GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS: #1 Carlos Superdrug Corp., et al. vs. DSWD, et al. G.R. No.

166494, 29 June 2007 FACTS: Republic Act No. 7432 (Old Senior Citizens Act) provides that the 20% discount from goods and services of establishments for the exclusive use and enjoyment of the senior citizens may be claimed by the establishments as tax credit. With the passage of R.A. 9257 (Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003), said discount may now be claimed by the establishments as tax deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or services rendered, provided that the cost of the discount shall be allowed as a deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Under this new law, more establishments were added such as: establishments providing medical and dental services, diagnostic and laboratory services, including professional fees of attending doctors in all private hospitals and medical facilities, operators of domestic air and sea transport services, public railways and skyways and bus transport services. Petitioners are domestic corporations and proprietors operating drugstores in the Philippines, who assail the constitutionality of the said law, alleging that they are entitled to just compensation since the allowance of the discount as a tax deduction amounts to deprivation of property. ISSUES: 1. Can the state, in promoting the health and welfare of a special group of citizens, impose upon private establishments the burden of partly subsidizing a government program? 2. Whether Section 4(a) of R.A. 9257 is constitutional. 3. Whether petitioners are entitled to just compensation. RULING: 1. Yes, the Court declared, upholding in the process the constitutionality of Section 4(a) of the Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003 (R.A. 9257, amending R.A. 7432), which considered the twenty percent (20%) discount given by drugstores to senior citizens as tax deductions and no longer tax credits. The Court acknowledged that treating the discount as tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount, thus, not meeting the definition of just compensation. Nevertheless, it could be justified as a police power measure. The Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of senior citizens to nationbuilding, and to grant benefits and privileges to them for their improvement and well being as the State considers them an integral part of our society. The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Accordingly, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to the general welfare. Certain differences of tax deduction and tax credit can be derived from the two laws. The tax credit under R.A. 7432 is a peso-for-peso deduction from a taxpayers tax liability due to the government of the amount of discounts such establishment has granted to a senior citizen. The establishment recovers the full amount of discount given to a senior citizen and hence, the government shoulders 100% of the discounts granted. The tax deduction under R.A. 9257 is based on the net cost of goods sold or services rendered. Effectively, the government loses in terms of foregone revenues an amount equivalent to the marginal tax rate the said establishment is liable to pay the government. Under a tax deduction scheme, the tax deduction on discounts was subtracted from net sales together with other deductions which are considered as operating expenses before the tax due was computed based on the net taxable income. Being a tax deduction, the discount does not reduce taxes owed on a peso-for-peso basis but merely offers a fractional reduction in taxes paid. Said treatment reduces the net income of the

establishments concerned. On the other hand, under the tax credit scheme, the amount of discounts which is the tax credit item, was deducted directly from the tax due amount. 2. Yes. Section 4(a) of R.A. 9257 has constitutional basis. R.A. 9257 is in accord with the States policy to provide social justice in all phases of national development and to adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavour to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women and children. 3. No just compensation is due. Petitioners are not entitled to just compensation. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. A tax deduction does not offer full reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such it would not meet the definition of just compensation. While the Constitution protects property rights, petitioner must accept the realities of business and the State, in the exercise of police power, can intervene in the operations of a business which may result in an impairment of property rights in the process. The right to property can be relinquished upon the command of the State for the promotion of the public good. #2 MIRASOL VS. DPWH GR # 158793, June 8, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of an administrative regulation banning the use

of motorcycles at the toll way on the ground that it is baseless and unwarranted for failure to provide scientific and objective data on the dangers of motorcycles plying the highways. Respondent avers that the toll ways were not designed to accommodate motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will compromise safety and traffic considerations.

(Background:Previously DOTC and DPWH is under one Ministry. On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.) ISSUE: Whether or not administrative regulation (A.O.1) banning the use of motorcycles is unconstitutional. HELD: No, the use of public highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an exercise of the police power of the state. The sole standard in measuring its exercise is reasonableness, not exact definition and scientific formulation. It is evident that assailed regulation does not impose unreasonable restrictions, but outlines precautionary measures designed to ensure public safety.

Others: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the first place.
CASE#3: ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents

Facts: This case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the PAL. On various dates, Petitioner was at 209 pounds, 217 pounds and 212 pounds. Well beyond the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL. When found to be overweight, he was asked to go on leave in order to address this. He was unable to comply and in one instance, he even gained weight instead by 49 pounds beyond the limit. He was restricted to ground duty as a result. He made a written commitment to reduce his weight. He remained overweight despite periods given to him in order to comply. He failed to report for weight checks and was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with accordingly. In 1992, he was finally served a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements and given 10 days to answer. In his answer, he did not deny being overweight. He claimed that his violation had been condoned by PAL and that PAL had discriminated against him considering that there were cabin crew members who are similarly situated. In 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL. The Labor Arbiter ruled in his favor but this was overturned by the Court of Appeals. Hence, his recourse to the Supreme Court. He argued that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the Labor Code; (2) continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupational qualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other overweight employees were promoted instead of being disciplined. Issues: (1) Whether petitioners dismissal for obesity can be predicated on the "bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense? (2) Whether petitioner was duly discriminated against when he was dismissed while other overweight cabin attendants were either given flying duties or promoted? Held: (1) The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In the United States, there are a few federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engage in an otherwise unlawful form of prohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to the normal operation of a business or enterprise. Petitionerscontention that BFOQ is a statutory defense as there is no statute that justifies his dismissal must fail.

First, the Constitution,the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the Magna Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British Columbia Government and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU), the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so-called "Meiorin Test" in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test: (1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job; (2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose. In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid "provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory job performance."Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supporting statute. The Labor Arbiter,NLRC, and CA are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees. Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made known to him prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at all times. In fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim down his weight. Bona fides exigitut quod convenit fiat. Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall be done. Kung angtao ay

tapatkanyangtutuparinangnapagkasunduan.

(2) Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL. Petitioner claimed that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate against him. The Court agreed with the CA that "[t]he element of discrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escape the consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position that impliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and the private respondents failure to comply." It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner has to prove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding of discriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabin attendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and why they are similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of his situation with other employees. Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed overweight cabin attendants, petitioner miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods they were allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminating treatment they got from PAL; and other relevant

data that could have adequately established a case of discriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, "PAL really had no substantial case of discrimination to meet." Petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guarantyof the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee. (ISSUE ON EQUAL PROTECTION) #4 JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G. VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ, SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ, HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G. MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA,Respondents. G.R. No. 188920 February 16, 2010 Facts: On March 2, 2006, petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference that eventually led for his election as Liberal Party (LP) president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the COMELEC to nullify the elections on the ground that it was illegal because it was not consistent with the partys constitution. On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution partially granting respondents Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, elections and ordered a new election under COMELEC supervision. Consequently, the Liberal Party held a meeting and such meeting installed Manuel Roxas II as the partys new president. Also in that meeting, Atienza et. Al. was removed from the LP roster. Atienza filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction before the COMELEC to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency claiming that the assembly which elected Roxas was invalidly convened. However, Atienzas petition was denied. Atienza then went to the SC. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations. Issue: Whether or not respondent Roxas et. al. violated petitioner Atienza et. al.s constitutional right to due process by the latters expulsion from the party. Held: NO. The requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due process standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality "contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for the performance of a state function." The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too, to administrative bodies.

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the states powers are found in Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a limitation on the states powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties. Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies. But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. In Sinaca v. Mula, the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system to evolve, according to the free choice of the people. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. A political party is considered a private organization. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the State into the fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties. Wherefore, Atienzas petition is hereby DENIED. DUE PROCESS: #1 Republic vs. Cagandahan FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.

ISSUE: Whether the change of sex or gender and name of respondent is valid? HELD: YES. The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality which is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male. #2 Bank of the Philippine Islands vs BPI Employees Union-Davao Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank

Chapter-Federation of Unions in BPI Unibank (BPI Union) whereby it is a pre-condition that new employees must join the union before they can be regularized otherwise they will not have a continued employment. By reason of the failure of the FEB employees to join the union, BPI Union recommended to BPI their dismissal. BPI refused. The issue went to voluntary arbitration where BPI won but the Court of Appeals reversed the Voluntary Arbitrator. BPI appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the Union Shop agreement violated the constitutional right of security of tenure of the FEB employees absorbed by BPI. HELD: No. As a general rule, the State protects the workers right to security of tenure. An employees services can only be terminated upon just and authorized causes. In this case, the presence of a Union Shop Clause in the CBA between BPI and BPI Union must be respected. Failure of an employee to join the union pursuant to the clause is an authorized cause for BPI not to continue employing the employee concerned and BPI must respect that provision of the CBA. Although it is accepted that non-compliance with a union security clause is a valid ground for an employees dismissal, jurisprudence dictates that such a dismissal must still be done in accordance with due process.Nevertheless, the FEB employees are still entitled to the twin notice rule this is to afford them ample opportunity to whether or not join the union. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of procedural due process. The law requires the employer to furnish the employee sought to be dismissed with two written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (1) a written

notice apprising the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought in order to afford him an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of counsel, if he desires, and (2) a subsequent notice informing the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. This procedure is mandatory and its absence taints the dismissal with illegality.

CASE#3: G.R. No. 166216 March 14, 2012 Rogelio Aberca, Rodolfo Benosa, Nestor Bodino, Noel Etabag, DaniloDelaFuente, Belen DiazFlores, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Edwin Lopez, Alfredo Mansos, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Joseph Olayer, Carlos Palma, Marco Palo, Rolando Salutin Benjamin Segundo, Arturo Tabara, Edwin Tulalian, And Rebecca Tulalian,Petitioners, Vs. Maj. Gen. FabianVer, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Gerardo B. Lantoria, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo M. Lacson, Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1lt. Pedro Tango, 1lt. Romeo Ricardo, 1lt. Raul Bacalso, M/Sgt.BienvenidoBalaba And "John Does," Respondents. Facts: In 1983, petitioners who were arrested, detained and tortured by the military for alleged subversive acts filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against respondents. Respondents through their counsel then Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza, filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) since the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was then suspended, the trial court cannot inquire into the circumstances surrounding petitioners arrests; (2) respondents are immune from liability for the reason that they were then performing their official duties; and (3) the complaint states no cause of action. The RTC granted the motion and filed petition with the Supreme Court. While the case was pending with the SC, the so-called EDSA revolution took place. Respondents lost their official positions and were no longer in their respective office addresses as appearing in the record. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal and remanded the trial court for further proceedings.

The fundamental guarantee of security of tenure and due process dictates that no worker shall be dismissed except for a just and authorized cause provided by law and after due process is observed.
Facts: In 2000, Far East Bank (FEB) was absorbed by the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI). Now BPI has an existing Union Shop Clause agreement with the BPI Employees Union-Davao

On remand, the record of the case was destroyed when fire razed the City Hall of Quezon City in 1988. Records were later reconstituted at the instance of petitioners. For lack of an opposition from respondents, the petition for reconstitution was granted. In 1990, RTC directed petitioners to report the addresses and whereabouts of petitioners so that they could be properly notified. Instead, petitioners filed a motion to declare respondents in default. RTC then instead issued an order directing that a copy of the order dated be furnished to new Solicitor General Francisco Chavez to enable him to take action pursuant to Section 18, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, and to former Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza to enable him to give notice as to whether he [would] continue to represent petitioners in his private capacity. Former Solicitor General Mendoza manifested that his appearance as respondents counsel terminated when he ceased to be Solicitor General. Solicitor General Chavez filed a notice of withdrawal of appearance but such notice was not furnished respondents. For failure of the petitioners to comply with the RTC orders, it dismissed the case. The dismissal order waslater set aside and case reinstated upon motion for reconsideration by the RTC. It also approved petitioners request to serve the notice to file answer or responsive pleading by publication. Respondents were then declared in default for failure to answer. A judgment was rendered in favour of petitioners holding respondents solidarily liable for damages. The CA reversed RTCs decision holding that RTC committed errors in declaring the respondents in default and proceeding to hear the case. It remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with the foregoing disquisition. Issue: Whether respondents were denied of due process when RTC declared them in default for failure to answer of the service made through publication? Held: Yes. The basic question is whether the constitutional right to procedural due process was properly observed or was unacceptably violated in this case when the respondents were declared in default for failing to file their answer within the prescribed period and when the petitioners were allowed to present their evidence ex-parte. Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that:

the partys or counsels residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein. SEC. 7. Service by mail.Service by registered mail shall be made by depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully prepaid, and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is available in the locality of either the sender or the addressee, service may be done by ordinary mail. SEC. 8. Substituted service.If service of pleadings, motions, notices, resolutions, orders and other papers cannot be made under the two preceding sections, the office and place of residence of the party or his counsel being unknown, service may be made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. The service is complete at the time of such delivery. The above rules, thus, prescribe the modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers, namely: (1) personal service; (2) service by mail; and (3) substituted service, in case service cannot be effected either personally or by mail.
The Rules of Court has been laid down to insure the orderly conduct of litigation and to protect the substantive rights of all party litigants. It is for this reason that the basic rules on the modes of service provided under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court have been made mandatory and, hence, should be strictly followed. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. In the case at bench, the respondents were completely deprived of due process when they were declared in default based on a defective mode of service service of notice to file answer by publication. The rules on service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers were not strictly followed in declaring the respondents in default. The Court agrees with the CA that the RTC committed procedural lapses in declaring the respondents in default and in allowing the petitioners to present evidence ex-parte. As correctly observed by the CA, the RTCs Order was an attempt to serve a notice to file answer on the respondents by personal service and/or by mail.Nevertheless, there was still another less preferred but proper mode of service available substituted service - which is service made by delivering the copy to the clerk of court, with proof of failure of both personal service and service by mail. Unfortunately, this substitute mode of service was not resorted to by the RTC after it failed to effect personal service and service by mail. Instead, the RTC authorized an unrecognized mode of service under the Rules, which was service of notice to file answer by publication. The RTC, thus, erred when it ruled that the publication of a notice to file answer to the respondents substantially cured the procedural defect equivalent to lack of due process. The RTC cannot just abandon the basic requirement of personal service and/or service by mail. To stress, the only modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers allowed by the rules are personal service, service by mail and substituted service if either personal service or service by mail cannot be made, as stated in Sections 6, 7 and 8 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. Nowhere under this rule is service of notice to file answer by publication is mentioned, much less recognized. Furthermore, the Court would like to point out that service by publication only applies to service of summons stated under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court where the methods of service of

