~ ~ U . S !

: S T
INTERVENTION
and
AGGRESSION
TlVELI"l\ } " / ~ A R S
OF A.lIERICAN IXTERVEXTIO.Y
AX]) AGGRf.<-SSIOX I.Y L,lO.... '
Jl1?J

e.- c:.-. 0
G.lJ@n1
<3}u0G iJ d1 '-J--U'1
TWELVE YEARS
OF AMERICAN INTERVENTION
AND AGGRESSION IN LAOS
:'lEO LAO HAKSAT PUBLICATIO:'IS
1966
011 the occasion of the 4th
dllllit'uSal]' of the Slgllillg of tli,'
1)62 Gellet'a rlgreelllellt 011 Laos
MAP OF LAOS

N"fionsI6oundar,.es
Boundariesofflrovinces
ProVisioIJslm;/ifary detnarcalion/lne
lown
CO TE TS
Pne;e
I. \merican neo-colonialism and "special \\"arfare"
in Lnos 15
II .\\nin po!icirs of thr United Statl's' nco colonialism
nnd mninstnY of its "special wndarr" in Laos 51
Ill. lneyitable bnnkruptcy of the United States' poliC\' of
intenention nnd aggression nne! ne\\" \\ar adventures
in Lans 93
1\ The Lno peoplr nre rrsolu!e to dcfrat the United
States' intl'f\Cntion and aggression, and s!riye for II
peaceful, neutral, independent. democratic, unified
and prosperous Laos 123
FOREWORD
Un[olding in close relation with the national-liberation
struggle o[ the fraternal Vietnamese and Khmer peoples, the
right [or liberation waged by the Lao people over the last
Irunty years led to the conclusion in Geneva of the 1954 and
1962 international agreements which recognize and reaffirm the
<;overfi{{nty, indfpfndence, nfutrality, unity and tfrrilorial inte-
Wity 01' Laos.
,VevNlheli'ss, a peaceful, neutral, indfpfndent, democratic,
unified and prosperous Laos is still a long way off achievement.
Sincf 1954, the American imperialists have been compelled
to attend two Geneva Conferences, but in hath cases they haue
Rone hack on their solemn pledges with equal impudence. Deli-
herutely and unremittingly, they have sOllght every means to
wbotage the 1951 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and Ihe
1962 Geneva Agrfement on Laos.
Ailer supplanting the defeated French colonialists, American
!.eo-colonialism has, over the past twelve years, IIndertaki'1l fo
tllrn Laos inlo a new-pattern colony and military base in [urth-
eranc/' o[ ils policy of aggression in Indochina and Southeast
Asia.
In the [rameworll o[ their plans [or systematic intensification
and expansion o[ Ihe war in Indochina, the American imperial-
isis have gradually stepped up to an unprecedented heighl their
'special war[are" in Laos which is but a neo-colonialist war.
II
That tilt immediate al1d uwlerl!lil1[{ cause of tht!
statt! of war which is unceasin[{ly aggrav:llil1[{ Iht! situation in
our country al1d the SU[Jt!rtI1RS of our pt!ople. al1d ha, il1crea,ed
the dal1.!fer 0/ a major conflowation In 1l1dochina lind Southeast
;1
For tri'el1.'e !/NlfS nOri'. ill oi the international afIrrp-
mel1ts so/rmnl!l [{uaral1teeing their indeprndel1ce. sovereigl1ty
and right to huild their country ill peace. our people havr herl1
iorced to defel1d, arms ill hal1ds, their existel1ce as a sovereign
/latiol1. For twelwe !lrars 110W, ill racr of thr impudi'l1//!I il1tel1-
,ified aggression or the Unitrd Statrs, our people have shown
(Ill unshakable de/prmil1atlon al1d all ever-clearer cOl1sciousl1ess
that their agail1s1 /1merican imperialism in defel1ce of
their natiol1al il1terest, is closely linked to the of other
peoples ill the world-wide l1ational-liberatiol1 movemel1t, 1I11d
that, heyond the l1ational it st/el1gthel1s all forc!'s
fifIhtil1g for democracy, peace and social
That is why we are rully confidel1t that with the ever-wid('/'
awareness or tht! danger posed hy Americal1 imperialism to the
world, and the joint action of our own forces resolved to figftt
against the /1merican neo-colol1ialist war ill Laos. al1d of the
justice al1d peace-lovil1!? peoples ill the world, first al1d ioremost
the peoples al1d of the participatil1g CO/Ill tries of
the 1962 Geneva Conrerence on Laos, we shall he ill a
to foil the Ullited States' adt'el1turous plans.
II is in Ihis spirit Ihal in commemoralion or the conclusiol1
of the 1962 Geneua Agreement 011 Laos, the ,Yeo Lao Haksat
Puhlicatiol1s. in or l1umerous di[Jicufties due to a prolol1ged
war imposed 011 Ihe Lao people. h(we taken the il1itialive of
puh/ishil1g the presel1t document It our hope that, 110twith-
ul1at'oidahle Ihis document will help
enlighten to a ceriaill exlenl public opiniol1 and thereby promote
a joint action in support or the Lao people
12
Though presented with stili III complete matertals, tillS dow-
//1,,"1, we believe, casts a reL'ealillg light Oil the frue feafures of
l',II'I/UIII lIeo-culOlialis//l as well a,\ the form of violellce if has
nsor!ed to ill Laos "speclUl !Carfare".
lurlh"r, il is IlIlellded 10 gIVe a broad aCCOl/llt of fhe victories
'cor"d liy Ih, Lao people ill thetr pafriotic sffllggle, fhetr
tllJproaell 10 Ihe Luo problem, fhe !C'ay to defeaf U.S. uggres-
~ ' O ' lur I he I rilllll/ih ul fhe cul/se of a peaceful. lIeufral,
",de!'eJl(!< III, dell/Uual,c, lIIlifled Ulld prosperous Laos
Llb,. .. atrd Zonr oj litO" Jnly 196(,
1\LU L.\U II.\I\SAT PLBLlCATlOI'S
13
AMERICAN NEOCOLONIALISl\1 A D
"SPECIAL WAFARE" I LAOS
.\fter \\urld \Var II, \merican imperialism has become the
ringleader of world imperialism. E\ er since, it has been making
e\er) effurt tu fulfil its dream uf ruling tile world.
Its global strategy aims at encircling the socialist
checking the national-liberation movement, and preparing a
new world war. It is materialized by a network uf militar)
bases, a liS-masterminded system of military alliances, and
preparations for a nuclear \\ar. The American imperialists have
driwn out til' other weakened imperialists one after the other
110m their colonies and replaced them in enslaYing the people
of ,\sian, .\fnc3n, and Latin .\merican countries, thus turning
t lese countries into U.S. new-pattern colonies and war bases.
But the JIlternatlUnal situation after World War !I has unde.-
gone great changes with the formation and increasing growth
of the socialist system, the c\'er-weakening of the imperialht
s)stem, the collapse b) lumps of the colonial system, and t!le
emergence of a series uf JJldependent countries.
Confronted with this situation, the imperialists with :\merican
imperialism at the head, realize that the era of old colonialism
is gone, and the despatch of an expeditionary force for colonial
aggression in the uriginal sense of the term is out-of-date.
1'5
1hel dare. Illg on its ltoIJUllIlC strengh, American imperial-
Ism has resorted to a ne\\ form of e\ploitatiall, ie. neo-
loloillal!sm, In order to cf)llCeaI its true aggressive features.
\s as it began to Ilurture e\pansionist schemes in South-
eaq.\sia,.\mcrican nco-colonialism had cO\'c!cd the Indochinese
coulltrres. On .Ianuan si\ mOllths before the conclu-
sion of thc 195-l Gel;c\'a .-'lgrcemcnts, wbich restored peace in
Indochina, l' Secrelar\ of State .I.F. Dullcs declared: "C.S
intcrcsts In thc Far East. from a strategic point of ,ie\\', are
c10sch connected \\ith \\"hat is called the 'chain of littoral
islands'. This dwin comprises 1\\0 continental bases: Korea ill
thc North <Inri, if possiblc, Indochina in 1I1e South."
Oil thc Indochinese pcninsula, Laos is a of three mil-
Ium Inhablt;lnh \\'itb a poor and back\\ard but
endowed with important natural resources and such strategic
iJreas as the Plain of .I'lr in the. orlll, the l3olo\'t.'n Plateau In
1I e South Its geographical location, L<los \\ hidl borders on
both socia list and ne\\ . independellt cOilntries, has common
fronliers \\ illl Thailand ami South Vietnam \\hidl <Ire U.S. ne\\-
pa ttern <lnd bascs.
Thereforc, In the eyes 01 the American Imperi<ltists, Laos
l-ccuples a trategic position. .I.F. Dulles himself s<lid that Laos
held a position in the glob<ll strategy of the United States.
rite U.S pulll;y towurds Luus, just like towurds Suuth Viet-
num Wid Cumbudia, consists in turtling this part of Induchina
into a U.S. new-pattern colony and military base uimed at
Clicircll/lg and evenlually atlaclling the socialist countries, at
suppressing the liberalion movement in Indochina und III South-
eust .Isia. This is part of the L' S. in the West Pacific
,Ilea, \rithin 1I1e framework of C.S. global strategy.
The .\merrcall neo-colonialists hale for long pursued these
dark schemes against Laos as welt as the other Indochinese
countries..\s as the last years of the French colonialists'
war of dg-grcs-lOn in Indochina, aYailIng themselyes of the e\er-
exhaustiun of the french, they haye gradually taken
lOot in tIC Indochinese countries.
By nud-J9-!9, conceding to the United States' demands, su as
to od more"l.: S aid" to cupe with their difYiculties and defeats
in "0 eir "dirty \\ar", the Prench were compelled to proclaim
L,os, \'ielnam and Cambudia "independent States", which thus
1)( me t It.' Stales" of Induchina.
II Jlue 1%0. L S. President 11. Truman declared lhat urders
I,ad bl'(l g-i\L 1 to incrt'ase mili!<lry assist<lnce tu the French
e.\peditiouary joree and to the Indochinese "associated States".
In September of the same year, the United States cuncluder!
with I"rdnce and the "associated States" an agreement un the
Lnitul States' p,lrticipatiun in the defence of Indochina. In
Decc'nbL, t signed a jjye-party agreement un "mutual defenCe
aid" by \duell I S. expansiun in lndoehind \\'as tu be greatly
stepped up.
This agreement became the b<lsis for the United States tu gi\e
direct "aid" to the Indochinese "assuciated States" from late
1950ol1\I"ards Since then, although the distribution of U.S. aid
\\'IS furmally in French hands, the United States had actually
'camed out Its u\\n alTairs by directly dealing with the Indo-
L.UIlt'Se Luuntries, in spite uf France's opposition" (Il.
In Septcmber 1951, the United States signed \dth the Laa
puppets it bilateral agreement on "economic co-operation", the
purposc uf which \\as to allow the United States to grant direct
military and ecunumic aid to the puppets, in the framework of
the "mutual defence" agreement.
The ahoYe-mentioned agreements have pa\ed the \\'ay jor still
deeper L S. inttnentlon in the French colonialIsts' war of aggres-
sion dnd in the internal alTairsofthe lndochincsecountries.
(I) IS Relatio/l., ..;.'ith SOlilheliSI ,Is;a, ,,\. Farley. New York. 1955.
2TY
17
In August 1953, explaining lhe reason for U.S. intensified
inlerference in Indochina, President D. Eisenhower declared lolhe
federated Slates gO\'ernors lhat, in case Indochina would be lost,
"the lin and lungslen of lhis region which \\'e greally ",due will
slop coming to us".
The American imperialisls endea\"()ured to all-out assist-
ance for the French colonialists 10 pursue "dirty war" and
become day by day the "actual commander" in Indochina, more
and more reducing the French 10 the posilion of "simple merce-
naries", as General II. I\'a\alTe, Comm'lnder-in-Chief of the
French expeditionary force in Indochina,admilteditinl953 (2).
In 1954, in the face of the unavoidable defeal of the French
in Dienbienphu, the United States had to attend the Geneva
Conference on Indochina, but it kept on seeking all means 10
sabotage this conference. At lasl, seeing lhat it \\'as impossible
to preYent the conference to come to success, the United Slates
had to let France sign the Agreement on the Cessation of
Hostililies in Indochina. But in doing so, France had to comply
wilh seven conditions laid down by the United States. Some of
these condilions were related to Laos, for inslance:
- The integrity of Laos and Cambodia should be presened.
-No restriction could be accepted on the right of Laos,
Cambodia and South Vietnam to build up their forces, to import
armaments, and 10 call for foreign advisers (3).
These conditions show lhat though the American imperialists
had to step back, they did not yet reconcile themselves to giving
up their dark and long-range schemes againsl the Indochinese
counlries in general, and against Laos in particular.
The signing of the 1954 Geneva Agreemenls evidences the
inlernational recognition of the slruggle for national liberation
( ~ ) General II. "a"arr,,', report to Paris. IUS;l
(3) La fin (['line gllcrre, J. Lacouture et Ph Devillers, Paris 1960
18
o[n
the cumplete failure of French colonialism, but also a bitter
defeat oi the L S inte[\'entionist policy in Indochina,
Si'lcl' then, ho\\'el'er, the American imperialists' polic)
Llos h;;s shifted to a nell' stage, that of direct inter-
I enlion and aggression, the beginning and gradual del'elup-
went 'If "spel'i,1l lIariare",,, form of I'iolencc b)' ,\merican neo-

rIe l!j;jl Genl'la \grecml'nts stipulate that:
In their relalions \lith Cambodia, Laos and \'ietn<lm, each
member of the Genel'a Conferencc undertakes to respect the
sOl'ereignt)', indepcndence, unit) and territorial integrity of the
ilnd to refrain from any interference in
With e!Tect from the proclamation of the cease-fire the
introduction into Laos of reinforcement of troops or military
personnel from outside Lao is prohibited (6);
--epon the l'ntr) into force of the present Agreement, the
establishmcnt oi nell' militar) bases is prohibited throughout
the territo[\ of Laos (7) :
- 'pon tie entry into force of the present Agreements, the
introduction into Laos of armament, munitions and military
l'quipment of all kinds is prohibited (B) ;
(I) Pravda, July cJ, 1954.
(iJ Point 12 of the Conierenee rinal Declaration.
(G) Article r of the Agre('ment on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos
(n .\rticle 7
(') .\; 9
19
- The go\'ernment of Laos undertakes that "it will not join
ill any agreement "'ith other States if this agreement includes
the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conform
ih \\ith the principles of the Charter of the United Nations
01: \\ith the principles of the ,\greement on the Cessation of
Hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened,
the obligation to e tablish bases on LlO territory for the mili-
t;,ry forces of foreign powers (9).
Whereas on July 21, 1 9 5 ~ , the llead of the U.S. delegation,
\\. Bedell SlJlith, had solemnly pledged at the last meeting of
the Geneya Conference on Indochina that the U.S. GOYernment
would refrain from resorting to the threat or the use of yiolence
to hinder the implementation of points frolJl I to 12 of the Con-
ference Final Declaration and the proYisions of the .\greement
011 the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina, U.S. President
D. Eisenho\\er declared: "The United States has not itself been
party to, or bound by, the decisions taken by the Conference...
The .\greement contains features which \\'e do not like... "
Eight years later, having sustained defeat after defeat in their
"special warfare" in Laos, the American imperialists were
compelled to accept the 1962 peaceful settlement of the Lao
question. This settlement included the agreements reached in
1961 at Zurich, and in 1962 in the Plain of Jars, by the three
political forces in Laos, and the 1962 international agreement
on the Lao question signed by fourteen countries in Geneva.
The 1961 and 1962 Tripartite Agreements determined the
policy oi peace, neutrality and national concord of Laos and
provided for the formation of a Lao Tripartite National Union
Go\ernment which took the unanimity of the three parties as
principle for settling major State issues.
Set up in June 1962 on the basis of these tripartite agreements
the National Union GO\'ernment put forward a political program
with a view to leading Laos on to the path of peace and neu
(9) Point 5 of the Conrerence Final Declaration.
20
t1alih' and to building a pcaceful. neutral, independcnt, demo-
unified and prospcrous Laos, In the diplomatic field, the
lolic\ would he to implement thc fiyc principles of peaceful
Cf, existence to rdrain from joining any military alliance or
bll'c, to forbid form of foreign interferencc in thc interll'll
,!Tail's of Laos, to receiye aid without binding conditions
dJreclh' from all countrics. The internal policy would be reso-
lutel\' 'to defend the independence, neutrality, sovereignty and
territonal of Laos, to ensure all democratic liberties,
to assure for aII citizens and equality for all nation-
alities in t II to deYelop national economy and culture,
t,l impro\e the liying conditions of the people, The political
program of the Trirartite \Jational Union Government was in
full accord,nce \\'itl' the Lao people's interests and aspirations,
11 e prcsent aclua I situa tion in the coun and abroad, and the
deSire t'le KlIlg 0' bos llad expressed during the il1\'estiture
ceremol1\ of the go\'('rnmenl
The 1962 Gpl1('\a \grcl:'mpnt on Laos pro\'ides that:
- The signatories to the .\greement recognize and will
ru:pect and obsen'e in eyery \\'ay the sO\'l'reignty, independence,
neutralih, lIlity .Inc! territorial integrih' of the Kingdom of
Laos (10);
The signatorie, to the .\greement undertake that they will
not commit or pnrticipate in any way in any act which might
or i impair the sovereignty, independence, nell
traIity, and territorial integrity of the l'ingdom of Laos (II) ;
- The signatorit's to the _\greement undertake that thev will
not resort to the lise or threat of force or anv other
\\'hich migJot impair the peace of thp Kingdom Laos (12) ;
(10) Point I of the Declaration on neutralih' of Laos,
(II) Point 2a of the Declaration all the nelltraiity of Laos,
(12) Point 2b of Declaration on the neutrality of l.aos.
21
- The signatories to the ,\greement undertake that they will
refrain from all direct or indirect interference in the iniernal
affairs of the Kingdom of Laos (13);
- The signatories to the .\greement undertake that they will
not attach conditions of a political nature to any assistance
\\'hich they may oiTer or \\'hich the Kingdom of Laos ma\
seek(J4); .
-The singatories to the .\greement undertake that they will
not bring the Kingdom of Laos in any way into any military
alliance or any other agreement, whether military or
which is inconsistent with her neutrality (15), that they will
respect the wish of the Kingdom 010 Laos not to recog'nize the
protection of any alliance or military coalition, including
SE.A.T.O. (16) ;
- The signatories to the Agreement undertake that they will
not establish in the Kingdom of Laos am foreign military base,
fOleign stronghold or other foreign military installation of any
kind (Ii);
- The signatories to the .\greement undertake that they \\'ill
not use the territory of any country, including their o\\'n for
interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Laos (18);
- .\11 foreign regular and irregular troops, foreign para
military formations and foreign military personnel shall be
\\,ithdra\\'n from Laos (19) ;
(13) Point 2c of thc Dcclaration on thc nelltrality of Laos.
(14) Point 2d of thc Declaration on thc nClltrality of Laos
(15) Point 2e of the Declaration on the nClltrality of Laos
(16) Point 2f of the Declaration on the neutrality of Laos.
(17) Point 2h of the Declaration on the neutrality of Laos.
(18) Point 2j of the Declaration on the neutrality of Laos.
(19) Point 2 of the Protocol to the Declaration on the neutrality
01 Laos.
22
-Tie ntrr,luetion of ioreign regular and irregular troops,
and foreign military personnel
T'le mtro(l[ tion into Laos (Jf armaments, munitions and
1I,lr matt'ri.1 IS prohibited (21).
Tile 195-l and 1962 (Jenera Agreements constitute great
lietories for till' people of Laos and other Indochinese countries,
and for pearl' 101 ing peoples allover tile world, confirm
till' status of a peaceiul :111(\ neutral Laos, recognize its SO\'

gelll,lIldl pI Ie II, 'H'utral, inrlependent, and democratic Laos.
The correct and strict implementation of tlleir obligations bl
all countries participating' in the aforesaid Gene\'a Conferences
has an important significance,
\\"hrreas tile socialist countrie and sereral other members
of the G('nl'\.1 Conferences, as \I'ell as the patriotic forces in
laos, I an- allln\s acted in accordance with the Gene\'a :\gree
ments, th .\'1'rcau imperialists han> taken a renrse course
ofnctillJ1
[n tI .In ten \ ears, the ,\merican imperialists had been
rompelled te attend hl'o conferences held in Gene\'a, but the.,
betrayed all tllat the\' had solemnly undertaken and signed 1t
both of them. The reason was that their scheme to enslave the
(20) PI nl of th. ProtOl'll1 to the Declaration on the nelltralitv
oilaos -
(21) Point r, I ti,e Protocol til the Declaration on the nelltrality
,fLaos
23
Lno people, to tum Laos into a U.S. new-pattem colony and a
military base in Indochina and in Southeast Asia remained
unchanged.
Only t\\'o months after the signing of the 1954 Gene\'a
Agreements the ..\merican imperialists instigated a number of
their allies and satellites to found the S.E.A.T.O. aggressive
military bloc and deliberately put Laos, South \'ietnam and
Cambodia into the "proteeti\'e umbrella" of this bloc, which was
completely at variance \\ith the Gene\'a Agreements and reso-
lutelyrepudiated by the peoples of the Indochinese countries.
Hitherto, the above-mentioned international and tripartite
agreements have been ceaselessly undermined. The peace, neu-
trality, sovereignty and independence of Laos are being tram-
pled underfoot. The Lao people have not yet been able to enjoy
[1 peaceful life and to build a peaceful, neutral, independent,
democratic, unified and prosperous Laos \\'hich con tit utes their
goal of struggle and their deepest nspiration.
As has been pointed out in the July 23,196-1 Declaration by
the Central Committee of the Nco Lao I-laksat on the occasion
of the second anni\'Crsary of the conclusion of ' the 1962 Geneva
.\greement on Laos, the only origin of this situation was the
neo-colonialisl policy of intervention and aggression pursued by
the American imperialists towards Laos during the past years.
The Western press has long since remarked thai Laos had
fallen into chaos due to the U.S. interference in the internal
nfTairs of this countrv... In the eves of all Asians, the United
States is the aggress'or in Laos (22). The \\'ell-kno\\'n .\merican
columnist \\'. Lippmann \\'I"ote: "By methods which ha\'e never
been properly reported or explained to the American people,
the present administration (of the U.S.A,) has deeply interfered
in the internal affairs of Laos" (23).
(22) Eastern World, January 1961.
(23) Le mOflde, December 31, 1960 and The Observer, January 1st.
1961.
24
The l" S. inlenl'nlion and aggression in Laos has been carriecl
ouli'l1J
ne
\\,jnlernalional j unclureafterWorlcl War II. :1sfar
as L105 "as concernecl, after the \'ictory 0\'1'1' the French colo-
ni,di,ts, it nominall) became a so\'ereign State, recognizecl by
till Gene\'a \greements; the people's national spirit surged
up \'igorously Therefore, to conceal their aggressh'e features
\dth to Laos as well as other countries in Asia, Africa
and L tin \mrrica. the J\merican imperialists resorted to neo-
cololl uI'\1 mlt/rods IIl/dl'r dec('ptiue political and economic

Thl' gl'a,[ual of lhl' \ml"rican nco'colonialisl
rule in Luo'
II' c!e",m.' of llIe pro\'isions of the 1934 and 1962 Gene\'a
\gTl't'JI1l'nh. the lmerical/ imperialists haue kept 01/ giuing
IIlililUI'lI (/lId ecnllomic aid to the pro-American faction iI/ Laos,
no lilt: btl,', n; the 1950 ul/eqllal fiue-partyagreement ,)It
'l1;lItIlOI dl/encl' " and the 1951 bilateral agreement 011 "('conomic
((operation"
\ccording to figures published by U.S. sen'ices and by the
pro.. \IT'erican UO aclminislration, U.S. aid to Laos o\'er the past
relic I \\'1S ,s follo\\', (in million c1ollars).
_ Tr,tol amollld 0; US. aid ouer eleven years (from 1955 to
1.%,i) about 830
a) for the penod 1955 - 1962 o\,er 480
il) fortlIeperiod 1963-1965 344(21)
_ \lilitary aid over eleuen years: about 600 (representing
noor, tI,m 70 per cent of the total amount of U.S. aicl o\,er these
el('\('n)ears).
.I) lor tI (' period 1955-1962: about 370 (nearly 80 per cent
oi tI'e amount of L.S. aid 0\'1'1' this period).
(2.1) According to data gi\'cn by thc U.S. Presidents office: 1963: 102
million dollars 1964: 112 million dollars-1965: 130 million dollars.
25
b) for tile period 1963 - 1965: about 230 (2Ib) (representing
70 per cent of the amount of U.S. aid oyer this period).
The amount of annual aid (U.S. aid in general, military aid
in pl1rticularl for the period 1963-1965 increaserlIJy 1.5 and
2 times, as compared witl1 tile period 1955-1962.
The aforesaid published figures are still very far from the
trutl1 because l1ave not included the huge amounts of secret
military aid, the money and ml1terial directly allotted to pro-
American groups, to U.S. controlled "special forces" and to
military regions without passing til rough the pro-.\mcrican
central administration.
,\s 11 matter of facl, U.S. aid to Laos is much more important
Ulan as re\ealed b\ published data..\ccording to tlIe Frenc'l
weekh' La Trihulle des Salions of Jul\' 26, 1957: "OlTicially
speaki'ng, U.S. aid to Lads amounts yeariy to 74 million
allotted as follows: 7 million for the police and security seni
ces, 7 million for the administrative sen'ices, 50 million for the
25,000-man strong army, and finally, 10 million for the main
tcn:lIlce of 250 U.S. advisers and technicians". The Journal de
Gplleve of .\ugust 13, 1960 wrote: "There is no other country
in the world \\'here the Americans spend more money per capita
l'nder the form of economic aid, and military l1id palticularly.
