi VneshneiRazvedki, ch. ch. 8. 8. Mter After his his arrest, arrest, Ramon's Ram6ns codename codename was was changed to GNOM; GNOM;there there are are a num numVneshnei ber VENONA decrypts. ber of of references references to to him himunder under this this codename codename in in the the VENONA decrypts. 106. Levine, The Mind of o f an Assassin, chs. chs. 1-4. 1-4. Sudoplatovs, Sudoplatovs, Special T Tasks, asks, ch. 4. 106. Levine, 107. k-2,369; k-2,369; k-16,5 k-16,518. 107. 18. 108. k-4,206; k-4,206; t-7,12; t-7,12; kk-16,518. A sanitized sanitized account account of 108. 16,518. A of Grigulevichs Grigulevich's career in the the Spanish Civil War appears in in the 1997SVR official history history of of pre-war pre-war intelligence intelligence operations. ismade appears the 1997 SVR official operations. No No reference, reference, however, however, is made

N o tt e e s N o s

5 88 588

to the first to assassinate fear of heroic to his his role role in in the first major major attempt attempt to assassinate Trotsky, Trotsky, doubtless doubtless for for fear of tarnishing tarnishing his his heroic image. the chapter FELIPE,itit gives indication that image. Though Though the chapter on on Trotsky's Trotskys assassination assassination refers refers to to FELIPE, gives no no indication that

al, Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei FELIPE and Grigulevich the same. same. Primakov FELIPE and Grigulevich were were one one and and the Primakov etal., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vizeshnei Razvedki, chs. 12. chs. 8, 8,12. 109. 109. t-7,12. t-7,12. 1 10. See 110. See below, below, chapter chapter 10. 10. 111. k-16,518. 1 1 1 . k-16,518. 1 12. k-2,354. 112. k-2,354. 1 13. Primakov 113. Primakov et al., aZ., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, pp. pp. 100-1. 100-1. 1 14. k-2,369. Salazar, 114. k-2,369. The The head head of of the the Mexican Mexican secret secret police, police, General General Leandro LeandroSanchez Sinchez Salazar, later later reached reached the the same identify Grigulevich assault same conclusion. conclusion. Though Though able able to to identify Grigulevich only only as as FELIPE FELIPE (his (his codename codename within within the the assault group), Sanchez Salazar Salazar described described him Sanchez Salazar group), Shnchez him as as "the the real real instigator instigator of of the theattack." attack. Sinchez Salazar believed believed the the multilingual of discovering of his multilingual Grigulevich Grigulevich to to be be "a a French French Jew," Jew, partly partly as as a a result result of discovering some some of his underwear, underwear, which been purchased purchased in Saint Michel. Sanchez Salazar, which had had been in Paris Paris on on the the Boulevard Boulevard Saint Michel. Shnchez Salazar, Murder in Mexico, Mexico, pp. pp. 48-9. 48-9. 45. 1 15. Sanchez 115. SinchezSalazar, Salazar, Murder in Mexico, Mexico, p. p. 45. 116. k-2,369. 1 16. k-2,369. T asks, p. 488. 1 17. Sudoplatovs, 117. Sudoplatovs, Special SeciaZTasks, p. 74. 74. C Cf. Deutscher, Deutscher, Trotsky, Trotsky,vol. vol. 3, 3, p. p. 488. 118. Deutscher, Trotsky, Trotsky,vol. vol. 3, 3, pp. pp. 487-9. 487-9. 1 1 8. Deutscher, 1 19. Primakov Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. 119. Primakov et al., a/., Ocherki Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei vol. 3, 3, p. p. 101. 101. 120. the help 120. Released Released on on bail, bail, Siqueiros Siqueiros escaped escaped from from Mexico Mexico with with the help of of the the Chilean Chilean Communist Communist poet poet Pablo 1-14. Pablo Neruda. Neruda. Sanchez Sanchez Salazar, Salazar, Murder in Mexico, Mexico, pp. pp. 21 211-14. 121. k-2,369,354; vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 121. k-2,369,354; . 5, part part 1 1. 122. 122. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 183-5. 183-5. 3, ch. 5. 123. 123. Levine, Levine, The Mind Mind of o f an Assassin, Assassin, chs. chs. 5-9; 5-9; Deutscher, Deutscher, Trotsky, Trotsky,vol. vol. 3, ch. 5. 124. 124. Note Note by by Enrique Enrique Castro CastroDelgado, Delgado, the the Spanish Spanish Communist Communist Party Party representative representative at at Comintern Cominternhead headquarters, an Assassin, quarters, on on a a conversation conversation with with Caridad CaridadMercader, Mercader, in in Levine, Levine, The Mind Mind of ofan Assassin, pp. pp. 216-22. 216-22. 125. See below, chs. 22,23. 125. See below, chs. 22, 23.

1. 1. k-27,app. 2. Primakov Primakov et al., a/., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, p. 247. 247. 2. 3. The visiting visiting lecturers lecturers included included Academicians Academicians 1. I. M. M. Maisky, Maisky, A. A. M. A. Guber, and and 3. The M. Deborin Deborinand andA. A. A. Guber, ambassadors ambassadors A. A. A. A.Troyanovsky, Troyanovsky, B. B.Yeo Ye. Shteyn Shteyn and and Shenburg. Shenburg. k-27,appendix. k-27,appendix. 4. Primakov Primakov et al., aZ., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi RossiyskoiVneshnei Vneshnei vol. 3, 3, p. 248. Razvedki, vol. p. 248. 4. 5. On O n June June 5, 5,1943 SHON was reorganized reorganized as as the the Intelligence Intelligence School School (RASH) (RASH) of of the the NKVD NKVDFirst First (For5. 1943 SHON was (For eign Intelligence) Intelligence) Directorate, and the thetraining training course to two two years. years. By Bythe the end endof of the the war war about eign Directorate, and course extended extended to about 200 foreign intelligence intelligence officers had graduated from it (k-27,appendix). During the the Cold Cold War Warit it was known successively successively as asthe the Higher HigherIntelligence School (codenamed School no. 101), lOl), the theRed Red Banner Banner Insti Instiknown School (codenamed School no. tute and and the the Andropov Andropov Institute. Institute. In In October October 1994 1994 it became became the the Foreign Foreign Intelligence Intelligence Academy Academy of of the the Rus Rustute it Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, vol. ch. 23). sian sian Federation Federation (Primakov (Primakov et al, al., Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Istorii Rossiyskoi fizeshnei vol. 3, 3, ch. 23). 6. Slutsky, Slutsky, Pasov Pasovand and Shpigelglas Shpigelglas had had been been liquidated liquidated during during 1938. 1938. Beria's Berias acolyte, acolyte, Vladimir Vladimir Georgyevich Georgyevich 6. Dekanozov, who who briefly succeeded Shpigelglas, Shpigelglas, became became Deputy Foreign Commissar Commissar in in May May1939. 1939. Dekanozov, briefly succeeded Deputy Foreign 7.Fitins career is is summarized summarized in in Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany VeteranyVneshnei pp.153-5, which 7. Fitin's career Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 153-5, which acknowledges that that he heowed owed his his promotion promotion to to "the theacute acute shortage shortage of of intelligence personnel. acknowledges intelligence personnel." 8. vol. vol. 7, 7,ch. ch. 2, para. para. 1. A somewhat somewhat inaccurate inaccurate hagiography hagiography of of Gorsky's Gorskys career career (which, (which, inter inter alia, alia,attributes attributes 8. 1. A intelligence by Cairncross to Maclean) appears in in Samolis (ed.), Veterany VeteranyVneshnei Vneshnei Razvedki intelligence supplied supplied by Cairncross to Maclean) appears Samolis (ed.), 31-2. There There is is no no mention mention of of Gorskys in 1953 1953 (Andrew (Andrew and Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 304). pp. 31-2. Gorsky's disgrace disgrace in and Gordievsky, p. 304). Rossii, pp. The The SVR SVR historians, historians, however, however, indirectly indirectly give give some some indication indication of of the the extent extent of of the the disgrace disgrace when when they they acknowledge that that they they have have been unable to to establish establish the the date dateof of Gorsky's Gorskys death. death. acknowledge 9. Interview Interview with with Blunt Blunt cited cited in in Cecil, Cecil, A Divided Life, Life, p. p. 66. 9. 10. Bentley, Out of o f Bondage, pp. pp. 173-7. 173-7. 10. Bentley, 11. See above, above, chapter chapter 5. 1 1 . See 5. 12. Borovik, Borovik, The Philby PhiZby FiZe, pp. 153-4, 153-4,166-7. O n SOE SO Esee see Foot, Foot, SOE. SOE. File, pp. 166-7. On 12. 13. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 303-12. 303-12. Though the identity identityof ELLI ELL1 appears not to have been 13. British intelligence for many years years after the Second World War, it was in fact one of of a numnumestablished by British

Chapter Six Chapter

War W ar

N o N o tt e e s s

589 89 S

ber period. In In Russian ELL! means means Ls, "Ls," an an appropri ber of of somewhat somewhat transparent transparent Soviet Soviet codenames codenames of of the theperiod. Russian ELL1 appropri-

ate codename codename for for Leo Leo Long, Long,whose whose initials initials were were LL. ate 14. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 9, 9, para. para. 22. 22. The The defector defector was was Walter Walter Krivitsky, Krivitsky, codenamed GROLL. OnKings arrest, see 14. vol. GROLL. On King's arrest, Andrew, Secret Secret Service, Service, pp. pp. 606-7. 606-7. Andrew,

15. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, p. p. 272. 272. 15. Andrew
16. West and andTsarev, Tsarev, The CrownJewels, CrownJewels, pp. pp. 214-17; 214-17; Michael Smith, The Humble Scot Rose the 16. West Michael Smith, "The Humble Scot whowho Rose to to the Top-But Then Then Chose Chose Treachery,Daily Telegraph Telegraph(January (January 12,1992). KGB file corroborates 12, 1992). Cairncrosss Cairncross's KGB Top-But Treachery,"
the the Centre's British desk desk that that he he provided provided "tons of documents documents" the recollection recollection of of a a former former head head of of the Centres British tons of

(Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 272). Confident that his file would would never never see light of 272). Confi dent that his file see the the light of day, day, CairnCairn (Andrew cross denied denied that that he provided anything anything of of significance significance to until after Soviet cross he provided to the the London London residency residency until after the the Soviet Union entered entered the the war. war. He H e admitted, admitted, however, however, that that he had no difficulty in having access access to secret Union he had "no difficulty in having to the the secret papers in in Hankey's Hankeys office" office(Cairncross, (Cairncross, The Enigma Spy, pp. 90-1). Cabinetregulations regulations in 90-1). When new War Cabinet papers June 1941 1941 limited limited the the circulation circulation of of diplomatic diplomatic telegrams telegrams to to Hankey, Hankey, Cairncross as well as Hankey comJune com plained personally personally to to the the Foreign Foreign Office. Office. The The restrictions restrictions were were quickly quickly lifted. lifted. (G. Clutton (Foreign plained (G. L. L. Clutton (Foreign
Office) Cairncross (June (June 6, 1941); Sir Alexander Cadogan to 17, 1941). Hankey Papers, Office) to to Cairncross 6,1941); Sir Alexander Cadogan to Hankey Hankey (June (June 17,1941). Hankey Papers, Churchill Churchill College College Archives Archives Center, Center, Cambridge, Cambridge, HNKY HNKY 4/33.) 4/33.) 17. 17. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 2, 2, para. para. 7. 7.

18. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany Veterany Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki Rossii, Rossii, pp. 63-5. Costello Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Illusions, pp. pp. 18. pp. 63-5. Costello and and Tsarev, 266. (Costello and Tsarev Tsarev wrongly wrongly compute compute the the period period when 78-81. Andrew 78-81. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 266. (Costello and when the months.) the Center Centerwas was out out of of touch touch with with Harnack Harnackas as fifteen fifteen rather rather than thantwenty-eight twenty-eight months.) Razvedki Rossii, p. p. 64; Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, pp. 82-5; 82-5; 19. Samolis 19. Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany VeteranyVneshnei Vneshnei 64; Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Illusions,pp. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 266-7; 266-7; Tarrant, Tarrant, The Red Orchestra, Orchestra, chs. chs. 17-19. 17-19. Andrew 20. 20. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, p. p. 286. 286. Razvedki Rossii, p. 64. 64. 21. Samolis 21. Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany VeteranyVneshnei Vnesbnei Rossii, p. 22. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany Veterany Vneshnei 154. Some Some of the intelligence intelligence warnings warnings of of the Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. p. 154. of the the 22. preparations for for BARBAROSSA BARBAROSSA are are printed printed as as appendices al, Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi preparations appendices to to Primakov Primakov et al., VneshneiRazvedki, Razvedki, vol. vol. 3 3. . Vneshnei of of 2 3 . The n it were n Izvestia o 23. The report report and and Stalin's Stalins comment comment o on it were published published i in f the Central CentralCommittee Committee o f the CPSU (April C Costello and Tsarev, p. 86. 86. (April 1990). 1990). Cf. Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Illusions,p. pp. 275, 275,282. Prange et al., T Target Tokyo,chs. chs. 42-7. 24. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. 24. 282. Prange arget Tokyo, 42-7. 25.JIC(41)218(Final), CAB 81/102, 81/102, PRO. PRO. On O n Churchill's Churchills warnings warnings to to Stdin, see Gorodetsky, 25. JIC(41)218(Final), CAB Stalin, see Gorodetsky, Sfafford Stafford C1'ipps'Mission reached Stalin, Stalin, and and in in what form, CrippsMissionto t o Moscow 1940-42, 1940-42, chs. chs. 2-4. 2-4. Exactly Exactly which which JIC reports reports reached whatform, cannot be be determined determined at at present. present. But, But, given given both both the the volume volume of of highly highly classified intelligence from cannot classified intelligence from LonLon don Churchill's belief an don and and the the numerous numerous JIC JIC assessments assessmentswhich which contradicted contradicted Churchills belief that that Hitler Hitlerwas was planning planning an invasion of of Russia, must surely surely have have been been aware aware of the JIC view. The files noted invasion Russia, Stalin Stalin must of the JIC view. The files noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin show show that Stalin Stalin had had access access to to at at least least some some of of the the telegrams telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Foreign Office Office and the that British ambassador in Cripps. vol. ch. 2, 2, para. para. 10. 10. British ambassador in Moscow, Moscow, Sir Sir Stafford Stafford Cripps. vol. 7, ch. 26. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 274. 274. 26. 27. 1. 27. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 2, 2, para. para. 1 11. Barbarossa, pp. 223-4, 241-3. A n important important new study b y Gabriel Gabriel Gorodetsky, Gorodetsky, 2 8 . Whaley, 28. Whaley, Codeword Barbarossa, pp. 223-4, 241-3. An new study by Grand Delusion: was published published just just as this volume volume was was going going to Delusion:Stalin Stalinand the German GermanInvasion of o f Russia, was as this to press. performs a a valuable valuable service service by bydemolishing the main surpress. It performs demolishing the main conspiracy conspiracy theories theories (in (in particular particular those those sur rounding ght to on Germany) Germany) which which have rounding Hess's Hesss fli flight to Britain Britain and and Stalin's Stalins alleged alleged preparations preparations for for an an attack attack on have confused some recent BARBAROSSA. Though Though there confused some recent interpretations interpretations of of the thebackground background of of operation operation BARBAROSSA. there are are some gaps gaps in in his his analysis analysis of of Soviet Soviet intelligence, intelligence, Professor Professor Gorodetsb some Gorodetsky also also adds adds much much interesting interesting detail detail from newly newly accessible accessible Russian Russian archives. archives. His His portrait portrait of of Stalin as as "rational rational and level-headed from level-headed" is, however, Stalin's obsessive pursuit of ofTrotsky Trotsky and his foreign foreign supporters. supporters. Grand difficult difficult to to reconcile reconcile with, with, inter alia, alia,Stalins obsessivepursuit and his is, none none the major work. Delusion Delusion is, the less, less, a a major work. 29. 29. Vaksberg, Vaksberg, The Prosecutor and the Prey, Prey,p. p. 220. 220. 30. had been been appointed appointed deputy deputy director director of ofINO 30. One One of of the the files files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin records records that that Zarubin Zarubinhad IN0 in successive heads heads of ofINO were liquidated, liquidated, and in 1937 1937(vol. (vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2). 2). Over Over the thenext next two two years, years, three three successive I N 0 were and Zarubin only only just just escaped escaped a a similar similar fate. fate. It is is not not clear clear precisely preciselywhat what position position he held held in the theCenter Center at the Zarubin at the beginning beginning of of 1941. 1941. 31. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. On O n December December 18, 18, 1940 1940 Hitler Hitler had had ordered the completion 3 1 . vol. ordered the completion of of preparations preparations for for BARBAROSSA May 15, 194 1 . BARBAROSSA by by May 15,1941. 3 2 . vol. 32. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5,part part 2 2..

N o t t N o
33. Samolis (ed.), 33. Samolis (ed.),

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Veterany Veterany Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki Rossii, p. 154. 154.

34. See below, below, chapter chapter 7. 7. 34. See 1992). Even 35. Interview with with Shebarshin, Shebarshin, Daily DaiZy Telegraph (December (December 1, 1,1992). Even in in the theyear year before before the the abortive abortive 35. Interview

coup of of August August 1991, 1991, both the public and inner convictions of of the the KGB KGB leadership were influcoup both the public rhetoric rhetoric and inner convictions leadership were influ

from the enced -Western conspiracy theories. Andrew enced by by crude crude anti anti-Western conspiracy theories. Andrew and and Gordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instructions InstructionsJjom theCen Cen8-22. Andrew ter, ter, pp. pp. 21 218-22. Andrew and and Gordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), More Instructionsfrom InstructionsJjomthe Center, Center,pp. pp. 125-8. 125-8. 281-3. Kahn, Cold War," 36. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 249-50, 249-50, 281-3. Kahn, "Soviet Soviet Comint Comint in in the the Cold War, pp. pp. 36. 1 1-13. PURPLE 1939. Soviet 11-13. PURPLE had had been been introduced introduced in in 1939. Soviet codebreakers codebreakers had had also also broken broken the the earlier earlier and and less less complex Japanese Japanese RED cipher. cipher. On O n the the breaking breaking of of PURPLE by by US military military cryptanalysts, cryptanalysts, see see Kahn, Kahn, complex "Pearl Pearl Harbor Harbor and and the the Inadequacy Inadequacy of of Cryptanalysis." Cryptanalysis. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin did did not not have have access access to to the thearchives archives of of the the KGB KGB Sixteenth Sixteenth Directorate, Directorate, which-together which-together with with those those of of the the GRU-contain GRU-contain the the main main SIGINT SIGINT files files of of the the Great GreatPatriotic Patriotic War. War. 37. Erickson, Erickson, The Road Roadto 329; Overy, Overy, Russia's Russia? War, War, p. 118. 37. to Stalingrad Stalingrad, p. p. 329; p. 1 1 8. 38. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 282. 282. 38. Andrew 39. On recruitment recruitment to to Bletchley Bletchley Park, Park, see see Hinsley Hinsley and and Stripp Stripp(eds.), (eds.), Codebreakers; Codebreakers;Andrew, Andrew, "F. F.H. H. Hinsley Hinsley 39. On and Moles"; Smith, Station and the the Cambridge Cambridge Moles; Smith, Station X X. 40. See below, 159. Andrew 40. See below, pp. pp. 156, 156,159. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 312-13. 312-13. T asks, p. the German German invasion, 41. Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, p. 130. 130. Mter After the invasion, Sudoplatov's Sudoplatovs Directorate Directorate for for Special Special 41. Sudoplatovs, Tasks the pre-war Tasks and and Guerrilla Guerrilla Warfare Warfare (officially (officially entitled entitled Diversionary Diversionary Intelligence), Intelligence), the the successor successor of of the pre-war Administration for Special Tasks, officially removed NKVD First First (Foreign (Foreign Intelligence) Administration for Special Tasks, was was officially removed from from the the NKVD Intelligence) Directorate Directorate as as a a new new Fourth Fourth Directorate. Directorate. Though Though the the two two directorates directorates remained remained formally formally independent independent until 1943, there until April April 1943, there was was a a constant constant interchange interchange of of personnel personnel between between them. them. Murphy, Murphy, Kondrashev Kondrashev and and Bailey, Bailey, Battleground Berlin, Berlin,pp. pp. 28-9. 28-9. 42. Partisan The official official Soviet Soviet guide guide to to the the Museum Museumof of Partisan Glory Glory is is Balatsky, Balatsky, Museum in in the Catacombs. CataLoombs. At 42. The the time time of of writing, writing, the the Museum Museumis is still still open open daily daily with with guided guided tours tours in in Russian Russian and and Ukrainian Ukrainian catacombs. catacombs. the 43. 43. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany Eterany Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki Rossii, p. p. 101. 101. 44. For details details of of the thereconstruction, reconstruction, see see Balatsky, Balatsky,Museum in inthe Catacombs. Catacombs. 44. For 45. vol. 5, sec. sec. 13. 45. vol. 5, 13. 46. capture and Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany Veterany Vneshnei Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, p. 102-3. 102-3. This This account account of of Molodtsov's Molodtsovs capture and 46. Samolis execution Odessa file. execution is is neither neither confirmed confirmed nor nor contradicted contradicted by by Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes on on the theOdessa file. 47. 3. 47. vol. vol. 5, 5, sec. sec. 1 13. 4 8 . vol. 3. vol. 5, 5, sec. sec. 1 13. 48. 4 9 . vol. . vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 1 1. 49. 50. ford Companion to r, pp. pp. 1240-1. 50. Dear Dear and and Foot Foot (eds.), (eds.), The Ox Oxford Companion t o the Second World Wa War, 1240-1. 5 1 . Dear and Foot Foot (eds.), (eds.), The Ox ford Companion Companion to the Second World WorldWar, W ar, p. best Dear and Oxford p. 1240. 1240. Probably Probably the the best 51. study of by Professor Professor Richard Richard Overy, Overy, concludes concludes that, that, " . Where the study of the the eastern easternfront, front, by . . . .. Where the NKVD NKVD did did intervene the effect wound the the war of the intervene the effect was was to to wound war effort, effort, not not to to invigorate invigorate it." it. One One part part of the complex complex ex explanation for increasing RedArmy Army was demotion,under under the pressure planation for increasing success success of of the the Red was the the demotion, the pressure of of war, war, of of the political apparatchiks apparatchiks at at the front and the new freedom freedom given given to to officers officers the front in in the theautumn autumnof of 1942 1942 and the new ar, to take decisions decisions without being constantly checked checked for correctness. Overy, totake withoutbeing constantly for political political correctness. Overy, Russia's Russias W War, pp. pp. 329-30. 329-30. There was was no no legal legal residency residency in in Argentina. Argentina. At the the outbreak of of war war no no Latin Latin American American state state had had diplo diplo52. There 52. At outbreak matic 1942 Cuba matic relations relations with with the the Soviet Soviet Union. Union. In In October October 1942 Cuba established established diplomatic diplomatic relations relations with with the the USSR. By By the the beginning beginning of of 1945 another eight eight Latin American republics republics had had followed followed suit. suit. Argentina Argentina did did USSR. 1945 another Latin American not establish establish diplomatic diplomatic relations relations with with the the Soviet Soviet Union Union until until 1946. 1946. not vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 1. 1. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes, notes, which which identify identify ARTUR ARTUR as as Grigulevich, Grigulevich, provide provide the the solution solution to to 53. vol. 53. a major major unsolved unsolved problem problem in in the theVENONA VENONA decrypts. Though Though the thedecrypts decrypts contain contain frequent frequent references references to to a decrypts. ARTUR, his his identity identity was was never never discovered discovered by by NSA or or the theFBI (Benson, (Benson, VENON VENONA HistoricalMonograpb A Historical Monograph ARTUR, #5, p. 5). p. 5). 54. Second World W ar, vol. , pp. 54. Humphreys, Humphreys, Latin America and andthe the War, vol. 1 1, pp. 154-6. 154-6. Macdonald,"The The Politics ofIntervention"; of Intervention; Newton, Newton, "Disorderly Disorderly Succession." Succession. 55. Macdonald, 55. Politics 56. 56. Wartime Wartime Soviet Soviet agents agents with with access access to to US USpolicy policy documents documents on on Argentina Argentina included included Laurence Laurence Duggan, Duggan, a a Latin Latin American American expert expert in in the the State State Department, Department, and and Maurice Maurice Halperin, Halperin, chief chief of of the the Latin Latin American American division in in the the OSS branch (Peake, (Peake, "OSS OSS and and the theVenona Venona Decrypts," Decrypts, pp. 22,25-6). division OSS R&A branch pp. 22, 25-6). 57. 57. k-16,477. k-16,477. 58. k-13,370. 58. k-13,370. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, part part 1; 1; k-16,477. k-16,477. 59. vol. 59.

N o t t N o

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60. 1945. 60. Argentina Argentina did did not not declare declare war war on on Germany Germany until untilMarch March 1945. 61. Grigulevich's 61. Grigulevichs couriers couriers to to New New York York included included the the Chilean ChileanCommunist Communist Eduardo Pecchio and and aamember Eduardo Pecchio member

of the the Latin American section section of of the the Columbian Columbian Broadcasting Broadcasting Service, Service, Ricardo Ricardo Setaro (GONETS). of Latin American VENONA decrypt, decrypt, 2nd 2nd release, release, p. p. 26; 26; 3rd 3rd release release, part 2 2, 101. VENONA p. 101. , p. , part 62. VENONA VENONA decrypts, decrypts, 5th 5th release, release, pp. pp. 1 11-12,14-17,20-1,24-6,31-2. 62. 1-12, 14-17, 20-1, 24-6, 31-2.
63. 63. k-16,477. k-16,477. 64. 64. See See below, below, chapter chapter 22. 22. 65. on February February 4,1956: 4, 1956: 65. The The Center Center instructed instructed the the Montevideo Montevideo residency residency on

Do not not re-establish re-establish contact contact [with [with VerzhbitksyJ Verzhbitksy]. Arrangements for for his his entry tothe theUSSR must be Do . Arrangements entry to USSR must be made under under MFA MFA auspices auspices in in the usual way; way; do do not involved in the process process and make make no no made the usual not get get involved promises, including including fi financial ones. Make Make a one-time one-time payment of pesos and and we we will promises, nancial ones. of 1,500 1,500 pesos will then make no no further further monetary monetary payments. payments. make
(k-16,477) (k-16,477) 66. 66. k-16,477. k-16,477.

67. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsk Gordievsky, pp. 259-64. 259-64. 67. J', KGB, pp.

Russia's War, W ar, pp. pp. 232-3. 232-3. 68. 68. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 259-64; 259-64; Overy, Overy, Russiai 69. Volkogonov, Stalin, Stalin, pp. pp. 444-7. 444-7. 69. Volkogonov, 70. k-4,204. The The total total number number of of sources sources was wassubstantially substantially greater greater than than those accorded agent agent status by the 70. Center. According According to to KGB KGB fi files, the nationality nationality of of the the agents agents was: French; 5 5 Belgians; 13 Center. les , the was: 55 55 Germans; Germans; 14 14 French; Belgians; 13 Austrians, Czechs Czechs and and Hungarians; Hungarians; 6 6 Russians; Russians; and and 116 others. The principal leaders, according to to the the same same Austrians, 6 others. fi les, were: were: Belgian French section files, Belgian section: section: Leopold Leopold Trepper; Trepper; German German section: section: Harro Harro Schulze-Boysen; Schulze-Boysen; French section (except Lyon): Lyon): Henry Henry Robinson; Robinson; Lyon: Lyon: Isidor Isidor Springer; Springer; Dutch section: section: Anton Anton Winterinck; Winterinck;Swiss Swiss section: section: (except Sandor Sandor Rado. Rado. "Spies, Ciphers and 'Zitadelle' "; Andrew 71. 71. Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency, Agency, The Rate Rote Kapelle; Kapelle; Milligan, Milligan, Spies, Ciphers and Zitadelle; Andrew and and Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 285-9. 285-9. Gordievsky, 72. Glantz, Glantz, Soviet Sovist Jl; Military Intelligezce in W War; Jukes, The Soviets and Ultra; Andrew and 72. Jilitary Intelligence m; Jukes, "The Soviets and 'Ultra' "; Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 289. 289. 73. Beevor, Stalillgrad, Stalingrad, pp. pp. 166-75, 166-75,201. 73 . Beevor, 201 . 74. States in in 1941, 74. Under Under lend-lease lend-lease agreements agreements with with Britain Britain and and the the United United States 1941, the the Soviet Soviet Union Union was was sup supplied with with 35,000 radio stations, stations, 380,000 380,000 fi field telephones and 956,000 miles of plied 35,000 radio eld telephones of telephone cable. cable. Overy, Russia's pp. 193-4. Russia? War, Wzr,pp. 193-4. 75. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 315-20; 315-20; Milligan, Milligan, Spies, and'Zitadelle.' Zitadelle. "Spies, Ciphers Ciphers and '' 75. 76. Soviet Co Comint in the the Cold ColdWar," War, p. p. 14. 14. 76. Kahn, Kahn, "Soviet mint in

1. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 241-2. least in in the the early early 1930s, FourthDepartment Department was 1. Andrew 241-2. At least 1930s, the the Fourth was probprob ably primarily primarily interested interested in in the theUnited United States as as a a base base from collect intelligence intelligence on Germanyand ably States from which which to to collect on Germany and Japan. files on on its its American American agents agents and and did did not not note Japan. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin did did not not have have access access to to Fourth FourthDepartment Department files note references to to these these agents agents in in KGB KGB files. files. The The case case against against Hiss, which has has been strong but ever references Hiss, which been strong but controversial controversial ever since his his conviction conviction for for perjury perjury in in 1951, 1951, is is now now overwhelming overwhelming as revealed during since as a a result result of of new new evidence evidence revealed during the 1990s 1990s from from the the VENONA VENONAdecrypts, decrypts, KGB KGB fi files made available available to Weinstein and Vassiliev which refer the les made Vassilievwhich to his work for for military military intelligence, intelligence, and and Hungarian Hungarian interrogation to his work interrogation records records of of Hisss Hiss's fellow fellow agent agent Noel Noel Field. These These sources sources also alsodo do much much to to vindicate vindicate the the credibility credibility of Hisss principal public accuser, the former Field. of Hiss's principal public accuser, the former Fourth Department Department courier courier Whittaker Whittaker Chambers. Chambers. The best accounts of Fourth of the Hiss case are the 1997 1997 and Vassiliev, Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, W ood, chs. chs. 2,12. 2, 12. updated updated edition edition of of Weinstein, Weinstein, Perjll1Y, Perjlcry, and and Weinstein Weinstein and 2. Wadleigh, Wadleigh, "Why Why I Spied Spied for for the the Communists," Communists, part part 7, 7,New York Post (July (July 19,1949). 19, 1949). 2. 3 . vol. 3. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2; 2; vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part part 1, 1,n. n. 2. 2. ption, p. defected from in 1938 1938 makes 4. 4 .Massing, Massing, This This Dece Deception, p. 155. 155.The The fact fact that that Massing Massing defected from the the NKVD in makes her her tribute tribute to to Bazarov Bazarov all all the the more more impressive. impressive. 5. 5. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. 6. 6. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. 7. The The details details in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes on on "19" 19(date (date of of birth, birth, work in the LatinAmerican theState State 7. work in the Latin American division division of of the Department, later later transfer transfer to to the the UN Relief Relief and and Rehabilitation Rehabilitation Administration) Administration) clearly clearly identi$ as Department, identify him him as Duggan; vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part 2. By By 1943, however, Duggans Duggan's codename code name had had been been changed changed to to Duggan; part 2. 1943, at at the the latest, latest, however, FRENK (or FRANK); 2nd release FRENK (or FRANK); VENONA, VENONA,2nd release, pp. 278-9. 278-9. , pp. 8. Weinstein, Weinstein, Peljury, Pevury, pp. pp. 182-3. 182-3. 8.

Chapter Seven

GrmzdAZZiance The Grand Alliance

No t
9. 9. vol. vol.6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. 10. 10. See See above, above, p. p. 84. 84.

e s

592

11. fter Long 10, 122-3, 129-36; Newton, Embrace, pp. 11. Straight, Straight, A After Long Silence, Silence, pp. pp. 1 110,122-3,129-36; Newton, The Butcher's Butcher> Embrace, pp. 20-2. 20-2. 12. Gordievsky, , 290. On 12. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 240-3 240-3,290. On Whittaker Whittaker Chambers, Chambers,see see his his memoir, memoir, Witness, Witness,and and the the biography biography by by Sam Sam Tanenhaus, Tanenhaus, 13. 13. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. 14. recalled from the 14. Others Others the United UnitedStates States to to be interrogated and and liquidated in Moscow included the the ille de-

Whittaker Chambers. Chambers.

et al, al, Ocherki Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Razvedki, vol. RossiyskoiVneshnei Vneshnei vol. 3, 3, pp. pp. 180-1. 180-1. 15. 15. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5,part part 2. Significantly, Significantly,material on Morozov's Morozovs denunciation of two successive successive residents was among that excluded excluded from from the thedocuments selected selected by the SVR SVRfor the recent study of Soviet Soviet espionage espionage in the United States the Stalin by Weinstein the United States in in the Stalin era era by Weinstein and and Vassiliev, Vassiliev, The The Haunted Wood While While obliged obliged to to acknowledge ficers, the SVR y reluctant to reveal acknowledge the the purge purge of many loyal loyal foreign foreign intelligence intelligence of officers, SVRis generall generally cases cases where where they they were were denounced denounced by by their their own own comrades. comrades. Despite Despite such such examples examples of of SVR SVR censorship, censorship, for for which ood is which Weinstein Weinstein and and Vassiliev Vassiliev are are not, not, of of course, course, responsible, responsible, The The Haunted W Wood is a a very very valuable valuable contri contribution bution to to the the history history of of Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence operations. operations. 16. 16. It I t is is unclear unclear from from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes whether whether or not Akhmerov Akhmerov was was given given charge charge of an independent independent illegal recall. However, both illegal residency residency bifore before Bazarov's Bazarovs recall. However, Hede Massing's Massings memoirs memoirs strongly suggest suggest that both Bazarov Bazarov and Akhmerov Akhmerov were members of the same same illegal illegal residency residency until at least least 1937. 1937. Massing, This 187-8, 191. Deception, Deception, pp. pp. 187-8, 191. 17. . Significantly, 17. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 3, part 1 1. Significantly,the list of of names noted by by Mitrokhin did didnot notinclude Samuel Samuel Dick Dickstein, stein, a a Democratic Democratic congressman congressman from from Manhattan Manhattan (codenamed (codenamed CROOK), CROOK), who who had had volunteered volunteered his his ser services but demanded a vices to the NKVD NKVD in in1937 1937 but a high price for his intelligence. intelligence. Over the thenext two two years, the NKVD oscillated recy oscillated between pride at having an agent in Congress Congress and suspicion suspicion that Dickstein was recycling publicly publicly available available information. In June 1939 1939 Ovakimyan denounced him in ina message message to the theCenter Center ood, ch. as as "a acomplete complete racketeer racketeer and blackmailer." blackmailer.Weinstein and Vassiliev, Vassiliev, The The Haunted W o o d , ch. 7. 7. 18 . On 18. O n Duggan's Duggans codenames, codenames, see see above, above, n. n. 7. 7. 19. Justice 19. MORIS MORIS is is described described in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhhsnote as as an "archivist" archivistat the the Justice Department (vol. (vol. 6, 6, ch. 3, part 1); access 1); this may, may, however, however,mean simply simply that he hehad had access to department departmentftles files and archives. archives. 20. 20. On the the careers careers of Morros Morros (who (who became became an FBI FBI double double agent early early in the the Cold ColdWar), Martha Dodd Dodd Stern Stern and andWilliam WilliamE. E. Dodd, Jr. (both (both of whom failed failed to live live up to the Centre's Centres high early expectations), expectations), ood, chs. , 6. see see Weinstein Weinstein and and Vassiliev, Vassiliev, The The Haunted W W o o d , chs. 3 3,6. 21. AIN is the spelling 21. KHOSY KHOSYAIN is identified identified as as Buchman Buchman in in vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part 2, 2,but but the spelling of of his his name ("Bukman" (Bukman in in Cyrillic Cyrillic transliteration) transliteration) is is uncertain. uncertain. 22. 22. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. 23. fter Long Silence, 23. Straight, Straight,A After Silence, pp. 143-4. 143-4. 24. 24. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2; 2;vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, app. app. 6. 6. 25. ficial history that mid-1939 is 25. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part 2. The claim claim in an SVR SVR of official that Akhmerov was recalled recalled in mid-1939 difficult inin late difficult to reconcile reconcilewith with Straight's Straightsaccount of a a meeting with with him him late October. October. Primakov et al, al., Ocherki Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Razvedki, vol. 3, RossiyskoiVneshnei Vneshnei 3, ch. ch. 15. 15. Rossiyskoi Vneshnei Razvedki, 26. 26. Primakov et et al, a l , Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Istorii Rossiyskoi Razvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, ch. ch. 15. 15. On O n Ovakimyan's Ovakimyans role in preparations f or Trotsky's for Trotskys assassination, assassination,see see Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 183-4. 183-4. The Centre's Centres obses obsession Trotskyists in the sion with the thepursuit pursuit of ofTrotskylsts theUnited United States continued even even after Trotsky's Trotskys assassination. assassination. 27. 27. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany Etermy Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki Razuedki Rossii, pp. 135-7. 135-7. Primakov et al., al., Ocherki Ocherki Istorii IstoriiRossiyskoi Rossiyskoi Vneshnei chemical institutes; the SVR histories VneshneiRazvedki, Razvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, pp. 177-8. 177-8. There were were two two New York chemical histories do not make clear erred to. clear which is ref referred 28. 28. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 6. 6. 29. Razvedki al., Ocherki 29. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part 2. 2. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany VeteranyVneshnei Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, Rossii, pp. 169-71; 169-71; Primakov et etal., Ochoki Istorii Rossiyskoi p. 173 . Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, vol. vol. 3, 3, p. 177. 177.Weinstein and and Vassiliev, The Haunted Wood, W o o d , 173. 30. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 3, 3, part part 1. 1.The VENONA VENONA decrypts decrypts of of NKVD NKVD wartime wartime telegrams telegrams from the United States 30. include 200 agents ofwhom remain unidentifi ed). Since include the the codenames codenames of of approximately approximately200 agents (about (about half halfofwhom unidentified). Since these telegrams raction of the telegrams represent represent only only a af fraction the wartime wartime communications between the Center Centerand its American residencies, residencies, the the total total NKVD NKVD network network must have have been substantially substantially larger. larger. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes give give no sta statistics for for the the size size of the network network after 1941. 1941. The occupational breakdown for the network network in April April1941 1941 tistics incomplete. Apart Apart f from the forty-nine "engineers," engineers,Mitrokhin gives gives the the occupations occupations of only is highly incomplete. rom the thirty-six others, others, ofwhom twenty-two twenty-two were werejournalists. Many of the agents agents were were immigrants and refugees. refugees. In 1940-1, States (vol. 1940-1, sixty-six Baltic Baltic recruits recruits emigrated to to the theUnited United (vol. 6, ch. 3, 3, part 1). 1 ) .

gal CHARLIE, le was destroyed CHARLIE, whose fi file destroyed and whose identity identity is is now unknown. Primakov

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3 1 . Weinstein and Vassiliev, ood, p 73 . 31. Vassiliev, The Haunted HauntedW Wood, p.. 1 173. 32. 32. Primakov et aL, aL, Ocherki OcherkiIstorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, vol. 3, p. 178. 178. f iles cited by 33. 33. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 290-1. 290-1. Weinstein, Weinstein, Perjury, pp. pp. 292-3. 292-3. KGB files by Weinstein and Vassiliev

(The ood, pp. 106, 106, 159, 159, 1 61-2)identifjr identify Lauchlin (The Haunted W Wood, 161-2) Lauchlin Currie as the agent PAGE

of the VENONA VENONAdecrypts. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not not mention mention Currie. referred to in a number of

Veterany Kterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, Rossii, p. 53. V eterany Vneshnei &terany VnesbneiRazvedki Rossii, pp. 50-3. 50-3. 36. 1929 Zarubina (then Gorskaya) Gorskaya) had been used to seduce the pro-Trotskyist illegal Blyumkin and 36. In 1929 lure him back to execution execution in Moscow. 37. 37. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2. 38. 38. vol. 6, 6, ch. 12. 12. 39. vol. 6, World $American ofAmerican Communism, Communism, ch. 7. 7. 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of VENONA decrypts refer to Lee's Lees work as a Soviet agent. Other Other important important agents in 40. A number of OSS identified identified by VENONA include Maurice Maurice Halperin Halperin(HARE), (HARE), J. Julius Joseph Joseph (CAUTIOUS) and and OSS Donald Niven Wheeler (IZRA). 118, 178-9; 3rd release, (IZRA).(For examples, examples, see VENONA, VENONA, 2nd release, pp. 118,178-9; agents at atOSS headquarters were probably well into double figures. Communists part 2, p. 196.) Soviet agents OSS headquarters of them agents) have been identified identified in in the the Russian, Spanish, (not all of Spanish, Balkan, Hungarian and Latin Latin of OSS's OSSs R&A R U division, and in its operational German, German, Japanese, Korean, Italian, American sections of Spanish,Hungarian and Indonesian divisions. Peake, OSS Decrypts; Andrew Spanish, Hungarian and Indonesian divisions. "OSS andthe the Venona Decrypts"; and Gordievsky, 294-5; Klehr, Haynes and American Communism, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. 294-5; and Firsov, The Secret World of ofAmerican Communism, pp. 276-8. 276-8. 41. Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. 450-1. 450-1. 42. Kiehr, American Communism, Communism, pp. 234-6. Klehr, Haynes Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of ofAmerican 234-6. 43. vol. vol. 6, ch. 12. 12. VENONA, p. 58. 44. VENON A, 2nd release, part 2, p. . 45. Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 451 451. 46. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2 2.. 47. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2 2.. 47. 4 8 . Akhmerov told the Center April 1944, [Brow 48. Centeri nin 1944, "For For your information: I have never nevermet RULEVOY [Browder]. VENON ENONA, 26-8. A, 3rd release, part 1, 1, pp. 26-8. der]''' 49. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. 2. Straight,A 50. Straight, fter Long Silence, After Silence, pp. 167-8. 167-8. 51. vol. 6, 6, ch. 5, 5, part part2. 2. Fearful Fearll that that State StateDepartment Departmentsecurity officers 51. vol. of ficers had discovered his earlier connecconnec tion with Soviet intelligence, intelligence, Duggan was less forthcoming during the the war than he he had hadbeen earlier. In 1944he he StateDepartment Department join newly founded United United Nations Nations Relief and RehabilitaJune 1944 left the State toto join the the Rehabilita Administration as diplomatic adviser. adviser. Weinstein and Vassiliev, o o d , pp. 16-19. Wood, 16-19. tion Administration Vassiliev, The Haunted W 52. vol. 6, 6, ch. 5, 5, part 2. 2. are indebted for information on Henry HenryWallace's Wallaces plans for Duggan and White to toProfessor Har53. We are Har vey Kiehr. Klehr. 54. 5,part part 54. vol. 6, ch. ch. 5, 2. 55. Bentley, Out of of Bondage, Bondage, pp. pp. 103-4, 103-4,115. 1 15. 55. 56. When Moscow changed control methods later in the the War, War, the New New York residency reported to the "In ALBERT [Akhmerov]'s intelligence officers] would hardly manman Center: In ALBERT [Akhmerovls opinion our workers [Soviet intelligence the same success FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN [Communist [Communist Party] flag. flag. We age to work with the success under the FELLOWCOUNTRYMAN may possibly possibly set up direct liaison with [members of of the theSilvermaster Silvermaster group], but it itis doubtful whether we could secure from them the [Silvermaster] , who, constantly dealing with them, could the same results results as ROBERT [Silvermaster], them, has many advantages The residency also reported advantages over us." us.The reported that Silvermaster "did did not believe in our ourortho orthodox methods." methods. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, p. 2. 57. Bentley, Out of Bondage, pp. 68-9, chs. $Bondage, 68-9, chs. 7, 7, 8. 8. Codenames from vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2 and VENONA VENONA decrypts. "Rus decrypts.The sanitized SVR account of of Golos's Goloss career makes no reference to his sexual indiscretion. Russian [intelligence] him." Primakov et a/., [intelligence] operatives," operatives, it concludes, concludes, "will will always honor and take pride in him. Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoy Rossiyskoy Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki, vol. 3, ch. 16. 58. vol. 6, Belf rage was UCN/9. 6, ch. ch.12. 12. The VENONA VENONAdecrypts indicate that BeErage was also alsocodenamed UCN/9. 59. On BSC, see Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, 96, 102-3, 127-30. 59. President? Eyes Only, pp. 96,102-3,127-30. 60. vol. 6, ch. 12. 12. The KGB file noted noted by Mitrokhin confirms the main features of 60. of the account, contested by Be1frage Belfrage during his lifetime, lifetime, in Bentley, Out of o f Bondage, Bondage, pp. 139-4o-notably 139-40-notably his espionage espionage links with Golos and with withV. J. Jerome, a close associate associate of of Browder.
35. 35. Samolis Samolis (ed.),

34. 34. vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 2. Samolis Samolis (ed.),

No t
6 1 . vol. 6, ch. part 2. 61. vol. 6, ch.5,5, part 2.

e s

59 4

62. On On the the woeful woeful limitations limitations of of the the intelligence intelligence on on the the Soviet Soviet Union Union available available to to Roosevelt Roosevelt early early in in the the 62.
war, Eyes Only, pp. war, see see Andrew, Andrew, For the President's President? Eyes Ouly, pp. 132-3. 132-3.

63, Andrewand and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 340-1; 340-1; Zubok Zubok and andPleshakov, Pleshakov, Inside the theKremlin's Kremlin?Cold W Wa?; 23. a1; p. 23. 63. Andrew
64. Zarubin's visit visit to 64. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. Hopkins Hopkins had had been been personally personally briefed briefed by by Hoover Hoover on on Zarubins to Nelson Nelson (Benson (Benson and (eds.), and Warner Warner (eds.),

VENON A, document 9). Hoover YENONA, document 9). Hoover would would doubtless doubtless have have been been outraged outraged had had he he known known

that Soviet embassy. that Hopkins Hopkins had had informed informed the the Soviet embassy. 65. The source of the the information on the the talks was code named "19" 65. The source of information on talks between between Roosevelt Roosevelt and and Churchill Churchill was codenamed 19an confusing habit sometimes recycling codename for peo an example example of of the theCentre's Centres confusing habit of of sometimes recycling the the same same codename for different different people. been codenamed codename FRANK FRANK; he he ple. Laurence Laurence Duggan Duggan had had formerly formerly been codenamed "19," 19, but but by by now now had had the the codename

cannot, in in any any case, case, have haveprovided provided this this information. information. A A detailed, detailed, meticulous meticulous and and persuasive persuasive study study by by Eduard Eduard cannot, Mark concludes concludes that that it is "probable probable virtually virtually to to the point of of certainty certainty that that Hopkins was Mark it is the point Hopkins was Venonas Source the'Trident' Trident Conference Conference of of 1943 1943. "Venona's Source 19 19 and and the ."
66. 1-2. 66. Andrew, Andrew, 'Anglo-American-Soviet Anglo-American-Soviet Intelligence Intelligence Relations," Relations, pp. pp. 125-6. 125-6. Crozier, Crozier, Free Agent, Ageut, pp. pp. 1-2. 67. 67. Hopkin's Hopkins efforts efforts to to avoid avoid US-Soviet US-Soviet friction friction also also included included securing securing the the removal removal of of officials officials he he judged judged to the US Steinhardt; the the military to be be anti-Soviet: anti-Soviet: among among them them the US ambassador ambassador in in Moscow, Moscow, Laurence Laurence A. A. Steinhardt; military attache, W. Soviet desk Department. attache, Major Major Ivan Ivan D. D. Yeaton; Yeaton; and and Loy Loy W. Henderson, Henderson, head head of of the the Soviet desk in in the theState State Department. When aside and When Soviet Soviet foreign foreign minister minister Molotov Molotov visited visited Washington Washington in in May May 1942, 1942, Hopkins Hopkins took took him him aside and

19. Mark, 19." Mark,

told him him what whatto to say say to to persuade persuade Roosevelt Roosevelt of of the the need need for for an an early front in in order to contradict told early second second front order to contradict concon
trary American military. military. Andrew and Gordievsky, trary advice advice from from the the American Andrewand Gordievsky, "Venona's Venonas Source Source 19 19 and and the the 'Trident' Trident Conference Conference of of 1943," 1943, p. p. 20. 20.

KGB, 297-300, 341; KGB, pp. pp.297-300, 341; Mark, Mark,

68. Bohlen, Bohlen? Witness Witnessto t o History 1919-1969, 1919-1969, p. p. 148. 148. 68. 69. Dilks Dilks (ed.), (ed.), 69. DiariesojSir ofSirAlexander Cdogan,OM, OM, 1938-1 1938-1945, p. 582. 582. The Dim-ies Alexander Cadogan, 945, p. 70. Cited Cited by by Kissinger, Kissinger, Diplomacy, Diplomacy, p. p. 412. 412. On O n relations relations between between Churchill Churchill and and Roosevelt Roosevelt at at Tehran, Tehran, see see 70.

W m; pp. 14h; pp. 237-55. 237-55. 71. Andrew 71. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 342. 342. 72. The The use use made made by by Stalin Stalin of of intelligence intelligence from from Britain Britain during during the Conference remains remains more more 72. the Tehran Tehran Conference problematic, given given the the Centre's Centres unwarranted unwarranted suspicion at that that time timeof of its main main British British sources. problematic, suspicion at its sources. 73. vol. 5, part 2. 73. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, part 2. 74. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 2, para. 2; 2; appendix appendk 3, n. 2 21. 1. 74. 2, para. 3, n. 75. vol. 7, 7, c ch. 2, para. para. 5. 5. 7 5 . vol. h . 2, 76. 76. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, para. para. 15. 15. 77. Philby, Philby, M My y Silent Will Uh?; ; pp. pp. 49-50, 49-50,67-8. 67-8. 77. 78. 5. 78. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, 10, para. para. 5. 79. Borovik, Borovik, The Philby Pbilby Files, pp. pp. 196-7. On SIS's SISs lack lack of of a Moscow Moscow station station in in the the 1930s, see Andrew, 196-7. On 1930s, see 79. Secrct Se1"vice, Serwce, p. 573. Secret p. 573. 80. The The text text of of the thereport report was was first first published, published, along along with with other other KGB KGB documents documents on on atomic atomic espionage, espionage, in in 80. 14prossi Estestvoznnnia Tekhniki (1992), no. no. 3. 3.This This issue issue was was withdrawn withdrawn shortly shortly after after publication, publication, V oprossi Istorii Estestvoznania iT ekhniki (1992), but the thedocuments documents are are reprinted reprinted in in Sudoplatovs, Sudoplatovs, Special T Tasks, appendix 2. 2. C Cf. Costello Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly but asks, appendix Illusions, p. 2 1 18. 8. Illusions, 81. According to to the the minutes tninutes of of the the Scientific Advisory Committee, Cairncross briefly briefly served served as as its its joint joint 8 1 . According Scientific Advisory Committee, Cairncross secretary; SAC SAC (DP)(41), (DP)(41), CAB CAB 90/8, 90/8, PRO. PRO. In In his his memorably memorably mendacious mendacious memoirs, memoirs, Cairncross Cairncross denied denied secretary; that he he ever held held this this post. post. Even Even ifhe if he is correct correct in in this this instance instance (and (and Whitehall Whitehall committee committee secretaries that ever is secretaries were, were, almost invariably, invariably, capable of ensuring ensuring that that their were correctly correctly recorded), recorded), this this would would not almost capable of their names names were not have have affected his access to to SAC minutes since, since, by by his own admission, he "had hadno no difficulty to affected his access SAC minutes his own admission, he difficulty in in having having access access to the secret papers in in Hankey's Hankeys office. office. Cairncross, The Enigma EnigmaSpy, pp. pp. 9-10,88-92. the " Cairncross, 9-10, 88-92. 82. The to his 82. The revelation revelation that that Cairncross, Cairncross, thanks thanks to his access access to to Scientific Scientific Advisory Advisory Committee Committee papers, papers, was the the first to of the plan to to construct construct the atotnic bomb tI.rst first appeared appeared in in 1990 was to warn warn the theCenter Center of the plan atomic bomb 1990 in Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 321 321. Probably because because Cairncross Cairncross was was then then still still alive, alive, a a series series of of Andrew and Gordievsky, . Probably KGB/SVR-sponsored publications publications suggested suggested that that the ofof the Scientific Advisory Advisory Committee Committee KGB/SVR-sponsored thereport report the Scientific had come come instead instead from from Maclean. Maclean.(See, Costello and and Tsarev, Tsarev, Deadly Illusions, Illusions, p. p. 218; 218; Samolis (ed.), had (See, e.g., e.g., Costello Samolis (ed.), l+ttrmy Vneshnt.iRazvedki RazvtdAi Rossii, pp. pp. 31, 60.) Following Following confirmation confirmation by by Yuri Yuri Modin, Modin, who who was was given given V eterany Vneshnei 31, 60.) responsibility for for Cairncross's Cairncrosss file file in in 1944 and became became his controller in in 1947, that Scientific Adresponsibility that the the ScientifIc Ad visory Committee Committeereport fromCairncross, the changed its its tune. tune.In 1998 it it released released visory report came from Cairncross, the SVR changed In 1998 documents from from Cairncross's Cairncrosss file file proving proving that that he he supplied supplied the the report and giving giving further further details details of of his his documents role as as the the ilrst first of of the theatom atomspies. spies. West West and and Tsarev, Tsarev, The Crown CrownJewels, pp. pp. 228-9, 228-9,234; role 234; Michael Michael Smith,

also in also Kimball, Kimball, Forged Forgedin

N o tt e e s s N o

595
Telegraph Telegraph (January 12, 12,

"The Treachery," D Daily The Humble Humble Scot ScotWho W h o Rose Rose to to the the Top-But Top-But Then Then Chose Chose Treachery, aib 1998). 1998).

The text of of Beria's Berids report of of March 1942, 1942, first published in 83. The
Holloway, Stalin

Voprossi Voprossi Istorii Estestvoznania i Tekhniki, Tekhniki.

1992, no. 3, is reprinted reprinted in Sudoplatovs, Sudoplatovs, Special Tasks, 1992, T asks, appendix 2, pp. 439-41. 439-41. On the background see and the Bomb, pp. 82-4. 82-4. and
84. 84. Holloway, Stalin StaZin and the Bomb, pp. 84-9. 84-9.

85. vol. 6, ch. 6. Roosevelt and Churchill agreed verbally on unrestricted exchange the 85. exchange of of information on the
of the MANHATMANHAT atomic project, project, but did not commit the agreement to writing. The Americans in charge of TAN project afterwards claimed to be ignorant of Qyebec agreement of of August afterwards claimed of the agreement. Not till the Quebec collaboration" between Britain and the United 1943 1943 was "full full and effective collaboration UnitedStates agreed in writing. 86. voL 6,, ch. ch. 6. 86. vol. 6 6. 87. Holloway, Stalin and and the Bomb, p. 85. 85. 88. 88. Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievs+, KGB, KGB, pp. 321-2. 321-2. 89. 89. West and Tsarev,

CroumJewels, 231-3. CrownJeweZs, pp. 231-3.

LondonUnderground Underground stations. H e later complained to Markus MarkusWolf 90. Fuchs preferred meeting in London He Wolf that Kremers habit of of constantly looking over his shoulder to see if if he was being followed seemed Kremer's "seemed to attract
more attention to us than simply getting on with it." Andrew and Gordievsky, 322-4; Wolf, Man on with it. Gordievsky,KGB, pp. 322-4;

without a Face, Face, p. 230. The best biography of of Fuchs is Williams, Klaus Fuchs, Atom Spy. 91. 91. The references references to FIR in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes, including her involvement with Fuchs, identify her as SONIA (voL 17). She is not to (vol. 7, 7, ch. 14, 14, item item 17). to be confused with a British NKGB agent also codenamed of the Economic Commission for Asia and the theFar Far East (ECAFE) (ECAFE) China in FIR, an official of recruited in China . 1943 (k-24,126). 1943 Face, p. 230. 92. Werner, Sonya's Sonya?Report, Report,pp. 250-3; 250-3; Wolf, Man without a Face, 93. 93. Wolf, Man without a Face, Face, p. 229. 94. voL vol. 7, ch. ch. 14, 14,item item 17. 17. It is just possible, though not probable, that that an even stronger candidate for either 94. of these titles is identified in files not seen by Mitrokhin. Like Likemost, if if not all, British agents recruited in of the 1930s 1930s who were still still active after the Second World War, Norwood had had more than one one codename in course of of her career. career. Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes refer to her only as HOLA, the course HOLA, her codename in 1945, 1945, shortly after she returned from GRU RITA. Extracts from KGB files made availavail GRU to NKGB NKGB control, was RITA. able by the SVR SVRto to Vassiliev, though not notmentioning mentioning Norwood by name, identify RITA able Weinstein and Vassiliev, RIT A as employee of of the the Non-Ferrous Non-Ferrous Metals [Research] [Research] Association (Weinstein and Vassiliev, an employee Vassiliev, The Haunted 194; c A in VENONA decrypts, 5th release, part 2, p. 247.) W ood, p. 194; Wood, cf. the reference reference to RIT RITA 95. 95. voL vol. 7, ch. 14, 14, item item17. 17. 96. . .. 96. voL vol. 7, 7, ch. 14, 14, item item 17 17. 97. Samolis 1 . Cf. vol. voL 6, ch. 8, part . Samolis (ed.), Veterany Veterany Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki Rossii, Rossii, pp. 59-6 59-61. part1 1. 9 8 . vol. 6, ch. 6. n March Kurchatov o M. G. Pervukhin, Deputy Prime MinMin 98. 6.I In March 1943 1943 Kurchatov sent similar reports t to Voprossi Istorii Estestvoznania ister and commissar of of the chemical chemical industry. industry. The text, first published in Voprossi Estestvoznania i slation in Sudoplatovs, Special T asks, appendix 2, pp. 446-53. 446-53. Tekhniki (1992), no. 3, 3, is reprinted reprinted in tra translation Tasks, 99. of MAR. 99. voL vol. 6, 6 , ch. 6. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not notreveal the the identity identityof 100. VENONA decrypts, 1st 1st release, pp. 1-4. 100. 1-4. 101. of Kurchatovs Kurchatov's top secret report. 101. voL vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins note does not identify identifl the therecipient of report. Given report of March7 (also quoted in vol. its importance, however, it was probably addressed, addressed, like his report of March voL 6, ch. 6), to Beria. C , 1943 in Sudoplatovs, Special T asks, appendix 2, pp. Cf. Kurchatov's Kurchatovs report to toPervukhin ofJuly of July 3 3,1943 inSudoplatovs, Tasks, 454-6. 454-6. 102. 102. Holloway, Holloway, Stalin and the tbe Bomb, Bomb,p. 104. 104. 103. voL 103. vol. 6, ch. 6. 6. 104. 1st release, p. and the Bomb, p. 103. 103. 104. VENONA VENONA decrypts, 1st p. 5. 5 . Cf. Holloway, Stalin andthe the Bomb, p. 103. 105. 105. Holloway, Stalin and andthe 103. 106. 1944 FOGELIPERS 106. There is some indication that later laterinin 1944 FOGEWPERS was providing intelligence from the Oak Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 10, 29. Tennessee, laboratory of the MANHATTAN MANHATTANproject. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 10,29. Vassiliev, The Haunted W W o o d , andKunstel, Bombshell, ood, pp. 190-1; Albright and Bombshell, p. 319. Weinstein and Vassiliev, Suggestions to the contrary derive derive chiefly chiefly from two sources: a fabricated version of of the career of 107. Suggestions of PERS (renamed PERSEUS), PERSEUS), apparently devised devised by the SVR for purposes of of mystification, perhaps to protect Theodore Hall Hall(c (cf. Albright and andKunstel, Bondshell, p. 271; Weinstein and Vassiliev, Vassiliev, The Haunted Kunstel, Bombshell, Sudoplatov, far less reliable on atomic espionage than W ood, pp. 190-ln.); and the fallible Wood, fallible memory of of Pavel Pave1 Sudoplatov, the "special special actions" actions to which he devoted most of of his career (cf. Holloway, on the Holloway, Sources "Sources for Stalin and the

N o t t N o

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596

Bomb"). The New Y ork residency was dismayed to learn early in 1945 Bomb). York 1945that thatFOGELIPERS FOGEWPERS had declined an offer of of family of employment as a construction engineer at Los Alamos, probably owing to a mixture of ood, p. 192. pressures and fear of exposure. Weinstein pressures of exposure. Weinstein and Vassiliev, Vassiliev, The Haunted HauntedW Wood, 192. 108. 108. vol. 6, ch. 6. 109. 1. 109. vol. 8, ch. 12, 12, para. 1. 110. 1 10. vol. 6, ch. 6. 111. vol. 6, ch. 5, 111. 5, part 2. 1 12. vol. 7, 112. 7, ch. 2, para. 4 1 13. Andrew and Gordievsky, 313-14. Pincher, T oo Secret Too Long, p. 396. Early in the war, 113. Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 313-14. Too Philby had tried and failed to enter enterBletchley Park. 1 14. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 3. 114. 7, ch. 3. 1 15. Haslam, "Stalin's 115. Stalins Fears Fearsof of a Separate Peace 1942," 1942, pp. 97-9. 97-9. 1 16. Andrewand and Gordievsky, "Der Hess-Flug 116. Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 273-4, 273-4, 305; Schmidt, Schmidt,Der Hess-Flug und und das Kabinet Churchill"; Marketing of Churchill; Schmidt, Schmidt,"The The Marketing of Rudolf Rudolf Hess." Hess. 1 17. Record of 1944, FO 800/414, 117. of dinner conversation conversation at the Kremlin, October October 18, 18,1944, 800/414, PRO. 1 1 8 . Some of 118. of the Hess conspiracy conspiracy theories were examined in the the BBC2 BBC2 documentary, documentary, Hess: An A n Edge of Conspiracy (presenter: 7, 1990. (presenter: Christopher Andrew; producer: Roy Davies), Davies), first broadcast January 1 17,1990. 1 1 9. Borovik, 119. Borovik, The Philby PhilJy Files, Files, pp. 216-18. 216-18. 120. Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 334-7. 334-7. 121. Borovik, The Philby Files, Files, p. 216. 121. 122. 1 7n. 122. Borovik, Borovik, The Philby Files, Files, p. 2 217n. 123 . Samolis Veteran?, Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki Rossii, p. 154. At At a meeting with Christopher Andrew Andrewin in 123. Samolis (ed.), Veterany August 1990, he did supply intelligence from Bletchley Park to the the NKGB NKGB 1990, Cairncross admitted that he before the battle battleof of Kursk but declined to give details. details. 14; Pincher, Too Secret Too Long, p. 396. 124. Andrew and Gordievsky, 124. Gordievsky, KGB, p. 3 314; 125. 125. Borovik, Borovik, The Philby Files, Files, p. 218. 218. 126. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 1 . 1.

Chapter Eight

Victory Victory

1. 1990 Valentin Falin, head of of the International International Department of the Central CentralCommittee, Committee, 1. As late as 1990 Department of which was largely largely responsible responsible for determining determining foreign intelligence requirements, claimed that intelligence reports 1943showed that some in Washington Washington as well as in London London the possibility of of termi termiin 1943 were considering "the nating the the coalition with the the Soviet Union and reaching an accord with Nazi Germany, Germany, or with the the Nazi Generals, on the thequestion of of waging a joint war against the Soviet Soviet Union": Union: Therefore when we talk about Stalin's Stdins distrust with regard to Churchill, at a certain stage towards Therefore those surrounding Roosevelt, Roosevelt, not so much towards Roosevelt Roosevelt himself, we should pay attention to of specifi c facts. the fact that he hebased this mistrust on a a very precise knowledge of specific facts.
The "facts" factsproduced by the Center Centerwere, in all probability, probability, mere conspiracy theories of of the thekind which, in

degree, distorted distorted Soviet intelligence assessment throughout, throughout, and andeven beyond, the Stalin Stalingreater or lesser degree, era. (Interview by Christopher Andrew Andrew with December 12, 12,1990.) ist era. with Valentin Falin in Moscow for BBC2, BBC2, December 1990.)

The Secret W orld Fihrld ofAmerican Communism; quotation quotation from p. 89. of American Communism; 6, ch. 12. 12. On O n the FBI FBI bugging of of Nelson, see also Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, The Secret World of 3. vol. 6, W orld of American Communism, Communism,pp. 216-17. 216-17. The disappointingly discreet account of of Nelson's Nelsons career, career, Steve Nelson, Nelson, brief ref reference the secret Party P a r t y American Radical, by Nelson, Barrett and Ruck, makes a brief erence to his work on the control commission (p. 242). 4. vol. vol. 6, ch. 12. 12. On O n Hopkins, see above, above, chapter 7. 5. See See above, above, chapter chapter 7. 5. 6. Benson and Warner (eds.), (eds.), VENON KENON!, 10. The authors suggest the author author 6. A, p. xviii, n. 30 and document 10. of the letter letterto Hoover "might might have been" beenMironov. One of of the files noted by Mitrokhin makes Mironov's Mironovs of NKVD in in 1945, 1945, Mironov smuggle to the the authorship virtually certain. While imprisoned by the NKVD Mironov tried to smuggle American embassy in Moscow information about the massacre of the Polish officer corps similar to that that contained in the theletter to Hoover in 1943 (vol. 5, 5 , section 1 11). of the theletter letter 1943 (vol. 1). A study of by Ben Fischer, written Mitrokhins notes on KGB files, seeks to make sense of Mironov's Mironovs bizarre claim that without access to Mitrokhin's sense of Zarubin and his wife were working for, respectively, respectively,Japanese and German German intelligence, intelligence, as a way "to (tograb

2. On CPUSA operations against Trotskyists CPUSA Trotskyists and heretics, see Klehr, Haynes and Firsov,

No t

e s

S9 7

attention and ensure that Hoover acted against them. But But Mr. Mr. Fischer also acknowledges acknowledges evidence FBI attention" evidence Mironov"may Ifnay have havebeen mentally disturbed I Mr. Guver, " pp. 10-1 1.). KGB files suggest that Mironov disturbed" (Fischer, (Fischer, " 'Mr. Guver,' 10-1 1.). obsessionalhostility to Zarubin Zarubinfrom Mironov and and the West should learn the both an obsessional a determination that the West officer corps. theletter letter to Mironov claimed that his real truth about the massacre of the Polish officer corps. In the to Hoover,
name was Markov; Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes, however, refer refer to him him as Mironov.

toCenter, Center, 3,1943: VENONAdecrypts, 2nd release, pp. pp. 157-8. 157-8. Zarubin moved to Wash7. Zarubin to June 3, 1943: VENONA Wash ington during during ington June.
8. reputation for 8. Following Following the corrupt governorships governorships of Huey and and Earl Earl Long, Long,Sam Jones established a reputation

scrupulous honesty. O n his term as governor, governor, see scrupulous On see Dawson,

The Louisiana Governors, Governors, pp. 255-9. 255-9.

5, part 2. The US "military military intelligence officer" officer may have have had knowledge of vol. 6, ch. 5, 9. vol. of the information
Zarubins involvement involvement in the themassacre of of Polish officers officers contained in Mironov's Mironovs letter to toHoover. on Zarubin's
10. vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 2. 10. 2.

asks, pp. 196-7. 1 1. Sudoplatovs, 11. Sudoplatovs, Special T Tasks, 196-7.

12. vol. 6, 12. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 2. Veterany 53-5. This SVR hagiography predictably makes Eterany Vneshnei Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, Rossii, pp. 53-5. no mention of of Zarubin's Zarubins various various misadventures misadventures in the theUnited United States. 14. sec. 1 11. claims that Mironov Mironovwas simply hospitalized 14. vol. 5, sec. 1 . Sudoplatov wrongly claims "hospitalized and discharged from the service" schizophrenia; Special Tasks, service on the grounds of of schizophrenia; Taskr,p. 197. 15. VENONA decrypts, decrypts, 4th release, part 4, pp. 1 115-16. 15. 15-16. 16. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 16. part 2; vol. vol. 6, 6,app. app. 2, part part 7. Zarubin's Zarubins immediate successor as asresident in New NewYork in the the summer of basis, had been Pave1 Pavel Klarin (codenamed LUKA); VENONA of 1943, 1943,probably probably on a temporary temporary basis, decrypts, 2nd release, pp. 180ff. 180ff, On O n Abbiate's Abbiates previous previous career see above, above, chapter 4. decrypts, 17. 17. VENONA decrypts, decrypts, 3rd release, part 2, pp. 205-6. 205-6. 18. VENONA decrypts, Abbiate as 18. decrypts, 3rd release, part 3, 3, p. 175. 175. The telegram from the Center Center appointing appointing codename NSAdecrypt as Pravdin (Abbiate's (Abbiates alias alias resident refers to him by his code name SERGEI, identified in the NSA in the of the the USA). USA).Apresyan's Apresyans transfer to San Francisco was not necessarily a demotion in view view of the forth forthconference of of the United UnitedNations, attended by NKGB agent Harry Dexter Dexter White and coming organizing conference presided over by by the GRU GRUagent Alger Alger Hiss. 19. 19. vol. vol. 7, ch. ch. 2, 2 , 1; l ; app. 3, n. n. 21. 2 0 . Among the documents Philby passed to the NKGB were the German foreign ministry documents 20. ass. Philby, M My obtained by ass OSS in Switzerland and probably also supplied by NKGB agents in OSS. y Silent W ar, pp. 84-6; 84-6; Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, 141-2. War, President? Eyes Only, pp. 141-2. 21. Borovik, The Philby Files, 21. Files,pp. 232-3. 232-3. y Silent War, W ar, ch. On M y 22. Philby, Philby, M My ch. 6; 6; Cecil, "The The Cambridge Comintern." Comintern. O n Krotenschield, see Modin, My Five Cambridge 124-5. 103-4,124-5. CambridgeFriends, Friends,pp. 103-4, y Five Cambridge 14. From Modin of 23. Modin, M My CambridgeFriends, Friends,p. 1 114. From 1944 to to1947 1947 Modin was responsible for the files of the Five at the Center, before being posted to London to aet as their controller. controller. toact 14. 24. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 3 314. oo Long, p. 397. 25. Pincher, Too T o o Secret T Too 26. Cecil, Cecil, A Divided Life, L$, pp. 74-5. 74-5. 27. vol. 7, ch. 10, 10, para. 9. 309-12; Cecil, Co intern." 28. Andrew 28. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 309-12; Cecil, "The The Cambridge Cambridge Comintern. 29. vol. 7, ch. 10, 10, app., para. 2. 30. 30. See See above, chapter chapter 7. 31. There are 31. are a number of of references to Fuchs's Fuchss codenames in the VENONA VENONA decrypts. Fuchs said later that he never knew which branch of his interrogation after of Soviet Soviet intelligence he was working for. During his claimed to have been previously existed. Andrew his arrest in 1950 1950he he previously unaware that more than one branch existed. and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 323. 323. 32. vol. 6, did, however, keep Anglo-Canadian atomic research 6, eh. ch. 6. 6.The GRU GRU keep control of of its agents in the theAnglo-Canadian center at Chalk ChalkRiver; River; Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 325-6. 325-6. 33. contact with SONY SONYA (referred to in KGB files as FIR) in in 1944. 1944.However, the first 33. Norwood ceased contact A (referred contact between Norwood and andher new (unidentified) controller recorded in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes took took place contact in in 1945. 1945. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item 17. 17. 34. 34. vol. 7, ch. 14, 14, item 17. 17. 35. code name at this period was TINA. 35. VENONA decrypts, 5th release, part 2, p. 249. Norwood's Norwoods codename 36. West and 36. andTsarev, Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, p. 234. 37. VENONA decrypts, 1st 1st release, pp. 8-9. 8-9. 13. 13. Samolis Samolis (ed.)

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38. FBI FOIA 65-58805, file 38, 38, p. 7. 38. 39. VENONA VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 8-9. 8-9. 40. FBI FOIA 65-58805, files 38,40. 38, 40. 41. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 25, 27. 41. 25,27. Golds evidence evidence to the theFBI FBI Fuchs?Atom 42. Gold's on on renewing contact with Fuchs is reprinted in Williams, Klaus Fuchs, Spy, pp. pp. 206-12. 206-12. 43. vol. 6, ch. 8, . 8, part 1 1. 44. n Rosenberg's 44. The The agents agents i in Rosenbergs ring ring included included the the scientist scientist William William Perl Per1 (GNOME), (GNOME), who who provided provided intelli intellielectronics engineers Joel Barr (METRE) and Alfred Sarant gence on jet engines, and the the military electronics (HUGHES), whom were 1st release, 12, 18-19, 47, 5 1. O On (HUGHES), both bothofofwhom were radar radar experts; experts; VENONA VENONA decrypts, decrypts, 1st release, pp. pp. 12,18-19,47,51. n the origins of Com of the theRosenberg spyring, spyring, run initially - according to Semenov - "on on the principles of of a Communist Party group," group, see Weinstein Weinstein and Vassiliev, Vassiliev, The Haunted HauntedWood, Wood, pp. 177-9. 177-9. VENONA decrypts, decrypts, 1st release, pp. 15, 15,36,45-6. 45. VENONA 36, 45-6. . 46 . Radosh and Milton, 46. Milton, The Rosenberg File, ch. 3 3. 47. VENONA decrypts, 1st release, pp. 44-5; 261-6. Hall explained his belief 44-5; 3rd release, pp. 255-6, 255-6,261-6. belief that A his atomic espionage VENONA espionage had been a way "to to help the world" world in the BBC Radio 4 documentary documentary VENON (presenter: (presenter: Christopher Andrew; Andrew; producers: producers: Mark Berman and Helen Weinstein), first broadcast March 18, 1998. 18,1998. part2. 48. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 49. VENONA decrypts, 2nd release, p. p. 424. 50. Bentley, 160-1. The first VENONA decrypt in which Akhmerov reports intelli Bentley, Out oJBondage, $Bondage, pp. 160-1. intelligence from Bentley is dated December 11, 1943; VENONA 11,1943; VENONAdecrypts, 2nd release, pp. 430-1. 430-1. 163-5. Bentleys Bentley's story is, once again, 5 1 . Bentley, 51. Bentley, Out oJBondage, $Bondage, pp. 163-5. again, largely corroborated by VENONA and other evidence. 1, pp. 26-8; 26-8; and Klehr, Haynes and Firsov, evidence. Cf. Cf. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, American Communism, The Secret World oj ofAmerican Communism, pp. 312-15. 312-15. 52. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part 2. 2. Doubtless through a slip slip of of the thepen, Mitrokhin also refers refers to Perlo in this note as VENONAand and other PEL(also codenamed PAL and andROBERT) ROBERT) PEL. VENONA other sources make clear that PEL was Greg Silvermaster. Silvermaster.The other members ofPerlo of Perlo (RAIDER)'s (RAIDER)s group, all described as Communists, Communists, were Charles Kramer, Glasser. Kramer, Edward Fitzgerald, Harry Magdoff, John Abt, Abt, Charles Flato and andHarold Harold Glasser. 53. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, 1, pp. 26-8. 53. 26-8. 54. Bentley, Out oJBondage, ofBondage, pp. 166-7. 166-7. Once again, VENONA confirms the substance of of Bentley's Bentleys ver version of of events. events. 55. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 1, 1, p. 272. 56. Bentley, 56. Bentley, Out oj o f Bondage, Bondage, pp. 173-7. 173-7. 1st release, part 1, 1, p. 14; 139, 152, 196. 57. VENONA decrypts, 1st 14; 3rd release, part 2, pp. 139,152,196. 58. 58. Bentley, Bentley, Out oj o f Bondage, Bondqe, pp. 179-80. 179-80. 59. VENONA 59. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part 2, pp. 17-18. 17-18. In January January 1945 1945 White was appointed Assistant Secretary of of the Treasury. " 1 1-12. George Silverman, to 60. Romerstein and Levchenko, The KGB against agninst the "Main MainEnemy, Enemy, pp. 1 111-12. whom (according to Bentley) Bentley) Currie rushed to deliver "sort of identified by deliver his warning sort of out of of breath," breath, is identified the VENONA decrypts as a Soviet himself VENONA Soviet agent (codenamed ELERON ELERON [AILERON]). [AILERON]). Currie Currie himself may well well towhom whom of references in the thedecrypts. Though deny denybe the agent codenamed PAGE to there are a number of ing that entertained at Gorsky's that he he had had ever been a Soviet spy, spy, Currie later acknowledged acknowledged that he been entertained Gorskys officials small group privy to the the highly home. Senior White House offi cials such as Currie were among the very small OSS had obtained a charred NKGB codebook. codebook. There is no reference reference to Currie classified information that OSS in Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's notes. 61. the early analysis of of the VENONA VENONA decrypts, Robert Lam Lam61. The senior FBI agent who took part in the ar, pp. 87ff) that phere, wrongly claims claims in his memoirs (The (The FBI-KGB FBI-KGB W Wur, that the theNKGB NKGBcodebook was later A and process of used to assist the process of decrypting. National Security Agency, Introduct01Y Introductory History HistoryoJ o f VENON lEN0NA Translations,p. 8. 8. Guide to the Translations, 62. 62. Andrew and andGordievsky, KGB, KGB, p. 295. part1. 1.vol. 7, 7, ch. 2, para. 22. 63. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 64. voL 6. vol. 6, ch. 6. Holloway, "Sources Sources for Stalin and andthe Bomb," Bomb, p. 5. 5. 65. Holloway, 66. vol. 7, ch. 2, para. 19. 19. 67. Albright and Kunstel, Kunstel, Bombshell, Bombshell, pp. 121-7. 121-7.

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68. Albright and andKunstel, Kunstel, Bombshell, Bombshell,ch. ch. 15. 15.The The career career of of Morris Lona Cohen is summarized in vol. 68. Albright Morris and and "Lona" Cohen is summarized in vol.
6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. 69. 69. Albright Albright and and Kunstel, Kunstel, Bombshell, Bombshell, pp. pp. 138-9. 138-9.

70. NKGB NKGB report report to to Beria, Beria, July July 10, first published published in Sovietski Razvedke (1991); (1991); extract extract 70. 10, 1945, 1945, first in Kurier Sovietski reprinted in Sudoplatovs, Special Tnsks, 4, pp. pp. 474-5 misidentifies MLAD reprinted in Sudoplatovs, S pecial T asks, appendix appendix 4, 474-5 (Sudoplatov (Sudoplatov misidentifies MLAD as as PonPon tecorvo).. tecorvo) 71. The story story of of Lona LonaCohen's Cohens trip trip to to Albuquerque Albuquerque is is briefly told told in the the short shortbiography biography of 71. The of her in SamoSamo lis (ed.), (ed.), V TGterany VneshlteiRazvedki Rnzvedki Rossii, p. p. 71. See also also Albright and Kunstel, Kunstel, Bombshell, eterany Vneshllei 71. See Bombshell, ch. 17. 17. lis 72. improved with telling. In In some some recent 72. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2.Unsurprisingly, Unsurprisingly,this this remarkable remarkable tale tale improved with the thetelling. recent Rus Russian versions, versions, Mrs. Mrs. Cohen Cohen hid hid the the documents documents in in a a box box of of Kleenex. The less elaborate elaborate account noted noted by by sian Mitrokhin appears appears more more reliable. reliable. He H e does does not, not, however, however, identify identify the the Los Los Alamos Alamos scientist who who supplied Mitrokhin the documents. documents. the 73. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 2, 2, part part 5. The The first first VENONA VENONA reference reference to to Yatskov's Yatskovs responsibility responsibility for ENOFWOZ dates 73 . vol. ENORMOZ dates from 1945; VENONA 1st release, 60. from January January 23, 23,1945; VENONAdecrypts, decrypts, 1st release, p. p, 60. 74. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), T7eterany TGtermy Vneshnei KzeshneiRazvedki Rossii, pp. pp. 169-71. 169-71. 74. 75. 75. VENONA VENONA decrypts, decrypts, 3rd 3rd release, release, part part 2, 2, p. p. 268. 268. 76. Though Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes include include references references to to most most of 76. of the the best-known, best-known, as as well well several several hithertohitherto unknown, Soviet Soviet spies spies in in the the wartime wartime United United States, all all refer refer to to NKVD/NKGB There is thus no no unknown, NKVDINKGB agents. There reference Hiss, who Soviet military reference to to Hiss, who worked worked for for Soviet military intelligence. intelligence. 77. VENONA VENONA decrypts, decrypts, 3rd 3rd release, release, part part 3, 3,p. p. 207. 207. 77. 78. 1. 78. k-27,appendix, k-27,appendix, para. para. 2 21. 7 9 . Andrew 79. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 343-8. 343-8. 80. ar, p. 80. Kimball, Kimball, Forged in W War, p. 318. 318. 81. VENONA VENONA decrypts, decrypts, 3rd 3rd release, release, part part 3, 3, p. p. 207. 207. A footnote to to this decrypt, added by by NSA in in 1969, 81. 1969, ideniden tifi es ALES Alger Hiss. Hiss." The evidence now now available available puts that identification identification tifies ALES as as "probably probably Alger The corroborative corroborative evidence puts that beyond reasonable reasonable doubt. doubt. Of Of the the four four Americans Americans (other (other than US embassy embassy staff) who who went went on to Moscow Moscow beyond after ts Gorsky's pp. 146-8). a after Yalta, Yalta, only onlyHiss Hiss fi fits Gorskys description description of of ALES ALES (Moynihan, (Moynihan, Secrecy, Senecy, pp. 146-8). Gordievsky Gordievskyrecalls recalls a lecture in in the the Centre Centrein in which which Akhmerov Akhmerov referred referred to to his wartime contact contact,with Hiss. Hungarian Hungarian intelligence lecture his wartime ",ith Hiss. intelligence files on the the Noel Noel Field Field case case show show that that Field Field also also identified identified Hiss as a Soviet agent. agent. Whittaker Chambers, the f ues on ex-G RU agent Hiss, testified indicated by by Gorsky's Hiss first first began began supply ex-GRU agent who who e>.:posed exposed Hiss, testified that, that, as as indicated Gorskys telegram, telegram, Hiss supplying Both Chambers and Bentley, Bentley, like like Gorsky, Gorsky, implicated implicated some some of of Hisss Hiss's ing intelligence intelligence to to Moscow Moscow in in 1935. 1935. Both Chambers and family, as aswell wellas family, Hiss himself, evidence pointing pointing to to Hiss Hiss came came from from the the Soviet Soviet as Hiss himself, in in Soviet Soviet espionage. espionage. Further Further evidence defector prevented Hiss's prosecution for for espionage espionage defector Igor Igor Guzenko Guzenko in in 1945. 1945.Though Though the thestatute statute of of limitations limitations prevented Hisss prosecution in in that for lying lying about government docdoc in 1950, 1950, the the evidence evidence used usedto to convict convict him him of of perjury perjury in thatyear, year, for about providing providing government a Communist Communist spyring, spyring, remains remains compelling. compelling. See, See, inter alia: Breindel, uments to to a uments Breindel, Hisss "Hiss's Guilt, Guilt," New Republic Republic (April 15, 1996); 1996); Schmidt, Schmidt, The Dossier, New RepubZic 1993); Weinstein, Weinstein, Perjury; (April 15, "The Hiss Hiss Dossier," Republic (November (November 8, 8, 1993); Pe1Jury; Andrew and Gordievsky, in the the Cyrillic alphabet, looks looks like like a a contraction contraction of Hiss"-one Andrew and Gordievsky,KGB. ALES, ALES, in Cyrillic alphabet, of "Alger Alger Hiss-one of a a number number of of Soviet Sovietcodenames codenames at at this this period period which which contain of the concerned. of contain clues clues to to the the identity identity of the agent agent concerned. 82. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 347. O n the the basis Akhmerovs contact Hiss(very (very unusual unusual in 347. On basis of ofAkhmerov's contact with with Hiss in 82. Andrew the deduced that by now now an an NKGB NKGB the case case of of a a GRU GRU agent), agent), Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky Gordievsky wrongly wrongly deduced that Hiss Hiss was was by agent, in in common common with with other otherleading leading American American GRU GRU agents agents of thelate agent, of the late 1930s. 1930s. 1946 SMERSH on a a 83. 83. vol. vol. 5, 5, sect. sect. 4. 4. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 350-1. 350-1. In In 1946 SMERSH was was reorganized reorganized on peacetime post-war the NKVD. peacetime basis basis and and returned returned to to the the control control of of the the MGB, MGB,the the post-war successor successor of of the NKVD. 84. Tolstoy, StalinS Stalin's Secret War, W ar, ch. ch. 17; 17; Knight, Knight, "Harold 84. Bethell, Bethell, The Last Secret; Secret; Tolstoy, Tolstoy, Victims Victims ojYalta; o f Yalta; Tolstoy, Harold 3, 5. Tolstoy Tolstoy provides provides the the most most Macmillan Cossacks"; Mitchell, Macmillan and and the the Cossacks; Mitchell, The Cost oj o f a Reputation, chs. chs. 1, 1, 3, detailed and and moving moving description description of of the the forced forced repatriation repatriation of of the the Cossacks, but, as detailed Cossacks, but, as Knight Knight demonstrates, demonstrates, exaggerates Macmillan, minister-resident and political political exaggerates the the personal personal responsibility responsibility of of Harold Harold Macmillan, minister-resident in in Italy Italy and adviser Commander Field Mitchell also also concludes concludes that MacIllil adviser to to Supreme Supreme Allied AUied Commander Field Marshal Marshal Alexandr. Alexander. Mitchell that Macmillan's be adjudged adjudged as as small. small." Tolstoys Tolstoy's charge lans "responsibility responsibility for for what what ultimately ultimately occurred occurred must must be charge that that Lord Lord Aldington in connection connection with repatriation Aldington (formerly (formerly Brigadier Brigadier Toby Toby Low) Low) had had committed committed war war crimes crimes in with the the repatriation led million pounds pounds damages damages for for libel. libel. led to to the the award award to to Lord Lord Aldington Aldingtonin in1989 1989 of of 1.5 1.5 million 85. The wanted" list,Timofei list, Timofei Domanov, Domanov, was was a a former former Soviet Soviet citcit 85. The fourth fourth White White general general on on Smersh's Smershs "most most wanted izen whose whose fate, fate, unlike unlike that that of ofthe the other three, had had been been sealed sealed at Yalta. izen other three, most friendly f riendly with with much much 86. 5, sect. 86. vol. vol. 5, sect. 4. 4. A A senior senior British British officer officer reported, reported, "All All relations relations with with Soviets Soviets most interchange WHISKY and and VODKN'; VODKA?; Knight, Knight, "Harold Harold Macmillan Macmillan and p. 239. interchange and the the Cossacks, Cossacks," p. 239. 87. 87. vol. vol. 5, 5, sect. sect. 4, 4, paras. paras. 2-4. 2-4.

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88. 88. For For legal legal reasons, reasons, six six words words have have been been omitted omitted from from the the first first sentence sentence ofMitrokhin's of Mitrokhins note; note; they they do do not not contain lieutenant-colonel. The memoirs of the contain the the name name of of the the lieutenant-colonel. vol. vol. 5, 5, sect. sect. 4, 4, para. para. 5. 5.The memoirs of of the the Deputy DeputyChief Chief of sequence of rm representation representation to sequence of events events in in the theKGB KGB fIles: files: "The The Soviet Soviet government government then then made made a a fi firm to our ourallies allies over Krasnov, criminals. The stalled briefly; over the the matter matterof of Krasnov, Shkuro, Shkuro, Sultan Sultan Ghirey, Ghirey, and and other other war war criminals. The British British stalled briefly; but but since their troops since neither neither the the old old White White guard guard generals generals nor nor their troops were were worth worth much, much, they they put put all all of of them them into into trucks of the Soviet trucks and and delivered delivered them them into into the thehands hands of the Soviet authorities" authorities (Tolstoy, (Tolstoy, Stalin's StalinsSecret

the

Red rm part Red Army, Army, General General Sergei Sergei Matveyevich Matveyevich Shtemenko, Shtemenko, make make no no reference reference to to bribery bribery but but confi confirm part of ofthe the

W ar, p. War, p. 298). 298).

89. 89. Alexander Alexander instructed instructed on on May May 22, 22, 1945, 1945, "All Allwho who are are Soviet Soviet citizens citizens and and who who can can be be handed handed over over to to Russians Russians without without use use of of force force should should be be returned returned by by 8th 8th Army. Army. Any Any others others should should be be evacuated evacuated to to 12th 12th Army the Army Group." Group. It It has has been been argued argued that that 5 5 Corps, Corps, the the section section of of the the Eighth Eighth Army Armywhich which handed handed over over the Cossacks, subsequently concluded that been given force if if Cossacks, subsequently concluded that it it had had none none the the less less been given "freedom freedom of of action" action to to use use force o f a Reputation, Reputation, pp. pp. 49-54. 49-54. Brigadier Brigadier Low Low left left for for The Cost of Britain on 22oror some days days before before the the "repatriation" repatriationbegan. began. There There is suggestion that, that, if if bribery bribery Britain on May May 22 23,23, some is no no suggestion occurred, he he was was in in any any way way cognizant cognizant of of it. it. occurred, 90. 90. Knight, Knight, "Harold Harold Macmillan Macmillan and and the the Cossacks," Cossacks,pp. pp. 248-52. 248-52. Y alta, pp. 82, 188, 266-8. The 91. 91. Tolstoy, Tolstoy, Victims Victims of ofYalta, pp. 1 182, 188,193, 193,266-8. The execution execution of of the the generals generals was was announced announced in in a a brief note note in inPravda on on January January 17, 17,1947. 1947. brief

necessary. Controversy Controversy continues. continues. Mitchell, Mitchell, necessary.

1. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 2. 2. 1. vol. 2. The The large large literature literature on on the case includes includes Bothwell Bothwell and and Granatstein (eds.), The Gouzenko Gouzenko 2. the Gouzenko Gouzenko case Granatstein (eds.), Transcripts; Granatstein Granatstein and and Stafford, Stafford, Spy W Wars, ch. 3; Sawatsky, Sawatsb, Gouzenko; Gouzenko; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Transcripts; ars, ch. Birds, ch. 21. Christopher Christopher Andrew interviewed interviewed Mrs. Gouzenko and her her daughter (both (both of of whom live live Birds, ch. 21. Gouzenko and under November under other othernames) names) in in Canada Canadain in November 1992. 1992. 3. VENONA decrypts, decrypts, 5th 5th release, release, part part 3, 3, pp. pp. 206-7. 206-7. 3 . VENONA 4. vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 2. 2. Burdin Burdin served served as as resident resident from from 1951 1951 to to1953. 1953. In In the therecords records of of the the Canadian CanadianMinistry Ministry of of External Mfairs Affairs his his name name is is transliterated transliterated as as Bourdine. Bourdine. In In 1952 1952 Burdin Burdin recruited recruited Hugh Hugh Hambleton, Hambleton,who who External later became became one of of the the KGBs most important important Canadian Canadianagents; agents; see below, below,chapter chapter 10. 10. KGB's most 5. vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 10, 10, paras. paras. 7-8. 7-8. 5. 6. VENONAdecrypts, decrypts, 5th 5th release, release, part part 2, 2,pp. pp. 263-5,272-3,275. 6. VENONA 263-5, 272-3, 275. 7. The The most most reliable reliable account account of of this this episode episode is is in in Brook-Shepherd, Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, Birds, ch. ch. 4, 4,which which corrects corrects 7. a number of inventions in Philby's Philbys version version of of events. events. a number of inventions in 14-15. 8. 8. Philby, Philby, My Silent War, War, pp. pp. 1 114-15. 9. vol. vol. 5, 5, ch. ch. 7. 7. 9. 10. Andrew 10. Andrewand and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, p. 379. 379. 11. Philby, M My War, 120. y Silent W ar, p. 120. 1 1 . Philby, 12. vol. vol. 5, 5, ch. ch. 7. 7. 12. 13. vol. . 13. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 6 6. 14. Modin, My Cambridge Friends,pp. pp. 137, 137,155; Zubokand and Pleshakov, Pleshakov, Inside the theKremlin's Kremlin? 1 4 . Modin, M y Five Cambrid ge Friends, 155; Zubok Cold War, War, pp. 86-8. 86-8. pp. 15. Andrew 15. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 375-6. 375-6. 16. Andrewand and Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 377, 377,396. 16. Andrew Gordievsky, 396. p. 17. Tsarev, The Crown Jewels, 17. West Westand andTsarev, Jewels, p. 222. 222. 18. Letters Letters from from Geoffrey Geoffrey A. A. Robinson Robinson to to Christopher Christopher Andrew, Andrew, October October 19, 19, 1997, 1997, September September 14, 14, 1998. 1998. 18. Cairncrosss memoirs memoirs are are as as unreliable unreliable about about his his post-war post-war career career as as about about his his earlier earlier work work as as a a Soviet agent. agent. Cairncross's H e claims claims that that he hehad had virtually no no access access to to secret secret material material in in the theTreasury Treasury (The (The Enigma Spy, Spy, pp. pp. 124-7). 124-7). He virtually According to to Robinson, Robinson, though, though, "That That is is totally totally untrue. untrue. The The TUBE TUBEALLOYS ALLOYS [nuclear [nuclear weapons] weapons] files files According themselves were many inches thick, let alone all the other otherSecret and Top TopSecret files. themselves files." 19. Modin, My Cambridge Friends, Cf. West Tsarev, The CrownJewels, Crown Jewels, 222-6; Andrew 19. Modin, M y Five Cambrid ge Friends, p. 150. 150. C West and Tsarev, pp. 222-6; Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 406. and Gordievsky, 20. vol. 7, ch. 6, para. 4. 21. vol. 1. 21. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 1. 22. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not not give the exact dates of the surveillance surveillance team's teams presence at the London London resi resithewar and remained "for for several years." years.vol. vol.7, ch. 2, para. 1; dency. It arrived late in the 1; ch. 6, para. 5. 23. vol. 10, para. 1. 23. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 10, para. 1 11. 24. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 398-9; 398-9; Boyle, cfTreason, pp. 305, 305, 341, 24. Boyle, The Climate of Treason, pp. 341 , 346-8. 346-8. MayMay t o Explain, p. 109. 109. hew, Time to

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25. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsly, KGB, KGB, p. p. 397. Modin, My M y Five Cambridge Friends,p. unable 25. Andrew 397. Modin, Cambrid ge Friends, p. 201. 201. Modin Modin was was unable
to reveal reveal Rodin's Rodins real real name name and and refers refers to to him him by by his his alias alias Korovin. to "Korovin."
26. 153. 26. VENONA VENONA decrypts, decrypts, 3rd 3rd release, release, part part 3, 3, pp. pp. 150, 150,153. 27. 27. Benson Benson and and Warner Warner (eds.), (eds.),

VENON A, pp. Hoover did did not Bentley as source. "At ENONA, pp. 61-71. 61-71. Hoover not identify identi5 Bentley as his his source. At

the present present time," time, he wrote, "it it is impossible to determineexactly the he wrote, is impossible to determine exactly how how many many of of these these people people had had actual actual
knowledge being made ormation they they were were transmitting." knowledge of of the thedisposition disposition being made of of the theinf information transmitting. 28. 28. Weinstein, Weinstein, Perjury, p. p. 357. 357. 266-7. 29. 29. Bentley, Bentley, Out of o f Bondage, Bondage, pp. pp. 204-7, 2067,266-7.

30. If If the the Centre Centre believed Gorsky Gorsky to to have have been been compromised compromised by by Gouzenkos proba30. believed Gouzenko's defection, defection, he he would would proba bly have have been been recalled recalled earlier. earlier. By By March March 1946 1946the the FBI was convinced bly FBI was convinced that that Bentleys Bentley's defection defection was was known known
o f Bondage, Bondage, p. p. 267. 267. Out of ofBondage, p. p. 329. 329. 31. vol. 31. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. On O n Bentley's Bentleys contact contact with with Pravdin's Pravdins wife, wife, see see Bentley, Bentley, Out $Bondage, 32. 32. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. y Five ge Friends, p. 33. My Fiwe Cambrid Cambridge Friends, p. 133. 133. 33. Modin, Modin, M 34. 34. See See below, below, chapter chapter 9. 9. 35. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 383. 35. 383. 36. 36. See See above, above, chapter chapter 2. 2. A, introduction. of the were pubpub 37. 37. Benson Benson and and Warner Warner (eds.), (eds.), VENON ENONA, introduction. Two Two further further studies studies of the decrypts decrypts were VENONA. lished just as press: Haynes and Klehr, Klehr, VENONA; lished just as this this volume volume was was going going to to press: Haynes and VENONA;and and West, West, VENONA. 38. Christopher Andrew with the late 1996. Dr. Dr. Cram Cram was was 38. Interview Interview by by Christopher Andrew with the late Dr. Dr. Cleveland Cleveland Cram, Cram, October October2,2,1996. one of the the first first CIA CIA officers to be be indoctrinated indoctrinated into into VENONA VENONAinin November one of officers to November 1952. 1952. Some Some of of his his recollecrecollec VENON A (written and presented presented by by Christopher Christopher tions tions were were included included in in the the BBC BBCRadio Radio 4 4 documentary documentary K?NOA?A (written and Andrew; producers: producers: Mark Mark Burman Burman and and Helen HelenWeinstein), Weinstein), first 18,1998. Andrew; first broadcast broadcast on on March March 18, 1998. 39. 39. Andrew, Andrew, "The The VENONA VENONASecret." Secret. 40. 1934. From however, contact was broken as 40. Weisband Weisband had had been been recruited recruited in in 1934. From 1945 1945 to to 1947, 1947, however, contact was broken with with him him as part of of the the security security measures measures which which followed followed the the defection defection of part of Elizabeth Elizabeth Bentley. Bentley. Weinstein Weinstein and and Vassiliev, Vassiliev, The Haunted HauntedWood, Wood, p. p. 291. 291. 41. Interviews Interviews with with Cecil Cecil Phillips Phillips and and Meredith Meredith Gardner in the the BBC BBC Radio documentary 41. Gardner broadcast broadcast in Radio 4 4 documentary VENON A (March 1998). ENONA (March 18, 18,1998). Pleshakov, h Inside the Kremlin's CoZd Cold W&; W at; pp. 42. pp. 388-9; 388-9; Zubok Zubok and and Pleshakov, i d e theKremZin? pp. 87-8. 87-8. 42. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 43. vol. vol. 6, 6 , ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 1. Though initially initially made made subordinate subordinate to theCouncil of Ministers, Committeeof 43. 1. Though to the Council of Ministers, the the Committee of Information 1949; Murphy, Murphy, Kondrashev Kondrashev and Battle Information was was transferred transferred to to the the Foreign Foreign Ministry Ministry in in 1949; and Bailey, Bailey, BattleBerlin,pp, 40-1, ground Berlin, pp. 40-1. 44. 44. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 4. 4. 45. The The most most detailed detailed available available account account of of the the organization and and development development of the KT is a 45. organization of the KI is a 24-page 24-page report report based of Vladimir Vladimir and and Yevdokia Yevdokia Petrov, Petrov, following following their their based on on information information obtained obtained during during the the debriefing debriefing of defection 1954: "The Committee of ('KI') 1947-1951" (November 17, 17, 1954) 1954)CRS CRS defection in in 1954: TheCommittee o f Information Information (KT) 1947-1951 (November A68231XR1I56, Australian A6823R(R1/56, Australian Archives, Archives, Canberra. Canberra. 46. vol. 46. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2; 2; vol. vol. 6, 6, appendix appendix 2, 2, part part 7. 7. 47. 47. Dzhirkvelov, Dzhirkvelov, Secret Servant, Servant, p. p. 138. 138. 48. Washington from from 1947 48. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 389. 389. Panyushkin Panyushkin was was ambassador ambassador in in Washington 1947 to to1951 1951 and head head of of the the FCD FCD f from 1953 to to1956. 1956. and rom 1953 1 8-19. 49. 49. Gromyko, Gromyko, Memories, Memories, pp. pp. 3 318-19. (KI) 1947-1951" 1947-1951 (November (November 17,1954) CRS A6823/XR1/56, 50. "The The Committee Committee of Information 50. ofInf ormation ('KI') 17, 1954) CRS A68231XR1/56, AusAus tralian tralian Archives, Archives, Canberra. Canberra. 51. "The The Committee Committee ofhformation ( W ) 1947-1 1947-1951 (November 17, 17,1954) CRS A6823/XR1/56, 51. ofInformation ('KI') 951" (November 1954) CRS A68231XR1/56, AusAus tralian 1 , para. para. 7, section was was not not withdrawn withdrawn tralian Archives, Archives, Canberra. Canberra. According According to to vol. vol. 7, 7,ch. ch. 1 11, 7, the the GRU GRUillegal illegal section f rom the . from the KI KI until until 1949 1949. 1 , para. 5. 52. 52. t-7,187; t-7,187; vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 4, 4, n. 8; 8; vol. vol.7, 7,ch. ch. 1 11, para. 5. 62. O On Korotkov's pre-war pre-war career, career, see Sudo 5 3 . vol. vol. , ch. 1 , para. ; vol. , app. 3 , n. 62. 53. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch, 5, 5, part part 1; 1; vol. 7 7, ch. 1 11, para. 7 7; vol. 7 7, app.3, n Korotkovs see Sudoasks, p. of Korotkov's mention of post platovs, platovs, Special T Tasks, p. 48. 48. The The official offkidSVR SVR version version of Korotkovs career career makes makes no no mention ofhis his postVeterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. pp. 63-5. 63-5. war war role role as as head head of of the the Illegals Illegals Directorate; Directorate; Samolis Samolis (ed., (ed., Veterany VneshneiRazwedki 54. as Philby. Philby. 54. Officers Officers are are not not to to be be confused confused with with agents, agents, such such as 55. His name name appears his birth Wilhelm August August Fisher. Fisher. His His father, father, though though Russian, Russian, came came 55. His appears on on his birthcertificate certificate as as Wilhelm f rom a see Saunders, Saunders, Tyneside "Tyneside and and the Russian from a family family with with German German origins. origins. On O n the the family family background, background, see the Russian Revolution, pp. pp. 280-4. 280-4. Fishers true identity identitywas was not not revealed revealed until until after in 1971, WestRevolution," Fisher's true after his his death death in 1971, when when West ern ern journalists journalists noticed noticed the the name name carved carved on on his his tombstone. tombstone.

to Silvermaster. Silvermaster.Bentley, Bentley, to

N o tt N o

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/ /

602

Veterany 156-9. Veterany Vneshnei VneshneiRaz'vedki Razvedki Rossii, pp. pp. 156-9. Veterany Vneshnei Razvedki Veterany Vneshuei Rnzvedki Rossii (pp. (pp. 156-9) 156-9) refrains refrains from from mentioning mentioning any any of of the the charges charges made made against against him. him. 58. vol. 58. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2.2. 59. 2. 59. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, parts parts 1, 1,2. 60. 60. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. 61. Recollections Recollections of of MARK's MARKS New New York York friend friend and and fellow fellow artist, artist, Burt Silverman; Silverman; Bernikow, Bernikow, Abel, Abed 61. pp. pp. 7-20. 7-20. 62. 5, part 2. 62. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, part2. 63. Samolis 63. Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veterany Vettwzny Vneshnei Vntshnei Razvedki Ruzvedki Rossii, pp. pp. 68-70. 68-70. Albright Albright and and Kunstel, Kunstel, Bombshell, Bombshell, pp. pp. 179-85. 179-85. 64. MLADA.) 64. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2. 2. (Mitrokhin's (Mitrokhins note note mistranscribes mistranscribes MLAD MLAD as as MLADA.) 65. 65. Albright Albright and and Kunstel, Kunstel, Bombshell, Bombshell,pp. pp. 176-8. 176-8. 66. Tchikov Tchikov and andKern, Kern, Comment Staline Stnlinea ( I 'vole volela auxAmhicnins, p. p. 205. 205. 66. la bombe atomique auxAmiricains, 67. 67. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2. 2. 68. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), V Etemly 17neshnei Razvedki Rnzvedki Rossii, pp. pp. 158-9. 158-9. eterany Vneshnei 68. 69. 69. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.), Veteranv Vetemn:j Vneshnei VneshneiRaz)edki Razaedki Rossii, Rossii, p. p. 159. 159. 70. ToribIo. vol. 41. 70. OREL OREL was was Sixto Sixto Fernandes Fernandes Donsel; Donsel; FISH was was Antonio Antonio Arjonilla ArjonillaToriblo. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,part part 41. 71. 71. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. 72. 72. Interviews Interviews with with Ted TedHall and and former former FBI FBI agent agent Robert Robert McQ,yeen, McQueen,first first broadcast broadcast in in the the BBC BBCRadio Radio 4 documentary VENONA presented by Burman 4 documentary VENONA (written (written and and presented by Christopher Christopher Andrew; Andrew; produced produced by by Mark Mark Burman and Helen HelenWeinstein, Weinstein, March March 18, 18,1998). Albright and and Kunstel Kunstel cite cite information information from from "confidential confidential sources and 1998). Albright sources" that Hall Hall had had four four or or five five meetings meetings in in New NewYork York with with a a Soviet Soviet agent agent whom he he knew knew as ''Jimmy Jimmy Stevens that Stevens" in 1952-3, 1952-3, before before finally finally breaking breaking contact with with Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence (Bombshell, (Bombshe& ch. ch. 25). 25). Hall Hall acknowledges acknowledges in that insists that that he he had had several several meetings meetings with with a a Soviet Soviet contact, contact, but but insists that he heprovided provided no no information information during during this this period (interview (interview with 1 , 1998). period with Christopher ChristopherAndrew, Andrew, March March 111,1998). 73. 73. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2. 2. 74. See See below, below, chapter chapter 17. 17. 74. 75. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 2. 2. Kopatzky Kopatzky later later claimed claimed to to have have been been born born in in Kiev Kiev on on New New Year's Years Day, Day, 1922 1922 (Wise, (Wise, 75. 1 , part Molehunt, p. 83). p. 1 183). p. 184. 184. Save Save for for recording recording Kopatzky's Kopatzkys date date and and place place of of birth, birth, Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes from from 76. Wise, Wise, Molehunt, p. 76. his his file file contain contain nothing nothing before before 1946. 1946. 77. 1 , part 77. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 2. 2. 78. 78. Wise, Wise, Molehunt, Molshl&, pp. pp. 182-3, 182-3, 199. 199. 79. Murphy, Murphy, Kondrashev Kondrashev and and Bailey, Bailey, Battleground Balin, Berlin,p. p. 248. 248. The The SVR SVR made made available available to to the the authors authors 79. (David head of Berlin station, station, 1959-61; (David Murphy, Murphy, head of the the CIA Berlin 1959-61; Sergei Sergei Kondrashev, Kondrashev, former former deputy deputy head head of of the the FCD; George Bailey, Bailey, former former Director ofRadio Radio Liberty) Liberty) a a substantial substantial number of files files on on KGB KGB operations operations FCD; George Director of number of in Berlin Berlin before before the the building building of of the the Wall. Wall. Its Its statement statementthat that no Kopatzky Kopatzky file file exists-rightly exists-rightly dismissed by in no dismissed by the authors authors as as "obviously (obviouslydisingenuous"-is disingenuous-is thus thus all all the more extraordinary. extraordinary.The The SVR that its its only the the more SVR claims claims that only record of of Kopatzky Kopatzky concerns his visit, visit, under under his his new name name Orlov, Orlov, to the Soviet embassy Washington in in record concerns his embassy in Washington 1965 when when he he inquired inquired about about possible possible asylum asylum in in the theUSSR and and complained complained that that the theFBI FBI was "attempting (attempting 1965 was to obtain obtain an an admission admission that that he hecollaborated collaborated with with Soviet Soviet intelligence intelligence while while he he was was in in Germany Germanyduring during the to the 1940s and and 1950s." 1950s. 1940s 80. 11, part 80. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 11, part 2. 2. 81. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 11, part 2. 2. On On Kopatzky's Kopatzkys recruitment recruitment by by the the CIA, CIA,see see also also Murphy, Murphy, Kondrashev Kondrashev and and Bai Bai8 1 . vol. 11, part ley, 10-12. ley)Battleground Berlin, Berlin,pp. pp. 1 110-12. 82. 11, part 82. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 11, part 2. 2. 83. 1. 83. See See below, below, chapter chapter 1 11. 84. Kopatzky's Kopatzkys case were Komarov, Komarov, Galiguzov, Galiguzov, Krasavin, Krasavin, V. V. V. Grankin, Krishchenko, Krishchenko, Borisov, Borisov, 84. caseofficers officers were V. Grankin, Komev, Fedorchenko, Fedorchenko, Melnikov, Melnikov, Chaikovsky, Chaikovsky, P. ? A. Shilov, Govorkov, Govorkov, Yeo Ye. P. l? Pitovranov, Pitovranov, V. V. G. G. Likhachev, Likhachev, Komev, A. Shilov, Biryukov, A. A. Ya. Ya. Zinchenko, Zinchenko, Ya. Ya. F. Oleynik, Oleynik, M. Kuryshev, Yu. Arsenev, G. Fedorenko, M. I. 1. Kuryshev, Yu. I. 1. Arsenev, G. G. G. Fedorenko, V. M. Biryukov, Makarov, 1 , part Makarov, Myakotnykh, Myakotnykh, Sevastyanov, Sevastyanov, and and the the illegal illegal DIMA. D I M . vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 2. 85. Zhdanovtold the founding meeting of Cominform (the (thepost-war successor of of Comintern) 85. Andrei Zhdanov Comintern) in September 1947 that "the theprincipal principal driving driving force force of of the the imperialist imperialist camp camp is is the the USA. USA. Allied Allied with with it it are are 1947 that Britain and France." Britain and France. Zhdanov, Zhdanov, The International InternationalSituation. Situation. 86. , 1 12-13; k-7,84. 86. k-11 k-11,112-13; k-7,84.
57. in Samolis 57. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2 2 and and n. n. 6. 6. Fisher's Fishers entry entry in Samolis (ed.), (ed.),

56. 56. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2 2 and and n. 6. 6. C Cf. Samolis Samolis (ed.), (ed.),

N o tt e e s N o s

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87. Buton, Les lendemains of 87. lendemains qui qui dichantent; dechantent; Mortimer, The Rise o f the French Communist Party, Party, chs. 9, 10; , 2. Wolton, La France sous s o u influence, influence, chs. 1 1,2. 88. 88. vol. 9, ch. 1. 1. 89. 15. 89. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the theKremlin's Kremlin) Cold Win; War,p. 15. 90. vol. 9, ch. 1. 1. 91. k-1 1 , 1 12-13;k-7,84. k-7,84. 91. k-11,112-13; 92. . 92. vol. 9, ch. 1 1.

93. vol. 9 9, 1,para. 8 86. Mitrokhins notes contain very little information o on the content content of 9 3 . vol. , ch. 1, 6 . Mitrokhin's n the of reports from
the post-war Paris residency. 94. 1946. 94. Dewavrin had resigned as head of of SDECE in February 1946. 95. 95. Vosjoli, Lamia, ch. 6; 6; Porch,

The 1. T h e French Secret Services, ch. 1 11.

96. vol. 9 9, 1,para. 17. 17. 96. , ch. 1, 97. k-6,91. k-6,91. WEST's WESTS other other contactsin the the DGEWSDECE, 97. "contacts" DGERISDECE, included members of of the Italian and SpanSpan sections, and PASCAL PASCALwho in 1946 1946was posted abroad. ish sections, 98. 98. k-6,92. Recollection of the Deriabin: Schecter and Deriabin, Spy Who Who Saved the the 99. Recollection the KGB defector Peter Deriabin: Deriabin, The Spy World, 237n. n. W orld, p. 237 100. Wolton, La France sous in inyuence, 78-9; Buton, Les lendemains lendemainsqui qui dechantent, 100. fluence, pp. 78-9; dichantent, p. 259. 101. t-l,24; M. Baklanov, Tikhonov, Kiselev, Nagornov and 101. t-1,24; t-2,25. t-2,25. Manac'h's Manachs other case officers officers were M . M. Baklanov,Tikhonov, S. I. I. Gavrilov. S. 102. 176,179; t-l,42. 102. k-4,32, k-4,32,176,179; t-1,42. 103. , para. 6. 103. vol. 9, 9, ch. 1 1, 6. 104. vol. 9, ch. ch. 1, 1,paras. 18-19. 18-19. 104. 105. vol. voI. 9, ch. 1 1, 31. 105. , para. 3 1. 106. of continuing staff shortages. I n 1948 106. vol. 9, 9,ch. l, 1,para. 51. 51.The Paris residency, however, however,complained of In 1948 Paris residency residency had a total of of eighteen operational officers and technical support staff. the Paris staff. Nine further intelligence offi officers intelligence cers whom the Centre had intended to send to Paris were refused visas. visas. Attempts were made, with only limited success, success, to make good the shortfall both by setting up upa new illegal residency and wellas as staff trade and other othermisby coopting residency translators and typists as well staf f from the Soviet embassy, trade mis sions for operational intelligence intelligence work. work. vol. 9, ch. 1, sions 1, para. 50. 107. See 107. See below, below, chapter 27. 108. Modin, M My CambridgeFriends, Friends,pp. 159, 159,165. 108. y Five Cambridge 1 65. Accidents, p. 7; Penrose ofSilmce, 324-7. 109. 109. Rees, Rees,A Chapter of OfAccidents, Penrose and Freeman, Conspiracy o f Silence, pp. pp. 324-7. 1 10. vol. 7, ch. 10, 10, para. 9. 110. 9. 111. ch. 10. 10. 111. vol. 7, ch. 112. L$, chs. 6, 6,7. 7. 1 12. Cecil, A Divided Life, 113. 1951). 113. The Times (January 2, 2,1951). 114. Minute by Maclean (December 21, 21,1950), AU 1013152. 114. 1950), PRO FO 371/81613 AU 101 3/52. 115. Philby, Philby, M My War, 134. y Silent W ar, p. 134. 115. 1 16. Though six telegrams in 1945 116. Though 1945referred referred to Philby under the codename STANLEY, they appear not to to beendecrypted until some years later; VENONA decrypts, 5th release, part 1, 263-7,272,275-6. have been 1, pp. 263-7, 272, 275-6. of thirty telegrams telegrams exchanged exchanged between the Centre Centreand the London Londonresidency, mostly in 1945, were A total of eventually eventually decrypted in whole or in part partby Anglo-American Anglo-American codebreakers. codebreakers. 1 17. Benson and Warner A, pp. xxvii-xxviii. 117. Warner(eds.), (eds.), VENON ENONA, mvii-mviii. 118. Fuchs told his interrogator that his last contact contact with with Soviet intelligence had been in February or 118. havebeen his last meeting meeting with withhis controller. Fuchs,Atom Spy, p. March 1949. 1949. That may have controller. Williams, Klaus Fuchs, 186. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, Delusion,ch. 12. 12. 1 86. See also Gorodetsky, 119. A, pp. xxvii-xxviii. 119. Benson and Warner Warner (eds.), (eds.), VENON ENONA, Xxvii-xxG. The US US government lacked the evidence evidence to prosecute Weisband for espionage, espionage, but he hewas sentenced to a years year's imprisonment imprisonment for contempt after failfail toattend attend federal grand jury hearing hearingon on Communist Party activity. ing to a federal Communist 120. 120. vol. 7, 7, ch. 10, 10, para. 7. 121. ar, p. 146. 121. Philby, Philby, My Silent W War, 146. 122. See See above, chapter 9. 9. 122. 123. ch. 5, part 2. rom Mitrokhin's 123. vol. 6, 6, 2. It is unclear f from Mitrokhinsnotes whether Philby refused contact with the legal res residencies from the moment of United Unsurprisingly, of his arrival in the the United States in 1949 or in the following year. year. Unsurprisingly, Phiby made no mention in his memoirs memoirs or published interviews ofthe American residencies. Philby interviews of the failings of

N o tt e e N o

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124. vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 2. Modin, My ge Friends, 124. M y Five Cambrid Cambridge Friends,pp. 186-7. 186-7.

125. Philby, Phdby, M My War, 151-2. Burgess arrived arrived at the Washington Washingtonembassy embassy as second secretary in y Silent W ar, pp. 151-2. 125.

ashington, pp. August 1950. 1950. On O n Philby's Philbys house at 4100 4100Nebraska Avenue, Avenue, NW, N W , see Kessler, Kessler, Undercover UndercoverW Washington,
93-5. 93-5. 126. Newton, The Butcher's 1; Knightley, 126. Butcher?Embmce, Embrace,pp. 305-1 305-11; Knightley Philby, Philby, pp. 167-8. 167-8. 127. According to HARRY's HARRYSKGB file, the out-of-date out-of-date passport in the thename of of Kovalik was was no. no.214595, 127. StateDepartment Department Washington on April April29, 29,1930. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 2. issued by the State inin Washington 1930. vol. 6, 128. 128. vol. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. 129. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. On O n the use of of the Batory to transport transport Soviet Soviet agents to the 129. the United United States, cf. Without Faces, Faces, pp. 19, 19,64,68. 64, 68. Budenz, Men Without 130. vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 2. 131. 5, part 2. 2.There There 131. vol. 6, ch. 5, is no suggestion that either Senator Flanders or his family were aware that HARRY was a a Soviet illegal. HARRY 132. 5, part 2. 132. vol. 6, ch. 5, 133. 133. Newton, The Butcher's Butcher? Embrace, Embrace,p. 281. 134. vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 2. 135. 135. Newton, Newton,The Butcher's Bntcher?Embrace, Embrace,pp. 281-2. 281-2. y Silent War, 136. Philby, 136. Philby, M My War, pp. 152-4. 152-4. 137. Cecil, A Divided Divided Life, Li j , p. 1 118. 137. 1 8. 138. 138. VENONA decrypts, 3rd release, part part 1, 1,pp. 240-1. 240-1. y Five Cambridge 1 39. This 139. Thisis acknowledged acknowledged by Yuri Modin (Modin, (Modin,M My Cambridge Friends, Friends,p. 199). 199). My We6 p. 156. 156. The KGB claim that the the escapades escapades which led to Burgess's Burgesss recall were y Silent War, 140. Philby, M pre-planned is not corroborated by Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes; they were much in line with similar, unpremeditated unpremeditated pre-planned "scrapes" over the previous few years. scrapes 141. 5, part 2. 141. vol. 6, 6, ch. 5, My 142. Modin, 142. Modin, M y Five Cambridge Cambridge Friends, Friends,pp. 199-201. 199-201. 143. My Cambridge Friends,pp. 202-3. 202-3. 14 3. Modin, M y Five Cambrid ge Friends, 144. Modin, My CambridgeFriends, Friends,pp. 203-4; 203-4; Costello and Tsarev, Deadly Dead4 Illusions, Ihsions, pp. 338-9. 338-9. 144. Modin, M y Five Cambridge 145. A Divided Life, pp. 135f 145. Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 404; Cecil, Ceci1,A DividedLij, 135ff. 146. 7, ch. 10, 16. 146. vol. 7, 10, para. 16. 147. vol. 7, ch. 10, 10, para. 1 17. 147. 7. 148. 10, para. 19. 148. vol. 7, ch. 10, 19. M y Five Cambridge 149. 149. Modin, Modin, My CambridgeFriends, Friends,p. 251 251.. 150. , ch. 1 0 , para. 19. 150. vol. 7 7, 10, 19. 151. vol. 7, ch. 10, 8. 151. 10,para. 1 18. 152. 5, part 2 2.. 152. vol. 6, ch. 5, ar, pp. 157-9. 157-9. 1 5 3 . Philby, 153. Philby, /Itv ib?y Silent W War, 154. vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 2. 2. 154. 155. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2. In 1953 theillegal illegal VIK also lost a hollow coin containing a microfi microfilm 155. 1953 the lm message. 156. 7, ch. 10, 10, para. 19. 19. 156. vol. 7, 157. Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, p. 406; Modin, M My Cambridge Friends, pp. 2 213-18. 157. y Five Cambrid ge Friends, 13-18. Modin is Colville had had recorded his 1939 1939 meetings with Cairncross in his diary, and and is apparently unaware that Colville skeptical of of his ability to identify Cairncross as the author authorof of a note describing one of of those meet meetwrongly skeptical inBurgess's Burgesss flat. ings, found in 158. Modin, .l\.1 illy Five Cambrid Cambridge Friends,pp. 221-4, 221-4,229-32; 406-7. 158. y Five ge Friends, 229-32; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 406-7. finally confessed in 1964 1964inin return for a guarantee of of immunity from prosecution. He H e was not pubBlunt fi nally confessed return for pub identified 1979. licly identifi ed as a former Soviet agent until 1979. 159. Philby, Philby, M My SiZent War, War,ch. 12; 12;Andrew Andrew Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. 407-8; 407-8; Knightley, Knightley,Philby, Philby, pp. 147-8; 147-8; y Silent and Gordievsky, 159. My Cambridge Friends,pp. 224, 224,228-32. Modin, M y Five Cambrid ge Friends, 228-32. 160. Borovik, The Philby Files, Files, p. 284. 284. 160. Borovik, 161. 161. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. 24-6. 24-6.

I Chapter Ten The The Main Adversary Part I

1. Mitrokhins notes omit to record Grigulevich's Grigulevichk alias as a Costa 1. t-7,12; k-13,267; vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 1. 1. Mitrokhin's the other other example, the fact that on May 14, 14,1952 Rican diplomat, but the details he provides (for example, 1952 Grigulevich of credence Plenipotentiary of of Costa Costa Rica in presented his letters of credence as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary Einaudi) clearly clearly identify Grigulevich as Teodoro Castro. The Rome to the Italian president, Luigi Einaudi) "Teodoro B. Castro."

N o tt e e s s N o

6 0S 5

members of the Costa Rican delegation Session of of the UN General Assembly are listed in delegation to the the Sixth Session

O fficial Records of Assembly Sixth Session, Session, Plenary Meetings, Oflcial o f the General GeneralAssembly Meetings,p. xiv. xi^ 2. See See above, 2. above, chapter 6. 3. 3. k-13,370. k-26,194.The of the the Costa Fran4. k-13,267; k-26,194. The two other leading members of Costa Rican delegation to Rome were Fran cisco Minister of Public Works, and Daniel Oduber, ambassador in Paris (later president of cisco Orlich, Orlich, Minister of of Costa Rica from 1974 1980 deputy chairman of of the Socialist International). 1974 to to1978, 1978, and in 1980 International). Grigulevich appears confidence, too; his wife was wasreceived received by them whenshe she visited Costa Rica in 1952. 1952. O n to have won their confidence, by them: when On Figueress role role in restoring constitutional government in Costa Costa Rica, see see Bird, Costa Rica, ch. 10. 10. Figueres's 5. 5. k-13,267. 6. Acheson, Present at the Creation, Creation,pp. 580-1. 580-1. 7. k-13,267; t-7,12; vol. 6, ch. 5, 1. United Nations, Oflcial O fficial Records ofthe ofthe GeneralAssembly GeneralAssembly Sixth SesSes 5, part 1. sion, Ad AdHoc Committee, p. 20. sion, Hoc Political Committee, p. 8. 8. k-13,267. 9. 9. See See above, above, chapter 9. 10. The The VENONA VENONAdecrypts decrypts led to very few arrests arrests of of Soviet spies, spies, largely largely because SIGINT was consid10. consid ered too secret to be used in court, even in closed session. Even had it itbeen used, it would would have been open of legal legal challenges. challenges. to a variety of 1 1 . See 7-8. 11. See above, chapters 7-8. 12. Klehr and Haynes, The American Communist Movement, ch. 4. 12. 4 . 13. See See above, above, chapter 9. 13. 14. The Illegals Directorate 14. Directorate planned a network of of 28 "documentation documentation agents" agents in Austria, 24 in East Ger GerinWest West 15 in France, 13 UnitedStates, 12 12 in inBritain, 12 in inItaly, 10 in inCanada, Canada, many, 24 in Germany, 15 13 in the United 10 in in 8 in Iran, 6 in Lebanon m and ) . The large num10 Belgium, 9 in Mexico, 8 ; d 6 in Turkey (vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4 4). num of agents in Germany Germany and andAustria reflected the high high proportion ber of proportion of of Soviet illegals posing as refugees Germany. from East Germany. 15. 15. Operations officers officers specializing in illegal documentation were posted to the legal residencies in New York, Washington, Ottawa, Ottawa, Mexico Mexico City, Buenos CopenYork, Buenos Aires, London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, Copen hagen, Oslo, Stockholm, Stockholm, Helsinki, Vienna, Athens, Istanbul, Tehran, Beirut, Calcutta, Karachi and Cairo. Korneyev, V. N. Danilin and A. M. Tikhomirov. Tikhomirov. vol. 6, 6,ch. 5, part 4. Those posted to New York were M. N. Korneyev, 16. See See above, above, chapter 9. 9. 16. 17. 7, ch. 11, 1 7. vol. 7, 11, item 2. 18. 8. 18. vol. 8, ch. 8. 19. 19. Sawatsky, Sawatsky, For Services Services Rendered, Rendered,p. 34. 34. 8, ch. 8, paras. 5-6. 5-6. 20. vol. 8, 21. 8, ch. 8, 8, para. 7. 21. vol. 8, 22. Sawatsky, Sawatsky, For Services Services Rendered, Rendered, p. 34. 34. Soboloffsfather had had left Canada to at Magnitogorsk Magnitogorsk in 1931. 1931. David and his mother motherfollowed in 23. Soboloff's left Canada to work 1935. 1935. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 7. 24. Sawatsky, Sawatsky, For Services ServicesRendered, Rendered,pp. 38-40. 38-40. 25. Though the HART's lover, it seems theKGB file noted noted by Mitrokhin names HARTS seems unfair to identify her. 8, ch. ch. 8, 8, paras. 14, 18. 26. vol. 8, paras. 14,18. Rendered, pp.44-53, 44-53 , 66-7. Interviews by Christopher Andrew Andrewwith with Terry 27. Sawatsky, Sawatsky, For Services ServicesRendered, 66-7. Guernsey in Toronto, October 1991. 1991. 28. vol. 8, ch. 2. On O n the Centre's Centres criticisms criticisms of of the Ottawa Ottawa residency see above, above,pp. 180-1. 180-1. 8, para. 9. 29. vol. 8, ch. 8, 9. 30. Sawatsky, Sawatsky, For Services Services Rendered, Rendered,pp. 53-4. 53-4. 30. 3 1 . vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 9. On EMMA, see 31. EMMA, see also k-8,82. Hambleton, Spy; Granatstein and 32. On Hambleton's Hambletons career prior to his recruitment, see Heaps, Hugh Hambleton, Stafford, ars, ch. 8; Barron, KGB Today, Stafford, Spy W Wars, Today, ch. 9. vol. 8, app. 1, 87. 33. vol. 8, 8, ch. 8; vol. 1, item 87. 34. See See below, chapter 12. 12. 35. vol. 6, 6, ch. 5, 5, part 2. 36. vol. 8, ch. 8; vol. vol.6, ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 37. 1 , 20. 37. vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. 8, paras. paras. 1 11,20. 38. Sawatsky, Sawatsky, For Services ServicesRendered, Rendered,pp. 64-71 64-71. . 38. 39. 10,20. 3 9 . vol. 8, ch. 8, paras. 10,20.
United Nations,

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40. 40. Sawatsky, Sawatsky, For Services ServicesRendered, Rendered,p. p. 27. 27. 41. 41. vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 8, 8,para. para. 14. 14. 42. 42. vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 8, 8, paras. paras. 10, 10, 12. 12. 43. 43. vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 8, 8,para. para. 13. 13. 44. 20. 44. vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 8, 8, paras. paras. 15, 15,20.

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45. 45. vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 8, 8, para. para. 16. 16. Remarkably, Remarkably, HART HART survived survived fifteen fifteen years' years imprisonment imprisonment (five (five in in solitary solitary con confinement, by finement, three three in in a a normal normal prison prison cell cell and and seven seven in in labor labor camp), camp), and and was was later later exfiltrated exfiltrated to to the theWest West by SIS. SIS. He He now now lives lives in in Canada. Canada. 46. a 46. vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 8, 8, para. para. 20. 20. In In January January 1964 1964 a a KGB KGB officer officer traveling traveling to to Winnipeg Winnipegwith with a scientific scientific and and cul cultural delegation delegation and the Igor IgorMoiseyev Moiseyev Folk Folk Dance Dance Group Grouptried to reestablish reestablish contact with Morrison, Morrison,but but without without success. success. An An investigation investigation by by agent agent ANTHEA ANTHEA then then established established that that he he had had moved moved house. house. The The Centre hunt for Centre later later planned planned to to involve involve Morrison Morrison in inthe the hunt for two two illegals, illegals, Yevgeni YevgeniRunge Runge (MAKS) ( M K S ) and and Valen Valentina Rush (ZINA), by the Ottawa (ZINA), who whodefected to the theCIA CIA in Berlin in 1967. 1967. But though thoughattempts attempts Ottawa resi residency 1974 they dency to to locate locate Morrison Morrison continued continued intermittently intermittentlyuntil until 1974 they were were unsuccessful unsuccessful(vol. (vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5 , part part 5; 5; vol. Morrison was jail for offenses vol. 8, 8,ch. ch. 8, 8,para. para. 21). 21). In In May May1986 1986 Morrison was sentenced to eighteen months months in in offenses against the Stafford, ars, p. the Official Official Secrets Secrets Act Act (Granatstein (Granatsteinand and Stafford, Spy W Wars, p. 149). 149). 47. 47. vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 8, 8,para. para. 19. 19. 48. l l ,130. From 1961 48. k-4,207; kk-11,130. 1961 to to 1964 1964 Grinchenko Grinchenko worked in Cuba as as a consultant to to the illegals illegals directorate DGI; kl l, 130. directorate of the the DGI; k-11,130. 49. 49. On O n Fisher, Fisher, see see above, above,chapter 9. 9. 50. named VIRTANEN) Brigades Span 50. Olavi A h llman m a n (code (codenamed VIRTANEN) was a veteran ofthe the International International Brigades during duringthe the Spanish 1. ish Civil Civil War. War. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2; 2; k-27,45 k-27,451. 5 1 . Bernikow, Abel, chs. chs. 2-3. 2-3. 51. Bernikow,Abel, 52. with the assistance 52. The The message message was wasfinally finally decrypted decrypted in in 1957, 1957, with the assistance of of cipher cipher material material given given by by VIK to to the the

The The 274-5. FBI-KGB ar, pp. FBI-KGB W War, pp. 27Q-1, 270-1,274-5. 53. 53. k-3,80; k-3,80; k-8,83. k-8,83. ORIZO's ORIZOs main main motivation motivation seems seems to to have have been been financial. financial. In In Paris, Paris, he he had had been been paid paid 40,000 ork. 40,000 francs francs a a month; month; Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes do do not notindicate indicate how how much much he he was was paid paid in in New NewY York. 54. 54. k-8,91. k-8,91. 55. ORIZO continued 55. k-3,80. k-3,8O.ORIZO continued work as as a Soviet Soviet agent unti1 until 1980. 1980. 56. 56. Bernikow, Bernikow,Abel, Abel, pp. pp. 171-2. 171-2. 57. 57. Bernikow, Bernikow,Abel, &el, chs. chs. 3-4. 3-4. Even Even after his his arrest, arrest, MARK MARK failed failed to realize realize that that VIK had never been under surveillance now believed that Hayhanen surveillanceby by the the FBI. FBI.He He told told his lawyer lawyer that "he he Hayhanenhad been secretly secretly appre apprehended hended in in December December [1956] [1956] by by the the FBI FBI and had met [him] [him] thereafter thereafter on on orders orders from from Federal Federal agents" agents (Donovan, ge, p. (Donovan, Strangers on on a Brid Bridge, p. 39). 39). 58. 58. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. 5, 5,part part 2. 59. 59. Bernikow, Bernikow,Abel, &el, pp. pp. 86-95. 86-95. 60. 60. vol. vol. 6, 6,ch. 5, 5, part part2. 2. 61. 61. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 2. 2. 1. 62. 62. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2, 2, n. n. 1 11. na 79-80; Bernikow, 6 3 . Donovan, 63. Donovan, Strangers o on a Bridge, Bridge, pp. pp. 1 179-80; Bernikow,Abel, Abel, pp. pp. 242-4. 242-4. 64. 64. Donovan, Strangers on a Bridge, Bridge, p. 257. 65. 65. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. 5, 5, part part2. 66. 66. Bernikow, Bernikow,Abel, Abel, pp. pp. 223-4. 223-4. 67. 67. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2. 2. 68. 1962 Frederic 68. Also Also on February 10, 10,1962 Frederic L. L. Pryor, Pryor, a a Yale Yale student accused of espionage espionage in East East Berlin, was released released at Checkpoint Checkpoint Charlie. 69. 69. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2. 2. 70. 70. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2.2. 71. 71. Donovan, Donovan, Strangers Strangers on on a a Bridge, Bridge, p. p. 418. 418. 6, 2. 72. 72. vol. vol. part 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part 2. 1 73. 73. vol. vol.6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2. 2. 74. York 74. While While in inNew New York "Abel" Abelhad had sent sentto to Moscow, Moscow, at the theGRU's GRUs request, request, large-scale maps maps of American cities. cities.Though Though this was was not a very very demanding demanding assignment in the United United States, States, similar similar maps were were unob unobtainable tainable for for Soviet Soviet cities. cities. 75. 75. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part 2. 2. ge, pp. 414. 76. 76. Donovan, Donovan, Strangers on on a Brid Bridge, pp. 275, 275,414.

FBI and and other material discoveredby by the Bureau other Bureau in MARK's MARKS flat after after his his arrest. arrest. Lamphere,

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77. 77. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part2. 2.

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78. The The SVR, SVR,which which still still propagates propagates the the heroic heroic "Abel" Abel myth, claimed in 1995 1995 that, that, Secrecy 78. "Secrecy requirements do not not yet yet allow allow the the disclosure disclosure of of many many of of the the operations operations in in which MARK MARK participated. do participated." Samolis Samolis (ed.),

Ehwmy Vwshnei Raz'edki Razwdki Rossii, Rossii, pp. pp. 156-9. 156-9. V eterany Vneshllei
79. Gordievsky, Gordievsky,Next Ntxt Stop Execution, Execution, pp. pp. 141-2. 141-2. 79.

1. See 9. 1. See above, above, chapter chapter 9. 2. vol. 1 , part 2. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 2. 2. 3 . vol. 11, part 3. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 11, part 2. 2. 4. 4. Wise, Wise, Mo/ehunt, Molebunt, pp. pp. 186-7. 186-7. 5. Murphy, pp. 245-6. 245-6. 5. Murphy, Kondrashev Kondrashev and and Bailey, Bailey, Battleground Berlin, Berlin, pp. 6. 1 , part 6. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 2. 2. 7. Wise, Wise, Mo/ehunt, Mol~brmt) pp. 188-9. 188-9. pp. 7. 8. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 2. 2. The Gallery Gallery Orlov, Orlov, originally originally in in South Pitt Pitt Street, Alexandria, Alexandria, later later moved moved to King King 8. 1 , part The Street in in the the Old Old Town Town (Kessler, (Kessler, Under(o}er Unden-oz~er W~dir~gton, W ashington, pp. 125-6). 125-6). Street 9. Wise, Wise, Mo/ehunt, Molebrrnt, pp. pp. 191-4. 191-4. 9. 10. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 2. 2. 10. vol. 1 , part 11. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 2. 2. Mrs. Mrs. Orlov said said later later that that her her husband husband had had told her her the the Soviet embassy had had agreed 1 1 . vol. 1 , part Orlov to his his request request for for asylum asylum for for them them and and their their two two young young sons JI.1o/ehunt, p. 192). 192). to sons (Wise, Aloleblmt, 3. 12. 12. Wise, Wise,Mo/ehzmt, Molehlrnt, ch. ch. 1 13. 1 3 . vol. h. 1 1 , part , parts 41. 13. vol. 6, 6, c ch. 11, part 2; 2; vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1 1, parts 17, 17,41. 14. Kessler, Kessler, Underco, Unde?-cover IYashi?lgton, p.. 126. 126. 14. ver W ashington, p 15. 15. k-4,136. k-4,136. 16. Barron, Barron, KGB, KGB)ch. ch. 10. 10. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 464-6. 16. 464-6. 17. k-4,136. 17. k-4, 136. 18. 18. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. pp. 465-6. 465-6. 144. 19. Bamford, 19. Bamford, The Tbe Puzzle Pnzzle Palace, Palace, p. p. 144. 20. 1 , part 1. 20. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 1 11. 21. Bamford, The Tbe Puzzle Plrzzle Palace, pp. 134-40. 134-40. 2 1 . Bamford, Palace, pp. 22. vol. 1 , part 1. 22. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 1 11. 2 3 . Bamford, 23. Bamford, The Tbe Puzzle Palace, Palare, p p.. 141. 141. 24. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 1 11. From 1960 1960 to to 1963 1963 the the GRU GRU had at NSA, 24. 1 , part 1 . From had an an important important agent-in-place agent-in-place at NSA, Staff Staff Sergeant Jack E. E. Dunlap Dunlap (like (like Mitchell Mitchell and and Martin, Martin, aawalk-in). walk-in). In 1963 a former SergeantJack 1963 Victor Norris Hamilton, a employee ofNSA of NSA who whohad had been been forced forced to to resign resign in in 1 1959 because of mental illness, the Soviet employee 959 because of mental illness, defected defected to to the Soviet Union and and gave gave a a press press conference conference much much like like Mitchell's Mitchells and Martins Andrew and Gordievsky, Union Martin's in 1960. 1960. Andrew Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 462-4. 462-4. Bamford, Bamford, The Tbe Puzzle Pmzle Palace, Azlac-e,pp. pp. 151-4. 151-4. KGB, pp. 25. Fursenko Fursenko and and Naftali, Naftali, "Soviet Soviet Intelligence Intelligence and and the the Cuban Cuban Missile Crisis," Crisis, p. p. 77. 77. 25. 26. 26. Bamford, Bamford, The Tbe Puzzle Puzzlt Palace, Palace, pp. pp. 142-3 142-3.. 27. vol. 6, ch. 1 11, part 1 11. Mitrokhins notes notes on on the the 500 allowanceare taken from 27. vol. 6, ch. 1 , part 1 . Mitrokhin's 500 rouble rouble monthly monthly allowance are taken from Mitchells file file and and refer refer only only to to him. him. However, However, two two years years later, later, Martin Martin told told a reporter from from Tbe Mitchell's The New York Times, whom whom he met in a chance chance encounter encounter in a Leningrad Leningrad cafk, had been Times, he met in a in a cafe, that that he he had been given given the the same same allowance.Theodore Theodore Shabad, Shabad, "Defector Defector from from US US Resigned Resigned to to Soviet Soviet Union," Union, Tbe allowance. The New York Times (June (June 24, 1962). Bamford, Palace, a job, job, he he was was paid paid 100 100 roubles as a a 24, 1962). Bamford, The Tbe Puzzle A~zzle Palace, p. p. 148. 148. When When Mitchell Mitchell got got a roubles as a subsidy; monthly salary salary and and another another 400 400 as as a monthly subsidy; vol. 6, ch. 11, 1 1 , part 11. 11. 28. Information o on Mitchell f from vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1 11, part 11; on Defector from 2 8 . Information n Mitchell rom vol. 1 , part 11; o n Martin from f rom Shabad, "Defector f rom US Resigned to to Soviet," Soviet, The Tbe New York Times Times (June (June 24, 24,1962). 1962). Resigned 29. 11, part 1. 29. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 11, part1 11. 30. Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, 3 0 . Bamford, Palace, p p.. 149. 149. Martin Martindied died i in n Moscow Moscow o of f acute acute leukemia leukemia i in n 1986. 1986. 31. The source source of of the the alarmist alarmist KGB KGB report report of of Pentagon Pentagon plans a nuclear was "a adocument 31. The plans for for a nuclear attack attack was document sent sent by by a[n ed] liaison cer with CIA to his own government" (Fursenko (Fursenko and and Naftali, Naftali, One "One HelZ Hell of a[n unidentifi unidentified] liaison offi officer with the theCIA to his own government o f pp. General Curtis the belligerent of Strategic Strategic Air Command, a Gamble," GnmBle) pp. 51-2). 51-2). Though Though General Curtis LeMay, LeMay, the belligerent head head of Air Command, privately had any becoming the the policy policy privately used used the the language language of of the the pre-emptive pre-emptive strike, strike, this this never never had any prospect prospect of of becoming of Eisenhower administration. language, however, caused some some concern concern among among the the United United of the the Eisenhower administration. Such Such language, however, caused States NATO allies. The British JIC, though believing believing it it highly States' NATO allies. The .TIC, though "highly unlikely that, with her democratic method of of government government and and her her close close ties with other other Western nations, [the [the USA] would ever method ties with Western nations, USA] would ever provoke provoke a a war," 1954 that was (a) aamore extreme government government in in the the US, (b) (b) war, concluded concluded in in 1954 thatitit was "just -justpossible possiblethat that given given (a) more extreme

Chapter Eleven The Adversnry Part 2 The Main Adversary

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increased US lack of of confidence confidence in some or all of of her Western allies owing to political development in their

countries, (c) some sudden advance advance in the USA USAin in the of weapons, counsels of of impatience the sphere of weapons, etc., the counsels might get hand." JIC(54) JIC(54) 37 (I Cam get the theupper hand. (I owe this information information to Alex Alex Craig of of Christ's Christs College, Camthe JIC in the theearly Cold War). bridge, currently completing a groundbreaking PhD on the]IC declassified US documents indicate that, under under specified emergency conditions, senior Recently declassified predelegatedpresidential authority to use nuclear weapons (Paul Lashmar, American commanders had "predelegated" 8, 1998). It is possible, possible, but by no means certain, that "Dr. Secrets," Independent, Dr. Strangelove's Strangeloves Secrets, Independent, September 8,1998). a report of of this from the KGB's KGBs source, source, together together with LeMay's LeMays apocalyptic apocalyptic rhetoric, fueled the Centre's Centres fear of of an American first strike. 32. Feklisov, Za okeanom i na ostrO'lIe, ostroae, pp. 199-201. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the theKremlin's Kremlin? Cold War, War,pp. 32. Feklisov, 236-40. 236-40. Eyes Only, 33. Andrew, For the President's President? Eyes OnZy, pp. 257f 257ff. 33. Cold W ar, p. 242. 34. Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the theKremlin's Kremlin? War, 242. President? Eyes OnZy, pp. 267f 267ff. 35. Eyes Only, 35. Andrew, For the President's 36. 1-Sh (July 29, 1961). Decree no. 191175-GS. 6, ch. Khrushchev, memorandum memorandum no. 186 1861-Sh (Jdy29,1961). 191/75-GS. vol. 6, 36. Shelepin to Khrushchev, W ar, pp. 5, Spy," pp. 28-30; 5, part 5. 5. C Cf.Zubok, "Spy Spy vs. Spy, 28-30; Zubok Zubok and Pleshakov, Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's KremZin? Cold War, 253-5. 253-5. 37. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, fidence, pp. 52-4. President? Eyes OnZy, pp. 278-9; 278-9; Dobrynin, In Con Confidence, 52-4. 155, 168. On American 38. Fursenko and Naftali, "One OneHell HeZl of o f a Gamble," Gamble,pp. 155,168. American covert action against Castro, 38. see Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, 274-6, 280. President? Eyes OnZy, pp. 271-2, 271-2,274-6,280. of 39. Fursenko and N aftali, "One Naftali, OneHell Hell o f a Gamble." Gamble. ch. 9. 9. Eyes Only, 40. Andrew, For the President's President? Eyes OnZy, pp. 282-90. 282-90. 41 . Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, ar, President? Eyes OnZy, pp. 285-95; 285-95; Zubok and andPleshakov, Pleshakov, Inside the theKremlin's Kremlin? Cold W War, 41. pp. 258-66; Dobrynin, In Con fidence, pp. 52-4. Confidence, 52-4. 42. 8. See above, chapters 7, 7,8. 42. See Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Crisis. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes add 43. Fursenko and Naftali, "Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis." privileged access to SVR files, of of KGB sources sources of of political nothing to this admirable analysis, based on privileged Washingtonduring during the missile to intelligence in Washington the missile crisis. There is no indication in files noted by Mitrokhin to access,notably those on illegals, of of any significant source which which Fursenko and Naftali did not have access, they have overlooked. overlooked. 44. Fursenko and Naftali, Soviet the Cuban CubanMissile Crisis," Crisis, p. 65. 44. "Soviet Intelligence and the 45. Spymaster, pp. 237-8. 237-8. Sakharovsky's Sakharovskys melancholy expression expression is clearly clearly evident in the photo photo45. Kalugin, Spymaster, graph which accompanies Vneshnei Razvedki accompanies his official SVR hagiography (Samolis (Samolis (ed.), Veterany Kterany Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 133-5). 46. 75, 85n. Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Cuban Missile Crisis," Crisis, pp. 66, 66,75,85n. 46. Fursenko and Naftali, "Soviet and Pleshakov, Pleshakov, Inside the the Kremlin's KremlinsCold ColdW War, ar, pp. 266-7. 266-7. Fursenko and Naftali, " One One Hell Hellof o fa 47. 47. Zubok and Gamble, ch. 14. Washington resident, had two, now celebrated, meetings Gamble," 14. On October 26, Feklisov, the Washington the ABC correspondent, John Scali, whom he knew had good access to the the White House, with the ABC diplomatic correspondent,John White House, discuss ways to end end the thecrisis. Kennedy was convinced convinced that Feklisov spoke for Khrushchev Khnishchev personally. to discuss archives,however, show that he hedid did not. playedno role either in Khrushchev's Khrushchevs proposal The KGB archives, not. Feklisov played on October October 26 to resolve the crisis by by an American guarantee of of Cuban territorial territorial integrity, integrity, or in his possible that attempt on October 27 to trade US bases in Turkey for Soviet missile sites in Cuba. It is possible who-unlike Semichastny-was of the Presidium, had encouraged Semichastny to Shelepin, who-unlike Semichastny-was a member of Feklkov and Scali to extract a US proposal to settle the crisis which would use a meeting between Feklisov Scali to try to Soviet climbdown less of the incomplete nature of of KGB flies files on this make the Soviet less humiliating. Because of episode, together together with the the conflict of of oral evidence evidence between Feklisov, Scali Scaliand Semichastny, never episode, Semichastny, it may never be possible side. Fursenko and Naftali, Using "Using KGB possible to establish what led up to the themeeting on the theSoviet Soviet side. Documents; Fursenko and Naftali, "Soviet Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban CubanMissile Crisis," Crisis, pp. 80-3. 80-3. Documents"; andPleshakov, Inside the theKremlin's Kremlin? War, Hellofa Gam48. Cold W ar, p. 267. 267. Fursenko and Naftali, One "One Hell ofa Gam 48. Zubok and ble, pp. 284-6. 284-6. ble," orld. 49. fullest account of of Penkovsky's Penkovskys career is Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who WhoSaved Savedthe theW World, 49. The fullest 50. 6, ch. 1 , part 1 . 50. vol. 6, 1, 1. 51. 6, ch. 8, 8, part 6 6. 5 1 . vol. 6, . 52. . 6. 52. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6 6, 1, part 1. 1. 53. 5 3 . vol. 6 , ch. 1, 54 . vol. 2, 2, app. 3. 54. 55. On arrior. O n Golitsyn's Golitsyns impact on Angleton Angleton and the CIA, CIA, see Wise, Molehunt, Molehunt, and Mangold, Mangold,Cold W Warriox

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56. app. 3; part 1. USembassy's embassys decision to return return Cherepanovs 1, app. 3; vol. 6, ch. 1, 1, part 1. On the US Cherepanov's documents, see 56. vol. 1, 121-3. Wise, Molehunt, pp. 121-3.
57. 57. See See below, chapter 22.

58. vol. 6, ch. 1, 1;Nosenko's Nosenkos codename appears appears in vol. 6, ch. 5, part part5. 58. 1, part 1;
59. 59. vol. 2, app. 3. 3.

60. The VPK also tasked the the GRU, GRU,the theState State Committee for Science 60. Committee Science and Technology (GKNT), a secret the Soviet Academy of of Sciences Sciences and the Committee External Economic Relations unit in in the Soviet theState State Committee for External
(GKES). GRU Hanson, (GKES). Most of of the S&T S&T it received came from the KGB and GRU. Hanson, Soviet Industrial IndusaiaZ Espi Espionage; Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. 622-3. 622-3. onage; 6 1 . k-5,476. 61. 62. 62. k-5,473. 63. URBAN may be a post-war codename codename for the unidentified unidentified wartime agent agent PERS referred to in the 63. VENONA decrypts. On KGB/SVR attempts to to confuse confuse identification identification of of PERS, see Albright and KunKun stel, Bombshell, Bombshell, pp. 156, 156,271. stel, 271. 64. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins note, in Russian, identifies BERG's BERGSemployee employee as Consolidated Vacuum.This "Consolidated Vacuum." This is probably reference to Sperry-Rand (UNIV (UNIVAC); a reference AC); it is known that UNIVAC UNIV AC computers were high on the list of of Espionage,ch. 1 11). S&T targets (Tuck, High-Tech Espionage, 1). 65. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 6. 6. 66. Romerstein and Levchenko, Levchenko, The KGB KGB against the Main Enemy, pp. 266-7; 266-7; Richelson, A Century of 66. Spies, pp. 279-82. 279-82. Spies, 67. vol. 6, ch. 6. 67. 68. The Case of of Computer Technology." Technology. 68. Judy, "The 69. part27. 69. vol. 6, app. 1, 1, part 70. k-5,473. 70. 71. k-5,369. 71. 72. vol. 6, app. app. 1, 1, part part39. 39. 72. 73. 73 . k-5,475. andSoviet Soviet computer technology, technology, see Judy, "The The Case of Tech74. On the time lag between US and of Computer Tech nology; and Ammann, Cooper Cooperand Davies (eds.), (eds.), The TechnoZogicalLevel nology"; Technological Level ofSoviet ofSoviet Industry, ch. 8. 75. Judy, "The 75. The Case of of Computer Technology," Technology,p. 66. 76. k-5,476. 77. 77. vol. 6, ch. 6. 3, part part 1; 1;vol. 10, 10,ch. 2, para. 7. 78. vol. 6, ch. 3,

Main Adversary Part 3 Chapter Twelve The The Main

1. part 4. 4.The KGB Collegium also proposed establishing networks networks of 1. vol. 6, ch. 5, part of illegal residencies to take over the main burden of intelligence operations in Canada, and in Canada, Mexico, West Germany Germany and China. 2. vol. 6, ch. 5, parts 2, 2,3. Unusually,Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes from KONOVs notrecord the real name of 3. Unusually, KONOV's file flie do not of himself or his wife. either himself 3. Nodetails are available of KONOV's KONOVs S&T. 3. vol. 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, parts 2,3. 2, 3. No available of 4. vol. vol. 8, app. app. 3a. ALBERTSand G E M S KGB KGB flies files record that that they were issued with Belgian passports nos. 5. ALBERT's and GEs 8,1961. 26862/37/41 and 26861/36/41 valid until April 8, 196 1 . vol. 8, app. 3a. vol. 8, app. 3a. 6. vol. vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 3. 7. vol. 8. 8. vol. vol. 8, 8, app. 3, item 7. vol. 6, ch. 13, 13,part part1 1. 9. vol. . 10. Today, 13, part 1. oday, pp. 294-320. 294-320.vol. vol. 6, ch. 1 3 , part 1 . During his interview with Barron, Valoushek 1 0 . Barron, KGB T used the cover name "Zemenek." Zemenek. 11. Today, 320-7; Granatstein and and Stafford, Spy Wars, oday, pp. 320-7; W ars, pp. 154-5. 154-5. 1 1 . Barron, KGB T 12. vol. 6, ch. 13, 13, part 1. 12. 1. 13. 13.vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 3. oday, pp. 388-90; W ars, pp. 170-1. 14. 14. Barron, KGB T Today, 388-90; Granatstein Granatstein and andStafford, Spy Wars, 170-1. 15. 11, part 4. In 15. vol. 6, 6, ch. 11, part5; vol. 8, ch. 8, 8, paras. paras. 3, 34. In1975 1975 alone Hambleton had had meetings with with Pyatin Pyatin in in Washington, with withV. G. G. Matsenov Matsenov in New York, with S. S. Sadauskas in Vienna and with withA. A.Rusakov in Washington, Prague. His other otherforeign missions missions took in Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and andIsrael. Israel.

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16. vol. 6, ch. 13, 13, part part1. 1.Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not not give IVANOVAs 16. IV AN OVA's name.

oday, pp. 330-1. 17. 17. Barron, KGB T Today, 330-1.

18. vol. 6, vol. 8, app. 8, item 87. 18. 6, ch. 13, 13, part part1; 1;

19. k-8,78; k-19,158; vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2. Mitrokhins not identify LENA. 19. Mitrokhin's notes do not 20. k-8,78. 21. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2. 22. vol. 6, app. 2, parts 3, 5. 3,s. 23. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part 2. 2. It is not clear from Mitrokhin's r a dead "dead Mitrokhins notes whether Feder was a "live" live o or double." double. 24. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2. 25. vol. 3. Like other Steinway customers, vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, parts 2, 2,3. customers, Governor Rockefeller Rockefeller can, of of course, course, scarcely for failing to realize that his piano tuner was a KGB illegal. illegal.There is no evidence evidence in Mitrokhins be blamed for Mitrokhin's notes that Rudenko Rudenkohad hadcontact with him. fidence, p. 26. Dobrynin, Anatoly, Anatoly, In Con Conjdence, p. 377. Isaacson, Kissinger, Kissinger, pp. pp. 90-3. 90-3. 27. Isaacson, INever W Wantedto Vice-President of OfAnything!, 8-9. 28. Kramer and Roberts, "I anted to be Vice-President Anything!," pp. 8-9. 15-17. Mitrokhin's 29. Schonberg, Schonberg, Horowitz, Horowitz, chs. 15-17. Mitrokhins notes, probably like like the KGB file on which which they they are notmake clear exactly how great a part part RYBAKOV played in tuning tuningHorowitzs T h e CD CD based, do not RYBAKOV Horowitz's pianos. The 186 186 was originally tuned by the Steinway chief chief technician, Franz Mohr. Mohr. 30. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2. part2; t-7,304. 31. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 32. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2. RYBAKOV's RYBAKOVs file file gives gives his Moscow address address as 108 108 Mir MirProspect, apartment 120. 120. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, p. 375. 33. Shevchenko, 34. vol. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4. The main regional priorities for the establishment of of illegal residencies residencies in the 1969-75, apart from North America, were the major states of ofwestern andthe the Midperiod 1969-75, western Europe, China and Mid the exception exception of of the United United States, dle East. East. With the States, where it was intended to establish ten residencies, residencies, no state was to have more than two. 35. 2,3. 35. vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, parts 2, 3. 36. Barron, KGB T oday, pp. 335-6. Today, 335-6. 37. vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 3. oday, pp. 337-41, 349-51 . vol. 6, ch. 13, 1. 38. Barron, KGB T Tod~y, 337-41,349-51. 13,part 1. 39. Barron, KGB T Today, oday, pp. 355-71. 355-71. 40. Though not not identified by Mitrokhin, LUTZEN was was probably the defector Rupert Sigl, Sigl, who had 1957 to 1969. 1969. worked for the KGB in Karlshorst from 1957 41 . vol. 6, ch. 13, 13,part 1. 1. 41. 42. vol. 8, ch. 8, para. 3. 3. 4 3. Granatstein and Staf ford, Spy Wars, 43. Stafford, Wars, pp. 17 176,179-83. 6 , 179-83. 44. vol. 8, 8, ch. 8, para. 4. ars, pp. 151-4, 184-5. In June 1986 Hambleton was moved 45. Granatstein and Staf ford, Spy W Stafford, Wars, 151-4,184-5. June 1986 Hambleton movedto a Cana Canamandatory supervision in March 1989. 1989. dian jail and released under mandatory 46. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2; vol. 6, app. app. 2, part 1; 1;k-16,89. of the Koecher case is is in Kessler, Kessler, Spy vs Spy (based in part parton on interviews interviews 47. The fullest published account of the Koechers Koechers after their return to to Czechoslovakia 1986). There are some further details in Earley, Earley, with the Czechoslovakia in 1986). Confesions . f a Spy, ch. 6, and Kessler, Kessler, "Moscow's Moscows Mole in the CIA, Washington 17, 1988). Con fessions ofa CIA," W ashington Post (April 1 7, 1988). Karl Koecher's l0. Koechers early career is summarized in k-8,1 k-8,110. 48. k-19,96. Spy, pp. 52-63. 52-63. Kessler, Washington, Kessler, Spy vs Spy, Kessler,Undercover Undercover W ashington, pp. 33-4. 33-4. 49. Kessler, Hana Koecher was given given the rather ratherobvious obvious KGB codename HANKA. 50. k-19,96. k-19, 96. Hana 245. 5 1 . Kessler, 51. Kessler, Spy vs vs Spy, Sp-y, pp. 60, 60,245. 52. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 2; k-8,1 l0. k-8,110. app. 1 1(misc.), (mix.), part part2.2. Ogorodnik CIA while serv serv53. t-7,306; vol. 6, app. Ogorodnik appears to have been recruited by the CIA copies of of hundreds of of secret Soviet Soviet documents, ing in Bogoti Bogota in 1974, 1974, and to have supplied microfilm copies summaries of of which were circulated circulated by the CIA to the theWhite WhiteHouse, House, the summaries the National Security Council and State Department. Department.Barron, KGB Today, Today, pp. 428-9. 428-9. the State Kessler, Spy vs vs Spy, Spy, pp. 139-44, 139-44,152-8,233-6; Kessler,"Moscow's MoscowsMole in the CIA," CIA,Washington Post, Post, 54. Kessler, 152-8, 233-6; Kessler, 17,1988). (April 1 7, 1988).

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55. Hana Koecher sued the journalist, Egon Lansky, who had hadpublished the story about her and andher her hus55. hus wasdismissed dismissed and costs costs awarded awarded against her. Tom Gross, "Spy's SpysWife Gets GetsaJob aJob with band. The case was with OurOur inPrague," Prague, Sunday T Telegraph 5,1995). Man in elegraph (March 5, 1995). 56. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 3. 57. vol. 6, app. app. 2, part 4.

Chapter Thirteen The Main Adversary Part 4 Thirteen The

1. vol. 6, ch. 2, part In. 1. 2. 2. See See below, below, chapter chapter 15. 15. 513. According "Andropovwas 3. 3. Dobrynin, Dobrynin, In In Confidence, Confidence,pp. pp. 209-10, 209-10,513. According to to Dobrynin, Dobrynin,Andropov was cautious enough not not to interfere in Gromyko's Gromykos everyday management management of foreign policy, and Gromyko for his part respected Andropovs growing infl influence Politburo. Andropov's uence in the Politburo." Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Cuban Missile Crisis," Crisis, p. 85, n. 7. FCD intelligence 4. Fursenko and Naftali, "Soviet analysis, undeveloped by by the the standards of the }IC, analysis, however, however,seems seems to to have have remained remained comparatively comparatively undeveloped standards of theBritish British JIC, CIAS Directorate of Intelligence and other major Western assessment agencies. the CIA's 5. See 15 and 19. 19. 5. See below, chapters 15 Volkogonov, The Rise and and Fall Fallof ofthe 6. Volkogonov, the Soviet Empire, p. 322. The letter contained simply routine propospropos als for strengthening strengthening the therole of the CPSu. CPSU. Spymaster, p. 257. During the the Brezhnevs life, life,however, however, Andropov began to cirfinal months of ofBrezhnev's Andropov cir 7. Kalugin, Spymaster, culate culate stories stories about about the the corruption corruption of Brezhnev's Brezhnevs family family and and entourage as part part of of his strategy to to eliminate rivals succession. Service, wentieth-Century Russia, p. rivals to to the the succession. Service,A History of o f T Twentieth-Century p. 426. 8. Dobrynin, In Con Confidence, 130. 8. fidence, p. 130. 9. Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, Vlast, pp. 1 15-44. Brother, pp. 6-8; 6-8; Chazov, Chazov, Zdorov'ye Zdorovje i Vlast, 115-44. 10. 10. vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 2, 2, part part 6. 1 1 . vol. 6, ch. 11, 1, parts 12, 41. 11. 11,part 3; 3;vol. 6, app. app. 1, 12,41. pymaster, p. 83. "a 12. 12. Kalugin, S Spymaster, 83. Kalugin does does not give Lipka's Lipkas name or codename and refers to him only as a wall-id who came to us in the mid-1960s, mid-l960s, explaining explainingthat he he was involved involved in shredding and destroying 'walk-in' who destroying NSA documents." Depart documents.A later analysis by the Centre Centresingled out 200 documents from NSA, the theCIA, State Department and other federal agencies agencies as of particular value. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes, alas, give give no details details of of their contents. 13. vol. 6, ch. 11, 11,part 3; vol. vol.6, app. app. 1, 12,26,28,41; Lipkas fil file 13. 1, parts 12, 26, 28, 41; k-8,78. Lipka's e includes his and his fathers father's the1970s, 1970s, as well as details of of his wife's wifes work at St. St. Josephs inLancaster, addresses during the Joseph's Hospital in Lancaster, PennPenn together with her telephone number at the thehospital. sylvania, together 14. Kalugin, Spymaster, 14. Spymaster, pp. 84-9. 84-9. I PledgeAllegiance. 15. Studies of the Walker case include Barron, Breaking the 15. theRing; Blum, I Allegiance. 16. 16. Kalugin, Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, p. p. 83. 83. Spymaster, p. 89. The fact that Walker's Walkers file filewas was held by the Sixteenth Department, separately 17. Kalugin, Kalugin, Spymaster, 17. from most other les, explains saw it. it. There There are are probably other Sixteenth Sixteenth from most other FCD FCD fi files, explains why why Mitrokhin Mitrokhin never never saw probably other Department Department agents agents of of whom whom he hewas was also also unaware. unaware. 18. Earley, Con Confessions ofa 18. fessions of a Spy, pp. 7-8. 7-8. 19. Kalugin, Spymaste1; Spymaster, p. 89. 89. 19. Kalugin, 20. The KGB officers who took part in running MAREK P. V. Yatskov, B. P. Kolymakov, Ye. Yeo N. Gor in running MAREK were ? B.? GorYe. V. Pustnyatsev, V. M. Bogachev, Ye. V. Piskarev, G. N. Pustnyatsev, Yeo A. Belov, V. N. Gordeyev, Gordeyev, litsyn, V. F. Perchik, Yeo S. V. Sychev, Alekseyev, S. S. Ye. Yeo Muzhchinin, V. S. Miroshnikov, A. V. Bolshakov, Bolshakov, S. Sychev, V. N. Melnikov, Melnikov, A. A. Alekseyev, V. A. Revin, N. V. 1. K. Baranov, V. I. 1. Kucherov, Kucherov, V. S. Loginov, Loginov, V. I. 1. Shpakevich, I. 1. S. Pakhmonov, Revin, N. V. Medved, I. V. V. Makarov, A. M. Gvosdev and L. L. K. Kostanyan. Makarov, A. Kostanyan. Even after Agee revealed that MAREK MAREKwas a plant, some in the did not regard the evidence theCentre Centre evidence as conclusive. conclusive. Confessions o f a n Spy, Spy) pp. 91-2. 91-2. 21. Earley, Con fessions of 22. 1 1-12. Though confirms the 22. Kalugin, Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, pp. pp. 1 111-12. Though Mitrokhin Mitrokhin does not not identifY identify Sedov by name, he he confirms the access to Kissinger Kissinger by an "operations operations officer." officer. 23. Turmoiland Triumph,p. 1 117. and Triumph, 17. 23. Schultz, Turmoil 24. t-7,321. Dobrynin, In Con Confidence. 25. Dobrynin, fidence. 26. Barron, 25-7. Barron, Barron, KGB Today, 240-3. vol. vol. 6, 1, parts 19,40. 19, 40. 26. Barron, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 25-7. Today, pp. pp. 240-3. 6, ch. 10; 10;vol. 6, app. 1, 27. vol. 6, ch. 10; 10; vol. 6, app. 1, Mitrokhins notes that the the cultivation of 1, part 40. There is no evidence in Mitrokhin's of Waldheim Waldheim was was successful. successful. 28. Shevchenko, 28. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, Moscow) pp. pp. 331-2. 331-2.

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29. vol. 6, app. 19; t-3,69, k-24,228. app.1, 1,parts 4, 4,19; k-24,228. 30. vol. 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part 4, n. 1. 1. n. 2. 31. part 2, 2, 31. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch.14, 14, part 2. 32. vol. 6, app. 1, 41; t-2,258. 1, parts 3, 3,41; t-2,258. 33. vol. 6, ch. part 2; vol. 33. ch.3, 3, part 2; 6, app. 1, 1,part 41. 34. 16. The 34. vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1, part part 16. The Turkish Turkish Cypriot Cypriot newspaper newspaper Malkin Sesi reported reported on on May May 18, 1985 1985 that, that, according intelligence supplied to the theTurkish Turkishgovernment, government,Ozgur Ozgurhad had worked as a according to intelligence supplied by Washington to worked Soviet Soviet spy spyfrom from 1974 1974to to1977. 1977. 35. vol. 6, 6, ch. 3, part 3. 36. vol. V O ~ .6, ch. ch.4; k-8,103,447. 37. 38. 37. vol. 6, app. 1, 1, part 38. app.1, 1,part 4; t-3,56. 38. vol. 6, app. vol. 6, app. 1, 1,parts 11, 11,39; 39. vol. 39; k-22,71. 40. vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app.1, 1, part 33. 33. 41. ch. part not give As was the case, 41. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. 3,3, part 2. 2. Mitrokhin Mitrokhh does doesnot give REM's R E M s identity. identity.As was frequently frequentlythe case, the the same of the others seems t the the Washington same codename codenamewas was given givento to several several other other agents. agents.None None of the others seems to to fi fit Washington REM. REM. 42. k-22,207. 43. 43. t-1,75. 44. vol. 6, 19. 6, ch. 4; 4;vol. 6, app. 1, 1, parts 16, 16,19. n. 2. 45. vol. 6, ch. 14, 14, part part2, 2, 46. vol. part 3. 3. vol. 6, ch. ch.3, 3, part 47. vol. 6, ch. part 2, 2, n. 2. ch.14, 14, part 48. part 3. 48. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch.3, 3, part 3. 49. Kalugin, Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, pp. 72-5. 72-5. 50. Kalugin, 50. Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, p. 103. 103. 51. Dobrynin, In Confidence, 51. Confidence, p. 355. 52. vol. 6, ch. part 3. 3. ch.3, 3, part Kramerand and Roberts, INever Wanted t o be Vice-President Vice-president of $Anything!, 53. Kramer Roberts, "I Never W anted to Anything!, " p. 23. 54. vol. 6, ch. ch.3, part part 3. 3. 55. Dobrynin, In Confidence, Confidence, pp. 377-8. 377-8. 55. 56. part 56. vol. 6, ch. ch.3, 3, part 3. Lomov returned returned to New York with with his deputy director, director, Yuri Mikhailovich Mikhailovich Zabrodin, Zabrodin, for for a a 57. In 1977 1977 Lomov three-month visit. visit. His main KGB mission on this occasion was to investigate investigate research on interrogation three-month techniques which, Centre hoped, would cause those it have no subsequent of which,the the Centre hoped, would it interrogated interrogatedtoto subsequentmemory memory of their part 1; vol. 5. their replies replies to to questions. questions.vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch.2, 2, part 1; vol. 6, 6, app. app. 2, 2, parts parts4, 4 , s. 58. vol. 6, ch. ch.2, part 1; 1;vol. 6, ch. ch.3, 3, part 58. part 3. 3. 59. vol. 6, ch. part 1. ch.2, 2, part 1. 60. vol. vol. 6, 6,ch. ch.2, part part 1. 1. 61. See See below, below,chapter 17. 17. vol.6, ch. ch. Mitrokhin identifies identifiesVLADIMIROV as deputy director director institute, but not not give 62. vol. 7. Mitrokhin ofof thethe institute, but does Cf. Barron, his name. Cf. Barron, KGB Today, Today, p. 265. 63. vol. 6, ch. part 1; vol. 6. ch.2, 2, part 1; 6, app. 2, parts parts4, 4,6. Kissinger, White WhiteHouse Years, Ears, p. 112. 112. 64. Kissinger, vol.6, app. 1, 1, part 6. 65. vol. 66. Dobrynin, Dobrynin,In Confidence, Confidence, p. 485. vol. 5, 5, section section 10. 10. 67. vol. 68. vol. 6, ch. 3, parts 3. parts2, 2,3. Andrewand andGordievsky Gordievsky Instructionsj-om the Centre, Centre,pp. 306-7. 306-7. 69. Andrew (eds.), Instructionsfrom 70. part 1, 70. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch.2, 2, part 1,n. 3. 3. and Gordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), Instructionsj-om Centre, ch. 4. 71. Andrew and (eds.), Instructions from the Centre, Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, pp. 302-3. 302-3. Kalugin considered the thetone toneof of Andropovs cable cableparanoid. Kalugin considered Andropov's "paranoid." 72. Kalugin, 73. Volkogonov, Volkogonov,The Rise and Fall Fallof of the Soviet SovietEmpire, Empire, p. p. 351. 351. fidence, p. 523. 74. Dobrynin, In Con Confdence, andGordievsky, KGB, pp. 582-603. 582-603. Andrew and andGordievsky Gordievsky Instructionsj-omthe Cen Cen75. Andrew and (eds.), Instructionsfrom tre, ch. 4. 76. Shvets, Washington Station, pp. 29,74-5. member of ofthe the Shvets, W ashington Station, 29, 74-5. Shvets Shvets had access to Androsovs Androsov's reports as a member

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6 I3 613

Line Line PR PR officer officerin inAndrosov's Androsovs residency. residency.

FCD and was FCD First First (North (NorthAmerican) American) Department Department from from 1982 1982 to to1985, 1985, and was then then posted posted to to Washington Washingtonas as a a 77. 77. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 591-605. 591-605.

79. 1991). 79. Izvestia Izwestia(September (September 24, 24,1991). 81. 81. vol. vol. 6, 6,ch. ch. 6. 6.

Eyes Only, 78. 78. Andrew, Andrew,For Forthe thePresident's President? Eyes Oniy, pp. pp. 471-7. 471-7.

80. KGB 80. Garthoff, Garthoff,"The The KGB Reports Reports to to Gorbachev," Gorbachev,pp. pp. 226-7. 226-7.

talist pp. talist world." world.Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky Gordievsky(eds.), (eds.), Instructionsfrom Instructionsfiom the the Centre, Centre, pp. 33-4. 33-4. 84. 84. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 6. 6.

82. or example, 82. See, See,f for example,Kryuchkov's Kryuchkovs 1984 1984 analysis analysis of of "the thedeepening deepening economic economic and and social social crisis crisis in in the thecapi capi83. . Mitrokhin or the 1,part part 41 41. Mitrokhin did did not not record record the the statistics statistics f for the San San Francisco Francisco residency. residency. 83.vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1,

the A YKAL (1976), the 1970s: 1970s: ANTON ANTON (1975), (1975), ARAM ARAM (1975), (1975), CHEKHOVIY CHEKHOVflAYKAL (1976), MAG MAG (1974), (1974), MIKE MIKE

85. 85. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhinsnotes notes give givethe the recruitment recruitment dates dates of of fifteen fifteen S&T S&Tagents agents who who began began work work for for the the KGB KGB in in 974), SATURN TROP (1979), TURIST (1973), (1973), OTPRYSK OTPRYSK (1974), (1974), SARKIS SARKIS (1 (1974), SATURN (1978), (1978), SOFT SOFT (1971), (1971),TROP (1979),TURIST

(1977), (1977), UGNYUS UGNYUS (1974), (1974), ZENIT ZENIT (1978) (1978) and and two two others others whose whose codenames codenames cannot cannot be be published published (re (re-

cruited dur cruited in in 1975-6). 1975-6). VIL VIL appears appearsto tohave have been been recruited recruited earlier. earlier. Other Other S&T S&Tagents agents active active in in the theUSA USA during ing the the1970s, 1970s,whose whose recruitment recruitment dates dates do do not notappear appear in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhinsnotes, notes, were were LONG, LONG, PATRIOT PATRIOTand and RIDEL. ve trusted the 1970s: RIDEL. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin also also identifies identifies fi five trusted contacts contacts recruited recruited during during the 1970s: KLARA KLARA (1972), (1972), KURT TSORN (1977), KURT (1973), (1973),TSORN (1977), VELLO VELLO (1973) (1973) and and VEYT VEYT (1973). (1973). In In the thecase case of of a a further further eight eight mem mem-

LOTEKNIK AYS), it LOTEKNIK and and V VAYS), it is isunclear unclearfrom from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhinsnotes noteswhich which were were fully fully recruited recruited agents agents and and which which were S&T were trusted trusted contacts. contacts.The The notes notes give give no no dates dates for for the the activities activitiesof of another anothereight eight S&T agents agents and and trusted trusted

bers S&T TEP bers of ofthe the S&T network network in in 1970s 1970s (FOGEL, (FOGEL, FREY, FREY, IZOLDA, IZOLDA, OZON, OZON,ROZHEK, ROZHEK, SPRINTER, SPRINTER, TEP-

length rom a length f from a few few lines lines to to a a paragraph. paragraph. A A majority majority of of both both agents agents and and trusted trusted contacts contacts are are identified identified by by 290,294-5,297-301; t-2,109,161-2; t-7,77. 290,294-5,297-301; t-2,109,161-2; t-7,77. name. vol. 6, 2, 3 , 5, 1 1 , 14, 20, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 38, 39; k-14,171; , 138, name.vo1. 6, app. app. 1, 1,parts parts 1, 1,2,3,5, 11,14,20,27,28,29,31,32,38,39; k-14,171; k-18,38Q-2; k-18,380-2; t-1 t-1,138, 86. parts 27). Agent SATURN 86. FREY FREYwas was an anagent agent and and PAVEL PAVEL a atrusted trusted contact contact in in IBM IBM (vol. (vol.6, 6,app. app. 1, 1, parts 5, 5,27). Agent SATURN

ODISSEY, ODISSEY, PAVEL PAVEL and and RUTH. RUTH.Mitrokhin's Mitrokhinsnotes notes on on all allthose those listed listed above above are are relatively relatively brief, brief,varying varying in in

contacts LIR, contacts probably probably active active in in the the 1970s: 1970s:ALGORITMAS, ALGORITMAS, AUTOMOBILIST, AUTOMOBILIST, CHARLES, CHARLES,KLIM, KLIM, LIR,

87. , parts 32. 1, parts 2, 2,32. 87.vol. vol. 6, 6,app. app. 1

scientist (vol. scientistin inTRW TRW (vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,part part 27). 27).

occupied 32). Agent ZENIT occupied a a senior senior scientific scientificpost post in in McDonnell McDonnellDouglas Douglas (vol. (vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,parts parts 27, 27,32). Agent ZENIT was was a a

referred or legal referred to to f for legal reasons; reasons;vol. vol.6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,part part 32. 32. 89. , part 89. vol. vol. 6, 6,app. app. 1 1, part 33. 33.

88. the best-known 88. vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,part part 38. 38.The The case case of of another another scientist scientist at at one one of of the best-known US US universities universitiescannot cannot be be

90. , part Command (AMC). 90.vol. vol. 6, 6,app. app. 1 1, part 31. 31. DARCOM DARCOM has has since sincebecome becomethe the Army ArmyMateriel Materiel Command (AMC).

New agents Fran NewYork York and andWashington Washington residencies residenciesis is 1970; 1970;he he provides provides no no statistics statisticson onthe the agents run run by by the the San San Francisco cisco residency. residency.

91. or which total numbers 91. The Thelatest latest date date f for which Mitrokhin Mitrokhin provides provides statistics statisticson on the the total numbers of of S&T S&T agents agents run run by by the the

the Falcon). banks run (Lindsey, banks while while on on the the run (Lindsey,The TheFlight Flight of ofthe Falcon).

later or escaping or robbing later and and sentenced sentenced to to an anadditional additional three three years years f for escaping and and twenty-five twenty-five years years f for robbing seventeen seventeen 93. IT's recruitment 93. vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,part part 27. 27. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhinsbrief brief note note on on ZEN ZENITs recruitment gives gives no no details details of of the theintelli intelli-

92. alcon and was 92. Lindsey, Lindsey, The TheF Falcon and the theSnowman. Snowman.Boyce Boyce escaped escaped from from prison prison in in 1980, 1980,but but was recaptured recaptured a a year year

gence intelligence or gence he he supplied. supplied.Other Other important important intelligenceon on satellite satellitesurveillance surveillanceincluded included the the operating operating manual manual f for employed employed by by the the CIA CIA Watch Watch Center, Center, presented presented a a copy copy of of it it to to the the KGB KGB residency residency in in Athens. Athens. He H e was was KH-1 1 , the William Kampiles, KH-11, the most most advanced advanced US US SIGINT SIGINT satellite. satellite.Early Early in in 1978 1978 William Kampiles,who who had had been been briefly briefly

unaware, KGB unaware,however, however,that that the the KGB officer officerwho who received received it, it, Sergei SergeiIvanovich Ivanovich Bokhan, Bokhan, had had been been recruited recruited sev sev-

rency. rency. Brezhnev Brezhnev was was informed informed that that the theeconomic economic benefit benefit of of S&T S&T for for the the Soviet Soviet defense defense industry industry had had not not been been calculated. calculated.vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 6. 6. 95. 95. Similar Similar reports reports on on S&T S&T successes successes were were sent sentto toKosygin, Kosygin,the the prime prime minister, minister, and and Ustinov, Ustinov,the the Defence Defence 96. 96. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 6. 6.

94. or in 94.This This calculation calculation appears appears to to have have been been based based on on the theestimated estimated saving savingin in imports importspaid paid f for in hard hard cur cur-

fessions of a Spy, eral eralyears years earlier earlierby by the the CIA. CIA.Earley, Earley, Con Confessions ofa Spy, p. p. 120. 120.

Minister. Minister.

97. t-7,105. 97. t-7,105.

