January 2004

Operator's Lesson Plan

Hit Confirmations

I. Introduction

A positive hit response to a Wanted File inquiry may not be probable cause to
arrest but is considered "Lead Information Only". However, a hit confirmed with
the originating agency may be adequate grounds to recover an item or detain a
missing or wanted person.

To confirm a hit means to very that the theft report or warrant is still active and
the person or item described in the record appears identical to the person or
item described in the record, and to obtain information concerning return of the
person or the item to the originating agency or the rightful owner.

II. Objective

Upon completion of this lesson, the user will be able to answer test questions
on Hit Confirmation Requests, and Hit Confirmation Responses.

III. Hit Confirmations

Upon receipt of a hit confirmation request from an inquiring agency, the

originating agency (ORI) of the record must within 10 minutes (urgent) or
one hour (routine) furnish a substantive response i.e., a positive or negative
confirmation or notice of the specific amount of time necessary to confirm or
reject.

A requesting agency not receiving a substantive response within the prescribed

time should generate a second request.

If the agency generating the second request again fails to receive a substantive
response within the prescribed time, the agency should generate a third message.

An agency receiving a hit on a record containing the code "NOAH" (Notify ORI
of all Hits) in the Miscellaneous (MIS) Field or the MFC of NO A must advise the
originating agency of the hit regardless of whether the location of the person or
item is known.

Hit Confirmation fonnats should be utilized whenever an IDACS/NCIC Wanted

File "HIT" is made.

-148-
 The Absconder Apprehension Initiative

Under U.S. immigration law, absconders are non-citizens who willfully fail to depart the
United States after receiving a final order of deportation from an Immigration Judge.
They may be prosecuted for a federal felony.1 After September 11th, INS Commissioner
James Ziglar proposed that the names of 314,000 absconders be placed in the National
Crime Information Center (NCIC) database Wanted Persons file accessible by State and
local law enforcement.2 To meet NCIC standards, every absconder entry had to be
supported by a full set of fingerprints and a photograph so that the INS Law Enforcement
Support Center (LESC) could electronically transmit them to the querying law
enforcement official within ten minutes.3 If the absconder's identity was confirmed, then
the INS could place a federal detainer or arrange for an INS agent to take the individual
into custody and proceed with removal. Finding terrorists was not a focus of the
program.4 Attorney General Ashcroft liked the idea and Commissioner Ziglar announced
it on December 5, 2001.5 Shortly thereafter, the initiative was re-cast as a
counterterrorism program.6

Deputy Attorney General Thompson on January 25, 2002 provided guidance for the
newly named Absconder Apprehension Initiative (AAI). He explained that the object of
the initiative was to deport 314,000 alien fugitives, known as absconders, in two phases.
The first phase was to focus on several thousand priority absconders "who come from
countries in which there has been al Qaeda terrorist presence or activity .. . because some
of them have information that could assist our campaign against terrorism." 7 These
"special interest countries" were Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Djibouti,
Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates,
Uzbekistan, Yemen, Territories of Gaza and the West bank. DAG Thompson said that
the first group to be investigated would be "a group of fewer than a thousand, many of
whom appear to be convicted felons." The second phase of the initiative was to locate
and deport the remaining absconders.8 The Deputy Attorney General directed the FBI's

8 USC 1253 (failure to depart, imprisonment up to four years, 10 years if a criminal); 8 USC 1324d
(failure to depart, civil fine of $500 a day); 8 USC 1326 (reentry after deportation, imprisonment from two
to 20 years).
-^ Ziglar MFR 11/24/03 p.22
XNCIC 2000, Operating Manual, Section 5.6
/^Ziglar MFR p.22. The directive from the Attorney General did not define what was meant by "from
countries . . . ." Under the immigration law, this could apply to citizens of a country or persons who were
bprn in one of these countries.
*ZiglarMFRp. 23
-* ZiglarMFR p.23
7 NSU AAI final report
^Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization
Service, Director Federal Bureau of Investigation, Director, U.S. Marshals Service, US Attorneys, Subject:
Guidance for Absconder Apprehension Initiative, January 25, 2002.
Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) to remove any names that were subjects
of active terrorist investigations;9

At the INS, the National Security Unit (NSU) was tasked with of the project.10 The
project was aimed at 5,923 selected absconders when the project began.11 The AAI effort
was a massive undertaking for the NSU, a small unit that was the INS' primary counter
terrorism unit. The NSU developed a special project staff of its own agents, INS
intelligence analysts from the Office of Intelligence, and detailed agents from the INS
field offices, as many as 10 at a time, to develop the project. These additional officers
organized the leads, made copies of the documents in the file, created the work file, did
data entry and kept track of the case assignment.12 For each absconder case where a last
known address could be found, the NSU created a work file and sent it to a designated
supervisory special agent POC in the INS field office located in that geographic area.
The administrative tasks associated with the AAI required the detailing of many officers
to the NSU, which left fewer special agents available to investigate the AAI cases in the
field.13

To meet the terrorist-related reporting requirements imposed by the Department of

Justice, the NSU developed special reporting requirements, to ensure that all encounters
with designated absconders was treated as a "significant incident" and therefore reported
within 24 hours of the incident.14

Phase 1 of the AAI contained 5,932 cases. At the end of the project, 4,074 cases had
been closed.16 The difference of 1,858 would be the remaining open cases still under

9
The Commission believes that the FTTTF did remove some subjects from the list; we have not yet
learnedJiow many and whether these subjects remained of interest to the FBI on terrorism grounds. Nardi
MFRV, SL^- 4/1/0H
10 Nardi MFR 4/1/04/p. 1; see also, Testimony of Joe Green, INS Assistant Commissioner for
Investigations, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, June 19, 2002.
11 Nardi MFR p. 1 ; see also, Testimony of Joe Green, INS Assistant Commissioner for Investigations,
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, June 19, 2002.
12 Ziglar MFR, p. 22
13 Nardi MFR, p 1-2
^In the usual course of immigration enforcement activity, significant incidents are those
that involve death or injury of an officer, significant public and media interest, or an ^ y^
unusual event, such as the apprehension of large numbers of smuggled aliens.
•^Closing report as of 7/10/03 when the AAI Project was transferred from Investigations National Security
Unit to Detention and Removal Office.
X
BREAKDOWN OF 4,074 AAI CLOSED CASES

Administrative closing 55
Asylee/Refugee 14
Board of Immigration Appeals 42
Convention Against Torture 3
Deceased 24
Duplicate 12
investigation or cases for which there was no final report. The total number of absconder
cases that were actually closed as a result of verifying that the subject was no longer an
absconder was 2,267 or approximately 38% of the original number of 5,932.