To spend 25 million dollars a month for a country of 3 million
inhabitants is a very high ratio indeed".
U.S. aid to Laos, primarily aimed at serving tile U.S \\'ar of
l1ggression, is therefore mainly military.
l\\eeting the requirements of the intensificl1tion l1nd expansion
of its war of aggression, the United Stl1'S lIas greatly increased
military aid to its Lao agents. In .\ugust 1959, the Eisenho\\'er
.\dministration urgently gave 34 million dollars for the Phoui
.Sananikone Administration to expl1nd \\ar to the whole country.
(24b) From the same source: 1963: 74,5 million dollars - 1964 : 74
million dollars.
26
B\' tI e end of 1960, the lnited States allotted" supplementary
aId of 16 million dollars for the Boun Oum-Phoumi
'osa\an \dministration to step up the war. By mid-1963, to
inthrr till" plan of occupying the strategic region of the Plain
of .Jars dlHI Xiengkhoang, til(' Kennedy Government and
m<1ssin'ly brought tens of tllOusands of tons of \\'eapons and war
material into Laos for the pro-;\merican faction. Obviously, aid
oi the l'nill'd States to Laos is closely associated with its policy
of iorcein this country.
\\'Iti. hundreds of million of dollars poured into Laos, U.S.
eid accounls ior 90 to 95 per cent of the yearly foreign aid to
Laos, and 85 to 90 per cent of the puppet administration budget.
The l'nltrd Shtes has supported the entIre Lao military
budge!.. It is in fact, virtu311y supporting the entire
economy" ('-)
Putting to a\'ail the po\erty, backwardness, and low social
2nd cultural standards of Laos, the consequences of the feudal
regime and over 60 years of French rule, the United States has
kept under its control all aspects of the political,economicanri
social lifr in Laos Thr report of the U.S. Congressional Jnquiiv
Commission on l' S. aid in Laos, published in 1959 b\' the Senate,
lIas admitted that "excessi\'e aid grants" forced into the
Lo econOI'l f"strr than it could absorb .. causing "inflation,
and corruption".
On the basis of the stipulations of the U.S. Congress ,\cl on
"aid" to iorrign countries, aid to Laos is subjected to extre-
mely drastic modalities and conditions, for no other purpose
than permitting U.S. interference in the internal affairs of this
country and its subjection.
The perfidious and dangerous character of these modalities
and conditions lies in the fact that U.S. aid transforms the reci-
pient into Ii "monthly salaried employee" of the United States,
(25) R,'porI 0; the Congressional Inquiry Commission on aid to Laos.
pU' li,hed the Senate in 1959.
27
destroys the exch:lI1ge yalue of the "kip" and makes it depen-
dent upon the dollar, gi\'es the United States the right to reduce,
to suspend or to cut off its aid at will, \\'henever it deems that
"its interests are menaced". That is why, U,S, aid creates a
permanent pressure on Laos' economy, ~ \ s the French paper
Liberation remarked on October 10, 1959: "The U,S. interference
in Laos' foreign policy and the closer control of U,S. aid are
almost simultaneous",
On the other hand, the modalities and conditions relating to
U.S. aid ha\'e enabled the United States to grasp monopoly in
(he Lao economy and tnrned Laos into a market for U.S. il1\'est-
ments and U.S.' sllfplus goods, thus strangling the Lao nationnl
economy. That is why "before 1953-1954, Laos \\'as a rice pro,
ducer but in 1955 it had to import 16,000 tons of rice from Thai-
land. In the past, it could turn out cotton fabric and no\\' it
has to buy this material from Japan, from the United S t a t e ~ .
or from Hongkong. It has to imporl eYen part of its needs in
fish, vegetables... " (26), and "nearly 60,000 tons of rice
annually" (2il.
According to an A.P. dispatch of June 20, 1965, e\'Cry year,
the \'alue of Laos' imports from the United States amounts to
20 million dollars, while its exports account for less than one
million dollars only
Throngh Lao comprador capitalists, the ,\mericans have
invested O\'er 80 per cent of the capital of o\'Cr 100 companies
no\\' operating in Laos. By founding a number of loan banks,
joint enterprises, monopolistic trade companies in particular,
they have nurtured a section of Lao people \\'hose interests are
closelv associated with the United States and whom theY lise
asa poJitical tool. -
We can say that C.S. dollars haYe created in Laos a pro-
American faction endowed \\'ith economic and political profits
(26) French re\'iew Democralie nouvelle, February 1957 issue,
(27) V.P.I., June 19. 1966.
28
and pri\ileges. This faction grasps import and export monopo-
lies and foreign currency distribution. It has enriched Yery

'TherL <lr!' from 200 to 300 well-knoll'n families in Laos which
C<ln secure til' maximum of profits in a yery great import pro-
"ram" and "the political leaders (of the Rightist faction) in Laos
gl\en a number of privileges aimed at maintaining their
friend'" links \\'ith the United States".
OIling to tic fad that military aid accounts for 70 to 80 per
cent ot L S aid to Laos, economic and technical assistance
occupies olly a \ery small part of the total amount. This assist-
diKe IS no! ,It .ill aimed at helping Laos build an independent
l'cunomy, bdt at creating an all fa<;ade prosperity in a few
Cities, and Sl'rH'S political and military purposes.
Fur thl last iL\\ years, this economic and technical assistance
has !ended to a little increase. But this only means that more
attention has been gi\'en by the L'nited States to demagogy, and
also that more money is invested in important chapters which
take up the grcatest part of the aid. Moreover, although called
"economic and technical" assistance, this aid actually serves
11111ital'\ purposls such as: supply to local bandits com-
mandos dubbed construction and improvement of
rOdds and airlields, expenditures for U.S. ad\isers and
lL'chnicians, etc.
The aforesaid is a number of outstanding features of the
"re\'erse" side of C.S. aid to Laos. As has been pointed out in
I'll' July 23, 1965 memorandum published by the 1'\eo Lao Haksat
Central Committee on the occasion of the third anniversary of
tlie conclusion of the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos, u;lder
the grip of u.s aid, the economy of Laos becomes more and
//lore depl'lldellt upon the United States. U.P.r. on June 2, 1966,
had to admit that there is no country more dependent upon
foreign aid than Laos.
Because of tlie impact of U.S. aid and goods, Lao national
production has come to a standstill; exports show a marked
29
fall, and there is a serIOUS excess of imports over exports
(according to U.P.I., June 2, 1966, the area under the control of
the pro-.\merican administration had to import about 31 million
dollars of foreign goods and could export through legal channel
only 1.6 million dollars of goods). That is \l'hy the pro-Ameri-
can administration budget is in permanent deficit (for the
1965-1966 fiscal year it "'as about 11,000 million "kips" and has
to depend upon foreign "aid", mainly upon U.S. aid. ,\loreover,
lhe administralion has to indulge in serious inflation, the "kip"
!Icing devalued day by day. Since the end of 1958, the United
Slates and its agents have !\"ice devalorized the "kip". This
measure olTered an occasion for the Americans and their lackeys
openly to plunder the Lao people's money, and for a clique of
"privileged" people 10 indulge at will in currency black
marketing. speculation and hoarding, to raise goods' price, and
10 exploit the people.
To "sa"e" the "kip", lhe Cnited Stales and a number of other
Western countries eslablished the "Foreign Exchange Opera-
tions Funds" (F.E.O.F.) allegedly in view of its stabilization.
The United States contributed half of the capital. This move
allo\\'ed the nited States and the Western countries "eITec-
tively to control Laos' c u r r e n c ~ and banks" (of the pro-Amer-
icanadrninistration)(
28
l.
Since 80 to 90 per cent of the country's income derive from
tnxes, the puppet administration has applied many measures to
increase taxes so as to partly make up for the deficit of the
budget. For the period 1956-1960, taxes of \'arious kinds
increased twofold. ,\\oreo\'er, gambling houses are publicly
opened in Vientiane and other cities for taxes. Besides, casinos,
night-clubs, dancing halls, opium-dens are rife: filthy books,
magazines, illustrated papers and films flood in, ad"ertising
"the American way of life".
(28) U.P I., June 2,1966.
30
As il result of this disastrous influence, in the area con-
trolled the puppet administration, the labouring people live
more and more miserably, the economic and social situation
dal' by day. As many "deputies" expressed in recent
sessions of the puppet "national assembly", in Vientiane, as a
result of C.S. aid over the last twelve years Laos "has now to
buy c\'erdhing from abroad", "in the whole country there
fifty doctors, that is to say one physician for
e\en 50,000 inhabitants", "the cost of living doubled in 1958
and'increased tenfold in 1965, as compared with that of
1953"... Iloumphan Saignasit, "deputy" and head of the
Statistics sen ice of the Vientiane Administration complained:
"The of Laos is rotten because its fa\,ade prosperity
comcs from foreign aid; the whole national economy is
shaken... "
The ,\merican press and news agencies have described this
sombre picture of Laos under the power of the dollar during the
past years as folloll's: "The supply to the puppet army has led
to an aid program which destroys all political and economic
stabilih" ('29); "over the past eleven years, the United States
ha\e spent 45 million dollars yearlyt; keep its adopted child
alive... ; to cut off or considerably to reduce U.S. aid to Laos
means to lead this country to collapse" (30).
Under the signboard of "aid", the American imperialists have
spent a lot of money and effort to build up in the area con-
trolled by the puppet administration a network of roads and
military bases backing on Thailand for the purpose of their long-
range scheme of aggression in Laos and in Indochina.
Since 1957, they ha\'e stepped up the construction of strategic
roads linking upper Laos to Northeastern Thailand, Lower Laos
to Thailand and the regions of Upper, Middle and Lower Laos
to South \'tetnam, along the Laos - Thailand border.
(29) Wall Street Journat, August 14, 1959 issue, quoting the 1959 report
of the Congressional Inquiry Commission on aid to Laos.
(30) AP., June 20, 1965.
31
Formerly, the Amencans had built up, repaired and widened
many sections of strategic road ..\i! 13 from Luangprabang to
Pakse, of national road ..\i! 9 connectJng Sa\'annakhet with
Quangtri (South Vietnam), of national road ..\'2 7 connecting
Phoukholln with the Plain of Jars, of road J"2 4 linking Paksane,
Xiengkhoang to Samneua, those linking Luangprabang, Saya-
boury to Northern Thailand, Pakse, Sara vane to ,\ttopell, that
be!\\'een Vientiane and Thadcua which is part of the strategic
road linking Vientiane to Nongkhai-Udorn (Thailand). On July
31, 1958, at the ceremon) inaugurating the ferry of Thadeua-
\'ientianc and the railway station of Nongkhai, Horace Smith,
L.S. ambassador to \'ientJane, pointed out that \\'ith the com-
pletion of this project, traffic would increase tenfold and it
\\ould be possible to go directly from ,\\alaya to the ,\\ekong
rhcr bank. When the plan for the construction of the Pakhin-
bun- Pakkading section on national road .\i! 13 was published
the .\merican press remarked that: "In the field of defence,
this road would enable the Lao Government quickly to move its
troops from one region to another. .. ", and "would be part of the
international road linking Luangprabang, Vientiane and Pakse
in Laos to Saigon in South Vietnam" (31).
O\'er the last three or four years, the L'nited States has
repaired or newly built nearly 400km of road. Recently for the
construction of the Xiengngeun-Hinheup and Vientiane-Thakkhek
sections of road ..\i! 13.and a road linking Thailand to j orthern
Laos, the .-\mericans have in\'Csted respectJvely 2,8.5 and 7
million dollars. The construction of the strategic road linking
the Boloven base in Lower Laos to Thailand and to the Hig!l
Plateau base in South Vietnam, from Udorn (Thailand) to
I\ontum (South Vietnam) via Pakse - Attopeu which had been
preY'iously begun on the Phiafay-Attopeu section, was relin-
quished afterwards when the war extended to Laos. It is now
being resumed by the United States on many sections between
Pakse and .\ttopeu.
(31) XeU.' lurk Times, July 25, 19GO.
32
A S)stem of airfields has also been actively built up the
ast years, 48 of them ha\'e or c,onstructed III the
controlled b) the Vientiane Admlllistra!lon: two second-
class (\\Taltay in \'ientiane and Seno in Savannakhet), 22 third-
class and 24 fourth-class, not counting a few hundred small ones
for helicopters and light transport planes. All of these form a
ne!\\'ork backing on Thailand and serving the military air
transport and other acti\'ities of the United States and its
agents, The Waltay airfield is being hectically built up into a
modern air base with strengthened installations and prolonged
rUI1\\'avsaccessibletojelplanes.
The'LJmtl'd States has also built up a system of secret militar)
stores and bdses along the Laos - Thailand border. Up to
H,60 - 1961, it has constructed for the Rightist faction's army
a general tore house at Seno (Sa\'annakhet), a number of main
warehouses at Vientiane, Luangprabang, Savannakhet, Pakse.,.,
a fourth-class repairing workshop at Vientiane and a number of
subsidian dumps in various militar) regions, Important bases
have created at Sayaboury, Vientiane, Pakse, Boloven,
(Sara\ane). Sello, with garrisons, magazines, airfields, training
centres, radio-communications establishments.
According to the 1954 Gene\a Agreements, the French \\'ere
allowed to maintain the Seno military base, and under the 1962
Gene\a .\greement, this base would be transferred to the Tri-
partite I 'ational Union Go\ernmenl. In February 1961, "with
19.5. means and partly together with U.S, technicians" (32), the
Phoumi troops occupied part of the Seno base, thus
c(1lTImitling an "illegal ael which was at variance \\'ith the 1954
Geneva Agreements" (33), In June 1963, while the French
Go\ernment and the Tripartite National Union Government were
preparing respecti\'l'I) to transfer and to take over Seno, in
furtherance of U.S. plan and putting to avail the compromise of
La Tribulle des \ aliolls, February 10, 1961.
(33) Liberatioll, February 8,1961, communique of the f'rench cmbass
J
in Vientiane
3 T.Y.
33
Prince Souvanna Phouma, General Phoumi Nosavan, in the
name of the Tripartite National Union Government, sent troops
of the Righlisl faction to occupy the base completely.
Now, Seno is the main base for the puppellroops and air
force of the Rightist faction. It is being actively transformed into
a modern one in the s\'slem of U.S. bases in LO\\'er Laos. As a
link tn this s\'slem, a s'ecret base on lhe Bolm'en Plateau is also
being built up. This is a slralegic base nol only for Luwer Laos,
but also for the whole area of SoutherIl Induchina.
J/ong with the power of the doUar, the U.S. aid and adviser
machinery is actually an administratit1e one, dominating the
pro-American government .
Since I95-!, in spile of the pro\ isions of the Gcne\'a Agreement.
the United States llas set up in Laus such urganizalions for
military purposes as:
I. The Programs Evaluation Office (PEO.). - During lhe
fitst ) ears 10 avoid 100 brazen violations of the Gene\a Agree-
menls wilh the formation of a military advisory mission, the
Unifed Slates eslablished the Programs Evaluation Office
affiliated to the State Deparlment, which \\'as essentially an
organization of military advisers. It was in charge of the
military aid program, the distribution of arms and the super-
vision of their use, the logistics service, the training of the
Rightist faction's army, commandos and militia.
The PEO. posted advisers beside the Militia and Commando
General Inspection Service of the army, dispalched to each
military region a technical advisory group and a training
advisory group, under the command of an American colonel; it
also sent advisers even to a number of battalions.
2. The Military Assistance Advisory Group (M.A.A.G.).-
Set up in 1961, the M.A.A.G. was simply the transformation of
the P.E.O.. It was headed by an American major general, arid
had a large-scale structure, capping over the army of the pro-
American government. It comprised mililary a d v i s ~ , experts,
34
technicians, on the one hand, officers and
of S. commando units to the U S. task force on
the other. It \\'as dl\'lded mto vanous departments: staff,
logistics, training, air force, etc.
The ,\I...1.1.G. had representati\'Cs and addsers beside the
Dcience and the Command of the puppet army. The
stalY organs, the intelligence, logistics, technical and other
services, the officers' training schools, military training centres,
and commandos formation centres had also advisers from the
\/..1..1 G. In the regions there \\'ere M.A.A.G. advisers'
"roups, Eacn mobile grouping, battalion, paratroop unit and
:pecial
unit
of the puppet received a team with five to ten
ad\'isers commanded by a lieutenant or a captam. The M.A,.I.G.
also had its olTicers and commandos from the "U.S. task force"
posted In almost all areas where the local bandits and com-
mandos of the puppet army were operating.
In faet, the M...1.A.G. played the role of an American stalT
controlling all the staff ,,'ork, the operations and the intelligence,
training and logistics activities of the Command of the puppet
arnl\'. It also elaborated the plans of operations and diracted
all activities of the puppet regular and irregular forces.
Speaking of the M.A.A.G. in Laos, the New York Herald Tri-
bune, in its issue of February 19, 1962, pointed out that the
'nited States' t'lYorts had succeeded in building up a consider-
able Lao army, that a group of U.S. instructors had been senl
to Laos, and C.S. officers went down to the battalions or even
to smaller units. It remarked that formally speaking, the method
just like in South Vietnam.
3. Beside the ,\L1.A.G. \\'as the United States Operation
Mission (US.O.M.). - :\'ominally, this organ was in charge of
the management and distribution of US. aid in Laos, examin-
ing and appro\ ing the military aid programs proposed by the
lS. military advisers missions.
In fact, the U.S. a.M. looked after the equipment, supply and
transport of the puppet army and U.S. military personnel in
35
Laos. It played the role of the logistics service beside th
jlL1..1.G., catering for the material needs of the U.S. aggressiv
\\af.
The u.S. a.M. posted it::; officers in all major branches of th
puppet administration. It had branch offices in the province
\\here its officers directed and controlled the use of U.S. aid
IH:rtil'ularly the supply of the local bandits-commandos, dubbe'
"refugees".
-I. The United States Information Service (U.S./.S.). - Under
this name, this organization ga\e advices to the Rightist faction
in the field of "psychological warfare" aimed at suppressing the
Lio people's patriotic mO\ement. It furnished finance and
111eans to reactionary organizations in the sen'ice of the United
States. It had its branch offices in the provinces and large towns
oj Laos. Its personnel was composed mostly of disg-uised intel-
ligence officers.
5...\fter the signing of the 1962 Gene\'a Agreement, for the
purpose of camouflage, the Americans changed the various mis-
~ i o n s p.E.a., M.A.A.G" U.S. a.M. and others into a new organi-
zation called the United States Agency for International
Development (U.S.A.I.D.) in Laos. The activities and the ma-
chinery of U.S.AID. differ in no \\ay from those of its prede-
cessQrs. It is composed mostly of disguised officers posted in
major branches and specialized sen'ices of the puppet adminis-
tration and armv, in base areas of the local bandits-commandos,
so-called "rural' developement zones" and "refugees centres",
which are none other than concentration camps.
Like the U.S. a.M. and the M.A.A.G. the U.S.A.I.D. has branch
offices in the pro\'inces and large to\\ ns to manage and super-
vise the usc of U.S. military and economic aid there, and to
supply to the local bandits-commandos. In a word, it is secretly
carrying out activities of a military character, and maintains the
role of a staff olTice and a logistics service.
36
6. Air AI1lNica is now an air transpo:l organization
affiliated to the U.S.A.lD. In the prenous years, Air Amertca
\\'a. a logistics orgal1lzatlOn dependent th.e U.S.O.M. nnd had
efficiently sened the C.S. war of aggressIOn 111 Laos.
\ftN the conclusion of the 1962 Geneva Agreement, Air
America did not withdraw from Laos ..\l present, it is based in
Thailand and keeps on making flights for the transport of mili-
tan supplies to the puppet troops and local bandits-commandos.
September 5, 1963, in the course of a supply-flight to a
po.t of the puppet army in Eastern S!l\'annakhet, a C. 46 plane
of ,Iir Amertca was shot dO\\"l1 by tile Lao patriotic armed
forces. The crew including .\nll'ricans, Thais, and Taiwanese,
\\'ere captured with proofs. The Reporter in its issue of April
IS, 1965 re\'ealed that the C./.,1. had used ,lir ,lmerica which
had 50 transport planes manned hy .\merican, Thai, Lao and
e\l'n South Vietnamese pilots, for the transport of supplies,
medicines and armamenls to the commando groups of the pro-
.\merican faction in Laos.
These are undeniable proofs of the military activities of Air
America as wrll as U.S .. 1.1.D. in Laos, proofs which take ofT the
"ci\'ilian" disguisr of tile aforesaid C.S. para-military organi-
zations.
With the establishmenl of its organizations, the number of
technicians. af1(l militarv ndvisers of the United States introduced
into Laos incrt'ase day iJY day.
According to the BlIllptill de Paris of :\'ovember 13, 1959,
up to 1959, the number of L'S. military personnel in Laos hnd
amounted to 300 -- 200 belonged to the PEO. and 100 ins
tructors for the training of the puppet army-and "to avoid too
brazen a \ iolation of the Gene\'a ,\greement, all these U.S. mili-
tary men earn' out their acti\'ities in civilian capacities but under
the command of a Brigadier". The annual expenditures for the
C,S. ac!\'isers and technicians occupy 10 per cent of the U.S. aid
to Laos. 1961-]962, according to .4.P., September 17, 1962, the
number of U.S militnry personnel increased to 1,500,
37
After July 1962, pretending to respect the 1962 Geneva Agree.
ment, 666 men of the U.S. military personnel were formally with.
drawn from Laos. But aftef\\'ards they \\'ere secretly b r o u ~ h t
back, along with many new-comers.
Now, the total number of Americans \\'orking in various U.S.
01 ganizations in Laos, has amounted to over 5,000, most of them
art disguised military personnel. They are seen in all important
branches and services of the pro-American administration and
army, in all military zones, in the command post of a number
of military units and local commando groups, in all training
centres, in secret militarv bases and even in a number of "rura
development zones" and- "refugees centres" now in construction.
Disguised as civilian personnel, U.S. military ad\'isers assume
the task of training and commanding the Lao puppet' regular
forces, the police, the local bandits-commandos.
U.S. advisers draw up operatignal plans of the puppet army.
The Times, in its January 20, 1961 issue, inrlirectly admitted
this when it wrote that General J.A. Heintges, head of the p.E.a.
in Vientiane, had to look after U.S. weapons until he supervised
what he called the "final decision", Le. when guns began firing.
On January 21, 1961, by evasive statements, General A. Boyle,
new head of the P.E.G., admitted the U.S. advisers' participation
in the military activities of the puppet army: "Since we ha\'e to
teach them (the puppet troops) ho\\tousethese (American) wea
pons, we want to supervise how they u.e them in the battlefield.
For this purpose, we have to send observers to the fran!."
In the course of the puppet army's offensives against the
liberated areas controllerl b ~ ' the patriotic forces of Laos, U.S.
military personnel were present at the operational command
post, and frequently went to prepare for and to observe the
battlefield.
At present, officiall), the U.SA.I.D. and the U.S.l.S. are the
main U.S. organizations in Laos, coming under the U.S. em
38
hasS\. Their highranking officials enjoy diplomatic privileges.
Thei; offices and warehouses occupy big buildings in Vientiane
and other main cities. .
TIll' hra{n of all machinery .is the U.S. embassy in Vien-
U[dle. With a stalT of over 400 persons, among them many dis-
cruised highr,lI1king officers, the U.S. embassy now plays the
;ole of an 'Idual commander.
'Replying to a correspondent of the I'oice of America, in an
irteniew the end of l'\o\'ember 1964, "'hen he was newly
appointed U.S. ambassador to Vientiane, \V.H. Sullivan distorted
the truth about Laos in a Jperfidious and condescending lan-
guag
e
. "In ordl'r to define the U.S. objecti\'es in Laos, we must
have a broader understanding of the objectives of our foreign
policies all over the world", and "assume great responsibilities
towards small countries such as Laos" (34). The U.S. ambas
s, dol' playing the role of a master in Laos is a typical evidence
oj the remark made by the former French CommanderinChief
111 Indochina, General H. Navarre on "the colonialism of the
dollar": "TLere is no governor general, no resident superior,
no high from the United States, only an American
,;mbassador, but nothing can be carried out without his
appro\'al" (3r,).
Ou the "tnH'" role of the U.S. organizations and personnel in
Laos, the foreign press has since long pointed out, "It is obvious
that the U.S. mission in Laos has set about undermining the
nrutrality of this small country" (36); "the Americans behave in
Laos as in an occupied countn" (37); "it can be said that the
actual go\'rrnment in Laos is th'e U.S. embassy (38).
(34) I SIS. :'\o\'Cl11ber 196-\.
(.'0) ,1gollie lit: l'lnl!ochillc, Henri l\avarre, Paris 11>56.
(36) British paper Tribulle, September II, 1959.
(37) B"lIetin de Paris, i\oHl11her 13,1959.
(38) Freneh paper Le Figaro, December 4, 1960.
39
On this score, the October 13, ]965 Declaration of the National
Union Political Conference between the Neo Lao Haksat and the
patriotic Neutralist forces, was also explicit: Under the grip of
the dol/or and the U.S. disguised ruling machinery, the area
under the control of the pro-American administration has in fact
become a US. new-pattem colony and a military base.