98. 98. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 6. 6.

99. 99. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievslq KGB, KGB, p. p. 622. 622.

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100. In 1965 the States 100. In 1965 theUnited United States had had accounted accounted for for over over 90 90 percent percent of of the the VPK's VPKs requirements. requirements. 101. 101. Documents Documents supplied by the French agent in Directorate Directorate T, Vladimir Vetrov (codenamed FARE FAREWELL); cited by Brook-Shepherd, WELL); Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. p. 260. 260. On Vetrov, Vetrov, see Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, Le 91 7-1 990, pp. KGB dans Ie le monde, monde, 1 191 7-1990, pp. 619-23. 619-23. For For the the text text of of some some of of Vetrov's Vetrovs documents, see see Hanson, Soviet Industrial Espionage. Industrial Espionage. Vetrov's Vetrovs documents and Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes complement each other. 102. Espionage, p. 102. Hanson, Hanson, Soviet Industrial IndustriaZEspionage, p. 31. 31. 103. vol. 6, ch. 6. Mitrokhin's c commu Mitrokhins notes identify 106 of of the KGB's KGBs agents within the the Soviet scientifi scientific community; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 1, n. 6. part 1, 104. vol. 6, ch. 6. 104. 105. vol. 6, app. 1, 1, parts 2, 32. 105. 2,32. 106. 32. 106. vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,parts parts 27, 27,32. 107. 107. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 6. 6. 108. 108. Kessler, Kessler, Spy vs v s Spy, pp. 167-8. 167-8. 109. Commission, the Bat 109. Also Also targeted by western European residencies residencies were the US US Atomic AtomicEnergy Energy Battelle Memorial Institute, Institute, Dow Dow Chemicals, Dupont de de Nemours, GTE, Arthur D. D. Little Little Inc., Litton Industries Inc., the the Massachusetts Institute of of Technology and RCA. RCA. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not indicate which-if any-residencies had which-if any-residencies had particular particular responsibilities responsibilities for for these these targets; targets; k-5,424. k-5,424. The The National Insti Institute of Health was targeted of Health targeted because of of its research on the theeffects effects of of chemical and biological warfare; warfare; vol. 6, ch. ch. 6. 6. 110. 1;t-7,8,77. 1, part 1; 1 10. vol. 6, app. 1, 1 1 1 . vol. 3. 111. vol. 2, 2, app. app. 3. 1 12. Volkogonov, 112. Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall Fallof of the Soviet SovietEmpire, Empire, p. 338. 1 13. US government, Soviet Acquisition 113. Acquisitionof o f Militarily Significant SignzjcantWestern Western Technology Technology 114. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. 260. 114. 115. 115.vol. 2, app. 3. 3. 1 16. k-5,504. 116. 117. IndustriaZEspionage, 10,23. Espionage, pp. 10, 23. 1 17. Hanson, Soviet Industrial 118. 118. Wolf, Man without a aFace, p. 182. 182. 1 19. Andrew and 119. andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. 641-2. 641-2. 120. (eds.), Instructionsfrom pp. 37, 49-50. 120. Andrew Andrewand Gordievsky (eds.), Instructionsji-om the theCentre, Centre, 37,49-50. . 121. 121. Recollections Recollections by Oleg Gordievsky of of Gorbachev's Gorbachevsaddress; address; Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, p. 621 621. 122. "The KGB Reports to Gorbachev," 122. Garthoff, Garthoff, The Gorbachev, pp. 228-9. 228-9. 123. Brook-Shepherd, 123. Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, p. p. 260. 124. from the pp. 40-9, 115-17. 124. Andrew Andrewand Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions Instructionsji-om theCentre, Centre, 40-9,115-17. 125. 125. The fullest account of the Ames case, and the the only one to benefit from interviews with Ames him himself, is Earley, Earley, Con Confessions o f a Spy. On the agents betrayed by Ames, see pp. 143-5. 143-5. According to the SVR, SVR, fessions of self, already been identified from other leads. leads. several of the Western agents named by Ames had already 126. 1, 1992). 126. Interview with Shebarshin, Daily Telegraph Telegraph (December 1,1992). 127. Gates, From the tbe Shadows, Shadows,pp. 424-6. 424-6. 127. 128. Andrew and and Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instmctionsfrom Instructionsji-om the the Centre, Centre, pp. 212-17. 212-17. Operation RYAN was not 128. 1991; Richelson, A Cen Cenfinally canceled until Primakov became head of foreign intelligence in October 1991; o f Spies, p. 421. tury of 129. Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsky,KGB, pp. 627-8. 627-8. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructionsfrom Instructionsji-om the Cen Cen129. Gordievsky, 217-18. tre, pp. 217-18. tre, 130. Shebarshin's Shebarshinsforeign postings had included a term as main resident in India from 1975 1975 to to1977. 130. 131. Gordievsky,KGB, pp. 620-1. 620-1. 131. Andrew and Gordievsky, 132. Intelligence Service Service Divorces from the KGB," KGB, Izvestia (September 24, 24,1991). 1991). 132. "Intelligence 133. Interview with Shebarshin, Daiy Dai& Telegraph TeZegraph (December 1, 1,1992). 133. 1992). 134. On the Soviet economy in the theGorbachev era, see Brown, The Tbe Gorbachev Gorbachev Factor, Factor,ch. 5. 5. 134. 135. BBC, Summary Summary of o f World WorZdBroadcasts, SU/0955 (December 24, 24,1990), C4/3@ SU/0946 (December 13, 13, 135. Broadcasts, SU/0955 1990), C4/3ff; 1990), B/1. Daily T Telegraph elegraph (December 1, 1,1992). 1992). 136. Interview with Shebarshin, Daiy 137. BBC, Summary of ofWorZdBroadcasts, B/1. Much Much the the same conspiracy conspiracy 137. W orld Broadcasts, SU/0946 (December 13,1990), 13, 1990), B/l. six years earlier; earlier; Andrew and theory had had been expounded in a secret circular to residencies residencies almost six Instructionsji-om theCentre, Centre, 152-9. Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions from the pp. 152-9. 138. Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instructions Instructionsj-om 218-22; More Instructions Instructionsfiom from the Centre, Centre, pp. 218-22; from the 138. Centre, pp. 125-8. pp. 125-8. Centre,

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139. Kryuchkov Kryuchkov continued to advance advance this preposterous conspiracy theory and and to to complain that, though though 139. thecase to Gorbachev, Gorbachev, he repeatedly reneged on a promise to look into it. Remnick, he submitted a file on the Resurrection, p. 86. 86. Resll1Tectiol1,

ChapterFourteen Fourteen Political W aif are Political Warfare

1. Marx, Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, 1. 1. Feuerbach, no. 1 11. 2.. "Chief Chief Conclusions and Views Adopted a at Meetingof Headso of 2 t the Meeting of [FCD] Heads f Service, Service," ref. ref 156/54 (Feb(Feb 1,1984); Andrew Instructionsj-om the Centre, Centre, pp. 30-44. 1984); Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructiol1sfrom 30-44. ruary 1, 3. Andrew 3. Andrewand Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, p. 629. 4. 4. On Modin, see chapter 9. 9. 5. 5. See above, above, chapters 9 and and 12. 12. 6. from the Kremlin, Kremlin, appendix B, pp. 6. An extract from the report appears appears in Yeltsin, The View View)om pp. 307-8. 307-8. (ed.), The Playboy Interview, 7. 7. Golson (ed.), Interview, p. 135. 135. 8. 8. Posner, Posner, Case Case Closed, Closed,p. 371; Summers, Conspiracy, Conspiracy,p. 36. 9. 9. Hurt, Hurt, Reasonable Reasonable Doubt, Doubt, p. p. 124. 124. 10. from the Kremlin, 10. Yeltsin, The View Viewporn Kremlin, appendix B, p. 308. 11. Confidence, 11 1. fidence, p. 1 1 1. 1 1 . Dobrynin, In Con 12. Viewj-om Kremlin, appendix B, p. 308. from the Kremlin, 12. Yeltsin, The View 13. The best and fullest account of of Oswald's Oswalds period in the theSoviet Soviet Union is in Mailer, Oswald's OswaldS T Tale. ale. Mailer 13. of the voluminous voluminous KGB files on Oswald, which include transcripts of of conversations conversations in had access to many of surveillance reports from KGB personnel who followed him wherever he his bugged flat in Minsk and surveillance went, even spying on him and his wife through a apeephole in the the bedroom wall to record record' their intimate "intimate moments. moments." 14. Childs's KGB chairman Semichastny to the 14. Childss warning about Oswald's Oswalds letter was cited in a report by KGB of which an extract appears in Yeltsin, The Viewj-om 10, 1963, 1963, of View from the Central Committee on December 10, Kremlin, appendix B, p. 307. Yeltsin identifies the CPUSA CPUSAinformant informant as "Brooks,"but Brooks,but does does not reveal that Kremlin, this was the CPUSA of Oswalds Oswald's letter to the CPUSA alias of of Jack Childs. For the text of the CPUSA CPUSA of of August 28, 1963,see Mailer, Oswald's OswaldS T Tale, 594-5. ale, pp. 594-5. 1963, 15. Posner, Case Case Closed, disposes disposes of of many of of the conspiracy conspiracy theories. Norman Mailer, the author of 15. Posner, of the best-documented best-documented study of of Oswald, admits that he he"began began with aaprejudice in favor of of the conspiracy the theorists but finally finally concluded both that thatOswald "had had the character to kill Kennedy, and that he heprobably did orists" alone.The unsolved question is not whether Oswald shot the the President but why he did it alone." The most difficult unsolved a self-obsessed fantasist and a compulsive compulsive liar. There is general agreement, however, so. Oswald was both a that he had no personal hostility to Kennedy himself. himself. The best clue to Oswalds Oswald's motives motives is probably that Intouristguide who first introduced him to to Russia. The thingfor [Osprovided by the Intourist "The most important thing [Os wald], she recalls, "was was that he he wanted to become famous. Idea Number One. One. H e was fanatic about it" it wald]," He (Mailer, Oswald's OswaldS T Tale, 321). opportunitytoto become ale, p. 321 ) . In Dallas on November 22,1963 22, 1963 Oswald seized the opportunity (Mailer, of the best-known Americans of of the twentieth twentieth century. century. one of 16. Marzani Marzani 1912 and emigrated with his parents to the theUnited States in 1923. 16. was born in Rome in 1912 1923. After Mter Williams College, Mass., in 1935, 1935, he worked for a year in publishing, then studied at graduating from Willi ams College, College, Oxford, from 1936 1936 to 1938. 1938. According to his KGB file, Oxford University (perExeter College, fUe, while at Oxford (per long vacation) haps during the 1937 1937 vacation) he served in an anarchist brigade in the theSpanish Civil War, then joined the Communist 1938), he became a a member of of the CommunistParty. Party. On his return return to the theUnited United States (probably (probably in 1938), Tony Wells." Wells. In 1942 Marzani joined the Office of of the Co-ordinator Co-ordinator of of CPUSA, using the Party alias "Tony of other Communists and Soviet agents). agents). Information (shortly to become OSS, OSS, which contained a number of When OSS OSS was was closed 1945, Marzani's Marzanis section was transferred to the State Department. When closed in September 1945, fde,Marzani was first recommended to the New New York residency residencyby by its agent, Cedric According to his KGB fUe, Second World War War worked for British Security Co-ordination Belfrage (CHARLIE), who during the Second Co-ordination in York (vol. 6, ch. 14, 14, part 2 2). State Department, Department, Marzani signed a sworn state state) . On his transfer to the State Marzani New Y ork (voL thathe he any political party or organization that advocates the overthrow ment that did not belong to, or support, "any of of the CPUSA of the Government by force forceor violence." violence. When later discovered to be a member of CPUSA(officially considered 1948 to two and a half halfyears years' imprisonment. considered to advocate that policy), he was sentenced in 1948 Marzani gave some details of his pre-war and wartime career in testimony to the Senate Subcommittee to 18, Investigate Other Internal Investigate the Administration Administration of of the Internal InternalSecurity Act and Other InternalSecurity Laws on June 18, 1953, and declined to answer the main questions put to him. 1953, but cited the Fifth FifthAmendment Amendment 17. voL 17. vol. 6, 6, ch. 14, 14, part part2. 18. Era, 18. Boffa, Boffa, Inside the theKhrushche1 Khrushchev Era, p. 227.

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19. 19. The The total total advertising advertising budget budget funded funded by by the the KGB KGB during during the the seven-year seven-year period period 1961-8 1961-8 was was 70,820 70,820 dollars. 2. dollars.voL vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14,parts parts 1, 1,2. 20. Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, p. p. 45. 45. Marzani Marzani published published over over twenty twenty books books and and pamphlets, pamphlets, written written either either by by him him20. Kalugin, self self or or by by authors authors he he had had selected, selected, on on subjects subjects chosen chosen by by the the KGB. KGB. Several Several concerned concerned the the Vietnam Vietnam War. War. Other Other active active measures measures organized organized by by Marzani Marzani included included an an attempt attempt to to discredit discredit Stalin's Stalins daughter, daughter, Svetlana Svetlana Alliluyeva States Alliluyeva (codenamed (codenamed KUKUSHKA), KUKUSHKA), after after her her flight flight to to the theUnited United States in in 1967. 1967.The The KGB KGB helped helped to to refinance refinance Marzani's Marzanis publishing publishing house house after after it it was was seriously seriously damaged damaged in in a a fire fire in in 1969. 1969. During During the the early early 1970s, 1970s, however, however, the the KGB KGB became became increasingly increasingly dissatisfied dissatisfied with with Marzani. Marzani. According According to to Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins later later notes notes on on his his flle: fde: The of The [New [New York] York] Residency Residency began began to to notice notice signs signs of of independent independent behavior behavior on on the thepart part of NORD. NORD. He H e began began to to overestimate overestimate the the extent extent to to which which the the Residency Residency depended depended upon upon him, him, and and deluded deluded himself was capable himself in in thinking thinking that thathe he was the the only only person person in in the thecountry country capable of of carrying carrying out out Soviet Soviet intel intelligence ligence tasks. tasks. Since Since 1974 1974 NORD has has been been living living in in Puerto PuertoRico; Rico; it it has has been been difficult difficult to to communicate communicate with with him him there, there, and and he helost lost many many intelligence intelligence opportunities. opportunities. (vol. (vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14,part part 2) 2) 21. 21. Joesten, Joesten, Oswald, Oswald, p. p. 4. 4. (Page (Page references references are are to to the theEnglish English edition.) edition.) 22. 149-50. 22. Joesten, Joesten, Oswald, Oswald, pp. pp. 119, 119,149-50. the second 23. Joesten, Oswald, Oswald, pp. pp. 143, 143, 145. 145. In In the second edition, edition, Joesten Joesten acknowledged acknowledged "substantial substantial aid" aid from from 23.Joesten, Marzani Joesten, Oswald, Marzani in in the the"research research and and writing" writingof of an an appendix appendix criticizing criticizing the the Warren Warren report report ( (Joesten, Oswald, p. p. 159n.). 159n.). 24. Even the the sympathetic sympathetic Mark Mark Lane Lane later later wrote wrote somewhat somewhat critically critically of of Joesten's Joestens book: book: "I I had had met met with with 24. Even Carl Carl Marzani, Marzani,read read proofs proofs of of the the book book at at his his request, request, and and made made some some few few suggestions. suggestions. It I t was was a a very very early early work, released; therefore, work, written written before before the the Warren Warren Commission's Commissions evidence evidence was was released; therefore, while while timely, timely, it it was was of of necessity necessity somewhat somewhat flawed flawed and and incomplete" incomplete (Lane, (Lane, Plausible Denial, Denial, p. p. 44n). 44n). 25. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part part 3. 3. 25. vol. 26. Joersten, Oswald, Oswald, p. p. 3. 3. 26. Joersten, 27. Lane, Plausible Plausible Denial, Denial, p. p. 23. 23. 27. Lane, 28. realize vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part part 3. 3. There There is is no no evidence evidence that that Lane Lanedid did realize the the source source of of the thefunding. funding. 28. vol. 29. 29. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part part 3; 3; t-7,102. t-7,102. Borovik Borovik doubtless doubtless did did not notidentify identify himself himself to to Lane Laneas as a a KGB KGB agent. agent. 30. 30. Lane, Lane, Plausible Plausible Denial, Denial, pp. pp. 4, 4, 19. 19.Posner, Posner, Case Case Closed, Closed, pp. pp. 414-15. 414-15. 31. Posner, Case Case Closed, Closed, p. p. 453. 453. 31. Posner, 32. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14,part part 3. 3. 32. vol. 33. Posner, Case Case Closed, Closed,pp. pp. 454-5. 454-5. 33. Posner, 34. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part part 3. 3. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin gives gives the the text text of of the the forged forged letter letter in inRussian Russian translation. translation. For For the the orig orig34. vol. dyslexia, see ale, inal inal version, version, see see Hurt, Hurt, Reasonable Doubt, Doubt, pp. pp. 235-6. 235-6. On On Oswald's Oswalds dyslexia, see Mailer, Mailer, Oswald's Oswaldi T Tale, appendix. appendix. 35. 35. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part part 3. 3. 36. Hurt, Reasonable ReasonableDoubt, Doubt, p. p. 236. 236. Hurt Hurt refers refers to to the theletter letter as as the the most most "singular singular and and teasing" teasingdocument document 36. Hurt, to to have have emerged emerged relating relating to to the theperiod period immediately immediately before before the the assassination. assassination. 37. 37. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part part 3. 3. 38. Lane, Plausible Plausible Denial, Denial, p. p. 187. 187. KGB KGB active active measures measures probably probably encouraged, encouraged, rather rather than than accounted accounted for, for, 38. Lane, the the Howard HowardHunt Hunt conspiracy conspiracy theory. theory. 39. Only, 1-12. 39. Andrew, Andrew, For the President's President:Eyes Eyes Only,pp. pp. 31 311-12. 40. the JFK and and King Also influential influential was was the the report report of of the the House HouseSelect Select Committee Committee on on the JFK King assassinations. assassinations.Its Its 40. Also draft draft report report in in December December 1978 1978 concluded concluded that that Oswald Oswald acted acted alone. alone. Flawed Flawed acoustic acoustic evidence evidence then then per persuaded suaded the the committee committee that, that, in inaddition addition to to the thethree three shots shots fired fired by by Oswald, Oswald, a a fourth fourthhad had been been fired fired from from a a grassy 1979 that grassy knoll, knoll, thus thus leading leading it it to toconclude conclude in in its its final final report report ofJuly of July 1979 that there there had had been been a a conspiracy. conspiracy. It It pointed pointed to tomobsters mobsters as as the the most most likely likely conspirators. conspirators. Posner, Posner, Case Case Closed, Closed,pp. pp. 475-86, 475-86, appendix appendix A. A. 41. 410-1 1, 421. In 41. Andrew, Andrew, For the the President's President:Eyes EyesOnly, OnZy, pp. pp. 401-7, 401-7,410-11,421. In private private Church Church later lateradmitted admitted that that his his study study of of CIA CIA assassination assassination plots plots convinced convinced him him that that the thereal real rogue rogue elephants elephants had had been been in in the theWhite White House: "The The CIA CIA operated as as an arm of the presidency. presidency,This led presidents presidents to conclude conclude that they were were 'super-godfathers' super-godfatherswith with enforcers. enforcers. It It made made them them feel feel above above the the law law and and unaccountable." unaccountable. 42. 2, 3; vol. 42. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, parts parts 1, 1,2,3; vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1, part part 22. 22. 43. Agees resignation resignation from from the the CIA, CIA,see see Barron, Barron, KGB Today, TodayJp. p. 228. 228. 43. On Agee's

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by Mitrokhin describe Agee as an an agent agent of of the 44. 44. Kalugin, Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, pp. pp. 191-2. 191-2. The The KGB files files noted noted by Mitrokhin describe Agee as the theKGB, but do donot not formally list him as a KGB, as Cuban DGI and give details of his collaboration with the well 6, ch. 14, 14, parts 1 , 2, 3; vol. 6, app. 1, 1, part 22. agent. vol. vol. 6, 1,2,3; vol. 6, well as as DGI, agent. 45. p. Agee, Inside the theCompany, Company, p. viii. viii. (Page (Page references references are are to the theBantam Bantam edition.) 45. Agee, 46. 1, part 46. vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, part 22. p. 47. Agee, Inside the theCompany, Company, p. 659. 659. 47. Agee, 48. co residency eventually became dissatisfied dissatisfied with Cheporov, claiming that that he he "used used his co48. The London residency benefit and "expressed expressed improper improper criticism of of the system in the operation with the the KGB for his own benefit" the USSR." k-14,115. USSR. k-14,115. 49. 49. vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,part part 22. 1 1-12, 120-1. 50. Agee, On The Run, pp. pp. 1 111-12,120-1. 50. Agee, 5 1 . Agee, On The Run, p. 123. 123. 51. 52. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 16, 16,para. para. 46. 46. 52. vol. defense committee also took up the case of an American journalist, Mark Hosenball, Hosenbd, 53. The defense 53. who had also order. Unlike Agee, however, Hosenball had no contact with the thecommitbeen served with a deportation order. commit inits campaign. In the theKGB files noted by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin there is no mention ofHosen of Hosentee and took no part in b d , save for a passing reference reference to the thework of the thedefense committee. ball, 54. Agee, On The Run, chs. 7, 7,8; The Deportations Deportations of 8; Kelly, "The of Philip Agee; Agee"; vol. 7, ch. 16, 16, para. 45. 45. 54. 55. 55. On O n the the residency's residencys tendency tendency to to exaggerate exaggerate in in its its influence influence on protest protest demonstrations, see see Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 586. 586. 56. 1 7, 1977, however, the At a a private private meeting meeting of of the the Parliamentary Parliamentary Labour Labour Party on on February 17,1977, the Home Home 56. At Secretary,Merlyn Rees, implied a KGB connection. Tony Benns Secretary, Benn's diary vaguely records that the gist of of Rees's Reess comments was that Agee and Hosenball "had had been in contact or whatever with enemy agents or something. According to Benn, Rees "got got quite a reasonable hearing from the Party. f Con flicts o of something." Party." Benn, Conficts Interest, pp. 41-2. 41-2. Interest, 14, parts 1, 1,2,3; 57. 57. vol. 6, 6, ch. 14, 2, 3; k-8,607. 58. Agee, "What 1 13. (Page references are to the 58. What Uncle Sam Wants to Know about You," You, p. 113. the 1978 reprint in Agee and Wolf, Dirty W ork.) Work.) 59. 1; vol. 7, 16, para. 46. 59. vol. 6, 6, ch. 14, 14, part 1; 7, ch. 16, 46. 60. Know about You," 1 14. What Uncle Sam Wants Wantstoto You, p. p.114. 60. Agee, "What pp. 255, 255,280-1. 61. 61. Agee, On The Run, pp. 280-1. 6, ch. 14, 14, part 2. 2. 62. 62. vol. 6, 63. of the RUPOR RUPOR group in vol. 6, ch. 14, 14, part 2. 255. Codenames of of some of 63. Agee, On The Run, p. 255. Mitrokhins notes record that the the group included "former former CIA employees not Mitrokhin's employees" apart from Agee, but do not identify Jim and Elsie Wilcott Wdcott by name. 276-82. 64. 64. Agee, On The The Run, Run,pp. 276-82. 65. The also sent The document document was was also sent anonymously anonymously to to the the British journal journal Leveller, Leveller, which which published published extracts 65. from 6, ch. 14, part from it it in inAugust August 1979. 1979. vol. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. 304. 66. Agee, On The Run, p. 304. 66. 67. 6, ch. 14, 14, part 2. 2. 67. vol. 6, 68. 2. 68. vol. 6, ch. 14, part 2. Run,p. 306. 306. 69. Agee, On The Run, 69. 70. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14,part part 2. 70. vol. 71. 13-15. 71. Agee, On The Run, chs. 13-15. 72. vol. 6, 6 , ch. ch. 14, 14,part part 1. 1. 72. vol. 73. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14,part part 1. 1. 73. vol. 74. ashington Post (August 4, 1966). Miss Knight Pens Another Letter," Letter, W Washington 4,1966). 74. "Miss 75. c Gentry,] vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part part 1. 1. On On Hoover's Hoovers contacts contacts with with Knight, Knight, cf. Gentry,J. Edgar Hoover, Hoover,p. 409. 75. vol. 76. . vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part part 1 1. 76. vol. 77. DeLoach, Hoover's HooversFBI, ch. 4. 4. 77. 78. DeLoach, Hoover's HooversFBI, p. p. 62. 62. 78. DeLoach, 79. 1. 6, ch. 14, 14, part 1. 79. vol. 6, 80. DeLoach, Sullivan's anonymous DeLoach, Hoover's Hooveri FBI, FBI, ch. ch. 9. 9. The The expurgated expurgated text text of of Sullivans anonymous message message to King, opened opened by his wife Coretta, From the of ] Edgar Hoover, Coretta, is published in Theoharis, Theoharis, theSecret Files Files OfJ: Hoover,pp. 102-3. 81. See 17. 81. See below, below, chapter chapter 17. ait; Colaiaco, Martin Luther ,Jr., ch. 5. 82. Why We We Can't Cant W Wait; LutherKing King, Jr, 82. King, Why

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83. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part 2. The The other other civil civil rights rights leaders leaders selected selected as as targets targets for active measures 83. part 2. measures were wereA. Philip Randolph, Whitney Whitney Young Young and and Roy Roy Wilkens. Wilkens. Randolph, 84. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part 2. 84. part2. 85. Colaiaco, Colaiaco, Martin Martin Luther p. 183. 183. Moscow Moscow disapproved, disapproved, however, however, ofthe of the Black Black Panthers Panthers (whom (whom LutherKing,Jr., King, JK, p. 85. in 1968), the Black Black Muslims Muslims and other black separatist groups who lacked what it Carmichael joined in proper sense sense of of solidarity with the American imperialism. believed was was a proper theworldwide struggle against American 86. DeLoach, DeLoach, Hoover? Hoover's FBI, FBL p. p. 247. 247. 86. 87. vol. vol. 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part 2. 87. part2. 88. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part 2. The The file file noted noted by by Mitrokhin does not not record the outcome outcome of of operation operation PANPAN 88. part 2. Mitrokhin does record the DORA. On evidence, it it is is impossible impossible to to be be certain certain which, which, if if any, any, of of the the attacks attacks on on black organiza DORA. Onpresent present evidence, black organizations blamed blamed on on the Jewish Defense Defense League League were were actually actually the the work work of of the KGB. tions theJewish theKGB. 89. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 10; 10; vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part 1. The The Soviet Soviet Union Union boycotted the Los Angeles Angeles Olympics Olympics in in retaliaretalia 89. part1. boycotted the of the Moscow Olympics four years earlier. tion for the American boycott of earlier. 90. US Department Department of of State, State, Active Measures, p. 55. 55. 90. Active Measures, Confidence, p. 176. 176. 91. Dobrynin, In Confidence, 92. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, p. p. 539. Dobrynin, In Confidencz, Confidence, pp. 235-6. 92. Andrew andGordievsky, 539. Dobrynin, pp. 235-6. of U pheaval, p. 256; Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 612. On the KGB ofJackson 93. Kissinger, Years $Upheaval, Isaacson, Kissinger, KGB targeting of Jackson and and Perle, see see vol. 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part 1. Perle, vol. 6, part1. Kissinger, pp. 94. Isaacson, pp. 612-15. Isaacson, Kissinger, 612-15. 94. I1I Confidence, Confidence, p. 269. 95. Dobrynin, In 96. vol. ch. 14, 14, part 1. 96. vol. 6, ch. part1. 97. On Centre's short-lived hopes of of using Brzezinskis Brzezinski's Soviet contacts to exert influence on him, O n the Centres him, see above, above, chapter chapter 8. 8. 98. Eyes Only, 98. Andrew, Andrew, For the President's President? Only, p. 433. 433. fidence, p. 99. Dobrynin, Dobrynin, In Con Confidence, p. 375. 375. 100. 1. 100. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 13,part part 1. 101. vol. 101. vol. 5, 5, section section 10. 10. 102. 102. vol. vol. 5, 5, section section 10. 10. 103. Eyes Only, 103. Andrew, Andrew, For the President's President? Eyes Only, p. p. 455. 455. Vance Vance resigned resigned as as Secretary Secretary of of State State after after opposing opposing the the unsuccessful unsuccessful mission to rescue the Teheran Teheranhostages in 1980. 1980. 104. 104. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part part1.1. 105. 105. Reagan, Reagan, An A n American Americnn Life, L@, p. p. 33. 33. 106. 106. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 14, 14, part part1. 1. 107. In Con fidence, pp. 470, 523. Cf. 107. Dobrynin, Dobrynin, Confidence, pp. 459, 459,470,523. Cf.above, above, ch. ch. 8. 8. On O n RYAN, RYAN, see seeAndrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, Gordievsky (eds.), from the ch. 4. KGB, pp. 583-605, 583-605, and Andrew Andrewand Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions Instructionsfi-om theCentre, Centre, 108. KGB 0066 (April 12, 1982). vol. indapp. 3, 3, item 108. Order Order of ofthe the KGB Chairman, Chairman, no. no. 0066 (April 12,1982). vol. 4, 4, indapp. item47. 47. 109. Gordievsky, 109. Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 590-1. 590-1. 1 10. Reagan, A n American Life, Lfe, pp. 329-30. 329-30. 110. Reagan, An 1 11 . vol. 111. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part part 3. 3. As As well well as as deceiving deceiving Sekou Sekou Toure, TourC, Seliskov Seliskovalso also made made an an unsuccessful unsuccessful attempt attempt to to recruit the CIA chief during CIAstation station during his visit to Conakry. Conakry. 1 12. vol. ch. 8, part 3. 112. vol. 6, 6, ch. 8, part 3. 113. Gordievsky, will be covered in more 113. Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 630. 630. Active Active measures measures in the theThird ThirdWorld World detail in the thenext volume. volume. 1 14. Andrew 114. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 630-1. 630-1. 1 15. Interview elegraph (December 1, 1992). 115. Interview with with Shebarshin Shebarshin after after his his retirement, retirement, Daily Daib T Telegraph 1,1992). 1 16. Order of the 116. the Chairman Chairmanof the the KGB, KGB, no. 107/0V. (September 5, 5,1990). 1990). 1 1 7. Yeltsin, from the Kremlin, cers who 117. Yeltsin, The View Viewfi-om Kremlirz, appendix appendix B, pp. 306-9. 306-9. Among those former KGB KGB offi officers conspiracy theories is Oleg Oleg Nechiporenko, who twice met Oswald Oswald in continue to propagate the old JFK conspiracy Mexico was later concerned Mexico City in October October 1963 1963and and concerned with active measures measures involving involving Philip Philip Agee. Agee. After his official officialretirement from the KGB in 11991, Nechiporenko made a number of appearances appearances on the Amer Amerhis 991, N echiporenko made ican lecture a lecture circuit, circuit, published his his memoirs memoirs in English and was interviewed by Dan Rather Ratherin in a CBS CBS spe special on theJFK the JFK assassination. assassination.Nechiporenko, however, however, has has become become confused confilsedby the distinction between the cial version of the the KGB KGB conspiracy conspiracy theory of the assassination assassinationinvolving involving oil oil magnate H. H. L. L. Hunt Hunt original version and a later version version which targeted targeted Watergate Watergate conspirator conspirator E. E.Howard Howard Hunt. Hunt. His book, Passpo1t Passport to t oAssassil1atiol1, Assassination, a His book, which argues argues that that the the"billionaire billionaireE. E. Howard Howard Hunt Hunt played played a a special specialrole" rolein the theassassination, assassination, confuses confuses the which two Hunts. Hunts. Nechiporenko Nechiporenko also also claims claims that that the the CIA was probably probably involved. Passp01"! Passportto t oAssassination, Assassination,p. p. 135. 135. two CIA was

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Chapter Fifteen Ffteen Progress Operations Operations Part 1 1

1. Andrew and 1. andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, ch. 9. Leonhard,Child of ofthe Revolution,p. 303. 2. Leonhard, the Revolution, 303. Leonhard accompanied Ulbricht back from Moscow. Moscow. 3. Gordievsky, 3. Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsky,KGB, ch. 9. for 4. Szasz, Szisz, Volunteers Volunteers f o r the Gallows, Gallows,p. p. 105. 105. 5. Flocken and Scholz, Scholz, Ernst W Wollweber. ollweber. 5. 6. Mter After being expelled 1958, Wollweiser lived in obscurity until his death in 1967. expelled from the Party in 1958, andPopplewell, Popplewell, The Stasi, Stasi, pp. 64-5. 64-5. Childs and Kopicsi, Au nom dela classe ouvriire, pp. 119-22. 119-22. Mikoyan Mikoyan and Suslov, who also arrived secretly in 7. Kopacsi, la c1asse ouvriere, thebeginning of the therevolution, reported reported to Moscow on October October24, "One One of ofthe the most seriBudapest at the seri Hungariancomrades comrades was the fact that, before twelve midnight last night, they did not not ous mistakes of the Hungarian permit anyone anyone to shoot at participants in the theriots" riots ("Soviet (Soviet Documents on onthe the Hungarian Revolution, permit Hungarian Revolution," p. 29). 240-8. 8. Kopacsi, Kopicsi, Au nom de la c1asse classe ouvriere, ouvriire, pp. 122, 122,240-8. 9. The best account in English of the repression of of the Hungarian Revolution, based on full access to 9. Hungarian archives and limited access access to Soviet sources, sources, is contained in a volume edited by Professor Litvin, Director Directorof the Institute Institutefor the History Historyof 1956Hungarian Hungarian Revolution, The Hungar HungarGyorgy Litvan, of the 1956 ian Revolution o f 1956. ian Revolution of1956. 10. k-19,136. 10. 11. t-7,299. 11. 12. 12. k-19,136. 13. t-7,299. 13. 14. 14. k-19,136. pymaster, p. 313. 15. 15. Kalugin, Kalugin, S Spymaster, 313. 16. Dawisha, The Kremlin and and the thePrague Spring, Spring, p. 16. 16. In InMarch March 1968 Novotny was also also forced to resign 1968 16. as president. 485-6. 17. Andrew 17. Andrewand Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. 485-6. 18. Dubcek, DubEek, Hope Dies DiesLast, Last, p. 139. 139. 18. fidence, p. 179. 19. 19. Dobrynin, In Con Confidence, 179. 20. 20. Pikhoya, Pikhoya, "Chekhoslovakiya Chekhoslovakiya 1968 1968 god," god, part part I, 1,pp. pp. 10-12. 10-12. 21. See below, chapter 15. 15. Litvin, The Hungarian Hungarian Revolution o f 1956,p. 58. 22. Litvan, Revolution of1956, 23. 23. Shevchenko, Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, Moscow, p. p. 104. 104. Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. 434-5. 434-5. 24. Andrew and Gordievsky, 1. vol. 7, ch. 7, 68. 25. k-16,250. vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 1. 7,68. 26. 26. k-19,299. k-19,299. 27. t-7,280. 28. Their names are listed in k-20,93,94. 29. of Kurt 29. GROMOV GROMOV was was Vasili Vasili Antonovich Antonovich Gordievsky, Gordievsky, who who at at different times times assumed assumed the the identities identities of Sandler, Karlovich Iozenson, who Sandler, Kurt Kurt Molner Molner and and Emil Frank Frank(t-7,279). (t-7,279). SADKO was was an Estonian, Estonian, Ivan Karlovich posed successively successively as asa Canadian of Finnish origins, Valte Urho Kataja, and as the Germans GermansHans Hans Graven (vol. 8, 8; k-8,23,167,574). SEVIDOVs and Pobbs Friedrich Schilling Schilling (vol. 8, ch. 8; SEVIDOV's real name is not recorded in Mitrokhins notes. When traveling in the West, he usually carried a West German Germanpassport in the thename of Mitrokhin's of Heinrich Dremer of Dremer. At Dremer or Kurt Ernst Tile; Tile;he healso possessed possessed an Austrian passport in the thename of one stage a Swiss travel Swiss passport was also alsoheld in reserve for him at atthe the KGB residency in Vienna. When traveling East German German Willi WilliWerner WernerNeumann Neumann (k-16,455). ing in Poland, he he posed posed as as the the East (k-16,455). VLADIMIR VLADIMIR was a a Soviet his first first West West German passport under an Soviet ethnic ethnic German, German,Ivan Ivan Dmitryevich Dmitryevich Unrau, Unrau, who who obtained obtained his German passport under an assumed identity in 1961; names, Hans Emil Emil Redveyks and [first name assumed 1961; he used at least two different names, unknown] Maykhert. His wife Irina Yevseyevna was the illegal BERTA (k-16,61). VLAS was a Soviet Moldavian (real German Rolf Max Thiemichen. His wife (real name unrecorded) who posed as the West West German RolfMax Thiemichen. His LIRA was also like others, were noted alsoan illegal (k-11,6; k-8,277). The aliases aliases of all five fiveillegals, illegals, noted by Mitrokhin in in alphabet; their retranslation into the theRoman alphabet may in some instances produce spelling the Cyrillic alphabet; errors. errors. 30. GURYEV 30. GURYEV was was Valentin Valentin Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Gutin, Gutin, who whoposed in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia as a businessman (alias not GROMOV to (k-19,655). YEV not recorded), recorded), probably probably from from West West Germany; Germany; he he accompanied accompanied GROMOV toPrague Prague (k-19,655). YEVDOKIMOVs real name is not recorded; he used the alias Heinz Bayer (k-20,94; t-2,65). DOKIMOV's

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31. The first list of of illegals selected selected for postings in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia contains the name of of PYOTR, also 31. Laterrecords records reveal that his wife ARTYOMOV ARTYOMOVA, illegal, played an active known as ARTYOM. Later A, also an illegal, role Mitrokhin's notes notes contain ARTYOM. role in in Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia, but but Mitrokhins contain no no reference reference to to operations operations by by PYOTRI PYOTWARTYOM. ARTYOMOVA was a MGIMO M G I M O graduate (real name unknown) who held a West German Germanpassport in the the name of Edith Edith Ingrid Ingrid Eichendorf, Eichendorf, but posed in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia as an Austrian businesswoman (alias unknown) unknown) (k-8,44; k-20,176). k-20,176). DIM D I M (or (or DIMA) DIMA) was was V. V. 1. I. Lyamin; Lyamin; he he traveled traveled to to Prague Prague on on an an Austrian Austrian passport 14; k-20,85). passport (alias (alias not not recorded) recorded) (vol. (vol. 5, 5, sec. 14; k-20,85). VIKTOR VIKTOR was was a a Latvian, Latvian, Pavel Pave1 Aleksandrovich Aleksandrovich Kar Karalyun, and alyun, who who obtained obtained a a Brazilian Brazilian passport in in 1959 1959 and later later assumed assumed Austrian Austrian nationality nationality (voL (vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, parts parts 2, 4; k-16,483). 2,4; k-16,483). 32. Mitrokhin notes that BELYAKOV BELYAKOVused British identity documents but does not record either his real or assumed name Usti or his his assumed name (voL (vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 4). USKOV USKOV was was [first name name not not recorded] Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Ustimenko, (aliases not ALYA was USKOV's menko, who who used successively successively Irish Irish and and British passports passports (aliases not recorded). recorded). V VALYA was USKOVs Norwegian-born wife, Victoria Martynova, who took Norwegian-born tookSoviet Soviet citizenship on her marriage in 1961; 1961; like her husband, she used a British passport in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia (vol. 7, ch. 7; k-20,190). 33. ALLA was Galina Leonidovna Vinogradova (later Linitskaya Linitskaya and Kaminskaya), a Yugoslav woman 33. whose first marriage was to a GRU illegal, Vladimir Ivanovich Vinogradov. In 1954 she obtained an Austrian Vinogradov. 1954 dismissed from of passport in in the the name name of of Maria Maria Machek. Machek. Mter After her her husband husband was was dismissed from the the GRU GRU on on charges charges of political immaturity and ideological instability" instability in 1955, 1955, ALLA married the KGB illegal "political illegal INDOR, then operating in Switzerland Switzerland as Waldemar Weber, Weber, and acquired Swiss Swisscitizenship citizenship as Maria Weber. Her marriage to operational reasons reasons" in relationship with to INDOR INDOR was was dissolved dissolved "for foroperational in 1957 1957and and she she began began a a relationship with an an Egyptian (codenamed PHARAOH) whom she met in Switzerland. fue record (codenamed Switzerland. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes on ALLA's ALLRs bulky file that that she she operated in in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia in in 1968 1968 as as Maria Maria Werner. Werner. It It is is unclear whether ALLA ALLA had had actually actually changed her alias from fiom Weber or or whether the apparent change is due to a clerical error related to the translit transliteration of her pseudonym pseudonym to and from the Cyrillic Cyrillic alphabet. alphabet. voL vol. 4, 4, indapp. 3; voL vol.4, 4,pakapp. pakapp. 3; k-20,187. k-20,187. 34. SEP was Mikhail Vladimirovich Vladimirovich Fyodorov. From 1945 1945 to to 1951 1951he heworked in Polish military intelli intelliillegal) obtained gence under the alias Mikhail Lipsinski. Lipsinski. In 1952 1952 he and his wife ZHANNA (also an illegal) Swiss passports. passports. From 1953 1953 to he was to1968 1968 he illegal illegalresident in Switzerland; Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not notrecord his alias. alias. k-20,94,201; voL vol. 7, ch. 7; vol. 7, app. 3. 35. YEFRAT was a Soviet Armenian, Ashot AshotAbgarovich Akopyan, who assumed the identity identityof of a living Lebanese double, Oganes Saradzhyan, who had migrated to the the Soviet Union and obtained, successively, successively, Lebanese passports. His wife, Kira Viktorovna Chertenko (TANYA), was also also an French and Lebanese an illegal. illegal. k-7,9; k-16,338,419. k-7,9; 36. 36. ROY ROY (also (also known known as as KONEYEV) KONEYEY) was was Vladimir Igorevich Igorevich Stetsenko, Stetsenko, who who assumed assumed the the identity identityof ofa a Mexican citizen, Felipe Burns, allegedly allegedly the son of of a Canadian father and Mexican mother. His wife PAT also an illegal. vol. 8, app. 3a. (also known as IRINA) was also illegaL vol. 37. The assumed nationality of of the illegalJURGEN illegal JURGEN is not recorded in Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's notes. 38. k-20,93. 39. k-19,331. 40. k-20,93. 1945, p. 35. k-20,86. On O n Barak's Biraks imprisonment imprisonment in in1962, 1962, OfCzechoslovakiaSince Since 1945, 41. k-20,86. see Renner, A History oJCzechoslovakia 42. 3. 42. k-20,87,189; k-20,87,189; vol. vol. 3, 3, pakapp. pakapp. 3. GustavHusak, Husik, who Dubtek as First Secretary in April 1969, Birak of of 43. Gustav who was to succeed Dubcek 1969, accused Barak personal trumped-up charges in 1954. 1954.Skilling, Skilling, Czechoslova Czechoslovaresponsibility for his brutal interrogation and trial on trumped-up kia? InterruptedRevolution, Revolution, kia's Interrupted p. 380. 44. k-20,93. 45. k-20,96. DubEek, Hope Dies DiesLast, Last,p. 150; 150; Skilling, Skilling, Czechoslovakia's Czechoslovakia?Interrupted Interrupted Revolution, 231,879. 46. Dubcek, Revolution, pp. 231 , 879. theCPCz CPCz theApril April reshuffle. In January 1970 47. k-20,79. Strougal lost his position in the secretariat during the reshuffle. 1970 succeeded vCernik Cernik as prime minister. he succeeded pp. 126-7; 126-7; Dubcek, 145-6; Dawisha, The 48. August and Rees, Red Red Star Star over overPrague, Prague, DubEek, Hope Dies DiesLast, Last,pp. 145-6; Kremlin and the Prague PragueSpring, Spring, p. 63. 49. Dubcek, DubEek, Hope Dies DiesLast, Last,p. 160. 160. 50. k-19,655. k-20,95. k-20,95. 51. 51. In In April April 1968 1968GROMOV GROMOV was was awarded awarded the the "Honoured HonouredKGB KGB Officer" Officer badge badge for his his part part in in exfiltrat exfltratFAUST (Yevgeni Ivanovich Ivanovich Ushakov, who had assumed the identity of a dead double, Olaf ing FAUST identity of "dead double," Olaf Carl Svenson). k-16,501; k-20,94. C Cf.Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution, Execution,p. 188. 188. Svenson). 52. k-19,655.

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53. k-19,655. 53. k-l9,655. 54. Revolution, 69, 568, 576, 696. Skilling, Czechoslovakia's CzechoslovakiaiInterrupted Interrupted Revolution, pp. pp. 69,568,576,696. 54. Skilling, 55. The KGB fIle file noted by Mitrokhin records records that that the the Service in Service V thugs chosen to assist GUREYEV in 55. kidnapping erny were were to to kidnapping C cernf were named named Alekseyev Alekseyev and and Ivanov; Ivanov; Petrov Petrov and and Borisov, also also from Service Service V, were help GROMOV make offwith off with Prochazka ProchPzka (k-19,655). (k-19,655). 56. 56. k-19,655; k-19,655;k-20,95. k-20,95. 57. 57. k-20,155,156,203. k-20,155,156,203. 58. 58. k-20,89. k-20,89. 59. p. 129; inin Czechoslovakia, 1968, pp. Rees, Red Star over overPrague, Prague, 129;Valenta, Valenta, Soviet Intervention Intervention Czechoslovakia, 59. August and Rees, 63-4. 63-4. k-20,203. k-20,203. 60. Pikhoya, "Chekhoslovakiya Chekhoslovakiya 1968 god, part 2, pp. 35fc 60. 1968 god," 35ff; Gardner, The "The Soviet Decision to Invade Czechoslovakia." Czechoslovakia. 61. August and Rees, Red p. 129; SO'l,iet Intervention in in Czechoslovakia, 1968, 1 968, pp. 61. Red Star O'l'er overPrague, Prague, 129;Valenta, Soviet Intervention Czechoslovakia, 63-4. 63-4. that KGB KGB plans plans to "to carry carry out out spespe 62. August and and Rees, Rees, Red Star over overPrague, Prtgue, pp. pp. 140-1. 140-1. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin notes notes that 62. August cial assignments on nine people people" in Czechoslovakia in August gives Centre,but but August 1968 were canceled by the Centre, (k-20,203). no further details (k-20,203). 63. k-19,644. 63. k-19,644. 64. StB offIcer defected to to the Accord This is is the the interpretation interpretation of of Frantisek Frantisek August, August, an an StB officer who who later later defected theWest. West. Accord64. This ing to Rees, Red Red Star 128). toAugust, Frouz was "a aSoviet agent" agent (August and Rees, Star over over Prague, p. 128). Interviews with Kalugin in Komsomolskaya Komsomolskaya Pra'l, Pravda News, 1990, no. 25; 65. Interviews 65. da (June 20, 1990) and Moscow News, of CzechoCzecho Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievslcy,KGB, KGB, pp. 487-8; Kramer, "The The Prague Spring and the Soviet Invasion of slovakia," slovakia,part part 2, 2, p. p. 6. 6. 66. 66. The minutes of the Politburo meeting of August 15-17,1968, 15-17, 1968, which agreed the final fInal details of of the invasion, invasion, are not yet available. 67. Littell pared by Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, pp. pp. 64-70; August August 67. Littell (ed.), (ed.), The Czech Black Black Book Book Pre Prepared bythe Czechoslovak Academyo f Sciences, Prague, pp. 134-5. and Rees, Rees, Red Star Star over over Prague, 134-5. 68. Dubtek, Hope Dies Dies Last, Last, p. p. 183. 183. 68. Dubcek, 69. Pre pared byby the Czechoslovak of Sciences, p. 70. Littell (ed.), (ed.), The Czech Black BlackBook Book Prepared CzechoslovakAcademy Academy o f Sciences, 69. Littell 70. Soviet of Czechoslovakia," Kramer, "The The Prague Prague Spring Spring and andthe the Soviet Invasion Invasion of Czechoslovakia,part 2, p. 3. 70. Kramer, 71. Dubtek, Hope Dies DiesLast, Last, chs. 22-25. 22-25. 71. Dubcek, the History of the CPCz, 72. Outlineof ofthe ofthe CPCz,p. 305. 305. 72. An Outline 73. 73. k-19,644. k-19,644. 74. was KGB is unclear unclear from from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes whether whether PATERA PATERA was an an StB StBor or KGB codename or an 74. k-19,644. k-19,644.It is alias. alias. pymaster, p. 107. Kalugin resident's words. words." 75. 75. Kalugin, Kalugin, S Spymaster, p. 107. Kalugin was was "deeply deeply moved moved by by the residents 76. (k-20,182); most had almost certainly 76. Fourteen illegals were were sent to to Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia in August August 1968 (k-20,182); been on short-term missions Spring. The more than been on previous previous short-term missions during during the thePrague Prague Spring. The total total sent, sent,usually usually on on more than one one mission, mission, to to Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia in in 1968-9 1968-9 was was twenty-nine twenty-nine (k-20,203). (k-20,203). 77. 77. k-19,246. k-19,246. 78. 78. k-20,181. k-20,181. 79. 79. k-16,329; k-16,329;k-20,150,187. k-20,150,187. 80. k-16,329; k-16,329;k-20,176. k-20,176. 80. 81. k-16,329; k-16,329;k-19,158. k-l9,158. 81. 82. k-16,329; k-16,329;k-19,158. k-19,158. 83. 83. k-19,384. k-19,384. 84. of SpanSpan vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 8 8 and and app. app. 1. 1. ERNA, ERNA, previously previously codenamed codenamed NORA, who who had had been been born in France France of 84. vol. ish ish parents parents in in 1914, 1914, became became a a Communist Communist militant militant and and commanded commanded a a machine-gun machine-gun company company during during the the Spanish 1939 she joined the 1941. Spanish Civil Civil War. War. In In 1939 she moved moved to to Russia, Russia, took took Soviet Soviet citizenship citizenship and and joined the NKGB NKGBin in 1941. She moving to 1958. She worked worked as as an an illegal illegal in in France France (1946-52) (1946-52) and and Mexico Mexico (1954-57) (1954-57) before before moving to Montreal Montrealin in1958. Despite her her criticisms, criticisms, ERNA told her shocked comrades in Budapest that she remained a committed Leninist. By become so so disillusioned contact with the Leninist. By the the mid-1970s, mid-l970s, however, however, she she had had become disillusioned that that she she broke broke contact with the KGB. KGB. 85. Gordievsky, 85. Gordievsky,Next Stop Execution, Execution,pp. 81-2. 81-2. 86. 86. k-19,158. k-19,158. 87. 87. vol. 3, pakapp. 3. 88. Gordievslcy, Next Stop Execution, Execution,p. p. 187. 187. 88. Gordievsky,

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89. VOI. 1;vol. VOI. 5, part 3. 89. k-8,78; k-19,158,298,415,454; vol. 6, ch. 1, 1, part 1; 6, ch. 5, 90. Gordievsky, Gordievsky,Next Stop Execution, Execution,pp. 172-3; 172-3; Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB,pp. 491-2. 491-2.

Chapter Sixteen Progress' Progress Operations Operations Part 2

1. Dubcek, 1. DubEek, Hope Dies DiesLast, Last, pp. 225-6. 225-6.

2. The Ministry of of the Interior existed at both federal and national levels. There were thus Czech and andSlo Slothe Interior addition to the Czechoslovak minister. minister. vak ministers in addition 3. Dubcek, 3. DubEek, Hope Dies Last, pp. pp. 236-9. 236-9. 4. k-20,149. 5. k-20,189,177. O n Pachman, see Hruby, Fools and and Heroes, Heroes, ch. 4. 6. k-20,154. On 7. k-19,643. 8. Renner, A History oJCzechoslovakia o f CzechoslovakiaSince Since 1945,p. 98. 8. 1945, JakeSs contact in the KGB liaison office was Slavin (fi (first 9. Jakes's was G. Slavin rst name and patronymic not recorded in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes; k-19,575). 10. 10. k-19,552. 1 1 . k-19,643. 11. 12. k-19,615. 12. 13. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not notprovide complete statistics for the purge of of security and intelligence person person13. officials dismissed from the central apparatus of of the interior ministry nel. In 1970, 1970, however, 1,092 1,092 offi cials were dismissed individuals deprived of of Party Partymembership (k-19,551). During 1970 1970more than a hundred StB StB and 3,202 individuals agents defected to the (k-19,559). theWest West 14. k-19,566. 14. 15.The The example of the full and frank frankintelligence provided by Kaska Kaska 15. KGB liaison office report cited as an example told us all all that he Indras behavior in connection with his visit to the the fact that he he "told he knew about Indra's the G D R .. .. .. Mitrokhins notes give no further information on this episode GDR " Mitrokhin's episode (k-19,645). 16. k-19,555. 16. 17. 17. k-19,576. 18. Husik had wanted to make further enquiries about KGB 18. Sinitsyn reported that both both Kaska and Husak records 1968-9 gave rise to doubts"; doubts; k-19,587. records on individuals individuals whose "whose behavior in 1968-9 19. Indra was seen by Husak Husik as a potential rival, and his move in 1971 1971from his position as Party secretary 19. influential of chairman of of the to the the prestigious but not not very infl uential post of the National Assembly was probably the CPCz. CPCz. Renner, A History oJ intended to curtail his influence within the o f Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Since 1945, 1945, pp. 111-12. 1 11-12. 20. k-19,554. 21. Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, pp. 157-8. 157-8. of calculating the final total of of the purge of the theCPCz, CPCz,see Kusin, From 22. k-19,554. On the problems of Dubiek to t o Charter Charter 77, 77, pp. 85-9. 85-9. DubCek 23. k-19,554. ofthe the 1972. 24. k-19,541. The probable date of meeting was April 1972. Mitrokhhs notes do not not give FYODOROV's FYODOROVs real identity. 25. k-16,329. k-19,158. Mitrokhin's 26. k-19,609. 27. k-19,600. 28. k-19,601. o f Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakiasince 1 1945, 945, pp. 100-1. 100-1. 29. Renner, A History oj 30. k-19,603. 31. k-19,606. 31. 32. k-19,62. 33. k-19,68. 34. k-19,62,92,643. Dub2ek to t o Charter Charter 77, p. 194. 194. 35. Kusin, From Dubcek DubEek describes describes his surveillance surveillance and harassment by the StB StBin in DiesLast, Last, ch. 29. 36. Dubcek Hope Dies Dubtek makes no mention of this episode in his memoirs. 37. t-7,272,297. Dubcek 38. 38. k-19,330. 39. k-19,75. 40. k-19,77. 41. k-19,76.

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42. Czechoslovakia investigation Grohman case 42. The The KGB KGB team team sent sent to to Czechoslovakia"to tohelp help with with the the investigation of of the the Grohrnan case at at a a higher higher and rom the During the the investigation, and "others others f from the KGB KGB Investigation 1nve:tigation Department." Department. During investigation, Bil'ak Bilak claimed claimed that that Grohman trougal." k-19,6 7. On Grohman "was wasa a close close contact contact of of S Strougal. k-19,67. O n Grohman's Grohmans subsequent subsequent trial, trial, see: see: "Former Former Prague Prague (January 1977); "Viele Minister Minister on onSpying Spying Charge," Charge, The TheTimes Times (January 5, 5,1977); Viele Mitarbeiter Mitarbeiter des des BND BND haben haben Angst Angst vor vor Verrat," 1977). Verrat,Die Die Welt Welt(January (January 27, 27,1977). 43. 43. k-19,77. k-19,77. 44. 44. t-7,263,280,281. t-7,263,280,281. k-19,451. k-19,451. 45. 45. Probably Probablythe the KGB's KGBs main main source sourceon on Moczar's Moczars active activemeasures measuresagainst against Gierek Gierek and and his his bugging bugging of of much much 46. the Rights in 46. For For an an analysis analysisof of the December December 1970 1970protests, protests,see see Kurczewski, Kurczewski,The TheResurrection Resurrectionoj $Rights in Poland, Poland, ch. ch. 5. 5. 47. 47. k-19,333. k-19,333. 48. 48. k-19,322. k-19,322. of leadership of the thePUWP PUWP leadership was was Szlachcic, Szlachcic,later later Polish Polish Minister Minister of of the the Interior. Interior. t-7,243. t-7,243. professional professionallevel" levelconsisted consisted of of A. A. A. A. Fabrichnikov Fabrichnikov and and V. V. A. A. Pakhomov Pakhomov of of the the Second Second Chief Chief Directorate, Directorate,

wentieth Centur y, pp. 49. 49. Crampton, Crampton, Eastern EasternEurope Europein in the the T Twentieth Centucy, pp. 359-60. 359-60.
50. 50. t-7,243. t-7,243. 5 1 . The 51. The other other targets targets of of cultivation cultivation assigned assigned to to BOGUN BOGUNwere were W. W. Klimczak Klimczak (not (not identified); identified); the the econo economist described mist G. G.Nowakowski; Nowakowski;the the writer writer K. K. Busz, BUSZ, described as as"leader leaderof of the the Krakow Krak6wintelligentsia"; intelligentsia;and and S. S. Kozin KozinBOGUN BOGUN with with Bardecki Bardecki was was later later continued continued by by the the illegal illegal FILOSOV. FILOSOV. Like Like others others targeted targeted by by PROG PROGidentifying identifying as as KGB KGB illegals. illegals. ski, Party and state apparatus" The contact ski, a a photographer photographer with with "contacts contactsin in the the Party and state apparatus(k-19,415). (k-19,415).The contact established established by by

RESS RESS operations, operations, Bardecki Bardecki cannot cannot be be blamed blamed for for speaking speaking to to Western Western visitors visitorswhom whom he he had had no no means means of of 52. seven for 52. In In addition addition to to the the seven illegals illegalsused used for operations operations in in East EastGermany, Germany,others otherswere were based basedthere there but but oper oper-

ated ated elsewhere. elsewhere. k-19,399,415. k-19,399,415. 53. 53. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhinsnotes notes do do not notrecord record the the specific specificobjectives objectives of of the the illegals illegals sent sent to to Bulgaria. Bulgaria.

in wentieth Century, pp. 54. 54. Crampton, Crampton, Eastern EasternEurope Europe in the the T Twentieth Century, pp. 354-5. 354-5.
55. 55. k-19,487. k-19,487. 56. 56. k-19,455. k-19,455. 57. 57. k-19,415,456. k-19,415,456. 58. wentieth Century, pp. 58. Crampton, Crampton, Eastern Eastern Europe Europein in the the T Twentieth Century, pp. 350-2. 350-2. 59. of the reports. 59. k-16,273; k-16,273; k-19,429. k-19,429. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes give give no no details details on on the thecontent content of the reports. 60. 60. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsb, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 359-60. 359-60. 61. 61. k-19,287. k-19,287. 62. 62. k-19,264. k-19,264.

in wentieth Century, In ame, p. 63. 63. Crampton, Crampton, Eastern EasternEurope Europe in the the T Twentieth Century, pp. pp. 357-8. 357-8. Garton Garton Ash, Ash, In Europe's Europe: N Name, p. 77. 77.

64. 64. k-19,264. k-19,264. 65. 65. k-19,270. k-19,270. 66. 66. t-7,264. t-7,264. 67. 67. Childs Childs and andPopplewell, Popplewell, The The Stasi, Stnsi,p. p. 82. 82. A A KGB KGB file, file, apparently apparently for for the the period period 1976-7, 1976-7, gives gives the the total total Archive, rom 59,500 Archive,which which record record a a rise rise f from 59,500 in in 1975 1975 to to 75,000 75,000 in in 1980. 1980. 68. 68. k-19,273. k-19,273. 69. 69. t-7,184. t-7,184. 70. 70. k-19,430. k-19,430. 71. 71. k-19,458. k-19,458. 72. 72. k-27,78. k-27,78. 73 . k-19,627. 73. k-19,627. 74. 74. k-27,243. k-27,243. 75. 75. t-7,94. t-7,94. 77. le on es the 77. k-26,162. k-26,162. The The KGB KGB fi file on the the drug drugtest test incident incident identifi identifies the Soviet Soviet player player concerned, concerned,but, but, since since he he was was never never tested, tested, it it is is unfair unfair to to mention mention his his name. name. 78. 78. k-26,162. k-26,162. 79. 79. k-19,235. k-19,235. 80. 'cek to 304-25; Renner, 80, Kusin, Kusin, From From Dub Dub*cek t o Charter Charter 77, 77, pp. pp. 304-25; Renner, A A History Histocy oj o f Czechoslovakia Czechosiovnkiasince since 1945, 1945, pp. pp. 76. 76. k-19,209. k-19,209. size 9,271). This size of of Stasi Stasipersonnel personnel as as "over over60,000" 60,000(k-1 (k-19,271). This is is consistent consistent with with documents documents in in the the Gauck Gauck[Stasi] [Stasi]

wentieth Century, 128-47; 128-47; Crampton, Crampton, Eastern Eastern Europe Europein in the the T Twentieth Century, p. p. 384. 384.
81. 945, p. 81. Cited Cited in inRenner, Renner,A History History oJCzechoslovakia o f Czecbosiovakiasince since 1 1945, p. 102. 102.

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Seventeen The KGB and Western Western Communist Parties Chapter Seventeen
1 . vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 1 , para. 17. 1. 1, 17. 2. Mitrokhins notes to Plissonnier's Plissonniers collaboration 2. k-3,65,115. k-3,65,115. k-8,182. k-8,182.Though the earliest reference in Mitrokhin's with the dates from 1952, theKGB KGB 1952, it may well have begun earlier. earlier. 3. Robrieux, 3. Robrieux, Histoire interieure intkrieure du du Parti communiste, communiste, vol. vol. 4, pp. pp. 450-2. 450-2. Bell Bell and and Criddle, Criddle, The French Com Compublic, pp. 21. munist Party in the Fifth F f t h Re Republic, pp. 19, 19,21. 4. 4. k-3,65,115. k-3,65,115. k-8,182. k-8,182. 5. k-3,65,115. k-3,65,115. k-8,182. k-8,182. Boumedienne was president of of Algeria from December 1976 1976 until his death in December December 1978. 1978. 6. Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary ContemporaryItaly, Italy, pp. pp. 84-7. 6. Ginsborg, PresidentsEyes EyesOnly, pp. 171-2. 171-2. 7. Andrew, For the President's 7. 8. Mitrokhins notes do not not include any examples of the theintelligence obtained by DARIO D A N 0 and his female 8. Mitrokhin's recruits recruits from from the the foreign foreign ministry. ministry. 9. At various in his as a 9. At various stages stages in his career career as a Soviet Soviet agent, agent, DARIO DANO was was codenamed codenamed BASK, SPARTAK, SPARTAK, GAU, GAU, CHESTNY He CHESTNY and GAUDEMUS. GAUDEMUS. H e appears appears to to have switched switched from from GRU to to MGB MGBcontrol control immediately after after the the Second World World War. War. k-10,109. k-10,109. 10. in 1956 in the the 10. k-10,101-3,107,109. k-10,101-3,107,109. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes imply that in 1956 DARIO DANO was also also instrumental instrumental in recruitment department (k-10,100,103). recruitment of of MAGDA, MAGDA, a a typist typist in in the the foreign foreign ministry ministry press press department (k-10,100,103).Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes also notes also record record the the recruitment recruitment in in 1970 of an an agent agent in in the theForeign Foreign Ministry, Ministry, codenamed codenamed STRELOK, STRELOK, by by Georgi Pavlovich "reluctant to Georgi Pavlovich Antonov. Antonov. STRELOK STRELOK subsequently subsequently became became reluctant to cooperate" cooperate (k-4,80,158; (k-4,80,158; k-2,221,231,268). k-2,221,231,268). 1 1 . k-10,109. 11. k-10,109. See below chapter 18. 18. 12. 12. k-7,4,193; k-7,4,193;k-16,338,419; k-16,338,419;k-18,153; k-18,153;k-20,94. k-20,94. 13. and the Struggle over Austria, chs. 1-4; PowerPolitics Politics overdustria, 1-4; Barker, Austria 1918-1972, part 3. 13. Cronin, Great Power Austria 1918-1972, p. 178. 14. Barker,Austria 178. 14. Barker, 15. 15. k-18,52. k-18,52. 16. 16. k-18,52. k-18,52. 17. vol. 5, sect. sect. 6, 6, paras. paras. 5,6 and and n. 17. k-16,214,216; k-16,214,216;vol. 18. t-7,l. 18. k-14,722; k-14,722; k-2,175; k-2,175; t-7,1. 19. 19. k-2,81,145,150. k-2,81,145,150. 20. k-13,55,61. k-l3,55,61. 21. t-7,1.. 21. t-7,1 22. s part f the 22. The The SKP fought fought elections elections a as part o of the Suomen Kansan Kansan Demokraattinen DemokraattinenLiitto (SKDL), (SKDL), mainly mainly com composed of of Communists and andfellow travelers. ar, pp. 1 8-19, 131-2. 23. Zubok 23. Zubok and andPleshakov, Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Kremlin) Cold W War, pp. 1 118-19,131-2. 24. Communist role in the post-war Mitrokhins notes unfortunately unfortunately contain nothing on the Communist post-war coalition 24. Mitrokhin's governments and little on Finland before the Brezhnev era. Given the willing assistance assistance given to to the KGB by the SVK chairman (later honorary chairman), Ville Pessi, 1970s (k-26,191,211,228), (k-26,191,211,228),it is scarcely scarcely Pessi,in the the1970s conceivable that such assistance assistance was not forthcoming forthcoming earlier. Pessi was already already a powerful figure as SVK secretary assistance to secretary after after the the Second World World War. War. The The earliest earliest post-war post-war example example of of SVK SVK assistance to Soviet Soviet intelli intelli1949-51 to the the illegal VIK in in adopting adopting the the gence operations noted by Mitrokhin was the help given in 1949-51 identity of Maki. The first KGB agent in the of the Finn Finn Eugene Eugene Maki. the Finnish Finnish police force referred to in inMitro Mitrokhins notes is ZVEN, ZVEN, a CID officer 1959 (k-5,309). (k-5,309). khin's CID offi cer recruited in 1959 7. Upton quotes from one of 25. Upton, The Communist Parties of of Scandinavia Scandinavia and Finland, part 2, chs. 6, 6,7. of the few surviving 1958 memoirs, Kommunisti sisiiministerinii, surviving copies copies of of Leino's Leinos 1958 sisaministerina, withdrawn on the the eve of of publication. 26. Communist Parties of of Scandinavia Scandinavia and Finland, p. 405. 26. Upton, The Communist 405. 27. See above, chapter 7. 7. 27. 28. Klehr and Haynes, The American Communist Movement, ch. 4. 4. This admirable volume omits the role 28. of the theundeclared Party members after 1958. 1958. 29. 10. 29. See above, chapter 10. 30. 30. See See below, below, chapter chapter 24. Mitrokhins notes give the names of of two Canadians who assisted in obtaining the passport in the name 31. 31. Mitrokhin's of "Robert Robert Callan," Callan, no. 4-716255. The Centre also doctored a genuine Canadian passport, no. 4-428012, in of of Vasili Dzogola (?Dzogol), (?Dzogol),inserting a photograph of''Abel'' of Abel color the name ofVasili and changing the eye color and other particulars to match his. Because Becauseof of ,Abels arrest, this passport too was never neverused. used. vol. particulars 'Abel's" arrest, vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2.

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k-27,4S1. 32. k-27,451. k-3,122. 33. k-3,122. non-Soviet citizens could not normally qualify for officer status in the KGB, it was was intended that Since non-Soviet theKGB, that 34. Since the new recruits should become illegal agents rather than thanillegal officers. officers. k-26,331. 35. k-26,331. k-26,332. 36. k-26,332. k-26,333. 37. k-26,333. k-3,65,115; k-8,182. k-8,182. 38. k-3,65,115; k-26,327. 39. k-26,327. hewas asked 40. vol. 8, ch. 13. 13. Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's note on the meeting with Kashtan does not say explicitly that that he of the CPC in helping to fabricate illegals illegals' legends, talent-spot illegal agents. Given the previous role of to talent-spot Communist mentioned in however, it is barely barelyconceivable conceivable that Kashtan, unlike the other otherWestern Western Communist leaders mentioned the files noted noted by Mitrokhin, was asked asked to recommend recommend only conventional agents. k-26,217. 41. k-26,217. of August August 7,1972, 7, 1972, entitled entitled Measures "Measures for the Further Activa 42. KGB Chairman's Chairmans Decree no. 0099/0V of FurtherActivaof Illegals I11egals Intelligence Activity and Increasing Its Role in the Foreign-Political Intelligence System tion of the Foreign-Political of the USSR USSRCouncil of of the KGB Under the of Ministers, Ministers," envisaged envisaged the recruitment recruitment of of illegal agents recomrecom mended by the Communist CommunistParties of theUnited of the United States, tates, Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Argentina Argentina for operoper ations America; by by the of Belgium, Belgium, Britain, Britain, France, France, the the FRG FRG and and Spain Spain for for ations in in North NorthAmerica; the Communist CommunistParties Parties of Party of operations in Europe; by the Communist Party of Japan for operations in Asia; and by the Communist Party ofIsrael Party of Israel for operations in the theMiddle Middle East. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 4. 43. 43. k-26,227. k-26,227. k-26,94-5,308. 44. k-26,944,308. Strugglefor Soares, Portugal's Portugals Struggle for Liberation, p. 24. 45. Soares, 46. of Portugal's of Portuguese rule was followed Portugals colonies, the the end end of 46. k-26,108. k-26,108. In Angola, once the richest of in full-scalecivil civil war between the of Angola in 1975 by by full-scale the Marxist Popular Movement for for the Liberation of and the the rival, non-Marxist non-Marxist FNLA and UNITA. Cunhal also promised to doeverything possi(MPLA) and "to do possi the MPLA, MPLA,including using illegal channels to send people drawn from among ble to give assistance to the experienced experienced military military cadres," cadres,though though the thePCP's PCPs assistance assistance was dwarfed dwarfed by that from from the the Soviet Soviet Union and and Cuba. Cuba. k-26,205,209. k-26,205,209. Portuguese Democray, 69-70. According to Maxwell, the PIDE/DGS 47. Maxwell, The Making of ofPortuguese Democra<y, pp. 69-70. PIDE/DGS 47. Maxwell, archives that PCP of its least the secret police archives also alsorevealed revealed that "the the PCP had had some some embarrassing embarrassing skeletons skeletons of its own, own, not not least the secret police informers informers within within its its own own ranks." ranks. 48. 48. k-26,4. k-26,4. 49. k-26,4. k-26,4. For examples of PIDE/DGS documents which which appeared in the press, probably as a result of of 49. KGB Mitrokhin's notes give KGB active active measures, measures, see see Maxwell, Maxwell, The Making of o f Portuguese Democracy, Democracy,p. p. 70. Mitrokhins give no details of details of these active active measures. measures. In 1994 1994 the the PIDEIDGS PIDE/DGS archive archive was was opened to researchers, researchers, subject to a series series of of restrictions, restrictions, at at the theLisbon Lisbon National National Archive. Archive. 50. Portuguese Democracy, chs. 7-9. 50. MaAwell, Maxwell, The Making of OfPortuguese Democracy,chs. 7-9. 51. 51. Recruitment Recruitment leads leads from from the the PCP PCP leadership leadership during during the themidmid- and and late late 1970s 1970s included: included: the the government government lawyers lawyers BORETS BORETS and and ZNATOK ZNATOK (k-16,180,182); (k-16,180,182);the the trade trade union union lawyer lawyer ZHAK (k-16,179); (k-16,179);MARAT, MARAT, a a registrar of births, deaths and marriages marriages who was able to provide documentation for illegals (k-18,345); (k-18,345); registrar KAREKA, KAREKA, a newspaper newspaper editor used for active measures measures from 1977 to 1982 (k-14,272); (k-14,272);and EMIL, EMIL,a jour journalist nalist with with the the ANOP agency agency (k-14,404). (k-14,404). Some Some of of the the other other Portuguese Portuguese cultivations, cultivations, agents agents and and confi confidential dential contacts contacts of of which which details details are are given given in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes probably probably also also stemmed stemmed from from PCP PCP leads. leads. 52. Cf k-26,210. k-26,210. 52. k-18,345. k-18,345. C 53. 53. Pessi Pessi had had further further discussions discussions on on agent agent recruitment recruitment in in both both Moscow Moscow and and Helsinki Helsinki during during 1978 1978 and and 1979; 1979;k-26,211,228,191. k-26,211,228,191. 54. Dublin resident name KAVERIN; 54. k-8,79. k-8,79. Mitrokhin Mitrokhh identifies identifies the the Dublin resident only only by by his his code codename KAVERIN; his his real real name name (Shadrin) Gordievsky, (Shadrin) is is given given in in Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, appendix appendix D3. D3. 55. 55. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instructionsfrom Instructionsyom the Centre, Centre, pp. pp. 53-6. 53-6. Kryuchkov's Kryuchkovs circular circular to to residen residencies 1978 referred 1975 and 1976, apparently cies of of April April 6, 6,1978 referred to to previous previous circulars circulars of of March March28, 28,1975 and June June17, 17,1976, apparently writ written ten in insimilar similar vein. vein. 56. k-19,7. k-19,7. The main Asian Communist Parties Parties mentioned in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes as taking part in 56. in the the recruiting drive drive were were those of the Indian Indiansubcontinent, Mghanistan Afghanistan and Japan. KGB relations with Third Third recruiting World World Communist CommunistParties Parties will will be be covered coveredin in more more detail detail in in Volume Volume 2. 2.

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57. It is possible, however, le not 57. is possible, however, that that a a latter-day latter-day Sorge Sorge remains remains concealed concealed in in a a fi file not seen seen by by Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin. It It is is

also possible possible that that one one or or more more of of the the recruits recruits of of the the 1970s 1970s and and early early 19805 1980s developed developed into into an an illegal illegal of of also
major major importance importance after after Mitrokhin Mitrokhin ceased ceased to to have have access access to to the the files. files. 58. k-27,99. to identify 58. k-27,99. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes give give Maria's Mariasfull full name, name, but but it it seems seems unfair unfair to identify her. her. 59. k-14,519; notes reveal of LIMB, MARCEL. 59. k-14,519; k-18,409. k-18,409. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes reveal the the identity identity of LIMB, DANA DANAand and MARCEL. 60. See See below, below, chapter chapter 18. 18. 61. The The FCD FCD communication communication to to Ponomarev of of October October 20, 20, 1980 1980 was was numbered numbered 2192-NOV 2192-NOV. The The basic 61. subsidy paid paid to to Kashtan Kashtan in in the the late late 1970s was 150,000 150,000US US dollars, dollars, paid paidin in rwo annual installments, installments,with subsidy 1970s was two annual with some some supplements. By By the the 1980s the CPC CPC had had a a membership membership of of only only about about 4,000, 4,000, and and was was thus thus receiving receiving a a sub subsupplements. 1980s the sidy Subsidies were sidy of of about about $40 $40 dollars dollars per per member. member. Subsidies were also also paid paid to to the the Canada-USSR Canada-USSR and and Qyebec-USSR Quebec-USSR Societies, and and to to the the Sevenz Seweny (Northern Neighbour") Neighbour) journal. journal. In In addition, addition, subsidies subsidies were were sometimes sometimes y Sosed ("Northern Societies, channeled through through the the CPC CPC to to the the Haitian Haitian Communists, Communists, and and perhaps perhaps other other Parties. Parties. vol. vol. 8, 8, eh. ch. 13. 13. channeled 62. Haynes Haynes and and Klehr, Klehr, " 'Moscow MOSCOW Gold, Confirmed Confirmed at at Last? pp. 28 281-4; L. Dobbs, 62. Gold,' Last?" pp. 1-4; L. Dobbs, Down with with Big Brother, p. 414. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes provide provide numerous numerous examples examples of of "Moscow Moscow gold," gold, especially especially during during the the p. 414. Brother, 1970s, subsidies received Communist Party. 1970s, but but no no figures figures for for the the total totalsubsidies received by by any any Communist Party. ch. 4; vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 63. 63. Barron, Barron, Operation Operation Solo, ch. 4; the the aliases aliases of of Morris Morris Childs Childs (born (born Chilovsky) Chilovsky) are are given given in in vol. 12. (On American (On Child's Childs earlier earlier career career in in the the CPUSA, CPUSA,see see Klehr, Klehr, Haynes Haynes and and Anderson, Anderson, The Soviet Wodd World of ofAmerican Conmunisnz, pp. pp. 257-71.) 257-71.) Barrons is based basedon on interviews interviews and and other othermaterial from Childs, Childs, his wife wife Barron's account is Communism, Eva and FBI with his the importance Eva and FBI agents agents concerned concerned with his case. case. Operation Operation Solo somewhat somewhat exaggerates exaggerates the importance of of the the intelligence he he supplied supplied to to the the FBI FBI after after his his trips trips to to Moscow Moscow (see (see Draper, Draper, Our Man in inMoscow," Moscow, New intelligence "Our Man Review of o f Books (May (May 9, 9, 1996 1996)). Mitrokhins notes notes from from KGB KGB files, files, however, however, largely largely corroborate, corroborate, as as York Reliew . Mitrokhin's well as as making making important important additions additions to, to, Barron's Barrons account account of of Childs's Childss role role in in channeling channeling Soviet Soviet funds funds to to the the well CPUSA. Soviet subsidies. subsidies. But pro CPUSA. Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin, unlike unlike Barron, Barron, rarely rarely gives gives annual annual totals totals for for the the Soviet But those those he he provides are are compatible compatible with, with, though though not notidentical identical to, to, Barron's Barrons figures. figures. According According to to the the KGB KGB fi files noted by by vides les noted Mitrokhin, the theallocations to the theCPUSA CPUSA were 1.7 1.7 million dollars in in both both1975 1975 and 1976 1976 (vol. (vol. 6, 6, ch. 12). Mitrokhin, "allocations" to were million dollars and ch. 12). Barron gives gives figures figures of of 1,792,676 1,792,676 dollars dollars for for 1975 1975 and and 1,997,651 1,997,651 dollars dollars for for 1976 1976 (Operation Barron (Operation Solo, appenappen dix B); one possible explanation for for the the discrepancies discrepancies is is that, that, as as sometimes sometimes happened, happened, additional additional alloca allocadix B); one possible explanation tions tions were were made made in in the thecourse course of of the the year. year. 64. vol. 6, 12. 64. vol. 6, ch. 12. 65. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 65. 66. The instructor's instructors congratulations were reported by Friedman to the FBI. Barron, Operation Operation Solo, pp. 144-5. 144-5. 67. 67. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 68. Barron, Barron, Operation Operation Solo, pp. pp. 144-5. 144-5. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes and and Barron's Barrons book neatly neatly complement complement each each 68. other. 12); Barron other. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin summarizes summarizes the the account account of of Friedman's Friedmans career career in in KGB KGB files files (vol. (vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12); Barron describes omits his describes his his career career as as known known to to the the FBI, FBI,though thoughhe he omits his real real name name and and identifies identifies him him only only by by his his FBI codename, CLIP. FBI codename, CLIP. 69. vol. 69. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 70. 70. Barron, Barron, Operation Operation Solo, pp. pp. 156-7. 156-7. 71. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 71. vol. 12. 72. Barron, Barron, Operation Operation Solo, ch. ch. 3 3. 72. . 7 3 . vol. 73. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 74. Barron, Barron, Operation Operation Solo, ch. ch. 3; 3; Draper, Draper, "Our Our Man Maninin Moscow,New York Revieul Review of $Books (May 9, 9,1996) 74. Moscow," Books (May 1996) 75. Barron, Barron, Operation Operation Solo, p. p. 263. 75. 263. 76. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. Instead Instead ofJackson, of Jackson, Dobrynin Dobrynin asked asked Hall Hall to to bring bring with with him himto to meetings meetings at at the the embassy embassy 76. Arnold Johnson, Johnson, director director of of the the CPUSA CPUSA Information Information and Lecture Lecture Bureau, Bureau, once once improbably improbably eulogized eulogized by by Arnold and Lee Harvey Harvey Oswald Oswald as as "the the Lenin Leninof of our our country" country (Posner, (Posner, Case Case Closed, Closed, p. p. 149). 149). Lee 77. DeLoach, DeLoach, Hoover's Hoower? FBI, pp. pp. 213-14; 213-14; Barron, Barron, Operation Solo, pp. pp. 262-3. 262-3. FBI FBI reports reports to to the the White 77. House said said that that Levison Levison had had been been identified as as a a secret secret CPUSA CPUSA member by by "an an informant informant who whohas has furfur nished the past Communist Party," nished reliable reliable information information in in the past as as a a secret secret member member of of the the Communist Party, presumably presumably Jack Jack Childs. Friedly Friedly and and Gallen, Gallen, Martin Luther King, King, pp. pp. 124, 124,136-7. Childs. 136-7. 78. Garrow, FBI and Martin Luther King]r., King JK, ch. ch. 1; Friedly and and Gallen, Gallen, Martin Luther King, pp. pp. 23-8. 1; Friedly 23-8. 78. Garrow, 79. Barron, Barron, Operation Oprration Solo, p. p. 263 263; DeLoach, Hoover' Hoo.uel-? p. 214; 214; Friedly Friedly and and Gallen, Gallen, Martin Luther Lzlther King, 79. ; DeLoach, s FBI, p. pp. 25-6, 25-6, 133-5. Though he denied denied current current membership membership of the CPUSA, O'Dell ODell resigned resigned from from King's Kings pp. 133-5. Though Southern Christian Leadership Conference Conference in in 1962. 1962. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes contain contain no no specific specific reference reference to to Southern Christian Leadership ODell but but reveal reveal that that the the magazine magazine Freedomways, Freedomways, with with which which he he became actively involved involved after after leaving leaving became actively O'Dell

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the been ounded with the SCLC, SCLC,had had been f founded with active active Soviet Soviet support, support, continued continued to to receive receive secret secret Soviet Soviet subsidies subsidies and and was vol. was "close" closeto to the theCPUSA. CPUSA. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 80. Barron, Operation Operation Solo, Solo, pp. pp. 265-6. 265-6. 80. Barron, 82. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 82.vol. 83. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,part part 34. 34. 83. vol. 84. , part vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1 1, part 4; 4; t-3,76. t-3,76. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin had had access access only only to to reports reports in in FCD FCD files files based based on on intelligence intelligence 84.vol. provided agent's -probably because provided by by the the agent, agent, not not to tothe the agents file fileitse1f itselfprobab1y because he he had hadbeen been recruited recruited by by the the Second Second (rather First) States (rather than thanthe the First) Chief Chief Directorate Directorate during during a a visit visit to to the theSoviet Soviet Union. Union. Within Within the theUnited United States he he seems rom the seems to to have have been been run run f from the San SanFrancisco Francisco residency. residency. identification identification difficult. difficult.vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 86. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 86.vol. 87. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 12. 12. 87.vol. 88. 329-31 . Barron, Operation Operation Solo, Solo, pp. pp. xiii, xiii, 312-14, 312-14,329-31. 88. Barron, 89. Klehr and and Haynes, Haynes, TheAmerican The American Communist CommunistMovement, Movement, pp. pp. 173-4. 173-4. 89. Klehr 90. Haynes and and Klehr, Klehr, " 'Moscow Moscow Gold,' Gold, Confirmed Confirmed at at Last?"; Last?; Klehr, Klehr, Haynes Haynes and and Anderson, Anderson, The The Soviet 90. Haynes 85. 85. The The transliteration transliteration of of these these names names into into the theCyrillic Cyrillic alphabet alphabet in in the theKGB KGB report report of of the themeeting meeting makes makes 81. DeLoach, Hoover's Hoover?FBI, FBI, p. p. 214-15; 214-15; Friedly Friedly and and Gallen, Gallen, Martin Martin Luther King, King, pp. pp. 36-43. 36-43. 81. DeLoach,

W orld of American Communism, World ofAmerican Communism,pp. pp. 149-64. 149-64.

91. Barron, Operation Operation Solo, Solo,p. p. 300. 300. 91. Barron, 92. p. 1973. Healey and and Isserman, Isserman, Dorothy Healey HealeyRemembers, Remembers, p. 273. 273. Dorothy Dorothy Ray Ray Healey Healey left left the the Party Partyinin 1973. 92. Healey

Chapter Chapter Eighteen Eighteen Eurocommunism Eurocommunism

2. k-26,187,252,288,295,296. 2. k-26,187,252,288,295,296. 3. 3. k-26,258. k-26,258. 4. 4. k-26,229. k-26,229. 5. 5. k-26,59. k-26,59. 6. 6. k-26,60. k-26,60.

1. 1.Urban, Urban, Moscow Moscow and the the Italian Italian Communist CommunistParty, Party, pp. pp. 254-6. 254-6.

in April or July in either either April July or 1972. 1972. k-26,299. k-26,299.

7. orgeries had The Centre Centre concluded concluded that that the thef forgeries had probably probably been been included included in in the themoney money handed handed to tothe thePCI PC1 7. The

8. requendy used rom the From 1969 1969 to to 1976 1976the the PCI PC1emissary emissary most most f frequently used to to collect collect Soviet Sovietsubsidies subsidiesf from the 8. k-26,306. k-26,306.From (codenamed (codenamed CARO) CARO) and and Guido Guido Cappelloni Cappelloni (codenamed (codenamed ALBERTO). ALBERTO). k-26,256,267,270,291,300,302, k-26,256,267,270,291,300,302, 303,305,306. 303,305,306. Smaller Smaller subsidies subsidies also also went went to to the the Italian Italian, Socialist Socialist Party Party of of Proletarian Proletarian Unity Unity (PSIUP) (PSIUP) and and the the San San embassy Barontini emissaries Marmuggi embassywas was Barontini (codenamed (codenamedCLAUDIO); CLAUDIO); other other emissaries referred referredto to in in KGB KGB mes fileswere were Marmuggi

Marino Marino Communist Communist Party. Party. In In 1974 1974 the the San San Marino Marino general general secretary secretary sent sent Brezhnev Brezhnev a a Capo Capo di di Monte Monte marble marble dock, clock,via via the the Rome Rome residency, residency, in in gratitude gratitude for for Soviet Soviet financial financial assistance. assistance.k-26,260,283,306. k-26,260,283,306. 9. 9. k-26,246. k-26,246. 10. 1 1 . The A radio The supply supply of of the the SELENY SELEIWA radio system system to to the thePCI PC1 by by the the KGB KGB had had been been approved approved 10. k-26,252,3 k-26,252,311.

in 1973, but two-way in principle principle by by Politburo Politburo decision decision no. no. P P 91/3 91/3 of of May May 17, 17,1973, but it it was was agreed agreed that, that,"The The two-way radios radios must riends [the must be be handed handed over over to to our our Italian Italian f friends [the PCI] PCI] only onlywhen when there there is is a a real real need need to to organize organize radio radio com com-

checks, " checks, maintenance maintenance and and repairs. repairs.

munications, munications, bearing bearing in in mind mind that that if if kept kept in in store store for for a a long long period period the the radio radio stations stations require require periodic periodic 1 1 . Berlinguer's n the f 1973, n Valenza compro 11. Berlinguers articles, articles, first first published published iin the autumn autumno of 1973, are are reprinted reprinted iin Valenza (ed.), (ed.), II Ilrompro-

messo 1. messostorico, storico,pp. pp. 14-3 14-31.

Amendola, Amendola, Pajetta Pajetta and and Ingrao Ingrao by by telling telling Ambssador Ambpssador Rhyzov Rhyzov that that all all three three had had tried tried to to prevent prevent Longo Longo seeking Soviet seeking medical medical treatment treatment in inthe the Soviet Union. Union. k-26,230. k-26,230.

12. f the Agostino Novella, Novella, a a veteran veteran member member o of the PCl PC1 Direzione, Direzione, strengthened strengthened the the case case against against 12. k-26,229. k-26,229.Agostino

1943-1 98 ch. 1943-1988, ch. 10. 10.

14. 14. k-26,237. k-26,237.

andthe the Italian 13. Urban, Moscow Moscow and Italian Communist Communist Pary, Par$ ch. ch. 8. 8. Ginsborg, Ginsborg, A History History of o f Contemporary Contemporary Italy, Ita&, 13.Urban,

15. 15.Urban, Urban, Moscow Moscow and andthe theItalian Italian Communist CommunistParty, Party, ch. ch. 8. 8.

16. 290. Urban, Moscow Moscow and andthe theItalian Communist CommunistParty, Party, pp. pp. 283-4, 283-4,290. 16. Urban, Berlinguer's Berlinguers allegedly allegedly dubious dubious building building contracts. contracts. 18. 18. k-26,264. k-26,264.

17. The KGB KGB mes files noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin do do not notrecord record what what use use was was made made of of its its intelligence intelligence on on 17.k-26,257. k-26,257.The

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19. k-26,256. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin gives gives no no details details of of payments payments after after 1976. 1976. 19. k-26,256. 20. k-26,259,261. k-26,259,261. In In i998 i998a a receipt receipt by by Cappelloni, Cappelloni, dated dated June June 27, 27, 1976, 1976,for for one one million million dollars dollars from from the the 20. CPSU for the the 1976 1976 election was published in the the Italian Italian press. ecco Ie le ricevute dei miliardi CPSU for election campaign campaign was published in press. Pci, "Pci, ecco ricevute dei miliardi
30, 1998). di di Mosca," Moxa,11 I1 Giomo Gionzo (April (April 30, 1998).

