COURT CASES: 1876 SCOTUS - United States v.

Cruikshank was an important United States Supreme Court decision in United States constitutional law, one of the earliest to deal with the application of the Bill of Rights to state governments following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. ==== 1937 SCOTUS - De Jonge v. Oregon Holding -- The Oregon statute as applied to the particular charge as defined by the state court is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The judgment of conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. -- held that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies to freedom of assembly. The Court found that Dirk De Jonge had the right to organize a Communist Party and to speak at its meetings, even though the party advocated industrial or political change in revolution. However, in the 1950s with the fear of communism on the rise the Court ruled in Dennis v. United States (1951) that Eugene Dennis, who was the leader of the Communist Party, violated the Smith Act by advocating the forcible overthrow of the United States government. ==== 1939 SCOTUS - HAGUE V CIO Holding -- The Court held that Hague's ban on political meetings violated the First Amendment right to freedom of assembly, and so the ordinances were void. ==== 1940 SCOTUS - Thornhill v. Alabama Holding The free speech clause protects speech about the facts and circumstances of a labor dispute. ==== 1941 SCOTUS - Cox v. New Hampshire (keywords: sidewalk,) although the government cannot regulate the contents of speech, it can place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on speech for the public safety. Also, that every parade or procession on public streets had to have a license and organizers had to pay a fee.

==== 1951 SCOTUS - Kunz v. New York A New York City ordinance, which required a street preacher to obtain a permit from the police, was deemed void by the Supreme Court. According to the Courts opinion, such an ordinance gave administrative persons discretionary power to control the speech and assembly rights of others. This is a clear violation of prior restraint on the rights set forth in the First Amendment. ==== 1963 SCOTUS - Edwards v. South Carolina Holding State governments must protect First Amendment rights through the Fourteenth Amendment. -That the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution forbade state government officials to force a crowd to disperse when they are otherwise legally marching in front of a state house. ==== 1965 SCOTUS - Cox v. Louisiana case based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It held that a state government cannot employ "breach of the peace" statutes against protesters engaging in peaceable demonstrations that may potentially incite violence. ==== 1966 SCOTUS - Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 HOLDING -- Because a jail facility is not a public forum and a state may regulate the use of its property, the First Amendment rights of the protesters were not violated. ==== 1969 SCOTUS - Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham it applied to the enforcement of an officer's order in directing vehicular traffic. -- HOLDING -The Court held that (1) even though the actual construction of 1142 of the Birmingham General City Code was unconstitutional, the judicial construction of the ordinance prohibited only standing or loitering on public property that obstructed free passage, but it was unclear from the record, whether the literal or judicial construction was applied; and (2) the literal construction of 1132 of the Birmingham General City Code was unconstitutional, and the statutory application revealed that it applied to the enforcement of an officer's order in directing vehicular traffic.

==== 1970 SCOTUS - Bachellar v. Maryland (keywords: sidewalk,) Petitioners' convictions for violating Maryland's disorderly conduct statute stemming from a demonstration protesting the Vietnam conflict must be set aside, as the jury's general verdict, in light of the trial judge's instructions, could have rested on several grounds, including "the doing or saying . . . of that which offends, disturbs, incites, or tends to incite a number of people gathered in the same area," and a conviction on that ground would violate the constitutional protection for the advocacy of unpopular ideas. RELATED: Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359. Pp. 397 U. S. 565-571. ==== 1971 SCOTUS - Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (keywords: sidewalk,) Holding A Cincinnati ordinance which made it a criminal offense for three or more persons to assemble on a sidewalk and annoy passersby violated the rights of free assembly and association. Additionally, the vagueness of the law violated due process. ==== 1972 SCOTUS - Flower v. United States (keywords: sidewalk,) -- Application of 18 U.S.C. 1382, proscribing the re-entry onto a military post of a person who has been removed therefrom or ordered by an officer not to re-enter, held violative of First Amendment rights as applied when petitioner, a civilian who had previously been barred from the post was arrested after re-entry while quietly distributing leaflets on a public street extensively used by civilians as well as military personnel that runs through Fort Sam Houston, an open military post. ==== 1972 SCOTUS - Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB ==== 1972 SCOTUS Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (keywords: sidewalk, shopping mall,) -- The District Courts opinion on Lloyd showed that Logan Valley were both very similar cases. Both were distinguished as having narrow grounds also limited to a labor dispute involving one of that shopping center's tenants occurred under any conditions where no realistic alternative for expression existed. Noting that the Lloyd Corp. respondent's message was directed to all members of the public, the Court concluded that the respondents could have distributed their handbills on "any public street, on any public sidewalk, in any public park, or in any public building." Therefore, respondents were not entitled to exercise their free-speech rights on the privately owned shopping-center property.

-- The Lloyd Shopping Center invites schools to hold football rallies, presidential candidates to give speeches, and service organizations to hold Veterans Day ceremonies on its grounds. The court also observed that the Center permits the Salvation Army, the Volunteers of America, and the American Legion to solicit funds in the Mall. Thus, the court concluded that the Center was already open to First Amendment activities, and that respondents could not constitutionally be excluded from distributing leaflets solely because Lloyd Center was not bewitched of the form or substance of their speech. The Court of Appeals affirmed, taking the position that it was not extending either Logan Valley or Marsh. In other words, the District Court found that Lloyd Center had deliberately chosen to open its private property to their own broad range of rules and expressions and that having done so it could not constitutionally exclude respondents in America, the writer for the dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall, agreed with Donald Tanner. ==== 1972 7TH CIRCUIT - Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely (keywords: sidewalk,) -- City ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a school, except peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute, found by the Court of Appeals to be unconstitutional because overbroad, held violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it makes an impermissible distinction between peaceful labor picketing and other peaceful picketing. Pp. 94-102. ==== 1972 SCOTUS - Grayned v. Rockford - When is picketing constitutionally protected? Picketing is normally a peaceful carrying of signs and banners clearly advertising a grievance or the purpose of a demonstration. It is a recognized means of communication. -- That the anti-picketing ordinance was overbroad and was therefore invalid; that the anti-noise ordinance, which prohibited only noise that took place near a public school and might disrupt school activity, was valid; and that therefore Grayned's conviction under the anti-picketing ordinance was reversed while his conviction under the antinoise ordinance was upheld. -- RELATED CASES: - - Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). - - Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). - - Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). - - Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). - - Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).