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting one's person or property. Moreover, pursuant to the provisions of Section 5(5) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,the Court adopted and promulgated the following rules concerning, among others, the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts:

Rule 13 SEC. 5. Modes of service.Service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments and other papers shall be made either personally or by mail. SEC. 6. Personal service.Service of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at

summons in civil cases are: (1) personal service; (2) substituted service;and (3) service by publication.Similarly, service by publication can apply to judgments, final orders and resolutions as provided under Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. As a final point, this Court commiserates with the petitioners plight and cry for justice. They should not be denied redress of their grievances. The Court, however, finds itself unable to grant their plea because the fundamental law clearly provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. #4 ANONYMOUS, complainant, vs. MA. VICTORIA P. RADAM, Utility Worker, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City, respondent. A.M. No. P-07-2333 (formerly OCA IPI No. 07-2510-P) December 19, 2007 FACTS: In an anonymous letter-complaint dated September 30, 2005, respondent Ma. Victoria Radam, utility worker in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City in Pangasinan, was charged with immorality. The unnamed complainant alleged that respondent was unmarried but got pregnant and gave birth sometime in October 2005. The complainant claimed that respondents behavior tainted the image of the judiciary. In her explanation, she admitted that she and her boyfriend, who had a pending application to migrate to Canada, had a mutual plan to remain unmarried. In connection with the complaint, Judge Elpidio N. Abella conducted a discreet investigation to verify the allegations against respondent. Judge Abella recommended that respondent MA. VICTORIA RADAM be accordingly found GUILTY of IMMORAL CONDUCT or ACT UNBECOMING A COURT EMPLOYEE. A suspension of one (1) month or a fine of Php5,000.00 is respectfully recommended, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended exoneration, since the charge of immorality because her alleged misconduct (that is, giving birth out of wedlock) did not affect the character and nature of her position as a utility worker, but submitted that Radam should be held liable for Conduct Unbecoming and fined for stating in the birth certificate that the father was unknown when she knew all along who it was. ISSUE: Whether the respondent could be found guilty for conduct unbecoming. HELD: NO, for that would run afoul of due process. The OCA correctly exonerated respondent from the charge of immorality. However, its recommendation to hold her liable for a charge of which she was not previously informed was wrong. For purposes of determining administrative responsibility, giving birth out of wedlock is not per se immoral under civil service laws. For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same

must be "grossly immoral," that is, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree. For a particular conduct to constitute "disgraceful and immoral" behavior under civil service laws, it must be regulated on account of the concerns of public and secular morality. It cannot be judged based on personal bias, specifically those colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on "cultural" values not convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the constitutionally guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority. Respondent was indicted only for alleged immorality for giving birth out of wedlock. It was the only charge of which she was informed. Judge Abellas investigation focused solely on that matter. Thus, the recommendation of the OCA that she be held administratively liable in connection with an entry in the birth certificate of Christian Jeon came like a thief in the night. It was unwarranted. Respondent was neither confronted with it nor given the chance to explain it. To hold her liable for a totally different charge of which she was totally unaware will violate her right to due process. The essence of due process in an administrative proceeding is the opportunity to explain ones side, whether written or verbal. This presupposes that one has been previously apprised of the accusation against him or her. Here, respondent was deprived of both with regard to her alleged unbecoming conduct in relation to a certain statement in the birth certificate of her child. An employee must be informed of the charges proferred against him, and the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic procedural requirement that cannot [be] dispense[d] with and still remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his defense(s). Ones employment is not merely a specie of property rights. It is also the means by which he and those who depend on him live. It is therefore protected by the guarantee of security of tenure. And in the civil service, this means that no government employee may be removed, suspended or disciplined unless for cause provided by law and after due process. Unless the constitutional guarantee of due process is a mere platitude, it is the Courts duty to insist on its observance in all cases involving a deprivation, denigration or dilution of ones right to life, liberty and property. WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against respondent Ma. Victoria P. Radam is hereby DISMISSED. She is, however, strongly advised to be more circumspect in her personal and official actuations in the future. #5 MACIAS V. MACIAS Facts: This involves an administrative complaint filed by complainant Margie C. Macias charging her husband, Mariano Joaquin S. Macias (Judge Macias), with immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The complaint was filed on March 7, 2001, when respondent was still sitting as the presiding judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Liloy, Zamboanga del Norte. Complainant alleged that respondent engaged in an illicit liaison and immoral relationship with a certain Judilyn Seranillos (Seranillos), single and in her early 20s. Allegedly, the respondent judge uses his Court personnel in the fulfillment of these acts.

Complainant presented witnesses who testified that indeed, respondent is doing the acts complained of. However, some of the witnesses later recanted their testimonies. The Investigating Justice submitted his Report and Recommendation to this Court. He recommended the dismissal of the complaint against Judge Macias. The Investigating Justice reasoned that complainant failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that respondent committed acts of immorality, or that his conduct was prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The Investigating Justice, however, recommended that Judge Macias be reprimanded for failing to exercise great care and circumspection in his actions. Issue: Is it really necessary that administrative complaints against members of the judiciary be disposed of only after adducing evidence that will prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt? And second, do the acts complained of warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction on respondent judge? Ruling: Members of the judiciary are not a class of their own, sui generis, in the field of public service as to require a higher degree of proof for the administrative cases filed against them other than, perhaps, the fact that because of the nature of the responsibility judges have, they are required to live up to a higher standard of integrity, probity and morality. When we dismiss a public officer or employee from his position or office for the commission of a grave offense in connection with his office, we merely require that complainant prove substantial evidence. When we disbar a disgraceful lawyer, we require that complainant merely prove a clear preponderance of evidence to establish liability. There appears no compelling reason to require a higher degree of proof when we deal with cases filed against judges. However, in this case, we are not convinced that complainant was able to prove, by substantial evidence, that respondent committed the acts complained of. Basic is the rule that in administrative proceedings, complainant bears the onus of establishing the averments of her complaint. If complainant fails to discharge this burden, respondent cannot be held liable for the charge. Nevertheless, we agree with the findings of the Investigating Justice that although the charges of immorality and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service were not satisfactorily proven by complainant, respondent cannot be completely exonerated. Mutias testimony that he saw Judge Macias having dinner with Seranillos and entering a bedroom with her may not satisfactorily prove the charge of immorality, but this act certainly suggested an appearance of impropriety, Judge Macias being a married man. Such behavior undeniably constituted unbecoming conduct, a light offense punishable by a fine not less than P1,000.00 but not more than P10,000.00. In light of the circumstances affecting not only the reputation of Judge Macias himself but the image and reputation of the whole judiciary as well, we find it reasonable to impose upon him the maximum fine of P10,000.00. #6 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR Judge-RTC Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232 April 10, 2012 FACTS: This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar. The case was set for hearing.The first notice of hearing which was sent via registered mail and private courier LBC, was received by one Mustapha Randang.The scheduled hearing was postponed and reset. The notice of postponement was sent to Judge Indar and was received again by Mustapha Randang on 8 July 2010.Judge Indar failed to attend the hearing as

rescheduled and to submit the affidavit as required. Thus, order was directed Judge Indar to explain his non-appearance, and reset the hearing. The LBC report indicated that the Order was received by a certain Mrs. Asok. Due to several failure to appear, trial proceeded and a decision against Indar was rendered. ISSUE: WON there was observance of due process? WON it can be dispensed in administrative proceeding?

(The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which govern the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, clearly provide that technical rules of procedure and evidence do not strictly apply to administrative proceedings.)
RULING:In Cornejo v. Gabriel, the Court held that notice and hearing are not indispensable in administrative investigations, thus: The fact should not be lost sight of that we are dealing with an administrative proceeding and not with a judicial proceeding. As Judge Cooley, the leading American writer on constitutional Law, has well said, due process of law is not necessarily judicial process; much of the process by means of which the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative, which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings it is otherwise since they rest upon different principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of an administrative character, it may be stated, without fear of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law. It is settled that "technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense." It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. The Court emphasized in Cornejo the Constitutional precept that public office is a public trust, which is the underlying principle for the relaxation of the requirements of due process of law in administrative proceedings, thus: Again, for this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be necessary to consider an office as "property." It is, however, well settled in the United States, that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there is no proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar. Indar was dismissed from the service and disbarred. CASE#7: G.R. No. 169391 October 10, 2012 GO, and Minor EMERSON CHESTER KIM B. GO, Petitioners, vs.COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, REV. FR. EDWIN LAO, REV. FR. JOSE RHOMMEL HERNANDEZ, ALBERT ROSARDA and MA. TERESA SURATOS, Respondents. Facts: Kim was identified by neophytes (Letran high school students) of the Tau Gamma Fraternity as one of the senior members of the fraternity present at their hazing.

Kim denied that he was a fraternity member. The Assistant Prefectfor Discipline through Mr.Rosardarequested Kims parents (by notice) to attend a conference to address the issue of Kims fraternity membership. Both Mrs. Go and petitioner Mr. Eugene Go (Mr. Go) did not attend the conference. In time, respondents found that Kim was one of the senior fraternity members. Based on their disciplinary rules, the Father Prefect for Discipline (respondent Rev. Fr. Jose Rhommel Hernandez) recommended the fraternity members dismissal from the high school department rolls. Mr.Rosarda conveyed to Mrs. Go and Kim, in their conference the decision to suspend Kim for one month. Incidentally, Mr. Go did not attend this conference.On that date, Mrs. Go submitted a request for the deferment of Kims suspension so that he could take a previously scheduled examination which was granted. Respondents proposed that the students and their parents sign a pro-formaagreement to signify their conformity with their suspension. Mr. and Mrs. Go refused to sign. They also refused to accept the respondents finding that Kim was a fraternity member. They likewise insisted that due process had not been observed. Petitioners then filed a complaintfor damages before the RTC of Caloocan City claiming that the respondents had unlawfully dismissed Kim.Mr. and Mrs. Go also sought compensation for the "business opportunity losses" they suffered while personally attending to Kims disciplinary case. RTC ruled in favour of petitioners holding that the respondents had failed to observe "the basic requirement of due process" and that their evidence was "utterly insufficient" to prove that Kim was a fraternity member. It also declared that Letran had no authority to dismiss students for their fraternity membership. Accordingly, it awarded the petitioners moral and exemplary damages. The trial court also held that Mr. Go was entitled to actual damages after finding that he had neglected his manufacturing business when he personally attended to his sons disciplinary case. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. It held, among others, that the petitioners were not denied due process as the petitioners had been given ample opportunity to be heard in Kims disciplinary case. The CA also found that there was no bad faith, malice, fraud, nor any improper and willful motive or conduct on the part of the respondents to justify the award of damages. Accordingly, it dismissed the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. C19938 for lack of merit. Issue: Whether the CA had erred in setting aside the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.C-19938? Held: The Court denied the petition and affirmed the CA decision. The disciplinary sanction the respondents imposed on Kim was actually a suspension and not a "dismissal". Petitioners were well aware of this fact, as Mrs. Gos letter specifically requested that Kims suspension be deferred. That this request was granted and that Kim was allowed to take the examination further support the conclusion that Kim had not been dismissed. Section 78 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations of Regulations for Private Schools, in particular and with relevance to this case, provides: Section 78. Authority to Promulgate Disciplinary Rules. Every private school shall have the right to promulgate reasonable norms, rules and regulations it may deem necessary and consistent