21. The training training was was authorized authorized by by Politburo Politburo decision decision no. no. SG SG 143/8 143/8 GS GS ofJanuary of January 17, 17,1979. k-26,2. 21. The 1979. k-26,2. 22. 22. Childs Childs and and Popplewell, Popplewell, The Stasi, Stasi, p. p. 138. 138. 23. 23. k-26,158. k-26,158. 24. A History oJContemporary o f ContemporaryItaly, 1943-1988, 2943-1988, pp. pp. 384-5. 384-5. 24. Ginsborg, Ginsborg, A 25. k-26, k-26,158. 25. 158. 26. The The PCI PC1decision decision to to dismantle dismantle the the radio radio stations stations was was reported reported by by Kryuchkov Kryuchkov to to Ponomarev, Ponomarev, head of 26. head of the International Department, in communication of June 22, 1981, published the Central CentralCommittee Committee International Department, in a a communication ofJune 22,1981, published in in the the Italian 1998). Italian press press in in 1998. 1998. "Servizio Servizio segreto," segreto, L'A'uanti LAaanti (May (May 16, 16,1998). 27. Urban, Mosco'W Mosro.zu and trlzdthr ItalialzCommunist Comnzunist Pal-zy, ch. 9; Cossutta, Lo strappo; "Cossutta Cossutta Sempre Pili Pih Iso Isothe Italian Pary, lato," lato, La RepubNica Repzddlica (January (January 2, 2, 1982). 1982). 28. Difficult 1. 28. Hellman, Hellman, "The The Difficult Birth Birth of of the the Democratic Democratic Party Party of of the the Left," Left,p. p. 8 81. 29. Though Though details details of ofthe payments to to Cossutta Cossutta and and other other "healthy healthyforces forces i in the PCI" PCI were were passed passedby by Moscow 29. the payments n the Moscow to ce in dei mil to the the Rome Rome Prosecutor's Prosecutors Offi Office in 1992, 1992,they they were were not not made made public publicuntil until 1998. 1998."Pci, Pci, ecco ecco Ie lericevute ricevutedei miliardi di di Mosca," Moxa,11 Il Giomo Giorno (April (April 30, 1998);"Ecco ECCO la Tangentopoli Tangentopoli rossa, Il T Tempo (April 30,1998). 30, 1998); la rossa," 11 empo (Apri1 30, 1998). iardi 30. 30. t-7,12. t-7,12. 31. Pike, In 171 the thr Service o.. offStalin, StaZin, p. p. 49; 49; Thomas, Thomas, The Spanish Civil W War, p. 535. 535. 31. Pike, ar, p. 32. Mujal-Leon, Mujal-Leh, Communism Communism and andPolitical Change in Spain, Spain, pp. pp. 107-9. 107-9. After After their their expulsion, expulsion, Gomez, Gbrnez, Gar GarPolitical Change 32. cia and and Lister Lister went went on on to to found found unsuccessful unsuccessful pro-Soviet splinter groups. groups. C Cf. k-3,12. k-3,12. da pro-Soviet splinter 33. ,16. 33. k-3 k-3,16. 34. Mujal-Leon, Mujal-Leh, Communism Commzmism and Political Change Change in Spain, Spain, ch. ch. 6. 6. 34. 35. ,13,15,22; k-26,410. 35. k-2,65; k-2,65; k-3 k-3,13,15,22; k-26,410. 36. k-3, k-3,18. 36. 18. 37. Mujal-Leh, Communism Communism and Political Change Change in Spain, Spain, pp. pp. 126-7. 126-7. 3 7 . Mujal-Leon, 38. k-3,17. 38. k-3 ,17. 39. Thomas, Thomas, The Spanish Civil W ar, p. 39. War, p. 9. 9. 40. in 1. 40. Mujal-Leon, Mujal-Lebn, Communism Comnmnisnl and and Political PoliticalChange Change itz Spain, Spain, pp. pp. 127-3 127-31. 41. 41. k-3,20. k-3,20. 42. k-5,879. k-5,879. 42. 43 . k-26,406. 43. k-26,406. 44. In In January, January, October October and and December December 1980, Gallego was was given givenpayments payments of10,000 of 10,000 dollars dollars by by the the Madrid Madrid 44. 1980, Gallego residency. k-26,405. k-26,405. residency. 45. k-26,407. k-26,407. 45. 46. The The anti-Eurocommunist anti-Eurocommunist Catalan Catalan Communist Communist Party, Party, the thePSUC (Partit Socialista Unifi Unificat de 46. PSUC (Partit Socialista cat de Catalunya), Catalunya), split split away away from from the the PCE. PCE. 47. Krasikov, Krasikov, From Dictatorship to t o Democracy, Demzocracy, p. p. 188. 188. His His book, book, originally originally published published in in Russian Russian as as Ispanskii 47. Reportazh, was was translated translated into into aanumber of of languages. Reportazh, languages. 48. k-3,98. 48. k-3,98. 49. Urban, Urban, Mosco'W Moscow and the Italian Communist Party, Party,pp. pp. 337-S. 337-8. 49. 50. Bell Bell and and Criddle, Criddle, The French Communist Communist Party in the Fifth F f t h Republic, pp. pp. 19-20; 19-20; Roy, pp. Roy, Somme tout, pp. 50. 156-7. 156-7. 51. k-3,65,1 15; k-8,182. 51. k-3,65,115; k-8,182. 52. Bell Bell and and Criddle, Criddle, The Thz French Communist Commmist Parv Party in the Fi Ffth p. 240. 240. f th Republic, p. 52. 53. k-3,140. 53. k-3,140. 54. 54. See See below, below, chapter chapter 27. 27. 55. k-3,140. k-3,140. 56. k-3,140. k-3,140. 56. 57. 57. Adereth, Adereth,The French Frelzrh Communist Commzmist Party, Party,pp. pp. 20S-13 208-13.. 58. The The text text o of the letters letters was was later later published published i in Cahiersdu Conznzu?zisme 1991). 58. f the n Cahiers Communisme (October 1991). 59. , 148. 59. k-8 k-8,148. 60. Bell Bell and and Criddle, Criddle, The French Communist CommunistParty in the Fifth F$h Republic, pp. pp. 153-4, 153-4, 1 644. 60. 164-5. 61. 61. k-3,123. k-3,123. 62. k-3,140. k-3,140. 62. 63. 63. L'Express LExprrss (July (July 27, 27, 1970). 1970).

N o t t N o
64. 64. k-3,140. k-3,140.

e s s e

/ I

629

65. Robrieux, Robrieux, Histoire 65. Histoire intirieure intirieuredu Parti communiste, communiste,vol. vol. 2, 2, pp. pp. 657-65; 657-65; vol. vol. 3, 3, pp. pp. 344-5,406-14. 344-5, 406-14.
66. 66. Bell Bell and and Criddle, Criddle,

The French Fifth Republic, pp. pp. 154-6, 154-6, 217-30. 217-30. Though Though the French Communist Communist Party Par9 in in the F F h Republic, the

Socialists elections and did not not depend depend on on PCF PCF support, support, Socialists won won an an overall overall majority majority at at the the 1981 1981 legislative legislative elections and did

four Communist ministers served served in in a a Socialist-dominated coalition until 1984. four Communist ministers Socialist-dominated coalition until 1984.
67. 52-3. 67. Urban Urban (ed.), (ed.), Moscow and the Global GlobalLeft Le$ in the Gorbachev Era, pp. pp. 5, 5,52-3. 68. 68. Brown, Brown, The Gorbachev GorbachevFactor, Factor,p. p. 75. 75.

69. Urban Urban (ed.), and the Global Lft Lfft in 69. (ed.), Moscow ilnd

While Gorbachev was publicly the Gorbachev Gorbachev Era, ch. ch. 2. 2. While Gorbachev was publicly

aligning himself with continued to to aligning himself with the thePCl's PCIs reformist reformist leadership, leadership, however, however, the the International InternationalDepartment Department continued subsidize old guard until 1987. PCI, led since 1988 1988 by by Achille Achille Ochetto, Ochetto, changed changed its its subsidize the the PCI PC1 old guard until 1987. In In 1989 1989the the PCI, led since

name to to the the PDS PDS (Partito (Partito Democratico Democratic0 della della Sinistra), the the Democratic Democratic Party Party of Left. A A breakaway name of the Left.
movement itself in della Rifondazione Rifondazione Comunista. Comunista. movement established established itself in 1991 1991 as as the the Partito Partito della

70. In In 1987 Gallegos PCPE, PCPE, the the Progressive Progressive Federation Federation (founded (founded by another another former P CE 70. 1987 the PCE, PCE, Gallego's PCE member, Ramon Ram6n Tamames), Tamames), Pasoc Pasoc (a (abreakaway breakaway Socialistgroup) group) and and a a number of of independents combined member, Socialist to form form the the Izquierdo Izquierdo Unida; Unida; the the PCE PCE accounted accounted for for about two-thirds of the total total membership. membership. to about two-thirds of the
16; Grachev, p. 247. 247. 71. Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 71 . Brown, Factor, p. p. 1 116; Grachev, Kremle'vskaya KremlevsknyaKh1'onika, Khronika,p.

72. Marchais's Marchaiss message message was was delivered delivered by by Gaston Gaston Plissonnier, Plissonnier, who who for the past twenty years years had been the the 72. French conduit conduit for for the the secret secret subsidies subsidies to to the the PCF. P C E Dobrynin Dobrynin to Gorbachev (June (June 20, 1987); text text in French 20, 1987);
Stepankov Stepankov and and Lisov, Lisov, Kremlevsky Kremlevsky Zagovor, Zagovor,appendix. appendix.

73. Politburo decision decision of of }uly July 3, 1987, 1987, in in Stepankov Stepankov and Lisov, Lisov, Kremlevsky K~emlevsky Zagovor, 73. Politburo Zagovor, appendix. Between 1981 and and 1991 subsidies to to the the PCF P C F totaled totaled about about 24 24 million million dollars. dollars. Burke, Recently 1981 1991 subsidies "Recently Released Material on Soviet Soviet Intelligence Intelligence Operations, p. 246; Albats, The State within a 222. a State, State, p. p. 222. on Operations," p. 246; Albats, I 'Moscow MOSCOW Gold, Confirmed Confirmed at Last?, 74. Haynes Haynes and and Klehr, Klehr, " 74. Gold,' Last?", p. 283. 75. Difficult Party of of the Left," p. 81. 75. Hellman, Hellman, "The The Difficult Birth Birth of of the the Democratic Democratic Party the Left, p.81.

Chapter Part 1 1 Chapter Nineteen Nineteen Ideological IdeologicalSubversion Subversion Part

1. Solzhenitsyn, p. p. 55 551. 1. Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, 1. 2. 0 , ch. 2. vol. vol. 1 10, ch. 3 3 .. 3. 1. 3. Labedz Labedz and and Hayward Hayward (eds.), (eds.), On Trial, Trial, p p.. 9 91. 4 . vol. 0 , ch. 4. vol. 1 10, ch. 3. 3. 5. . C and the 61. 5. vol. vol. 10, 10, ch. ch. 3 3. Cf.Zamoyska, Zamoyska, "Sinyavsky, Sinyavsb, the theMan Manand the Writer," Writer,p. p. 61. 6. . 6. vol. vol. 10, 10, ch. ch. 3 3. 7 . Aucouturier, Eve f His 344. 7. Aucouturier, "Andrey Andrey Sinyavsky Sinyavsb on onthe the Eve o of His Arrest," Arrest, p p.. 344. 8. had worked worked abroad abroad as as an an illegal illegal under the name 8. Geli Geli Fyoderovich Fyoderovich Vasiliev, Vasiliev,codenamed codenamed MIKHAILOV, MIKHAILOV, had under the name Rudolf to Moscow, Moscow, apparently apparently unable to stand Rudolf Steiner Steiner in in Austria Austria and and Latin Latin America. America. On O n returning returning to unable to stand the the strain Agency (k-16,446). (k-16,446). Though Though the probability strain of of life life as as an an illegal, illegal, he he began began work work in in the the Novosti Novosti Press Press Agency theprobability is cell, it it is is just just possible possible that that the KGB used used another another is that that Vasilyev Vasilyev was wasthe the stoolpigeon stoolpigeon placed placed in in Sinyavsky's Sinyavskys cell, theKGB agent same codename-though no identifiable identifiable record record of of such such an an agent agent in in Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's agent with with the the same codename-though there there is is no notes. notes. 9. vol. vol. 10, ch. 3 3. 9. 10, ch. . 1 0 . vol. 0 , ch. 10. vol. 1 10, ch. 3. 3. 11. Mitrokhin's interrogators evidence "evidence against against Sinyavsb. Sinyavsky." At 11. Mitrokhins notes notes record record simply simply that that Remizov Remizov gave gave his his interrogators At the evidence included had delivered delivered one one of of Sinyavskys Sinyavsky's manuscripts manuscripts to to the trial trial this this evidence included an an admission admission that that he he had Helene and Hayward Hayward (eds.), 153 . HClkne Zamoyska. Zamoyska. Labedz Labedz and (eds.), On Trial, Triul, p. p. 153. 12. vol. 10, ch. 3 3 .. 12. vol. 10, ch. 13. 13. Labedz Labedz and and Hayward Hayward (eds.), (eds.), On Trial, Trial, p p.. 306. 306. 14. 209. 14. Labedz Labedz and and Hayward Hayward (eds.), (eds.), On Trial, Trial, pp. pp. 196, 196, 198, 198,209. 15. Asked Sinyavsky replied, replied, "No, unofficially." Sending Sending 15. Asked if if he he had had sent sent his his manuscripts manuscripts abroad abroad "illegally," illegally, Sinyavsb No, unofficially. manuscripts the state claimed-inaccu manuscripts abroad abroad was was not not illegal. illegal. But But in in his his final final address, address, the state prosecutor prosecutor again again claimed-inaccurately-that to the West "illegally." Labedz and and Hayward Hayward (eds.), (eds.), rately-that the the defendants defendants had had sent sent their their manuscripts manuscripts to theWest illegally.Labedz On Trial, 308. Trial, pp. pp. 185, 185,308. 16. 16. Labedz Labedz and and Hayward Hayward (eds.), (eds.), On Trial, Trial, pp. pp. 253-4. 253-4. 17. in PROGRESS PROGRESS operations operations in in Albania, Albania, Bulgaria, Bulgaria, 17. vol. vol. 10, 10, ch. ch. 3; 3; vol. vol. 7, 7, nzch. nzch. TANOV TANOV later later took took part part in Czechoslovakia forged Canadian Canadian passports, passports, and carried out other Czechoslovakia and and Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia, using using Austrian Austrian and and forged and carried out other intelligence India, France, Syria, Kuwait Kuwait and and Spain. Spain. In In 1982 1982 he he was intelligence assignments assignments in in Pakistan, Pakistan, India, France, the the Lebanon, Lebanon,Syria, was recalled producing little little intelligence greatly overspent overspent his his recalled to to Moscow Moscow on on the the grounds grounds that that he he was was producing intelligence and and had had greatly budget 3, pakapp. budget (vol. (vol. 3, pakapp. 3). 3).
.

N ot te e s N o s

I /

630

18. 18. Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn,pp. pp. 614-16. 614-16. 19. 19. vol. vol. 10, 10, ch. 3. 3. 20. 20. k-27,370 k-27,370 21. 41. This collection 21. Scammell Scammell (ed.), (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Files, pp. pp. xxv, xxv, 7, 7,41. Thisimportant important collection of of documents documents on on "the the Solzhenitsyn order B reports Solzhenitsyn case," case, declassified declassifiedby by order of of President President Yeltsin Yeltsin in in 1992, 1992, includes includes a a number number of of KG KGB reports to to the and KGB the Central CentralCommittee Committee and Politburo Politburo but but not notthe the KGB operational operational fues files to to which which Mitrokhin Mitrokhin had had access. access. 22. 22. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 487-8. 487-8. 23. 23. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 492. 492. 24. 24. Scammell Scammell (ed.), (ed.), The The Solzhenitsyn SolzhenitsynFiles, Files, pp. pp. 138-41. 138-41. 25. 25. Scammell Scammell (ed.), (ed.), The The Solzhenitsyn SolzhenitsynFiles, Files, pp. pp. xxix, mix, 161-3. 161-3. 26. 26. Andropov Andropov instituted instituted judicial judicial proceedings proceedings against against Shchelokov Shchelokov in in December December 1982, 1982, only only a a month month after after Brezhnev's Brezhnevs death. death. Two Two years years later, later, before before his his case case had had come come to to trial, trial, Shchelokov Shchelokovcommitted committed suicide. suicide. Volkog Volkogonov, the Soviet Empire, 348. onov, The The Rise and Fall Fallof ofthe Empire, pp. pp. 330, 330,348. 10. 27. 27. Scammell Scammell (ed.), (ed.), The The Solzhenitsyn SolzhenitsynFiles, Files, pp. pp. 194-2 194-210. 28. 28. Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn,p. p. 615. 615. 29. 29. k-21,30. k-21,30. 30. 30. k-21,17; k-21,17; vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5,part part 4. 4.The The spelling spelling of of Boucaut Boucaut in in the theRoman Roman alphabet alphabet is is uncertain; uncertain; it it appears appears in in Cyrillic Cyrillic transliteration transliteration as as "Buko." Buko.Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes do do not notidentify identifjr Nikashin's Nikashinsfirst first name name and and patronymic. patronymic. 31. 14. 31. k-21,1 k-21,114. 32. 369-70; Grigorenko, 32. Sakharov, Sakharov, Memoirs, Memoirs, pp. pp. 359, 359,369-70; Grigorenko, Memoirs, Memoirs, pp. pp. 387-8. 387-8. 33. Yakir classifled 33. Article Article by by G. G. Kizlych Kizlych and and P. P. Aleksandrov Aleksandrov on on the the Yakir and and Krasin Krasin cases cases in in the the classified in-house in-house quar quarterly, terly, KGB Sbornik, Sbornik, no. no. 73; 73; k-25,124. k-25,124. 34. 34. vol. vol. 10, 10, ch. ch. 5. 5. 35. 35. Protocols Protocols of of Krasin's Krasins interrogation; interrogation; vol. vol. 10, 10,ch. ch. 5. 5. 36. 36. On O n Savinkov, Savinkov, see see above, above, chapter chapter 2. 2. Yakir ed in-house 37. 37. Article Article by by G. G. Kizlych Kizlych and and P. P. Aleksandrov Aleksandrov on on the the Yakir and and Krasin Krasin cases cases in in the theclassifi classified in-house quar quarterly, terly, KGB Sbornik, Sbornik, no. no. 73; 73; k-25,124. k-25,124. 38. 38. vol. vol. 10, 10, ch. ch. 5. 5. 39. 39. Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn,p. p. 807; 807; Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn, The Oak and the Calf, Calf;p. p. 522. 522. 40. 40. Grigorenko, Grigorenko, Memoirs, Memoirs, p. p. 388. 388. 41. Yakir 41. Article Article by by G. G. Kizlych Kizlych and and P. P. Aleksandrov Aleksandrov on on the the Yakir and and Krasin Krasin cases cases in in the theclassified classified in-house in-house quar quarterly, terly, KGB Sbornik, Sbornik, no. no. 73; 73; k-25,124. k-25,124. 42. 42. Sakharov, Sakharov, Sakharov Speaks, Speaks,pp. pp. 212-15. 212-15. 340-6, 350-3. 43. 43. Scammell Scammell (ed.), (ed.), The The Solzhenitsyn SolzhenitsynFiles, Files, pp. pp. 256-74, 256-74,340-6,350-3. 44. 44. Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn describes describes his his forced forced departure departure from from Russia Russia in in The The Oak Oak and the the Calf, Calf;pp. pp. 383-453. 383-453. 45. 45. k-21,123. k-21,123. 46. Solzhenitsyn,p. p. 886. 886. Though Though the the woman woman who who came came to to Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns door door on onhis his first first day day 46. Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, in ed, her origins and in Zurich Zurichhas has never never been been identifi identified, her Russian Russian origins and the the fact fact that that within withina a few few weeks, weeks, if if not not days, days, Valentina Valentina Holubova Holubovi had hadestablished established herself herself as as his his secretary secretary and and assistant assistant make make it it probable probable that that she she was was the the caller. caller. It is is unlikely unlikely that that a a genuine genuine native native of of Ryazan Ryazan had had tracked tracked him him down down so so rapidly. rapidly. In In reality, reality, Holubova Holubovi came ,123). came not from Ryazan but from Vladivostok Vladivostok (k-21 (k-21,123). 47. Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn,p. 886. 886. The fact that Dr. Dr.Franti"sek Frantisek Holub was, like like his wife, wife,working working for for the 47. StB, Hol StB, is is implied implied rather rather than thanspecifically specifically stated stated in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes. notes. For For example, example, he he records records that that the thevHolezac StBofficer officer posing as a Czech dissident, Tomas TomsR ReziE ubs jointly recommended to Solzhenitsyn another StB (k-21,123). the KGB (k-21,123). It is is inconceivable inconceivable that that the the StB StBor or the KGB would would have have allowed allowed a a husband husband and and wife wife team team to to operate in this way way unless unless both were working working for for them. them. 48. k-21,123,124. On O n Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns first meeting with Krause, Krause, see see Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn,p. 886. 48. 49. 49. See See above, above, chapters chapters 2, 2 , 5. s. 50. ,124. SO. k-21 k-21,124. 51. The Solzhenitsyn SolzhenitsynFiles, Files, pp. pp. 387-90. 387-90. 51. Scammell Scammell (ed.), (ed.), The 52. 52. k-21,25. k-21,25. 890-3, 987-90; Scammell 53. 53. Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn,pp. pp. 887-8, 887-8,890-3,987-90; Scammell (ed.), (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn SolzhenitsynFiles, Files, pp. pp. 431-2, 431-2, 451-3. Betrayal, described author as 451-3. Rezac's Rezics scurrilous scurrilous volume, volume, The Spiral of of Solzhenitsyn's SolzhenitsynS Betrayal, described by the author as "an an autopsy corpse and Russian autopsy of of the the corpse of of a a traitor," traitor, appeared appeared in in Italian Italian in in 1977 1977 and Russian in in the thefollowing followingyear, year, but but failed failed publisher. While in Russia, Rezac Rezic also also interviewed Sahkarov, Sahkarov, who was to find a British or American publisher. in Russia, unaware unaware of his his background background (Sakharov, (Sakharov,Memoirs, Memoirs, p. p. 591). 591). 54. 54. k-21,25. k-2125.

N o t t N o

e s e s

3I 1 6J

55. Sakharov, Sakharov, Memoirs, Memoirs, p. p. 428. 428.

56. Solzbenitsyn, p. p. 890. 890. 56. Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn,

k-3(b),27. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin copied copied or or noted noted sections sections 1-5, 1-5,8,9,11,16-19 the 19-point 19-pointplan oper8, 9, 1 1 , 16-19of of the "plan of of agent agentoper 57. k-3(b),27. ational measures." measures. ational 58. 58. k-3(b),27. k-3(b),27.
59. ,212. 59. k-25 k-25,212. 60. 60. Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn, p. p. 955. 955.

61. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part part 6. 6. 61. vol.

62. 62. k-25,29. k-25,29. 63. and its reception in Thomas, Alexander 63. There There is is a a vivid vivid description description of of Solzhenitsyn's Solzhenitsyns address address and its reception in Thomas, Alexnnder Solzhe Solzhepp. 460-3. 460-3. nitsyn, pp. 64. k-25,29. and the the W Washington the Harvard HarvardAddress Address are 64. k-25,29. The New York Times and ashington Post comments comments on on the are quoted quoted Solzhenitsyn,p. p. 462. 462. in Thomas, Thomas, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in

1. Dobrynin, In Con CorEfinence, pp. 346,390. 1. Dobrynin, fidence, pp. 346, 390.
2. 2. k-21,16. k-21,16.

Chapter Twenty Ideological Part 2 Ideological Subversion Subversion Part

3. Sakharov, Memoirs, Memoirs, p. p. 429. 429. The The Nobel Nobel Peace Peace Prize, Prize, presented presented in in Oslo, is is awarded by by the the Nobel ComCom 3 . Sakharov, mittee appointed appointed by by the the Norwegian Norwegian parliament. parliament. The The other other Nobel Nobel prizes, prizes, presented presented in in Stockholm, are mittee awarded by by Swedish committees. awarded Swedish committees. 4. k-21 k-21,69. Before being being passed passed for for signature signature to to Kryuchkov, Kryuchkov, head 4. ,69. Before head of of the the FCD, FCD, and and Andropov, Andropov, this this docudocu ment (reference (reference no. no. 15512422) 1592422) was was initialed initialed by by B. Oleg Kalugin, Kalugin, head head of ment B. S. Ivanov, Ivanov, Kryuchkovs Kryuchkov's deputy, deputy, Oleg of Counter-intelligence, and and V.P. Ivanov Ivanov of of Section Section A. A. The The alleged supported Sakharov were Counter-intelligence, alleged criminals "criminals" who who supported Sakharov were
mostly, mostly, if if not notentirely, entirely, dissidents dissidents sentenced sentenced on on trumped-up trumped-up charges. charges.

5. On O n the the fabricated fabricated KGB KGB claim claim that that Sakharov Sakharov supported supported the the Pinochet Pinochetregime, see Sakharov, Sakharov,Memoirs, Memoirs, pp.
389,426. 389, 426.
6. 6. k-21,64. k-21,64. 7. 7. Scammell, Scammell, Solzhenitsyn, Solzbenitsyn, p. p. 893. 893. 8. 8. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 8, 8, part part 6. 6.

pymaster, pp. 9. 9. Kalugin, Kalugin, S Spymaster, pp. 260-1. 260-1.

10. k-21,104. k-21,104. 10.

11. k-2 1, 104. 11. k-21,104. 12. ofYakovlev to attack attack Solzhenitsyn, Solzhenitsyn, see see Scammell Scammell 12. Sakharov, Sakharov, Memoirs, Memoirs, pp. pp. 585-92. 585-92. On On the the KGB's KGBs use use of Yakovlev to

The Solzhenitsyn Files, 394, 398, 409, 426-30. Files,pp. pp. 394,398,409,426-30. 13. k-21,1. Cf. Bonner, Bonner,Alone Together,p. p. 46. 46. Y YAK wasused usedfor measures.One the files 13. k-2 1 , 1 . Cf. Alone Together, AK was for avariety a variety of of active active measures. One of ofth(! files noted 1976 he per month). same fi le noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin records records that that in in 1976 he was was paid paid 500 dollars dollars (probably (probably per month). The The same file records that that Russkiy Rusdiy Golos Golos had had a a circulation circulation of of only only 1,500. records 1,500. k-21,106. k-21,106. Alolle T ogethel; pp. 37-8. 14. 1 , 1 . Bonner, 14. k-2 k-21,l. Bonner,A/om Togethe?; pp. 37-8. 15. CHI E" E ELENA ELENABONNER? BONNER? Artifice di piu piu assassinii la dell "accademico accademico Sakharov, 15. "CHI Artifi ce di la moglie dell Sakharov," Sette Giorni (April CE Bonner, 31-2. (April 12, 12, 1980). 1980). Cf. Bonner, Alone A/one Together, Together, pp. pp. 31-2. 16. 104. C 16. k-21, k-21,104. Cf. Bonner, Bonner, Alone Together, Together, pp. pp. 37-8. 37-8. 1 7. k-6,1 l4; k-21,1, 105. 17. k-6,114; k-21,1,105. 18. ce di assassinii la la moglie moglie dell Sakharov," Sette 18. "CHI CHI E" E ELENA ELENA BONNER? BONNER? Artifi Artifice di piu piu assassinii dell "accademico accademico Sakharov, Giorni (April 1980). k-2 1 , 1 ,82. (April 12, 12,1980). k-21,1,82. on Solzhenitsyn, on an an interview interview with 19. , 1 , 105; k-6,1 l4. Sette Giomi 19. k-21 k-21,1,105; k-6,114. Giornialso also published published an an attack attack on Solzhenitsyn, based based on with his ,82). his first first wife wife (k-21 (k-21,82). 20. ,82. 20. k-21 k-21,82. 21. k-21,104. 21. k-21,104. 22. 22. k-21,104. k-21,104. 23. Bonner, Bonner, Alone T Together, p. 30. 30. ogether, p. 23. 24. Bethell, Bethell, S Spies and Other Semts, Secrets,p. p. 73. 73. pies and 24. 25. Rudenko, no. no. 123-A 123-A (January 21, 1977); Albats, 25. Memorandum Memorandum by by Andropov Andropov and and State State Prosecutor Prosecutor Rudenko, (January 21, 1977); Albats, The State 178-9. Statewithin a State, State, pp. pp. 178-9. 26. 26. k-21,153. k-21,153. pies and 27. 27. Bethell, Bethell, S Spies a m Other Secrets, Secrets,pp. pp. 98-9. 98-9. 28. The The sentence sentence was was thirteen thirteen years. years. Shcharansky, Shcharansky,Fear No Evil, pp. pp. 205-6, 205-6,224-5. 224-5. 28. 29. 29. k-21,157,159. k-21,157,159.

(ed.), (ed.),

N o tt e e s 5 N o

632

30. k-21,164. 30. k-21,164. 31. k-21,156. the file recording the residency's success in preventing the residencys success 31. k-21,156. Makarov was informed that the award award of of the theprize prize to to Orlov Orlov had hadbeen been passed to to Andropov. Andropov. 32. k-1,98. k-1,98. 33. 33. vol. 6, 6, ch. 1, 1, part 1. 1. 34. Sakharov, Memoirs, Memoirs, pp. 510-16. 510-16. 35. 35. k-21,80. k-21,80. 36. Gorbachev, Memoin, Memoirs, p. p. 296. 296. 36. Gorbachev, 37. Bethell, Spies and Other Secrets, pp. 315-16. 37. 38. Brown, p. Brown, The Gorbachev GorbachevFactor, Factor, p. 37. In In public, public, in in order order not not to toalienate alienate a a majority on on the thePolitburo, Gor Gor38. bachev bachev stuck stuck to to the the official oficial line. line. He H e declared declared in in an an interview interview with with L'HumaniN LHumanite in in February February 1986: 1986: "Now NOW about actions about political political prisoners, prisoners, we we don't donthave haveany any .. .. .. It It is is common common knowledge knowledge that that [Sakharov] [Sakharov] committed committed actions punishable by law legislation. The actual state law.. .. .. Measures were taken with regard to him himaccording to our legislation. of follows. Sakharov of affairs affairs is isasas follows. Sakharov resides resides in in Gorky Gorky in in normal normal conditions, is is doing doing scientific scientificwork, work, and and remains remains a Academy Sciences. He a member member of of the the USSR USSR Academy of of Sciences. H e is is in in normal normal health health as as far far as as I know. know. His His wife wife has has recendy recently left the country for medical treatment secrets of spe treatment abroad. abroad. As for Sakharov himself, himself, he is still a bearer of of secrets of special importance to the state and for this reason cannot go abroad." abroad. Sakharov, Sakharov,Memoirs, Memoirs, p. 607. 607. 39. Grachev, Grachev, Kremlevskaya Kremlevskuya Karonika, Kuronikn, pp. pp. 94-104; 94-104; Brown, Brown, The Gorbache'v GorbucheaFactor, Factor,p. p. 165. 165. 39. 40. Sakharov, Sakharov, Memoirs, Memoirs, p. p. 615. 615. 41. Cited in in Dobbs, Dobbs, Down with Big Brother, Brother,pp. pp. 252-3. 252-3. 41. Cited 42. Memoirs, p. 295. 295. 42. Gorbachev, Memoirs, omb, ch. 43. Dobbs, Down with withBig Brother, Brother,pp. pp. 253-64; 253-64; Remnick, Remnick, Lenin's Lenins T Tomb, ch. 19. 19. 43. Dobbs, omb, p. 44. Lenin? T Tomb, p. 282. 282. 44. Remnick, Lenin's 45. Gorbachev Factor, Factor,pp. 7-10. 7-10. 45. Brown, The Gorbachev 46. 46. k-21,76. k-21,76. 47. 47. k-21,153. k-21,153.

Chapter ar Chapter Twenty-one Twenty-one SIGINT in in the Cold W War

1. Andrew, 1. Andrew, "Intelligence Intelligence and and International International Relations Relations in in the theEarly Early Cold Cold War." War. assess the varying interest taken by US presidents in 2. Andrew, For the President's President? Eyes Eyes Only, Only, seeks to assess SIGINT. SIGINT. 3. hadno direct access to the thefiles of of either either the Eighth Eighth Directorate or the theSixteenth (SIGINT) (SIGINT) 3. Mitrokhin had Directorate, founded in the late 1960s. 1960s. He H e did, however, see some documents from both directorates in FCD files. 4. KGB to Khrushchev, Khrushchev, "Report Report for 1960" 1960(February 14, 14,1961), the"special special dossiers" dossiersof theCPSU Cen4. 1961), in the of the Cen tral Committee; 23. Committee; cited by Zubok, "Spy Spy vs. Spy," Spy,p. 23. Garthoff, "The The Gorbachev, p. 228. 5. Garthoff, 5. KGB Reports to Gorbachev," 228. 6. Cold War." Soviet Comint in inthe the Cold War. 6. Kahn, "Soviet 7. Russians," pp. 52-3, 7. Samouce, Samouce, "I I Do Understand Understand the Russians, 52-3, Samouce papers, US Army Military Institute, Institute, Barracks, Pa.; Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. 237-40. 237-40. Carlisle Barracks, 1950-1963, pp. 154-7. Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 454-6. 454-6. Kennan was declared declared 8. Kennan, Memoirs 1950-1963, 1952,though chiefly for reasons unconnected with the thebugging incident. persona non grata in October 1952, 9. 919-1969, pp. 345-6. Andrew 9. Bohlen, Witness Witness to History 1 1919-1969, pp. 345-6. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. pp. 456-7. 456-7. 10. Dobrynin, In Confidence, Confidence, p. 357. 357. 10. and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, p. 456. 456. Remarkably, Nosenko's Nosenkos information was not sufficient sufficient to con11. con 11. Andrew and defector. vince his CIA debriefers that he was a genuine defector. 12. vol. 6, of some the espionage equipment supplied by the FCD OT Direc Direc12. 6, ch. 9. 9. For illustrations of some of of the UltimateSpy Book. Book. torate, see Melton, The Ultimate 13. k-18,342. 13. k-18,342. 14. 14. k-1,160. k-1,160. On O n KGB penetration penetration of the Orthodox Orthodox church, see below, below, chapter 28. 15. 44. 15. vol. 7, ch. 5, para. 44. 16. k-24,299; 5. VOI.7, ch. 5. 16. k-24,299;vol. 17. Philby's an SIS officer had ended after his recall Philbys career careeras as recallfrom Washington in 1951. 1951. Philby's Phdbyslater account 17. to Borovik of his years in Beirut contains contains a number of inaccuracies, due pardy partly to his attempt to discredit discredit Lunn ofinaccuracies, (transcribed by Borovik Borovik as "Lan"-an Lan-an error derived, as in the KGB fIles fdes noted by Mitrokhin, from the con con(transcribed ofLunninto into escapein 1963 Lunns incompetence incompetence version of"Lunn" Cyrillic). Philby attributes his successful escape 1963 largely to Lunn's amazingly,three or four years later [Lunn] received a high honour-the honour-the Cross of of St. Michael and adds that "amazingly,

N o tt e e s N o s

6 33 633

s Phdby Philby had correctly informed the KGB after and St. St. George" George (Borovik, (Borovik, The Philby Files, Files p p.. 354). 354).In reality, aas his defection, defection, Lunn was awarded awarded the C M G a decade earlier, in 1957 (vol. ch.5). CMG (vol. 7, ch. 18. Lunn was the author of High-Speed (1948) and The Guinness Guinness Book ofskiofSki 18. High-speed Skiing (1935),A Skiing Primer Primer(1948) of Europe's ing (1983). (1983).His father, father, Sir Arnold Lunn (1888-1974), was one of Europes leading ski pioneers, as well as a leading Catholic apologist apologist and a vocal opponent of of both Nazism and Communism. His 63 books included 23 on skiing and 16 on Christian apologetics National Biography, 1971-1980, 522-3). apologetics (Dictionary (Dictionaryof ofNationalBiographyJ 1971-1980,pp. 522-3). Lunns recent Whos Who? Who Whoentries give the date date of of his entry into into SIS. 19. 19. Lunn's SIS. Earlier entries make no reference to his intelligence intelligence career. 20. Unless otherwise indicated, the account of operation RUBIN is based on k-24,299 and vol. 7, ch. 5. 20. 21. k-26,223. k-26,223. 21. 22. k-26,223. k-26,223. 23. The file noted by Mitrokhin does not reveal what the the measures were. were. 24. the late 1960s the 1970s, 1970s, see Andrew and 24. On O n Philby's Philbys depression in the 1960s and partial recovery during the 544-5, and Knightley, Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. 24-6, 246,544-5, Knightley, Philby, Philby, pp. 234-7. 234-7. 25. One of the CIA officers on whom of the CIA whomintelligence intelligence was gathered gathered during operation RUBIN was selected by 25. Andropov as the target of an attempted abduction. 26. k-18,342. 26. k-18,342. 27. vol. 6, app. app, 1 1(misc.), parts 1, 1,4; k-27,242.Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes give no indication of was 27. 4; k-27,242. ofwhat inteUigence intelligence was CIA officers flat. V E R A S file records theKGB lost contact with her in 1975 obtained by bugging the CIA officer's flat. VERNs records that the as a result of the theLebanese Civil War. 28. k-27,239. k-27,239. 29. KGB operations in Mrica Africa will w i l be covered in volume 2. 30. in k-17,49,59,185; 10. O On 16, 1981 1981 operation k-17,49,59,185;vol. 6, ch. 10. n November 16, 30. Details of operation REBUS in PHOENIX succeeded succeeded in bugging the residence residence of the theUS ambassador in Conakry. Conakry. The agent responsible was a Guinean (probably a domestic servant) code named MURAT (k-17,145; (k-17,145; k-8,519). k-8,519). The KGB also codenamed succeeded of other African Mrican capitals, succeeded in intercepting the communications of US embassies in a number of among them Bamako and Brazzaville 10; k-17,168). Brazzaville (vol. 6, ch. 10; k-17,168). 31. The last, reforming chairman of the KGB, Vadim Bakatin, appointed after the failed coup of of August 31. 1991, of the highly sophisticated bugging 1991,outraged his staffby staff by giving the American ambassador blueprints of system State, pp. 311-13). 311-13). There were several security alerts within the theexisting system (Albats, (Albats, The State within aaState, US embassy embassy in Moscow during the the 1980s. 1980s. In 1984, 1984,however, bugs bugs were were discovered discoveredin electric typewriters in the embassy in Moscow which had been in use for some years (Lardner, Unbeatable "Unbeatable Bugs). Bugs"). In the US US embassy 1986 admitted giving KGB agents access to the US embassy. embassy. Because Because of 1986 two two marine guards admitted of improved security procedures, seem to have gained access to the sen procedures,however, the KGB do not notseem thecipher room or other othersensitive areas areas (Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 611). 611). 32. already residencies designed to intercept US and GRU already had posts in a number of of its residencies and 32. k-22,135,232. k-22,135,232.The GRU NATO military communications. 33. vol. 6, 33. 6, ch. 9. 9. 6, ch. 9. 9. 34. 34. vol. 6, Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, p. 92. 92.The POCHIN POCHIN files noted noted by Mitrokhin confirm Kalugin's Kalugins list of of intercepted 35. Kalugin, communications (vol. (vol. 6, 6, ch. 9). 9). 36. vol. 6, 6, ch. 9. 9. 37. 11. 37. See above, chapter 11. 38. See above, chapter 11. 11. 38. See 39. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 2; vol. 6, 6, ch. 9. 9. There was a further operation to bug bug UN Secretariat offices in 1963 1963 (k-8,138). (k-8,138). 40. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 2. 2. 41. Mter He After leaving leavingGCHQin G C H Q m 1977, 1977,Prime broke off off contact with the theKGB for the next three years. H e had work,as s. a Soviet agent further meetings with his case officer in Vienna and Potsdam in 1980, 1980 and 1981. 1981.. His wrk lightafter he was arrested for sexually molesting little girls in 1982. e was sentenced to thirtycame to light 1982. H He thirty KGB, pp. five years years' imprisonment assault (Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, imprisonment for espionage and three for sexual assault 526-8, 530-1). A senior GCHQofficer was later quoted as saying, saying, On "On the side, there was a time 526-8,530-1). the political side, mid-1970s when we used to get useful usefuI [Soviet] [Soviet] political and high-level military communicaup to the mid-1970s communica 6.) Because Prime was a tions. But that Prime." (Urban, UK Eyes Alpha, that dried up, partly as a result of Prime. A@ha, p. 6.) didnot not accessto his file. The latest study of Third Directorate, not an FCD, agent, Mitrokhin did have access of Prime, Geo.ffrey Prime. by the detective chief superintendent charge of superintendent in in of his case, is isCole, Geoflcy 42. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not notgive the date dateof foundation of of the Sixteenth Directorate, but indicate that it 42.

N o N o tt e e s s

6 34 63

existence not later than 1968; 1968; k-22,232. was in existence 43. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsb,KGB, KGB, p. 529. vol. 6, ch. 9. 44. 44. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 3, 3, part part 3. 3. 45. vol. 6, ch. 9. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not notrecord ANTON's ANTONS real name. 46. Kissinger, Y ears of pheaval, p. 1 179. Yrars o f U Upheaval, 1179. 47. vol. 6, ch. 9. 9. 48. Kissinger, Y ears of pheaval, p. 1192. Years o f U Upheaval, 1192. pymaster, p. 49. Kalugin, Kalugin, S Spymaster, p. 92. 92. of some of ofthe theroofs of of Soviet missions in the theUnited United 50. For illustrations of the complex antennae on the States and elsewhere, ), pp. 49-68. elsewhere, see Ball, Ball, Soviet Signals SignahIntelligence InteZZkence (SIGINT (SIGINT), 49-68. 51. vol. 6, ch. 9. 9. 52. 52. Andrew, For the President's Presidcnti Eyes Only, p. 359. 53. 53. Dobrynin, Dobrynin,In I?z Confidence, Confidence, pp. 357-8. 357-8. 54. vol. 6, ch. 9. 55. 55. vol. 6, 6, ch. 3, part 2. 56. vol. 6, ch. 9. 9. part 1. 57. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 1. 58. vol. 6, On see Andrew, For the President's Eyes 6 , ch. 9. 9. O n the crisis over overthe Soviet Soviet "combat combat brigade" brigade in Cuba, Cuba, Presidents Eyes Only, pp. 444-7. CHIN files also record that "during Onb, 444-7. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes on PO POCHIN during the crisis in Lebanon the [Washington] [Washington] residency was was able able to to make make a a correct correct evaluation evaluation of of the the unfolding unfolding situation situation and and inform inform the the Centre on a timely basis that the States had no plans for military intervention" C.entre theUnited United intervention (vol. 6, ch. 9). It is unclear unclear which which Lebanese Lebanese crisis crisis is is referred referred to. to. Since Since the the other other material material in in this this section section of of Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes deals mid-1970s, however, 1974, when deals with with the mid-l970s, however, the the reference reference is is probably probably to to 1974, when Israel Israel made made a a series series of of air air attacks which attacks against against villages villages in in southern southernLebanon, Lebanon, which it it suspected suspected of of harboring harboring terrorists. terrorists. 59. vol. 9. 59. vol. 6, ch. ch. 9. FBI shortwave radio communications channels monitored continuously by the RAKETA post 60. The FBI during during the the 1970s 1970s were: were:
- the the radio radio link link between between surveillance surveillance vehicles vehicles and and the the six six FBI FBI posts responsible responsible for for observing observing the the movements of Soviet personnel (167.4625 megahertz); of Soviet - the channel used by surveillance surveillance vehicles vehicles and observation posts monitoring the the movements of of members members of of Middle MiddleEastern Eastern and and some some Western Western missions missions to to the the UN UN(167.2125 (167.2125 megahertz); megahertz); - the channel used for communications between the FBI investigating bank robberies FBI department department and surveillance surveillance vehicles vehicles (167.6887 megahertz); - the the channel channel used used by by those those investigating investigating other other federal federal crimes crimes (167.3756 (167.3756 megahertz); megahertz); - the channel used for communications between the FBI FBIdespatch centers in New NewYork and New Jersey (frequency in the megahertz band not recorded); recorded); the 167 167 - the channel used for other communications between the New York dispatch center and FBI vehicles (167.7760 megahertz) vol. 6, ch. 9). 9). 61. vol. 6, ch. 9. 61. 62. . 62. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 4, n. 72. 1 1. 63. costs for the main intercept posts i in residencies around the world i in 1979were as 6 3 . The running costs n KGB residencies n 1979 follows (tlgures (figures in thousands of of hard currency roubles): Washington (POCHIN): (POCHIN): 26.0 (PROBA): 29.4 New York (PROBA): San San Francisco Francisco (VESNA): (VESNA): 6.7 6.7 Ottawa Ottawa (codename (codename not not recorded): recorded): figures figures unavailable unavailable (5.8 in in 1977) 1977) Montreal (VENERA): (VENERA):3.3 (plus (plus 3.5 for purchase of of motorcar) Cuba Cuba (TERMIT-S): (TERMIT-S): 18.8 18.8 Brazil (KLEN): (KLEN): 4.8 (increased (increased to 8.2 in 1980; 13.3 13.3 in 1981) Mexico (RADAR): (RADAR): 3.5 3.5(increased (increased to 4.6 in 1980) Reykjavik (OSTROV): 2.3 London (MERCURY): 1 (MERCURY): 7. 7.1 Oslo (SEVER): 7.2 Paris (JUPITER): 10.1 10.1

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Bonn (TSENTAVR-1): 11.3 11.3 Cologne Cologne (TSENTAVR-2): figures unavailable unavailable Salzburg (TYROL-1): 1.3 1.3 Salzburg Vienna (TYROL-2): 3.3 3.3 Berne (ELBRUS): 2.8 Geneva (KAVKAZ): (KAVKAZ): 2.3 Rome (START): 15.0 15.0 Athens Athens (RADUGA): (RADUGA):4.2 Ankara (RADUGA-T): 9.5 9.5 (plus (plus supplementary supplementary 2.2) Istanbul (SIRIUS): 5.3 Teheran (MARS): (MARS): 5.0 Beijing (KRAB): 4.5 Tokyo (ZARY (ZARYA): 10.4 Tokyo A): lOA vol. 6, ch. 9; 1977 1977 figures figures for Ottawa from vol. 8, 8, ch. 5) KGBs curious accounting methods, these figures doubtless do not represent the full Because of the KGB's running costs costs of the intercept posts. They do, however, however,give give an approximate indication of of the therelative relative level of activity activity at each post. than those listed above, post. Other significant intercept posts, probably less important than included Lisbon (ALTAY), Nairobi (KRYM), The Hague (TULIP), (TULIP),Brussels (VEGA), (KRYM), Cairo (ORION), (ORION), The Belgrade Mitrokhin's notes do Belgrade (PARUS), Hanoi (AMUR), (AMUR),Jakarta (DELFIN) and andDamascus (SIGMA). Mitrokhins not give the budgets for these posts. SignalsIntelligence Intelligence (SIGINT), pp. 27-9; 27-9; Rosenau, A 64. Ball, Soviet Signals (SIGINT), ''A Deafening Silence, Silence," pp. 723-5. 723-5. 65. vol. 6, ch. 9. 65. 9. 66. Ball, Soviet Signals (SIGINT), SignalsIntelligence Intellkence (SIGIAJT),pp. 27-9. 27-9. 67. vol. 2, app. 3. 3. 68. k-22,136. Shorter reports were submitted by each intercept post at least once a month. 69. vol. 6, ch. 3, part 69. part2. 70. vol. 6, ch. 6. 6. 71. vol. 6, ch. 2, part 3; vol. 4, 5. vol.6, ch. 6; vol. 6, 6, app. app.2, parts 4,s. of the UKUSA UKUSA agreement, see Andrew, The Making of 72. On the origins of "The Making of the Anglo-American Anglo-American SIGSIG INT I N T Alliance"; Alliance; on its subsequent development, see Ball and Richelson, The Ties That Bind Bind and Hager,

Power. Secret Power. 73. t-7,131. 73. 74. t-7,130. 75. k-19,435. 76. vol. vol. 6, ch. 8, 8, part 5. 5. 77. See See above, chapter 6. app. 3. The names of the head and deputy heads of 78. vol. 2, app. of the Sixteenth Department are given in k-22,134. Andrewwith with Makarov, 1993. When Oleg Gordievsky became resi79. Interview by Christopher Andrew Viktor Makarov, resi dent-designate dent-designate at the London residency early in 1985, the Sixteenth Department officer told him that there was currently no British source Gordievsky, source providing high-grade high-grade cipher material (Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, p. 610). 80. Interview by Christopher Andrew with Makarov, 1993; Kahn, Soviet "Soviet Comint in the Cold with Viktor Makarov, War," 3. War, pp. 20-20-3. 81. Interview with Gurgenev (identified only by his first name and patronymic), Izvestia (September 24, 1991). 1991). 82. On March 25, 25,1985, example, the London Londonresidency received an urgent urgenttelegram asking for 82. 1985, for example, f or British reactions of the Socialist International. Sooner than reactions to Gorbachev's Gorbachevsmeeting with the theexecutive committee of Socialist International. report that the favor theevent had failed to excite great interest in Britain, the residency simply concocted a favorable of sources. (Recollection of of Oleg Gordievsky, Gordievsky, then able reply without contacting any of its limited range of resident-designate.) 83. See above, chapter 21. Andrewwith with West Had No 84. Interview by Christopher Andrew Viktor Makarov, Makarov, 1993; Viktor Makarov, The "The West Had Aggressive Plans against the USSR, USSR," Express Chronicle (February 19,1992), 19, 1992), p. 5. 5. 85. Urban, UKEyes Alpha, Abha, ch. 19. 19. Ball, Soviet Signals SignalsIntelligence Intelligence (SIGLNT). Ball and Windren, Soviet (SIGINT). "Soviet Signals Intelligence (Sigint). (Sigint)." 86. Ball,

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87. Rosenau, Silence," p. 87. Rosenau, ''A A Deafening Deafening Silence, p. 726. 88. Andrew, 88. Andrew, "The The Nature Nature of of Military Military Intelligence," Intelligence, p. p. 5. 89. Rosenau, Silence," pp. 732 n. 6. 89. Rosenau, "A A Deafening Deafening Silence, pp. 727, 727,732 n. 6.

Chapter Twenty-two

T asks Part 1 Tasks 2

1. Djilas, Tito, 29; Djilas, Rise and Fall, 1. Tito, p. 29; Fa& pp. 106-7; 106-7; Radzinsky, Stalin, p. 399. 2. k-20,272; RankoviC's RankoviCs codename is in k-20,287. 105-6. 3. Djilas, Rise and Fall, Fall, pp. 82-3, 82-3,105-6. 4. 4. k-20,281. k-20,28 1. 5. k-20,276. 105-6. 6. 6. k-20,290,292. Tishkov's Tishkovs cover name (Timofeyev) (Timofeyev) is given given in Djilas, Rise and Fall, Fall, pp. 82-3, 82-3,105-6. 7. 7. k-20,279. k-20,279. 8. 8. k-20,289,290. k-20,289,290. 92, 95, 98-9, 105-6; Dedijer, Tito peaks, p. 268. 9. Djilas, Rise and Fall, Fall, pp. 84-5, 84-5,92,95,98-9,105-6; Tito S Speaks, 10. 10. k-20,292. 11. 1 1 . k-5,707. 12. Fall, chs. 14, 15; Djilas, Tito, pp. 84-7; V AL 12. Djilas, Rise and andFall, 14,15; 84-7; Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. 371-2. 371-2. VAL is asks, p. is identified identified by by Sudoplatovs, Sudoplatovs, Special T Taks, p. 338. 338. 13. Gordievsky, 415-17. 13. Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 415-17. 14. 6, and 14. See See above, above, chapters chapters 5, 5,6, and 10. 10. ted in in 15. MGB report to Stalin, first published by Dmitri Volkogonov in Iz'vestia June 111,1993); 1 , 1993); repri 15. Izaestia ( (June reprinted Sudoplatovs, asks, pp. 336-7, Sudoplatovs, Special T Tasks, 336-7, and "Stalin's Stalins Plan to Assassinate Tito," Tito, p. 137. 137. 16. MGB report to to Stalin, first published by Dmitri Volkogonov in Iz'vestia Izvestia ( (June June 111,1993). 1 , 1993). 16. 17. 17. "Stalin's StalinsPlan Plan to toAssassinate Assassinate Tito," Tito, p. p. 137. 137. 18. Wolff, "Leadership Leadership Transition in a Fractured Bloc, p.1 1. 18. Bloc," p. . 1 9 . Sudoplatovs, pecial T asks, pp. 335-8. 19. Sudoplatovs, S Special a s k s , 335-8. 20. k-13,267. Some examples examples of of Grigulevich's Grigulevichs works, published under his own name, the pseudonym I. R. Lavretsky and the thehybrid Grigulevich-Lavretsky, Grigulevich-Lavretsky,are included in the thebibliography. bibliography. 21. T asks, pp. 249, 252-3. 21. Sudoplatovs, Sudoplatovs, Special SpecialTasks, 249,252-3. 22. Khokhlov, 430-1. Khokhlov,In the Name ojConscience, o f Conscience, part 3; Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, pp. 430-1. 23. 23. vol. vol. 3, 3, pakapp. pakapp. 3. t-7,267. 24. t-7,267. 25. t-7,267. had 26. 26. Each Each target target file file (obektovoye (obektovoyede/o) delo) had to togive give the the following following information: information:

of the target in peacetime and wartime, and its place in the enemy's enemys military-industrial military-industrial 1) The role of capabilities. Documents, Documents, photographs, films, maps and diagrams giving details on its location, capabilities. work schedule, schedule, security system, system, personnel, neighbors, populated areas nearby and methods of of approaching the target. of the target's targets vulnerable points, methods of of attacking each of of them, 2) Detailed descriptions descriptions of the thetype of of personnel to be used in sabotage operations estimates of the likely damage, and the (agents, illegals, etc.). 3) Opportunities to reconnoitre and sabotage the target. This section of of the thefile contains individual (spravki) on every information source source available on the target, and on each combat agent reports (spravki) (agent-boyevik) selected for operations against it. (agent-boyevik) 4) Details operations against Details of of the the special equipment equipment needed for for operations against the the target, target, the theprecise use to to of it, it,dead drops, storage arrangements and andthe therole of of each eachof of those entrusted with be made of those entrusted with its use. responsible for attacking the target, together with 5) Arrangements for giving instructions to those responsible special action partof of the was placed in a sealed the codewords for the "special action" to begin. (This (This part the file was package.) If information on any of of the subjects If subjects listed above was missing, a note was added to the file on the action being taken to obtain it. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5, n. 2. 27. k-16,255. 28. 11. 28. t-7,3 t-7,311. 5, part 5. 5. 29. vol. 6, ch. 5, 30. 30. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 5.

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31. Wolf, Wolf, Man Man without without a Face, Face, pp. 211-12. 31. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 1, 1 ,part part 1. 1. 32. vol. 32. KGB, pp. pp. 421-6. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 467. 467. 33. Barron, KGB, 33. The fullest fullest account of Stashinsky's Stashinskys career career is in Anders, Anders, Murder to Order. Order. 34. The 34. 35. Anders, Murder to to Order, Order,p. 107. 107. 35. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 468. 468. See See below, chapter 15. 15. 36. Andrew 36. Beeston, "KGB KGB Refused Refused to to Kill Kill Khrushchev" Khrushchev [interview with Semichastny], The TheTimes 37. Richard Beeston, Times 37. 23,1997). (December 23, 1997). and Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. 481-2. 38. Andrew and 38. The text of Khrushchev's Khrushchevs secret secret speech of August 3, 3,1961 lightuntil until 1993. Zubok and and 39. The 39. 1961 did not come to light 1993. theKremlin's Kremlin?Cold Cold War, 252. W ar, p. 252. Pleshakov, Inside the vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part 5. 5. 40. vol. 40. 41. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, part part 5. 5. Fonseca was wasco-founder of the FSLN. FSLN.Initially it was called calledthe National Liberation 41. Front. "Sandinista" Sandinistawas was added, added, chiefly chiefly at at Fonseca's Fonsecas insistence, insistence, in in 1962 in honor honor of of the the "anti-imperialist" anti-imperialist Front. 1962 in hero, General General Augusto August0 Cesar CCsar Sandino. Sandino. Volume 2 will w l igive more detail on KGB links with the the FSLN FSLN and operations in Latin LatinAmerica. on other operations 42. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. 5, 5, part 5. 5. 42. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part 5. 5. 43. vol. 44. vol. 8 8, 10. 44. , ch. 10. 45. t-7,173. t-7,173. 45. put the 46. It was planned to put 46. the Wilhemshaven-Wesseling oil pipeline out of of action where it crosses the Lippe river river and and the the Seitenkanal; Seitenkanal; t-7,277. t-7,277. 47. t-7,65; t-7,65; k-16,380. k-16,380. 47. 48. k-2, k-2,186. 48. 186. 49. t-7,163,165,17o-2. t-7,163,165,1702.For examples of of radio caches, caches, see this chapter, appendices 2,3. 49. 2, 3. k-5,483. 50. k-5,483. chapter, appendix 1. 1. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not 51. 51. On the the MOLNIYA MOLNIY A device, see this chapter, not always identify caches are booby-trapped. clearly which caches 52. 52. See this chapter, appendix 2. 2. Reuter report (January 18, 18,1999). 53. 53. Reuter 1999). caches turned out outnot not to be booby-trapped. 54. k-5,382. k-5,382.The Belgian caches 54. to 55. 1968-9, the Thirteenth ThirteenthDepartment Department had one illegal, PAUL, assisted by his wife VIRGINIA, and and 55. In 1968-9, had of German illegal agents, on whom Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's notes give no further details; vol. 3, pakapp. 3. two pairs of There may have have been others in infiles f ues not noted by Mitrokhin. 56. The fullest account of of PAUL's PAULs career is in vol. 7, ch. 7; there are a few further details in vol. 6, ch. 5, 56. part 5. On O n RAG RAG see see also also k-11,17. k-11,17. PAUL's PAULs f file, which Mitrokhin made detailed notes, notes, gives little indi indipart ue, on which of the nature of theassistance cation of of the assistance provided by VIRGINIA. 57. 57. vol. 7, ch. 7; vol. 8, ch. 9; 9; vol. 6, ch. 5, 5, part 5. Among other other illegals seconded for shorter shorter periods periods to Thirteenth Thirteenth Department Departmentoperations operations was Vasili Gordievsky who on ona mission to Spain Gordievsky (GROMOV), (GROMOV), who in the winter winter of arms caches for DRG operations. of 1964-5 1964-5 selected seven landing sites and eight arms operations. RoRo din, the thehead of theThirteenth Thirteenth Department, requested togive him an anaward to of the Department, requested the Illegals Directorate to mark the the success of of his mission; t-7,279. t-7 ,279. part 1. 58. vol. 6, ch. 1, part 1. 59. See above, chapter 11. 11. theCIA in, in, respectively, Vienna thesame 60. Deryabin and Rastvorov defected in 1954 to the Vienna and Tokyo. In In the year the Petrovs defected in Canberra. 61. vol. 5, sec. 7n.; vol. 2, app. 3. 62. vol. 6, ch. 8, part 6. 63. vol. 2, app. 3; vol. 6, ch. 5, part 5. 64. See above, chapter 11. 1I. 65. Wise, Molehunt, ch. 11; l1; Mangold, Cold Warrior, W arrior, ch. 12. part 5. 66. vol. 6, ch. 5, part ch. 5, part 5. The KGB also sought, unsuccessfully, to the Canadian Canadian RCMP, Jim 67. vol. 6, ch. to use use its its agent agent in the RCMP,Jim Morrison (FRIEND), (FRIEND),to to track down down Runge. track 68, 68. vol. 2, app. 3. 69. Nureyev, Nureyev, Nureye'1.I, pp. 96-7, 96-7. 70. Percival, Nureyev, pp. 55-6. 55-6.

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71. 3. 71. vol. 2, app. 3. Sheymov, Tower of of Secrets, Secrets, pp. 92-3. 92-3. Probably because of of the deep lingering hostility to Nureyev 72. Sheymov, among the KGB old guard, he was not rehabilitated in Russia until September 1998, 1998, five years after his exile. See See "Russia 1998). death in inexile. Russia reinstates Nureyev," Nureyev, The Times (September 23, 23,1998). 73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part 5. Nureyev, p. 99. 74. Percival, Nureyev, 5, part 5. 75. vol. 6, ch. 5, 76. vol. 2, app. 3. 3. Both Nureyev and Makarova were also the targets of of numerous KGB active measures designed to discredit them. 77. k-l0,155. k-10,155. 78. k-l0,154. k-10,154. Ministkre Public de la Confederation press release (January 18, 18, 1999). 1999). The Swiss press release made 79. Ministere no reference reference to the thedocuments from Mitrokhin's Mitrokhhs archives used to locate the cache. cache. 80. 80. k-5,382. 81. k-l0,156. 81. k-10,156. 82. k-l0,158. k-10,158. k-10,157. 83. k-l0,157. 84. 84. k-l0,158. k-10,158.

Chapter Twenty-three pecial Tasks T asks Part Part 2 Twenty-thee S Special

1. vol. 3, 3, pakapp. 3. 1. reference to Department V (the letter "V," V, not the the Roman numeral) noted by Mitrokhin 2. The earliest reference was contained in order no. 00197 of 1965 instructing other FCD departments departments with agents suitsuit of October 7, 7,1965 with able able for use in time of of war or international crisis to hand hand them them over to Department Department V. The Department had probably been founded not long longbefore. before. vol. 2, app. 3. 3. 3. vol. vol. 3, 3, pakapp. 3. 3. 4. k-16,408. 5. 5. k-26,317. 6. The earliest subsidies subsidies recorded by Mitrokhin were 135,000 dollars in February 1968, 1968, followed followed by 100,000 Party files for 1967, 100,000dollars in March. March.Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes on Greek GreekCommunist Communist 1967, however, are very thefi first subsidies to the underground underground Party were handed over in Budapest during thin and it is likely that the rst subsidies 1967. k-26,3 k-26,319. the later months of 1967. 19. 7. k-16,69. 8. See above, chapter 18. 18. 9. k-27,61. 9. 10. 10. k-16,69. 11. 11. k-27,61. 12. 12. k-3,28. 13. 13. k-3,23,24,29. 14. 14. k-3,28; k-26,315,318,323,325,326,384,387,390,394. 15. 15. k-26,322. The Iraqi Communist CommunistParty also deposited its archives in the Soviet Union for safekeeping; safekeeping; see volume 2. 16. k-14,531. The location for operation ZVENO ZVENO was studied by the illegal YAKOV 16. Y AKOV and the the agent ROBBI of of the Vienna residency. Y YAKOV was Gennadi Mikhailovich Alekseyev, Alekseyev, based in Switzerland, AKOV was had assumed identity of of a Swiss man, Igor Miirner, Murner,who who had the Soviet Union. In 1973 1973 who had assumed the identity had died in the YAKOV wasarrested by the Swiss authorities, who were unable to prove charges charges of of espionage against him. Y AKOV was H e served two years in prison for using false identity documents (k-5,193; k-24,236). Mitrokhin is unable He identify ROBBI. Other OtherKGB officers (at least three, and possibly V)involved in to identifY possibly all, from Department Department V) operation ZVENO were Yu. V. Derzhavin, A. D. Grigoryev, Grigoryev, B. N. Malinin, Ye. S. preparations for operation Malinin, Yeo S. Shcherbanov, B. S. S. Olikheyko, A. S. S. Savin, Kovalik, and Yeo Ye. A. Sharov (k-14,531). Shcherbanov, 17. 17. k-16,408. 15 18. 18. vol. 7, ch. 15 19. vol. 3, 3, pakapp. 3. 3. Vol. 7, ch. 5, 5, para. 35 gives the location of of PEPEL as Istanbul, but but neither reference reference 19. identifies of special special action employed employed in PEPEL. PEPEL.Mitrokhin Mitrokhin notthe PEPEL PEPEL 1969 identifi es the type of diddid not see file. The 1969 report also noted that the 1955 1955 requirement for the Thirteenth Department to steal Western military ofdate; this had become the primary responsibility of of FCD Directorate T (Scientific (Scientific technology was out of and Technological Espionage).

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20. Connolly Column, Column, was printed 20. O'Riordan's ORiordans history of the Irish members of the International InternationalBrigades, Connofly in East Germany published in Dublin), and gratefully acknowledged assistance of Germany(though (though acknowledged the assistance of the Soviet EastGermany, Germany, John Peet. agent and British defector to East ORiordans appeal for weapons for the IRA IRA is published in the the appendix to Yeltsin, The 21. The text of O'Riordan's Viewfiom the Kremlin, Kremlin, pp. 311-16. 311-16. In December 1969, 1969, shortly before the split which led to the theemergence Viewfrom Provisionals,a secret meeting of the IRA leadership approved a proposal by Goulding to toestablish a of the Provisionals, Irish Communist Communist Party Partyand other left-wing groups. National Liberation Front including Sinn Fein, the Irish Coogan, The Troubles, Troubles, p. 95. 95. Coogan, IRA, p. 88. 22. ProvisionalIRA) 88. 22. Bishop and Mallie, The Provisional 23. Eight memoranda on the subject by Andropov on the theIRA appeal for arms are published, in whole or 23. Viewfiom Kremlin, pp. 311-16. part, in the appendix to Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, 31 1-16. 24. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 7; 7;vol. vol. 8, 8, ch. 9; 9; vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 5. 5. 24. vol. F L Q see Granatstein Granatstein and andStafford, Spy W Wars, 206-10. 25. On the FLQsee ars, pp. 206-10. 26. vol. 8, 8, ch. 14. 14. Stafford,two of Canada's Canadas leading historians historians of conclude that that the theCIA 27. Even Granatstein and Stafford, 27. of intelligence, intelligence, conclude if authentic .. .. .. does suggest suggest strongly strongly that the theCIA was operating in Quebec; IVars, p. 209. 209. document, "if Qyebec"; Spy Ttars, 28. vol. 8, 8, ch. 14. 14. 28. 29. k-24,365. k-24,365. 29. 30. ashington Post 31, 1970). SovietsProtest to Argentina After Envoy Foils Kidnaping," Kidnaping, W Washington Post(March 31,1970). 30. "Soviets 31. vol. 4, indapp. 3. 3. 31. 32. 1976). Rob Bull, Bull, "Defector Defector Bares Bares 'Secret' SecretPast," Past, Vancouver VancouverSun (April (April 5, 5,1976). 32. Rob 33. vol. 4, indapp. indapp. 3. 33. vol. 34. 1994). Interview with with Robert Robert Gates Gates by by Christopher Christopher Andrew Andrew(March 14, 14,1994). 34. Interview 35. See above, above, chapter chapter 22. 35. See 36. 36. k-24,365. k-24,365. 37. k-24,365. k-24,365. 38. k-24,365. 38. k-24,365. 39. See below, below, chapter chapter 24. 24. 39. See 431f; Brook-Shepherd, Brook-Shepherd, The Storm 40. and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. 524-5; 524-5; Barron, KGB, pp. 110, 110,431fc 40. Andrew and Birds, pp. 197-9. 197-9. 41. Kalugin, Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, pp. 131-2. 41. 42. series 3, vol. 1, 1, pp. 388-9. 388-9. (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 42. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Gordievsky,Next Stop Execution, Execution, p. 184. 184. 43. Gordievsky, 43. 44. (eds.), series 3, vol. 1, 1, pp. 337-43,359. 337-43, 359. Bennett and andHamilton Hamilton (eds.), Documents Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 44. Bennett 389n. 45. series 3, vol. 1, 1, p. 389n. 45. Bennett and Hamilton (eds.), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series KGB, pp. 413-15. 413-15. Kuzichkin, Kuzichkin, Inside the theKGB, p. 81. 46. Barron, KGB, 46. 47. Kalugin, Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, pp. pp. 131-2. 131-2. Execution, 48. Gordievsh, Next Nexf Stop Sfop Execufion,p. p. 184. 184. 48. Gordievsky, 49. 6, ch. 1, 1, part 1; 1;voL vol. 6, 6, ch. 5, 5, part 5. 5. It is, of of course, course, impossible to exclude exclude the possibility that that plans 49. vol. 6, to to cripple cripple Baryshnikov Baryshnikov were were contained contained in in aafile file not not seen seen by by Mitrokhin. 50. of the split between Officials and Provisionals Provisionalsinclude Bell, The SecretArmy, SecretArmy, ch. 18; 18; Bishop and 50. Studies of Troubles, ch. 3; Taylor, Taylor, Mallie, The Provisional IRA, chs. chs. 7-8; 7-8; Coogan, Coogan, The IRA, chs. 15-17; Coogan, The Troubles, The Provos, ch. 5-6. Provos, ch. 5-6. 51. Smith, Fightingfor Fightingf o r Ireland?, pp. 88-90. 51. Smith, 52. Andropov's memorandum ORiordans letter letter to to the the Central Central Committee Committee and and Andropovs memorandum on operation operation SPLASH 52. O'Riordan's from the Kremlin, pp. 314-16. 314-16. According to Yeltsin, Yeltsin, the the file are appendix are printed printed in inthe the appendix to to Yeltsin, Yeltsin, The The View Viewfiom Kremlin, pp. According to file on it was on SPLASH SPLASH in in the the archives archives of of the the General GeneralSecretary Secretary does does not indicate whether whether it was implemented. The flies files noted noted by by Mitrokhin, Mitrokhin, apparently apparently withheld withheld from from Yeltsin, Yeltsin, show that it itwas and and identify the boat used in the 15, para. 2. the operation. operation. vol. vol. 7, ch. ch. 15, para. 2. 53. vol. 15, para. vol. 7, ch. ch. 15, para. 2. 2. 53. 54. will take take no no part part in in the operation, and my ORiordan informed informed the the Central Central Committee, Committee,"I I will the transport transport operation, and my 54. O'Riordan information about this to Seamus Costello. role will only involve transferring the technical information Costello." Yeltsin, The View from the Kremlin, Viewfiom Kremlin, p. 314. 314. 55. Bishop Ireland?, p. 90; 90; Coogan, The Bishop and and Mallie, Mallie, The Provisional IRA, pp. pp. 221-2; Smith, Fightingfor Fightingfor Irelaud?, 55. Troubles, The Irish founded ofIRSP, Troubles, pp. pp. 276-80. 276-80. The Irish National National Liberation Liberation Army Army (INLA), (INLA), founded as the military military wing of IRSP, became became arguably arguably the the most most violent violent of of the the republican republican paramilitary paramilitary groups. Its victims victims included Airey Airey Neave, Neave, Northern Ireland, killed in 1979 by a bomb, activated by a mercury tilt MP, Conservative spokesman spokesman on Northern

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switch, switch,which which was was planted planted in in his his car car in in the thePalace Palace of of Westminster Westminster car car park. park. 56. 56. k-27,393; k-27,393; voL V O ~ 6, .6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 5. 5. 58. became 58. voL vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part5. 5. On On Pineiro, Pifieiro,who who in in1974 1974 became head head of of a a new new Departamento Departamento Americano American0 of of the the American American revolutionary revolutionary movements, movements, see see Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 514. 514. 59. 59. voL vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5, part part 5. 5. 60. all of Somoza, p. 60. Pezzullos, Pezzullos,At At the the F Fall ofSomoza, p. 58. 58. Shelton's Sheltons reports reports were were widely widely regarded regarded in in diplomatic diplomatic circles circles as as refl ecting only ficer, James reflecting only Somoza's Somozas views. views. On O n at at least least one one occasion, occasion, his his political political of officer, James R. R. Cheek, Cheek, used used the the State State Department's Departments "dissent dissent channel" channel to to contradict contradict his his chief. chief Jeremiah Jeremiah O'Leary, OLeary,"Shelton Shelton being being Replaced Replaced Cuban Communist Party's Latin Cuban Communist Partys Central Central Committee, Committee, which which took took over over responsibility responsibility for for assistance assistance to to Latin 57. oundations of Revolution, InteZZectualF Foundations o f the theNicaraguan Nicaraguan Revolution,p. p. 228. 228. 57. Hodges, Hodges, Intellectual

1975). as as Ambassador Ambassador to to Nicaragua," Nicaragua, Washington WashingtonStar Star(April (April 19, 19,1975). 61. 61. Pastor, Pastor, Condemned Condemnedto t o Repetition, Repetition,p. p. 39. 39. 62. 62.voL vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 5, 5,part part5. 5. replaced replaced as as ambassador ambassador in in April April1975. 1975. 64. 64.voL vol. 6, 6 ,ch. ch. 5, 5,part part 5. 5.

Somoza, pp. 1 6-17. Shelton 63. 63. Booth, Booth, The TheEnd End and and the theBeginning, Beginning,p. p. 142, 142,Pezzullos, Pezzullos,At At the the Fall Fallof ofSomoza, pp. 1 116-17. Shelton was was

65. 65. On O n the the three three main main factions factions within within the the FSLN FSLN which which emerged emerged in in 1975, 1975, see see Booth, Booth, The TheEnd End and and the

oundations of Revolution, Beginning, Beginning, pp. pp. 143-4; 143-4; Hodges, Hodges, Intellectual IntellectualF Foundations o f the theNicaraguan Nicaraguan Revolution,pp. pp. 233-55. 233-55.
66. USSR, see 66. On O n Fonseca's Fonsecaslink linkwith withthe the USSR, see volume volume 2. 2. 67. 67. k-27,393. k-27,393.

the the trip tripitself, itself, it it is is unlikely unlikely that that the therequest request was was rejected. rejected. 70. 70. t-7,135; t-7,135; voL vol. 2, 2, appendix appendix 3. 3.

68. le seen 68. The The ft file seen by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin records records only only Fonseca's Fonsecas request request to to visit visit Moscow. Moscow. Though Though he hesaw saw no no ftle file on on

69. of 1 7-19. On 69. Pezzullos, Pezzullos,At At the theFall Fall o f Somoza, Somoza, pp. pp. 1 117-19. O n KGB KGB relations relationswith with the theSandinistas, Sandinistas, see see volume volume 2. 2. 71. 1 1-12. 71. Kuzichkin, Kuzichkin,Inside Inside the theKGB, KGB, pp. pp. 1 111-12.

72. pymaster, pp. 72. Kalugin, Kalugin, S Spymaster, pp. 238-9. 238-9.

pymaster, pp. 73. 73. Kalugin, Kalugin, S Spymaster, pp. 152-3. 152-3.
74. . 74.voL vol. 2, 2, app. app. 3 3.

pymaster, pp. Wise, 7 5 . Kalugin, 75. Kalugin, S Spymaster, pp. 152-9. 152-9. C Cf Wise, Molehunt, Molehunt,pp. pp. 195-7. 195-7.

part part 5. 5.

the Y ork residency also ectors; voL the New New York residency in in 1978, 1978, also spent spentmuch much of of his his time time trying trying to to track track down down def defectors; vol. 6, 6, app. app. 2, 2, 77. 70-3. 77. Bereanu Bereanu and and Todorov, Todorov, The The Umbrella UmbrelZaMurder, Murder, pp. pp. 34-7, 34-7,70-3.

76. T), posted 76. voL vol. 2, 2, app. app. 3. 3.The The Line Line KR KR officer officerVladimir Vladimir Nikolayevich NikolayevichYelchaninov Yelchaninov(codenamed (codenamed VEL VELT), posted to to

78. 78. Kalugin, Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, pp. pp. 178-83; 178-83; Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 644-5. 644-5. Bereanu Bereanu and and Todorov, Todorov, The The

Umbrella UmbrelZaMurder, Murder, adds adds usefully usefullyto to previous previous accounts accounts of of Markov's Markovs murder murder but but also also introduces introduces some some implau implausible sible speculation. speculation. For For an an illustration illustration of of an anearlier earlier version version of of the theweapon weapon used used to to kill kill Markov, Markov, a a KGB KGB poi poi-

Spy Book, son son pellet pellet cane cane of of the the1950s, 1950s, see see Melton, Melton, The The Ultimate Ultimate Book,p. p. 152. 152. SAS 13, 1999). 79. 79. Interviews Interviews with with Alpha Alpha group group veterans, veterans, broadcast broadcast in in Inside Inside Russia's Russias SAS(BBC2, (BBC2,June June 13,1999).
80. 80.voL vol. 1, 1,ch. ch. 4. 4. 81. the Situation Big 1-12. p. p. 130. 130. Dobbs, Dobbs, Down Down with with Big Brother, Brother, pp. pp. 1 11-12. 81. Westad, Westad, "Concerning Concerning the Situation in in 'A,' A, "

82. 82. See See above, above, chapter chapter 15. 15. 83. , ch. toto poison ood, 83.voL vol. 1 1, ch. 4. 4. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins account account contains contains only only a a brief brief allusion allusionto to the theattempts attempts poison Amin's Amins f food, which which appears appears to to have have been been the the Eighth Eighth Department's Departments preferred preferred method method of of assassination. assassination. According According to to Vladimir rom Directorate Vladimir Kuzichkin, Kuzichkin, who who defected defected f from Directorate S Sa a few few years years later, later, the the first first choice choice of of assassin assassin was wasan an Azerbaijani several Azerbaijani illegal, illegal, Mikhail MikhailTalybov, Talybov,who who was was bilingual bilingual in in Farsi Farsi and and had hadspent spent several years yearsin in Kabul Kabul with with M ghan identity orged by rom the Afghan identity papers papers f forged by the the KGB. KGB. Equipped Equipped with with poisons poisons f from the OTU O T U laboratory, laboratory,Talybov Talybov

succeeded a succeededin in gaining gaining a job job as as a a chef chef in in the thepresidential presidential palace. palace. But, But, according according to to Kuzichkin, Kuzichkin, "Amin Aminwas was as as careful ood and careful as as any any of of the the Borgias. Borgias. He H e kept kept switching switching his his f food and drink drink as as if if he he expected expected to to be be poisoned." poisoned. Kuzichkin, 314-15; Kuzichkin, Kuzichkin, Inside Inside the theKGB, KGB, pp. pp. 314-15; Kuzichkin, "Coups Coups and and Killings Killings in in Kabul," Kabul, Time Time (November (November 22, 22, 1982); oday, pp. 1982); Barron, Barron, KGB KGB T Today, pp. 15-16. 15-16. A A further, further,unsuccessful unsuccessful attempt attempt to to poison poison Amin Amin took took place place at at a a

Big lunch lunchgiven given by by him him for for his his ministers ministers on on December December 27 27 (Dobbs, (Dobbs, Down Down with with Big Brother, Brother,p. p. 19). 19).
84. the Situation 84. Westad, Westad,"Concerning Concerning the Situation in in 'A,' A," p. p. 130. 130. 85. 85. "The The Soviet Soviet Union Union and andMghanistan, Afghanistan, 1978-1989," 1978-1989, p. p. 159. 159. on on December December 12. 12. 87. , ch. 87. voL vol. 1 1, ch. 4. 4. 88. Big 88. Dobbs, Dobbs, Down Down with with Big Brother, Brother,pp. pp. 18-19. 18-19.

86. the Situation p. 131. 86. Westad, Westad, "Concerning Concerning the Situation in in 'A,' A,"p. 131. The The invasion invasion plan plan was was approved approved by by the the Politburo Politburo

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89. vol. 1, 1, ch. 4. 89. 90. 1, ch. 4. 90. vol. 1, 91. vol. 1, 1, ch. 4. 92. 1, app. 92. vol. 1, app. 2. 93. vol. 1, 1, ch. 4. 94. On O n Kikot's Kikots previous previous career, career,see seek-24,87,89; k-12,376; k-8,590. 95. 95. vol. 1, 1,app. 3. 96. Childs and Popplewell, 156-7; Gates, From the Shadows, Popplewell, The Stasi, Stasi, pp. 138-40, 138-40,156-7; Shadows,pp. 206-7; 206-7; Wolf, Man Without Face, pp. 271-81. Without aa 271-81. On Carlos's Carloss contacts with the the KGB, see volume 2. 97. vol. 7, ch. 15. 15. 98. Gates, From the the Shadows, Shadows,pp. 338-9. 338-9. Instructionsfiomthe Centre, Centre,pp. 82-5. 99. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructionsfrom 82-5. 100. 100. Accounts of the August coup include those in Stepankov and Lisov, Kremlevsky Zagovor; Zagovor;Albats, The Lend T Tomb; Gorbachev, The August Coup. omb; and Gorbachev, Coup. Though Kryuchkov and State within a State; Remnick, Lenin's other leading plotters were arrested after the coup, 1993 all coup, their trial was repeatedly postponed. By early 1993 all had been released. They were given givenformal amnesties amnesties by the Russian parliament elected in December 1993. 1993. 101. 101. k-16,408.

Chapter Twenty-four ar Operations T w e n t y f o o u r Cold W War Operations against against Britain Part 1 1
1. files that for the implausible theory theory that a major 1. There is no support in any of the f ues seen by Mitrokhin that Soviet of the Mitrokhin's notes concon Soviet agent remained at work in MI5 after the demise of theMagnificent Magnificent Five. Mitrokhins tain no reference ofMI5, of the MI5 officers wrongly reference to Sir Roger Hollis, director-general of MIS, the most senior of .. y , accused of of being a Soviet Soviet agent. The Hollis story is now thoroughly discredited (Andrew and GordievslGordievsLy, KGB, KGB, p. 27). Norwoods early career, see see above abovechapters 7 and 8. 2. On Norwood's 3. vol. vol. 7, ch. 14, 14, item item17. 17. 4. Hennessy, Again, p. 269. Hennessy, Never NeverAgain, 5. 17. Myakinkov's 5. vol. 7, ch. 14, 14,item item 17. Myakinkovs name was wrongly transcribed by Mitrokhin as Mekin'kov. Mekinkov.(CBEN) 6. vol. vol. 7, ch. 14, 14, item item17. 17. 7. For legal reasons reasons neither HUNT's HUNTSreal identity nor the government departments for which he worked (included in Mitrokhin's HUNT's first controller was V. E. Tseyrov (then also Mitrokhins notes) can be identified. HUNTS Norwood's controller), followed by K. Stolenov and Yu. Kondratenko. Mter expulsion of of KGB Norwoods by B. B. K. After the themass expulsion and GRU personnel from London in precau in 1971 1971HUNT H U N T was put on ice for several years years as as a security precaution. Contact was resumed in 1975 by MAIRE, an agent of of the Paris residency. Following MAIREs MAIRE's death 1975 in 1976, residency resumed control in 1977. HUNTS HUNT's last two case officers were V.V. V. YaroYaro 1976,the theLondon London shenko and A. N. Chernayev. of a small business, business, his wife was Chernayev. In 1979, 1979, following following HUNT's HUNTS establishment of was recruited as a courier. By 1981, of HUNTS HUNT's intelliintelli 1981, however, the Centre Centre was dissatisfied with the the quality of gence and apparently fearful surveillance. Contact with fearful that he he was under MI5 surveillance. with him him seems to have been broken at that 14, item thatpoint. vol. 7, ch. 14, item16. 16. 8. ge Blake. Blake. Though acknowledging 8. Blake, No Other Choice, Choice, chs. chs. 2-5. 2-5. C Cf. Hyde, Geor George acknowledging his affection and admiration for Curiel, Blake plays his influence on him. According Blake unconvincingly unconvincinglydown downplays According to Kalugin, Blake Spymaster, p. 141.). For exam "already War" (Kalugin, Spymaster, alreadyheld far-leftist views at the outbreak of the theKorean War examples of other distortions in Blake's 755-6, n. 117); Mur Blakes memoirs, see Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 755-6, Mur482-3, n. n. 36. phy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Bailey, Battleground Berlin, Berlin,pp. 217, 217,482-3, 9. Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Bailey, Battleground Berlin, Berlin,pp. 214-15 214-15 (an account based on partial access to 9. KGB files and on the the recollections recollections of of Kondrashev). Kondrashev). Rodin was London resident from 1947 to to 1952 1952and from 1956 663 . 1956 to to1961; 1961; Andrew and Gordievsky, GordievsQ)KGB, p. 663. 10. See 10. See below, chapter 26. 11. k-9, 65. 11. k-9,65. 12. 141. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Choice, pp. 207-8. 207-8. Kalugin, Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, p. 141. Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 12. Blake, Blake, No Other Choice, 755-6, 755-6, n. 117. 117. 13. The best account of 13. of the Berlin tunnel operation, based based both on material made available by the SVR 11 and and on newly declassified CIA files, files, is Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Bailey, Battleground Berlin, Berlin, ch. 11 appendix 5, 5, which corrects accounts. Mitrokhin's brief notes on the Berlin tuntun corrects numerous errors in earlier accounts. Mitrokhins brief nel add nothing to toBattleground Berlin. Berlin. 14. 442. On Battle 14. Andrew Andrewand Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, p. 442. O n Goleniewski see Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, Berlin,pp. 342-6. 342-6.

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12. 15. Blake, No Other Choice, 15. Choice, chs. 11, 11,12. 16. Kalugin, Spymaster, Spynanster,p. 142. 142. 16. 17. 17.vol. 7, 7, ch. 14, 14,item 3. Driberg hadjoined joined the Communist Party while at public school school but was expelled expelledin 1941 National Biog1' aphy, the 1941when, according according to his entry in the the Dictionary of $National Biograpby, the Party Party leadership leadership "discovered discovered that he National BiogBiog hewas an an agent ofMI5, of MIS, to which he had been recruited in the late 1930s" 1930s(Dictionary (Dictionary of ofNational raphy, rapby, 1971-1980, 1971-1980, p. 251). 251). Though Driberg Driberg undoubtedly undoubtedly gave gave information information to to Maxwell Knight, Knight, a a leading leading MI5 officer, officer, much remains remains obscure about the relationship relationship between them. According to Knight's Knights personal assistant, assistant,Joan Joan Miller, Miller, he he was was a a bisexual bisexual who, who, for for a a time, time, was was "crazy" crazyabout about Driberg. Driberg. In her her view, view, Driberg Driberg was was a casual agent turn inin of stuff when (Interviewwith Joan only "a casual agent" who would "turn a bit of stuff" when Knight put pressure on him. (InterviewwithJoan TimesMagazine Magazine 18,1981); Miller, One one Girl's Girl?Uizr; War;Andrew, Secret Service, Service,pp. 521-2. 521-2. (October 18, 1981); Miller, Miller, Sunday Times 18. 228-9. 18. Driberg, Ruling Passions, Passions, pp. 228-9. 19. Wheen, Wheen,Tom Tom Driberg, Driberg, p. 309. 19. 20. Vassall, Vassal!; Ynssalk Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 442-4. 442-4. Andropov considered Vassall one of of the KGB's KGBs most valuable valuable agents. agents. 21. Driberg, Ruling Passions, Passions, p. 235. 22. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 3. Mitrokhin's he was "recruited 14,item Mitrokhins notes on on Driberg's Dribergs file record thathe recruited in Moscow .. .. .. chiefly on on the basis of compromising material which recorded his homosexual relations with an agent," details of agent, but give no no further details of the "compromising compromising material." material. 23. vol. 7, ch. 14, 14, item item3. 24. T om Driberg, 24. Watkins's Watkinss comments comments are are quoted quoted in inWheen, Wheen, Tom Driberg, p. p. 328. 328. 25. vol. 7, ch. 14, 14, item item3. 26. Wheen, Tom Tom Driberg, Driberg, pp. 292-315. 292-315. Francis Wheen's Wheens very readable and entertaining entertaining biography of of Driberg uenced in Driberg dismisses dismisses all suggestion suggestion that that his his book book on on Burgess Burgess was was infl influenced in any any way way by bythe the KGB. KGB. Though Though shocked by the stench acrid piss" piss of of stories thepress by byMI5 and MI6 (Tom (Tom Driberg, Driberg, "stench" from the "acrid stories planted in the Mr. Wheen p. 317), Mr. Wheenfailed to detect any unwholesome aroma emitting from the vast array of KGB active measures. Despite the the SCD's SCDs addiction to compromise operations, it also does him that that the the measures. does not occur to him Dribergs sexual sexual adventures adventures in Moscow lavatories. lavatories. KGB might have exploited Driberg's 27. 27. Driberg, Driberg, Ruling Passions, Passions, p. p. 229. 229. Burgess. 28. Driberg, Guy Burgess. Mitrokhins summary of of Driberg's Dribergs KGB fi file, of KGB 29. According to Mitrokhin's le, he was used for the "the publication of the British press," press, and "sent sent to the the United United States and other Western countries with a a [KGB] themes in the brief"; 14, item brief; vol. 7, ch. 14, item3. 30. om Driberg, 30. Wheen, Wheen, T Tom Driberg,p. p. 337. 337. 31. Ziegler, Wilson, Wilson, p. 313. 31. Ziegler, 32. om Dribe1-g, 32. Wheen, Wheen, T Tom Driberg,pp. pp. 353-4. 353-4. 33. vol. 7, 33. 7, ch. 14, 14, item 3. om D1'iberg, 400. 34. Wheen, T Tom Driberg, pp. 362-8, 362-8,400. 35. Wilson, p. 313. 35. Ziegler, Wilson, the pay of of the StB: Will 36. Frolik also identified three other Labor MPs whom he claimed had been in the Owen, John John Stonehouse and agent GUSTAV (not so so far reliably identified); Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 523-4. 523-4. 37. vol. 7, ch. 14, 37. 14,item item 2. 38. Fletcher, 38. Fletcher, 60 E60 a a Second Second on Defence, Defence, pp. pp. 132-3. 132-3. 39. vol. 7, ch. 14, 14, item item2. MI5had had 1969 showing that he had had hadan 40. Fletcher claimed that MI5 shown his wife intercepted letters in 1969 affair during a visit to Hungary. Dorril and and Ramsay, Ramsay, Smear, Smear, p. 197. impressed, telling his diary that Wilson had a magnificent job of of 41. Dick Crossmann was less less impressed, had done "a information in order to pose as a Soviet Soviet expert. Ziegler, Wilson, Wilson,pp. 89-94. 89-94. blowing out his information" 42. vol. 7, ch. 14, 14, item item18. 18. 43. Ziegler, Wilson, Wilson, p. 91. 44. vol. 7, 7, ch. 14, item item18. 18. 45. Ziegler, Wilson, Wilson, p. 94. 46. 46. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item18. 18. Molebunt, pp. 97-9. 97-9. Mangold, Cold W Warrior, 95-7. 47. Wise, Molehunt, arrior, pp. 95-7. pycatcher. Wright later disowned most of 48. Wright, S Spycntcber. of his own conspiracy theory theory and said in a Panorama serious plotter (BBC1, (BBC1, October October13, 13,1988). interview that there had been only one serious 1988).