AAI Phase 1
5,932 total initial cases
2,267 cases closed after investigation verified departure or immigration status
1,807 cases closed after investigation, unable to locate or verify immigration status
704 absconders located and removed from U.S. during Phase 1
1,858 cases remain open
14 cases referred to FBI for further investigation relating to possible terrorist links
0 cases prosecuted or removed on terrorism grounds

Identified as Females16 55
In State or Federal Custody 45
In Legal Non-Immigrant Status 11
LIFE Act Applicant 8
Legal Permanent Resident 191
Motion to Reopen Deportation Hearing 64
No Final Deportation Order 99
Under Order of Supervision 72
Other16 56
Pending Application for Immigration Benefits 47
Prior Removal 99
Refused Entry 7
Released on Bond 122
Removed from U.S. 704
Released on Order of Recognizance 25
Self-deported16 390
Stay of Deportation or Removal16 10
Temporary Protected Status (TPS)16 18
Unable to Locate or Leads Exhausted 1807
United States Citizen 80
Waiver Approved 5
Withholding 9
Total 4,074
By the summer of 2002, the initiative had resulted in the apprehension of approximately
700 fugitives.17 By early 2003, 1,139 of the designated absconders had been
apprehended, 704 had removed from the country, and 224 were in custody and awaiting
removal, hi addition, U.S. Attorneys had criminally prosecuted 45 of the absconders, 41
of which were prosecuted for criminal immigration violations.18 Although the INS had
referred 14 cases to the FBI based on possible links to terrorism, no absconders who were
removed, as part of Phase I, were deported under a terrorism statute, or prosecuted for
terrorist related crimes.

Not all 5,932 AAI cases were actually entered into NCIC. Immigration records do not
always provide the documents required by NCIC to support entry into the system. NCIC
criminal record checks were conducted on all AAI cases. A total of 863 had a criminal
history, hi many cases the disposition of the alien's criminal case was not part of the
NCIC record. Case agents determined what action was appropriate in each case. NCIC
hits resulting from routine record checks conducted by law enforcement agencies led to
the location of 95 absconders.19 The LESC confirms all NCIC hits on immigration
absconders in the NCIC Immigration Violators File. The LESC places a detainer on the
alien and refers the case to the local ICE field office for follow-up.

Three absconders were located as a result of the routine interaction between the FBI and
the LESC involving aliens who have been arrested and fingerprinted for criminal activity.

A continuing problem is the failure to have a compatible fingerprint system between the
FBI and the INS/ICE. NCIC records contain a complete set of fingerprints which are
readable by the IAFIS system. INS/ICE continues to use the two index finger prints that
can be matched in the IDENT system. The joining of the two systems has been under
development for many years but is behind schedule.20

A total of 191 absconders were found to be legal permanent residents when located.
Another 80 had been naturalized and were United States citizens. This was a total of 271
cases or about 5%. INS record keeping has always been unreliable. The reasons are
many. The INS "A" file is actually a paper file. The file is created from an alien's name
and was not linked to a biometric identifier. Aliens may use a variety of name variations
or they may use aliases to commit immigration fraud or to avoid deportation. Multiple

jr Testimony of Joe Green, INS Assistant Commissioner for Investigations, before the House Judiciary
*
Subcommittee on Immigration, June 19, 2002.
!&/'
-^Testimony of Mike Dougherty, Director of Operations, Bureau of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), Department of Homeland Security, before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration, May 8, 2003. A total of 41 were charged with criminal immigration violations.
-^Not all law enforcement agencies arrest immigration absconders even after they have received a "hit"
from NCIC. Some agencies believe that they cannot legally arrest or detain an alien unless a criminal arrest
warrant has been issued.
^ USDOJ/OIG, "IDENT/IAFIS: The Batres Case and the Status of the Integration Project, March 2004,
page 22,
files are not uncommon as the alien may apply for various immigration benefits at the
same time.2122

In some cases the reason can be explained by the fact that the final order of deportation
had been issued years previously. The alien had departed and then legally returned to the
United States. In other cases, it was because the United States had no system to record
departures and therefore the warrant of deportation was issued after the alien had already
departed.

Some files were created when the alien applied for immigration benefits and the original
"A" file was no located or known. This resulted in the alien having two immigration
tracks. One file was on the enforcement side of INS and the other was a temporary file
on the service side of INS. With over a million aliens arrested each year and over a
million aliens applying for benefits most years, the INS was overwhelmed.

The Commission believes the remaining absconders who were not apprehended in the
first phase of the program, no longer receive special attention from INS/DHS
enforcement personnel. The DHS is working to implement the proposed phase two of the
project, and incorporate in the same systematic fashion the remaining 314,000
absconders—or the current number—into the NCIC database after careful review.

In conclusion, despite the commitment of extensive investigative resources, only 38% of

the absconders could be located or their immigration status verified. The immigration
records system is so poor that approximately 5% of the absconders had, in fact, become
legal residents or naturalized citizens of the United States. Many of the absconders were
found to have left the United States, but without a verifiable entry-exit system that uses a
biometric identifier, their cases remained open. The difficulty encountered by the INS in
locating absconders is consistent with the difficulty generally encountered by
immigration authorities when attempting to locate aliens inside our country whether they
entered legally through a port of entry or illegally across an unguarded border.

It is very difficult to locate alien absconders without extraordinary effort or pure luck.

"^Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind sheik, who was convicted of terrorism, had two immigration files
at the same time. He did this by changing his name slightly and filing for immigration benefits at New
York City and Newark, New Jersey. Immigration files.
^ GAO Report 1-2003-004, "The Immigration and Naturalization Service's Removal of Aliens Issued Final
Orders", February 2003, page 1
9/11 Classified Information
\ 22

are absolutely terrified that the next attack could be from their borders. 82% of Canadian
exports come to US; 90% of Mexican. We send 25% to Canada and 15% to Mexico.
\g we did that would seriously limit trade would have a huge impact on their
\; fear of FORTRESS AMERCIA if we experience another attack. The
\n problem in Mexico: they are addressing a little; they have an FBI/CIA combo,
\d doing pretty well managing corruption. I think that has proven well. I I
| | At working level, so corrupt.

Volunteer Interview Program. The names on the voluntary interview process came
from the FTTTF. Steve McGraw, my recollection was that the list of 5000, that list got
compiled by FTTTF, compiled by FBI, but came out of INS records, and it was compiled
based on national origin. (Commission has Thompson memos on how the interviews
would be conducted.) As to relation to CT, our people went out with them. It was seen
as legitimate law enforcement technique where terrorists could potentially would be
hiding. The real reason was to recruit operatives. That meant that if found out
immigration violations, investigators would be act upon them. I didn't get into that level
of operation; that was a FBI issue. Nothing says our agents have to deport; that is up to
our discretion. LESC is helpful in helping state and locals, and decide whether or not to
pick up, and depends on resources we have available, so discretion used every day.

Alien Absconder Initiative. I actually started that program. When I got there, sometime
after 9/11, there were 314K people out on bond who failed to show up for final order of
deportation (in regs, constructive notice didn't count, had to have actual notice), and
actual notice without change of status, then afoul of fed crim laws. I said this was
unacceptable to have such defiance of US laws. Announced in front of House Judiciary
Cmte and luncheon speech at Chamber of Commerce. Idea was to go through files at
LESC and determine who'd received notice and who hadn't and who dead or gone. The
oldest first orders would go. All paper files, so long process in culling through them.
The names would go into NCIC. No activity to affirmatively find them. This was the
initial cut. This was not about terrorism at all, but immigration enforcement.