with the provisions of this Manual for the maintenance of good school discipline and class attendance. Such rules and regulations shall be effective as of promulgation and notification to students in an appropriate school issuance or publication. The right to establish disciplinary rules is consistent with the mandate in the Constitution for schools to teach discipline; in fact, schools have the duty to develop discipline in students.Corollarily, the Court has always recognized the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions on students who violate disciplinary rules. The penalty for violations includes dismissal or exclusion from re-enrollment. Letrans rule prohibiting its high school students from joining fraternities to be a reasonable regulation because of the adult-oriented activities often associated with fraternities. Letrans penalty for violation of the rule is clearly stated in its enrollment contracts and in the Students Handbooks it distributes at the start of every school year. In this case, the petitioners were notified of both rule and penalty through Kims enrollment contract for school year 2001 to 2002. Notably, the penalty provided for fraternity membership is "summary dismissal." We also note that Mrs. Go signified her conform to these terms with her signature in the contract. No reason, therefore, exist to justify the trial courts position that respondent Letran cannot lawfully dismiss violating students, such as Kim. On the issue of due process, the petitioners insist that the question be resolved under the guidelines for administrative due process. They argue that the respondents violated due process (a) by not conducting a formal inquiry into the charge against Kim; (b) by not giving them any written notice of the charge; and (c) by not providing them with the opportunity to crossexamine the neophytes who had positively identified Kim as a senior member of their fraternity. The petitioners also fault the respondents for not showing them the neophytes written statements, which they claim to be unverified, unsworn, and hearsay. The records show that the respondents gave petitioners two (2) notices to seek their help in correcting Kims Membershipproblem in Fraternity. Respondents had given them ample opportunity to assist their son in his disciplinary case. "Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot [thereafter] complain of deprivation of due process." Through the notices, the respondents duly informed the petitioners in writing that Kim had a disciplinary charge for fraternity membership. Mr.Rosarda also informed Mrs. Go that the charge stemmed from the fraternity neophytes positive identification of Kim as a member; thus the petitioners fully knew of the nature of the evidence that stood against Kim. We see no merit in this argument as the petitioners apparently hew to an erroneous view of administrative due process. Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the strict judicial sense. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation. Thus, we are hard pressed to believe that Kims denial of his fraternity membership before formal notice was given worked against his interest in the disciplinary case. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to be explained, not the form in which the notice is given.The raison detre of the written notice rule is to inform the student of the disciplinary charge against him and to enable him to suitably prepare a defense.The essence of due process, it bears repeating, is simply the opportunity to be heard. As a final point, the CA correctly held that there were no further bases to hold the respondents liable for moral or exemplary damages. Records confirms that the respondents did not act with

bad faith, malice, fraud, or improper or willful motive or conduct in disciplining Kim. The Court found no basis for the award of actual damages. The respondents' liability for actual damages cannot be based on speculation. #8 Jenny M. Agabon and Virgilion C. Agabon, Petitioners. V. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Riviera Home Improvements Inc. andVicente Angeles Inc.,respondents. G.R. No. 158693 17 November 2004

Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later, which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of
the employer. . FACTS:

In this case, it was shown that petitioners abandoned their work twice. First was in January 1996 when they did not report for work because they were working for another company. Private respondent even warned petitioners that they would be dismissed if this happened again. Yet the petitioners disregarded the warning and exhibited a clear intention to sever their employer-employee relationship. In February1999, petitioners were frequently absent for having subcontracted for an installation work for another company. Subcontracting for another company clearly showed the intention to sever the employer-employee relationship with private respondent. The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out to him. In Sandoval Shipyard v. Clave, the Court held that an employee who deliberately absented from work without leave or permission from his employer, for the purpose of looking for a job elsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his job. This ruling is applicable in this. The law also recognizes the right of the employer to expect from its workers not only good performance, adequate work and diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty. The employer may not be compelled to continue to employ such persons whose continuance in the service will patently be inimical to his interests. Procedurally under the Labor Code, (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation. From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived: (1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284, and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for just or authorized cause but due process was not observed. The present case squarely falls under the fourth situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. Prior to 1989, the rule was that a dismissal or termination is illegal if the employee was not given any notice. In the 1989 case of Wenphil Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court ruled that where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated Due Process Rule. On January 27, 2000, in Serrano v. NLRC, the rule on the extent of the sanction was changed. The Court held that the violation by the employer of the notice requirement in termination for just or authorized causes was not a denial of due process that will nullify the termination. However, the dismissal is ineffectual and the employer must pay full backwages from the time of termination until it is judicially declared that the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause.

Petitioners, employees of Riviera Home Improvements Inc. as gypsum board and cornice installers, were dismissed for abandonment of work. So they filed a case with labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal for non-compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that petitioners had abandoned their work. In fact, private respondent sent two letters to the last known addresses of the petitioners advising them to report for work. Private respondents manager even talked to petitioner Virgilio Agabon by telephone sometime in June 1999 to tell him about the new assignment. However, petitioners did not report for work because they had subcontracted to perform installation work for another company. Petitioners also demanded for an increase in their wage to P280.00 per day. When this was not granted, petitioners stopped reporting for work and filed the illegal dismissal case. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter finding the petitioners abandonment of work, and thus were not entitled to back wages and separation pay. The other money claims awarded by the Labor Arbiter were also denied for lack of evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the legality of dismissal but awarded the money claims. CA also found out that petitioners were already employed to another employer, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed. HELD: Petition is DENIED. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship. The second element manifested by overt acts of the employees indicating the intent to discontinue the employment is the determinative factor.

The Court after carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent doctrines in the law on employment termination, it held that the better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would be able to achieve a fair result by dispensing justice not just to employees, but to employers as well. The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent the Court from sustaining the employer when it is in the right, as in this case. Certainly, an employer should not be compelled to pay employees for work not actually performed and in fact abandoned. The law protecting the rights of the laborer authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of the employer. It must be stressed that in the present case, the petitioners committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which, if the requirements of due process were complied with, would undoubtedly result in a valid dismissal. An employee who is clearly guilty of conduct violative of Article 282 should not be protected by the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory rights, as ruled in Reta v. National Labor Relations Commission. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later, which we sought to deter in the Serrano ruling. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer. The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, the Court deem it proper to fix it at P30,000.00. It is believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules. Case#9 Michael H. vs. Gerald D. Brief Fact Summary. Carole had an adulterous affair with Michael while married to Gerald. A child was born while Carole and Gerald were together, but was likely Michaels child. Michael and the child by guardian ad litem brought suit to establish paternity and a right to visitation. Synopsis of Rule of Law. An adulterous, natural father does not have a constitutional right to paternity over the marital father. Facts: In 1976 Carole D. and Gerald D. were married and established a home in California. In 1978, Carole became involved in an adulterous affair with Michael H. She conceived a child, Victoria, in 1980, with Gerald listed as father on the birth certificate. Gerald has always held the child out to be his daughter, but soon after delivery Carole informed Michael she believed he might be the father. In 1981 Gerald moved to New York and Carole, Michael, and Victoria had blood tests revealing a 98.07% probability that Michael was the father. Carole visited with Michael for several months, were he held Victoria out as his daughter. Carole left Michael and took up residence in California with another man. In the summer of 1982 Carole and Victoria visited Gerald in New York, and the three vacationed in Europe. In the fall she returned to California. In November of 1982 Michael filed a filiation action in California to establish his paternity and right to visitation. In 1983 the court appointed an attorney and a guardian ad litem to represent Victorias interests. Victoria filed a cross-complaint asserting that if she had more than one psychological or de facto father, she was entitled to maintain her filial

relationship, with all of the attendant rights, duties, and obligations, with both. Carole filed for summary judgment while she was again living with Gerald in New York. In August of 1983 she returned to California and again became involved with Michael, instructing her attorneys to remove the summary judgment motion. For the next eight months Michael held Victoria out as his daughter. In April 1984, Carole and Michael signed a stipulation that Michael was Victorias father. The next month Carole left Michael, instructing her attorneys to not file the stipulation. Carole reconciled with Gerald and they lived together with two more children being born. In May 1984 Michael and Victoria, through guardian ad litem, sought visitation rights for Michael pendente lite. A court appointed psychologist recommended that Carole retain sole custody, but Michael be allowed continued contact with Victoria pursuant to a restricted visitation schedule. The court concurred. In October of 1984 Gerald moved for summary judgment on the ground that under California law there were no triable issues of fact as to Victorias paternity. The law provides that the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage. The presumption may only be rebutted by blood tests, and a motion for such tests must be made within two years of the birth by the husband, or by the wife if the natural father has filed an affidavit acknowledging paternity. In 1985 the Superior Court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding that Carole and Gerald were cohabiting at the time of conception and birth and that Gerald was neither sterile nor impotent. Issue: Does the presumption established by the law infringe upon the due process rights of a man who wishes to establish his paternity of a child born to the wife of another man or infringe upon the constitutional right of the child to maintain a relationship with her natural father? Held: Michael contends as a matter of substantive due process that because he has established a parental relationship with Victoria, protection of Gerald and Caroles marital union is an insufficient state interest to support termination of the relationship. However, Michaels interest must be a fundamental liberty to be constitutionally protected. Historically, the marital family has been protected rather than the potential father outside of the marriage. The presumption of legitimacy was fundamental at common law, and could be rebutted only by a husband who was incapable of procreation or had no access to his wife during the relative period. The policy rationales were the aversion to declaring children illegitimate and the peace and tranquility of the States and families. No modern or historical precedent similarly recognizes the power of the natural father to assert parental rights. Michael must establish not that society has traditionally allowed a natural father in his circumstances to establish paternity, but that it has traditionally accorded such a father parental rights. To provide protection to an adulterous natural father is to deny protection to a marital father. Victorias due process challenge is weaker than Michaels. Her claim that a State must recognize multiple fatherhood has no support in history or tradition. The Court declines to accept Victorias argument that she had no opportunity to rebut the presumption of her legitimacy, because Victoria is not illegitimate. Dissent. If we had looked to tradition with such specificity in past cases, many decisions would have had a different result. The plurality ignores the developing society in which we live. Liberty must include the freedom not to conform. This is not a new interest, in that of a parent and a child in their relationship with one another. The pluralitys decision is striking considering the precedent preventing States from denying important interests to those in situations that do not fit the governments narrow view of the family. Discussion. The dissent accuses the plurality of being too specific in its search of history to support the right claimed by appellant. An omitted concurring opinion agreed in the sense that it

objected that the pluralitys historical analysis might foreclose the identification of future liberty interests. #10 Washington v. Glucksberg Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the United States held that a law that prohibits anyone (including physicians) from aiding or causing another to commit suicide is constitutional Synopsis of Rule of Law. The liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not include the right to assist suicide. Facts. It is a crime to assist suicide in Washington. Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. Respondents are physicians who practice medicine in Washington. Respondents occasionally treat terminally ill patients and claim that they would help these patients end their lives if not for Petitioners ban on assisted suicides. In January 1993, Respondents, along with three terminally ill patients (who have since died), and a non-profit organization that counsels people considering physician assisted suicide sued in the United Stated District Court claiming that Petitioners assisted suicide ban is unconstitutional. The District Court invalidated the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed, but then reversed itself en banc and affirmed the District Court. The en banc decision held that the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of ones death and the states assisted suicide ban was unconstitutional. Issue. Whether Washingtons prohibition against causing or aiding a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. Held. No. The en banc judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. There is consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right of assisting suicide. To hold that such a right is fundamental in nature would be to reverse centuries of legal doctrine. Therefore, assisting suicide is not a fundamental right. The Constitution requires the state ban to be rationally related to legitimate government interests. Petitioners have an unqualified interest in the preservation of human life. Suicide is a serious health problem. Further, Petitioners have an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, as well as an interest in protecting vulnerable groups from abuse, neglect and mistakes. The ban on assisting suicide is thus rationally related to these legitimate state interests. Concurrence. There is no generalized right to commit suicide. There is no need to address Respondents question whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death. The majoritys holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the law addressed in the case may be invalid and thus the constitutionality of such a law could prevail in a more particularized challenge. The legislature has more competence to address this issue than the Court. The Courts formulation of the liberty interests is incorrect. Additionally, the majoritys holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the law addressed in the case may be invalid, and thus the constitutionality of such a law could prevail in a more particularized challenge. Discussion. Once the Court held that assisting suicide is not a fundamental right, it was easy to satisfy the rational basis test and hold that the law was violative. Case#11: Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003). Facts: Houston police were dispatched to Lawrences (D) apartment in response to a reported weapons disturbance. The officers found Lawrence and Garner (D) engaged in a sexual act. Lawrence

and Garner were charged and convicted under Texas law of deviate sexual intercourse, namely anal sex, with a member of the same sex (man). Lawrence and Garner challenged the statute as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Lawrence and Garner were each fined $200 and order to pay $141.25 in costs. The Court of Appeals considered defendants federal constitutional arguments under both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. After hearing the case en banc the court rejected the constitutional arguments and affirmed the convictions. The court held that Bowers v. Hardwick was controlling regarding the due process issue. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. Issue: Whether a statute prohibiting specific sex acts violates liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? Held (Kennedy):

Yes. A statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause.