N o tt e e s s N o

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item15. of the thefuture Labor leader, Michael Foot, with Tri49. vol. 7, ch. 16, 16, item 15. In view of the connection of Tri allegations made against him by the Sunday Times 1995, for which he received libel dambune and the allegations Times in 1995, dam seems appropriate to add that Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes contain no reference to him. ages, it seems 50. 50. Crankshaw, Crankshaw, Putting up with the Russians, Russians,1947-1984, 1947-1984,p. xi. xi. 51. Crankshaw, Crankshaw, Russia by Daylight, Daylight, p. 12. 12. 1981-1985, 52. Dictionary of o f National NationaZ Biography, Biography, 1981-1985,p. 101. 53. vol. 7, ch. 14, 14, item item42. 54. Crankshaw, Putting up with the Russians, Russians,p. 13. 13. 55. 55. vol. 7, ch. 14, item 42. 56. Crankshaw, 56. Crankshaw, Putting up with the Russians, Russians,p. 81. 81. 57. vol. 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item 42. 58. vol. 7, 16, item 58. 7, ch. 16, item17. 17. 59. Barron, KGB, pp. 343-5. 343-5. 60. vol. 7, ch. 16, 16, item disproves suggestions that Courtney was item17. 17. The KGB fIle file on operation operation PROBA PROBA disproves the victim of a plot by MI5 rather than KGB. Dorri! 107. thanthe the Dorril and andRamsay, Smear, Smear, p. 107. 61. vol. 7, ch. 14, 13. There of any major hemorrhage of of informainforma 61. 14, item 13. Thereis no record in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes of tion by any seduced member of the British embassy Vassallo embassy staff staff after Vassall. 10 and 12. 12. 62. See above, chapters 10 63. 103-5. Though the main features of of Molodys Molody's 63. Samolis Samolis (ed.), Veterany Eterany Vneshnei Vneshnei Razvedki Rossii, pp. 103-5. illegal resident in London, much of of which came out at his trial in 1961, 1961,are already known, the career as illegal fIles files noted by Mitrokhin add some important details. SVYASHCHENNIK 64. vol. 8, ch. 8. SVY ASHCHENNIK had previously been used to check "check" Hambleton before his recruitrecruit vol. 8, app. 1 1. ment by the KGB; vol. . 8, 65. vol. 8 , ch. 8. Wars, 119. Granatstein and and Stafford, Spy W 66. Granatstein ars, p. 119. part3.3. 67. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 68. k-11, 19. k-11,19. BENSpossession after his arrest in 1961. Bulloch and Miller, Spy Ring, ch. 69. Microdot letter found in BEN's 11; 11;West, The II/egals, IZZegaZs, pp. 175-7. 175-7. 70. vol. 6, 6, ch. 5, part part3. 71. Agranovsky, "Profession: 71. Profession: Foreigner." Foreigner. part2. 72. vol. 6, 6, ch. 5, part 73. part file for 1953 1953 describes describes LONG as a "valuable valuable agent 73. vol. 6, ch. 5, part 2. A KGB ftle agent" of of the Paris residency; residency; k-4,99. Peter Kroger" Krogerhad been born in Gisborne, New Zealand, on July 10, 10, k-4, 99. According to their passports, "Peter 1910 and "Helen Helen Kroger" Krogerhad been born in Boyle, Alberta, on January 17,1913; part 2. Their 1910 17, 1913; vol. 6, ch. 5, part colleagues in the theBritish book trade believed both to to be Canadian. 74. Snelling, Rare Books Bookc and Rarer People, PeopZe, p. 208. 75. 75. Blake, No Other Choice, Choice, p. 265. 76. Agranovsky, "Profession: Profession: Foreigner." Foreigner. 77. vol. 7, ch. 14, 14, item item17. 17. 78. vol. 7, ch. 12. 12. 79. Houghton, Operation Operation Portland, PortZand,Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 446-7. 446-7. pycatcher, pp. 137-8; 80. 80. Wright, S Spycatcher, 137-8; Rositzke, The KGB, KGB,pp. 76-7. 76-7. 81. 81. vol. 7, ch. 12. 12. 82. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2. 82. 83. 83. vol. 6, ch. 5, part part2.2. 84. Samolis Veterany Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki Rossii, pp. 68-72. 68-72. Samolis (ed.), Veterany 85. Blake, 85. Blake, No Other Choice, Choice, pp. 264-5. 264-5. 86. vol. 7, 86. 7, ch. 12. 12. 87. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. 447-8. 447-8. 87. 88. 88. vol. 7, ch. 12. 12. 89. 89. vol. 7, ch. 12. 12. 90. RAG had been recruited in 1955; of the 1955; his work as a Soviet agent was known to at at least one leader of Belgian Communist Party. k-11, 17. k-11,17. 91. vol. 7, ch. 13. 13. At the the time of Koslov's Koslovs recall, recall, the Centre Centre does not appear to have decided whether his fInal final destination was to have been Britain or the United United States.

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him him as as holding holding that that post post in in 1975. 1975.vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 8, 8, para. para. 6. 6.

92. Directorate 92. Bagrichev Bagrichevlater later became became head head of of the the first first department department in in Directorate S; S;a a file file noted noted by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin records records

93. 93. Lopatin Lopatin became became acting acting resident, resident, following following Chizhov's Chizhovs sudden sudden recall recall to to Moscow Moscow in in 1966 1966 after after he he had had

apparently apparentlysuffered suffered a a brain brain hemorrhage; hemorrhage; Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, p. p. 773, 773, n. n. 121. 121.Chizhov Chizhov appears appearsto to have 452. have recovered. recovered.In In the the mid-1970s mid-1970s he he was was resident resident in in Mogadishu. Mogadishu. k-12, k-12,452. 17. 94. 94. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 5 517. 95. 95. Frolik, Frolik, The TheFrolik Frolik Defection, Defection,p. p. 82. 82. 96. Savin officer 96. From From 1964 1964to to1968 1968 Savinwas was Lyalin's Lyalinspredecessor predecessor as as the the Thirteenth ThirteenthDepartment Department officer at at the the Lon London vol. 84. don residency; residency;he he later later became became head head of of Line Line N N in in Finland. Finland. vol. 7, 7, app. app. 2, 2, paras. paras. 61, 61,84. 98. Gordievsky, 8 . In sixteen ficers were 98. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 517-1 517-18. In 1971 1971 sixteen Line Line X X of officers were operating operating under under offi offieight eight in in the the trade trade mission; mission; one one in in Mashpriborintorg Mashpriborintorg (International (International Machine Machine Tool Tool Trade Trade Organization); Organization); seriously nyy anan (unidentified) nyy Bank Bank and and in in (unidentified) Anglo-Soviet Anglo-Soviet organization. organization.The The number number of of Line LineX X officers officers was was seriously reduced 124. reduced as as a a result result of of the themass mass expulsion expulsionof of September September 1971. 1971. k-2, k-2,124. 99. 124. For 99.vol. vol. 7, 7,app. app. 1, 1,item item 65; 65;k-2, k-2,124. For legal legal reasons, reasons,it it is is not not possible possibleto to include include the the names names or or other other iden iden100. 100.vol. vol. 7, 7,app. app. 1, 1,item item 51. 51. and and one oneas as a a trainee. trainee. Additional Additional Line Line X X officers officerswere were being being selected selected for for positions positions in in the theMoscow Moscow Narod Narod-

Trust, p. 97. A Matter 97. West, West,A Matter of $Trust, p. 171. 171.Brook-Shepherd, Brook-Shepherd, The The Storm Storm Birds, Birds, p. p. 198. 198.

cial cial cover cover in in London: London:one one (Sherstnev) (Sherstnev) as as embassy embassy first first secretary; secretary; three three as as third third secretaries; secretaries;one one as as attache; attache;

tifying tifylng details details of of the the Line LineX X agents agents contained contained in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes. notes. 101. 24; 120. 101. vol. vol. 7, 7,ch. ch. 14, 14,item item 24; k-2, k-2,120. 103. 4. 103.vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14,item item 4. 102. 124. 102.vol. vol. 7, 7,app. app. 1, 1,item item 70; 70; k-2, k-2,124. 104. 104.vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14,item item16. 16. 105. 124 105.vol. vol. 7, 7, app. app. 1, 1,item item 64; 64; k-2, k-2,124 106. 124. 106.vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14,item item 36; 36; k-2, k-2,124. 107. , item 124. The 107.vol. vol. 7, 7,app. app. 1 1, item 69; 69; k-2, k-2,124. The engineer engineer DAN DAN is is not not to tobe be confused confused with with the theTribune Tribunejournalist journalist with with the thesame same codename. codename. 108. k-2, 124. 108.vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14,item item15; 15; k-2,124. 109. 109. vol. vol. 7, 7, app. app. 1, 1,item item 96. 96. 1 10. k-2, 124 110. k-2,124 1 1 1 . vol. 111. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14,item item31. 31. 1 12. Andrew rust, pp. 15-19. 112. Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. p. 518; 518;West, West,A A Matter Matter ofT $Trust, pp. 1 115-19. 1 13. Reports (Cmnd. 2722) (Cmnd. 113. Reports of of the the Security Security Commission Commission in in June June 1965 1965 (Cmnd. 2722) and and November November 1968 1968 (Cmnd. 3856); oo Semt 463; West, rust, pp. 161-2. 3856); Pincher, Pincher, T Too Secret Too TooLong, Long, pp. pp. 421-3, 421-3,463; West,A A Matter Matter ofT o f Trust, pp. 127-9, 127-9,161-2. 1 14. vol. 114. vol. 7, 7,app. app.2, 2, item item 64. 64. 1 15. vol. 115. vol. 7, 7,app. app. 2, 2,item item31. 31.

1 16. vol. 116. vol. 7, 7, app. app. 2, 2, item item 14. 14.

117. and 117.Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 24-6. 24-6. 1 19. vol. 3737 119. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,part part

y Silent ar, p. 7. 1 1 8. Philby, 118. Philby,M My Silent W War, p. 1 17.

120. orms, respectively 120.Philby's Philbys original original codename codename had had both both Russian Russian and and German German f forms, respectively SYNOK SYNOK and and SOH SOH-

121. 121.vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 1, 1,part part 37 37

NCHEN, NCHEN, both both meaning meaning "Sonny." Sonny.

122. 122. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 525-6. 525-6. 123. 123. See See above, above,chapter chapter 23. 23. 124. 124.Gordievsky, Gordievsky,Next Next Stop StopExecution, Execution,p. p. 184. 184. 125. pymaster, p. 31. 125. Kalugin, Kalugin, S Spymaster, p. 1 131.

Chapter Chapter Twenty-jive

3 . See 3. See above, above, chapter chapter 7. 7.

1. Knightley, Philby; 1.Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 24-6. 24-6. Knightley, Philby;pp. pp. 234-7. 234-7.

Cold ar Operations Cold W War Operationsagainst against Britain Part 2 2

2. 1971). 2. Izvestia Izwestia (October (October 1, 1,1971). 4. 4. SIS SIS officers officers stationed stationed in in Beirut Beirut since since Philby's Philbys defection defection in in 1963 1963had hadbeen been identified identified by by the the bugging bugging of of the the British British embassy embassyand and SIS SIS station station in in operation operation RUBIN; RUBIN; vol. vol. 7, 7,ch. ch. 5, 5, para. para. 38. 38. 971). Robert ashington 5 . Izvestia 5. Izwestia (October (October 1, 1,1 1971). Robert G. G. Kaiser, Kaiser, "Soviets Soviets Name Name 7 7 Britons Britons as as Mideast Mideast Spies," Spies, W Washington 1971). Post Post (October (October2, 2,1971).

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6. Zaman editorial 1972). 6. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. 5, 5, para. 29. 29. Al AlZaman editorial (May 8, 8,1972). orld Broadcasts, ME/3823/i (October 1971). Al Zaman editorial (May 1972). 7. 7. BBC, BBC, Summary of W World Broadcasts, (October27, 27,1971). (May 8, 8,1972). 8. 8. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 5, 5,para. para. 36. 36. 9. 9. vol. vol. 7, 7,ch. ch. 5, 5,para. para. 29. 29. 10. Times (April 7, LOrient-Le Jour (Beirut) (Beirut) (May 13, 13, 1972); 1972); The The Times 7, 1973). 1973). When When later questioned by 10. L'Orient-Le Knightley about about the KGB's KGBs renewed contact with him early 1970s, 1970s, Philby was a vague Knightley him in inthe the early "a little vague" (Knightley, (Knightley,Philby, Philby p. 237). 237). Philby could could scarcely have haveforgotten the long interview in Izvestia Izzlestia on October October 1, 1971, which 1,1971, which marked marked his partial return return to favor, h o r , but plainly preferred not to totalk about it. it. pymaster, pp. 133-4l. 1 l . Kalugin, 11. Kalugin, S Spymaster, 133-41. Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. 544-5. 544-5. 12. 12.vol. vol. 7, 7, app. app. 2, 2, item 82. 82. tter of rust pp. 171-2. 13. 13. Brook-Shepherd, The The Storm Birds, Birds,p. p. 199; 199;West, A Ma Matter o fT Trust, 171-2. 14. 14. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. 525-6. 525-6. 15. 15. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 6. 6. 16. 16. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 526. 526. 17.vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 6, para. 9. 9. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes do do not notrecord the date dateat which which the the bugging of the trade trade dele dele17. gation was discovered. discovered.In 1989, 1989,however, however, the Soviets Sovietspublicized publicized their discovery discoveryof the bugs some some years ear earlier. Christopher Christopher Andrew, Andrew, Simon Simon O'Dwyer ODwyer Rssell Russell and Robert Robert Porter, Porter, "Battle Battle of the Bugs on the the Wall," Wall, lier. Sunday T elegraph (June 4, 1989). Telegraph 4,1989). 18. 18. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsh, KGB, KGB, p. p. 514. 514. 19. embassy 1973 were Ivan I. 19. vol. vol. 7, 7, app. 2, item 7. 7. KGB KGB agents agents in the theLondon London embassy on January 15, 15,1973 I. Ippolitov (minister-counselor), (minister-counselor), Ralf Bernkhardovich Bernkhardovich Mikenberg Mikenberg (second (second secretary), secretary),V. V. 1. I. Solovev Solovev (third secretary), secretary), Andrei rst secretary), Andrei Sergeyevich Parastayev Parastayev (fi (first secretary), Grigori Grigori Petrovich Petrovich Dremlyuga Dremlyuga (aide (aide to naval naval attache), Andrei Andrei Filippovich Filippovich Pekhterev (senior (senior assistant assistant military military attache), Nikolai Nikolai Nikolayevich Nikolayevich Pleshakov Pleshakov (inter (interI.A. A. Bardeyev, Bardeyev, (assistant (assistant naval naval attache), attache), A. A. A. A. Abramov Abramov (attache), 1. I. M. M. Klimanov, Dmitri Alekhin preter), 1. (duty (duty office keeper), keeper), Leonid A. Moskvin (third (third secretary), secretary), Vasili Vasili A. Tolstoy (duty (duty office keeper), Viktor Mikhailovich Gribanov (trade attache), attach$, Vladimir Vladimir Petrovich Petrovich Molotkov, Molotkov, Stanislav Stanislav Pokrovsky, Pokrovsky, Lev. Lev.A. A, Konev, Viktor Mikhailovich Ivanov Ivanov (trade representative) representative) and Tamara Tikhonovna Nikulina. 20. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 3, 3, para. para. 12; 12;vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 3, 3, paras. paras. 6-7. 6-7. 2l. 453. 21. vol. vol. 7, 7, app. 3; 3; k-27, k-27,453. 22. 22. k-4, k-4, 154. 154. 23. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. 14, 14,item item 16. 16. 24. 24. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item17. 17. 25. 124. 25. k-2, k-2,124. 26. 26. See See above, above,chapter 24. 27. 27. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14,item item4. 28. 28. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 3. 3. 29. 29. vol. vol. 7, 7,app. app. 3, n. n. 8. 8. It does does not follow followthat that the theKGB KGB succeeded succeeded in sending agents or trusted contacts to all all these colleges. colleges. 30. 30. vol. 7, 7, app. app. 2, 2, item 77. 77. Because Because of his difficulty in combining a career career as as a distinguished research sci scientist with work work as as an operational intelligence intelligence officer, officer, Lednev was later allowed allowed to leave leave the KGB, KGB, though he was no doubt expected was deputy expected to retain an association association with it. it. According to KGB fues, files, in 1981 1981he he director of the Institute Biological chino. vol. Instituteof of Biological Physics Physics in the thecity of Push Pushchino. vol. 6, 6, app. 2, part 5. 3 l . vol. was succeeded 31. vol. 7, 7,app. app. 2, item 4. 4. In 1979 1979 Lopatin Lopatin succeededas as head of of Directorate T by Leonid Sergeyevich Zaitsev, Zaitsev, who had also also begun specializing specializing in S&T while while at the London residency residency in the 1960s. 1960s. vol. 3, pakapp. pakapp. 3, 3, items 294-5; 294-5; Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 622. 622. 32. 124. vol. 32. k-2, k-2,124. vol. 7, 7, app. app. 1, 1,item item 66. 66. 33. 33. COOPER, who who worked in the thenew new products department of a pharmaceutical company; company; a virologist; virologist; a research research scientist in a pharmaceutical pharmaceutical company; company; and an engineer at a British nuclear reactor. vol. vol. 7, 7,ch. 14, 14, item 31; 124; vo1. 31; k-2, k-2,124; vol. 7, 7, app. app. 1, 1,item 96. 96. 34. 34. Meetings Meetings between STARIK STANK and and his his controller took place place in Paris, Paris, those with DAN in Western Europe. Europe. In In 1975-6 1975-6 contact with HUNT H U N T was maintained by an agent of the Paris residency. residency. Other cases cases were 124; vol. were run by by the the Copenhagen Copenhagenand Helsinki residencies residencies(k-2, (k-2,124; vol. 6, 6, app. 1, 1 ,part 39; vol. vol.7, 7, app. app. 1, 1,items 65, 68). 65,68). 35. 35. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item 12. 12. Daily T elegraph (November 18, 1993). 36. 36. John Steele, Steele,"25 25 years years for the the Spy SpyWho Who Stayed Stayed in the theCold," Cold, Telegraph 18,1993). 37. 37. Report Report of the Security Security Commission (Cm 2930) 2930) (July 1995), 1995), chs. 2-4. 2-4.
,

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38. 38. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item12. 12. 39. 1978, see that Trapped a 39. On O n the the information information about about Smith Smith passed passed by byMIS MI5 to to EMI EM1 in in 1978, see "Phone Phone Call Call that Trapped a Spy," Spy, Independent 1993). Independent (November (November 19, 19,1993). 40. 40. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item 12. 12. 41. held 41. The The Security Security Commission Commission later later concluded concluded that that Smith Smithhad had held on on to to some some of of the the classified classified documents documents he he had had obtained obtained at at Thorn-EMI Thorn-EM1 and and given given them them to tothe theKGB KGB some some time time after after he he lost lost his his security security access access in in 1978. 1978. One One or or more more of of the the payments payments recorded recorded in in his his file file may maythus thus refer refer to to a a period period after after his his loss loss of of access. access. Since the details refer Since Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes end end in in1984, 1984, the details of of KGB KGB payments payments to to Smith Smithcannot cannot refer to to his his later later years years as as a a Soviet Soviet agent. agent. 1993). 42. 42. " 'Boring' BoringIdealist Idealist Who W h o Spied Spied for for Russia Russia Gets Gets 25 25Years," Years, The The Times Times(November (November 19, 19,1993). 43. 43. Report Report of of the the Security Security Commission Commission (Cm (Cm 2930) 2930) (July (July 1995), 1995), pp. pp. 8-9. 8-9. "Dear Dear Maggie, Maggie, Please Please Let Let Me Me 1993). Laurence Spy Spy for for the the KGB!," KGB!, Daily DaiZy Mirror (September (September 21, 21,1993). Laurence Donegan Donegan and andRichard Richard Norton-Taylor, Norton-Taylor, Guardian 1993). "Spy Spy Who W h o Slipped Slipped Through Through the theNet," Net, Guardian (November (November 19, 19,1993). 44. 44. See See below, below, chapter chapter 25. 25. 45. 45. Britain Britain ranked ranked fourth fourth in inS&T S&T collection. collection. 46. was firm 46. Klockner Klockner INA INA Industrial Industrial Plants PlantsLtd Ltd was a a British-based British-based subsidiary subsidiary of of the the West WestGerman German firm Kl6ck Klockner ner & & Co., Co., Kommanditgesellschaft Kommanditgesellschaft auf auf Aktien. Aktien. 47. operation 47. The The KGB KGB officers officers who who received received commendations commendations for for their their part part in inthe the operation were were A. A. B. B. Maksimov, Maksimov, V. V. G. G. Goncharov, Goncharov, V. V. A. A. Andryevskaya, Andryevskaya, A. A. I. I. Baskakov, Baskakov, A. N. N. Belov, Belov, V. P. ? Varvanin, Varvanin, A. A. N. N. Kosarev, Kosarev, A. V. Smirnov, S. A. Smirnov,A. A. A. A. Shishkov, Shishkov, S. A. Agafonov, Agafonov, V. V. K. Gavrilov, Gavrilov, S. S. Yu. Yu. Demidov, Demidov, B. B. 1. I. Danilin, Danilin, O. 0.1. I. Bukharev Bukharev and and V. V. A. A. Sedov. Sedov. vol. vol.7, 7, app. app. 3, 3, n. n. 15. 15. 48. 48. See See above, above, chapter chapter 21. 21. 49. 49. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item14. 14. 50. On , items 42. 50. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item18. 18. On Parastayev, Parastayev, see see also alsovol. vol.7, 7, app. app. 1 1, items 7, 7,42. 51. 51. Ziegler, Ziegler, Wilson, Wilson,p. p. 503. 503. 52. 52. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14,item item18. 18. 53. 53. Ziegler, Ziegler, Wilson, Wilson,pp. pp. 508-9. 508-9. 54. 54. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item18. 18. 55. 55. Andrew and andGordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instructionsfrom Instructionsjom the Centre, Centre,p. 129. 129. 56. 62. 56. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 16, 16, items items 54, 54,62. 57. 57. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 16, 16,item item62. 62. 58. 58. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instructionsfrom Instructionsjom the the Centre, Centre,pp. pp. 129-30. 129-30. 59. 59. See See above, above, chapter chapter 24. 24. 60. 60. Information Information from from Oleg Oleg Gordievsky. Gordievsky. 61. 61. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 16, 16, item item50. 50. 1975). 62. 62. Morning Star Star(October (October 31, 31,1975). 63. 63. De-la-Noy, De-la-Noy, Mervyn Stockwood, Stockwood,pp. pp. 214-15. 214-15. 64. 50. but declined 64. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 16, 16,item item 50. Tony Tony Benn Benn was was also alsoinvited invited to to dinner dinner but declined because because "Mervyn Mervyn Stockwood Stockwood is is such such an an old old gossip gossip that that he'd hed tell tell everybody everybody that that he's hes had had a a dinner dinner party party for for the the Secretary Secretary of of the the Com Communist munist Party and myself." myself. Benn, Benn,Against the the Tide, Tide, p. 482. 482. 65. 65. De-la-Noy, De-la-Noy, Mervyn Stockwood, Stockwood,p. p. 212. 212. 66. 66. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 16, 16,item item 51. 51. 67. 67. vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 16, 16, item item53. 53. 68. KGB pectator (December 10, 1994). 68. Alasdair Palmer, Palmer, "How Howthe the KGB Ran Ran the the Guardian's Guardians Features Features Editor," Editor, S Spectator 10,1994). Interview with Richard Gott, 1994). Gott, Guardian Guardian (December 12, 12,1994). 69. le or references to other Guardian 69. Mitrokhin did did not note note either Gott's Gotts KGB KGB fi file Guardian articles articles by him. His His notes notes thus thus do do not notclarify clarify the the nature nature of of Gott's Gotts relationship relationship with with the the KGB. KGB. Gott Gott acknowledges acknowledges having having met met KGB offi cers in London, London, Moscow, the only money he officers Moscow, Vienna, Athens Athens and Nicosia, Nicosia, but claims claims that the received from them them was was to pay pay travel expenses to and and in the last last three locations. locations. Interview with with Richard 1994). Cf. Gott, Gott, Guardian Gunrdian (December (December 12, 12,1994). Cf. Gordievsky, Gordievsky,Next Stop Execution, Execzltion, pp. pp. 281-2. 281-2. 70. fficial Report, 70. vol. VOI.7, 7?ch. ch. 16, 16, item item 66. 66. Parliamentary ParZiamentary Debates, 5th 5th series, series, House of o f Commons Commons O Oficial Report, Session Session 1977-78, 944, 1977-78, vol. VOI. 944, col. col. 1200. 1200. 71. 71. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 506-8. 72. from the 138-9. 72. Andrew and Gordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions Instructionsfiom the Centre, Centre,pp. 101-2, 101-2,138-9. 73. Observerduly duly reported reported American American claims claims that that the thedocument document was was forged forged but but gave gave greater greater weight weight to to evi evi73. Observer 1984). dence dence for for its its authenticity authenticity (Observer, (Observer,January January 22, 22,1984).

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74. "A A Girl's Girls Best Friend," Friend, New Statesman Statesman (November (November 5, 5,1982). 1982). 74. 75. Andrew and and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, p. 630. 630. 75. 76. vol. vol. 6, 6, app. 1 1(misc.), (misc.), part part 1; 1;k-12, k-12,51. 76. 51. 77. Andrew and andGordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), Instructions Instructionsfiom Centre,pp. 130-7. from the Centre, 77. 78. Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instructions Instructionsfiom Centre,p. 118. 118. from the Centre, 78. 79. There is, is, for example, example,no no reference reference in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes to to Geoffrey Prime, the the agent in GCH GCHQw ho 79. who was-unusually-recruited KGB Third Directorate, to whose files was-unusually-recruited and run run outside the UK UK by the KGB didnot not access. Mitrokhin did have access. 80. vol. vol. 7, 7,app. app.1, 1,item 77. 77.There is another another tantalizing one-sentence reference to a SIGINT official (appar (appar80. codenamed ZHUR (JOUR), contacted in 1963 1963for the first time since since 1938. 1938. Mitrokhin gives ently British) codenamed the contact had any result. result. It is also also possible possible that the the reference was garbled, garbled, no indication whether or not the since the longest-serving longest-serving agent providing intelligence intelligence on cipher systems, an employee of the French foreign foreign since ministry, was was codenamed JOUR. vol. 7, app. 1, 122. 1, item 122. 81. vol. 5, 5, ch. ch. 14. 14. 81. 82. The The Times Times(November 29, 29,1969, March31, 31,1994). 82. 1969, March 1994). 83. vol. vol. 5, ch. 14, 14,para. para. 1; 1; vol. 7, ch. 7, para. para. 74. 83. 84. vol. 5, ch. 14, 14, 11. n. 4; vol. 7, 7, ch. 7, para. para. 74. 84. 85. vol. 5, 5, ch. 14, 14, para. para. 2 and n. n. 4. 85. 86. vol. 7, ch. ch. 7, paras. 73, 73,74; k-2,171; 86. 74; k-2, 171; vol. 5, ch. 14, 14, paras. 2,3,7. 2, 3, 7. 14, paras. paras, 5, 5, 6; vol. 87. vol. 5, ch. 14, vol.7, 7, ch. 7, para. 75. Since there is no indication that VERA behaved improperly, it would be unfair to reveal her identity or precise job in the Moscow embassy, improperly, embassy, both of of which Symondss fi file. are recorded in Symonds's le. 88. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 7-9. 7-9. 88. 14, paras. 89. 5, ch. 14, n. 6. 89. vol. 5, 14, n. 6. Symonds to use his forged British passport to apply for an Aus90. It was also considered too risky for Symonds Aus toNew New notrequire a visa. From New Zealand he would need only Everetts tralian visa; entry to Zealand did not Everett's birth certificate certificate to gain entry to Australia. Australia. Symonds, however, was was unable to book a direct flight from Tokyo to New Zealand and was forced to use his bogus British passport as a transit passenger in Sydney. When flying from New Zealand to Australia later in the year, he used the same passport with an AusAus if he he used Everetts tralian visa obtained in Wellington, fearing that if Everett's birth certificate an immigration immigration serser hehad had previously possessed possessed a British passport containing the same name vice computer might detect that he of birth. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 10-11. and date of 14, paras. 10-11. 5, ch. 14, paras. 12-44. 91. vol. 5, 12-44. 45-6. 92. vol. 5, ch. 14, 14, paras. 45-6. 93. vol. 7, 7, ch. 7, para. 76. 94. vol. 5, ch. 14, 14, paras. 51-2. 51-2. The Fugitive Detective and His Secret Trips to toBritain, Times(April 15,1981). 15, 1981). 95. "The Britain," The Times 96. vol. 5, ch. 14, paras. 53-4. 53-4. 97. Bribes e was Told to Flee, Times "Bribes Trial Man Says H He Flee," The Times (April 7,1981). 7, 1981). Detective "Detective in Morass 'Morass of of CorCor ruption a Bent Copper," Copper, The Times (March 15, 1981). Confessions "Confessions of ofa (March 31,1994). 31, 1994). ruption' is Jailed, Jailed," The Times (April 15,1981). 98. Andrew and andGordievsky, KGB, p. 526. Lukasevics was was unable to claim credit for Prime Prime and and Symonds, KGBs most notable British agents of the1970s; hadbeen recruited recruited abroad. two of of the KGB's of the 1970s; both had 99. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 585-7; 585-7; Gordievsky, Gordievsky, Next Next Stop Execution, pp. 249-52. 249-52. 100. 7, app. app. 2, item 69. 100. vol. 7, 101. 7, app. 2,71. The file 101. vol. 7, 2, 71. The file noted by Mitrokhin refers to Guk Guk by by his codename, codenarne, YERMAKOV. 102. 102. Zamuruyev was succeeded succeeded as head of of Line N by Aleksandr Igorevich Timonov. vol. 7, ch. ch. 7, para. 10; app. 2, para. 50. 103. Andrewand and Gordievsky, KGB, p. 599. Gordievsky, 103. Andrew Gordievsky, Next Next Stop Execution, pp. 269-70. 269-70. 104. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 582-605. Andrew and 104. Andrew 582-605. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instrzrctionsfiom Instructions from the Centre, ch. 4. 105. item 19. 105. vol. 7, ch. 16, item 19. 106. Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. 586. 107. vol. 7, app. 2, item 73. 108. 108. vol. 7, app. 2, item 72. 109. f a Spy, pp. 139-45, 109. Earley, Confessions Con fessions o of 139-45, 176-9. 176-9. 110. 1 10. Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 28-35,609; 28-35, 609; Gordievsky, Gordievsky, Next Next Stop Stop Execution, chs. 1,14, 1, 14, 15.

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1 1 1. vol. 111. vol. 7, ch. ch. 14, 14, item item12. 12. 1 12. Report Security 112. Report of ofthe the Security Commission Commission (Cm (Cm 2930) 2930) (July (July 1995), 1995), p. p. 10. 10. 1 13. Report 32-3. "Phone 113. Report of of the the Security Security Commission Commission (Cm (Cm 2930) (July (July 1995), 1995), pp. pp. 13-14, 13-14,32-3. Phone Call Call Hoax (November 19, 1993); "Vital Clues that that Trapped TrappedaaSpy," Spy, Independent (November 19,1993); Vital Clues to to aaTraitor," Traitor, Daily Mail (Novem (November ber 19, 19, 1993). 1993). 1 14. Some 114. Some indication indication of of the the intelligence intelligence provided provided by by Kuzichkin Kuzichkin and and Butkov Butkov is is provided provided in in their theirmemoirs. memoirs. On Cold War." On Makarov, Makarov, see see Kahn, Kahn, "Soviet Soviet Comint Comint in inthe the Cold War. Butkov's Butkovs memoirs memoirs have have so so far far appeared appeared only only in in Norwegian. Norwegian. 1 15. Pasechnik, 115. Pasechnik, one one of of the the scientific scientific directors directors of of Biopreparat, Biopreparat, the the world's worlds largest largest and and most most advanced advanced bio biological logical warfare warfare research research institute, institute, made made contact contact with with SIS SIS during during aavisit visit to to France France in in 1989 1989 and and was was exftl exfiltrated the 1995 Radio trated to to Britain. Britain. Interview Interview with with Pasechnik Pasechnik by by Christopher Christopher Andrew Andrewinin the 1995 Radio 4 series series New Spies for for Old? OZd? (presented (presented by by Christopher Christopher Andrew; Andrew; produced produced by by Dennis Dennis Sewell). Sewell).

The Federal Chapter Chapter Twenty-six The Federal Republic Republic of o f Germany Germany
1. 1.See See above, above, chapter chapter 12. 12. 2. German illegals 2. In In 1977 1977 the the KGB KGB apparat apparat at at Karlshorst Karlshorst was was training training seven seven East East German illegals and and investigating investigating another 774. another fifty-two fifty-two potential potential recruits, recruits, most most of of whom whom would would probably probably not not make make the the grade; grade; k-5, k-5,774. 3. 3. On O n its its foundation foundation in in 1952, the the Stasi's Stasis foreign foreign intelligence intelligence arm arm was was known known as as Hauptverwaltung Hauptverwaltung XV (Main it it was A in (Main Department DepartmentXV); XV); was renamed renamed the the HV HVA in 1956. 1956. 4. Childs Childs and andPopplewell, Popplewell, The The Stasi, Stasi, pp. pp. 122-3. 122-3. 5. 5. Wolf, Wolf, Man without aaFace, Face, p. p. xii. xii. 6. 522. The 6. k-16, k-16,522. The residencies residencies in in Cologne Cologne and and Hamburg Hamburg were were subordinate subordinate to to that thatof of Bonn, Bonn, whose whose head head had had the the title title of of Chief ChiefResident. Resident. 7. 247. 7. k-19, k-19,247. 8. 8, The The leader leader of of the the snatch snatch squad squad was was another another German Germanagent, agent, WAGNER WAGNER (later (later renamed renamed FLORA). FLORA). For For this Star. While was this and and other other special special actions, actions, he he was was awarded awarded the the Order Orderof of the the Red Red Star. While WAGNER WAGNER was stationed stationed Belgium from 1964 1964 to to1967, as courier to him. k-5, k-5,88; k-16,212. in Belgium 1967, SERGEYEV acted as 88; k-16, 212. 9. 88. 9. k-5, k-5,88. 10. 283. 10. k-5, k-5,283. 11. 284. 11.k-5, k-5,284. 12. 65. 12. k-9, k-9,65. Generalwas was a Spy, 13. 13. Hohne Hohne and and Zolling, Zolling, The General Spy, ch. ch. 12. 12. Rositzke, Rositzke, The KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 189-94. 189-94. Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky, Berlin, pp. Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 412, 412, 452-3; 452-3; Murphy, Murphy, Kondrashev Kondrashev and and Bailey, Bailey, Battleground Berlin, pp. 430-9. 430-9. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins brief notes notes on Felfe Felfe contain no detailed examples examples of the the intelligence intelligence he provided; provided; they con confirm, firm, however, however, that that Felfe's Felfes memoirs, memoirs, Im Im Dienst des des Gegners, Gegners, contains contains disinformation disinformation fabricated fabricated by by Service Service A 284). A (k-5, (k-5,284). 14. 11. 14.vol. vol. 6, ch. ch. 2, part part 1, 1,n. 101-3, 184-5, 229-3 1 . 15. Peet, Peet, The TheLong Engagement, Engagement, pp. pp. 3, 3,101-3,1844,229-31. 15. 1 6 . Peet, The 16. Tht.Long Engagement, Engagement,ch. ch. 30. 30. Childs Childs and and Popplewell, Popplewell, The The Stasi, Stasi, pp. pp. 145-6. 145-6. 17. Otto John case 17. The The best best account account of of the the Otto John case is isMurphy, Murphy, Kondrashev Kondrashev and and Bailey, Bailey, Battleground Battlepound Berlin, Berlin, ch. ch. 10. 10. Mitrokhin ue on Mitrokhh saw saw no no f file on the thecase. case. 18. Nationalrat der Nationalen Front des Demokratischen Deutschland, Braunbuch 18. Braunbuch and Graubuch. Graubzrch. 19. 19. Schmeidel, Schmeidel, "Shield Shield and and Sword Sword of of the the Party," Party, pp. pp. 146-7. 146-7. 20. 88. The fact that Brandt 20. k-26, k-26,88. Brandtwas was given given a codename is not, of course, course,evidence evidence that he hewas an agent. Churchill and andRoosevelt Rooseveltwere were referred referred to by coden codenames wartime Soviet Sovietintelligence intelligence cables. Even Churchill ames in wartime 21. Brandt, y Road to Berlin, Brandt, M My Roadto Berlin, chs. chs. 2-4. 2-4. y Road to 22. 88. On 22. k-26, k-26,88. O n Rein, Rein, see see Brandt, Brandt, M My t o Berlin, Berlin, pp. pp. 79-80. 79-80. 23. The British also ULTRA intelligence on the the movements the Tirpitz. also had ULTRA movements of the Tirpitz. After several un unsuccessful battleship was finally sunk in in November the loss of 1,204 successful British attacks, the the battleship November 1944 1944 with the 1,204 lives. lives. 24. TERENTY TERENTY was the the Czech Czech Communist journalist journalist Walter Taube. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins note identifies identifies VANY VAWA 24. A as Vanek, Vanek, a a former Czech intelligence intelligence officer officer now working for the British. It is unclear whether "Vanek" Vanel? is is as a 88). a forename forename or or surname surname (k-26, (k-26,88). 25. k-26, 88. k-26,88. 26. 88. 26. k-26, k-26,88. 27. 86. 27. k-26, k-26,86. 28. Colitt, Colitt, Spy Mastel; Mastel;p. p. 97. 97.

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29. Brandt, People and Politics, 29. Politics, pp. 47-8. 47-8. approval of 30. Operations against major foreign statesmen normally required the approval of the political leadership. 31. k-26, k-26,88. 31. 88. Mitrokhins notes on Brandt's Brandtsftle file go only to 1962. 1962.They 32. Mitrokhin's They do, however, include later references to Bran& Brandt from other files. 33. Politics, pp. 102-3. 102-3. Abrasimov, Abrasimov, later accused of 33. Brandt, People and Politics, of behaving like a Soviet pro-consul, was ambassador in East EastBerlin. 34. Wolf, Man without a Face, ch. 9; 9; Colitt, Spy Master, Master, ch. 4; Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battle34. Battle Berlin,p. 300. 300. ground Berlin, 35. Probably the best study of Ost politik is Garton Ash, In Europe? Europe's Name. Ostpolitik Ash, Name. 35. 36. Wolf, Man without aaFace, p. 156. 156. 36. 37. 248, 250. 37. k-19, k-19,248,250. 38. Prittie, Velvet Chancellors, Chancellors, pp. 170-1. 170-1. 38. 39. WilbBrandt, Brandt, pp. 86-7. 86-7. 39. Marshall, Willy 40. 52. 40. k-2, k-252. 41. Wolf, Spionagechefim geheimen Krieg, p. 261. Spionagechef imgeheimen 261. 42. Marshall, Willy Wily Brandt, Brandt, pp. pp. 88-90. 88-90. 43. 52. 43. k-2, k-2,52. Bank pay-in pay-in Slip Published in Bonn Bribes Scandal," Scandal, The Times Times (June 20, 1973). of 44. "Bank 44. 1973). Steiner "Steiner Tells of Work as an Agent," 1973). Agent, Daily Daib Telegraph Telegraph (August 8, 8,1973). Wolf concludes concludes that "it it is impossible impossible to establish whether [Steiner] was paid twice over for his ser45. Wolf 45. ser vices-by Wienand as well wellas asthe HV HVA Krieg,p. 261. Spionagechefim geheimen Krieg, vices"-by A directly. Wolf, Spionagechefimgeheimen 28, 1974). 46. Bonn Bribery Allegations 'Not Not Proven,' Proven, " The Times Times(March 28,1974). 46. "Bonn 47. Erinnerungen,pp. 197-201. 47. Genscher, Erinnerungen, es a number of of boastful inaccuracies Guil 48. Wolf identifi identifies inaccuracies in Guil48. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 157-65. Wolf laume's laumes own account of his career. career. 49. Genscher, Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 201-2. 49. Erinnerungen, pp. 201-2. 50. 50. Wolf, Wolf, Man without a a Face, pp. xi, xi, 171-2. Face, p. 124. 124. 51. Wolf, Man without aaFace, 51. 442-4, 456-7, 611. 52. 238-40,442-4,456-7,611. 52. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 238-40, 53. The identity of of Wolf's the early Wolfs first "Romeo Romeo spy," spy, codenamed FELIX, who began operations in the 1950s, 124. 1950s, remains unknown. Wolf, Man without aaFace, p. 124. 54. k-5, k-5,30,31. 54. 30, 31. 55. k-5, 31. k-5,31. 56. Barron, KGB, pp. 198-9. 198-9. 57. k-16, 139. The alias "Franz is not recorded by Mitrokhin, but was later revealed at Hokes Hoke's trial. FranzBecker" Beckeris but 57. k-16139.The 58. k-l0, k-IO, 56; 56;k-16, k-16,139. 139. 59. 56; k-16, 139. 59. k-l0, k-10,56; k-16,139. 60. 65. 60. k-16, k-16,65. 61. 139; k-5, 19. 61. k-16, k-16,139; k-5,19. 62. 65. 62. k-16, k-16,65. 63. 139; k-5, 19. 63. k-16, k-16,139; k-5,19. 64. k-l0, k-10,56; k-16,139. 64. 56; k-16, 139. 65. egal based in Switzerland, who was also RYBACHEK,a Czech ill illegal also working 65. RENATA was married to RYBACHEK, for the KGB. k-16, 94, 139; k-12, 5; k-8, 25-6; k-2,k-2,46,84. 46, 84. k-16,94,139; k-12,5; k-8,256; 66. "Bonn Spy Knew Army Russia May Have Learned War Secrets," Secrets, Observer Observer (September 1, 1985); 1985); Bonn 66. "Russia Secrets," 8, 1985); Glamour "Glamour Spy's Secrets,Observer (September 8,1985); Spys Love Ends in intreachery," treachery,Observer (December 14, piegel (December 29,1986); 29, 1986); "KGB 1986); Spionage:Wie ein Helmspiel," Helmspiel, Der S Spiegel KGB Lover Led Shy Secretary 1986);"Spionage: into Treason," 1, 1987). Treason, Daily Duib Telegraph Telegraph(September 1,1987). Mitrokhins notes on ROSIE ROSIE do do not not give her real name. Press reports after her arrest in December 67. Mitrokhin's 67. 1976 identify her as Heidrun Hofer. 68. 385. According to k-8, 68. k-8, 7, 7, 177; 177; k-18, k-18,385. k-8, 177, ROSIE was recruited in October 1971; 1971; according to k-16, atat k-16,108, 108, she was recruited in 1973. 1973.The two two dates probably refer, respectively, respectively, to the the point point which she to to herher 1973, after began to supply information to ROLAND, ROLAND,and and meeting with VLADIMIR VLADIMIRinin February 1973, increased. which the importance of her role as an agent appears appears to have increased. 69. k-16,61. k-16, 61. From 1970 1982 VLADIMIR was an trainer based in Karlshorst, var 69. 1970 to 1982 anillegal illegal Karlshorst,who performed various FRG and Austria. Austria. His wife, Irina Yevseyevna (BERTA), was also ious assignments assignments in the GDR, GDR, FRG also an illegal.

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Bettgefluster Nach Dienstschluss, Quick 13,1977). uick (January 13, 1977). 70. "Bettgefliister Dienstschluss," Q 20. 71. k-S, k-5,20. Quick 13,1977). Hat aufJahre 72. "Bettgefliister Bettgefluster Nach Dienstschluss," Dienstschluss, Q uick (January 13, 1977). "Hat Spionin Hofer den BND auf Jahre 72. gelahmt?," 14, 1977). WeZt (January 14,1977). gelahmt?, Die Welt 73. 70; k-18, S, 14S. Details 73. k-16, k-16,70; k-18,5,145. Details of of the the lonely lonely hearts hearts column column and and the the alias alias used used by byGEORG GEORG (though not not Falks trial in 1989. 1989. Childs and Popplewell, Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 160. 160. his real identity) were revealed at Falk's and Popplewell, Popplewell, The Stasi, p. 160. 160. 74. Childs and 7S. 70; k-2, 374. 75. k-16, k-16,70; k-2,374. k-19,357. Childs and Popplewell, Popplewell, The Stasi, Stasi, p. 160. 76. k-19, 3S7. Childs 160. k-18,145. 77. k-18, 145. 78. 78. Childs Childs and and Popplewell, Popplewell, The Stasi, Stusi, pp. pp. 160-1. 160-1. 79. vol. 6, app. 1, 747, 748; k-1 1 , 91; k-12, 43S. 1,part S; 5; k-14, k-14,747,748; k-l1,91; k-12,435. k-14,747. 80. k-14, 747. 81. k-l1,91. 81. k-11, 91. 82. t-1, t-l,45,135; k-5,193; k-24,236; app. 2, part part3. 82. 4S, 135; k-S, 193; k-24, 236; vol. 6, app. 83. k-14, k-14,237; k-8,72. 83. 237; k-8, 72. 84. Wolf, Man without a Face, Face, pp. 142-8; 142-8; Colitt, Spy Master, Master,pp. 128-34. 128-34. Gast was arrested on September cation of 29, 1990, 1990, four days before the reunifi reunification of Germany, Germany, betrayed by a former senior official official of of the now defunct HV A. HVA. 8S. 85. Wolf, Wolf, Man without a Face, Face, pp. 188-94; 188-94; Colitt, Colitt, Spy Mastel; pp. 197-20S, 197-205, 23S-7. 235-7. In February 1992 1992 Kuron was sentenced to twelve years years' imprisonment and fined 692,000 marks-his marks-his total earnings from the HVA. 198-201; Colitt, Spy Master, Master,pp. 203-4. 203-4. Wolfludicrously Wolf ludicrously maintains that 86. Wolf, Man without a Face, pp. 198-201; employed to provide sexual services servicesfor Tiedge and other defectors were the prostitutes he employed "were not prostitutes but down-to-earth down-to-earth women, Party members and loyal to their country, who were prepared to do this in car. return for .. .. .. a preferential flat or an advance up the waiting list for a car." 87. "Wienand Wienand zu zweieinhalb Jahren Jahren Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt," verurteilt, Frankf Frank~4rterAZlgellzei~1e Zeitzmg (June 27, urter Allgemeine Zeitung 87. 1996); 1996); "Politik: Politik: Wegen langjahriger Spionage fur f i r die DDR: D D R Karl Wienand zu zu zweieinhalb zweieinhalb Jahren Jahren Haft verurteilt, Suddeutsche Siiddeutsche Zeitung (June 27, 27,1996); ImreKaracs, "Cold Cold War War Agent Jailed, Independent (June 1996); Imre Agent Jailed," verurteilt," 27, 1996). 27,1996). 88. 88. Genscher, Erinnerungen, Erinntrungen, p. 188. 188. 89. Wolf, Spionagechef Spionagechef im geheimen geheimen Krieg, Krieg,pp. 186-8. 186-8. After a conversation conversation with the the former Soviet ambas89. ambas sador Bonn, Valentin wrote, "Since 1975, himself to sador in in Bonn, Valentin Falin, Falin, in in 1992, 1992,Brandt Brandt wrote, Since 1975, Karl Karl W[ienand] W[ienand] committed committed himself to overthere. reference to Wienand. Wienand.Roger working for the services over there." Falin later denied having made a specific reference 1 , 1995). The Boyes, Brandt "Brandt Papers Revive Spy Claims," Boyes, Claims, The Times (February 1 11,1995). Thefiles seen by Mitrokhin contain no reference reference to a KGB attempt to torecruit Wienand. 90. Observer Observer reported from Bonn on July 3, thatWehner Wehner nowwidely suspected of 3, 1994 1994 that was "now of having been a Stasi spy." spy. k-3,63. 91. k-3, 63. Master,p. 250. 92. Colitt, Spy Master, k-3,63. 93. k-3, 63. 94. k-3, 63. k-3,63. 95. Wolf, Man without a Face, p. 169. 169. Wolf's Wolfs claims claims are not confirmed (or denied) by Mitrokhin. 9S. Mitrokhins detailed notes on Wehner's Wehners file stop in in1941. 1941. Mitrokhin's Spionagechefim geheimen Krieg, Krieg, pp. 18S, 185, 210-11 210-11. . Most of of Wolf's Wolfs memoirs on 96. Wolf, Spionagechef im geheimen of the section of German politics, is omitted from the English translation. Wehner, like much else dealing with German 97. Garton Ash, 321-2, 533-4. 97. Ash,In Europe's EuropesName, pp. 199, 199,321-2,533-4. 98. Spionagechef im geheimen geheimen Krieg, Krieg,pp. 207, 207,209. 98. Wolf, S pionagechefim 209. 99. k-2,53. Wolfthen then Qzricks rival Stem, Stern, which 99. k-2, 53. Wolf took his revenge on Van Nouhuys by leaking the story to Quick's published it on onOctober October followed, eventually decided in favor of Stern. Wolf, 25,25,1973. 1973. A long court battle followed, M m without a Face, pp. 237-8. 237-8. Man 100. In 1994 1994Brandt's Brandts widow caused a political storm by referring publicly to his suspicions suspicions of of Wehner. 100. 101. Wolf, S Spionagechefim geheimen Krieg, pionagechef im geheimen Krieg, p. 218. 101. 102. k-12, k-12,505-6. 102. S05-6. 103. k-2, 162. 103. k-2,162. 104. 165. 104. k-2, k-2,165.

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105. k-2, 179; k-10, 135-6. 105. k-2,179; k-10,135-6. 106. 787. 106. k-5, k-5,787. 107. Brezhnev's Brezhnevs visit, however, led to enormous expenditure of andeffort. Security procedures 107. of KGB time and of no less than seven KGB directorates (Kryuchkov were overseen by by a committee including the heads of among them). Twenty-nine KGB and GRU operational groups were assigned to supervise supervise Brezhnevs Brezhnev's thevisit. k-5,788-9. security during the k-5, 788-9. 108. 104. Soviet-FRG Soviet-FRG negotiations on the natural gas pipeline from Siberia were successfully con108. k-8, 104. con 1981. According to Sir Percy Cradock, later Mrs. Thatcher's Thatchers foreign policy adviser, cluded in November 1981. found in the Polish crisis [of December 19811 the Reagan administration "found 1981] a convenient pretext for sabosabo June taging an agreement they did not like. Their action was at first confined to US companies, but in June 1982 it itwas extended, with little thought for the consequences, US subsidiaries 1982 consequences, to US subsidiaries and foreign companies as well." Schmidt, the well.Mter After vigorous vigorous protests by Mrs. Thatcher Thatcheras well as by Schmidt, theUnited United States backed down 1982 in inreturn return acceptance of of greater restrictions on trade with the theSoviet in November 1982 for NATO acceptance Soviet Union. ofBritish Interests, p. 56. Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests, 109. 104. 109. k-8, k-8,104. 110. agent's name. 110. Mitrokhin did not have access access to the SCD SCDflies files which reveal the agents 111.k-13, k-13,44. Mitrokhins notes do not notrecord any response by the Schmidt Schmidtgovernment. 111. 44. Mitrokhin's 112. k-19, 282. The active measures Wolf's suggestions since the publication 112. k-19,282. measuresagainst Strauss give the lie to Wolfs Strauss was an HVA informant. of his memoirs that Strauss 113. 718, k-19, 282. Inge had been withdrawn GDR Mitrokhin's notes sumsum 113. k-5, k-5,718, k-19,282. IngeGoliath Goliath had withdrawn to the theG D R in 1979. 1979.Mitrokhins series of other KGB active measures designed to compromise the marize, but give few details about, a series withthe the HVA from 1978 BND and BN: operation JUNGLE, conducted jointly joindy with HVA 1978 onwards to discredit the BND and disrupt its relations with other 102-3); operations other Western intelligence services (k-13, 61, 82, 102-3); ZHAK-RUZH, BURGUNDER, OSMAN OSMAN and PANTER (1978), designed, again in coco ZHAK-RUZH, ROZA, BURGUNDER, theHVA, "to to expose and impede the activity of FRGspecial services in Europe and in operation with the of the FRG the Near East" (k-13, 61); operation ONTARIO (1978), to "to cause disagreements between the CIA, East (k-13,61); CIA, the the SDECE BND (k-13, (k-13,79); SDECE and the BND" 79); operation JAMES (1980), to "to exacerbate exacerbate disagreements between the BND and the the CIA" BN 85); operation CIA (k-13, 102); 102); operation KLOP (1981), to discredit the B N (k-13, 85); ORKESTR (1981), to discredit West German journalists who were alleged to be BND officers officers or coco optees (k-13, 86); and operation DROTIK (1981), to compromise Western businesses businesses allegedly used by (k-13,86); the CIA and the BND (k-13, 87). BNDas cover cover and for other operational purposes (k-13,87). 114. k-5, k-5,718, k-19,282. 114. 718, k-19, 282. 115. 102; k-19, 32. 115. k-6, k-6,102; k-19,32. 116. Garton Ash, Ash, Europe?Name, p. 320. In Europe's 116. 117. 117. Wolf, Man without a a Face, Face, p. 222. 118. Centre, pp. 38-9. 118. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), More Instructionsfrom Instructionsfiom the Centre, 38-9. 119. Hanson, Soviet Industrial IndustriaIEspionage; Government, SovietAcguisition $Militarily 119. Espionage; US Government, Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Signfacant Significant WestWest ern Technology; Technology; Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Birds, Birds, p. 260. 120. rst deployed k-16, 110, 129. 120. RICHARD RICHARDwas was fi first deployed in the theFRG in 1964; 1964; k-16,110,129. 121. k-18, 441. 121. k-18,441. 122. 39. 122. k-10, k-10,39. 123. 34. 123. t-2, t-2,34. 124. 124. vol. 6, ch. 6. 125. 125. Even when restrictions on the export of Western computers were relaxed relaxed during the theGorbachev era, fears that they they were bugged or deliberately infected with viruses continued. Nikolai Brusnitsin, deputy State Technical Commission, complained in 1990 that the the software in a West German chairman of the State 1990 that Soviet shoe-making factory had been deliberately pre-programmed to self-destruct. computer sold to a Soviet T here had, he claimed, Openness and andEspionage, pp. 28-9. 28-9. There claimed, been a whole series series of such incidents. Brusnitsin, Openness 126. ues seen seen by by Mitrokhin include (in alphabetical 126. Line X agents agents identified in the f files alphabetical order) BORIS, the manager of an electronics 230); DAL, specialist (k-10, 38); electronics factory (k-18, (k-18,230); DAL, a laser technology and plasma specialist DYMOV, (k-12, 442); EBER, an employee of DYMOV, a a computer programmer at a research center in West WestBerlin (k-12,442); of a major company company (k-14, 570); EGON, an East German (k-16, 112, 296); (k-14,570); German illegal working as an engineer (k-16,112,296); EMIL, an employee of Messerschmitt-B6lkow-Blohm Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (k-10, 37); ERICH, a chemical engineer (k-5, 232); FOTOGRAF, a scientist employed (t-2, 54); FRIMAN, employedby the International Atomic Energy Agency (t-2,54); FRIMAN, a rocket technology specialist (K-10, 32, 47); GUTSUL, owner of (k-18, 318); HANS, (K-10,32,47); GUTSUL,the the of a dye company (k-18,318); an agent with access to two large engineering firms (k-14, 698); KARL, an expert in electro-magnetism (k-14,698);

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who for part of of his career worked as an agent of of the the Paris residency against French targets; targets; KERNER, a polymer chemist (k-10,48; (k-l0, 48; k-12,414; k-12, 414; k-16, 120-1); KEST, head of k-16,120-1); of a research group at a medical institute 341); KLEIN, a nuclear physicist (k-14, 429); 429); LEONID, a computer scientist in a multinational (k-5, 341); chemical company (k-18, 277; k-27, 323); LETON, a trade official specializing (k-18,277; k-27,323); specializingin radio electronics electronics (k-12, (k-12, 129); 44); MORZH, a who held a senior position in an aerospace research institute (k-l0, (k-10, 41, 41,44); 129); LOTTS, who Yugoslav who supplied embargoed chemical products (k-5, 9); MOST, founder of (k-5,9); of an electronics electronics company (k-12, 87); PAUL, owner of (t-2, 18); RASPORY ATIDEL ("Organizer"), (k-12,87); of an electronics electronics company (t-2,18); RASPORYATIDEL (Organizer), a com company director who supplied equipment for assembling assembling integrated circuits (k-14, 570); ROBERT, a rocket circuits (k-14,570); engineer (k-l0, 35); SHMEL, SHMEL, head of 283); TAL, (k-10,35); of a computer company (k-18, (k-18,283); TAL, a designer of of chemical fac factories and polymer plants (t-2,l); (t-2, 1); TART, who worked for the giant chemical (k-14, 670); chemical company Bayer (k-14,670); 48; k-12,414; k-12, 414; k-16, 12(}-1); VILON, a company director who sup TSANDER, a polymer chemist (k-lO, (k-10,48; k-16,120-1); supplied embargoed goods (k-5,lO); (k-5, 10); VIN, director of 216); YUNG, an aircraft of an electronics electronics company (k-5, (k-5,216); computer systems engineer (k-2, 120); WAGNER, an employee of (k-2, 70, 120); of a major petrochemical company (k-10, 33, 46). (k-10,33,46). 127. 1986). 127. Die Welt Welt (July 17, 17,1986). 1987). 128. to West," Ex-KGB Agent to to Return Return to West, Guardian Guardian (November 26, 26,1987). 128. "Ex-KGB 129. k-10, k-10,37. 129. 37. 130. ashington Post (October 24, 1986). East Seen Escalating Drive for West's Wests Industrial Secrets," Secrets, W Washington 24,1986). 130. "East 131. k-10, 37. 131. k-10,37. 132. to West," Guardian 1987). "Red Ex-KGB Agent to toReturn Return West, to Guardian (November 26, 26,1987). Red Spy Returns for His Pen Pen132. "Ex-KGB sion," Today (November 26,1987). 26, 1987). sion, 133. Man without a Face, WOE, Face, ch. 1. 1. 133. Wolf,

and Italy During ar Chapter Twenty-seven France and During the Cold W War
1. 1. k-4, k-4,91-9,101. 91-9, 101. The 1953 1953 list of of "valuable valuable agents" agents in Paris also includes the codename MES, but but gives no indication of of his or her occupation. The only codenames which can be identified on the thebasis of of infor inforMitrokhins notes are PIZHO (Georges Piques) and and LONG (Paddy Costello). It I t is quite pos posmation in Mitrokhin's sible, however, that the the other other "valuable valuable agents" agents include some of of those recruited under under other codenames the few years after the Liberation. Piques's Piquess most important period as a Soviet agent almost cer cerduring the theFrench general staff from 1958 1958 to 1962. 1962. tainly came while he was working at the 2. vol. 9, ch. 1. 1. 3. See above, chapter 9. Security Aspects of of Possible Staff Talks with France." France. (February 24, 1948), 1948), ]IC(48)5, JIC(48)5, CAB158/3, CAB158/3, 4. "Security 4. Alex Craig of of Christ's Christs College, Cambridge. PRO. We are indebted for this reference to Alex 5. During the 1960s the FRG, as a result of A and KGB, became an even more 5. the1960s FRG, of penetration penetration by both the theHV HVA See chapter 26. important source source of intelligence intelligence than France. See Miscellaneous Soviet Soviet Personalities Personalities Who W h o Have Served Abroad," Abroad, (September 29, 1954), 1954), CRS 6. "Miscellaneous 6. A6283IXR1/144, A6283/XR1/144,Australian Archives, Archives, Canberra. 7. vol. 9, ch. 1. of classified classified French documents on Berlin and the German question 7. 1. For other examples of obtained by the Paris residency, see Murphy, Kondrashev and Bailey, Battleground Berlin, 68-9, 75-7, Berlin,pp. 68-9,757, theauthors were given access to some reports from the Paris residency, they were 82-4,95,145. 82-4, 95, 145. Though the not allowed to see the files on agent penetration penetration in France noted by Mitrokhin. 8. On JOUR, 8. JOUR,chapters 9 and 27. files JOUR,Fursenko and Naftali confirm KGB access during 9. Though given to no access to KGB fi 9. les on JOUR, Cuban Quai dOrsay embassies in Moscow the Cuban Missile Crisis to diplomatic traffic between the Qy.ai d'Orsay and French embassies Washington; "Soviet Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban CubanMissile Crisis," Crisis, pp. 70-1. and Washington; 7(}-1. 10. Wolton, Le KGB en France, France, pp. 204-6; 204-6; Andrew and andGordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, p. 466. 10. 11. 11.vol. 9, ch. 6. 12. fluence, p. 70. sous in influence, 70. 12. Wolton, La France sous 13. vol. 9, ch. 6, 6, para. 47. 13. 43. Some doubt remains as to whether whether the 14. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 43. 14. the FCD officer who calculated this total took fdly old to "new" newfrancs. francs. full y into account the transition from "old" 15. influence, 70. 15. Wolton, La France sous in fluence, p. 70. 16. vol. 9, ch. 1. 1. 16. 17. k-4, k-4,2-4. Mitrokhins notes give no details of of the theintelligence supplied by GERMAIN, but butthe the 17. 2-4. Mitrokhin's award of the theOrder Order reliable indication of of its importance. of of of the the Red Star Star is a reliable 18. k-7, k-7,178. After her her false flag recruitment, recruitment, ROZA was controlled by a female agent, JEANNETTE, 18. 178. Mter

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who who doubtless doubtless posed as as a member of the fictitious fictitious "progressive" progressivegroup. group. 19. 1 12. 19. LARIONOV LARIONOV joined joined the the foreign foreign ministry ministry from from the the army army in in 1960; 1960; k-4, k-4,112. 1 8. 20. 20. k-4, k-4,18. 21. police in Paris 1 14. depoZice Paris in 1960; 1960; k-4, k-4,114. 21. FRENE became became a commissaire de was recruited during a visit to the the USSR in August 1962 1962 by by the the Fourteenth Department 22. DACHNIK was 1. of of the the FCD FCD "for for material material reward"; reward; k-14, k-14,l. 23. ADAM was a chemist a at CNRS(Centre (Centre de Recherches Scientifiques) Scientifiques)recruited iin 1959; 23. t the CNRS National d e Recherches n 1959;

k-4,25. k-4, 25. 24. 24. SASHA SASHA was was recruited recruited in in or or before before 1960. 1960. In In that that year year he he went went to to study study electronics electronics in in Washington; Washington; k-4,113. k-4, 1 13. 25. 18. 25. k-4, k-4,18. 169-82. Interview by with Yuri Nosenko (November 15, 26. KGB, pp. 169-82. by Christopher Andrew with 15, 26. Barron, KGB, sousinfluence, in fluence, pp. Because these not 1987); 1987); Wolton, Wolton, La La Francesous pp. 374-9. 374-9. Because these were were SeD SCD operations, operations, they they do do not appear appear in in the theFCD FCD files files seen seen by by Mitrokhin. Mitrokhin. 27. 131. The 27. k-4, k-4,131. TheLOUISA LOUISAcase, case, unlike unlike those those of of Dejean Dejean and and Guibaud, Guibaud,figured figured in in the the FCD FCD files files seen seen by by Mitrokhin Mitrokhin because because of of the the unsuccessful unsuccessful attempt attempt by by the the Paris Paris residency residency to to renew renew contact contact with with her. her. 28. 28. NN's NNs name name is is not not recorded recorded in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes but but can can be be identified identified from from the the biographical biographical detail detail con contained tained in in them them as as Saar-Demiche1; Saar-Demichel; vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 5. 5. Saar-Demichel Saar-Demichel later later admitted admitted his his links links with with the the KGB; fluence, p. KGB; Wolton, Wolton, La France sous sous in i@rence, p. 247. 247. According According to to Wolton, Wolton, his his original original KGB KGB codename codename was was ALEKSEI. ALEKSEI. 29. 29. Wolton, Wolton, La France sous sous influence, influence, pp. pp. 247-50. 247-50. 379, 41 1-12, 416-17, 426n., 437. 30. 30. Wolton, Wolton, La France France SOliS sous influence, influence, pp. pp. 374, 374,379,411-12,416-17,426n., 31. 31. vol. vol. 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 5. 5. 32. 32. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 4, para. para. 8. 8. 33. 33. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, paras. paras. 43-5. 43-5. 34. 34. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes contain contain no reference reference to the radical radical (later (later socialist) socialist) politician politician Charles Hernu, who who was was to to become become defense defense minister minister from from 1981 1981 to to1985. 1985. It It has has been been alleged alleged that that Hernu Hernu was was recruited by by the the later became a Bulgarian Bulgarian DS DS in in 1953, 1953, later had had contact contact with with the theRomanian Romanian Securitate Securitate and and became a KGB KGB agent agent in in 1963. 1963. Dupuis Dupuis and and Pontaut, Pontaut, "Charles Charles Hernu Hernu etait ttaitun un agent agent de de l'Est." 1Est 35. 80, 128; t-l, 61. For 35. k-6, k-6,80,128; t-l,61. For legal legal reasons reasons GILBERT's GILBERTSidentity, identity, though though recorded recorded in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes on on KGB les, cannot KGB fi files, cannot be be published. published. There There is is some some indication indication that that at at one one point point GILBERT GILBERT avoided avoided contact contact with with his his case case officer. officer. 36. For legal legal reasons reasonsDROM's DROMs identity, identity, though recorded recorded in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes files,cannot be pub pub36. notes on KGB flies, lished. successively, Spartak lished. His His file fde f fill ds s seven seven volumes. DROM's DROMs controllers controllers were, were, successively, Spartak Ivanovich Ivanovich Leshchev Leshchev (codenamed (codenamed LARIN) LARJN) from from 1960 1960 to to 1964; 1964; Vladimir Vladimir Filippovich Filippovich Yashchechkin Yashchechkin (YASNOV) (YASNOV) from from 1964 1964 to to 1967; Yuri Konstantinovich Tsi 1967;Yuri KonstantinovichSemyonychev Semyonychev (TANEYEV) (TANEYEV) from 1967 1967to 1972; 1972;and Anatoli Nikolayevich NikolayevichTsi1 ; t-1, 58, 68; k-4, 27, 58. palkin palkin (VESNOV) (VESNOV) in in 1972-3. vol. 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, paras. paras. 30-30-1; t-l,58,68; k-4,27,58. 37. 37. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 33. 33. 38. 38. vol. vol. 9, chs. chs. 2, 2 ,4 39. 39. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, para. para. 5. 5. 40. 40. Myagkov, Myagkov, Inside the theKGB, KGB, p. p. 24. Elysee. De 41. 41. In In the the course course of of 1965 1965 Saar-Demiche1 Saar-Demichel seems seems to to have have lost lost his his influence influence at at the the Elyste. De Gaulle Gaulle is is reported reported to to have have said said to to a a member member of of his his entourage, entourage, "Saar-Demichel Saar-Demichel is is a a Soviet Soviet spy. spy. He H e doesn't, doesnt, of of course, course, steal tells flu steal secrets secrets to to hand hand over over to to them, them,but buthe he tells them them everything everything he he knows." knows. Wolton, Wolton, La France SOliS sous in i7+ence, 424-6. enre, pp. pp. 382, 382,424-6. 42. fluence, p. 426. 42. Wolton, Wolton, La France France sous in influence, 40. 43. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, paras. paras. 33, 33,40. 44. vol. 1. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 2, para. para. 1 11. 45. the period fthe the 45. During During the period 1963-6 1963-6 three three unidentified unidentified French French intelligence intelligence officers officers were were members members o of GRANIT one of of the BULAT group. department at atthe the Surete G M N I T group, group, and and one the BULAT group. BON, BON, a a former former head head of of department SQrett Generale, 242. The GCntrale,worked worked as as an an agent agent recruiter; recruiter; k-27, k-27,242. The latest latest reference reference in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes to to penetration penetration of 81. of SDECE SDECE is is to the thepresence presence there of of a a KGB KGB agent agent (not (not identified) identified) in in May May1969; 1969; k-4, k-4,81. 33, 34, 38. 46. 46. k-4, k-4,33,34,38. 47. 47. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 30. 30. 48. 48. vol. vol. 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 10. 10. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes give give few few details details of of the the regular regular (non-bonus) (non-bonus) payments payments to to these these agents. agents. 49. 49. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes on his file do not notspecify what proportion of the large large sums sums paid to him himwere in the

N o tt e e N o

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654

form of a regular salary or retainer, but they do make clear that he he received very substantial bonuses for particularly 460). particularly important important items items of of S&T S&T (k-5, (k-5,460). t-l,47; k-4,34. 50. t-l, 47; k-4, 34. 51. k-4, 35, 65; k-14, 93; vol. 6, app. 1, 264-5. 51. k-4,35,65; k-14,93; 1,part 33; t-l, t-l,264-5. 52. k-5, 281; k-l l, 87; t-l , 266. k-5,281; k-11,87; t-l,266. 53. t-l, 42. 53. t-l,42. Favier and Martin-Roland, La decennie 54. Wolton, Le KGB en France, France, pp. 242-3; 242-3; Favier dicennie Mitterrand, vol. 1, 1,pp. 271-2. 271-2. 55. mint in Cold War," 55. Kahn, Kahn, "Soviet Soviet Co Comint inthe the Cold War, p. p. 20. 20. 56. k-4, k-4,176. 176. 57. 57. The The six six cipher cipher personnel personnel under under cultivation cultivation were were codenamed codenamed ALMAZOV, ALMAZOV, GROMOV, GROMOV, GUDKOV, GUDKOV, KRASNOV, LAPIN and VESELOV. VESELOV. Mitrokhin Mitrokhingives details of only two. two. The cultivation of LAPIN began after began in in 1980 1980and and plans were were made made for for it it to tocontinue continue after he he was was posted abroad abroad in in 1982. 1982. With With the theassis assistance of of JOUR, an investigation was undertaken of of KRASNOV's KRASNOVs finances, home and leisure pursuits, and he was secretly photographed. photographed. At the end end of of 1981 1981 an an (unidentified) illegal began to cultivate him false fl flag. Mitrokhins notes do not not record which, if any, any, of the the cultivations ended in recruitment; under false ag. Mitrokhin's k-4, k-4, 177. 177. 58. t-l, 46; k-7, 145. 58. t-l,46; k-7,145. k-3,81; t-l,32. 59. k-3, 81; t-l, 32. t-l,34; 60. t-l, 34; vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 7. 3-5; t-l, 57. 61. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 41-53; 41-53; k-6, k-6,3-5; t-l,57. 62. 120. 62. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 16; 16; k-25, k-25,120. t-l,27; 1,21. 63. t-l, 27; vol. 3, pakapp. 1, 21. 64. t-l, 43; k-4, 1 80. t-l,43; k-4,180. t-l,44; k-14,100. 65. t-l , 44; k-14, 100. 66. t-l, 36; k-27, 292. t-l,36; k-27,292. 67. t-l, 46. t-l,46. k-7,145. 68. k-7, 145. 69. vol. 9, ch. 2, para. 17. 17. 70. 70. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 7. 71. k-7, 145. k-7,145. 72. vol. 9, arne is given 81. 9, ch. 6, para. 7. Giscard d'Estaing's dEstaings coden codename given in k-3, k-3,81. 73. 73. For For the the two two years years 1976-7, 1976-7, BROK BROK was was paid paid a a total total of217,000 of 217,000 francs: francs: 72,000 72,000 francs francs basic basic salary, salary,83,000 83,000 expenses. From January to November 1978, the of payments bonuses, 62,000 expenses. 1978, the last period for which details of to BROK bonuses, 62,000 BROKare available, available, he received a total of of 182,000 francs: 55,000 55,000 francs salary, 83,000 bonuses, expenses. k-3, 81. k-3,81. 74. cer(s) for 1. Thereafter, 74. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin does does not not identify identify BROK's BROKs case case offi officer(s) for the the period period 1946-5 1946-51. Thereafter, his his controllers controllers Ye. R. Radtsig (1951-7); (1951-7); V. K. Radchenko (1957-9); (1957-9); E. Yakovlev (1959-63); were Yeo E. N. Yakovlev (1959-63); I. 1. F. Gremyakin (1970-2); L. I. (1972); R. F. F. Zhuravlev (1972-6); (1972-6); R. N. Lebedinsky (1974-5); (1974-5); Ye. (1970-2); I. Vasenko (1972); Yeo L. Mokeyev (1976-8); k-3, 81. (1976-8); and Yeo Ye. N. Malkov (1978-9). (1978-9). k-3,81. 75. 81. 75. M. S. Tsimbal, Tsimbal, A. A. I. Lazarev, Lazarev, A. V. V. Krasavin, Krasavin, V. P. ? Vlasov Vlasov and and N. N. N. Chetverikov; Chetverikov; k-3, k-3,81. 76. k-3, 81. k-3,81. 77. 77. See See above, above, chapter chapter 12. 12. 5,6; t-7,219. 78. vol. 9, ch. 3, paras. 5, 6; t-7, 219. 15,24. 79. vol. 9, ch. 6, paras. 15, 24. n'y a 599-60. 80. 80. Raymond Raymond Aron, Aron, "11 I1 ny a pas pas de de quoi quoi rire," rire, Le Figaro (June (June 23, 23, 1975). 1975). Aron, Aron, Memoires, Meinoires, pp. pp. 599-60. Other prominent prominentcritics of of Le Monde included Pierre Nora andJean-Franois and Jean-Fransois Revel. 1975). 81. 81. Le Monde (July (July 3, 3,1975). 12,1975). This but Le Monde's Mondes critics critics com com82. Le Monde (September 12, 1975). This claim was subsequently withdrawn, but prodiguer impuniment quelques guelgues insultes insdtessous Ie le plained that itit continued, in its reporting on Solzhenitsyn, to "prodiguer impunement couvert de l'ob ZobjectivitL guil est, est,p. 32. couvert jectiviti." Legris, Le Monde tel qu'il 1975,jointly signed by the heads of of the First First Chief, Second Chief Chief and and 83. A major operational plan for 1975, to discredit PAUK [Solzhenitsyn] ., .. ., through mass information media Fifth Directorates, aimed "to abroad. k-3b, 27. abroad." 84. Legris, Le Monde tel qu'il guil est. est. 85. flis 85. Jacques Thibau's Thibaus analysis of Le Monde in the 1970s 1970s concludes: concludes: .. .. .. il repose a a la . ? a fois sur ce re que ses ses adver"

N ot te e s N o s

6 65 55 5

gauche' appellent l'ordre, et ses critiques la subversion. icile it saires saires 'de degaucheappellent lordre, critiques 'de dedroite' droitela subversion. L'iquilibre Liquilibre est diff dficile a tenir. tenir.II Ifrequiert requiert it laflnction dujournal." Thibau, de prudence et de pratique de la mais globalement il correspond dela la prudence de la lapratique la casuistique, casuistique, maisglobalement ilcorrespondri fonction la journal.Thibau, Monde, 1944-1996, p. 433. 433. Le Monde, 86. the1970s, 1970s, KRON, is identified as 86. However, at at least least one one regular Paris-based Paris-based contributor to to Le Monde in the KGB agent (k-24, (k-24,153). Mitrokhins notes also also identify identify MONGO, MONGO, one one of Le Monde's Mondes Mrican African correspon correspona KGB 153). Mitrokhin's dents, as give 116). as a KGB KGB agent, agent, but do donot not give his identity or the dates dates when he was posted in Mrica Africa (k-6, (k-6,116). 87. uence operations 87. t-1, t-1, 46, 46, 58; 58; vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, paras. paras. 15, 15, 24. 24. Most Most of of Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes on on infl influence operations directed directed are both brief and general. general. He H e identifies identifies only two two active active measures measures articles articles by both author author against Le Monde are and exact date KGB a leading Le Monde date of publication. publication. One is is described described as as "entirely entirelywritten on on KGB themes" themesby by journalist; the other was other was an article article "using using KGB KGB arguments" arguments by a leading socialist socialistpolitician. Both were were pub pub1980. vol. vol. 1, 1,ch. ch. 8; 8; vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, paras. paras. 15, 15,24; k-8,522; k-24,153. lished in 1980. 24; k-8, 522; k-24, 153. 88. 88. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 2, para. para. 23. 23. 89. 89. The The same same disproportion in the the treatment of KGB and CIA active measures measures is isevident, on a somewhat Thibau. Thibau concludes, smaller scale, in scale, in the generally generallyvaluable valuable history of Le Monde by Jacques Jacques Thibau concludes,for exam example, ple, that that one one notorious notorious forgery forgery published published by Le Monde, Monde, the so-called "Fechteler Fechteler report," report,which purported to reveal reveal outrageously outrageously belligerent belligerent US designs designs in the Mediterranean, was almost certainly certainly fabricated fabricated by the CIA and French French intelligence. intelligence. He does does not consider consider the far far more more probable hypothesis that it it was a KGB KGB CIA probable hypothesis mid-1970s forgery forgery (Thibau, Le Monde, Monde, 1944-1996, 19-w 996, pp. 214-18). 214-18). For an assessment assessmentof the revelations revelationsin the the Only, of malpractice malpractice by the the US USintelligence intelligence community, community, see see Andrew, Andrew, For the the President's President?Eyes Eyes OnZy, ch. ch. 10. 10. 90. 3). JACQ UES, an 90. SIDOR was was recruited in 1956 1956 but butlater suspected suspected of working for the the DST (k-14, (k-14,3). JACQUES, AFP AFP correspondent in a number of Asian Asian countries, was was a KGB KGB agent from 1964 1964 to to 1973; 1973; during that that period he had seven seven different controllers controllers (k-6, 53). MISHA was recruited during during a visit to the Soviet Union in 1965; Mitrokhin's in 1965; Mitrokhins notes do not not reveal reveal how long his work work as as an agent continued (vol. (vol. 2, app. 1, 1, para. para. 46; 46; vol. vol. 2, appendix appendix 2, para. para. 68). 68). LAN was an an agent from 1969 1969to to1979, 1979, mostly-if mostly-if not exclusive1y exclusivelyin France (k-4, 85; k-27, 291). MARAT was an agent in Paris (k-6, 42). (k-4,85; k-27,291). MARAT Paris and abroad from c. c. 1973 1973 to to1982 1982 (k-6,42). GRININ 379). GRININ was was recruited in 1980 1980(k-14, (k-14,379). 91. 111, 134), and 91. PIERRE, PIERRE, a confidential contact in the the 1960s 1960s (k-14, (k-14,111,134), and JOSEPH, a confidential contact from 1974 (k-6, 84). 1974 to to 1977 1977 (k-6,84). 92. 291. 92. k-27, k-27,291. 93. 93. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 33. 33. 94. Dezin formatsia, p. 134. 94. Shultz Shultz and andGodson, Godson, Dezilformatsia, 134. 95. 95. vol. 9, 9,ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 40. 40. formatsia, pp. 135-49. 96. 96. Shultz Shultz and and Godson, Godson, Dezin Dezinformatsia, 135-49. 97. 560. 97. k-5, k-5,560. 98. 39-40. Sakharovsky 98. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, paras. paras. 37, 37,39-40. Sakharovskywas referred referred to at Pathe's Pathts trial trial by his alias, alias, "Kuznetsov."The Kuznetsov.The Paris residency residency believed that the theDST had not notsucceeded succeeded in identifying him as as the son of the former head of the 560. theFCD; FCD; k-5, k-5,560. 99. VERONIQ UE, JACQ UELINE and ed in Mitrokhin's 99. Like Like DURANT, DURANT, NANT, NANT, VERONIQUE, JACQUELINE and NANCY are are identifi identified Mitrokhins notes, 3. notes, but cannot cannotbe named for legal legal reasons; reasons;vol. vol. 9, 9,ch. 6, 6, paras. paras. 43-9; 43-9; k-6, k-6,3. 100. 100. vol. vol. 9, 9,ch. ch. 6, para. para. 11. 11. 101. 101. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 4, 4, para. para. 33. 33. 102. vol. 9, ch. 102. vol. vol. 9, 9,ch. ch. 6, para. para. 28; 28; vol. vol. 9, 9,ch. ch. 2, paras. paras. 25-30; 25-30; vol. ch. 6, paras. paras. 13-15. 13-15. 103. prisidentielle, 26 avril-10 Cold War," 103. L'ilection Lelectionpresidentielle, avril-10 mai mai 1981, 1981, p. p. 34. 34. Kahn, "Soviet Soviet Comint in inthe the Cold War, p. 18. 18. 104. 104. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 3, 3, para. para. 20. The The "affair affair of the diamonds" diamonds had had begun with the the publication by one satirical weekly Enchaini on October 10, 1979 ofof an order six weekly Le Canard CanardEnchainneon 10,1979 orde: placed by byBokassa Bokassa six years earlier for the pur purchase lysee tried to fend off this and similar stories chase of a diamond plaquette plaquette for Giscard d'Estaing. dEstaing. The E Elyste stories over the next year and a half until it finally 1981, just over a month before the finally announced on March March 23, 23,1981, just first round of the presidential election, 1974 and 1975 election, that diamonds given to Giscard in 1973, 1973,1974 1975 had been valued at 115,000 115,000 francs francs and that that this sum had been donated donated to the the Red Cross and other good causes in the the Central CentralAfrican African Republic. Republic. 105. 1. 105.vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 2, 2, para. para. 3 31. 106. C'est incontestablement Ie parti socialiste qui a la meiileure meilleure 106. Le Le Monde Monde reported during during the the campaign, campaign, " Cest incontestablement leparti image dans l'electorat Jui]" L'election image de demarque marque dans ldectoratju$ Ltlection presidentielle, prtsidentielle, 26 avril-l0 avril-10 mai mai 1981, 1981, p. p. 73. 73. 107. 107. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 2, para. para. 31. 31. 108. 128. 108. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes give give no no details details of of the inside information provided by GILES; k-6, k-6,128. 109. 109. vol. vol. 9, 9, ch. ch. 6, 6, para. para. 3. 3.

N o t t N o

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656

1 10. k-3, 81. BROK was not the 110. k-3,81. theonly French journalist on whom the KGB radically revised its views. In 1979 1979 the Centre concluded that LAN LAN was providing "material material not qualitatively qualitatively different from material published in the press," and broke off contact with him. k-27, 291. thepress, k-27,291. 3. 111. 111. vol. 9, ch. 6, para. 3. 112. residencies in 1975 1975 were as follows (figures (figures for Line 112. The statistics for Line X operations in European residencies X officers officers certainly refer to 1975; 1975; those for agents are for approximately-probably exactly-1975): exactly-1975):

Residency Line Residency

Belgrade Berne Bonn Brussels Copenhagen Geneva The Hague Helsinki Lisbon London Oslo Paris Rome Stockholm Vienna

Line X Officers [k-5, 420] Officers [k-5,420]

Line [k-5, 423] Line X Agents Agents [k-5,4231

3 3 15 15 7 6 3 3 6 2 9 3 22 9 7 19 19

? ? 9 4 7 2 1 1 2 ? 9
0 22 10 10 1 1 29

of FCD Directorate T, which was respon responThese statistics were compiled by the Second Department of theresidencies residencies listed above. The figures for the Bonn Bonnresidency account for sible for Line X operations in the part of Line X operations in the the FRG; FRG;Line Line only a part X operations were also run from Cologne. Line X in of Directorate T, had fifty-nine agents in 1975 (k-5, Karlshorst, which came under aadifferent department of 1975 (k-5, LineX operations in Vienna (which Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not notmake it possi possi416). A probable majority of Line 416). non-Austrian targets. ble to quantify) were directed at non-Austrian 113. Mitrokhins notes give no later statistics, it is possible that the 1 13. k-5, 383, 383, 386, 386, 406. 406. Though Mitrokhin's the 1977 1977 surpassed. record was subsequently surpassed. 114. Mitrokhins notes give the following following incomplete statistics of of Line X officers stationed in European 1 14. Mitrokhin's residencies for all or part of ofthe the residencies period 1974-9:
Belgrade Berne Bonn Brussels Cologne Copenhagen Geneva The Hague Helsinki Lisbon London Oslo Paris Rome Stockholm Vienna 4 6 9 10 10 13 13 13 13 7 6 10 10

? ? ?

36 17 19 19 38

(k-5, 459) (k-5,459) succeeded in penetrating penetratingan anunquantifiable number of of US companies and sub sub115. Line X in Paris also succeeded 115. sidiaries in France. sidiaries 1 16. k-5,460. k-5, 460. 116.

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657

117. Though Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins note merely records that Andropov Andropov recommended the award of of the Order Order of 117. of the Star, it is barely Red Star, barelyconceivable conceivable that the recommendation was turned down. Kesarevs Kesarev's assistant, Yuri was recommended for accelerated accelerated promotion. k-5, k-5,470. Ignatyevich Rakovsky, was 470. 118. Mitrokhinnoted noted the ALANwhich which hisfile: 409,000 francs 1 1 8 . Mitrokhin the following payments to ALAN were recorded in his for the period 1973 1973 to to1976 1976 (probably his basic salary with additional additional sums for particular particular items); 100,000 francs (undated) (undated) for information on 100,000 onthe the design of of infra-red infra-red detectors; 40,000 francs (also undated) for samples of the detectors; 50,000 francs in September September 1973 1973 for two samples of of missilemissile systems; payments payments of 71,000 and 100,000 100,000francs in 1974 1974for for technical documentation; 40,000 40,000 guidance systems; technical 1974or or 1975 for unidentified technical 1975; francs in 1974 1975 for unidentified technical samples; 89,400 francs (purpose unspecified) in 1975; 110,000 1 10,000 francs in 1977 1977 for documentation on on missile guidance; 60,000 francs and approximately December 1977 1977 (purpose unspecified); and 200,000 200,000 200,000 francs (30,000 convertible roubles) in December O n the assumptions assumptions that these were all separate sums and francs (purpose unspecified) in mid-1978. On unrecorded by Mitrokhin, this thatthere there were no other payments unrecorded this would make a grandtotal total of of 1,429,400 francs. k-5,460. 1,429,400 k-5, 460. 119. 460. 119. k-5, k-5,460. 120. 120. Favier and Martin-Roland, Martin-Roland,La dicennie dkcennie Mitterrand, Mitterrand, vol. 1, 1,p. 97. 121. ve years' of intelliintelli 121. Bourdiol was arrested in 1983 1983 and later sentenced to fi five yearsimprisonment, imprisonment, as a result of gence provided by the French agent FAREWELL. Wolton, Wolton, Le KGB KGB enFrance, France, p. 245; Ariane: "Ariane: un ingtnieur franc;ais franqais incarcere incarctrt pour l'espionage," Yespionage,Liberation, Liberution, (December 2, 1983); Ear4 ingenieur Early Warning (March 2, 1984); 1987). There is no identifi able reference to Bourdiol in Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's notes. 1984); Reuter reports (June 16, 16,1987). There identifiable 1979 he 122. Mitrokhin's 122. Mitrokhins incomplete notes on payments to KARL record that from January to November November 1979 he of 13,200 francs and an additional sum of was paid a monthly salary of of 32,000 francs; and that from January to October he hewas paid 12,000 34,000 francs. KARL worked as a 12,000 francs a month plus a single payment of of34,000 KGB agent from 1972 367-9. 1972 to 1982. 1982. k-5, k-5,367-9. 123. k-5, k-5,367. 123. 367. 124. On O n the FAREWELL FAREWELL case, see see Wolton, Le KGB KGB en France, part 5, and Brook-Shepherd, Brook-Shepherd, The Storm 124. 17. FAREWELL FAREWELL was first identified as Vetrov in Andrew and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, Le KGB dnns dans le Ie Birds, ch. 17. monde, monde, pp. 619-23. 619-23. 125. Raymond Nart, head of of the DST Soviet section, writing under under the pseudonym Henri Regnard, gave 125. FAREWELLoperation in December 1983 in the first first public public account account of what had been learned from the FAREWELL 1983 in an article article published in the journal journalDifense Dqense Nationale. Nutionale. 126. 126. President Mitterrand, whose mind turned naturally to conspiracy, subsequently began to suspect bizarrely that the information might somehow have been planted on the theFAREWELL FAREWELL theDST by the CIA CIA "as as a way of of testing socialist socialist France and me personally," personally, in order to see whether he hewould hold it back or dicennie Mitterrand, Mitterrand, vol. 1, 1, pp. pass it on to the Reagan administration. Favier and Martin-Roland, La decennie 94-8, 271-3. 944,271-3. 127. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes contain the following comparative figures for the numbers of 127. of agents run by KGB residencies residencies controlled by the FCD Fifth Department: Department: 1971
France Italy Belgium Greece Netherlands Switzerland Cyprus Luxemburg Yugoslavia

1966 1966
66 18 18 24 1 8 18 2 2 2 1 1
0

1971
48 21 21 19 19 6 2 8 8 5
0 0

1974
55 (+17 confidential contacts) 24 (+4 confidential contacts) 19 19 (+7 confidential contacts) 18 (+3 confidential contacts) 18 (+3 ? 8 (+2 confidential contacts) 8

(k-8,472; k-4,33) (k-8, 472; k-4, 33)

On January 1,1975 1, 1975 the Rome residency had 23 active) and 6 confi dential contacts, the 23agents (18 of ofthem them confidential as well (16 active), active), 7 conficonfi well as 4 agents in the theSoviet community. community. A year later it had 21 non-Soviet agents (16 dential contacts and 9 Soviet 135). Soviet agents (k-13, (k-13,135). 128. 128. See above, chapter 17. 17. 129. 129. See above, chapter 17. 17.