I was sitting with the AG, Levy, Ayres waiting to talk to Ridge in Roosevelt Room and I
told the AG about the initiative. The AG was very happy about it. One or two weeks
later I announced it. It wasn't anytime before it got hijacked by Kobach, and then I was
working at direction of AG's office. He saw it as an opportunity to turn it into a terrorist
thing. So then was to sort via terrorist sponsor states, and then see is if these people have
criminal backgrounds. The truth was that most of these had been removed. Then became
the absconder apprehension initiative: terrorist connection, then criminal, and got down
to 5,000. As they vetted these cases, then files were sent to field for FBI, US Attorneys
along with the INS (b/c federal criminal issue) it was driven through the US Attorneys
offices. Locals also worked these via the JTTFs and locals can participate in enforcement
of fed crim statutes, as well as immigration matter. It is the administrative, noncriminal
part of the INA that they don't have authority to enforce unless there's an MOU, although
now AG has an undisclosed opinion saying that locals/state can enforce civil and
criminal immigration laws. I don't know if AG changed the constructive notice portion
of initiarve; that was done close to time I left. I had no objection to changing the reg:
January 2004

Operator's Lesson Plan

Hit Confirmations

I. Introduction

A positive hit response to a Wanted File inquiry may not be probable cause to
arrest but is considered "Lead Information Only". However, a hit confirmed with
the originating agency may be adequate grounds to recover an item or detain a
missing or wanted person.

To confirm a hit means to very that the theft report or warrant is still active and
the person or item described in the record appears identical to the person or
item described in the record, and to obtain information concerning return of the
person or the item to the originating agency or the rightful owner.

II. Objective

Upon completion of this lesson, the user will be able to answer test questions
on Hit Confirmation Requests, and Hit Confirmation Responses.

III. Hit Confirmations

Upon receipt of a hit confirmation request from an inquiring agency, the

originating agency (ORI) of the record must within 10 minutes (urgent) or
one hour (routine) furnish a substantive response i.e., a positive or negative
confirmation or notice of the specific amount of time necessary to confirm or
reject.

A requesting agency not receiving a substantive response within the prescribed

time should generate a second request.

If the agency generating the second request again fails to receive a substantive
response within the prescribed time, the agency should generate a third message.

An agency receiving a hit on a record containing the code "NOAH" (Notify ORI
of all Hits) in the Miscellaneous (MIS) Field or the MFC of NOA must advise the
originating agency of the hit regardless of whether the location of the person or
item is known.

Hit Confirmation formats should be utilized whenever an IDACS/NCIC Wanted

File "HIT" is made.

U/rtJ-
- 148-
 23

your failure to follow the law should not be a defense, so I had no problem with changing
the reg; I initially was just following the reg as written. The Absconder Initiative was not
an effective CT measure necessarily because the singling out meant perception of fairness
that was damaging. I doubt whether any terrorists were found. We knew more about
these b/c had been through the process, so why spend extra money to single one group
out.

NSEERS. Kobach behind this too, to resurrect to the alien registration act of 1940s, a
law still on the books. There was a proposal Kobach put together to register state sponsor
citizens, and got attention of WH. It was a stand alone unconnected with Entry/Exit.
WH did huge pushback, OHS and DPC. Diana Schacht was primary immigration person
at DPC. At OHS, was Poncho Kenney and Flakenrath, Bruce Lawler. Kobach wanted to
do this, and went back to drawing board, and decided to marry registration with entry/exit
and use NSEERS as the first phase of entry /exit. Now putting these people in secondary,
with std set of interviews, and documents carrying got add'l scrutiny. National Security
Entry/Exit Registration System. Didn't change the content of it, just gave it new PR.
Seems like DOT would sneak things under the cover without full vetting of WH. I didn't
think regiratration would be very effective, if at all. I thought very expensive, resource
intensive, and not going to yield much if anything, that it would be disruptive of our
relations with other countries like Pakistan and Jordan. It is all about effectiveness with
me, after rule of law. I saw a money and time sink without tangible results. I was fairly
vocal internally.
Kobach was a WH fellow that wormed his way into AG's office. Very ambitious. Hope
with US VISIT they aren't making two print investment, b/c creates dislocation b/w
LAFIS and EDENT system. I'm on board of company that does electronic ten prints, so
maybe I shouldn't comment. They've said 1 1 potential terrorist connections via
NSEERS. How many detected through IBIS v. a print match. If they found through
prints, then biometric matters, on a risk management system, but I thin the hits were
really iBIS hits that POEs would've found without NSEERS in place. Kobach took over
NSEERS process; he mislead the Hill and the AG about the effectiveness of NSEERS;
would've found these people via IBIS anyway. /-* yjr

Call-in registration happened after I left. Would be a mess, and bad policy, and we got
nothing out of it. Kobach was driving this train as well.

A lot of things WH raised a lot of questions about. The state and local law enforcement
opinion from the Office Legal Counsel, hi 287(g) IIRJRIA, state and local may assist in
enforcement of single immigation laws pursuant to state agency /INS MOU. Legislative
history indicates that Congress was creating an exception to the preemption doctrine, we
are prepared to have state and local help us do our laws as long as under our guidance. .
There had been several incidences of MOUs, Utah etc. but local pressure said no. After ^ ^r
9/11, AG revisited the '96 opinion which had been rendered in '89 that state/local law
enforcement that couldn't enforce civil immigration laws, hi any event, '96 and '89
opinion revisited, hi Nov. 2001, OLC confirmed the '96 opinion, and told to go back and
do again, hi March, opinion said state/local could implement immigration laws. Don't
know how got to conclusion with immigration being a fed issue when immigration has
 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE / LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

11 . How many were charged criminally after being located?

44.

12. How many of these criminal prosecutions were related to immigration

violations?

A total of 41 were related to criminal immigration violations only. A total of

2 were related to criminal immigration charges and other criminal charges,
such as bank fraud and making false statement to the Social Security
Administration or the Internal Revenue Service. A total of 1 was related to
credit card fraud.

1 3. How many of these criminal prosecutions were related to terrorist

violations?

0.

14. How many were removed administratively?

A total of 803 (while under the purview of the NSU) were removed
administratively. All of these subjects are included in the number of
located subjects in the response to question #8.

15. Of these, how many were granted voluntary departure and how many
were actually deported?

INS removed all 803 subjects referenced in the response to question #14
at government expense. NSU did not separately track the subjects who
voluntarily departed; however, the NSU was able to conclusively confirm
through INS investigative efforts that 390 aliens "self -deported."

NSU did not separately track the number of the absconders who were
initially granted voluntary departure and failed to depart timely, thus
causing a warrant of deportation/removal to be issued.
i*-t
To what countries were they removed?