" Special warfare" in Laoli, an American neo-coloniali.t
War of aggreliliion
With their dollars and camouflaged ruling machinery, the
,\merican imperialists have been stepping up their scheme of
tl'rning Laos, \\'hich the Geneva Agreements and the Tripartite
Agreements had stipulated to be a neutralist country, into a
"pro-American neutral country", a "bulwark of the free world in
Southeast Asia". The Weslern press remarks that with regard to
Ihe Lao question, the Kennedy Go\'Crnment had the slime attitude
as the Eisenhower Government, thaI the U.S, scheme in Laos has
al\\'ays been to "found a free, independent, unified and non-
aligned Laos, on condition that it should be n Western-
inclined neutrality. And the Uniled Slales sees no paradox in
the acceptance of American aid by a non-aligned
Laos" (39).
In furtherance of this scheme, the American imperialists have
resorted to all means, political, diplomatic, economic, and
An out.standing feature of their neo-cotonialist policy
in Laos is the close combination of military, political, and diplo-
matic methods, the simultaneous application of the policy of
force and the method of "peaceful evolution" and peace nego-
tiations. But the policy of force remains their fundamental
policy.
This dual policy of the American imperialists has brought
about very complicated developments in the Laos situation O\'er
(39) French papcr Lo Croix, February 6, 1961.
40
the past twehe years. 'ow the becomes very tense,
noW it temporarily calms dO\\'n, but Its general trend IS to
become increasingly serious. rhe New York Herald Tribune
bluntly \\Tote in its issue of February 19, 1962 that "The U.S.
Government adopted two courses of action in Laos, parallel to
other, and complementary to each other: on the one hand,
it tried to a\'oid leading Laos onto the Communist path by form-
ing a coalition go\'erlllnent with the participation of all political
parties, on theotherhand,it endeavoured to increase the anti-
Communist forces in Laos and to equip them with all they might
need to cope with every emergency".
In the last twel\'e years, the American imperialists and their
agents ha\e been twice compelled to accept a peaceful solution
at the Geneva Conferences of 1954 and 1961-1962. Twice they
ha\e been compelkd to accept the formation of a coalition
government \\ith the participation of the Lao patriotic forces,
in 1957 and in 1962. But each time, they plotted to use the poli-
tical method of "peaceful e\'olution" to wipe out the Lao
patriotic forces, to materialize the objectives which they failed
to reach hy armed violence. This constitutes their greatest poli-
tical schemps,
By participating in peace talks, by using bribery and induce-
ment, and by resorting to political and economic pressure, they
hoppd \\olild make the Lao patriotic forces slacken vigi-
lance, 50\\ di\ision among their ranks, and weaken them in order
to wipe t1H.'m out by political means or to suppress them by
armed forces.
On the other hand, they carried out frantic "anti-communist"
propaganda. In its issue of ,\lay 1955, the U.S. review Foreign
Affairs wrote: "We (.\mericans) covered up our objectives by
slogans of defence against Communists. No doubt, we admitted
that this was a deceiful expedient". They trumpeted about the
so-calleo "aggression b\' the Pathe! Lao Communists ano the
:\orth \'ietnamese Communists" to slander the Lao patriotic
fcrces and the socialist countries, particularly the Democratic
41
Republic of Vietnam, a signatory party which has al\\ays been
respecting and correctly implementing the Geneva Agreements,
The:- thus attempted to isolate the Lao patriotic forces politi-
cally, to deceive public ORiJlion, and to conceal their own igno-
minious face. The British Daily exposed this U.S,
mancrU\Te in its issue of January 2,1961: "The criminals in
Washington and in the Pentagon were contemplating a direct
armed inter\'ention in Laos, The pretext for them to intervene
was a completelv fabricated tale about North Vietnamese inter-
ference in Lao.. This \\'as an obvious trick which no commen
tator ha\'ing a sense of responsibility could belie\'e. ,\11 inter-
ference in the internal a!Tairs of Laos comes from the United
Slides side",
The experience gathered over the past twelve years has sho\\'n
that whene\'er the .\merican imperialists sustained defeat on the
battlelield, they and their a?;ehts a!\\'ays temporarily stepped
back, shifted to political methods, and accepted a peaceful

HO\I'el'er, as they still possess strong forces and stick to their
will of aggression, they do not reconcile themselves to defeat.
Realizing on the other hand tbnt they c"nnot peacefully eliminate
the Lao patriotic forces by political methods and after consoli-
dating and priming their forces, they \\'ent on brazenly sabo-
taging this peaceful solution by both attacking the Lao patriotic
forces and undermining the Lao coalition gOl'ernment with
subHrsive methods, r\nd whenever resorted to force they
further aggravated the situation in Laos,
The reality of Lao history o\'er the past twelve years is that
the .-'\merican imperialist aggressors' guns have never stopped
Iiring in this countr:-, in spite of negotiations and agreements,
.\s pointed out in the October 13,1965 Declaration of the
:'\Iational Union Political Conference, the American imperialists'
fundamel1tal policy has always been a policy of force because
they have not given up their consistent scheme of annihilating
42
the Lao patriotic forces and turtling into a U.S. nl'w-
pattern co/any and a war base in Indochina and in SOll/h('ast
Asia.
It is kno\\'n to eYer) body tbnt in thr press conference hcld
on ,\Iarch 23.1961,1\\'0 months beforr thr opcning of thc Gencvn
Conference on Laos, President J.f. Kennedy demanded, as a
condition for' the peaceful solution of the Lao qurstion, that an
end be put to \\ hat he called "Communist attacks with foreign
assistance", noisily thrratened that "in case these nttacks \\'rl"('
not stopped, the United States would ha\'e to consider ho\\' to
reacl .. The form of the U.S. reaction would be carefully studird
not only in Washington but alsoM S.E.A.T.O. conferences with
our and "let no one have any doubt about our detrrmi-
nntion in this connection". During the last dnys of the Genc\'a
Conference on Laos, the Manchester Guardian of June 12, 1962
\\Tote: "The enemy of peace in Laos was linking his dark sche-
mes with the plans of the reaction in Laos. Those reaction:lry
elements haw craselessy pinned their hopes in undermining the
efforts to form an independent and democratic State in Lnos
nnd rrlied on the support of U.S. arms". This objective remark
might be considered a very correct evaluation of the policy of
force the American imperialists' had hitherto pursued in Lnos.
For the past twenty years, the Lao patriotic forces hay(' grown
up The) hnve led the resistance war against the French to
\ ictory and become the main force of the Lao people's strugglr
for national liberation.
Considering the Lao patriotic forces the main obstncle 10 its
pohcy of intervention and aggression, American neo-colonialism,
cruel bv nature, did not hesitate to use force to annihilate at
nm' the Lao patriotic forces and to crush the Lao people's
for liberation as early as it entered Lao' to replace
defeated French colonialism. Using the reactionary forces, on thc
one laml it has ceaselessly launched military offensives against
the Lao patriotic forces, on the other, through mopping-up ope-
rations, it has ruthlessly oppressed thepopul<1tion in areas con-
trolled b) the puppet administration.
43
Over the past !\n'ln' years, with the puppet forces as an
instrument and using prisons, detention camps, bombs and even
toxic chemicals, the A.merican imperialists ha\'e perpetrated
innumerable crimes. ha\'e jailed and massacred so many
patriots, killed and crippled so many innocent people! They have
indiscrimin:ltely destroyed pagodas, hospitals, schools, ricefields
and gardens, \'illages and t0\\"11S. They haH plundered and
killed many thousands of domestic animals, and devastated
large populated areas.
In fact, OVN the past twelve years, the American
hat'e been waging a neo-colonialist war of aggression in Laos,
gradually carrying out the so-called "special warfare", a form
of violence IiIf American neo-colonialism.
"Special warfare" is the third type of warfare in the "flexible
response" stratefly elaborated by the Kennedy-Taylor clique in
recent years. It is essentially a neo-colonialist \\'ar of aggression.
This is a kind of aggressive war in which the aggressors assume
the role of 'behind-the-scene commanders through a system of
advisers, prOVide money and equipment, whereas tile native
reactionary puppet forces prettified by signboards of sham
"independence", "State", and "democracy", are used as
instruments.
In this sense, \\'e can say that in the recent period, the Amer-
ican imperialists ha\'e been \\'aging in Laos a kind of \\'ar in
\\'hich "Asians are used to fight Asians" and "Lao people to
fight Lao people".
In fact, no sooner had the 1954 Gene\'a Agreements been
signed than the American imperialists' scheme of aggression
against Laos was laid bare by the United States' pressure
brought to bear on the S.E.ATO. to the effect that Laos be
deliberately put \\'ithin its "zone of protection" and by the visit
of the U.S. Secretar\' of State J.F. Dulles to Vientiane in
February 1955 to pre;s the pro-American Katay Don Sasorith
Administration "to take more drastic actions against the Pathet
44
Lao" (40). Later on, Amencan high-ranking officers such as
General L Collins, \dmiral A. Radford... rushed to Vientiane
and dre\\ up plans for their agents to launch an offensive on
the Pathet Lao iorces (II).
Earlv in 1955, half a )ear after the conclusion of the Gene\a
on Indochina, and a few months after its coming
into force. the Katll) Don Sasorith Government, on American
orders, ::.tarted an olTensi\e on Samneua and Phongsaly, the
h\ 0 regrouping pro\ inces of the .eo Lao Haksat laid dO\\'11 in
the 1954 Gene\'a l\greements. Thus, a protracted "civil \l'ar",
actually an ;\merican neo-colonialist \\'ar of aggression \l'as
kindled. Kata) Don Sasorith explicitly stated that: "The first
a::.piration to be materialized was to compel the Pathet Lao to
put do\\n their arms and to dissolve their armed forces"
In an attempt to seize at any cost the regrouping zone of the
, eo Lao Ilaksat, the Katay Don Sasorilh Administration mobi-
lIzed half of its armed forces into the offenshe. U.S. planes
as::.ured the transport of the attacking troops while U.S. advisers
took their command.
In .\pril 1957, the United States and a number of other Wes-
tern governments simultaneously sent notes to the Souvanna
Phouma Government "protesting against the participation of the
Pathet Lao" in an) Lao Government. Nevertheless, the 1957 Vien-
tiane agreement on the formation of tlIe first coalition govern-
ment including the leo Lao Haksat, \\'as signed. This marked
the defeat of the three-year military campaign against the
regrouping zone of the Neo Lao Haksat, the first defeat of the
L.S. "special warfare" in Laos. Soon after this, on November
20, 1957, the spokesman of the State Department declared,
"The United States thinks it dangerous to form a coalition
government including representatives of the Pathet Lao".
PO) ,\ew Fork lIerald Tribllne, 1955.
(11) The appellation "Pathet Lao" was lI"es in the 1954 Gene\a Agree
ments to designate the Nco Lao lbala Resistance Forces, the predeces-
"ors oi the ,'eo Lao Haksat.
(42) Radio I'icntianc, October 4. 1955.
45
Less than one year after, in August 1958, with American
support, thePhoui Sananikone's reactionary factiono\'erthrewthe
coalition government and seized power. In February 1958, the\'
rcpudiated the 1954 Gene\'a Agreements. Then, the state Depart-
ment declared that the United States "supported the determina-
tion" of the Phoui Sananikone Government and that now "Laos
could join the S.E.A.T.O.". The New York Herald Tribune in
its j\\arch 9, 1959 issue bluntly wrote that this action by the
Phoui Sananikone Government "endo\\'ed the United States \\'ith
more possibilities in organizing the defence of this highly impor-
tant cOLintry". By the middle of that year, in furtherance of U.S.
plans, the PhoLii Sananikone Administration ordered their troops
to disarm, encircle and attack the Neo Lao Haksat battalions
\\'hich \\'('I'C garrisoned in Upper Laos, awaiting the integration
of the two armed forces in accordance with the 1957 Vientiane
.\greement. Later on, they illegally imprisoned leaders of the
:\eo Lao Haksat, members of the Coalition Government. This
"iIS an extremely serious act o( pro\'ocation and sabotage b\'
the .\merican imperialists and their agents, who ha\'e gradually
expanded the war throughout the country.
B) "resting from the French the right to train the puppet
troops, .by setting up organizations of U.S. military advisers
and by granting emergency military aid to the Phoui Sananikone
clique, the Americans rapidly built up an arm) of mercenaries
as a tool of their neo-colonialist war, the direction of which
Uley grasped more and more firmly.
In this period, the United States changed puppet governments
one after the other and rigged up new ones as a more effective
instrument for carrying out their policy of intervention and
aggression.
After the SOlllsanith Government was overthrown by those
armymen, who stood for peace and neutrality and \dlO staged
up the r\ugust 1960 coup d'Etat, the United States helped by all
means the Phoumi Nosavan clique establish their "headquarters"
and the so-called "Revolutionary Committee" in Savanakhet,
Lower Laos. In December 1960, they founded the Soun Oum-
4fi
Phoumi Nosa\'an reactionary government, in open opposition
to the legal government which had been formed and invesled
after lhe August 1960 coup d'Etat. Then, in furtherance of the

tlOOpS, in coordination with those from Thailand, were brought
from Lo\\'er Laos to storm and seize Vientiane, the capital, in
an aUempt to crush, the legal go\ernmenl. ",1,. s\\'ann of l\\'el\'e-
seat helicopters wilh insignias of the U.S. Na\y carefully
painted 0ut and a' number of six-seat BeaYers \\ere used to
transport troops to the concentration area, .. " (43) Dozens Df
\l1lerican advisers directly commanded the streel baltle in
\'ientiane.
In 1961,1962. in the face of great military \ietories, partinl'
lalll the resounding victory at Namtha, recorded by the Lao
patriotic forces and people, and in the face of the impending
disintegration by lumps of the puppet army, the .1,.merican impe-
rialists hastilv ordered marines units to land in Thailand and
to be ready ror participation in the war in Laos, brought the
U.S. Se\enth fleet to the China Sea for a show,off of slrength,
,nd manoeu\ red to induce a number of their S.E,A,T.O. siltellites
into a collectiye armed inten'ention in Laos.
The signing of the Tripartite Agreements in 1961 and 1962
and the Geneva Agreement in 1962 stayed these U.S, military
adventures, marking the second m<\jor defeal of the American
nco-colonialist war in Laos.
The delente following the conclusion of lhe 1962 Geneva
\greement was short-lived. After consolidating and keeping
their forces in readiness, the Arne,ican and their
agents perpetrated the murder of Foreign Minister Quinim
Pholsena in April 1963, directly struck at the Tripartite National
lInion Go\'ernment of Laos, and starled large-scale encroaching
operations ill the strategic region of Plain of Jars and Xieng-
k!lOang, pa\'ing the way for furlher steps of war expansion. On
(-13) 10 S. /I'e-...:s alld World Januau' Q3, 19G1 issue.
47
June 2J, 1963, General Phoumi osavan, the leader of the
Rightist faction, openly stated that: "From now on, the ,,'ar has
blazed up again in the country",
Oyer the past four years, the American imperialists continued
to pour into Laos hundreds of millions of dollars, tens of thou-
sands of tons of arms and ammunition, thousands of military
personnel from the United States and its satellites, many units
of combat troops and commandos from Thailand and South
Vietnam, to help their agents intensify and extend the war,
Meall\\'hile, apart from the encroaching operations involving
nearly two mobile regiments, the puppet army under the com-
mand of U,S, advisers, continuously launched eight big offen-
sives on the liberated areas of the Lao patriotic forces, from
Upper Laos to Middle and Lower Laos, mobilizing from six to
IIvent) battalions of regular troops ,,'ith artillery and air support,
in each campaign, such as the amtheun campaign in the area
of road.\'1! 8 and road Xg 12 (,\\iddle Laos) in 1963-1964, the
Plain of Jars and the "Samsone" (Three Arrows) campaigns in
the area of road.\11 7 and road Xg 13 (Upper Laos) in 1964,
the Sonsay (Victoriolls Arrow) campaign in the area of road
.\11 9 and road Kg 12 (Middle and Lower Laos) in 1964-1965,
the Phoukout (Xiengkhoang) campaign in 1966, etc,
On April 19, 1964, to complete the sabotage of the 1962 pea-
ceful settlement of the Lao question, the United States staged
a military putsch to overthrow the Tripartite National Union
GO\'ernment, used the extreme Rightist Kouprasith .-\bhay mili-
tarist group,
The King of Laos condemned this brazen and serious act of
sabotage by the United States and its agents, branding it as
'anti-constitutional", In the May 1st, 1964 report to the King,
Prince Souphanouvong, President of the eo Lao Haksat Central
Committee and Vice-Premier of the National Union Government
\\rote: "The stern condemnation by Your .\lajesty of the April
19 coup captivated the heart of the people in the whole kingdom.
In the struggle against the dark plots to undermine the peace
and neutrality of our motherland, it is our hope that Your Ma-
48
jest) would use Your supreme authority to presen'e the Nation.. l
Union Government as it was at the moment of its formation,
to ensure the continuation of its normal activities, the respeLl
and strict implementation of the 1962 Geneva Agreement on
Laos, as well as the Zurich, Plain of Jars, and other Tripartite
Agreements, in the supreme interests of the nation and the
future of our motherland",
The International Commission in Laos "could not help dral\'-
Ing the conclusion that if because of the latest developments in
Laos, the Lao National Union Government \\'as overthrown and
ib tripartite structure broken, it would be a brazen \'iolation of
the Gene\'a ,\greement, jeopardizing the aims and objectives of
this Agreement" (44), .j"s for the Co-Chairmen of the 1961-1962
Genen! Conference, they "hoped that those who opposed the
Geneva Agreement and the Coalition Government \\'ould imme-
diatel) slop their illegal acti\'ilies" (45),
One month after, in ,"\ay 1964, the American imperialists
began using their air force to bomb and strafe the liberated
areas in Laos, Recently they \\'ent so far as to launching air
raids with B,52 strategic bombers, to massllcre the Lao people,
These activities constitute new, most dangerous steps in the
escalation of American "special warfare", They also expose their
increasing difficulties and ever-greater defeats, and lay bare
the cruel, aggTessi\'e character of the "special warfare", a
plOduct of ,j"merican neo-colonialism in Laos, As has been
pointed out by the October 13, 1965 Declaration of the National
Union Political Conference, with this new "escalation" mo\'e
after their pre\'ious aels of aggression, the American imperialists
have thrO\\'Il off their hypocritical Illask and appeared in Iheir
Irue colours as Ihe mosl cruel colonialisl aggressor, the most
dallgerous ellemy of Ihe Lao people,
(44) Special report dated April 2 ~ _ 1964 of the Intcrnational C01J1mis,
sion in Laos to the Co-Chairmen of the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference
(45) Messa!(e datcd ,\Iay 1st. 1964 of the Co-Chairmen of the 1961-
1 9 6 ~ Geneva Confen'nce to the leaders of the three political parties in
Laos and to the !(overnments participating in the Conference
4 T,Y,
49
II
POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES'
NEO.COLONIALISM AND MAINSTAYS
Of' ITS" SPECIAL WARf'ARE" I - LAOS
Building and using the puppet administration and paci-
ing and \\ielding control O\-er the people by mopping-up opera-
tions and disguiscd large-scale concentration schemes, playing
upon the complex nationality problem in Laos to push ahead
their policy of di\'ision, and organizing "special forces" in the
minority areas. such as the main policies of ..\merican neo-
colonialism in Laos.
1. The puppet administration
With the signing of the 1954 Gene\'a Agreements, Laos
became a so\ereign State. The State machinery left oYer by the
French, although an olTspring of colonialism, \\'as nominally a
sovereign governmcnt. In the course of the struggle bet\\"een
the Lao people's patriotic movement on the one hand, and the
.\merican aggressors and their henchmen on the other, it occur-
red that the latler had t(J take back\\"ard steps and there\\'ere
established go\ernments including elements more or less in
iavour of a of peace and neutrality, or coalition gO\'ern-
ments \I'ith the participation of the patriotic forces of Laos.
31
The American imperialists, thus, haye pursued a dual policy,
On the one hand, they have taken adYantage of the legal
ance of the old State machinery and its \I'eakness to rig up
disguised pro-American governments, on the other, they have
resorted to all kinds of perfidious tricks to control, undermine
and oYerthro\\' those gOHrnments which haH more or less
stood in the way of their policy of intef\'ention and aggression,
and the coalition goYernments which included the represent a-
tiyes of Lao patriotic forces, To reach their goal, rely, in
both cases, on the power which they derive from their "aid"
programs, on the nel\\'ork of their adYisers, and the Lao puppet
reactionary forces paid by them,
Hal'ing in effect intruded into Laos el'en before France's
defeat in Indochina, the United States could gradually secure,
by bribery and corruption, the allegiance of a section of former
French henchmen and, at the same time, recruit nell' agents,
By besto\\'ing upon their lackeys economic privileges and
important positions in the puppet administratiye machinery in
which they indulged in embezzlement and the United
States has created in Laos compradore capitalists, high-ranking
ofTicials and puppet military ofTicers, These elements
with interests intimatelY linked with those of the United States,
are faJlhful .\merican henchmen usually known as the Rightist
faction. They constitute the social basis of the successiye puppet
gOl'ernments rigged up the .\mericans,
The .-\merican imperialists, relying on these reactionary forces,
haH on three occasions exerted over the last t\\'elye years,
political and economic pressure to overthrow those
engaged in peace talks \I'ith the patriotic forces. and haH twice
undermined and ol'erthrown by violence those coalition govern-
ments, They hal'e successiICly installed six puppet goYernments,
10 counter the new advances of the Lao people's patriotic
struggle and to meet the new requirements of their policy of
inten'ention and aggression, The weekly France Observateur
of February 28,1957 pointed out: "As the collapse of Vientiane
52
rna) lear! to an eventual downfall of Bangkok, Vientiane is in
the eves of the United States a key which must be kept 111 hand
bv rn'aintaining t11ere a government faithful to Wllshington".
'The \merican imperialists camouflage successive puppet
regimes in Laos with such signboards as "independence",
"nationalism" and "democrllcy".
.\11 those puppet administrations, hellded by Katay Don
Sasorith, Phoui Sananikone, Boun Qum - Phoumi Nosavan and
Prince Souvanna Phouma at present, claimed to be "national"
lind representative of the sovereignty and independence of Laos.
..\s a sembJllnce of democracy, they stage managed "elecUons"
to "national assemblies".
The United States has entered into bililteral agreements with
its Lao henchmen lind IIllowed them to hold diplomatic nego-
tiations and conclude treaties and accords with U.S, allies and
satellites.
Over recent years, ever more perfidious tricks have been used
[)\ the United States and its hangers-on. After wire-pulling the
I(ouprasith Abhay extreme Rightist and militarist clique to
stage the April 1964 military putsch overthrowing the National
Union Government established on the basis of the 1961 and 1962
Tripartite Agreements, they have resorted to the "new wine in
old bottles" device to set up a puppet government which profes-
~ e s to be a "national union government". Playing upon Prince
SOll\'anna Phouma's capitulation and collusion, theY have
retained him as "Prime Minister", and acting through hi;n, have
carried out a number of government reshuffles in order, in point
of fact, to oust the Neo Lao Haksat and the patriotic Neutralist
J\linisters and Secretaries of State, and to replace them with
pro-American elements. In substance, this so-called "national
union government" is nothing but a coalition of pro-American
factions such as the Phoui Sananikone-Kouprasith Abhay elique,
the Phoumi Nosavan clique, etc.
53
Thereafter, the Americans and their lackeys staged the farce
of "restricted elections" to choose a new "national assemblv"_
\\'hich, in turn, sanctioned the above puppet administrati;n.
Yet all these perfidious tricks have failed to cover up the
puppet and traitorous nature of the U.S. henchmen. In fact, their
"sovereignty" and "independence" are a mere as their
existence depends on the American aid. They are in a
predicament \\'hene\'er the United States reduces or suspends its
assistance.
As a result, to quote the remark of the French paper Le Figaro
of December 4, 1960, "In Laos, e\'erything depends on the Arne
ricans". This explains \l'hy the Lao valets can never pursue an
inciependence course in foreign alTairs or apply a democratic
internalpolic)' .
.\11 their talks about "peace", and "neutrality" are sheer dema-
gogic attempts to conceal their o\\'n traitorous dealings.
Theirs is a brand of "peace" and "neutrality" which stands
for the acceptance of U.S. assistance with conditions attached,
\\lIich asserts that "not onlv Laos but other Southeast Asian
countries, too, lie withIn scope of the S.E.A.T.O." (I), and
requests the U..0. to dispatch "emergency forces" (2) and the
S.E.. \.T.O. to send "observers" to Laos (3).
have entered into bilateral agreements which provide
a legal basis for U.S. sabotage activities and acts of aggression.
Tl:ey have negotiated and concluded with Thailand and South
Vietnam agreements on "cooperation" which in fact constitute
a secre! military alliance \l'ith U.S. satellites and allow them
to interfere into Lao affairs.
Such is the true nature of the foreign policy of the Lao pup-
pets, a policy subservient to the United States behind the fig-
leaf of "neutrality".
(I) Statement by Kata)' Don Sasorith. January 1955.
Action taken by the Pholli Sananikone Government in 1959.
(3) Action taken by the Phoumi Nosavan Administration in 1961.
54
The\' lavishly talk aboul freedom and democracy, but have
in fac't enforced ever-harsher military dictatorship,
Thev have ignored and, worse still, flouted the provisions of
the 1954 Gene,'a Agreements which guarantee democratic free-
doms and prohibit all discrimination and reprisals against the
former Resistants, The citizens' rights and basic democratic free-
doms which, as a result of the struggle o[ the patriotic and
democratic forces o[ Laos, were laid down in the 1957 Vientiane
Aareements, the amended Constitution o[ 1957 and the 1962
program o[ the Tripartite National Union Government,
}:3\'e remained dead letter.
The\' ha,'e hounded. imprisoned and executed without trial
o[ former Resistants (4),
Writing In lhe .\'ew York Herald Tribune, September 6, 1959,
J Alsop admitted that lhese acts o[ terror were carried out
"ilh American approval and often as a result o[ American
suggestions, The News Chronicle o[ July 31, 1959 also remarked
that the 1954 Geneva Agreemenls specified that democratic [ree-
doms in Laos should be guaranteed, but these rights were being
trampled underfoot.