The court does not focus on protecting sodomy specifically, but rather, personal relationships. It explains that despite the fact that the statutes in questions purport to only prohibit sex, Their penalties and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. The court found it alarming that the statute in question sought to control a personal relationship, stating that forming personal relationships is one of the liberties we have, and should be able to choose such relationships without fear of being punished or classified as criminals. The court focuses on the fact that the laws should not target relations between consenting adults in private, as this is what liberty hinges on. The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or whoare situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government. It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.The court ultimately applies a rational basis review, stating that the Texas statute in question furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify an intrusion into a personal and private life of an individual. Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct. The defendants are adults and their conduct was in private and consensual The right to privacy is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. This case overrules Bowers v Hardwick, which had held that there is no fundamental right to engage in sodomy, or homosexual activities. Bowers was based on the fact that historically sodomy has been outlawed, but this court finds that historically it was only outlawed to protect individuals from sexual predators, and that rationale should not be used when consenting adults

are involved, specifically stating "The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter." Concurring (OConnor) I do not join the Court in overruling Bowers but I agree that the Texas statute is an unconstitutional violation of the Fourteenth Amendments Equal Protection Clause. Dissent (Scalia) Nowhere does the Courts opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a fundamental right under the Due Process Clause; nor does it subject the Texas law to the standard of review that would be appropriate (strict scrutiny) if homosexual sodomy were a fundamental right. Thus, while overruling the outcome of Bowers, the Court leaves strangely untouched its central legal conclusion: D would have us announce . . . a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy. This we are quite unwilling to do. Instead the Court simply describes petitioners conduct as an exercise of their liberty and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of rationalbasis review that will have far-reaching implications beyond this case. Dissent (Thomas) If I were a member of the Texas Legislature I would vote to repeal this law. Punishing someone for expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial consensual conduct with another adult does not appear to be a worthy way to expend valuable law enforcement resources. But I am not empowered to help petitioners and others similarly situated. My duty is to decide cases agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States. I can find neither in the Bill of Rights nor any other part of the Constitution a general right of privacy, or as the Court terms it today, the liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions. #12 CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005 FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent). On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police power; (2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and (3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional. ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional. HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void. The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause. The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power. A. The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property. Requisites for the valid exercise of Police Power are not met To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause. The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.

The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end. It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and property. Modality employed is unlawful taking It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property. What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking. The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businessesare confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a taking of private property.

Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which cannot reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking. Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community. The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions. Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business. B. The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance. The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area. The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the discrimination is invalid. C. The Ordinance is repugnant to general laws; it is ultra vires The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof. With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.

It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It cannot be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention. Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the general law. Conclusion All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void. Petition Denied. Case #13 WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009 FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law and ordinance entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-time Admission, Short-time Admission Rates, and Wash-up Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) with the RTC of Manila and prayed that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional. On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation, Titanium Corporation and Sta.Mesa Tourist Development Corporation filed a motion to intervene, which was granted by the RTC. MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff which was also granted by the RTC. On January 14, 1993, the RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The City then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals. The City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Local government code and the Revised Manila charter. Operators of drive-in hotels and motels argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is unconstitutional. HELD: Yes. For an ordinance to be a legitimate exercise of police power, (1) It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. (2) It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. (3) A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject establishments have gained notoriety as venue of prostitution, adultery and fornications in Manila since they provide the necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers. Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well. We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative. The Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition. The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments. We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and

renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions. The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and the like. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. However well-intentioned the Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricts the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. #14 DYCAICO VS. SSS FACTS: Bonifacio became a member of SSS in 1980 and named Elena and their 8 children as his beneficiaries. At that time, Bonifacio and Elena lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. He retired in 1989 and began receiving his SSS pension. He married Elena on January 1997 and he died on June 1997. Elena filed for survivors pension but said application was denied on the ground that they were married after Bonifacios retirement. According to the SSC, it has consistently ruled that entitlement to the survivors pension in ones capacity as primary beneficiary is premised on the legitimacy of relationship with and dependency for support upon the deceased SSS member during his lifetime. Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 provides that the primary beneficiaries who are entitled to survivors pension are those who qualify as such as of the date of retirement of the deceased member. HELD: The proviso infringes the due process clause. In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, employees have contractual or vested rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. Where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the due process clause and retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. The mandatory contributions to the SSS under RA 8282 form part of the employees compensation. The proviso as of the date of his retirement runs afoul of the due process clause as it outrightly deprives the surviving spouses whose respective marriages to the retired SSS members were contracted after the latters retirement of their survivors benefits. There is outright confiscation of benefits due such surviving spouses without giving them an opportunity to be heard. By this outright disqualification, the proviso qualifying the term primary beneficiaries for the purpose of entitlement to survivors pension has created the presumption that marriages contracted after the retirement date of SSS members were entered into for the purpose of securing the benefits under RA 8282. This presumption, moreover, is conclusive because the said surviving spouses are not afforded any opportunity to disprove the presence of the illicit purpose. The proviso, as it creates this conclusive presumption, is unconstitutional because it presumes a fact which is not necessarily or universally true. Standards of due process require that the petitioner be allowed to present evidence to prove that her marriage to Bonifacio was contracted in good faith and as his bona fide spouse she is entitled to the survivors pension accruing upon his death. Hence, the proviso as of the date of his retirement in Section 12-B(d) which deprives the petitioner and those similarly situated dependent spouses of retired SSS members this opportunity to be heard must be struck down.

#16 Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council 632 SCRA 146 October 5, 2010

FACTS: This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, aka Human Security Act of 2007. Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected communist fronts by the government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers. KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to close security surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim they have been branded as enemies of the State. BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to takejudicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim such tagging is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law. Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. ISSUES: WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism NO. WON a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners NO. WON there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity NO.

1. 2. 3.

HELD AND RATIO: The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. 1. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. 2. Romualdez v. COMELEC: A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, but the Court nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners werecharged, is couched in precise language. 3. The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice Mendozas Separate Opinion in the Estrada case: Allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one, which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect. If facial challenge is allowed, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. 2. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual or imminent charge against them. 1.

a. The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. 1. i. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when: 1. It lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2 ways: 1. Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conduct to avoid 2. Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. 2. ii. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means, which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. 3. A facial challenge is likewise different from an as applied challenge. 1. i. As applied challenge considers only extant facts affecting real litigants. 2. ii. Facial challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. 1. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants. And, one must always remember the high value placed on speech which explains why Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the "transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression. On the facts of the case, the Court Concluded that since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them. Again, harking back to American experience, it observed: American jurisprudence instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity. For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among the most important guarantees of liberty under law." On the other hand, In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. 3. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity. 1. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements of the crime of terrorism: 1. i. Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and the enumerated special penal laws;

1. 1.

ii. Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; 3. iii. The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand. 1. Petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The argument does not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. 2. Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of offender.Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech. Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible. This hold true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible. Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct. Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis. Finally, to make sure that there is no possible conflict with what the US Supreme Court said in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the Court explained that the former allowed the preenforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief." In Southern Hemisphere, however, the petitioners established neither and actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

2.

Case#15: G.R. Nos. 156556-57 October 4, 2011 ENRIQUE U. BETOY, Petitioner, vs.THE BOARD OF CORPORATION, Respondent.

and adopting the principles and guidelines enunciated in NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125. DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER In said Resolution, the Court clarified the exact date of the legal termination of each class of NPC employees, thus: From all these, it is clear that pursuant to NPB Resolution No. 2002-124, covers all employees of the NPC and not only the 16 employees as contended by the NPC. However, as regards their right to reinstatement, or separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, pursuant to a validly approved Separation Program, plus backwages, wage adjustments, and other benefits, the same shall be computed from the date of legal termination as stated in NPC Circular No. 2003-09. As to the validity of NPB Resolution No. 2007-55, the Court ruled that the same will have a prospective effect. Anent the question of the constitutionality of Section 63 of RA 9136, as well as Rule 33 of the IRR, the Court found that the same is without merit. It is undisputed that NPC was in financial distress and the solution found by Congress was to pursue a policy towards its privatization. The privatization of NPC necessarily demanded the restructuring of its operations. To carry out the purpose, there was a need to terminate employees and re-hire some depending on the manpower requirements of the privatized companies. The privatization and restructuring of the NPC was, therefore, done in good faith as its primary purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient. Constitutionality of Section 34, 38of the EPIRA Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Validity of Section 63 (DUE PROCESS) Section 63 of the EPIRA and Section 33 of the IRR of the EPIRA did not impair the vested rights of NPC personnel to claim benefits under existing laws. Neither does the EPIRA cut short the years of service of the employees concerned. If an employee availed of the separation pay and other benefits in accordance with existing laws or the superior separation pay under the NPC restructuring plan, it is but logical that those who availed of such privilege will start their government service anew if they will later be employed by any government-owned successor company or government instrumentality. It is to be noted that this Court ruled in the case of Herrera v. National Power Corporation, that Section 63 of the EPIRA precluded the receipt by the terminated employee of both separation and retirement benefits under the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) organic law, or Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 186. However, it must be clarified that this Courts pronouncements inHerrera that separated and retired employees of the NPC "are not entitled to receive retirement benefits under C.A. No. 186," referred only to the gratuity benefits granted by R.A. No. 1616, which was to be paid by NPC as the last employer. It did not proscribe the payment of retirement benefits to qualified retirees under R.A. No. 660,Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1146,R.A. No. 8291, and other GSIS and social security laws. It is clear that a separation pay at the time of the reorganization of the NPC and retirement benefits at the appropriate future time are two separate and distinct entitlements. Stated otherwise, a retirement plan is a different program from a separation package.

Facts: On June 8, 2001, Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) was enacted for restructuring the electric power industry and privatization of the assets of the National Power Corporation (NPC). Section 63 of the EPIRA provides for separation benefits to officials and employees who would be affected by the restructuring and privatization of the NPCs assets, to wit: Section 63.Separation Benefits of Officials and Employees of Affected Agencies. - National Government employees displaced or separated from the service as a result of the restructuring of the electricity industry and privatization of NPC assets pursuant to this Act, shall be entitled to either a separation pay and other benefits in accordance with existing laws, rules or regulations or be entitled to avail of the privileges provided under a separation plan which shall be one and one-half month salary for every year of service in the government: Provided, however, That those who avail of such privileges shall start their government service anew if absorbed by any government-owned successor company. In no case shall there be any diminution of benefits under the separation plan until the full implementation of the restructuring and privatization. The National Power Board (NPB) passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which, among others, resolved that all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on January 31, 2003 and shall be entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002125 which created a transition team to manage and implement the separation program. As a result of the foregoing NPB Resolutions, petitioner with thousands of his co-employees from the NPC was terminated. Hence, this petition for certiorari and supplemental petition for mandamus,specifically assailing National Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, as well as Sections 11, 34, 38, 48, 52 and 63 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA). Also assailed is Rule 33 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA. Issue: Whether NPB resolutions were valid and EPIRA (Section 63) isnot a violation of due process clause? Held: Yes. The petition is without merit. Validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 The Court had already ruled in NPC Drivers and Mechanics Association (NPC DAMA) v. National Power Corporation (NPC) that NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002- 125are void and of no legal effect as the Resolutions were not concluded by a duly constituted Board of Directors since no quorum in accordance with Section 48 of the EPIRA existed.

NPC Drivers involved a special civil action for Injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of
the same However, a supervening event occurred in NPC Drivers when it was brought to this Court's attention that NPB Resolution No. 2007-55 was promulgated on September 14, 2007 confirming

There is a whale of a difference between R.A. No. 1616 and C.A. No. 186, together with its amendatory laws. They have different legal bases, different sources of funds and different intents. In R.A. No. 1616, the retirees are entitled to gratuity benefits to be paid by the last employer and refund of premiums to be paid by the GSIS. On the other hand, retirement benefits under C.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 8291, are to be paid by the GSIS. Stated otherwise, under R.A. No. 1616, what would be paid by the last employer, NPC, would be gratuity benefits, and GSIS would merely refund the retirement premiums consisting of personal contributions of the employee plus interest, and the employers share without interest. Under C.A. No. 186, as amended, it is the GSIS who would pay the qualified employees their retirement benefits. A retirement law such as C.A. 186 and amendatory laws is in the nature of a contract between the government and its employees. When an employee joins the government service, he has a right to expect that after rendering the required length of service and fulfilled the conditions stated in the laws on retirement, he would be able to enjoy the benefits provided in said laws. He regularly pays the dues prescribed therefore. It would be cruel to deny him the benefits he had been expecting at the end of his service by imposing conditions for his retirement, which are not found in the law. It is believed to be a legal duty as well as a moral obligation on the part of the government to honor its commitments to its employees when as in this case, they have met all the conditions prescribed by law and are therefore entitled to receive their retirement benefits. Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested right to benefits that is protected by the DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law. Thus, a pensioner acquires a vested right to benefits that have become due as provided under the terms of the public employees pension statute. No law can deprive such person of his pension rights without due process of law, that is, without notice and opportunity to be heard.Verily, when an employee has complied with the statutory requirements to be entitled to receive his retirement benefits, his right to retire and receive what is due him by virtue thereof becomes vested and may not thereafter be revoked or impaired. Moreover, Section 63 of the EPIRA law, if misinterpreted as proscribing payment of retirement benefits under the GSIS law, would be unconstitutional as it would be violative of Section 10, Article III of the 1987 Constitution78 or the provision on non-impairment of contracts. In view of the fact that separation pay and retirement benefits are different entitlements, as they have different legal bases, different sources of funds, and different intents, the "exclusiveness of benefits" rule provided under R.A. No. 8291 is not applicable. Section 55 of R.A. No. 8291 states: "Whenever other laws provide similar benefits for the same contingencies covered by this Act, the member who qualifies to the benefits shall have the option to choose which benefits will be paid to him." Accordingly, the Court declares that separated, displaced, retiring, and retired employees of NPC are legally entitled to the retirement benefits pursuant to the intent of Congress and as guaranteed by the GSIS laws. Thus, the Court reiterates: 1] that the dispositive portion in Herrera holding that separated and retired employees "are not entitled to receive retirement benefits under Commonwealth Act No. 186," referred only to the gratuity benefits under R.A. No. 1616, which was to be paid by NPC, being the last employer; 2] that it did not proscribe the payment of the retirement benefits to qualified retirees under R.A. No. 660, P.D. No. 1146, R.A. No. 8291, and other GSIS and social security laws; and

3] that separated, rehired, retiring, and retired employees should receive, and continue to receive, the retirement benefits to which they are legally entitled.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE Case #1 SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC. G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009 Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May. Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner. The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit: Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00. Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at th e monthly rate of US$2,590.00. ISSUES: 1. Does the clause or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less of R.A. 8042 violate the guarantee of equal protection among OFWs? 2. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on nonimpairment of contracts; 3. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector. HELD: On the first issue. Yes.