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130. not include 130. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes do do not include any any examples examples of of the the intelligence intelligence obtained obtained by by DARIO D A N 0 and and his his female female recruits recruits from from the the Foreign Foreign Ministry. Ministry. 131. 131. k-10, k-10, 101-3, 101-3, 107, 107, 109. 109. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes imply in 1956 that DARIO DAN0 was also instrumental instrumental in in the the recruitment of department; k-l0,100,103. Mitro of MAGDA, an an employee employee of of the foreign ministry press department; k-10,100,103. Mitrokhin's notes also recruitment in an agent the Foreign Foreign Ministry, named 1970 of ofan agent in in the Ministry, code codenamed khins notes also record record the the recruitment in 1970 STRELOK, became "reluctant STRELOK, by by Georgi Georgi Pavlovich Pavlovich Antonov. Antonov. STRELOK STRELOK subsequently subsequently became reluctant to to co-operate" co-operate (k4, 80, 158; k-2, 221, 231, 268). 4,80,158; k-2,221,231,268). 132. 285. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin notes notes that that by by 1965 1965 LEDA LEDA "had had lost lost her her intelligence access." access. 132. k-16, k-16,285. 133. k-IO, 97,109. 133. k-10, 97, 109. 134. 109. 134. k-10, k-10,109. 135. 17. 135. See above, chapter 17. 136. various ciphers ciphers and surveillance lists lists Mitrokhins notes notes do do not not give give the the date date at at which which the the various and surveillance 136. k-10, k-10, 63. 63. Mitrokhin's were handed over by by Q UESTOR. In QUESTOR. Inview of of the the Centre's Centres dissatisfaction dissatisfaction with the the declining amount of of intelligence obtained from Q UESTOR by YEFRAT in later 1950s, however, the bulk of of the QUESTOR inthe the later 1950s, thematerial was in the was probably probably handed handed over over in themid-1950s. mid-1950s. 137. bankruptcy of of the 137. Mitrokhin Mitrokhin interpreted interpreted YEFRAT's YEFRATs file file as as placing placing the the responsibility responsibility for for the the bankruptcy the Italian Italian firm on his mismanagement (k-7,4,193; (k-7, 4, 193; k-16, 338, 419; k-18,153; k-18, 153; k-20,94). k-20, 94). In addition to being assisted assisted on k-16,338,419; by his wife TANY A, YEFRAT YEFRAT was as deputy deputy resident resident the Aleksandr Vasilyevich Subotin by his wife TANYA, was given given as the illegal illegal Aleksandr Vasilyevich Subotin (codenamed of Adolfo Tolmer (k-16,98,285). (k-16, 98, 285). (codenamed PIK), who whohad had gained an Italian passport in the thename of 138. YEFRAT also CENSOR's wife, also cultivated cultivated CENSORS wife, KAPA; KAPA, Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do do not not record the the outcome outcome of of 138. the cultivation (k-16,419; (k-16, 419; k-18, 153). the cultivation k-18,153). 139. YEFRAT part in PROGRESS brother TIBER, Y E F M T later took tookpart in PROGRESS operations. In 1962 DEMID recruited recruited his his brother TIBER, 139. who of the who worked worked in the accounts accounts department of the interior interior ministry, to act as radio radio operator for SAUL, a Lithuanian Catholic Catholic priest and KGB agent then studying at the Vatican. DEMID, CENSOR CENSOR and Q UESTOR continued to 1963 (k-16, 419; k-10, 63; k-5,688-91). k-5, 688-91). After Mter QUESTOR to provide provide intelligence intelligence until until at least 1963 (k-16,419; k-10,63; YEFRAT's 1965, acting as YEFRATs departure, his iormer former deputy, deputy, PIK, worked for the legal Rome residency until 1965, LED.Ns 1963 (k-16,285). (k-16, 285). LEDAs controller from from February 1962 to September September 1963 140. 66. Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's notes give no indication of of whether whether IKAR continued to work as a KGB agent 140. k-2, k-2,66. after after his his return return to to Italy. 141. k-5, 102. 141. k-5,102. 142. k-9,23; k-10,126. 142. k-9, 23; k-10, 126. 143. k-12, 516. IKAR, IKAR, PLATON, and PLATON,ENERO ENERO and ARTUR were were not the the only SCD recruits in the the Italian 143. k-12,516. embassy in in Moscow. Moscow. Mitrokhin's also refer case of of POLATOV POLATOV (or POLETOV), POLETOV), an assistant embassy Mitrokhins notes notes also refer to to the thecase anassistant service 124). There service attache, attache, recruited recruited by the SCD SCD in the late late 1970s, but give give no details details (k-10, 124). There may have mentioned in Mitrokhin's notes. been further embassy agents not mentioned in Mitrokhins Other of the Other Italians Italians recruited by the the SCD in Moscow included included an official in the legal legal department department of the assistance of of VERA, a swallow from the Polish (k-2, 273); Italian interior interior ministry, recruited with with the the assistance Polish SB (k-2,273); employee of of the (k-10, 132). and RITA, a female employee the Fiat Fiat company recruited in 1976 (k-10,132). 144. k-27, 240. 144. k-27,240. 145. k-22, 72; k-26, 66; t-2, 158. 145. k-22,72; k-26,66; t-2,158. 146. k-5, 256. k-5,256. Andrewand and Gordievsky, KGB, KGB, p. 459. 459. 147. 147. Cf. Andrew Gordievsky, 148. 262, 383. BUTIL BUTIL broke broke contact contact in in 1979 after after his his firm firm had had failed failed to to win win Soviet Soviet contracts. contracts. 148. k-14, k-14,262,383. 149. 420, 423. 149. k-5, k-5,420,423. 150. 150. The The Italian Italian businessmen businessmen identified identified in in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes as as Line Line X agents agents in in the the 1970s andlor andor early early 1980s 567), ERVIN (k-7, 37), KOZAK 174), METIL 383), PAN 1980s were were CHIZ C H I Z (k-14, (k-14,567), ERVIN (k-7,37), KOZAK (k-14, (k-14,174), METIL (k-14, (k-14,383), PAN (k-12, (k-12, 593) 389). It is unclear whether SAUST, (k-12,389). SAUST, a business business consultant cultivated by the KGB, 593) and TELINI (k-12, was actually recruited (k-14, 568). (k-14,568). 151. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes identify a total of of seventeen Line X officers stationed at the theRome residency for all all 151. or part 459). partof of the period 1974-9 1974-9 (k-5, (k-5,459). 152. 353, 425. The The Soviet Soviet ambassador atnbassador in in Rome, Rome, N. N. S. Rhyzov, Rhyzov, had had opposed opposed the the establishment establishment of of a a 152. k-5, k-5,353,425. Soviet consulate in Milan in order to provide cover for a KGB residency in northern northernItaly, but the the foreign pressure from 422). ministry in in Moscow gave gave way wayto to pressure from the the Centre Centre (k-5, (k-5,422). 153. k-5, 353, 357. 153. k-5,353,357. 154. k-5, k-5,357. 154. 357. 155. Mitrokhins notes give few details on MARIO MARIOsave that that he hewas recruited in 1972 and usually met his 155. Mitrokhin's the Soviet Soviet Union (k-6,192). controller in the (k-6, 192).

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156. k-14,264; 6, app. app. 1, 40. As in other othercountries, Line X agents in Italy were also used used to obtain 156. k-14, 264; vol. 6, 1, part 40. S&T from US sources (k-5, (k-5,236). S&T 236). 157. 6, app. 1, 1, part 39. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes identify KULON and andhis research institute. 157. vol. 6, 158. k-5, 425. 425. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not UCHITEL and Kuznetsovs 158. not indicate what happened to UCHITEL Kuznetsov's other agents after his expulsion. expulsion. It would have been normal practice for them to to have been put on onice. 159. 415. 159. k-2, k-2,415. 160. 217; k-3, 112. 160. k-2, k-2,217; k-3,112. 161. k-2, 225, 243; k-20, 348. 161. k-2,225,243; k-20,348. 1, parts 39,41. 162. k-2, k-2,250,275; k-4,71; k-10,52; 162. 250, 275; k-4, 71; k-l0, 52; vol. 6, app. 1, 39, 4I. 163. 230, 242; k-13, 133; k-20, 347; k-21, 34; k-26, 68. 163. k-2, k-2,230,242; k-13,133; k-20,347; k-21,34; k-26,68. Mitrokhins notes transcribe his codename alternately as ACHERO and AGERO. The The 164. k-2, 274. 274. Mitrokhin's 164. achero-the Italian for steel. most likely codename is ACERO, pronounced "achero"-the "steel." 165. 126. 165. k-7, k-7,126. 166. 48. 166. k-7, k-7,48. 167. 212, 216, 220, 224, 229, 257-8; k-21, 32. 167. k-2, k-2,212,216,220,224,229,257-8; k-21,32. 168. k-2, 211, 249. 168. k-2,211,249. METSENATS controllers in the Rome residency were,successively, 169. k-2, 240, 271; 271; k-25,188. 169. 188. METSENAT's the Rome successively, Vladimir Yevgenyevich Strelkov, Strelkov, Anatoli Yegorovich Abalin, Valentin Mikhaolovich Yatsura and KonKon stantin Kazakov. 170. k-l, k-l,l k-2,214,222,244; k-13,143; k-14,687. 170. 1;; k-2, 214, 222, 244; k-13, 143; k-14, 687. 171. 153, 148. 171. k-13, k-13,153,148. 172. k-13, k-13,148. 172. 148. The active measures statistics were much in line with those for the previous two years. In 1975 1975 the Rome residency reported that "3 3 documentary [forged document] operations were carried out; 10 1 conference conference [were arranged]; 4 oral reports 10 conversations conversations of of influence were held; 1 1 press conference, conference, 1 disseminated; 48 articles were published; 6 questions were asked in Parliament; 1 delegation was were disseminated; assembled sent appeals were drafted; 4 mailing operations were carried out; an Italy-Spain assembled and sent out; 4 appeals Italy-Spain comcom and2 anonymous letters were sent out" out (k-13,135). mittee was set up; 2 leaflet operations were carried out and (k-13, 135). measures statistics for 1976 were as as follows: follows: The active measures
articles articles placed [in the press]: 63 conversations conversations of of influence: 6 appeals appeals made: 9 working group organized: 1 booklet distributed: 1 1 leaflet operation carried out: out: 1 1 anonymous letters distributed: 2 demonstration held: 1 1 demonstration parliamentary questions: questions: 2 question in the the Senate: Senate: 1 1 "Round Round Table" Table meeting held: 1 1 Of Of the total total number of of articles printed, 28 of of the press articles were designed to discredit the Main Main Adversary; "active Adversary; 21 alleged CIA interference in halian Italian affairs. The residency also claimed to have made active use of the Italy-Spain measures operations were intended to use" of "Italy-Spain" committee. Four active measures "to discredit Maoism as an anti-socialist tendency." k-13, 15I. tendency. k-13,151. Mitrokhins notes probably contain only an incomplete record of of new agents recruited by the Rome 173. Mitrokhin's 173. residency during the the period 1977-83. Among them, however, were ARO, who worked for the Ansaldo Genoa and andwas recruited at some point between 1978 company in Genoa 1978 and 1981 (k-14,439); (k-14, 439); CLEMENT, a international department of of the Christian (ACLI), member of the international Christian Association of of Italian Workers CACLI), 1981 after he had failed to supply intelligence of recruited in 1978 1978 but put on ice in 1981 of much significance (k-14, 395); KARS, an Italian physicist who worked as a Line X agent in both (k-14,395); bothItaly and the theUnited United States in the early 1980s (k-14, 264; vol. 6, app. 1, 1, part 40); 40); KOK, a sinologist recruited in 1977 1977 for operations 1980s (k-14,264; against the PRC PRC (k-13, 153); 153); and KOZAK, KOZAK,the the owner of of an Italian engineering company, who was recruited not later than 1978 174). 1978 (k-14, (k-14,174). 174. 687. 174. k-14, k-14,687. 175. 48. 175. k-7, k-7,48. 176. 109; k-25, 188. 176. k-10, k-10,109; k-25,188. 177. k-7, k-7, 126. 126. 177.

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178. 1 12. 178. k-13, k-13,112. CentTe p. 179. and Gordievsky 179. Andrew Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instructionsfrom InstructionsJi.omthe the Centre, p. 10. 10. 180. 180. Andrew Andrew and andGordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instructionsfrom Instructionsfiomthe Centre, Centre,pp. pp. 19-20. 19-20. 181. 181. Andrew Andrewand and Gordievsky, Gordievsky,KGB, KGB, pp. pp. 629-31. 629-31. 1990. 182. 182. "Order Order of of the the Chairman Chairmanof of the the KGB," KGB, no. no. 107/0V, 107/0V, September September 5, 5,1990.

Chapter The Penetration Chapter Twenty-eight Twenty-eight The Penetration and and Persecution Persecution of o f the the Soviet Soviet Churches Churches
1 . Lenin, orks, vol. pp. 89-90; 1. Lenin, W Works, vol. 35, 35, pp. 89-90; Shipler, Shipler, Russia, Russia, pp. pp. 270-1. 270-1. KGB KGB persecution persecution ofIslam of Islam and and Judaism Judaism will will be be covered covered in in volume volume 2. 2. 2. uenced by 2. Stalin Stalin may may also alsohave havebeen been infl influenced by the the desire desire not not to toalienate alienate his his Anglo-American Anglo-American allies allies by bycontin continued was ued religious religious persecution persecution at at a a time time when whenhe he was pressing pressing them them to toopen open a a second second front. front. Pospielovsky, Pospielovsky,"The The 'Best Archival BestYears' Years of of Stalin's Stalins Church Church Policy Policy (1942-1948) (1942-1948) in in the the Light Lightof of Archival Documents." Documents. 3. 3. The The work work of of Michael MichaelBourdeaux Bourdeaux and and his his colleagues colleagues at at Keston Keston College College has has impressively impressively documented documented the the vitality vitality of of religious religious life life in in the the post-war post-war Russian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Church, Church, despite despite continued continued persecution persecution and and a a mostly subservient intcralia, alia, Bourdeaux, Bourdeaux,Risen Rism Indeed. Indeed subservient hierarchy. hierarchy. See, See, inter 4. Council 4. Luchterhandt, Luchterhandt,"The The Council for for Religious Religious Affairs." Affairs. 5. 5. vol. vol. 5, 5, sec. sec. 9. 9. 6. 6. Meerson, Meerson, "The The Political Political Philosophy Philosophy of of the theRussian Russian Orthodox Orthodox Episcopate Episcopate in in the the Soviet Soviet Period," Period, p. p.221. 221. 7. Con ftrence, pp. 7. Revesz, Revesz, The The Christian Christian Peace Co?Eference, pp. 1-4. 1-4. 8. 232. 8. k-1, k-1,232. 9. 214. 9. k-1, k-1,214. 10. 10. Harriss, Harriss, "The The Gospel Gospel According According to to Marx," Marx, pp. pp. 61-2. 61-2. 1 1 . Mitrokhin not see WCC 11. Mitrokhindid did not see the the file file on the the 1961 1961 W C C Central Committee Committeemeeting. Another file file noted by es ADAMANT him, him, however, however, identifi identifies ADAMANT as as Nikodim; Nikodim; vol. vol. 7, 7, ch. ch. 5, 5,para. para. 28. 28. 12. 1969). 12. "WCC WCC Gives Gives Eight-point Eight-point Lead Lead to to Member MemberChurches," Churches, Church Church Times Times (August (August 29, 29,1969). 13. 13. "Elusive Elusive Goal" Goal (leader), (leader), Church Church Times Times (August 29, 1969). 1969). 14. role 14. Harriss, Harriss, "The The Gospel Gospel According According to to Marx," Marx,pp. pp. 61-2. 61-2. On On Buyevsky's Buyevsys role in in the theMoscow Moscow Patriarchate's Patriarchates foreign foreign relations relations Department, Department, see see Ellis, Ellis, The TheRussian Orthodox Orthodox Church, Church,p. p. 266. 266. 15. 1973); Smith, 15. Letter Letterfrom the the Bishop of Bristol to the theChurch Church Times Times (September 7, 7,1973); Smith,Fraudulent Gospel, Gospel, pp. pp. 2-3. 2-3. 16. 16. Babris, Babris, Silent Churches, Churches,p. p. 472. 472. 17. p. 17. Document Documentcited cited by by Harriss, Harriss, "The The Gospel Gospel According According to to Marx," Marx, p. 62. 62. 18. 18. KGB KGB Church Church records records temporarily temporarily accessible accessible to to journalists journalists after after the the disintegration disintegration of of the theSoviet Soviet Union Union indicate indicate that, that, at atsome some stage stage after after Nikodim's Nikodims death death in in1978, 1978, Yuvenali Yuvenali was wasgiven given his his former former KGB KGB codename codename ADAMANT. was ADAMANT. (It (It was not not unusual unusual for for KGB KGB codenames codenames to to be be recycled.) recycled.) Michael Michael Dobbs, Dobbs, "Business Businessas as Usual Usual ashington Post 1 , 1992). for for Ex-KGB Agents," Agents, W Washington Post(February 1 11,1992). 19. 19. Pawley, Pawley, Donald Coggan, Coggan, pp. pp. 244-8. 244-8. 20. k-1 , 24. k-1,24. 21. 21. Polyakov, Polyakov, ''Activities Activitiesof of the the Moscow Moscow Patriarchate Patriarchate in in 1991," 1991,p. p. 152. 152. 22. 22. Ellis, Ellis, The The Russian Rzrssian Orthodox Orthodox Church, Chzrrch, pp. pp. 226-9. 226-9. 23. DailyAmerican DaiZyAmericun (September 8, 8,1978). 29,1978, less than a month after Nikodim's Nikodims death 1978). On September 29, 1978, less 23. in the Vatican, the Vatican,John Paul I I also also died suddenly, suddenly,thus becoming the shortest-lived pope since since Urban VII VI1 died of malaria malaria twelve days days after his election election in 1590. 1590. 24. 24. See See above, above, chapter chapter 28. 28. 25. 30. 25. k-1, k-l,30. Orthodox Church, Church, pp. 26. 26. Ellis, Ellis, The The Russian Orthodox pp. 215-16. 215-16. On On the the authenticity authenticity of of the the report, report, see see Oppenheim, Oppenheim, ''Are Are the the Furov Furov Reports Reports Authentic?" Authentic? 27. the Patriarchal of the 27. "His His Holiness Patriarch Patriarch Pimen's Pimens Address Before Panikhida Panikhida in the Patriarchal Cathedral of the ofthe Moscow Epiphany Epiphany in inMoscow," Moscow,Journal Journalofthe Moscow Patriarchate Patriarchate(1984), (1984), no. 3. 28. See, See, for for example, example, Pimen's Pimens telegram telegram to to Brezhnev of December 17, 17, 1976 1976 in JOl/rnal Journal of o f the Moscow Patri Patri28. archate archate (1977), (1977), no. no. 2, 2, pp. pp. 3-4. 3-4. ofthe Moscow Patriarchate 29. 29. "Soviet SovietPeace Fund Fund Awards," Awards,Journal Journalofthe Patriarchate(1976), (1976), no. 4. 4. the Moscow Patriar 30. 30. "His His Holiness Patriarch Pimen Awarded by the World WorldPeace Council," Council,Journal of ofthe Patriarchate chate (1976), (1976), no. 6. 6. 31. "World World Conference: Conference: Religious Religious Leaders for Lasting Peace, Disarmament Disarmament and Just Relations Relations among 31. (1977), Nations," Nations,Journal of o f the the Moscow MoscowPabiarchate Patriarchate (1977), no. no. 7, 7, pp. pp. 2-3 2-3 and and no. no. 8, 8, pp. pp. 17-64. 17-64.

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32. k1, 23; 23; vol. 10. The also involved involved in another another KGB-sponsored production in in 32. k-1, vol. 6, 6, eh. ch. 10. The Patriarchate Patriarchate was was also in KGB-sponsored production 1982, World Conference the Sacred f rom Nuclear Nuclear CatasCatas 1982,the the World Conference of of Religious Religious Workers Workers for for Saving Saving the Sacred Gift Gift of of Life Life from

trophe, which which again again attracted attracted about about 600 600 participants. participants. trophe, 33. Decree of of the the Presidium Presidium of of the the USSR USSR Supreme Supreme Soviet Soviet on Conferring Conferring the the Order Orderof 33. "Decree of the Red Banner
of Labor Labor upon upon Patriarch Patriarch Pimen Pimen of of Moscow Moscow and and All All Russia,Journal~fthr Patriarchaft. (1977), of Russia, " Journal fthe fifoscow lVloscow Patriarchate (1977), no. no.

9, p. p. 3 3. 9, .
3 4 . Ellis, Chw'ch, p 34. Ellis, The Tht. Russian RussianOrthodox Orthodox Church, p.. 217. 217.

35. The The full full text text of of the the letter letter f from Yakunin and and Regelson Regelson was published in 35. rom Yakunin vol. 41 (1976), no. no. 1 1. vol. 41 (1976), .
3 6 . Lefever, 36. Lefever, Nairobi to to

Religion in Communist Lands, Lands,

Vancouver, Church, pp. pp. 355-68; 355-68; Hudson, Hudson, Thr The Yancouuer, pp. pp. 64-5; 64-5; Ellis, Ellis, The Russian Russian Orthodox OrthodoxChurch, 286-7. W orld Council A ffairs, pp. World Councilof o f Churches in International I?zternationalA~airs, pp. 286-7. 37. Norman, Norman, Christianity and and the the W World Ordo; pp. pp. 1-2, 1-2,90 orld Ordel; 90 n. n. 62. 37. 38. Lefever, Nairobi to t o Vancouver, Vancouver,p. p. 65; 65; Babris, Babris, Silent Churches, Churches, p. 475. 38. Lefever, 39. 10. 39. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 10. 40. Harriss, Harriss, "The The Gospel Gospel According According to to Marx," Marx, p. p. 63. 63. 40. 41. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 10. 10. 41. 42. "Interview Interview Given Given by by Metropolitan .Metropolitan Filaret Filaret of of Kiev Kiev and and Gallich Gallich to to a Novosti Press Agency Agency Correspon42. Correspon ofthe Moscow Patriarchate dent," dent,Journal Journalofthe Patriarchate(1976), (1976), no. no. 5. 43. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 10. 10. 43 . vol. 44. Smith, Smith, Fraudulent Frmdulent Gospel, Gospel, p. p. 68. 68. 44. Com 45. of the published in in Religion in Com45. The The text text of the founding founding declaration declaration of of the the Christian Christian Committee Committeewas was published Lands, vol. vol. 6 6 (1 (1978), no. 1. On the the work work of of the the committee, see Ellis, Ellis, The Russian Russian Orthodox OrthodoxChurch, Church, 978), no. 1. On munist Lands, pp. 373-81. 373-81. pp. 46. 203. 46. k-21, k-21,203. 47. Documents Documentsqfthe ffthe Christian Committeefor Committee f o r the thr Difense Defense ofBelirversRights (Vol.3 conofBelievers 'Rights in the USSR, USSR, 12 12 vols. (Vol. con 47. sists of of English English translations; translations; the the remainder remainder contain contain reproductions of of the original original Russian texts.) texts.) See also sists Committeefor of , Rights in the USSR. Scarfe Scarfe (ed.), (ed.), The Tht. CCDBR Documents: Documents..Christian Christian Committee for the Difense Defenscr o f Believers Believers USSR. 48. kk-1, On Varsonofy's Varsonofys resignation resignation from from the the Christian Thr Russian Orthodox l , 65. 65. On Christian Committee, Committee, cf. cf. Ellis, The Orthodox Church, Church, p. p. 379. 379. 49. k-27, k-27,488. 49. 488. 50. Ellis, Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, Church,p. p. 379. 379. 50. 51. k-l,50. On Fonchenkov's Fonchenkovs public public career, career, cf. cf Ellis, Ellis, The Russian Orthodox 380-1. Orthodox Church, Church, pp. 380-1. 51. k-l, 50. On 52. Ellis, Ellis, The Thr Russian Orthodox Church, Church, p. p. 428. 428. 52. 53. Albats, Albats, The State within a State, State, p. p. 46. 46. 53. 54. Ellis, Ellis, The Russian Russian Orthodox OrthodoxChurch, Church, pp. 422f 422ff. pp. 54. pp. 430-9. 55. 55. Ellis, Ellis, The Russian Orthodox Church, Church,pp. 430-9. 56, It is is impossible, impossible, however, however, to to rule rule out out the the possibility, possibility, that Fonchenkov had become genuinely genuinely sympa56. It sympa thetic as agent agent DRUG are limited limited to the 1970s. 1970s. thetic towards towards Yakunin. Yakunin. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes notes on on his his career career as DRUG are to the 57. pp. 57. Ellis, Ellis, The Russian Russian Orthodox OrthodoxChurch, Church, pp. 439-41. 439-41. 58. Lefever, Nairobi to t o Vancouver, Ynncouver, pp. pp. 3-5, 3-5,67-70,73,75, 67-70, 73, 75, appendix appendix A. A. 58. Lefever, 59. Andrew Andrew and and Gordievsky Gordievsky (eds.), (eds.), Instructions InstrwtionsJCron1om from the Centre, Centrr, p. p. 20. 20. 59. 60. pymaster, p. 60. Kalugin, Kalugin, S Spymaster, p. 197. 197. 61. vol. vol. 6, 6, ch. ch. 10, 10, n. n. 1. 1. 61. 62. f or example, example, record that during during his period in New 62. Mitrokhin's hlitrokhins notes notes on on the the file file of of agent agent VORONOV, VORONOV, for record that his period in New York to identify identify among among his parishioners people people who who York State State in in the the late late 1970s 1970s and and early early 1980s, 1980s, he he "was was tasked tasked to his parishioners had of the USSR-government workers, political political party party [members], [members], union union had a a progressive progressive and andsympathetic sympatheticview view ofthe USSR-government workers, members, immigration officials, clergymen and and members,workers workers at at scientific scientific research researchinstitutes, institutes, diplomatic diplomatic personnel, personnel, immigration officials, clergymen church the of births and deaths deaths [for church employees employees who who were were involved involvedin in the registration registration of births,, marriages, marriages, and [for assistance assistancein in the the documentation ofillegals] of illegals]and and agents agents of of Zionist Zionist and and anti-Soviet anti-Soviet organizations" organizations(vol. (vol. 6, app. documentation 6, app. 2, 2, part part 4). 4). 63. Kalugin, Spymaster, Spymaster, p. p. 197. 197. 63. Kalugin, 64. vol. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 2, 2, part part 4 4 64. 65. vol. 65. vol. 6, 6, app. app. 2, 2, part part 4. 4. 66. vol. 8, 8, ch. ch. 6, 6, paras. paras. 16-17. 16-17. 66. vol. 67. 67. vol. vol. 8, 8, app. app. 3, 3, para. para. 20. 20. of DROZDOVs DROZDOV's identity provided by the 68. 68. Albats, Albats, The State within a State, State, p. p. 46. 46. Confirmation Confirmation of identitywas was provided by the release early early in in 1999 1999of of a 1958 report on on his his recruitment, allegedly on Estonian release a 1958 report recruitment, allegedly on patrioticgrounds, "patriotic" grounds, by by the the Estonian

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thereport refers to the agent only by his codename, his year of of birth and career details are KGB. Though the identical Guardian Guardian (February 12, 12, identical with with those of of Aleksi. Aleksi. James James Meek, Meek, "Russian Russian Patriarch 'was was KGB KGB spy,' spy, " 1999). 1999). 69. "Metropolitan the 69. Metropolitan Aleksiy's Aleksiys Speech Speech at at the the Founding Founding Conference Conference of of the the 'Rodina' Rodina Society," Society, Journal of ofthe Moscow Patriarchate Patriarchate (1976), (1976), no. 2. 2. 70. p. 46. 70. Albats, The State within a aState, Stafe, Eglise greco-catholique 71. Suppression de l' 1Eglise grtco-catholique ukrainienne;" ukrainienne; Pelikan, Con Confessor between fessor between East and 71. Bociurkiw, "Suppression West, ch. 8; 8; Floridi, Floridi, "The TheChurch Churchof of the the Martyrs Martyrs and and the the Ukrainian Ukrainian Millennium," Millennium, pp. pp. 107-11; 107-11; Tataryn, Tataryn, West, ch. "The Catholic Church the USSR," The Re-emergence of the theUkrainian (Greek) Catholic Churchin in the USSR, pp. 292-4. 292-4. 72. k-1, 246. 72. k-l,246. 73. The intelligence agencies Hungary, Poland and Romania were rep 73. agencies of the USSR, USSR,Bulgaria, the GDR, GDR, repof directorates (k-l,106). resented by heads and deputy heads of (k-l, 106). k-1,106. Mitrokhins notes do not notmake clear which, if if any, of of the KGB representatives representatives at the confer confer74. k-1, 106. Mitrokhin's ence came came from ence from the the FCD. FCD. confirmation thereport, the Centre Centre took the alleged Vatican conspiracy seriously seriously 75. Though seeking confi rmation of the expost of of it, if if further details could be obtained (k-1,2). and drew up plans for a press expose (k-l, 2). k-l,71. 76. k-1, 71. Babris, Silent Churches, Churches,pp. 149-50. 149-50. 77. Babris, 78. SLUGAare not identified in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes (k-1, (k-1,2). 78. APOSTOL, RASS and SLUGA 2). k-l,3,110. It is unclear whether the the PETROV who studied at the theRussicum was the cleric with the the 79. k-1, 3, 1 10. It same codename later sent to North America. 80. k-l, k-l,81-2,109. 1968; Mitrokhin does not record the date of 80. 81-2, 109. ANTANAS arrived in Rome in January 1968; of of VIDMANTAS. arrival ofVIDMANTAS. 81. k-l,83-4. alsorecords that in inOctober October 1969 DAKTARAS gath8 1 . k-l , 83-4. A KGB file also 1 969 DAKTARAS visited Rome to attend a "a gath of bishops (k-1,2). ering of bishops" (k-l, 2). 82. k-1, k -l, 2 . Dudas Du d bappears in KGB files, in Cyrillic transliteration, as Dudast. 82. 2. 83. k-l,2. 83. k-l , 2. 84. k-1, 133. 133. 85. k-1 k-1,133. , 133. 86. k-1, k-l,36, k-19,82. 86. 36, k-5,11, k-5, 11, k-19, 82. 87. Unlike the similar 1967 conference, the 1975 1975 conference conference was attended by the Cubans. On this occa occa1967 conference, k-l,13. sion, however, there was no delegation from Romania. k-1 , 13. 88. k-l, k-l,13. 88. 13. 89. k-l, 246. k-1,246. 90. Borec1<)T, Borecky, Bishop Isidore,"The The Church Church Ukrainel988;Tataryn, The Re-emergence of of the Ukrainian in in Ukraine-1988;" Tataryn, "The USSR; Polyakov, Polyakov,''Activities Activities of the theMoscow Patriarchate in 1991, 152. (Greek) Catholic Church in the USSR;" of 1991," p. 152. 91. k-1, 146. 146. The KGB estimate may have been too low. Published estimates for 1990, 1990, admittedly at a 91. k-l, ceased,were signifi significantly Poltime when active persecution had almost ceased, cantly higher; see Ramet (ed.), Religious Pol Soviet Union, Union, pp. 355-6. 355-6. icy in the Soviet 92. k-1 , 73. k-1,73. 93. k-l, 146. k-1,146. GenerationsofSu o f Suflring; Bourdeaw, Gorbachev, Gorbachev,Glasnost Glasnost& &the Gospel, p. 121. 121. 94. Ellis (ed.), Three Generations ffiring; Bourdeaux, the Gospel, 95. k-l , 214. k-l,214. 96. Penton, Apocalypse ApocaZypse Delayed. Delayed k-1,241. 97. k-1, 241 . 98. Recollections o of oneo of the by Cult-busters Fight 'Sins Sins of of 9 8 . Recollections f one f the deportees, Vasili Kalin, cited b y James Meek, "Cult-busters Witness, " Guardian Guardian (February 12,1999). False Witness,' 12, 1999). 99. k-1 , 91. k-l,91. 100. Among the the evidence evidence ignored by the KGB conspiracy theorists who saw the Jehovah's Jehovahs Witnesses as 100. ideological subversion was the fact that, from the First World WorldWar Warto tothe thewar in vehicles for American ideological conscientious Vietnam, they consistently represented the largest group of Americans imprisoned for conscientious 1918 their leaders leaders were imprisoned for contravening the American Espionage Act, though though objection. In 1918 their sentences sentences were overturned on appeal. ApocaZypse Delayed, Delayed, pp. 55-6, 55-6,142. Sadly, some of of the 142. Sadly, appeal. Penton, Penton, Apocalypse conspiracy survived the collapse of the Soviet system. conspiracy theories survived system. 101. k-1, k-1,241. JehovahsWitnesses behave in many ways as as model citizens. 101. 241. In reality, Jehovah's citizens. Since Since 1962 1962 they have been instructed to obey all human laws not directly in conflict with those of of God. Penton, A Apocalypse pocalypse Delayed, p. 140. 140. Delayed,

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102. Antic, "The The ModernCults Cults USSR, pp. 257-8. 102. Antic, Spread of Modern in in thethe USSR," 257-8. 103. 92. 103. k-1, k-l,92. 104. k-1, 91. reference in the files noted noted by Mitrokhin to any successful KGB penetration 104. 91. There is no reference penetration Jehovahs Witnesses" Witnesses Brooklyn headquarters or of either of the Jehovah's of its west European offices. 105. k-1, 91. 105. k-l,91. 106. 73. 106. k-1, k-l,73. The Spread of of Modern Cults Cultsinin the USSR, 107. Antic, "The the USSR," p. 259. 108. Polyakov, Polyakov, ''Activities Activities of of the Moscow Patriarchate in 1991; 1991; p. 147; Van den Bercken, The 108. "The Russian Church,State State Society in 1991-1993," 1991-1993, p. 164. Orthodox Church, and Society 109. Walters, "The The Defrocking of Fr. Gleb Yakunin," Yakunin, pp. 308-9. 308-9. 109. 110. Yakunin, Yakunin,"First First Open Letter Letterto Patriarch Aleksi II," 11,pp. 313-14. the 110. 313-14. Father Gleb was in dispute with the HolySynod in October October1993 1993 that Orthodox Patriarch over the decision decision by the Holy that Orthodox clergy would no longer be standas candidates for political office. He H e went ahead with his candidature in th the elections two allowed to stand defrocked. Walters, The months later, later, was elected and then defrocked. "The Defrocking of of Fr Gleb Yakunin, Yakunin," p, p. 310.

Chapter Twenty-nine The The Polish Pope and the Rise of o f Solidarity
1. 1. k-19,515. k-19, 515. 2. See above, chapter 16. 16. 3. k-19, k-19,516. 3. 516. arrests, see Karpinski, Poland since since 1944, 1944, pp. 196-7. 4. On the arrests, 196-7. 5. Cywinski later read Walcrsa's Wdqsasacceptance acceptance speech for the the1983 1983 theceremony in Oslo 5. Nobel Peace Prize at the Walqsa was unable to attend. attend. which Walcrsa 6. k-19,516. k-19, 516. Holiness, p. 126. 126. 7. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, See above, chapter 16. 16. 8. See 9. k-19, 429. Bardecki cannot, k-19,429. cannot, of of course, course, be blamed in any way for receiving, among his Western visitors, two men whom whomhe had no possible means of identifying as KGB illegals. 10. 516. 10. k-19, k-19,516. Holiness, p. 127. 127. 11. 1 1 . Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, II, p. 264. 12. 12. Szulc, Szulc, PopeJohn PopeJohn Paul PaulII, 13. k-19, 516. 13. k-19,516. 14. since 1944, Polandsince 1944, pp. 200-1. 200-1. 14. Karpinski, Karpinski, Poland 15. k-19,473. 15. k-19, 473. 16. 45. 16. k-l, k-l,45. 17. 515. 17. k-19, k-19,515. 18. 506. 18. k-19, k-19,506. 19. II, p. 289. 19. Szulc, Szulc, Pope John Paul PaulII, 20. The KGB claimed in 1982 there were 26,000 Catholic priests in Poland (k-19,506). (k-19, 506). 1982that that 21. Szulc, 21. Szulc, PopeJohn PopeJohn PaulII, p. 403. 22. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, Holiness, p. 321. k-1,ll. 23. k-l, 11. Szulc, PopeJohn Paul PaulII, II, p. 285. 24. Szulc, 25. k-1, 11. k-l,11. 2 6 . Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, Holiness, p p.. 184. 184. 26. 27. vol. 8, ch. 8; vol. vol. 8, 8, app. 3. Tischner cannot, of of course, course, be blamed in any way for receiving, among his Western visitors, Pol visitors, an apparendy apparently well-recommended Canadian publisher seeking his help for a book on on Polish missionaries, missionaries, whom he had hadno possible possible means of of identifying as a KGB illegal. 28. Holiness, p. 373. 28. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, II, p. 299; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 191. 191. 29. Szulc, Szulc, PopeJohn PopeJohn Paul PaulII, 30. k-20, 208. k-20,208. 31. k-20,163. 31. k-20, 163. 32. 211. 32. k-20, k-20,211. 33. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, Holiness, pp. 217-18. 217-18. 34. Szulc, Szulc, PopeJohn PopeJohn Paul II, II,pp. 310-12; 310-12; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 308. k-l,19. 35. k-l , 19. 36. k-20, 245. k-20,245. 37. 245. 37, k-20, k-20,245.

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38. k-20, 220. 38. k-20,220. 39. Kramer (ed.), ed Soviet Documents on the Crisis," p. 116. 39. (ed.),"Declassifi Declassified Soviet Documents on Polish the Crisis, 116. andPoliti, Politi, Holiness, p. 246. 40. Bernstein and His Holiness, 41. k-20, k-20,221. 221. 42. Bernstein and His Holiness, p. 246. andPoliti, Politi,

Chapter Thirty The Polish Crisis and the Crumbling Crumbling of of the Soviet Bloc
1. Soviet Documents on 17, 129-30. 1.Kramer (ed.), (ed.),"Declassified Declassified on the Polish Crisis," Crisis, pp. 1 117,129-30. k-20,221. 2. k-20, 221. withBig Brother, Broth,, pp. 48-9. 48-9. 3. Dobbs, Down with 4. k-20, 342. k-20,342. 5. k-20, k-20,34. 5. 34. k-20,35. 6. k-20, 35. andPoliti, Politi, Holiness, pp. 247-8. 247-8. His Holiness, 7. Bernstein and 8. k-16, 409. 8. k-16,409. 9. vol. 8, be blamed 8, app. 3. 3. Neither Neither Bardecki Bardecki nor nor Mazowiecki Mazowieckican can blamed in any any way for receiving, among their their Western visitors, whom they hadhad no possible means of as a KGB illegal. visitors,someone someone whom they no means ofidentifying identifying illegal. 10. t-7,156. t-7, 156. 10. 11. Bernstein and His Holiness, p. 250. 11. andPoliti, Politi, 12. k-20, k-20,10,26. 12. 10, 26. 13. k-19, 29. 13. k-19,29. 14. His Holiness, p. 254. 14. Bernstein and andPoliti, Politi, 254. 15. 28. 15. k-20, k-20,28. 16. t-7, t-7,154. O n January 22 22Mikhail Mikhail Zimyanin returned to Moscow from a fact-finding Poland 16. 154. On Zimyanin returned to Moscow from a fact-finding mission in Poland reportto to the Politburo (Bernstein Politi, Holiness, pp. 255-6). 255-6). His Holiness, and gave an equally gloomy report the Politburo (Bernstein andand Politi, 17. k-19,511. 17. k-19, 511. 18. 155. 18. t-7, t-7,155. His Holiness, 19. Politi, 19. Bernstein Bernsteinand and Politi, Holiness, pp. 271-4. 271-4. 20. k-20, 309. k-20,309. 21. Bernstein and His Holiness, 21. andPoliti, Politi, Holiness, pp. 276-84. 276-84. k-20,110. 22. k-20, 110. 23. Kramer (ed.), (ed.),"Declassified Declassified Documents on on the thePolish Crisis," Crisis,pp. 130-1. 130-1. Soviet Documents 24. Szulc, His Holiness, Szulc, PopeJohn Pope John Paul PaulIL II, ch. 24. Bernstein and andPoliti, Politi, Holiness,pp. 293-307. 293-307. 25. At the the Centre were divided on whether the the time, opinions opinionswithin within the Centre the KGB had been been involved in the the About half half the the FC D officers with whom Oleg Oleg Gordievsky Gordievskydiscussed the attempt assassination attempt. About FCD were convinced contemplate such a risky special action, even ifit sub convincedthat the theKGB would no nolonger longer contemplate such specialaction, if it were subcontracted to the theBulgarian intelligence service. The other half, half,however, suspected suspected that thatDepartment Department8 8 of of Bulgarian intelligence service. S, which was responsible Directorate S, responsible for assassinations, had been involved; involved; some told Gordievsky Gordievsky they regrettedthat thatthe the attempt had andGordievsky, Gordievsky, KGB, p. 639.) only regretted attempt had failed. (Andrew and k-20,101,104. 26. k-20, 101, 104. 27. k-20, 104. k-20,104. 28. k-20, k-20,102. (k-19,26). 102. Olszowski was regarded as a KGB co-optee (k-19, 26). k-20,103. O n June June 7 Aristov, Kulikov Kulikovand Pavlov telegraphed the thePolitburo Politburo the necessity of 29. k-20, 103. On to to urge "the of aa dialogue with S. Kania about his departure from fromthe the post First Secretary (k-20,57). direct dialogue with S. post ofof thethe First Secretary" (k-20, 57). 30. k-20, 105. k-20,105. 31. k-20, 53. 31. k-20,53. k-20,52. 32. k-20, 52. 33. k-20, 55. k-20,55. k-20,54. 34. k-20, 54. 35. k-19, k-19,385. 385. k-20,54,102,112. 36. k-20, 54, 102, 112. 37. Boyes, The Naked Ntzked President, President,pp. 97-8. 97-8. 38. k-19,110. k-19, 1 10. 38. 39. k-19, 115. k-19,115. 40. Boyes, pp. 94-5. Boyes, The Naked NakedPresident, President, 94-5. 41. k-19, k-19,115. 115. 42. k-19, 115. k-19,115.

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43. k-19,117. k-19, 117. k-19,113. 44. k-19, 113. 45. k-19, 102. k-19,102. k-19,106. 46. k-19, 106. 47. k-19, 105. k-19,105. 48. 103. 48. k-19, k-19,103. 49. k-19, 104. k-19,104. 50. 132-3. 50. Kramer (ed.) "Declassified Declassified Soviet Soviet Documents Documents on onthe thePolish Crisis," Crisis, pp. 132-3. 51. CPSU CPSUSecretary Secretary K. V. Rusakov told Honecker after Kania's Kanias sacking, We noticed that lately a differ51. sacking, "We differ ence began to appear between Kania and J aruzelski in their aruzelski began ence Jaruzelski theirapproaches to basic questions. J Jaruzelski readiness to accept violent measures in dealing with counter-revolution. We began to show more and more readiness Jaruzelski. When doing this, we were influenced by the fact that Jaruzelski possessed greater to work with Jaruzelski. authority in army and also enjoyed the support of ministers" (k-20,338). (k-20, 338). inthe the of the ministers 52. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, Holiness, pp. 315-16. 315-16. 53. k-20, 303. k-20,303. Crisis, pp. 133-4. 133-4. Declassified Soviet Documents on the Polish Crisis," 54. Kramer (ed.), "Declassified 55. k-20, 311. k-20,311. 56. k-20, 327. k-20,327. 57. k-20, 307. k-20,307. 58. k-20, 304. 58. k-20,304. 59. k-20, 327. k-20,327. 60. k-20, 308. k-20,308. 61. Ustinov denied, not wholly convincingly, that Kulikov had actually referred to the 61. thepossibility of of Soviet onthe the Crisis, pp. 134-7. 134-7. military intervention; Kramer (ed.), Declassified "Declassified Soviet Documents on Polish Crisis," 62. k-20, 315, 316. k-20,315,316. 63. k-20, 340. k-20,340. 64. k-20, 315. k-20,315. 65. k-20, 325. k-20,325. k-20,293. 66. k-20, 293. 67. k-20, 324. k-20,324. 68. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, 339. Holiness, pp. 334, 334,339. 106-7. 69. Boyes, Boyes, The Naked President, President, pp. 106-7. 70. k-20, 329. k-20,329. 71. k-20, k-20,297. 297. 72. 72. Boyes, Boyes, The Naked President, President, p. 107. 107. Holiness, pp. 336-7. 336-7. 73. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, 74. k-20, 297. k-20,297. 75. k-20, 316. k-20,316. Holiness, pp. 337-9. 337-9. 76. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, 77. k-20, 323. k-20,323. k-20,296. 78. k-20, 296. 79. 298. 79. k-20, k-20,298. 80. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, Holiness, pp. 343-4. 343-4. 81. k-19,53. k-19, 53. 82. k-19, 321. k-19,321. 19, 23. 83. k k119,23. 84. Boyes, Boyes, The Naked President, President, p. 108; 108; Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, p. 348. 85. k-20, 249. k-20,249. 86. 23. 86. k-19, k-19,23. 87. 87. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, Holiness, p. 348. 88. Boyes, The Naked President, President, pp. 307-9. 307-9. 89. k-20, 249. 89. k-20,249. 90. k-19,261. k-19, 261. 91. Boyes, Boyes, The Naked President, President, p. 117. 117. 92. k-19, 381. k-19,381. 93. k-19, 380. k-19,380. k-19,411. 94. k-19, 411.

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95. k-19, 312. k-19,312. k-19,252. 96. k-19, 252. 97. k-19, 253. k-19,253. k-19,257. 98. k-19, 257. 99. k-19, 258. k-19,258. 100. 261. Mitrokhin's 100. k-19, k-19,261. Mitrokhins notes notes do do not notrecord record the the content contentof of Brezhnev's Brezhnevs message messageto to Jaruzelski. Jaruzelski. On On pros prosecutions 981-1986. ecutions after after the the declaration declaration of of martial martial law, law, see see Swidlicki, Swidlicki, Political Trials Trialsin Poland 1 1981-1986. 101. 642. 101. k-19, k-19,642. 102. k-19, 311. 102. k-19,311. 103. 324. 103. k-19, k-19,324. 104. 326. 104. k-19, k-19,326. 105. k-19, 328. 105. k-19,328. 106. k-19, 337. 106. k-19,337. 107. k-19, k-19,339. 107. 339. 108. 128. 108. k-19, k-19,128. 109. 124. 109. k-19, k-19,124. 1 10. k-19, 143. received; 110. 143. Kiszczak expressed his thanks for material and technical assistance assistance alreadyreceived; Mitrokhin's Mitrokhhs notes do do not notrecord record the the nature nature of of this this assistance. assistance. 1 1 1. k-19, 143. 111. k-19,143. 1 12. k-l, 15. 112. k-l,15. 113. k-19,135. 1 13. k-19, 135. 1 14. Bernstein 114. Bernstein and and Politi, Politi, His Holiness, pp. pp. 376-7. 376-7. 115. 115.Szulc, Szulc, PopeJohn Pope John PaulIL PaulII, pp. pp. 388-9. 388-9. 1 16. Boyes, 116. Boyes, The Naked President, President,p. p. 131. 131. 1 17. k-19, 143. 117. k-19,143. 1 18. Bernstein and Politi, His Holiness, 118. Holiness,pp. 381-2. 381-2. 1 19. Boyes, The Naked 119. NakedPresident, President, pp. 132-3. 132-3. 120. 17, 134-6. 120. Boyes, Boyes, The Naked President, President,pp. pp. 1 117,134-6. 136-7. 121. 121. Boyes, Boyes, The Naked NakedPresident, President, pp. pp. 117, 117,136-7. President, 137-8. 122. 122. Boyes, Boyes, The Naked Naked President, pp. pp. 137-8. 123. IL pp. 123. Szulc, Szulc, PopeJohn Pope John Paul PaulII, pp. 395-6; 395-6; Bernstein Bernstein and and Politi, Politi, His Holiness, pp. pp. 387-8. 387-8. IL pp. 124. 124. Bernstein Bernstein and and Politi, Politi, His Holiness, Holiness, pp. pp. 388-9; 388-9; Szulc, Szulc, PopeJohn PopeJohn Paul PaulII, pp. 396-7. 396-7. 125. 500. 125. k-16, k-16,500. 126. 126. Brown, Brown, The Gorbachev Gorbuchev Factor, Factor,p. p. 249. 249. 127. 127. Dobbs, Dobbs, Down with withBig Brother, Brother,pp. pp. 265-9; 265-9; Levesque, Ltvesque, The TJe Enigma of1989, o f 1989, ch. ch. 6. 6. 128. 128. Dobbs, Dobbs, Down with withBig Brother, Brother,p. p. 288. 288. 129. 1992). 129. Interview Interview with with Shebarshin, Shebarshin, Daily Dai& Telegraph Telegraph (December (December 1, 1,1992).

Conclusion. Conclusion. From the One-Party One-party State to t o the Yeltsin YeZtsinPresidency Presidency
1. Jukes, "The Though Jukes's 1. The Soviets Soviets and 'Ultra.' Ultra. " Though Jukess conclusions conclusions are debatable, his 1988 1988 article remains a pathbreaking pathbreaking study. study. 2. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the orld, 191 7-1991. 2. the W World, 7-1 991. Dr. Kennedy-Pipe's Kennedy-Pipes otherwise valuable book is only example of the continuing continuingunderestimation underestimation of of the role of of Soviet of one example Soviet foreign intelligence intelligence even in some of the most recent work by leading Western scholars. scholars. significance ofSIGINT of SIGINT was made clear by David Kahn's Kahns pioneering The Codebreakers, Codebreakers,published in 3. The significance 1967. Though a bestseller, rather than to inspire, most historians of 1967. Though bestseller,however, its contents appeared to stun, stun, rather than to of international international relations. of international relations, history and other other departments in 4. A growing minority of departments in British universities now offer courses intelligence, though on flourish courses on intelligence, on a much smaller scale than in north America. There is a flourishing British Study Group Intelligence, with a largely academic academic membership, and an increasing number Groupon on of of similar groups in north northAmerica and continental Europe. y-Four, p. 7. 5. Orwell, 5. Orwell, Nineteen Nineteen Eight Eighty-Four, o f the Soviet Soviet Union, Union, p. 219. 6. Hosking, A History of 7. Two of of the leading historians of of the Bolshevik Revolution, Orlando Figes and Richard Pipes, agree on on the Cheka Chekaas "a a state within withina state." state. describing the 8. 8. Volkogonov, Volkogonov, The Rise and Fall Fallof o f the Soviet SovietEmpire, Empire, pp. pp. 73-4. 73-4.

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9. Conquest, of the difficulty encountered by many Western 9. Conquest, The Great Terror, Terror, pp. 468-70. 468-70. It was a sign of interpreting the Terror that Conquest's Conquests was the only full-scale history of historians in interpreting of it published during of the Soviet Soviet Union. the life of 10. Ostryakov, 10. Ostryakov, Voyennye Kyennye Chekisty, Cbekisty, p. p. 258. 258. 11. Russia's 78. On O n the punitive use of of psychiatry in the Soviet Union, see Bloch and Reddaway, Russia? 11. k-25, 78.

Hospitals. Political Hospitals. 12. k-25, k-25,79. suggestion in Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes that Voloshanovich was was working for the KGB. 12. 79. There is no suggestion 13. 13. See See above, above, chapter chapter 20. 20. 14. frag. 1, 7. of the frag. 1, 7. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes give no details of the precise charges leveled against Korobov or of the 14. ofhis sentence. sentence. length of 15. k-3b, 15. k-3b, 136. 136. 16. I am grateful to Dr. Clarissa de Waal W a d of of Newnham College, Cambridge, for these recollections of recollections of 16. in1992. 1992. Tirana in 17. A further 3 percent were KGB co-optees. 17.
18. t-7, 284. 18. t-7,284. 19. t-7,286. beharshlyjudged. Those who who refused 19. t-7, 286. The behavior of the informers should not, in most cases, be willof theKGB towards themselves and their families. of the invitations to inform were likely to incur the ill will 20. frag. 3. frag. 5, 5,3. pymaster, pp. 287-98. 21. Spymaster, 287-98. 21. Kalugin, S 22. See above, above, chapter 20. 22. See Kissinger subsequently acknowledged acknowledgedthat Senator Senator Pat Moynihan Moynihanhad been an exception. exception. Your crys23. Kissinger "Your crys was better than thanmine." mine. Moynihan, Secrecy, Secrecy, p. 6. 6. tal ball, ball," he told him, "was 24. For example, of the twentieth century, example,the Russian sections sections of Eric Hobsbawm's Hobsbawms brilliant history of century,Age of Extremes, include no mention of any of the heads of of the Cheka and its successors, save savefor for a passing referrefer Extremes, ence careerbefore beforebecoming General Secretary Secretary as chief of the security ence to Andropovs Andropov's career "chief of security apparatus apparatus" (p. 476). however,a one-line reference reference to Andropov's Andropovs subsequent emergence as Soviet leader in Vances 25. There is, however, Vance's Hard Choices, reflections on the theperiod after his resignation (Vance, Hard reflections Choices, p. 421). 421). Gorbachev, however, acknowledged acknowledged that, eighteen months or two two years earlier, the coup might have 26. Gorbachev, 26. succeeded. succeeded. Resurrection. The American edition of of this generally admirable study appeared in 1997. 27. Remnick, Resurrection. 1997. 28. k-13, 268. k-13,268. andthe World, 1917-1991, is the most recent of of the many studies of 29. Kennedy-Pipe, Russia and the W orld, 191 of Soviet forfor 29. aspects of of it. eign policy which make no mention of these aspects 30. Andrew, Andrew, For the President's President?Eyes Eyes Onb, pp. 149-52. 149-52. Only, 30. Truman, Y Year o f Decisions, Decisions, p. 346. 346. 31. Truman, ear of 32. and presented by Christopher Andrew (producers: VENONA, BBC Radio 4 documentary written and (producers: 32. VENONA, VENONASecret. Mark Burman and Helen Weinstein), first broadcast March 18,1998. 18, 1 998. Andrew, The "The VENONA Secret." progress reports on VENONA VENONA from Weisband until 1950 The Centre received progress 1950 and from Philby from 1949 1949 to 1951. 1951. 33. 33. See above, chapter 9. 34. DARIO had already already served in the Italian foreign ministry before the Second World War, and was reemployed reemployed there there afterwards. afterwards. 35. 21. 35. See See above, chapter 21. 36. from the Centre, 29-40. (eds.), Instructions Instructionsfiom Centre, pp. 29-40. 36. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), 37. Fursenko Crisis," pp. pp. 65-6. 65-6. Fursenko and and Naftali, Naftali, "Soviet Soviet Intelligence Intelligence and and the the Cuban CubanMissile Missile Crisis, 37. 38. See 7, and See above, above, chapters chapters 6, 6,7, and 15. 15. 38. 39. See above, chapter 26. 39. See 24,1991). 40. Izvestia (September 24, 1991). 40. 41. assess intelligence reports submitted to Stalin and Khrushchev and the more elaborate assess41. The foreign intelligence their successors will one day be a major source for the study of of Soviet foreign policy. ments supplied to their far, however, however,very very available for research. research. Thus far, few are are available 42. k-9, k-9,122; 3. 42. 122; vol. 2, app. 3. 43. S t a h and the Bomb, Bomb, pp. 145-7. 145-7. 43. Holloway, Stalin 44. 1 , 13, and 21. See above, chapters 1 11,13, 21. 44. See 45. Pentagon estimate cited by Tuck, Tuck, High-Tech High-Tech Espionage, Espionage, pp. 108-9. (eds.), Instructionsfrom Instructionsfiom the Centre, Centre, p. 33. 46. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.),

, N o tt e s N o
*

/ /

668

47. Gorbachev's 1 986. Gorbachevs speech was reported in Pravda on March March26, 26,1986. 48. Brown, The Gorbachev 139. Gorbachev Factor, Factor,pp. 134-5, 1365,139. 49. See above, chapter 25. HouseCommittee, Committee, of which a declassifi declassified 50. Report of the House chaired by Representative Christopher Cox, of ed version was published as this volume was going to topress in May May1999. 1999. 51. k-3b, 137. 137. Though this residency circular was sent out out in in1977, 1977, formuit merely reiterated priorities formu lated in previous instructions from the Centre. 52. k-25, 1 86. k-25,186. 53. See above, chapter 20. 54. See above, chapter 18. 18. 55. 55. See above, chapter 22. 56. vol. 1, part 1; 1; k-25, 56; k-21, 74, 96, 99. 56. V O ~ 6, . ch. 1, k-25,56; k-21,74,96,99. 10. Mitrokhin's Mitrokhins notes do not give the names of of the operational officers assigned assigned to the 57. vol. 6, 6, ch. 10. Karpov-Korchnoi cial "second," Keene, believed Karpov-Korchnoi match. Korchnoi's Korchnois offi official second,the British grandmaster Raymond Keene, BaturinsQ, was a KGB colonel (Keene, (Keene, that the thehead of the Soviet delegation at the championship, V. D. Baturinsky, Korpov-Korchnoi 1978, of his defection and career up to the 1978 1978world Kar pov-Korchnoi 1 978, p. 32). Korchnoi gives an account of autobiography, Chess is M My y Liji. Life. championship in his autobiography, Karpov-Korchnoi 1978, pp. 56,147-9153-4. therematch between Korchnoi and Kar Kar58. Keene, Keene, Kar pov-Korchnoi 1978, 56, 147-9, 153-4. During the 1981, the theKGB established pov at Merano, Italy, in 1981, established a dedicated cipher communication circuit to report on progress of of matches and arranged a shuttle service between the Rome residency and the KGB opera operathe progress measures were tional group covering the World Chess Chess Championship. No fewer than fourteen active measures implemented in an attempt once again to ensure Korchnois Korchnoi's defeat (k-5, 921). The undercover KGB advance thedrinking drinking levadvance party at Merano claimed to be monitoring the water, the climate, noise levels, even lev of radioactivity (Kasparov, (Kasparov, Child of o f Change, Change, p. 76). Korchnoi, then past his best and, fifty, els of and, at fi fty, a relatively elderly challenger for the world tide, title, lost by eleven eleven points to seven. 59. Karpovs eventual conqueror in the the 1 1985 Kasparov, has made much of of the the 59. Karpov's 985 world championship, Gary Kasparov, obstacles placed in his path by the Soviet Soviet establishment. He H e himself, himself, however, owed owed much to the the support obstacles of the head of the Azerbaijan KGB, Geidar AIyev. Alyev. Lawson, The Inner Inner Game, Game, p. 17; o f 17; Kasparov, Child of of Change, p. 79. 79. Change, 60. See above, chapter 28. 61. See above, chapter 29. of the appeal of of the "State StateCommittee Committee State of ofEmergency," Emergency, dated August 18, 18,1991, 62. The text of for the State 1991, Times(August 19, 19,1991). 1991). was published in The Times Gorbachev, TheAugust Coup, Coup, p. 31. 63. Gorbachev, Without Cloaks, Cloaks, pp. 130-1. Trubnikov Ti-ubnikov is is a former senior FCD officer who made his rep rep64. Knight, Spies Without utation during operations in India, India,which will be covered in volume 2. 65. 65. Unattributable information from Russian Russian sources. 66. Instructionsfiom the Centre, Centre,p. 17. 17. 66. Andrew and Gordievsky (eds.), Instructionsfrom 67. Unattributable information from Russian sources. 68. 68. Remnick, Resurrection, p. 370. 69. Unattributable Unattributable information from Russian sources. sources. 89-91, 106-8. Remnick, Resurrection, 70. Knight, Spies Without Cloaks, Cloaks, pp. 89-91, 106-8. Resurrection, pp. 276-7. 276-7. Anna Blundy, Times(May 13, 13,1999). of the Return to Grace of the the Baby-faced Hawk, "Return to Hawk," The Times 1999). Stepashin is the only one of of the thewar to admit admithis mistake. original supporters of Davies, Europe, Europe, pp. 328-32,464-5. 328-32, 464-5. 71. Davies, thefaultlines between cultures is Huntington, The 72. The classic, though possibly overstated, analysis of the Clash of o f Civilizations Civilizations and the the o f World Order. Clash Remaking ofW odd Order. Western-educated elite Clite often out of tune with 73. Pulled westward by a Western-educated out of with its own population, Greece something of of an anomaly as an Orthodox member of of NATO NATOand and the EU. Stefan Wagstyl, Kerin remains something the ED. Hope and andJohn John Thornhill, Christendoms 4,1999). 1999). Thornhill, "Christendom's Ancient Split, Split," Financial Times (May 4, RussiasSeat at the Table," Table,p. p.129. 129. 74. Haslam, "Russia's 75. Vujacic, "Gennadiy Gennadiy Zyuganov and the the'Third Third Road. '' 75. Road.' not of the divisive legacy of the Spanish Civil War, War, Spain also has no words 76. Unusual but not unique. As a result of divisive legacy of anthem.The 1956after Krushchev Krushchevsuppressed to its national anthem. The Soviet Union found itselfin a similar situation in 1956 suppressed Stalinist. New words were not devised until 1977. 1977. the existing words to the Soviet national anthem as too Stalinist. Veterany Vneshnei VneshneiRazvedki Rossii, pp. 3-4. 3-4. 77. Samolis (ed.), Veterany 78. Primakov et al., Ocherki Istorii Rossiyskoi Vneshnei 78. VneshneiRazvedki, vol. 3, conclusion. conclusion.

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1. 1.Mitrokhin's MitrokhinsArchive Archive

Mitrokhins Mitrokhin's notes and transcripts are arranged in four sections: sections: handwritten notes on individual KGB fi files, envelopes; (i) k-series: handwritten les, stored in large envelopes; (ii) t-series: handwritten notebooks containing notes on individual KGB files; files, (iii)vo1.-series: vol.-series: typed volumes containing material drawn from numerous KGB fi les, mostly country, sometimes with commentary by Mitrokhin; arranged by country, (iv) frag-series: frag-series: miscellaneous miscellaneous handwritten notes.
2. of KGB Material 2. Published Collections Collections of Soviet Documents DocumentsContaining Containing

Instructionsfiom on KGB Andrew, Christopher, and Gordievsky, Gordievsky, Oleg (eds.), Instructions from the Centre: Centre: Top Secret Files Files on Operations,1975-1985 1975-1 985(London: Hodder Hodder& Stoughton, Stoughton, 1990); 1990); slightly revised US edition pub pubForeign Operations, Kryuchkov?Instructions: Instructions: Fileson KGB Foreign Foreign O Operations, 1975-1985 (Stanlished as Comrade Kryuchkov's Top Secret Files perations, 1975-1985 (Stan ford, Calif: Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1993) Gordievsky, Oleg (eds.), More Instructions Instructionsfjom from the Centre: Top Secret Files Files on Andrew, Christopher, and Gordievsky, Operations,1975-1985 1975-1985 (London: Frank Cass, 1991) KGB Global Operations, Cold W ar International ject Bulletin: regularly publishes declassified Soviet offi cial documents, War InternationalHistory Pro Project official the Politburo (see articles cited in section 3 of of the bibliography) including some KGB reports to the Fond 89: documents assembled assembled in late 1991 1991 for the prosecution of of the CPSU (including some KGB reports), available on Chadwyck-Healey microfilm IndustrialEspionage: New Information (London: (London: RIIA, RIM, 1987) Espionage: Some New Hanson, Philip, Soviet Industrial Koenker, Diane P., and Bachman, Ronald D. (eds.), (eds.), Revelations Revelationsfi-om Archives (Washington, (Washington, Koenker, from the Russian Archives DC.: Library of of Congress, 1997) 1997) Russian Foreign Intelligence (VChk-KGB-SVR): (VChk-KGB-SVR): 1996 1996 CD-Rom CD-Rom produced by the SVR, containing brief brief extracts from declassified declassified KGB documents Scammell, (Chicago: Edition q, 1995): Scammell, Michael (ed.), The Solzhenitsyn Solzhenitsyn Files Files (Chicago: 1995): includes some KGB reports Sergei, et al (eds.), (eds.), Organy Gosudarstvennoi GosudarstvennoiBezopastnosti BezopastnostiSSSR v Velikoi Elikoi Otechestvennoi Otechestvennoi Voine: Voine: Stepashin, Sergei, Shornik Dokumentov: Dokumentov: vol. 1 1 (November 1938-December 1938-December 1940); 1940); vol. 2 (January-June (January-June 1941) (Moscow: (Moscow: Sbornik Kniga i Biznes, Biznes, 1995) 1995) 1 Lenin i VChk: Documentov (191 7-1922gg) (Moscow: Tsvigun, Tsvigun, S. K. et al (eds.), V. K I. ViChk: Sbornik Documentow (1917-1922g) (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Politicheskoi Literaturi, 1975) 1975) YENONA. VENON A: decrypted Soviet telegrams (many concerning intelligence operations), mostly for the period 1940-8, accessible on the NSA www.nsa.gov:8080/ 1940-8, accessible NSAwebsite: website: http:// http://www.nsa.gov:8080/
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X II N D DE E X

Aaron, David, David,241 241 Aaron, Abakumov, 146 146 Abakumov, ABBAT (Archbishop (ArchbishopPitirim), Pitirim), ABBAT 496 496 Abbiate, Mireille Mireille Lyduvigovna, Lyduvigovna, Abbiate, 757 9 75, 79 Abbiate, Roland Roland Lyudvigovich Lyudvigovich Abbiate, (Pravdin), 75, 7579,124-25, (Pravdin), 79, 124-25, 143 143 Abdoolcader,Sirioj SiriojHusein, Husein, 413, Abdoolcader, 413, 419 419 Abel, Rudolf Rudolf(Vilyam (Vilyam Willie Abel, Willie Fisher), 146-48,156-57, Fisher), 146-48, 156-57, 159,163,164-65,171-76, 159, 163, 164-65, 171-76, 176,190,196,280,367,412 176, 190, 196, 280, 367, 412 Abella, Robert, Robert,418 418 Abella, ABLE ARCHER ARCHER exercise, exercise,433 433 ABLE A B 0 (Peter (Peter Smollett), Smollett),84, 84,120 ABO 120 ABRAMOV, 414 414 ABRAMOV, Abramov, N. N. E, F., 98-99 98-99 Abramov, Abramova,Nina, Nina,99 99 Abramova, Abrasimov,Pyotr PyotrAndreevich, Andreevich, 271 Abrasimov, 271 Abt, John, 106 106 Abt,John, ACE (aeronautics (aeronautics engineer), engineer), ACE 420-21 420-21 Acheson, Dean, Dean,162,163 Acheson, 162, 163 ADA (Helen Lowry), Lowry),104, 104,109, ADA 109, 111 1 11 officer),8 83,84 ADA (NKVD officer), 3, 84 ADAM, 449 ADAMANT (Metropolitan Nikodim), 487-88, 487-88,490,492, 490, 492, 507 ADEN, 148 148 Adenauer, Konrad,438, 438,440 Adenauer, Konrad, 440 Afghanistan invasion (1979), (1979),22, 22, Mghanistan invasion 299,302,305 299, 302, 305 Afghan War, 11-12,391,470,497 Mghan War, 11-12, 391, 470, 497 Afro-Asian Solidarity Mro-Asian Solidarity Committee, 341 341 AGAT operation, operation, 389-91 389-91 Agayants, Ivan IvanIvanovich, Ivanovich,152, 152, 46 1 461 Agca, Mehmet Ali, Ali,522 522 Agee, Philip, Philip,206, 206,230-34 230-34 Ageloff, Sylvia, Sylvia,86 86 Ahman, Olavi, Olavi,280 280 AIDS virus, 200,244-45,428, virus, 200, 244-45, 428, 484 Akhmerov, Iskhak IskhakAbdulovich, Abdulovich, 104-6,109-11,118,123, 104-6, 109-11, 118, 123, 129,132-34,143,148 129, 132-34, 143, 148 Akhromeyev, Marshall,390 390 Akhromeyev, Marshall, AKHURYAN (nuclear physicist), physicist), AKHURY AN (nuclear 413 Akopyan, Ashot AshotAbgarovich, Abgarovich, 477 477 Akselrod, Moisei MoiseiMarkovich, Markovich, 50-52,78 50-52, 78 ALAN, 474 Albam, Abram AbramMironovich, Mironovich, 77 77 Albania, 247 247

ALBERT (Iskhak (Iskhak Akhmerov), Akhmerov), ALBERT 104-6,109-11,118,123, 104-6, 109-11, 118, 123, 129,132-34,143,148 129, 132-34, 143, 148 ALBERT (Nikolai (Nikolai Bitnov), Bitnov), ALBERT 191-92,195-96 191-92, 195-96 ALBERT0 (Guido (Guido Cappelloni), Cappelloni), ALBERTO 298 298 Aleksandrov,Georgi Georgi Aleksandrov, Nikolayevich, 480 480 Nikolayevich, Aleksandrov,Vladimir Vladimir Aleksandrov, Valentinovich, 379 379 Valentinovich, ALEKSEI (Anatoli (Anatoli Yatskov; Yatskov; ALEKSEI Yakovlev), 223 Yakovlev), 132, 132,223 Aleksi of of Tallinn, Tallinn, Metropolitan, Metropolitan, Aleksi 307,498-99 307, 498-99 ALES (Alger (Alger Hiss), Hiss), 104, 104,105, ALES 105, 107, 132-34, 142, 144, 164 107,132-34,142,144,164 Alexander, Field FieldMarshall, Marshall, Alexander, 135-36 135-36 Alexandrovsky, Pavel, Pavel,314-16 314-16 Alexandrovsky, Algeria, 276 276 Algeria, ALICE, 156 156 ALICE, ALev, Ismail Ismail Murtuz Murtuz Ogly, Ogly,391 391 Aliev, ALLA (Galina (Galina Linitskaya), Linitskaya), ALLA 25243,259-63 252-53, 259-63 Allegretti, Alfredo, Alfredo,35 Allegretti, Allen, Allen, Richard, Richard,211 211 Allende, Salvador, Salvador,296,427 296, 427 ALPHA(caches),365 ALPHA (caches), 365 Alpha group, group,389-91, 389-91,394 Alpha 394 Althammer, Althammer, Hedwig HedwigMarta, 366 ALVAR (IBM employee), 187, ALV AR (IBM employee), 1 87, 188 188 Amendola, Giorgio, Giorgio,294,297,299 Amendola, 294, 297, 299 American National NationalSecurity Security Act American Act (1947), 144 (1947), 144 American American Relief ReliefAssociation Association (ARA), 30 ( A M) , 30 Ames, Aldrich, Aldrich,205,206,220, 205, 206, 220, 434-35 434-35 11, 362, Amin, Hafizullah, Hafhdlah, 11,362, 389-91 389-91 AMUR (Robert Sheldon SheldonHarte), AMUR 87 Anderson, Jack, Jack, 240-41,347 Anderson, 240-41, 347 ANDRE, 466,467-68 466, 467-68 Andreev, Nikolai NikolaiNikolayevich, Nikolayevich, 346 ANDRE1 (Dmitri (Dmitri Bystroletov), ANDREI Bystroletov), 43-46,48,49,53 43-46, 48, 49, 53 Andrew, Christopher, Christopher,14,20 14, 20 Andrews Air Air Force ForceBase, Base, 346,348 346, 348 Andreyevskaya, T. S., 406 Andropov, Yuri YuriVladimirovich, Vladimirovich, 5-7,10,13,22,179,203-4, 5-7, 10, 13, 22, 179, 203-4, 21(k14,218,219,238,251, 210-14, 218, 219, 238, 251 , 256-57,259,265,285,286, 256-57, 259, 265, 285, 286, 298,311-12,317-20, 298, 3 1 1-12, 3 17-20, 322-25,330,333,340,342, 322-25, 330, 333, 340, 342, 346,347,35143,374, 346, 347, 351-53, 374, 377-81,385,388-93,411, 377-81, 3 85, 388-93, 411,

415, 439, 455, 456, 466, 469, 415,439,455,456,466,469, 522, 526, 541 522,526,541 Andropov 216-17, Andropov Institute, Institute,142, 142,216-17, 224, 245-46, 416 224,245-46,416 Androsov, Androsov, Stanislav StanislavAndreyevich, Andreyevich, 214,243,434 214, 243, 434 Angeloff, Sylvia, Sylvia, 76 Angeloff, 76 Angleton, James, James,185, 185,368 Angleton, 368 ANITA, 450 450 ANITA, ANNA (typist), (typist), 277 277 ANNA ANO (Japanese interpreter), 37 A N 0 (Japanese interpreter),37 ANTENNA ANTENNA (Julius (Julius Rosenberg), Rosenberg), 128, 148, 164, 409 128,148,164,409 Anti-Comintern Pact, 53,442 53, 442 Anti-Comintern Pact, ANTON ANTON (Leonid (Leonid Kvasnikov), Kvasnikov), 116,127-28,132 1 16, 127-28, 132 ANTON CHIN operational ANTON (PO (POCHIN operational officer), officer), 346 346 Antonov, 478 Antonov, Georgi GeorgiPavlovich, Pavlovich, 478 Apresyian, Stepan, Stepan,12425,157 Apresyian, 124-25, 157 Arab-Israeli 342 Arab-Israeli Six-Day Six-DayWar, War, 342 Araujo 87, 162 Araujo Aguilar, Aguilar,Laura, Laura,87,162 Arbatov, 213 Arbatov, Georgi, Georgi,211-12, 211-12,213 ARDOV 19 ARDOV (Mikhail (Mikhail Polonik), Polonik),19 Argentina, 162, 182, Argentina, 99-101, 99-101,162,182, 28243,379 282-83, 379 ARGUS 467 ARGUS Goumalist), (journalist),466, 466,467 Aristov, Boris, 508, 515, 520, 528, Aristov, Boris,508,515,520,528, 529, 531, 535, 536, 538, 539 529,531,535,536,538,539 ARLEKINO, 479 479 ARLINGTON (E. Howard ARLINGTON Hunt), 228-29 228-29 Hunt), Arnedo, Alvarez, Alvarez, 282-83 282-83 Arnedo, ARNO (Ernest Oldham), Oldham),44-46, 44-46, 48-49 48-49 Gold), 127-28, 127-28, ARNO (Harry Gold), 131 131 Aron, Raymond, Raymond,469 469 ARSENIO (Louis Wolf), 233 Arsov, Boris, Arsov, Boris,388 388 Artamonov, Nikolai Artamonov, NikolaiFyodorovich, Fyodorovich, 387-88 387-88 ARTEM, 272-73 272-73 ARTEMIS (Soviet intelligence), intelligence), 148 148 ARTEMOVA, 259,260 259, 260 ARTUR, 479 479 ARTUR, ARTUR ARTUR (Iosif Grigulevich), Grigulevich),87, 87, 99-101,147,162-63,300, 99-101, 147, 162-63, 300, 357-58 357-58 ARTUR (Rem (Rem Krassilnikov), ARTUR Krassilnikov), 170 170 Artuzov, Artur Khristyanovich, Khristyanovich, 33, 34-35, 42, 50 33,34-35,42,50 ASCHE (Hans-Thilo (Hans-Thilo Schmidt), 47 Ash, Timothy TimothyGarton, 533 Asimov, Nikolai Asimov, NikolaiNikolayevich, Nikolayevich, 398 398 ASKET (Andrei Sakharov), Sakharov),22, 312, 317, 320, 322-36 312,317,320,322-36 ASKO, 157 157 ASKO,

In nd de ex x I
Astor, David, Astor, David,405 405 ASY A (Ethel (Ethel Gee), Gee), 410-11 ASYA 410-11 Attlee, Clement, 398, 404 Attlee, Clement, 398,404 Aucouturier, Mreda, Alfreda, 308 308 Aucouturier, Australia, 351, 430-31 Australia, 351,430-31 Austria, 359-60, 388 Austria, 359-60,388 Kommunistische Partei Kommunistische Partei Osterreichs (KPO), 276, 278, Osterreichs (KPO), 276,278, 282 282 Austrian Stapo police), Austrian Stapo (security (security police), 19 19 AV ANTGARDE, 474 AVANTGARDE, 474 AVIATORSHA (Mireille AVIATORSHA (Mireille Abbiate), 75,79 75, 79 Abbiate), 1., 382 Avramenko, V. Avramenko, V. I., 382 AYUN (Georgi AYUN (Georgi Aleksandrov), Aleksandrov),480 480 Babkov, G. G. S., 382 382 Babkov, Backis, Backis, Andris, Andris,512 512 Bagley, Pete, Bagley, Pete,368 368 Bagrichev, Nikolai Bagrichev, NikolaiGrigoryevich, Grigoryevich, 412-13 412-13 Bagritsky, V sevelod, 326 Bagritsky, Vsevelod, 326 Bahr, Egon, Bahr, Egon, 455-56 455-56 Baibakov, Nikolai, Baibakov, Nikolai, 530 530 Baker, Baker, Harry, Harry,168 168 Balkan Balkan federation, federation, 356 356 Ball, Ball, George, George,211 211 Bandera, Stephen, Bandera, Stephen, 361-62 361-62 Barak, Rudolf, 252-53 Bar&, Rudolf, 252-53 Barannik, Valentin Barannik, ValentinViktorovich, Viktorovich, 541-42 541-42 BARANOV BARANOV (Ville ( V i e Pessi), 280, 280, 285 285 BARBAROSSA, BARBAROSSA, operation, operation, 92-95 92-95 Barcikowski, 527, 529, Barcikowski, Kazimierz, Kazimierz,527,529, 532 532 Bardecki, 269, 509-10, Bardecki,Andrzej, Andrzej, 269,509-10, 519 519 BARITONE BARITONE (deputy (deputy to to Peter Peter Lunn), 341 Lunn), 341 Barkovsky, 127, Barkovsky,Vladimir, Vladimir,114-15, 114-15,127, 416 416 Barre, 472 Barre, Raymond, Raymond, 472 Barron,John, 19, 197-98 Barron, John, 19,197-98 Baryshnikov, Baryshnikov,Mikhail, Mikhail,384 384 Barzel, 444 Barzel, Rainer, Rainer, 444 Basic enets of Basic T Tenets o f Intelligence Intelligence (Yevseyev), (Yevseyev),24 24 Batarovskaya, Batarovskaya, Yanina, Yanina,191 191 BATWING 343 BATWING (power (power source), source), 343 Baudoin, 430 Baudoin,Jean-Jacques, Jean-Jacques, 430 Bayer, Bayer,458 458 BAYKAL, B A W L , 251 251 Bazarov, 46, 104-6 Bazarov,Boris, Boris,44, 44,46,104-6 Bechko, Bechko,Jan, Jan,170 170 Beck, 50 Beck,Joseph, Joseph, 50 Becker, Becker,Franz, Franz,447 447 Begin, Begin, Menachem, Menachem,329 329 Behind of Behind the theFacade Facade of the the Masonic Temple Temple (Zamoysky), (Zamoysky),21 21 BELFORT BELFORT (Erich (Erich Birkenhauer), Birkenhauer), 452 452 Belfrage, Belfrage, Cedric, Cedric, 110, 110,123 123 Belgium, Belgium, 365 365 BELLA, BELLA, 450 450

/ I

684
Boll, Heinrich, Heinrich,266 266 Bolshakov, Georgi, 111, 111,181-82 Bolshakov, Georgi, 181-82 Boniecki, Adam, Adam,539 539 Bonner, Elena, Elena,3313,320,324, 13, 320, 324, 325-27,331,332,333 325-27, 331, 332, 333 BONZA 482 BONZA operation, 482 BOR scientist),186 186 BOR (research scientist), Borcha, Ivan IvanGrigoryevich, Grigoryevich, 498 498 Borovik Genrikh, Genrikh, 228 228 Borzov, G. F., 252 Borzov, Gennadi Gedorovich Gennadi Gedorovich (Bystrov), 295-96 295-96 (Bystrov), Bossard, Frank, Bossard, Frank,414 414 Boumedienne, President,276 276 Boumedienne, President, Bourdiol, Pierre, Pierre,474 474 Bourke, Sean,400 400 Bourke, Sean, BOXER (fiber-optic (fiber-opticsystem), system), 353 353 Boyarinov, Grigori,391 391 Boyarinov, Grigori, Boyce, Christopher,216,217 Boyce, Christopher, 216, 217 Walter,259-60 259-60 Brade, Walter, Bradley, OmarN., 144 Bradley, Omar 144 Brandon, Henry, Henry,209 209 Willy,17-18, 17-18,271, Brandt, Willy, 271, 440-45454 440-45, 454 Branzinkas, Branzinkas, P. S., 382 Brezhnev, LeonidIlich, Ilich,5,204, Brezhnev, Leonid 5, 204, 207,210,213,250,251,256, 207, 210, 213, 250, 251, 256, 257,266-67,290,317-18, 257, 266-67, 290, 317-18, 352,362,378-79,455,465, 352, 362, 378-79, 455, 465, 472,520,521,528 472, 520, 521, 528 BritfInstructions Chekaon BriefInstructionsfor for the Cheka How t o Conduct IT1telligence How to Intelligence (Yevseyev),24 (Yevseyev), 24 Brik, Yevgeni Yevgeni Vladimirovich, Vladimirovich, 165-71,191,195-956 165-71, 191, 195-956 Non-FerrousMetals Metals British Non-Ferrous Association, 116,127, Association, 1 16, 127, 397-98,410,420 397-98, 410, 420 SecretIntelligence IntelligenceService Service British Secret (SIS), 1,14,16,17,46,83, 1, 14, 16, 17, 46, 83, 90,113,119-20,125-26, 90, 113, 119-20, 125-26, 140,155,160,339-41, 140, 155, 160, 339-41, 398-400 398-400 SecurityCoordination Coordination British Security 110 (BSC), 110 Douglas,414 414 Britten, Douglas, (U Thant), 207, 207,290,291, BROD (U 290, 291, 345 345 466,467,468-69, BROK, 466, 467, 468-69, 473-74 473-74 Gerald,411 411 Brooke, Gerald, Brookhaven National National Laboratory, Laboratory, Brookhaven 186,218,348 186, 218, 348 Browder,Earl, Earl,104, 104,108-9,110, Browder, 108-9, 110, 122,123,129-30 122, 123, 129-30 Brown, Jerry, Jerry, 291 Brown, 291 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, Zbigniew, 200,212, Brzezinski, 200, 212, 241-42,322 241-42, 322 Buchanan, Pat, Pat,211 211 Buchanan, Buchholz, Ernst, Ernst,368 368 Buchholz, Buchman, Henry, Henry,106, 106,109 Buchman, 109 Buikis,Yan (Shmidkhen),25, 25, Buikis, Yan (Shmidkhen), 26-27 26-27 Bujak, Zbigniew, Zbigniew,525-26, 525-26,532 Bujak, 532 Bukharin, N., N.,72, 72,78 Bukharin, 78 Bukovsky,Vladimir, Vladimir,312-13 312-13 Bukovsky, Bulgakov,Mikhail, Mikhail, 11, 11,505 Bulgakov, 505

BELOV (Abram 77 BELOV (AbramAlbam), Albam), 77 Aleksandrovich, Belov, Yevgeni YevgeniAleksandrovich, 398 398 280, 398, BEN (Konon Molody), Molody),280,398, 407-12, 415 407-12,415 Benes, Eduard, 50, 113 Benes, Eduard, 50,113 Bentley, Elizabeth, 129-30, Bentley, Elizabeth,110, 110,129-30, 142-43, 144, 147-48, 142-43,144,147-48, 163-64 163-64 BERG (senior BERG (senior engineer), engineer),186 186 Bergsten, C. C. Fred, Fred, 211 211 Bergsten, Beria, Lavrenti 2, 3, 23, Beria, LavrentiPavlovich, Pavlovich, 2,3,23, 81, 85, 94, 101-2, 114, 81,85,94,101-2,114, 116-17,131,137,144-46 116-17, 131, 137, 144-46 Berle, Adolf, 107 Berle, Adolf,107 Berlinguer, Enrico, 297-98,299, Berlinguer, Enrico, 297-98, 299, 301, 302, 304, 306 301,302,304,306 Berlin Wall fall of of(1989),12,452,459 (1989), 12, 452, 459 Rudenko) , BERTA (partner (partnerof of Rudenko), 195 195 BERTRAND (Georgi Kotlyar), Kotlyar), 313 313 148 Bertrand, Gustave, Gustave,47-48, 47-48,148 Berzin, Eduard, Eduard,25, 25,26-27 26-27 Berzin,Jan, 73 Besedovsky, Grigori,45 45 Besedovsky, Grigori, Bessarabia, 270 Bessarabia, 270 Bessedovsky, Grigori,461 Bessedovsky, Grigori, 461 BESSER (Feliks (Feliks Verzhbitsky), Verzhbitsky), 100-101 Bettaney, Michael, Michael, 432-33 432-33 Beutming, 452-53 Beutming, Theodor, Theodor, 452-53 Bevin, Ernest, Ernest, 140 140 Bevin, Bezmenov,Yuri Yuri Aleksandrovich, Bezmenov, Aleksandrovich, 379 3 79 Bidault, Bidault, Georges, Georges,152 152 Bilak, Vasil, Vasil, 25243,263,264, Bil'ak, 252-53, 263, 264, 267 267 Birkenhauer, Erich, Erich,452 452 Birkenhauer, Bishop, Maurice, Maurice, 234 Bishop, 234 Bitnov, Nikolai NikolaiNikolayevich, Nikolayevich, Bitnov, 191-92, 195-96 191-92,195-96 Bitnov, Nina, Nina, 190 190 Bitnov, Blake,George, George,9,9,203,398-400, Blake, 203, 398-400, 409,411,414-15,438 409, 411, 414-15, 438 Blanch, Blanch, Stuart, Stuart,426 426 Anthony,57,58,59,63-65, 57, 58, 59, 63-65, Blunt, Anthony, 79, 80, 85, 90-91, 119-20, 79,80,85,90-91,119-20, 126-27,140,158,160,281 126-27, 140, 158, 160, 281 Blyablin,Gennadi GennadiPetrovich, Petrovich, Blyablin, 193-94,19596,261,269, 193-94, 195-96, 261, 269, 510 510 Blyumkin,Yakov, Yakov, 40-41 40-41 Blyumkin, Bobkov,Filipp FilippDenisovich, Denisovich, 313, Bobkov, 313, 320 320 Boeing, 348 348 Boeing, Bogdanov,Radimir, Radimir,211 211 Bogdanov, Bogoraz, Larisa, Larisa, 310-11 Bogoraz, 310-11 BOGUN (Gennadi (Gennadi Blyalblin), Blyalblin), BOGUN 193-94, 195-96, 261, 269, 193-94,195-96,261,269, 510 510 Bohlen, Charles Charles"Chip," Chip, 112,338 Bohlen, 1 12, 338 Bokassa, Jean Bkdel, 473 Bokassa,Jean Bedel, 473 Boley, 53 Boky, Gleb Gleb Ivanovich, Ivanovich,26, 26,53 Bolbotenko,L. L.G., G., 320 320 Bolbotenko, BOLEK, 535 535 BOLEK,