To strengthen their grip over the people, the U,S, henchmen
ha\'e gradually turned the administrative machinery down to
the commune level into police and militar\' set-ups and ha\'e on
many occasions declared the "stale of in specific
areas or lhroughoul the counlry, Ever since Phoumi osavan's
(-I) As exampj(s. the iollowing documents may be cited:
A Confidential directive of December 15. 1958 addressed by the Interior
Minister of the Phoui Sananikone Administration to provincial go\'ernors
and district chiefs empowering them to persecute or liquidate without
tlial all iormer members oi the Neo Lao Haksal and all former
Resistants
Top Secret Order 397,KFD,4 dated December 13. 1959 oi Bounleuth
Sanichan. Commander oi the 1st Military ordering the arrest
and detention of all those who show sympathy for the Neo Lao Haksat.
55
accession 10 power, Ihe National Department of Coordination,
the secret police headed by General Siho Lanephouthakou, has
lllled the roost in\'ientianeand other cities.
In fact, thE'ir so-called "parliamentary elections", riddled with
anti-democratic practices, are designed 10 rig-up "national
assemblies" which represent nothing but the interests of milit'i-
rists, compradore bourgeois elements and reactionary high-
ranking officials.
These ha\'e poured Ollt dozens of millions of kips, used all
kinds of malpractices and even mobilized the services of the
administrative machinery, the police and the army, in order to
secure the maximum number of votes (5). Thev shrunk from no
tricks to control and repress the voters, even to terror-
ism and murder to prevenl a victory of the patriotic and demo-
cratic forces at the supplementary elections held in 1958 with
the participation of the Neo Lao J-Iaksat and the Party for
Peace and l'\elltrality, as provided for in the Vientiane Agree-
ments of 1957.
In 1965, the pro-r\merican elements in Vientiane organized
the so-called "restricted elections" in which only government
officials, members of the police force, army officers, industrialists
and Iraders were enlitled to elect a new "national assemblv"
patterned after the 1960 "national assembly" of the
:\losavan clique. This semblance of democracy was only a,l
occasion for the pro-:\merican factions to proceerl to a new
of seals.
In fact, the members of their so-called "national governments"
are chosen and sanctioned III ad\'ance by the State Department
and the Central Intelligence Agency.
(5) An offirial mrssagr ,\"2 526/CO-AG datrd April 6. 1960 addressed
by thr lntrrior \\inistrr of thr Somsanith Administration to the (,(overnor
of Paksr province, ordrring the latter to provide and
1II0rai sllpport to "nationalist" and "govrrnment" candidates and use
punitil'e measures towards opposition voters.
Both American and Western press pointed out that over the
past the ears, the United States had poured into Laos some
$ 300,000,000 worth of military and economic assistance in order
to install successive "anti-communist g'oHrnments"((.,. "They (the
,-\mericans, Pub!.) are the \'ery people who make and unmake
governmenb (in Laos, Pub!.) (il.
The Sew l ark Herald Tribune of September 15, 1959, speci-
ficall\ said that the Eisenho\\'er .-\dministration had exercised its
to bring' about the anti-communist goverment of
PllOUi Sanilnikone.
The Indian paper National Herald of January 5, 1961 com-
mented that the Boun Gum - Phoumi )losa\':1n Government was
totallv alienated from the people and could survi\'e only thanks
to arms and supplies. The paper further wrote that if
this regime ever had to live on its own, it would not stand 1'\'1',1
for a \\'eek The Joumal de Geneve of December 6, 1960 was
e\'en more explicit .-\sia, the U.S. services have carried
out their action in accordance with theobsoleteinstructionsoi
.I.F. Dulles, They had searched for n strong man and found
General Phollmi Nosavan whom they have been nurturing and
pro\'iding with arms and equipment in Savannakhet, the latter's
rebel capital"
The french \\eekly La Tribune des NatiollS of January 6, 1961
\\ rate "Dozens of millions of U.S. dollars poured into Laos
as foreign aid, ha\'e immediately become 'secret funds' While
the Ill/emational Cooperation Administration (I.C.A.) continues
to (end its name, the use of these funds has now pa-ssed into
the hanns of C LA. men".
Thus, judging from their deeds, all the puppet governments
rigged up over the past twelve years have acted as effectual
tools in the service of the American neo-colonialist war of
aggression in Laos,
(6) Time, October :H, 1960.
(7) Le Figaro, Dece'mber 4,1960.
'57
It \\'as the first pro-American government under Katay Don
Sasorith \\'hich kindled the flames of this war. War was pursued
and intensified still further by the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan
Government \\'ith military expenditures unkno\\'n so far.
The present puppet administration in Vientiane has ftouted
the 1962 Genel'a Agreement and the Tripartite Agreements and
sabotaged the pellce talks between the threee parties; it has
been helping the United States to expand the \\'ar, and in parti-
cular, allowed the U.S. Air Force to launch bombing attacks on
the liberated zone.
Prince Souvanna Phouma, its "nominal Prime Minister", has
gone farther and farther along the path of surrender to and
collusion with the United States and betrayed the genuine in-
terests of the Neutralist Party and the Lao people. He has thus
forfeited his position a Prime Minister of the Tripartite
'\Jational Union Government, and representative of the Neutralist
Party.
Openly jettisoning the sovereignty of Laos and the principle
of among the three parties of the National Union
Government, Prince Souvanna Phouma has obediently let the
United States and the Rightist faction misuse his position as
"Prime Minister" to legalize their disruptive dealings. He has
cast aside his own mask and laid bare his subservience to the
United States when he told the Time on December 19, 1964 that
"If U.S. and Thai forces are im'olved (in Laos - Pub!.) that
Ilould be solely for defending freedom against Communist sub
I ersion in Southeast Asia". This statement has no other aim
than to prepare public opinion and pave the way for the com
mitment of U.S. and satellite troops to the war in Laos.
On the occasion of the fourth anniversary of the establish
ment of the Tripartite National nion Prince Sou
phanouvong, Vice Premier and Chairman of the Neo Lao Haksat
Central Committee, the Neo Lao Haksat and Patriotic Neutralist
Ministers and Secretaries of State of the Tripartite ational
58
Union Gonrnment, issued on June 22, 1966, a joint statement
sternly condemning the puppet administration in Vientiane. The
reads in part:
"The present administration in Vientiane with Prince Sou
vnnna Phouma as "Prime Minister" has adorned the garb of
"independence", "neutralist" and "national union" merely for
the purpose of misleading public opinion and covering up its
own acts of betrayal. It has pursued internal and external poli
des at variance with the political program of the
Tripartite National Union Government, betrayed our people's
aspirations for peace and neutrality and sold out the sovereignty
and independence of our Fatherland... This is in essence an illegal
administration, an outandout puppet regime which has been
serving as the main instrument of the American "special war
fare" against Laos and has no capacity whatsoever to represent
the Lao people",
This stern indictment of the puppet administration in Vien
tiane also fuJly applies to all the puppet governments succes
sively rigged up in Laos by the American imperialists over the
pastdecad('
2. The puppet army
By late 1954, beside the old State machinery a mercenary
arm\' continued to exist under the name of "national army of
Despite its name, this is nothing but an "asset" 'left
over by a defeated colonial power, and, too weak to lead an
independent existence.
Along with mana'U\Tes to seize control of the administrative
machinery, the American imperialists took advantage of this
situation to take hold of these troops and turn them into an
instrument of their own, retaining, however, their appellation
as camouflage. They have poured in to Laos hundreds of millions
of dollars and hundreds of thousands of tons of arms and
ammunition to build up this army. The motive behind all this
59
assistance can best be ilIustrated the colonial-type ca Icula-
tions of former U.S. \'ice-President Nixon who said that the
cost for maintaining an allied solrlier \\'as fhe times cheaper
than for a U.S. soldier.
Since 1955 the Americans have, b\' means of direct military
airl. gradually taken oyer control of this army. In July 1959.
under their pressure, France and the pro-American administra-
tion of Laos issuerl a joint communique authorizing the United
States to openly send in ad\'isers and all types of arms for
tlaining anrl equipping the puppet forces in Laos. thus opening
\dde the doors to U.S. penetration.
The France-Lao joint communique marked the otTicial elimi-
nation of French influence in Laos, first and foremost in the
military sphere. :'\0 wonder, such a development dre\\' biting
comments from the French press. "Taking ad\'antage of the
disorderly and uncertain situation in Laos. the .\mericans
intend to definitively discard the French military personnel in
order to take in hand the building of a new Lao army" (8).
"France's position in Laos is indisputable. even in the eyes
I)f the Lao people. yet, the Americans seem determined to elbo\\'
the French out of Laos. and they make no secret of it...; in all
spheres of military. technical and cultural assistance,-lhe Amer-
icans are preparing for a change which seems to have begun....
in principle, the United States is not entitlerl to have its experts
in Lao ,\linistries which must use the French language, yet, in
fact, Americans arc seen \\'orking as officials anrl private advi-
sers to the Ministers in all important .\\inistries"(9). "The role
of these U.S. otTicials is. abo\'e all, to o\'Crlap that of the French
experts working in the same .\linistries; a surreptitiolls attack
is going on to oust the French" (10).
(8) AlIx collies. 25. 1959.
(9) France Obserualeur, October 29.1959
(10) Liberalion, October 21,1959
60
On the other hand, the said joint communique constitutes an
attempt to the presence of American military adyisers in
Laos and the inflow of ..\merican arms into that country, Since
then, the Ilnited States has completely taken in hand the frain-
ing, equipment and command of the puppet troops, The number
of military a(hlsrrs and experts of the United States and Its
satdlites in Laos has rapidly increased from a few hundreds to
thollsa'1ds of men, whrreas modern \I'eapons of all types hal'e
been brought in,
Follolling the France-Lao joint communique and the decision
to gil e aid to the Phoui Sananikone Admi-
nis(ration in 1959. the United States has rapidly replaced the
totalil\ of French arms and equipment in use in the Lao puppet
arJl1\ -II ith nl'\1 \merican equipment. The Bullefin de Paris of
13, 1959 reported that the United States has supplied
to the puppet troops II'ith"materials"II'hich, if not ultra-modern,
arc at least fully suitable for local jungle Il'arfare, The Daily
Tt!lf!graph of September 21, 1959 published a report of its special
correspondent. F, Robertson, saying that all types of equipment
being used in Lao training camps, including heal'y Il'eapons,
Il'ere American made,
Smer 1960. as fighting in Laos has reached a nell' height. the
\mericans established an airlift from Bangkok to Sa\'annakhet
and from Bangkok to \'ientiane \I'ith a yie\\ to supplying arms
to Phoumi osalan troops, [n fact, during their attacks against
\lentiane. these troops brought into action such weapons as
105mm guns. 120 mm mortars, heal'y tanks, armoured launches,
helicopters, etc., which had not been al'ailable to
tbem until then,
mid-1963 taking adl'antage of the so-called "request of
P,ince Soul'<lI1na Phouma" - a request meant to justify the
liolations of the 1962 Genel'a A,greement by the United States-
tile .\mericans supplied dozens of thousands of tons of
all1JS and war materials to tbe army of the Rightist faction and
the reactiOilal elements in the Neutralist forces, These war mate-
rials, \lhich'included I'arious types of machineguns, mortars,
61
and 105mm guns, were later used during the large-scale nibbling
aUacks in the Plain of Jars and Xiengkhoang. An airlift, servi-
ced by planes of ,Iir .II/lerica was established between Bangkok
and Vientiane.
O\-er the recent years, the Americans hale delivered tens of
'1'.28 combat aircraft <lnd tr<lnsport planes to the puppet forces
\\hich now h<lI'C at their command, nearly 100 planes of various
as against the initial number of 30.
E\'er since 1955, the LJnited States has direel'" <lssured the
ment of the mercenary troops. Fairly high- salaries <Ire
intended to bolster up their mor<lle, and also to provide incen-
tiles for the enlistment of nell' recruits. Officers arc given a
particularly privileged treatment, as the aggressors seek to
strcnghthcn their grip O\'er them in order to secure tight control
o\er the entire mercenary <lrmy. Every year, <I considerable
number of seleeled junior and field olTicers are sent to the United
States or its s<ltellite countries for training or study. In its issue
of February 13, 1961, Life made the folloll'ing calculation: In a
country "'here pCI' capita income is at most 50 dollllrs a year,
a prinlte gets annually 130 dollars plus food allo\\ances, while
olTicers are paid from 800 to 3,000 dollars a year, not counting
olher amenities which possibly include a II <It <lnd a car.
With doll<lrs, arms <lnd militarv advisers, the United States
lias raised the strength of the puppet armed forces, from 25,000
b, the end of 1955 to 44,000 b\ the end of 1960 and near'" 70,000
iJ; late 1965, i.e. an increase of 2.8 times 0\'('1' the past ten
years. These forces comprise about 50,000 regular troops (five
mobile groupings, two paratroop groupings, thirty-seven baUa-
lions for garrison duty, fifteen motorized baUalions, a number
of artillery and engineering formations, and several specialized
<Jnd technical units), 2,000 policemen and nearly 20,000 bandits-
commandos of the "special forces" directly organized and com
m<Jnded by r\merican olTicers.
In addition, there are General Konglae's troops which
claim to be the "armed forces of the Neutralist Party." In fael,
62
genuine. 'eutralist forces were part of those peace-and-neutral-
it\--minded officers and men of the pro-Amencan gO\'ernment
a;m\ \\'ilo staged the August 1960 coup d'Etat. But later, as a
resu-It of pressure coupled \\ith bribery and corruption of the
United States and tile Rightist fadion who supplied and con-
trolled them, General Konglae and his men gradually drifted
a\la\ from the :\feutralist forces and became an appendage of
tli!' 'reactionan forces. With the addition of Konglae's troops
tl.e strength of \Ihich \Ias raised to about IJ,OOO men, U.S.
forces in Laos reached a total of 80,000 men towards
the end of 1965.
Owing to American elTorts, by the end of 1965 this puppet arm)
Ilhich originally possessed only infantry units, had at its dispo
Sed m31l\ other anns such as armoured troops (four battalions
N:uipped' \dth 18-ton tanks), artillery (four battalions and seven
companies), engineers (seven battalions and five companies),
ta f10ttila \I'ith five companies of ril-cr craft), air force
(nearl) 100 aircraft of \'arious pes). The puppet air force,
though small, has actively coordinated its actions
\I'ith the U.S...\ir Force in launching attacks on the liberated
lone.
1he abole facts 5ho\\' the unremitting elTorts exerted by the
L'nited States to build up and usc the Lao mercenary army.
The American imperialists ha\'e made their best to giYC this
"rmy the appearance of a "national army". But never could
conceal its puppet and mercenary nature. It is entirely equipped,
paid and commanded by the Americans \\'ho decided on its build-
ing, on the increase or decrease of its numerical strength. Tilis
can be seen from the re\'elations of the U.S. Congressional
Report of 1959 on aid to Laos. The report stated that according
to U.S. military experts 12,000 to \5,000 men were quite enough
for this army, "but the State Department, under ,\\r J.F. Dulles
il;si ted on 25.000 men, which was later raised to 29,000".
As a standing military organization used for attacking the
patriotic forces and repressing the people, this mercenary army
has acted as an effectual instrument of the extremely perfidious
63
classical colonialist of using "Lao people to fight Lao
people", to serve U.S. "special wariare", It is also an instru-
ment of violence often employed by the various pro-American
cliques in their power struggle and attempts to o\'erthro\\' one
another. The French daily Le MOllde, on February 27, 1961 gave
the follolling comment on a specific instance: "Lavishly sup.
plied lI'jth material by Thailand, an ally of the United States
in the S.E./\.T.O., and trained by Yankee officers, General Phoumi
Io\osal'an's troops hal'e established in \'ientiane a government
headed by Prince Boun Oum, which has been sworn in by the
Parliament in conditions lI'hose legitimacy is not agreed on by
anybody".
In order to reinforce the mercenarl' arml' whose combati\'eness
remains poor in spite of its ;trength, the .\meriean
imperialists, in utter defiance of the Gene\a .\greements, have
since long brought into Laos many army units and commando
groups of their satellites.
Before the signing of the 1962 Genel'a ,\grecment, the United
States sent to Laos some 3,500 Thai troops, 3,000 Chiang Kai-
shek remnant troops. together lI'ith many specialized units and
commando groups of South \'ietnam for coordinated action with
the Lao puppet forces, especially during the attacks on Vientiane
(1960) and the military operations in Upper Laos (1961-1962),
In its letter dated :'\o\ember 9, 1962, the High Command of
the Neo Lao Haksat armed forces informed the International
Commission that el'en after the signing of the 1962 Genel'a
Agreement the United States had not lI'ithdrall'n all the abo\'e
forces from Laos, ,\11 inl'estigation undertaken by the Interna-
tional Commission in Houeisai area, in December 1962, re\'caled
the presence of Chiang Kai-shek remnant troops there after
October 7, 1962, Some xix hundreds of these are still going on
with their bandit-commando actil'ities in Upper Laos.
The Americans continue dispatching to J\\iddle and Lower
Lws many commando groups from the Saigon "special forces"
to carry out sabotage in the liberated zone, to gi\'e target gui-
64
danc:
re

Laos, On September 28, 1964, ,\\1' ,Phoumi
,\\inister for Information, Publtclty and Tounsm of the Tnpartlte
'ational Cnion GO\ernment and Representative of the 0:eo Lao
iiaksat in the. 'ational Committee for the implementation of
the 1962 Gene\a ..\greement, addressed a message to the Inter
national Commission denouncing the acti\'ities of South \'iet-
Ilamese commando groups in ,\\iddle and Lo,,'er Laos, His
charges \\Lre substantiated by concrete proofs about a number
of South \'ienamese commandos captured by the patnolic armed
forces and local population in the middle of 1964,
In a deposition made on August 15, 1964, Second-Lieutenant
\'0 Thanh, born in 19-11 in Quangnam pro\'ince, South Vietnam,
serial number 238,263. chief of one of the above South \'iet-
namese commando groups wrote: "At 10 p,m, of June 30, 1964
,,'e were ordered by U,S, Colonel Leonard and South Vietnam
Colonel Lam Son, head of the Commando Centre at Nhatrang,
to perform a parachute landing in Muongnong area (in Muong-
phin, Laos) for reconnaissance and commando activities, We
no\\' realize that ,,'e have been led astray into becoming U,S,
agents and indulging in reconnaissance and commando activities
in Laos. Our acts are at variance with international la,,' and
the Geneva ..\greements, and constitute a crime towards the
Lao people".
As stated on June 25,1965 by the spokesman of the :\eo Lao
Haksat Central Committee, the Thai authorities, acting at ..\mer
ican behest, had sent an additional number of infantn and
artillery units to areas west of Xiengkhoang and to s'e\,eral
places in .\\iddle and Lower Laos, During the attacks on Phou-
khout (Xiengkhoang province) and the recent operations in
,\\iddle and Lo,,'er Laos, these Thai troops sen'ed as second
echelon and support units for the puppet forces.
Along with combat units and commando groups from satellite
countries, the United States has brought into Laos thousands
5T.Y.
65
of Thai, South Vietnamese, Filipino, Japanese and other military
advisers and experts who, together with ,\merican advisers, have
been organizing and training the puppet forces in intelligence
"nd reconnaissance activities, and building secret American mili-
tarybases.
E\'('n after the signing of the 1962 Gene\'a Agreement, the
United States has still kept in Laos a considerable number of
foreign military personnel:
About 500 Thai military experts \\'orking in various technical
blanches, particularly in the organization and training of spies
and commandos;
,\bout 400 Filipino intelligence and logistics experts operating
under the garb of "welfare organizations", "health teams";
About 300 Japanese oO'icers and men serving in the construc-
tion of an Americiln secret military base in the BolO\'en plateau;
A group of South Vietnamese liaison officers \\'orking at the
headquarters of the Southern Command of the puppet forees
and many South Vietnamese intelligenee, communication and
artillery experts operating in the regions of Savannakhet and
Pakse in the guise of civilian personnel.
At American behest, by mid-1964, the ~ e \ \ ' Delhi authorities
in utter disregard for the position of India as Chairman of the
International Commission also sent to Laos a forty-odd "medical
team" comprising military personnel.
'{he illegal introduction and maintenance of combat units,
commando groups and military personnel from U.S. satellite
countries are part of the American unremitting efforts to build
up and reinforce the Lao mercenary army. The United States
continues to increase the latter's strength and equipment and
to create new military formations so as to turn it into a strong
military force for the furtherance of its new war schemes,
6G
3. The ho-called policy of pacification and tbe popula-
lion conccntration plan
One of the "special \\lIdare" yital problems is to secure a

of the patriotic struggle lind narrow do\\'n the regions controlled
the patriotic f
\iolence remains their fundllmental policy, the first step
taken In regard the ,\mcrican imperialists and their
henchmcn has inyariably been to use the mercenary army for
securing a hold oycr the population and pacifying the areas
under their control. That is why, in addition to nibbling attacks
on the liberated zone "mopping-up" and "pacification" opera-
tions ha\e become one of the principal methods oi "special war-
iare"andoneoiitsspecificllspecls,
O\'er the past )ears, practically not a single month has passed
without "mopping-up" and "pacification" raids being started
either in one or simultaneously in sc\'eral places under the con-
trolofthepuppets,
These "mopping-up" and "pacification" inroads were stepped
up \\'ith the accession to po\\'er of the Pholli Sananikone clique
in 1958, \\'hile trying to encircle and attack the Neo Lao Haksat
battalions, and extend the war to the \\'hole countn', the Phoui
Sananikone ,\dministration publicly announced its armed
iorces had "launched 'mopping-up' operations throughout the
Lao territon" (II), _-\5 a rule, these raids \\'ere marked by acls
oi arson, ba-nditry and attempts at pressganging the youth into
the army and regrouping the population to specific areas, In
places, the Phoui Sananikonc Goycrnment resorted to the
"burn all, destroy all, kill all" policy while in
(II) LoP {, October 1959,
Lau {{aksat {lIiormotivlI Bulletill, Oetober
67
Luangprabang and other provinces, its troops obliterated entire
villages and massacred the inhabitants, including old folks and
children (13).
Many of these mopping-up operations were carried out under
the personal direction of American ad\isers. In a message
addressed to the Lao people in May 1960, the Neo Lao Haksat
Central Committee pointed out, "American advisers, with com-
mand posts located at Pakkading commanded the 'mopping-up'
operations in Khamkeut district (Khammouane province) in
January 1960; on February 26, 1960, the American military atta-
che in Vientiane flew to Khammouane to command the "mopping-
up" operations in this province; an American Army Major
assisted General Amkha Soukhavong in the "pacification" opera-
tions in Lower Laos".
In the last four years, the puppet army launched hundreds of
big and small "mopping-up" operations in Laos, the average
number being twenty per month, each involving from one or
two companies to one or two battalions. In 1965 alone, there
\\ere fifty relatively big "mopping-up" incursions undertaken by
at least one battalion.
Some of those were large-scale and long-term operations car-
ried out with air support and mobilizing, each time, from one
mobile grouping to over ten army battalions, such as those
taking place along the Sekong River (Attopeu province, July
1963), in Laongam region (southwest of Saravane province,
in September and October 1963), in the northern part of Vientiane
province (in August, September and October 1964), along high-
\ ~ a y NQ 9 (north of Donghene and Phalane, Savannakhet pro-
vince, May and August 1965), in Honsa-Xienglom areas (north
of Sayaboury, September, October and November 1965). Many
regions were fiercely combed again and again, such as the
northern parts of Sayaboury and Vientiane provinces, the areas
(13) The situation in Laos after the olltbreak of the civil war, a Neo
Lao Haksat pamphlet. 1960.
68
south and north of highway NQ 9 in the western part of Middle
LaOS, Laongam, Phiafay and Khong districts, southern part of
Pakse province, etc.,
Combined with "mopping-up" operations were measures desi-
ned to regroup the villages, a move usually resorted to in areas
~ ' h e r e the people's patriotic movement had made vigorous
headway. To this effect, the population were herded into specific
laces under the tight control of the puppet administration or
in the prox.mity of military posts and strongholds, to sever
all ties between them and the patriotic movement. During the
last months of 1959, in Samneua and Luangprabang provinces
alone, the Phoui Sananikone Administration moved over 7,000
inhabitants to resettlement zones (14) while in the first months
of 1960 nearly 2,.100 families \\-ere relocated around militar)
posts (15).
Coercive '.ll1d repressi\Oe measures such as "mopping-up"
operations and population concentration are bound to meet with
\iolent reaction from the people.
That is \\'hy, [he American imperialists and their henchmen
ha\e made an increasing use of politico-economic measures to
secure a hold O\-er, and regain control of, the populated and rich
countryside of Laos..-\fter criticizing American assistance pro-
grams for having' but rigged up a second-rate mercenary army,
the American journalists and correspondents have advised Was-
hington to grab the countryside. In their view, to succeed in
Laos, the United States must adapt itself to the local conditions,
maintain contacts in the countryside and engage in rural deve-
lopment work .. To them, some amount of economic assistance
in this direction could turn the rural regions into a weapon as'
effective as rifles and possibly much more effective than
tanks(J6l.
(14) Lao Haksat Information Bulletin, October ~ 2 . 1959.
(15) Message addressed by the Neo Lao Haksat Central Committee
to the Lao people. May 1960.
(J6)Life,FebruaryI3.1961.
69
These hints show that ,\merican neo-colonialism regards dollar
handouts as a \\'eapon to conquer the hearts of the people ancl
secure control over the wide countryside of Laos. This is indeed
the aim and substance of the "rural development"
scheme being actively implemented over the recent years in this
country by the United States as part of its economic and tech-
nical assistance program.