The Court noted that the enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latters unexpired contracts fall short of one year. The Court further observed that, the subject clause creates a sublayer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the subject clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months only. The court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar advantage. On the second issue. The answer is in the negative. Petitioners claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable. The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of ensuring respect for the dignity and wellbeing of OFWs wherever they may be employed. On the third issue. The answer is in the affirmative. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic security and parity. Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on, OFWs at two levels: First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more; Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and Third, OFWs vis--vis local workers with fixed-period employment; The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage. Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection. The subject clause or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL. #2 JUDY ANNE L. SANTOS v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 173176 Date: August 26, 2008 Ta evasion charge against Juday.

Facts: On 19 May 2005, then BIR Commissioner Guillermo L. Parayno, Jr. wrote to the Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul M. Gonzales a letter regarding the possible filing of criminal charges against petitioner. In said letter, BIR Commissioner Parayno summarized the findings of the investigating BIR officers that petitioner, in her Annual Income Tax Return for taxable year 2002 filed with the BIR, declared an income of P8,033,332.70 derived from her talent fees solely from ABS-CBN; initial documents gathered from the BIR offices and those given by petitioner's accountant and third parties, however, confirmed that petitioner received in 2002 income in the amount of at least P14,796,234.70, not only from ABS-CBN, but also from other sources, such as movies and product endorsements; the estimated tax liability arising from petitioner's underdeclaration amounted to P1,718,925.52, including incremental penalties; the non-declaration by petitioner of an amount equivalent to at least 84.18% of the income declared in her return was considered a substantial underdeclaration of income, which constituted prima facie evidence of false or fraudulent return under Section 248(B) of the NIRC, as amended; and petitioner's failure to account as part of her income the professional fees she received from sources other than ABS-CBN and her underdeclaration of the income she received from ABSCBN amounted to manifest violations of Sections 254 and 255, as well as Section 248(B) of the NIRC, as amended.

murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x x. Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of a crime. CASE# 3: G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010 ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent. Facts: Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide: SEC. 4.Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position. Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs. Issue: Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause? Held: Yes.In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment. In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll

Judy Anne denied the charge. One of her contention is that she has been denied due process and equal protection of the laws when similar charges for violation of the NIRC, as amended, against Regina Encarnacion A. Velasquez (Velasquez) were dismissed by the DOJ in its Resolution dated 10 August 2005 in I.S. No. 2005-330 for the reason that Velasquezs tax liability was not yet fully determined when the charges were filed.
ISSUE: WON there is violation of Equal Protection of the laws. Ruling: The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.59 Petitioner was not able to duly establish to the satisfaction of this Court that she and Velasquez were indeed similarly situated, i.e., that they committed identical acts for which they were charged with the violation of the same provisions of the NIRC; and that they presented similar arguments and evidence in their defense - yet, they were treated differently. Furthermore, that the Prosecution Attorney dismissed what were supposedly similar charges against Velasquez did not compel Prosecution Attorney Torrevillas to rule the same way on the charges against petitioner. In People v. Dela Piedra,60 this Court explained that: The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination." While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have

ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle. Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not germane to the purpose of the law. The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work. If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the VicePresident, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign. As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Facts: This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the COMELEC resolution, and Section

4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides that: For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy. Issue: Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional? Held: No. To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain." In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned provisions? There is. An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned. The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to the sovereign will.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions for Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code. #4 Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 FACTS Pursuant to the slogan Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap posed by Pres. Noynoy Aquino in his campaign for Presidential election, he created Philippine Truth Commission by virtue of Executive Order No. 1. Said executive order was questioned by herein petitioners as violative of equal protection clause insofar as its objective is to investigate large scale graft and corruption during the previous administration under former president Arroyo. Petitioners contend that it did not meet the requisites for a valid classification as it singles out the previous administration as its sole object. Respondent, on the other hand, defended that it was based on widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. It further contends that the segregation of the preceding administration as the object of the fact-finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely to bear the immediate consequence of the policies of the previous administration. ISSUE WON Executive Order No. 1 violates the constitutional guaranty of equal protection of the laws HELD Yes. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration" only. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that [1] the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, [2] that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; [3] that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; [4] and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or underinclude those that should otherwise fall into a certain classification. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. The Court also added that it is not unaware that mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection clause. With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might conceivably have been attacked. In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES Case#3: AAA vs. Carbonell, G.R. No. 171465, June 8, 2007 Petitioner worked as a secretary at the Arzadon Automotive and Car Service Center from February 28, 2001 to August 16, 2001. On May 27, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m., Arzadon asked her to deliver a book to an office located at another building but when she returned to their office, the lights had been turned off and the gate was closed. Nevertheless, she went inside to get her handbag. On her way out, she saw Arzadon standing beside a parked van holding a pipe. He told her to go near him and upon reaching his side, he threatened her with the pipe and forced her to lie on the pavement. He removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina. She wept and cried out for help but to no avail because there was nobody else in the premises. Petitioner did not report the incident because Arzadon threatened to kill her and her family. But when she discovered that she was pregnant as a consequence of the rape, she narrated the incident to her parents. On July 24, 2002, petitioner filed a complaint for rape against Arzadon. Assistant Prosecutor and panel of Prosecutors found that there was a probable cause. Petitioner failed to appear 4 consecutive orders to take the witness stand in order to satisfy the judge for the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Judge Carbonell dismissed Criminal Case No. 6983 for lack of probable cause on the ground that

the petitioner and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand. He claims that under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Issue: Whether respondent Judge Carbonell acted with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Criminal Case for lack of probable cause? Held: No. Judge Carbonell committed grave abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court explained that this constitutional provision does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses. We reiterated the above ruling in the case of Webb v. De Leon, where we held that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the function of the investigating prosecutor. True, there are cases where the circumstances may call for the judges personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in support thereof. Indeed, what the law requires as personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez, we stressed that the judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. If the report, taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted. Case #5 JERRY VALEROSO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES September 3, 2009G.R. No. 164815 STATEMENT OF THE CASE: A petition for review on certiorari involving the decision of the Hon. Court of Appeals which affirmed that of the RTC of Quezon City in finding the petitioner-accused Jerry Valeroso liable of illegal possession of firearm.

FACTS: Petitioner was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. 1866 and was found liable as charged before the RTC of Quezon City. On July 10, 1996, the Central District Command served a duly issued warrant of arrest to Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso in a case of kidnapping for ransom. Valeroso was found and arrested in INP Central Station in Culiat, Quezon City where he was about to board a tricycle. He was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was later verified by the Firearms and Explosive Division at Camp Crame and was confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person. The defense on the other hand contended that Valeroso was arrested and searched in the boarding house of his children in New Era Quezon City. He was aroused from his slumber when four heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room. The pointed their guns on him and pulled him out of the room as the raiding team went back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later an operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. Adrian Yuson, an occupant to the adjacent room testified for the defense. SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that the firearm with live ammunition was issued to Jerry Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt. The petitioner was found guilty as charged by the RTC. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the same. Hence this petition. Petitioner raised the issue of legality of the search and the admissibility and validity of the evidence obtained as the same was the fruit of the poisonous tree. ISSUE: 1. 2. RULING: 1. No. The court explained that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapon that the latter might use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape, or for the protection of the officer, as well as to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence on the suspects person. A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase within the area of his immediate control means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. The court said that the cabinet which was locked could no longer be considered as an area within his immediate control because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him. The court further added that this exception should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its purpose. 2. No. The plain view doctrine may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures or to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Whether or not the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition is valid. Could the warrantless search be justified under the plain view doctrine?

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the February 22, 2008 Decision and June 30, 2008Resolution are RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. RATIONALE/REASON: From the foregoing narration of facts, we can readily conclude that the arresting officers served the warrant of arrest without any resistance from Valeroso. They placed him

immediately under their control by pulling him out of the bed, and bringing him out of the room with hishands tied. To be sure, the cabinet which, according to Valeroso, was locked, could no longer be considered as an "area within his immediate control" because there was no way for him to take any weapon or to destroy any evidence that could be used against him. Case#7:SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENTAGENCY (GRs. 157870, 158633 and 161658) November 3, 2008 Facts: Before the Court are 3 consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 36of RA 9165 or theComprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses. According to Aquilino Pimentel Jr., a senator of the RP and a candidate for re-election in May 2004 elections, saidmandatory drug testing imposes an additional qualification for Senators beyond that which are provided by theConstitution. No provision in the Constitution authorizes the Congress or the COMELEC to expand the qualificationrequirements of candidates for senator. Meanwhile, SJS contends that Section 36(c)(d)(f) and (g) are constitutionally infirm as it constitutes unduedelegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It also violates the equal protection clause as it can be used to harass a student or employee deemedundesirable. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached.In addition to the abovementioned contentions. Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as a citizen and taxpayers maintainsthat said provision should be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the rightagainst unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the dueprocess and equal protection guarantees. Issue: Whether Section 36 (c), (d), (f) and (g) are unconstitutional? Held: Section 36 (c) and (d) are constitutional while (f) and (g) are not. Ratio: Section 36 (c) and (d) As to students and employees of private and public offices Using US authorities, the Court ruled in favour of the constitutionality of Section 36(c) applying the following reasonabledeductions: (1) schools and their administrators standin loco parentiswith respect to their students; (2) minor studentshave contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students andmay adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right toimpose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.Therefore, the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students areconstitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of

educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it issubject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, themandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private officesis justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason.For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much aspossible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shallemploy two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possiblethe trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted bytrained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguardagainst results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees'privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,and is relatively minimal. SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x xx The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x xx The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: xxxx(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x xx for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law; xxxx(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug tes t;(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. (SEARCH AND SEIZURE) In context, the right to privacy means the right to be freefrom unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to causehumiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow fromC. Camarav. Municipal Court . Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power. The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which thedrug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. Just as defining asthe first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scopeof the search or

intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated inOple v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search"narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well- being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. Taking into account theforegoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likelyto be met by the search, and the well defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of therandom testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonableand,ergo, constitutional.Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonablesupervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote ahigh standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees,the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to beaccountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.On the charge of being anundue delegation, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to giveunbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. It expressly provides how drugtesting for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should beconducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be inaccordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedureshall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplannedway. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results areestablished. Section 36 (f) as to persons charged before the prosecutors office with criminal offenses The Court found the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's officewith criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in themandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before theprosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness andbeing suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are notrandomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged,they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled beforethe prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarilyconsent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is ablatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of theConstitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. Section 36 (g)- as to candidates for public office(not material to search and seizure) It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and voidand has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts withthe Constitution.