==== 1980 SCOTUS - Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. --under the California Constitution, individuals may peacefully exercise their right to free speech in parts of private shopping centers regularly held open to the public, subject to reasonable regulations adopted by the shopping centers --under the U.S. Constitution, states can provide their citizens with broader rights in their constitutions than under the federal Constitution, so long as those rights do not infringe on any federal constitutional rights. ==== 1984 SCOTUS - Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288 -- Holding A rule against camping or overnight sleeping in public parks is not beyond the constitutional power of the Government to enforce. ==== 1997 SCOTUS - Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 Holding The injunction provisions imposing "fixed buffer zone" limitations are constitutional, but the provisions imposing "floating buffer zone" limitations violate the First Amendment. ==== 2000 SCOTUS - Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 -- police interactions based on anonymous tip, absent observing a crime. -- Holding A police officer may not legally stop and frisk anyone based solely on an anonymous tip that simply described that person's location and appearance without information as to any illegal conduct that the person might be planning. ==== 2002 9 CIRCUIT BROWN v. CalTrans -- CalTrans's proffered justification that the display of flags, which poses the dual safety risks of falling objects and motorist distraction, increases highway safety is patently unreasonable. -- It is CalTrans's stated encroachment permit policy that citizens who wish to display a sign on a California highway overpass must obtain a permit to do so. Even then, permits are only available for signs designating turnoffs for special events. Citizens wishing to display any other message are prohibited from using the highway overpass to do so. Notwithstanding this policy, CalTrans does not prohibit the display of American flags, nor does it impose a permitting process for their display.
TH

==== 2003 CA 3RD APPEALS COURT - Sanctity of Human Life v. CHP (keywords: overpass, impede, ) (Vehicle Code sections 2410, 21465 and 21467) -- We find that the statutes, Vehicle Code sections 21465 and 21467, under which the CHP claimed the power to terminate plaintiffs' activities, do not apply to plaintiffs' activities. However, we also conclude the CHP, under the facts presented at trial, acted appropriately pursuant to its authority to direct traffic.(See Veh.Code, 2410.) We further conclude that the CHP's actions in this case did not violate plaintiffs' free speech rights. Accordingly, we modify the trial court's judgment to grant to plaintiffs declaratory relief only to the extent of declaring that the CHP may not interfere with plaintiffs' activities under the authority of Vehicle Code sections 21465 and 21467 and otherwise affirm the judgment. (Hereafter, unspecified code citations are to the Vehicle Code.) -- Plaintiffs' signs cannot be characterized as traffic signs subject to prohibition under section 21465. --- They did not purport to be traffic signs. --- They did not imitate or resemble traffic signs. --- The signs did not attempt to direct the movement of traffic or hide from view any traffic sign. --- The CHP, relying only on sections 21465 and 21467, cannot prevent plaintiffs from displaying the signs. -- Plaintiffs have presented an actual controversy concerning whether the CHP may interfere with plaintiffs' activities under the authority of sections 21465 and 21467. --- We conclude the CHP may not do so. -- Members of the California Highway Patrol are authorized to direct traffic according to law, and, in the event of a fire or other emergency, or to expedite traffic or insure safety, may direct traffic as conditions may require notwithstanding the provisions of this code. (2410.) Traffic includes pedestrians. (620.) The record shows that the CHP acted to terminate plaintiffs' activities on freeway overpasses only when those activities were causing freeway congestion. --- Thus, under the authority of section 2410 allowing the CHP to direct traffic to expedite traffic as conditions may require , the actions taken by the CHP conformed to their statutory authority.

==== 2011 - Occupy Nashville et al v. Haslam et al ==== 2011 9th Circuit - Comit de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, California ==== 2012 - Stahl v. City of St. Louis, Mo. -- The fact that a person only violates the ordinance if his or her action evokes a particular response from a third party is especially problematic because of the ordinance's resulting chilling effect on core First Amendment speech. ===== pedestrian noun a person walking along a road or in a developed area. For police to construe peaceably assembled protest as pedestrians to force the end of a protest rally is a prior restraint. ===== CA VEH CODE 620. The term traffic includes pedestrians, ridden animals, vehicles, street cars, and other conveyances, either singly or together, while using any highway for purposes of travel. ======= CA VEH CODE 2410. Members of the California Highway Patrol are authorized to direct traffic according to law, and, in the event of a fire or other emergency, or to expedite traffic or insure safety, may direct traffic as conditions may require notwithstanding the provisions of this code. ======== CHP has authority to direct traffic and conduct a lawful inspection. CA VEH CODE 2800. (a) It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful order, signal, or direction of a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commencing with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, when that peace officer is in uniform and is performing duties pursuant to any of the provisions of this code, or to refuse to submit to a lawful inspection pursuant to this code. ==== To act outside that authority is an abuse of power. ====