G.R. No. L- 6355-56 August 31, 1953 Pastor M. Endencia and Fernando Jugo Vs.

Saturnino David, as Collector General of Internal Revenue

Facts:
After the ruling of the Court of first Instance of Manila declaring R.A. 590 unconstitutional and thereby ordering Saturnino David to refund Justices Endencia and Jugo of the income taxes decreased from their salary, petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the R.A. 590. The lower court held that the said collection made to Justice Endencia and Jugo was a diminution of their compensation and a violation of the constitution citing the case of Perfecto vs. Meer. Thereafter, according to the solicitor general on behalf of David said that the congress did not favorably received the ruling of the Perfecto case, because immediately after its promulgation the congress enacted R.A. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in the Perfecto case, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. The court questioned the legal basis of section 13 of R.A. 590 which states that: Sec. 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers were exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 13 of R.A. 590 can justify and legalize the collection of income taxes on the salary of Judicial Officers?

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of R.A. 590 unconstitutional as it violated the clear and express provision of Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution. The Supreme Court further explained that the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial Department, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the constitution. The legislative cannot pass any declaratory

act, or act declaratory of what the law was before it passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. It also cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.