In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but toyield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. Thus, legislativepower remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe boththe exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional limitations arechiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing thequalifications of candidates for senators.In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgatingrules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to whatthe Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, theCOMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should notbe defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. Case#9 United States v. Jones (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012) 2012 WL 171117; No. 10-1259 In a hotly anticipated decision, the Supreme Court unanimously found that the Governments warrantless attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device to a vehicle to monitor its movement constituted a Fourth Amendment violation. While unanimous in judgment, the Court split on both its underlying reasoning and with regards to whether the tracking amounted to a search at all. The Court also did not reach the question of whether the search was reasonable. Due to the Courts fractured analysis, it remains unclear when the Government must obtain a warrant to track a vehicles movements, particularly in the case of short-term monitoring. In concurrence, Justice Alito also suggests that if the public views the losses of privacy brought on by new technologies as inevitable, his Katz analysis would be different in future cases. Facts and Procedural History: In 2004, respondent Antonie Jones, owner and operator of a nightclub, was suspected of and investigated for trafficking in narcotics. Based on information the government gathered through their investigation, they applied for a warrant authorizing the use of a GPS device on a Jeep registered to Joness wife. The warrant was issued, authorizing the Government to install the GPS device on the Jeep in the District of Columbia within 10 days. Agents, however, did not abide by those requirements, installing the GPS device on the eleventh day and not in the District of Columbia but in Maryland. Nonetheless, for the next 28 days agents used the device to track the vehicles location, collecting over 2,000 pages of data. Eventually, Jones was charged with, among other things, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Before trial, Jones filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the GPS device. The District Court granted the motion in part, suppressing only the data obtained while the vehicle was parked in Joness garage; the remaining data was held admissible because [a] person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. Joness 2006 trial produced a hung jury. Then, in 2007, a grand jury returned another indictment against Jones. The Government used the same GPS data, which connected Jones to a stash house that contained $850,000 in cash, 97 kilos of cocaine, and 1 kilo of cocaine base. This time the jury found Jones guilty, and the court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the conviction, finding the installation of the GPS device and collection of GPS data without a valid warrant to violate the Fourth Amendment. A rehearing en banc was denied and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Opinion of the Court:

Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, focused on the fact that the Government physically trespassed on private property for the purpose of obtaining information. Because the physical trespass was on property expressly protected by the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia found the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test from Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 351 (1967) inapposite. Instead, Justice Scalia revitalized and then used a common-law trespassory test. Under this trespassory test, it was irrelevant whether Jones had a reasonable expectation of privacy in data about where his car had traveled it was enough that the Governments trespass on Joness effect would have constituted a search within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Sotomayor Concurrence: While Justice Sotomayor joined the majority opinion, her separate concurrence makes clear that while she found the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test unnecessary in this case, had a Katz test been necessary, she would have found a reasonable expectation of privacy violated. The majority of her concurrence was then dedicated to articulating her Katz analysis. But, before moving on to her Katz analysis, it is interesting to note that Justice Sotomayors articulation of the majoritys holding deviated slightly, though potentially significantly, from the majoritys own articulation. The majority found that a trespass becomes a search when the trespass is done for the purpose of or with an attempt to find something or obtain information. Justice Sotomayor, however, stated that she agree[s] that a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum, [w]here, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected area. By making no reference to the purpose or aim of the trespass, Justice Sotomayors articulation suggests somewhat broader Fourth Amendment protection. Justice Sotomayors Katz analysis further showed her broad reading of the Fourth Amendment by making clear that, unlike Justice Alito, she would likely find even short-term GPS monitoring, regardless of physical trespass, a violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Sotomayor observed that incredibly sensitive information can be deduced from a persons movements (e.g., trips to psychiatrists, abortion clinics, AIDS treatment centers, gay bars, and places of worship). And, given how easy and cheap it is for the government to collect and then store and mine that data for years, she found such monitoring particularly likely to chill free expression. Justice Sotomayor then again went further than the other Justices by stating that a reconsideration of the third-party doctrine may be required. Referring specifically to Internet browsing records, she found that people would find warrantless disclosure of browsing information to the Government unacceptable. By stating that secrecy should not be a prerequisite for privacy, Justice Sotomayor cast welcome doubt on the third-party doctrine. Justice Sotomayor presents an incredibly pro-privacy position that will likely resonate with a generation that finds an expectation of privacy reasonable when paired with nuanced privacy settings, passwords, and encryption. Justice Alito Concurrence: Justice Alito dismissed the majoritys reliance on a trespassory test and instead analyzed the case through Katz. Finding Joness reasonable expectation of privacy violated, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, concurred in judgment. Justice Alito began by criticizing the majority for not adequately explaining how the attachment or use of the GPS device constituted either a search or a seizure. There was no seizure because there was no meaningful interference with Joness possessory in terest. And, as for a search, Justice Alito expressed skepticism: the placing of a GPS device on the car was not a search by itself, and the use of the device did not seem like a search either. He also faulted the majority for disregarding the central issue of the case: the use of GPS for long-term tracking, regardless of whether that tracking amounts to physical trespass. In contrast to the majority, Justice Alito found that the Fourth Amendment should simply be understood as prohibiting every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon an

individuals privacy, where physical trespass and technical search and seizure are neither necessary nor sufficient for finding such a Fourth Amendment violation. Through his analysis, Justice Alito found that while relatively short-term monitoring of a persons movements on public streets does not violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, long-term GPS monitoring in investigations for most offenses does. However, Justice Alito noted that technological changes may fundamentally alter popular privacy conceptions and, as a result, future applications of the Katz test. Specifically, while the public may find privacy losses brought on by new technologies as unwelcome, they may also accept them as inevitable. And, the belief that privacy losses are inevitable will then alter what counts as a reasonable expectation of privacy. Justice Alito thus ended by suggesting that legislation and not Fourth Amendment protection may be the better way to deal with these technological intrusions in the future. Case#11: United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez Decided on Feb. 28, 1990; 494 US 259 The Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country. The reference in the Constitution to "the people" means all citizens and legal aliens while in the United States. Facts: After the Government obtained an arrest warrant for respondent - a Mexican citizen and resident believed to be a leader of an organization that smuggles narcotics into this country - he was apprehended by Mexican police and transported [in the U.S.], where he was arrested. Following his arrest, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents, working with Mexican officials, searched his Mexican residences and seized certain documents. The District Court granted his motion to suppress the evidence, concluding that the Fourth Amendment - which protects 'the people' against unreasonable searches and seizures - applied to the searches, and that the DEA agents had failed to justify searching the premises without a warrant. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Citing Reid v. Covert, which held that American citizens tried abroad by United States military officials were entitled to Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections - the court concluded that the Constitution imposes substantive constraints on the Federal Government, even when it operates abroad. Relying on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, where a majority assumed that illegal aliens in the United States have Fourth Amendment rights - the court observed that it would be odd to acknowledge that respondent was entitled to trial-related rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, but not to Fourth Amendment protection." On certiorari, the US Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Issue: Whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the search and seizure by United States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country? Held: No. The Supreme Court held that "The Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and seizure by United States agents of property owned by a nonresident alien and located in a foreign country. The Fourth Amendment phrase 'the people' seems to be a term of art used in select parts of the Constitution and contrasts with the words 'person' and 'accused' used in Articles of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments regulating criminal procedures. This suggests that 'the people' refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community. The Fourth Amendment's drafting history shows that its purpose was to protect the people of the United States against arbitrary action by their own Government and not to restrain the Federal Government's actions against aliens outside United States territory... The view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the Government exercises its power is contrary to this Court's decisions in the Insular Cases, which held that not all

constitutional provisions apply to governmental activity even in territories where the United States has sovereign power... Those cases in which aliens have been determined to enjoy certain constitutional rights establish only that aliens receive such protections when they have come within the territory of, and have developed substantial connections with, this country. Respondent, however, is an alien with no previous significant voluntary connection with the United States, and his legal but involuntary presence here does not indicate any substantial connection with this country. The Court of Appeals' rule would have significant and deleterious consequences for the United States in conducting activities beyond its borders... Any restrictions on searches and seizures incident to American action abroad must be imposed by the political branches through diplomatic understanding, treaty, or legislation." The US Supreme Court reversed the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit judgment.

Privacy of Communication and Correspondence Case#2: Ontario vs. QuonNo. 08-1332 (U.S. Jun. 17, 2010) Facts: Plaintiff, a police officer on defendant city's Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team, claimed that the city violated his 4th Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. The city provided alpha-numeric text pagers to its SWAT Team under a contract with a service provider that included a set number of characters that could be sent or received each month without the payment of additional fees. The police officer on several occasions exceeded the limit and reimbursed the city for overages. The city's police chief asked for a report on such overages in order to learn, according to the Supreme Court, whether officers were paying overage fees for work-related messages or private messages. Transcripts of text messages over two months were obtained from the pager service provider, and the report to the police chief concluded that plaintiff violated department rules because on an average workday, only 3 of 28 of the officer's messages were related to police business. A city "Computer Policy" signed by the officer did not apply because the messages never passed through a city computer. However, the officer had been told that pager messages would be treated the same as email. The policy in part stated that "[t]he City of Ontario reserves the right to monitor and log all network activity including e-mail and Internet use, with or without notice," and that "[u]sers should have no expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources." Employees were told verbally that the text-messaging pagers were considered e-mail and subject to the general policy. The district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed in part. The court held that city employees had a reasonable expectation of privacy for the text messages they sent on their city-issued pagers because there was no text message privacy policy in place. Moreover, the court noted that the police department's review of the text messages was unreasonable because it could have used "less intrusive methods" to determine whether employees' had properly used the text messaging service. Issues: 1) Whether a city employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages transmitted on his city-issued pager when the police department has no official privacy policy for the pagers? 2) Whether the Ninth Circuit contravene Supreme Court precedent by analyzing whether the police department could have used "less intrusive methods" of reviewing text messages? Held:

(1)

Without addressing employee privacy expectations when using employer computers, the Supreme Court held that a city's search of a SWAT Team member's messages on a cityissued pager was reasonable. The search was "motivated by a legitimate work-related purpose," and "it was not excessive in scope." Assuming the officer "had a reasonable expectation of privacy," the Court held that the City's search of the officer's text messages was reasonable in its inception and its scope. After declaring that it "must proceed with care when considering the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment owned by a government employer," the court acknowledged competing views of employee privacy expectations: Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for self-expression, even selfidentification. That might strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. On the other hand, the ubiquity of those devices has made them generally affordable, so one could counter that employees who need cell phones or similar devices for personal matters can purchase and pay

for their own. And employer policies concerning communications will of course shape the reasonable expectations of their employees, especially to the extent that such policies are clearly communicated. The Court then concluded that if the special needs of the workplace justified an exception to the general rule that warrantless searches were per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, then the search of the officer's text messages was reasonable. The search was justified at its inception because it was ordered to determine whether character limits in the city's contract with the service provider met the needs of the city. The scope of the search also was reasonable and "not 'excessively intrusive'" because only transcripts of message during on-duty hours for a two-month period were reviewed. The Court added that a SWAT Team member "could have anticipated that it might be necessary for the City to audit pager messages to assess the SWAT Team's performance in particular emergency situations."

(2)

Yes. The Supreme Court held that the City of Ontario did not violate its employees' Fourth Amendment rights because the city's search of Mr.Quon's text messages was reasonable. The Court reasoned that even assuming that Mr.Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, the city's search of them was reasonable because it was motivated by a legitimate work- related purpose and was not excessive in scope. In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's "least intrusive" means approach to the issue. Justice John Paul Stevens concurred. He observed that the majority had not settled on one of the three approaches enunciated in O'Connor v. Ortega for determining the parameters of a "reasonable expectation of privacy." He reasoned that under any of the three approaches, Mr.Quon's expectations were not violated. Justice Antonin Scalia concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. He disagreed that the Court tacitly reaffirmed the O'Connor framework for determining whether the Fourth Amendment applies to public employees, arguing that it was "standardless" and "unsupported."

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM #1 FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. RAUL M. GONZALES, in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Justice; and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondents. G.R. No. 168338 February 15, 2008 In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial and so inextricably woven into the right to free speech and free expression, that any attempt to restrict it must be met with an examination so critical that only a danger that is clear and present would be allowed to curtail it. Facts: On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. Later, in a Malacaang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the complete version, and the other, a spliced, "doctored" or altered version, which would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to manipulate the election results in the Presidents favor. It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but subsequently made a retraction. On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap. Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers. Respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc (CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence. In another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations "found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape" of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about fixing votes in the 2004 national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer and GMA7 television network, because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the contents of the tape more widely. He then expressed his intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, "I [have] asked the NBI to conduct a tactical interrogation of all concerned." On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS

NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information. Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a Joint Press Statement. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, "praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents. Issues: (a) Does the petitioner has a legal standing of the case? (b) What is the extent of the right to information of the public? (c) Whether free speech and freedom of the press have been infringed? Held: The Procedural Threshold: Legal Standing Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that we strike down the acts and statements made by respondents as violations of the right to free speech, free expression and a free press. For another, the recipients of the press statements have not come forwardneither intervening nor joining petitioner in this action. Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint statement with respondent NTC that does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press. This Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them. Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society, it brushes aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the civil rights, the freedom of expression. Re-examining the law on freedom of speech, of expression and of the press Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands on a higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties. This preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognition now enshrined in international law as a customary norm that binds all nations. In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. This right was elevated to constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our own lesson of history, both political and legal, that freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom. Moreover, our history shows that the struggle to protect the freedom of

speech, expression and the press was, at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms. For it is only when the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will be capable of rendering enlightened judgments. Abstraction of Free Speech Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the press should allow and even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view "induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political, economic, scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority. While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media, as will be subsequently discussed. Differentiation: The Limits & Restraints of Free Speech From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation. But the realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridge such freedom. For freedom of expression is not an absolute, nor is it an "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom." Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society. Distinctions have therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. A study of free speech jurisprudencewhether here or abroadwill reveal that courts have developed different tests as to specific types or categories of speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversive speech; obscene speech; the speech of the broadcast media and of the traditional print media; libelous speech; speech affecting associational rights; speech before hostile audiences; symbolic speech; speech that affects the right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights of assembly and petition. Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and

the danger contemplated; (b) the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; and (c) the clear and present danger rule which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high." As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present danger test to resolve free speech challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we have generally adhered to the clear and present danger test. In Focus: Freedom of the Press The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of clear conscience. Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving of extra protection. Indeed, the press benefits from certain ancillary rights. The productions of writers are classified as intellectual and proprietary. Persons who interfere or defeat the freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication are liable for damages, be they private individuals or public officials. Anatomy of Restrictions: Prior Restraint, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; (3) freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of circulation. At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts constitute prior restraints. This presents a unique tinge to the present challenge, considering that the cases in our jurisdiction involving prior restrictions on speech never had any issue of whether the governmental act or issuance actually constituted prior restraint. Rather, the determinations were always about whether the restraint was justified by the Constitution. And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle have been etched on a case-to-case basis, always tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against the circumstances in which they operate, and then determining the appropriate test with which to evaluate. Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media Finally, comes respondents argument that the challenged act is valid on the ground that broadcast media enjoys free speech rights that are lesser in scope to that of print media. The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one other. Contrasted with the regime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines and traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film and video have been subjected to regulatory schemes. The three major reasons why broadcast media stands apart from print media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print medium may be limitless]; (b) its "pervasiveness" as a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children. Because cases involving broadcast media need not follow "precisely the