With high-sounding phraseology on "the impronment of the
life of the rural population". "the development of combined
services and meeting of priority needs for education, health and
the impro\ement of production and distribution in the existing
clusters of villages... ", the State Department, hO\\'e\'er, bluntly
stated that this "rural development", lies "in the context of U.S.
larger strategic goal... in Southeast Asia" and is aimed at
"assisting the efforts of the government of National Union" (the
\'ientiane puppet administration-Pub!.) to resist the agression
of the Pathet Lao" (Ii).
To carry out this purpose. the United States in\'ested in this
scheme 2.5 million dollars in 1960, over 4 million in 1964 and
ovt'r 6 million in 1965(18), that is roughly from 1/10 to 1/6 of
the annual total of American economic and technical assistance
to Laos.
Ll.S. assistance agencies (formerly under the U.S. a.M. and
no\\' under the U.S.A-J.D.) are directly in charge of this pro-
gram. To make it attractive the United States has secured the
participation of several American-controlled international orga-
nizations such as U.N.E.S.C a., F.A.a., \Y;.H.a., etc.
The -U.SA.l.D. has now set up a Rural Development Direc-
!Ion with two deputy directors, and an "International
(17) Proposed Allltlial Defense and [)evelopment Program for Jj66,
U.S. SI3te Department. 1965.
(18) Life, February 13, 1961, Proposed Allltlial Defense and Develop-
ment Program for 1966, State Department 1965: Statement by Keo Vipha-
I<one. a "Mputy" to the puppet "national assembly" in Vientiane, at
an extraordinary session of the said assembly on February 1, 1966.
70
Service for Rural Development" (I.V.S.R.D.), a variant of the
"Peace corps". "Rural Development" experts are posted in
dozens of towns, district .and .in the under
the control of the puppet admmlstratlOn. WhIle super\'1smg the
execution of this scheme, they secretly conduct intelligence work
and proceed with the building of .political bases (l91. Are.a.lso
working within the framework of thiS U.S. scheme many FllIpmo
experts, who operate under the garb of a pri\'ate welfare organi-
zation, as \\-1'11 as specialists from other countries (20).
Under the direction of American experts, the "rural de\elop
ment" agencies of the puppet administration have gradually
been strengthened [rom the central headquarters down to the
plovincial and district level. The "Civic Action Direction", sei
l'p in 1955, became in 1957 'the Department of Rural Affairs"
and later, the ",\iinistry of Rural Affairs". Members of the
puppet police and army are selected and trained either on the
spot by American advisers or in Thailand, and are subsequently
sent to the countryside where they coordinate their work under
the "rural development" program with intelligence activities
and the organization and direction o[ the local militia.
L'nder till' pretence o[ promoting rural progress, the "rural
development" scheme is a most subtle device evolved by Amer
ican neDcolonialism in order to secure control over the popula
tion and the large expanses of the Lao countryside.
The backbone of the "rural development" plan is the cons
truction o[ "union villages", "rural development zones" and
"Iefugees centres" (this third version being buill mainly in the
artas inhabited by the ,\\iao nationality). As pointed out in the
(19) According to the abo\"e pamphlet of the State Department there
experts and 35 I. V.S.R.D.
(:la) The aboH pamphlet of the U.S. State Department has also

7]
Proposed Mutual Defense and Development Program for 1966
of the State Department, "rural de\'elopment efforts have been
concentrated in selected clusters of villages in strategic areas".
This means that in the eyes of the Americans, these "selected
clusters of villages" must necessarily occupy positions of stra-
tE.gic value, a fact which, in turn, shows that the objective of
the United States is not "rural development" as alleged, but
omething quite different.
Drawing on the experience of the "prosperity zones" and
"strategic hamlets" in South Vietnam, and the "rural develop.
ment zones" in Thailand, the United States has proceeded step
by step with a large-scale forced population relocation plan. A
u.p.!. dispatch of November 8,1965 bluntly said that Laos had
taken after her South Vietnamese neighbour in establishing
clusters of villages modeled after the 7,000 Vietnamese "stra-
tegic hamlets". In fact, "union villages", "rural development
zones" and "refugees centres" in Laos are a form of "strategic
hamlet" without barbed wire. That is the Americans' principal
and unadmitted objective. Therefore, it can be said that the
"rural development" scheme is nothing other than a pacification
program adapted to the realities of Laos.
l1aking advantage of its huge economic resources, the United
States has thrown out a number of "baits" which, as they claim,
would likely make their policy more attractive. These are the
wells, medical centres, schools, village roads, small dams, etc.,
parlly built \I'ith U.S. assistance funds and, to a great extent,
with the pressganged labour of the local population. These
"baits" also include surplus goods and the new shops that have
sprung up in the "rural development zones" and "refugees cen-
tres". The Americans are thus trying to give a new - and
arlifical-face to the countryside in order to altract the masses.
The fact remains that in the rural areas under the puppets'
control, the administratil'e machinery remains in the hands of
the feudal notabilities, various forms of political oppression and
economic exploitation are still preserved, and no basic change
72
whatsoe\'er has been brought about in the relations of produc-
tion. The "rural development" efforts would only provide some
privileges and interests to a small section of people in the coun-
trvside, enabling them to intensify further the exploitation of
tl1'e rural masses. They would only succeed in giving a varnish
of prosperity to the "rural development zones", a sham prospe-
ritv which could at best mislead a number of rural people who
not yet seen through the deceitful tricks of the United
and its agents.
\\'ith regard to the areas where the patriotic movement has
developed to a high level, and those lying in the proximity of
the liberated lone the U.S. imperialists ,md their henchmen have
not gi\'en up their familiar dedces of coercion and violence.
Resorting to "psychological warfare" tricks, they have been
trying to threaten the people \\ho refuse to move to the "rural
zones" that their villages will be bombed in case
of "intrusions" by Pathet Lao troops. In fact, U.S. air raids
against the populated areas are designed to drive the people
into misery and thereby compel them to move into the "rural
development zones" and "refugees centres". For the same pur
pose the bandit-commando units ha\'e also indulged in terro-
Jism and sabotage to create an atmosphere of insecurity in the
above areas. Further, troops are used to "mop-up" and herd the
people into these agglomerations while in certain regions inha-
bited by the .\\iao nationality people are forcibly flown to "refu-
gees centres".
The building of "union villages", "rural development zones"
and "refugees centres" usually starts in a selected hamlet or
village in an area tightly controlled by the puppet administra
tion. Subsequently, either the population of neighbouring villages
are herded into the settlement, or the settlement itself is gradu-
expanded to encompass them. The size of the "union
villages", "rural de\'Clopment zones" and "refugees centres"
\aries in proportion to the area under the control of the puppet
administration.
73
In these disguised concentration camps, the people are subject-
ed not only to the invisible rule of the dollar, but also to the
impact of "psychological warfare" and the control of a repres-
sive machinery comprising the local notabilities, the police,
intelligence and militia organizations, bandits-commandos and,
in many areas, a whole network of military posts, airfields and
depots. The inmates are forced to receive arms and organize
militia units which are gradually turned into reactionary armed
bands. Further, the inhabitants are at the mercy of bandit-
commando groups operating in the vicinity of the "rural deve-
lopment zones" and "refugees centres". Thus, in spite of the
absence of barbed-wire fences, they are facing serious difficulties
and restrictions: a strict control over their movement and daily
occupations and harsh moral oppression.
Speaking of the "achievements" of the "rural development
zones" in Kengkok (Savannakhet province), a "deputy" told a
session of the"nationalassembh'" in Vientianeearlv this vearthat
against he infirmaries two poiice stations were not
to mention the organization and trainning of one militia squad.
A U.P.I. dispatch of NO\'ember 8, 1964 admitted that any bar-
racks of the Rightist faction were located in each
village. Obviously, there is a gun behind each dollar bestowed
Ilsaid.
The "union \-illages", "rural development zones" and refugees
centres", typify the combined use of economic and politicnl
devices including PS)'CllOlogical warfare and Violence, by Amer-
ican neo-colonialism with a view to securing control over the
population and isolating them from the patriotic movement.
Until now, nearly 130,000 people (21) have been herded into
"rural development zones" in Luangprabang, Sayaboury, Vien-
tiane, Bbrikhane, Savannakhet, Champassak, Wapikhamthong,
Attopeu provinces, while 300,000 others (22) - of Miao nation-
ality in their majority-have been concentrated in "refugees
centres" scattered in bandit-and commando-infested minority
areas in certain provinces of Upper Laos. Some of these "rural
74
de\'e!Opm
ent
zones" are of considerable size, the one in Wapi-
khamthong, for example, comprises oyer 200 Yillages with 50,000
inhabitants (23).
Thus, a large-scale network of concentration camps is heing
built in the puppet-controlled areas, keeping se\eral hundred
thousand people behind inyisiblebarbed-wire fences.
The construction of "rural deyelopment zones" and "refugees
centres" which is regarded as a major policy by the US.
}lenchmen, has been the subject of much discussion during the
recent session of the puppet "national assembly".
To gi\'e publicity and stimulus to the "rural deyelopment"
scheme, leading personalities of the puppet administration, the
.\merican ambassador and U.SA.I.D. representatiYes in Vien-
tiane frequently inspect "rural deYelopment zones" and "refu-
gees centres" ...\ssistance agencies often stage-manage inaugu-
ration ceremonies in which yarious constructions are handed
o\'er totiJe puppet administration. In March 1965,a decision was
taken by the U.S.A.I.D. to finance yisits by Lao puppet provincial
go\'ernors to se\eral "rural development zones" in Thailand for
til(' purpose of gathering experience. In facl, the building of these
settlements is entirely supervised by the United States
which intends to set up ne\\' ones in a near future (21) and to
de\elop major "rural deYelopment zones", such as the one in
Wapikhamthong proYince, into "rural de\'elopment provinces".
(21). (!2). : Figures taken from a speech of Keo \'iphakone at an
rxtraordinary se;;;;ion of the puppet Vientiane "nalional assembly".
FebrllaryI,1966.
The Proposed .lfllillal Defense and Deoelopmenl Program for 1966
i,,"ed by the U.S. State Department. 1965 estimated the nllmber of
rrillgeesatl50.000persons.whileal'.P1.di;;patchofJtlne2.19G6Ptlt
ilat2.10.000.
According to the Proposed .\tllillal Defense and Deuelopmenl
Program for 1966 (U.S. State Department. 1965). the United States intends
to raisp t1w ntlmber of "rural de--elopment zones" from six in 1965 to

75
Undoubtedly, the "rural development" scheme in general, and
the "rural development zones" and "refugees centres" in parti-
cular, which lie in the context of "U.S. larger strategic goals
in Southeast Asia" constitute a major pacification plan being
actively pushed ahead by the American imperialists to secure
a hold over the Lao countryside, and turn it into a mainsta\'
and a source of material and human power for their "special
warfare".
4. The policy of diviijiou among ':uatioullIities
With a total population of three million, Laos comprises over
60 nationalities and tribes. Of these the majority nationality
is the Lao-Thai, which liws in rather dense agglomerations in
the plains, and possesses a relatively higher social, economic
and cultural standard of development.
The minority nationalities are scattered over the mountains
and and in the border areas which generally cons-
titute important regions. Their social, economic and cultural
le\'el of de\'elopment is generally lo\\'. Some of them retain,
to a great extent, their tribal character; tribal feelings still
pre\'ail o\'er national ones.
It can be said that salt, cloth and farming implements are
vital items for the dail\' subsistence of the minority nationalities.
These essential used to be supplied -to them from
the plains. With some minorities, like the Miaos and the Yaos,
opium constitutes the main product, the bulk of which is mar-
ketedintheplains.
Thus, for centuries, as is still the case today in the areas con-
trolled by the puppet administration, marked unequality has
been prevailing in the political and economicrelationshetween the
various nationalities of Laos,
In their time, the French colonialists capitalized on this situa-
tion to aggravate the national antagonisms and give full play
to their traditional "divide and rule" policy. They took particular
care to win over the ,\liaos, a nationality dwelling in dense
7G
a glomerations in Upper Laos and especially in the strategically
Xiengkhoang pro\"ince. The French colonialists used
to sa\' that whoever had a hold over the Miaos could conquer
Xiengkhoang and thereby secure control over North Indochina
as a whole.
Exploiting the chivalry, warlike pride and tribal spirit of the
,\\iaos and alo their veneration for their O\\'n tribal chiefs, and
turning to account vital problems like opium, salt and cloth,
the french endeavoured to corrupt and win over a few impor-
tllnt .\\iao leaders such as Toubi Lyphoung. They also applied
special policies towards the regions inhabited by the Miaos in
Xiengkhoang province, distributed arms to a section of the
,\\iao people, and organized J\tiao bandit-commando groups with
a view to harassing the Resistance movement. The consequences
of this policy are still felt long after the French had withdra\\'n
from Laos, as a number of ,\tiao bandit-commando groups still
continue to operate surreptitiously in the minority areas.
The above facts show how complex is the nationality problem
in Laos.
In its nco-colonialist scheme to enslave the peoples of A.sia,
.\frica, and Latin American, an important and long-term policy
of the United States is to sow division between the nationalities
and to build up reactionary political and military elements
among the minority nationalities in order to undermine the
national-liberation movements. After supplanting the french
colonialists in Laos, the American imperialists soon realize the
importance of the nationality problem and, in particular, the
J\iiao question, which their specialized services have been study-
ing over many years.
Therefore, they have set about exploiting as best they can
the complex nationality problem in Laos to pursue and push
forward their policy of division. By means of perfidious and
vicious neo-colonialist tricks, they have regrouped and revived
the reactionary political and military elements left over by the
French in the minority areas. Further, they have recruited tribal
77
people into the "special forces" which have strenuously been
built up and developed as a force for countering the Lao people's
anti-U.S. struggle for national sal\ation, as a mainstay for
their "special warfare" and as an instrument for the furtherance
of their long-term policy of agg-ression. This is one of the main
policies of American neo-colonialism in Laos.
In execution of this policy, \\'ashington has put into effect
the following three important and coordinated measures;
Firstly, by bestowing special political and economic pri\'ileges,
the Americans ha\'e sought to \\'in the allegiance of a number
of tribal chiefs in the minority areas, particularly in the .\\iao-
inhabited regions, and rely on them for building up and conso-
liriating the puppet administralion in these regions.
These tribal chiefs who usually occupy leading posts in local
administration arc gi\'en command of militia and commando
groups with ranks corresponding to their administrative ones; in
many cases, tribal chiefs acting as commanders of militia and
commando groups are granted administrati\'e positions com-
mensurate \\'ith their military ranks.
In this way, the .\mericans have thoroughly militarized the
puppet administration it had rigged up in the minority areas
under the control of the bandits-commandos. There the tribal
chiefs who have concentrated the spiritual, political and military
pO\\'ersin their hands, have become the absolute authority.
Of these, Vang Pao is enjoying particular attention and
favour from the United States. ,\ second-lieutenant in the puppet
almy under the French in 1954, he has now been promoted
general and put in command of the Second .\\ilitary Region.
Working under direct U.S. supervision, he is in fact leading
the activities of all the b3ndit-commando forces and the entire
network of the puppet administration in the ,\\iao-inhabited
areas in Upper Laos. Though outwardly taking orders from
Vientiane, his troops and administration are actually indepen-
dent from the central puppet authorities, and have gradually
78
become an aulonomous regime. The Americans have empowered
him 10 appoinl and lransfer bandil-commando chiefs as \\'ell
aslocalpuppelauthoritiesinlheareasunderhiscommand.
Secondly, the Uniled Slales has exerled all efforts 10 build
up lribal bandit-commando units as part of its "special forces".
Starting with se\eral groups left over by the French, these ha\'e
no\\' gro\\'n into a big force, the bulk of which is made up of
j\\iao people irom LIpper Laos. :--lew bandit-commando units ha\'e
recently been organized in ,\\iddle and Lower Laos. By lhe end
of 1965, these forces tolalled nearly 20,000 men. Though nomi-
nally belonging to the puppet gO\'ernment army, these contin-
genls arc actually part and parcel of the "special forces" directly
equipped, trained and commanded lhe .\mericans.
They are organized into "zones" and "groupings". Each Lonc
comprises from one to three battalion-size unils, operating as
bandits-commandos and provided with a training centre run
American and Thai experts. Each "grouping" ils bases, a
number of company or platoon-size units, and se\'eral
self defence groups" (ADC).
Bandit-commando forces operating in Upper Laos arc essen-
tially composed of J'v\iao tribesmen commanded by General \'ang
Pao. They also include a number of so-called "special guerilla
units" which the Cnited Stales no\\' intends to de\'elop inlo a
separate ",\\iao lask force".
In ,\\iddle and LO\l"er Laos, the ..\mericans have organized
a number oi "special commando" units and groups. In addition,
a number of special Thai and South Vietnamese commando units
from the U.S. "special forces" in Thailand and South Vielnam
hc.\ealsobeendispalchedhere.
Thousands of bandil-commando chiefs specialized in sabotage
acti\'ilies ha\'e been senl 10 Commando Training Cenlres in
Thailand while higher-ranking commando chiefs have undergone
lraining in lhe Uniled Slates, Japan and elsewhere.
79
American and Thai commando experts are posted either in
separate or mixed groups headed by junior or field officers, in
command posts and training centres to take in hand the direc
tion and training of the bandit-commando forces.
American pilot E.B. Bruce and Thai commando Pasa Han
_ amy, captured by the Lao patriotic armed forces on b\ay 21,
1965 at Buomlao, (\\'est of Luangprabang), confessed that the
groups of American and Thai commando experts operating in
Laos are in close relation with similar groups in Thailand, and
take orders from a special U.S. command at Udorn (Thai
land) (25).
These bandit-commando forces engage in intelligence, recon-
naissance, sabotage and harassment activities, provide target
guidance to the American and puppet air forces and act in
coordination with the IlIbbling attacks of the regular units of
the puppet army against the liberated zones (26). The American
imperialists allach great importance to their activities.
( ~ 5 ) E.B. Bruce was born on August 15. 1931. in Detroit. Michigan.
.\ former captain of the l'.S.A.F.. he was capturcd while piloting a
"Porter" light transport planc carrying military snpplics from Chiengmai
(Northern Thailand) to Thailand frontier police posts and to bandit
nnils operating in an arca wcst of the Namou ri\cr (Luangprabang
plOvince).
Pasa Han Namy, born in 1931. at Uthay. Ayuthia (Thailand), served
as radio operator in a ballalion of the Thai special forces at Lopboury.
He was later transferred to a bandit base at Xienglom (west of Luang-
prabang) where he worked as radio opera lor for a group of American
and Thai experts stationed there. On May 21. 1965. both E.B. Bruce and
Pasa Han Namy "'ere captured in a flight from Chiengmai to Xienglom
and Buomlao. They confessed that the Command post of the bandit
forces west of the Namou Ri\'er was located at Xicnglom where a group
of American and Thai experts operated under the general supervision
of an American captain, his own group leader being a Thai captain.
(26) Thousands of bandits-commandos took part in the a l l a c k ~ against
the Plain of Jars. in the "Samsone" operation and others in Southern
and Southwestern Xiengkhoang province (1964-1965).
80
Thirdly, Washington has built up a number of "refugees cen-
tres" which are in effect resettlement areas for people of mino-
ritv nationalities. Like the "rural development zones" the "refu-
centres" are also part of a large-scale population concen-
tration plan of the United States and its agents, the only dIffe-
rence being that the "refugees centres" are especially meant for
minority areas and particularly those regions inhabited by J'\iao
tribesmen. For seYeral years no\\', the establishment of "refugees
lentres" has been carried out with the building
(j bandit-commando units among tribesmen
Starting usually \\'ith settlements for the families of bandits-
commandos in specific regions, the "refugees centres" have sub-
sequently been expanded to encompass the neighbouring areas
under bandits-commandos' control. The Americans themselves
ensure the supply of these "refugees centres" in which, in addi-
tion to family and tribal bonds, the inhabitants are tied up by
the economic strings of this supply. The United States pays
considerable attention to the establishment of "refugees centres"
in key areas, Some of these settlements have from several to
tens of thousands of people. That is the case of the "refugees
centres" in Longcheng, Samthong (border to the south-west Df
Xiengkhoang province), at J\\uongmeung (north of Houeisai),
at Muongphieng (Sayaboury province), at Houeikong (Attopell
province), etc. The 150,000 refugees referred to in V.P.I. dispatch
of June 20,1965 are none other than the ,'\iao tribesmen herded
into such "centres",
Command posts of bandits-commandos are located in major
"refugees centres" \\'hich are thus turned into political and
operational bases and manpower sources for the latter. In par-
ticular, the United States is endeavouring to develop Longcheng,
the headquarters of General Vang Pao, and have made it the
"capital" of the .'\iao people with a view to pushing forward
its policy of division. To this end, it has stage-managed visits
by Vientiane puppet leaders to this "region" where army bar-
racks, depots, an airstrip, roads as well as hospitals run by
6T.Y.
81
..\merican staffs have been built for the bandit-commando f o r c e ~ .
Longcheng has thus been turned into a command centre of these
forces.
With an American-directed system of "airlifts" operating bet-
\\'een Thailand and Laos under the direction of U.S. services,
Washington has taken in hand the supply of the bandit-com-
mando forces and the "refugees centres" in general.
A document issued on January 29, 1961 by the U.S.I.S. in
Vientiane confirmed that U.S.A.I.D. air supplies to the
"refugees" amounted to 1,500 tons of "goods" per month, a
figure ob\'iously far below the truth, the major part of the
supplies consisting of arms and ammunition for the bandits-
commandos. The Reporter of ..\pril 15, 1965 disclosed that the
C.I.A. had enlisted the service of Air America in ferrying food
supplies, medicines and arms to tribal commando groups of the
pro American faction in Laos. The paper wrote that Air America
and two other associates \\ere utilizing to this end some 200
airfields in Thailand and Laos. An A.P. dispatch of June 20, 1965
reported that the United States had been spending nearl)
twenty million dollars, i.e. more than 20 per cent of its total
expenditures in Laos at present, to rent the services of a group
of thirty-fhe American-piloted aircraft for carrying these sup-
plies. These are but official figures \\'hich naturally did not
include the expenses earmarked for the arms and equipment
provided to the bandit-commando forces.
In its efforts to build up the bandit-commando forces and to
set up "refugees centres" the United States has taken avail of
the authority of the tribal chiefs among the minority people.
and closely combined coercive measures with "psychological
wariare" tricks, political deceit, corruption and superstition. All
this has been carried out on the basis of exhaustive studies of
the psychology, customs, religious beliefs and economic life of
the minority nationalities
Special attention is attached to corruption. The United States
reserves a most privileged treatment to Miao bandits-comman-
82
dos; the latter are given salaries higher than those of puppet
Lao troops and their families are provided with food and cloth-
ing. Beside military equipment, gaudy traditional jewels and
costumes are distributed to each bandit-commando. Miao com-
manders enjoy better facilities than Lao puppet officers when
travelling by American planes.
Capitalizing on the economic difficulties of the minority
people, tre United States has undertaken to cater for the
material needs of the inmates of "refugees centres", giving them
foodstuff and other dail) necessities. It has even airdropperl
Jewels and coloured cloth befitting the taste of the m i n o r i t ~
people. Yet nothing has been done to alleviate farming imple-
ment shortage. In this way, the national minorities are made
to depend entirely on American supplies for their subsistence
and to gradually give up production work. As a result, they
\I'ould haw to go on living on American alms in the "refugees
centres" and ultimately join the ranks of American-directed
bandits.
In short, the United States has even speeding up the imple-
mentation of its policy of division among the nationalities,
trying to control the minority nationalities and the areas inha-
bited by them, and building up the "special forces"-recruited
from among the minority people and particularly the Miaos -
as a politico-military organization to sprve as a mainstay of
"special warfare" and as an instrument for the execution of
their neo-colonialist scheme in Laos. The gradual establishment
\\ith the help of tribal chiefs, of a somewhat autonomous admi-
nistration in the Miao-inhabited regions, the organization of the
American-directed "special forces" recruited mostly from among
the Miaos, and the setting up of "refugees centres" - a large-
scale population relocation in the Miao-inhabited areas-are
in effect the prerequistes for the founding of a "Miao princi-
pality", a most vicious political scheme.
In Washington's eyes, the founding of the "Miao principality"
is strategicall) important for it aims not only at dividing the
83
Lao nation and opposing the Lao people's patriotic struggle
but also at furthering its long-term schemes of aggression in
Laos and in Indochina as a vv-hole_
Yet, despite its feverish mana'uvres to divide the nationalities
and enslave the Lao people, the American imperialists have to
cope with their militant solidarity_ The minority nationalities,
and the Miao nationality in particular, are known for their long-
standing traditions of undaunted resistance against colonialist
and imperialist oppression_ They have had to their credit staunch
and long struggles lasting for dozens of years, against French
colonialism, e_g_, the movement led by Patchay (a j\\iao leader
in Upper Laos) and by Kommadam (a leader of the Laven
nationality in Lovl-er Laos), etc_ Since 19-t5, they hal-e made
great contributions to the victory of the nine-year resistance
war against French colonialism and the struggle which has been
waged for twelve years now against American aggression for
national salvation_ In the liberated zone the minority nationa-
lities whose equality in rights is ensured and II-hose living con-
ditions have gradually improved, are fighting and labouring
shoulder to shoulder with the other members of the great family
of the Lao people
No matter how perfidious they rna) proy<- to be, the American
imperialsists can in no way cov-er up the deceptiYe and cruel
character of their military and political schemes against the
minority nationalities_ And that is precisely the cause for the
increased awakening of the people nOlI- being confined in the
"refugees centres", and of those vl-ho hal-e been led astray and
turned into bandis-commandos_ Over the recent years, many
groups of Miao bandits-commandos have regained their coun-
tl ymen's ranks with their arms and belongings while many
families haye tried to break free from the "refugees centres"
and go back to their villages_ As the American imperialists
resort to more wicked mana'uvres, this situation is bound to
develop_ The minority people will rise up with increasing mo-
mentum and are sure to foil all their dark schemes_
8 ~
Invoking the "protection" clause of the S.EA.T.O., the Ameri-
can imperialists !loue, ouer the past tITlelve years, increasingly
lIsed their SEATO. satellites, and particularly Thailand and
South Vietnam, as instruments for their "special warfare" in
Laos. This has become an integral part of their policy of inter-
vention and aggression vis-a-vis this country.
all the meetings of the S.E.ATO. Council of Minis
ters and the Conference of its military advisers over the past
lears hal'e illegally discussed the Lao question, under the
pretence oi opposing "Communist aggression and subversion"
in the areas under S.E.A.T.O.'s "protection". This is a trick
aimed at covering up the American imperialists' plan for inten-
sified interference in the Internal alTairs of Laos and of other
Southeast .-\sian countries.