They were removed to the following countries: Afghanistan, Algeria,

Armenia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Canada, China, Denmark, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico,
Morocco, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Australia,
Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Austria, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Guinea, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Yemen.

vT/f
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE / LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
 (©fftre of tfje ^eputn ,Att0rneri (general
•Qlashingiini, Ji.C. 20530

January 25, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMISSIONER

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DIRECTOR
UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE

UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS

FROM: THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

SUBJECT: Guidance for Absconder Apprehension Initiative

Introduction

This memorandum is directed to those Department of Justice agencies that will be primarily
responsible for implementing the Absconder Apprehension Initiative ("the Initiative"). The
objective of this Initiative is to locate, apprehend, interview and deport a group of alien fugitives
known as "absconders." These absconders are aliens who, though subject to a final order of
removal, have failed to surrender for removal or to otherwise comply with the order. The
Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") has determined that there are approximately
314,000 such individuals.

While the INS will ultimately undertake to deport all 314,000 from the United States, there
are several thousand among that group who come from countries in which there has been Al Qaeda
terrorist presence or activity. We want to focus our initial efforts on these "priority absconders,"
as we believe that some of them have information that could assist our campaign against terrorism.
Among these priority absconders is a group of fewer than a thousand, many of whom appear to be
convicted felons, who will constitute the first list of absconders we will ask you to investigate.

" The purpose of this memorandum is to explain the process for apprehending and
interviewing the priority absconders. That process will involve the following steps: (1) entry of the
absconders into the National Crime Information Center database ("NCIC") by the INS; (2)
assignment of the absconders by judicial district, based on the most current address information;
1 - (3) transmission of the relevant portions of each absconder's INS file to the INS Field Office in the
assigned district; (4) assignment of the absconder fugitive investigations to apprehension teams k/rtf-
AKL
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE

The initial 6,000 non-citizens were selected based on three criteria:

1. Males
2. Final orders of deportation
3. Place of birth or citizenship was in al Qaeda supporting countries

The list of non-citizens was run through the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF).
There numerous databases were checked for information. The FTTF also diverted some cases f
out of the AAI project and provided them directly to the FBI. This process and other data TN
searches conducted by the NSU and the LESC resulted in a final target population of W «
approximately 5,000 to 5,200 non-citizens. IVJ^* .

The NSU took these files and determined the last address of record. A work file was then sent to K\O Y ^
the INS Investigations Office having jurisdiction over the last known address. Each District ,. > Af\^
office had a Supervisory Special Agent as a POC. The file was then checked again against V& ' 0
national and local databases. (Note: Many local databases such as public utility records, parking \vA. v *
violations, welfare records, etc. could not be searched from HQ). This required considerable ^
effort at the local office when the services of every INS office were severely taxed. The work
file was then usually assigned to a Special Agent (some were handled by SA's assigned to the
Joint Terrorist Task Forces, JTTF). There was a thirty (30) day call up on all assigned cases.
Thirty day extensions were only given when there were other open leads that had been developed
locally or there was a probability that the case could be closed by an arrest within the next thirty
days. All extensions had to be approved by NSU. The targeted population was not distributed
evenly throughout the United States. Some cities like Detroit and New York had a large number
of assigned AAI cases and did not have enough Special Agents to work them, hi many cases, the
location of the deportable alien was determined to be in another city. The work file would have
to be completed, returned to NSU and reassigned to another office.

Copies of significant documents in the "A" file were made and sent to the LESC. The LESC
would review the data and enter accepted cases into the NCIC wanted person file. However the
majority of the AAI cases were not entered into the NCIC because the "A" files did not contain
the required fingerprint card, photograph, or other data. These were needed to meet the NCIC
standard for "hit" confirmation.

Nardi stated that most of the selected cases were not criminal aliens. Some of the cases were
quite old and had few local leads. He did not remember any that had terrorist identifiers and to
the best of his knowledge, none of these cases resulted in terrorist prosecutions.

Lessons Learned

The AAI project was a costly, time consuming and labor intensive project. INS was not prepared
to undertake a nationwide investigation of this size.

Intelligence officers, who were critically needed to evaluate information in the Office of
Intelligence, were instead detailed to NSU to do clerk level data checks.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 COMMISSION SENSITIVE
[Unclassified]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Telephonic Interview with Louis Nardi

Type of event: Telephone Interview
Date: April 1, 2004
Special Access Issues: N/A
Prepared by: Walter T. Hempel
Team Number: 5
Location: Telephone
Participants - Louis Nardi, Former Deputy Director of the INS National Security Unit <t ^0 4~ [\s - Commissio

Background
Lou Nardi was Deputy Director of the INS National Security Unit (NSU) from to .
During that time the Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI) Phase 1 was initiated. The AAI was run •
out of the NSU in HQ and they had the responsibility to report the results, through channels, to
DOJ.

Nardi did not know how the initial 6,000 non-citizens were extracted from the pool of 314,000
that INS Commissioner Ziglar had announced as absconders. Nardi believed that the 314,000
were a computer search of the Deportable Alien Control System (DACS) which maintains
information on aliens that are in the deportation process, in INS custody, or who have been
deported from the United States. The DACS system, like all INS information systems, was well
known to have unreliable data. With at least eight "stovepipe" computer data bases, DACS
frequently would reflect that the alien was deportable when in fact there was a benefit
application under consideration. Also some deportable aliens in DACS had been granted
permanent residence or had been naturalized. INS often created multiple "A" files that were not
consolidated. This was because of poor recordkeeping, the use of names instead of biometrics to
open new files and the incompatibility of the various recordkeeping systems. gj

The AAI project was considered a critical task at NSU. This was at a time when over 50% of the j$ ,
2,000 INS Special Agents in the field had been assigned to the FBI for post 9-11 investigations.
The NSU did not have the personnel to handle the initial 6,000 target files. It was necessary to ~g p™
bring in intelligence officers from the Office of Intelligence and assign them to reviewing the §. S
files. This was at a time when there was an increased demand for products from the Office of o 8
Intelligence. Many Special Agents from the field were detailed for extended periods of time to "^ -<
work on the mechanics of the AAI project. The Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) sC) was
tasked with entering the AAI cases into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). I
n
J After 9-11, the number of daily record check queries increased greatly as
the nation's law enforcement agencies tried to prevent another terrorist attack.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Sensitive
 9/11 Law E n f o r c e m e n t Sensitive

COMMISSION SENSITIVE

The initial 6,000 non-citizens were selected, based on three criteria:

The list of non-citizens was run through the Foreign terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF),
There numerous databases were checked for informatibri. The FTTF also diverted some cases
out of the AAI project and provided them directly to the FBI. This process and other data
searches conducted by the NSU and the LESC resulted in a final target population of
approximately 5,000 to 5,200 non-citizens.

The NSU took these files and determined the last address of record. A work file was then sent to K\0 kt
the INS Investigations Office having jurisdiction over the last known address. Each District
office had a Supervisory Special Agent as a POC. The file was then checked again against , r,
national and local databases. (Note: Many local databases such as public utility records, parking \W\"
violations, welfare records, etc. could not be searched from HQ). This\required considerable »
effort at the local office when the services of every INS office were severely taxed. The work
file was then usually assigned to a Special Agent (some were handled by SA's assigned to the
Joint Terrorist Task Forces, JTTF). There was a thirty (30) day call up on all assigned cases.
Thirty day extensions were only given when there were other open leads that had been developed
locally or there was a probability that the case could be closed by an arrest within the next thirty
days. All extensions had to be approved by NSU. The targeted population was hot distributed
evenly throughout the United States. Some cities like Detroit and New York had a large number
of assigned AAI cases and did not have enough Special Agents to work them. In many cases, the
location of the deportable alien was determined to be in another city. The work file would have
to be completed, returned to NSU and reassigned to another office.