same approach that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media," nor go "so far as to demand that such regulations serve compelling government interests," they are decided on whether the "governmental restriction" is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest,"or the intermediate test. Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed a differentiation in treatment between broadcast and print media. Nevertheless, a review of Philippine case law on broadcast media will show thatas we have deviated with the American conception of the Bill of Rights we likewise did not adopt en masse the U.S. conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast media, particularly as to which test would govern content-based prior restraints. Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in treatment, in the main, is in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast media that is not imposed on traditional print media, and narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography, seditious and inciting speech), or is based on a compelling government interest that also has constitutional protection, such as national security or the electoral process. Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has consistently held that the clear and present danger test applies to content-based restrictions on media, without making a distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media. This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule has been applied to all cases that involve the broadcast media. The rule applies to all media, including broadcast, but only when the challenged act is a content-based regulation that infringes on free speech, expression and the press. That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print media is observed also in other jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes in place over broadcast media include elements of licensing, regulation by administrative bodies, and censorship. Ruling in the Case At Bar To recapitulate, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media. This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. The Court ruled that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. Our laws are of different kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but does not endanger national security. There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record. The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of the land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of speech and of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation. The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of each case. For there are no hard and fast

rules when it comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative freedoms are never set in stone. In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities, for constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. SO ORDERED. Case# 4: G.R. No. 170643 September 8, 2006 JEJOMAR C. BINAY, for and in behalf of his minor daughter, JOANNA* MARIE BIANCA S. BINAY, petitioner, vs.THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GENIVI V. FACTAO and VICENTE G. TIROL, respondents. Facts: In the April 15-21, 2001 issue of Pinoy Times Special Edition, an article entitled "ALYAS ERAP JR." was published regarding the alleged extravagant lifestyle of the Binays and the assets that they acquired while in public office. Paragraph 25 of the article reads:

Si Joanne Marie Bianca, 13 angsinasabingamponganakngmgaBinay, ay bumibiling panty nanagkakahalagang P1,000 angisa, ayonsaisang writer niBinay. Magarboangpamumuhayngbatangitodahilnaspoiledumanongkanyangama.

Based on this article, Elenita S. Binay, mother of the minor Joanna Marie Bianca, filed a complaint for libel against private respondents Vicente G. Tirol as publisher, and Genivi V. Factao as writer of the article, with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case for libel and recommended the filing of information against private respondents. The casewas filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. With the Secretary of Justice, it reversed the City Prosecutors findings and directed the withdrawal of the information filed in court. CA affirmed the reversal. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether there is prima facie evidence showing that the subject article was libellous? Held: Petition granted. Under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead." Its elements are as follows: (a) an imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) the existence of malice. Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, it must be defamatory, malicious, published, and the victim is identifiable. The elements of publication and identity of the person defamed are present in this case. Thus, in resolving the issue at hand, we limit our discussion on whether paragraph 25 of the subject article contains the two other elements of libel, to wit: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another, i.e., whether the paragraph is defamatory; and (b) existence of malice.

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are construed in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense. There was a prima facie showing that paragraph 25 of the subject article is defamatory. It is opprobrious, ill-natured, and vexatious as it has absolutely nothing to do with petitioner's qualification as a mayoralty candidate or as a public figure. It appears that private respondents only purpose in focusing on Joannas status as an adopted child and her alleged extravagant purchases was to malign her before the public and to bring her into disrepute. This is a clear and simple invasion of her privacy. Paragraph 25 does not qualify as a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication, which Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code limits to the following instances: (1) A private communication made by a person to another in the performance of any legal, moral, or social duty; and (2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. To qualify under the first category of a conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communication, paragraph 25 must fulfill the following elements: (1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without malice. Whichever way we view it, we cannot discern a legal, moral, or social duty in publishing Joanna's status as an adopted daughter. Neither is there any public interest respecting her purchases of panties worth P1,000.00. Whether she indeed bought those panties is not something that the public can afford any protection against. With this backdrop, it is obvious that private respondents' only motive in inserting paragraph 25 in the subject article is to embarrass Joanna before the reading public. In addition, the claim that paragraph 25 constitutes privileged communication is a matter of defense, which is can only be proved in a full-blown trial. It is elementary that "a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties evidence. It is for the presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof. Moreover, under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. It is thus incumbent upon private respondents to prove that "good intention and justifiable motive" attended the publication of the subject article. #5 MTRCB v. ABS-CBN and Loren Legarda (2005) G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005 FACTS:

ABS-CBN aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of The Inside Story produced and hosted by Loren Legarda. It depicted of female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees and interviewed student prostitutes, pimps, customers and some faculty members. Philippine Womens University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the faade of PWU served as the background of the episode. It caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia de Guzman (Chancellor and Trustee of PWU) and PWU Parents and Teachers Association file letter complaints with petitioner MTRCB, alleging that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students. MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee alleging that respondents: 1. It did not submit The Inside Story to MTRCB for review 2. it exhibited the same without its permission, violating Sec. 7 of PD 1986 and Sec. 3, Chapter III and Sec. 7, Chapter IV of MTRCB Rules and Regulations Respondents: The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press. MTRCB has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents. MTRCB Investigating Committee ordered respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the program and declared that all subsequent programs of the The Inside Story and all other programs of the ABSCBN Ch 2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing. On appeal, the Chairman of MTRCB issued a Decision affirming the ruling of the Investigating Committee. Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with the RTC and sought to: 1. declare unconstitutional certain provisions of PD 1986 and MTRCB Rules and Regulations 2. (alternative) exclude the The Inside Story from the coverage of such provisions 3. annul and set aside MTRCB Decision and Resolution because they constitute prior restraint on respondents exercise of freedom of expression and of the press, and those provisions do not apply to the The Inside Story because it falls under the category of public affairs program, news documentary or socio-political editorials governed by standards similar to those governing newspapers. RTC decided in favor of ABSCBN: 1. annulled Decision and Resolution of the MTRCB 2. declared that assailed provisions do not cover The Inside Story and other similar programs for being public affairs programs which can be equated to newspapers Hence, this petition for review on certiorari by MTRCB. Issue: WON the MTRCB has the power/authority to review the The Inside Story prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television. YES MTRCB/SG: (1) all tv programs including public affairs programs, news documentaries or sociopolitical editorials are subject to MTRCBs power of review, (2) tv programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus liberal regulation cannot apply, (3) power to review tv programs does not amount to prior restraint, (4) Sec. 3(b) of PD 1986 does not violate respondents constitutional freedom of expression and of the press. SC RULING: Rule in statutory construction: Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos (where the law does not make any exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justify it). When the law says all television programs, the word all covers all tv programs, whether religious, public affairs,

news documentary, etc. Since The Inside Story is a tv program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review. It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and present, designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x. Yet despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos religious program from petitioners review power. Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside Story is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status. If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story which, according to respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status. The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. ISSUE: WON The Inside Story falls under the category of Newsreels. Respondents: Yes. SC RULING: NO. It is not defined in PD 1986 but Websters dictionary defines it as short motion picture films portraying or dealing with current events; mostly reenactments of events that had already happened. The MTRCB Rules and Regulations define it as straight news reporting, as distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and opinions. The Inside Story is more of a public affairs program, a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure tv news and newsrelated commentaries, etc. within MTRCBs review power. MTRCB did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program nor did it cancel respondents permit. The latter was merely penalized for their failure to submit the program to MTRCB for its review and approval. Therefore, there is no need to resolve whether certain provisions of PD 1986 and MTRCB Rules and Regulations contravene the Constitution. No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry: 1. proper party 2. actual case or controversy 3. question raised at the earliest possible opportunity 4. the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself Petition of MTRCB Granted. RTC Decision Reversed. MTRCB Decision Affirmed. Case#6 JAPAN AIRLINES vs. SIMANGAN G.R. 170141 (April 22, 2008) FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner JAL appeals the: (1) Decision of the CA ordering it to pay respondent Jesus Simangan moral and exemplary damages; and (2) Resolution of the same court denying JAL's motion for reconsideration. The facts herein

follow: In 1991, respondent Simangan decided to donate a kidney to his ailing cousin, Loreto Simangan, in UCLA School of Medicine in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. Respondent needed to go to the United States to complete his preliminary work-up and donation surgery. Hence, to facilitate respondent's travel to the United States, UCLA wrote a letter to the American Consulate in Manila to arrange for his visa. In due time, respondent was issued an emergency U.S. visa by the American Embassy in Manila. Having obtained an emergency U.S. visa, respondent purchased a round trip plane ticket from petitioner JAL and was issued the corresponding boarding pass. While inside the airplane, JAL's airline crew suspected respondent of carrying a falsified travel document and imputed that he would only use the trip to the United States as a pretext to stay and work in Japan. The stewardess asked respondent to show his travel documents. Shortly after, the stewardess along with a Japanese and a Filipino haughtily ordered him to stand up and leave the plane. Respondent protested, explaining that he was issued a U.S. visa. However, He was still constrained to go out of the plane. Hence, he filed a case against JAL airlines. ISSUE: Are commentaries on public officials and on matters of public interests, privileged? RULING: As explained in the case of Borjal v. Court of Appeals, to wit: To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. Even though JAL is not a public official, the rule on privileged commentaries on matters of public interest applies to it. The privilege applies not only to public officials but extends to a great variety of subjects, and includes matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office. Considering that the published articles involve matters of public interest and that its expressed opinion is not malicious but based on established facts, the imputations against JAL are not actionable. Therefore, JAL may not claim damages for them. Case#8: Reno vs American Civil Liberties Union (1997) Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where a content-based blanket restriction on speech is overly broad by prohibiting protected speech as well as unprotected speech, such restriction is unconstitutional. Facts: Congress passed provisions in the Communications Decency Act of 1996 to protect minors from harmful material on the Internet. Two provisions criminalized the display of "indecent" or "patently offensive" online communications. The American Civil Liberties Union and many other groups challenged the constitutionality of these provisions in federal court. They argued that these provisions infringed on First Amendment free-speech rights. A lower federal court ruled the two provisions violated the First Amendment. The government appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. At issue is the constitutionality of two statutory provisions enacted to protect minors from indecent and patently offensive communications on the Internet. The District Court made extensive findings of fact about the Internet and the CDA. It held that the statute abridges the

freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Issue: Whether the two CDA statutory provisions at issue are constitutional? Held. No. Judgment of the District Court affirmed. Under the CDA, neither parents consent nor their participation would avoid application of the statute. The CDA fails to provide any definition of indecent and omits any requirement that the patently offensive material lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Further, the CDAs broad categorical prohibitions are not limited to particular times and are not dependent on any evaluation by an agency familiar with the unique characteristics of the Internet. CDA applies to the entire universe of the cyberspace. Thus, the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech, as such, cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time, place and manner restriction. The CDA lacks the precision that the First Amendment of the Constitution requires when a statute regulates the content of speech. In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the statute suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive. The CDA places an unacceptable burden on protected speech, thus, thestatute is invalid as unconstitutional. The government has a very important interest in protecting minors from harmful material. But the government cannot silence adult free-speech rights simply to protect minors and these provisions swept in sexual speech that was not obscene. "In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another." Concurrence. The constitutionality of the CDA as a zoning law hinges on the extent to which it substantially interferes with the First Amendment rights of adults. Because the rights of adults are infringed only by the display provision and by the indecency transmission provision, the judge would invalidate the CDA only to that extent. #11 GOVERNOR ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, JR., AURELIO C. ANGELES, JR., EMERLINDA S. TALENTO, and RODOLFO H. DE MESA, Petitioners, vs. LEO RUBEN C. MANRIQUE, Respondent. G.R. No. 186592 October 10, 2012 FACTS: This is a Petition for Indirect Contempt against respondent for allegedly publishing statements which tend to directly impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice. The instant case stemmed. from an article in Luzon Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation wherein respondent Manrique is the publisher/editor, which allegedly contained disparaging statements against the Supreme Court:

RULING: Malicious publications cannot seek the protection of the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press. Manrique tries to invoke the protection of the constitutional guaranties of free speech and press, albeit unpersuasively, to extricate himself from liability. However, said constitutional protection is not a shield against scurrilous publications, which are heaved against the courts with no apparent reason but to trigger doubt on their integrity based on some imagined possibilities. Contrary to nourishing democracy and strengthening judicial independence, which are the expected products of the guaranties of free speech and press, the irresponsible exercise of these rights wounds democracy and leads to division. In Alarcon, : Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with the requirements of equally important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community.18 Certainly, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Leo Ruben C. Manrique is hereby adjudgedGUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and is ordered to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P 20,000.00). Case#12: Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III (Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007) Facts: Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres. Aquino on Oct. 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to her under the Freedom Constitution. One of thepreambular clauses of TMC the law seeks to give effect to Article 11 of the International Code of Marketing of BreastmilkSubstituttes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the WHA (World Health Assembly) in 1981.In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Art. 24 of the instrument mandates that States should take measure to diminish infant mortality and should ensure that all segments of society are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. From 1982 2006, the WHA adopted several resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. On May 15, 2006, DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.The RIRR imposes a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes. On June 28, 2006, petitioner filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or Writ of Preliminary injunction. On August 15, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution granting the TRO, enjoining the respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR. Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions of TMC thereby amending and expanding the coverage of the said law.DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also various international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. They posit that the said international