In order to "Iegalize" S.E.A.T.O.'s intervention in Laos, the
US. henchmen publicly stated: "Although Laos has not signed
the ,\\anila she is nel'ertheless II'ithin its protection
area" Further. they even said: "Laos will not hesitate to
join the S.E..-\.T.O. bloc, if that proves necessary to her
defence" (28).
Disregarding the I\'ill of Laos not to recognize "the protec
Con of alliance or military coalition, including S.E.ATO.",
a \1 ill \\hich all signatories to the 1962 Geneva Agreement hal'e
pledged to respect, the S.E.ATO bloc has stubbornly main
tained its "protectil'e umbrella" over Laos, thus exposing its
design to keep on interfering in the internal affairs of this coun
tiY. It has not given up its policy of threat of force vis-a-vis
Laos as is clear from military manceuvres on Thai territory, in
the I icinity oi Lao borders, with the aim of intimidating the
Lao people. This has aggravated tension in Laos.
(27) Communlqlle iss lied on February 28. 1955 by the Katay Don Saso
after talks with Secretary of State J.F. Dulles In
(28) December 21. 1960 statement by BOllavan Norasing,
Minister of the BOlin OllmPhoumi Nosavan Administration.
85
However, as a result of deepening contraditions in colonial
interests between the American imperialists and the other Wes-
tern imperialist powers, the S.E.A.T.O. is not a "united bloc"
as initially hoped for by Washington. Rather, it has gradually
become a corpse. The United States, therefore, cannot effectively
use this organization for the furtherance of its scheme of inter-
\'ention and aggression in Laos.
In face of this situation, the American imperialists have long
since endeavoured to get a number of their satellites in the
region covered by the S.E.A.T.O., especially Thailand and South
Vietnam, to intervene in Laos. In this connection, the influential
New York Times of May 5, 1961 bluntly wrote that in the
execution of its policy, the United States must strive to have
:\sian countries join it in dealing with the situation in Laos,
and must pledge support and assistance to Thailand and South
Vietnam as part of the American policy in Laos
In application of such a policy, the United States has since
the very outset sought to bring about an ever-closer collusion
among the Lao, Thai and South Vietnamese puppets, and to
use Thailand and South Vietnam - which the Feuilles d'avis
de Neuchalel of September 13, 1960 described as the "two
pillards" of the S.E.A.T.O. - as major springboards and
logistics bases for its "special warfare" in Laos.
As early as in 1955, American press agencies already reported
that the talks between Secretary of State J. F. Dulles and the
Katay Don Sasorith Administration might lead to Lao troops
(i.e. the puppet troops) being trained in Thailand, and that this
fact represented the first concrete step taken after the Bangkok
Conference to implement the ,\\anila Treaty (29).
Over the past years, the American imperialists have in fact
used the territory of South Vietnam and especially of Thailand
as training centres for officers, armymen, bandits-commandos of
(29) l.N.S., February 28,
86
the Lao Rightist faction, as bases for the dispatch to Laos of
iJrms, war materials, Thai and South Vietnamese troops, com-
mando groups and spies and as venues of the Vientiane, Bang-
hok and Saigon puppets to work out plans for the carrying out
of the U.S. schemes to expand the war of aggression in Laos
On March I, J955, Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Defence
;\\inister in the Katay Don Sasorith Administration, announced
that officers of the Lao (puppet) army would go to Thailand and
attend a short-term training course organized according to
methods. In August 1959, when the Phoui Sananikone
Administration expanded the war to the whole of Laos, Thailand
Defence Minister Thanom Kittikachorn publicly stated: "The
Thailand army is ready to assist Laos if the latter so
requests" (30). A month later, Thailand Prime '\\inister Sarit
Thanarat also declared: "Thailand has dispatched a military
mission to Laos as an expression of sympathy and goodwill for
the Lao Government and for observing the battles fought in
Upper Laos" (31). Later Sarit Thanarat also expressed the
intention "to send to Laos from 10,000 to 20,000 shock troops
specialized in jungle warfare, if this is sanctioned by the U.N.O.,
the S.E.A.T.O. or the United States and agreeable to the Lao
Government (32).
Prior to the signing of the 1962 Geneva Agreement and parti-
cularly in 1958 and 1959, the Vientiane and Saigon puppets
negotiated and concluded agreements of cooperation on such
questions as "border regulations", "legal cooperation in the
suppression of rebels", and particularly on the "coordination
between the civilian and military forces" of the two countries
and on the "entry routes to Laos via Saigon and Tourane
ports". As pointed out by the Foreign Ministry of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam in its statement of June 26,1959, "these
agreements mark a new phase in the collusion between the Vien-
August 7. 1959.
10.1959.
25.1959.
87
tiane and Saigon authorities in yarious fields, and mainly in the
military field, in line with the American imperialists' war pre-
paration scheme"_
During the same period, Saigon "psychological warfare"
agencies also organized many special training courses for Lao
puppet army officers, arms and ammunition, including artillery,
and military yehicles were sent from South Vietnam to Laos via
highway J\'g 9, full-strength units of the South Vietnamese First
and Second Regiments, and First Division, were also moved
from Quangtri proyince (South Vietnam) to Lower Laos (33).
_j, typical instance of the collusion between the Vientiane,
Bangkok and Saigon puppets and of the direct military inter-
\ention in Laos by the reactionary authorities of Thailand and
South Vietnam is the armed support given by the latter to
Phoumi f\iosavan in his attacks on Vientiane at the end of 1960.
His troops \\'ere allowed to transit through Thai territory on
the \\'ay from Lo\\'er Laos to Vientiane, Three battalions of Thai
regular troops with artillery support, and a sizable number of
South Vietnamese officers and gunners took part in the attacks
of Phoumi Nosavan's troops on Vientiane (34). Thai artillery
based on the right bank of the Mekong River (Thailand) gave
fire co\'er to the attacking troops. The French paper La Croix
of December 6, 1960 \\Tote: "Further, this bank is used as a
staging base or a retreat shelter for Phoumi Nosavan's troops
which can cross and re-cross the Mekong River in complete
~ e f e t y " , The Gazette de Lausanne in its issue of September 13,
1960 specifically pointed out: The Bangkok authorities not only
allow General Phoumi Nosovan's troops to cross the Thai-Lao
(33) Memoranda issued on August 29, 1959. January 5, 1961 and
January 30, 1961 by the Government or the Democratic Republic o[
Vietnam,
(34) Memoranda issued on August 29, 1959. January 5, 1961, and
January 30. 1961 by the Government or the Democratic Republic or
Vietnam_
88
border for combat activities, lJut also supply him with arms and
ammunition, and this is the all-out support which General
Phoumi Nosavan has been receiving from Bangkok".
After the conclusion of the 1962 Geneva Agreement, the
Bangkok and Saigon authorities, in defiance of the provisions
of the said agreements, have continued to collude with the
United States in intervening in Laos.
On June 26, 1965, a spokesman of the Neo Lao Haksat Central
Committee made it clear that in order to help the Lao Rightist
faction increase its armed forces, the Thai authorities have not
withdrawn, but instead, have further brough\ in thousands of
armymen, spies and special agents which are merged with the
hoops of the Rightist faction. At the same time, thousands of
officers and commandos of the Rightist faction have been under-
going training in American military centres located on Thai
terri ton . At American behest, a number of Thai infantry and
units and pilots, have been sent to the western part
of province and a number of areas in Middle and
Lower Laos. Great quantities of arms and ammunition have
been funneled from Thailand to Laos, to be supplied to the Lao
Rightist faction particularly in the areas of Vientiane and
Savannakhet.
Collusion between the Vientiane and Saigon puppets has
also been speeded up. As planned by the United States secret
talks took place in Dalat in March 1964, between a of
the South Vietnamese puppet administration led by General
Nguyen Khanh and a delegation of the Lao pro-American clique
led by General Phoumi Nosavan. The talks centered on plans
for coordinated action in the military and political fields (35).
According to A.P. (March 30) and A.F.P. (April I), diplomatic
sources in Vientiane confirmed that both Nguyen Khanh and
Phoumi Nosavan had "arrived at an understanding of great
(35) Urgent message addressed by Prince Souphanollvong to the Co-
Chairmen of the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference on Laos.
89
military importance", and that Phoumi Nosavan had agreed to
give South Vietnamese troops "the right of hot pursuit" into
the territory of Laos. As is known, it was after these talks that
South Vietnamese commando groups of the American "special
forces", were airlifted from Nhatrang base and dropped on the
liberated zone in Middle and Lower Laos, where they were
neatly captured by the Lao patriotic forces.
Since the end of 1964, the Thai and South Vietnamese puppet
authorities have put their airbases at the disposal of the Ameri
cans for bombing raids against the liberated zone of Laos. As
emphasized by the Neo Lao Haksat Central Committee in a
memorandum dated July 23,1965, they are the most odious
criminal accomplices of the American imperialists in the latter's
air attacks on the territory of Laos over the past two years.
American and Western sources made it clear that "45 per cent
of air raids against Laos and North Vietnam are performed by
American aircraft taking off from such Thai bases as Udorn,
Korat, Takli, Donmuong and Nakhonphanom" (36).
An A.P. dispatch gave the following details: three American
F.ID5jet squadrons based at Korat are mainly used in air attacks
on Laos and North Vietnam, another F.ID5 squadron is stationed
at Takli; air cover to F.ID5 aircraft is provided by one squadron
of "Phantom" F.4C stationed at Ubon; the rescue of flyers
brought down over Laos and North Vietnam is undertaken by a
helicopter squadron based at Udorn ; also at Udorn, the U.S. Air
Force was engaged in helping the air force of the Lao Rightist
faction.
To evade responsibility, Thanom Kittikachorn and Praphas
Charusathien, respectively Prime Minister and Interior Minister
of Thailand, sought to deny too obvious facts. Praphas Charusa-
thien told the press: "To say that Thailand is an American base
just because American aircraft can land there, is not all right. It
should be understood that this is w,hat is usually described as
mutual aid". But A.P. commented on September 2, 1965 that
(36) New York Times, April 15, 1966.
90
fJrilphas Charusathien's statement represented the first public
"dmission by a Thai high-ranking official to the effect that Thai-
land bases were being directly or indirectly used for "countering
the communist forces in Laos and Vietnam".
SInce the end of 1964, in furtherance of the American scheme
to expand the war of aggression in Laos and to the whole of
Indochina, and in the immediate future, to invade ,\liddle and
LJ\\er Laos, the Lao, Thai and South Vietnamese puppets con-
~ r r e d on many occasions in Bangkok and Saigon on plans to
introduce Thai and South Vietnamese forces into Laos and to
launch coordinated air operations against the liberated zone in
\liddle and Lower Laos. These plans were part of what \\'as
cnealed by Western sources and the Saigon press as "Viet-
nam - U.S. combined plans for taking the \\'ar beyond South
Vietnam". !twas no accident that on November 13, 1964, ?lJguyen
Cao Ky, then commander of the South Vietnamese puppet air
force, bluntly stated that air attacks would be launched on the
regions under the Neo Lao Haksat control in Middle and Lower
Laos.
\lore serious still, the South Vietnamese puppet air force has
recently taken a direct part in American air raids against ,\liddle
. nd Lower Laos. This was admitted by none other than Nguyen
':an Thieu, the puppet "Head of State" of South Vietnam, who
Ileclared on January 24,1966 that "there have recently been fierce
.lir attacks by American and South Vietnamese planes on the
Infiltration routes via Laos". Western sources regard Thieu's
"tatement as the first reference to South Vietnam's air attacks
en Laos. In an attempt to throw dust into the eyes of public
opinion, on January 27,1966, the Vientiane Administration sent
1 note to Saigon, protesting over the above episode. Yet, this
,ery note also confirmed a most blatant fact, the logical implica-
tIOn of \\hich was that no air raids could be launched by the
South Vietnamese puppets unless there was a specific decision of
the United States. In other words, a decision to this efiect of
91
Washington would be binding on both Saigon and Vientiane.
Indeed the protest of the Vientiane Administration was nothing
but a very manceuvre which could not mislead anybody.
The fact that aircraft of the South Vietnamese puppets ha\e
til ken pilrt in American raids against the liberated zone in Middle
and LO\\'er Laos sho\\'s that the nited States is exerting all
efforts to expand the scope of its air attacks on Laos. It is also
('vidence of ho\\' far was the collusion between the Lao and
South Vietnamese puppets, in furtherance of the American
to expand the war of aggression in Laos and to the
whole of Indochina, and to ill\'ade Middle and
Lower Laos. '
As part of this scheme, the U.S. imperialists ha\'e been endea-
vouring to turn Thailand into a major military network, a second
"Okinilwa" in Southeast Asia. The United States has set about
building on Thailand's territory thirty modern airbases, incluQ-.
ing a big airbase capable of handling B,52 strategic bombers, at
least twel\'e naval and many secret missile bases. The Sattahip
military port will be developed into the biggest American na\'al
Lase in Southeast Asia, Fe\'erish efforts are being made in the
construction of a network of strategic high\\'ays. P. Larsen,
correspondent of the French paper Le monde in Bilngkok, \\Tote
on March 7, 1966 thilt "the wide 'Friendship highway' linking
Bangkok to Nongkhai, a to\\'n along the ,\\ekong River just
opposite Vientiane, makes it possible to rush reinforcements,
ilrms and ammunition to the forces of the Rightist General Photl-
mi Nosa\'an; this type of transport work is performed by Thai
army trucks preferably at night". In the Northeastern provinces
of Thailand, other strategic trunk-roads also lead to the Mekong
Ri\'er just opposite the Lao towns of Thakhek, Paksane, Savan-
nilkhet, Pakse, etc,
With such a system of modern military complexes linked with
Thailand's hinterland by a network of strategic highways, the
United States can rapidly bring sizable army units, including
many infantry divisions, right to the Lao border via the Thai
92
territory. According to Seymour Topping, New York Timl!s
correspondent in Bangkok, it is considered that this system of
military complexes \\'ill proxide the American armed forces with
additional means to conduct fierce attacks on Laos.
In fact, the United States has been steadily pushing ahead the
Introduction of troops from Thailand into Laos. The Saint Louis
Post Dispatch of 11, 1966 disclosed that a considerable
number of Thai troops had come to Laos. R. Dudman, correspon
dent of this paper in Washington, reported that American military
commanders in Southeast Asia were fully informed of this Thai
mO\'e, while \anous obsen'ers related this step with plans to
bring American troops into Laos xia Thailand, Washington,
Bangkok and Vientiane hurriedly came out with denials. But in
the March 7, 1966 issue of Le Mandl! P, Larsen affirmed, "Yet,
these units exist; Thai commando troops, organized into
'special forces' ha\'e been trained and implanted in Upper Laos",
On April 1, 1966, the Voice of the People of Thailand also made
the follo\\'ing charge: mid,0:oxember 1965, Thanom Kitti-
kachorn sent h\o Thai battalions to Savannakhet and Thakhek
for coordinated action with the United States in expanding the
war of aggression in Indochina. three Thai artillery
batteries joined the Rightist faction troops in attacking Phou-
kout area (Plain of Jars), At American behest, a Joint Ameri-
can-Lao Command has recently been set up".
In short, as the ,Vew York Times wrote on April 15, 1966, both
militarv and diplomaticalh a second front has been estab-
lished in Thailand. -,
In face of the ever-deeper interYention of the Thai and South
\'ietnamese authorities in collusion with the United States, till'
eo Lao Haksat has time and again sternly warned these two
puppet regimes that if they obdurately toed the United States'
line and press forward along the path of war adventures, the\'
\\'ould ine\itably be gixen a well-deserxed punishment by the
Lao, Thai and \'ietnamese peoples, and would have to bear full
for all consequences arising out of their actions.
93
In pursuing their policy of intervention and aggression O\'N
the past many years, the American imperialists and their hench-
men have perpetrated countless crimes toward the Lao people,
They have intensified their "special warfare" to an unprecedent-
ed le\'el, and have thus brought about a most serious and
dangerous situation in Laos, Yet, in spite of all the perfidious
and ruthless policies and manceuvres of American neo-colo-
nialism, this "special warfare" has failed to achieve its political
objectives. Coming up against such a staunch and dauntless
people as the Lao, "special warfare", riddled with irretrievable
weaknesses, has sustained one defeat after another, and \\'ill
unquestionably end in complete bankruptcy,
~ - l
III
INEVITABLE BA KRUPTCY OF THE UNITED
STATES' POLICY OF INTERVENTION AND
AGGRESSION AND NEW WAR ADVENTURES
I LAOS
HeaTy defeats of the American imperialists and ~ r c a t
victories of Ihe Lao patriotic forces and people
The American imperialists have sustained heavy and funda-
mental defeats in their neo-colonial war of aggression in Laos.
On the other hand, the Lao patriotic forces and people have
scored \ictories of great consequence in their just struggle
against the aggressors for national salvation.
Despite the influx of dollars, advisers and weapons for the
purpose of turning Laos into a new-pattern colony and a military
base. the American imperialists have failed to subdue the Lao
people and to drag Laos back to the path of colonial slavery.
They have failed to attain the political objectives of their war of
aggression. That is their fundamental defeat.
Holding aloft the banner of peace, neutrality, independence
and democracy, the Neo Lao Haksat together with the other
patriotic forces and the whole Lao people, have foiled one after
another all American schemes. That is a victory of paramount
importance for the patriotic forces and the people of Laos.
95
Laos has secured the status of an independent and sovereign
State. This independence and sovereignty have been recognized
by international agreements guaranteeing respect for them.
Laos has asserted before history her position as a member of the
community of free and independent nations. From the 1954
Geneva Conference to that of 1961-1962, the Neo Lao Haksat
Las emerged as the interlocutor of the American imperialists; it
has become one of the three parties in the National Union
Government of Laos. Its legal position and ever more important
role in the political life of the Lao nation have also been affirmed
before history
However perfidious their schemes may be, the :'\.merican impe-
rialists have not been able to negate history, nor can they turn
back its \\heel. They have failed to impose once again the yoke
of slavery on the Lao people. Tempered through decades of anti-
colonialist and anti-imperialist struggle, the patriotic forces and
people of Laos. like the fraternal Indochinese peoples, have now
"ttained enough political maturity to go on defeating all Ame-
rican schemes of enslavement
Since the very beginning of their aggression, the American
imperialists have realized that to enslave the Lao people and
turn Laos into an American new-pattern colony and war base,
they have necessarily to strike at the Lao patriotic forces and
conquer their base areas.
That is why they have resorted to all kinds of perfidious poli-
tical schemes and tricks in an attempt to isolate the Neo Lao
Haksat, to win oYer Prince Sou\'anna Phouma and Konglae by
means of bribery and corruption, to secure control over the
Neutralist forces, and thus \\'eaken the patriotic alliance against
American aggression. They have tried by every means to sow
division among the fraternal nationalities of Laos and promote
the "divide and rule" policy. Yet, they have failed to strangle
the patriotic forces and break the Lao people's united front
fighting against American aggression for national salvation.
Instead, the latter has been continuously strengthened and
96
den'loped. This constitutes the main defeat of the American
imperialists and a highly important political victory for the
people's patriotic movement.
Intensified American aggression has resulted in swelling the
r[:nks of those people \\'ho, conscious of the perfidy of the Ame-
rican imperialists and their henchmen, declare for the policy of
neace and neutrality and the patriotic struggle. The :'\eutralist .
'Party has come into being and concluded an alliance with the
~ e o Lao Haksat under the banner of peace, neutrality, in de-
r,cndence and democracy. A broad front against the American
aggressors for national salvation, has thus taken shape. Except
for a small number of elements represented by Prince SoU\anna
Phouma who, prompted by their wavering stand and selfish
interests, have toed the line of the American imperialists and
their henchmen, left the ranks of the Neutralist Party, anrl
betrayed the people's interests, all genuine Neutralists ha\'e
closed their ranks, stood fast on tlwir combat positions and
fought shoulder to shoulder with the 'eo Lao Haksat (I). In
~ p i t e of the U.S. imperialists' perfidious policy of division, the
\arious nationalities of Laos' have unswervingly pursued the
patriotic struggle for national salvation. Holding aloft the
banner of peace, neutrality, independence and democracy, and
hasing itself on its solid alliance with the patriotic Neutrali5t
forces, the Neo Lao Haksat has achieved a broad national unit:,'
in Laos.
All fraternal nationalities and social strata of Laos, rallied
around the l\eo Lao Haksat, with Prince Souphanou\'ong a5
Chairman, are resolutely marching shoulder to shoulder under
t1,e banner of peace, neutrality, independence and democracy, in
the fight against the American imperialists for national salva-
tlOn. The greatest aspiration of the Lao people since the found-
(I) Maniiesto of the National Political Union Conierence.
13,1965.
7T.Y.
97
ing of their State - the achievement of a really united Laos-
which remained unfulfilled through the many ruling dynasties
has now begun to come true (2).
Ever since their entry in Laos, where they have faced an
armed opponent tempered in armed struggle, the American
imperialists, ferocious by nature, have ruthlessly resorted to
military viQlence with a vie\\' to suppressing the eo Lao Haksat
and the patriotic forces of Laos, and destroying their base
areas. Such is their basic policy in their aggression against
Laos.
They have launched hundreds of attacks and military cam-
paigns mobilizing big units of puppet troops, and in the past t\IO
~ e a r s they hal'e gone to the length of using the U.S. Air Force
to bomb the liberated zone of Laos. But the results have fru,-
tlatedtheirexpectations,
I-'ar from being absorbed by the enemy, the base areas of the
Lao patriotic forces have been extended: starting with a small
regroupment zone comprising only two provinces, they have
become a wide liberated zone accounting for two-thirds of the
national territory and one half of the country's population
Despite countless difficulties due to the American war of aggre3-
sion, the liberated zone is being strengthened in all respects
Democratic freedoms and equality in rights between all fraternal
nationalities are being guaranteed. At all levels, elected 10c,,1
administrations are busy maintaining order and security and
building up step by step a national and democratic economy and
culture. Semi-mechanized production bases and State-run stores
have been established, forms of collective labour organized; t h ~
people help one another to boost up production. The
varrous forms of exploitation in the rural areas have been curbed
or gradually eliminated. The fight against illiteracy has del'e-
(2) The struggle for a peaceful, neutral, independent, democrotic,
unified and prosperous Laos win unquestionably win victory, a pamph-
let by Mr Phoumi Vong\"ichit. Secretary General of the Neo Lao Haksat
Central Committee (October 12, 1965).
98
loped, hygiene has been widely popularized. Hospitals and
schools have been built in many places, even on the high
mountains. These efforts have contributed to gradually improve
the material and cultural life of the people in the liberated zone
Far from being wiped out, the patriotic armed forces have
grown up from a few fighting units of the Neo Lao Haksat into
a strong people's liberation army. With its rising technical and
tactical standards, its ardent patriotism and love for the people
\\hich are being steadily enhanced, this army has scored brilliant
'\ ictories, smashed all enemy attacks, big and small, wiped out
tens of thousands of puppet troops, shot down several hundreds
of American aircraft of various types and captured many Arne
rican n\ers. These are great victories to the credit of the LlO
people's patriotic struggle, and heavy defeats for the American
imperialists.
In a message addressed to the Lao people on the occasion of
their traditional New Year's Day (April 13, 1966), Prince Sou
phanoU\ong. Chairman of the Neo Lao Haksat Central Com
mittee, highlighted the victories of the Lao armed forces and
people over the past years as follows:
"The liberated zone has been not only maintained but also
steadil) consolidated, and deserves to be regarded as the sacred
base of the struggle against the American imperialists for
national sal\'ation in the whole country. The army and people of
Laos have defeated all nibbling attacks, big and small, of the
American imperialists and their henchmen, the most recent of
these glorious \'iclories being the Phoukout operation. Banking
on their numerous planes and abundant supplies of bombs and
rockets, the American imperialists have intensified their air
attacks with a view to savagely massacring the Lao people. But
the valiant army and people in the liberated zone have dealt a
heavy blow to the U,S. 'air supremacy' and brought to 330 the
number of U.S. aircraft shot down since May 17, 1964, Over-
coming countless difficulties and hardships brought about by the
American imperialists and their henchmen the Lao people ha\'e
endeavoured to build up the liberated zone, give it a new face
99
and improve step by step their material and cultural life". A.,
poinled out by Mr Phollmi Vongvichit, Secretary General of the
0Ieo Lao Haksat Central Committee "in a relatively shorl period
of history, the Lao people hale sel up a people's army and
liberated the major parl of the national territory to serve as their
base, that is indeed a great victor) of particular significance" (3).