Copies of significant documents in the "A" file were made and sent to the LESC. The LESC
would review the data and enter accepted cases into the NCIC wanted person file. |

Nardi stated that most of the selected cases were not criminal aliens. Some of the cases were
quite old and had few local leads. He did not remember any that had terrorist identifiers and to
the best of his knowledge, none of these cases resulted in terrorist prosecutions.

Lessons Learned

The AAI project was a costly, time consuming and labor intensive project. INS was not prepared
to undertake a nationwide investigation of this size.

Intelligence officers, who were critically needed to evaluate information in the Office of
Intelligence, were instead detailed to NSU to do clerk level data checks.

COMMISSION SENSITIVE
 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE / LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Pursuant to the Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI) guidance memorandum from the
Deputy Attorney General, dated January 25, 2002, the Foreign Terrorist
Tracking Task Force (FTTTF) compiled a list of alien absconders per the criteria
detailed in the response to question #1. The INS Headquarters National
Security Unit (NSU) was responsible for managing Phase I of the project from
January 25, 2002 through July 2003. After July 2003, the Detention and
Removal Office (DRO) assumed management of the initiative.

1. Who was targeted in the original list of 5,900 aliens?

The total number of alien absconders who were targeted during Phase I of W* ff
the Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI) was 5923. The alien absconders were
all males from "countries in which the Intelligence Community indicated Al-
Qaeda terrorist presence or activity." All subjects identified had received
final orders of deportation/removal and had absconded. The Attorney
General and the FTTTF developed the following criteria that was used to
determine whether an individual was included on the list: 1) males; 2)
between ages of 18 - 50; and 3) from "special interest countries."1

2. What was the mechanism for determining who was to be included in the
original list?

Immigration database searches were conducted in the Deportable Alien

Control System (DACS) for male alien absconders between the ages of
18-50 who were from countries referenced in the response to question #1 .

3. How many had identifiable terrorist indicators?

During AAI Phase I, none of the subjects had been identified as possible
terrorist threats. The individuals were included in Phase I based on the
criteria as previously described in the response to question #1.

4. How many were from countries identified as supporting terrorism?

The subjects' Alien Registration Files (A-Files) were examined to

determine the subjects' country of birth and country of citizenship based
on the list of "special interest countries." As the term "from" used in the

1 The following list of countries from a compilation of State Department and other United States
government lists are referenced as "special interest countries:" Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon,
Libya, Malaysia, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan,
Yemen, Territories of Gaza & the West Bank

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE / LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE / LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

Appendix: AAI Statistics on subjects located

when NSTP transferred the program over to DRO

Breakdown of the Located Subjects

Administrative close 55
Asylee/Refugee 14
BIA Appeal 42
Convention Against Torture 3
Deceased 24
Duplicate 12
Female Case 55
In State/Fed Custody 45
In Status (Non-Immigrant) 11
LIFE Applicant 8
LPR 191
Motion to Reopen Filed/Granted 64
No Final Order Found 99
Order of Supervision 72
Other5 56
Pending Application 47
Prior Removed 99
Refused Entry 7
Released on Bond 122
Removed 704
ROR 25
Self-deported 390
Stay of Deport/Removal 10
Temporary Protective Status 18
USC 80
Waiver Approved 5
Withholding 9
2267

5Includes Juveniles, Informants, Government Sources, FTI/Never Received, For Consolidation, Post Order
Custody Review, Reconsideration by DD

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE / LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE

r Page 7 of 8

organizations often use human smuggling organizations to move around the globe. Many targets of

Operation Southern Focus were believed responsible for smuggling hundreds of aliens. Since the

inception of this operation, five significant alien smugglers have been arrested and charged with alien

smuggling violations, and significant alien smuggling pipelines have been severely crippled.

Alien Absconder Initiative

The INS recently initiated the Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI). The AAI is designed to identify

and apprehend unauthorized aliens who have unexecuted final orders of removal. The objective of Phase

I of the AAI is to locate, apprehend, interview, and deport approximately 5,900 aliens with unexecuted

final orders from countries with active al Qaeda networks and to gather valuable information to assist in

the prevention of future terrorist or criminal attacks. INS Headquarters provided more than 5,000 leads

to INS field offices that have thus far resulted in the apprehension of nearly 700 fugitives, including 32

positive hits from the National Crime and Information Center (NCIC).

Phase II of the AAI targets over 300,000 immigration fugitives with unexecuted final orders of

removal. The AAI is the INS' first national program to address alien absconders.

Joint Terrorism Task Forces

Our Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) continue to be the backbone of the INS' efforts to

combat international terrorism in the interior of the United States. The INS has 112 JTTF agents

stationed in various locations. JTTF agents serve as a critical component in the effort to root out

terrorists and their supporters. INS Special Agents working with the JTTFs have played a significant

role in recent terrorist investigations nationwide. Working closely with the FBI and other agencies

within the multi-agency task forces, INS Special Agents serve the national security of the United States

by proactively investigating, targeting, and arresting known terrorists, terrorist organization leaders,
 Page 5 of 8

Absconder Apprehension Initiative

BICE is deeply committed to using the full range of its broad statutory authority to enhance domestic
security. The Absconder Apprehension Initiative is one of several notable examples of this approach.
Under this initiative, BICE tracks, apprehends, and removes violators of U.S. immigration law who had
been ordered deported, but fled before the deportation order could be carried out. Careful analysis has
determined there are in excess of 300,000 alien absconders with unexecuted final orders of removal
including approximately 80,000 with criminal records. Moreover, historically, voluntary departures have
not been tracked. BICE views the failure to track departures as a serious issue effecting national . ^
security. The affective implementation of the Entry-Exit system, now part of U.S. VISIT, under 7^ *
development will be part of the solution to confirm departures. \ *S"V/
K. ir£ ^ \

BICE has identified outstanding areas of concern. For example, Phase I of the two-phase alien « "*
absconder project first sought to target 5,900 aliens from countries with a known al Qaeda presence or
known terrorist recruiting activity. After vetting all files, approximately 5,000 individuals were deemed
appropriate for removal. To date, only 1,139 absconders have been apprehended. Moreover, 803 of
those arrested have been removed from the country; 224 of those arrested are currently in BICE custody
awaiting removal; and 45 apprehended absconders are in various stages of criminal prosecution by the
United States Attorneys for a variety of offenses. BICE has taken a variety of steps to apprehend these
individuals or to verify they have left the U.S. These efforts include following-up on all available leads
by conducting field investigations to determine if individuals are still located in the U.S. Additionally,
we have analyzed passenger departure manifests, a variety of public and government data systems
including driver license information, and state-owned systems available to law enforcement personnel.