In d dex x
Bulganin,Nikolai Nikolai Bulganin, Aleksandrovich, 145-46 145-46 Aleksandrovich, Bulgaria,273, 273,297,375,388-89 Bulgaria, 297, 375, 388-89 o f the Opposition, Opposition,69, 69,76 Bulletin of 76 BUMBLEBEE (David (David BUMBLEBEE Greenglass),128, 128,131,132 Greenglass), 131, 132 Bunker, Ellsworth, Ellsworth,163 163 Bunker, Bunyk,Ivan IvanIvanovich, Ivanovich, 510, Bunyk, 510, 518-19 518-19 Burdin,Vladimir Vladimir Trofimovich Burdin, Trofimovich (Borodin), 138, 138,168,174, (Borodin), 168, 174, 408,410 408, 410 Bureau of of People's People's Protection Protection Bureau (OZNA), 356-57 356-57 (OZNA), Burgess, Guy, Guy,57, 57,59-62,64,79, 59-62, 64, 79, Burgess, 80,82-84,85,90,119,126, 80, 82-84, 85, 90, 1 19, 126, 138-39,141-42,154-59, 138-39, 141-42, 154-59, 160-61,169,401-2,403 160-61, 169, 401-2, 403 (YuriLinkov), Linkov),198 198 BURGOV (Yuri Burtakov, Savell Saveli Vladimirovich, Burtakov, Vladimirovich, 355,356 355, 356 Buryen, Oleg OlegPetrovich, Petrovich, 512 Bueyen, 512 Bush, George, George,337, 337,475 Bush, 475 Butenko,John, John, 187 187 Butenko, BUTIL, 480 BUTIL, Butkov,Mikhail, Mikhail,17, 17,436 Butkov, 436 Buyevsky,Alexei AlexeiSergeyevich, Sergeyevich, Buyevsky, 488,491-92 488, 491-92 Bystroletov,Dmitri Dmitri Bystroletov, Aleksandrovich,43-46, 43-46,48, Aleksandrovich, 48, 49,53,81 49, 53, 81 Cadogan, Alexander, Alexander,133 133 Cadogan, Cairncross,John, 57-59, 57-59,6665, Cairncross, 64-65, 66,79,82,83,91,114,118, 66, 79, 82, 83, 91, 1 14, 118, 120,126,140-41,160,281 120, 126, 140-41, 160, 281 (DavidGreenglass), Greenglass), CALIBRE (David 128,131,132 128, 131, 132 James, 346,424,425, Callaghan, James, 346, 424, 425, 427 Callan, Robert,280 280 Callan, Robert, Cambridge Five, Five,56-67, 56-67,79,95, Cambridge 79, 95, 104,113-14,119-21,122, 104, 1 13-14, 119-21, 122, 125,133,138-40,15461. 125, 133, 1 38-40, 154-61. see Anthony; also Blunt, Anthony; Burgess, Guy; Cairncross, Cairncross, John; Maclean, Donald; Donald; Kim Philby, Kim Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), 434 Camp David David agreement, agreement, 241 241 Canada, 137-39, 137-39,165-68,191-93, 165-68, 191-93, 198-99,351,363-64,378, 198-99, 351, 363-64, 378, 384,407 384, 407 Communist Party Partyof of Canada Canada (CPC), 280, 280,282,287,408 282, 287, 408 Canadian Broadcasting BroadcastingCompany, Company, 192 Canaris, Admiral, Admiral,448-49 448-49 Cancer Ca1lcer Ward W ard (Solzhenitsyn), (Solzhenitsyn), 3311 11 Capital Couples, Couples,200-201 200-201 Capital Cappelloni, Guido, Guido,298 298 CARDINAL, 454 Carey-Foster, George, George, 141 141 Carmichael, Stokely, Stokely, 237-38 Carmichael, 237-38 Carr, E. H., 461 Carr, Sam, Sam,282 282

685 6 85
Christian Christian Peace Peace Conference, Conference,487, 487, 496 496 Christie, Christie, Agatha, Agatha,57 57 CHRISTINA, CHRISTINA, 421 421 Chronicle of o f Current Events, Events,6-7, 6-7, 316 316 Churches, Churches, 486-507 486-507 Churchill, Churchill, Sarah, Sarah,134 134 Churchill, 33, 66, 71-72, Churchill,Winston, Winston, 33,66,71-72, 90, 91, 93, 1 1 1-12, 114, 118, 90,91,93,111-12,114,118, 119, 122, 133-34, 398, 465 119,122,133-34,398,465 CIA CIA (Central (Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency), 149, 176, Agency),144, 144,149,176, 200-201, 230-34, 305, 342, 200-201,230-34,305,342, 343, 378-80, 382 343,378-80,382 Ciosek, Stanislaw, Ciosek, Stanislaw,532 532 Citizens' Citizens' Committee CommitteeofInquiey, of Inquiry, 228 228 Clark, 211, 232 Clark, Ramsey, Ramsey, 211,232 Clemens, Clemens, Hans, Hans,438 438 CLIP CLIP (FBI (FBI agent), agent),288 288 COBRA operation, COBRA operation, 368 368 COBRA-2 COBRA-2 operation, operation, 456 456 COCOM, 405 COCOM, 187, 187,405 Coggan, Coggan, Donald, Donald,426 426 Cohan, }., 18 J., 18 Cohan, Barbara Barbara Cohen, Cohen, Leontina Leontina (Lona), (Lona),131-32, 131-32, 147-48,409-11 147-48, 409-11 Cohen, 131, 147-48, Cohen, Morris, Morris,9, 9,131,147-48, 409-11 409-1 1 Colby, Colby,William, William,233 233 Colombi, Arturo, 299 299 Colombi, Arturo, COLOSSUS, COLOSSUS, 96 96 Columbia University Columbia University School ofInternational School of International Relations, 202 Relations, 202 Colville, John, 160 Colville, John, 160 Comintern, 53-54 53-54 Comintern, Commander of Forces Commander ofSubmarine Submarine Forces in the in theAdantic Atlantic (COMSUBLANT), 205, 344 (COMSUBLANT), 205,344 Committee for Human Rights, Rights, Committee forHuman 312 Committee of ormation (IU; (KI; Committee ofInf Information Komitet Informatsii), Komitet In formatsii), 1, 1, 144-46, 156, 165, 397 144-46,156,165,397 Committee of of Party Party and Committee andState State Control, 5 Control, Committee of 402-3 Committee of Twelve, Twelve, 402-3 Communist Party Canada Communist Partyof of Canada (CPC), 280, 282, 287, 408 (CPC), 280,282,287,408 Communist Party Partyof of the Soviet Union (CPSU), 276, 281, Union (CPSU), 276,281, 287, 294-306 287,294-306 Communist Party Partyof of the United the United States (CPUSA), 108, 1 10, States (CPUSA),108,110, 122, 148, 164, 226, 236-37, 122,148,164,226,236-37, 279-80, 287-93 279-80,287-93 Communist Y outh League Communist Youth League (Komsomol), 4,249 4, 249 (Komsomol), COMSUBLANT (Commander of Submarine in the the of Submarine Forces Forces in Atlantic), 205, 205,344 344 Congress of the Writers Writers Union, Union, Congress ofthe 255 255 Constantini, Francesco, Francesco, 35-36, Constantini, 35-36, 38, 43, 49-55, 78 38,43,49-55,78

Carrillo, Santiago, Santiago,300-303 300-303 Carrillo, Carter, 200, 210, 211, 212, Carter, Jimmy, Jimmy, 200,210,211,212, 213, 239, 241, 242, 290, 291, 213,239,241,242,290,291, 348, 482, 496 348,482,496 CASE of Zayarny), CASE 39 39(capture (capture of Zayarny), 32 32 Casey, 244 Casey,William, William, 244 Castelo, Pacheko Pacheko Jost, 74 74 Castelo, Jose, Castillo, Maria (Chema), 386 Castillo,Jose Tost Maria (Chema), 386 Castillo, Ram6n, Rambn,99 99 Castillo, Castle, Barbara, Barbara, 232 Casde, 232 Castro, 229-30, Castro, Fidel, Fidel,180-82, 180-82,229-30, 386 386 Castro, Teodoro, Teodoro, 162-63,357 Castro, 162-63, 357 Grigulevich, Iosif Iosif see also Grigulevich, Romualdovich Romualdovich Ceausescu, 269, 304 Ceausescu, Nicolae, Nicolae,269,304 Cecil, Robert, Robert,125,155 Cecil, 125, 155 CENSOR, 477 477 CENSOR, Central Control Control Commission, Commission, 39 39 Central C Cernik, Oldiich, 254, 254,263 ernik, Oldrich, 263 Cerny,Vaclav, Vaclav, 254-55 254-55 Cerny, C H (Russian maid),407 407 CH (Russian maid), Chaban-Delmas, Jacques, Jacques, 469 Chaban-Delmas, 469 Chalet, Marcel, Marcel,475 475 Chalet, Chalidze, Valeri, Valeri,3 12 312 Challdze, Chamberlain, Neville, Neville,82, 82,133-34 Chamberlain, 133-34 Chambers, Whittaker, Whittaker, 105,107, Chambers, 105, 107, 142,144,163-64 142, 144, 163-64 Chamoun, Chamoun, Camille, Camille,418 418 Chamoun, Don, Don,418 418 Chamoun, Chaoui, Nicolas, Nicolas, 340-41 340-41 Chaoui, CHARLES (Klaus (Klaus Fuchs), Fuchs), 1 CHARLES 15, 115, 127-28,131-32,155,164, 127-28, 131-32, 155, 164, 397 397 CHARLIE (Cedric (Cedric Belf Belfrage), rage), 110,123 110, 123 Charter 77,275 77, 275 Chase Manhattan ManhattanBank, Bank, 210 210 Chebrikov, Viktor, 214, 331-32, Chebrikov, Viktor, 214,331-32, 513,538 513, 538 Chehab, Emir EmirFarid, Farid,418 418 Chehab, Cheka, 23-32, 23-32,40 Cheka, 40 Cheporov, EdgarAnatolyevich, Anatolyevich, Cheporov, Edgar 23 1 231 Cherepanov, Aleksandr Cherepanov, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, 185-86 185-86 Cherkashin, Viktor, Viktor,434 434 Chernenko, Konstantin, Konstantin,352,434, Chernenko, 352, 434, 541 541 Chernyayev, Anatoli Chernyayev, Anatoli Alekseyevich, 434 434 Chertenko, Kira Viktorovna, Viktorovna, Chertenko, Kira 477 Cheysson, Claude, Claude,475 475 Chiang Kai-shek, Kai-shek, 94 94 Chichayev, IvanAndreevich, Andreevich, 37, Chichayev, Ivan 37, 113 113 Childs, Eva, 292 292 Childs, Eva, Childs, Jack, Jack, 226,288-92 226, 288-92 Childs, Morris, Morris, 2288-93 88-93 Chile, 296-97, 296-97,427,470 Chile, 427, 470 Chilston, Viscount, Viscount,51,54 51, 54 Chirac, Jacques, 305,473 Chirac,Jacques, 305, 473 Chizhov, Mikhail Mikhail Timofeyevich, Timofeyevich, 412-13 412-13 151-52 CHOUAN, 151-52

I de x Ind
Constantini, 51, Constantini, Secondo, Secondo,35-36, 35-36,51, 52 52 Conyers, Conyers,John, John, Jr., Jr., 291 291 COOPER COOPER (Hans (Hans Christian Christian Pieck), 64 Pieck), 49, 49,64 COOPER COOPER (pharmaceuticals (pharmaceuticals employee), employee), 413 413 Cornford, 64 Cornford, John, John,63, 63,64 CORSICAN CORSICAN (Arvid (Arvid Harnack), Harnack), 91-92, 102 91-92,102 Cortellazzo, di, Cortellazzo, Galeazzo GaleazzoCiano Ciano di, 46-47 46-47 Cossit, Thomas, Cossit, Thomas,138 138 Cossutta, Cossutta, Armando, Armando, 299-300 299-300 Costa 357, 358 Costa Rica, Rica, 162-63, 162-63,357,358 Costello, 22 Costello,John, John, 20, 20,22 Costello, Costello, Paddy, Paddy,409 409 Costello, 377, 385 Costello, Seamus, Seamus,377,385 Cot, 123 Cot, Pierre, Pierre, 108-9, 108-9,123 Council Ministers, Council of ofForeign Foreign Ministers, 139-40 139-40 Council of Commissars, Council ofPeople's Peoples Commissars, 26 26 Courtauld Courtauld Institute, Institute, 160 160 Courtney, 407 Courtney, Anthony, Anthony, 407 Couve Maurice, 472 Couve de deMurville, Murville, Maurice, 472 Covert Action In formation Bulletin, CovertAction Information Bulletin, 232-34 232-34 CPC CPC (Communist (Communist Party Partyof of Canada), 282, 287, 408 Canada), 280, 280,282,287,408 CPSU the CPSU (Communist (Communist Party Partyof of the Soviet 281, 287, Soviet Union), Union),276, 276,281,287, 294-306 294-306 CPUSA the CPUSA (Communist (Communist Party Partyof of the United 108, 1 10, United States), States), 108,110, 122, 148, 164, 226, 236-37, 122,148,164,226,236-37, 279-80, 287-93 279-80,287-93 Crankshaw,Edward, Edward, 405-7 Crankshaw, 405-7 Cranston, Cranston, Alan, Alan,291 291 Cremet, CrCmet,Jean, Jean,36-37 36-37 CRESCENDO CRESCENDO operation, operation, 482 482 Cross, James, James, 378 Cross, 378 Crown Crown Books, Books,20 20 Cuba, 348, 349-50, 354, Cuba, 180-84, 180-84,348,349-50,354, 363, 442 363,442 Cunhal, Alvaro, 284 Cunhal, Alvaro, 283, 283,284 Lauchlin, 107, 107,130,142 Currie, Lauchlin, 130, 142 Custine, 332 Custine, Marquis Marquisde, de, 332 Cyrankiewicz,Jozef, 268, 269 Cyrankiewicz, Jozef, 268,269 Cywinski, Cywinski,Bohdan, Bohdan,509 509 Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Prague 22, Prague Spring Spring (1968), (1968),6, 6,22, 185, 203, 249-69, 294, 295, 185,203,249-69,294,295, 303-4, 311, 318, 331 303-4,311,318,331 Czechoslovak 219, CzechoslovakStB, StB,199-201, 199-201,219, 298-99,341 298-99, 341 DACHNIKI DACHNIKI (Lona (Lona and andMorris Morris Cohen), 131, 409-10 Cohen), 131,409-10 DAEDALUS DAEDALUS (Pierre (Pierre Cot), Cot), 108-9,123 108-9, 123 Daix, Daix, Pierre, Pierre,462 462 DAKS (Iosif (IosifGrigulevich), Grigulevich), 87, DAKS 87, 99-101 , 147, 162-63, 300, 99-101,147,162-63,300, 357-58 357-58 Daladier, Edouard, Edouard,61-62 61-62 Daladier, DAN DAN (engineer), (engineer), 413 413

686
DORIS, DORIS, 447 447 Dorogov, Georgyevich, 108 Dorogov, Vasili Vasili Georgyevich, 108 DOROZHKA DOROZHKA (runway), (runway),365 365 Doss, William DOSS, William E., E., Jr., Jr., 106 106 DOUGLAS DOUGLAS (Dalibar Valoushek), Valoushek), 191-92, 195-99 191-92,195-99 Dovin, 318 318 Dovin, Dozhdalev, Dozhdalev,Vasili Vasili Alekseyovich, Alekseyovich, 399 399 DRGs DRGs (sabotage (sabotage and andintelligence intelligence groups), 374-77 groups), 359-66, 359-66,374-77 Driberg, Driberg, Tom, Tom,400-403 400-403 464, 466 DROM, 464,466 Droujinsky, Droujinsky,Dmitri, 18 18 DROZDOV, DROZDOV, 462 462 DROZDROZ DROZDROZ (Aleksei (Aleksei of of Tallinn), 498-99 Tallinn), 307, 307,498-99 DRUG DRUG (Vasili (Vasili Fronchenkov), Fronchenkov), 495-96 495-96 Drummond, 52 Drummond, Eric, Eric,51, 51,52 Dubcek, 254, 256, Dubtek, Alexander, Alexander, 250, 250,254,256, 257-58, 262, 263, 266-67, 25748,262,263,266-67, 527 527 DUDLEY DUDLEY (Secondo (Secondo Constantini), 51, 52 Constantini), 35-36, 35-36,51,52 Duggan, 106, 109 Duggan, Lawrence, Lawrence,105, 105,106,109 Dulles, 229-30 Dulles, Allen, Men, 175, 175,229-30 DUNCAN DUNCAN (Francesco (Francesco Constantini), 38, 43, Constantini), 35-36, 35-36,38,43, 49-55, 78 49-55,78 Dunlap, E., 344 Dunlap, Jack JackE., 344 Du 17, 186 Du Pont Pont de de Nemours, Nemours, 1 117,186 DURANT DURANT (Andre (Andrk Ulmann), Ulmann), 461-62, 464, 471 461-62,464,471 Durzhavna 388 Durzhavna Sigurnost Sigurnost (DS), (DS), 388 1.,I., 33 Dutov, Dutov, Ataman AtamanA. A. 33 Dyakonov, Dyakonov, Nikolai NikolaiVasilievich, Vasilievich, 310 310 Dynomit Dynomit Nobel, Nobel,458 458 Dzerzhinsky, 23-24, 26, Dzerzhinsky, Feliks, Feliks, 23-24,26, 29-31, 35, 40, 315, 394 29-31,35,40,315,394 Dzhirkevlov, Ilya, Ilya,145 145 Dzhirkevlov, Dzhugashvili,Joseph Joseph Dzhugashvili, Vissarionovich, Vissarionovich, 26-27. 26-27. see also Stalin, Stalin, Joseph Joseph East 219, 270-72, East Germany, Germany,6,6,219,270-72, 298-99, 392, 437 298-99,392,437 EDDING EDDING operation, operation, 376-77 376-77 EDELWEISS EDELWEISS operation, operation, 278 278 54, 55, 65, Anthony,50-51, 50-51,54,55,65, Eden, Anthony, 162 162 EDITH EDITH (Edith (Edith Suschitsky SuschitskyTudor Tudor Hart), 58, 84 Hart), 58,84 EDUARD EDUARD (KGB (KGB police police agent), agent), 278 278 Egypt, 340, 477 Egypt, 329, 329,340,477 Einaudi, Einaudi, Luigi, Luigi,163 163 Eisenhower, Eisenhower,Dwight DwightD., D., 176, 176, 178-80, 235 178-80,235 LeonidAleksandrovich, Aleksandrovich, Eitingon, Leonid 74, 86, 88 74,86,88 ELLI 126, ELL1 (Leo (LeoLong), Long),90-91, 90-91,126, 140 140 EMIL (Manfred (Manfred Rotsch), Rotsch),458 458 EMIL EMMA EMMA (Erna (Erna Decker Decker Kohler), Kohler), 190-91, 197 190-91,197

DAN 426 DAN Gournalist), (journalist), 405, 405,426 DAN 205, DAN (Robert (Robert Lipka), Lipka), 18, 18,205, 206, 344 206,344 DANA, DANA, 286 286 Daniel, Arzhak), Daniel, Yuli Yuli(Nikolai (Nikolai Arzhak), 307-11 307-1 1 Danilov, Danilov, Anatoli AnatoliAleksandrovich, Aleksandrovich, 281 281 DARIO, 476, 483 DARIO, 277-78, 277-78,476,483 DARYA DARYA (typist), (typist),277 277 DAVID DAVID (Eugene (EugeneMaki), Maki),171 171 Dawson, Dawson, Geoffrey, Geoffrey,80 80 Day in the Lift Ivan Denisovich, Lye of $Ivan Denisovich, A (Solzhenitsyn), 1 (Solzhenitsyn), 1 11 Debre, 472, 473 Debre, Michel, Michel,463, 463,472,473 Decker, Maria, Decker, Erna ErnaHelga Helga Maria, 190-91 190-91 De 150, De Gaulle, Gaulle, Charles, Charles,108-9, 108-9,150, 151, 304, 462-68, 472 151,304,462-68,472 Dejean, Dejean, Maurice, Maurice,463 463 Dekanozov, Dekanozov,Vladimir Vladimir Georgievich, 93 Georgievich, 93 Delbrouck, Delbrouck, Leopold LeopoldLambert, Lambert,191 191 DeLoach, 235-36, 238 DeLoach, "Deke," Deke, 235-36,238 DEMID DEMID (Communist (Communist civil civil servant), 476, 477 servant), 278, 278,476,477 Denisov, 424 Denisov, Boris BorisVasilyevich, Vasilyevich, 424 Denmark, 278, 281, 353 Denmark, 278,281,353 Dennis, Dennis, Eugene Eugene (Francis (FrancisS. S. Waldron), 164, 280 Waldron), 108, 108,164,280 DEREVLYOV DEREVLYOV (Oleg (Oleg Buryen), Buryen), 512 512 Deryabin, 387 Deryabin, Pyotr, Pyotr,367, 367,387 Deutsch, 55-65, Deutsch, Arnold, Arnold,43, 43,55-65, 78-79, 81, 281 78-79,81,281 Deutsch, 5656 Deutsch, Josefine, Josefine, Deutscher, Deutscher, Isaac, Isaac,71 71 Dewavrin, 151 Dewavrin, Andre Andre(Passy), (Passy), 151 DEYEV DEYEV (Gennadi (Gennadi Kotov), Kotov), 434 434 DGI, DGI, 385-86 385-86 Diakite, Diakite, Mussa, Mussa,244 244 Diestel, 392 Diestel, Peter-Michael, Peter-Michael,298, 298,392 DIF 208 DIF (US (US businessman), businessman), 208 DIM (Vitali (Vitali Lyampin), Lyampin),157 157 DIM DIMA DIMA (Vitali (Vitali Lyampin), Lyampin),157 157 DIOMID, DIOMID, 399 399 DIR Price), 106 DIR (Mary (Mary Wolf Wolf Price), 106 dela laSurveillance SurveiZlance Direction de dudu T erritoire (DST), 471 Territoire (DST), 152, 152,471 Work: TheCIA in Western Western Dirty W ork: The Europe (Agee), (Agee), 233-34 233-34 Work I.* The CIA CIA in Africa Apica Dirty W ork II The (Agee (Agee and andWolf), Wolf), 233-34 233-34 Djilas, 249-50, 356 Djilas, Milovan, Milovan, 249-50,356 DLINNY DLINNY (Aleksandr (Aleksandr Korotkov), Korotkov), 91, 92, 146, 165 91,92,146,165 Dmitriev, Dmitriev,V. V. A., A., 408-9 408-9 Dobrovosky, Dobrovosky,Alexei, Alexei,310 310 Dobrynin, 204, 207, Dobrynin, Antoli, Antoli,203, 203,204,207, 210, 212, 239, 242-43, 347 210,212,239,242-43,347 Doctor Zhivago 3-4 Zhivago (Pasternak), (Pasternak), 3-4 Dodd, E., 106 Dodd, William William E., 106 Dolbin, Dolbin, Grigori Grigori Grigoryevich, Grigoryevich, 143 143 Donovan, James, 173 Donovan, James, 173 108, 130 Donovan, "Wild WildBill," Bill, 108,130 69-70 Doriot, Jacques, Jacques, 69-70

In nd de ex x I
EMMA (female (female agent EMMA agent in in Canada), 167 Canada), 167 ENERO, 478-79 478-79 ENERO, ENIGMA machine, machine, 47,96,103 47, 96, 103 ENIGMA ENORMOZ project, project, 118,132, 1 18, 132, ENORMOZ 148. scl sec also MANHATTAN MANHATTAN 148. E also project project Enterprise 422 Enterprise G-4598, G-4598,422 EPIGONI operation , 308-9 EPIGONI operation, 308-9 ERBE (Peter ERBE (Peter Herrmann), Herrmann), 197-98 197-98 ERICA, 431 431 EFUCA, ERIKH (U.S. State State Department ERIKH (U.S. Department employee), 105 employee), 105 ERNA, 260 ERNA, 260 ERNST ERNST TOLSTY TOLSTY group, group, 73 73 ERWIN ERWIN (Aleksandr (Aleksandr Kopatzky; Kopatzky; Igor 148-49, Igor Orlov), Orlov),21, 21,148-49, 176-77 176-77 Estonia, Estonia, 354 353 Evans, Evans, Gwynfor, Gwynfor,376-77 376-77 Everett, Raymond 430-31 Everett, RaymondFranci, Franci, 430-31 Evraert, Ernst, 366 Evraert, Ernst, 366 EXCOMM, EXCOMM,183 183

I /

687
FRED (Ivan Gladysh), Gladysh), 166 166 FREDDI (Leo Lappi), Lappi), 259-60, 259-60, 265 429 Freeman, John JohnFrederick, Frederick, 429 Friedman, Albert, Friedman, Albert,288 288 Friedman, Litzi, Litzi,58 58 FRIEND (James Morrison), Morrison), 168-70 168-70 Fritz, Geinrich, Geinrich,282 282 Frolik,Josef, 413 Frolik, Josef, 413 Fronchenkov, Vasili, Vasili,495-96 495-96 (Boris Morros), 106,123 106, 123 FROST (Boris Frouz-Farkac, 256 Frouz-Farkac, 256 Frydenlund, h Knut, Frydenlund, u t , 329 329 FSLN (Sandinista (Sandinista National National Liberation 8 1 , 363, Liberation Front), Front), 1 181,363, 385-87 385-87 Fuchs, Klaus, 15, 127-28, Klaus,1 115,127-28, 131-32, 155, 164, 397 131-32,155,164,397 Fulbright, 209, 291 Fulbright, William, William, 209,291 Funk, Funk, Herbert, Herbert, 452 452 Fyodorova, Timofeyevna, Fyodorova,Yelena Yelena Timofeyevna, 310 310
Gaitskell, 405 Gaitskell, Hugh, Hugh, 402-3, 402-3,405 Galanskov, uri, 310 Galanskov,Y Yuri, 310 Galbraith, 2 1211 1 Galbraith, John JohnKenneth, Kenneth, Gallego, 301, 302 Gallego,Ignacio, Ignacio, 301,302 Gallo, 277 Gallo, Fausto, Fausto, 277 Gandhi, Gandhi, Rajiv, Rajiv,244 244 Garcia, Garcia, Eduardo, Eduardo,300 300 Gardner, 144, Gardner, Meredith, Meredith, 143, 143,144, 157 157 Gardner, 241 Gardner, Richard, Richard, 241 Garnitsky, V., Garnitsky,A. A. V., 382 382 Gasperi, de, Gasperi,Alcide Alcide de, 163 163 Gast, Gast,Gabriele, Gabriele,451 451 Gates, 221 , 379 Gates,Robert, Robert, 221,379 Gdansk 517 Gdinsk Agreement, Agreement,516, 516,517 GEC 435 GECHirst Hirst Research ResearchCentre, C.entre, 435 Ge.e, Ethel, Ge.e, Ethel,410-11 410-11 Geheimschreiber Geheimschreiber messages, messages,103 103 Gehlen, 149, 440 Gehlen, Reinhard, Reinhard, 149,440 Geldart, 421 Geldart, Richard, Richard, 421 General 348 GeneralDynamics, Dynamics, 348 GENNADI GENNADI(Gayk (GaykOvakimyan), Ovakimyan), 106-7 106-7 Genscher, 445, Genscher,Hans-Dietrich, Hans-Dietrich, 445, 448, 452 448,452 Georg Simon), 449 Georg(Kurt (Kurt Simon), 449 GEORGE Johnson), GEORGE(Robert (RobertLee Lee Johnson), 177-78 177-78 Georgetown GeorgetownUniversity University Centrefor forStrategic Strategic Studies, Centre Studies, 202 202 George GeorgeVI, VI,King, King,52 52 GERA 190 G E M(Nina (NinaBitnov), Bitnov), 190 GERDA 192 GERDA(Inga (IngaVaIoushek), Valoushek), 192 German Party GermanCommunist Communist Party (KPD), 15 (KPD),1115 German Republic GermanDemocratic Democratic Republic (GDR), 6, 219, 270-72, (GDR), 6,219,270-72, 298-99, 392, 437 298-99,392,437 GERY, GERY,157 157 Ghazarian, Aghasapet, Ghazarian,Elizabeth Elizabeth Aghasapet, 339, 341-42 339,341-42 Ghirey, Kelech, 134-35 Ghirey,Sultan Sultan Kelech, 134-35

FILOSOV (Ivan (Ivan Bunyk), FILOSOV Bunyk),510, 510, 518-19 518-19 Finland, 3,12,24,42,157,172, 3, 12, 24, 42, 157, 172, Finland, 353 353 Suomen Kommunistinen Suomen Kommunistinen Poulue (SW), (SKP), 276,278-79, 276, 278-79, Poulue 2 80, 285 280,285 FIR, 115 115 FIR, FIRMA operation, FIRMA operation, 348 348 First Five Five Y ear Plan, Plan, 68,97 68, 97 First Year FISH, 148 148 FISH, Fisher, Peter 193 Fisher, PeterCarl, Carl, 193 Fisher, Vilyam Fisher, Vilyam(Willie) (Willie) Genrikhovich, Genrikhovich, 146-48, 146-48, 156-57, 159, 163 , 164-65, 156-57,159,163,164-65, 171-72, 173-75, 176, 190, 171-72,173-75,176,190, 196, 280, 367, 412 196,280,367,412 Fitin, Fitin, Pavel Pave1Mikhailovich, Mikhailovich, 89-90, 89-90, 92, 94, 120, 130 92,94,120,130 79, 95, 104, Five, Five, The, The, 56-67, 56-67,79,95,104, 1 1 3-14, 1 19-2 1 , 122, 125, 113-14,119-21,122,125, 133, 138-40, 154-61 . see 133,138-40,15461. see also also Blunt, Blunt, Anthony; Anthony;Burgess, Burgess, Guy; John; Guy; Cairncross, Cairncross, John; Maclean, Philby, Maclean, Donald; Donald; Philby, Fairchild, Kim Kim Fairchild, 348 348 F nlcon and FLAMINGO FLAMINGO operation, operation, 350-51 350-51 Fnlcon and the the Snowman, Snowman,The The (film), Flanders, Flanders, Ralph RalphE., E.,157 157 (film),216 216 Falk, FLEET FLEET (Goronwy (Goronwy Rees), Rees),79-80. 79-80, Fak, Elke, Elke, 449 449 FAREWELL 85, 154 85,154 FAREWELL(Vladimir (VladimirVetrov), Vetrovj, Fletcher, 403-4 218, 475, 481 Fletcher, Raymond, Raymond, 403-4 218,475,481 FAUST, FLINT, FLINT,474 474 FAUST,254 254 F ocus, 16, 17 FBI Focus, 16,17 FBI (Federal (FederalBureau Bureauof of FOGEL Investigation), 1 8, FOGEL (Communist (Communist engineer), engineer), Investigation),15, 15,18, 117-18 122-24, 130, 143, 148, 117-18 122-24,130,143,148, 164-65, 170, 172, 195, Folik, 403 Folik,Josif, Josif, 403 164-65,170,172,195, 197-98, 234-37, 348, 349 Fonseca Carlos, 363, FonsecaAmador, Amador, Carlos, 363, 197-98,234-37,348,349 Feder, Walter August, 194194 385-86 385-86 Feder,Heinz Heinz Walter August, Federal ofof Government 369 Fonteyn,Margot, Margot, 369 FederalAgency Agency Government Fonteyn, Communications Footman, 126 Footman,David, David, 126 Communicationsand and FOOT 416, 417, Inf ormation (FAPSI), FOOT operation, operation,383, 383,416,417, Information (FAPSI),354 354 Federal of of Germany 420-21, 426, 428-29, 475 420-21,426,428-29,475 FederalRepublic Republic Germany FORD 83, (FRG), 353, 364-65, FORD(Albert (AlbertFriedman), Friedman), 83, (FRG), 309, 309,353,364-65, 288 392, 437-59 288 392,437-59 Ford, 242, 348 Federovna, Ford,Gerald, Gerald, 242,348 Federovna,Anna, Anna,168 168 FORST FEDOR 498 FORST(Raymond (RaymondEverett), Everett), FEDOR(Ivan (IvanBorcha), Borcha), 498 430-31 FEDOROV, 260, 265, 430-3 1 FEDOROV,259, 259,260,265, 272-73 Fourcaud, 151 151 Fourcaud,Pierre, Pierre, 272-73 Fourth Fedorov, Andrei Pavlovich, 33, 34 FourthInternational, International,76 76 Fedorov, Andrei Pavlovich, 33,34 Frachon, 152 Fedotov, Vasilyevich, 145 Frachon,Benoit, Benoit, 152 Fedotov,Pyotr Pyotr Vasilyevich, 145 69-71, 75-76, Feklisov, Aleksandr Semyonovich France,42-55, 42-55,69-71,75-76, Feklisov, Aleksandr Semyonovich France, 78-79, 150-52, 353, (Fomin), 1 83 78-79,15042,353, (Fomin),180, 180,183 460-75 Felfe, 399, 438-39 460-75 Felfe,Heinz, Heinz,203, 203,399,438-39 Parti Franais FELIPE 87,87, Parti Communiste Communiste Franpis FELIPE(Iosif (IosifGrigulevich), Grigulevich), (PCF), 150-54, 276, 277, 99-101, 147, 162-63, 300, (PCF), 15044,276,277, 99-101,147,162-63,300, 287, 297, 301, 303-6, 328, 357-58 287,297,301,303-6,328, 357-58 462, 470 FELKE 462,470 FELKE(Du (DuPont Pontde deNemours Nemours Franco, 67, 72-73, 79, employee), Franco,Francisco, Francisco, 67,72-73,79, employee),186 186 87, 300, 301 Feltrinelli, 3-4 87,300,301 Feltrinelli,Giangiacomo, Giangiacomo, 3-4 Frans;ois-Poncet, FIDELIO, 483 Fragois-Poncet,Jean, Jean,472 472 FIDELIO,482, 482,483 FRANK, , 482, 483 Figueres Jose, FRANK,481 481,482,483 FigueresFerrer, Ferrer, Josi,162 162 FRANK German illegal), Filatov, Nikolai, 418 FRANK(East (East German illegal), Filatov, Nikolai, 418 449 Filippov, Aleksei Frolovich, 24, 26 449 Filippov, Aleksei Frolovich, 24,26 FRANK Duggan), Filippov, Viktor FRANK(Lawrence (Lawrence Duggan), F~lippov, ViktorMikhailovich, Mikhailovich, 105, 106. 109 302 105,106,109 302 FRANY A (female Polish FiIonenko, Mikhail Ivanovich, FRANYA (female Polish Filonenko, Mikhail Ivanovich, student), 168-70 student),73 73 168-70

In nd de ex x I
GIDEON (Yevgeni (Yevgeni Brik), GIDEON Brik), 165-71, 191, 195-96 165-71,191,195-96 GIDROLOG (Carlos (Carlos Fonseca), GIDROLOG Fonseca), 363, 385-86 363,385-86 Gielgud, John, John, 120 120 Gielgud, Gierek, 267, 268, 269, Gierek, Eduard, Eduard,267,268,269, 509, 512, 521, 536-39 509,512,521,536-39 GIGI (French (French communist GIG1 communist mechanic), 73 73 mechanic), GILBERT, 463 GILBERT, 463 Gilbert, Jean, Gilbert, Jean,102 102 Ginzburg, Aleksandr, 327-30 Ginzburg, Aleksandr,3 10, 310,327-30 Giscard d'Estaing, Valery, 304, 304, Giscard d'Estaing,ValCry, 305, 468-73 305,468-73 Glading, Glading, Percy, Percy,116 116 Gladysh, Ivan 166 Gladysh, Ivan Vasilyevich, Vasilyevich, 166 Gleason, S. So Everett, Everett, 211 Gleason, 211 Glemp,Jozef, 526, 529, 532-34 Glemp, Jszef, 526,529,532-34 GIeske, Heinz, Heinz, 361 361 Gleske, Globke, Hans, Globke, Hans,440 440 98-99 Glushchenko, 98-99 GNIDA GNIDA (Yevgeni (YevgeniRunge), Runge),368 368 Godlevsky, General, Godlevsky, General,359 359 Goering, Goering, Hermann, Hermann, 70 70 GOGOL (Nikolai Dyakonov), GOGOL (Nikolai Dyakonov), 310 310 Gold, 131 Gold, Harry, Harry, 127-28, 127-28,131 Goldfus, Goldfis, Emil Emil Robert, Robert, 147 147 GOLD operation, GOLD operation, 399-400 399-400 Goldstacker, Goldstacker, Eduard, Eduard,253 253 Goleniewski, 400, 410 Goleniewski, Michal, Michal, 400,410 Goliath, Goliath, Inge, Inge,456 456 Golitsyn, Golitsyn, Anatoli AnatoliMikhailovich, Mikhailovich, 177, 184-85, 362, 367, 368, 177,18445,362,367,368, 405 405 Golos, 123, 129 Golos, Jacob, Jacob,110, 110,123,129 Golubev, Golubev, Sergei SergeiMikhailovich, Mikhailovich, 389 389 GOMEZ GOMEZ (Spanish (Spanish cipher cipherclerk), clerk), 341 341 Gomez, Gsmez, Agustin, Agustin, 300 300 Gomulka, 268, 512 Gomulka, Wladislaw, Wadislaw, 268,512 Gonzalez, 302-3 Gonzdez, Felipe, Felipe, 301, 301,302-3 GOOSE GOOSE (Harry (Harry Gold), Gold), 127-28, 127-28, 131 131 Gorankova, Ivanovna, 366 Gorankova, Yulia Yulia Ivanovna, 366 Gorbachev, 95, Gorbachev,Mikhail, Mikhail,12-13, 12-13,95, 214-15, 220-23, 244-45, 214-15,220-23,244-45, 306, 331-33, 393-94, 434, 306,331-33,393-94,434, 459, 484, 518, 541-43 459,484,518,541-43 Gorbachev, Gorbachev, Raisa RaisaMaximovna, Maximovna, 353 353 GORBATY GOFtBATY (Anatoli (AnatoliGolitsyn), Golitsyn), 177, 184-85, 362, 367, 368, 177,184-85,362,367,368, 405 405 Gordievsky, Gordievsky, Oleg Oleg Antonovich, Antonovich,20, 20, 214, 220, 416, 425, 428, 214,220,416,425,428, 434-36 434-36 Gordievsky, Antonovich, Gordievsky,Vasili Vasili Antonovich, 254, 255, 261 254,255,261 Gordon, Gordon, B. B. Mo, M., 77-78 77-78 Gorkhin, Gorkhin, A. A. F., F., 7 7 Gorskaya, Yulyevna Gorskaya, Ye1izaveta Yelizaveta Yulyevna (Lisa), (Lisa), 40 40 Gorsky,Anatoli AnatoliVeniaminovich, Veniaminovich, Gorsky, 83, 84, 85, 90, 1 13, 114, 118, 83,84,85,90,113,114,118, 124, 130, 132, 142-43 124,130,132,142-43

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armsdump), dump), 16 GROT (secret arms GRU, 1, 102, 137, 144-46, GRU, 1,102,137,144-46, 181-82, 207, 361 181-82,207,361 GRUM (Irish Communist), Communist), 285 285 Grumman, 348 348 Grushko, Viktor 222, Grushko, ViktorFedorovich, Fedorovich, 222, 330 Guernsey, terry, terry,166-67 166-67 Guibaud, Louis, Louis,463 463 Guillaume, Gunter, Guillaume, Giinter, 443-45 443-45 Guinea, republic republicof, of, 244,342-43 244, 342-43 Guk, Arkadi Arkadi Vasilyevich, Vasilyevich,432-34 432-34 Gulag Archipelago ArcAipelago(Solzhenitsyn), (Solzhenitsyn), 311,318,319,469-70 311, 318, 319, 469-70 Gunes, Turin, Turin,346 346 Gurgenev, Vacheslav VacheslavIvanovich Ivanovich (Artemov), (Artemov), 352-53 352-53 GURYEV (Valentin (ValentinGutin), 254, 255 Gusev, NikolaiPavlovich, Pavlovich, 381 Gusev, Nikolai 381 Gusev, S. So I., Io, 325 Aleksandrovich, Gutin, Valentin Aleksandrovich, 254,255 254, 255 Gutzeit, Davidovich, 106 Davidovich, 106 Guy Burgess (Driberg), 401-4 401-4 Habash, George, George,380 380 Haddad, Wadi, Wadi, 38042,385 380-82, 385 HAGEN (Hans-Jurgen Henze), Henze), 447-48 447-48 Halifax, Lord, 65-66,80 65-66, 80 Hall, GUS, Gus, 288,289-93,306 288, 289-93, 306 Joan,148 148 Hall, Joan, Hall,Theodore Alvin Alvin(Ted), (Ted), Hall, 128-29,131-32,147-48, 128-29, 131-32, 147-48, 164-65,205 164-65, 205 Morton, 232 232 Halperin, Morton, Hugh, 168-69, 168-69,192, Hambleton, Hugh, 192, 198-99 198-99 VictorNorris, Norris, 344 Hamilton, Victor 344 Hanes, Dalibor, Dalibor,264 264 Hankey, Lord, Chancellor of ofthe Hankey, 91, Duchy of of Lancaster, Lancaster, 91, 114 114 HANS (Dmitri (Dmitri Bystroletov), Bystroletov), HANS 43-46,48,49,53 43-46, 48, 49, 53 HANSEN (Gunter Guillaume), 443-45 443-45 Charles,43 43 Hardinge, Charles, Harnack, Arvid, Amid,91-92, 91-92,102 Harnack, 102 Harriman, Averell, Averell, 210,211 Harriman, 210, 211 William,342 342 Harrop, William, HARRY (Valeri (ValeriMakayev), Makayev), HARRY 156-57,159-60,164,165, 156-57, 159-60, 164, 165, 170-71,195-96 170-71, 195-96 Harsch, Joseph, Joseph, 209 Harsch, 209 HART (Yevgeni (YevgeniBrik), Brik), 165-71, 165-71, HART 191,195-96 191, 195-96 Hart, Alex Alex Tudor, Tudor, 58 Hart, 58 Hart, Edith Edith Tudor, Tudor, 58, 58,84 Hart, 84 Hat,Judith, Judith, 231-32 231-32 Hart, Harte, Robert Robert Sheldon, Sheldon,87 87 Harte, Harvey, Libby, Libby,156 156 Harvey, Mark,209 209 Hatfield, Mark, Reino, 157,171, Hayhanen, Reino, 157, 171, 172-73,195-96,280,367, 172-73, 195-96, 280, 367, 370 370

GORT, 202 GOT (Percy (Percy Glading), Glading), 116 116 Gott, Richard, Richard, 427 Gott, 427 Goulding, Cathal, 384, 385 Goulding, Cathal, 384,385 Gouzenko, Igor, 141, Gouzenko, Igor,137-39, 137-39,141, 142, 163-64, 167, 168, 367 142,163-64,167,168,367 GPU, 32 GPU, 32 523, 525 Grabski, Tadeusz, Tadeusz, 523,525 Grachev, Andrei, 332 Grachev, Andrei,306, 306,332 Grafpen, 82,83 82, 83 Grafpen, GRANIT (target), 364 GRANIT (target), 364 Grankin, S. So M., Mo, 381-82 3 81-82 Grankin, Gratsiansky, Yuri Yuri Vasilyevich, 351 Vasilyevich, 351 Great Britain, 36-37, 36-37,42-55, 42-55, 90-91,113-15,150,337, 90-91, 1 13-15, 150, 337, 345-46,351,397-436 345-46, 351, 397-436 Cambridge Five, Five,55-67, 55-67,79,95, 79, 95, 104,113-14,119-21,122, 104, 113-14, 1 19-21, 122, 125, 133, 138-40, 154-61. see 125,133,138-40,154-61. also Blunt, Anthony; Anthony; Burgess, Guy;Cairncross, Cairncross, Burgess, Guy; John; Maclean, Maclean,Donald; Donald; Philby, Kim Kim Great Illegals, 42-67, 42-67,72 72 Magnifi cent Five, 79, Magnificent Five,56-67, 56-67,79, 95,104,113-14,119-21, 95, 104, 113-14, 1 19-21, 122, 125, 133, 138-40, 122,125,133,138-40, 154-61. see also Blunt, 154-61. Anthony; Burgess, Burgess, Guy; Guy; Cairncross,John; John; Maclean, Cairncross, Maclean, Donald; Philby, Philby,Kim Kim Donald; Great Patriotic War War( 1941-1945 (1941-1945), ), 95-103, 166 95-103,166 Encyclopedia, 2 2 Great Soviet Encyclopedia, Terror, 21-22, 21-22,23,26-27, Great Terror, 23, 26-27, 28, 39, 42, 68, 72, 76, 77, 80, 28,39,42,68,72,76,77,80, 91,93,163 91, 93, 163 Greece, 163, 163,353,374-75,379, Greece, 353, 374-75, 379, 394-96 394-96 CommunistParty, Party, 281-82 Greek Communist 281-82 Greene, Graham, Graham,59 59 Greenglass, 131 Greenglass,David, David,128, 128,131 Greenglass,Ruth, Ruth, 128 128 Greenglass, Greenhill, Greenhill, Dennis, Dennis,383 383 Gregennik, K., 248-49 248-49 Gregennik, Grenville, Robert, Robert,46 46 Grenville, Gribanov,Oleg Oleg Mikhailovich, Gribanov, Mikhailovich, 367, 463, 487, 504 367,463,487,504 Gridina, Mo M. Mo, M., 173 173 Gridina, Grigorenko, 318 318 Grigorenko, Grigulevich, Romualdovich, Grigulevich,Iosif Iosif Romualdovich, 87,99-101,147,162-63, 87, 99-101, 147, 162-63, 300, 357-58 300,357-58 GRIN GRIN (Anatoli (Anatoli Chernyayev), Chernyayev),434 434 GRIN (Sandinista (Sandinista agent), agent),386 386 GRIN VladimirVasilyevich, Vasilyevich, Grinchenko, Vladimir 170-71 170-71 Grishin,Viktor, Viktor, 5 Grishin, Groesser, 262 Groesser,Josef, Josef, 262 Grohman, 267 Grohman, Jozef, Jozef, 267 GROMOV GROMOV (Vasili (VasiliGordievsky), Gordievsky), 254,255,261 254, 255, 261 Gromyko, 203, 256, Gromyko,Andrei, Andrei,145, 145,203,256, 286,322,344,352,541 286, 322, 344, 352, 541 Gronchi, Gronchi, Giovanni, Giovanni, 476 476 GROSS (Goronwy (Goronwy Rees), Rees), 79-80, 79-80, GROSS 85,154 85, 154

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!talo-Ethiopian 51 Italo-Ethiopian war. war,51

Hitler, Adolf, Adolf,1 17,20,50,54,55, 7, 20, 50, 54, 55, 61,65-66,72, 6 1 , 65-66, 72, 86,91,92-95, 86, 9 1 , 92-95, 96,99,101,107-8,120, 96, 99, 1 0 1 , 107-8 , 120, 133-34,150,440-42,452, 133-34, 150, 440-42, 452, 45 3 453 Hitler Youth, Youth, 61, 61, 149 149 Hitler Hladik, 318 18 Hofer, Heidrun, 448-49 448-49 Hoffmann, Karel,266 266 Hoffmann, Karel, Hoke, Margret, Margret,447-48 447-48 HOLA Norwood), HOLA (Melita (Melita Norwood), 115-16,127,397-98,410, 1 15-16, 127, 397-98, 410, 413,420,435 413, 420, 435 HolePek, Lubomir, 253 253 Holecek, Lubomir, Hollaway, Richard, Richard, 488-89 488-89 Holub, Frantiiek, 318-19 Holub, Frantisek, 3 1 8-19 Holubova, 318-19 Holubova, Valentina, Valentina, 3 1 8-19 Home, Alec Douglas, Douglas, 383 383 HOMER, HOMER. 157,158 157, 158 Honecker, Erich,271,304,453, Honecker, Erich, 271, 304, 453, 456,542 456, 542 Honeywell, 218 Honeywell, 218 Honner, Franz, Franz,278,279 278, 279 Hoover, Hoover, J. ]. Edgar, 123,142, 123, 142, 144, , 230,234-36 230, 234-36 Hopkins, Harry, 1 111-12,122 Hopkins, Harry, 1 1-12, 122 Horowitz, Horowitz, Vladimir, 195 195 Hosenball, Mark,232 232 Hosenball, Mark, Houghton, Harry,410-11 Houghton, Harry, 410-11 House on UnUnHouse Committee on American Activities, 144 144 American Activities, House House Select Select Committee on Assassinations, 229 Assassinations, 229 Houska, Josef,257, 257,258 Houska, Josef, 258 HruikoviE, Miloslav,266 266 Hruskovic, Miloslav,

Healey,Dennis, Dennis,429 429 Healey, Healey,Dorothy Dorothy Ray, Ray,293 293 Healey, Heath, Edward, Edward, 383, 383,468 Heath, 468 Hebrang, Andriya, Andriya,356, 356,357 Hebrang, 357 HECTOR (Ivanovich (Ivanovich HECTOR Filonenko), 168-70 168-70 Filonenko), Heinz, Leonore, Leonore,445-47 445-47 Heinz, Helmer, Oskar, Oskar,278 278 Helmer, HELMUT, 458 458 Helsinki Accord Accordon onSecurity Security and Helsinki and Co-operation (1975), (1975),322, 322, Co-operation 492,193 492, 493 Helsinki Watch WatchGroups, Groups, 325, Helsinki 325, 327-30 327-30 HENRI group, group, 70-71 70-71,150,151 HENRI , 150, 1 5 1 HENRY (Anatoli (Anatoli Gorsky), Gorsky),83, 83, HENRY 84,85,90,113,114,118, 84, 85, 90, 1 13, 1 14, 1 18, 124,130,132,142-43 124, 130, 132, 142-43 Henze, Hans-Jurgen, Hans-Jurgen,447-48 447-48 Henze, HERBERT (Aleksandr (Aleksandr HERBERT Kopatzky; Igor IgorOrlov), Orlov).21, 21, Kopatzky; 148-49,176-77 148-49, 1 76-77 HERMES (Ozdemir (Ozdemir Ozgur), Ozgur), 208 208 HERMES Hernu, Charles, Charles, 15, 15,1 16 Hernu, 6 Herrmann, Peter, 197-98 197-98 Herrmann, Herrmann, Rudolf Rudolf Albert, 192 Albert, 192 Herzog, Gisela, Gisela.445, 445,346-47 446-47 Hess, Rudolf, Rudolf,20,119 Hess, 20, 1 19 Hiroshima, 132 Hiroshima, Hiss, Alger, Alger, 104,105,107, 104, 105, 107, 132-34,142,144,164 132-34, 142, 144, 164

H E (Hans-Thilo (Hans-Thilo Schmidt), Schmidt),47 47 HE

Hughes, H. H. Stuart, Stuart,235 235 Hughes, Hull, Cordell, Cordell,1 11 1 Hull, 11 HUMINT, 2 21 8 HUMINT, 18 Humphrey,Hubert, Hubert, 239 239 Humphrey, Hungarian Uprising Uprising( (1956), 5, 13, 13, Hungarian 1 956), 5, 22,248-49,251,257,303, 22, 248-49, 251, 257, 303, 311,331,402 3 1 1 . 331, 402 HUNT (civil (civilservant), servant), 398,413, HUNT 398, 413, 420 420 Hunt, Bunker, Bunker, 225 225 Hunt, Hunt, E. E.Howard, Howard, 228-29 228-29 Hunt, Hunt, H. H. L., 225.227-29,246 Hunt, L., 225. 227-29, 246 Husik, Gustav, Gustiv, 262, 262,263,264, Husak, 263. 264, 266-67 266-67 Huseinjyan, Karo, Karo, 193 193 Huseiiyan, Huxley, Hugh, Hugh, 421 121 Huxley, HVA (Hauptverwaltung HV A (Hauptverwaltung Aufldurung), 437-40. 437-40,442. Authlurung), 442, 443-46,449,45142,454, 443-46, 449, 451-52, 454, 457-59 457-59 Ibirruri, Dolores, Dolores, 301-2 301-2 Ibarruri. IBM, 187-88, 187-88,215,218,219,348 IBM, 215, 218, 219, 348 IDOL (Yuri (Yuri Nosenko), Nosenko), 1178, IDOL 78, 185-86,338,367-68,387 185-86 , 338. 367-68, 387 Iglesias, Gerardo, Gerardo,303 303 Iglesias, IGOR (Konstantin (Konstantin Kukin), Kukin), 125, 125, IGOR 139,142 1 39. 142 IKAR, 477-78 lKAR. 477-78 Ilk, Bertold Karl, Karl,38 38 Ilk, Bertold Inderfurth, Karl, 241 Inderfurth, Karl. 241 India, India, 244,245,379 244. 245, 379 Indra, Alois, 25243,263 Indra, Alois, 252-53, 263 Information Information Research Research Department Department (IRD), (IRD), 141-42 141-42

Hudson Institute, Institute, 202 202 Hudson Hughes, 348 348 Hughes,

Italy, 365, 374, 475-85 Italy,353, 353,365,374,475-85 Parrito Partitv Comunista Comunista Italiano Italian0 (PCI). 294-301, (PCI),276-78, 276-78,294-301, 306, 328, 374 306,328,374 ITT, 87, 2 1 8 ITT, 1187,218 Ivanov, Ivanov,Boris BorisSemenovich, Semenovich,290, 290, 386 386 IV ANOV A, 193 IVANOVA, 193 Ivanova, 12 Ivanova,Galina, Galina,4 412 Ivashutin, Ivashutin, Pyotr, Pyotr,174 174

INGA INGA (typist), (typist), 277,476 277, 476 Ingrao, Pietro, Pietro,297 297 Ingrao, I N 0 (Innostranyi INO (Innostranyi Otdel), Otdel), 28, 28, 31-32,35-38,42-55,89-90, 31-32, 35-38, 42-55, 89-90, 146 146
Inside the Company: CL4 CIA Diary (Agee), 230-31 (Agee), 230-31 INSPECTOR, INSPECTOR, 478-79 478-79 Intelligence Identities Intelligence Identities Protection Protection Bill, 234 Bill, 234 International 73-74, International Brigades, Brigades, 73-74, 131,377,441 1 3 1 , 377, 441 International Liaison Department Department International Liaison (OMS) (OMS) of of Communist Communist International, 36,56-57 International, 36, 56-57 INTlKAM operation, operation, 382 INTIKAM 382 Ioffe, A. F., Iof fe, A. F. , 131 131 Ippolitov, Ivan Ivanovich, Ivanovich, 383, Ippolitov, Ivan 383, 420 420 IRA Republican Army), Arnly), IRA (Irish (Irish Republican 377-78,384 377-78, 384 IRENE ofBritish British IRENE (wife (wife of journalist), 420 journalist), 420 IRENEY, 502 IRENEY, 502 Irish Republican Socialist SocialistParty Party Irish Republican (IRSP), (IRSP), 385 385 IRONBARK, IRONBARK, 182 1 82 Isbir, Ahmed, 418 418 Isbir, Ahmed. Israel, 329 Israel, 329 Istkov, A. N., N.,233 233 Istkov. A.

Jackson, 239-41 Jackson, Henry Henry"Scoop," Scoop, 239-41 Jackson, 290 Jackson,James. James, 290 Jacson, Mercador). Jacson, Frank Frank(Ramon (Ram6n Mercador), 86 86 Jagielski, Jagielski, Mieczyslaw, Mieczyslaw,515 515 JAGUAR JAGLJARoperation, operation,368-69 368-69 Jakes, 266 Jake;, Milos, Miloi, 263, 263,266 Janczyszyn, 7 Janczyszyn,L., L.,5 1 517 Japan, 42. 53, 95-96 Japan, 37-38, 37-38,42,53.95-96 Jaruzelski, Wojciech, Jaruzelski, Wojciech,268-69, 268-69, 521-25, 527-42 521~25,527-42 Javits, 209, 291 Javits,Jacob, Jacob, 209,291 Jebb, 157 Jebb, Sir SirGbdwyn. Gladwyn, 157 Jehovah's JehovahsWitnesses, Witnesses,504-6 504-6 Jenkins, Roy, Jenkins, Roy, 425 425 Jespersen, Jespersen, Knud. Knud,281 281 Jewish 238 Jewish Defense DefenseLeague, League, 238 Jewish lobby, Jewish lobby,239 239 JILL (English woman), JILL (English woman),430 430 JOE (army (army electronics JOE electronicsengineer), engineer), 215 215 Joesten, Joachim, 227-28 Joesten, Joachim, 227-28 JOHN (Ivan (Ivan Chichayev), 37, 1 1 3 JOHN Chichayev),37,113 John, Otto, Otto, 440 440 John, John Birch Birch Society. John Society,235 235 John Paul I, I. Pope, Pope, 490 John Paul 490 John Paul II. Pope, 508-16, 520. John Paul 11, Pope, 508-16,520. 522, 537, 538-41 522,537,538-41 Johnson, Lyndon 290 Johnson, Lyndon B.. B.,226, 226,290 Johnson, Robert Robert Lee! Lee, 177-78 Johnson, 177-78 Joint Intelligence Joint Intelligence Committee Committee (JIC), 93,460-61 93, 460-61 (JIC), Joliot-Curie, FrkdCric, Frederic, 151 151 Joliot-Curie, Jones, Penn, Jones, Penn,229 229 Jones, Sam Houston, 123 123 Jones, Sam Houston, JOSE (Antonio (Antonio Pujol), " JOSE Pujol), 87 87 , JOSE (Pacheco (Pacheco Jose JOSE Jose Castelo), Castelo),74 74 JOUR (cipher (cipher office JOUR officeagent), agent),152, 155, 352, 461 , 462, 463, 466, 467, 352,461,462,463,466,467, 476 476 JURIST (Harry (Harry Dexter Dexter White), White), JURIST 106, 107, 109, 130 106,107,109,130 Momo, 357 Jurovic, Momo, JuroviC, 357 1 4-15, K (Vladimir K (Vladimir Barkovsky), Barkovsky),1 114-15, 127 127 Kahane, Meir, Kahane, Meir,238 238 Kahle, Wilhelm, Kahle, Wilhelm, 449-50 449-50 Kahn, David, Kahn, David, 338 338 Kalugin, Oleg Oleg Danilovich, Kalugin, Danilovich, 205-6. 205-6, 209, 227, 230, 256-57, 259, 209,227,230,256-57.259, 344, 382, 387-88, 399. 416. 344,382,387-88,399,416. 418, 430, 497-98 418,430,497-98 Kamenev, Lev. 24, 72 Kamenev, Lev,24,72 Kamenev, Zinovyev, Kamenev, Zinovyev, 77 77

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Kiszczak, Czeslaw, Czeslaw,521, 521,525,526, Kiszczak, 525, 526, 528, 529, 531-32, 534, 535, 528,529,531-32,534,535, 536-39,542 536-39, 542 KIY (US. State KIY (U.S. State Department Department employee), employee), 105 IO5 KIZH KlZH (Gordon (Gordon Lonsdale), Lonsdale),408 408 Kleiman, Kleiman,Leon, Leon, 326 326 Klement, Klement, Rudolf, Rudolf,76 76 Klimchuk, A. A.S., 382 Klimchuk, S., 382 Kliszko,Zenon, Zenon,268, 268,269 Kliszko, 269 KLOD (Texas (Texas Instruments Instruments employee), employee),187 187 KLOD (Vladimir (Vladimir Grinchenko), Grinchenko), KLOD 170-71 170-71 Klugmann, John Klugmann, Norman Norman John (James), 63, 65, 82, 127 (James), 63,65,82,127 Knight, 235 Knight, Frances, Frances, 235 Kobaladze, 17 Kobaladze,Yuri, Yuri, 17 KOCH (Duncan (Duncan Lee), Lee),108, 108,130, KOCH 130, 142 142 Koecher, Karl Karland andHana, Hana, 199-201 Koecher, 199-201 Kohl, 1, 456 Kohl, Helmut, Helmut,45 451,456 Kohler, Erna Erna Decker, Decker, 190-91 190-91 Kohler, Kohler, Kohler, Foy, 338 338 Kohler, Kohler, Gerhard Gerhard Max, Max,190 190 Kokornaya, Kokornaya, Miroka, Miroka,313 313 Kolder, Kolder, Drahomir, Drahomir,252-53 252-53 Kolev, Kolev,Ivan, Ivan,388 388 Koliannis, Kostas, Kostas, 281-82 281-82 Koliannis, KOLIN (Anatoli Kuznetsov), KOLIN 480 480 Kommunistische Kommunistische Partei Partei Osterreichs 276, 278, Osterreichs (KPO), (KPO),276,278, 282 282 Kondrashev, Kondrashev, Sergei Sergei Aleksandrovich, Aleksandrovich,399 399 KONE 87 KONE (David (David Siquieros), Siquieros),86, 86,87 KONOV x Kohler), KONOV (Gerhard (Gerhard Ma. Ma Kohler), 190-91, 196-97 190-91,196-97 Konovalets, Konovalets, Yevkhen, Yevkhen,86 86 KONTAKT KONTAKT system, system, 349 349 Kopacsi, Kopicsi, Sandor, Sandor,248 248 Kopatzky, Kopatzky,Aleksandr Aleksandr Grigoryevich Grigoryevich (Igor (IgorOrlov), Orlov), 21,148-49,176-77 21, 148-49, 176-77 Kopinic,Josip, 355 Kopinik, Josip, 355 Korczynski, Grzegorz, Grzegorz,268 268 Korczynski, Korean 333, 398-99 KoreanWar, War,155, 155,333,398-99 KORNELIS, KORNELIS, 452 452 Kornelis, H. M., 453 453 Kornelis, Korotich, Vitali, Vitali,333 333 Korotich, Korotkov,Aleksandr Aleksandr Korotkov, Mikhailovich, 91, 91,92,146, Mikhailovich, 92, 146, 165 165 Korsakov, Korsakov, Klementi KlementiAlekseyevich, Alekseyevich, 199 199 Koslov, Eduard Eduard Ivanovich, Ivanovich,412 412 Koslov, Kosterin, Kosterin,V. V. N., N., 233-34 233-34 Kostov, Kostov, Vladimir, Vladimir,389 389 Kosygin, , 254, 256, Kosygin, Alexei, Alexei,251 251,254,256, 424 424 Kotlyar, Georgi GeorgiIvanovich Ivanovich(Alain (Alain Kotlyar, Boucaut), Boucaut), 313 313 Kotov, Kotov, Gennadi Gennadi Fydorovich Fydorovich (DEYEV), 434 434 (DEYEV), Kotov, 252 Kotov, M. M. G., G., 252 Koucky,Vladimir, Vladimir,299 299 Koucky,

Third Third Department, Department,330 330 Kania, 520-25, Kania, Stanislaw, Stanislaw,517-18, 517-18,520-25, Thirteenth Thirteenth Department, Department, 527-28 527-28 359-64, 369, 374 359-64,369,374 Kannegiser, Leonid, 26 Kannegiser, Leonid, 26 KGB KGB Fourth FourthDepartment Department KANT (Mark (Mark Zborowski), Zborowski), 69-71 69-71 KANT (Military (Military Intelligence), Intelligence),36, 36, Kapek, 274 Kapek, Antonin, Antonin, 266, 266,274 43, 52-53, 95, 104-5.146 43,52-53,95,104-5.146 Kapitza, Kapitza, Pyotr, Pyotr,6 6 KGB KGB OT O T (Operational (Operational Technical Technical Kaplan, Kaplan, Fanya Fanya(Dora), (Dora), 26 26 Support) Support) Directorate Directorate KAREV KAREV (male (malediplomat), diplomat),407 407 (Fourteenth (Fourteenth Department), Department), KARL, 458, 474 KARL, 458,474 339-40 339-40 Karmal,Babrak, Babrak,11, 11,391 Karmal, 391 Shonzik (in-house (in-house journal), journal),7 7 KGB Sbornik Karpekov, Karpekov, Nikolai, Nikolai,414 414 KGB KGB Second Second Chief Chief Kartseva, Kartseva, Evdokia, Evdokia,52-53 52-53 ( Counterintelligence) (Counterintelligence) Kashtan, 282, 286 Kashtan, William, William,282,286 Directorate, 320, Directorate, 9-10, 9-10,320, Kaska, Radko, Radko,264-66 264-66 Kaska, 337-38, 400, 401, 455-56, 337-38,400,401,455-56, Kasparov, 124 Kasparov, Grigori Grigori Pavlovich, Pavlovich, 124 477 477 KASSIR (Harry White), KASSIR (Harry Dexter Dexter White), KGB KGB Seventh Seventh(Surveillance) (Surveillance) 106, 107, 109, 130 106,107,109,130 Directorate, 390, Directorate, 9-10, 9-10,390, Katyn Wood Woodatrocity, atrocity, 267 Katyn 267 455-56 455-56 KAVERN (Mikhail (MikhailShadrin), Shadrin), 285 KAVERN 285 KGB KGB Sixteenth SixteenthDirectorate, Directorate,334, 334, Kayotis, Yurgesovich, Kayotis,Andrey Andrey Yurgesovich, 346, 352, 353, 467, 479 346,352,353,467,479 147 147 KGB Third Third Directorate, Directorate, 345 345 Kazachenko, Kazachenko,Diana DianaGeorgiyevna, Georgiyevna, KGB (Morris Childs), Childs),288-93 288-93 KHAB (Morris 478-79 478-79 KHAN KHAN (Ladislav (Ladislav Lebovic), Lebovif), KEDR KEDR operation, operation, 364 364 262-63 262-63 Ponomarev), KEDROV (E. R. Ponomarev), KHANN KHANN (Hans (Hans Clemens), Clemens), 438 438 388 388 KHARLEV 428 KHARLEV (Arne (Arne Petersen), Petersen), 428 KELLY (scientist), (scientist),115 KELLY 115 KHODOKI operation, 256 KHODOKI operation, 255, 255,256 Kelly, 229 Kelly,Clarence, Clarence, 229 Khokhlov, Khokhlov,Nikolai, Nikolai,367 367 Kemp, Kemp, 46 46 KHONG KHONG (IBM (IBM affiliate affiliate Kennan, Kennan, George, George,338 338 employee), 187-88 187-88 employee), Kennedy, 240-41 , Kennedy, Edward, Edward,211, 211,240-41, KHOSYAIN (Henry Buchman), Buchman), KHOSY AIN (Henry 291 291 106, 109 106,109 Kennedy, 176, Kennedy,John John F., F., 174, 174,176, Khrushchev, 2, Khrushchev, Nikita NikitaSergeevich, Sergeevich, 2, 180-84,207,209,225-30, 180-84, 207, 209, 225-30, 3,4,5,69,174,180-84,210, 3, 4, 5, 69, 174, 180-84, 210, 246, 471 246,471 225, 311, 337, 338, 356-57, 225,311,337,338,356-57, Kennedy, 181, Kennedy, Robert, Robert, 174, 174, 180, 180,181, 358-59, 361, 362, 363, 442, 358-59,361,362,363,442, 182,290 182, 290 443 443 Kerensky, Kerensky,225 225 Khvatov, Mikhail Mikhail Nikolayevich, Nikolayevich, Khvatov, Kesarev,Boris BorisFederovich, Federovich, 474 Kesarev, 474 138 138 Kessler, Kessler, Eric, Eric, 84 84 KI KI (Committee (Committee of ofInformation; Information; Kessler, 200, 201 Kessler, Ronald, Ronald, 15, 15,200,201 Informatsii), 1, Komitet In formatsii), 1 , Kevorkov, Kevorkov,455 455 144-46,156,165,397 144-46, 156, 165, 397 KGB: The Inside Story of of Its Foreign Wolf Price), 106 KID (Mary Wolf Price), 106 Operations from Lenin to 0perationsfi.orn Lenin to Kidd, Ronald RonaldF., E, 18 18 Kidd, Gorbachev Gorbacfiev(Andrew (Andrew and and Kikot, V. I., I., 391 391 Kikot, Gordievsky), Gordievsky),20 20 KIM KIM (Klementi (Klementi Korsakov), Korsakov),199 199 KGB: The Secret W ork ofSoviet Work KIN 46, KIN (Boris (Boris Bazarov), Bazarov),44, 44,46, Secret Agents (Barron), Secretlflgents (Barron), 19 19 104-6 104-6 KGB KGB Eighth Eighth Chief ChiefDirectorate, Directorate, King, John H., 49,52,64,79,91 H., 49, 52, 64, 79, 91 337,343,346,354 337, 343, 346, 354 King, King, Martin Martin Luther, Luther, Jr., Jr.,236-38, 236-38, KGB Fifth Fifth (Ideological (Ideological KGB 290 290 Subversion) Subversion) Directorate, Directorate,13, 13, Kiprian, 493 Kiprian, Archbishop, Archbishop, 493 311,313,314,316,318, 311, 313, 314, 316, 318, KIR 106 KIR (Ivan (IvanMorozov), Morozov), 106 320-21,330,331 320-21, 330, 331 Kireyev, Kireyev, Anatoli Anatoli Tikhonovich, Tikhonovich,238 238 Ninth Department, Department, 325 325 Ninth Kirilenko, 352 Kirilenko, N. V., V., 282, 282,352 KGB KGB First First Chief Chief(Foreign (Foreign Kirkpatrick, 428 Kirkpatrick,Jeane, Jeane, 428 Intelligence) Intelligence) Directorate Directorate Kirov, Kirov, Sergei SergeiMironovich, Mironovich,68-69 68-69 (FCD), 1, 3, 7-8, 13, 23, (FCD), 1,3,7-8,13,23, Kirov 369, 370, 384 Kirov Ballet, Ballet,7, 7,369,370,384 145,320-21 145, 320-21 Kirpichenko, Vadim Vadim Vasilyevich, Vasilyevich, Kirpichenko, Department 374, 381-83 Department V, V, 6, 6,374,381-83 390, 391 390,391 Directorate K, 387, 387,430 Directorate 430 Kislyak, Kislyak, Ivan IvanPetrovich, Petrovich,281-82, 281-82, Directorate 28, 298, S, 8-9, 8-9,28,298, Directorate S, 375 375 389-90 389-90 Kissinger, 207, 211, Kissinger, Henry, Henry,194, 194,207,211, Directorate 359, Directorate T, T,215-19, 215-19,359, 212, 232, 240, 346-48, 352 212,232,240,346-48,352 413-14,421,458,474-75 413-14, 421, 458, 474-75 Kissinger, 1.1aginnes, Eleventh Kissinger, Nancy Nancy Maginnes, Eleventh (East (East European) European) 346-47 Department, 346-47 Department, 250 250

I I n de x x
Kovalik,Mikhaylovich Mikhaylovich (Valeri Kovalik, (Valeri Makayev),156-57, 156-57,159-60, Makayev), 159-60, 164,165,170-71,195-96 164, 165, 170-71, 195-96 Kozlov,Leonid Leonid Aleksandrovich, Kozlov, Aleksandrovich, 391 391 KPO.(Kommunistische Partei KPO (Kommunistische Partei Osterreichs),276, 276,278,282 Osterreichs), 278, 282 KRABoperation, operation,345 345 KRAB Kraft,Joseph, Joseph, 209 Kraft, 209 Kramer,Charles, Charles,129 129 Kramer, Krasavin,A. A. V., 352 352 Krasavin, Krasikov,Anatoli, Anatoli,303 303 Krasikov, Krasin,Viktor, Viktor, 313-17 Krasin, 313-17 Krasnov,Pyotr, Pyotr,134-36 134-36 Krasnov, Krasovsky, Vladimir Grigoryevich, Krasovsky, Vladimir Grigoryevich, 387,390 387, 390 Krassilnikov,Rem RemSergeevich, Sergeevich, 170 Krassilnikov, 170 Krause, Oskar, Oskar, 18 3 Krause, 318 KRAVCHENKO (Yuri (Yuri Linov), Lhov), 263 263 (Boris KRECHIN (Boris Krotenschield), 125-27, 125-27,138, Kr6tenschield), 138, 139 139 Kremer,Simon SimonDavidovich, Davidovich,115 115 Kremer, Krenzfin Chimes, Chimes,The The (fUm), (film), 265 265 Kremlin Krepkogorsky, Valeri ValeriViktorovich, Viktorovich, Krepkogorsky, 207 kestnikov, N. T, ?I,420 Krestnikov, Kriegel,Annie, Annie,462 462 Kriegel, Krimker, Simona SimonaIsaakovna, Isaakovna,170 170 Krimker, Krivitsky, Walter,79 79 Krivitsky, Walter, Kroesen, Frederick,392 392 Kroesen, Frederick, Kroger, Peterand and Helen,148, 148, Kroger, Peter Helen, 409,410. s o Cohen, 409, 410. see d also Leontina (Lona); (Lona); Cohen, Cohen, Morris KROT (Valery (ValCry Giscard dEstaing), d'Estaing), 468-69 468-69 Krotenschield, Boris, Boris, 125-27, 125-27, Kr6tenschield, 138,139 138, 139 Kruglov, SergeiNikiforovich, Nikiforovich, 134 Kruglov, Sergei Kryuchkov, Vladimir Kryuchkov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich,13,20,22, Aleksandrovich, 13, 20, 22, 212-13,214,216,219, 212-13, 214, 216, 219, 220-23,245,285,298,320, 220-23, 245, 285, 298, 320, 388-89,393,394,419,420, 388-89, 393, 394, 419, 420, 430,455,457,484,532,533 430, 455, 457, 484, 532, 533 Kuberski, Jerzy, Jerzy,532 532 Kuczynski, Jiirgen,115 Kuczynski, Jurgen, 1 15 Kuitan, Klemens Klemens Oscar, Oscar,199 199 Kukin, Konstantin KonstantinMikhailovich, Mikhailovich, 125,139,142 125, 139, 142 Ku Klux Klan, 236,238 236, 238 KULBIT operation, operation, 244 244 Kulda, JosephIvanovich, Ivanovich, 168 Kulda,Joseph 168 Kulebyakin, Nikolai Nikolai Panteleymonovich, 204 Panteleymonovich, 204 Kulikov, Viktor,523-25, 523-25,529-31, Kulikov, Viktor, 529-3 1, 533 KULON, KULON, 480-81 480-81 Kunosenko, Aleksandr Kunosenko, Aleksandr Nikolayuevich, Nikolayuevich, 285-86 285-86 Kurchatov, Igor Vasilievich, Vasilievich,1116, Kurchatov, Igor 16, 117,131 1 17, 131 Kurikka, Kurikka, Hannah, 172-73 Kuron, Klaus, 451 451 Kuron, Klaus, Kursogof(ship), Kursogif(ship), 381-82 381-82

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LEONID LEONID (Svyatoslav (Svyatoslav Kuznetsov), Kuznetsov),283 283 LEPAGE, LEPAGE, 401 401 Lesiovksy, Mechislavovich, Lesiovksy,Viktor Viktor Mechislavovich, 207-8, 290, 291 207-8,290,291 LESLIE a Cohen), LESLIE (Lon (Lona Cohen), 131-32, 131-32, 147-48, 409-11 147-48,409-11 LETCHIK LETCHIK (Roland (Roland Lyudvigovich LyudvigovichAbbiate), Abbiate),75, 75, 79, 124-25, 143 79,124-25,143 Levison, D., Levison,Stanley Stanley D., 290 290 LIBERAL LIBERAL (Julius (Julius Rosenberg), Rosenberg), 128, 148, 164, 409 128,148,164,409 LIMB, LIMB, 286 286 LIND, LIND, 167 167 Line 374, 382, 383, F, 359-65, 359-65,374,382,383, Line F, L, 467 467 L, 391 391 Lafontaine, Oskar, Oskar,456 456 Lafontaine, Line Line KR KR (counterintelligence), (counterintelligence), LA MANCHE MANCHE operation, 468 468 operation, 388, 416, 419, 424, 428-29, 388,416,419,424,428-29, Lamond, James, 427 Lamond,James, 427 433, 434 433,434 Lamphere, Robert, Robert,143 143 Lamphere, Line Line N N (Illegal (IllegalSupport), Support),199, 199, Mark,227-28 227-28 Lane, Mark, 252, 408, 432 252,408,432 LANG (Gaston Plissonnier), Plissonnier),276 276 Line LANG Line PR PR (political (political intelligence), intelligence), Pierre,378 378 Laporte, Pierre, 204-9, 212, 214, 224, 239, 2049,212,214,224,239, Leo,259-60, 259-60,265 Lappi, Leo, 265 382, 424-25, 428-29, 432, 382,424-25,428-29,432, (NikolaiArtamonov), Artamonov), LARK (Nikolai 481-83 481-83 387-88 3 87-88 Line 209 Line SK SK (Soviet (SovietColony), Colony), 209 LAROCHE (French embassy embassy Line 127, 187, 188, 215, 107,127,187,188,215, Line X, 107, employee), 44 217, 220, 350-51, 413-14, 217,220,350-51,413-14, Vera, 310 Lashkova, Vera, 310 420-22, 434, 435, 457-58, 420-22,434,435,457-58, Latvian troops, troops,25 25 473, 475, 480, 481 473,475,480,481 Lazarenko, Aleksandr Ivanovich, Lhitskaya, Lazarenko, Aleksandr Ivanovich, Linitskaya, Galina Galina Leonidovna, Leonidovna, 381,390,391 381, 390, 391 252-53, 259-63 252-53,259-63 Lazarev, AnatoliIvanovich, Ivanovich, 252, Lazarev, Anatoli 252, Linkov, Yuri 198 Linkov, YuriKonstantinovich, Konstantinovich, 198 282,411 282, 411 Linov, Yuri, 263 Linov, Yuri, 263 Lazebny, Yevgeni YevgeniIvanovich, Ivanovich, 419 Lionaes, 419 Lionaes, Aase, 322 Aase, 322 League of ofNations, Nations, 49,51 49, 51 Lipka, Nikitin), Lipka, Robert Robert (Sergei (Sergei Nikitin), Lebanese Communist CommunistParty, Party, 18, 205, 206, 344 18,205,206,344 340-41 340-41 Lippmann, 106, 209 Lippmann, Walter, Walter,106,209 Lebanon, 339-41, 339-41,380-82,418 LISA (Elena 313, 320, 380-82, 418 LISA (Elena Bonner), Bonner),313,320, Lebedev, Lebedev, V. P., 382 324, 325-27, 331, 332, 333 324,325-27,331,332,333 Lebovif, 262-63 LIST (Saveli Burtakov), 355, 356 Lebovic, Ladislav, 262-63 LIST (Saveli Burtakov), 355,356 Lecaneut, Jean, Jean,468 468 LISTER, 167 167 LISTER, Le CarrC, John,149 Carre, John, Lister, Enrique, Lister, Enrique,300 300 Lecoeur, Auguste, Auguste,305 305 LISZT (John Cairncross), 57-59, LISZT (John Cairncross), 57-59, LEDA (typist), 277,476 277, 476 64-65, 66, 79, 82, 83, 91, 64-65,66,79,82,83,91, Lednev, Valeri ValeriVasilyevich, Vasilyevich, 421 421 1 14, 1 18, 120, 126, 140-41, 114,118,120,126,140-41, Lee, Andrew Andrew Daulton, Daulton, 215-16 215-16 160, 281 160,281 Lee, Duncan Duncan Chaplin, Chaplin,108,130, Litvinov, Maxim, 36, 50, 51, 98, 108, 130, Litvinov, Maxim,36,50,51,98, 142 461 461 Lefortovo Prison, Prison, 12, 12,308-9,393 308-9, 393 Litvinov, Pavel, 310-11 Lkvinov, Pavel, 310-11 LEGRAND, 73 LIZA (Martha (Martha Stern), Stern), 106 LIZA 106 Legris, Michel, Michel,470 470 Lloyd, Selwyn, Lloyd, Selwyn, 337 337 Leino, Lloyd George, 25, 34 Leino, Yrjo, Ytj6, 279 279 Lloyd George, David, David,25,34 LEMOINE, Lockhart, Robert Robert Bruce, 25 LEMOINE, 150 Lockhart, Bruce,25 Lemoine, Rodolphe,47-48 Lockheed, 348 Lemoine, Rodolphe, 47-48 Lockheed, 348 LOLA (Leonore (Leonore Heinz), Heinz), 445-47 445-47 LENA Falk),449 449 LENA (Elke Falk), LOLA LENA ofBlyablin), Blyablin), 193, Lomov, Lomov, Boris 210 LENA (partner of 193, Boris Federovich, Federovich, 210 261 LONG (Paddy (Paddy Costello), LONG Costello),409 409 261 Long, Leo, 126, 140 LenPrt, Jozef, 252-53 Lenart, Jozef, 252-53 Long, Leo, 90-91, 90-91,126,140 Lendl, 200 Longo, Luigi, Longo, Luigi, 294-97 294-97 Lendl, Ivan, Ivan, 200 Ilyich Lenin, Lonsdale, Gordon V. I. 1. (Vladimir (Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, V. Lonsdale, Gordon Arnold, Arnold,408 408 p., 382 382 Lopatin, E. E. P., Ulyanov), 10,24,25-26, Ulyanov), 10, 24, 25-26, Lopatin, Lopatin, Mikhail 29-30,32,38-39,54,69, 29-30, 32, 38-39, 54, 69, Lopatin, Mikhail Ivanovich, Ivanovich, 412-13, 421 71-72 71-72 412-13,421 Lopukhin, Aleksandr Leonev, Nikolai Nikolai Sergeevich, Sergeevich, 222 222 Lopukhin, Aleksandr Vladimirovich, 432 Leonhard, Wolfgang,437 437 Vladimirovich, 432 Leonhard, Wolfgang,

KURT (Heinz (HeinzFelfe), Felfe), 203,399, KURT 203, 399, 438-39 438-39 Kutepov,Alexandr, Alexandr, 34,41,42,75 Kutepov, 34, 41, 42, 75 Kuzichkin,Vladimir, Vladimir, 436 Kuzichkin, 436 KUZNETSOV (Alexi (Alexi Buyevsky), Buyevsky), KUZNETSOV 488,491-92 488, 491-92 Kuznetsov,Anatoli AnatoliVasilyevich, Vasilyevich, Kuznetsov, 480,481 480, 481 Kuznetsov,I. I. 1., I., 479 479 Kuznetsov, Kuznetsov,Svyatoslav Svyatoslav Federovich, Kuznetsov, Federovich, 283 283 Kuznetsov,V. V. A., A,, 98 98 Kuznetsov, KVANT,1 117 KVANT, 17 Kvasnikov,Leonid Leonid Romanovich, Kvasnikov, Romanovich, 116,127-28,132 1 16, 127-28, 132

I de x Ind x
(wife of of lgnacio Ignacio Gallego), Gallego), LORA (wife 301 301 V., 419 Loshkarov, M. V., LOT (Charles Kramer), Kramer),129 129 LOUIS L O U S (Morris Cohen), Cohen), 9, 9, 131, 131, 147-48,409-11 147-48, 409-11 LOUISA, 463 463 Low, Low, Toby, Toby,135 135 Lowry, 109, 111 Lowry, Helen, Helen, 104, 104,109,111 ViktorVasilyevich, Vasilyevich, 350 Lozenko, Viktor 350 ClaireBooth, Booth,163 163 Luce, Claire 271 LUCH operation, 271 Ludwig, Ludwig, Renata, Renata,368 368 LUIZA, 202 LUIZA, LUIZA (Laura Araujo AraujoAguilar), Aguilar), 87, 162 87,162 Yakov Lukasevics, Yakov Konstantinovich, 425, Konstantinovich, 419, 419,425, 432 Lunn, Peter, Peter, 339-40 339-40 LUTHER (Andrew Young), Young), 290-91 290-91 Lvovna, Lvovna, Frida, Frida,77 77 Lyalin, 382-84, Lyalin, Oleg OlegAdolfovich, Adolfovich, 382-84, 387, 416, 419, 429 387,416,419,429 Lyampin, Vitali VitaliIvanovich, Ivanovich, 157 Lyampin, 157 Lyon, Alex, Alex,232 232 LYRIC (Donald (Donald Maclean), Maclean), LYRIC 57-63, 65, 66, 82-84, 85, 90, 57-63,65,66,82-84,85,90, 105,119,126,138-39, 105, 1 19, 126, 138-39, 154-55, 157-59, 160, 169 154-55,157-59,160,169 174 LYUTENTSIA operation, 174
M15, 62, 84, 90-91, 1 10, 1 16, M15,62,84,90-91,110,116, 121, 140, 141, 157, 158, 159, 121,140,141,157,158,159, 160 160 MacBridge, MacBridge, Sean, Sean,232 232 Maclean, Alan, Alan, 157-59 157-59 Maclean, Donald, 65, 66, Donald,57-63, 57-63,65,66, 82-84, 85, 90, 105, 1 19, 126, 82-84,85,90,105,119,126, 138-39, 154-55, 157-59, 138-39,154-55,157-59, 160, 169 160,169 Maclean Melinda, Melinda,157 157 Macnamara, 61 Macnamara, Jack, Jack, 61 Sean,384 384 MacStiofin, Sean, MAM MADAM (Lucy Oldham), Oldham),45-46 45-46 MAD CHEN MDC H E N (Guy Burgess), Burgess),57, 57, 59-62,64,79,80,82-84,85, 59-62, 64, 79, 80, 82-84, 85, 90, 119, 126, 138-39, 90,119,126,138-39, 141-42, 154-59, 160-61, 141-42,154-59,160-61, 169, 401-2, 403 169,401-2,403 MADLEN (Helen Lowry), Lowry), 104, 104, 109, 111 109,111 King), 49, 49,52,64,79, 52, 64, 79, MAG (John King), 91 91 Magnificent Five, 79, 95, Five,56-67, 56-67,79,95, 104,113-14,119-21,122, 104, 1 13-14, 1 19-21, 122, 125, 133, 138-40, 154-61. see 125,133,138-40,154-61. see also also Blunt, Anthony; Anthony; Burgess, Guy; Cairncross, Cairncross, John; John; Maclean, Maclean, Donald; Donald; Philby, Kim Kim Magnificent Magn8cent Seven (fIlm), (film), 57 57 MAGYAR (peaceactivist), activist), 208 MAGY AR (peace 208 MAIRE (French agent), agent),420 420 Maisky, 1 8-19, 139 Maisky, Ivan, Ivan,1118-19,139 MAK (Mark Zborowski), Zborowski),69-71 69-71

692
Martin, William H., 178-80, 320 178-80,320 Martinez Moreno, Jorge, 163 Moreno, Jorge, 163 MARVIN (Viktor (Viktor Lozenko), Lozenko),350 350 Marx, Karl, 441 Karl,224, 224,441 (Litzi Philby), Philby), 58,84 MARY (Litzi 58, 84 Marzani, Carl Aldo, Aldo, 226-27 226-27 Maslow, 467 Maslow, Igor IgorVasilovich, Vasilovich, 467 MASON (Pierre-Charles Pathe), PathC), 464-67, 470-71 464-67,470-71 Massachusetts Massachusetts Institute Institute of of Technology,215, 215,217,353 Technology, 217, 353 Massing, Massing, Hede, Hede, 104-5 104-5