The American imperialisls have exerted unremitting efforts to
build up a puppel adminislration and a mercenary army as lhe
main instrument of their "special warfare". HO\I'ever, the more
the aggression is intensified, the furlher the puppet adminislra-
tion and the mercenary army are torn up and weakened by sharp
rivalries. Six puppet governments hale been ~ i g g e d lip but none
of them could lasllhree veal'S, some could stand hardh three or
four months, as were the-cases of tlie Kou ..\bhav and Somsanith
Governments in 1960. This bespeaks the inslabili-ty and weakness
of the puppet regime.
The cause for such a siluation lies, first and foremost in the
ever-stronger impact of the Lao people's palriotic lruggle on the
puppet adminislralion and army. Another important cause is lhe
imperialists' lraditional policy of "keeping se\'eral horses in the
same stable", a policy which has gi\"en rise to ever-deeper con-
tradictions among their henchmen.
In 1960, the so-called "Committee for the Defence of National
]nterests", the Phoumi - Somsanith clique, staged a coup d'Etat
toppling the Phoui Sananikone-Katay Don Sasorilh clique, and
set lip the Kou Abhay Governmenl then the Somsanilh Govern-
ment. Again after the April 1964 COlIp d'Etat which ov-erthrew the
Tripartite National Union Go\ernment, fierce conflicts broke Ollt
between the putschists headed by the extreme Rightist militarist
iaction of Kouprasith Abhay and the Phoumi 0Iosavan faction
whose prestige had just been lowered. These are the consequences
of the American policy of "changing horses in mid-stream".
(3) The struggle for a peaceful, neu/-al, independent, democratic,
unified and prosperous Laos wilt unquestionabty win victory, a
pamphlet by Mr Phollmi Vong\"ichit. Secretary General of the Neo Lao
Haksat Central Committee (October 12, 1965).
100
At present, despite the Americans' attempts at conciliation,
sharp \\Tangles contInue to rage inside the puppet "national
assembly" and "gO\'Nnment" of Vientiane, between the Phoul
Sananikone - Kouprasith r\bha y, Phoumi Nosa\an and Souvanna
Phouma cliques, The Sananikone - Kouprasith faction goes on
oraduall\ ousting the pro-Phoumi Nosa\'an generals. It has
bullied Konglae's forces and SOLl\'anna Phouma's followers.
The bitter conflicts of interests among the pro-American factions
I a\e led them to denounce one another for acts of corruption,
embezzlement, shady tran actions. abuse of po\\'er and the like.
tillS exposing to public opinion the rottenness of the puppet
i1dministration
By pouring in dollars, the American imperialists have endea-
\'oured to setup a mercenary army numerically strong, equipped
\\ith modern \\'eapons and possessing all armed services
Howe\'er, from the admission of the A.merican press itself, it
has a poor sho\\, As a matter of fact, being built up on the basis
of a crippled puppet army inherited from the French colonialists.
it is, despite its numerical strength and abundant armaments,
bound to suffer from the basic weaknesses inherent in anymerce-
naryarmy.
This arm\' - and the bandits-commandos of the American
srecial are no exception - consists mostly of elements
bribed, lured or coerced into taking up arms against their own
lompatriots. Sen'ing an unjust cause and having no ideal to
fight for, it has necessarily a low morale and a poor fighting
ability, Furthermore, it has often been used by the rival pro-
J\merican factions as an instrument for ousting one another. As
a result, it is seriously torn by internal dissensions and lacks
unity in organization and command, In addition, it has a record
of ignominious defeats, particularly in the 1961-1962 campaign
in Cpper Laos: in the recent "dry season campaign", it was
badly mauled by the patriotic armed forces.
The longer this arm) is used as cannon-fodder for the United
States and its henchmen, the sharper will be the differentiation
111 its ranks and the more its men awake to national con-
101
sciousness. A typical illustration of this is to be found in the
August 1960 uprising of the armymen who stand for peace and
neutrality, uprising which led to the overthrow of the Somsanith
Government. Cases of non-compliance with battle orders and
crossing over to the people have become common occurrences in
the puppet army.
Dissensions internal differentiation, demoralization, these are
the basic weaknesses of the puppet administration and mercenary
army, weaknesses which are bound to aggravate as the. United
States intensifies its war of aggression and sustains ever-
greater defeats.
Over the recent years, the American imperialists have turned
to account the complicity of the Indian and Canadian represen-
tatives in the International Commission and the British Co-Chair-
man of the 1961 - 1962 Geneva Conference, in order to distort
the facts, slander the Neo Lao Haksat and the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam and cover up their own acts of sabotage and
aggression.
But all these deceitful tricks can in no way conceal their
aggressive designs and save them from political isolation. As a
matter of fact, their policy of intervention and aggression in
Laos has been energetically condemned by public opinion.
The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has
stated:
"Who is responsible for the grave situation prevailing at pre-
sent in Laos? It is the American imperialists who have been
intervening in Laos in spite of the conclusion of the 1962 Agree-
ment(4).
Samdech Norodom Sihanouk, Head of State of Cambodia, has
stressed:
"The Co-Chairmen of the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference should
take action to put an end to the military intervention being
(4) April 15, 1963 Statement by the Government of the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam regarding the situation in Laos.
102
pursued in Laos by the United Slates within the framework of
the expansion of its ever more direct aggression in South
\'ietnam(5).
Vice-premier and Foreign Minisler of the People's Republic of
China Chen Yi has pointed out: "The United States signed the
Geneva Agreements three years ago, yet from the outset it did
not intend to implement them, its sole object being to gain a
brealhing spell for readJusling and regrouping its forces so a ~
to further intensify and expand its inten'ention and aggression
11 Laos, and turn Laos into its colony and military base" (6).
The Government of the Soviet Union has emphasized: "These
.\merican imperialists' actions create new obstacles to a peaceful
settlement in Laos and aggravate the situation nol only in this
country, but all over Southeast Asia. In openly violating the
Geneva Agreements, the Unites States assumes grave respoll-
<ibility for all the ensuing consequences" (7J.
The Asian and African peoples have "severely condemned the
-\merican aggression, and particularly the dispatch of American
nircrafl and pro-American troops to bomb, strafe and encroach
on the zone controlled by the Neo Lao Hilksat and the genuine
I'eutralist forces (8).
Thus, the more the American imperialists step up lheir aggres-
SiOn. the greater their political isolation. In constrast, as pointer!
ut in the October 13, 1965 Manifesto of the National Political
t.:nion Conference of Laos, the Lao people's struggle against the
American imperialists for national salvation, "being an integral
part of the national-liberation movement of the Asian, African
(5) Message addressed on Janllar) 15. 1965 by Samdech Nocodom
SihanollktoPrinceSouphanouvong.
(6) Message addressed on July 28.1965 by Vice-Premier and Foreign
linister Chen Yi to Prince Souphanouvong.
(7) Soviet Draft message of the Co-Chairmen of the 19611962 Geneva
Conference to the U.S. Government and the three political parties in
Laos. forwarded to the British Government on January 19. 1965.
(8) Resolution of the Fourth Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Confe-
rence. May 1965. Winneba.
103
and Latin American peoples, and of the struggle of the world
people against imperialism and in defence of peace", "has
enjoyed particular attention, apprO\'al and warm support in all
fields from the fraternal peoples of Indochina, and the peace-
loving peoples in Southeast Asia and the world".
The peoples and governments of member-countries of the
1961 - 1962 Gene\'a Conference and those of the socialist coun-
tries have time and again expressed deep sympathy for the Lao
people's just struggle and extended strong support to the just
stand of the I'\eo Lao Haksat and the Lao patriotic forces.
The Conference of the Indochinese peoples (March 1965)
"highly appreciated and resolutely supported the just and heroic
s t r u g ~ l e of the Lao people against the aggression and interven-
tion of the :\merican imperialists and their allies".
The First Conference for the Solidarity of Asian, African and
Latin American peoples Meeting in January 1966 called on all
peoples and gO\'ernments in Asia, Africa and Latin America, as
well as all peace-loving peoples and governments in the worlrJ.
to join in a'collective demonstration of solidarity with the Lao
people and patriotic armed forces and render them effective
material and moral assistance, help them increase their force
o as to enable them to defeat the inten'ention and aggression
of the American imperialists and achieve their legitimate aspira-
tions fora peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic,unified and
prosperous Laos".
The American imperialists' increasing political isolation due
to the unjust character of their aggressive war and the weak'-
ness and internal contradictions of the puppet administration
and mercenary army, constitute the basic weaknesses of their
"special warfare". There lies the cause of their heavy defeats,
As the American imperialists, \'exed at their increasing defeats.
plunge ever more frantically into the war of aggression, these
weaknesses are bound to aggravate further.
The large-scale attacks launched over the past two years on
the liberated zone by the U.S. Air Force with a view to giving
104
5upport to the United States' henchmen and the current plan to
commit U.S. ;JIld satellite troops to combat operations for the
purpose of expanding the \\'ar of aggression have exposed on the
one hand, the ruthless and bellicose features of the American
aggressor-, on the other, the insuperable weaknesses of their
"special \\ariare'. In spite of the temporary material superiority
of the Cnited States, these fundamental weaknesses, factors of
failure for its policy of intenention and aggression in Laos, will
further aggra\ate and ultimately lead to the inevitable bank-
ruptcy of the said p o l i c ~ .
Of course, the Lao people's patriotic struggle against Ameri-
can imperialism is still encountering numerous difficulties. But
these are difficulties of gro\\'lh. The Lao people have scored
important \ietorics ;lI1d e\er-stronger appro\'al and support from
the \\orld people. This is due to the justness of their cause and
thecorreetnessof their political line.
This political line, mapped out by the First National Congress
of Ill' _ -eo Lao Haksat (1956), advocates the rallying of all
patriotiC forces and the entire Lao people under the banner of
peace, ncutralit), independence and democracy, to struggle
against the American aggression and the betrayal of the puppets,
and to achieyc a peaceful. neutral, independent, democratic,
unified and prosperous Laos_
This political line \\"hich fully conforms to the basic national
rights and deep aspirations of the Lao people and the actual
situation in Lao' and the \\'orld, has made it possible to unite
all patriotIc forces and the people of Laos in a broad and solid
national front against the ,-\merican imperialists. In addition to
this national united bloc, there also exist patriotic armed forces
which \\holeheartedly fight for the people's cause.
\s an integral part of the moycment for peace and national
independence in Indochina the Lao people's patriotic struggle
has enjoyed the direct and powerful support of the fraternal
Indochinese peoples. For decades, the peoples of Laos, Vietnam
and Cambodia, fought shoulder to shoulder against the common
enemy. At present, the Vietnamese people's struggle against
105
.-\merican aggression for national salvation, a struggle marked
by boundless heroism and resounding victories, and the Cambo-
dian people's resolute struggle in defence of their sovereignty,
independence, neutrality and territorial integrity are precious
sources of encouragement to the Lao -people's patriotic struggle.
Further, the just struggle of the Lao people is unfolding in
the context of an impetuous growth of the Asian, African and
Latin American peoples' struggles for winning and safeguarding
national independence. It is enjoying wholehearted support from
the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the other parts of
the world.
The above are the basic fa\'ourable conditions which enabled
the Lao people to win great victories and which will lead them
to still greater ones in their struggle. By bringing fully into play
these factors, the Lao people will certainly defeat the policy of
intervention and aggression of the United States and win final
\'ictory in their protracted and arduous, but highly glorious
struggle for national liberation.
The new adventurous moves of the American imperi-
alists for the expansion of their war of aggression
The American imperialists have sustained heavy defeats in
their aggression against Laos, just as they have been driven
into a "tunnel with no end in sight" in their aggression against
South Vietnam.
Nevertheless, blind and obdurate, the American aggressors do
not reconcile to their defeat. The Late J.F. Dulles once con-
sidered Laos a "key position" in the U.S. global strategy. In
July 1964, the present Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, stated that
.-\merican determination and ability to assist the Vientiane
Government are as vital to "the struggle for freedom" as the
efforts being made by the United States in South Vietnam (9).
(9) U.P.l., July 30.1964.
106
-'lgain in February 1966, while seeking Congress approval for
the 1966 - 1967 Assistance Program to Laos, Thailand and South
Vietnam, President L.B. Johnson declared that each of these
countries constitutes "an important link" in the U.S. defence
s\'stem(lO) .
. It is obvious that the American imperialists have not given up
their aggressive designs, and that their dark schemes vis-a-vis
Laos remains unchanged. Not satisfied to regard Laos as a link
in their global strategy, they sUll attempt to connect it with the
South Vietnam theatre of operations.
Since May 1964, they have launched large-scale air attacks on
the liberated zone. Simultaneously with the "escalation" of the
\\ar in South and North Vietnam, their aircraft and those of their
henchmen taking off from the Seventh Fleet and from bases in
Laos, Thailand and South Vietnam, have night and day carried
out indiscriminate bombings on the populated areas of Laos.
These barbarous crimes constitute not only a gross violation
of the Geneva Agreements, but also a breach of the most ele-
mentary norms of international law (II). As a matter of fact, the
direct armed intervention of the U.S. Air Force in Laos has
placed the Geneva Agreements before a danger of complete vio-
lation (12). These acts of aggression show that the American
imperialists and their agents, in defiance of public opinion and
IIlternational law and the 1962 Geneva Agreement on Laos, have
deliberatel) trampled underfoot the sovereignty and inde-
pendence of Laos, undermined her peace and neutrality, and thus
posed an unprecedentedly serious threat to the security of the
countries in Indochina and Southeast Asia (13).
(10) V.P.I. February I. 1966.
(II) Soviet draft message from the Co-Chairmen to the governments of
the member-countries of the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference forwarded to
the British Government on July 2.1964.
(12) Note dated August 2. 1965 from the Government of the People's
Republic of China to the Government of the Soviet Union.
(13) Urgent message dated January 16, 1965, from Prince Souphanou-
yong to the governments of the member-countries of the 1961-1962 Geneva
Conference.
107
The intensified U.S. air strikes haye taken the form of raids
launched by twenty to forty jet planes showering hundreds of
tons of bombs on a single target for hours on end. That was the
case of the January 13, 1965 bombing of 1 Tamtien and ammat
areas (highway Ng 7, Xiengkhoang pro\'ince) by twenty-four
F.IOO and F.I05 jets, and the attacks by forty jets on Bandong
area (highway ,\"Q 9, S3yannakhet province) in March 1966. Ame-
rican aircraft and those of the Rightist faction have
bombed \'arious populated localities, including such important
towns and urban centres as Samneua, Xiengkhoang, Khangkhay
and \\'antonly destroying pagodas, hospitals and
schools.
Since the end of 1964 under the pretext of preventing so-called
"'Jorth Vietnamese infiltrations into South \'ietnam", the Uniled
States has intensified its air raids on the liberated zone if!
J\\iddle and Lower Laos in coordination with the military cam-
paign launched by puppet troops. It has thus made a further step
in their extension of its war of aggression.
The American imperialists have used napalm, phosphorous
bombs and, since mid-1965, even noxious chemicals as means of
\I arfare. Denouncing these monstrous crimes, the March 16,
1966 message of Mr Phoumi Vongvichit to the Co-Chairmen of
the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference and the 8, 1966 Statement
by the Central Committee of the Neo Lao Haksat have pointed
out the following facts: In early 1966, for many consecutive days
American planes sprayed noxious chemicals on various populated
areas in the eastern part of Saravane province. As a result, vege-
tation, cultivated lands and orchards were destroyed, mam
ci\'ilians afTected or killed and the cattle decimated. According
to preliminary surveys by the health services of the Neo Lao
Haksat, the noxious chemicals used contained the C - ON and
other highly toxic substances. In a dispatch on February 15, 1966
from Saigon, New York Times correspondent R.W, Apple wrote
that the United States had used some l\\'enty specially-equipped
C.123 transport aircraft from Danang and Tansonnhat bases
(South Vietnam) to spray toxic chemicals on Laos.
108
In an attempt to eYade the Yerdict of public opinion, at first,
the American imperialists described these air attacks as "recon-
naissance flights" carried out by "armed jets" with the agree-
ment of the Souvanna Phouma Goyernment and in conformity
with the Geneva Agreements (14). Later on, they decided to
refrain from giving any information on these air activities so
as not to cause "embarrassment" to the puppet government.
\\eanwhile, Prince SoU\anna Phouma and the Vientiane military
chiefs time and again denied that U.S. aircraft had bombed
Laos, claiming that "the bombings had been carried out by the
Lao Air Force".
Yet, the American imperialists unmasked themselves. 0n
\ovember 19, 1964, Defence Secretary Robert McNamara stated
that "reconnaissance flights" in Laos would be continued as
long as they proved to be necessary. On the same day, the U.S.
Defence Department made known the name of U.S. Air Force
Captain W.C. Martin who had piloted one F.IDD, one of the three
Jets shot down over Middle Laos in November 1964 (15). On May
3, 1966, it again revealed that over the past two years, eleven
U.S. pilots were killed and some twenty others captured or
reported missing in the course of air missions over Laos. Accord-
ing to A.P., May 3, 1966, and U.P.J., May 4, 1966, the above
disclosure made at specific requests, constituted a breach of the
secrecy kept until then in order not to embarrass the Lao GO\'ern-
ment, something which reflected an "important shift" in U.S.
participation in the military activities in the territory of a
"neutral State".
In fact, the truth in the so-called "reconnaissance flights" over
Laos has been exposed by American pilots themselves. In a letter
addressed to Prince Souphanouvong on April 26, 1966, Captain
D.l. Hrdlicka, born in 1931 in Colorado (U.S.A.), serial number
72,541 A, pilot of a F.ID5 shot down over Samneua on May 18,
J965 wrote:
(14) Statement by the U.S. State Department, May 21, 1964.
(15) A.F.P., November 19. 1964.
V.P.I., November 20, 1964.
109
"For a year now I ha\'e a chance to think about my crimes
against your nation and they don't form a very pretty picture in
my mind. On May 18, 1965, I took off from Takli airbase in Thai-
land and was shot down by the Lao People's Army, while bom-
bing the liberated areas controlled by the eo Lao Haksat. The
U.S.A. and Thailand \\'ho signed the 1962 Geneva Agreements
on Laos are now trampling underfoot these agreements when
U.S. jets take off from Thailand airbases for attacks on the
liberated zone of Laos. Even as I write this letter"'asking [or m}
freedom, U.S. jets are overhead carrying out their round-the-
clock raids on the liberated zone of Laos."
After expressing his gratitude for the humane treatment given
him by the army and people of the liberated zone of Laos, D.L
Hrdlicka raised his voice "in protest against the United States'
policy of \l'ar and aggression in Indochina, particularly in Laos".
[n spite of the American imperialists' efforts to cover up their
own acts and shift the responsibility on their henchmen, it is
quiteobviousthattheairraidsarepartoftheir"specialwarfare"
in Laos. With the commitment o[ the U.S. Air Force on an ever-
greater scale, "special warfare" is being brought to a new
height.
With Ihis new "escalation" of the war, the American impe-
rialists hope to instil added strength into their lackeys by the
utilization of modern weapons, and break the fighting will of
the Lao patriotic forces and people. But the realities of the past
t\l'O years have proved that they are grossly mistaken.
Bombings and particularly the recent massive air attacks on
the liberated zone in Middle and Lower Laos are also part of the
[resh adventurolls schemes to step up aggression in Laos and
the whole of Indochina.
From the very beginning, American and Western sources ha\'e
pointed out that the flights over Lao territory were regarded in
American circles as the first step towards an expansion of the
military activities of the Unites States in Southeast Asia to such
extent as might be considered necessary by its President to check
the so-called "Communist activities" in this region.
110
Follo\\'ing the June 1964 high-level military and diplomatic
conference in Honolulu, and the ovember 1964 Johnson - Taylor
meeting in Washington, the United States worked out a plan for
the occupation of the liberated zone in Middle and Lower Laos
bv means of coordinated air and land actions with a view to
Laos in 1\\0 and turning its ,\1iddle and Lower part into
a bridge-head linking the American bases in Thailand to those
in South Vietnam, and a springboard against the people's move-
ment in Indochina, Commenting on this plan, the U.S, News
and \f'orld Report in its June 5, 1965 issue, revealed that U.S.
troops would not only occupy the Laobao corridor (South Viet-
nam) but also operate in the Mekong valley, near the Thailand-
Laos border. General Maxwell Taylor, former ambassador to
Saigon, openly stated that air and land attacks on the liberated
zone of Laos "might help defeat" the liberation struggle of the
South \'ietnamese people.
The American imperialists ha\'e intensified their war efforL
after the trips of Defence Secretary l'v\cNamara to South Vietnam
in July and NO\'ember 1965. On November 28, 1965, McNamara
declared in Saigon that infiltrations" into South Viet-
nam through Lao territory and other routes called fora "counter-
action" on the part of the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces (16).
The same day, Alexis Johnson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State.
declared that armed U.S. planes had been controlling the infil-
tration routes into South Vietnam via Lao and Cambodian
territory (17), These statements have laid bare the design to
extend the war of aggression in South Vietnam and Laos,
and to prepare for a war against the Kingdom of Cambodia.
In the frame\\ ork of their new war efforts, the American impe-
rialists are massively reinforcing their expeditionary corps in
South Vietnam, continue their "escalation" in orth Vietnam,
multiply pro\'ocations against the Kingdom of Cambodia, at the
same time, fe\'erishly pushing ahead the carrying out of extre-
mely dangerous military and political schemes in Laos.
(16) A B.C., November 29.1965.
(17) Saigon Radio, November 30.1965.
III
Giving priority to the plans for the occupation of Middle and
Lower Laos, they have subjected the liberated zone there to air
attacks of unprecedented scale and violence. The French \\'eekly
La Tribune des .vtifions reported on 1'\O\ember 25,1965 that
"Paris has been given confirmation of the systematic character
of these operations \\'hich are in keeping \\ith a secret militarv
plan adopted in September at a Conference at Savannakhet,atten'-
ded by representatives of the United States, Thailand and the
Rightist faction in Laos. This plan is aimed at building Lower
Laos into a real stronghold and an operlltional base. Under the
cammand of U.S. instructors - as \\'as the case in Vietnllm-
Thailand troops will be senl there to reinforce the troops of
Rightist Lao faction. The raids undertaken at present by the
U.S. Air Force are the first steps in the execution of the
Savannakhet secret military plan". A.P. of January 8,1966 des-
cribed these raids as a "massive bombing" campaign. adding
that every day U.S. aircrllft flew some 300 sorties and showered
nearly 1,000 tons of bombs and rockets on the liberated zone in
Middle and Lower Laos.
Along with strafing and bombing, ..\merican planes also
sprayed noxious chemicals on an ever-larger scale. R.W. Apple
reported in the New York Times of February 15, 1966, that U.S.
olficialshad decided to turn the liberated zonein.\\iddle and
Lower Laos - dubbed "Viet Cong supply route" - into a "dark
brown" zone and to do their utmost to this end. R.\\' ...\pple also
revealed that the Cnited States llnd the Vientiane ..\dministration
had agreed not to make any public announcement on the spray-
ing of noxious chemicals.
The American imperialists have even gone farther ..\s pointed
out by Prince Souphanouvong in his January 15, 1966 message
to the Co-Chairmen of the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference, recent
events have shown that, in face of the powerlessness of their
l,enchmen, and in accordance with their design to expand the
war of aggression in Laos and in the whole of Indochina, the
American imperialists are seeking to dispatch their troops to
occupy Middle and Lo\\er Laos. This is part of what American
112
and \\'('stern sources ha\'e usually referred to as the plan 101
a "second fron!"' in Indochina. These plans envisage the use of
Thailand as a base for attacks on Laos and Cambodia, the estab-
lishment oj an "EastWest corridor" stretching from the shores
of the South China Sea to the banks of the Mekong Ri\'er
through Middle and Lower Laos. The United States intends to
occupy Middle and Lower Laos so as to join up the various
links of its "strategic bel!"' in Southeast ,\sia and defend its
"o.called "l\\ekong defence lines".
.\fter j\\cNamara's visit to Saigon in November 1965, Washing-
ton ruling circles publicy talked about committing U.S. troops
to combat operations in Laos. As reported by American papers
and ne\\'s agencies, these circles \\'ere discussing the possibility
of bringing into Laos a highly mobile division similar to the
First U.S. ,\irmobile Cavalry Division in South Vietnam (18) ;
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other high-ranking olTicials
recently hinted that American troops might have to enter
Laos (19). It \\as also reported that in an on-the-spot inspection
tour of Southeast .\sia, General E.G. Wheeler, Chairman of the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of StalT, had discussed the possibility of using
\mericiln land forces in Laos and carefullv examined the
emplo)ment of over 40,000 American troop; along \'arious
paths (20).
The American imperialists \\'ill not fail to ponder seriously o\'er
these plans before putting them into execution. However, intense
preparations arc being made to this effect. The W'ashington
Evening Star of February 10, 1966 quoted an ).merican authori-
tative source as saying that military preparations in Thailand
\Iere designed to meet the requirements of an eventual dispatch
of at least three American combat divisions to Laos. 1'I'10re
seriously still, in order to pa\'e the way for the implementation
of the above schemes, the spokesman of the U.S. State Depart-
ment declared on December 21,1965, that Washington had given
(18) l'urk Times, Deccmbcr 18, 1965.
(19) Dccembcr 22, 1965.
( ~ ' O ) 6, 1966.
BT.Y. 113
extensi\e powers to the U,S, command in Saigon and allowed
U,S, troops to "shoot across" the border and to engage in "hot
pursuit" into Lao and Cambodian territories. This arrogant
decision has aroued a big \\'aye of indignation in Laos and the
nthercountriesof Indochina and in the world as well.