Phase II of the Initiative is focused on the apprehension and removal of more than 300,000 aliens with
unexecuted final orders of removal. As a force multiplier, this data is being entered into the FBI's
National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database so that the added weight of other Federal, state,
and local law enforcement officers is brought to bear on this mission. Working with the FBI, an
Immigration Violators File has been created within NCIC specifically for this initiative and is expected
to be deployed in June. We are now in the process of prioritizing these violators so that the most violent
offenders, those that pose the greatest threat to public safety, are located first.

BICE recognizes the fundamental importance of this program to immigration law enforcement. To
maintain integrity in our legal immigration system, there must be consequences for those who fail to
abide by orders of removal. In order to give this effort appropriate attention and priority, BICE plans to
move the AAI from the Investigations Program to the Office of Detention and Removal. The shift will
permit Special Agents, who currently handle these cases, to concentrate on national security and
criminal investigations and at the same time allow Deportation Officers to focus on locating and
apprehending absconders. BICE's ultimate goal is to apprehend and remove all aliens who have received
a final order of removal. We realize accomplishing this goal will take time to achieve but it is vital to the
integrity of our immigration system.

National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS)

The NSEERS program, which BICE now oversees, plays an important role in our anti-terrorism efforts.
The program has recently been folded into the new comprehensive U.S. VISIT system mentioned above.

Congress called for development of an integrated entry-exit system for arriving visitors. NSEERS is the
first part of that system. NSEERS promotes several key national security objectives:

http://www.house.gov/judiciary/dougherty050803 .htm 3/29/2004

Special Report Page 22 of 30

• Data Completeness. According to JMD, as of September 2003 the DHS had identified
discrepancies in the data that JMD was collecting from various sources to estimate
"front line" and "downstream" costs of the integration project for the Metric Study.— As
of January 2004, the DHS and JMD still were in the process of identifying and resolving
these discrepancies.

We concluded that as of January 2004, some progress has been made in deploying the initial
integrated versions of IDENT/IAFIS, but the integration process continues to proceed slowly.
IDENT Version 1.1+ workstations have been deployed to approximately 56 DHS sites,
including 25 ports of entry and 31 Border Patrol stations. That represents about 12 percent of
all ports of entry, and about 20 percent of all Border Patrol sites.34

The first Metric Study report sent to Congress on July 18, 2003, estimated that, as a result of
improved IAFIS access, the Border Patrol was able to obtain additional criminal history
information that it would not have known about for between 8.8 percent and 10.3 percent of
the aliens it apprehended at the metric sites. Preliminary Metrics data from October through
December 2003, with all sites deploying Version 1.1+, suggested that access to IAFIS
provided criminal history information to the Border Patrol on between 8.5 and 11.8 percent of
apprehended aliens that would not have been known by searching IDENT alone. From
October 1, 2003, until January 31, 2004, the Border Patrol had 9,650 criminal hits from
IAFIS that, including hits for aliens wanted in connection with 13 murders.

The FBI continues to electronically update every two weeks the "wants and warrants" file that
goes into the IDENT lookout database. Every month, the FBI also provides to the lookout
database an updated Terrorist file, which includes fingerprint records the FBI has acquired
from various law enforcement and security sources. From October 2003 until January 31,
2004, the DHS has received 3,034 hits on apprehended aliens from the updated "wants and
warrants" file, including 399 hits for aliens wanted for violent crimes.
—-•
Finally, JMD has revised the official project schedule to reflect the delays that had been
incurred through September 2003. According to the revised schedule, IAFIS will be expanded
to handle the additional workload generated by the nationwide deployment of Version 1.2 by
September 30, 2005. According to JMD officials, DHS will determine the date by which
Version 1.2 is deployed nationwide. The revised schedule indicates that the final version,
Version 2 - which will provide the important capability for the FBI and local law enforcement
agencies to access the DHS's fingerprint and criminal history databases - will not be
completed before August 2008. That is more than 5 years later than Version 2 originally was
scheduled to be deployed, and almost 2 years behind the original scheduled completion date
for the entire integration project. However, according to JMD officials, the scope and phasing
of the entire project has undergone a thorough revision. Version 2 will incorporate what was
referred to as Versions 2, 3, and 4 in the original project plan.

Thus, while there has been some progress at deploying an integrated version of
IDENT/IAFIS, full integration of the two systems remains years away. The FBI, the DHS, and
local law enforcement agencies still are far from a fully integrated system that will
automatically check the fingerprints of apprehended aliens against all IDENT and IAFIS
records. According to the latest schedule, the deployment of a fully integrated fingerprint
system is at least 4 years away. We believe this continues the significant risk that aliens who
should be detained, such as Resendez and Batres, instead will be released because Border
Patrol agents will not learn of their significant criminal or deportation history.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The DOJ should develop and implement a memorandum of understanding (MOU)

http ://www.usdoj .gov/oig/special/0403/index.htm 6/1 5/2004

 PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

We conducted the current review to determine whether the

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had improved its effectiveness
at removing nondetained aliens with final orders, and whether the INS took
the actions it agreed to in response to the five recommendations we made in
our 1996 report.
The scope of this review included all aliens who received final orders
of removal from the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) during
a 15-month period from October 1, 2000 through December 31, 2001. The
EOIR's Office of Information Resource Management provided us with a
database of all aliens issued final removal orders. In each case, the aliens
either had exhausted their appeals with the EOIR or did not appeal the
initial court decision. Each case included 86 data elements pertinent to
our report, including the alien's name, file number (A-file number),
nationality, date of entrance, custody status, criminal and asylum statuses,
court appearance details, and final removal decision.
The original EOIR database had 145,361 cases drawn from the
Automated Nationwide System for Immigration Review (ANSIR).10 Although
we did not independently assess the reliability of the ANSIR data in this
review, we did omit 2,678 duplicate or multiple cases.11 In addition, we
omitted 1,768 cases that were under appeal with the Office of Immigration
Litigation because the INS cannot execute a final order of removal while it is
under appeal. To maintain comparability with our 1996 sample, we did not
remove cases where Deferred Enforced Departure or Temporary Protected
Status might have prevented the INS from carrying out the removal
orders.12 Our final database totaled 140,915 cases.

10 ANSIR is the Information Resource Management System that provides the EOIR with
case tracking and management information. . y^rf—XJL
11 The INS creates a unique A-file number for each alien. However, duplicate cases in
ANSIR allowed different aliens to share the same A-file number. Multiple cases in
ANSIR had several different entry lines for the same alien with the same A-file number
due to numerous court hearings and appeals, which could not fit into one data field.
12 Temporary Protected Status for Nationals of Designated States (P.L. 101-649)
authorizes the U.S. Attorney General to temporarily exempt from removal aliens who
are in a protected status because of instability in their country. In 2002, the TPS
countries included: Sierra Leone, Burundi, Sudan, Montserrat, Kosovo, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, Honduras, and Angola. Deferred Enforced Departure (Executive Order
12711) was issued in 1990, by President George H.W. Bush to temporarily protect
aliens from the People's Republic of China from removal. Presidents William J. Clinton
and George W. Bush, through Presidential Memoranda, granted this relief from removal
to Haitians and Liberians in 1997 and 2001, respectively.

