Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Individual Factors:
1. Evacuation time and failure to evacuate appears to be associated with
disabilities. Individuals with health problems (e.g., obesity, asthma) and/or ?
poor physical condition were similarly disadvantaged. , . ^ A^a
2. The evacuation pace in stairwells was affected by disabled individuals. Vr'
3. Inappropriate/inadequate footwear and clothing reportedly increased time T7
to evacuate and even led to fatalities. ,.A f^1"^
4. Delaying evacuation to collect personaJJtemsandA3f-cQmplete work-
related tasksjjppearstphaye length^ed_eyacuation time> , ,
5. Remaining "calm and focused throughout the evacuation process ' •"*'
facilitated evacuation at both the group and individual levels.
6. Direct exposure (i.e., felt building shake, saw impact and/or fire) to the - x ^,
^ impact provided cues regarding the magnitude of the disaster and seems ft &
to have prompted decisions to evacuate. ^
7. Prior experience with building fires and other emergencies, including the oc
1993 WTC bombing, prompted rapid decision-making. ^
8. Lack of knowledge regarding the magnitude of destruction helped to
mipjmizejjanic.
. Groupleaders who emerged were often individuals with prior experience
ir){u" /} in emergency situations (e.g., EMS, military background).
/ r^ Xj^v Y 10. Lack of familiarity with the building layout apparently led to delays in the
a
vUV -p
AC \;
Nr o 'gjh 1. Lack of information and-direction delayed the initiation of employees'
evacuation process.
0^ 12. Employees were unaware of the length of time it would take to navigate
the stairs and evacuate the building.
13. Some employees in WTC 2 hesitated leaving immediately after the first
place struck out of concern over negative employment repercussions.
Organizational Factors:
1. Prior emergency training was generally cursory and almost exclusively
provided by the Port Authority of NY/NJ. Training by their employer was
„. - rarely provided. r=5 =r
V? y /'\. Fire drills were limited in scope; entry into stairwells rarely occurred.
J" \jL° 3. Knowledge of all 3 stairwell locations was limited, with even the most
v ^^/^ seasoned-employees unaware or airstairwell locations.
(y 4. Employees were not provided with orientation to the entire building,
including the location of all exit points leading out of the building.
5. Employees were not instructed on the safety features of elevators.
The WTC Evacuation Study February 1 9, 2004
Dr. Robyn Gershon
Principal Investigator
212-305-1186
Structural Factors:
1. Smoke and congestion in stairwells resulted in backtracking up stairs to
higher floors in search of other passable stairwells.
2. Debris from WTC 2 (South Tower) as it collapsed backed upjp^er level
niWJQJJj^£^h Tower), making a exit impossible and
fataities, i\A\. Stairwells at the lower floors (<20th floor) were smo
4. For security reasons, many stairwell doors exiting onto floors were kept
locked, thus making stairwell g^'tH-iing fjjffjriiit
5. Debris, water, smoke, and collapsed structured on lower levels impeded
street access.
6. Some cell phones and wireless devices remained operational, leading to
information sharing and, to a certain extent, spreading of rumors.