In detlance of public opinion, the American imperialists have
step by step put into effect their dark schemes. Tactical air force
having failed to achie\C the expected results, have, since
early April 1966, used B,52 strategic bombers to dump thou
sands of tons of bombs on various areas of Lower Laos near
the \'ietnam border, and in many places in Khammouane, Sa van-
nakhet and Sara\ane provinces, _.\s was the case with the spray
ing of noxious chemicals, in order to e\'ade the Yerdict of public
opinion, they have agreed with the Vientiane Administration not
to make any official announcement about the bombings by
B,52 These raids which constitude a ne\\' and highly dan-
gerous "escalation" in the framework of the ad\'enturous military
schemes of the United States ha\'e \\'orsened an already danger
('US situation, and posed an unprecedentedly grave threat to
the security of Indochina and Southeast Asia (22).
It should be stressed here that B,52's ha\'e entered into action
to sow destruction in the liberated zone of Laos only a short
time after being used against the population of South Vietnam.
Thus, Laos is now one of the first two countries in the world
\\'here strategic bombers are employed in a war of aggression.
By resorting to chemicals and strategic bombers against a
small and peace-lowing people like the Lao, the American belli
cists who haH lost all human features have impudently chal-
lenged all Asian, African and Latin American peoples and
progressi\'e mankind as a \\'hole, Yet, these hysterical acts of
\\'ar do not bespeak strength; they only show clearly that
the aggressor have been driven into a blind alley,
(21) (PI" December 18, 1965,
(22) Urgent message dated April 28, 1900 from Mr Phoumi \'onll\'ichit
to the Co,Chairmen of the 1961-1962 Geneva Conference on Laos,
114
While carrYll1g out eyer mote violent air raids, the American
imperialis!:' have direded the Lao puppet troops to intensify
nibbling attacks on the liberated zone. Since the end of 1965,
"long with their "dry-season counter-offensi\e" plan on the
South \'ietnam theatre, they launched a "dry-season campaign"
in Laos, mobilizing to this effed tens of regular battalions of
the Rightist faction and Konglae troops, with the support of
U.S. aircraft and many infantry and artillery units from Thai-
land. The attacks were launched in two directions: firstly, North
and South of high\\'ay .\'29 to gnaw at the liberated zone in
.\liddle and Lo\\"er Laos; secondly, the Phoukout operation
(Iirected at the Plain of Jars. In addition, the troops of the
Rightist fadion carried out a number of mopping-up operations
and smuggled many groups of bandits-commandos into the
liberated zonL 111 Gpper Laos for sabotage activities.
On the Pnoukout front alone, eight battalions of Konglae
troops supported by Thai artillery units \"ere thrown into dozens
of tierce attacks against this important height under the control
of the l\eo Lao Haksal. The aim was to compel the People's
Liberation Army to disperse its forces, thus giving free hands
[or the mobile columns of the Rightist faction to launch nibbling
,Ittacks on the areas north and south of high\\"ay X29.
In unleashing Konglae troops into direct actions again t the
eo Lao lIaksat forces, the American imperialists wanted to
use these so-called ",eutralist troops" against the patriotic
fc.rces to set them against the Lao people's patriotic struggle,
?nd driw them into closer dependence on them and on [he Lao
Rightist faction.
With their "dry-season campaign", the J\merican imperialists
and their henchmen wanted to deal a crushing blow at the
People's Liberation Army and the patriotic Neutralist forces, to
narrow down the liberated zone and thus pave the way for an
occupation of ,\\iddle and Lower Laos by U.S. troops. But they
grossly miscalculated. Their "dry-season" military plan ended
in dismal failure and their attacks on all fronts were smashed
by the patriotic armed forces of Laos.
115
The situation in Laos has clearly shown the frantic war efforts
of the American imperialists and 'their new and most perfidious
political schemes. ,\\ilitary efforts and poltical man<rU\Tes have
been combined ,,'ith a view to furthering plans for a larger war
in Laos and in the \\'hole of Indochina..-\n outstanding feature
of the Cnited States' new political scheme is the attempt to use
the "S01l\anna Phouma card" with a vie\\' to promoting its policy
of inten'ention and aggression employing both pressure and
persuasion on the Prince.
The American imperialists use Sou\anna Phouma's faclion as
a "buller" force to patch up the acute contradiclions among the
\"rious pro,American factions; they use his name to maintain
the self,styled national union government in Vientiane which, in
eITeet,isapuppetone.
They have been trying to present Prince SOll\'anna Phouma as
a "Neutralist" and resort to his sen'ices as a "screen", a legal
cover for their new plans and acls of aggression. They consider
that nothing serves better their interests than a "Neutralist
Prime Minister" seemingly concerned for national sovereignty
but, in facl, secretly giving a helping hand to their aggression.
E\'erybody can see from the first glance that Prince Sou vanna
Phouma's recent protests against the United States' preparations
for a dispatch of its and its satellites' troops to Laos are but a
shop,worn trick to mislead public opinion. As a matter of fact,
SOll\'anna Phouma remained significantly silent \\'hen on
December 12, 1965, the State Department came out \\'ith an arro-
g<Jnt statement resen'ing to U.S. troops the right of "hot pur-
suit" into Lao and Cambodian territon', As Olivier Todd \\'rote
in the French weekly XOllvel of Januarv 25, 1966,
Prince SOll\'anna "is prepared to accept an 'American-
Thai inten'ention while apparently protesting against it. One
remembers his statement of December 19 1964 to the effect that
he would welcome a commitment of and Thai forces
in Laos".
On the other hand, nothing could sen'e the American interests
better than the misleading talks of this "l\eutralist Prime
116
.'Iinister" about the so-called "aggression b) North Vietnamese
Communists" .\ political mana'U\Te to which the United States
i ~ pa) ing particular attention consists in slanderously accusing
1I1C' Democratic Republic of Vietnam of "aggression ill Laos"
and thus, camouflaging its plans for new military adventures.
\n indication of this is to be found in a statement made in
Januan 1966 b\ U.S.\mbassadorat-Iarge Averell Harriman in
his liil'ks with' Prince SoU\'anna Phouma in Vientiane. With a
threatening and slanderous tone he said that the United States
realTirmed its determination to "counter any North Vietnamese
control over Lao territory" (23),
The \merican aggressors han instigated the Indian and
Canadian Representati\'es in the International Commission for
Supervision and Control in Laos to submit an illegal report
about so-called "North Vietnamese prisoners in Laos"; they
I'a\e prompted the Vientiane puppet national assembly to adopt
a resolution protesting against the so-called "interference of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam", Writing in the January 25,
1966 issue of the Nouvel Observaleur, Olivier Todd made the
following remark: "For the purpose of preparing public opinion,
a noisy publicity is being made of the 6,000 North Vietnamese
~ e f \ i n g in the ranks of the Pathet Laot troops".
Therefore, it is not fortuitous that recently, and particularly
during his meetings with Thanom Kittikachorn, then with Sato,
Prince Souvanna Phouma, acting as a willing tool of the United
States, has directly slandered and publicly expresst:'d hostility to
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
Another political manOt:'U\Te to which the American imperialists
also attach great importance consists in promoting through
their satellites in Southeast Asia their policy of intervention and
{'xtended war in Laos and in Indochina, The realization of this
perfidious trick of .-\merican neo-colonialism is being actively put
into effect through a closer collusion between Prince Souvanna
Phouma and United States' satellite countries. The meetings
(23) A r P, .J3nuary 14, 1966
117
which the lalter had with Thanom Kittikachorn in Vientiane
(March 1966) and Sato in Tokyo (April 1966) are very clear
illustrations of this.
Thai Prime Minister Thanom Kiltikachorn himsC'1[ told the
press on March 31,1966 after his return to Bangkok that besides
such matters as trade development, technical cooperation, etc.
"the main problem discussed during the Thai - Lao talks was t h ~
supprC'ssion of Communists along the border bel\\'een the two
countries", He affirmed that "the 1\\'0 countries were going to
launch combined operations \\'ith a vie\\' to repressing the Com-
munists on the border". While den)ing the existence of any plan
[or the establishment o[ a joint command, he admitted that "the
army and police o[ the two countries would cooperate in the
repression o[ the Communists", The [ollowing day, Thai Home
,\\inister Praphas Charusathien stated to the press in Bangkok
that the Thai Government \\'ould help the Lao Go\'ernment cut
the Communist infiltration route through Laos, It is obvious that
\\ithin the Cnited States' manCCU\Tes for an extended war in
Laos and in Indochina, the Sou\'anna Phouma - Thanom
Kiltikachorn meeting has resulted in the establishment of a form
o[ military alliance, camouflaged under the signboard o[ "coordi,
nated action for the suppression o[ Communists" and "develop-
ment of friendly relations and economic cooperation", As a
matter o[ [act, the statements of the Thanom - Praphas cliqne are
nothing but a move to prepare public opinion [or an open com-
mitment o[ Thili troops to the righting in Laos alongside U.S,
forces.
During his Tokyo talks, Prince SOl1\'anna Phouma discussed
with Japanese Prime Minister Sato "the importance o[ streng-
thening regional cooperation among Asian countries" and
stressed that "the so [aruntappednaturalresourcesofthese
countries could be exploited with the help of Japan" (24), In an
alms-begging tone he expressed his hope that Tokyo would
denlop her long-term loan policy towards Laos in the field of
(24) A F P., April 18, 1966,
118
acrriculture '\ so-called "agricultural (rientation" agree-
n;ent was conc.luded beh\-een \'ientiane and Tc.kyo. In a declara-
tion i'suer' on '\pril 15, 1966, the. 'eo Lao Hal s1t Central Com-
miller pointed out that tillS agreement was m, rely "a disguise
making It po<;slble for the Japanese militarists to achieve the
. s \\'ell as their
\Iso In Tolno, Prince Som anna Phouma "assured the
Japancse Prime ',\\inister of Laos' support for Tokyo's proposal
(n the estilblishment of an Asiiln Association for the Promotion
(f Economic, Cultural and Technical cooperation among Sou-
tll'dst \slan countries" In fact, this ".\sian .\ssociation"
rt suggested by Japan \\'ould be a ne\v form of anti-Com-
munist alliance designed to replace the disintegrating S.E. \.T.O.
military bloc. colluding with the L'nited States and resorting
'0 the signbo.rd of "economic, cultural, and technical coopera-
t on" to its satellites in Southeast Asia, the Japanese mili-
tarist cilpitalists \I'ant to play "manager's role" in this ne\\
; lIiilncl' with a viell' to carrying out the l'nited States aggressive
plans and their o\\'n expansionist schemes. At the Tokyo Con-
ference for \sian Economic Development convened on their ini-
tiilti\(' III ..\pril 1966, they decided to establish a "120 mil-
lion dollilrs fund for long-term loans" in order to lure the
\sian countries
It \\ as < t the same conference that Prince Souvanna Phouma,
in dn nttempt to curry favour, "assured foreign capitalists that
the) \\'ould enjoy appropriate securit) and profits", and
"requested the friendl\' countries to sho\\' their confidence b\'
extending to Laos both from the State and from
societies as \1'('11 as assistance in terms of specialists" (27). Before
lea\ ing for the Tokyo Conference, Tay Keolouangkhot, Health
.\\inister in the Vientiane puppet administration, who accolll-
(25) Reuter, April 15, 1966.
(26) Reuter, April IS, 1966.
(27) A.F.P, April 6, 1966.
119
panied Prince Sou anna PllOuma, declared: "The Conference is
of great important e to Laos, for it will be kept fully informed of
her resources, \Ilich will draw more foreign investments to
Laos" (28).
Obviously enlJugh, Prince SouI'anna Phouma has acted as a
zealous advertiser for the American-Japanese' schemes, and in
agreement with the Rightist faction, he advocates the "open
door" policy towards the United States and its allies. By fully
embarking' on this reactionary foreign policy, he expects to rely
on foreign "funds" to consolidate his position.
For their part, capitalizing on this situation, the American im-
perialists haH instigated their allies and satrllites to strp up
penetration in Laos in an attempt to get them directly invol\ed
in the eventual extension of the aggressivr war in Laos and
throughout Indochina as a result of U.S. troop commitment to
combat operations.
...\\ailing themsel\'es of the pro-,\merican faction's "open door"
policy, the allies and satellites of the United States, and parti-
cularly /Japan, have stepped up their penetration in Laos by
relying on E.C.,\,F.E., the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development and the Bank for .\sian De\elopment. Thns,
they haH' participated in the Foreign Exchanges Operation
f'unds, the Namngun Dam Project (.\\ekong River development
project) ; they have set up among other things, branches of the
Bank for Asian Development. Under the guise of the "Peace
Corps", economic experts and technicians, intelligence agents
and logistics personnel from these countries ha\e been coming to
Laos in increasing numlwrs.
Recently, the Vientiane puppet administration ~ e n t reprcsenta-
til'es to the so-called "Foreign .\\inisters' Conference of the
,\sian Pacific Council" held in Seoul in June 1966, and attended
hI' S.E.. \.T.O. and ), .. Z.U,S. countries - all of these tied to the
United States and Great Britain by bilateral military agreements,
(28) Laas Presse bulletin (Vientiane). ,\Iarch 25, 1966.
120
and Asian puppet regimes. This is a new aggressive political and
military alliance in Asia and the Pacific, under the cover of
"economic and cultural co-operation", set up at the instigation of
the United States to strengthen its military and political posi-
tions in this part of the world. By attending the Seoul Conference
the Vientiane puppet administration openly joined this new
~ . l l i a n c e in flagrant violation of the Declaration on the Neutrality
of Laos concluded at Geneva in 1962 (29).
In short, the situation in Laos, over the recent months shows
that the American imperialists are pushing forward in a calcul-
ated and systematic way their new military and political
schemes. These are extremely adventurous and dangerous war
plots, fraught with unforeseable consequences, because they are
intended to further the United States' design of expanding the
war in Laos and throughout Indochina.
In its January 17, 1966 statement, the Neo Lao Haksat Central
Committee pointed out:
"These dark schemes constitute a new danger which seriously
threatens this part of the world. The 1962 Geneva Agreement on
Laos, the agreements concluded by the three Lao political parties
as well as the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina are in
danger of being thoroughly scrapped. Laos and the whole of
Indochina, run the risks of becoming a great battlefield. The
obstination of the American imperialists persisting in this
criminal path confirms once again that they are the most dan-
gerous war criminal in the present-day world.
In face of this extremely barbarous policy of war, the Lao
people reaffirm their unshakable determination to fight to the end
for the salvation of their motherland.
(29) Statement by the Spokesman of the Neo Lao IIaksat Central
Committee. June 12. 1966.
121
IV
THE LAO PEOPLE ARE RESOLUTE TO DEFEAT
THE UNITED STATES' INTERVENTIO AND
AGGRESSION, AND STRIVE FOR A PEACEFUL,
NEUTRAL, INDEPE DE T, DEMOCRATIC,
U IFIED A D PROSPEROUS LAOS
The Lao people's present struggle against the American impe-
rialists for national salvation is the continuation of the struggle
which they have been waging for nearly a century against
foreign invasion for national independence.
Like other peoples :n the world, the Lao people are deeply
attached to peace. But they are fully aware that real peace is
possible only \\'hen their motherland is fully independent and
their nation genuinely frce. It is the American imperialists who
have compelled the Lao people to stand up, arms in hands
against them. And it is for the sake of peace that the Lao people
are resolutely struggling in defence of their independence and
ireedom.
The 1961 and 1962 Tripartite Agreements and the 1962 Geneva
Agreement for a peaceful settlement of the Lao question consti-
tute great victories for the Lao people and patriotic forces in
their protracted and arduous struggle for a peaceful, neutral,
independent, democratic, unified and prosperous Laos (I).
(I) Manifesto of the La!) ational Political Union Conference, October
18.1965
123
Faithful to this lofty goal and aware of the value of the abo\'e
agreements, the Neo Lao Haksat, the patriotic forces and the
Lao people have always respected and strictly implemented while
resolutely struggling for their strict observation and fulfilment
by the parties concerned. Such is their unswerving stand (2).
However, as a result of the American imperialists' systematic
policy of intervention and aggression, these agreements have
been seriousl) sabotaged. The peace, neutrality, sonreignty and
independence of Laos have been and are being trampled under-
foot. A peaceful settlement of the Lao question reached in 1962
has been virtually scrapped.
With the United States' plans for new war adventures and
particularly the preparations for the dispatch of its ground forces
to Laos, "special warfare" will reach unprecedented violence.
Laos and Vietnam are becoming most dangerous theatres of "hot"
war in the world at present. The flames of war are threatening
to spread to the whole of Indochina and Southeast Asia. The
peace and security of this part of the world are seriously
threatened.
Thus, the question at issue over Laos is, in essence, the United
States' intervention and aggression. That is why its solution
should lie in the ending of this intervention and aggression. In
other words, the United States must stop interfering in Laos in
any form, respect the basic national rights of the Lao people and
let them settle themselves their own affairs, it and its lackeys
must stop violating and sabotaging the 1962 Geneva Agreement
on Laos, the Tripartite Agreements of Zurich (1961) and the
Plain of Jars (1962) and strictly abide by these accords (3).
To solve the Lao problem correctly the Neo Lao Haksat, the
Lao patriotic forces and the Lao people as a whole steadfastly
uphold the line and concrete measures adopted by the l\'ational
(2) Memorandum dated July 23, 1965 of the Neo Lao Haksat Central
Committee.
(3) Memorandum dated July 23. 1965 of the Neo Lao Haksat Central
Committee
124
Political lTnion Conference of the Neo Lao Haksat and the Neu-
tralist Forces which find their expression in a four-point stand
and a five-point solution mentioned in a manifesto issued in
October 196.5. In so doing tlie Neo Lao J-1ilksat and the patriotic
forces proceed from tlie above objective realities and the task
arising from the struggle for national salvation; they are also
prompted by tlieir will to safeguilrcl the revolutionary gains
already achieved.
The four-point stilnd reads:
1. To resolutely defend the peace, neutrality, sO\'ereignty, inde-
pendence, unity and territorial integrity of Laos on the basis of
strict respect for, and correct implementation of, tlie 1962 Geneva
:\greement, the Tripartite Agreement of Zurich (1961) and the
Plain of Jars (1962) ;
2. To persistently fight ami defeat the United States' imperi-
alist inten'ention and aggression against Laos under whatever
form;
3. To ensure the Lao people's right to settle themselves their
o\\'n internal alTairs by means of peaceful negotiations among tlie
parties concerned, free from the American imperialists' inter-
ference;
.1. To persistently struggle for the implementation of the poli-
tical progrilm of the Tripartite National Union Government in
order to build up a peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic,
unified and prosperous Laos.
The ii\'e-point solution reads:
1. To \\'ithdra\\' from Laos all the armed forces, militan'
persollnel, covert military organizations and all weapons and
\\ar material which the American imperialists and their satellites
haH' illegally introduced into Laos; to dismantle all U.S.
military bases in Laos;
2. To completely stop all acts of aggression against Laos by
the United States and first and foremost, to immediately stop
American air raids, and attacks by pro-American troops against
the zone under the control of the Lao patriotic forces;
125
3. To put an end to all collusion bet\\'een the United States'
lackeys in Vientiane, Bangkok and Saigon, and the utilization
of the territory oi Thailand and South \'ietnam as springboards
for inten'ention in Laos:
4. To condnct tripartite negotiations in earnest and in a spirit
of mutual understandll1g and concession \I'ith a vie\\' to solving
all the problems outstanding bet\\'een the parties concerned, and
stabili7ing step step the situation in the country:
5, To restore the organizational structure and the principle of
!I ipartite of the Lao :'-Jational Union Gov('rnment set
up on the basis oi the 19GI Zurich .\grccm('nt and th(' 1962
Plain of Jars .\grecment
The a!Jol'e stand and solution are iully consistent \\'ith the
basic national interests and deep aspirations of the Lao people,
the realities oi the present situation in Laos :lIld the \I'orld, and
the interests of peace in Indochina and Southeast "hia.
The r('cent events in Laos haH' further sho\\'n that the four-
point st<lnd and iil'e,point solution are the only sensible and
correct ones \Ihich alone, ii abi ded can ensure a basic settle-
ment oi the Lao problem, S3\'e Laos from an e\'er more dan-
gerous situation, and eliminate a major threat to peace and
security in Indochina and Southeast Asia.
That is \\'hl' this four-point stand and ii\'C-point solution have
enjoyed full approval and vigorous support from the peoples and
governments oi the fraternal countries of Indochina and the
peace-loving countries in the \I'orld.
Ol'er the past period, the Neo Lao IIaksat, by means of con-
crete actions, has displayed its good \\'ill in abiding by the
prol'isions of the Genel'a Agreement and the Tripartite Agree-
ments, in struggling ior the preservation of the :\ational Union
Government and for a thorough implementation oi the latter's
political program. It has al\\'ays stood for, and earnestly taken
126
part in the tripartite talks \\ith understanding and a conciliating
spirit Jnd a genuine desire to gradually sol\'e by peaceful means
all problems still pending between the three parties (4),
Rut the more good\l'ill the Neo Lao lIaksat displays, the more
e_actlng are the American imperialists and their agents who do
110tceaseto step up and expand their "special warfare"_
In face of these aggressi\-e designs of the :\merican impe-
rialists and the aets of betrayal of their Lao henchmen, the Lao
people \\-ho prefer dpath to s]ayery ha\'p no other alternative
than to unflinchingly carryon their struggle in order to defeat
.\mrrican inten-ention and aggression.
In this strnggle, the Lao people make it a point to rely on
thpir 0\\"11 strength and capabilities, at the same time, they
highly \alue and \l'armly \l'elcome the all-round support which
their friends all oyer the world haye been giYing them, and
regard it as a great and important source of encouragement to
their just nght (5).
The imperialists continue introducing into Laos
fresh arms, aircraft and military personnel and are contemplat-
ing to bring in their o\\n ground forces so as to expand their
\\-,11' of aggression, \l'hile the Lao traitors, kowto\\'ing before the
Ill\aders are out "to help the \\'0 If into the sheepfold"_ In face
of uch a situation, the :\eo Lao Haksat, the patriotic forces and
til(' people of Laos as a \I-hole cannot stand by idly; they resen-e
for themselyes the right, \l'hen necessary, to appeal for all-round
practical assistance, including material help, from the peoples
and goYernments of peace-loving countries and the peace and
democratic organizations in the \\'orld so as to increase their
self defence potential.
(4) Memorandllm of the Central Committee of the Neo Lao Haksat.
Jllly 1965,
(5) Manifesto of the National Politieal Union Conferenee, October
IJ.1965,
127
As pointed out in the October Ii), 1966 .\\anifesto of the
l\:ational Political l'nion Conference, this is a fully legitimate
right ()f the patriotic forces and people of Laos, It is perfectly
consistent \\'itil tile Gene\'a Agreemen(s, (he preseryation of the
peace, neutrality, so\'ereignty, independence, and territorial
integrity of Laos. as \\'ell as the interest of peace in Indochina
and Southeast ,\sia, Tilat is why. the goYernments and peoples
of the fraternal countries of Indochina, of ..\sian, African and
Latin ,\Illerican countries, l1nd other peace-Joying countries of
the \\'orld, haH come out \\ith statements expressing full appro-
\'al oi, and rel1diness to \\':Jrmly respond to, such an :Jppeal by
tile patriotic forces and peoples of Laos,
The ,\lllericl1n boast of a huge material potential.
But neyer \\ill tiley be able to shake the \\'ill and determination
oi the patriotic forces and people of Laos to fight for national
sal\ation, Haying failed in the past, tiley no\\' ha\'e still less
cilance to win, If tiley obduratel)' an(1 recklessly embark an new
\\'ar ad\'entures the\' \\'ill ine\'itahly meet \\'ith heayier and more
ignominious de'feats', ,
The glorious \'ictaries scored b) the Lao people in tbeir t\\,el\'e-
year old struggle against aggression by the United States ha\'e
demonstrated that tiley nre fully capable of defeating its "special
\\'ariar.:' as \\'elll1s all oi its ne\\' \\ar schemes,
In tile present,da) world, a nation, ho\\e\'er small, is perfectly
capable of defeating any form of inten'ention and aggression
by any colonial and Imperialist po\\'er, the United States
included, if it rises up in close unity, and resolutely struggles
for independence and peace along a correct political line and,
in addition, enjoys the broad support of the peace-Io\'ing peoples
intile\\'orld.
This great truth of our times fully substantiated the libe-
ration struggles of the J\sian, .\frican, and Latin .\merican
peoples, finds furtber e\'idence in the Lao people's patriotic
struggle,
128
Confronted \\ith an exceedingl) stubborn and ferocious enem)
of a huge material potential, the Lao peuple's struggle
U.S, aggression to defend their motherland is bound tu
protracted and arduous. But \\'ith the fayourable situation
pll'\'.iling at present in the world, it is full of bright prospects.
With conlidence in their IInal \'idory, the Lao people are resolu-
teh a(!\1nclng \\'ith stead) steps along this path, :\0 mailer
'Jbdurate and ruthless the enem)' may be, the Lao people
,lI1detared b) hardships and sacrilices, \\'ill resolutely \\'age their
,Jrotracll'd struggle to the end in order thorough I) to defeat all
f
or
ll1S of C,S, inten'ention and aggression and break the laller's
\\ill of oJgression.
\s clearl) puinted out in the Odober 13.1965 .\\anifesto of
thl' Lao I 'ational Political Llnion Conference, the Lao people,
\\hid! ha\e gone through nine )ears of resistancc \\'ar against
tlie Frencli colonialists and t\\'elye ycars of struggle against U,S.
aggrcssion are unquestionabl) strong cllough to go on IIgliting still
longer untillinal \'ictory for tlie realization of a peaceful, ncutral,
Independent, deIllocratic, unilled and prosperous Laos,