U.S. Department of Justice ^

Office of the Inspector General
Evaluation and Inspections Division
absconders has been entered as a subject or target of any other investigation. If there is a match
for any absconder in the PENTTBOM database or the other FBI databases, the FTTTF will remove
that absconder from the list for this Initiative. This filtering process will help to ensure that the list
of absconders does not include individuals who are subjects of active terrorism investigations.

2. Entry of the Absconders into NCIC

The FTTTF will transmit the finalized list of priority absconders to the INS Headquarters
Investigations Division, where agents will obtain and examine the absconders' INS Administrative
Files ("A-Files"). Agents will confirm that each A-file contains documentation reflecting that the
absconder had received notice that he was to be deported or, for those absconders who failed to
appear at their deportation hearings, that he would be deported if he so failed to appear. After
confirming that the absconder was on notice and that the deportation warrant remains valid, the
agents at the Investigations Division will transmit the absconders' A-Files to the INS Law
Enforcement Support Center in Burlington, Vermont for entry of the absconders' names into NCIC.
At the same time, the list of absconders assigned to each district will be distributed to the INS and
FBI Field Offices and to the United States Attorney's Office in each district.

3. Transmission of Documents from the Absconders' A-Files

The INS will create a "fugitive folder" for each absconder on the list. These folders will
contain duplicates of relevant documents from the absconder's original A-File. INS Headquarters
will then transmit the fugitive folder for each absconder to the INS Field Office in the judicial
district of the absconder's last known address. If no last known address information exists, the
fugitive folder will be sent to the district of the office of origin for the alien's deportation
proceeding.

4. District Coordination Meeting

Each INS and FBI Field Office will appoint an Initiative Coordinator who will be
responsible for overseeing his or her agency's involvement in the Initiative in that district. Prior
to receipt of the fugitive folders, those Coordinators will meet with the United States Attorney's
Anti-Terrorism Coordinator to discuss plans for implementation of the Initiative. At those
meetings, the three Coordinators should: (1) make arrangements for consultation among themselves
throughout the apprehension process; (2) determine how to staff each of the "apprehension teams,"
consistent with the guidance below; (3) decide who will check the list of absconders against local
and/or state criminal databases; (4) discuss how to handle fugitive investigations that extend outside
the district; and (5) decide any other logistical issues relating to timely implementation of this
Initiative.

5. Assignment of Absconder Cases to the Apprehension Teams

Upon receipt of the absconder fugitive folders, the INS Coordinator must contact his or her

3
absconders has been entered as a subject or target of any other investigation. If there is a match
for any absconder in the PENTTBOM database or the other FBI databases, the FTTTF will remove
that absconder from the list for this Initiative. This filtering process will help to ensure that the list
of absconders does not include individuals who are subjects of active terrorism investigations.

2. Entry of the Absconders into NCIC

The FTTTF will transmit the finalized list of priority absconders to the INS Headquarters
Investigations Division, where agents will obtain and examine the absconders' INS Administrative
Files ("A-Files"). Agents will confirm that each A-file contains documentation reflecting that the
absconder had received notice that he was to be deported or, for those absconders who failed to
appear at their deportation hearings, that he would be deported if he so failed to appear. After
confirming that the absconder was on notice and that the deportation warrant remains valid, the
agents at the Investigations Division will transmit the absconders' A-Files to the INS Law
Enforcement Support Center in Burlington, Vermont for entry of the absconders' names into NCIC.
At the same time, the list of absconders assigned to each district will be distributed to the INS and
FBI Field Offices and to the United States Attorney's Office in each district.

3. Transmission of Documents from the Absconders' A-Files

The INS will create a "fugitive folder" for each absconder on the list. These folders will
contain duplicates of relevant documents from the absconder's original A-File. INS Headquarters
will then transmit the fugitive folder for each absconder to the INS Field Office in the judicial
district of the absconder's last known address. If no last known address information exists, the
fugitive folder will be sent to the district of the office of origin for the alien's deportation
proceeding.

4. District Coordination Meeting

Each INS and FBI Field Office will appoint an Initiative Coordinator who will be
responsible for overseeing his or her agency's involvement in the Initiative in that district. Prior
to receipt of the fugitive folders, those Coordinators will meet with the United States Attorney's
Anti-Terrorism Coordinator to discuss plans for implementation of the Initiative. At those
meetings, the three Coordinators should: (1) make arrangements for consultation among themselves
throughout the apprehension process; (2) determine how to staff each of the "apprehension teams,"
consistent with the guidance below; (3) decide who will check the list of absconders against local
and/or state criminal databases; (4) discuss how to handle fugitive investigations that extend outside
the district; and (5) decide any other logistical issues relating to timely implementation of this
Initiative.

5. Assignment of Absconder Cases to the Apprehension Teams

Upon receipt of the absconder fugitive folders, the INS Coordinator must contact his or her

3
consisting of INS, Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and other federal agents and, where
appropriate, members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces ("ATTFs"); (5) apprehension of the
absconders; (6) interviews of the absconders by the apprehension teams; (7) entry of the results of
the interviews into the database; and (8) prosecution or removal of the absconders.

While there are aspects of this Initiative that are similar to the Interview Project that was
recently conducted by the ATTFs, I want to make clear that this is a very different undertaking.
The Interview Project was directed at individuals who were not suspected of involvement in
criminal activity, and investigators' contacts with the individuals were entirely consensual. This
Initiative, by contrast, is directed at persons who have violated the law by remaining in the country
after issuance of a deportation order and, in some cases, by committing other criminal offenses.
Unlike the subjects of the Interview Project, therefore, these absconders are to be apprehended and
treated as criminal suspects, and they are to be afforded all standard procedural rights and
constitutional protections. In addition, while the Department and certain United States Attorneys'
Offices intentionally publicized the Interview Project, this Initiative will not entail any official
notice to either the public or the absconders. It would be counterproductive, and potentially
dangerous, to provide the absconders with official warning that agents and officers will be seeking
to locate and capture them.

This Initiative will require a sustained and vigorous effort by a number of federal law
enforcement agencies. As the agency tasked with enforcement of the immigration laws, the INS
will be the lead investigative agency in all phases of the Initiative. The United States Attorneys will
be responsible for coordinating the assignment of ATTF members to the apprehension teams,
ensuring that the results of interviews of captured absconflers are entered into the database, and
handling any prosecutions arising out of this Initiative. The FBI Field Offices and their Joint
Terrorism Task Forces ("JTTFs") will actively participate in the apprehension effort, and they will
be responsible for assessing each arrested absconder to determine whether the FBI has an interest
in that absconder as a criminal suspect or as a source of information. Finally, it is expected that the
United States Marshals Service ("USMS"), with its vast experience in capturing federal fugitives,
will play a significant role in the apprehension effort.