Bukod sa mga kontrobersiya na bumabalot ngayon sa Korte Suprema dahil sa isyu ng umanoy pagpapatalsik kay Chief Justice Renato Puno, hindi maalis sa isip ng ilang Bataeo ang pagtatanong kung totoo nga kayang binayaran ng kampo ni Bataan Governor Enrique Garcia, Jr. ang isa o ilang Mahestrado ng Korte upang mag-isyu ng Temporary Restraining Order ang Korte na humarang sa implementasyon ng anim na buwang suspensyon ng Punong Lalawigan. Marami umano ang nagdududa kung papaano nakakuha ng TRO si Garcia gayung malinaw na ang kaso ay kasalukuyang dinidinig noon ng Court of Appealsx x x x May mga nagsasabing binayaran umano ng hanggang sa P20-Milyon ang isang mahestrado ng Korte upang pagbigyan ang kahilingan ni Garcia.x x x x Kaya naman hindi maalis ng ilan ang magduda na ang taong gipit sa kaso ay maaaring magbayad ng milyung-milyon piso upang upuan ng Korte Suprema ang kaso at manatiling habang buhay ang TRO.

instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore may be implemented by the DOH in the RIRR. Issue: Whether the RIRR is unconstitutional? Sub-issue(s): W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? Whether pertinent international agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the land and may thus be implemented through an RIRR, if so, is the RIRR in accord with such international agreements? Held: No. However, what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code which in turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. The other WHA Resolutions however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land. Ratio: 1. Are the international instruments referred to by the respondents part of the law of the land? The various international instruments invoked by respondents are: (1) The UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child (2) The International Convenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (3) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women These instruments only provide general terms of the steps that States must take to prevent child mortality. Hence, they do not have anything about the use and marketing of breastmilk substitutes The ICMBS and other WHA Resolutions however, are the international instruments which have specific provisions on breastmilk substitutes Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of domestic law in 2 ways: (1) Transformation an international law is transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation Treaties become part of law of the land through this method, pursuant to Art 7, Sec 21 wherein no treaty or international agreement shall be valid.. unless concurred by at least 2/3 of Senate The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are NOT treaties as they havent been concurred in by the required 2/3 vote. HOWEVER, the ICMBS has been transformed into domestic law through local legislation that is TMC. Therefore, it is not the ICMBS per se that has the force of law but its TMC. o While TMC is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, it did not adopt the latters provision on the absolute prohibition on advertising of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead the MC provides that advertising promotion or other marketing materials may be allowed if such materials are approved by a committee. (2) Incorporation by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law This is found under Art 2, Sec 2 The Philippines adopts generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land In Mihares v. Ranada: International law becomes customary rules accepted as binding as a result of two elements: 1.) Established, widespread, and consistent practice on part of the state 2.) Opinion jurissive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity. 2. -

Generally accepted principles of international law refer to norms of general or customary international law which are binding on all states, valid through all kinds of human societies, and basic to legal systems generally Fr. Bernas has a definition similar to the one above. Customary international law has two factors: 1.) Material factor how states behave The consistency and the generality of the practice 2.) Psychological or subjective factor why they behave the way they do Once state practice has been established, now determine why they behave they do. Is it ouor of courtesy or opiniojuris (the belief that a certain type of behavior is obligatory) When a law satisfies the two factors it becomes part of customary international law which is then incorporated into our domestic system

Since the WHA Resolutions have not been embodied in any local legislation, have they attained the status of customary law and hence part of our law of the land? The World Health Organization (WHO) is one of the international specialized agencies of the UN. According to the WHO Constitution, its the WHA which determines the policies of the WHO, the former also has the power to adopt regulations concerning advertising and labeling of pharmaceutical and similar products and to make recommendations to members on any matter within the Organizations competence Note that the legal effect of a regulation as opposed to recommendation is quite different (1) Regulations which are duly adopted by the WHA are binding on member states (2) On the other hand, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for its members unlike regulations. Rather, they carry moral and political weight as they constitute the judgment on a health issue of the collective membership of the highest body in the field of health. The WHA resolution adopting the ICMBS and the subsequent WHA resolutions urging states to implement the ICMBS are merely recommendatory and legally non-binding. Hence, unlike the ICMBS which has become TMC through legislative enactment, the subsequent WHA Resolutions, which provide for exclusive breastfeeding and prohibition on advertisements and promotions of breastmilk have not been adopted as domestic law. WHA Resolutions have been viewed to constitute soft law or non-binding norms, which influence state behavior. Soft law has been noted to be a rapid means of norm creation, in order to reflect and respond to the changing needs and demands of constituents (of the UN.) As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered customary law, it must be established that such rule is followed by states because it is considered obligatory (opiniojuris). In the case at bar, respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions are in fact enforced or practice by member states. Further, they failed to establish that provisions of pertinent WHA Resolutions are customary international law that may be deemed part of law of the land. Hence, legislation is necessary to transform the WHA resolutions into domestic law. They cannot thus be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law to be enacted by legislature.

Whether the DOH has the power to implement the WHA Resolutions under the Revised Administrative Code even in the absence of a domestic law? Only the provisions of the Milk Code. (as per the discussion above) Section 3, Chapter 1, Title IX of the RAC of 1987 provides that the DOH shall define the national health policy and can issue orders and regulations concerning the implementation of established health policies.

A.O. No 2005 -0014 which provides the national policy on infant and young child feeding, does not declare that as part of its policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk substitutes should be absolutely prohibited. Only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of the subsequent WHA Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the DOH through the subject RIRR.

Whether the provisions of the RIRR being in accordance with the Milk Code? Not all of them Assailed provisions: [1] extending the coverage to young children; [2] imposing exclusive breastfeeding for infants from 0-6 months; [3] imposes an absolute ban on advertising and promotion for breastmilk substitutes; [4] requiring additional labeling requirements; [5] prohibits the dissemination of information on infant formula; [6] forbids milk manufacturers and distributors to extend assistance in research and continuing education Although the DOH has the power under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk vis--vis breastmilk substitutes, this power is not absolute because it has no power to impose an absolute prohibition in the marketing, promotion and advertising of breastmilk substitutes. Several provisions of the Milk Code attest to the fact that such power to control information is not absolute. Sections 11 and 4(f) of the RIRR are clearly violative of the Milk Code because such provisions impose an absolute prohibition on advertising, promotion and marketing of breastmilk substitutes, which is not provided for in the Milk Code. Section 46 is violative of the Milk Code because the DOH has exceeded its authority in imposing such fines or sanctions when the Milk Code does not do so. Other assailed provisions are in accordance with the Milk Code. Whether Section 13 of the RIRR providing a sufficient standard? Yes. Questioned provision, in addition to Section 26 of Rule VII provide labeling requirements for breastmilk substitutes found to be in consonance with the Milk Code The provisions in question provide reasonable means of enforcing related provisions in the Milk Code. Whether Section 57 of the RIRR repeals existing laws? Section in question only repeals orders, issuances and rules and regulations, not laws. The provision is valid as it is within the DOHs rule-making power. An administrative agency has quasi-legislative or rule-making power. However, such power is limited to making rules and regulation subjected to the boundaries set by the granting statute and the Constitution. The power is also subject to the doctrine of nondelegability and separability of powers. The power, which includes amending, revising, altering or repealing, is granted to allow for flexibility in the implementation of the laws. Disposition: The Petition is Partially Granted. Only sections 4(f), 11 and 46 of A.O. 2006-0014 are declared null and void for being ultra vires. The TRO is lifted insofar as the rest of the provisions of A.O. 2006-0012 is concerned. #13 Pleasant Grove City v. Summum 555 U.S. 460 (2009) FACTS: Pioneer Park (Park), a public park in petitioner Pleasant Grove City (City), has at least 11 permanent, privately donated displays, including a Ten Commandments monument. In rejecting the request of respondent Summum, a religious organization, to erect a monument containing the Seven Aphorisms of Summum, the City explained that it limited Park monuments to those either directly related to the City's history or donated by groups with longstanding community ties. After the City put that policy and other criteria into writing, respondent renewed its request, but did not describe the monument's historical significance or respondent's connection to the community. The City rejected the request, and respondent filed suit, claiming that the

City and petitioner officials had violated the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause by accepting the Ten Commandments monument but rejecting respondent's proposed monument. The District Court denied respondent's preliminary injunction request, but the Tenth Circuit reversed. Noting that it had previously found the Ten Commandments monument to be private rather than government speech and that public parks have traditionally been regarded as public forums, the court held that, because the exclusion of the monument was unlikely to survive strict scrutiny, the City was required to erect it immediately. ISSUE: Whether a permanent monument donated by a private organization to Pleasant Grove retains its character as private speech, or whether it becomes government speech because the city owns, controls, and decides to display it? HELD: The placement of a permanent monument in a public park is a form of government speech and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause. (a) Because that Clause restricts government regulation of private speech but not government speech, whether petitioners were engaging in their own expressive conduct or providing a forum for private speech determines which precedents govern here. (1) A government entity "is entitled to say what it wishes," Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819, 833, and to select the views that it wants to express, see, e.g., Rust v.Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 194. It may exercise this same freedom when it receives private assistance for the purpose of delivering a government-controlled message. See Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Assn., 544 U. S. 550, 562. This does not mean that there are no restraints on government speech. For example, government speech must comport with the Establishment Clause. In addition, public officials' involvement in advocacy may be limited by law, regulation, or practice; and a government entity is ultimately "accountable to the electorate and the political process for its advocacy," Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U. S. 217, 235. (2) In contrast, government entities are strictly limited in their ability to regulate private speech in "traditional public fora." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 800. Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are allowed, see Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45, but content-based restrictions must satisfy strict scrutiny, i.e., they must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, see Cornelius, supra, at 800. Restrictions based on viewpoint are also prohibited. Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 463. Government restrictions on speech in a "designated public forum" are subject to the same strict scrutiny as restrictions in a traditional public forum. Cornelius, supra, at 800. And where government creates a forum that is limited to use by certain groups or dedicated to the discussion of certain subjects, Perry Ed. Assn., supra, at 46, n. 7, it may impose reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restrictions, see Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U. S. 98, 106-107. (b) Permanent monuments displayed on public property typically represent government speech. Governments have long used monuments to speak to the public. Thus, a governmentcommissioned and government-financed monument placed on public land constitutes government speech. So, too, are privately financed and donated monuments that the government accepts for public display on government land. While government entities regularly accept privately funded or donated monuments, their general practice has been one of selective receptivity. Because city parks play an important role in defining the identity that a city projects to its residents and the outside world, cities take care in accepting donated monuments, selecting those that portray what the government decisionmakers view as appropriate for the place in question, based on esthetics, history, and local culture. The accepted monuments are

meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a government message and thus constitute government speech. (c) Here, the Park's monuments clearly represent government speech. Although many were donated in completed form by private entities, the City has "effectively controlled" their messages by exercising "final approval authority" over their selection. Johanns, supra, at 560561. The City has selected monuments that present the image that the City wishes to project to Park visitors; it has taken ownership of most of the monuments in the Park, including the Ten Commandments monument; and it has now expressly set out selection criteria. (d) Respondent's legitimate concern that the government speech doctrine not be used as a subterfuge for favoring certain viewpoints does not mean that a government entity should be required to embrace publicly a privately donated monument's "message" in order to escape Free Speech Clause restrictions. A city engages in expressive conduct by accepting and displaying a privately donated monument, but it does not necessarily endorse the specific meaning that any particular donor sees in the monument. A government's message may be altered by the subsequent addition of other monuments in the same vicinity. It may also change over time. (e) "[P]ublic forum principles ... are out of place in the context of this case." United States v.American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U. S. 194, 205. The forum doctrine applies where a government property or program is capable of accommodating a large number of public speakers without defeating the essential function of the land or program, but public parks can accommodate only a limited number of permanent monuments. If governments must maintain viewpoint neutrality in selecting donated monuments, they must either prepare for cluttered parks or face pressure to remove longstanding and cherished monuments. Were public parks considered traditional public forums for the purpose of erecting privately donated monuments, most parks would have little choice but to refuse all such donations. And if forum analysis would lead almost inexorably to closing of the forum, forum analysis is out of place. Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U. S. 753, distinguished. Case#14 Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006 Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880. Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.

Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble. Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the rally. Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED. #15 Intergrated Bar of the Philippines, H. Harry L. Roque, et al. vs. Honorable Manila Mayor Jose Lito Atienza,

G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010

FACTS: IBP filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila an application for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge. The mayor issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge. The rally pushed through at Mendiola Bridge. A criminal action was thereafter instituted

against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit. ISSUE: WON the mayor can modify the venue on granting permit to rally? RULING: LAW Public Assembly Act of 1985; JURISPRUDENCE KMP(Bayan) vs Ermita The Supreme Court held that in modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof. Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.