Makarov, Makarov, Leonid LeonidAlekseevich, Alekseevich, 329-30 329-30 Makarov, 436 Makarov, Viktor, Viktor,352-53, 35243,436 Makarova, 384 Makarova, Natalia, Natdia, 370, 370,384 Makayev, Mikhaylovich Makayev,Valeri Valeri Mikhaylovich (Mikhaylovich (Mikhaylovich Kovalik), Kovdik), 156-57, 159-60, 164, 165, 156-57,159-60,164,165, 170-71, 195-96 170-71,195-96 Nikolai, 171-74, 171-74, Maki, Eugene Nikolai, 280 MAKS MAKS (Eugen (Eugen Runge), Runge),446 446 MAKS MAKS (Iosif (Iosif Grigulevich), Grigulevich),87, 87, 99-101 , 147, 162-63, 300, 99-101,147,162-63,300, 357-58 357-58 MAKS MAKS (Mark (Mark Zborowski), Zborowski),69-71 69-71 (YevgeniRunge), Runge),368 368 MAKS (Yevgeni MAKSIM (Vassili (Vassili Zarubin), Zarubin), 40, 94, 107, 109-13, 122-24 94,107,109-13,122-24 Maleter, Maker, Pal, PA, 248 248 Yakov, 210, 210,344 Malik, Yako 344 Malinovsky, Roman, Roman,24 24 Malinovsky, Malotenko, Stanislav StanislavFederovich, Federovich, 251 251 48, 59, 63-65, 67, Maly,Teodor, Teodor, 48,59,63-65,67, Maly, 78, 7?, 81, 83, 91 78,79,81,83,91 Manac'h,Etienne, Manach,Etienne, 152 152 Manakov, Mikhailovich, Manakov,Anatoli Anatoli Mikhailovich, 208 208 MANHATTAN project, 1 4, project, 1 114, 117-18, 127-32, 164, 182, 117-18,127-32,164,182, 279-80 279-80 MANN (Teodor Maly), 59, Maly),48, 48,59, 63-65, 67, 78, 79, 81, 83, 91 63-65,67,78,79,81,83,91 Mannerheim, Karl, Karl,24 24 Mike,209 209 Mansfield, Mike, MAR (scientist), 17 (scientist), 1 117 MARA, 167 167 Marakhovsky, Marakhovsh, Yuri Nikolayevich, Nikolayevich, 351 351 MARA T (Jack Childs), MARAT Childs),226, 226, 288-92 288-92 MARAT (Lebanese (Lebanese hotel hotelowner), owner), 342 342 MARCEL, 151, 286 151,286 Marchais, Georges, 303-6, Georges,301, 301,303-6, 472 Marder, 209 Marder, Murray, Murray, 209 MAREK MAREK (U.S. army sargent), sargent), 206 206 MARIY A, 502 MARTYA, 502 MARK, MARK, 454-55 454-55 MARK (Willie (Willie Fisher Fisher Genrikhovich1; Genrikhovichl, Rudolf Rudolf Abel), 146-48, 156-57, 159, 146-48,15647,159, 163, 164-65, 171-72, 163,164-65,171-72, 173-75, 176, 190, 196, 280, 173-75,176,190,196,280, 367, 412 367,412 I. A., 13 Markelov, 1. 13 MARKO MARK0 (Alexander-Leka (Alexander-Leka Rankovic), 355, 356 355,356 Markov, 389 Markov, Georgi, Georgi,388, 388,389 MARLENE MARLENE (Gisela (Gisela Herzog), Herzog), 445 445 Marling, Melinda, Melinda,83 83 MARR (Ignati Reif), 59, 62, 83 Reif), 59,62,83 MARTA (Anna 168 (Anna Federovna), Federovna), 168 (typist),277 277 MARTA (typist), Giuseppe,414 414 Martelli, Giuseppe,

andMargarita, Margarita, Master and The (Bulgakov), 1 11,505 (Bulgakov), 1 , 505 Matrosian, Mary, Mary,342 342 Matsokin, Professor, Professor,37 37 Reginald,383 383 Maudling, Reginald, MAVR, 454 454 (Yevgeni Primakov), MAXSIM (Yevgeni Primakov), 13 13 MA Y (Stepan MAY (StepanApresyian), Apresyian), 124-25, 157 124-25,157 Heinrich, 452 452 Mayer, Heinrich, Mayhew, Mayhew, Christopher, Christopher, 141-42 141-42 MAYSKY (Ivan (IvanKislyak), Kislyak), 281-82, MAYSKY 281-82, 375 375 MAZON (East German illegal), illegal), 449 Mazowiecki, 518-19 Mazowiecki,Tadeusz, Tadeusz, 518-19 Mazurov, Mazurov, K. K. T., T.,252 McCarthy, Eugene, 291 Eugene,209, 209,291 T., McCarthy, Joseph Joseph T., 164 164 160,164-65,280, McCarthyism, 160, 164-65, 280, 286 286 Douglas,215 215 McDonnell Douglas, McGovern, George, George,209 209 McLennan, Gordon, Gordon,426 426 140, 141 McNeil, Hector, Hector, 140,141 Mechulayev, Ivanovich, Mechulayev,Vladimir Vladimir Ivanovich, 286-87 286-87 Medvedev, Roy, Roy,5 Melnik, Constantin, Constantin, 463 463 Menzhinsky, Menzhinsky, Vyacheslav Vyacheslav Rudolfovich, Rudolfovich,39 39 Menzies, Stewart, Stewart, 139 139 Mercador, Ramon, 86, 87-88, Mercador, Rambn,76, 76,86,87-88, 124 124 Mercador del 88 delRio, Rio, Caridid, 86, 86,88 MERCURY (chemist), (chemist), 413 413 Messerschmitt, 458 458 Messmer, 467-68 Messmer, Pierre, Pierre, 467-68 METIL, METIL, 480 480 METSENA T, 482, 483 METSENAT, 482,483 Mexico, 343, 344, 363-64 Mexico, 86-88, 86-88,343,344,363-64 MGB, I , 2, 140, 144-46, 1 55-56, 1,2,140,144-46,155-56, 356-58 356-58 Mllc MIlc (British Secret SecretIntelligence Intelligence Service), Service), 25 25 MICK, 407 Mielke, Erich, 259, 453-54, Erich,248, 248,259,453-54, 456 456 Mihailovich, Mihailovich, 127 127 MIKE (MIT physicist), 215,217 215, 217 (MIT MIKHAILOV (Geli Vasilyev), Vasilyev), MIKHAILOV 309 Mikhaylovna, 541-42 Mikhaylovna, Svetlana, Svetlana, 541-42 Mikoyan, Anastas, Anastas,404 404 Mikoyan,

I de x Ind
Milewski, 19, 520, Milewski, Miroslaw, Mirosiaw,5 519,520, 524, 526, 528, 530, 533, 536 524,526,528,530,533,536 Military-Industrial Commission Commission Military-Industrial (VPK), 186-88, 186-88,217,474 (V1PK), 2 1 7, 474 Miller, Yevgeni YevgeniKarlovich, Karlovich, 75,79 Miller, 75, 79 MIRA MIRA (female (female accountant), accountant), 195 195 MIRA (Simona (Simona Krimker), Krimker),170 170 MIRA MIREN M I E N operation, operation, 241-42 241-42 MIRNA (Elizabeth (Elizabeth Bentley), Bentley), MIRNA 110, 129-30, 142-43, 144, 110,129-30,142-43,144, 147-48,163-64 147-48, 163-64 MIROKA M I R O U (Miroka (Miroka Kokornaya), Kokornaya), 313 313

/ I

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NIKA (West (West German German NIKA Communist), Communist), 438 438 NIKE, 474 474 NIKE, Nikitenko, Leonid Leonid Yef Yefremovich, Nikitenko, removich, 433,434 433, 434 Nikitin, Sergei Sergei (Robert (RobertLipka), Lipka), Nikitin, 18,205,206,334 18, 205, 206, 344 Nikodim, Metropolitan, Metropolitan, 487-88, 487-88, Nikodim, 490, 492, 507 490,492,507 NIKOL 476 NIKOL (typist), (typist), 277, 277,476 Nikolaevsky, Boris,71 71 Nikolaevsk )" Boris, NIKOLAI (Davidovich Gutzeit), NIKOLAI (Davidovich Gutzeit), 106 106 Nikolayevich, Nikolayevich,Nikolai, Nikolai,34 34 Nin, Andreu, Andreu, 72 72 Nin, 19 105, 106, 19 (Lawrence (LawrenceDuggan), Duggan),105,106, 109 109 Nkon, kchard, 1 180, 194,209; Ni xon, Richard, 80, 194, 209, 210-1 1 , 228, 239, 317, 344, 210-11,228,238,317,344, 346, 378 336,378 NKGB, 144, 155 NKGB, 137-38, 137-38,144,155 NKVD, 23, 51, 68-88, 95, NKVD, 17, 17,23,51,68-88,95, 96-103, 146, 147, 149, 150, 96-103,146,147,149,150, 358,43142,452-53 358, 441-42, 452-53 Noble, Noble, Andrew, Andrew,35 35 Noerke, Ingalore, Noerke, Ingalore,192 192 Nollau, Nollau, Gunter, Gunter,445 445 NOMAD (Michael (Michael Straight), Straight), 64, 64, NOMAD 105, 106, 109 105,106,109 NOR, NOR, 151-52 151-52 NORD (Boris Bazarov),44, 44,46, NORD (Boris Bazarov), 46, 104-6 104-6 NORMA (NKVD officer),82,83 NORMA (NKVD officer), 82, 83 Northern Ireland, Ireland, 366, 366,377-78 Northern 377-78 NORTON (RCA (RCA employee), employee), NORTON 186 186 Norway, 278, 278,329,441-42,442 Norway, 329, 441-42, 442 Norwood, Melita, 15-16, 127, Norwood, Melita, 1 115-16, 127, 397-98,410,313,420,435 397-98 , 410, 413, 420, 435 Nosenko, 1 78, Nosenko, Yuri YuriIvanovich, Ivanovich, 178, 185-86, 338, 367-68, 387 185-86,338,367-68,387 Nouhuys, Heinz Heinz Van, Van, 454,471, Nouhuys, 454, 471, 473 473 Novotny,Antonfn, Antonin.250, 250,266,267 Novotny, 266, 267 Nureyev,Rudolf, Rudolf, Nureyev, 7,7,369-70,384 369-70, 384
Obzina, Obzina,Jarimir, Jarimir, 266, 266,267 267 OBZOR, 464 464 OBZOR, OCT ANE, 107 107 OCTANE, ODell, Hunter HunterPitts Pitts "Jack," Jack,290 290 O'Dell, Odessa Odessa catacombs, catacombs,97-99 97-99 Office of ofStrategic StrategicServices Services Office (OSS), 1 11 , 122, 125, (OSS), 108, 108,111,122,125, 130, 144 130,143 Official Secrets Act, 199 Of ficial Secrets Act, 1 99 Ogorodnik, Ogorodnik, Aleksandr Aleksandr Dmitryevich, Dmitryevich, 200 200 OGPU, 42-55, 74 OGPU, 33-41, 33-41,42-55,74 Okhrana, 27-28, 43 Okhrana, 24, 24,27-28,43 Okhunev, S., 441 441 Okhunev, M. M. S., Okolovich, Georgi Georgi Sergeyevich, Sergeyevich, Okolovich, 359 359 OLAF (Armenian (Armenian Orthodox Orthodox OLAF Archbishop), Archbishop), 339 339 Oldham, Ernest ErnestHolloway, Holloway, 44-46, 44-46, Oldham, 48-49 48-49 Oldham, Oldham, Lucy, Lucy, 45-46 45-46

Mironov, Vas Vasili Dmitryevich, 108, 108, Mironov, iii Dmitryevich, 122-24 122-24 MIRRA, 452 MIRRA, 452 Mitchell, Bernon Bernon F., 17840,344 E, 178-80, 344 Mitchell, Mitchell, 179-80 Mitchell, Galina, Galina, 179-80 Mitchell, Leslie, Leslie,169 169 Mitchell, Mitrokhin, Vasili Vasili Nikitich, Nikitich, 1-22, Mitrokhin, 1-22, 436 436 Mitterrand, Franyois, Franqois, 15-16, 15-16,303, Mitterrand, 303, 304, 305, 464, 468, 469, 472, 304,305,464,468,469,472, 473,475,484 473, 475, 484 MLAD MLAD (Ted (Ted Hall), Hall), 128-29, 128-29, 131-32,147-48,164-65, 131-32, 147-48, 1 64-65, 206 206 Moczar, MYeczysfaw, Mieczysiaw, 268-69, Moczar, 268-69, 521,522 521, 522 Modin, Yuri Yuri Ivanovich, Ivanovich, 82, 82, Modin, 140-42,143,154,158,159, 140-42, 143, 154, 158, 159, 160, 224, 237, 416 160,224,237,416 MOLIERE MOLIERE (John (John Cairncross), Cairncross), 57-59, 64-65, 66, 79, 82, 83, 57-59,64-65,66,79,82,83, 91, 1 14, 1 1 8, 120, 126, 91,114,118,120,126, 140-41,160,281 140-41 , 160, 281 Molnir, Bohumil, Bohumil,257 257 Molnir, MOLNIYA MOLNIYA (lightning), (lightning), 365, 365, 370-71 370-71 Molodtsov, Molodtsov, Vladimir Vladirnir Aleksandrovich, Aleksandrovich,97-98 97-98 Molody, Konon Konon Trofimovich Molody, Trofimovich (Gordon (Gordon Arnold ArnoldLonsdale), Lonsdale), 280, 398, 407-12, 415 280,398,407-12,415 Molotov, Vyacheslav Vyacheslav Molotov, Mikhailovich, 139-40, 139-40, Mikhailovich, 144-45,404 144-45 , 404 MONA, 17 MONA, 1 11 7 MONA MONA (French (French translator), translator),450 450 Monarchist Monarchist Association Associationof of Central Central Russia Russia (MOR), (MOR), 34-35 34-35 Mondale, Mondale, Walter, Walter,348 348 Monde, 469-70 Monde, Le, Le, 15-16, 15-16,469-70 Monsanto, 218 Monsanto, 218 Montgomery, Montgomery, Earl, Earl,46 46 Moody, Moody, Bill, Bill,429 429 MOOR (scientist), 15 MOOR (scientist), 1 115 MOPR (International (International Workers MOPR Workers Relief Organization), Relief Organization), 58 58 MORlS M O N S (ballet (ballet dancer), dancer),%4 364 MORlS M O N S (John (John Abt?), Abt?), 106 106 Moro, Moro, Aldo, Aldo,299 299 MOROZOV 432 MOROZOV (Yuri (Yuri Myakov), Myakov), 432 Morozov, Andreevich, 106 Morozov,Ivan Ivan Andreevich, 106 Morrison, Herbert, Herbert, 158 Morrison, 158 Morrison, Morrison, James, James, 168-70 168-70

Morros, Morros, Boris, Boris, 106, 106,123 123 MORTON MORTON (lawyer), (lawyer),208 208 MORVIKOV, MORVIKOV, 327 327 MOST MOST (Heinrich (Heinrich Mayer), Mayer),452 452 MOTHER MOTHER (Caridad (Caridad Mercador), Mercador), 86 86 Mott, 15 Mott, Neville, Neville, 1 115 Muhri, Muhri, Franz, Franz,282 282 Muller, Muller, Kifi, Kiii,253 253 Mulley, Mulley, Fred, Fred,427 427 Munich Munich crisis, crisis, 82 82 Museum Museum of of Partisan Partisan Glory, Glory, 97 97 Mussolini, 277 Mussolini, Benito, Benito,50, 50,277 MUSTAFA, MUST AFA, 184-85 184-85 M.W. M.W. Kellogg KelloggTechnology Technology Company, Company, 186 186 Myakinkov, Gennadi Gennadi Borosovich, Borosovich, Myakinkov, 398 398 Myakov, 432 Myakov,Yuri YuriSergeyevich, Sergeyevich, 432 Y ar (Philby), My Silent SihtW War (Philby), 415 415 NADEZHDIN NADEZHDIN (KGB (KGB police police agent), agent), 278 278 Nagasaki, Nagasaki, 132 132 NAGIN NAGIN (chemical (chemical engineer), engineer),413, 413, 420 420 Nagy, Nagy, Imre, Imre,251 251 NANT (Heinz (Heinz Van Van Nouhuys), Nouhuys), NANT 454, 471, 473 454,471,473 Nasser, 340 340 Nasser, NATASHA, NATASHA, 503 503 National of Civil Civil National Council Councilof Liberties, 232 232 Liberties, National Health, 18 National Institutes Institutesof of Health, 2 218 National (NSA), National Security SecurityAgency Agency (NSA), 18,205,344,347 18, 205, 344, 347 NATO, 353, 360, 364, 376, NATO, 304, 304,353,360,364,376, 377,391-93,401,433,448, 377, 391-93, 401 , 433, 448, 449, 465, 466, 467, 480, 482, 449,465,466,467,480,482, 484 484 NATSIONALIST (Wadi NA TSIONALIST (Wadi Haddad), 385 Haddad), 380-82, 380-82,385 Navotnaya, Mariya, Mariya, 168 168 Navotnaya, Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Non-AggressionPact Pact Nazi-Soviet (1939), 106, 108-9 (1939), 84-85, 84-85,106,108-9 Nechiporenko, ximovich, Nechiporenko, Oleg OlegMa. M;tuimovich, 233 233 Nedosekin, Pavel Nedosekin, Pave1Yetimovich, Yefimovich, 340-41 340-41 NEIGHBOURS, NEIGHBOURS, 134 134 NELLIE,430 430 "NELLIE," Nelson, Steve, Steve,1 111,122 Nelson, 1 1 , 122 Nenni, Pietro, Pietro,277 277 Nenni, NERPA NEWA (weapons (weapons researcher), researcher), 215 215 New Class, Cluss, The (Djilas), (Djilas), 249-50 249-50 Newens, 1 , 232 Newens, Stan, Stan,23 231,232 New New Zealand, Zealand,351 351 Nezamov, Nezamov, Peter, Peter, 388 388 Nicaragua, 181, 1 82 Nicaragua, 181,182 FSLN FSLN (Sandinista (Sandinista National National Liberation 8 1 , 363, Liberation Front), Front), 1 181,363, 385-87 385-87 11,Tsar, Tsar, 34 34 Nicholas II, Nicholas NIGEL NIGEL (Michael (Michael Straight), Straight),64, 64, 105, 106, 109 105,106,109 NIK (Colombian), (Colombian),208 208 NIK

In nd de ex I
OLDING (Harold (Harold Wilson), OLDING Wilson), 403, 403, 404-5, 425, 456 404-5,425,456 OLEG (M. (M. S. S. Okhunev), Okhunev), 441 OLEG 441 Oleinkov, Anatoli, Oleinkov, Anatoli,490 490 Oleynik, Yevgeni Aleksandrovich, Oleynik, Yevgeni Aleksandrovich, 397 397 Olivetti, 470 Olivetti, 470 OLIVIA, 117 OLIVIA, 117 Olivier, Lawrence, Olivier, Lawrence,120 120 Olszowski, Stefan, 523, 525, 531 OIszowski, Stefan,523,525,531 Olympics, 238-39 238-39 Olympics, OMAR, 477 477 OMAR, OMUT operation, operation, 342 OMUT 342 One Day in the L$e Life of ofIvall Ivan Denisovich (Solzhenitsyn), (Solzhenitsyn), Denisozrich 311 311 Oppenheimer, Robert, 117 Oppenheimer, Robert, 117 OREL (Gustave (Gustave Bertrand), OREL Bertrand), 47-48, 148 47-48,148 OREND Kessler), 84 84 OREND (Eric (Eric Kessler), ORFEL (Josip (Josip Tito), Tito), 127, 270, ORFEL 127,270, 355-58 355-58 Organization of Organization ofUkrainian Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), Nationalists (OUN), 358, 358, 361-62 361-62 O'Riordan, ORiordan, Michael, Michael, 377-78, 377-78, 384-85 384-85 ORLOV ORLOV (Valentin (Valentin Barannik), Barannik), 541-42 531-42 Orlov, Orlov, Aleksandr AleksandrMikhailovich, Mikhailovich, 20, 40, 59-60, 62, 73-74, 76, 20,40,59-60,62,73-74,76, 78, 81, 83, 358 78,81,83,358 Orlov, Orlov, Igor Igor(Aleksandr (Aleksandr Grigoryevich 21, Grlgoryevich Kopatzky), Kopatzky), 21, 148-49, 176-77 148-49,176-77 Orlov, 334-36 Orlov, Yuri, Yuri,327-30, 327-30,334-36 ORLOVA ORLOVA (Svetlana (Svetlana Mikhaylovna), Mikhaylovna),541-42 541-42 Orszulik, Orszulik, Alojsy, Alojsy,534-35 534-35 Oshchenko, Oshchenko, Viktor Viktor Alekseevich, Alekseevich, 422 422 OST 50-52, OST (Moisei (Moisei Akselrod), Akselrod), 5042, 78 78 OSTO 50-52, OSTO (Moisei (Moisei Akselrod), Akselrod), 504'2, 78 78 Ostrovsky, Ostrovsky,Nikolai NikolaiPavlovich, Pavlovich, 168-69, 397 168-69,397 Oswald: OswaZd:Assassin Assassinor or Fall-Guy? Fall-Guy? (Joesten), (Joesten), 227-28 227-28 Oswald, 225, Oswald, Lee LeeHarvey, Harvey, 225, 228-29, 230, 246 228-29,230,246 OTTO OTTO (Arnold (Arnold Deutsch), Deutsch),43, 43, 55-65, 78-79, 81, 281 55-65,78-79,81,281 Ovakimyan, Ovakimyan, Gayk GaykBadalovich, Badalovich, 106-7 106-7 OVERLORD OVERLORD operation, operation, 112 112 Overy, Overy,Richard, Richard,96 96 OVOD, OVOD,476 476 OVRAG station), OVRAG (Lebanese (LebaneseSIS SIS station), 339 339 OZEROV OZEROV(Viktor (Viktor Oshchenko), Oshchenko), 422 422 Ozgur, Ahmet, 208 Ozgur,Ozdemir Ozdemir Ahmet, 208 Paaskivi, President, 279 Paaskivi, President, 279 Pacelli, Pacelli,Giulio, Giulio,163 163 Pachman, 263 Pachman,Ludek, Ludek, 263

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People's People's Republic of ofChina, China, 154, 154, 165,353 165, 353 People's Union Union for forDefence Defenceof of Country and Freedom Freedom Country and (NSZRis), 33-34 33-34 PEPEL operation, 377 operation, 377 Percy, Charles, Charles,209 209 Perez, Pedro PedroPupo, Pupo, 234 234 PCrez Cukllar, Javier, 207 Perez de Cuellar, Javier, 207 Perkins, Frances, Frances,112 112 Perle, Richard, Richard, 239-41 239-41 Perlo, Victor, Victor, 129 129 PERS (Communist engineer), engineer), 117-18 117-18 Pervukhin, 174 174 Pessi, Vue, Ville, 280,285 280, 285 PETER (KGB police police agent), agent),278 278 Petersen, Arne ArneHerl0V, HerIm,428 428 Petlyuchenko, Viktor Viktor Sergeyevich, Sergeyevich, 498 Petlyura, Simon, Simon,32 32 Petrov, Vladimirand and Evdokia, Petrov, Vladimir Evdokia, 367,387,461 367, 387, 461 Petrovic, Dusica, Dusica, 356 356 Pfeiffer, Edouard, 61-62 61-62 Good Privacy), Privacy), 353 PGP (Pretty Good 353 PhiIadelphiaInquirtr, Philadelphia Inquirer, 18 18 Philby,Aileen, Aileen,156 156 Philby, Philby, Kim, Kim,21,57,58-60,62, Philby, 21, 57, 58-60, 62, 65,66-67,83-84,85,90, 65, 66-67, 83-84, 85, 90, 113,119-20,125-26,139, 113, 119-20, 125-26, 139, 154-61,203,339,341,398, 154-61, 203, 339, 341, 398, 399,415,417-19 399, 415, 417-19 Philby, Litzi Litzi Friedman, Friedman,58, 84 Philby, 339-40 PHOENIX (Peter Lunn), 339-40 Pieck, Hans Christian, Christian,49,64 Pieck, Hans 49, 64 Pietruszka, Adam, Adam,540 540 Pietruszka, Pimen, Patriarch, Patriarch,490-91 490-91 Piiieiro Losado, Losado,Manuel, Manuel, 385-86 Pineiro 385-86 Augusto,427, 427,470 Pinochet, Augusto, 470 PIRATY (Branzikas (Branzikasand and son), son), 382 382 Pitirim, Archbishop, Archbishop,496 496 Pitirim, Pitovranov, Yevgeni Yevgeni Petrovich, Pitovranov, Petrovich, 440 440 Pius XII, X I , Pope, Pope, 163 163 Pius Pivovarov,Yuri YuriSergeevich, Sergeevich,379 379 Pivovarov, 478 PLATON, 478 Platonov,329 329 Platonov, Plissonier,Gaston, Gaston,282, 282,303-4 Plissonier, 303-4 Plissonnier, Gaston, Gaston,276 276 Plissonnier, Plyushch, Leonid, Leonid,304 304 Plyushch, POCHIN (intercept post), post), PO CHIN (intercept 343-44,346,347-48,350, 343-44, 346, 347-48, 350, 351 351 Pohl,Inge, Inge,362 362 Pohl, Pokrovsky, Georgi Petrovich, 379 Pokrovs1.. J', Georgi Petrovich, 379 Poland,22, 22,42,133,299,305,451, Poland, 42, 133, 299, 305, 451, 508-43 508-43 POLECATS, 70 70 POLECATS, Politburo,42 42 Politburo, Polonik, Mikhail Mikhail Korneevich, Korneevich,19 19 Polonik, Pol Pot, Pot,470 470 Pol Polyakov,Dmitri, Dmitri,220 220 Polyakov, POLYNARIK(Willy (WillyBrandt), Brandt), POLYNARIK 17-18,271,440-45,454 17-18, 271, 440-45, 454 POMOSHCHNIK, 167 167 POMOSHCHNIK,

Page, C. C. H., 138-39 138-39 Page, Pajetta, Gian Pajetta, Gian Carlo, Carlo,297 297 PAL (Nathan PAL (Nathan Gregory Gregory Silvermaster), 110,111,129, 110, 111, 129, Silvermaster), 142 142 PALLE (Arne (Arne Petersen), Petersen),428 428 PALM (Gus (Gus Hall), Hall), 288 288 PALM PANDORA operation, 238 238 PANSO (Pacheco (Pacheco JosC Jose Castelo), Castelo), PANS0 74 74 Panyushkin, Aleksandr Panyushkin, Aleksandr Semyonovich, 145,359 145, 359 Semyonovich, PaoIe Zion, 50 Paole Papaioannou, Ezekias, Ezekias,281-82 281-82 Parastayev, AndreiSergeyevich, Sergeyevich, Parastayev, Andrei 425 Park, Daphne, 169-70 Park, Daphne,169-70 Parshin, Lev, 434 434 Parshin, Lev, ais Parti Communiste Comrnuniste Frans: Franqais (PCF), 15044,276,277, 150-54, 276, 277, 287,297,301,303-6,328, 287, 297, 301, 303-6, 328, 462,470 462, 470 Espana Partido Comunista Comunista de Espaiia (PCE), (PCE), 297,300-303,306 297, 300-303, 306 Partito Comunista Comunista Italiano Italiano(PCI), Partito 276-78,294-301,306,328, 276-78, 294-301, 306, 328, 374 374 Pasechnik, Vladimir, Vladimir,436 436 Pasov, Zelman,81 81 Pasov, Zelman, Pasternak, Boris, Boris,3-4 3-4 PATERA, 259 259 PATERA, PathC,Pierre-Charles, Pierre-Charles,464-67, 464-67, Pathe, 470-71 470-71 Patocka,Jan, Jan, 275 Patocka, 275 PATRICK, 284-85 284-85 PATRICK, PATRIOT PATRIOT (Viktor (Viktor Petlyuchenko),498 498 Petlyuchenko), PAUK (Aleksandr (AleksandrSolzhenitsyn), Solzhenitsyn), PAUK 10-11,311-12,313, 10-11, 311-12, 313, 316,317-21,324,333, 316, 317-21, 324, 333, 469-70 469-70 PAUL 366, 368, PAUL (Igor (IgorVoytetsky), Voytetsky), 366,368, 375,378 375, 378 PAUL 48, 59, PAUL (Teodor (TeodorMaly), Maly), 48,59, 63-65,67,78,79,81,83,91 63-65, 67, 78, 79, 81, 83, 91 Paulus, Friedrich, Friedrich,103 103 Paulus, Pavarotti, Luciano, Luciano,195 195 Pavarotti, PAVEL, PAVEL,506 506 Pavel, Josef, 25657,259 Pavel,Josef, 254-57, 259 Pavlov,Vadim, Vadim, 508,524-25, Pavlov, 508, 524-25, 527-29,531,533,536,537 527-29, 531, 533, 536, 537 Pavlov,Valentin, Valentin, 222 Pavlov, 222 Pavlovsky,Sergei, Sergei, 34 Pavlovsky, 34 PCF PCF (Parti (Parti Communiste Communiste Franqais),150-54, 15044,276,277, Frans:ais), 276, 277, 287,297,301,303-6,328, 287, 297, 301, 303-6, 328, 462,470 462, 470 PC1(Partito (PartitoComunista ComunistaItaliano), Italiano), PCI 276-78,294-301,306,328, 276-78, 294-301, 306, 328, 374 374 Pearl 99 Pearl Harbor, Harbor,96, 96,99 Pearson, 209, 235 Pearson,Drew, Drew, 209,235 Peet, Peet,John, John,439-40 439-40 Pelikin,Jicri, JiTri,253 253 Pelilcin, Pelton, Ronald, Ronald, 344 Pelton, 344 Penkovsb, Oleg OlegVladimirovich, Vladimirovich, Penkovsky, 182,184 182, 184

In dex
Pompidou,Georges, Georges, 467-68 Pompidou, 467-68 Ponger, Kurt, Kurt, 173-74 173-74 Ponger, Poniatowski,Michel, Michel, 468 Poniatowski, 468 Ponomarev,Boris, Boris, 286-87,292, Ponomarev, 286-87, 292, 295,303,306 295, 303, 306 Ponomarev, E. E. R., R., 388 388 Ponomarev, PONT (Philip (Philip Agee), Agee), 206 PONT 206 Popular Front Frontfor for the Liberation Liberation Popular the of Palestine Palestine(PFLP), (PFLP), 379-82, of 379-82, 385 385 Poremsky,Vladimir, Vladimir,361 361 Poremsky, Poretsky,Ignace Ignace(Ignace (Ignace Reiss; Poretsky, Reiss; Raymond),47-48, 47-48,78-79, Raymond), 78-79, 124 124 POROK operation, operation, 239, 239,241 POROK 241 Portugal, 283-86 283-86 Portugal, Portuguese Communist CommunistParty Party Portuguese (PCP), 283-86 283-86 (PCP), Portuguese Revolution Revolution(1974), (1974), Portuguese 283 283 Postoutov, Iosif, Iosif,489 489 Postoutov, Pottle, Pat, Pat,400 400 Pottle, (Partido Obrero Obrero de POUM (Partido de Unificacion Marxista),73, 73,441 Unifi cacion Marxista), 441 Powers, Gary, Gary,174, 174,175 Powers, 175 Prague Spring Spring(1968), (1968), 6,22,185, Prague 6, 22, 1 85, 203,249-69,294,295, 203, 249-69, 294, 295, 303-4,311,318,331 303-4, 3 1 1 , 3 1 8, 331 Pravdin, Vladimir Vladimir(Roland (Roland Pravdin, LyudvigovichAbbiate), Abbiate),75, 75, Lyudvigovich 79,124-25,143 79, 124-25, 143 PRESIDENT (William E. E. Doss, DOSS, Jr.), 106 106 PRESSING operation, 344-45 344-45 Price, Mary MaryWolf, Wolf, 106 106 PRIM Ramdn),363 363 PRlM (Manual Ramon), Primakov, Yevgeni Maksimovich, Primakov, Yevgeni Maksimovich, 13 13 Prime, Geoffrey GeoffreyArthur, Arthur, 345,424 345, 424 PROBA (intercept post), post), 343-44, 343-44, 346,347-48 346, 347-48 PROBA operation, operation,407 407 Prochizka, Jan, Jan,253, 253,254-55 Prochazka, 254-55 PROFESSOR, 502-3 502-3 PROGRESS (FCD operations against dissidents), dissidents),23, 23, 249-75,252,510,512, 249-75, 252, 510, 512, 518-19,541 5 1 8-19, 541 Protestant churches,503-6 Protestant churches, 503-6 Prussian Prussimz Nights Ni ghts (Solzhenitsyn), 318 318 Public Key Cryptography, 353 Cryptography, 353 Pugo, Boris, Boris,393-94 393-94

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Revoi, 84 Revoi,Andrew, Andrew, 84 REX 47-48 REX (Rodolphe (RodolpheLemoine), Lemoine), 47-48 Rezac, Tomas , 3 1 8-19 318-19 Rezic,TomiS Ribbentrop, von, 84, 95, Ribbentrop,Joachim Joachim von, 84,95, 96 96 Ribiare, Ribiare,Henri, Henri, 151 151 Ribicof f, Abraham, 291 Ribicoff, Abraham, 291 RlCHARD, RICHARD, 458 458 RlCHARD RICHARD (Aleksandr (Aleksandr Kopatzky; 21, Kopatzky;Igor IgorOrlov), Orlov), 21, 148-49, 176-77 148-49,176-77 Richardson, Richardson,Charlie, Charlie,429 429 Riches, Riches,Derek, Derek,339 339 RlMEN RIMEN (Hugh (Hugh Hambleton), Hambleton), 168-69, 192, 198-99 168-69,192,198-99 RINO RINO (Karl (Karl Koecher), Koecher), 199-201 199-201 ROBERT (Nathan (Nathan Gregory Gregory Silvermaster), 10, 1 1 1 , 129, Silvermaster),1110, 111, 129, 142 142 Roberts, Roberts, Chalmers, Chalmers,209 209 Roberts, Goronwy, Goronwy,404 404 Robertson, 140 Robertson, "Tar," Tar, 140 Robinson, Robinson, G. G. A., 140 140 Robotron, Robotron, 219 219 Rocard, Rocard, Michel, Michel,473 473 Rockefeller, Rockefeller,David, David,210 210 Rockefeller, 194 Rockefeller,"Happy," Happy, 194 Rockefeller, 210 Rockefeller,Nelson, Nelson,194, 194,210 Rodin, Nikolai Nikolai Borisovich Borisovich (Korovin), 142, 158, 399 (Korovin), 142,158,399 Rogozhin, Anatol, 6 Anatol,1 3 136 ROLAND, 448-49 448-49 Romania, 269-70, 356 Romania, 42, 42,269-70,356 ROMELLA (Latin American American 208-9 diplomat), 208-9 Romzha, Archbishop, 358-59 Romzha, Archbishop,358-59 RON (Richard Gott), 427 RON (Vladimir Grinchenko), Grinchenko), 170-71 170-71 105 Roosevelt, Eleanor, Eleanor,105 Roosevelt, Franklin 71-72, Roosevelt, Franklin D., 71-72, 105, 107-8, 109, 1 1 1-12, 105,107-8,109,111-12, 122, 133-34, 164, 1 88, 122,133-34,164,188, 279-80, 465 279-80,465 MANHATTAN project, 1 1 4, 114, 1 1 7-18, 127-32, 164, 182, 117-18,127-32,164,182, 279-80 279-80 Rose, Fred, Fred, 282 282 128, 148, 164, Rosenberg, Ethel, Ethel,128,148,164, 409 Rosenberg, Julius, 128, 148, 164, Rosenberg, Julius, 128,148,164, 409 Rosensteil, Susan, Susan,235 235 ROSIE (Heidrun (Heidrun Hofer), ROSIE Hofer), 447, 447, 448-49 448-49 Rosinevich, E. S., 406 Rosinevich, E.S., ROSSI (Giovanni 44, 45, ROSS1 (Giovanni de deRy), Ry), 44,45, 46 46 RoteKappelle Kappelle (Red (Red Orchestra), Rote Orchestra), 102 102 Rothstein, Andrew, Rothstein, Andrew, 116 116 Rotsch, Manred (EMIL), (EMIL), 458 458 Rotsch, ROVS, 41 41 ROVS, Rowan, Carl, Rowan, Carl, 209 209 Royal Canadian Royal Canadian Mounted MountedPolice Police (RCMP), 166-67,169,170, 166-67, 169, 170, (RCMP), 198 198

RADAR RADAR operation, operation,343 343 Radchenko,381-82 381-82 Radchenko, Radek,Karl, Karl, 40 Radek, 40 RADIST, 454 454 RADIST, Rado, Rado, 102 102 RADOV RADOV (Hugh (Hugh Hambleton), Hambleton), 168-69, 192, 198-99 168-69,192,198-99 RADUGA project, project, 1 118 RADUGA 18 RAIDER RAIDER (Victor (Victor Perlo), Perlo),129 129 Rajk, Rajk,Laszlo, Lisz16,247,357 247, 357 RAKET A (intercept post), RAKETA (intercept post), 348-49 348-49 Rakowski, 536, Rakowski, Mieczyslaw, Mieczyslaw,525, 525,536, 539 539 Ramon Andara y Ubeda, Ramdn de deJesus Jesus Andara y Ubeda, Manuel, Manuel, 363 363 RAMZES RAMZES (American (American professor), professor),

208 208 Rand Corporation, Corporation, 202 202 Rand Randle, Michael, Michael,400 400 Randle, Rankovii, Alexander-Leka, Alexander-Leka,355, 355, Rankovic, 356,357 356, 357 151 RANOL, 151 Ransome, 1 Ransome,Arthur, Arthur,3 31 Rastvorov, 367 Rastvorov,Yuri, Yuri, 367 RATYEN, 1 51 151 Ray, Ellen, 233 233 Ray, RAYMOND (Ignace RAYMOND(1gnace Reiss/Poretsky), Reiss/Poretsky), 47-48, 47-48, 78-79, 124 78-79,124 RAYMOND (Ramdn Mercador), Mercador), RA YMOND (Ramon 76, 86, 87-88, 124 76,86,87-88,124 RCA, 186 186
Reader? Reader's Digest, 19 19

Reagan, Nancy, Nancy,213 213 Reagan, Ronald, 207, 213-14, Reagan, Ronald, 207,213-14, 242-43, 292, 293, 350, 242-43,292,293,350, 391-93, 455, 475, 484 391-93,455,475,484 Rebet, Lev, Lev, 361-62 361-62 342-43 REBUS operation, operation,342-43 27, 28, 32, 33, 73, Red Army, Army, 27,28,32,33,73, 101-3,120,134,149 101-3 , 120, 134, 149 Red Brigade, Brigade,298-99 298-99 Red Terror, Terror,26 26 Reduktor (ship), 385 385 79-80, 85, 154 Rees, Goronwy, Goronwy, 79-80,85,154 Rees, Jenny, Jenny,85 Rees, Merlyn, Merlyn,232 232 Reform Baptists, Baptists,504 504 55-56 Reich, Wilhelm, Wilhelm,55-56 59, 62, 83 Reif, Ignati, Ignati,59,62, Reilly, Sidney, 25-26, 34-35, 41 Reilly, Sidney, 25-26,34-35,41 Rein, Mark, Mark,441 441 Pujol, Antonio, Antonio,87 87 Reiss, Ignace Reiss, Ignace (Poretsky), (Poretsky),47-48, 47-48, PURPLE, 78-79,124 78-79, 124 PURPLE, 95 95 Pushkin (assistantto REM (Italian (Italian employee employee of ON), REM of UN), Pushkin (assistant to Solovyev), 81 208 81 Pustoutov, Iosif,489, 489,496 Remizov, Andrei, Andrei,309 309 Pustoutov, Iosif, 496 RENAT A (East PUWP CommunistParty), Party), RENATA (East German Germanillegal), illegal), PUWP (Polish Communist 508,511,512,520-21, 448 448 508, 511, 512, 520-21, RENA TO, 482, 483 523-30,532,536,538 RENATO, 482,483 523-30, 532, 536, 538 Puzanov, A.M., Renner, Karl, Karl,278 278 Puzanov, A. M., 390 390 REPO (Tomis (Tomas Rezic), Rezac), 318-19 3 1 8-19 Pyatin, 199 REP0 Pyatin, Artur Artur Victorovich, Victorovich, 199 REST (Klaus (Klaus Fuchs), 1 15, REST 115, 127-28, 131-32, 155, 164, Qaddafi, 470 127-28,131-32,155,164, ddafi, Muhammar, 470 397 Quebec separatists, 378 378 397 Qtebec separatists, Reston, James, 181 Reston, James, 181 QUESTOR, Q UESTOR, 278,476-77 278, 476-77

In nd de ex x I
Rubak, Mikhail, Rubak, Mikhail,359 359 Rubakov, Vladimir, Rubakov, Vladimir, 353-54 353-54 RUBIN operation, 342, RUBIN operation, 339-41, 339-41,342, 348 348 RUBY (Schaap), RUBY (Schaap), 233 233 Ruby, Jack, 225, 246 Ruby, Jack, 225,246 Rudenko, Anatoli Rudenko, AnatoliIvanovich, Ivanovich, 1 94-96 194-96 Rudenko, Roman, 11 Rudenko, Roman,3311 Rudinitskaya, S Sotya Davidovna, Rudinitskaya, of)~ Davidovna, 366 366 RULEVOY (Earl (Earl Browder), Browder), 104, RULEVOY 104, 108-9, 1 10, 122, 123, 108-9,110,122,123, 129-30 129-30 RUM (Guinean embassy embassy RUM (Guinean employee), 342-43 342-43 employee), Rumsfeld, Donald, Rumsfeld, Donald,348 348 Runge, Eugen, Runge, Eugen,446 446 Runge, Yevgeni, Runge, Yevgeni,368 368 RUPOR group, group, 233-34 RUPOR 233-34 Rusak, Rusak, Vladimir, Vladimir,497 497 Rush, Valentina, Rush, Valentina,368 368 (Lane), 228 Rush ttoJudgmel1t o Judgment (Lane), 228 Rusk, Dean, Rusk, Dean,207 207 RUSLAN (Aleksei RUSL,AN (AlekseiSavin), Savin),381, 381, 413 413 Russia at W ar~ (Werth), 3 15 R I~s atsWar ~ (Werth), 315 Russian Federation, 13, 354 Russian Federation, 13,354 Russian Orthodox Russian Orthodox Church, Church, 486-99 486-99 Russian Russian People's Peoples Army, Army,33 33 Russo-Polish 33 Russo-PolishWar War(1920), (1920), 33 Rust, Rust, Matthias, Matthias, 12 12 Ry, 45, 46 Ry, Giovanni Giovanni de, de,44, 44,45,46 Ryabov, Ryabov,Viktor, Viktor,6 6 RYAN RYAN (Eugene (Eugene Dennis), Dennis), 108 108 RYAN adernoye RYAN (Raketno-Y (Rakttno-Yodernoye 219 Napadenie), 213-14,219 Nupadenie), 213-14, RYAN 433, RYAN operation, operation, 392-93, 392-93,433, 457 457 RYBAKOV RYBAKOV (Anatoli (Anatoli Rudenko), Rudenko), 194-96 194-96 Rykov, Rykov, 72 72 Ryutin, Ryutin, Mikhail, Mikhail,68 68 RYZHOV RYZHOV (Valentin (Valentin Sidak), Sidak),473 473 Ryzhov, 296, 297, Ryzhov,Nikita, Nikita,295, 295,296,297, 299 299

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696

Serov, IvanAleksandrovich, Aleksandrovich, 3,23, Serov, Ivan 3, 23, Sandinista National Sandinista National Liberation Liberation 248,257 248, 257 Front (FSLN), (FSLN), 181,363, 1 8 1, 363, Front Servan-Schreiber, Jean-Jacques, Servan-Schreiber, Jean-Jacques, 385-87 385-87 468 468 Sapper, Alan, Sapper, Alan,232 232 &mice Extrieure Ser'vice de deDocumentation Dommentation Ex'trieure Sarmanov, S. S. S., S., 420 420 Sarmanov, et Espionnage et de Contre Espionnage SASHA Korotkov), SASHA (Aleksandr (Aleksandr Korotkov), (SDECE), (SDECE), 15143,460,462, 151-53, 460, 462, 91, 92, 146, 165 91,92,146,165 463 463 SATURN (McDonnell SATURN (McDonnell Douglas Douglas Sevastyanov, 177 Sevastyanov, I. I. P., 177 department head), department head), 217 217 SEVIDOV, 272-73 SEVIDOV, 272-73 SATURN (support SATURN (support group), group),363 363 Shadrin, Mikhail Shadrin, Mikhail Savchenko, Sergei Savchenko, Sergei Romanovich, Rornanovich, Konstantinovich, 285 Konstantinovich, 285 145 145 Shadrin, Nicholas,387 387 Shadrin, Nicholas, Savin, Aleksei 3 8381, 1, Savin, AlekseiNikolayevich, Nikolayevich, Shadrin, 325 Shadrin, V. V. N., N., 325 413 413 SHAH SHAH (Harry (Harry Houghton), Houghton), Savinkov, Boris, 33-35, 41, 315 Savinkov, Boris,33-35,41,315 410-411 410-411 Sax, Saville Saville Savoy, 131 Sax, Savoy,128-29, 128-29,131 Sharov, Sharov, A. V., V., 414 414 Schaap, Bill,233 233 Schaap, Bill, SHAUN bureau SHAUN (advertising (advertising bureau Schildbach, Gertrude, Schildbach, Gertrude, 79 79 owner), 341 owner), 341 Schmidt, Hans-Thilo, Schmidt, Hans-Thilo, 47 47 Shaw, GeorgeBernard, Bernard,59 Shaw, George 59 Schmidt, Helmut, 352, 455, 456 Schmidt, Helmut,352,455,456 Shcharansky, Anatoli, 328-29 328-29 Shcharansky, Anatoli, Schonbrunn, Reinhold,91-92 Schonbrunn, Reinhold, 91-92 Shcharansky, Avital,329 329 Shcharansky, Avital, School ofOriental Oriental and African School of and African Shchelokov, Nikolai,3312 Shchelokov, Nikolai, 12 Studies (SOAS; Studies (SOAS;London), London), Shebarshin, Leonid Shebarshin, Leonid 408-9 408-9 Vladimirovich, 20,95, Vladimirovich, 20, 95, Schroder, Gerhard,446-47 446-47 Schroder, Gerhard, 220-22,245,543 220-22, 245, 543 Schulze-Boysen, Harro,92, 92,93, Schulze-Boysen, Harro, 93, SHEF (American (American professor), professor), 209 209 102 102 Shelepin, NikolayevichAleksandr, Aleksandr, Shelepin, Nikolayevich Schumann, Maurice, 467-68 Schumann, Maurice,467-68 4-5,18044,362,363,367 4-5, 1 80-84, 362, 363, 367 SCHWED (Aleksandr SCHWED (Aleksandr Orlov), Orlov), Shelest, Yefimovich, Yefimovich, Shelest, 25251 1 20, 40, 59-60, 62, 73-74, 76, 20,40,59-60,62,73-74,76, Shelmatova, 8 81 Shelmatova, 1 78, 8 1 , 83, 358 78,81,83,358 Shelton, Turner TurnerB., B., 386 Shelton, 386 SCOT SCOT (John (John Symonds), Symonds),428-32 428-32 Shemov,Viktor, Viktor, 343 343 Scotland, Scotland, 366 366 Shemov, Sherstnev, Lev LevNikolayevich, Nikolayevich, 398. Sherstnev, 398, SDECE SDECE (Service (Servicede dt 413 Documentofion Ex'trieure Extrieure Doculne1ltation et et de 413 Shevchenko,Arkadi ArkadiNikolayevich, Nikolayevich, Shevchenko, 5 1-53, COl/tre ContreEspionnage), Espionnage),1 151-53, 207-8 460, 462, 463 207-8 460,462,463 Shishkin, Ivan, Ivan,416 416 SDI Shishkin, SDI (Star (Star Wars), Wars),214 214 Shishlin, Nikolai NikolaiVladimirovich, Vladimirovich, SEDOV Shishlin, SEDOV (Leonid (Leonid Makarov), Makarov), 332,433 332, 433 329-30 329-30 Shkuro,Andrei, Andrei,134-36 134-36 Shkuro, Sedo 69-71, 75-76, 207 Sedov,Le Lev, 69-71,75-76,207 Shlyandin, Gleb GlebPavlovich, Pavlovich, 366 Segal, 245 Shlyandin, 366 Segal,Jacob, Jacob, 245 Shmidkhen (Yan (YanBuikis), Buikis), 25, Seimens, Seimens,458 458 Shmidkhen 25, 26-27 Seliskov, 26-27 Seliskov, O. 0.A., A., 244 244 Shokin, V. V. 1., I., 351 351 Semenov, 107 Shokin, Semenov,Semen SemenMarkovich, Markovich, 107 Shokla Osobogo Osobogo Naznacheniya Semenov, 179-80 Naznacheniya Semenov,Yuri, Yuri, 179-80 (Special Purose PuroseSchool; School; Semichastny, L. L. v., V., 1 188 Semichastny, 88 (Special SHON), 89-90 89-90 Semichastny, SHON), Semichastny,Vladimir Vladimir Shpeter, Henrich HenrichNatan, Natan, 241-42 Saadeh, 418 Yefimovich, 174, 1 85, 3 1 1 , Yefimovich,5, 5,174,185,311, Shpeter, 241-42 Saadeh,Raymond, Raymond, 418 Shpigelgals,Mikhail, Mikhail,8 81 Saar-Demichel, 463-65 362, 367, 442, 443 Shpigelgals, 1 Saar-Demichel, Franc;:ois, Franqois, 463-65 362,367,442,443 Sadat, 329 SHTOLPEN, 454 454 Senate Senate Foreign ForeignRelations Relations Sadat, Anwar, Anwar, 329 SHTOLPEN, Sidovsky, an, 266 Shtyov,A. A. G., G., 3 382 Committee, Committee, 345 345 Shtyov, 82 Sidovskf, Stef Stefan, 266 Safire, 2 1211 1 Shultz, George, George, 207 SERAFIM, SEFUFIM, 501-2 501-2 Shultz, 207 Safire,William, William, Sakharov, 22, 3 12, 3 17, Shurnsly, Oleksander, 358-59 SERB, SERB, 148 148 Shufl1sl -y, Oleksander, 358-59 Sakharov,Andrei, Andrei, 22,312,317, 320, 322-36 SHVEYTSARETS (Erik (Erik Serdinov,Eduard EduardMihailovich, Mihailovich, Serdinov, 320,322-36 SHVEYTSARETS Sakharovsl -y, Aleksandr Kessler),84 84 324 Kessler), Sakharovsly, Aleksandr 324 Mikhailovich, 1 83, 356, Sidak,Valentin Valentin Antonovich, 473 v., Serebrov, Mikhailovich, 174, 174,183,356, Serebrov,N. N. V., 422 422 Sidak, Antonovich, 473 376, 4 1 1 , 443 SIGINT, 95-96, 95-96,103,118,143, Serebryans~, YakovIsaakovich Isaakovich Serebryansky, Yakov SIGINT, 103, 1 18, 143, 376,411,443 Sakharovsky, Igor Aleksandrovich, 178,205,206,218,337-54 (Yasha),41, 41,69-73,75,76, (Yasha), 69-73, 75, 76, Sakharovsky, Igor Aleksandrovich, 178, 205, 206, 218, 337-54 471 SILIN (Gennadi (GennadiTitov), Titov), 414 85-86 471 85-86 SILIN 414 SAKS company SILVER,148 148 SERGEI SERGE1 (Roland (Roland Lyudvigovich Lyudvigovich SAKS (British (Britishaircraft aircraft company SILVER, employee), Silverman,George, George, 104 Abbiate), 79, 124-25, Abbiate),75, 75,79,124-25, employee),413 413 Silverman, 104 Salgovic, 257, 265 143 SalgoviE,Viliam, Viliam, 257,265 Silvermaster,Nathan Nathan Gregory? 143 Silvermaster, Gregory, Samolis, Tatyana, 1 SERGEYEV(West (WestGerman German 110,111,129,142 SERGEYEV Samolis, Tatyana, 1 1 10, 1 1 1 , 129, 142 SANCHO Communist), Communist),438 438 SANCHO (Guinean (Guinean embassy embassy Simon,John, John,46, 46,50,54,55,80 Simon, 50, 54, 55, 80 employee), Sergeyev, Simon,Kurt, Kurt,449 449 employee),342-43 342-43 Sergeyev,N. N. D., D., 382 382 Simon,

I n d ex x I
SIMONOV(Archbishop (Archbishop SIMONOV Kiprian),493 493 Kiprian), SIMSON (Julius (Julius Steiner), Steiner), 444 SIMSON 444 SINDIKAT (deception (deception SINDIKAT operation), 33-34, 33-34,42 operation), 42 Sinitsyn,Yeo Ye. G., G., 264, 264,265 Sinitsyn, 265 Sinyavski,Andrei Andrei (Abram Tertz), Sinyavski, (Abram Tertz), 307-11 307-11 Siqueros,David David Alfaro, 86,87 Siqueros, Alfaro, 86, 87 SIRA operation, operation,158 158 SIRA SIROTA (Donald (DonaldMaclean), Maclean), 57-63,65,66,82-84,85,90, 57-63, 65, 66, 82-84, 85, 90, 105,119,126,138-39, 105, 1 19, 126, 138-39, 154-55,157-59,160,169 154-55, 157-59, 160, 169 SIS (British (BritishSecret Secret Intelligence SIS Intelligence Service), 1, 1,14,16,17,46,83, Service), 14, 16, 17, 46, 83, 90,113,119-20,125-26, 90, 113, 1 1 9-20, 125-26, 140,155,160,339-41, 140, 155, 160, 339-41, 398-400 398-400 SKIF (Karo (Karo Huseinjyan), Huseinjyan),193 193 SKIF Skoblin, Nikolai, Nikolai, 75 Skoblin, 75 SKP (Suomen (Suomen Kommunistenen Kommunistenen SKP Poulue), 276, 276,278-79,280, Poulue), 278-79, 280, 285 285 Slipyj,Josyf, Josyf, 499,502 Slipyj, 499, 502 Slovikowski,Jan, Jan, 512 Slovikowski, 512 Slutsky,Abram AbramAronovich, Aronovich, 4550, Slutsky, 45, 50, 80-81 80-81 Smagin, Aleksandr, Aleksandr,435 435 Smagin, Sbpionam), SMERSH (Smert Shpionam), 134-36 134-36 Smirnov, 72 72 Smirnov, Smith, Smith, Michael John, 421-24,435 421-24, 435 Smith, Walter WalterBedell, Bedell, 160 160 WilliamFrench, French, 239 Smith, William 239 Smolka, ? , 84 Smolka, H. I P., SmoUett, Peter,84,120 Smollett, Peter, 84, 120 Soares, Mirio, 283 Soares, Mario, Sobell, Helen, Helen,171 Sobell, 171 Sobell, Morton,171,173 Sobell, Morton, 171, 173 SOBOLEV, 518 518 Soboloff, DavidSemenovich, Semenovich, 166 Soboloff, David 166 Social-Democratic National National Labor Union Union(NTS), 358, 359,361-62 359, 361-62 Society for forCultural Cultural Relations, Relations, 115 Society for forOperational OperationalResearch, Research, 350 350 SOHNCHEN (Kim Philby), Philby), 21, 21, 57,58-60,62,65,66-67, 57, 58-60, 62, 65, 66-67, 83-84,85,90,113,119-20, 83-84, 85, 90, 1 13, 1 19-20, 125-26,139,154-61,203, 125-26, 139, 154-61, 203, 339,341,398,399,415, 339, 341, 398, 399, 415, 417-19 417-19 SOKOL (David Soboloff), Soboloff), 166 166 Sokolov, GeorgiAleksandrovich, Aleksandrovich, Sokolov, Georgi 143 143 Solidarity, 22,451,514-16,521, Solidarity, 22, 451 , 514-16, 521, 522,525-27,529-30, 522, 525-27, 529-30, 532-34,539,542 532-34, 539, 542 Solomatin, BorisAleksandrovich, Aleksandrovich, Solomatin, Boris 205,210,240,298 205, 210, 240, 298 Solonitsyn, YuriMikhailovich, Mikhailovich, Solonitsyn, Yuri 427 427 Solovyev, Solovyev, 81 81

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69 97 7 6
State thethe Revolution, The The Stateand and Revolution,

Solzhenitsyn,Aleksandr, Aleksandr, 10-11, Solzhenitsyn, 10-11, 311-12,313,316,317-21, 31 1-12, 313, 316, 317-21, 324,333,469-70 324, 333, 469-70 SomozaDebayle, Debayle, Anastasio, 386 Somoza Anastasio, 386 SONYA, 115,116,127,397 SONY A, 115, 116, 127, 397 Sorensen,Theodore, Theodore, 180-82,211 Sorensen, 180-82, 211 Sorge,Richard, Richard, 36,43,93,95, 36, 43, 93, 95, Sorge, 281,439 281, 439 Sotskov,L. L. F., F., 241 241 Sotskov, South Mrica, Africa, 428 South 428 SovietWriter's Writer'sUnion, Union, Soviet 44 Spain Spain Partido Comunista Comunista de deEspana Espaiia Partido (PCE), 297, 297,300-303,306 (PCE), 300-303, 306 Spanish Civil Civil War, 63,64,65, Spanish War, 63, 64, 65, 67, 72-74, 83, 86-87, 99, 67,72-74,83,86-87,99, 131,147,162,300,301,358, 131, 147, 162, 300, 301, 358, 439 439 Special Operations OperationsExecutive Executive Special (SO E), 90, 127 (SOE), 90,127 Spedding, David, David, 418 Spedding, 418 speransky, V. V. 1., I., 34, 34,41 Speransky, 41 Sperry-Rand (UNIV (UNIVAC), 186, Sperry-Rand AC), 186, 187,348 187, 348 SPIRT operation, operation, 235 235 SPIRT SPLASH operation, operation, 385 385 SPLASH SPRINTER (Canadian resident), resident), 218 218 Spy dust dust(metka), (metka),185 185 Spy S&T (scientific (scientific and andtechnology technology S&T intelligence), 127,128,131, intelligence), 127, 128, 131, 132,186-89,190-91, 132, 1 86-89, 190-91, 215-22, 348, 350-51, 215-22,348,350-51, 413-14,420,457-58, 413-14, 420, 457-58, 474-75 474-75 Stakhov, Petr, Petr, 32-33 32-33 Stalin, Joseph Joseph(Joseph (Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili), Dzhugashvili), 2,38,40-41, 2, 38, 40-41, 43,54,55,65-66,68-73,82, 43, 54, 55, 65-66, 68-73, 82, 86-88,92-95,107-8, 86-88, 92-95, 107-8, 111-12,118-19,131, 1 1 1-12, 1 1 8-19, 131, 133-36,145,356-57 133-36, 145, 356-57 Great Terror, 21-22, 21-22,23,26-27, 23, 26-27, 28,39,42,68,72,76,77,80, 28, 39, 42, 68, 72, 76, 77, 80, 91,93,163 91, 93, 163 Stalinism, 3, 3,38-39 38-39 Stallmann, Rudolf, Rudolf,47 Stalnov, BorisKonstantinovich, Konstantinovich, Stalnov, Boris 422-23 422-23 Stanford University Stanf ord University for Strategy Centre for Strategy and and Research, 202 Research, 202 STAR (SavilleSax), STAR (Saville Sax), 128-29,131 128-29, 131 STARIK (aeronauticaldesign design ST ARIK (aeronautical engineer), 413 413 STARIK (Leon Trotsky), Trotsky),17, ST ARIK (Leon 25-26,39,40-41,68-69,72, 25-26, 39, 40-41, 68-69, 72, 76,86-88,162 76, 86-88, 162 STANK scientist), ST ARIK (research (research scientist), 186 186 STARSHINA (Harro Schulze SchulzeST ARSHINA (Harro Boysen), 92,93,102 92, 93, 102 Boysen), START (oilpipeline), pipeline), 363 START (oil 363 Stashinsky, Bodgan,361-62, 361-62,367, Stashinsky, Bodgan, 367, 370 370

(Lenin), (Lenin), 29 29 State the StateArchive Archiveof of the Russian Russian Federation, Federation, 28 28 State State Committee Committeefor for Science Scienceand and Technology Technology (GKNT), (GKNT),219 219 Statute Statute of of limitations limitations for for espionage, espionage,18 18 Steen, Steen, Reiulf, Reiulf,329 329 STEFAN STEFAN (Arnold (Arnold Deutsch), Deutsch),43, 43, 55-65, 78-79, 81, 281 55-65,78-79,81,281 Steiner, 444 Steiner,Julius, Julius, 444 Steinway, Steinway, 194-95 194-95 Stennes, 9494 Stennes,Walter, Walter, STEP 413, STEP (laboratory (laboratoryassistant), assistant), 413, 420 420 STEPAN, STEPAN, 476 476 Stephenson, Stephenson,William, William,110 110 Stern, Stern, Alfred Alfred Kaufman, Kaufman,106 106 Stern, Stern, Martha Martha Dodd, Dodd, 106 106 Sternyuk, Sternyuk, Archbishop ArchbishopVolodymyr, Volodymyr, 503 503 STERVY ATNIK (Josip STERWATNIK (Josip Tito), Tito), 356-57 356-57 Stirner, Stirner, Eleanore, Eleanore,149 149 Stockwood, 426 Stockwood,Mervyn, Mervyn, 426 Stoessel, 347 Stoessel,Walter, Walter, 347 STOIC STOIC (Latin (Latin American American diplomat), diplomat), 209 209 271, 444 Stoph, Willi, Stoph, Wd i , 271,444 Stoyanov, 389 Stoyanov,Dimitar, Dimitar,388, 388,389 Stoyova, Stoyova, Vesselina, Vesselina,388 388 Straight, 105, 106, Straight, Michael, Michael,64, 64,105,106, 109 109 Strangers on a Brid ge (Donovan), (Donovan), Bridge 175 175 Strauss, Franz-Jose6 Franz-Josef, 456 456 Straws, STRELA (AledEdith (Alex/Edith Tudor Tudor STRELA Hart), 58 58 Hart), tride T oward Freedom (King), 290 stride Toward Freedom (King), 290 Strougal, Lubomir, 263, 264, Strougal, Lubomir,254, 254,263,264, 266 266 SUAREZ (Colombian SUAREZ (Colombianjournalist), journalist), 208 208 Suarez, Adolfo, Adolfo, 300, 302 Suirez, 300,302 Sub as, Ivan, Ivan, 113 1 13 Sub& SUBJECT 110,393 110, 393 SUBJECT Sudoplatov, Pavel Anatolyevich, Sudoplatov, Pave1 Anatolyevich, 86, 97 86,97 SUKHOV A, 478-79 SUKHOVA, 478-79 Sullivan, William C., 236 236 Sullivan, WilliamC., Suomen Kommunistinen Suomen KommunistinenPoulue Poulue (SKP), 276,278-79,280, 276, 278-79, 280, (SKP), 285 285 Supreme Headquarters Supreme HeadquartersAllied Allied Expeditionary Force Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), 126-27 126-27 (SHAEF), Supreme Military Supreme Military Council Council

( Vysshaya Voyskovaya Rada; (Yyssshaya Voyskovaya Rada; VVR), 32-33 W R ) , 32-33 Surits, Yacov, Y acov, 77-78 Surits, 77-78 Suschitsky, Edith, Edith, 58 58 Suschitsky, Suslov, 352 Suslov, 352 Suslov Commission, Suslov Commission, 524 524 Sutterlin, Heinz, Heinz, 445-46 445-46 Sutterlin, SUZA, 476 SUZA, 476

In dex
SVR nezhney SVR (Sluzhba (SlzrzAda V fizezhmy Razvedki), , 9, 13, 21, R,1zatdJi),1 1,9, 13, 19, 19,21, 34, 55, 246, 354 34,55,246,354 SVY ASHCHENIK, 168, SVYASHCHENIK, 168,408 408 SWEDE SWEDE (aero-engine (aero-engine specialist), specialist), 42 42 1 1 Sweden, 353,442 353, 442 Sweden, Sweeny, Sweeny,Charles, Charles,169 169 Swinton, Swinton, Ernest, Ernest,80 80 Switzerland, 365, 371-72 Switzerland,353, 353,365,371-72 Sykes, Sykes, R. R.A., A.,71 71 Symonds, Symonds,John, John, 428-32 428-32 SYNOK 1 , 57, (Kim Philby), Philby), 2 21,57, SYNOK (Kim 58-60, 62, 65, 66-67, 83-84, 58-60,62,65,66-67,83-84, 85,90,113,119-20,125-26, 85, 90, 1 13, 1 19-20, 125-26, 139,154-61,203,339,341, 139, 154-61 , 203, 339, 341, 398,399,415,417-19 398, 399, 415, 417-19 SYNOK SYNOK (youngest (youngestWestern Western recruit), 415-16 415-16 recruit), Syroyezhkin,Grigori, Grigori, 34,35 Syroyezhkin, 34, 35 Syroyezhkin, Grigori Grigori Sergeevich, Sergeevich, Syroyezhkin, 33 33 System Planning Planning Corporation Corporation System (SPC), 350-51 350-51 (SPC),

/
Tverdokhlebov, Tverdokhlebov,Andrei, Andrei,312 312 Tyshchuk, Tyshchuk, Arkadi ArkadiRodionovich, Rodionovich, 498 498 UCHITEL, 480, 481 UCHITEL, 480,481 UDBA, UDBA, 357 357 Ukrainian Ukrainian Catholic Catholic Church, Church, 499-503 499-503 UKUSA UKUSA Security SecurityAgreement Agreement ( 1 948), 351 (1948), 351 Ulbricht, 247, 271, Ulbricht, Walter, Walter,174, 174,247,271, 453 453 ULEY ULEY (beehive), (beehive),365 365 Ulmann, 461-62, 464, 471 Ulmann, Andre, AndrC, 461-62,464,471 ULTRA, 118,120,126,337 UL TRA, 1 1 8, 120, 126, 337 Ulyanov, 27. see Ulyanov,Vladimir VladimirIlyich, Ilyich, 27. see nlso Lenin, Lenin, V. V. 1. also UMNITSA (Elizabeth (Elizabeth Bentley), Bentley), UMNITSA 110,129-30,142-43,144, 1 10, 129-30, 142-43, 144, 147-48, 163-64 14748,163-54 Union Carbide, Carbide, 1 186 Union 86 Union for Union of ofthe theStruggle Struggle for Liberation of Peoples of Liberation of the the Peoples of Russia (SBONR), (SBONR). 149 149 Russia Union Treaty, Treaty,393 393 Union United United Fruit Fruit Company, Company,385 385 United Nations, Nations, 7, 7,207-9 United 207-9 United 104-13, 1 14, United States, States, 42, 42,104-13,114, 117-18,122,127-32,150. 1 17-18, 122, 127-32, 150, 162-75 , 176-89, 279-80, 162-75,17649,279-80, 337,343-45,346,347-49, 337, 343-45, 346, 347-49, 350-5 1, 353 350-51,353 Communist Party Partyof of the the United United Communist States (CPUSA), (CPUSA),108,110. States 108, 1 1 0, 122,148,164,226,236-37, 122, 148, 164, 226, 236-37, 279-80,287-93 279-80, 287-93 Unrau, Ivan IvanDmitryevich, Dmitryevich, 449 Unrau, 449 UN UN Refugees Refugees Commission, Commission, 168 168 Unshlikht, Iosif IosifStanislavovich, Unshlikht, Stanislavovich, 30 30 Urban, 542 Urban, Jerzy, Jerzy, 542 Uritsky, 26 Uritsky, Moisei Moisei Solomonovich, Solomonovich, 26 USACH (Brookhaven (BrookhavenNational National USACH Laboratory employee), employee),1 86 186 Laboratory Usatov, Mikhail, iVIikhail,388 Usatov, 388 USSR at n tW FV ~ T(film), (film), 120 120 USSR ar Ustinov, Dmitri, Dmitri, 203, 203,214, 352, Ustinov, 214, 352, 381,390,522 3 8 1 , 390, 522 U 290, 291, 345 I J Thant, Thant, 207, 207,290,291,345 UTKA (Trotsk (Trotsky assassination UTKA ), assassination plot), plot), 86-88 86-88

TAFFY (Andrew (AQdrew Revoi), TAFFY Revoi), 8484 TAKSIM (Etienne (Etienne Manac'h), Manach),152 152 TAKSIM Tanaka, Gi-ishi, Gi-ishi,37-38 37-38 Tanaka, TANOV, 273 273 TANOV, TANOV TANOV (Anatoli (Anatoli Tonkonog), Tonkonog), 3 310 10 TAN OVA (Yelena TANOVA (Yelena Fyodorova), Fyodorova), 310 3 10 TANYA (Kira (KiraChertenko), Chertenko),477 477 TANYA Tarasov, Tarasov, Lev, Lev, 124 124 TASS, 2, 2,124,418 TASS, 124, 418 Tatuzov, Ydimovich, 343 Tatuzov, Yuri Yuri Yefimovich, 343 Tehran Conference Conference (1943), (1943). Tehran 11 1-12 1 1 1-12 TELON, 474 474 TELON, TEMNY (Vaclav (Vaclav Cerny), Cerny).254-55 254-55 TEMNY TEODOR (Pacheco (PachecoJose JosC TEODOR Castelo), Castelo), 74 74 TERENTY (Czech agent),442 442 TERENTY (Czech agent), TERMIT-P (intercept station), TERMIT-P (intercept station), 349 349 Texas Instruments, Instruments, 1 187,218 Texas 87, 2 1 8 Thatcher, Margaret, Margaret,392, 392,423-24, Thatcher, 423-24, 428 428 THEO 59, T H E 0 (Teodor (Teodor Maly), Maly),48, 48,59, 63-65,67,78,79,81,83,91 63-65, 67, 78, 79, 8 1 , 83, 9 1 Thieme, Gerhard, Gerhard, 449 439 Thieme, Thompson, E. E. P., I ? , 232 232 Thompson, Thorn-EM1 Defense Thorn_EMI Defense Electronics, Electronics, 423,435 423, 435 Three Musketeers, Musketeers, 62-63 62-63 Three Thyssen, Thyssen, 458 158 Tiebel, Erwin, Erwin, 439 439 Tiebel, Tiedge, Hans-Joachim, Hans-Joachim, 45 451 Tiedge, 1 Time, 15 Time, 15 Tischner, Jdzef, 512 512 Tischner,J6zef. Tishkov, Arseni ArseniVasilyevich Vasilyevich Tishkov, (Timofeyev), (Timofevev).356 356 Tito. Josip (Josip (JAsipBroz), Broz), 127,270, Tito,Josip 127, 270, 355-58 355-58 Titoist conspiracies, conspiracies, 1-2, 1-2,247 Titoist 247

310 3 10 TONY (Anthony (Anthony Blunt), Blunt),5 57,58, TONY 7 , 58, 59,63-65,79,80,85,90-91, 59, 63-65, 79, 80, 85, 90-9 1 , 119-20,126-27,158,160, 1 19-20, 126-27, 158, 160, 281 281 T O P 0 (typist), (typist), 277, 277,476 TOPO 476 T oure, Sekou, Toure, Sekou,244 244 Toye, Toye, Eleanor, Eleanor,34 34 Toynbee, Toynbee, Philip, Philip, 154 154 Trade Union UnionCouncil, Council,5 5 Trade Treaty of ofVersailles, Versailles, 54 Treaty 54 Trepper, Leopold, Leopold,92, 92,102 Trepper, 102 TREST (deception (deception operation), operation), TREST 33,34-35,42 33, 34-35, 42 TREZOR operation, operation, 368, 368,369 TREZOR 369 TREZUBET TREZUBET (cache), (cache), 365 365
Trio/ Begins, Brgins, The TAe Trial

Titov, Titov, Gennadi GennadiFedorovich, Fedorovich, 414, 414, 427 427 Titov, 427 Titov, Igor IgorViktrovich, Viktrovich, 427 TKACHEV TKACHEV (Eduard (Eduard Serdinov), Serdinov), 324 324 Todman, 342 Todman, Terence, Terence, 342 Togliatti, Togliatti, Palmiro, Palmiro,277 277 Tolkavhev, 220 Tolkavhev,Adolf, Adolf, 220 Tolson, Tolson, Clyde, Clyde, 235 235 Tolstoy, 44 Tolstoy,Aleksei, Aleksci, 44 Tolstoy, Tolstoy, Sergei, Sergei,95 95 TOM TOM (British (British journalist), journalist),420 420 Tomsk ),, 72 Tomsky, 72 Tonkonog, Anatoli AnatoliAndreyevich, Andreyevich, Tonkonog,

(Tertz/Sinyavski), (TertdSinyavski), 307-8 307-5 Tribune Group, Group, 403 403 Tribune Trilisser,Mikhail Mikhail Abramovich, Trilisser, Abramovich, 3 1 31, , 40,42 40, 42 TROP (Argonne National National TROP (Argonne Laboratory researcher), researcher),215 215 Laboratory Trotsky,Leon, Leon,17, 17,25-26,39, Trotsky, 25-26, 39, 40-41,68-69,71,72,86-88, 40-41, 68-69, 7 1 , 72, 86-88, 124,162,442 124, 162, 442 Trudeau, Pierre, Pierre,192, 192,198,378 Trudeau, 198, 378 Truman, Harry HarryS, S, 109-10, 109-10,142, Truman, 142, 143-44, 163, 164 14344,163,144 Trusevich, Georgi GeorgiLeonidovich, Leonidovich, Trusevich, 398 398 Trushnovich, Aleksandr, Aleksandr, 361 Trushnovich, 361 TRW TRW Corporation, Corporation, 215-17 215-17 Tsarev, 0 Oleg, 20 leg, 20 Tsarev, Tserpitsky, 490 Tserpitsky, Nikolai NikolaiLvovich, Lvovich, 490 Tseyrov,Vitali VitaliYevgenovich, Yevgenovich, 398 Tseyrov, 398 Tsimbal, M. M. S., Tsimbal, S.. 152 152 Tsvigun, Tsvigun, Semyon Semyon Konstantinovich,264-65 264-65 Konstantinovich, Tsymbal, Stepanovich, 340 Tsymbal,Mikhail Mikhail Stepanovich, 340 TUBE ALLOYS ALLOYS project, project,1 115, TUBE 15, 116,118,397-98 1 16, 1 18 , 397-98 TULIP (Mark (Mark Zborowski), Zborowski), 69-71 69-71 TULIP Turtek, Julius, Julius, 266 266 Turcek, Alan, 96 96 Turing, Alan, Turing, TURIST, 482, 482,483 TURIST, 483 Turkestan, 85 Turkestan, 1 185 Turkey, 138-39, 138-39,140,377,394-96 Turkey, 140, 377, 394-96 Tursevich, Galina GalinaKonstaninova, Konstaninova, Tursevich, 397 397 Tutyunnik, Yurko, Yurko,32-33 32-33 Tutyunnik, TVEN TVEN (Semen (Semen Semenov), Semenov),107 107

VADIM (Anatoli Gorsky), Gorsky),83, 83,84, 84, V ADIM (Anatoli 85,90,113,114,118,124, 85, 90, 1 13, 1 14, 1 1 8, 124, 130,132,142-43 130, 1 32, 142-43 VAL VAL (Momo (Momo Jurovic), Jurovik),357 357 VALDAY (money-transfer V ALDAY (money-transfer operation), 289, 292 operation), 288, 288,289,292 Valoushek, Valoushek,Dalibar, Dalibar,191-92, 191-92, 195-99 195-99 Valoushek,Nina, Nina,192 192 Valoushek, Vance, 1 1-12, 241-42, Vance,Cyrus, Cyrus,2 211-12,241-42, 348,352,456 348, 352, 456 Vansittart, Robert, Robert,48 48 Vansittart, VlZNYA (Czech agent), agent),442 442 VA.NY A (Czech Vasek, Miroslav, Miroslav,274 274 Vasek,

In d dex x
VASILI (GeorgiArbatov), Arbatov), V ASILI (Georgi 211-12,213 211-12, 213 Geli Federovich, Federovich,309 309 Vasillyev, Geli Vasilyev, P. F ! 1., I., 498 498 Vasilyev, Vassall,John, John, 203,400-401,407 Vassall, 203, 400-401 , 407 Vater, Clara, Clara,248 248 Vater, Vatican, the, the, 500-503 500-503 Vatican, Vaupshasov,Stanislav Stanislav Vaupshasov, Alekseyevich, 74 74 Alekseyevich, VAZHDUH (Josop Kopinic), KopiniC), V AZHDUH (Josop 355 355 Velychkovsky,Archbishop ArchbishopVasyl, Vasyl, Velychkovsky, 499,501,502,503 499, 501, 502, 503 VENETSIANKA, 476 476 VENONA project, project, 143-44, 143-44,155, 155, 157,163,165,337 157, 163, 165, 337 (KGBpolice police VENTZEYEV (KGB agent), 278 278 agent), VERA, 430, 430,431 VERA, 431 VERA (Mary (MaryMatrosian), Matrosian), 342 VERA 342 Verzhbitsky, Feliks Feliks Verzhbitsky, Klementyevich, 100-101 100-101 Klementyevich, VESNA (intercept (interceptpost), post), 348 VESNA 348 VESTNIK (Le (LeMonde), Monde),469-70 469-70 Vetrov, Dmitri Kirillovich, Kirillovich,262 262 Vetrov, Vetrov,Mikhail MikhailSergeyevich, Sergeyevich, 441 Vetrov, 441 Vetrov,Vladimir Vladimir Ippolitovich, Vetrov, Ippolitovich, 218,475,481 218, 475, 481 Vietnam, 349 349 Vietnam, Vietnam War, War, 466 Vietnam 466 (Yeltsin),246 246 (Yeltsin), (ReinoHayhanen), Hayhanen),157, 157,171, VIK (Reino 171, 172-73,19596,280,367, 172-73, 195-96, 280, 367, 370 VIKTOR, 176 176 VIL (Union (Union Carbide Carbide employee), employee), VIL 186 186 382 VINT operation, 382 VIR (CIA offker), officer), 380-81 380-81 VIRGINIA (Yulia Gorankova), (Yulia Gorankova), 366 VIRTANEN (Olavi (OlaviAhman), Ahman), 280 VITOS (director in inLatvian Latvian Academy of ofSciences), Sciences), 217 217 Vivian, Valentine, Valentine, 51-52 51-52 VIZIR (Cyrus (Cyrus Vance), 211-12 211-12 VLADELET (Russian-born agent), 363 363 VLADIMIR, 448-49 448-49 VLADIMIR (Nikolai Tserpitsky), Tserpitsky), 490 VLADIMIROV (Radimir Bogdanov), 211 Bogdanov), 211 VLAS, 272-73 272-73 Vlasov, Andrei, 149,461 149, 461 Vogel, Wolfgang, 453 V ogel, Wolfgang, 453 Volga German German Autonomous Autonomous Region, 101 101 Volkov, Konstantin Dmitrievich, Dmitrievich, 138-39,140,141 138-39, 140, 141 VOLUNTEER (Morris Cohen), 9,131,147-48 9, 131, 147-48 Voronin, Yuri YuriNikolayevich, Nikolayevich, 383, 383, 412-13 412-13 Viewfiom Kremlin,The The View from the Kremlin,

/ /

699
Wilson, 404-5, 425, Wilson, Harold, Harold, 403, 403,4044,425, 456 456 Winter 279 Winter War War (1939), (1939), 279 Wohlgemuth, gang, 440 Wohlgemuth, Wolf Wolfgang, 440 Wojtyla, 508-16 Wojtyla, Karol, Karol,269, 269,508-16 Wolf, Louis, Louis,233-34 233-34 Wolf, Wolf, Johannes (Mischa), Wolf, Markus Markus Johannes (Mischa), 361, 437, 443-45, 451, 452, 361,437,443-45,451,452, 453, 457, 459 453,457,459 Wolisch, Reif; Wolisch,Max Max(Ignati (Ignati Reif; MARR), 5 59,62,83 9 , 62, 8 3 MARR), Wollweber, 247-48 Wollweber,Ernst, Ernst, 73, 73,247-48 Woodfield, Woodfield, Bill, Bill,113 113 WorkersPopular Popular Socialist Party, Workers' Socialist Party, 26 26 World Council Councilof of Churches World Churches (WCC), 496-97 (WCC), 487-93, 487-93,496-97 World Championship World Ice IceHockey Hockey Championship (1969), 274 (1969), 262, 262,274 World World Peace Peace Council Council(WPC), (WPC), 341, 427, 433, 484-85, 486, 341,427,433,484-85,486, 491 491 World World War WarII. 11.see Great Great Patriotic Patriotic War War (1941-1945) (1941-1945) Wormwood 409, 411 Wormwood Scrubs, Scrubs,400, 400,409,411 Wrangel, 33 Wrangel, Peter, Peter,33 Wright, Peter, Peter, 405 405 Wright, Wyzynski, 519 WyzjrIlski,Stefan, Stefan,509, 509,519 Yagoda, 2, Yagoda, Genrikh Genrikh Grigoryevich, Grigoryevich,2, 23, 72, 80 23,72,80 Y AK Gournalist), YAK (journalist), 326 326 Yakhontov, Yakhontov,General, General,33 33 Yakimov, Oleg Aleksandrovich, Yakimov, Oleg Aleksandrovich, 420 420 Yakir, Pyotr, Yakir, Pyotr,313-17 313-17 Yakovlev (Anatoli 132, Yakovlev (AnatoliYatskov), Yatskov), 132, 223 Yakovlev, A. A. S., 118 Yakovlev, S., 118 Yakovlev, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, Nikolayevich, 286, 332, 542-43 286,332,542-43 328 Yakovlev, Nikolai, 326, 326,328 Yakovleva, Galina Vladimirovna, Yakovleva, Galina Vladimirovna, 179-80 179-80 496 Yakunin, Gleb, Gleb,491-93, 491-93,496 Yakushev, Aleksandr, 34 Yakushev, Aleksandr, 34 Yakushkin, Dmitri Dmitri Ivanovich, Ivanovich, 233 Yakushkin, 233 Yalta Conference Yalta Conference (1945), (1945),133-34 133-34 Yanayev, Gennadi, Gennadi, 393-94 Yanayev, 393-94 Yankelevich, Efrem, Yankelevich, Efrem,327 327 Yatskov, Anatoli Antonovich, 132 Yatskov, Anatoli Antonovich, 132 Yazov, Dmitri, Dmitri, 393-94 393-94 Yazov, YEFIMOV, 308 YEFIMOV, 308 YEFRAT (Ashot 477 YEFRAT (AshotAkopyan), Akopyan), 477 YEFREMOV (Aleksandr YEFREMOV (Aleksandr Kunosenko), 285-86 285-86 Kunosenko), Yegorov, Alexei, Yegorov, Alexei,393 393 YELENA (Anna (Anna Federovna), YELENA Federovna), 168 168 Yeltsin, Boris, 13, 246, 287, 394, Yeltsin, Boris,13,246,287,394, 41 1 411 Yemen, 349 349 Yemen, YERMAKOV (Arkadi YERMAKOV (ArkadiGuk), Guk), 432-34 432-34 Yermolev, G. M., 420 420 Yermolov, Vasili 75 Yermolov, VasiliIvanovich, Ivanovich,75 Yerofeyev, Ivan Ivan Alekseyevich, Yerofeyev, Alekseyevich,282 282

VORONOV (Arkadi (Arkadi VORONOV Rodionovich),498 498 Rodionovich), Ydi, 475 475 Vorontsev,Yuli, Vorontsev, VOSTOK operation, operation,381-82, 381-82,385 VOSTOK 385 Voynovich,Vladimir, Vladimir, 44-45 Voynovich, 44-45 V oytetsky, Igor 366, Voytetsly, IgorVitalyevich, Vitalyevich, 366, 368,375,378 368, 375, 378 Voytetsky,Vitali Vitali Voytetsky, Panteleymonovich(Emil (Emil Panteleymonovich Evraert), 366 366 Evraert), VOZDUKH project, project, 1118 VOZDUKH 18 (Military-Industrial VPK (Military-Industrial Commission), 186-88, 186-88,217, Commission), 217, 474 W R( (vysrhaya Vyskovaya Rada; VVR JiYsshaya Voyskovaya Rada; Supreme Military MilitaryCouncil), Council), Supreme 32-33 32-33 Vyshinsky,Andrei, Andrei,145, 145,162-63 Vyshinsky, 162-63 Wadleigh, Julian, Julian,104 104 Wadleigh, WMSE (Donald Maclean), Maclean), W AISE (Donald 57-63,65,66, 57-63, 65, 66, 82-84,85,90, 82-84, 85, 90, 105,119,126,138-39, 105, 1 19, 126, 138-39, 154-55,157-59,160,169 154-55, 157-59, 160, 169 Waldheim, Kurt, Kurt,207 207 Waldheim, Waldron, Francis Francis S. S. (Eugene (Eugene Waldron, Dennis), 108 108 Dennis), Walker, John John Anthony, Anthony,205-6, 205-6, Walker, 344 344 Wallace, Henry, Henry, 109-10 109-10 Wallace, Walsa, Lech, Lech,514-16, 514-16,519,520, Walsa, 519, 520, 526,529,532,534,535, 526, 529, 532, 534, 535, 539-40 539-40 WALTER (Heinz (Heinz Siitterlein), Sutterlein), WALTER 445-46 445-46 Warren Commission, 226, 229, 230 Warren Commission, 226,229,230 Warsaw Pact, Pact, 295,354,363,381, Warsaw 295, 354, 363, 381, 520, 523, 524, 530 520,523,524,530 WASP (Ruth Greenglass), Greenglass),128 128 W ASP (Ruth 230, 239, 346 Watergate scandal, scandal,230,239,346 Watkins, Alan, Alan,401 401 Watkins, WEEKEND (SIS operation), operation), 17 17 Wehner, Herbert, 452-54 452-54 Wehner, Weinstein, Moritz, Moritz, 38 Weinstein, Weisband, William, William,144,155 144, 155 Weizmann Institute, Institute, 353 353 Welles, Sumner, Sumner,105 105 WERNER WERNER (Wilhelm Kahle), 449-50 449-50 Werth, Alexander, 315 315 151 WEST, 151 West Germany, Germany,309,353,36665, 309, 353, 364-65, 392,437-59 392, 437-59 Westinghouse Electric, Electric,218 218 Whalen, William, 187 Whalen, William, 187 White, Harry Dexter, Dexter, 104,106, White, Harry 104, 106, 107,109,130,142 107, 109, 130, 142 White, Theodore, 194 194 White Army, 31 White Guards, Guards, 32,33,41,69,75, White 32, 33, 41, 69, 75, 318 318 Wienand, Karl, Karl,444, 444,452 452 Wilcott, and Elsie, Elsie, 233 Wileott, Jim and 233 Wildprett, Wolfgang, 361, 361,362 Wildprett, 362 WILLIAM (Line PR agent), 424-25 424-25

I de x Ind
YESAULENKO (losif YESAULENKO (Iosif PustoutOY), 496 Pustoutov), 489, 489,496 YEVDOKIMOV (Eduard YEVDOKIMOV (Eduard Kosloy), KosIov),412 412 YEVROPA operation, YEVROPA operation,305 305 Y eyseyev, Dmitri Yevseyev, Dmitri Gavrilovich, Gavrilovich,24 24 Y evstafeyev, Gennadi Gennadi Yevstafeyev, Makhaylovich, 207-8 Makhaylovich, 207-8 Yezhov, 2, 23, Yezhov, Nikolai Nikolai Ivanovich, Ivanovich,2,23, 72, 80-81, 452-53 72,8041,452-53 Young, Young, Andrew, Andrew,290-91 290-91 Yugoslavia, 247, 270, 355-59 Yugoslavia, 127, 127,247,270,355-59 YUNG YUNG (aeronautical/computer (aeronauticallcomputer engineer), 420 engineer), 413, 413,420 YUNG (lskhak YLJNG (Iskhak Akhmerov), Akhmerov), 104-6, 109-11, 1 18, 123, 104-6,109-11,118,123, 129, 132-34, 143, 148 129,132-34,143,148 YUZ (Ivan Morozov), Morozov), 106 106 W Z (Ivan Zabinski, Zabinski, Andrzej, Andrzej,525 525 Zaire, Zaire, 428 428 Zaitsev, 33, 216 Zaitsev, Lev LevSergeyevich, Sergeyevich, 33,216

70 00 0
Zhenikhov, Vladimir 3 Zhenikhov, VladimirVasilyevich, Vasilyevich, 3 Zhivkov, Todor, 297, 388-89 Zhivkov, Todor, 297,388-89 Zhizhin, Vyacheslav, Vyacheslav, 393 Zhizhin, 393 ZHORA (William ZHORA (William Weisband), Weisband), 144, 155 144,155 Zhukov, Yuri, 2, 103 Zhukov, Yuri,2,103 Ziegler, Philip, 425 Ziegler, Philip,405, 405,425 ZlMIN (Anatoli Zamuruyev), 432 ZIMIN (Anatoli Zamuruyev), 432 Zimmermann, Zimmermann, Phil, Phil, 353 353 ZINA ZINA (Valentina (Valentina Rush), Rush),368 368 Zinovyev, Grigori, 26, 72 Zinovyev, Grigori,24, 24,26,72 Zionist conspiracies, 19, Zionist conspiracies,1-2, 1-2,19, 224-25, 247, 272, 324, 325, 224-25,247,272,324,325, 469, 473 469,473 ZOLUSHKA (Elizabeth ZOLUSHKA (Elizabeth Ghazarian), 339, 341-42 Ghazarian), 339,341-42 Zorin, Zorin, Valerian, Valerian,145 145 Zujovic, Zujovic, Streten, Streten, 357 357 Zujovic, Zujovik, Streten, Streten,356 356 ZVENO ZVENO (oil (oil pipeline), pipeline),375-76 375-76 ZVUK 110, 123, Z W K (Jacob (Jacob Golos), Golos), 110,123, 129 129

ZAK ZAK (KGB police police agent), agent),278 278 Zakharov, Zakharov,Aleksandr Aleksandr Demyanovich, Demyanovich,454 454 Zamoyska, Zamoyska, Helene, Htlkne, 308-9 308-9 Zamoysky, Lolly, 21 21 Zamoysky, Lo$, Zamuruyev, Zamuruyev,Anatoli AnatoliAlekseyevich, Alekseyevich, 432 432 Zarubin, Vasili Zarubin, Vasili Mikhailovich, Mikhailovich, 40, 40, 94, 107, 109-13, 122-24 94,107,109-13,122-24 Zarubina, Yulyevna, Zarubina, Yeuzaveta Yel'izaveta Yulyevna, 108 108 Zaytsev, Leonid 281 Zaytsev, Leonid Sergeevich, Sergeevich,281 Zborowski, 75-76 Zborowski, Mark, Mark,69-71, 69-71,75-76 ZEFlR (intercept ZEFIR (intercept post), post),348 348 Zelenin, General, 33 Zelenin, General,33 Zeman, Jaroslav, 263-64 Zeman, Jaroslav, 263-64 ZENIT ZENIT (Christopher (Christopher Boyce), Boyce), 216 216 ZHANGO, ZHANGO, 168 168 Zhdanov, Zhdanov, Andrei, Andrei,72 72 Zheleznov, Mikhaylovich, Zheleznov,Anatoli Anatoli Mikhaylovich, 343 343

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