B. The Process

1. Creation of the List of Absconders

The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force ("FTTTF") drew the names of the priority
absconders from the INS' Depprtable Alien Control System ("DACS"). In order to finalize the list,
the FTTTF is currently completing the following tasks: (1) running the absconders on the list
through public source databases to determine a last known address in the United States; (2) using
the last known address information to designate an investigating district for each absconder; (3)
cross-checking the entire list against the PENTTBOM investigation database to determine whether
any of these absconders has previously been identified as having a connection to that investigation;
and (4) cross-checking the entire list against the FBI's other databases to determine if any of the
counterparts at the FBI and the United States Attorney's Office. The three Coordinators should
then jointly decide how to staff the apprehension teams. The composition of the apprehension team
assigned to each absconder will vary from district to district, depending upon agency staffing, the
number of open absconder cases in the district, and the Coordinators' judgment about the
appropriate manner of making assignments. If the INS and FBI in a particular district lack the
manpower to conduct the fugitive investigations and apprehensions in a timely manner — or if their
agents are occupied with other investigations ~ the United States Attorney will solicit assistance
from the members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Force in that district.

The apprehension teams will each be provided with copies of the fugitive folder and any
relevant background material for each absconder, a copy of the interview questions and any
operational instructions developed by the Coordinators.

6. Apprehension of the Absconders

Every absconder who is located will be apprehended and taken into custody. The legal basis
for that custody may differ depending on the law enforcement members on the apprehension team.
If INS is represented on the apprehension team, the absconder can be arrested pursuant to the INS'
authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1357 to arrest individuals on the basis of the civil warrant of deportation
or removal. Because only INS agents have that clear authority, apprehension teams that do not
include INS agents may not arrest absconders solely on the basis of the civil warrant. Instead, they
can arrest absconders on the basis of probable cause that the absconder has committed the federal
felony violation of Failure to Depart under 8 U.S.C. § 1253W The probable cause that the absconder
has committed that offense would be based on the existence of a final deportation order and the
absconder's presence on American soil.

7. Interviewing the Absconders

When an absconder is arrested, the arresting officers or agents will interview him about his
knowledge of terrorist activity. The absconder should be advised of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona prior to the interview, and the interview should proceed only if he waives those rights.

The interview should follow the list of questions that will be provided to all Anti-Terrorism
Coordinators for distribution to the apprehension teams. This list of questions will be similar to the
topics covered in the Interview Project. Following any interview, the investigators conducting the
interview must provide the written results to the Anti-Terrorism Coordinator in the United States
Attorney's Office, who will ensure that the information is entered into the Computerized Reporting
System that was developed and used in the Interview Project.

Investigators conducting interviews should feel free to use all appropriate means of
encouraging absconders to cooperate, including reference to any reward money that is being offered
and reference to the availability of an "S Visa" under the Responsible Cooperators Program for
alien informants. Investigators should fully explain these inducements, but should be careful not
 be taken before the nearest federal magistrate judge without unnecessary delay. In those instances
where he was arrested by the INS on the civil warrant, the absconder need only be presented when
and if criminal charges are filed. If the decision is not to prosecute, the absconder will be deported
in accordance with standard INS procedures.

11. Deportation of the Absconders

Absent an affirmative notification from the Anti-Terrorism Coordinator or the FBI

Coordinator of the desire to undertake further investigative or prosecutive action against the
absconder, the INS will make every effort to remove the absconder from the country as quickly as
possible.

12. Absconder Investigations Outside the Initial Investigating District

It will often become necessary to pursue leads for an absconder outside of the initial
investigating district. As lead agency, it will be the responsibility of the INS to determine how best
to conduct that investigation. In those instances where there are only isolated leads outside the
district, or where the leads are in a nearby district, the INS Coordinator may determine that it is
more efficient for the original apprehension team to pursue those leads. In those instances where
the apprehension team determines that the absconder has moved to a distant district, the INS
Coordinator would probably transfer the case to the INS Field Office in that district. In deciding
whether to shift the investigation to another district, the INS Coordinator should always consult
with and consider the views of the apprehension team members who are assigned to that
investigation. Also, whenever the INS Coordinator decides to transfer an investigation to another
district, he or she must communicate with INS headquarters, so that the fugitive folder may be re-
assigned, and with the Anti-Terrorism Coordinator and the FBI Coordinator, so that they can alert
their counterparts in the other district.

13. Tracking of Absconder Cases

The results of any interview with an absconder will be provided to the Anti-Terrorism
Coordinator in each district, who will ensure that the results are entered into the Computerized
Reporting System. The Anti-Terrorism Coordinator will provide the Executive Office for United
States Attorneys regular reports on the number of absconders apprehended and interviewed in each
district and the status of any prosecutions arising from this Initiative. In addition, the INS will be
responsible for tracking each absconder's case following apprehension, and providing my office
with regular reports on the number and timing of those removed under this Initiative.

C. Legal Issues

1. Authority of Law Enforcement Officers to Effect Arrests

There is no question about the legal authority of federal agents to participate in arresting
, these absconders, as the United States Code specifically authorizes agents of the FBI and deputies
of the USMS to make warrantless arrests for federal violations where probable cause exists. In
many districts, however, I expect that state and local law enforcement members of the ATTF will
also participate in this effort. Their legal authority is less clear, as some states and municipalities
place certain restrictions on the extent to which their officers can be involved in enforcement of the
immigration laws. The INS has researched this issue on a state-by-state basis, and the Director of
the Executive Office of United States Attorneys (EOUSA) will arrange a conference call with the
fifty State Attorneys General to discuss this issue. The INS research will be shared with the Anti-
Terrorism Coordinator for each district.

2. Consular Notification

In connection with the arrest of these absconders, the United States has certain obligations
under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). Under the VCCR, every foreign
national arrested or detained within the United States must be informed that consular officials of
his/her country of nationality may be notified of the detention. If the foreign national "so requests,"
or if the detainee is a national of a "mandatory notification" country, the appropriate consular
officials are entitled to be notified and to have access to their incarcerated nationals. The INS
Coordinator in each district will be responsible for making consular notification, in accordance with
existing INS guidelines.

D. Implementation Deadlines

This Initiative is to be implemented by taking the following steps within the designated
deadlines:

1. The FTTTF will finalize the list of priority absconders on or before January 25,
2002.

2. The INS, the FBI and EOUSA will send to their offices in each district the initial list
of priority absconders assigned to that district on or before January 28,2002.

3. The Director of EOUSA, members of my staff and the Anti-Terrorism Coordinators

will hold a conference call concerning the Initiative on January 29, 2002.

4. The Anti-Terrorism Coordinator and the INS and FBI Coordinators in each district
will meet to discuss implementation of this Initiative in their district on or before
January 31,2002.

5. The INS Law Enforcement Support Center in Burlington, Vermont will have the
first group of priority absconders entered into NCIC, and their fugitive folders will
be distributed to the appropriate districts on or before February 1, 2002.
6. The Anti-Terrorism Coordinator and the INS and FBI Coordinators in each district
will assign apprehension teams for all absconders on their list and distribute the
fugitive folders and interview questions to those apprehension teams on or before
February 11,2002.